

ENTANGLED SPACES

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Some Aspects of Portuguese Presence in
Coromandel-Archipelago Southeast Asia Complex

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
Introduction	1
1. The Coast and the Archipelago	14
The Coromandel Coast	
The Maritime World of Archipelago Southeast Asia	
2. Across the Littoral: Portuguese Presence in the	54
Maritime World of Coromandel and Southeast Asia	
Portuguese Expansion and the Presumption about the “east”	
The <i>Estado</i> in archipelago Southeast Asia	
Coromandel-The Unofficial Realm	
3. The European Companies on the Coromandel Coast	83
and Archipelago Southeast Asia (1600-1641 CE)	
The Organization of the <i>Estado da Índia</i>	
The <i>Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie</i>	
The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry	
4. Spaces, Institutions and the Contestations	117
(1600-1641 CE)	
The Contending Powers	
The <i>Misericordia</i> and the <i>Estado</i>	
The Challenging Determinants	
The Existential Crisis	

5. The Decline and the Retreat (1642-1662 CE)	167
The Retreat	
Makassar and the Lesser Sunda Islands	
The Rise of the English Company as a Mercantile Power	
<i>Bibliography</i>	189

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Introduction

Some five hundred years ago, Afonso de Albuquerque conquered the *taluka* of Tiswadi enclosed between the mouths of the rivers Zuari and Mandavi on the Konkan coast in western India. The city of Goa that was built by the Portuguese on this land came up as the capital of their maritime territories in the Indian Ocean region. It symbolized the coming into being of structures of governance associated with colonialism that developed in Asia and elsewhere. Thus, the many coasts and the seas that the Portuguese began exploring and dominating from the sixteenth century could be basically controlled due to the structure of governance developed at Goa. Besides, there were other mechanisms of control that were devised according to the prevailing circumstance in a particular region. It is in this latter context that studying Portuguese presence in the age-old commercial linkages that existed between the Coromandel coast in south-east India and various parts of archipelago Southeast Asia assumes importance. Among the various linkages criss-crossing the Indian Ocean, the commercial linkage in concern developed distinctly around the First century C.E. The functional contact between the two regions, among others, was based on exchange of spices grown in the archipelago with Coromandel textiles and vice versa which the Portuguese and later other European companies also capitalized on. Malacca was the choke-point of this bustling commercial network. Sailing on their huge ships, carracks and armadas across the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese had understood its importance soon on their arrival to this *entrepôt*.

To understand different aspects of Portuguese presence in this linkage, an attempt has been made to explore the official manuscripts of *Estado da Índia* from the huge and enchanting repository of documents. Among them, the most copious are the correspondences between the King of Portugal and the Viceroy at Goa about various affairs of the *Estado* that are compartmentalized under *Livros das Monções* and *Monções do Reino*. The documents of the missionaries like those of the Jesuits have also helped to sharpen the theme. Furthermore, to understand the investment of resources in securing the concerned region of study, the documents related to the *fazenda* or treasury of *Estado da Índia* and the *orçamentos* or budgets of different years among others are insightful. Besides, other contemporary sources such as the European traveller's accounts, the records of the English East India Company and the translated ones of the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (the United Dutch East India Company or VOC, hereinafter) have also facilitated to reflect on the state of affairs and enable to draw a comparative view as well as act as a supplement to the official Portuguese documents.

The secondary sources that pertain to the theme under consideration are either Coromandel-centric or are focused on Southeast Asia or simply have a pan-Asian view. The early works around Coromandel are centred on the region's political history. Rao Bahadur and C.S. Srinivaschari's "A History of Gingee and its Rulers" (1943) is one such work. Thereafter, the politico-economic themes acquired focus. Reflection on the economic aspect of the coast in view of the European trade was first studied by Tapan Raychaudhuri in his "Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690" (1962).¹ Sinnappah Arasaratnam's three decades of writings on various themes related to the European companies and indigenous polity, society and economy culminated in his most distinguished work published in 1986 – "Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650-1740". The writings of Sanjay Subrahmanyam related to south India followed in 1990's. His two books, "The Political Economy of Commerce" and "Improvising Empire" are comprehensive accounts that deal with the intra and inter trade structure, the centres of trade and trading groups

besides the role played by the indigenous polities and European trading groups in the sixteenth century and the changes which took place in the mid seventeenth century.² S. Jeyaseela Stephen's "The Coromandel Coast and its Hinterland" (1997) is an interesting study of the sixteenth century Coromandel in which epigraphic sources along with the main body of Portuguese sources have been effectively used.

In the case of Southeast Asia, van Leur's 'Indonesia Trade and Society' (1934) was written with an indigenous perspective.³ The dismissive comments of van Leur on Portuguese trade formed part of Meilink Roelofs's critique (1962). Two years after the publication of Meilink Roelofs's work, Luis Filipe FR Thomaz's thesis, "Os Portugueses em Malacca" threw a valuable light on various aspects of Portuguese expansion in Malacca and the region beyond. Besides, many of his articles subsequently on different aspects of Portuguese activities in Asia gathered attention.⁴ Anthony Reid's work "Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680" (1993, 1998) spread over in two volumes not only brings into focus the European element but also envisages the milieu that dominated *the land below the winds*. In addition to these two clusters of writings that are either Coromandel centric or focused on Southeast Asia, there are a third set of writings that pertain to maritime and commercial history in a pan Asian context. These are the works of C.R. Boxer, K.N. Chaudhuri, Ashin Dasgupta, Sanjay Subrahmanyam along with the edited ones of Francisco Bethencourt, Diogo Ramada Curto and K.N. Chaudhuri that have thematic bearing on the area and period of study.⁵

Thus, in the light of the above mentioned scholarly works, this monograph is an attempt to explore and interpret some aspects of the events that went untouched so far. The whole subject matter is summed in five aspects which are shaped in the form of chapters. Writing and presenting it, thus, is a trial to be assessed by those who take interest in this field of study.

The first aspect that is dealt in the present effort is to study various topographical aspects of the concerned region. Without understanding this macro-region and the various places that assumed importance in history, one cannot transverse ahead. The

sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries travel accounts in this regard have been profusely used. Most travellers have described the Coromandel or Cholamandalam as the '*land of open plains*'.⁶ They also record the crops grown and the abundance of cotton and the related textile production.⁷ Also, the coast under study, as documented by the sailors was dangerous for its strong currents, frequent cyclones and storms. Peter Floris's description (1611-15 CE) also points out the coast of being dotted by bad harbours.⁸ On the other hand, the Southeast Asian region can be seen to have been comprised of two parts – the mainland and the archipelago⁹ as compartmentalized by Nicholas Tarling today, but discerned by Ludivico di Varthema in the sixteenth century. While the mainland included China (south of Yangtze), Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and peninsular Malaysia, it was the archipelago where different aspects of the Portuguese presence can be marked. The European demand for spices could be fulfilled from East Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines and the Moluccas. Thus, it would be noteworthy to anyone as to how the Portuguese had perceived the region.

In the study of the sources available, of the region, one observes as how the Portuguese presence had developed the maritime world during the period. It is on records that this colossal area of study had just three Portuguese settlements-Malacca, Ternate and Timor where they maintained their official presence. The off and on settlements exceeded and some of them were Makassar, Ambon, Banda, Tidore in the archipelago while the Coromandel was totally out of the ambit of Goa¹⁰ but lay closer to Ceylon where there existed official settlements. The political scene in the macro-region during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was in flux. On the Coromandel Coast, the Vijayanagar Kingdom in sixteenth century and the Golconda rulers in the seventeenth century were the polities in power. Besides, there were Nayaks of Tanjavur, Gingee and Madurai. In the archipelago, besides Malacca, the Sultan of Makassar, Ternate, Susuhunan of Mataram and Sultan of Aceh gained power among other polities whose importance, at many times, did not last long. Such indigenous polities were the ones who caused the Portuguese and encouraged them to establish

trade. But later on, these polities were the ones, who, according to many modern scholars, were responsible for the Portuguese retreat.¹¹

The polities continued cherishing their relationship with the Portuguese but there was a change in the agency. The Portuguese were replaced by the Dutch. Besides, it is interesting to locate the reaction of the indigenous powers towards the Portuguese. This is more prevalent in the archipelago where for instance the Sumatran Sultanate of Aceh, who was the arch-rival of Malacca, turned more hostile with each passing day. A closer examination of such examples may enable us to come to a conclusion regarding the relation between Portuguese and the indigenous polities in the succeeding chapters. In the seventeenth century, the other Europeans had also discerned the importance of the Coromandel-archipelago Southeast Asia commercial linkage which became the obvious reason of the resultant conflicts among the Portuguese, Dutch and English.

The next aspect which needs an examination is the configuration of the other European powers mainly the Dutch and the English vis-à-vis the Portuguese before the year 1641 CE. The year taken into consideration is important as it draws a watershed in the Portuguese presence in the concerned linkage. Portuguese Malacca succumbed to the persistent Dutch assaults. Studying the structures of the Dutch VOC and the English East India Company besides the Portuguese's *Estado da Índia* becomes imperative to understand their relations with each other. While the VOC and the Portuguese were at loggerheads, the English maintained a defensive attitude towards the Portuguese as well as the Dutch as according to the circumstances. Travelling between 1616 and 1620 CE, Martin Pring records that the Dutch had not only been doing wrongs with the Portuguese but with the Englishmen too. One of the Englishmen, who was held as a prisoner by the Dutch in the Moluccas and had fled from there, reported of the Dutch mischiefs¹² though many of them went unobserved. Among other examples of violence noted by the contemporaries, the 'Amboyana Massacre' figures most prominently. If the English had met with such treatments by the Dutch, then one could imagine the

state of the mind of the Portuguese. Besides, in this aspect, an examination of how the English acted as mediators between the Dutch and the indigenous polities would also be assessed. The treaties signed would also be given attention with respect to the prevalent conditions in Europe. A study of the way in which the companies were organized is also presented to explain that as to why the Portuguese retreat began so early.

The penultimate aspect would relate to the contestations between the Portuguese and the other European powers that changed the world in the linkages dominated earlier, by the former. The time period chosen is from 1600 to 1641 CE. The control established by the *Estado* through the sixteenth century was whittled down due to the presence of the 'other' European powers during the period. Compared to the *Estado*, the VOC for instance, apparently was a different type of trading organization.¹³ The approach of the States of Holland promoted the Dutch onslaught on whichever power they thought could pose difficulties in their functioning of which the Portuguese were most effected. Besides, the Portuguese connection with the Spanish from 1580 CE and the latter's rivalry with the Dutch in Europe also poised difficulties for the state of Portuguese affairs in Asia. In case of the concerned macro-region, along with the above-mentioned cause, the Dutch could identify the importance of Coromandel Coast in relation to the archipelago in their early years in Asia. Hendrick Brouwer, a Governor General of the VOC noted that the Coromandel Coast was the "*left arm of the Moluccas and the surrounding island because without textiles that came from there [The Coromandel Coast], the trade in the Moluccas will be dead*".¹⁴

The twelve-year truce (1609-1621 CE) between Spain and Holland inked among other things that the Dutch and the Portuguese should not interfere with each other's trade in the East. But it was petered out by the statement made by the Dutch Governor General, Jan Pieterszoon Coen to Heren XVII on Twenty Seventh of December, 1614 CE which gave a clear idea of the Dutch policy – "*From experience, your lordship ought to know very well that in India trade is driven and maintained under the protection and favour of your own weapons, just as weapons are*

furnished from the profit of trade in such wise that trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without trade".¹⁵ The Dutch posed a serious threat to the Portuguese 'seaborne empire'. The results of the Dutch policy were quite evident from the early years of their arrival in Southeast Asia. A striking example that can be noted was Peter Floris's observation on the Siamese markets in 1612 CE. He pointed that the entry of the Dutch into markets previously monopolized by the Portuguese inevitably resulted in temporary dislocation of trade.¹⁶ This fall-off could have effected other parts of the macro-region.

Meanwhile on the Coromandel Coast, the VOC had obtained the *firman* from the Qutb Shahi Sultans to establish a factory at Masulipatnam. But it was still an open question to the company directors about the larger role Coromandel Coast would play in their Asian design apart from the fact that its cloth was the only item to barter in the Moluccas. There followed a factory at Nizampatnam and Pulicat. The latter was detrimental for the Portuguese because they had their settlement at São Thomé, but used Pulicat for trading activities. William Methwold observed the Dutch presence at Pulicat as a "*bade neighbour to the Portugall*"¹⁷. Thus the Portuguese waged a losing struggle with Dutch for Pulicat for thirty years (1610-1640 CE.) It appears that in the first half of the seventeenth century the Vijayanagar Empire was dissipated into the fuzzy states run by the nayaks who were as the real local powers. The Qutb Shahis were gradually extending their influence. During this period of relative insecurity, in the region, the establishment of fortified presence was the only guarantee the Dutch would be willing to remain in it.¹⁸ In the whole of Southeast Asia, Malacca was the major bone of contention between the Portuguese and the VOC. Due to the Portuguese dominance in Malacca, they could control the spice trade. After a number of blockades and allying with indigenous polities like Aceh, the Dutch were successful in capturing Malacca in 1641 CE. The contemporaries have described this event as a catastrophe. It was a big blow to the Portuguese after which they had virtually nothing left.¹⁹ Besides examining the dominance aspects of the contest, the degradation that came into being in the *Estado* has also been examined.

The *Livros das Monções* provide ample information regarding the deterioration of the structure of the *Estado da Índia*. The correspondences between the Kings and the various Viceroy who occupied the post in time to time at Goa, record the information exchanged between them relating to matters of the East. The subjects of the correspondences are varied. In these correspondences besides describing the methods, the measures that the King sought to execute are also mentioned. So it appears that the King understanding the gravity of the situation in time was trying to stall the *Estado's* retreat by taking appropriate measures. The growing importance of *Misericordias* as well as bishoprics can be seen in this light. Did various *Misericordias* had some role to play in the retreat of the Portuguese or did they act as saviours?

The last aspect refers to the rapid decline of the Portuguese settlements during the period 1641 and 1662 CE. Since Malacca, the main stronghold of the Portuguese *Estado*, had already been occupied by the Dutch in 1641 CE, it was not difficult to occupy other Portuguese settlements. In a council meeting of the *Estado* held at Goa on the Sixth of February, 1642 CE, the viceroy informed the members who were present that – “*he has been informed through different sources, that the Dutch enemy was preparing itself to attack some of the praças (military installations) of Colombo, Jaffna, Manar and Saint Thomas and for this purpose have left from Batavia. Six naus and from that are outside this port have left for to join them and on their way they were in a position to create some damage to the fortress of Canara, Cannanor of Cragnaore, if the opportunity raised they could not miss it.*”²⁰ The places mentioned in the document actually became the scenes of conflicts in this phase. Philip Baldaeus also noted the difference of opinion between two Portuguese generals, Meneses and Gama, on the question of viceroy’s ship in 1662 CE. According to Baldaeus, this “*had almost prov’d fatal to the Portuguese Affairs in the Indies*”.²¹ So if we are to believe Baldaeus, then it gives an impression that the men in position in the *Estado* were still contesting for power among themselves while the Portuguese territories were already on decline.

The adoption of the policy of *mare clausum* clearly shows what Dutch had aimed at. A good review of their position can be visualized by the general instructions compiled by Herreen XVII. This was meant to be the guideline for the Governor-General and his council at Batavia and was issued in 1650 CE. It explicitly recognized that the Company's trade in Asia could be divided into three categories: Firstly, trade in regions where the VOC exercised unchallenged territorial control by right of cession or of conquest. In 1650 CE, these places were limited to a few islands in the Moluccas and some of the fortified trading settlements like Batavia, Malacca and Pulicat. Secondly, regions where the VOC enjoyed exclusive trading rights due to monopoly contracts negotiated with the indigenous politics such as the Sultan of Ternate and the village headman of Amboyna. Thirdly, trade conducted by virtue of treaties with the rules 'both on the basis of freely negotiated agreements as well as on the basis of free trade alongside merchants of all other nations.'²² By 1660's, the Portuguese had been ousted from most parts of Southeast and the whole of Coromandel Coast. Where did these Portuguese go?

The activities of the Portuguese in the Lesser Sunda Islands also require attention. This group of islands, which is comprised of Timor, Solor and Flores, were controlled by the *Estado* directly as well as indirectly. It is interesting to note how in this micro-worlds while on the one hand all three places were dependent on each other for their trade and survival; on the other hand, the official Portuguese settlement was adjoining the unofficial ones! The Dominican missionaries who with their activities controlled these islands had a noteworthy presence around. The Portuguese frequented on these islands to procure the fragrant white sandalwood. The Dominican influence was so well understood that the inhabitants, at times, fought against the Dutch. But after the Dutch capture of Malacca, at a council meeting held at Goa on Twenty Fifth of November, 1642, the Dominican priests requested the viceroy to permit them to travel in a Dutch ship to Solor.²³ This is a note worthy fact that the priest now sorted the permission of Goa for their travel in a Dutch ship. The Lesser Sunda group of islands need a deeper examination for many such reasons.

Situating the Portuguese diaspora and the indigenous mercantile communities in the light of the developments that took place in the seventeenth century would further garnish the last concern. After the Portuguese were pushed away from the Moluccas, they congregated themselves at Makassar from where they traded till 1660's.²⁴ It may be added that earlier when in 1511 CE, the Portuguese had captured Malacca; some of the Muslim merchants had fled to Makassar. The Gujaratis, who were considered a dominant mercantile community before the capture of Malacca had fled to Aceh. Later Achinese attacks on Johore and the blockade of Malacca by the Dutch also led Javanese and Malay traders to take shelter in Southern Sulawesi. The Portuguese at Malacca started leaving in distress once the Dutch took over the port-state. Fray Sebastien Manrique, travelling between 1629 and 1643 CE noticed that during Emperor Sumbanco's tenure, the Portuguese were permitted to take shelter in Makassar.²⁵ Later on, one of the Portuguese served as a regent and played a formidable role in the politics there. On the Coromandel coast, the Portuguese flocked to Fort. St. George and formed part of the population of the White Town. While summing up the taking over of Nagapattinam by the Dutch, Baldaeus recorded, "*the Portuguese were permitted to depart with their Goods, Families, Church – Ornaments, and C. in Certain Ships appointed for that purpose by the Dutch Company*".²⁶ The diaspora thus had been on the move in search of a niche.

Among the various features of Portuguese expansion in the larger context of European expansion that would be analyzed in the theme, there are other ones that also bound the Portuguese oceanic world together. The evangelical campaigns undertaken by different religious orders cannot be ignored. Of them, the Jesuits, the Dominicans, the Franciscans and the Augustinians were the prominent ones and generally boarded and preached the teaching during their travels in the *Estado's* ships. Besides this facet, one would also note the spread of Portuguese language and its adaptation in the vernacular. Even after the decline of the Portuguese in the region that concerns our theme, their language and culture lingered on. There are references. One such is when

Philip Baldaeus stayed at Dutch Nagapattinam in 1660 CE and wrote that he “*preached the first the 18th, both in Dutch and Portuguese and administered the Holy Sacrament to 20 Persons, and Baptism to several children.*”²⁷ If Baldaeus is to be believed then it took two years before the Dutch could start with their religious preaching. His preaching in Portuguese shows that though the Portuguese had vacated that town, but their legacy prevailed around.

Notes

1. Other works in the group of regional commercial history are Ashin Dasgupta’s “Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740-1800” (1967) and Sushil Chaudhuri’s Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal 1650-1720” (1975). K.N. Chaudhuri’s “The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint Stock Company, 1600-1640” (1965) and his later work “The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760” (1978) were different from the works classified under regional commercial history. His basic interest was to study the company and its penetration in the Asian commerce.
2. M.N. Pearson’s detailed study of the “The Portuguese in India” (1987) and K.S. Mathew’s “Portuguese Trade with India in the 16th Century” (1983) are important related works.
3. van Leur characterized the Southeast Asian trade as a pre-capitalist peddling trade. A strong follow-up of his work was M.A.P. Meilink Roelofs “Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesia Archipelago” (1962). D.G.E. Hall and B.J.O. Schrieke are other prominent names who have written on the theme between 1934 and 1962. But it was Meilink Roelofs’s work which gave a broader perspective to the Southeast Asian studies.
4. Leonard Andaya’s doctoral thesis on “The Kingdom of Johore” (1975) was a fine study of its polity and economy. Nicholas Tarling’s edited. “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia” (1992) was an enduring compilation of different articles by the known authorities of Cornell group like Kenneth Hall, Anthony Reid, J. Kathirithamby Wells, Leonard Andaya, Barbara Watson Andaya.
5. C.R. Boxer’s “The Portuguese Seaborne Empire” (1969) and “The Dutch Seaborne Empire” (1965); K.N. Chaudhuri’s “Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean” (1985); Ashin Dasgupta’s and M.N. Pearson edited “India and the Indian Ocean” (1987); Kenneth McPherson’s “The India Ocean’ (1993); Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s “The Portuguese Empire in Asia” (1993) are the main individual works on the theme. In the category of the edited works, Francisco Bethencourt and Kirti Chaudhuri’s “História da Expansão

Portuguesa” (1998) and Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (ed.), “Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800” (2007) are the important ones.

6. Dames, M.L. (ed.), The book of Duarte Barbosa, II, AES, 1989, p.125.
 7. Domingo Paes notices it in between 1520-22, Fijiozat, Vasundhara (ed.), Vijaynagar as seen by Domingo Paes and Fernao, Nunao, NBT, Delhi, 1999, p.60.
 8. Moraland W.H. (ed.), Peter Floris, His Voyaye to the East India in the Globe, 1611-1615, London, 1934, p.9. His remark stated and warned about the occasional problem that the vessels faced: “*We came before Paleacatle at ancker, passing over the (drought the) shallowe not being a lenghte above a musket shatt, having butt 3 fadeem water, which is very dangerous for greate ships*”
- Thomas Bowrey also commented that “*All this Coast indeed wantinge nothing but some good harbours for shippings*” Temple, R.C.(ed.), A. Geographical Account of the Countries around the Bay of Bengal 1669-1679, New Delhi 1997, p. 4.
9. Nicholas Tarling has made this distinction in his edited volume of “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia”, vol. I, 1993.
 10. Newitt, Malyn, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668, Routledge, 2005.
 11. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700, Longman, 1993. He sees it as a multi-dimensional affair.
 12. Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol. V, p. 8.
 13. Cited in Boxer, C.R., The Dutch Sea borne Empire, Hutchinson, London, 1965, p.90. As early as 1608 CE, the States of Holland passed a secret resolution they would never “*in whole or in part, directly or indirectly withdraw, surrender or renounce the freedom of the seas, everywhere and in all regions of the world*”.
 14. Cited in Prakash, Om, The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p.2.
 15. Cited in Tracy, James (ed.), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, CUP, 1991, p.1.
 16. Moreland, W.H. (ed.), Peter Floris, His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-1615, The Hakluyt Society, 1934, p. XXXV.
 17. Moreland, W.H. (ed.), Relations of Golconda in the early Seventeenth Century, The Haklyut Society, 1931, London, p. 3.
 18. Vink, M. and Winius, G.D., The Merchant – Warrior pacified, OUP, 1990, p. 13. The Nayak of Gingee, Krishnapa, for instance, gave permission to build a fort at Devanampatnam (modern Fort St. David), in 1608. This concession was granted to the Dutch, so as to check the Portuguese and to increase the trade thus the Nayak’s Olla (for Farman) was stated as: “We promise to protect the Dutchmen who will settle in Tegnapatnam to allow them to build a town, to refuse entrance to the Portuguese to whom we shall

- remain hostile. On the other hand we, the Dutchmen, promise to bring all kinds of gods, to traffic with all traders, on the condition that they will pay us for every merchandise excepting rice. We shall also pay 4 for every 100 of our merchandise we carry away from their. Those who have paid once will not pay again. We promise to take the oath and to keep all conditions faithfully” <Bahadur, Rao and Srinivasachari, C.S., A History of Gingee and its Rules, Annamalai University, Annamalianagar, 1943, p. 109>.
19. Travelling in 1670, the Dominican missionary, Friar Domingo Navaratee very aptly commented: “I shed tears as I walked through those streets to see that country [has been] possessed by enemies of the Church, for it is Garden and Paradise in Worldly things, in Spirituals it was once a great colony, and the Church has many children there still, but they are set among bloody wolves. The women wish they could get away from thence, but are so poor and without help that they cannot, those who have some wealth the pleased and satisfied”. Cummins, J.S., *The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navaratee, 1618-1686*, vol. II, The Hakluyt Society, 1962, p. 283.
 20. Pissurlencar, S.S. (ed.), *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*. Vol. II, Tipografia, Rangel, Bastora-Goa, 1953, Doc-113, pp.331-332.
 21. Baldaeus, Philip, *A Description of the East India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the isle of Ceylon with their adjacent Kingdom and provinces*, Asian Educational Services, 2000, p. 629.
 22. Boxer, C.R. *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, Hutchinson, 1965, p.94.
 23. Pissurlencar, S.S. (ed.), *Assentas do conselho do Estado*, Tripagrafia Rangel, Bastora – Goa, 1956, Doc: 137, vol. IV, pp.380-381.
 24. In 1660 and 1667, the Portuguese suffered two severe attacks from the Dutch which lead them to give up Maccasar.
 25. Luard, C. Eckford (trans), *Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique (1629-1643)*, Vol. II: China, India etc. Hakluyt, Society, London, 1927, p. 79. In Manrique’s words – “he has been a real father to all the Portuguese who reached his shores in a distress conditions, aiding and assisting them all with paternal solicitude.”
 26. Baldaeus, P. 2000, p. 651.
 27. Baldaeus, P. 2000, p. 651.

The Coast and the Archipelago

PORTUGAL'S oceanic expansion in the Indian Ocean region had commenced with da Gama's epochal discovery of the route to reach India from Europe. It triggered many more events subsequently which have left distinct imprints in the archival records as well as in the memory of the populace of the erstwhile colonized area. The awareness of the existence of Portuguese settlements in the mainland of Indian subcontinent is, but natural, negligible as they were located only on the coast at certain nodal lands. Their influence area among the masses was very limited when compared to that of the English who penetrated in nearly all corners of Indian subcontinent. Vasco da Gama's arrival to India and the subsequent conquest and expansion of the settlement at Goa and around are the only facts that highlight the Portuguese presence. Though not being land based, the Portuguese still ventured in the interiors as adventurers, missionaries, traders, emissaries and also sometimes occupied positions in the indigenous courts. Thus, the impact felt by the inland indigenous polities or populace was marginal which can be cited as the reason for fading of the Portuguese presence from memory.

If one discerns the linguistic traditions of the coastal area of Bay of Bengal for instance, where the Portuguese settlements existed, it is commonly noticed that the society still uses some of the terms derived from Portuguese language without being aware of their origin. A case in point is the use of the Portuguese word *janela* in Bengali language that has assimilated so well that it rather

appears to be an indigenous term. In its Portuguese origin and as in Bengali, the word has the same meaning - a window. It is for a person having familiarity with the Portuguese lingua or interest in linguistics to understand the assimilations. To a seeker studying the marginal settlements around the Bay, the presence of such words in the tongue do remind of the Portuguese presence. One notes that in the public memory of Bangla-speaking people, the French and the English existence at Chandernagore and Calcutta has not faded but of the Portuguese presence at Hughli. This is somewhat true for other regions of coastal India and their hinterlands that had witnessed the Portuguese presence in the sixteen and the seventeenth centuries. The glory of erstwhile colonial Madras did not fade the English proto-colonial settlement that came into being at Fort St. George but the Portuguese settlement of Saõ Thomé and of Mylapore figured out. The Mylapore habitation was engulfed in the English city of Madras as a sub-urban area with the shrine of St. Thomas standing desolately on the mount. But not even a fraction of the population can recount the Portuguese presence on that coast. Was the nature of the Portuguese presence so meager that though the words have survived in the indigenous lexicon but not the imagery of the people from whom the words derived? This is a matter of investigation.

A tiny nation with feeble resources could build a colossal edifice that dominated the coastal economies from Brazil to Mozambique to Japan before the advent of the steam ships has preoccupied many in attempting to explain the nature of expansion. Among the many reasons that led to the building of the Portuguese presence were the entrepreneurial quality and the ability to recognize the existing patterns of commercial networks and devising systems to monopolize them. Devising arrangements according to the need of the time was an important pattern that can be observed through the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. This was either done by evolving systems like the *prazo*, concession and *cartaz* systems, through quasi-religious institutions like the *misericordias* or through the religious ones like the bishoprics and different Christian orders like the Jesuits and Dominicans while not relegating the authority of the captain of fortresses. But the

network that the Portuguese built came into being as a result of their capitalizing the already existing economic linkages across the Indian Ocean. One such existing network between the Coromandel coast in south-east India and Southeast Asian archipelago was exploited by the Portuguese. A glimpse at the regions in concern seems important due to the very nature of political formations that took place at the indigenous level and also in relation to the nature of the Portuguese presence in the sixteen and seventeenth centuries.

Possibly two important factors helped the Portuguese to acquire various coastal niches and the commercial linkages of the Indian Ocean trading world. The very geography and weather conditions of the region appeared to be good hosts. In the age prior to the advent of the steam ships, it was imperative that the mentioned factors largely determined the area in which the imperial edifice could be built and where frontiers could be expanded. Accessibility to a region was thus a concern for early Portuguese endeavours in Asia. The first visits of the *armadas* led by Afonso de Albuquerque in Southeast Asian archipelago, for instance, justifies this perception. To many more lands to which the Portuguese *armadas* sailed, accessibility remained a dominant issue. It is in the latter context that it is imperative to comprehend the regions of the commercial linkage in concern.

The region is understood as a geographical entity that has a definable boundary or characteristics. The pursuit to understand a region does not involve the solitary aspect of topography. A wide range of features that can be included under the headings of social, political and economic aspect also discern a region. These facets tend to develop due to particular characteristics of the region as well the availability of the resources within it. Hence the topography of a region nurtures and addresses to a variety of attributes that become mutually exclusive with the expanse over a period of time. The concerned thematic region, the Coromandel Coast and Southeast Asian archipelago separated mainly by the Bay of Bengal give the impression of being large and ambiguous. If one has to understand the importance of Portuguese presence in the maritime commercial networks across the Indian Ocean region in

the sixteen and seventeenth centuries, then one cannot circumvent this linkage for it does indicate the existential situation within and outside the boundaries of *Estado da Índia*. The Portuguese harped on this centuries-old nexus without effecting any changes in the commodities transacted. Coromandel textiles and spices from the archipelago continued to remain the mainstay of this interaction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The testimonies of contemporary travellers visiting the coast at different times help to recollect the region in the most comprehensive way. The perceptions, personalities and backgrounds of the observant are reflected in the journal that has often raised arguments among the historians about using them as a reliable source material. Most of the itinerants who travelled to what was largely termed as “*East Indies*”¹ often touched the well-known and accessible ports of Asia. While there were voyagers who wrote fictive accounts about certain places resulting in the development of the notion of the ‘*other*’, there were barely few others whose conception was different. To create a narrative from such assortment of journals, it is important to sieve information in a comparative way so that the construct is closer to realism.

A good number of the itinerants who travelled in the sixteenth century generally sailed along the coastline. Hence a vessel that was bound for the “*East Indies*” would after touching Cape Comorin navigate through the Palk Straits passing across Ceylon on the right and the Pearl Fishery coast on its left and further doubling on to the Coromandel coast on the Indian subcontinent. But after the discovery of the Brouwer Route², an even smaller number of vessels steered their oars first towards the Coromandel *en route* to Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, in order to be in rhythm with our premise about the notion of accessibility that the early sailors had, a reflection on the topography and the navigational conditions of the Coromandel region would explain the development of Portuguese perceptions about the region. From the Coromandel Coast, one could undertake a journey on the age-old route across the Bay to discover the region abounding in the potpourri of spices that is, Southeast Asian archipelago.

The Coromandel Coast

In the sixteenth and especially in the seventeenth century, there were two alternatives of navigational direction which the European itinerants on their way to 'East Indies' could choose from, once they were closer to Cape Comorin. The first one was that if the itinerant was travelling especially after 1616 CE, he might sojourn at Ceylon before taking the Brouwer Route again to reach Malacca. In this case, he would not visit the Coromandel Coast. Through the second route, on reaching Cape Comorin, the traveller would sail northwards along the Tamil coast, though, this course was not so popular even before 1616 CE on account of the factors that directed the sail. A contrary violent wind, which was so akin to this region, could increase the probability of a tempest. It could even disperse the fleet. There were observations of many of the vessels getting unhappily lost due to such weather conditions. However, in order to procure the much known textiles of the coast, the ships did undertake the perilous journey to reach the Coromandel. Thus, study of this journey-passage is essential to understand the geo-historic and the then environs of the coast. Initially, this journey of exploration would take a voyager to the Fishery Coast where one would come across the Paravas, occupied with fishing activity and culturing of pearls if the travel was undertaken between the months of March and June.³ Side by side, he would also encounter the Jesuits busy in various activities along with converting the indigenous populace into Christianity. The Jesuits had come to the land of the Paravas under the aegis of St. Francis Xavier, whose labours saw the fishing community converting into the Holy Faith around the mid-sixteenth century. This was the amphitheatre in the southern parts of modern Tamil Nadu which most onlookers noticed on their passage to the Coromandel.

If we perceive the region through the eyes of a fictive itinerant, then on crossing the Palk Straits, he would sail into the Coromandel Bay from where distinct landform features could be noticed while moving northwards. Along with the palms that swayed to the rhythms of the wind there was a ferocious sea rocking the coast on the right and small vessels trying to manoeuvre on the

waves to reach to the shore or striving to catch fishes. This was the broad landscape along the Coromandel. Situated on the south-eastern end of the Indian peninsula, the Coromandel coast or Cholamandalam⁴ as it has also been referred to, attracted attention of the itinerants, Companies, trading groups and last but not the least, the Portuguese renegades due to various reasons. Its unique topography made it distinct. Be it the *Ghats* or the plains; the cyclones or winter monsoons- these characteristics distinguished it from other geographical entities of the Indian peninsula. There is no doubt that these very features were responsible for shaping the “world” on the Coromandel. This “world” had its essence in the cotton production in the hinterland. It was this very commodity that made the Europeans access the coast and made them hold through all odds whether it was the uninviting topography or the politics of the indigenous polities or the contest for hegemony among themselves.

Lying on the Eastern *Ghats*, nature has created with a broader strip of land when compared to the Western *Ghats*. Described as a ‘*land of open plains*’, it also encompassed the deltas of the three major rivers- the Godavari, the Krishna and the Kaveri- wherein paddy was mainly cultivated. So this terrain presented an interminable sea of green or golden paddy-fields, dotted with villages and water bodies surrounded by palm trees. The narratives of the contemporary sixteenth and the seventeenth century travellers are either devoted entirely or at large on Coromandel or as a section while describing their travels in Asia. The coast has generally been described loosely by the itinerants as the region between Point Calimere in the south and the mouth of Godavari river in the north. Different accounts conferred its boundaries to the best of knowledge and observations of their perceivers, which turned generally similar. Thomas Bowrey gave one of the clearest descriptions. He pointed out that the coast, “*begineth at Nagapatam...(and)...Extendth it Selfe to point Godaware, on the South Side of the bay Corango, which by computation is in length 400 miles.*”⁵ Hence abiding by Bowrey’s definition, the present parts of northern Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh with focal points being the settlements of São Thomé and Nagapattinam followed

subsequently by Pulicat, Masulipatnam and Madras would help us define the geo-politics of the region.

Ensuing Bowrey's description, one would thus need to travel from the south to the north with our fictive traveller and reach to places that incited interest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not only to the Europeans but also to a pan-Asiatic trader. Thus, the first place one would encounter would be Nagapattinam⁶. Seated near the shore, on the Kaveri delta, the city had no convenient harbour. In fact Baldaeus is precise in pointing that the whole of Coromandel was destitute of them⁷. Thus the question of easy accessibility to the coast did not encourage the Portuguese to venture to the coast in their early years. Despite this major hindrance, Nagapattinam turned out to occupy an early attention as a great port town in the European mindset. The bustling commercial activities, both overseas and coastal in the Asian trading network had enabled it to gather an early European attention. Among the overseas products, the calicoes were much in demand. Rice was the chief commodity supplied to the other coastal regions⁸. These aspects of trade are undoubtedly reflected in the various itineraries. Due to high commercial attributes of this city, Nagapattinam had diverse diasporic flavours which though did not entitle it to be called an entrepôt as Malacca but definitely a 'marine district'⁹. Varthema notes that "... *it is the root to very large countries. There are many Moorish merchants where who go and come for their merchandise*"¹⁰ is a self-explanatory statement about the state of commerce at Nagapattinam. Another attribute that attracted the Europeans to this port were the refreshing sea-winds though the land-winds were hot and stifling. In order to counter, the high humid and hot weather of the tropics, the Europeans planted gardens to get some relief at least in the evenings.

Karikal¹¹ located on Madura district was the next among the portal towns to be talked about. The Labbâis conducted trade from this port. Baldaeus notes trade in certain stuffs called 'ramboyttns'¹², conducted with Japan. The itinerant then reached to Tranquebar where Fort St. David was built by the Danish as their sole settlement in the Bay in the seventeenth century. The trade from this place was inconsiderable. Cuddalore was the next stop-over. Attracted

by the allure of textiles, our fictive traveller might travel a certain distance in the interior of Cuddalore to encounter Tirupapuliur. This weaving centre also had a dyeing unit from where the Dutch later procured textiles. Lying on the bank of a navigable river, Tirupapuliur was observed by Baldaeus as fit for anchorage. It had not only the required fathoms of water for docking but also a grey sandy ground. A safe anchorage was possible during the 'South Monsoon' but it turned out to be dangerous during the period of the 'North Monsoon'.¹³ The presence of a dangerous sand-bank did not provide conditions to anchor the vessel there. Porto Novo, in the seventeenth century gained some significance though the trade from this port consisted of certain quality of hard wood, coconuts, arck, coir etc. Another port, called Tegenapatnam, though small in nomenclature rose to prominence due to the Dutch presence. Going further ahead along the coast one would reach Pondicherry, the French enclave. Sadraspatnam yet was another small place that one would reach. All along this sea-route from Nagapattinam, the relater visited various small places which generally rose to prominence in the seventeenth century.

A visit on the Coromandel would be considered incomplete for the then European traveller if he did not get a look of the shrine at Mylapore. Paying reverence to St. Thomas at this small town was a customary practice among the Europeans. The shrine was located on a hillock which was indeed an inconsiderable place. But it was only the legend of St. Thomas that brought most of the travellers to this coast despite all odds. Such was the extent of the influence of this shrine that it was well incorporated in the town of Madras in the later period. Known as São Thomé to the Portuguese and as Mylapore to the indigenous population; this small maritime town occupied much attention in the mindset of the Europeans for a considerably long time. The Saint was so much popular that around his persona various kinds of myths were knitted. Moreover, the increasing interest in relocating St. Thomas and his Christian community was an impact of the Crusades also. Such was the memory of the Crussades that it dominated the Portuguese mindset as late as the sixteenth century. The apostle, who had a shadowy, but glorious career as a missionary and martyr had

founded an opulent Christian colony in Southern India around the first century CE. The saga of St. Thomas¹⁴ was so inherently built among the Portuguese from the very beginning that the official chronicler of the *Estado da Índia*, João de Barros underlined the monarch's emphasis to relocate the said Christians.¹⁵

Besides the legend of St. Thomas there were other aspects also though not so obvious that glued the interest of the Europeans. The Abbé Carré, a late seventeenth century French traveller, who visited the town when it was sandwiched between the wrestling French, Dutch and Golconda powers extolled high praises for it—“*This town is the most important on the Coromandel Coast, and has a great reputation for trade and commerce in all sorts of lovely calicoes and the best dyes in all the country.*”¹⁶ On the contrary, John Fryer, the Abbé's contemporary suggested an abated look of São Thomé while not eclipsing the glory of its past.¹⁷ Thevenot (1664-1667 CE) also noted the finer quality and better variety of colours of chintzes procured at São Thomé than at Masulipatam. The opinion of difference in the different testimonies is apparent. If in the late 17th century this town [when it was constantly under the siege of one or the other power] had so much magnetism that it could make the observant see its good days so perceptibly, then one can comprehend its opulence in the prior period too. Duarte Barbosa's¹⁸ sixteenth century perception about this town thus held and continued the saga in the next century too.

The town of São Thomé had no natural harbour. The importance of trading ways related with this shrine-town and the ever violent and swelling sea compelled the inhabitants to develop surf-boats which were known to be as the mussoolas. A mussoola was built by fixing and fitting planks together with ropes and coir-twine, both the materials being locally available. Though these indigenous vessels were used for ferries throughout the Coromandel but they could be more often used and seen at São Thomé where the sea happened to be ruthless. Often the European travellers were amused with this vessel so much so that they termed it as ‘*odd boats*’¹⁹. The Venetian, Caesar Frederick gave a fine description of *masadie* as he calls a *mussoola*. From the way they were made to the way they were used, Frederick captivates it brilliantly²⁰. The celebrated past of the town

of São Thomé was not only due to the holy shrine of St Thomas and the trade but also to its pleasant ambience as has been noted by most of the Europeans in their accounts. The adjoining chain of hills according to Fryer intercepted the hot land-winds. But being in the tropics, it seems to be infested with mosquitoes and that too of a particular kind which communicated elephantiasis.²¹ So a difficult accessibility to the place was overshadowed by the very nature of the aspects that the town promised to offer.

Madras was the next destination on the coast of the observer who was travelling around 1640 CE. Founded in 1639 by the English factors on the sandy shores of the Coromandel, Fort St. George²² was the first proto-colonial enclave in the Indian sub-continent. The importance of Madras lay in the fact that it was a convenient place for the Europeans to buy textiles.²³ Though it was exposed to heavy surf that led the English to construct an artificial harbour later, but it had an advantage as well. This was in the form of a small island on the strip facing the sea which was formed on the land side by river Coum.²⁴ Prior to the construction of the artificial harbour, the Europeans used indigenous vessels, the catamarans²⁵ to approach the shore and to load and unload their huge ships. Madras was considered an agreeable and flourishing place known for the manufacture of variety of piece goods such as cottons, chintz, painted fabrics.²⁶ The Fort was divided into 'White Town' and 'Black Town' which as the names suggest was inhabited by the European and indigenous population respectively. Besides this segregation which became quite popular in the early days of the establishment of Fort St. George, there were some other features which gave Madras its peculiar and popular character. Making their way through the watery paddy fields, the eloquent observer would often notice sun-tanned indigenous folks uprooting weeds so that the paddy crop would not get spoiled. Rice, after all was their staple diet and also the trading commodity. Along with these fields one could also notice the gardens laid by the English. Strewed with all sorts of stews and pottage besides gourds and herbs for salads, there were also fruit-bearing trees like cocoas, guavas, jackfruit, mangoes, plums, pomegranates, bananas among others. And

last but not the least, there were the betel creepers making their presence in the English gardens.

In the northern sea shore of Madras, was located a habitation called Pulicat. The Portuguese generally handled their overseas trade originating from Mylapore through Pulicat as the former did not have a handling harbour. Though being a low coast area it still became prominent in the trading world of the sixteen as well as the seventeenth centuries.²⁷ Situated on the south end of an island that separated the lake or lagoon of Pulicat from the sea, the town was known for the abundance of printed cotton cloths that were worth much in Malacca, Pegu and Sumatra as well in Gujarat and Malabar.²⁸ Besides this, traders from the mainland also ventured to this port to buy goods. Thus Pulicat provided a great diversity in merchandise. If cloth was available here for the overseas as well as the coastal markets, so were the rubies and musks. Thus, there is no doubt that it was a '*fair sea-haven*'²⁹ wherein ships of diverse lands took resort to. Like Nagapattinam, Pulicat had 'Moorish merchants' who were trading from this well-recognized port town. Varthema noted the abundance of every possible thing in this town except for grains. Paddy was however grown in abundance.³⁰ The Dutch factory that was established here in 1610 came to be known as '*one of the best they have in the Indies, by reason of the Cotton-cloaths, of which they have great Ware-houses full there.*'³¹ Pulicat was also known as the place where refining of saltpetre that was brought from Bengal was done. Saltpetre, as is known was used for making gun-powder.

Leading further to north of Pulicat and after traversing Armagaon, where the English first built their factory on the coast, one would reach Petapolli. Negotiating the sea further, would lead the itinerant to the town of Masulipatam, a straggling town lying on the sea shore. The custom house was the first place one would encounter as soon as he boarded off his vessel. It was customary for every visitor to go to the custom house where toll duties were levied. Thevenot, who had also visited Surat, noticed that though Masulipatam was a small town but it was well-populated. On the streets, that were narrow, one could notice houses built of wood

separated from one another. According to Tavernier, it was “*only renowned on account of its anchorage, which is the best in the Bay of Bengal and it is the only place from which vessels sail for Pegu, Siam, Arakan, Bengal, Cochinchina, Mecca, and Hormuz, as also for the islands of Madagascar, Sumatra, and the Manillas.*”³² Known for the fertile land and cheap provisions, this port town was a rendezvous on the route of overland and overseas route. The areas adjoining to it like Pettipolee or Nizampatam, Bimilipatam, Srikakulam, Palakollu, Narsapur³³ specialised in various processes of textile production. Thus the hinterland of this port was a productive one and a highly specialized one. So, in a way, it was a hub of a much focused textile production though the quality was not considered superior to the ones marketed from São Thomé.

In the journey from Nagapattinam to Masulipatam, one can notice that the coast was dotted with ports. However, the irony was that not even one coastal town had a fine natural harbour. The great seventeenth century expert on geography, Thomas Bowrey compared Pulicat with Fort St. George as a port, although the bar at the Pulicat lake caused a hindrance to the ships weighing above 40 tons. He added that “*all this coast indeed wanting nothing but some good harbours for shipping.*”³⁴ Peter Floris’s adequate description of Pulicat sums it finely.³⁵ The lack of harbours explains the accessibility question that might have hovered in the Portuguese mindset while navigating the coast. This must have formed the basic reason for the neglect of the coast by Goan authorities although during the south-west monsoon its roadstead provided a safer anchorage compared to the Malabar Coast. But if the lack of good harbours hindered Portuguese trade then the Malabar Coast was no better. In this case, it was the preference of trading commodities that mattered. Thus pepper presumably was favoured over the textiles though the latter were the important exchange items for the spices from archipelago Southeast Asia. Though the testimony given by the contemporaries is reliable, but still as one progressed towards the north of Madras, the coast was better suited for maritime settlement as Deloche has rightly pointed out.³⁶ That is one of the reasons as why Pulicat and Masulipatnam (which was even better

than others provided good shelter to the ships) had developed as important European enclaves.

Besides the bad harbours, another factor that often hampered the prospects of a vessel to visit the coast was the currents. The torrent waves often carried the ship away from its destination. For instance, the Agent and the Council at Fort St. George on Twelfth of November, 1668 CE remarked: “*These two Ships [Rainbow and Loyal Merchant] in going from hence [i.e. Madras] were deceived by the currents and overshot their port of Metchpatam as far as Corongo’s.*”³⁷ It is a well-known fact that the cyclones were the periodic phenomenon in the Bay of Bengal. Being a common occurrence, the Coromandel could not but be in the grip of it. They were usually more severe in nature at the changing of the monsoons. The testimony of those yester years holds true today also.³⁸

An inhospitable harbour accompanied by strong currents and occasionally by cyclones and storms would nonetheless make a place look averse to the high-tonnage oceanic vessels. Henry F. Blanford³⁹ who wrote a guide to understand the climate and weather of the South Asia region in 1889 CE drew a chart of the storm tracks in the Bay of Bengal for the months of May, October and November. Noticing the tracks in the figure, one may observe that May and November appeared to be the hard-hit months. The ships sailed to Southeast Asia in September which was a safer month to move away from this coast. Besides if we closely observe the topographical factors around the Bay of Bengal, one can easily discern the absence of the presence of the *Estado* in this region. All the Portuguese settlements were unofficial in nature except the ones that existed in Ceylon. So in this sense the Bay can also be termed as a peripheral region. Though heavily marred by forces of nature, yet the coast was marked by trading towns in the commercial world of the Indian Ocean. The trade was fostered due to the demand for the textiles. Besides the textiles that were the commodity for trade from the coast, the land provided all that was necessary for European dietary needs.⁴⁰ The *chettis* were engaged in the textile trade from the region. This being their age-

old occupation had made them well known for commercial skills. Besides them, there were Muslim merchants or 'Moors' as the blanket classification by the Europeans for the former, prevailed. The Armenians and *balijas* were also part of this major section which managed commerce in the coastal towns of Coromandel.

The trading activities could only be endured on the Coromandel due to the two kinds of indigenous small sailing vessels that were developed by the indigenous coastal populace- *Mussoola* and *Catamaran*. They had been in use for a long time and were widespread on the coast. Both the vessels were used for loading and unloading the goods.⁴¹ The adaptability of the indigenous population of the Coromandel to the sea is remarkable and provides a clue of how despite harsh environs, the coast endeavoured to become a known mart. The country was predominantly agricultural. In the coastal plains, the staple crops were paddy, millets and pulses while on a smaller scale, the dye-crops, indigo and chay-root were also grown to complement the requirements of the textile industry. Besides, tobacco was grown largely for export. Cotton was not grown extensively in the lowlands but in the interior. So the yarn material required by the weaving industry was brought from the interiors. Weaving was the primary occupation of the people. The weavers were independent, in one sense of the word, for they were not brought together in workshops under skilled direction, but worked from their houses. The main classification of cloth was into plain and patterned goods. The plain goods could be subdivided into muslin and calico. The latter, a stout cloth, was produced in various qualities, depending on the fitness of the yarn, and the number of threads to the inch. It was sold in three ways- brown, bleached or dyed in the piece. Apart from its local use, it was in demand in most of the markets to which the kingdom had access by sea. Muslin, a thinner cloth, could also be coloured brown, bleached, or dyed. It was made principally woven inland at Warangal, situated about 160 miles north-north-west of Masulipatam.

The patterned goods, described in travel accounts and Company correspondences as 'prints', were designed either on calico or muslin, with coloured patterns produced by the indigenous processes. The work was done mainly on the coast, where the industry was closely

adapted to the needs of the foreign markets, situated principally in Java and further to the East. Each of these markets had its own peculiar tastes. So it was essential for merchants interested in those markets to be in close touch with the centres of supply, where alone they could be certain of procuring exactly what was in demand. The Golconda coast was the best place to buy plain goods, while its superior dye-stuffs, indigo for blue and chay-root for red, together with various vegetable-yellows, provided a wide range of colour. For patterned goods on the other hand, production centre in the town of Pulicat, twenty five miles north of Madras city was much favoured.

The polities of the region also took keen interest to develop a congenial atmosphere for the growth of commercial activities. In the period prior to the sixteenth century, one notices that the Cholas and the Pallavas dominated the setting. By the year 1500 CE, the region of our study was already in the sway of the mighty Vijaynagar kingdom. But there were several local centres of power which had sprouted under different *nayaks* within the kingdom. Later on in the seventeenth century, the Golconda kingdom also catered to the interests of the international commerce. The great port of Masulipatam is the thriving example in this context.

Our fictive character now takes leave from the Coromandel coast by embarking on a ship sailing for Malacca. The ships from the Coromandel generally used to leave in the month of September to reach Malacca in October⁴². It is only after about a month long trail that the ship would reach the Malay straits.

The Maritime World of Archipelago Southeast Asia

From the coast that produced a variety of textiles, one transverse across the Bay of Bengal with the fictive spirit to the “*The Land below the Winds*”⁴³. The itinerants have wonderfully captured the picture of the region of Southeast Asia. The mainland fragment also gathers considerable interest though it is distinctly apart from the insular part. In order to venture to the archipelago, one had to cross the Straits of Malacca which had the busiest

and the most important entrepôt of the sixteenth as well of the seventeenth centuries-Malacca. A sojourn at this port becomes essential due to its very significance in the trading world. Heading off from Malacca towards the south, one would encounter myriad islands of different sizes and extents. These islands comprised the archipelago. The frequency of the ports and islands increase as a ship sailed farther and farther deep in this part. Being the largest archipelago in the world with unique tropical traits, it presented itself as an effervescent region.

Southeast Asia had come into limelight in the world of commerce much earlier than Coromandel. The region was known for its aromatic spices. Being a large region, two divisions can be easily discerned on the basis of a simple physiographical appraisal. These are the mainland and the archipelago. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, an Italian wanderer, Ludovico di Varthema had understood the region in terms of the mainland and insular part.⁴⁴ Exploring the linkages and the Portuguese presence therein becomes more interesting in the insular part. In the mainland region barring Malacca there was neither an official or unofficial settlement of the Portuguese. Arakan, Pegu and Siam [that are located in the mainland] which are the names often spelt in the travel-accounts and documents were known to have contacts with the trading world of Coromandel. But the unique polity structure and the European presence that developed in the archipelago holds more interest.

The insular region was the one that comprised of both official as well as unofficial Portuguese settlements. Ironically, it was here that the Dutch, English and the Spanish had their headquarters in the seventeenth century while important Portuguese settlements were strewn over. Therefore, when one studies the commercial networks and subsequently the Portuguese retreat there are many queer facts that line up making the theme fascinating as well as perplexing. The major share of market for the piece goods was in the archipelago. There were varieties of cloths that were in demand. Besides in the mainland, other than Malacca (if one brings Varthema and Tarling's demarcation into use) that was the official Portuguese settlement, there was no other port that fell under this classification. Malacca

also lay in fact, in the Malay Straits in the peninsular part of the mainland but acted as a gateway to the archipelago. The basic clash of interests among the European powers took place here, as it was the spice-producing region. Pepper, cloves and nutmeg were produced in East Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. Tomé Pires's statement marks sumptuously the potentiality of the region: "*The Malay merchants say that God made Timor for sandalwood and Banda for mace and Maluku for cloves, and that thus merchandise is not known anywhere in the world except in these place.*"⁴⁵

So resuming the sojourn of the region with imaginary itinerant, one reaches Malacca whose manifold facets could engross any visitor. Located on the Malay straits, it was undoubtedly one of the biggest entrepôt of the times. At the onset of the sixteenth century, Varthema noted that- "*more ships arrive here than any other place in the world, and especially there come here all sorts of spices and an immense quantity of other merchandise.*"⁴⁶ The hinterland of Malacca that was a tiny sultanate on a *bughâz*⁴⁷, did not produce anything substantial rather much of its provisions were bought in. Its richness was not only due to the location but was also based on the fact that the polities created a cohesive atmosphere as Tome Pires has stressed greatly. If we chronologically observe how the various Malaccan kings took keen interest in the growth of trade, then a clear picture would emerge on how and why this port city grew so rich. In the contemporary European accounts the best picture of the region has been drawn by Pires.

The second ruler of Malacca, Muhammad Iskandar Shah tried to improve relations with Siam and Java. [According to Varthema, Malacca paid tribute to Siam]. Due to his diplomacy, trade between Pasai and Malacca sprang which made some 'Moorish' merchants, Bengalis, parsees and Arabian Muslims moved from thence to Malacca. During the reign of the third king of Malacca, Muzaffar Shah, the port was frequented by a large number of merchants belonging to different lands. Since the merchants had found a good abode, Pase's glory as a trading centre started diminishing. The merchants could drop their anchor at Malacca through the year which proved to be an asset for the merchants as well as the

port. This was the biggest advantage Malacca had over any other port in Asia. All sorts of commodities were available that made it a convenient business-related place as well. So the trading class whose living depended on the profits it incurred from commercial practices started getting glued to Malacca due to good returns it got in the profession. The interest of Muzaffar Shah is best observed through Pires statement—*“The king of Malacca dealt kindly and reasonably with them, which is a thing that greatly attracts merchants, especially the foreigners. He took pleasure in being in the city much more often than he went on hunting, so that he could hear and decide about the abuses and tyrannies which Malacca creates on account of its great position and trade.”*⁴⁸

Besides the polity of Malacca imparting a serious role in the development of trade, there was another reason that sprouted commerce at this port so well. Modern scholars indicate to the existence of poly-centred polity. Such polities have been perceived as ‘kingdom’ by Barbara Watson Andaya, who understood it to be a *“coalescence of localized power centers, ideally bound together not by force but through complex interweaving of links engendered by blood connections and obligations.”*⁴⁹ This is very true in the case of Malacca. Kinship ties were of utmost importance and most of the tiny kingdoms in Southeast Asia were inter-related to each other through matrimonial alliances or simply due to trade. King Alauddin, for instance, always had kings of Pahang, Kampar and Indragiri at Malacca. Pires observed⁵⁰ how in part trade defined allegiance of neighbouring kings of Malacca towards the port state. It seems that the kinship ties were important and this was the traditional way to rule. Besides there was also a concept of tributary states prevalent much before the establishment of the Malaccan Sultanate. Assuming such titles whose meaning was grand like- *Raja Quda* which meant King of the horses; *Raja Baya* alias *Sam Agy Jaya Baya* which meant Great lord of nations; *Sam Agy Jaya Taton* meaning Lord of all; *Batara Tamarill* which stood for Pure king ; *Batara Tomarjill* meaning king of the lands and lords of the islands; *Sam Agi Palimbaão* meaning Lord of all for-explicitly connotes the attitude of the polity.

Another reason can be sorted from the references one comes across in Malay Annals. A case in point is one of the narratives from *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*, which is a collection of anecdotes about Malacca. This pertains to the King of Kedah and the genus of relation he had with the Sultan of Malacca. In it, is referred how the Raja of Kedah went to Malacca to pay homage and ask for the Drum of Sovereignty and how it was granted to him.⁵¹ This was the way traditional kinship ties were maintained. Contrary to this image that we get from Malacca, Anthony Reid has pointed that the rulers in insular Southeast Asia were always 'in tension with the tenuousness of their power base'⁵². It is also true that the legal and bureaucratic basis of the polities was still fragile in most of the cases. A Malaccan noble expressed his opinion regarding the difficulties he had to face while being an administrator as: "*As far as we who administer territory, what concern is that of yours? For territory is territory even if it is only the size of a coconut shell. What we think should be done we do, for the ruler is not concerned with the difficulties we administrators encounter, he only takes account of the good results we achieve.*"⁵³

The bitterness of the Malaccan noble towards the Sultanate can be well-understood. It cannot be disregarded though. At the same time one can also discern that the administration of Malacca was very well-knit and was devised towards catering commercial activities. It has already been noted how polity and trading activities were interdependent in the case of Malacca since the very early days. In order to maintain such a great commercial traffic there was a hierarchy of officers which administered this tiny kingdom. The foremost place was occupied by *Paduca Raja*, who was the captain-general of Malacca. A sort of viceroy, who came next in the hierarchy to the king in the administration, reverence was paid to him by the mandarins as well as by the *bemdara* and *lasemana*, who were next in the chain of command. In the absence of the aforesaid *Paduca Raja*, it was the *Bemdara* who acted as the highest official in the kingdom.⁵⁴ Pires noted that he could order a person to death whether it was a nobleman or a foreigner. But before taking any action he informed the king and both of them decided the matter

in consultation with the *Lasemana*⁵⁵ and the *Tumunguo*. Besides he was the king's guard and every knight and mandarin obeyed his orders. Though he was as important as the *Bemdara* but in matters relating to war his position exceeded and was more feared of. The chief magistrate of the city was known as the *Tumunguo*. Pires noted that the person who occupied this office was the one who had great esteem. Besides taking care of the law and order, he was also entitled to collect the dues on the merchandise.

Besides these officers, there was another major category of representatives of the King who interacted with the various diaspora⁵⁶ trading at Malacca. These were called as *Xabamdares* or the municipal officers. After receiving the captain of a ship, the *Xabamdar* took them to the *Bemdara*. Besides this, the *Xabamdares* were also responsible to allot warehouses to captains, dispatch their merchandise, provide them with lodging if they have the documents and also provide them with elephants. In order to cater to the needs of large trading diaspora, there were four *Xabamdares* in number. This classification was based on the region from which the merchants came. There was hence a *Xabamdar* for Gujaratis, who according to Pires was the most important of all. Another *Xabamdar* catered to the needs of *Bunuaqjlim*⁵⁷ Bengalees and merchants from Pegu and Pase. The Javanese, Moluccans, *Luções* and those from Banda, Palembang and *Tamjompura* were allocated to another *Xabamdar*. The fourth one was appointed to take care of the Chinese merchants and those from *Lequeos*, Chancheo and Champa.⁵⁸ Besides, there are also *cabaães* who were noblemen and *amoks* who were the knights by profession. The much known indigenous source used for studying Melaka, *Sējarah Mēlayu*, also reasoned a well-structured administration for the prosperity of Malacca⁵⁹ for the polity at Malacca had understood the importance of trade to the city-state.

In such an environment where the administration was so well-knit, a Malaccan noble was suppose to perform his duties with full rigour which unquestionably led to sullen attitude sometimes. The profit at the same time derived from the commercial activities was also immense and in actual it provided subsistence to the port state. Six percent was collected as dues from the merchants who

came from the west of Malacca. The ones who came from the mainland like Pegu and Siam paid dues on the merchandize and a present on the provisions. The Malayans paid three percent as the dues. Pires's⁶⁰ observations indicate that giving presents was a norm of the day. The position of the *Xambander* was of immense importance so much so that good presents were endowed to him by the merchants to be in good terms with the higher people in the administrative hierarchy. Another mode of the payment that Pires refers to was the system of dues. This was also a way to estimate the worth of commodities the ship had in it. For this purpose, five *keling*⁶¹ merchants and five belonging to other regions were called and in presence of a *Tumungam* and the *Bemdara's* brother they would make the valuation.⁶²

Of all the trading groups present in Malacca, the *keling* merchants had assumed immense importance. On an average in a year, there were three or four ships carrying varying amount of cotton bales-some of them just twelve to fifteen thousand *cruzados* while others twelve to fifteen thousand *cruzados*. Bringing around thirty varieties of rich cloth, they were in fact the richest lot in the mercantile category. Pires noted that: "*These Klings have all the merchandise and more of the Malacca trade than any other nation.*"⁶³ On their return journey the *kelings* carried white sandalwood. This commodity seemed to be in great demand as sometimes there were ten ships in a year which carried it though red sandalwood was produced in the hinterland. Besides this they also took camphor, alum, white silk, seed-pearls, pepper, a little of nutmeg, mace and cloves. Copper was another commodity which was in great demand though tin was not so much in demand. Beside these items which the *kelings* procured for the , there were Chinese brocades, gold, *damasks*, *calambac* and *fruseleira* of the lowest quality which also were the item of trade. It seems that the *kelings* were in the good books of the Malaccan polity because sometimes they also travelled from Malacca to Pulicat in Malaccan junks.

Besides Malacca, one also needs to have a cursory glance of the parallel situation in the insular parts. The Majapahit rulers reigned in east Java between 1293 and 1528 CE. They made every possible effort to provide internal peace and security to smoothen

commercial activities. Kenneth Hall pointed that “*the relationship between Majapahit’s kings and its merchants grew so close that some sources both local and foreign, considered Java’s spice merchants to be little more than monarch’s trade agents,*”⁶⁴ although this seems to be an exaggeration. This very point shows the proximity of the Majapahit King’s to the activities of trade and helps us to understand that how close were the two related. With the pace of time, the Mataram state based in central Java was established by coastal communities had defeated the Majapahits.

Thus all these polities gave impetus to economic activities in some way or the other. The trade provided the essential resource base that led to the formation of states along with the development of maritime townships. This is exemplified by the formation of states like Laos, Aceh, Bantam, Banjarmasin, Makassar and Ternate. These local polities formed themselves into states for the first time in the “*age of commerce*”, i.e., in the period between fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The geographical location of the places of the region described till now was such that each of them assumed importance in its own way. The growing nature of trade made them pleasant to stay. But the most strategic location was of the Straits of Malacca. It was an area through which the vessels passed from the east to west and thus goods from its east or west could be procured. The power that could dominate it stood to benefit it enormously from the commerce that passed through it.

Freek Colombijn in a case study of Sumatra has explained the nature of states in Southeast Asia in terms of volatility. According to him, the states were volatile in the sense that the size of the individual states changed frequently. There were cases the ruler moved his state capital under forced circumstances. The death of a ruler sometimes was caused by a dynastic struggle, which was so common in Malacca of the fifteenth century. In some cases, a local subordinate head either ignored or took over the central state power. So, in short, the states underwent through frequent cycles of rise and decline.⁶⁵ Another point which Colombijn stressed was that the key to the success of Southeast Asian polities was not to control over land but to gain control over the people. The rulers lost control over the subjects desperately. The class of people who

generally lived in the royal core domain were slaves, debtors, close family members and villagers who were dependent on the ruler. However this class was just a meagre. The rulers used indirect method of alliances with local heads, princes, or state officials to bring the rest of population under his control. These intermediaries enjoyed a great degree of autonomy.⁶⁶

It appears that all the above mentioned methods can be understood in the way the state of Malacca arose freeing itself from Palembang. As noted by Pires: *“When Sam Agi Palimbaão died, he left a son, a great knight and a very warlike man, whom they called Paramjçura, which means ‘The bravest man’ in the Palembang Javanese tongue. He was married to a niece of Batara Tamarill who was called Paramjçure⁶⁷, and when he realised how nobly he was married and how great was his power in the neighbouring islands which were under his brother-in-law’s jurisdiction, he rose against the vassalage and obedience and called himself the Great Exempt.”*⁶⁸ Still further if one sees how the allegiance to Malacca was maintained, then one cannot miss out certain Sumatran polities. The kingdom of Rokan [or *Jrcan*] named after the river Rokan had no king for instance. Instead, it had a mandarin who was a vassal of the late king of Malacca. He had helped the later in wars. Similarly, the kingdom of Rupert and Purim had the same obligations to Malacca as those of Rokan. In fact all the three of them either provided manpower during a war or rowers with their prahus. The irony was that most of the population of these little kingdoms comprised of the celates, who were termed as sea-robbers in Malay. Still the Malaccan polity made use of their manpower. What can be a better example of the scarcity of human muscles which made the polities to take the help of the so-called ‘robbers’?

After this comprehensive but lengthy description of the gateway to insular Southeast Asia and the nature of the polities, one has to travel further in the archipelago to comprehend the polity and commerce of the region in a more cohesive manner. So, one moves with the itinerant towards the lands that were the potpourri of spices. Hiring a junk would enable a traveller to sail smoothly because as the sail moves more towards south and south-east, the topography would change. The first island which would be

encountered is Sumatra. If December is the month of travel then one could encounter a thick gusty and rainy weather. Sumatra has generally been described as the great, rich and populous island. It comprised of many kingdoms. The prominent among those were the kingdoms of Achin (Achei) and Biar Lambry, Pedir, Pirada, Pase (Paçee), Bata, Aru, Arcat, Jambi, and Palembang. A popular saying about the Sumatran and the mainland polities exposed the long standing quarrels amongst them. The saying related the fights is shortened as: “*Aru against Malacca, Achin against Pedir, Pedir against Kedah and Siam, Pahang against Siam on the other side, Palembang against Linga, Celates against Bugis(Bajus), etc’, and all these nations fight one against the other and they are very rarely friends.*”⁶⁹ So though the polities were chequered in nature but the binding factor amongst was nonetheless but commerce. Almost all of the kingdoms carried the products of the land to Malacca and in return generally brought the ‘*kling cloth*’⁷⁰. The cloth from the that was disembarked at Malacca was a popular item of exchange in Tapobrana or Sumatra.

The island as a whole had been rich in resources of which the tradable ones can be listed. Some of these were gold which was mined in great quantities, two kinds of edible camphor, pepper, silk, benzoin, honey, wax, pitch, sulphur and cotton. Besides these, there was abundance of rattans⁷¹, and canes used to make mats. It was also used like coir or esparto and served as a string to tie up things. Rice, meat, wine and fruits were in abundance. But pepper from Pedir⁷² was the most wanted product. This pepper was long in size which was called *molaga*. Varthema noted in Pedir that business was at its brim due to trade in pepper as reflected in his statement: “*I saw here in one street about five hundred money-changers, and these because a very great number of merchants come to this city, where they carry on a very extensive traffic. ...*”⁷³ Pedir seems to have been booming with trade. Though the number of money-changers seems to be an exaggerated figure, nevertheless one can discern that there were many who were lured to this business. Varthema’s statement is complemented by Barbosa’s observation who reported too much pepper cultivation in this

land. Further he pointed that it was the principal kingdom of the *Moors*.⁷⁴ This shows that the most established trading community might have been Islamic.

Prior to the rise of Malacca, it was Pacem⁷⁵ which dominated as the port near this funnel shaped strait. The Keling merchants used to be present in this port as well. Pacem had the right to one *maz*⁷⁶ on every *bahar* of merchandise that was exported. Unlike any other port, it levied on anchorage but it depended on whether it was a ship or a junk. However, as far as foodstuffs were concerned, nothing was to be paid. Only a present was given in exchange. On the other merchandise that came from the western parts, six per cent on the cost was levied. The practice of selling and buying slaves was also known in this part of the world. So on every slave that was brought there to be sold, five *mazes* of gold was charged. The merchandise that was taken out, whether it was pepper or any other commodity, one *maz* per *bahar* was levied that had to be paid. Though Pacem was a great trading centre but it could not cater to the building of great junks. This was due to the critical resource factor. In fact, neither Pacem nor Pedir had a single junk but they had *lancharas*. It was at Malacca that junks were bought by the polities/merchants of Pasai and Pedir. The merchants of Pase also bought junks from other merchants who visited this port from other places to trade. The scarcity in the country of *jaty* wood [teak wood], which was used to make strong junks was the reason which hampered the construction of cargo vessels.

Another category of vessels that dominated the trading as well pillaging world of Sumatra were the *paráos*. More adapted for speed rather than carrying more cargoes, these were small vessels which could even transverse through small river inlets. Used by the people of the kingdom of Aru and Ropat, these vessels were used for robberies to sustain their livelihood. *Celates* were the class of people who were known for committing sea robberies. From the picture drawn by the contemporary accounts, it seems that they did not owe allegiance to any power rather acted as a substitute force as the circumstances arose. Making their livelihood from the sea, they usually hovered the Malay straits. In case of Malacca

for example, they helped Parmesvara, to settle at this entrepôt. When Parmesvara fled from Palembang, the *celates* accompanied and some thirty of them went all along protecting his life. While Parmesvara was in Palembang, they would serve him as fishermen; after that they may come to Singapore, where they would stay at Karimun (*Carjman*), an island near the channel. At the time when Parmesvara moved to Muar, again, some of them came to live in the place which is now known as Malacca; the place being five leagues from Muar.⁷⁷

Not calling on at Aceh or Achin, the greatest indigenous power of the island of Sumatra during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would be inexcusable for many a reasons. Located on the north western tip of the island, the place acquired a great resonance which one knows from the history of the retreat of the Portuguese in Southeast Asia. Another port which became the headquarters of the English in Southeast Asia was Bencoolen. After the appraisal of the various kingdoms of Sumatra, one can sail towards Java. Any traveller who wished to further steer his oars on the road to the insular part had to be wary of corsairs. But he had to be more aware of the sea. Both Pires and Varthema indicated it in their travelogues. Varthema along with his company, for instance wanted to visit the Spice Islands. A discussion at Pedir whether they could further venture safely i.e. if it was secure from robbers and corsairs, and the subsequent conversation between him and his conversant are worth noting. The reply to Varthema's query goes as follows: "*That secure from robbers we might go, but not from the chances of the sea*"; and they said that we could not go to the said island with that large ship. My companion said: "*What means then might there be for going to this island?*" They answered: "*That it was necessary to purchase a *chiampana* [*sampan*, junk], " that is, a small vessel, of which many are found there..."⁷⁸ This dialogue indicates that the fear of people who looted at the sea was less as compared the sea which was the cause of more anxiety. There was a need, hence, to sail in indigenous crafts like *sampan* which had been built to adapt to the dangerous waters.*

The insular part was known for its tropical climate and vegetation. A sort of skill and technique were required to transverse

through such a tropical area. Like the Coromandel Coast where indigenous vessels used to pass through rough harbours, similar was the case with Southeast Asia where *sampan* like vessels were required to pass through rough seas. Thus the decisive factor in both the regions was the question of accessibility. The indigenous vessels particular to the area helped the Europeans in both the region. In archipelago Southeast Asia, the vessel was sometimes called, Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian or simply *prohu* has been well delineated in the nautical literature. Its most abiding features were – a keel, a hull built by joining planks to the keel, and then to each other by means of wooden dowels. Iron nails were not used. This was a practical small freight vessel, which had been in use for many years in many parts of Indonesia. In the age of sail, these vessels carried cargoes from amount between 4 to 40 tonnes across the seas of Southeast Asia. However, in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, it was not this vessel that dominated the trading routes. Much larger vessels with two or three masts and with many features of the *prahu* like dowelled hulls, double rudders, keels continued most of the longer distance and tonnage. These have been unanimously described as junks.⁷⁹

In the seventeenth century, if one crossed the Sunda straits, then the Dutch banner swaying with the breeze could be noticed. This was Batavia or Calapa as was known to the indigenous populace. It was headquarter of the Dutch East India Company and had occupied the site of the old city of Djakarta [the seat of a Javanese kingdom] since 1619 CE. It was a magnificent port where according to Pires “*trade is greatest and whither they all sail from Sumatra, and Palembang, Laue, Tamjompura, Malacca, Makassar, Java and Madura and many other places.*”⁸⁰ Located on the island of Java⁸¹, south of equator, this isle had also been known for a number of kingdoms.⁸² On the western side of the island lay another place called Bantam⁸³. It was an independent kingdom at the beginning of the seventeenth century and was famous for pepper production. Alexander Hamilton noted as late in 1727 CE that “*the only Product of Bantam is Pepper, wherein it abounds so much that they can export 10, 000 Tuns per annum.*”⁸⁴ Linschoten did not fail to mention the locale of the pepper creepers. The place has been marked

as Sunda Calapa, which lay to the east of Bantam.⁸⁵ An English factory was established there in 1603 CE which was in existence till 1682 CE when the Dutch interlopers ousted the English. Like most of the places in this part of the world, the revenues of Bantam were dependent on shipping. Peter Floris who was a merchant, for instance noted that even upon the insistence of his Company, the *Pangaran*⁸⁶ of Bantam did not exempt them from duties. The reason the latter cited was that ‘*the King was att greate charges and his revenewes butt little, and yf hee shoulde receyve nothing of suche ships, who then woulde bee able to doe it?*’⁸⁷

Besides pepper there were other products for which the island of Java was known. Rice, along with various kinds of fowl and vegetables were abundant. There was also a known trade of slaves. Pires noted that “two or three junks come from Malacca to Sunda every year for slaves, rice and pepper”⁸⁸. Like other people in Southeast Asia, the Javanese also very often came to Malacca to trade. They brought cargo in *lancharas*, and also in ships of a hundred and fifty tons. The kingdom also had junks. Other commodities which fetched good prices in the market were mace, cloves, nutmegs, black as well as white benioin and camphor. These products were bartered with assorted cloths from India of which the bales from Coromandel also figured in the list. Besides the linen from the south-eastern coast of India, a special reference was made to the ‘*painted Tapen from S. Thomas*’⁸⁹. The clothes brought by the keling merchants-*balachos* and *atobalachos*- also figure in their list.

Pires unlike Barros does not seem to compartmentalize between Sunda and Java. Giving a general account of the people and mannerisms of Sunda [Java], he observed that: “*Sunda is [land of] chivalrous, seafaring warriors-they say more so than the Javanese, taking them all in all.... The people on the sea coast get on well with the merchants in the land. They are accustomed to trade.*”⁹⁰ So it was trade again that integrated this island largely. Another noticeable characteristic of the island was the practise of Islam. According to Duarte Barbosa, the inhabitants of the hinterland are “Heathens” but the ones who dominate the sea-haven are “Moors”⁹¹. Tome Pires also attested to this fact and wrote in great detail how Java was Islamized.

After leaving Java Major one would encounter an array of islands of various sizes. Travelling further along the coast south-east, the exponent would reach Bali, Lombok and Java Minor, in that order. Java Minor was also known as Sumbava in the contemporary nautical literature and was known to be a place well-furnished with victuals. All these lands brought slaves and horses to sell in Java from where in return they took cloth. Beyond these islands there lay the island of Bima. Known for its brazil-wood, this was taken to Malacca to be sold in the mart. From Malacca, this wood was further loaded in the ships going to China. Besides, slaves and horses were meant for the market of Java. It was normal for the people travelling to Banda and the Moluccas to call here for they bought clothes here which sold well further east.⁹² Continuing the journey further east in the archipelago the exponent would arrive at Solor. Flores and Timor which were collectively known as the Lesser Sunda islands. A small village of Larantuka on Flores also attracted the Portuguese interest later.

Solor supplied foodstuffs to Malacca. Sulphur which according to Pires was found in abundance was also supplied to Malacca and from there it was re-exported to Cochin China. Timor occupied a great importance in micro-regional as well as macro-regional commerce. It was one of the few official settlements of the Portuguese in Southeast Asia. The white sandalwood was the specific product of the island which made it assume a place of significance in the world of commerce. It was of great value in India and Persia.⁹³ In exchange for this product, they procured varieties of cloth at Malacca among which the cloth from 'Paleacate' which was *balachos* and *cotabalachos* figured prominently. Antonio Bocarro, a contemporary Portuguese chronicler wrote in 1635 about the prosperity of Solor and the flourishing sandalwood trade from Timor with Macao.⁹⁴ The Europeans generally visited the island periodically for sandalwood but trade and later conversions were centred on Solor. In these Lesser Sunda islands, the Dominican missionaries preached Christianity in the sixteenth as well as the seventeenth centuries.

Most of the contemporary travellers found the voyage to Timor remunerative but unhealthy. Sailing in the narrow seas, which had reefs and shoals caused problems in navigation. Only the skilled

indigenous sailors were trained and equipped to handle a vessel. That is why one notices that the Europeans hired the indigenous pilots to navigate in these parts. Another factor which ruled was the flow of winds. For instance, the vessels which were bound for Banda journeyed from Malacca in the monsoon season. Between the islands of Bima and Solor, the sea was known to be full of reefs which caused many accidents. So in order to avert such miseries, the ships started passing through the channel where the risk was less. The ships that were destined from Malacca to the Spice Islands took the following course: Malacca-Java- Batu Tara-Buru- thence either to Banda or to the Moluccas. The one with fictive character has already voyaged till Solor and Timor and is now ordained to enter the world of the land of spices.

Making a sojourn at Batutara [Komba island] would be better before taking the route to Banda or Amboina [Amboyna]. The Banda Isles were known for the production of nutmeg and mace. Being six in number- Lontar, Ai, Run, Rozengain, Nailaka and Gunong Api- they attracted considerable attraction because of the products and good anchorage. A great quantity of mace was produced in the above-mentioned five islands respectively. Describing nutmeg and how from it mace was produced, Linschoten very aptly noted the process.⁹⁵ The nutmeg was known to the indigenous populace as *Palla* and the mace was known as *Buna Palla*. There were two varieties of nutmegs that were produced. The long variety was called *Males* and the rounded one was considered better and stronger. Considered good for cold and digestion, the people of Banda also extracted oil from this fruit and preserved it in sugar for its use year around. The Javanese and the Malays used to procure cloth to sell in Banda which was a novelty besides nutmeg and mace being the main production of the isle, clove was also sold. Loads of cloves were brought from the Moluccas to Amboyna and from Amboyna to Banda for the sails.

Travelling further from Banda in search of more spices, the itinerant would reach Ceram and from there he would advance on to Amboyna. The island of Amboyna did not produce much quantity of spices. Clove⁹⁶ was the main produce of the island. The ships that were on their way to the Moluccas from Malacca did

stop here for refreshments and fresh water. From here the narrator can travel further towards the northern side in order to procure for more cloves which one finds on reaching the Moluccas. Though the name Moluccas or Maluku, has been used over the years in a wider sense, but geographically it was a collective name to five small islands producing cloves. These islands are: Ternate, Tidore, Motir, Makian and Bacan. Of these only Ternate was the official realm of the Portuguese while Tidore constituted the unofficial part.

Among these islands, Ternate was the most attracted one. Being a good site for anchorage as well as having a healthy air and a good product to buy, Ternate was preferred by Europeans greatly. There were merchants of other Asian diasporas also who came to trade on this island. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the populace of this island had already accepted Islam. Besides an enormous clove production which was harvested generally six times in a year, it also produced some coarse cloth. But it was supplemented by the one brought from Cambay along with patterned clothes from other places which were of great value. Travelling further with the eloquent narrator one would reach Tidore. The people of this isle had first understood the value of the cloves from the Chinese traders. A sixteenth century Spanish traveller, Antonio Pigafetta who visited Tidore pointed that the Moluccans “*did not care for the cloves*” until Muslims began visiting Tidore and Ternate in 1470 CE.⁹⁷ Though people of this island were also practising Islam, the politics of Ternate and Tidore even then were at loggerheads. Half of the island of Motir, according to Pires, was subject of Tidore.⁹⁸ The king of Tidore and Motir brought cloves of their lands to the island of Makian to be sold there. This was because the latter island had a very good port. So these three islands were inter-dependent on each other. The last of these islands, Bacan produced cloves which were very distinct as compared to that produced in other islands in the group. Having a good port as well, it made the commerce easy and sustainable. It also produced a great amount of pitch, as reported.

Travelling from Bacan towards the south, one would reach Seram which is located opposite to Amboyna. Steering the sail

in a westerly direction would make the navigator to land at the Celebes. Makassar, a port situated on the extreme south-western part of the peninsula of Celebes. This port had trading contacts with Borneo, Java, and Malacca and as far as Siam. After crossing Makassar, one would reach the great island of Borneo. Known as the great store-house of camphor, this was a trading commodity also across the Bay of Bengal. Barbosa noted that the camphor produced was edible and worth its measure in silver. He records that the merchants “*carry in powder in cane tubes to Narsyngua, Malabar and Daquem.*”⁹⁹ Besides the Malaccans, the Chinese, the Siamese and other merchants also frequented the marts of Borneo for trading. The cloth brought by the *keling* merchants had a great market here. The fictive itinerant having travelled through the biggest archipelago of the world now commences his return voyage to the straits of Malacca. The sea being rough between Borneo and Java, travellers were often suggested to take a larger vessel at Borneo. It would take a month to reach Malacca from thence.

In all these places located far and beyond the Lesser Sunda islands, spice production and trading was a common occurrence. Besides this there is some kind of commonality that can be observed in the food habits. Rice, sago and fish comprised their staple diet. In fact the observation of Pyrard de Laval is accurate in this sense. He commented on Banda, Borneo, Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas as: “*I content myself with speaking of them altogether, because they are inhabited by the same people, and lie under the same parallel and climate, with the same temperature or in temperature. The air is not very healthy, but rather the reverse; and food is very dear- nay, very frequently cannot be got for money; for the supply by sea is not to be depended on.*”¹⁰⁰

Thus with a cursory glance at the world of Coromandel and insular Southeast Asia with the fictive traveller gave the insight of the region of our study. The so-called mysterious world of the land of spices and the wide circulation of the varieties of cloth procured by the ‘*klings*’ from the Coromandel in the nooks and corners of Southeast Asia has enabled to visualize how the whole macro-region was united in a world of its own. This was the world which the Portuguese explored, tried to monopolize and establish their

presence in the sixteenth century for which they had to witness an immense competition in the succeeding hundred years.

NOTES

1. The expression *East Indies* is widely used in the contemporary records and accounts of the 16th and 17th centuries.
2. The Brouwer Route was discovered in 1616. Developed by the Dutch, the vessels that were to travel along this route were supposed to sail directly to Indonesia once they reached Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch vessels made their way along the Indian coast and often touched Ceylon *en route*.
3. "The Voyage and Travel of M. Cæsar Fredericke, Marchant of Venice, into the East India, and beyond the Indies" in Hakluyt, Richard, *The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, Volume V, AMS Press Inc., New York, 1965, pp. 395-396.
4. Deriving its name from Colamandalam, this coast came to be known as the coast. It meant the circle of the Cholas or more precisely the politico-cultural region of the Cholas.
5. Temple, R.C. (ed.) Thomas Bowrey, *A geographical account of the Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679*, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 2-3.
6. Negapatnam was also known as the 'snake town'.
7. Baldaeus, AES, 2000, p. 651.
8. Sanjay Subrahmanyam explains in great detail how rice was an important commodity in the intra-coastal trade from this region. For more details, refer to Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Political Economy of Commerce*, CUP, 1990.
9. Jones, J.W. (ed.), *The itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502-1508*, The Argonaut Press, London, 1928, p. 72.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Karikal was also known as Chereacalle to Barros, Quilicare by Barbosa, Carcal to Baldaeus, Carecall to Pires.
12. Baldaeus, AES, 2000, p. 652.
13. *Ibid.*
14. The legend of St. Thomas had existed since the early days of the Catholic Church with its creation as an organized body having religious and administrative structures, of the twelve, two apostles moved away from Palestine-Santiago towards Spain and St Thomas towards India. Even after the headquarters of the Church shifted to Rome, the preoccupation of the Pope, who was the Bishop of Rome and the head of the new faith, was to establish contact with them and also with these two centers of the faith.
15. Barros [Da Asia de João de Barros, Decada III, Livro VIII, Edicao Liveraria Sam Carlos, Lisboa, 1973, pp. 222] wrote: "*One of the things that King Dom Manuel used to press on the Governors of India, was that they would be*

particularly interested in getting information about group of Christians in the East and regarding the life of the Apostle St. Thomas and if it was true that this body was buried in these areas; the same sort of interest was prevalent in the instructions given by his son Dom Joao."

16. Fawcett, Charles and Burn, Richards, *The Travels of the Abbé Carré in India and the Near East, 1672 to 1674*, Vol. II, The Hakluyt Society, 1947, p. 436.
17. Fryer [Crooke, William(Edt), *A New account of East India and Persia being nine years' travels, 1672-1681*, Vol. I, The Hakluyt Society, 1909, p. 115] observed that São Thomé was 'a city that formerly for riches, pride, and luxury, was second to none in India.' Alexander Hamilton [Vol. I, 198] wrote that 'the city of St. Thomas was formerly the best mart town on the Choromandel Coast.'
18. Barbosa while describing the 'Kingdom of Narsingha' in the 16th century spoke of São Thomé as '*very great an fair*' [Dames, M.L.(ed.), *The book of Duarte Barbosa*, Vol. II, AES, 1989, p. 126].
19. Cummins, J.S., *The Travels of Navarrete*, 1962, Vol. II, p. 295. The Dominican father besides terming the mussoolas as 'odd boats' pointed out that '*they have no Nails or Pins, but the Boards are sew'd together with Ropes made of Coco, and Water enter'd by a thousand Holes...*'
20. Purchas, Samuel, *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, Vol. X, The Hakluyt Society, 1905, p. 109.
21. Crooke, William(Edt), *A New account of East India and Persia being nine years' travels, 1672-1681*, Vol. I, The Hakluyt Society, 1909, p. 116-117.
22. Up to 1653, the settlement was subordinate to the Chief of Bantam in Java. After this it was then raised to the rank of Presidency.
23. Cummins, J.S., 1962, Vol. II, p. 298.
24. Wheeler, J. Talboys, *Early records of British India- A History of the English settlements in India*, Office of the Superintendent of Government printing, Calcutta, 1878, p. 48.
25. Catamarans, according to Fryer [Vol. I, p. 74] were '*logs lashed to that advantage that they waft off all their Goods, only having a Sail in the midst, and Paddles to guide them.*'
26. Burn and Fawcett, Vol. II, 1947, p. 360.
27. Pulicat was the site of the first Dutch settlement on the Indian mainland. The town has the history of being transferred between the Dutch and English several times in succession.
28. Dames, Vol. II, 1989 p. 132.
29. Ibid, p. 130.
30. Jones, J.W. 1928 p. 74.
31. Sen, Surendranath, *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1949, p. 148.
32. Ball, V., *Travels in India by Jean Baptiste Tavernier*, Macmillan and Co., Vol. I, 1889, p. 175.
33. Narsapur was also the place where ships were built on this coast.

34. Temple, R.C., 1997, p. 4.
35. Moreland, W.H.(ed), Peter Floris, His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-1615, London, 1934, p. 9. Peter Floris noted :“*We came before Paleacatte att ancker, passing over the (drough the) shallowe , not being a lenghte above a musket shatt, having butt 3 fadeem water, which is very dangerous for greate ships*”.
36. Deloche, Jean, Transport and Communications in India Prior to Steam Locomotion, Vol. II, OUP, 1994, p. 101. He states that- the coast, extending to the North of the colonial capital, is better suited for maritime settlement; firstly, because there are several deeper lagoons forming good shelter; then because the access to the estuaries is easier. The amplitude of the tide progressively increases as one advances towards Vangal, the mouths and the outlets are not obstructed by sandy bars during the dry seasons and are open throughout the year with a not inconsiderable water depth.
37. Temple, R.C., 1997, p. 3.
38. Also refer to “Imperial Gazzeeter of Madras, Provincial Series, I, Superintendent of Government printing, Calcutta, 1908, p. 14” for more details.
39. Blanford, Henry F., A practical guide to the Climates and Weather of India, Ceylon and Burmah and the storms of the Indian seas, Macmillan and Co., 1889.
40. Barbosa noted that: “*very fruitful and abounds in rice, flesh-meat, wheat and all vegetables of other kinds are also found there.*” Dames, M.L., Vol. II, p. 125.
41. Temple, R.C. (ed.) Thomas Bowrey, A geographical account of the Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 42-3. Bowrey gave a comprehensive description of the way these vessels were built by Macoas and how useful they were to combat the rough seas.
42. Tomé Pires noted the movement of keling merchants who were from the and dominated the trade at Malacca. In this regard he commented-“*They generally left Malacca in January and came back again in October.*” Cortesao, Armando (ed.), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, Vol. II, The Hakluyt Society, 1944, p. 272.
43. Anthony Reid has wonderfully connoted this term to explain how Southeast Asia was a vivacious tropical world which was a ‘world’ in itself.
44. The pattern of division of the mainland and archipelago has been adopted by Nicholas Tarling in his edited work, “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, ” Vol. I. CUP, 1992. While the mainland includes China (south of Yangtze), Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and peninsular Malaysia; the archipelago comprises of Indonesia, and all the islands further east.
45. Cortesão, A., The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, Vol. II, The Hakluyt society, London, 1944, p. 204.
46. Jones, John Winter (ed.), The itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502-1508, The Argonaut Press, London, 1928, p. 85.
47. *Bughâz* meant a strait in Arabic.

48. Cortesão, Armando (ed.), Vol. II, 1944, p. 246.
49. Andaya, , Barbara Watson in Tarling, N.(ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. I, CUP, 1992, p. 202.
50. Pires noted that “...*the said kings came to be in Malacca, ... for all the things and lands and districts were nothing in comparison with Malacca...*” Cortesão, Armando (ed.), Vol. II, 1944, p. 251.
51. Brown, C.C., (trans), Sĕjarah Mĕlayu, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, pp. 163. Sĕjarah Mĕlayu is a compilation of stories about the Sultanate of Melaka.
52. Reid, vol II, 1993, p. 83.
53. Brown, 1976, p. 76.
54. “The *Bemdara* is a kind of chief-justice in all civil and criminal affairs. He also has charge of the king’s revenue.” Cortesão, Vol. II, p. 264.
55. Pires observed that Lasemana was a sort of admiral: “Everybody at sea, and junks and lancharas are under this man’s jurisdiction.” Ibid.
56. Tome Pires gives a descriptive list of merchants who traded at Malacca. It is as follows: *Moors* from Cairo, Mecca, Aden, Abyssinians, men of Kilwa, Malindi, Ormuz, Parsees, *Rumes*, Turks, Turkomans, Christian Armenians, Gujaratees, men of Chaul, Dabhol, Goa, of the kingdom of Deccan, Malabars and Klings, merchants from Orissa, Ceylon, Bengal, Arakan, Pegu, Siamese, men of Kedah, malays, men of Pahang, Patani, Cambodia, *Champa*, Cochin China, Chinese, *Lequeos*, men of Brunei, *Luçoes*, men of *Tamjompura*, *Laue*, Banka, Linga (they have a thousand other islands), Moluccas, Banda, Bima, Timor, Madura, Java, Sunda, Palembang, Jambi, Tongkal, Indragiri, Kappatta, Menangkabau, Siak, *Arqua* (Arcat?) , Aru, Bata, country of the *Tomjano* , Pase, Pedir, Maldives.
57. Under this term, Pires puts the merchants from Malabar and see Vol. II, p. 271.
58. Cortesao, Vol. II, p. 265.
59. Brown, C.C. (Trans.) Sĕjarah Mĕlayu, OUP, 1970, p. 181. One of the related anecdote goes on as- “*when Sri Maharaja had become Bendahara, the city of Melaka steadily increased in prosperity and in population, for Bendahara Sri Maharaja was exceedingly just and humane, clever in his handling of foreigners and skilled in conciliating the good will of the populace. So much so that in ships bound for Melaka from above the wind it was the custom, as the anchor was being weighed, for the master of the ship, afterreceiving the usual prayer to say: May we reach Melaka safely and see Pisang Jerman, the stream of Bukit China and Benadahara Sri Maharaja!*” And the crew would answer, “*Ay, ay, Sir!*”
60. Pires noted: “*They [Malayans] pay three per cent, and besides this a royal due of six per cent in the case of a foreigner, and three in the case of a native. A present is paid to the king, and the Bemdara , and the Tumunguo, and the Xabandar of the nation in question, and tese presents will amount to one or two per cent. According as the Xabandar decides, so the merchants pay,*

because the xabandares are sympathetic to the merchants and of the same nations as the merchants; and sometimes they give more, according as the xabandares wish to be on good terms with the king and the mandarins. And this done they sell their goods freely.” Ibid., p. 273.

61. The merchants from Tamil coast have been documented in the sources as keeling merchants.
62. Cortesão, Vol. II, p. 273.
63. Ibid., p. 272.
64. Hall, K.R., *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Vol. I, 1992, pp. 218
65. Colombijn, Freek, ‘The Volatile State in Southeast Asia: Evidence from Sumatra, 1600-1800’, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (May, 2003), p. 497.
66. Besides Colombijn, there have been array of important scholars who have at various times talked about the nature of chequered polities of Southeast Asia. So for further reference one can refer to: Reid, Anthony, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce; Expansion and Crisis, 1450-1680*, Vol. II, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 202 and pp. 251-52; Ricklefs, M.C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, Macmillan, 1991; Andaya, Barbara Watson, “Political Developments between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth centuries” in Tarling, Nicholas (ed) *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Vol. I, CUP, 1992.
67. Parameswara meant Prince Consort and was the style of one married to a princess of higher rank than himself.
68. Cortesão, 1944, Vol. II, p. 231.
69. Cortesão, A., *The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, The Hakluyt society, London, 1944, Vol. I, p. 147.
70. This is how the textiles from are termed in the region.
71. The Malay word is *rotan*, which means a cane.
72. Pedir was the name of a port as well as of a kingdom. It was located on the north coast of Sumatra.
73. Jones, 1928, p. 86.
74. Dames, Vol. II, 1989 p. 196.
75. Pacem or Pasei was a Malay state near the north eastern point of Sumatra.
76. *Maz* is a gold weight used in Sumatra, equivalent to one sixteenth of a *tael* or ounce.
77. Cortesão, Vol. II, 1944, p. 233.
78. Jones, 1928, p. 87.
79. Reid, Vol. II, 1993, p. 36.
80. Cortesão, Vol. I, p. 172.
81. The western part of the island of Java was termed as Sunda. Often differentiated in the 16th century, an impression grew among the European travelers that they were two different islands. The Sunda was considered to extend from the extreme western part of the island to Cheribon, which

meant that it embraced one-third of the island of Java. Joao de Barros <Barros, Lisboa, 1973, IV, I, p. 12> in his chronicle in 1553 wrote: “*Of the island of Jaüa we make two islands, one before the other, lying west and east as if both on one parallel.... But the Jaos themselves do not reckon two islands of Jaoa, but only one, of the length that has been stated... about a third in length of this island towards the west constitutes Sunda, of which we have now to speak. The natives of that part consider their country to be an island divided from Jaüa by a river, little known to our navigators, called by them Chiamo or Chenano, which cuts off right from the sea, all that third part of the land in such a way that when these natives define the limits of Jaüa they say that on the west it is bounded by the island of Sunda, and separated from it by river Chiamo, and on the east by the island of Bali, and that on the north they have the island of Madura, and on the south the unexplored sea...*”.

82. Pires <Cortesao, Vol. I, p. 166> gives a comprehensive list of the kingdoms in the island of Java. These were: Cherimon(*Cheroboam*), Japara, Losari (*Locarj*), Tegal(*Teteguall*), Samarang (*Camaram*), Demak (*Demaa*), Tidunan (*Tidumar*), Rembang (*Ramee*), Tuban (*Tobam*), Sidayu (*Cedayo*), Grisee (*Agacij*), Surabaya (*Curubaya*), Gamda, Blambangan (*Bulambuam*), Pajarakan (*Pajarucam*), *Camtã*, Panarukan (*Panarunca*), *Chamdy*, and Madura.
83. Pyrrard de Laval <The Voyage of François Pyrrard de Laval to the East Indies, The Maldives, The Moluccas and Brazil, The Hakluyt Society, 1888, Vol. II, Part I, p. 161> noted about Bantam that : “*The town is situate on low and marshy ground, being between two arms of the river, so that for the most part of the winter the river is overflowed throughout the town, and one cannot go through the streets but by boats. The streets are not paved: in nearly all parts of the town there are quantities of coco-trees. Outside the walled enclosure are a great number of houses for the foreigners*”.
84. Foster, William (ed) Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, The Argonaut Press, 1930 Vol. II, p. 127.
85. According to Linschoten < Burnell and Tiele (ed) The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies, Vol. I, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1997, p. 112>: “*The principall haven in the Island is Sunda Calapa...in this place of Sunda there is much Pepper, and is better then that of India or Malabar, whereof there is so great quantitie, that they could lade yearlie from thence 4 or 5 thousand kintales Portingales waight...*”
86. *Pangeran* is the Malay word for governor.
87. Moreland, W.H.(ed), Peter Floris His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe 1611-1615, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1934, p. 24.
88. Cortesão, Vol. I, p. 169.
89. Burnell and Tiele, vol I, 1997, p. 114.
90. Cortesão, Vol. I, p. 167.
91. Dames, M.L. , Vol. II, p. 190.
92. Cortesão, vol I, p. 203.

93. Damel, M.L., 1921, vol II, p. 196; Hamilton, Alexander, A New Account of the East Indies, The Argonaut Press, 1930 Vol. II, pp. 139-140.
94. Bragança Pereira, A.B. de, (anotado), Arquivo Português Oriental, Tomo IV, História Administrativa, Vol. II, 1600-1699, Parte II (Livro das plantas de tôdas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da India Oriental) por António Bocarro, Tipografia Rangel, Bastorá, 1938, pp. 53-55.
95. Linschoten's observation goes as: "*The fruite is altogether like great round Peaches, the inward part whereof is the Nutmegge. This hath about it a hard shell like wood, wherein the Nut lyeth loose: and this wooden shel or huske is covered over with Nutmeg flower, which is called Mace, and over it is the fruit e... When it is ripe it is a verie costly meate, and of a pleasant savor.*" (Burnell, Arthur Coke and Tiele, P.A., (ed), The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies, Vol. II, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1997, p. 84.) Barbosa (Dames, Vol. II, 1989, p. 97) also reported the nutmeg and mace production as: "*And in three of them grows abundance of nutmeg and mace on certain trees like unto bay trees, whereof the fruits is the nut; over it spreads the mace like a flower, and above that again another thick rind. One quintal of mace is worth here as much as seven of nutmeg. The abundance is such that they burn it, and it may be had almost for the asking.*"
96. The clove 'nail' as traded was the dried flower bud of the tropical evergreen tree, *Syzygium aromaticum* or *Caryophyllus aromaticus*. There are several descriptions of these clove producing islands of which Pires's is notable. Tomé Pires (The Suma oriental, Vol. I, 1944, pp. 213-214). While giving a description of the Moluccas, he noted the clove production—"*The Molucca islands which produce cloves are five, to wit, the chief one is called Ternate and another Tidore and another Motir (Motes) and another Makyan (Maqujen) and another Bachian (Pachan). And there is also a great deal of wild cloves in the part of Gillolo (Jeilolo) in the land of the island of Gillolo (Bato China)... There five islands must produce about six hundred bahars of cloves a year—sometimes a thousands more, or a thousand less. It is true that merchandise brought in Malacca for five hundred reis will buy a bahar of clove in the Moluccas. The bahar is by Malacca weight, because they weigh it in accordance with that, and the merchants take the scales, as it is sometimes worth more, sometimes less, just a little. There are six crops of cloves every year... cloves were always worth nine or ten cruzados a bahar in Malacca when they were plentiful, and twelve cruzados a bahar when they were scarce.*" Though it is doubtful that Varthema (Jones, J.W., The itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502 to 1508, The Argonaut Press, 1928, p. 89) ever visited the Moluccas, but his clear description of the clove production is noteworthy:
- "The tree of the cloves is exactly like the box tree, that is thick, and the leaf is like that of Cinnamon, but it is a little more round, and is of that colour which I have already mentioned to you... when these cloves are ripe, the said men beat them down with canes, and place some mats under the said tree to*

catch them. The place where these trees are is like sand...We found that they [Cloves] were sold for twice as much as the nutmegs, but by measure, because these people do not understand weights."

97. Reid, II, 1993, p. 6.
98. Cortesão, 1944, Vol. I, p. 217.
99. Dames, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 207-208.
100. Gray, Albert, 1888 Vol. II, Part I, p. 169.

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Across the Littoral: Portuguese Presence in the World of Coromandel and Archipelago Southeast Asia

THE SEA from time immemorial has bonded various littorals and the communities that nestled along its shores. The maritime world of Coromandel and archipelago Southeast Asia were also part of the same coherent process that had been in existence for long. Commerce, no doubt was the factor that controlled the dynamics of this linkage. So this world was always on the commercial move. From the *mussoolas* and *catamarans* of the Coromandel coast to *junks*, *lancharas* and *prohus* of insular Southeast Asia- all of them catered to this bustling trade network. The Portuguese made efforts to discover this world in the early sixteenth century. They were able to understand the importance of port-state of Malacca that led to its subsequent conquests. Malacca being the initial point of Portuguese explorations in the archipelago, various veins of trade were traced by the Iberians that were soon bound to come within the ambit of their control. In order to understand Portuguese presence in the region, there is a need to understand firstly how and why they came to this part of the globe. It is a later story though as the Portuguese ventures became more deeply entrenched in the commercial world of the Indian Ocean under *Estado da Índia* that the nature of their presence was classified as official and unofficial.¹

The testimonies of Periplus, Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta and the likes mark the Arabs as a dominant mercantile community in the web of commerce that lay across the Indian Ocean. Their mercantile and navigational knowledge were the resources the Portuguese acquired in their future endeavors. The aroma of the spices that had reached Europe through the Red Sea trade pursued the Portuguese to reach Asia though Prestor John had also gathered their attention. So among the many prevalent linkages across the Indian Ocean, the Coromandel-Southeast Asia connection began to dominate the Portuguese mindset. The earliest date for this contact is distinctly recorded around the first century CE as per the archaeological finds. The functional contact between the two regions, as has already been noticed in the previous chapter was based largely on the exchange of spices with the Coromandel textiles and vice versa. The Portuguese venture in this trade stood beneficial. Besides, the commercial activities, the Portuguese also influenced the indigenous people, at least in the area of settlement. Gradually there developed a heritage that left its imprints in the time to come.

Portuguese Expansion and the Presumption about the “east”

Prior to the invention of a compass, the stars and the coasts acted as guides for the ship on sail.² In the ship, there was a master and below him were other men. The master was the one who knew the art of navigating. In case a disastrous storm stuck the ship by a sudden surprise, the master would find himself and his art at the losing end. Many ships were lost in this way. Later on, the invention of the compass with the magnetic needle directed the travellers on their journeys through the land and through the vast seas. In the Renaissance period, the Italians invented the art of printing, making guns and perhaps the compasses too. When the Portuguese entered in the waters of the Indian Ocean, they found that the compass was being used by “the Mores, together with Cards and Quadrants to observe both the Heavens and the Earth.”³ The Arab navigators who were basically merchants and guided

the Portuguese in their search for exotic spices were the dominant mercantile group in the Indian Ocean trading world.⁴

At the time of the discovery of lands in the 'East', the Portuguese drew inspiration from two prevalent impulses—one was the spread of the greater glory, God and the other was making profits. It had surely led to a dramatic expansion in Asia and the Americas. But along with, there were other factors like the strategic and political ones that brought into being the expeditions. C.R. Boxer's classic work about the Portuguese expansion did classify the crusading zeal against the Muslims, the desire for Guinea gold, the quest for Prestor John and the search for oriental spices⁵ as the basic motives behind the zest. The holy men of the Company of Jesus or Jesuits, as they were known, spread the faith in the Indian Ocean world and assisted the Portuguese. A study done by Dauril Alden⁶ on this 'Company' reflects that it acted as the 'Portuguese Assistancy' in its seaborne empire. A. H. de Oliveira Marques observed the presence of a strong royal authority; the consequent disengagement from internal political problems; the national cohesion necessary for common efforts; the economic, social and other pressures pointing towards expansion; and a number of local conjunctural circumstances, varying with time and the country.⁷

To these earlier studies, Sanjay Subrahmanyam added another important motive and reasoned that the Portugal's turning towards the sea was due to its strategic location and relatively limited agrarian resources. His explanation further about the involvement of conscious choices and a measure of serendipity cast in terms of a nationalism determined in a matrix of Christian versus Moor and Portuguese versus Castilian opposition holds true.⁸ Portuguese enterprise can only be understood according to Malyn Newitt, when seen in the context of Europe's commercial relations with the East, the adverse balance of trade and the search for bullion to cover the payments gap; the decline of the economies of the Middle East and the shift of sugar production to the western Mediterranean with the consequent rise in the demand for land and slave labour; the expansion of the Genoese commercial empire in western and northern Europe and the making of the map making, shipping and commercial infrastructure that accompanied it; and finally in

terms of political and social struggles within Portugal itself which generated the first impulse towards emigration- always a powerful undercurrent and often one of the principal driving forces of expansion.⁹

The “whys” behind the Portuguese expansion, as the modern historiography portrays are very vital to understand *Estado’s* further endeavours in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Keeping the modern writings in the background, one cannot relinquish the spirit of Renaissance along with the centuries old traditions of seafaring at various times. It is well known that the exponents of the seafaring traditions were the philosophers of ancient Greece, geographers of Alexandria, the Roman seafarers, the Arab traders and the Venetians and the Genoese. The treaties about the ‘East’ like the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* and the other indirect references also encouraged explorations. Moreover prior to the voyage of Vasco da Gama, the image of the ‘East’ was shrouded with mystery that developed myths and theories about it.

The human nature to know his surroundings and unfold the mysteries of the earth created some obnoxious theories from the very early times. This can be understood as a part of history of explorations. In the European context, there existed different deductions among quarters to understand the planet that remained axiomatic till late. The Greeks, the earliest one among them claimed in their famous classic epic, ‘*Odyssey*’ that no ones geographical knowledge matched theirs. By the fifth century BCE, the Pythagorean School had evolved the theory of a spherical earth-a theory which was deduced on philosophical grounds rather than empirical grounds and had been followed by the liberal-minded ever since. The Greeks also gave birth to the concept of *oikoumene* or the area inhabited by Greeks or by men of a like nature. Though its limits were not known but it was felt that Ocean, which covered the rest of the globe, bound the land of the *oikoumene*. It was Plato who advanced the possibility of the land outside it, which he thought was towards the west. Aristotle believed in a great southward as well as in the eastward extension.

Along with the classical Greek and Roman writings, side by side another interesting advancement was taking place in the world of learning. This was the knowledge of Geography and Cartography, especially at the city of Alexandria that had become a great center of learning after decline of the Roman Empire. Figures like Ptolemy, Eratosthenes, Hipparchus and Posidonis contributed greatly to the existing notions in geography. Ptolemaic geography was a great addition as well as a transformation from the existing notion because this was the first time the map of world was sketched. Along with the continents of Europe, Africa and Asia, the Indian Ocean was also marked, which was assumed to be the Greater Mediterranean. The perception was that it was enclosed by the land bridge that ran from East Africa to south-eastern Asia. A truncated Indian peninsula and the Golden Chersonese (the Malay Peninsula) were featured in it. Beyond this was the Sinus Magnus or Great Gulf, and beyond again the region where the African land bridge terminated. According to Penrose, this latter feature gave rise to the portrayal of two Malay Peninsulas in the early sixteenth century cartography, while the concept of the Indian Ocean puzzled the Portuguese and other Europeans before the arrival of Vasco da Gama.¹⁰ Such works formed the base of early travels and writings of the Europeans about Asia in the fifteenth and in the later century. The misunderstanding or distorting of the geography in the quest to know the unknown or newly-explored regions was a common trait in them.

The long-known tradition of Arab Geography also contributed to the enrichment of the European knowledge. Its introduction was epitomized in the career of Edrisi (1100-1166 CE), a Muslim from Ceuta. Albert Magress and Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century also contributed to the development of geography. Further the contribution of Ptolemaic geography¹¹ by Jacobelus Angelus (1406-1410 CE) was a step forward. Thus rich traditions of knowledge and learning provided a basic ground or more appropriately helped in the development of the background on which the Portuguese worked as a part of their endeavors of maritime expansion. During the sixteenth, seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, there were

no amazing advances made in the field of navigation. Large ships with high capacity of load and greater speed along with the better control of the winds and utilization of sea currents remained the key features of navigation.

Besides such an array of developments in the geographical knowledge of the Europeans, there are insights that one gets from the contemporary texts about the latter's perceptions of the indigenous populace. This is the usage of the terms like Moor, Heathen, Pagan, Gentues, and Barbarian which were frequently used in the lingua of the times. The expression of these terms becomes more frequent in the case of Southeast Asian archipelago. It can be possible that when an eloquent orator visited these places, he felt superior and so labeled such terms. Or it could have been a method employed to justify the need to culture the 'uncultured' indigenous lot and thus legitimize the European domination over the territory. Thus the issues of superiority and culturing the 'uncultured' ones were the dominant trends in the writing of the period. This is also reflected in the writings of the missionary orders who found the prospects of enhancing their faith among such children of God.

Taking into consideration the case of the Moluccas would explain European perceptions more evidently. The Moluccas, which was the spice-producing zone, had caught attention of the Portuguese on their first voyages to Malacca. Adjudging the prosperity of Venice due to its involvement in spice trade,¹² the temptation to explore the Moluccas could hardly be resisted. Though the awareness of the spices was much prevalent in Europe yet Varthema, an early sixteenth century traveller commented on the people of the Moluccas as being "*very weak of understanding, and in strength they have no vigour, but live like beasts.*"¹³ Such a remark suggests that it was a pre-conceived notion and it is doubtful that Varthema ever visited the region! Barbosa opined about the people of Celebes as 'flesh-eater's' which he justified by saying that "*if the king of Maluco wishes to put to death any person condoned by law they beg him to be delivered to them to eat as if they were asking for a pig.*"¹⁴ Such notes enhance strong contentions about the sort of sordid conceptions the travellers had.

There were other instances, which seem to show that the local population tried to instill fear in the minds of our narrators so that the latter kept away. While describing Sumatra, Barbosa speaks of the kingdom of Aru, which comprised of ‘Heathens’ who were flesh eaters. Continuing further, he mentioned, “*every foreigner when they can take they eat without any pity whatsoever*”.¹⁵ This could however be an exaggeration, for another contemporary Pires acknowledges that: “*the people of Aru are presumptuous and warlike and no one trusts them. If they do not steal they do not live, and therefore no one is friendly with them*”.¹⁶ There is a sharp difference in the perception of Barbosa and Pires, though both of them were almost contemporaries, traveling in the sixteenth century in Asia. Probably Barbosa did not like the nature of the people of Aru, which made him simply regard them as “flesh-eaters”. So he acknowledged them with a term which is just not in agreement with other writings of the time. The later writings contest such views. John Crawfurd, a high authority on the themes pertaining to Southeast Asia condemned them and termed it to be false and worthless. Writing in the late 19th century, Alfred Russel Wallace with a refined bend of mind observed that: “*Men of a superior race freely trade with men of a lower race. It extends trade no doubts for a time, but it demoralizes the native, checks true civilization, and does not lead to any permanent increase in the wealth of the country*”.¹⁷

The perceptions about archipelago Southeast Asia were still milder when compared with those of the ‘New World’. Those pertaining to Americas were obsessed with Cannibalism and savagery.¹⁸ Firstly, either it was the discourse of Varthema, Barbosa or Barros, the construct of the other was authorized by the other. Secondly, the three stages identified by Michael de Certeau¹⁹ can be liberally applied for most of the itinerants proceeded with the idea of visiting east that was acclaimed for spices. The claims made by the early travellers were not entirely true. They either never visited the concerned area or just gave a hypothetical account or even if they ventured, they revealed similar picture so as to subjugate the ‘other’. Oliveira Marques also noted that most of the geographical knowledge was transmitted to the Portuguese not only through

the commercial and political currents connecting them with the rest of Europe, but also by the Portuguese ambassadors, travellers, and pilgrims who returned home.²⁰ In fact, Barros, the famous 16th century state chronicler of Portugal never visited Asia and wrote his series on the information that was brought back by such intrepid itinerants. The myths and theories that became part of the 16th century discourse were a part of the mindset of the Portuguese as well as those who first travelled in these regions. They had always been present latently in the thought. To understand the Portuguese conquest and expansion in Asia in their context can explain the different nuances that developed in the process of expansion.

Most of the monarchs of Portugal were preoccupied with the maritime expansion. Bailey W. Diffie observed that the growing wealth and the increasing importance of the Portuguese merchant class and those of foreign merchants who were using Portugal as a base, was exclusively confined due to trade in goods for which the Portuguese had hold in northern Europe, Spain, Granada and North Africa. This experience helped Portugal in preparing for an overseas expansion that the fifteenth century was to witness.²¹ Among the authors who wrote about European expansion, the early ones followed the traditional view by allocating the chief role of the Portuguese rulers. They described the works of the kings and specially held accolades for Prince Henry's efforts. Ascribing the establishment of the 'school' of Sagres as Prince Henry's great contribution for promoting maritime activities, the eulogy began with Samuel Purchas's seventeenth century work which has since then not been bypassed in the writings.

Donald F. Lach, an exponent on the theme remarked about the development of the port of Laiges as harbour by Prince Henry at Sagres from where regular small expeditions were sent to the Atlantic coast.²² Diffie argued the theory of the existence of 'school' at Sagres and said that it was just a legend, which grew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and moreover Barros (who is acclaimed to have written about this 'school') wrote nothing about it.²³ Observing Portuguese expansion in a wider context, Malyn Newitt pointed that it should not center on the personalities

of Prince Henry and Vasco da Gama rather it can be dated back to the battle of Aljubarrota in 1385 CE that secured the throne of Portugal for the House of Avis. An amphibious expedition about thirty years later captured the Moroccan coastal town of Ceuta. From that point the great epic unfolds through settlement of the Atlantic islands and expeditions of exploration down the African coast that lead eventually to the first successful voyage to India and two years later to the discovery of Brazil.²⁴

Portuguese institutions had not undergone any of the changes associated with the emergence of the early modern state when overseas expansion began in the fifteenth century. Government still meant personal rule by the monarch. The country and most of the towns were controlled by the church, the Military Orders and the great nobles. Financial institutions consisted of the private transactions of money-lenders; armed forces were still levies of services nobility and their retainers. During the process of overseas expansion the Portuguese state attempted to enlarge and develop its capacity to manage a vast, worldwide enterprise, but it is a key to understanding the story of Portuguese imperialism that this transition to a modern, professional, bureaucratic state failed. That the Portuguese Empire endured so long was due not Portugal's ability to mobilize state resources or private capital but to the activities of the mixed race the Portuguese- Africans and the Portuguese-Asians who created a whole new Portuguese identity in remote parts of the world and held together an enterprise that, if it had relied on the metropolitan effort alone, would have collapsed at an early stage.²⁵ This conjecture propounded by Newitt is to be well regarded.

Besides myths, theories and the developments in cartography and seafaring referred above, the understanding of the Portuguese expansion remains incomplete if life on board of the fleets that travelled to the East is not comprehended. This is because the fleets comprised of men who would occupy positions in the various Portuguese settlements and hence it is necessary to realize the difficulties in their travel that could also get manifested in their duties. A general picture of the *Carreira da India* along with the

image which one can gather from the travel writings would help one to comprehend how unwieldy this nine month sailing from Europe to Asia was.

The *Estado* in Archipelago Southeast Asia

The men who arrived from Portugal in the East had to hold positions in different capacities. According to the instructions given by the King, all people who left for the East from Lisbon assumed the obligation of serving the Crown for eight years in the aegis of the *Estado da Índia*. After the completion of first three years of service, these men were enlisted to occupy the posts of responsibility.²⁶ Nevertheless there were a number of violations in this process. All the necessary services were to be given to them for the benefit of the administration. Thus the Portuguese Crown made all possible efforts to give impetus to the service conditions for the smooth functioning of its overseas territories.

Once beyond the Cape of Good Hope, the Portuguese were going to enter a world of well-established and intensive maritime connections from East Africa to Japan. Firstly, in these waters the Portuguese tried to challenge Arab and Guajarati trade domination of the routes to the Levant to control the spice trade to Europe. Though these mercantile communities were allowed to trade but were now made to do through the way of Portuguese *cartazes*. The second approach was unlocking the key to commerce in the east with China, Japan and Southeast Asian archipelago along with the Bay of Bengal. If this mission was accomplished, then the commerce of the Indian Ocean would be under the hegemony of the Portuguese. The controlling of the trade routes to the Levant and Persian Gulf by the Portuguese along with locating themselves at the choke points of the Indian Ocean trading world by the end of the sixteenth century was the realization of a vision that the Portuguese had developed through the century. In spite of such a dominance which they mastered through the *cartaz* system and by granting concession voyages, Portuguese failure to capture Aden left open the loophole of the Red Sea to the trade conducted by Islamic merchants. Control of such key points was crucial to the

maintenance of a Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The first Portuguese who arrived in the straits of Malacca in 1509 CE discovered a flourishing trade at the entrepôt of Malacca. The Arabs had a notable presence and an influence as a trading community in Southeast Asia. So much so that Ludovico di Varthema who travelled in this region just before the arrival of the Portuguese, had to dupe his identity and call himself a Persian.²⁷ Besides the Arabs there were many other communities that were involved in trade. So Malacca was an important center of call and was the place where most of the trading diasporas were located in the region. The amalgamation of so many different communities at Malacca is significant from the view of cross-cultural interaction. Philip Curtin's deduction that cross-trade has almost always been carried out through special institutional arrangements to help guarantee the mutual security of the two side holds true in case of Malacca.²⁸ It has already been noted that there existed a well-defined structure of the way trade was organized prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, which had provided an incentive to the growth of cross-cultural trade.

The administrative structure of Malacca hence, provided every amenity for the trade communities located there. Besides, the strategic location of Malacca had also brought prosperity to the port as well as to the communities. Malacca was one of the three key-locations, with Goa and Hormuz that gave Portugal the control over the main Asiatic trade routes. Such a place could but hold any one's attention. In the age of pre-modern commerce, the role played by polity and the trading communities at Malacca is of immense importance. One can actually categorize these expatriate mercantile communities under the nomenclature of 'Trade Diaspora.'²⁹ Without these communities Malacca's prosperity could not have won so many accolades. They were the lifeline of the trade that thrived here after all!

Philip Curtin has analyzed that the organization of the trade diasporas varied widely. Besides the informal ties that were based on a shared culture, religion, language, kinship, there were also formal ones with centralized arrangements.³⁰ In the former

category, the *Keling* merchants from the Tamil coast can be placed for they became an important factor in the conduct of Coromandel-Southeast Asian trade. It is difficult to compartmentalize them though in a particular section as there were a number of factors that made this diaspora settle in Southeast Asia, trade being a primary one. The Dutch and the English East India Companies fit in the second part along with the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. The role played by the Asian diasporas in the Coromandel-Southeast Asian archipelago linkage was much more than what has been assumed by the modern writings. In fact the *Keling* merchants were the ones who introduced the Portuguese in Coromandel-Southeast Asia network, though the latter had understood the profit incurred in this network once they discovered Malacca. Although the European stimuli had resulted in the growth of trade on this route, but at the same time we cannot understate the role played by say the *Kelings*. They had been a part of this network for centuries which is why their impact was not felt as profoundly as that of Europeans. Moreover the European enterprise was much larger in scale and organized on different lines.

The most distinct example of one diaspora helping the other can be seen in the case of the capture of Malacca. From the days of the arrival of Diogo Lopes Sequeira at the entrepôt of Malacca, it was believed by the various groups of merchants like the *Gujaratis*, *Parsis*, *Arabs*, *Bengalis* and the *Kelings* that “*the Portuguese had reached the port, and consequently were bound to come there anytime, and that, besides robbing by sea and by land, they were spying in order to come back and capture it [i.e. Malacca] just as all India was already in the power of the Portuguese.*”³¹ Thus, most of the groups helped each other in their endeavor to keep the Portuguese away from Malacca. The apprehension of the trading diasporas was however correct regarding the Portuguese venture of Malacca. In the capture of Malacca by ‘Franks’,³² the *Keling* merchants played a crucial role by siding with the Portuguese. This was because they saw a potential ally in the Portuguese who were also against their arch rivals—the Arab and *Gujarati* merchants. So significant was their role that when the *Bemdara* of Malacca, Nina Chatu (who was a *Keling*) died, the Portuguese remarked “*May it*

*please our Lord that we do not miss Nina Chatnu, as we all fear.*³³ It was thought by them to have two hundred more Portuguese to uphold Malacca! Thus, the port of Malacca, was important for the *Estado da Índia* right from the onset of the capture of Malacca.

The conquest of Malacca³⁴ by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511 CE became a significant saga in the writing of the later Europeans. Writing in the nineteenth century, John Crawfurd, while writing about the history of the Indonesian archipelago did not digress much from the facts relating to the Portuguese capture of Malacca. Besides such narratives that were written on history, the authors writing about their contemporary times could also not afford to fail to notice Malacca and its historicity. For instance, Peter James Begbei, a Captain with the English East India Company in the 1830's, related the seizure of Malacca by the Portuguese in context of the ongoing Nanning War (1831-32 CE). While giving a vivid description of the prosperity of Malacca and the military encounters of the Portuguese, he gave a detailed account similar to that of Barbosa or Pires. Having some discrepancies like reporting Nina Chatnu as a '*pagan Malay*',³⁵ it is clear that since he was interested in the conflict side of the history, he did not care to give other details. Nevertheless, Malacca occupied a place even in the writings of the nineteenth century.

Once Malacca was conquered, Afonso de Albuquerque sent men in all those directions from where commodities were brought to Malacca. His basic concentration was towards the archipelago. He sent Antonio de Miranda d' Azevedo to Siam and Pegu, Ruy d' Acunha to Java and Antonio d' Abreu to Moluccas. With such embassies he also wanted to assure that the people trading with Malacca should not have fear of the Portuguese for they would preserve rights and give all protection to the dealings,³⁶ as Barros chronicled. Before Antonio d'Abreu moved for his venture, Albuquerque sent a believer of Islam, a native of Malacca called Nehoda Ismail, who regularly traded with the ports of the archipelago to facilitate d'Abreu's mission in the archipelago. Thus this merchant was used by the Portuguese to introduce them in a good light and that there ought to be no disruption in trade at Malacca.³⁷ Such acts of publicity by the Portuguese to pave cordial

relations to monopolize the trade of the archipelago were tactics that urged according to situations and regions.

Besides sending the Portuguese missions in the archipelago, Albuquerque immediately ordered to construct a fortress at Malacca on the south side of the river. This fortress was called “*A Famosa*” and it was finished in November 1511 CE. In 1532 CE, the *Confraria da Misericórdia* was founded and a beautiful wooden hospital for the poor was also constructed. The church also started a school. Active missionary work began in 1545 CE with the arrival of the Jesuit, St. Francisco Xavier. In 1552 CE, the “*Camara*” (Municipal Council) of Malacca was set up. Portugal’s policy in the Malaya Peninsula after the conquest of Malacca had been either to establish alliances with local rulers or to convince the adjoining kingdoms to accept Portuguese suzerainty. From his base at Johore, the old Sultan of Malacca repeatedly attacked Malacca in 1517, 1520, and 1521 and in 1525 CE. This series of attacks led to the signing of a peace treaty in 1583 CE. Malacca was also repeatedly under siege again in 1550, 1567, 1571 CE and the main enemies were Johore and Atjeh or Aceh (in Sumatra). In Malacca, Albuquerque also established a new administration, minted a new currency and built a wooden chapel close to the fortress.

Between 1511 and 1515 CE, the Portuguese crown in cooperation with the *Keling* merchants at Malacca organized a series of overseas ventures. The destinations from Malacca were either ports of the mainland Southeast Asia like Martaban or Pulicat on the Coromandel coast or the Moluccas in the archipelago, besides others. Such ventures of the *Estado* in the Indian Ocean led to the emergence of the system of *carreira*.³⁸ From the second decade of the sixteenth century as Sanjay Subrahmanyam has observed—“*the carreira system represented a compromise between Crown and private interests.*”³⁹ Like the *nakhoda* (captain of the ship) in the traditional Indian shipping, who had the right to have a cargo space, the captain and the officials of the *Estado da Índia* were also allowed the free use of a certain proportion of the cargo-hold, in addition to the salary they secured.

So, as part of their endeavours to venture further in archipelago Southeast Asia, the Portuguese did establish the *carreira* system there but only after winning the confidence of the land. The *Mar do Sul*⁴⁰ was then the focus area for the *Estado*. Under this nomenclature, Sumatra, Java, the Moluccas, and all the other islands of the insular Southeast Asia were categorized. The Portuguese posted clerks and factors in all the islands of the archipelago for conducting trade. This arrangement was helpful for the inhabitants as they had no need now to go with their vessels laden to Malacca. So, in this way, the Portuguese took charge of the arteries of the commercial world of archipelago and started dominating. Malacca, Ternate and Timor thus became known as the official settlements of the Portuguese in the insular region. Though the *Estado* had entered in the archipelago in such an astute manner, but there were still certain settlements which were unofficial in nature. These were Makassar, Ambon, Banda and Tidore.

Antonio de Abreu's expedition to the Moluccas was the first one that arrived in Amboina and in the Banda islands in 1512 CE. After an adventurous voyage, he went back at Malacca. Francisco Serrão, who was with Antonio de Abreu, as a commander of another vessel in the expedition to the Moluccas became ship-wrecked on the reefs of an island, probably at Giliang, not far from Ambon island. Fortunately, the Portuguese wreckage was spied by a band of Malaysian pirates, who specialized in exploiting such distresses. Serrão and his sailors saw them approaching and merely lay low, waiting for the cutthroats to come ashore. They then sprang up behind them and commandeered their vessel to the Moluccas, where they were stranded for three years. The Sultan of Ternate on hearing that Francisco Serrão was at Amboina, set for him and received him well in his domain. He adopted Serrão as his personal councilor and also installed his companions as prominent figures in the court. As Pires noted, "*the said King wrote letters to Malacca saying how he and his land were the slaves of the King our Lord.*"⁴¹ It was in 1514 CE, an expedition to Tidore and Ternate from Malacca under Antonio de Miranda de Azevedo was successful in acquiring a place for building the Portuguese fortress in the region.⁴² Thus,

this contact was the beginning of future Portuguese endeavors in the region. It finally resulted in building up of the fort of São Joao at Ternate in 1522, the first real foothold of the Portuguese in the Moluccas. The process initiated the beginning of the Portuguese monopoly in the trade of spices produced by the region.

The Kingdom of Makassar at the time of Portuguese expansion in the Asian seas comprised of kingdom of Gowa and Tallo. Portuguese merchants frequented Makassar (*Ujung Pandang*) intermittently during sixteenth century, but it was only after the Islamization of the latter land (1600s.) that their presence grew. The Portuguese during the seventeenth century used Makassar as a commercial center for the silk, cloves, textiles, sandalwood and diamonds. During 1620's, there were on a regular basis as many as five hundred Portuguese merchants that frequented the port of Makassar. They traded here safely and were promoted by the Sultans who were fluent in Portuguese lingua.⁴³ The friendly relations between Makassar and Portugal were strengthened by their common attempts to prevent the Dutch power in the Moluccas and Sunda islands. The prosperity of Makassar greatly increased after the fall of Malacca in Dutch hands (1641 CE), when many Portuguese merchants immigrated to Makassar.

The history of furthermore territories of the archipelago, the interaction that they had with the Portuguese and subsequently, the establishment of different kinds of Portuguese presence have been summed in the following lines using sources like *Documenta Malucensia* of Hubert Jacobs SJ (ed); *Da Asia* of João de Barros; R.A. De Bulhao Pato and H. Lopes de Mendonca (ed.), *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque*; Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções*; Armando Cortesão, (ed.), *The Suma Oriental* of Tome Pires and the *Book of Francisco Rodrigues*; John Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago*.

So, as known from the primary records, in February 1522 CE, the Portuguese captain Antonio de Brito arrived to the Banda islands and strengthened the friendship with the King of these islands. To mark this event, they erected a stone “padrao” with the arms of the King of Portugal. Arriving in Ternate, in May of 1522

CE, he built the fortress of São João Baptista, there. The Jesuits also began a school in Ternate. However, the Portuguese rule in these islands was always weak due to the remoteness of the islands and also that few Portuguese arrived there. The Europeans were never more than a few thousand in number. Several Spanish expeditions arrived at Tidore, the first being that of Magalhaes. The Spaniards settled in Tidore and annoyed the Portuguese for many years. On Twenty Fifth of October, 1536 CE the Portuguese governor, Antonio Galvao arrived at Ternate, he being reputed as a good governor. Besides in his efforts at reconciling, organizing and evangelizing the Moluccas, he was also the builder of the Portuguese town of Ternate. He is credited with building a school, a hospital and a stone wall built all around the town. On Fifteenth of July, 1575 CE, however, the Portuguese surrendered the fort.

Ambon was an island located in the center of the Spice Islands in what is today the Indonesian archipelago. In the year 1569 CE, Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque erected a wooden fort on the northern coast of the Ambon Island which was moved to the southern side of the bay after three years. Subsequently, Sancho de Vasconcelos built a temporary fort at Gelala and another at Batumarah, both of wood; and finally built a stone fortress where the town of Ambon is situated today. The first stone was laid on Twenty Fifth of March, 1576 CE and the fortress was named “*Nossa Senhora da Anunciada*”. Inside the square construction crowned with four towers, one at each corner, there was the captain’s residence, a meeting room, some storehouses and dwellings for the military officials. The town was built around the fortress and was divided in several quarters, all inhabited by Christians.

The Portuguese town was not walled; only the Jesuits (in Ambon since 1578 CE) had a stone wall around their garden to protect themselves against attacks of enemy villages. Near their residence was the church of “Sant’ Iago” (1581 CE) covered by a thatched roof. The Jesuits also served in the church of São Tomé in the same year. They used their residence in Ambon like a pastoral center for the place and the three Lease Islands: Haruku, Saparua, Nusalaut. The Ambon residence was the center of the Moluccas Jesuit mission for some years (1575-1578 CE). Along the shore there was

situated the oldest church of Ambon called “Sao Paulo” a fortress church. Near the southeastern side of the fort there were hospital and the church of “*Misericordia*”. The brotherhood -*confraria da Misericordia*- was founded in 1579 CE. The town of Ambon was besieged many times. Its history is a history of struggle. In 1590’s, the Ternatans besieged it followed by the Javanese. The first five years of the seventeenth century saw the struggle with the Dutch to whom they finally surrendered.

The early Portuguese contact with Solor and Flores islands commenced around 1520’s. They frequented these islands mainly to purchase sandalwood. The early traders established only temporary warehouses. They did not built permanent trading posts, farms or fortresses, as this task was assigned to the Dominican missionaries. In 1561 CE, four Dominican friars under the orders of Brother Antonio da Cruz left Malacca to preach the Gospel in these islands. They settled in Solor. The friars had a noticeable success in the conversions. In order to protect their spiritual work from the enemies, five years later, they built a stone fortress at Solor. Within the fort were built the friars’ dormitory, a seminary (in 1600 CE it had fifty pupils) and the church of Nossa Senhora da Piedade reserved for the Portuguese.

The Portuguese captain resided in a tower. On the left side of the fort, a native village was built adjacent to the church of São João Baptista. A few years later, outside the fort and near the sea the church of *Misericórdia* was built. New conversions were also done in the nearby islands of Adonara and Flores. In the island of Ende Minor the friar built a fort (1595 CE) and within its walls was built the church of São Domingos. The baptized indigenous people settled in the vicinity of the fort where three native villages were founded. Numbas, close to the fortress, Currolalas on the left side, with the church of Santa Catarina de Sena, and Charaboro on the right side, with the church of Santa Maria Maddalena. The first commander of the fortress of Ende was Capitão Pero Carvalhais. By 1599 CE, the Dominicans had built as many as eighteen churches in the Solor islands.

The becoming of Malacca as a Portuguese beachhead in 1511 CE led to a dispersion of trade to a number of other centers as

Anthony Reid has pointed out.⁴⁴ The immediate beneficiaries were Patani, Johore, Pahang, Aceh and Banten - which emerged from obscurity to become substantial states in the sixteenth century. Most of the Gujarati merchants followed the ousted Malaccan Sultan to his exile at Pagah, and later on to Bantam. From there, the Sultan harassed the Portuguese. At a later date, he finally settled in Johore and his successors were equally hostile towards the Portuguese. The several attacks they made, incurred great loss to the Portuguese. In the troubled straits of Malacca was the emergence of Johore, where a part of Malacca's trade had shifted with the sovereigns. Pasai in north Sumatra was another part where Islamic diaspora moved away from Malacca to take refuge in Aceh. It was this place, which was to become a chief Islamic center of the region in the coming years. Not only did the Muslim merchants move to the places near Malacca but as far as to Brunei in north Borneo. Besides, the Portuguese also faced rivalry from the rulers of Bintin.⁴⁵ In the meanwhile, the Malay traders also transferred their activities to Makassar in South Celebes. Thus, with so many lands of varying sizes in Southeast Asian archipelago and dominated by different polities, the Portuguese were able to develop their niches.

Coromandel—The Unofficial Realm

The early interaction of the Portuguese with the Coromandel Coast happened as early as 1506 CE, which was purely a chance event. They approached in the vicinity of Nagapattinam where they faced a hostile reaction from the local Muslim traders as a letter from Gaspar da India to the King of Portugal dated Sixteenth of November, 1506 CE suggests.⁴⁶ According to Barros, it was in relation to discover the land of the martyrdom of St. Thomas that the Portuguese reached the Coromandel Coast around the year 1518 CE.⁴⁷ They were in the company of an Armenian called Khwaja Sikander who had already been to Pulicat and had the knowledge of the place where St. Thomas was buried.

Thus, the Coromandel that was considered to be a peripheral zone by the Portuguese administrators became a new source

of commercial interests. There also developed clarity about the resources and the strength of the pre-existing commercial network of the coast with Southeast Asia. Also, the indigenous polities on the coast, Vijayanagar and Golconda mainly, did not impair the activities of the Portuguese. It was only by the late 1520's that the custom of sending a ship annually, on account of the Portuguese Crown crystallized. The development of the *carreira* moved from the initial Malacca-Pulicat- Malacca route to become Goa-Pulicat-Malacca-Goa route. The one between Malacca and Pegu now included Pulicat and thus the pattern was transformed as Goa-Pulicat-Pegu-Goa route. The inclusion of Pulicat in the *carreira* as well as its beginning and terminal point, Goa shows the increasing confidence of the Portuguese officialdom to conduct commerce on the Coromandel coast. Pulicat, hence rose to importance and became tiny, unofficial '*empire within an empire*.'⁴⁸

Though the Portuguese establishment was at São Thomé but now all the trading was done from Pulicat due to the fact that it had a better harbor.⁴⁹ A far distant port from Pulicat was Nagapattinam. At least from the Chola period, if not before, it was one of the hubs in the trade in the Bay of Bengal and across to Southeast Asia. Varthema observed it as a large city bustling with trade activities. This port was famous for rice trade and was '*the route to very large countries*, '⁵⁰ as Varthema stated. Indo-Portuguese and Muslim merchants extensively dominated the port. The beginnings of the Portuguese settlements at this port can be dated back to 1520's. It was only after the decline of Pulicat that Nagapattinam rose to prominence in the latter half of the sixteenth century.

The Portuguese settlements of Coromandel- Pulicat, São Thomé, and Nagapattinam- had men of influence and was a prestige resident there by the late 1530's. Around 1542 CE, as Subrahmanyam pointed, the governor and his clansmen were shifting away from the traditional focus of the government i.e. the western Indian Ocean, to the eastern side. The concern, as he says was clearly expressed in two ways. Firstly there was a heavy deployment of Crown vessels in Southeast Asia. Secondly an elaborate expedition, which was eventually unsuccessful, was

sent under Jeronimo de Figueiredo to discover the ‘Island of Gold’ rumoured to exist near Sumatra.⁵¹ Again from the mid 1540’s to the mid 1550’s the Portuguese officialdom retained its western Indian Ocean focus. Thus the focus dwindled and it seemed that only motive of the Portuguese was to maintain such ports that bore profits. There were factors responsible for the likes and that falling of Basra under the control of the Ottomans. This had made the Portuguese apprehensive about the western Indian Ocean and thus resulted in their dwindling policies.

Thus there was a sort of crisis in the mid-sixteenth century as pointed by Subrahmanyam. The upshot in the thinking of the high officials seeing the prices in the Coromandel *carreira* led them to introduce two changes. The first was to withdraw shipping activities from such lines and the second to monopolize the Coromandel-Malacca network to create obstacles for the parallel Asian shipping. These changes were promptly visible in the 1570’s with the full flowering of the concession system- a system in which, those people were granted the concession or right by the King of Portugal to make a voyage between two points in the Indian Ocean in their shipping who had rendered services to the Crown. The concession voyage was also granted in lieu of a salary payment or to enable a *fidalgo* to arrange marriage of his daughter. Hence, these concessions replaced the old Crown shipping *carreiras* with their new system of concessions, for the first time, there established a system of monopoly over commercial routes of the Bay of Bengal by the Portuguese.

Luis Fillipe Thomaz has posited the existence of a ‘second wind’⁵² as a consequence of the concession system, in the closely argued article on the ‘Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century Indonesia’. From the study, it emerges that it is demonstrably false to treat Portuguese official policy with respect to their participation in Asian trade uniformly during the sixteenth century. He, rather shows that there were significant differences between policies followed in the course of century and that, randomly, these changes evolved in a particular direction. The concession system was the consequence result of these changes. The reasons behind the changes also appear

to have arisen due to the Counter-Reformation, the attention diverted to Atlantic trade and Brazil and the successive financial crisis of the *Estado da Índia*.

Under this system of concessions, direct trade between Nagapattinam and Melaka was forbidden in official papers. This was because such a voyage would infringe the monopoly of the concessionaries who navigated from São Thomé to Melaka. But the documentation testifies that these monopolies were in fact rarely effective as Subrahmanyam has pointed out.⁵³ Ceasare Federici, an Italian, who passed through in around 1570 CE, speaks of two 'great ships' that used to leave São Thomé each year, the one bound for Melaka and the other for Pegu. These were apparently the concession vessels.⁵⁴ By the end of the century, when Pulicat was on its decline, it were Nagapattinam and Masulipatnam, which had gained importance. Such were the shrinking of commercial activities of Pulicat that John Huygen van Linschoten did not even mention it among the principal ports of Coromandel in 1580's. Pulicat finally succumbed to the Dutch attacks during the first half of the seventeenth century.

The second half of the sixteenth century was a period of profound change in the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. It has already been noticed in the case of Coromandel. The insular Southeast Asia and Malacca were no exception. Malacca witnessed an increasingly hostile environment. The Sumatran Sultanate of Aceh was one of the rivals of Portuguese Malacca. The Achenese attacked Malacca and laid sieges on it on numerous times of which the most known ones were of the late 1560's and early 1570's. Despite their defeat, there remained a hostile scenario in the Malay Straits. Islamic adherence was spreading in Java, Borneo and Maluku and the Catholic missionary-pressure increased the propensity of Portuguese for religious intolerance. The Portuguese petered out the direct control of the niches in Moluccas and Banda in 1570's. The Javenese took over the administration.

If the larger canvas of the Portuguese presence across the Indian Ocean is drawn, then, by the beginning of the third decade of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had constructed the forts in major niches of the trading world of Asia. The extant ones were:

Sofala (1505 CE), Mozambique (1508 CE), Hormuz (1515 CE), Chaul (1521 CE), Goa (1510 CE), Cannanore (1505 CE), Calicut (1513 CE), Cochin (1503 CE), Kollam (1519 CE), Colombo (1518 CE), Pasai (1521 CE) and Malacca (1511 CE)- from west to east. On the east African coast, Kilwa (1502-12 CE), Socotra (1507-11 CE) and Anjedive (1505-07 CE) had already been abandoned.⁵⁵ Thus with all the major trading zones covered within the ambit of these niches, the foothold of the *Estado da Índia* in the trading world of the Indian Ocean became stronger. This is one of the reasons behind the monopoly of the *Estado* that lasted for about a century.

From the above list, it can be discerned that the Portuguese enterprise to the east of Cape Comorin followed the ‘*Guinea model*’,⁵⁶ as postulated by Luis Fillipe F.R. Thomaz. According to this model, firstly, the fortresses became less frequent and the factories were also placed at distant intervals. Secondly, the dominant type of trade was a seasonal one along the coasts. This is noticeable even when the Portuguese enterprise was at the fullest. This type of trade was not only prevalent on the Coromandel Coast but also in Southeast Asia. The fortresses, east of Cape Comorin were mainly situated in Southeast Asia. The western part of the Bay of Bengal was left unfortified. As for this region of the Bay of Bengal, it remained for the most part a more *incognitum* as Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Thomaz have pointed.⁵⁷ The reason cited by them is that the greater part of the Bay remained a domain of Portuguese deserter and disreputable private trader in the pre-1530 period. Thus there were no fortresses built on the Coromandel Coast but the unofficial Portuguese settlements were nevertheless the theatres for the activities of the *Estado*. Not only this as mentioned earlier in the chapter while dealing with the myth of St. Thomas, the *Estado* tried to provide religious legitimacy to the region to assure its trade as well as the Gospel.

Hence, one can sum up that the Coromandel Coast and Southeast Asia underwent vast changes in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese under the aegis of the *Estado da Índia* as well as with the help of private traders among others are at the base of these changes. Their presence by the end of the century was felt throughout in Asia. Most of the lines of trade, on surface, appeared

under their control; however there were certain forces natural or man-made which existed beyond their comprehension. In the first four decades of the sixteenth century, their main concentration was in Southeast Asia and in Coromandel to some extent. They learned from the expatriate trading communities at Malacca to trade in the archipelago as well as in Coromandel. In the second half of the sixteenth century, there were changes that have been termed as the 'second wind'. An important element of this process was the concession system through which the Portuguese tried to monopolize the network of trade across Bay of Bengal. Therefore, in this context, to study linkages that the Portuguese developed either through political presence or religion is important for it underlines the presence of two kinds of settlements- official and unofficial. While the Portuguese had official settlements at Malacca, Ternate and Timor, the unofficial ones were located at Makassar, Ambon, Banda, Tidore. On the Coromandel coast, they had a shadowed presence- the unofficial one. Historians like Winus have attributed the Bay of Bengal as the 'shadow empire' of Goa. These ports had to face the impact of the Luso-Dutch conflict in the coming seventeenth century when purses and swords reflected even more violence.

Notes

1. Malyn Newitt has categorized the official as well as unofficial settlements in his study "A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668", Routledge, 2005.
2. This is collaborated in Purchas His Pilgrimes "The Starres and Coasts were then the Guides, and without those Stilts, and Stayes, Navigation durst not adventure, in that her impotence and infancie, to goe into the Maine."
3. Purchas, Samuel, , Purchas His Pilgrimes, Volume II, The Hakluyt Society publication, Glasgow, MCMV, p. 5.
4. In his narrative, Duarte Barbosa tells about the Arab pilots being hired for navigating difficult waters-'Here ships take "pilots", on board to take them and guide them to Juda, which pilots dwell here for this purpose only.' (Dames, M.L., The book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. I, AES, 1989, p. 51). The necessity for local pilots is obvious in the dangerous waters. Afonso D'Albuquerque found it absolutely necessary to obtain the services of a pilot by force or fraud when he made his way into the Red Sea in 1513.

5. Boxer, C.R., *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, Hutchison, London, 1963, p. 18.
6. Alden, Dauril, *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750*, Stanford University Press, 1996.
7. Oliveira Marques, A.H. de, *História de Portugal, Comissariado para a Europália*, 1991, p. 59.
8. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, Longman, London, 1993, p. 53.
9. Newitt, 2005, pp. 1-2.
10. Penrose, Boies, *Travel and Discovery in the Renaissance 1420-1620*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1955, p. 6.
11. Of considerable historic importance is Ptolemaic geography, which charts the world, as people of his time knew it. This work, which employs a system of latitude and longitude, influenced mapmakers for hundreds of years, but it suffered from a lack of reliable information. Ptolemy also devoted a treatise, *Harmonica*, to music theory, and in *Optics* he explored the properties of light, especially refraction and reflection. *Optics*, known only from an Arabic version, stresses experiment and the construction of special apparatus to promote the study of light and to develop a mathematical theory of its properties.
12. For further reference see Cipola, Carlo M., *Fontana Economic History of Europe*.
13. Jones, J.W., 1928, p. 88.
14. Dames, M.L, II, 1989, p.2 05. It was not only the easternmost part of the archipelago about which the Voyagers wrote in such a way. The people of Java were also described as *flesh eaters* and Varthema goes on as- “ when their fathers become so old that they can no longer do any work, their children or relations set up them up in the market-place for a sale, and those who purchase them kill them and eat them cooked. And if any young man should be attacked by any great sickness, and that it should appear to the skillful that he might die of it, the father or brother of the sick man kills him, and they do not wait for him to die. And when they have killed him they sell him to others to be eaten.” <Jones, 1928, p. 91>. It is surprising to note that Mandeville, traveling in the early seventeenth century when the entire insular region has been explored also took note about the Sumatrans that “they have an evil custom among them, for they will gladly eat men’s flesh than any other” (Letts, Malcolm (trans), *Mandeville’s Travels* vol.1, The Hakluyt Society’, London, 1953, p. 127. This might be a an interpolation or the European concept of showing the other as inferior.
15. Dames, II, 1989, p.188; Barros (Decada III, Livro V, Capitulo I, p. 119) says about Aru as: “the Heathen who dwell in that part of the Island which is over against Malacca, and that tribe thereof which they call Battas, who eat

- flesh, the wildest and Fiercest people in the whole world.”
16. Cortesao, A. vol.1, 1990, p. 148.
 17. Wallace, Alfred Russel, *The Malay Archipelago*, London, 1894, p. 73.
 18. For further reference, see, Michael Palencia Roth, *Cannibalism and the new man of Latin America in the 15th and 16th century European imagination*, *Comparative civilizations review*, Carlisle, PA, 1979.
 19. Michel de Certeau <de Certeau, Michel, *Heterologies, Discourses on the Other*, Minneapolis, 1986, p.68-70>while discussing Montaigne’s “*Of Cannibals*” provides an excellent example of how the image of the ‘other’ is created in a narrative. He says, “The discourse about the other is a means of constructing a discourse authorized by the other”. The three stages discussed by him in this essay are- the outbound journey, where there is search for the strange, which is presumed to be different from the place assigned to it in the beginning by the discourse of culture; the depiction of savage society, as seen by a “true” witness; lastly the return voyage, the home coming of the traveller-narrator.
 20. Oliveira Marques, A.H. de, 1991, p. 35.
 21. Diffie, Bailey, W. and Winius, George D., *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire*, vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 41.
 22. Lach, Donald, F., *Asia in the making of Europe*, Vol. I, Book one, Chicago, 1965, p. 52.
 23. Diffie and Winius, 1977, p. 116.
 24. Newitt, 2005, p. 1.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
 26. António da Silva Rego, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções*, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VII, MCMLXXV, p. 217
 27. The narrative by Varthema (Jones 1928, p. 82) concerns with Pegu. When the King of Pegu questioned the identity of Varthema and his companions, they revealed themselves as Persians. Thus the King agrees to their request of selling their produce. The dialogue, which follows, provokes interest. The King began to say: “That he had been at war with the King of Ava for two years, and on that account he had no money; but that if were willing to barter for so many rubies, he would amply satisfy us”. We caused him to be told by these Christians (i.e. the other group mates) that we desired nothing further from him than his friendship- that we should take the commodities and do whatever he pleased to develop ties. On a number of other occasions, the Portuguese adopted similar tactics to expand safely in the region so as to monopolize the trade.
 28. Curtin, Philip, *Cross-Cultural trade in World History*, Cambridge, 1984, p. 1.
 29. Introduced by Abner Cohen in 1971, the concept described “the interrelated

- commercial network of a nation of socially interdependent but spatially dispersed communities.”
30. Curtin, 1984, pp. 2-12.
 31. Cortesão Vol. II, 1990, p. 255.
 32. A term used for the Portuguese in many sources like Sĕjarah Mĕlayu, Suma Oriental.
 33. Cortesão Vol. II, 1990, p. 288.
 34. B. W. Diffie and G. D. Winius in the book “Foundations of the Portuguese Empire 1415-1580” write: “the capture of Asia’s greatest trading city by a mere 900 Portuguese and 200 Indians must rank as an event in the history of European expansion no less stunning than the better known conquest of Tenochtitlan by Hernando Cortés”.
 35. Begbei, P.J., Malayan Peninsula, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, p. 38.
 36. Barros, Década III, Parte Primeira Livro II, Chapter VI, 1973, p. 583; It is interesting to note here that the Portuguese inverted the rates paid at the custom house of Melaka. The Christians, that now paid 6% and the Muslims and the Hindus 10% as Thomaz argues (Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R., “The Indian Merchant Communities in Malacca under the Portuguese Rule.” In de Souza, Teotonio R. (ed.), Indo-Portugues History Old Issues, New Questions, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1985, p. 63.
 37. Barros wrote: “The purpose that had been spread was that this Nehoda was going to fetch clove in Maluku and cinnamon in Banda and in this way would give testimony how peaceful was Melaka and how great protection was given by the Captain to all foreign merchants without the harassments the used to suffer at the time of the King of Melaka.” *ibid*.
 38. Carreira was a system by which a particular trade route was dominated by the Crown. This system was widely prevalent to the east of Cape Comorin. With the help of it the Portuguese could dominate the most important and priceless trade in the region in the 16th century.
 39. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History, Longman, 1993, p. 71
 40. The Portuguese called the Eastern Archipelago and the Pacific generally by the name *Mar do Sul*. Also in the East India Company’s records, down to the early part of last century, those regions are always termed “the South Sea”.
 41. Cortesão Vol. I, 1990, p. 215.
 42. Barros, (Década III, Parte Primeira Livro II, Chapter VI, 1973, p. 598), gives an account of Ternate and Tidore which is interest stimulating and on different lines. “In the same year (1513) after the visit of John Lopo Alvin Antonio de Miranda d’ Azevedo went one armada to the islands of Maluku and Banda to load clove, and in the said voyage he lost a junk; And both the Kings there one of Ternate and the other of Tidore competed among themselves regarding the supply of cloves and the jealousy that

always existed between them although the King of Ternate was the son-in-law of the other, married to the daughter of the King of Tidore. In order to establish the peace between the two, Antonio de Miranda d' Azevedo interfered and being afraid that the one in which the Portuguese would settle would become more powerful than the other, each one of them has written to the King Don Manuel requesting him to build a fortress giving the reasons for the services that they would give to the King. And as the request of both has created a deep confusion in the mind about where to put up the fortress and as they have an island that was owned by both of them which was known by the name of Maqueium it was decided that the fortress would be built there without creating any feeling between them."

43. Cortesão Vol. I, 1990, p. 217.

44. Reid, Anthony, 1993, pp. 209.

45. Barros has noted the conflict between Bintin and the Portuguese Melaka in detail, 1 (Década Tercira, Livro II, Chapter IV, 1973, pp. 146-151). "Dom Aleixo de Menezes was sent to Melaka with galleons and ammunitions. As a part of the measures to make Melaka secure, Dom Aleixo sent Duarte Coelho to the King of Siam with a letter and gift from Dom Manule, King of Portugal. But this also seems to be an opportunity taken by the Portuguese to strengthen and uphold their ties. Further they requested to the King of Siam to send some of his people to settle down in Melaka. This was because the Portuguese intended to send away all the Malays who were Muslims and settle the subjects of the King of Siam. It was a way of improving the relations on the part of the Portuguese. As the Portuguese felt more secure with the Siamese, rather than the Malays; they wanted the Siamese to be a part of the trade at Melaka and that is why the Muslims were as planned, to be thrown out. Furthermore when Duarte Coelho while returning from Siam accidentally landed on the coast of Pam, which was ruled by the King of Bintin, he was well-received with the testimonials of friendship rather than getting punished. Since he had bad relations with his father-in-law, he made himself a vassal of King Dom Manuel promising him to give every year a vase of gold weighing four cates."

On a later date when the Dutch were making incursions in Siam in the 17th century, an itinerant noted that the markets and trade of Siam has been disrupted.

46. As cited by Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1990, p. 98.

47. Barros gave detailed description of the venture, which is as follows: The first news that the Portuguese had about this place where was buried, St. Thomas is dated of 1517 and is due to Diogo Fernandes and Bastiao Fernandes who in the company of their Portuguese were returning from Melaka in the company of an Armenian, Khwaja Sikander, who was accompanied by other Armenians. The said Armenians had already been in the city of Pulicat on the coast of Coromandel belonging to the Kingdom of Vijaynagar in the

extreme of Cape Comorin on his way to Bengal and had knowledge of the place where according to the tradition the Saint was buried. Arriving at the port of Pulicat at a moment in which weather conditions did not allow him to proceed in his voyage, he landed; having this Armenian told ours [i.e. the Portuguese] if they were wishing to accompany him to the place where the body of St. Thomas was buried according to the tradition. If they were wishing to go there, what the Portuguese accepted with great pleasure.”

48. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1990, p. 102.
49. Many of the contemporary writers point that the coast had bad harbours. About São Thomé or Mylapur, Cesare Federici also noted it. The authors do not miss Pulicat too, which had a relatively good harbour. The famous Pulicat lake in which the ships anchored is mentioned by Streynsham Master in 1679. (Master, Streynsham, Diaries of, vol. II, p. 131) as “a great lake of salt water, which communicates with the sea at Pollicat” by which a great deal of trade was carried out.
50. Jones, 1928, p. 72.
51. Subrahmanyam, 1993, pp. 90-91.
52. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *Improvising Empire-Portuguese trade and settlement in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1700*, OUP, Delhi, 1990, p. 35.
53. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1990, (b), p. 191.
54. *The Voyage of Master Ceasare Federici into East India and beyond the Indies, Anno 1563* in Hakluyt, Richard(ed.)*The Principal Navigations, Voyage, Traffiques and the Discoveries of the English Nation*, vol.III, London, pp. 229-231, 251-5.
55. In Southeast Asia, as Barros (Decada II, Livro VIII, Chapter I, p. 241) observed that “fortress of Pacem was the first one unto this date that we have been compelled to abandon due to the fight with those of the land.”
56. Cited in Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Political Economy of Commerce 1500-1650*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 92.
57. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay and Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R., “Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean During the Sixteenth Century,” in Tracy, James D. (ed.) *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 302.

The European Companies on the Coromandel Coast and Archipelago Southeast Asia (1600-1641 CE)

THE COMMENCEMENT of the seventeenth century signifies the beginning of the expansion of the European companies in the Indian Ocean region. It also marks the gradual end of the sole monopoly of the *Estado da Índia* in the East. This period was marked initially by a tough competition among the Europeans. But later on, as it would be noticed, there was an evolution of a sort of understanding among these powers for the sake of their mutual benefits. It must be stressed, here, that this understanding did not arise due to the treaties signed in Europe for as shall be seen that they were hardly implemented in the *East*. The understanding of the organizational structure of different European Companies would enable to comprehend *Estado's* relationship with them and also enable to understand the Portuguese presence in the changing landscape in this century.

The dawn of the century saw the coming into being of the joint-stock companies in Europe. Their interests from primarily being commercial ventures in the Indian Ocean region got transformed into becoming colonial powers later on. The *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (the United Dutch East India Company or VOC) and the English East India Company (EEIC) formed in Holland and Britain respectively, became the primary

competitors of the Portuguese enterprise. Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, had expanded overseas on entirely different lines. The Portuguese overseas endeavours were driven by the initiatives taken by the Crown and were so called, the *Estado da Índia*. There was an influx of soldiers in *Estado da Índia* after the unification of Portugal with Spain with the Habsburg Crown (from 1580 CE onwards) initiating the same. Due to the different motives and expansionary zeal, different European companies surfaced to dominate the commercial world of Asia. The Portuguese had already monopolized the trading networks in the Indian Ocean in sixteenth century. The entry of the Dutch, when compared to the English in this arena was bound to have some repercussions. As the Dutch also had concentrated on the spice trade, it resulted in their establishment of contacts in the Coromandel. The statement of Hendrick Brouwer in 1612 CE marks it well. Understanding the usefulness of the commercial linkage between the Coromandel coast and Southeast Asian archipelago and involving themselves in it became one of the priorities of the VOC. This came as a challenge for nearly the century-long Portuguese hegemony on the coast and the archipelago.

The Organization of the *Estado da Índia*

The *Estado da Índia* borrowed necessary structures and institutions for its functioning from the homeland and tried to implant them in the conquered area. This is well indicated by the records. The Portuguese Crown in the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan finely tutored these necessities of maintaining their overseas territory. It was this attitude that facilitated the Portuguese enterprise through many odds. The territories acquired had to be managed well so that economic assets could be build for Portugal, the nation. Thus there came into being a well-structured regime at Goa, the capital of the expanded empire. A Viceroy or a Governor who had his residence at Goa governed the territories as well as the institutions through the Indian Ocean expanse. The Crown gave him powers to govern the region and report the matters of the

concern. Thomaz has explained the nature of the *Estado da Índia* by putting forward the notion that it was ‘a *system of communication between multiple spaces*.’¹ In the year 1515 CE at the time of the death of Afonso de Albuquerque, *Estado da Índia* had already acquired a definite structure. A coherent network consisting of various linkages had been established that covered the whole of the Indian Ocean and thus integrated the Portuguese politically. But according to John Villers, the *Estado da Índia* never succeeded in acquiring any political homogeneity, and it remained little more than a scattered and often inchoate confederation of territories, military and commercial establishments, individuals, goods and interests, administered, controlled or protected, directly or indirectly with varying degrees of completeness by the Portuguese Crown or by others on behalf of the Crown.²

As far as understanding of the administration of the *Estado* is concerned, the writings of the contemporary chroniclers – João de Barros, Diogo do Couto and António Boccaro also assume importance. The itinerary of Linschoten provides a detailed account of its functioning. The records of the happenings and the proceedings of the *Estado da Índia* were held under the aegis of the Council of State³. These letters which had been corresponded between the Viceroy and the King of Portugal have been compiled together in *Assentos dos Conselhos do Estado*. They along with *Livros das Monções* provide source for the study. Another source, which is of considerable importance, is the diary of the *Conde de Linhares*, Dom Miguel de Noronha, ⁴ who served as the Viceroy between 1629 and 1635 CE.

The *Estado da Índia* appears as a political entity with the appointment of the first governor at Goa. In the year 1505 CE, Dom Francisco de Almeida secured this position. This period is marked by the political and diplomatic contacts that at the early stage were essentially important. The gradual domination of the military aspect in the policies of the *Estado* gave the Portuguese presence a peculiar character. From the very beginning, the Portuguese presence through the Indian Ocean looked dissimilar. Their competitors in the seventeenth century, the Dutch and the

English were organized on different lines and to a certain extent there was uniformity in their presence. In the seventeenth century when the *Estado* was facing the brunt of its European counterparts, the Portuguese even envisaged a plan to build a company on the lines of the VOC.

According to the orders of the Crown, a new Viceroy was to be sent to India to administer the territories in every three years. The tenure would be extended at the King's pleasure. But this was not the regular norm followed of the day. Linschoten observes that a Viceroy, during the last year of his tenure, would visit the forts in and around Goa for some administrative supervision besides to acquire some wealth for self and to receive presents.⁵ Besides, the words of this famous Dutch itinerant who resided in Goa in an official position for a considerably long period narrate the Viceroy's position as- '*these Viceroys have great revenewes*'.⁶ The Viceroy also had the authority to retain the King's treasure and use it whenever he pleased. The extent to which a Viceroy misused the powers disposed by the King to him in most cases was high. Besides this, the high significant allowances which the Viceroys enjoyed also made him affluent and mighty. In addition, gifts offered by the indigenous polity on his first arrival at Goa also made him wealthier.

Linschoten observed that the Viceroys at the close of their tenures, while leaving Goa took everything with them as their personal assets.⁷ So the basic aim of most of the Viceroys appears to acquire as much wealth as they could. Their attitude while leaving Goa itself portrays that they were more involved in self gains rather than in the service of the Crown. The reason behind such an approach could have been the mere fact that their tenure was limited and the chances of getting another one were at distant. A discourse of the general happenings of the three years of the Viceroy's occupancy is well described by Linschoten. In the first year of the term, the focus of the Viceroy was generally to refurbish his official residence and to furnish it. Besides he also ascertained the manners and customs of the area under his jurisdiction. The second year of tenure saw the Viceroy amassing treasure and to

look for profits for which he had taken the post. The last year was to prepare and set the things in order so that he could leave as soon as the new Viceroy joins.

Fraçois Pyrad de Laval also noted that the appointment for the coveted post of Viceroy was a lucrative assignment for one could amass as much wealth as one could during the tenure. In the last years of the stay, the Viceroy would visit to all nearby forts to fill his coffers.⁸ The depiction of Viceroy's activities that are communicated through the itinerant accounts does provide a glimpse of his only interest in thy-self. The official documents of the *Estado* barely state such deeds of a Viceroy's sojourn at Goa. Can a parallel of this sort of practice be drawn for the Captains of the forts and the other officers in *Estado da Índia* who held important positions in the *fortalezas* and *feitorias*?

Thus, if one is to believe Linschoten, the Viceroy's attitude ought not to have made the *Estado* more effective and strong. Was such an outlook of the Viceroys also responsible for the consequent retreat of the Portuguese in most parts of the Indian Ocean region in the seventeenth century? If the persons in positions like the Viceroy, Captains and officers were involved in such activities then it was almost certain for people down in the hierarchy to imbibe a similar attitude. In the official Portuguese documents, corrupt practices are often reported by the Viceroy to the King. For instance, in a letter to the King dated Twenty Sixth of February, 1616 CE, the Viceroy, Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d'azevedo wrote about the lack of order and indulging into thefts by the guards while the *naus* leaving for Lisbon were being loaded. In response, the King took the initiative of giving authority to the Viceroy to take measures against the said group. Further, the King noted that it had come to his knowledge that persons who were performing the roles of the guards of the *naus* of the *companhia* of Dom Manuel Coutinho [private trader] had also performed a similar act. This indicates that such happenings also took place in the private Portuguese ships also besides the ones that were under the control of the *Estado*. If the King receives information about the happenings in a private trader's ship as indicated above, does this imply that the Crown was also interested in the trade conducted by the individuals

besides the *Estado*? If the Crown had such manifold concerns, then it was difficult to maintain and concentrate on particular needs of vast oceanic expanse. Nevertheless, the King to control such acts ordained that the '*Ouvidor Geral*' would take every year a survey of all acts of the guards.⁹ Thus, all along the hierarchy it seems that there was an interest to amass much wealth during their sojourn in Asia.

Another category of the Portuguese who had a notable presence were the *fidalgos*. Amongst the two categories of men who arrived at Goa to serve in *Estado da Índia*, there were the married men and the soldiers. The soldiers were the unmarried ones. Such a status was denoted as '*the best name that a man can have*.'¹⁰ The men who boarded the ship at Lisbon were mustered. Out of these, some of them received the title of the *Fidalgo da Caza del Rey nossas Senhor* that is, a Gentlemen of the King's house and this was considered to be the chief title. Another honorable title was *Mozos Fidalgos* which was usually given to the sons of the Gentlemen or by the King to whom he favored. Yet there was another category of the *fidalgos* who were less in number. Persons in such category received the title of *Cavalheiro Fidalgo*, which was the title of the knight. Such designation was granted to person for some valiant act that one had performed. *Mosas da Camara, do Numero, e do Serviço* was yet another title that indicated they were in the service of the King whether at his chamber or the ones who managed his accounts or his service in general. This was the first title or degree of credit whereby through their good service they attained better and more glorious titles which would also give them riches of the world.¹¹

Besides these categories of the *fidalgos*, there were others like *Escuderos Fidalgos* or *Esquires* whose title was a degree of credit. There were still others named as *Hommes honorados* who were the men of honour and the poorest among them [as they didn't have any title] were set down for soldiers considered to be commoners and a mischievous sort. All men received salaries subject to their titles from the Crown. There was always a chance for them to rise in service either due to the length of their service or by presenting some good action. But, in general, it was favourism that led to ascend in their designations. Thus, the *fidalgos* belonged to

various categories and their promotion was ruled by preferential treatment. It is worth noting here that among the Portuguese who came to Asia, the *fidalgos* were the ones who had highest strength. The quest for monopoly of the Portuguese is seen from the fact that a large number of men were sent to Asia for the purpose. The granting of such designations noted above also attests that the Crown did so to lure more men in the service. Thus, one can infer the fact that the medieval mentality of granting titles and deeds was still at work.

In addition to these men who were believed to be the guardians of the *Estado*, there were others appointed at Goa to facilitate the working of the *Estado*. It has already been recorded that before the fleets depart for Asia, a muster roll was prepared. This register was delivered to one of the King's officers at Goa who was called *Chief Clerk of the Matricula Generall*¹² with his tenure being for three years. Under his command used to be three or four clerks. Besides this, there was another function of this office. Whenever the Portuguese had to send an expedition for a certain purpose or to just keep an army ready on the coast or to convoy and safe-conduct the merchants traveling daily or to check the pirates, drums were struck that whosoever wants to serve the King in his fleet should come to the *Matricula Generall*. It was the *Matricula Generall's* responsibility to provide resources for the purpose. In a subsequent act, the Viceroy would ordain a chief Captain and other captains under him for every *fuste* and *galley*. The *Matricula Generall* paid to all the men who were part of this fleet subject to their titles that had been registered at Lisbon.¹³ Such a practice of organizing a fleet in Asia as per to the requirement of the plan was an interesting innovation on the part of the Portuguese authorities.

After performing its task when the fleet returned back to Goa, the Viceroy would grant a certificate to the Captain General of the fleet testifying his services on his commandment. Since he had performed an important task, all the information regarding it was relayed and in the said certificate it was also marked that he had spent money from his purse in the service of His Majesty. According to this credential, the Captain General also made certificates for his subordinate captains and soldiers in the same

way as his testimonial was. Thus the manner in which the task was accomplished was important for it carried a recommendation of their feat in Asia. This could further lead to promotions in their ranks and commands.

The Viceroy maintained an advisory council from an early date after 1505 CE, which was closely modeled on the lines of the *Conselho do Estado* (Council of State) in Lisbon. In the Council of State that was held at Goa, matters of high importance were discussed. The Government functionaries who served the *Estado* were its councilors. The chief civil, military, judicial and ecclesiastical personas were part of it. It comprised of the Captain of the city of Goa, *Alcaide-Mor* (Head of the fortress), *Feitor* (Factor) who collected taxes and worked as an agent on commercial matters, *Vendor da Fazenda*, Notary, Captain of the Sea and the *Fidalgos* along with the Archbishop and the chief inquisitor (after 1560 CE). These functionaries participated in the meeting that used to be convened by the Viceroy in time to time. The *Conselho do Estado* not only functioned at Goa but also in all fortalezas (fortresses) and *praças* (trading outposts) forming part of the Portuguese dominion. Since it was composed of the highest functionaries of the State and was intended to act in certain respect as a check on the Viceroy, but practically, it is observed that its action got negated by the latter's supreme position. In March 1564 CE, the Government of the *Estado da Índia* extended a request to the King to reduce the membership of the *Conselho* as it had been often causing inconvenience to the smooth functioning of the administration. But it was impractical to change this age-old practice and that in the important state affairs the opinions of the *Fidalgos* had to be obtained and forwarded to Portugal. The implementation of the resolution passed in a meeting was obligatory to the Viceroy. However, the ultimate authority of taking the final decisions remained in the hands of the King in the sixteenth century.

At the viceregal court, the most important official next to the Viceroy was the secretary. Any person was vested in this position if the King had the pleasure in him. The candidate must have some administrative experience. In the hierarchy after the secretary,

there were various officials of the two main sections. The vice regal administration was divided into *fazenda* (the revenue department) and *justica* (the judiciary). The *vedor geral* (overseer) controlled the *fazenda*. This post was created in 1549 CE. He also served as the chief financial advisor of the *Estado da Índia*. An *escrivão* (clerk) assisted him with a number of subordinate officials. Among them the treasurer of the city of Goa, the chief *feitor*, the *juiz da alfandega* (a magistrate responsible for the customs), *casas dos contos* (the officers of the exchequer) under a *provedor mór* (chief superintendent), who before the creation of the office of *vedor*, had been a chief financial officer in the viceregal administration. The customhouse was headed by an *almoxarife*, who was directly responsible to the *vedor*.¹⁴ The administrative organization of the Viceroy's court in Goa was replicated in smaller and simpler form in Malacca. Most of the Portuguese settlements in Asia, whether they were officially described as *fortalezas* or *feitorias* and whether or not they were in territories where the Portuguese exercised sovereignty or claimed *possessão* were governed. In each *fortaleza*, there was stationed a military force headed by a captain. Thus this was the general structure that can be observed in Portuguese Asia.

George Winius contradicts the theory that it was due to the Portuguese Crown's support that the *Estado da Índia* could survive. The decision of King Manuel I to create his Asian operation was fabulous. But its survival owed anything but to chance. Winius argued that only the efforts of men like Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Francisco de Almeida and Afonso de Albuquerque together with many of their less known colleagues saved Manuel and his councils from disaster in India. The *Estado*, according to him, seems to have designed itself with only a few guidelines (such as nominations, the *feitoria* structure and the three-year terms) and whose governance was imposed from Europe. He admits that the convoys of ships that traveled outwards to Goa were hardly adequate.¹⁵ Thus, the *Estado da Índia* was almost wholly built by endeavours of the Portuguese who were present in the Indian Ocean world and not by the ones who were in Portugal. There were hardly efforts put by the monarchs, their councils and board of directors to give it the same shape as it was conceived of.

It is imperative from the above set of ideas that besides the few guidelines that were directed by Lisbon, the authorities at Goa functioned in their own way according to the variables present in Asia. As it has been noticed, the focus of the Viceroy, for instance, was essentially to take hold of assets during their three-year tenure. If we were to consider this, then is it possible to say that it was one of the reasons leading the *Estado* to its retreat in the seventeenth century? The lines on which the *VOC* was organized especially did matter as the Dutch posed the greatest degree of threat to the Portuguese monopoly. The *VOC* was a tightly organized company and the officials did not have personal motives as we have noticed in the case of the Portuguese *Estado*. Moreover the authorities in Amsterdam also gave an emphasis on trade and war for they understood that they could only derive profits through these two means.

The seventeenth century saw some changes in the functioning of the *Estado da Índia*. This was mainly due to the fact that the King gave some authority to the Viceroy to take decisions in matters of concern. The situation in the seventeenth century was overwhelmingly different and so the *Estado* was given liberty regarding the decisions to be taken. The correspondence from the King to the Viceroy of Sixteenth of January, 1607 CE¹⁶ clearly illustrates this fact. This letter is particularly important considering how in the early seventeenth century there was already a marked change in the formulation of the policies by the King and *Estado da Índia*. Earlier in the sixteenth century, the initiative for formulating policies was largely handled by the King and his advisors in Lisbon. With the Dutch presence, there had to be taken some immediate measures in accordance with “*tempo por mostrando*” (the need of the moment). A second aspect of no less importance that can be observed in the documents is the Viceroy resorting to the opinion of those who had better information on the matter. This implied that within a period of hundred years there had developed a public opinion in Goa that was surely formed by the high clergy, the members of the high echelons of the administration and the more affluent members of the trading community.

The presence of the Dutch can also be seen in the high scale of initiatives that the *Estado* undertook in taking decisions and implementing policies. The urgencies of one over another were motivated by the physical presence of the enemy (the VOC). Some measure had to be taken and there was hardly anytime disposed with the administration at Goa to take the approval of the King at Lisbon or in Spain. Therefore there is a need for a careful evaluation of events that took place with the arrival of the Dutch in Asia. The granting of authority (political) to the viceroy on the matters that concerned the Indian Ocean region by Lisbon was a new development in this time that is considered to be of decadence (financial). The decadence in economic aspect has been widely studied by the historians. On the other hand, one can observe evolution in other aspects like political budding as early as the year 1607 CE.¹⁷

The Council of Viceroy or the Council of India, as it was known, was an important body responsible for assisting the Viceroy at Goa in governing the *Estado*. In a letter of the Thirty First of January, 1615 CE written by the King to the Viceroy, Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d'Azevedo, the matters of the Council of India have been discussed. For certain considerations regarding the service of Viceroy, the Crown decided to bring to an end the Council of India. The purpose of taking such a decision was that the issues related to the governance of the overseas Portuguese territories formerly addressed to the tribunal were now to be taken up as: letters related with the *Estado* and the military operations were to be dealt by Christovão Soares of the Viceroy's Council and his State Secretary; matters related with granting of *mercês* (titles or advantages granted to someone who has rendered important service to the King) would be taken up by Ruy Dias de Meneses; those of justice by a *desembargo* (a judge of the higher court); matters pertaining with the treasury of the King were to be dealt by the Council of Viceroy.¹⁸

Already in the late sixteenth century, there was a startling administrative change that was introduced. This was the decision to divide the *Estado da Índia* regionally into three separate governments: the first one, along the East African coast; the

second, from Hormuz to the Bay of Bengal and the third, extending from the eastern Bay of Bengal littoral to Macau. To this effect, in 1571 CE, separate governors were appointed to these three *sub-Estados*, the first to be based in East Africa, the second one at Goa and the third one at Malacca.¹⁹ However, this plan could not materialise due to some opinion of differences. There arose differences between the governor of Goa and that of Malacca. The King, Dom Sebastião tried to resolve the issues but ultimately it led to the abandonment of the plan.²⁰

Besides these organisational attempts, after reviewing the existing situations in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, a scheme to form a Portuguese Company to trade with India was also envisioned. At a meeting of the Spanish Council of State in Madrid, the Count of Olivares (later known by the title of Count-Duke), the favourite of Philip IV, gave his support for the proposal with some suggested amendments. It said that rather than giving charge to one person to organize the Company, it would be better to give this responsibility to the governors of Portugal. This Company was finally constituted in 1628 CE. When the Company came into existence a contradiction of Olivares's original suggestion surfaced.²¹ Lorraine White has argued with regards to the failure of the Company that faction as- religious bigotry and changes in administrative control triggered opposition to this Company and foreshadowed its political failure.

It may be otherwise recorded that the *Estado da Índia* had, no doubt, certain guidelines that it followed. But, there were times when the superior authorities in the East took their own decision. It has also been noticed as earlier that from the Viceroy down to the guards, everyone who came within the ambit of the *Estado*, strove to gather as much wealth as one could. It may be added that C.R. Boxer also takes note of the fact that the viceroyalty of Goa in the seventeenth century was still highly sought to harness gains. Hence the Crown was very selective and careful in appointing a Viceroy²² and giving two terms as viceroyalty was again in exceptional cases. The *Conde de Linhares*, Dom Miguel de Noronha, who served as the Viceroy from 1629 to 1635 CE is one such example. Noronha, when reached Goa rather found the state of the *Estado* in a pitiful

state. Among the Viceroys of Goa, he is recorded to be the most successful one. His tenure which ran slightly over six years provides many insights into the social, economic and political situation of the period. Linhares took efforts to become familiarized with the rules and procedures. To assist him in the administration, there was a small staff that had accompanied him from Lisbon. Among it, there were his teenage son, Dom Fernando de Noronha, Pedro Barreto do Resende, the state archivist, António Boccaro²³ and the Spanish military engineer, Dom Domingo de Toral y Valdes. These persons became conversant in their own right with time. Nonetheless, for the most part of his term, Noronha had to rely on the existing bureaucracy that was made of individuals with personal needs and interests often different from those of the state.²⁴ Thus the Crown had realized the importance of governance when its emissary, the *Estado*, was facing the brunt of the VOC in the time.

The *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*

While understanding the Portuguese presence and its linkages in the Coromandel-Archipelago Southeast region, it is unwise to forgo the presence of the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* in the seventeenth century in them. After all, the frigates of the VOC began sailing in the same channels of water that were under the ambit of the *Estado*. But, was the mere presence of the VOC the root cause of the problems that the Portuguese witnessed? The knowledge about the company's inception, its planning and functioning would develop an understanding about the differences between the endeavours of overseas expansion of the Portuguese and the Dutch and the resultant conflict. The constitution of the company was embodied in a charter adopted by the States General on Twentieth of March, 1602 CE by virtue of which the company came into existence. The previously existing companies at Amsterdam- Hoorn Enkhuizen, Rotterdam, Delft and Middelburg became chambers in it. Its central management was assigned to the court of Directors-Heeren XVII-consisting of seventeen delegates from the chambers. Of these, the majority consisted of those from

Amsterdam (who were eight) and Zeeland (who were four). The VOC was, thus, purely a merchant's combine and remained true throughout the two centuries of its existence to its commercial ideals though these could also imply military actions to reinforce its quest of monopoly as Winius and Vink have correctly pointed.²⁵

The meetings of Heeren XVII were held twice in a year and if further negotiations were urgent, they took place in a sub-committee, *Kleine Zeventien*. The directors of the chamber (the so-called *bewindhebbers*) took some of the decisions, but the final power vested with the seventeen Gentlemen. With the passage of time, Heeren XVII started appointing committees for treatments of various spheres. Thus four departments were distinguished: for receipts, for equipment of ships, for accountancy and for commerce.²⁶ The VOC as an organization was tightly structured and centralized too. The manner in which it was formed shows that there was no paucity of resources but was far better capitalized than its other European counterparts in the overseas expansion. The interest of the States General in making the Dutch Company a strong military power endowed it from its very foundation with a distinctive feature that was never obliterated. The Company was a "*staat-buiten-de-staat*" with its own administration, jurisdiction, and finally also a right to make agreements with the foreign, Asiatic powers.²⁷

Around the beginning of the seventeenth century, Amsterdam had risen as a centre for trade in Europe. Thus, the very foundation of the company at the same time gave it a flavour of being a purely mercantile organization. From the charter, through which the company was secured, it was pointed that the basic motive behind its formation was to secure monopoly over Asiatic trade. Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, it sought zealously to maintain and safeguard this monopoly against interlopers and against any attempts at private trade by its officers. This fact is illustrated by the general instructions given by the board of directors, Heeren XVII to the Governor General in 1650 CE. According to it, the trading options of the VOC were to be divided into three categories. These categories were: firstly, the trade which the company enjoyed as an outcome of its own

conquest, exercising its own jurisdiction, as for instance on Ceylon and to a lesser extent on the Coromandel Coast; secondly, the trade ‘by virtue of exclusive contracts,’ giving its monopolistic rights on the local production as on the coast of Malabar; and thirdly, the trade conducted ‘by virtue of treaties,’ by which the Company did not occupy any special position at all and found itself only one amongst many, as in Gujarat and Bengal.²⁸

From the very beginning, it seems that the Directors of the VOC considered buying cloth from India to trade with the spices produced in the Moluccas. The mace, clove and nutmegs could be obtained for silver in the spice markets of the Moluccas. As the monetary system to the east of Malacca was not yet fully developed, it seemed more advantageous for the VOC to offer cloth instead of silver in such markets. As such, the cloth from India was famous in this part of the world. The cloth from the Coromandel was bound to get the attention of the Dutch in this context for exchange. So the equation of trade between the cloth of the Coromandel Coast and the spices of the Moluccas dominated the mindset of the higher echelons of the VOC. An advantage, which the Dutch had on the south-eastern coast of India, was the absence of Portuguese strongholds. Though there existed Portuguese settlements but they were private in nature. All the above factors facilitated the establishments of factories by the Dutch for the enhancement of their trade in the existing Coromandel-archipelago Southeast Asia linkage.

The pattern of operation at the beginning of the seventeenth century had not yet developed. There was no strategic planning or even a fixed pattern of operation. According to Winus and Vink, it was more in the nature of an impromptu trading presence.²⁹ From the experience of the pre-companies, it had figured the importance of the Moluccas that combined the availability of the most valuable spices along with a great distance from the real centres of the Portuguese power. For an organization that was still nascent, as far as its maritime activities are concerned the latter factor was of utmost importance. The Portuguese as is known had already been involved in such activities for a century. So for the VOC, the immediate source of peril was the *Estado da Índia*.

With its expansion and establishment in the East, the Company extended the concept of monopoly to acquire as much Asian trade it could. In its early years, it developed the policy of acquiring a monopoly of certain key commodities of the network by controlling the areas of production and supply. The spices, which had been pivotal items of trade in the world commerce, drew their immediate attention. The VOC in order to fulfil its trade requirements captured Fort Victoria in Amboyna from the Portuguese in 1605 CE. This was the first effective base it had established in the Spice Islands from where it could conduct trade without the Portuguese interference. Till this time, the VOC had still not organized itself well enough for other expeditions and for establishing control. The need for a central authority to coordinate the activities was increasing. Thus in order to realise the mounting demands of the expansionary zeal, the Directors of the VOC in Holland created the post of *gouverneur-generaal* in 1609 CE. The function of the *gouverneur-generaal* was to organize activities within the Asian part of their operation. He came to reside in and around the Malay Archipelago. After the establishment of Batavia in 1619 CE, the Dutch capital shifted to the aforementioned place. Though it may seem that the establishment of Batavia marks the beginning of the centralization and *modus operandi*, but in practice it had started much earlier.

The foundation of Batavia as the head quarters of the VOC was also due to the fact that before the middle of the seventeenth century, the entire region west of Malacca had been identified as the Company's *Westerkwartieren*. The focus was on the subordination of Indonesia and the China Seas for their trading interests. The subsequent strategy of the Company was to acquire pre-eminence in the spice trade over its English rivals and also to gain significant access to the lucrative China and Japan trades. At this point, the Dutch did little more than to maintain a status quo in south Asia. The Dutch were to concentrate again on the Coromandel in the 1630's as far as the control over the coast's trading had been concerned. In order to promote its own inter-Asian trading interests, the VOC imitated the Portuguese pass-convoy-armada system. In imitating this practice, the Dutch interest was less to

generate revenue but more to discourage competition and to concentrate the intra-Asian trade in the Company's hands.³⁰

The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry

The genesis of the English East India Company is also dated at the beginning of the seventeenth century. A charter from Queen Elizabeth I founded the Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies on Thirty First of December, 1600 CE, following more than a year of political negotiations and finance raising. The charter named two hundred and eighteen subscribers to the new enterprise, which was granted a monopoly of all English trade in lands lying east from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan--in other words, the whole of Asia and the Pacific. Spices were the spurs for this mercantile venture. They gave taste and flavour to otherwise bland foods, besides being mixed, blended and distilled into medicines and perfumes. Their rarity made them extremely valuable. Trading in them offered the possibility of making a good fortune.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, as seen in the above section, the Dutch policies and plans especially of J.P. Coen had made the English Company concentrate its activities in India and on developing the bilateral trade with Europe. From the middle of the seventeenth century this strategy began to pay-off, as the European market for Indian textiles expanded. This slow moving company gradually took lead over the Dutch as participants in trade both within Asia and between Europe and Asia in the eighteenth century.

The concentration of both the VOC and the English companies was in Southeast Asia, initially, especially in the insular part, which was the area of the cultivation of spices. The English were bound to follow the Dutch wherever they went for the goals of both the companies were similar. So the competition with the English East India Company implied a far more serious threat to the Jan Company's commercial interests. In 1604 CE, the English East India Company sent its second fleet, commanded by Henry Middleton to the Malay archipelago. Van der Hagen commanded

the Dutch fleet, which was also sent during the same time. These two fleets raced with each other at certain times to insure more gain from each other.

Prior to the beginning of the English Company's endeavours, Francis Drake had already visited the Moluccas in 1579 CE during his celebrated voyage around the world. While off Motir, the governor of that island persuaded Drake to visit the Ternate sovereign, Sultan Babu. Drake accepted the proposal and on anchoring there, sent a message to its ruler inviting him to exchange commodities. When the competition between the Dutch and the English gained pace in the Moluccas, the above-mentioned visit of Drake gathered importance. The English contended that they had a first claim to the commerce of the Moluccas on the ground that Drake had approached the ruler first for buying cloves. Prior to the visit of Middleton, the Dutch had already tried to tarnish the image of the English as early as 1596 CE. As late as the nineteenth century, such incidents did occupy the writings.³¹

While more European powers were looming on the horizon of the archipelago, the indigenous polities were more involved in settling their scores against each other for which they took the help of the former. A correspondence from the King of Tidore to the King of England in the year 1605 CE for instance, pleaded the latter to help them against their old rival- Ternate. Not only this, they also desired that England and Spain should join them and help them combat Tidore who were supported by the Dutch.³² The Dutch had conquered the Portuguese stronghold of Amboyna in the same year. Thus, they had begun to establish their hegemony in the Moluccas. They prohibited the English from trading at Amboyna, which was a true outcome of the principles of monopoly. The English took to the island of Ternate, whose Sultan was the successor of the prince with whom Sir Francis Drake had carried on commercial relations.

Unlike the Dutch, the English had no settled plan of action. The East India Company thought only in terms of separate voyages, and for a long time even the accounts of each voyage were kept in distinct. Too often the goods of the company and the general interest were sacrificed to the private quarrels of individual captains. This

lack of a farsighted and vigorous policy, the meagre resources of the Company and the lack of support by the government of England made the chances of the Company's obtaining a share of Southeast Asian trade very slight indeed. The contending Dutch company had precisely these advantages and their ultimate success against the English was certain.³³

The attitude of the Dutch became more hostile in the second decade of the seventeenth century. As early as 1611 CE, the English had established their factory at Masulipatnam and a little later, also opened a factory at Petapuli. *'The Globe'*, an English ship on its seventh voyage had visited Pulicat two years later, in the quest of trade. The Dutch did not allow the vessel to anchor as they reminded the local authorities that they had an exclusive right on the port of Pulicat. The States General of Holland had earlier ordered the VOC to follow a friendly policy and not to obstruct the English trade. This led to the conflict between their state defined policy and local commercial interest of the company, which can also be observed in one-line sarcasm- "*The English would shear the sheep and we, the Dutch Pigs.*"³⁴ Thus, *the Globe* was forced by the Dutch strength to look for alternative markets in Southeast Asia. But, they also, had to make their choice for the next best choice like Bantam or Patani.

The Globe left for England in 1615 CE. In the next four years, the English could do little to improve their position in the eastern archipelago. In 1613 CE, they had already established a factory at Bantam. It was an important factory and had a prospect of becoming a good stronghold in future in the archipelago. Bantam had the great export trade with China and the neighbouring islands and its nearness to the Sunda strait made it a more profitable centre for sale and purchase of goods from Aceh. Like the Dutch, the English had also suffered much from the oppression of the Sultan. When the Dutch moved to Djakarta, the English after some delay followed their example in 1617 CE. In the next year, the English opened a factory at Japara, which was then of considerable importance as it was the chief port of Mataram. In the meantime, competition with the Portuguese private traders constrained the English efforts

at Makassar, while Amboyna, Bandas and Moluccas were bone of contention with the VOC.

The Dutch ships, forts and garrisons routinely obstructed English trading attempts. They were unable to offer effective counter-protection to the spice producers; indeed any promises made were soon broken and served as pretexts for Dutch reprisals against the island populations. In October 1616 CE, in desperation at what had happened to their world, the Bandanese of Run ceded their island to the English Crown. It was at this juncture that the VOC moved from being threats to openly being hostile to the English. Seven English ships were captured and a Dutch sharpshooter killed the Company's chief commander, John Jourdain, on the deck of his ship off Pattani during truce negotiations in July 1619 CE. In the same year, the VOC's newly appointed Governor General, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, took the decision to make their small post at Djakarta, east of Bantam, the main rendezvous for Dutch trade. Javanese resistance to the VOC's initiative was crushed. Djakarta was destroyed and the castle and city of Batavia began to take shape. Batavia, now Djakarta, the capital of Indonesia, became the headquarters of the VOC's operations throughout Asia, in imitation to Portuguese Goa. It had a population of eight thousand. Soldiers, overseas Chinese settlers, migrants from Europe, and slaves bought in Madagascar, India and the islands poured in to create a Dutch settlement. .

When in November 1617 CE, the Dutch declared war on English in the Moluccas, Banda and Amboyna, the Company followed a policy of cautious vigilance on the Coromandel coast. There were no actual hostilities on the Coromandel for the concentration of the VOC was on the Spice Islands. In fact the Dutch factors on the Coromandel with their hands sufficiently full with the Portuguese would have preferred more friendly relations with the English.³⁵ In a letter of Twelfth November, 1618, General Coen wrote to the directors from Djakarta, that: "*It was a pity that due to the shortage of money and ships, the important trade at Surat was being neglected. Participation in this trade would have helped the Dutch against the English in the Moluccas, Amboina and Banda.*"³⁶ As early as

January 1617 CE, the Dutch factors had been sensing the dangers they would face due to the intrigues of the English. Not only the English, but also the Portuguese and the Mughal official at the port city of Surat were also the sources of worry for the Dutch. Since the concentration of the Dutch during this period was the Moluccas, the frequent intrigues by the English at the factory of VOC at Surat worsened the situation.

But a document of the VOC dated of Nineteenth of October, 1617, shows a different aspect of the VOC towards the English. The Directors approved of Pulicat's intention to reduce the size of the local garrison to one hundred and send the surplus soldiers to the Moluccas and around. This would reduce the costs at Pulicat and enable the factors to face more successfully the competition from the English, who were likely to begin trading in the area in the near future and who would be unencumbered by such costs.³⁷ This document shows that in the early years, the Dutch were not afraid of the English as competitors in the textile trade.

It was suggested by Franco van der Meer³⁸ along with some others that Tegenapatam would provide a better roadstead for the VOC's ships. They even suggested the construction of a small fort at low cost. But, the opinion on this subject differed and the Governor-General thought of communicating the final decision to Pulicat. The general policy that the Dutch were following now was not to build any more forts, particularly since the Company's charter was due to expire in another five or six year's time and the Director's were still uncertain of its renewal. The factors were hence advised to keep as small a number of employees on the Coromandel Coast as possible. Notwithstanding the resultant problems caused on the Coromandel Coast, the Directors approved of the policy to permit free burghers living in the Moluccas, Amboina and Banda to operate on the Coromandel Coast. Even the closure of the factory at Petapuli was approved.³⁹

On the contrary, an English document suggests a different depiction. The situation that existed in the early 1618 CE is related by a correspondence between Sir Thomas Roe at Ahmedabad and the English Company:

“...The Dutch have spoyled Moluccoes which they fought for, and spent more then they will yield them. If quiet, in seaven yeares. Syndu you may freely goe too, lade and relade; but it is inhabited by the Portugal; lies noe way well for your stock (except you scatter it); it vents only your teeth [Ivory] and affords good cloth and many toyes. But if the sorts you have seen serve your marketts, you are nearer seated and may have what quanteties you please; and for your teeth, the marchant will fetch them at Suratt.”⁴⁰

The Dutch eagerness to expel the English at gunpoint checked by a contrary state policy had given place to a willingness to co-exist at a time, when the two nations were at war.⁴¹ There existed a conflict between state policy and local commercial interest of the Dutch though the circumstances had changed radically. The VOC was conscious of the power of its rival. So, it was evidently seeking the establishment of a limited dual control on the buyer’s market, which would have eminently served their ultimate purpose of reducing the bargaining power of local supplier and eliminated the effects of powerful competition as Tapan Raychaudhuri has pointed out.⁴²

Meanwhile, the English Company had finally managed to put together a large fleet of fifteen ships and was prepared to challenge the VOC. But the news of the Anglo- Dutch truce (Treaty of Defence) that was signed in Europe in the year 1619 CE came forth. The Treaty was to come into effect in Asia in April 1620 CE. Prior to this treaty, two treaties had already been signed and there were no fruitful results. In accordance with the seventh clause of the Treaty of Defence⁴³, De Carpentier, Jacob Dedel and a third person on behalf of the VOC and three persons on behalf of the English company signed an agreement at Djakarta, at a meeting of the Council of Defence, by which they were planning to send a ship to Pulicat for the purpose of trade. The English were, however, concerned with the presence of a Dutch garrison in the fort at Pulicat⁴⁴ for they thought that the indigenous merchants might feel constrained to supply to the Dutch alone excluding the English in this manner. Among other points, it was also agreed that “*in regard of the great blood-shed and cost, pretended to bee bestowed by the Hollanders, in winning of the Trade of the Iles of*

the Molluccos, Banda, and Amboyana, from the Spaniards and Portugals, and in building of Forts for the continuall securing of the same, the said Hollanders therefore should enjoy two thirds parts of that Trade, and the English the other third; and the charge of the Forts to bee maintained by taxes and impositions, to be levied upon the Merchandize.”

The following articles were agreed upon provisionally subject to confirmation by the Dutch Governor General⁴⁵: According to Article 1, accommodation would be provided to the English factors in Fort Geldria at Pulicat subject to the payment of the necessary rent. If accommodation could not be spared within the fort, the Dutch would arrange alternative lodgings or even have a new house built for the English. Till such an arrangement was made, the English would be accommodated within this fort. Article 2 said that the English factors would inform the Dutch what particular varieties of cloth they desired to buy and in what quantity. If the Dutch intended to buy any of the same kind, the goods would be bought jointly and afterwards divided in proportion to the capital invested. Article 3 related to the English share of the charges and the maintenance of the fort as well as the wages of the garrison had been fixed by the seventh article of the Treaty of Defence. Additional payment would, however, be made for any ammunition that the English might buy from the Dutch. Article 4 was concerned with the cost of repairing any damage to the fort would be borne jointly by the two companies. Article 5 said that the wages and the maintenance of Dutch employees exclusively concerned with trade would not be treated as part of the expenses of the garrison. According to Article 6 the servants of both the companies were expressly prohibited from the private trade in cloth under penalty of the confiscation of the goods. Article 7 was regarding the general costs; the guidelines in clause 7 of the Treaty of Defence would be followed. Article 8 said that the English would pay the Dutch governor every month their share of the cost of maintenance of the fort

The nature of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry revealed by this treaty and along with such clauses being developed made the English apprehensive about their trade at Pulicat. Each article mentioned

above was in the favour of the VOC. This was bound to create more bitterness between the two companies. Though the agreement was an important one, as far as the relations between the English and the Dutch were concerned, but it was foredoomed to failure. The employees of the VOC whatever the attitude of the masters had were unwilling to give away entirely through a partnership, the definite advantages they had over their rivals. General Coen, who seldom crushed matters, inquired if their Honours in Amsterdam had been lacking in good counsel. To him, friendship with the English was impossibility; it would mean that the Dutch “*would have to quit not only Indies, but the world.*”⁴⁶ There followed a bitter struggle between the two companies mainly in the Indonesian archipelago and particularly around Batavia and the Moluccas. In Coromandel, there was a low-key confrontation as the English with factories at Masulipatnam and Nizamapatnam could ill-afford to enter into an armed confrontation with the Dutch, who were prosperous and relatively well supplied. In a correspondence, Matthew Duke at Petapoli to the Company dated Ninth of December, 1618, the enraged English factor declared, ‘*theis buterboxes [the Dutch] are groanne soe insolent, that yf they be suffered but a whit longer, they will make claims to the whole Indies.*’⁴⁷ The English were also apprehensive about this agreement. They felt that such a co-operation with a powerful rival would only mean numerous encumbrances and surrender of legitimate rights. The English Council as early as March 1622 CE reported to London that the partnership with the Dutch in Coromandel was working very badly and requested the home authorities to give them a solution.⁴⁸

From the Treaty of Defence that was concluded between England and Holland, the Council of Defence was established in July 1619 CE between the two companies. This Council consisted of four Dutch and four English members. In order to inflict damage on the enemies and to promote the Dutch and the English trade on the coast of Malabar, the Council of Defence on recommendations of the representatives of the English and the Dutch Companies, and after ripe deliberations, had decided to send a fleet of nine ships and two yachts on the coast of Malabar and Goa. In all they would together carry 1, 139 soldiers (730 on the Dutch ships and

385 on the English ships).⁴⁹ The ships were to proceed on towards their destination without forewarning the enemy. It was thought that on reaching Goa, a word would be sent to Coromandel about the Portuguese strength so that the Portuguese on the Coromandel get inhibited with the Dutch and the English power.

The Dutch had in reality little reason to be insecure. In the pursuit of their monopoly policy, they deliberately destroyed the clove plantations elsewhere in order to make Amboyana the only source for the supply of cloves.⁵⁰ By 1623 CE, the English finding nothing but obstructions and repeated fights, decided to close down their factories in the East. But before these orders reached Amboyana, an incident took place that embittered relation between the Dutch and the English in the years to come. This was the famous Amboyana incident or the “Massacre of Amboyana”⁵¹ as is known in the documents. This was one incident among many of the extreme ones that the Dutch took to ensure their monopoly. Ten Englishmen, after being tortured together with nine Japanese and one Portuguese, were executed on a charge of having attempted to seize the fortress of Amboyana. In spite of the agreement between the English and the Dutch this undesired incident took place. As part of the treaty that was signed between the two, the English East India Company had planted certain factories for their share in the trade of spices. Some of these factories were in Banda while the other were in the Moluccas and the Amboyana.

From one point of view the “Massacre” was an event of world importance, for it finally convinced the English of the futility of their attempts to compete with the Dutch. Moreover with this outrage all the hopes of future co-operation between the two nations in the archipelago ended. The President of the English East India Company was determined to quit Batavia where they had established headquarters in 1620 CE and managed now to shift outside the Dutch jurisdiction. By the end of the year the English factories at Patani, Pulicat, Siam and Hirado (Japan) had been closed, and the remaining ones under the control of the English President and Council at Batavia were those at Masulipatnam, Aceh, Jambi, Japara and Makassar.

On the Coromandel Coast, the English did not find worthwhile to maintain a factory at Pulicat. The reasons given were that there was a need to reduce the expenses. Besides, the textiles from the Coromandel Coast were no more required, as the English factories in the Moluccas had been closed. The Dutch at Batavia offered no objection to the proposal, though they intimated them that if the English desired to return to Pulicat, the question of the payment of the garrison would arise in the period of their absence. Thus ‘*The Ruby*’, was dispatched to Pulicat with orders for the dissolution of the factory and shifting to Masulipatnam which also indicated the end of Anglo-Dutch partnership on the coast.⁵² Prior to the shifting of the factory from Pulicat to Masulipatnam, the latter had become a port for centralization and shipment of goods collected from the hinterland as well as from the coast. William Methwold, who was in Masulipatnam between 1618 and 1622 CE referred to it as ‘the chief port of the Kingdome of Golchonda.’⁵³ Anthony Schorer, around 1616 CE had called it the ‘most famous market on the coast’. Thus this already prosperous port city⁵⁴ was given a new lease of life in the period following 1624 CE. This was largely on account of the growth of the trade involving Makassar.

Makassar, as will be recorded in the subsequent chapters, had provided refuge to the various trading diasporas who had fled from Malacca or expelled from elsewhere. The English had established a factory there in 1613 CE. But it was not until the middle of the decade of twenties that Makassar grew in importance largely due to its clove trade. Between 1622 and 1643 CE, when the Dutch effectively snuffed out all sources of ‘smuggled’ cloves, the trade continued to grow apace. The English policy was to use their Coromandel factories to supply Batavia (upto 1628 CE) and Banten (thereafter) with textiles, which were then carried to Makassar.⁵⁵ Moreover the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1635 CE also made the Dutch apprehensive that the English were plotting with the Portuguese against them. The Dutch in their efforts to restrict clove trade of Makassar met success only after 1643 CE that lasted eight years hence. In this period, the English trade declined between Coromandel and the insular Southeast Asia. The

combined English-Danish export of textiles to Makassar in 1646 CE was estimated to be only four hundred bales.

Thus in this section, as has been noticed till now, the Dutch proved to be hostile enemies of the English in the Coromandel and archipelago Southeast Asia. So much so that an itinerant, Nathaniel Courthop to Southeast Asia observed between the years 1617 and 1618 CE that “the Hollanders are hated of all Nations in those parts: that they vaunt they have the Copies of the Companies Commission before any ships come forth: that no English Generall hath the King’s Commission: that they bring letters from petty Kings (which are reputed as their slaves) as of Amboyana and Hetto, with the like: that if the Bandanese will have their Countreyes in peace, they must submit themselves to the Hollanders, for that no nation can compare with them.”⁵⁶ Thus, if Courthop is to be believed, then, the position of the Dutch seems from this account, sound and strong. The success of the English trade was not only limited, but also of short duration in the first half of the seventeenth century. It was during this period that the English initiated the building of Fort St. George at Madras in 1639 CE. This was to become the residence of their President and Council, controlling the trade of the Bay of Bengal and the one towards the farther east.

Both the VOC and the English East India companies were organized on different lines from the Portuguese’s *Estado da Índia* as noticed above. While on the one hand, the Dutch East India Company and the *Estado da Índia* were at loggerheads, the English had a defensive attitude towards the Portuguese. Travelling between 1616 and 1620 CE, Martin Pring noted that the Dutch had not only been doing wrongs with the Portuguese but with the English also. One of the Englishmen, who was held as a prisoner by the Dutch in the Moluccas and had fled from there, had reported of the atrocities committed by the Dutch.⁵⁷ If the English had met with such a treatment then what would have been the fate of the Portuguese?

The English and the Portuguese, prior to the seventeenth century, had amiable relations. In the seventeenth century when the competition among the different European companies was lingering high, even then, the relations did not decline much.

There existed a regular trade between the Iberian Peninsula and England at an early date. This is corroborated from the fact that on the Seventeenth of February, 1294 CE, King Edward granted safe-conduct to the merchants of Spain and Portugal, to last only till the middle of the October, on condition that the Kings of Spain and Portugal should act in the same manner to his subjects.⁵⁸ A letter that was being sent by the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe in 1619 CE through the Dutch to the Amsterdam reported, “the English had captured two Portuguese frigates worth over 5000 crowns.”⁵⁹ There was another incident that reflected the English and the Portuguese relations. An English ship which was on its way from England to Bantam had accosted a Portuguese carrack on the Coromandel Coast and seized from it 90, 000 *rials*. The carrack was allowed to proceed on with the remaining 400, 000 *rials*.⁶⁰ This was the kind of relationship that was maintained between the Portuguese and the English.

Thus, as it has been observed in the course of the theme above that there were different factors at work which gradually led to the diminishing of the monopoly of the *Estado da Índia*. The long established monopoly of the Portuguese was disrupted due to the fact that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) contended strongly to contain the domination of the *Estado* in the spice trade. One of the reasons behind the success of the Dutch Company was the way in which it was organized. The other European competitors in the scene were the English. At the end of the sixteenth century only, the Dutch and British interests in the region gave rise to a series of voyages: those of James Lancaster in 1591 CE, Cornelis de Houtman in 1595 and again in 1598 CE, Jacob van Neck in 1598 CE, Lancaster again in 1601 CE, and others. In 1602 CE the Dutch East India Company (formal name United East India Company [*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*; VOC]) received its charter, two years after the formation of the English East India Company; It began to attempt to exclude European competitors from the Indies, control the trade carried on by indigenous Asian traders, and establish its own commercial monopolies in their very networks.

The Dutch company's monopoly in archipelago Southeast Asia, however, was more extensive and came to form the basis of

the Dutch territorial empire. Under the governor-generalship of Jan Pieterszoon Coen and his successors, particularly, Anthony van Diemen (1636-45 CE) and Joan Maetsuyker (1653-78 CE), the company had laid the foundations of the Dutch commercial empire and became the paramount power of the archipelago. It captured Malacca from the Portuguese (1641 CE), confined the British, after a period of fierce rivalry, to a factory at Bencoolen in southwestern Sumatra, and established a network of factories in the eastern islands. Though it may have wished to limit its activities to trade, the company was soon drawn into local politics in Java and elsewhere, and, in becoming the arbiter in dynastic disputes or in conflicts between rival rulers, it inevitably emerged as the main political entity in the islands. In acquiring territorial responsibilities, the company did not at first establish a close administrative system of its own in the areas that passed under its direct control. In effect, the *VOC* replaced the sovereign of the royal court and, in so doing, inherited the existing structure of authority. An indigenous aristocracy administered the collection of tribute on behalf of the company, and only gradually was this system converted into a formalized bureaucracy. The *VOC*, like the royal court before it, drew revenue in the form of produce from the peasantry within its domain.

To implement its commercial monopoly, the *VOC* established company factories (trading posts) for the collection of produce, pressured individual rulers to do business solely with the company, controlled the sources of supply of particular products (clove production, for example, was limited to Ambon, nutmeg and mace to the Banda Islands) and, in the 18th century, pushed through a system of so-called forced deliveries and contingencies. Contingencies constituted a form of tax payable in kind in areas under the direct control of the company; forced deliveries were produce that indigenous cultivators were compelled to grow and sell to the company at a set price. There was little difference between the devices. In theory, forced deliveries were thought of as a form of trade in which goods were exchanged, but they were, in fact, as the British scholar J.S. Furnivall has described it, “*tribute*

disguised as trade,” while contingencies were “*tribute undisguised.*” In effect, the whole system of company trade was designed to extract produce from the Indies for disposal on a European market, but without stimulating any fundamental technological change in the area’s economy. The profits belonged to the company, not to the producers. The indigenous traders of the region were pushed aside by the VOC as it gained control of more and more of the export trade of the archipelago. The growth of Batavia resulted, for example, in the decline of the north coast ports of Java, through which much of the spice trade had been channeled since before the fifteenth century. In this way, the traditional pattern of trade was checked and distorted.

Thus, the *Estado da Índia* was bound to suffer. The relations of Portugal with Spain also contributed to the hostility between the Portuguese and the Dutch. The Dutch bought the indigenous polities to their help against the Portuguese. In the meantime the Portuguese had themselves started realizing the factors that were leading to their gradual decline of their domination. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has pointed that there was only a limited extent to which the Portuguese could follow the Dutch model. For firstly, they had an elaborate local apparatus in place in the form of the *Estado da Índia*, which included designated cities with municipal chambers, and all sorts of sovereign claims, which could not simply be added over to a company. The state in Portuguese Asia already existed; one could not create a Company that would also be a quasi-state, as was in the case of the VOC.⁶¹ Besides the Portuguese even thought of creating a Company on similar as that of Dutch in as early as 1618 CE! So much so that the king of Portugal even instructed the viceroy to maintain healthy relations with the indigenous polities. Besides, the giving of the power to take decisions for immediate affect were given to the viceroy by the king of Portugal. The authorities at Lisbon had understood the situation and were acting accordingly. Thus, the Portuguese by taking different measures were trying to sustain the linkages that they had explored and which they had maintained for a century at least.

Notes

1. Thomaz, Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis, “Estrutura Política e Administrativa do Estado da Índia no Século XVI” in II Semainario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas, Lisboa, 1985, p. 459.
2. Villiers, John, “The Estado da India in Southeast Asia” in Kratoska, Paul H. (edt), Southeast Asia Colonial History, Vol. I, Routledge, 2001, pp. 151-152.
3. The origin of the Council of State, Conselho do Estado can be traced in the Councils of the captains, Conselho dos Capitães which Afonso de Albuquerque used to convene in the matters of high importance during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The government functionaries who also served as councillors were Captain of the city of Goa, Head of the Fortress (Alcaide-Mor), Factor (feitor) who collected taxes and worked as an agent on commercial matters. Besides them there was a Notary, Captain of the Sea and Fidalgos or Noblemen who were invited to attend the meetings.
4. Diario Do 3º, Conde de Linhares, Vice-rei Da India, Tomo I, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa, 1937 and Diario Do 3º, Conde de Linhares, Vice-rei Da India , Tomo II, Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa, 1943.
5. Burnell, Arthur Coke(ed) The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies, Vol. I, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Limited, 1997, pp. 217-219.
6. Ibid., p. 219.
7. Linscoten (ibid., p. 221) noted “*they leave the house as bare and naked [as possible maybe] so that the new Viceroy must make provision to furnish it, and gather a new treasure.*”
8. Gray, Albert, (trans) The Voyage of François Pyrad of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1887, p. 88.
9. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 421.
10. Burnell, A.C., vol I, 1997, p. 188.
11. Burnell, A.C., vol I, 1997, pp. 188-189.
12. The Latin word “*matricula*” which means a register.
13. Burnell, A.C., vol I, 1997, pp. 189-190.
14. Villers, John, “The Estado in Southeast Asia” in Kratoska (ed.), 2001, pp. 160-161.
15. Winius, George, “Few Thanks to the King: The Building of Portuguese India” in Disney, Anthony and Booth, Emily, Vasco da Gama and the linking of Europe and Asia, OUP, 2000, pp. 484-85.
16. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou

- Livros das monções, publicações de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, p. 90.
17. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicações de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 74-75
 18. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicações de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 180-181.
 19. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1993, p. 122.
 20. Couto, Diogo do, Da Ásia, Décadas IX, Livraria Sam Carlos. Facsimile of the 1777-78 Régia Oficina Tipográfica edition, Lisboa, 1973-74.
 21. White, Lorraine, "Faction, Administrative Control, and the Failure of the Portuguese India Company, 1628-33" in Disney and Booth, 2000, p. 471.
 22. Boxer, C.R., Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in South Asia 1500-1750, Variorum, Great Britain, 1990, p. 59
 23. António Boccaro has two works to his credit viz: *Historia da India* and *Livro das Plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e Povoações do Estado da India Oriental*, which provide an ample quantity of information regarding the Estado da India.
 24. Disney, Anthony, "The Viceroy Count of Linhares at Goa, 1629-1635" in II Semainario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas, Lisboa, 1985 p. 306.
 25. Winius, G.D. and Vink, Marcus P.M., *The Merchant – Warrior pacified*, OUP, 1991, p. 9.
 26. Glamann, Kristoff, *Dutch Asiatic trade, 1620-1740*, Martimes Nighoff S-Gravenhage, 1981, pp. 3-5.
 27. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 28. Winius, G.D. and Vink, Marcus P.M., 1990, pp. 10-11.
 29. Winius and Vink, 1990, p. 12.
 30. Winius and Vink, 1990, p. 16.
 31. St. John, *The Indian Archipelago: Its History and present state*, Vol. I, Longman, London, 1853, p. 221 The memoir remarks that: "...He Cornelius Houtman, a Dutch merchant had come to threat for alliance and claim the privileges of trade. The natives appeared were pleased with the Dutch, and warned them against the merchants of Portugal. The Hollanders as they assert, defended the people of that nation, praying that they might not be confounded with those pirates, the English, who were already on strength of strange report hated and feared throughout that region."
 32. Foster, William, (*The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas . . .* 1943, p. 63). The letter was written as: "This writing of the King of Tydor to the King of England is to let Your Highnesse understand that the King

of Holland hath sent hither into these partes a fleet of shippes to joyne with our ancient enemie, the King of Tarnate; and they joyntly together have overrunne and spolyed part of our country, and are determined to destroy both us and our subjects. Nowe, understanding by the bearer hereof, Captaine Henry Middleton that your Highnesse is in frien[d]ship with King of Spaine, Wee desire your Majestie that you would take pittie of us, that wee may not be destroyed by the King(s) of Holland and Tarnata, to whom wee have offered no wrong, but they by forceable meanes seek to bereave us of our Kingdome. And as great Kings upon the earth are ordayned by God to succour all them that be wrongfully oppressed, so I appeale unto your Majeste for succour against my enemies; not doubting but to find reliefe at your Majesties hands.”

33. Moorhead, F.J., *A history of Malaya*, vol. II, Longman, 1963.
34. Peter Floris, pp. 10-12.
35. EFI, 1618-1621, p. 17.
36. Om Prakash, *The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p. 80. The documents of 5th January 1617 (p. 20) and of 18th December 1617 (p. 57) also hold importance with regards to the mentioned Dutch-English intrigues.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
38. Franco van der Meer came to the East Indies on 28th December 1610 on the *Leeuw* as an upper merchant. In 1612, he became chief of the factory at Tegenapatam. He returned to Holland on 26th February 1616 with the *Zwarte Beer* but came out again as an upper merchant on the *Delft* in the autumn of 1617. He arrived at Jacarta in October 1618, went to Amboina and Banda and was back in Jacarta in May 1619. On 9th July 1619, he went to Coromandel as second-in -command and succeeded Adolff Thomasz as the head of the factory at Pulicat and the governor of Fort Geldria. He returned to Holland in October 1621, with the *Woerden*.
39. Om Prakash, *The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p. 46.
40. EFI, 1618-1621, p. 14.
41. Raychaudhuri, Tapan, *Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p. 103.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
43. According to the seventh clause of the Treaty of Defence, William Foster noted in EFI (1618-1621, p. xliiii) that: “The English Companie shall freely use and enjoy the traffique at the place of Pellicate and shall beare the moyetie of the charge of the maintenance of the fort and garrison there, this to begin from the tyme of the publication of this treaty in those parts.”
44. Purchas, Samuel, *Purchas His Pilgrimes, The Tenth Volume*, Hakluyt Society, p. 507.
45. Om Prakash, 1984, pp. 157-158; also in EFI, 1618-1621, pp. 253-254.
46. Raychaudhuri, 1962, p. 104.

47. EFI, 1618-1621, p. 48.
48. EFI, 1618-1621, p. 48.
49. Om Prakash, 1984, p. 173.
50. Foster, William, (ed.), Alexander Hamilton, A New account of the East Indies, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1930, vol. II, p. 141.
51. Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, Vol X, the Hakluyt Society, pp. 507-521.
52. EFI, 1622-1623, pp. 246-247: "The shipp *Rubie* arrived att Pallacatt the 8th June, bringinge order for desoulvinge of this factory [i.e. Pulicat], the reasons wherefore you shall understand, by the Presidents letter more large from the said Pallacatt I dispeeded this shipp *Rubie* the prime July and raised that factory and there inbayled 131 baylls cloth, being woven and paintings, which now suppose as, the case stands, will little advance our masters, is regard of the disoulving of all the factories in the Moluccas, beinge clothes most parte not vendable in other places, except Bantam when open (whereof in some hope). The 4th of July wee by Gods providence wee safly arived in this road of Musulapatnam.
53. Methwold, William, "Relations of the Kingdome of Golchanda, and other neighbouring nations with the Gulfe of Bengala, Arreccan, Pepin, Tannassery, etc. and the English Trade in those Parts" in Moreland, W.H. (edt) Relations of Golconda in Early Seventeenth Century. The Hakluyt Society, London, 1931, p. 6.
54. Schorer, Anthony, "Brief Relation of the trade of the Coromandel coast, especially at Masulipatnam, where I resided in the service of the Hon'ble Company in the seventh year" in Moreland (edt), 1931, p. 55.
55. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, The Political Economy of Commerce, OUP, 1990, p. 176.
56. Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol.V, Glasgow, 1905, p92
57. Purchas, Samuel, Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol. V, p. 8.
58. Danvers, F.D., The Portuguese in India, Volume I, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966, p. 10.
59. Prakash, Om, The Dutch factories in India, 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1984, pp. 82-83.
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Spaces, Institutions and the Contestations (1600-1641 CE)

THE *Estado da Índia* as an enterprise, through the sixteen century, had gathered territories while exploring various commercial linkages through the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan. At the onset of the seventeenth century, the expression *Estado da Índia* indicated not only a well-defined geographical space but also included other dimensions like establishments, resources, persons and administration within its geographical space. The Portuguese Crown in the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan tutored all these interests. A study of the position of the *Estado da Índia* in the context of the early seventeenth century becomes imperative due to the ascend of the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC) or the United Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company. These companies, as noticed in the previous chapter, had been organized on different lines from the Portuguese, *Estado da Índia*. While the *Estado* was under the aegis of the Crown, the association of the merchants who had pooled their resources in order to undertake the overseas ventures organized the VOC and the English East India Company. Besides, there were other inherent factors within the organization of the *Estado* that led to its retreat. Such inherent factors would be the focus of this theme mainly in relation to the peninsular India in the seventeenth century.

The sources used in the study generally reflect a hostile Dutch attitude towards their dealings with the Portuguese in Asia. This

can be understood as one of the factors, which led to the retreat of the *Estado da Índia*. But was this the solitary factor reasoned in their retreat? Or were there other causes also that made the Portuguese stronghold and fortress vulnerable to the antagonism of the VOC in the seventeenth century? Was the organization of the *Estado da Índia* the very factor that was the cause for the worry for Portuguese? Such questions related to the organization of the *Estado da Índia* need attention. The understanding of these factors is pertinent to understand the position of the *Estado* in the early seventeenth century and that how its retreat started.

The Contending Powers

The main aim of the Dutch was to secure a monopoly of spices in Southeast Asia.¹ Besides in the early years of the seventeenth century, the pattern of their maritime expansion was such as to avoid the area where the Portuguese were still strong. This was because when the Dutch attempted to make contact with Gujarat they were intercepted by the Portuguese and executed. In the insular Southeast Asia as early as 1559 CE, a fleet under Wijbrand van Warwijk and Jacob van Heemskerck visited Amboina and the Bandas and concluded treaties with the natives (subject to ratification by the King of Ternate) and left factories in two of the Banda islands. Van Warwijk then proceeded to Ternate, where the King, in the hope of assistance against the Portuguese and their ally, the king of Tidore, agreed to the establishment of a Dutch factory in his capital. In the following year another fleet arrived under van Neck, and the Portuguese fort at Tidore was bombarded. Around the same time, Steven van der Hagen besieged a Portuguese stronghold on the Amboina, with much success.²

In 1602 CE, the position of the Dutch was further strengthened when Wolphert Harmenszoon visited Ternate and the Bandas, and concluded an alliance with the chiefs of the latter islands, who agreed to sell their cloves only to the Dutch. Later the Spanish squadron from Manila joined them. The allied forces, besieged the King of Ternate, said Berkat in his capital but had to abandon the enterprise due to the finishing of ammunition. Thus the Kings of

Ternate and Tidore continued their war with each other banking their support on the Dutch and the Portuguese respectively. In the opening years of the seventeenth century the nascent VOC had not yet developed any strategic plan or even any fixed pattern of operation. It 'was more in the nature of an impromptu trading presence'³ as Vink and Winius have observed. Moluccas, as has already been noted, was preferred due to spice trade besides being at a greater distance from what were understood as the real centers of the Portuguese power. It was only in 1605 CE when Fort Victoria at Amboyna was captured from the Portuguese that led to the establishment of an effective base of operation of the VOC. They built a fortress afterwards called "Nieuw Victoria" (i.e. New Victory). Fredrick de Hontman, the celebrated navigator and compiler became the first Dutch governor of Ambon.

However, the satisfaction of the indigenous polities with the Dutch was short-lived. As an early nineteenth century British Resident at the court of Java, John Crawfurd noticed that the hatred of the people of the Moluccas towards the Portuguese, made them readily join the Dutch in driving them from the Moluccas but the rapacity of the latter was too open for their artifices, and the natives were scarcely acquainted with them, when they were as desirous of being rid of these new quests as of the former.⁴ The relevance of this observation can be noticed as early as 1606 CE. The King of Ternate attempted to league with the princes of the Moluccas against the Dutch for their expulsion. In fact by the second decade of the century, the indigenous polities had realized that the Dutch were not less dangerous than their former visitors, the Portuguese.

On glancing through different Portuguese sources, the Dutch are generally described as assaulting the Portuguese settlements. Condemning such actions of the '*inimigos*' undoubtedly was the Portuguese reaction. However, at the same time the Portuguese did not seem to have realised that though the Dutch presence did act as the causative factor in their retreat but there were problems within the *Estado* that were also responsible for the state of affairs. The predicaments in the functioning of the *Estado* had started appearing with the VOC's presence. [A document of Twenty Seventh of January, 1607 portrays that in Chaul in the previous

year, there was an armed galleon when the Dutch were blockading the city of Goa.] The 1606 blockade of Goa by the Dutch testifies the state of affairs of the *Estado*. The men serving the *Estado* had removed thirteen guns from the fortress. The Viceroy was questioned by the King and asked to return back the guns. Why were the guns removed? Was it because the soldiers wanted to move away from Goa to have a better living and earn profits thereby to use guns for their protection in the new place or as sell-off items to earn some money or simply to indulge into piratical activities or simply to become freelance mercenaries and provide service as gunners to indigenous rulers? Whatever the motive of these men might have been, it is clear that such actions were perceived due to certain discontent that the employees had with the state policies. At a time when the Dutch were trying to block Goa, which was the capital of the *Estado da Índia*, such an occurrence or malpractice did indicate something. If the situation in Goa was of this nature as early as 1606 CE, then matters in other parts would be worse. Adjudging from this incident, it was easy to foresee what the future held for the *Estado*, if careful measures were not adopted.⁵

Three years later, the post of the ‘*gouverneur generaal*’ was created by the company directors in Holland as a means of coordinating activities within Asia. Though the Dutch concentrated in Southeast Asia, the age-old trading link to the Coromandel could not be avoided. The VOC obtained the first of its firman for establishing a factory at Masulipatam from the Qutb Shahi Sultans. But it was still an open question to the company directors what future role would the coast play in their Asian design apart from the fact that its cloth was the only item to barter in the Moluccas.⁶ In the following year, a settlement was reached with the local authorities whereby subsequently a factory was established at Petapuli (i.e. Nizampatnam). The firman for establishing a factory at Pulicat was received in 1607 CE. This was detrimental for the Portuguese, who had their settlement at nearby São Thomé and had been using Pulicat harbour though now less in use. While describing Pulicat, an English observer, William Methwold observed the hostile Dutch presence there and it presented “*a bade neihbour to the Portugal*”.⁷

In the early seventeenth century the whole of the southern most parts of India were in theory under suzerainty to what was left of the once mighty Vijaynagara Empire. But in actuality, it was the semi autonomous *nayaks* who were the real local powers. In 1640 CE, Vijaynagara had ceased to exist when it was conquered at Golconda. Out of the Islamic dynasties that ruled Deccan, the Qutb Shahis gradually extended their influence on the Andhra coast. The Adil Shahis in the meantime absorbed Gingee with Vijaynagara's decline. To the south of the Coleroon river there remained only three smaller Hindu Kingdoms, all claiming to be heirs apparent to the Vijaynagara's legacy- the Nayak of Tanjore, the Thevar of Ramnad and the Nayak of Madura.⁸

Perhaps, both the Europeans and the rulers were aware of the relative insecurity of the region and that the establishment of fortified presence was the best guarantee that the Dutch would be willing to remain in it.⁹ For example, the Nayak of Gingee, Krishnappa gave permission to build a fort at Devanampatnam (modern Fort St. David) in 1608 CE. This concession was given to the Dutch, so as to check the Portuguese and to increase the trade. Thus the Nayak's Olla (or farman) was stated as: "*We promise to protect the Dutchmen who will settle in Tegnapatam to allow them build a town, to refuse entrance to the Portuguese to whom we shall remain hostile. On the other hand we, the Dutchmen, promise to bring all kinds of goods, to traffic with all traders on the condition that they will pay us for every merchandise excepting rice. We shall also pay 4 for every 100 of our merchandise we carry away from their. Those who have paid once will not pay again. We promise to take the oath and to keep all conditions faithfully*".¹⁰

The Portuguese on hearing the news of the 'farman' being granted to the Dutch, their bitter rivals, started exercising much influence at the court of Venkata I, the King of Vellore. The said king sent an envoy to the Nayak of Gingee ordering the expulsion of the Dutch from his territory. The disobedience of Krishnappa made Venkata issue another letter reprimanding him of his act and ordering him to act according to the demands of the Jesuit father, i.e. to expel the Dutch. To the king the Portuguese were better friends than the Dutch. Such instances were common. Of

all the places it was Pulicat, which really witnessed the Portuguese-Dutch conflict for nearly three decades. Though the Dutch had received a farman to establish a factory there, but it was not before 1612 CE that they could build a settlement. Pulicat became the headquarters on the coast for all other settlements.

The attitude of the Dutch towards the oceanic expansion, in comparison to the Portuguese, was an enterprising one. As early as 1608 CE, the States of Holland passed a secret resolution that they would never *‘in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, withdraw, surrender or renounce the freedom of the seas, everywhere and in all regions of the world’*. With such a consideration, the Dutch vigorously started assaulting whoever they thought was capable to challenge their authority. Eventually, the States of Holland persuaded the States-General to adopt the same standpoint as passed in the resolution. This was later affirmed by it (i.e. the States General) in 1645 CE that *‘the existence, welfare and reputation of the State consists in navigation and maritime trade.’*¹¹

In Europe, the long-drawn war between Spain and Holland was suspended in 1609 CE which resulted in the signing of a truce of twelve years (1609-1612 CE)¹² between them. Among other things it was stated that the Dutch and the Portuguese should not interfere with each other’s trade in the East. But this did not happen so. Instead, the conflict between the two picked up pace. It seemed that such treaties that were signed in Europe hardly mattered for the powers. Rather in Asia it was the quest for monopoly that was most essential. During the truce period, what happened in Asia was a series of actions between Spanish naval forces operating out of the Philippines and the VOC fleets in the Moluccas. The Spanish might have pressed the Dutch solely for a time, but the Portuguese did not take much part in the operations.¹³ As a matter of fact, the Spanish and Portuguese do not seem to collaborate with each other against the Dutch during the time.¹⁴ The attitude of the Dutch can be seen from the following statement with which Jan Pietersz Coen, who assured the Heeren XVII in 1614 CE:

“Your Honours should know by experience that trade in Asia must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of Your Honour’s own weapons, and that the weapons must be paid for by the

profits from the trade, so that we cannot carry on trade without war and war without trade."¹⁵

The Portuguese, as has been noted had enjoyed a monopoly of nearly hundred years in the Asian trade by the seventeenth century. It can be said that the rulers who had made peace with them had benefited atleast in terms of the stability of the trade. Siam, for example, had been an ally of the Portuguese for many years. So it was obvious that its trading operations were quite stable. But the entry of the Dutch had resulted in a dislocation of trade as observed by Peter Floris in 1612 CE.¹⁶ This could as well be applied to other regions, especially the Moluccas, where during this time the Dutch presence was strong. But at the same time, the feature of dislocation of trade cannot be positioned only to the arrival of the Dutch. If the question of dislocation of the existing trade is prompted, then it could happen with any new group coming in the picture. The Europeans were no exception. Moreover, it can be reasoned that when any new power tried to monopolize an existing market or a production area, there were disturbances till the time the existing system got adjusted to them. If not, then the agency that was trying to establish its monopoly over the other or on its system of trade, for instance would continue devising methods either to subjugate or appeal for mutual coexistence. The counter reaction by the other group could be either to detest such efforts of subjugation or compromise for a mutually advantageous solution. Thus the *cartaz* and the concession systems as devised by the Portuguese can be seen in this light.

The Dutch as a power came to be known in Southeast Asia and in the Coromandel in a short span of time. As early as 1612 CE, the Governor-General of the Dutch company came to reside in and around the Malay Archipelago. His very presence showed the increasing influence of the company in the region. Moreover with the seat of the Governor being located within the region, the discrepancies and the malpractices if done by the company officials would come in light. Thus the governor-general was able to solve the matter before it turned worse.

In 1616 CE, a new southern route (the 'Brouwer's route') was developed directly to Indonesia from the Cape of Good Hope. The

Dutch vessels made their way along the Indian coast and often touched Ceylon *en route*. It seems that the acquisition of cotton cloth for trading in the Moluccas spice market now occupied the minds of the Directors. Initially as has been noticed, the company directors were not sure of the worth of the Coromandel cloth. They realized it when they obtained mace, cloves and nutmeg in silver since money economy was not yet fully developed. Thus this new route also promoted the Dutch influence in the region. It became increasingly difficult for the Portuguese to avoid the growing Dutch presence. Several possible solutions were suggested by men of different ranks in Portuguese Asia, to counter the ever increasing Dutch presence. One such example is that of Andre Coelho, ¹⁷ a soldier and a ship's captain with some knowledge of Asia. He wrote a detailed *Relação* in 1621 CE describing the Dutch possessions and trade in Asia and the means to 'extinguish' them (as he put it). One of his suggestions was to disturb the said Dutch trade on the Coromandel coast involving the monopoly of a dye-wood (*Xaia*) produced at Mannar. This proposal however did not gather much attention.

His other proposal involved the creation of a fleet of eight galliots. While four of them would wait at the bar of Tenasserim, the other four would attack shipping in lower Burma till the Tenth of October as most of the ships from Bengal and Coromandel would have arrived. The two sub-fleets would then proceed to Malacca to get supplies only to return in December and January to attack ships along the whole coast of Tenasserim to Arakan. In the month of February, they would make a lighting raid on Masulipatam harbour, '*and will burn in that bay (sic) all the vessels, carracks, sampans of the years and the Dutch, which may be in that port.*' The same would be followed at the Dutch factory at Pulicat, after which the said fleet would proceed on to Galle in Ceylon.

It was not easy to get rid of the Dutch as Coelho had contemplated. As is well known, the Portuguese were becoming weak as a power in these parts during the aforementioned period. The Portuguese could only maintain and protect some of their bases of which Malacca was one of them (a stronghold). Their resources were used in this direction. The Dutch could not fail to

spot such a bustling *entrepôt* where one could procure whatever one requires. Their eyes were set on Malacca as early as the first decade of the seventeenth century. In 1606, the Dutch had entered into alliance with the indigenous polities with a view of expelling the Portuguese from Malacca. After a serious encounter that lasted for months, the Dutch retreated. Both the sides suffered serious losses.¹⁸ Ever since, the Dutch had conducted a series of blockades to capture Malacca.

The Portuguese on sensing the Dutch presence also considered of creating a company like the Dutch East India Company. But there was only a limited extent to which they could follow it. Firstly, the basis of the organization of the *Estado da Índia* was different from the VOC. Secondly, the Portuguese had developed an elaborate local apparatus that included designated cities with municipal chambers and all sorts of sovereign claims. This could not be simply handed over to the Company. The state in Portuguese Asia already existed. One could not create a company that would also be a quasi-state, as was the case with the VOC.¹⁹ Anthony Disney has pointed out that the Portuguese had an idea of forming a company like that of VOC as early as 1618 CE. In the second decade of the seventeenth century, the New Christian merchant and arbitrator, Duarte Gomes Solis actually published a proposal for the formation of a company.²⁰

It was observed by Frederick Charles Danvers that “*the internal affairs of the Portuguese in India that appear about this time (i.e. 1615 CE) [seems] to have been in a very disordered and unsatisfactory condition.*”²¹ Further, he mentioned that the want of funds in India was evidently very great and at the time when the sinews of war were most urgently required in the struggle of the Portuguese with the English and the Dutch, their pecuniary resources were at the lowest ebb.²² Thus despite the Portuguese being in such constraints, there were still men like Coelho and Duarte Gomes Solis who desired great designs against the Dutch or transforming the *Estado* like the VOC. As early as 1608 CE, Diogo do Conto complained that the Indians no longer termed the Portuguese as *Ferenghis* (Franks) but as *Frangoes* (Chickens). The change in the usage of the terms is self-reflective of the Portuguese state of affairs.

The heavy Dutch presence and the fading Portuguese influence provided the right theatre for the former to make their monopoly felt in the Indian Ocean trading world. This is one of the reasons that can be attributed to the establishment of the Dutch as a trading power in a very short span of time in Asia. The founding of Batavia on the ruins of Jakarta in 1619 CE, as the headquarters of the VOC marked the beginning of true centralization and *modus operandi*. It was the policies of Coen that had created a prospect to fill the Dutch coffers. It is true that the Dutch were already conducting the blockades of Malacca, which took most of their navy. But in Java proper they just had a small foothold in Batavia and so had many formidable problems to face. The two great powers in Java were Bantam on the west and Mataram on the east of Batavia. Bantam resented the loss of Jakarta and also that the Dutch had removed their factory from Bantam which diminished its revenues.

The Kingdom of Bantam attacked the Dutch in 1622 CE, but did not succeed. The Dutch retaliated by blockading it for the next six years. This was an important contest because Batavia was the headquarters of the Dutch. If the attacks of Bantam had succeeded, then it was almost sure that the Dutch hopes for supremacy in Southeast Asian would have been seriously jeopardized, if not put to an end altogether. A similar threat to the Dutch came from Mataram when Sultan Agung, who was determined to spread his rule all over Java including Bantam. By 1625 CE, he had extended his territories to Madura and Surabaya and declared himself to be the 'Susuhunan' i.e. he is to whom everyone is a subject. For the sake of his prestige, he was anxious that the Dutch should acknowledge his authority. The Dutch however refused to recognize it. The VOC and Bantam realizing the increasing power of Mataram signed a treaty with Bantam in 1628 CE. As per its clauses, the Dutch removed their blockades from Bantam and agreed to reopen the factory again. The serious attack launched by Mataram in the same as well as subsequent year was repulsed by the Dutch.²³

In the meantime, the Dutch were also occupied with blockading Malacca, besides the insular Southeast Asia. Malacca was an important entrepôt, which the Dutch had been trying to seize from the Portuguese. On the other hand, it was the port of Pulicat

on the Coromandel coast that occupied their interest. The 1630's were crucial in many ways for both the Portuguese and the Dutch. The Portuguese had just tasted a major victory against a besieging Achenese force off Malacca. The dispatch of Nuno Alvares Botelho to the Governor of India from Malacca, dated Eighth of December, 1629 CE showed the mood of the Portuguese- "*I raised the siege of Malacca; I kept in that the fleet in which I serve; and I completely destroyed that of the enemy; for which infinite thanks be given to God for evermore.*"²⁴ This success came due to the support of Johore. Its ruler, Sultan Abdul Jamil had arrived with a substantial war-fleet to help the Portuguese and so the tide turned against the Achenese forces.

The defeat of the Achenese at Malacca provided a fillip to trade between Coromandel and Malacca. During this time, three rulers from north to the south, the last Vijayanagara dynasty at Chandragiri, the Nayak of Senji and the Nayak of Tanjavur, controlled central and southern Coromandel. By the late 1620's, the activities of the Dutch was concentrated at Pulicat as they had abandoned their factories in the Senji Nayak's lands. One of the most celebrated Viceroys of Portuguese Asia, Dom Miguel de Noronha, Count of Linhares, who was in Pulicat for almost six years in the past, speeded what has been generally termed as the 'Pulicat enterprise'.²⁵ As a part of this enterprise, a letter of Diogo de Mello that was read in the Council meeting of Nineteenth of April, 1631 CE holds bearing on it. In the above-mentioned letter it was read that Diogo de Mello had sent an envoy, Salvador de Rezende to Vijaynagar. Rezende, a close friend of the ruler of Vijaynagar imparted instructions to the latter that the authorities at Goa had requested him to communicate. It is in this context that the said King swore to the Portuguese solemnly that he would seize the fortress of Pulicat and would give its possession back to the Portuguese. The artillery and ammunition would be delivered by the King himself.²⁶

Besides this letter, the Count of Linhares also put forward a suggestion to expel the Dutch from Pulicat. According to his plan, the Portuguese were to persuade the ruler of Chandragiri, Venkata III, to attack Pulicat by land while they themselves would do so

from the seaward side. In lieu of the cooperation that would be rendered, Linhares offered 30,000 xerafins in coin, twelve horses and six elephants. If he were successful in his mission, he offered to give entire contents of the Dutch warehouse to his allies. But he proved less than successful largely due to the better connections of the Dutch with the local polity networks of commerce in and around Chandragiri.

Though Pulicat was the main preoccupation of the Portuguese, Tegnapatam and Nagapattinam also occupied considerable attention. In a letter sent by the Portuguese King to the Viceroy at Goa on the Twenty Eighth of January, 1634 CE, the concerns related to the two latter places were highlighted. The said letter appreciated the ways in which the Viceroy dealt with the Naik of Gingi. According to the document, it was thought that the Naik of Gingi would expel the Dutch from Tegnapatam. The *Estado da Índia* was not only anxious with the Dutch intrusion on the Coromandel but also of the other European enemies. It was emphasized that with the settlers of Nagapattinam cordial relations must be established besides granting them necessary favours to ensure their support. Nagapattinam came under the dominion/ closer to the territory of Naik of Tanjore. So it was necessary to be with the aforesaid Naik in good humour for the cause of Nagapattinam as a settlement. Further, it was also assumed that “*the Portuguese would remain there for a longer period considering the acts of vandalism performed against the whole images and the bad treatment of the Naik without having.....means of self defence.*”²⁷

Thus the Portuguese were looking forward to secure the support of the indigenous polities to expel the Dutch. They, it seems were too hopeful in making such alliances. Actually the situation they were facing that of the continued hostility by the Dutch had made them enter into such sort of understandings. Since the Portuguese saw only the immediate benefits from such acts, without realizing their position in Asia, they favoured the Naiks without any apprehension.

One of the documents related to the council meeting of April 1638 CE requested the Governor of Manila to join the Portuguese in resisting the Dutch. If the Spaniards were unwilling to partake,

they were at least expected to send some *galleons* to the city of Macao to collect copper, artillery and ammunitions. In the 1630's, as is known, it is clear that Spain had neither the resources nor the will to resist the Dutch incursions overseas. The events in Brazil give the impression. As Dutch force took Pernambuco in 1637 CE and then turned their attention towards the crucial sugar producing area of Bahia in the next year, the Portuguese resentment at what they saw a Spanish neglect of their overseas possessions grew.²⁸ The Portuguese in Asia understood according to the above-mentioned document of 1638 CE that if the trade of the Portuguese with Manila and vice versa was forbidden, then the losses incurred due to this would show how great benefits were handed to the Dutch.²⁹

In the meantime, the Portuguese were also pre-occupied in Southeast Asia especially at Malacca. After a number of blockades in the first four decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch finally took Malacca from the Portuguese on the Fourteenth of January, 1641 CE. They took the help of the King of Johore in capturing Malacca. The understanding with Johore was that the VOC after the capture of Malacca would enable Johore to build its trading network at the cost of Aceh. The Dutch after the seizure of Malacca kept their promise that transpired in the years till 1680 CE.³⁰ Just before the capture of Malacca, the occurrence that the Portuguese underwent also played an important role in their defeat. It has already been noticed that Spain and Portugal were already drifting apart in the early 1630's. There was a growing resentment among the Portuguese regarding the indifferent attitude of Spain towards them.

In the mean time, the revolt in Catalonia presented the Portuguese with a marvelous opening to break from the Spanish rule. The Duke of Bragança, Dom Joao IV seized the opportunity on December 1640 CE declaring himself the King of Portugal. As a ruler, Dom Joao IV's first acts were to have peace with Holland and ratifying the one with England. Though the peace between Holland and Portugal had been signed in Europe, but the Dutch refused to accept it in Asia until the points of the truce were

officially declared to them. It was in this period, after the peace had already been signed that the Dutch captured the Malacca.

In two of the correspondences, between the Viceroy at Goa and the King of Portugal (Twenty Ninth of December, 1637 and Third of August, 1638 CE), the King was informed about the letters that the Viceroy had received from the President of the Danish factory. The letter from the Danes announced the plan of the supposed Dutch assault on Goa, Malacca and Ceylon. It also mentioned the help the Dutch had received from Holland and the power they enjoyed. Though the Portuguese had information about the Dutch preparation, but due to their ever-growing tenuous position it was of no avail.

The capture of Pulicat by the Dutch in 1640 CE and that of Malacca in the following year can be seen as related events. Can these subsequent episodes signify the fact that the Dutch had managed to capture an important nerve of the Coromandel-Southeast Asia linkage? Pulicat and Malacca were part of the concession voyages too. As it has been noticed in Chapter II, the development of the *carreira* (navigational line) had moved from an initial Malacca-Pulicat-Malacca route to Goa-Pulicat-Malacca-Goa route. The neighbouring settlement of São Thomé was dependent on Pulicat for its harbour to conduct its trade in textiles. Malacca, on the other hand was the most important and only entrepôt of Southeast Asia. Thus, the capture of these settlements by the VOC was not only the capturing of the age-old commercial linkage but also ascertained the Dutch dominance and existence to the east of Cape Comorin. The charisma of the trade in spices and textiles for which the Portuguese and the Dutch had vied for nearly forty years had become a reality for the latter. The Portuguese monopoly was undoubtedly threatened with the advent of the VOC. But the difference in the attitude of the two lay in the fact that the Dutch were mentally prepared for this kind of conflict while the Portuguese in many ways were not.

The contemporaries have observed Malacca's capture by the Dutch as a catastrophic event. It was a major blow to the Portuguese body politics. Travelling after almost three decades

of the happening in 1670 CE, the Dominican missionary, Friar Domingo Navaratte very aptly commented- *“I shed tears as I walked through those streets to see that country [has been] possess’d by Enemies of the Church, for it is Garden and Paradise in Worldly things, in Spirituals it was once a great colony, and the Church has many children there still, but they are set against bloody Wolves. The women wish they could get away from thence, but are so poor and without help that they cannot, Those who have some wealth are pleased and satisfied.”*³¹ Navaratte’s observation implied a strong Dutch presence that came into being by resorting to violent means at the erstwhile Portuguese stronghold of Malacca. Besides this, it also pointed to the fact that there were Portuguese still in Malacca, though many of them had moved to Larantuka. The continuity of the Portuguese culture is also observed though in a decayed state. Such statements do tend to reflect that the Portuguese did enter into compromises as and when the situation demanded.

In order to make their presence felt, the Dutch adopted certain measures. Of the ships sent from Holland, the purpose of most of them was first to unload the goods at the destined port and then sail on as directed earlier or on the orders of the administrative authorities. This pertained to cruising in the sea. Whenever their services were required either for trade or to face the challenge of the enemy, they were called upon. An example of this is an order of 1617 CE by the Directors at Amsterdam. It states that: *“... after unloading the cargo at Pulicat, [they] would cruise against the Portuguese in Ceylon, São Thomé, the straits of Malacca or elsewhere at the direction of the factors of Pulicat.”*³² This exemplifies the fear psychosis the Dutch were trying to build in the Asian waters. Besides, instructions were given specifically to inflict damage to the Spanish and the Portuguese vessels as well as to the Indians living under their jurisdiction. The policy of inculcating fear in the indigenous lot would thus help the Dutch to pace up their ambition to attain monopoly, as it would cause distress among them. In the process, the indigenous would snap ties with the Portuguese and abide by the Dutch assuming them to be “the power”.

The above portrayal of the relations between the *Estado* and the VOC are important as far as the political retreat of the Portuguese

from the area of their monopoly is concerned. It was not only the VOC factor that led to the recoiling of the Portuguese. There were other factors involved that were not of direct consequence. The very institutions with whose support the *Estado* was built were related with this aspect. The malfunctioning of these institutions had become the order of the day. But along with such negative traits that were developing within the *Estado* with the course of the time, new measures were also being taken. For instance, the King of Portugal on realizing the state of affairs in Asia did give some sort of freedom to the Viceroys to make decisions.

The *Misericórdia* and the *Estado*

There were two basic institutions that were characteristic of the Portuguese overseas expansion and which helped to weld its disparate settlements together. These were the *Senado da Camara* (town council) and the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* (charitable brotherhoods and lay confraternities, the most important of which was the Holy House of Mercy). C. R. Boxer has described both the institutions referred above as the twin pillars of the Portuguese colonial society from Maranhão to Macao. They afforded a continuity that the transient governors, bishops and magistrates could not supply. Their members were drawn from identical or comparable social strata, and they formed to some extent colonial elites.³³

Between these two pillars of the *Estado*, the *Misericórdia*'s diminishing position became more specific as far as the questions of the retreat were concerned. The corruption that was seeping in the *Estado* was taking this institution in its swathe as the documents portray. As the famous Alentejan proverb goes: "*Quem não está na Camara está na Misericórdia*."³⁴ By this it was meant that whoever is not in the *Camara* is in the *misericórdia*. So the importance of this institution among the notables can be understood from this proverb. *Misericórdia* was a charitable institution. The institution had branches spread throughout the colonies of the Portuguese in Asia. The Goa branch was established shortly after the conquest of Albuquerque and it was based on the same principle as the one in

Lisbon. Of the various *misericórdias* spread over Asia, the one at Macao assumed great importance. The funds that supported this body were entirely derived from private charity and from legacies left by the departed souls. As part of its duties, a percentage at least of ill-gotten gains was returned to the poor and the needy from (whom) perhaps it had been squeezed in the first place. When the *Advocatus Diaboli* has had his say, it remains true that whatever was done in the way of mitigation of the inevitable ills of humanity, was done wisely, sympathetically, and reasonably honestly by the *Misericórdia*.

The duties of the brotherhood of the *Misericórdia* were defined as being seven spiritual and seven corporal works. The spiritual ones were: giving good advice; teaching the ignorant; consoling the sorrowful; punishing evildoers; pardoning injuries received; suffering our neighbour's shortcomings; praying to God for the living and the dead. The corporal works consisted of: giving food to the hungry; giving drink to the thirsty; clothing the naked; visiting the sick and the prisoners; giving shelter to the weary; ransoming captives; burying the dead.³⁵

The rules of *Misericórdia* at Lisbon provided for a brotherhood of three hundred members, of which half were gentry and half *mechanicos* or plebeians. It is an interesting fact that though in Macao members to the *Misericórdia* were appointed from the gentry class but in reality they originally came from the slums of Lisbon or Porto, or from the squalid hamlets in Beira or Alentejo. According to the common testimony of voyagers like Linschoten, Pyrard de Laval etc, once these men crossed the Cape of Good Hope they claimed to be *fidalgos*.³⁶ The members of the brotherhood in addition to being “*men of good conscience and repute and obedient to God, modest, charitable and humble*”, were supposed to be endowed with certain qualifications, in default of any of which they were liable to instant expulsion on detection.

An understanding of the qualifications is important to know the exact functioning and also to see the loopholes that came in this institution in the course of the seventeenth century. The political condition that the *Estado* was encountering was responsible to a certain extent for such developments for it is well known that

people of good means occupied position in this organization. The purity of blood was an essential criterion. The Brother was not to have taints of Moorish or Jewish origin. This is because the said person would be involved in the religious activities as well as in those of conversions. The next criterion was freedom from ill repute in word and deed. If the person himself had ill repute, then he would not be able to represent the real functionary of *Misericórdia*. Besides, the candidate had to be of a suitable age and not less than thirty years of age if unmarried. Another point of importance was that a person should not be serving the institution just for the pay. In order to preach and be able to administer the orders, the brother was to have sufficient intelligence and also the ability to read and write. It was taken care of that the conditions or circumstances for the living of a brother had to be comfortable so that any temptation to embezzle the funds of the *Misericórdia* could be obviated or any others to which they might have access to. The last norm was to accompany only the Bier of the *Misericórdia* and no other.

C.R. Boxer is correct when he mentions that it would be too much to expect that this standard be invariably maintained.³⁷ Not only came here the standards of maintaining the *Misericórdia*, but the problems that it was causing to other organizations. In a letter addressed by the King of Portugal to the Viceroy on the Twenty Third of November, 1606 CE one such problem was raised. It was regarding the matter of conversion and reconversion of inhabitants of the city of Goa covered by the *Confraria*³⁸ of São Miguel to which the brothers of *Misericórdia*³⁹ opposed. The latter rather wanted to enhance their own area of activities and influence. As has already been observed, the institution of *Misericórdia* was one of the pillars of the *Estado da Índia*. The people who were associated with the institution took its highly regarded position as a matter of pride. If the role of this institution was being superseded by some other organization, (in this case, *Confraria* of São Miguel) then the brothers were bound to react and would condemn the doings of other organization.

Moreover in the above-mentioned letter, the differences between the *Misericórdia* at Goa and the *Confraria* of São Miguel

are high lightened. The brothers of the *Confraria* of São Miguel had communicated with the Viceroy that their institute aimed to help those who were wishing to convert and also those to convert others in Goa. The acts performed in 1605 were exemplified as the testimony for their services to the King. It was these acts that made the Brothers of *Misericórdia* of Goa oppose them and disturb them in the so-holy work. Besides the matter of conversion, larger services were also said to have been performed by the *Confraria* for the King. The former had also requested the King that for the continuation of their work for the Faith, the King should order that no one, a community or an individual should act against them. The above dispute at Goa does reflect on the spaces the different religious and quasi-religious groups occupied in the *Estado*. It can be assumed that where the control of the state was limited, such groups dominated the regional politics and acted as the envoys of the *Estado*. The conflict over spaces like the one mentioned above must have been a regular feature especially in regions where the *Estado* had unofficial settlements.

In the possibility to identify reasons for such confrontations between the two *Confrarias*, the King further took help of the Archbishop. In case the two organizations did not wish to accommodate their differences, the Archbishop was instructed to separate them indicating the field in which each one of them would employ themselves in the service of the God. Besides, the Archbishop would also maintain the information of the further happenings between the two conflicting groups. It was instructed to the *Confrarias* that as long as a solution had not been reached they would govern themselves in the way that Viceroy and the Archbishop would ordain them to do so.⁴⁰ The attitude of the King clearly indicates that religion was still given a primary importance though the fleets of the VOC dispersed through the Indian Ocean loomed at large over the Portuguese monopoly.

Though the King's occupancy with religion cannot be denied, at the same time, the authorities who maintained the *Estado* did realize the changing situation in the early seventeenth century due to the VOC's increasing presence. It was at this time that the practice of transferring of resources allocated to the *Misericórdias*

by Lisbon towards maintaining the defense of the *Estado's* territories commenced. The letter of the Bishop of Cochin dated Twenty Fifth of December, 1606 CE is a reflection of this attitude of the *Estado*. The said Bishop wrote that the larger poverty that existed in the *Estado* had compelled him to give the silver vessels of the Church of *Casa da Misericórdia* in order to raise money in the city of Cochin so as to purchase two *naus* to be sent to Malacca for help. The scarcity of funds in the *Estado da Índia* is thus well observed. On the one hand, the Portuguese wanted to do the works of welfare through the organization of the *Casa da Misericórdia* and on the other they took loans from it to build their defense in times of need.⁴¹

It was ensured by the Bishop of Cochin that the loan borrowed from *Casa da Misericórdia* would be returned. The Bishop requested that in the first *naus* that would arrive from Lisbon, the loan should be sent so that it could be paid back to *Misericórdia*. He emphasized that the payment of this loan was an utmost priority and should not be juggled with other matters. So much so was it significant that the bishop said that the revenue generated at the customhouse of Cochin could be used to pay the loan back in silver and the amount that would arrive from Lisbon would be returned to the bishop. The bishop said that this measure should be implemented in spite of any other payment that was due by the said customhouse of Cochin. Thus, this matter was of grave importance and could not be ignored.⁴²

Another pertinent question, which can also be raised here, is about the wealth of the *Misericórdia*. The richness of the organization was obvious which is indicated by the fact that it had begun granting loans for the purpose of the defence of the *Estado*. The granting of the loan to the Bishop of Cochin by the *Misericórdia* is one such example. There were other similar instances whereby the *Misericórdia* gave loans when the need arose. This practice was prevalent in most of the settlements of the *Estado* besides Goa. If this practice was prevalent in Goa, then can one assume that it came into existence due to non-availability of funds at a particular time or due to delay in arrival of funds at Goa or that it was simply the requirement of the circumstances of the time? For instance,

a document pertaining to Twenty First of February, 1615 CE which is in nature a letter written by the King to the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo de Azevedo noted that when the Archbishop was in charge of the *Estado* at Goa, a loan from the *Misericórdia* of Goa was taken to send the revenue as a help to Malacca. Most of the aforesaid debt was subsequently paid but a standing balance of seventeen thousand *pardos* still had to be paid. The recognition given by the King to the *Misericórdia* is reflected by his concern in paying the due amount without further delay.⁴³

The communication between the King and the same Viceroy in a letter of the same date as above again pertains to the taking of the loans by the same Archbishop, but this time from the *Misericórdia* of Hormuz. The amount borrowed is not specified but it was again taken to be sent to Malacca. Although the King had ordered for the full payment of the debt, the same had not been settled totally like in the case of *Misericórdia* of Goa. It was regarding returning the borrowings that the King instructed the Viceroy to settle the matter from the amount collected by the custom house of Hormuz and other profits that the fortress incurred.⁴⁴ It is interesting to observe the King's concerns for returning back the borrowed amount from the *Misericórdias*. Can it be assumed from such concerns of the Crown that it held the *Misericórdia* and its activities in high esteem? Maybe, the King understanding the situation in Asia as well as in Portugal perceived that cordiality had to be maintained with these quasi-religious philanthropist bodies so that the *Estado* could request them for a borrowing whenever it was required. Another reason that one can comprehend regarding the King's action could have been his realization that the *Misericórdias* also had their duties towards the faith as well as Lisbon.

As the above instances show, the borrowings from the *Misericórdia* grew with circumstances that the *Estado* faced. Was the *Estado* so scarce of resources that it could not defend Malacca with its own appropriations? Or the danger of the Dutch Company was so high in those seas that the authorities at Goa did not wait for the ships coming from Lisbon to respond to the need of the time? In the age of sail, the correspondence between Europe and

Asia took time. The Portuguese (*Estado da Índia's*) documentation of the said period shows itself that it took nearly a year for a correspondence to take place between the two parties located at Goa and Lisbon. So the *Estado* was bound to generate funds within its maritime enterprise to ensure that help reached any said settlement at an appropriate time. Though in dealing with grave matters, the Portuguese used caravels which were swifter than carracks and galliots for the sake of correspondence between Goa and Lisbon but still the paucity of time induced pressure on them to raise funds from institutions like *Misericórdia* and Bishops.

If the following annual budget of 1571 CE of the different fortresses of the *Estado da Índia* is taken into consideration, then one can clearly discern that Goa received the maximum number of funds and also the expenditure was the highest so much so that the balance was negative. Can this also be sorted as one of the reasons why borrowing of revenues and fraudulence seeped in the *Estado*? Or were there other reasons involved that led to the raising of funds from the institutions later in the seventeenth century? The year 1571 CE, had not yet seen the presence of the Dutch and English companies in the waters dominated by the Portuguese. Moreover, as far as the budget figures of Malacca are concerned, one cannot observe a negative balance. Does this indicate that Malacca was appropriating well the resources provided by the Crown? Besides Malacca, Maluco is also listed in the budget with indications of a negative balance. The amount that was sanctioned in its name seemingly was less sufficient due to the higher probability of the Dutch and English contentions with the region due to spices.

At the same time, if one studies the figures in the budgets of the *Estado* between the years 1598 and 1607 CE, the revenues allocated by Lisbon for governance of various settlements of the *Estado da Índia* seem to have been substantial.⁴⁵ Besides Matos in his fine study of the financial situation of the *Estado* has also examined the balance of accounts available for the years 1609, 1620 and 1635 CE.⁴⁶ The figures when compared with the budget of 1571 CE (i.e. before the Phillipine period) show that the revenues granted to the *Estado* were more in the seventeenth century when it was

ORÇAMENTO OF 1571**

<i>Fortelaza</i>	<i>Receita</i>	<i>Despesa</i>	<i>Saldo</i>	
			<i>Positivo</i>	<i>Negativo</i>
<i>Ormuz</i>	51000\$000	15251\$627*	35748\$373*	-
<i>Diu</i>	42840\$000	10341\$440*	32498\$560*	-
<i>Damão</i>	18000\$000	12763\$650*	5236\$350*	-
<i>Açarim</i>	1403\$049*	3420\$000*	-	2016\$9251
<i>Baçaim</i>	31503\$960	6838\$280*	24665\$680*	-
<i>Chaul</i>	8358\$000*	2703\$096*	5654\$904*	-
<i>Dabul</i>	-	-	-	-
<i>Goa</i>	71612\$016*	137172\$055*	-	65560\$039*
<i>Santa Catarina de Onor</i>	864\$000	4525\$080*	-	3661\$800*
<i>Santa Luis de Barcelor</i>	120\$000	2341\$400*	-	2221\$400*
<i>São Sebastião de Mangalor</i>	-	2873\$480*	-	2873\$480*
<i>Cananor</i>	-	1115\$860*	-	1115\$860*
<i>Chale</i>	-	946\$560*	-	946\$560*
<i>Cranganor</i>	-	689\$600*	-	689\$600*
<i>Cochim</i>	-	6834\$720*	-	6834\$720*
<i>Coulão</i>	1500\$000	3713\$800	-	2213\$800
<i>Ceilão</i>	900\$000	6993\$600*	-	6093\$600*
<i>Malaca</i>	17463\$000	6209\$860*	11253\$140	-
<i>Maluco</i>	300\$000	4147\$240*	-	3847\$240*
<i>Soma</i>	245864\$025	228881\$348		
<i>Solado</i>	(+) 16982\$677			

*Total corrigido

Source: **Adopted from Artur Teodoro de Matos's, "O Orçamento do Estado da Índia 1571," Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1999, p. 19.

under the Spanish Crown. Does this reason spell for the increased amount of revenues that have been indicated in the *orçamentos* and the *regimentos*?

The borrowing of revenue as it has been clearly indicated in the documents was meant for the sole purpose of defence of Malacca.

For the Portuguese, Malacca⁴⁷ was a coveted possession. It was the gateway to the insular Southeast Asia. It was here that merchants of different origins conducted their trade. Thus here lied the interest of other European powers to occupy this port. Pyrard observed about Malacca that: “*This place causes much trouble to the Hollanders, English, and French, by reason whereof the Hollanders have desired to take it, and they laid siege to it in this wise*”⁴⁸ Through the documents it is implicit that the *Estado* was raising finances from the *Misericórdias* and bishoprics for the defence of Malacca. But in the same set of documents, we come across a contradiction regarding funds for the protection of Malacca.⁴⁹

A correspondence of Eighth of February, 1620 CE offers this negation. The letter relates to the reply by the Governor to the King in which the former replied that for many years no money had come to Malacca. If other documents portray so evidently the borrowing of loans from the *Misericórdia* and bishoprics for the sake of helping Malacca, then why did the resources not reach Malacca as the governor asked? Was there a discrepancy that was shrouding in transfer of funds to Malacca? Or were the authorities at Malacca so dishonest that they instead put the resources sent in their coffers? If such an occurrence had happened then could it be said that the Portuguese were more interested in building their personal wealth rather than helping the *Estado* that was undergoing slow *decadência*. The document in concern consequently makes us think of two possibilities. Firstly, incorrect information had been delivered to the king. Secondly, the authorities at Malacca were creating an artificial scarcity of funds on the premises that the danger of the VOC was looming large over Malacca and so more of resources were to be sent.

Was the involvement of the *Estado* in other activities which led to the draining of resources at Goa that was the core of the empire or was there a crisis within the funding agencies that made *Estado* more malnourished? For instance, in about the year 1616 CE, a congregation by the Jesuits was created in the *Misericórdia* of Goa. A letter of Sixth of March, dated of the same year of the King of Portugal to the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d’Azevedo provides us information in this regard. The King informed that

the chamber of Goa and the directory of the *Misericórdia* (Mesa) had written to him regarding the inconvenience in maintaining the congregation founded by the Jesuits in the Convent of *Bom Jesus* maintained by the *Misericórdia* of Goa. The King instructed the Viceroy to examine the matter with utmost care considering that the reasons for the creation of the said congregation were most endearing. Therefore in the interest of his services the King highly recommended the Viceroy to look into the matter using all means that were aiming to reach a compromise involving the extinction of the said congregation. In the same spirit the King also instructed that the letter be addressed to the Archbishop, Dom Frei Christovao requesting him that on his part he and the Viceroy should harmoniously decide about the matter in concern.⁵⁰

The opinion of the viceroy to the King as regards to the above letter was that the creation of the congregation aimed to bring together the citizens and *casados* living in Goa. The congregation came into being without interfering with the activities of the *Santa Casa de Misericórdia* regarding loans and alms. These observations became object of an inquiry that had taken place and had been approved by the archbishop of Goa, bishop of Malacca, the apostolic inquisition, *desembargadores* (the judges of high court). Besides all the religious and a larger number of authorities supporting them pointed the view that the existence of the congregation was in no way impeded the multiple activities of *Misericórdia*. Therefore the King on the basis of information of those supporting a different point of view and wishing that the congregation be extinct would want to delay any decision to the time that more clear information was available.⁵¹

Thus, it was not only one kind of problem that was troubling the *Estado*. But there were multiple problems within it that were a source of worry. The problems like the one mentioned above was the one which was inherent in the way the *Misericórdia* as an institution became dominant in the Indian Ocean world and wanted to have its sole presence over *confrarias* and congregations, for instance. But on the other hand it was this very organization that was funding the *Estado* during the time of its need. As it has already been mentioned this was also when the Archbishop of the

Estado da Índia had made borrowings from the *Misericórdia* of Goa and Hormuz. The importance of both of these ports cannot be undermined keeping in mind that one was the capital of the *Estado* and the other was an important trading establishment in West Asia.

By the second decade of the seventeenth century, it seems that within the *Misericórdia* there arose some administrative problems. A document of Twentieth of February, 1614 CE reflects this particularly. The King in his letter to the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo (Jeromymo) de Azevedo reflected on the poor administration of the *Misericórdia* of Mylapore. The money of the deposits of the said House was being used to pay the persons who were serving it. If the information that was delivered to the King was correct, then this indicated that the grant allocated by Lisbon to the said *Misericórdia* was not used for the purpose for which it was assigned. Thus the authorities in charge of the *Misericórdia* did not implement the execution of the works for which the grant was sent. Ruy Lourenço de Tavora took the initiative to curtail some of this mismanagement. For this purpose, he requested the Bishop of Mylapore to assume the responsibility of the deposits of the *Misericórdia*. In actual practice it was the Bishop's duty and he had not been complying with it. Not only this, he instructed the Bishop to visit the said Casa but also the one at Nagapattinam. The Bishop was asked to take responsible measures in this regard.⁵² This instance also reflects that the *Misericórdias* and Bishoprics worked hand in hand and that the Bishop was requested to assume responsibilities of *Misericórdias* in time of need. The role of the religious and quasi-religious bodies on the Coromandel as well as the Fishery coast seems to have been relatively greater when compared to the western Indian coast. Was it the very nature of settlements that gave such colouration to these bodies? Were such roles also imparted in the unofficial settlements of Southeast Asian archipelago?

As far as Mylapore is concerned, another correspondence between the King and the Bishop of Mylapore, Frey Dom Sebastião de São Pedro belonging to the same date pertains to the problem of the *Misericórdia*. The news of the poor governance of the

Misericórdia for many years had reached the court at Lisbon. The authorities in charge of the administration of the said House were using the wealth of the deceased. To control such state of affairs, the King ordered that no execution of the resources that had been granted to the dead when they were alive was to be done now. Further, it was also observed by Lisbon that neither the duties regarding the giving of alms was being obeyed nor the maintenance of the work being done. Besides, as it has already been noted that one of the functions of the *Misericórdia* was to take care of the orphans. But the *Misericórdia* at Mylapore was also not executing this function. Can such an excerpt imply that the scope of the institution was becoming narrower and so was becoming increasingly redundant?

Along with these duties, which the *Misericórdia* at Mylapore was not performing, there were other activities that were putting the King of Portugal in a state of caution. Many of the Brothers who were being appointed in the said Casa had had a sinful life. If one goes through the essential qualifications that the Brothers of *Misericórdia* were to have, then it can be observed that the person of ill repute did not have place in this organization as per to the regulations of the body. But at the *Misericórdia* of Mylapore this norm was not observed and men of such repute were granted the governance of the House. Such waning conditions of the said Casa at Mylapore did seem to put the King in a worrisome state. The prevalent state of affairs was such that a restructuring seemed to be important that was duly embarked on. Instructions were given by Lisbon to the Bishop to pay a visit to Mylapore also in the phase of the restructuring of the *Misericórdia*. Similarly, the Bishop was also ordered to survey the *Misericórdia* of Nagapattinam, which also made the King anxious.⁵³

From the above documents, it can be observed that Lisbon was anxious about handling of the Coromandel coast. The fostering of the Portuguese presence on the Coromandel that seems to have been the duty of the *Misericórdia* and the bishopric is indicative of the growing concerns of Lisbon with this region that was not previously comprehended by the echelons of the *Estado*. The Coromandel was a part of what Winius terms as ‘Shadow Empire’

with Mylapore being the capital during its heydays between 1570 and 1610 CE. Mylapore was thus an important Portuguese settlement in the Bay of Bengal that oscillated between no-rule to semi-rule and vice-versa in the time period as defined by Winius. This could be one of the reasons about Lisbon's growing concern towards Mylapore.

The functioning of *Misericórdias* and the bishoprics on the coast was a governing aid to the captain of fortresses/ Captain of the Coromandel coast. Can one attribute to the role imparted by the *Misericórdias* and the bishoprics as an important one in the phase beyond the shadow empire period? Though these institutions were quasi-religious and religious in nature but their presence was important for the Portuguese existence on the coast. If the concept of the 'core' and the 'periphery' area of the empire is brought into use, then one can adjunct that the *Misericórdias* operating within the core areas of the *Estado* like those of Cochin and Goa were checked and controlled by the standardizing devices of the state. The one on the Coromandel Coast due to its distance from the power center remained outside the orbit of control just like all other institutions in the periphery did.

Nevertheless it can definitely be said that in the period when the VOC was constantly blocking and attacking the important Portuguese basements, such acts of corruption within an important organization of the *Estado* was an outcome of the loose control by the later. It did reflect the declining condition of state in Portuguese Asia. If the immediate support system of the *Estado* in Asia was involved in such mannerisms, then its fate was quite implicit. The very basis of the formation of the *Estado da Índia* was to trade and to spread the glory of God. If this purpose was not met or had alterations as has been observed, then the outcome was bound to be negative. Thus the possibility of a political retreat of the Portuguese can also be explained by the deteriorating conditions within the organization of the various *Misericórdias* that were spread throughout Asia.

If other *Misericórdias* were also involved in such sorts of practices, then the fate of the *Estado* seems to be obvious. It can also be assumed that the wealth that they had collected in their corpus

was also due to malpractices besides getting grants from Lisbon. Borrowing of wealth from the *Misericórdias* of Goa or Cochin by the Portuguese authorities in Asia was the only solution to combat the situation. One cannot also bypass the fact that the Coromandel Coast was known in the observations of the *Estado* as the abode of renegades and was famous for all kind of corrupt practices. The involvement of *Misericórdia* in fraudulent practices also reflects that the original purpose of this institution was at stake.

Thus this was the state of one of the two pillars of strength of the *Estado da Índia* in as early as the year 1614 CE. It is difficult to draw a conclusion on the basis of the malpractices and the corruption that the *Misericórdias* were witnessing in the first half of the seventeenth century.

The Challenging Determinants

Besides the above-discussed factor there were other factors that were the determinants in the decline of the Portuguese power in the region of this study. The primacy has already been given to the Dutch factor in various contemporary and modern writings. As early as 1607 CE, one comes across those documents that point towards the difficulties faced by Portugal in maintaining the *Carreira da Índia*. It was obvious that when the Portuguese had to share their resources in Asia with other European companies, the trouble started then. Not only was there an involvement of the political factor, but the factors within the *Estado* were also involved in directing it towards a retreat in the vast expanse of overseas empire that had been built in the course of the sixteenth century in Asia. The expression of the different factors within the *Estado* took various shapes and natures. Some of them would be discussed in the subsequent few paragraphs.

The paucity of men and also that the skilled ones was a regular feature of the *Estado*. In some of the documents, one comes across references about permitting of the voyages to captains who had never confronted enemies on the high seas.⁵⁴ This implied that the men who were selected as captain for a particular voyage to

the East were either selected in haste or there was a discrepancy in it at Lisbon. If such men were to confront the enemy then the results were apparent. Such men in the time of the confrontation with the enemy would rather not fight and let the enemy dominate. The King took measures when the particular matter came to his knowledge. Other than the captains of the *Estado*, the 'new christians' also became the source of an inquiry. This group was being linked with the Dutch in the trade of India and the King had directed the Viceroy to take rigorous measures against them.⁵⁵ A letter of a later date of the King to the Viceroy also instructed that he should not admit into service people who are new christians.⁵⁶

One may record that the Bishop of Mylapore wrote about the problems he was facing to the Viceroy. He stressed the need to the latter that it was important to fortify the town of Mylapore taking into consideration its proximity to Pulicat. The Bishop also referred to investments made by the Crown to maintain the *Sé* (headquarters of the Bishopric) at Mylapore. The salaries of the priest and the ministers who served it had not been paid. There was also reference made that the Vijaynagar Empire used to provide grants to the *Sé* for its maintenance. Due to the non-payment of grants by the *Estado*, the Bishop of Mylapore was obliged to maintain the Bishopric in sixteen thousand *prados* only. The Bishop also reported that on earlier occasion, the Viceroy for the purpose of giving salaries had already owed eleven thousand *padros*. Besides this, whatever amount was sent to safeguard Malacca, the Bishop had received nothing in real. The complaint of the Bishop was further forwarded to the King upon which the latter felt that the Bishop was exaggerating the situation.

Though the King noted such a complaint initially in terms of the Bishop wanting to return back to Portugal, but later seems to have understood the nature of the grievance. Considering the services rendered by the Bishop, the King ordered for the regular payment from his treasury as done previously.⁵⁷ Also, the nature of the bishop's grievance shows that Coromandel was not particularly the interest area. It is possible that the basic requirements of the settlements on the coast were being neglected as they were unofficial in nature. Most of the subjects of query by the King

were related to appropriation of resources by the Viceroy. This took various forms like the non-payment of salaries, borrowings from the Bishoprics or *Misericórdias* for different purposes like the defence of Malacca. It is astounding that the *Estado* was having a paucity of funds or maybe the funds for defence were not reaching Goa at the critical time. This reflection does posit the gradual coming into being what can be termed as the 'existential crises' in the Portuguese overseas expansion.

Besides such obstacles that the Portuguese were facing within their devised framework in Asia, there were other kinds of difficulties that the *Estado* encountered. A document pertaining to Twenty Sixth of February, 1616 CE reflects the behaviour of the guards, who were in charge of surveying the loading of the *naus* (the *vedores da fazenda* of the *Estado da Índia*) and their continued acts of stealing in the same. The *naus* belonged to a private trader, Dom Manuel Coutinho. Though the above mentioned incident was pointed in 1616, but by then stealing had become a practice. This malpractice, though happened in a privately owned ship, nevertheless reflects on the malfunctioning of the *Estado da Índia*. Besides, in the same correspondence the King corroborated that he had received complaints of the general dissatisfaction of the situation and that it has not improved with the measures that had been taken.⁵⁸

The members of the fleet who used to travel to Asia in the service of the *Estado* were given salaries by the King. An instruction by the King to the Viceroy in the letter of the Twenty Sixth of February relates to the inquiry of the passengers who were enrolled in *Casa da India* about the salaries received by them. These salaries were actually not due to them and the passengers of the said fleet had received them through unauthorized means.⁵⁹ It is a known fact that offices in the *Estado* were mischievously sold at exorbitant prices for whosoever held this office was able to amass a lot of wealth. Was the crew mentioned above not in the hope of achieving good positions in Asia or was there so much corruption that they were also washed with the tide!

A correspondence of Eighth of February, 1620 CE inks an interesting insight on the theme. It is a well-known fact that during

this period Malacca was under the constant siege of the Dutch. The letter mentioned above relates to the reply by the Governor to the King in which the former mentioned that for many years no money had come to Malacca.⁶⁰ This seems to be a remote possibility or just an act of hiding corruption. As we have already observed, the loans were borrowed from the *Misericórdias* of Cochin, Hormuz and Goa for sending to Malacca around the year 1614 CE. Then, why was it that the money had not reach Malacca? And if it reached, then were the authorities so corrupt that they did not utilize it for the purpose for which it was sent? Or were they taking the *VOC* just for granted. If we go by this document then there are two possibilities that can be thought of. Firstly, the document in concern is wrong and incorrect information has been delivered to the King. Secondly, the authorities at Malacca were creating an artificial scarcity of funds on the premises that the danger of the *VOC* was looming large over Malacca and so more of resources were to be required.

By the second decade of the seventeenth of century, it was thought by the King to discipline military force of *Estado da Índia* on the same lines as the one that existed in Europe.⁶¹ The King's enthusiasm about introducing changes in the organization of army was in accordance with the circumstances of the time for the Dutch had become quite belligerent in their efforts to occupy important places of profits. Moreover the organization of the *Estado da Índia* varied greatly from that of the *VOC*. The latter was a well-knit organization and due to this fact now the Portuguese had become cautious. It is also possible that in the course of the Dutch presence in the region the Portuguese far more understood the importance of existence of trade for their nation. The other point that one can gather from the above measure, is that the Portuguese army was not so well disciplined. If this is true, then this could as well contribute to be a reason for their retreat.

The Portuguese King at Lisbon was aware of the growing power of the *VOC*. It is a well-established fact that the Dutch were also focusing their attention around the Coromandel Coast besides Southeast Asia. Thus the link was gradually coming under the cover of the *VOC* clouds. The Dutch policy towards the aforementioned

coast was again gaining momentum after a brief halt. The King's awareness regarding the matter is reflected from a letter of the Twentieth of February, 1621 CE in which is mentioned the growing power of the Dutch alongside Pulicat. One of the possible reasons cited in this letter is that the Portuguese at that time were "no more in a position to send help due to lack of means".⁶² Why was the *Estado* as well as the Portuguese Kingdom facing such a crunch of resources? As it has been observed, the Portuguese were trying to channelize their resources to Malacca. But even there, they were not able to fulfill the need of the time. The question that arises here is that if such were the cases in the second decade of the seventeenth century then matters would become more difficult and grave in the years to come.

Besides, there were other acts of dishonesty and difficulties faced by *Estado da Índia*. The private trade conducted by some of the Portuguese and the difficulties arising in the *Estado* were also a matter of concern.⁶³ By the year 1622 CE, the lack of observation of the administrative measures⁶⁴ that had been taken by that time also caused apprehension among the authorities at Goa. These measures, some of which would be discussed in the following section, were taken in order to help the *Estado* grow in strength and fight its rivals. Instructions were also given to the residents of the towns closer to the border of the enemies that they should train with arms.⁶⁵ One of the implications of this letter could be that the *Estado da Índia* was falling short of men to fight against the foes. Hence, the residents of such cities were requested to take up arms. Another interesting document pertains to a ship that was returning back to Lisbon. In this ship, the soldiers were not equipped with weapons and there was private cargo on board.⁶⁶ Does this letter not reflect the changing attitude of the men within the *Estado*? Are these indications of weakness or precursor of the problems that the *Estado* had developed which eventually lead to the loss of many of its overseas territories? The ships during this period used to be never unarmed during the sail.

There were instances of weapons being sold by the soldiers to the private persons.⁶⁷ Yet another letter also corroborates with this piece of information. Here the involvement of the captains,

who were the most important persons in any *carrack* or *galleon* are also obscured in malpractices.⁶⁸ One of the reasons for such occurrence could be the delay in payment of the salaries. Another possibility was that many men getting the chances of amassing of wealth during their sojourn as a functionary of the *Estado*. A letter Nineteenth of February, 1622 CE illustrates the details of such fact.⁶⁹ There are also examples that one can cite about the acts of corruption at Malacca as well as among the lower rank officers in the department of taxation.⁷⁰ The behaviour of the soldiers and the nobility is also taken care of.⁷¹ The issues that have been raised regarding the behaviour and attitude of the soldiers in these letters are interesting. They not only reflect the life of the soldiers and their attitude towards the service of the *Estado* but also a decline in general of the organization. This becomes obvious by a letter of the King of Portugal to the Viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama dated the Seventh of March in the subsequent year wherein the King not only corresponded matters related to the *Estado* but also the spirit prevailing in Portugal. The King wrote to the Viceroy about the causes of the decadence of the *Estado da Índia* which according to him were of moral in nature.⁷² This can be among the first documents in which the King observed the decadence of the *Estado da Índia* and the causes of it.

Thus, the very factors that were responsible for building up the *Estado's* empire were the ones that were responsible for its decadence. Besides within the span of time the factors mentioned above became so inherent in the *Estado* that it rather became difficult for the Portuguese to revive their organization as well as their spirit with which they had come to Asia. The claims and the observations made by the King of Portugal in this regard as early as the year 1623 CE is the testimony of the fact that the Portuguese were a receding power in Asia. However, some efforts were adopted to stall the retreat. Though one measure has been pointed by Anthony Disney as the formation of the Portuguese Company on the lines of the joint stock companies of Holland and England, we would try to locate if there were certain other measures adopted to stall the retreat.

The Existential Crisis

The Kings who ruled Portugal during the seventeenth century did take measures to bring some changes in the administration of the *Estado*. As early as the year 1607, the King had instructed the Viceroy to adopt defensive measures with reference to the fortresses of Mozambique, Malacca, Chaul, Macao, Cochin and Daman to avoid a surprise attack by the Dutch.⁷³ As far as the Portuguese policies with the indigenous kingdoms were concerned, an early seventeenth century document clearly maintained that it should be of peace and friendship. To develop these conditions, the Viceroy was advised to convey to monarchs like those of Bijapur, Bengal, Avantapanaique that they must not maintain trade or entertain friendship with the Dutch. Further, the granting of authority by the King to the Viceroy to take initiative in matters requiring urgent measures according to the *tempo por mostrado* (the need of the moment) was an important development in the Portuguese endeavours to maintain their overseas territories. The opinion of people with greater experience was also to be sort in such matters and that secrecy had to be maintained while conducting the measures.

In the context of the functioning of the *Estado*, this letter is of particular significance. It clearly indicates the changing nature in the formulation of the policies of the Portuguese King as well as that of the *Estado* in the early seventeenth century. In the previous century, the source and the initiative for the policies of the *Estado* was largely handled by the King and his advisors at Lisbon. It was the VOC presence that made them adopt such measures like “*tempo por mostrando*”. A second aspect of no less importance was that the Viceroy now resorted to the opinion of those who had better information on the matter. This implied that within a period of one century there had developed a public opinion in Goa, surely formed by the high clergy, the members of the high echelons of the administration and the more affluent members of the trading community.

The granting of political authority to the viceroy on matters related to the administration of overseas territories by Lisbon was

a new development in this age. Though the fiscal aspects of the *Estado* were degenerating, but an evolution in other aspects such as political could be observed. This new development did lay a mark in the history of the *Estado da Índia* for the authorities at Goa did not have to wait for the reply of Lisbon for a certain matter of concern. The initiative to take rapid decisions was now in the hands of Goa. This measure was thought to be of great importance because the headquarters of the *Estado da Índia* did not have such authority before. Though the King had granted this power to Goa nonetheless the authorities in Asia still could not prevent the retreat!

One of the regular problems that the *Estado* faced was the paucity of soldiers. It has already been noted in the previous chapter that in a fleet that left Lisbon, had at least three hundred to four hundred men. But *en route* of their voyage, many of them succumbed to bad conditions on board or to the perils of the seas. Of the men who reached India, there had to be necessary conditions so that they could take their positions here. From the itinerary of John Huyghen van Linschoten and others, we are well versed that the crew that left Lisbon for Asia was meant to guard the interests of the *Estado*. The soldiers on arriving at Goa were assigned positions. So the latter had to be fit to perform their duties which were to protect the settlements of the *Estado*. The hospital that was being constructed at Goa held relevance with this respect. In this context, a letter dated of Seventeenth of January, 1607 CE holds significance. This was a letter of the King to the Viceroy Dom Martin Affonso de Castro wherein the King referred to the necessity to finish the construction works of the hospital at Goa.

The King wrote regarding the works of the hospital of Goa that the Fathers of the *Compania* (Jesuit Company) had accepted the administration of it. The officers of the *Camara*⁷⁴ were also interested in the completion of this work. According to the latter, this work was of great importance, as it would provide a place for the recovery of the soldiers who arrived in India from Portugal. If the hospital did not provide them the resources, their conditions would deteriorate further. In this spirit, the King ordered the Viceroy to use the profit of the voyage to China along with the

grants that had been given to complete the work of the hospital. In case, if the amount was not enough, the Viceroy in consultation with the well-informed had the right to plead the King for required resources to complete the work. Besides, the Viceroy was also asked to assist financial payments for its maintenance.

In addition, the King also directed the Viceroy to complete the work of the hospital besides making him aware that in the proposed hospital there may be casualties three hundred to four hundred yearly in the age group of eighteen to thirty years. This approximation is a consequence of not only the seriousness of the disease with which the crew was affected *en route* their journey to India but also due to the fact that they had not been duly cured. One of the reasons was the limited amount of medicines and food available. The King assured the Viceroy that with the participation of Jesuits in the administration of this hospital this aspect would be overcome. A close survey of the conditions of the sick people according to the King showed that their poor health was not due to necessities that they were deprived of. But the ever-existing suffering in their minds paced down the recovery.

Sharing his information for the larger number of deaths, the King observed that with the arrival of Viceroy at Goa, there also arrived a new set of doctors. The situation for such a doctor was new and he having not yet acquired the knowledge of the land and of the diseases that occurred in the same could not be much of help to the sick. Once the doctor started getting acquainted with the land, problems and the disease, a new batch of doctors without experience would replace them for the tenure of the viceroy with whom they had come would get over. Thus the King recommended the Viceroy not to disturb the doctors with experience and should consequently be retained in their respective hospitals.⁷⁵

The King of Portugal also took other measures to prevent the soldiers and the captains of the fleets from resisting the enemies (the Dutch). The King apparently shared the information with Viceroy Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo that the enemy ships sailing the seas supposed to be dominated by *Estado da Índia* were neither challenged nor resisted by the men of the *Estado* when they attacked the latter. Seeing such instances, the King instructed

the Viceroy that in future those who did not resist the enemy or challenge would not be granted a new voyage. Further, the King insisted that these measures should be brought to the knowledge of the sailing pilots in the strictest manner. The pilots who refused to obey were to be identified and an inquiry was to be ordered on their conduct. Such personalities were to be sent back to Portugal as prisoners.⁷⁶ Thus, if such were the King's instructions to the Viceroy to be implemented then it seems apparent that the monarch had realised that besides the enemy his men were also responsible for the happenings in the East.

Amidst maintaining and creating better conditions for the appropriate governance of the overseas territories *consulado*⁷⁷ was created. The idea behind the conception of the *consulado* was to help in the maintenance of the armadas that were necessary for the defence and maintenance of the *Estado da Índia*. Most of the major settlements of the *Estado* had written about this. But Lisbon was not forthcoming about its implementation and wanted to postpone the matter.⁷⁸ Though the King was aware of the situation prevailing in the Indian Ocean, he directed the Viceroy to postpone the dialogue about *consulado* while resorting to soft excuses.⁷⁹ The King was aware about the situation prevailing in the East but then why did he not imply the proposed *consulado*?

The position of the Coromandel coast in the eyes of Goa and Lisbon oscillated from being the abode of renegades to the coast of some importance. In the correspondence with the Viceroy of Sixteenth of January 1615 CE, the King showed interest to defend against the rebels and also against the European companies as far as the trade on the coast was concerned. In conformity with the conditions, the King believed that the Viceroy should prioritise the matter considering its greater importance. For the King, it was of utmost importance in agreement with the decisions already taken to expel the enemies from Pulicat and to consider the fortification of the city of Meliapore. He also considered on the matter about which the Viceroy had written to the King in the year 1614 CE with reference to the appointment on permanent basis to take care for the events listed. Therefore to the King of Portugal, it was of extreme importance that the steps in this regard be taken and that

someone with exceptional capacity should be considered. The likes of Dom Bernardo de Noronha were in the King's concern as far as the appointment was concerned. The criteria for the appointment was that a noble with experience and known value and one who could be trusted for implementing the decisions was to handle this capacity.⁸⁰

Thus by the year 1614 CE, the King of Portugal had also realised the importance of the Coromandel Coast. The state in which this coast was with the frequent attacks by the Dutch in addition to establishment of their factory had become the matter of concern. Thus the King wanted to appoint a person with good repute and the one who could be trusted on permanent basis. If the crown was realising the situation and was taking such a measure it would have turned fruitful for the Portuguese enterprise. But the state of affairs turned to be different. In the previous section it has also been observed how the King ordered the Viceroy to return back the money that had been ordered from the *Misericórdia*. This shows the King's concern for such institutions. He could understand the gravity of the situation and that is why ordered that his instructions should be maintained in the strictest possible manner. Another instruction ordained by the King was the creation of the post of 'Ouvidor Geral' who would take every year a survey of all acts of the guards who were accused of stealing. The measure was to be accurate. In case some guards violated the said instructions of the King, they were liable to a severe punishment.⁸¹

There were also measures thought of in Lisbon by which different strategies were considered to enhance *Estado's* men-power so that the enemy could be combated and trade and settlements be defended in an effective way. In a document pertaining to Eighth of March, 1616 CE, the Viceroy made it known through the *alvara* that in the *naus* that leave Lisbon every year to the East there are a larger number of passengers and traders that have been enlisted in the *Casa da India*⁸². They receive salary and foodstuffs in the said *naus* during the whole sea journey and they also return back in the same *naus* in their home voyages. The travel by the passengers and traders was thought by the King to cause a large damage to his treasury. The fact in concern of the Crown was that the soldiers

could replace such travellers. There was a paucity of soldiers in the East and the ones who were there were indulging in corrupt practices. Hence the King took the decision and instructed the Viceroy of the *Estado da Índia* that at the time when the *naus* reach Goa yearly, a trustworthy person should be appointed for an enquiry of all passengers and traders travelling from Lisbon in the said *naus*. Measures would be taken according to the law on this matter. When it would be certified that such passengers and traders are going to those parts of India to practice their trading activities, they will be compelled to return the amount received in *Casa da India*. This *alvara* was to be published in Goa as well as in the *Casa da India* and in other regions.⁸³

The King also ordered an inquiry regarding the payment of the salaries to those who arrive to the East. Besides, instructions were also made regarding the taxes to be collected for maintenance of *armada* necessary for the defence of the *Estado da Índia*. On one occasion, the government of the *Estado* was even instructed to induce the residents and Portuguese settlers to collect resources for the fortification of Diu.⁸⁴ If this was the case of Diu then it could be an example for other Portuguese settlements too! As far as the new Christians were concerned, the Viceroy was even given instructions to open an inquiry as this group was thought to be associated with the Dutch in trade of India. In a correspondence to the Viceroy of Eighteenth of March, 1615 CE, the King refers to Dr. Goncalo da Silva being entrusted with this purpose to take necessary measures to contain the damage that has taken place against the *Estado*. Further, a secret inquiry about new Christians and their contact with the Dutch was ordained. In case a person was identified as involved in the matter, the Viceroy was told to take the most severe measures against the same and also inform the King about it.⁸⁵

The Portuguese Crown was not only keeping a track of the information that was being delivered about the enemy (the Dutch) but also verifying the relations of the *Estado* with the indigenous polities. When the Portuguese had started their ventures in the Indian Ocean region under the aegis of *Estado da Índia*, it seems that the indigenous polities did extend their support to them then.

But in the seventeenth century as soon as the VOC ships started venturing in the waters of the Indian Ocean, the indigenous polities resorted to their help to cast out the Portuguese from their respective areas. Keeping the issue of the indigenous polities and their involvement with the Dutch, the King of Portugal instructed the Viceroy to evaluate the behaviour of the Portuguese with reference to the indigenous polities.⁸⁶ This was an important measure taken by the Crown as far as reviving of the Portuguese relations with the indigenous polities was concerned.

The importance which the *alvara*⁸⁷ of Twenty Ninth of March, 1619 CE had is referred in a document exchanged between the King and the Viceroy of Twelfth of March, 1620 CE. By this *alvara*, the ministers and the factories of *Estado da Índia* had to vow that they were not holding any money of the *fazenda* (treasury) before assuming their respective duties. In case they made a false statement while swearing in, they would be obliged to pay nine times the amount they had hidden in their coffers.⁸⁸ Thus the Crown brought such measures into being as it was much aware of how the *Estado* was moving towards decadence. Measures of this sort were the requirement of the time. With the appointment of the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco da Gama in the year 1622 CE, the Crown at Lisbon advised him to have a clear survey of the King's treasury at Goa.⁸⁹ This Viceroy was the one who took a lot of measures to prevent the decline of the *Estado da Índia*.

Dom Francisco da Gama (also known as Conde de Vidigueyra), is an interesting personality in the history of the *Estado da Índia*. He had served as the Viceroy of the *Estado* twice. Being the grandson of Vasco da Gama, he thus belonged to an influential lineage. Dom Francisco's tenure came into being due to his family name. His first period of vice-royalty lasted from 1597 to 1600, which can be seen as the last years of the monopoly of the *Estado* in Asia. In these three years, the comment made by the modern historians need to be appraised viz. -"*from the commencement he adopted a very high tone in his communications with others, and generally conducted himself in such a manner as rendered him extremely unpopular*".⁹⁰ A person could only maintain a high tone if there was some essence

in the position of power he held. The Portuguese were still enjoying the fruits of their conquests in Asia, though the *Estado* had already begun facing different problems within its framework.

In spite of his unpopularity, da Gama was again made the Viceroy. Between the outset of Dom Francisco da Gama's first tenure and the onset of his second viceroyalty, there is a gap of twenty two years. In these years, the situation had become so changed that when the viceroy was coming to Goa to assume his duties, the English and the Dutch attacked his *carracks* and *galleons* near Mozambique! By this time the contest for hegemony between the *Estado* and other European powers had begun in full swing. If one looks at the events which took place in 1622 CE itself, then the prominent one was the capture of the important Portuguese outpost of Hormuz. Besides, there were the Anglo-Dutch blockades of Goa after Dom Francisco da Gama had assumed the power. The English and the Dutch, who were at certain times together, took different stands at other times. Their dissolution of partnership at Pulicat in the same year is one example. Thus with the venture of the other European powers in the Indian Ocean world there grew complexities. This was inevitable.

The two tenures of the viceroyalty of Dom Francisco da Gama can be taken as two poles between which the situation in Portuguese Asia can be analysed. The acts of Conde de Vidigueyra become interesting in this context. His first two years of the second viceroyalty help us to understand his actions and reactions to the situation. For a person who had administered the same territories at better times, it must have been a totally different world.

It is a known fact that between the years 1600 and 1640 CE, the *Estado da Índia* was governed wholly through the *Casa da Índia* at Lisbon. Through these years Portugal was under the subjection of Spain, but the interests of Portugal and Portuguese officials dominated. Pyrard, whose sojourn to India is remembered through his encyclopaedic work, noted that- '*All the ships of the Armadas are equipped at the expense of the King of Portugal, for they never speak there of Spain or the Spaniards but of Portugal, Goa and the Indies only.*'⁷⁹¹ So if this attitude of the Portuguese in the early seventeenth

century is considered, then it might explain the borrowings of the *Estado* from the *Misericórdia* and bishopric. But on the other hand the arduous work of Matos reflects the funds that were sent from Lisbon and the expenditure made. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, one can clearly adjunct the fact that the *Estado* was undergoing an existential crisis. In order to overcome it, loans were taken from the *Misericórdias* and bishoprics, which became a concern with time. Besides, questions were raised about the functioning of these institutions.

The decade of thirties were so turbulent that even men like Conde de Linhares who was thought to be savior could hardly improve the state of affairs. The loss of the important fortresses of the *Estado* like Syriam, Hormuz and finally Malacca in 1641 CE points to the slow decadence the *Estado* was undergoing. Defending a port like Malacca for more than a century can be ascribed as Portuguese's valiant attempt at survival in desolated circumstances. The Portuguese were aware of the presence of their European counterparts as well as of the hatred of indigenous polities. Nevertheless, the endurance of the *Estado* for a continued existence in this phase of existential crisis barely ceased.

Notes

1. John Crawfurd (Vol. II, 1820, pp. 411-413) reasoned the advent of the Dutch in Asia which is as follows: "the inhabitants of the Low Countries, driven from the parts of Portugal and deprived, by the Union of those Kingdoms, of the beneficial commerce which they carried on in distributing throughout Europe the production of the East, obtain at the mart of Lisbon, resolved to proceed direct to the Indies in search of those productions and on. The 2nd of April 1595, a fleet of four ships sailed from the telex for this purpose. The adventures in their intercourse with the natives, behaved without judgement or moderation." This was the prelude to the future Dutch enterprises after the setting of the VOC.
2. Foster, William, *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas 1604-1606*, Hakluyt Society, London, 1943, pp. XX-XXI.
3. Winius, George D. & Vink, Marcus, P.M., *The Merchant-Warrior Pacified*, OUP, Delhi, 1991, p. 12.
4. Crawfurd, Vol.II, 1820, p. 436.
5. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes*,

- políticas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, p. 129.
6. Winius & Vink, 1990, pp. 12-13.
 7. Moreland, W.H., (edt), Relations of Golconda in the early Seventeenth Century, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1931, p. 3.
 8. Arasratnam, S., Merchants, companies and commerce, OUP, 1986.
 9. Winius & Vink, 1990, p. 13.
 10. Bahadur, Rao and Srinivasachari, C.S., A History of Gingee and its Rulers, Annamalai University, Annamalinagar, 1943, p. 109.
 11. Cited in Boxer, C.R., The Dutch Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson, London, 1965, p. 90.
 12. Moreland, W.H.(edt), Peter Floris, His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-1615, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1934, p. 21. In his travel account, Peter Floris talks about the truce between Holland and Spain, which came into force in the East in October 1610. He pointed that it had little or no effect in the affairs of the East.
 13. Blusse and Winius, 1985, p. 77.
 14. Navaratte wrote "When Dom John de Sylva was Governor of the Philippine Islands (1609-1616) His Majesty order'd all the Force of Manila and Goa
 15. Boxer, 1965, p. 96.
 16. The comment made by Floris[Moreland, W.H.(edt), 1934, p. XXV]who was a Dutch travelling in an English ship, *The Globe*, in 1612 is: The recent entry of the Dutch into markets previously monopolized by the Portuguese inevitably resulted in temporary dislocation of trade.
 17. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1993, p. 159.
 18. Danvers, F.C., The Portuguese in India, vol. II, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London, 1966, pp. 135-139.
 19. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1993, p. 160.
 20. Disney, Anthony R., Twilight of the pepp. er empire: Portuguese trade in Southwest India in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Harvard university press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1978.
 21. Danvers, F.C., Report to the secretary of state for India in Council on the Portuguese Records related to the East Indies, London, 1982.
 22. Ibid, pp. 26-27.
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28. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1993, p. 175.
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31. Cummins, J.S. (ed), *The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navaratte, 1618-1686*.
32. Prakash, Om, *The Dutch Factories in India, 1617-1623. A collection of Dutch East India Company documents pertaining to India*. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers pvt. Ltd., 1984, p. 45.
33. Boxer, C.R., *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire*, Hutchinson of London, 1963, p. 273.
34. *Ibid*, p. 286.
35. Boxer, C.R., *Fidalgos in the Far East*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1948, pp. 217-218.
36. Fidalgo (‘son of somebody’). He was a Gentleman or a petty noble.
37. Boxer, C.R., *Fidalgos....*, 1948, pp. 218-219.
38. Confraria was a religious body that brought together those Catholics who were the followers of the patron saint, Conferaria. This service could be of social or religious order.
39. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX*, p. 46.
40. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX* pp. 46-47.
41. *Ibid.*, p 157.
42. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX*, pp. 157-158.
43. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX*, p. 252.
44. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX* p. 263.

45. Pissurlencar, S.S., *Regimentos das fortalezas da Índia*, Tipografia Rangel, Bastora, Goa, 1951, pp. 527-530 Between 1598 and 1607, the amount allocated by Lisbon was 335:560\$600 réis. Of this the amount spent was only 235:677\$600 réis. In yet another communication between the king and the same viceroy in a letter of 21st February 1615 there are indications of borrowing of loans by the same Archbishop, but this time from the Misericórdia of Hormuz. The amount of the loan is not specified and the letter says that the Archbishop had acquired a loan “of a certain amount” which was to be sent to Malacca for help. Although the King had given an order for the full payment of the debt, the same had not been settled totally till then. Since the matter had to be settled, the King instructed the Viceroy to give orders that from the amount which is collected by the custom house of Hormuz and other profits which that fortress endures, the matter should be settled through the payment to the said missericordia. The balance of the loan taken from the Misericórdia still existed as the debt. (Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de ciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das ciencias de Lisboa*, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 252).
46. Matos, Arthur Teodoro de, “The Financial Situation of the State of India During the Philippine Period (1581-1635) in de Souza, Tentonio R. (ed) *Indo Portuguese History –Old Issue, New Questions*, Concept Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 92-93. Arthur Matos points that the amount received in 1609 was 249 780 \$000 and of this 156 627 \$088 was used. In case of the years 1620 and 1635, the disparity was less as compared to the previous allocations
47. The structure of administration in Malacca was organized in such a way so as to ease commerce. This is very well depicted by Tome Pires (Cortêsão, A., *The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, Vol. II, The Hakluyt society, London, 1944, p. 286). He asserts the significance of this port-state as: “Malacca is a city that was made of merchandise, fitter than any other in the world; the end of the monsoons and the beginning of the others. Malacca is surrounded and lies in the middle, and the trade and commerce between the different nations for a thousand leagues on every hand must come to Malacca.”
48. Gray, Albert, (ed & trans) *The Voyage of Fraçois Pyrad of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil*, Vol. II, part ii, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1888, pp. 150-151.
49. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de ciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das ciencias de Lisboa*, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 421.
50. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou*

- Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 443-444.
51. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 444-445.
 52. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 66.
 53. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 66-67.
 54. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 49.
 55. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
 56. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VIII, MCMLXXVII, p. 459.
 57. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 65-66.
 58. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 421.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 421 and p. 457.
 60. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VI, MCMLXXIV, p. 200.
 61. Letter of 5th March 1620 from the King of Portugal to the Viceroy. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
 62. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicados de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VII, MCMLXXV, p. 147.

63. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VII, MCMLXXV, p. 329.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
65. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VIII, MCMLXXVII, p. 43.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
67. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VIII, MCMLXXVII, p. 227.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
69. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VIII, MCMLXXVII, p. 247.
70. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo IX, MCMLXXVIII, p. 67 and p. 71.
71. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo IX, MCMLXXVIII, p. 171.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
73. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, p. 90.
74. Camara was the municipal or town council.
75. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 80-85.
76. This is a correspondence of 17th February 1614 between the King and the Viceroy.
Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 49-50.

77. Consulado meant convoy tax.
78. In the letter of 14th February 1615, to the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo (Jeronymo) d'Azevedo, the King instructs the viceroy to be as careful as possible in the exchange of correspondence by land between Hormuz and Lisboa. The King advices the Viceroy that these letters must be always sent in cipher or code based on the code and the King has asked the Viceroy to follow. Also the King calls the attention of the Viceroy that the letters forwarded from Hormuz to Lisbon written by private persons usually carry in their text a larger number of details of the events taking place; what would allow a more accurate mind to arrive at conclusions about informations that must not fall in the public knowledge. (Livros das Monções, p. 204).
79. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 146-147.
80. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 177-178.
81. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 421.
82. *Casa da India* was an institution in Portugal that dealt with all the matters in the *Estado da Índia*. It was the India house at Lisbon.
83. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 457-458.
84. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX, p. 155.
85. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo III, MDCCCLXXX pp. 328-329.
86. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VI, MCMLXXIV, p. 294.
87. Alvara means royal decree
88. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas

- e bellas-letttras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VII, MCMLXXV, p. 28.
89. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-letttras da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VIII, MCMLXXVII, p. 432.
 90. Danvers, F.C., *The Portuguese in India*, vol. 2, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1966, p. 96.
 91. Gray, Albert (ed), *The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil*. The Hakluyt Society, London, Vol. I, 1887, pp. 438-39.

The Decline and the Retreat (1642-1662 CE)

THE DECLINE of the settlements of the *Estado da Índia* on the Coromandel Coast and archipelago Southeast Asia was an important development that gradually led to the establishment of the Dutch hegemony in Indonesia and the English one on the Coromandel Coast. There took place a transformation in the age-old links between the regions. In the previous chapter, it has been traced the factors that led to the retreat. In the period before the capture of Malacca by the Dutch, Syriam, Hormuz and Pulicat had already slipped out of the hands of the Portuguese. It was during the third decade of the seventeenth century that the decline gained momentum to that extent from where there was no looking back. Despite the measures that the Portuguese Crown had taken, nothing seemed to have had bore a consequence. Perhaps the very structure of the *Estado da Índia* and its working was responsible for this decline. The Anglo-Portuguese agreement was one such that can be counted among the very few positive aspects in the 1630's from the Portuguese viewpoint, relieving them of the burden of having to combat at least one adversary. Dom Miguel de Noronha, Conde de Linhares, who was the Viceroy between the years 1629 and 1635 CE made attempts to stall the Portuguese retreat but to no avail!

The understanding of the reasons behind the decline of the Portuguese settlements has already been studied in the earlier

chapters. It has been traced that the factors within the *Estado* were partially responsible for the rapid decline of the Portuguese settlements in the seventeenth century. The measures suggested by the Portuguese King to the Viceroy at Goa were of no use, as they could not facilitate the Portuguese in overcoming the enemy. Relating to the process of decline that was setting in the Portuguese settlements, it is important to understand how territories that had comprehended oceans as their frontiers, retreat. It would also help to understand how the new formations come into being in such frontiers. Is the process similar to land-based empires? Did the elements of the Portuguese oceanic expansion manifest themselves in the new order that came into being in the seventeenth century? The interests of the country of Portugal, as is well known got translated in the large number of territories that it acquired during the phase of its oceanic expansion. Though the retreat of the Portuguese started much earlier than 1641 CE, but the waning of the Portuguese settlements is concerned in the perspective of the rapid decline after the said year.

The Retreat

The year 1641 CE appears to be a turning point in the history of the *Estado da Índia*. The most important port of the Portuguese, Malacca was no more occupied by them. The capture of Malacca, however, did not cease the Portuguese and the Dutch colonial rivalry, but saw beginning of a new phase in this regard. This phase saw a rapid decline of the Portuguese settlements on the Coromandel Coast as well as in Southeast Asia. The chapter of the rivalry began with the proclamation of the ten-year truce between Portugal and Holland in February 1642 CE in Asia although the truce had already been signed in Europe in the previous year.¹ Though both the sides were to maintain peace for the next ten years, but the hostilities continued. By this time the Viceroy at Goa, the Count de Aveiras, had at least made an attempt to persuade the Dutch to accept a local truce in Asia. However, the Dutch declined to do so since each passing month enabled them to press forward in their attempt to gain ground in Ceylon and elsewhere.²

The Portuguese, as is known, were succumbing to the attacks by the Dutch due to the lack of finances as well as the administration which was becoming incapable of organizing a coherent overall strategy. Thus, if one keeps these aspects in mind, Malacca was bound to be seized by the VOC. The Dutch success or failures depended on local conditions. In the taking over of Malacca, the VOC had the support of Johore which was the crucial factor for the seizure.³ The Dutch Council at Batavia acknowledged the facts while writing to the Heren XVII much later in July, 1675 CE: “*We must continue to remember that the Johorese contributed substantially toward the conquest of Malacca. Without their help we could have never become masters of that strong place.*”⁴ The VOC also enabled Johore to build up its trading network at the cost of Aceh between the years 1641 and 1680 CE. Thus, the rewards for assisting the VOC in their capture of Malacca were truly worthwhile.

The fall of Malacca was the last major episode in the sequence of Portuguese reverses that extended from Syriam, through Hormuz and Hughli, to Japan and the Sri Lankan east coast ports. The *Estado*, in the 1640's felt a relative respite not only from the Dutch but also from their Asian adversaries.⁵ With the implementation of the ten-year truce, the fact remained that the Dutch did not cease their hostilities. At a council meeting at Goa, on the Third of October, 1642 CE, it was decided to send a ship to Batavia to make the truce known to the Dutch. However, the Portuguese received a hostile reception.⁶

As far as the Coromandel Coast was concerned, a Dutch fleet was sent two years after its occupation of Malacca on a plunder raid to the Portuguese settlement at Nagapattinam. Known as a bigger settlement of the Portuguese on the coast, Nagapattinam had been an important center for trade since the early times. However this raid was held off only due to the intervention of the Nayak of Tanjavur. This implied that the indigenous polities still held a role to play in the struggle among the European companies. A similar incident occurred in 1649 CE at the Portuguese settlement of Tuticorin in the territory of the Nayak of Madurai and once again the Nayak checked the forces of the VOC.

The period when the negotiations for the implementation of the ten-year truce were being done, the Portuguese were still optimistic about the positive attitude and behavior of the *VOC* towards the *Estado*. An influential fiscal officer and later adviser to Dom João IV, José Pinto Pereira's optimism is reflected in his letter of March 1644 CE:

“The state of affairs teaches and tells us that the most healing remedy for now is Your Majesty to go along with and adjust with this nation [Holland] tolerating their deceits, double dealing and frauds, for it is thus that I believe one can check the luck they enjoy, and the greatest war one can make is to enter into a peace with them...for once trade is free, it is a force that that will weaken their trade, and also the force which [you] have; which is of no less importance; and our trade will expand, the custom houses will begin to yield[money], the royal revenues will increase, [your] subjects who are finished and consumed by the robbery and piracy practiced by this enemy, the reason for his greater expansion, will thrive.”⁷

After the conquest of Malacca, there was a desire on the part of the Dutch to normalize the trade which had been disrupted by the long siege. Passes to enter Malacca were freely issued from Indian factories and orders were placed to stop the place with goods that would be desired by the merchants. The other policy followed by the *VOC* was to achieve monopolistic aims through their commercial policies. In the context of Malacca, it implied Dutch control of the main articles of import and export with the view to dictate prices in the arteries of the linkages.⁸ The Dutch were also trying to force the traders to call only at Malacca to transact their business. They also had a policy of exclusive contracts with Malay rulers to further monopolize trade.

In Southeast Asia after 1641 CE, one can observe an increasing Dutch interest in signing treaties with the indigenous rulers. With the Sultan of Kedah a treaty was signed on Eighteenth of June, 1642 CE whereby a half of the tin produced or imported in Kedah was to be sold to the Dutch at a fixed price. A year later a similar treaty, was signed with the overlord of Junk Ceylon (Phuket). By

this treaty, the ruler promised not to allow any traders from Kedah, Perak, Java, Coromandel, Bengal and other neighbouring places unless they had the Dutch passes and had sojourned at Malacca by paying the tolls there. With the governor of Bangery, a treaty was signed in 1645 CE which implied that all the tin found in the state was to be delivered to the Dutch.

The Sultan of Johore who had helped the Dutch in their conquest of Malacca, had fallen out with them four years after the said event. He was trying to establish a port to rival Malacca. The Raja of Kedah made several requests to the Governor of Malacca for issuing a pass to sail to the Coromandel but was repeatedly denied. The cargoes from Coromandel that comprised of cloths were affected by the Dutch policies. The merchants who traded in them had to pay a heavy toll tax of ten percent on cloths. Though there was some relief granted in it, but the merchants always complained of the tariff policy.

Though the Dutch tried to adopt measures of restrictions in case of the indigenous rulers, at the same time they were hostile to other European powers. The Portuguese were one of them. By 1642 CE, as the Portuguese documents highlights, the Dutch had earmarked the former's *praças* in the isle of Ceylon and São Thomé on the Coromandel as their target to attack.⁹ The places aforementioned became the scene of conflicts between the Portuguese and the Dutch forces between 1642 and 1662 CE. One after the other they succumbed to the Dutch pressure.

Although the VOC's sphere of activities extended across the Indian Ocean but it was only in certain regions that they could exercise an effective monopoly. In Sir George Downing's word, who served as an English envoy at The Hague at the outbreak of the second Anglo Dutch conflict, it was '*mare clausam*' in the eastern waters. This meant that the Dutch took measures in the east to carve out sections of the sea and the traffic therein for themselves to the exclusion of other European and Asian traders.¹⁰ As observed earlier, the Dutch had vigorously petered out the Portuguese monopoly in Southeast Asia as well as on the Coromandel Coast. They disposed off the Portuguese claims and set to enunciate the principles on which restrictions of various kinds were introduced.

A good review of the VOC's attitude towards monopolizing the Indian Ocean trade and their position in it can be visualized by the general instructions compiled by Hereen XVII. This compilation was meant to act as the guideline for the Governor General and his council at Batavia which were issued in 1650 CE. The Hereen XVII explicitly recognized that the Company's trade in Asia could be divided into three categories: firstly, the trade in regions where the VOC exercised unchallenged territorial control by right of cession or conquest. In 1650 CE, these places were limited to a few islands in the Moluccas and some of the fortified trading settlements like Batavia, Malacca and Pulicat. Secondly, the regions where the VOC enjoyed exclusive trading rights due to monopoly contracts negotiated with the indigenous polities such as the sultan of Ternate and the village headman of Amboyna. Thirdly, trade conducted by virtue of treaties with the indigenous rulers on the basis of freely negotiated agreements as well as on the basis of free trade alongside merchants of all other nations.¹¹

The years between 1641 and 1680 CE represent the height of the Dutch maritime influence in the Asian waters. The Dutch influence in the Coromandel- archipelago Southeast Asia linkage had become dominant by 1662 CE. Most of the important niches had been conquered by them. On the Coromandel coast Nagapattinam and Tuticorin were captured in 1658 CE and the conquest of the Coromandel Coast was over with the capture of São Thomé four years later. Their major concern in the Bay of Bengal, Ceylon, met with the similar end. Soon after the Dutch took over of Malacca, they seized the Portuguese strongholds of Galle (1641 CE), Negombo (1642 CE), Colombo (1656 CE) and Jaffna (1658 CE). The aroma of some of these cinnamon-producing islands and places had enthralled the Dutch interest from the very days of their expansionist zeal in the Indian Ocean.

Regarding the Dutch supremacy, the captain of the English ship, *Expedition*, commented that the trust the English company will not be-

“again circumvented by that politick nation, who aspire to the sole trade of India, especially that of spice, which the better to compass, they have for these four months invested in Colombo on Zealon

with a straight siege, by sea and land assaulted it, and entered the city, but were suddenly beaten back with great loss; also four of their ships[lost] by fowle weather there; which have been recreated from Paleacatt [with] much provision, the siege still continuing, and tis thought they [will go] neere to carry it at last by storme, the Portugall having not eq[ual forces] to oppose or strength by sea to relieve it. And for Amboyana, tis wholly reduced to obedience; and Maccassers utterly routed [with] great slaughter of their people.”¹²

The sentiments captivated in the above statement made by the English captain note the very presence and importance of the VOC in the region.

Makassar and the Lesser Sunda Islands

Most of the insular Southeast Asia had come under the Dutch occupation by the second half of the seventeenth century. Makassar, which was one of the main markets for procuring spices was the only one left on the eastern part of the archipelago that was still out of the ambit of the Dutch control. Located at south Celebes, this had been a land where ships from Manila, Goa, Macao, England and Holland frequented. Friar Domingo Navarette as late as 1657-58 CE, commented that “*abundance of rich Commodities were brought thither from all parts of the Archipelago, and Trade enrichd the Country, making its Sovereign powerful.*”¹³ When the Portuguese conquered Malacca, many muslim merchants migrated to Makassar. The attack by Achen on Johore and later the Dutch blockades at Malacca drove Malay and Javenese traders eastwards to Makassar that soon became a great center of shipping. The Portuguese began to trade with Makassar in the second half of the sixteenth century on a regular basis. The popularity of the Coromandel and Bengal cloth was encashed here by the Portuguese in lieu of rice and slaves besides spices and rials.¹⁴

As early as 1601 CE, the Dutch had established a factory at Makassar. But when their treaty ended in 1619 CE, Makassar did not renew it. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has opined that several of the concession voyages from the Coromandel Coast to the Moluccas suffered after the Dutch capture of Ambon and Tidore (1605

CE). Hence from about 1610 CE, the Portuguese had to resort increasingly to Makassar for cloves and other spices which were brought with the Dutch opposition. But there was no regular concession route developed as Makassar being the terminus.¹⁵ Also, Macasser looked to the Portuguese, English, Danish and Chinese traders for support and indeed these traders flocked to Makassar in ever increasing numbers to escape heavy duties levied at either Malacca or at Batavia. An English merchant traveling in 1625 CE rightly pointed that the Portuguese looked upon Makassar as a second and better Malacca and “*held themselves as safe as if they had no enemies in India, since they never once been attacked there.*”¹⁶

The Portuguese on their expulsion from the Moluccas had used Makassar¹⁷ as the next base for trading in cloves, sandalwood and other Indonesian products, under the protection of the tolerant muslim rulers of Gowa and Tallo, and in defiance of the monopolistic claims of the Dutch East India Company with its headquarters at Batavia since 1619 CE. Prior to this when the Portuguese had occupied Malacca in the sixteenth century, many Muslim merchants had migrated to Makassar. Achinese attacks on Johore and the blockade of Malacca of the Dutch led Javanese and Malay traders to this southern market of Sulawesi. Thus Makassar had been known to give refuge to the ones expelled for no matter whether they were Portuguese or expatriate trading communities or the indigenous lots. The disruption of the spice trade in the Moluccas by the Dutch made it a more approachable center for spices. Moreover new production centers were developed in the small islands of Ambelau and Manipa, where Makassar traders could more easily buy cloves without being seen by the Dutch.¹⁸

Fray Sebastien Manrique, traveling between 1629 and 1643 CE noted that during Emperor Sumbanco’s tenure, the Portuguese had taken shelter at Makassar.¹⁹ Moreover after the said King’s death, his successor Prince Carrim Liquio was to remain under the guidance of a regent called Carrim Patingoloa who was a Portuguese. Born in Makassar and although a follower of Islam, this regent, in Manrique’s words was “*in actual practice and in zeal for increasing the lustre of the Portuguese name he could hold his own with those most eager and anxious for the common good and*

the enhancement of our country's glory."²⁰ If we are to believe the Fray, then there exists a paradox in personality of the regent. Can the regent's attitude be commented upon as his adaptability to the existing situation? Does it indicate that the indigenous polities recognized well the changing tide? Or was it that the said regent was too impressed with the Portuguese and so he wanted to attain glory by doing such an act.

The occupation of Malacca by the Dutch found expressions as late as the decade of seventies of the seventeenth century. Navarrete referred that '*when the Dutch took Malaca, most of the Portugueses, the Mungrels, and all others who serv'd them, retir'd to this Country.*'²¹ The King received them and allocated them a place to live. By the time Navarrete reached Makassar, there was a considerable population of the Portuguese residing there. Not only this, any eloquent observer could also see Malays residing at this town besides an ambassador of the Nawab of Golconda. According to Navarrete, there were no charges levied for anchorage at the port or any other duty not to be added. The captains of the ships as well as the merchants bestowed gifts to the *Sumbane* (the King) and thus all trade that they did with this part of the world was free. Such were the attributes of the port that '*this made it the universal Mart of those parts of the World,*'²² as the Dominican friar observed.

Thus Makassar provided immense support to the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their behalf also maintained amiable relations with the *Sumbane*. When Makassar was engaged in the conquest of Boni, Sambawa, Xulla isles and Butung, they came in contact with the Dutch power in 1665 CE at the latter's establishment at Buntung; Makassar had destroyed the establishment in an effort to conquer Buntung. The Dutch determined to take revenge by sending a powerful force against Makassar in 1660 CE. The Portuguese²³ in the decade of twenties had assisted Makassar while Makassar's enemy, Boni, assisted the Dutch. After a long siege, the ruler of Makassar, Hassan Udin, capitulated and accepted the Treaty of Bongaya in 1668 CE. Thus the VOC ultimately secured a monopoly of the trade in Makassar and insisted that all non-Dutch traders could be compelled to leave the city.

Prior to the capture of Makassar, the Dutch were forced to mount two major expeditions against it. The first one was in 1660 CE followed by another in 1669 CE. It was only after these expeditions that the Dutch could oust the Portuguese from Makassar. In the expulsion of the Portuguese from Makassar, it was not solely the efforts of the Dutch East India Company. The English and the Danish East India Companies had also sent their representatives to lend a hand to the VOC. The involvement of the three East India Companies in the joint expedition against the Portuguese at Makassar does mark the *Estado's* hold and presence in the archipelago. Among the other Portuguese settlements where the Dutch or the English Companies were not able to make inroads was Macao on the south China Coast and in the innermost islands of the Lesser Sunda Group that is- Timor, Solor and Flores- in Indonesia.

In the Lesser Sunda Group of islands, Timor was known for supplying fragrant sandalwood of both white and yellow variety. It was the main source of supply for the markets on the Coromandel²⁴ and also in China. After the conquest of Malacca in 1511 CE, it was not until fifty years later that the Portuguese had made their first proper settlement in the Lesser Sunda Group of islands. Subsequently, it was not Timor but the neighbouring Solor that became the center of activities. It is in records that the Fathers of the Dominican Order had laid the foundation of this center in 1566 CE by building a stone fortress. There grew a settlement round this fortress that comprised of the converts and the progeny of the Portuguese soldiers and sandalwood traders from Malacca and Macao who intermarried with the indigenous women.²⁵ The mixed race that came into being was known as '*topazes*'. It was at Solor that trade and conversions were centered around. As far as Timor was concerned, the Portuguese only visited the island to collect the sandalwood.

The Dominicans on their arrival at the Lesser Sunda Islands had concentrated on the conversion of the local rulers on the coast in order to gain their support.²⁶ It seems that the Bishop of Malacca had played a pertinent role in settling the Lesser Sunda

Islands with the christian religious persons. For instance, in the correspondences that pertain to first decade of the seventeenth century, one can notice the said Bishop repetitively urging the Crown to send more religious to continue service to the Faith. The said document does refer to a number of churches that were built in the earlier century.²⁷

The Portuguese domination in the Lesser Sunda Islands had come into being since the early days of the *Estado*. The aromatic sandalwood had drawn them towards these remote islands. Since 1561 CE, the Dominicans had maintained a precarious presence at first at Solor. Larantuka, on the island of Flores was the next place to occupy their attention in 1613 CE. Eventually, it was Timor that gained their interest in the course of time. The most interesting fact is that the *Estado* never controlled these islands directly but through the Dominican Order. The Dominican missionaries were the ones who with their activities controlled these islands. The Portuguese frequented these islands with the purpose of trade. The Dominican influence on the populace was so much so that the inhabitants fought against the Dutch.

The Dutch power in this micro-region seemed to have grown in the second decade of the seventeenth century. Antonio Pinto de Fonseca²⁸ had given the information to the Viceroy about the arrival of the Dutch at Malacca. In the correspondence between the King of Portugal and the Viceroy, Conde de Redondo dated Eighteenth of March, 1619 CE, according to the information of Fonseca, the Dutch had arrived at Solor. There had to be a decision taken to send ‘*some soldiers and ammunitions*’ to defend Solor. At this, the Crown instructed the Viceroy to act and adopt measures in the shortest possible time depending upon the situation.²⁹

Thus in one of the correspondences, like in a letter of Sixth of February, 1620 CE that was communicated between the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque and the Viceroy, the later had instructed Antonio Pinto de Fonseca to send ships from Malacca to Solor with a Dominican priest. There were no ships available at Goa at that time. The aim was to send required foodstuffs. In the last part of the letter, the Governor opined that as the Dutch have consolidated their position in Solor, it was beyond the hopes of the *Estado*

to send a powerful naval unit there. It was thought to be more advisable to maintain contacts with the Portuguese in the island as well as with the Christians and the priests through periodical visits of light ships carrying food stuffs and ‘*maintaining highly the spirit of this segment of Christians isolated from the Motherland.*’³⁰ Thus, the Portuguese had well understood their position in Solor in the religious as well as in economic terms.

As far as the administration of the *Estado* in these islands was concerned, John Villers has noted the establishment of Portuguese administration beyond the walls of the *fortalazes* that the Dominicans and later, the Portuguese military authorities had built successively in Solor, Flores and Timor. However, it was never seriously or systematically undertaken. This was because of the extraordinary degree of antagonism to their presence that the Portuguese encountered especially at Timor.³¹ In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the captain of the fort of Timor was chosen by Dominicans prior at Malacca subject to the confirmation of his choice by the Captain of Malacca. So much so that the Portuguese settlements in these islands were not even officially listed as parts of the *Estado da Índia* till 1681 CE!

The passing of Malacca from the Portuguese to the Dutch hands also brings out a noteworthy facet about the attitude of the missionaries like the Dominicans. The request made by the Dominican priests to the Viceroy at a council meeting held at Goa on Twenty Fifth of November, 1642 CE demonstrates it well. The said priests sought the permission of Goa to travel in a Dutch ship to Solor.³² This is a change of mind because prior to the fall of Malacca, the Dominicans had acted as autonomous body of power though it was through them that the *Estado* controlled the Lesser Sunda islands. Although the document gives a clear idea of the decline of the Portuguese Empire beyond Malacca, it also shows how the Dominicans started deflecting from the Portuguese to the Dutch side. It also illustrates a growing initiative taken by the members of the Dominican order to organize themselves in the dealings with the Dutch in an autonomous set up.

The Portuguese presence in the Lesser Sunda islands was strengthened after the withdrawal from of Malacca. Makassar

was the abode that the Malaccan refugees looked forward to. The growth of Makassar had been attributed to the fall of Malacca. The position of Makassar was such that it fell in the main trade route between Malacca and Java and the Spice Islands. Not only this, it was close to major sources of supply of goods, notably the pepper of south Borneo, the rice of Bima and the sandalwood of Timor. A Portuguese named Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who traded from Makassar to Macao, Timor, Flores and the Coromandel Coast, became a favorite of the Sultan Hasan Udin in the Lesser Sunda Islands.³³ This gives an inkling of the trade vigour of the Portuguese.

Thus, the Lesser Sunda Islands were never under the direct control of the *Estado da Índia* in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The Portuguese on being ousted from Malacca took refuge in Makassar and thereafter at Larantuka in the Lesser Sunda group. Though the *Estado da Índia* had retreated from its center of power in Southeast Asia in 1641 CE, nevertheless they found a new niche to stay on, where they had been occupied with the trading activities only.

As late as 1670's the Portuguese, either the itinerants or those living in Asia, blamed the Dutch for their decline. Travelling between 1672 and 1674 CE, the French itinerant, Abbe Carre while on his way to Madras blamed the Portuguese for their decline. Pretending to be a Portuguese due to existing circumstances, Carre questioned his fellow traveler regarding his sharp reaction on the Dutch presence. Carre's deliberation goes on as:

*“Why do you blame the Dutch for all the calamities and misery that your nation has suffered in India? Why do you accuse that nation of baseness? God has used them as He does, to chastise or abase the pride and haughtiness with which he wished to rule and govern everything. No, no, I said, you must not rage against the Dutch, but against idolatry, against wild passion to amass treasures, against luxury against illicit delights and voluptuous excesses. You must denounce all these, for they have ruined our fine government and lost all our credit and reputation, as well as our trade, our towns, and principal places, and finally have reduced us to misery contempt all over the East.”*³⁴

It is interesting to note how Carre explains to the fellow traveler his observations about the decline of the Portuguese in his conversation. The Portuguese themselves had created the entire web of circumstances for the decline. The totally hostile attitude of Carre's fellow traveler can be countered by the consideration that the Dutch had, though in their early years. A correspondence that took place between General Coen and Andries Soury at Masulipatam in 1621 CE adjuncts the above fact. Coen wrote: "*it should be realized that the fort and the factories in Coromandel were maintained to carry on profitable trade and not simply to trouble the Muslims and the Portuguese.*"³⁵

Thus the retreat of the Portuguese in the years from 1610 to 1665 CE was not only the result of the rivalry with the Dutch, but one of the causes of the Portuguese retreat was also the result of their own design. The Dutch presence acted as a catalyst as pointed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam.³⁶ The taking of the beachheads like Malacca could not have accomplished, had the local polities like Johore not helped the Dutch. So, the Dutch East India Company which at its inception was a pure merchant's combine enforced its quest for monopoly and acquired the major niches of the commercial world of the Indian Ocean. In October 1664 CE, the company submitted to the States-General the following list of their settlements in Southeast Asia and the Coromandel coast—Amboyna; the Banda islands, Pulo Roon; Ternate and other islands in the Moluccas group; Makassar and Manado in Celebus; Timor; Bima on Sambawa; in Sumatra, Jambi, Palembang and Indragiri, Malacca, Tenasserim; Junk Ceylon; and factories in Tonquin, Arakan, Pegu, Ava and Sirian. On the Coromandel Coast, they had acquired Pulicat, São Thomé, Nagapattinam, Masulipatam and Tuticorin. Hence, in a short period of time the Dutch were able to build their presence that posited a strong challenge to the century-old Portuguese hegemony on the Coromandel and Southeast Asia.

The Rise of the English Company as a Mercantile Power

In the first half of the seventeenth century, as already observed, the Dutch policies and plans especially of J.P. Coen had made

the English Company concentrate its activities in India and on developing the bilateral trade with Europe. From the middle of the seventeenth century this strategy began to pay-off, as the European market for Indian textiles expanded. This slow moving company gradually took lead over the Dutch as participants in trade both within Asia and between Europe and Asia in the eighteenth century. The Amboyana incident had bearings on the relations of the English with the VOC in the archipelago. The access to the Spice Islands was now firmly closed due to this incident. The English concentrated on the pepper trade of Bantam and southern Sumatra, while at the same time opening contact for fine spices with Makassar, on the southwestern arm of Sulawesi, whose intrepid Bugis seafarers continued to visit the islands in defiance of the Dutch. This loophole was not closed until 1667 CE, when the VOC occupied Makassar and forced its ruler to exclude all other Europeans.

Bantam and Batavia continued to have an uneasy relationship, punctuated by the VOC capture of Malacca and the three Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1652-54 CE, 1665-67 CE and 1672-74 CE. Whatever the outcomes of the wars were in Europe, in Asia, the English invariably saw their ships captured and their Bantam trade interrupted. The Treaty of Breda was signed at the end of the second war. The final VOC triumph came in 1682 CE. Abu'l Fatah, the 'old' Sultan of Bantam, who had been to city dethroned under pressure by his son, Sultan Abdul Kahar, two years before, resumed the government by force. Fulfilling one of the conditions for Dutch assistance, the English factory was ordered out and its personnel evacuated Bantam on Eleventh of April, 1682 CE. News of their expulsion reached London in mid-March 1683 CE. Preparations to meet the enemy force began but were soon abandoned, and it seemed as if the VOC would succeed in excluding its rival from the trade in Indonesian pepper as well as fine spices.

As has already been related earlier, the English and the Portuguese relations were always amiable except in the period when Portugal was under the Spanish domination (1580-1640 CE). Indeed, five years before the successful Portuguese revolt of December 1640 CE against Castilian rule (the *Restauração*), the

Count-Viceroy of Linhares, Dom Miguel de Noronha, concluded a non-aggression pact with William Methwold, then president of Surat. Soon after the accession of Dom João de Bragança as King of Portugal, there negotiated a formal peace with England at London in January 1642 CE.³⁷

Due to the kind of relations that existed between the English and the Portuguese, it made the way easy for the English to establish Fort St. George (Madras) on the Coromandel Coast. In 1639 CE, the pact made by Conde de Linhares had already conditioned Goa's consent to allow an English settlement near São Thomé. But the residents of this Portuguese settlement were against this idea and even made an attempt to block the English from provisioning themselves inland. Due to this the English Governor threatened hostilities against the Portuguese if the Captain and the residents of the town continued with their approach. The intervention of Goa led to the replacement of the obstructive Captain so that the English could start building the said fort.³⁸

This was the point from which the English, acting as private traders rather than in any official capacity, began to incorporate the Portuguese into their operations from Fort St. George and other meeting points, whether English, neutral or Portuguese. Perhaps chief among them was Porto Novo, where the English had another establishment, Fort St. David. Not only this, Anglo-Portuguese business firms also came into existence. Some of the notable ones which remained prominent throughout the eighteenth century were those of Lucas Luis de Oliveira, João Pereira de Faria and Cosmo and Luis de Medeiros and they appeared in Madras itself.³⁹

The Dutch records as well as the correspondences of the English also reported an improvement in the state of English trade on the Coromandel Coast between 1649 and 1652 CE.⁴⁰ But their position again diminished considerably after 1652 CE despite the fact that they enjoyed certain advantages, over the Dutch due to their friendly relations with Mir Jumla. The situation became so pathetic in the subsequent two years that with the exception of Masulipatnam and Fort St. George, all factories were abandoned, as they ran in loss. During the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1653, there were no actual hostilities as the English ships had

practically stopped sailing due to the fear of the Dutch. When peace was established, the English started seafaring again. The English Company's troubles with Mir Jumla, in 1657-58 CE led to the attacks on Madras, which helped the Dutch to maintain their ascendancy on the coast.

The English trade became a serious threat to the Dutch commercial enterprise from the early 1660's. The investments of the English in the imported vertices of the cloth were large enough. By this time, their network of acquiring the cloth from the Coromandel hinterland had solidified. In Southeast Asia, while the Dutch had their main market in Malacca and adjacent regions, the English sold their cloth at Aceh from where it eventually reached Johore. As the English developed more efficient network it caused a glut in the markets of Southeast Asia. The situation was so severe in 1661 CE that for many months not a bale of Coromandel cloth could be sold in Malacca. This resulted in reducing the orders for the succeeding year. In the next decade, the impact of the English competition was felt in the cloth trade of Java as well.⁴¹

The outbreak of the second Anglo-Dutch war in Europe had repercussions in Asia also. Meanwhile in the second half of the seventeenth century, the English had grown strong. So much so that during the second Anglo-Dutch war, the Dutch factors at Masulipatnam feared an attack on their factory by the numerically stronger English force. The administrators at Fort Geldria in Pulicat decided to postpone any decisive action until further orders from Batavia. In August 1665 CE, Batavia instructed the factors at Coromandel to inflict as much damage on the English as they could. Not only this, three yachts were sent from Pulicat under Peter de Lange to capture the English ships anchored off Madras. But they merely succeeded in seizing a small ship belonging to an English private trader near Masulipatnam. This action was accorded by the Golconda authorities as an unlawful violation of the peace of the harbour and temporarily placed the Dutch in serious difficulties.

In 1672 CE, the Dutch at Batavia informed their fellows in Coromandel of the renewal of the war with England. This resulted in a naval engagement to the south of Masulipatnam. A fleet of four Dutch ships and ten English vessels fought which ended with

the victory of Hollanders. This was decisive because a fleet of four ships had captured three of the enemy. This success made the Dutch factors in Coromandel approve of Batavia's recommendation that in the time of war no heed should be responded to the prohibition of the indigenous polities like Golconda in their waters. The third Anglo-Dutch war in Europe ended in 1674 CE and before it no further hostilities with the English took place.⁴²

Thus the changing scenario especially in the late seventies was in favour of the English. The English East India Company had the support of capital from home with which they could make large purchases from Europe. The Dutch on the other hand, were inadequately supplied with the capital from the Netherlands. They had to depend on the credit now for a large part of their business. With the fulcrum of Coromandel trade increasingly going on the English side, the Dutch openly admitted that the ascendancy of the trade has passed on to the English. The situation had two implications for the VOC. Firstly they could no longer procure from Coromandel, the textiles of right quality and quantity. The Masulipatnam market was totally in control of the English. Secondly, due to the English ascendancy on the coast, the Dutch were ousted from the market of Coromandel cloth in Europe.

The English, at last, had gained grounds on the Coromandel coast, though they were of minor importance in Southeast Asia except in few places like Bencoolen. It was partly due to their private trade and interloping that the English hegemony had been established. The interlopers, for example, were satisfied with even lower rates of profit per unit than the English Company's. They were thus considered the most dangerous competitors for the Dutch. Due to the increased capital of their rivals, the Dutch lost their control over the Coromandel market though they posited as power in the insular Southeast Asia. When the English abandoned Bantam and were involved in a war with Mughals in 1689-1690 CE, the Dutch thought that they could still outrival the English. But these were just false hopes. The focus of the English in the second half of the century had been the Indian sub-continent and not the Southeast Asia.

Thus in the seventeenth century, there were different scenes being enacted simultaneously in the theatre beyond Cape Comorin. On the one hand there was the fading Portuguese power whose decline was accentuated by the hostile Dutch presence. While on the other hand, the Dutch rivaled with the English in their quest for monopoly. The primary aim of the Dutch as is well known was to monopolize the trade in spices. So was also the case of the English. Initially, both the English and the Portuguese received fatal blows due to the Dutch attacks. The Portuguese and the English had signed a treaty in 1635 CE that stood meaningless as far as their power relations in Asia were concerned. The second half of the seventeenth century not only saw the Dutch occupying the important Portuguese settlements but also a rapid growth of the English power that absorbed the Dutch supremacy. The English control grew strong on the Coromandel in the 1670's while Southeast Asia remained in the ambit of the VOC's control. So, the very linkages that the Portuguese had explored and dominated to the east of Cape Comorin through the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth century had now the Dutch and the English presence.

Notes

1. As Philip Baldaeus (Baldaeus, Philip, *A Description of the East India, coast of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the isle of Ceylon with their adjacent kingdoms and provinces*, Asian Educational series, 200, pp 615-616) noted it was: " a firm Alliance and Truce has been concluded for 10 years betwixt the most Potent Dom John IV, King of Portugal, Algerve, and Lord of Guinea, and of the conquests made on the shores of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India, on one side, and their High and Mightiness the States General of the United Provinces on the other side, including all the before mentioned Kingdoms, Countries, Provinces, Islands, and other places on both side of the Equinoctial Line (without exception) all such as now actually are, or for the future maybe under the Jurisdiction of the said King and States-General; during which space of ten years successively all Hostilities betwixt their respective Subjects shall cease both by sea and Land, without limitation or exception of any Places, Persons or Circumstances, as by the Articles of the said Truce, does more amply and fully appear. It is therefore that we are commanded to cease all manner of Hostilities from

this day for next succeeding ten years, according to which all our subject shall regulate themselves, and to take effectual care that nothing may be transacted any wise contrary to the true intent of the Articles of the said alliance and Truce, but to maintain the same fame inviolably. And that nobody may plead ignorance in this case, but have ordered these Presents to be published enjoying everybody under severe Penalties, not to infringe any of the before mentioned Articles, as they will answer, the same at their peril.”

2. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700*, Longman, 1993, p. 175.
3. This is elaborately dealt by Leonard Y. Andaya in his “Kingdom of Johore 1641-1728”, OUP, 1975.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
5. Subrahmanyam, 1993, p. 175.
6. Pissurlencar, 1953, Vol. II, Document 132, p. 374. The letter goes as: “*Father Frei Goncalo Sao Jose in order to make known to the Dutch superior authority that had its head quarters there, to inform him that his Majesty was wishing to observe it. And that due to the bad weather conditions the ship was not able to leave up to Twenty Sixth of September; when having arrived at the entrance of this port seven Dutch ships; They with the purpose to conduct military operations against us and, as in the previous year, to harm us as much as possible. And are not disposed to accept the suspension of hostilities and having declared that they had in mind to conduct acts of war and plunder as it has taken place in the previous years.*”
7. Boxer, C.R., “Portuguese and Dutch colonial rivalry, 1641-1661”, *Studia* 2, 1958, p. 18.
8. Arasratnam, S., “Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan trade 1641-1670” in his *Varorium Series Collection*, 1990, p. 481.
9. Pissurlencar, 1953, Vol.II, Document 113, pp 331-332.
10. As cited in Boxer, C.R., 1965, p. 92.
11. Boxer, 1965, p. 94.
12. Foster, William, *The English Factories in India, 1655-1660*, Oxford, 1921, p. 45.
13. Cummins, J.S. (edt), *The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navaratte*, Volume I 1618-1686, p. 113.
14. Dasgupta, Arun, “The maritime trade of Indonesia” in Kratoska, P.H. (ed), 2001, pp. 112-113.
15. Subrahmanyam, 1993, p. 141.
16. Boxer, C.R., *Fidalgos in the Far East*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1948, pp. 177-178.
17. The Kingdom of Makassar at time of Portuguese expansion in the Asian seas comprised the two kingdom of Gowa and Tallo. Portuguese merchants frequented Makassar (Ujung Pandang) intermittently during 16th century, but were only after the Islamization of the Makassar’s Kingdom (1600s.)

that there presence growth. The Portuguese during the 17th century used Makassar as a commercial center for the silk, the cloves, the textiles, the sandalwood and the diamonds. In 1620's, there were regularly as many as 500 Portuguese merchants that frequented the port of Makassar. They traded here in safety and the Sultans who were fluent in Portuguese, gave aid and comfort to them. The friendly relations between Makassar and Portugal were strengthened by their common attempts to stop the Dutch power in the Moluccas and Sunda islands. The prosperity of Makassar greatly increased after the fall of Malacca in Dutch hands (1641), when many Portuguese merchants immigrated to Makassar. In 1650s, the Dominicans founded a church in Makassar. In 1660, there were about 2.000 Portuguese residents in the town; they lived in their own residential area called Portuguese quarter.

18. Reid, Anthony, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, Vol. II, *Expansion and Crisis*, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 33.
19. Luard, C.Eckford (trans), *Travels of Fray Sebastien Maurique, (1629-1643)* Vol. II: China, India, etc., Hakluyt Society, London, 1927 pp. 79. In Maurique's words-"he has been a real father to all the Portuguese who reached his shores in a distressed condition, aiding and assisting them all with paternal solicitude.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Cummins, J.S. (ed), *The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navaratte*, Volume I 1618-1686, pp. 113-114.
22. *Ibid*, p. 114.
23. Crawford, Vol. II, p. 338.
24. Friar Sebastien Manrique expressed the fact that the Portuguese imported red sandalwood from Solor and Timor to São Tomé. <Luard, C.E. and Hosten, Fr. H., (ed) *Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-43*, vol. I, The Haklyut Society, 1927, p. 31>
25. Boxer, 1948, pp. 173-175.
26. Villers, John, "As derradeiras do mundo: The Dominican missions and the sandalwood trade in the lesser Sunda Islands in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries" in *II Semainario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-Actas*, Lisboa, 1985.
27. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções*, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa, Tomo I, MDCCCLXXX, pp. 158-159.
28. Antonio Pinto da Fonseca was well-known figure in the seventeenth century. In 1611, he held the position of the Provedor and Visitador of the fortresses of Malacca.
29. António da Silva Rego, *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções*, publicadoes de ordem da classe de sciencias moraes, politicas

- e bellas-lettas da Academia real das ciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VI, MCMLXXIV, p. 11.
30. António da Silva Rego, Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das monções, publicacoes de ordem da classe de ciencias moraes, politicas e bellas-lettas da Academia real das ciencias de Lisboa, Tomo VI, MCMLXXIV, pp. 11-13.
 31. Villers, John, "The Estado da India in Southeast Asia" in Kratoska, P.H. (edt), 2001, p. 170.
 32. Pissurlencar, S.S. (ed.), Assentas do conselho do Estado, Tripagrafia Rangel, Bastora – Goa, 1956, Doc: 137, vol. IV, pp. 380-381. The letter gives a clear idea of the state of affairs of the Portuguese: "It was proposed that the Dominican religious that had submitted a request in which have declared that with the purpose of giving assistance to the Christians of Solor, that were entrusted to them, having no shipping connection that would be leaving from the fortress of His Majesty having a departure to that port. As it was most convenient that a large loss of time would not take place they request that the Viceroy granted them permission to travel by any Dutch shipping. And have been debated the method by all the councilors they expressed the uniform opinion that any case the Count Viceroy would grant such a permission through a written document as it would be against the interest of his Majesty and of the state of India. And wishing the said religious deal this method of the journey, the method would be conducted in a way in which the Count Viceroy would be maintained ignorant of the development and no instruction would be issued on the method."
 33. Boxer, 1948, p. 179.
 34. Fawcett, Charles and Burn, Richard (edt), *The Travels of Abbe Carre in India and Near East (1672-1674)*, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1947, p. 365.
 35. Prakash, Om, 1984, p. 169.
 36. Subrahmanyam, 1993, p. 180.
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