EARNING ONE'S LIVELIHOOD IN MAHUVA

P. PANDIT

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

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To
the 'angry young men' of Mahuva
—at the turn of the twentieth century—
who prepared the ground
for its constructive upsurge of today

PREFACE

MAHUVA is not, by obvious standards, typical of the Indian urban scene; it does not represent the modern industrial towns of India at all. Yet it is typical, not because of its size and character alone, but also because of the underlying facets of economic growth in a country like India.

The growth of Mahuva, from a small coastal village in the chaotic period of Kathiawar politics 300 years ago, has its origin in the political importance, stability and security given to it by a minor prince who held it for a long time as the capital of his small kingdom, and later for 200 years, by a prince of Bhavnagar. Basically, therefore, this town has non-economic origins but has been sustained by the economic opportunities that have flowed since, especially by virtue of its geographical position.

What is typical about Mahuva may be illustrated by a few contrasts in an otherwise common pattern. Its growth has synchronized with commercial changes in Western India, but it is neither as sudden nor as startling as that of Bombay or Ahmedabad. The adjustments demanded by the Mahuva-type of growth are quite manageable in any society and the built-in flexibility helped to retain the original pattern of family, caste, status-system and inter-personal bonds. The 'adjustments' to the new environment could co-exist with the maintenance of the basic scheme. Urban India, thus, represents an evolution of the traditional structure and not a revolutionary break from it.

Even Ahmedabad is not far different; it is only Mahuva magnified, rather than an instance of meaningful contrast between pre-industrial and industrial communities. The sudden growth of a town and large-scale demand for fairly abundant 'native' talents and resources can be coped with quite smoothly in the midst of a settled region like, for instance, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Coimbatore or Nagpur and unlike Bombay or Jamshedpur. The inflow of population, entrepreneurs as well as industrial labourers, is significantly from the same cultural orbit, and the mores of the original population, having

assimilated the slightly differing standards of neighbouring areas, are neither uprooted, nor shocked and revolutionized by some marginal elements that may intrude upon the elite or the mass of people.

It is easily perceived that all the urban areas in India are not developing along the lines of Bombay, nor is the word 'urban' congruent with any given Indian prototype. This mystery is not solved by the use of words like 'industrial' and 'pre-industrial' or 'city' and 'town,' nor by the presence or absence of adjustment to the environment. The variety of urban environments is not simply a reflection of modern technology, but is also a complex system involving the history and geography of each situation. The study of Mahuva is the study of a representative phenomenon of changing yet unchanging society that is urban India.

Mahuva has its attraction to the student of economics as a type of centre which has the makings of a growth-point in it. Certainly this is not the virtue of an urban area as such, but that of a commercial and open-sea base; a commercial town with an in-built entrepreneurial spirit is always a better indicator of the coming change. Mr. Jaswant Mehta, the arch-entrepreneur of the municipal and public life of Mahuva, deserves our thanks as the man who first gave us the idea 'to study' Mahuva.

This research was sponsored by the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda and financed entirely by the Rockefeller Foundation. I thank both the sponsor and the Foundation.

Appreciating my initial interest in Mahuva, Dr. I. P. Desai of the Sociology Department at Baroda, invited me to assist in the research project almost from its very beginning. I am indebted to him for this opportunity of inter-disciplinary venture, notwithstanding my family association with Mahuva. It is for the social scientists to judge whether this new experiment of joint input in more than one sense has added to the width and depth of the study and whether the subjective association has detracted from its objectivity or added some insight. The credit for insight, if any, also goes to the team of enthusiastic investigators who made the unstructured interviews possible. These bright graduates of the Baroda University have been

valuable on account of their very rawness and immaturity. They were least spoiled by routine notions and could faithfully reproduce the flowing narratives in the idiom and dialect of Mahuva. These interviews by such percipient young men and women enabled the author to evaluate complex forces—not always represented in the few figures and percentages that are available.

The people of Mahuva have not shown urban reticence. We were fortunate to catch them in their most rural moods to talk freely and in a leisurely manner.

Besides half a dozen friends and seniors who helped me with their comments, special mention should be made of Dr. Ian Raeside of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, for thoroughly checking up my presentation. I am indebted to Shri R. K. Trivedi, Superintendent of Census Operations, Gujarat, for making available the tables included in the appendix. My thanks are also due to the management of the Baroda University Press.

Poona
February 1965

DHAIRYABALA P. PANDIT

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTORY

EARNING one's livelihood is a social activity in the full sense of the term—except to a Robinson Crusoe, and yet the activity of earning usually reminds one of the technology and the economic organisation of this process, rather than a social relationship that goes with any pattern of occupations.

Broadly speaking, we can approach the study of occupations from two sides—from the standpoint of production and from that of the persons engaged in production. In this study it is proposed to approach it from the side of the persons.

The Ranking System

While persons are engaged in any production activity, they interact with others engaged in the same situation, and an order of relationship is established among them. Each of them has a position in that order. Within the work-unit this is one set of relationship, which is due to the fact of a man being engaged in that work-unit. Over and above this micro-structure, the various occupations themselves are graded in a ranking system, spread over a variety of work-units. One enters an occupation and begets a certain score in ranking from his position in the occupational system, but *at the same time* he already has his position in the larger society, outside the occupational situation. In this outer system, his religion, caste, family-background, marriage connection, as well as his occupational standing combine to put him in a particular niche. The problem before us is how far each position affects the other, and how men strive to keep up and even to raise the overall social position, through every possible manoeuvre in the occupational status. To be precise, the question is, to what extent and how the fact of a person having a given position in the status-system of a society moulds his attitude to his chance of plus or minus score that

might be attributed by his society, with reference to the occupational evaluation as such; in this essay, we pose this question with reference to the total implications—social, economic and " power " significance of one's choice of occupation. It is also legitimate and important to ask how far the occupational ranking of a person or usually of a group tends to modify his position in the wider status-system. The answer is indirectly provided by various social climbers in Mahuva who deliberately choose to earn in a new " higher " way, so that they " can stand erect " with their head high. For many, it might be the only way " to come up in this world. "

It is possible that even in the past, some individuals and even families changed their occupations, perhaps by leaving the neighbourhood to go to a town, to the capital or " abroad " in sheer desperation with the then existing socio-economic situation; but in the absence of regular transport, communication or contacts, these were cut off from the original society, whether they liked it or not. In the last two or three centuries, on the other hand, the stress as well as the opportunity have increased, and Indians have changed their occupations (for better or worse) in large numbers; yet it is not now possible to forget or to wipe out the past—glorious or otherwise—and the original associations. In such a transition, there is bound to be a disequilibrium between a man's claim to status via occupation—old or new—and his actual rank in the overall social evaluation.

Occupations themselves have a new context sometimes, but the occupational scores are rather slow to change. Even when the technology and organisation of some activities change, the old associations are retained, and the new context of these familiar points in the old pattern takes time to impress itself upon the minds of men. Completely new occupations, say a typist's, are also fixed in the frame of old reference of personnel relations. The question before us is how at a given moment of disequilibrium and stress, in a complex balance of plus and minus scores on various counts, the established status system delimits the choice of occupations, in conjunction with the stresses and opportunities of their related economic status as well.

Indian students have complained and are also worried about

a certain mode of caste behaviour delimiting the choice of occupations and recruits because it was also granted that an industrialising society cannot afford to be so delimited. The rise and growth of the entrepreneurial talent, and the efficient organisation of the new production-relations are supposed to suffer in an atmosphere where such bonds are placed on freedom of choice.

This anxiety is unnecessary for a mere sociologist without being sure of the springs of entrepreneurship in a given society, and on the other hand it is too much a presumption on the part of the complaining economist to accept the dogma of rigidity of occupational choice as a fact in India. It is therefore necessary to study some real situation to assess what sort of rigidity actually obtains in India, and whether the total context of that rigidity encourages or discourages the entrepreneurial spirit and organisational efficiency.

The present essay is an attempt to understand how the choice is delimited in an urban area named Mahuva, and whether the pattern that would emerge from that manner of delimitation of choice of occupation is compatible with the needs of an industrialising society.

An industrial society is supposed, rightly or wrongly, to need many specific norms and values, but, in functional terms, two things essential to it are: (1) a group of entrepreneurs, including the collective authority, e.g. a municipality or a State, with a drive—creative as well as imitative—and (2) the emergence of an industrial work-force of all grades and skills with a high degree of commitment to their task, in other words a good fusion of the individual and the organisation. These two requirements do not exhaust the list, but they are social preconditions, and perhaps necessary and sufficient conditions for economic development.

It is true that people are attracted to new and economically advantageous occupations and that there are others who are pushed into the change of occupations, because they do not earn enough from the old ones. Yet mere economic pull, unaided by the social pull, cannot go far in generating and keeping up the " driving force "—the essence of an entrepreneur. Similarly, economic push can supply labour, but the commit-

ment of a modern work-force requires the aid of social factors as well.

Commitment here means the happy adjustment of the labour-force to the employee-role. This depends, ultimately, on the securing of necessary adaptations on all sides. It is logical to expect this adaptation to grow from the norms and values of broader social relations. The inner logic of the indigenous social system alone can give rise to a unique pattern of fusion. Earlier it was only a myopia of the students to see even " the West " cast into one uniform mould. The natural growth of the necessary " fit " will be the basis of commitment and optimum efficiency in a given culture. In the absence of an overall " fit ", the awkward patterns in imitation of others would simply die out. The " fit " can be guided, if at all, only at the pliable points in society, and in the heat of emotional crisis and appeal.

On the whole, these unique micro-adjustments might prove more baffling to the theorist as well as to the social planner. It is therefore a necessary part of our study to see and understand the relations between employer-employee groups in the work situation, and their basis of commitment, if any, in Mahuva.

Our data is not sufficient to give final answers to these and other questions that are and can be raised. In point of fact ours was an exploratory attempt to see the social interaction in an urban area. It is the exploration itself that led us to appreciate this special context and provided us with a realistic framework for many specific inquiries in the future. We would claim to have found, by now, nothing more than the realisation, how the posing of problems and the manner of attacking them will have to be revised or reformulated in the interest of a meaningful research in sociology—particularly the sociology of economic growth in a real situation, urban or otherwise.

Consistently with what is said above, the study should begin with the understanding of the economy of Mahuva as it was, and as it has been changing.

THE CHANGING ECONOMY OF MAHUVA

" Mahuva—town and port in the State of Bhavnagar, Kathia-

war, Bombay, situated in 21° 5′ N. and 71° 40′ E., population (1901) 17,549....Mahuva merchants are generally both wealthy and enterprising. The principal export trade is cotton sent to Bombay. There are good turners who manufacture cots or dholias, cradles and many kinds of wooden toys."

This is Mahuva according to the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 1908 (Vol. XVII, p. 26).

The population of Mahuva has varied as under during the last 50 years:

Year	*Population*	*Variation*
1901	17,549	—
1911	17,063	—486
1921	16,232	—831
1931	19,019	2,787
1941	22,058	3,039
1951	26,718	4,660

Net variation during 1901-1951 was 9,169. At least one of the causes of the decline in the first 20 years is the epidemic of plague.

It is perhaps useful to consider the economic aspects of Mahuva as it is before proceeding to study the interplay of social considerations that can play a very important part in the dynamics of the economy.

The findings of this inquiry are not in the same form as the census data, hence it would be advisable to refer to the results of 1951 census, in the beginning.

The table below refers to the number of persons earning their livelihood, under various categories. Categories 1 to 4 refer to agriculture with varying patterns of ownership and operation. No. 5 refers to production other than cultivation, which is a bit wider than manufacture, covering many casual jobs like construction work in particular. No. 6 refers to commerce and No. 7 to transport. No. 8 is a loose term covering administrative as well as other miscellaneous services. The proportions of the population of Mahuva in various categories in 1951 were found to be as under:

TABLE I

Category	*No. of persons*	*Percentage*
1 to 4 : Agriculture	2,864	12
5 : Industry	6,825	25
6 : Commerce	7,359	27
7 : Transport	1,372	5
8 : Service	8,276	31
Total	26,696	100

The findings of the present inquiry refer only to the heads of the households as reporting in 1956, neglecting at least an equal number of juniors in the earning population. Yet in five years after the census (1951), there are some definite trends.

The percentage of heads engaged in agriculture is a little less than 10. Further there is a strong probability that women, old and young, plus the younger generation of earners, the brothers and sons under these heads in their respective families, go in still lesser proportion into agriculture as an occupation. The percentage of heads in commerce is about 25 and adding the younger generation of earners to these heads may not significantly change the picture. Many heads in commerce have found business as a family-vocation, engaging all the juniors as well; quite often the tendency of those who change occupations is to leave Mahuva. Moreover the juniors in Mahuva do not yet show an overall " retreat " from commerce. On the whole there is a small decline in the dependence on agriculture as well as commerce.

There is a slight increase in transport, 7 per cent instead of 5 per cent, and also in administrative and other services, 33 per cent rather than 31 per cent, so far as heads ' occupations are concerned today. It is quite probable that the trend is the same in the juniors' choice.

While coming to production other than cultivation, the percentage is about 25 for the heads and might be higher if the juniors are included, to offset the juniors' trend away from agriculture.

Counting all probabilities, neither industry nor commerce can claim even 30 per cent of Mahuva's earners. One should

expect at least 30 per cent in such activities if the town is to be classified and labelled—commercial or industrial.

On the other hand 30 per cent or a little more is not enough when it refers to Category no. 8. It should be 40 per cent before a town is classified as administrative-cum-service town. Mahuva does not yet fall in any of these types. Certainly it is not a transport-oriented town, though by definition it is a non-agricultural type.

In short, Mahuva looks like one of those towns that elude a definite classification.

Commerce and administration at taluka level have been the two elements in the existence of this town. It is possible that some structural change is at work in Mahuva's economy over the last fifty years. The relative stagnation of this town, particularly in the trend of population, is not explained by any series of severe natural calamities. Net emigration of the population is one of the significant aspects of Mahuva's economy.

It is not possible to say anything more definite about the nature and significance of the change in Mahuva's economy. Any picture of the economy today or even the comparative static description of occupational pattern, say 1951, compared with 1956, cannot explain the laws of motion within the pattern. They simply do not exist there. They exist in the people who have settled in Mahuva. To be more precise, the laws of economic dynamics lead us in the direction of norms guiding the social interaction in Mahuva's families.

THE INQUIRY AND THE SAMPLE

The Meaning of our Sample

The present inquiry has tried to explore this area of social interaction, particularly the social system where it touches the activity of earning one's livelihood.

A random selection was made of the family of every 56th individual in Mahuva's population resulting in a total sample of 423 households. This may be called an average family rather than an average household, because this sample tried to locate an average person in this little society and the influences of

tradition and change that are at work in his or her individual family. The life of an average Mahuvaite is very much a part of his family-life. Hence, the interviews were meant only to understand the minds of male head as well as the female head of this family, i.e. the norms of two effective decision-making persons or sanctioning authorities in his life. We present below the general observations drawn from the interviews and other allied data.

The Presentation: Push and Pull

Our presentation will be in terms of " push " and " pull ". For the present " push " means in a broad sense only the fact that men were pushed into an occupation because of the pressure of circumstances. " Pull " means that it was some ambition which led a man to take to an occupation. In the former case people took up an occupation because they had no alternative, i.e. they had to give up the old one. In the latter case they wanted to go into it. There is thus a positive desire. However, what is not attractive may still be quite acceptable under duress and it may never exercise " pull ".

The words " push " and " pull " have often been used in the past in contexts that make these concepts meaningless as tools of analysis. The present position has led to a dead end, where there can be no push without a pull and vice versa. The trouble started with the ex-post analysis rather than ex-ante or motivational analysis. An opportunity must exist somewhere if the " push " is to result in a change of occupation. But on the other hand a " push " as a force motivating the change remains a fact even when one is only desperate about the situation and has positive desire to enter into " something else ". Mere discovery of an opportunity of even a decidedly better social status does not make any difference to the prime moving force of " push ". It would make a difference if some socio-economic ambition stimulated and " pulled " one over to a change.

Both forces culminate in a movement from a given position to another position, but every movement has only one meaningful force behind it. " Push " and " pull " are meaningful only as prime-movers in the urge to change. To look for these forces

without reference to economic advantage is the essence of studying total social implications of any change.

The Factual Basis: The Three Generations

Most of the family heads could relate a long family history. They could testify that even some grandfathers had changed their occupations, and had also left their native place when pressed by circumstances. Their new environments may or may not mean a social climb, but the fact remains that it was a change at the instance of "push" only, economically as well as socially. This happened particularly to artisans like *Ghanchis* (oil pressers), and later to weavers and *Khatris* (dyers), mostly before the turn of the century.

There are 16 *Ghanchi* (oil presser) heads in our sample. The name itself denotes their hereditary occupation. But they lost this occupation in the days of their grandfathers, and most of the grandfathers are found in agriculture and "carting", i.e. plying a bullock cart; all those who had "carting" as their main occupation left the village to settle in Mahuva.

Weavers were in no better position. The Muslim weavers found it easier to leave weaving and take up some other skill or business or jobs. The Harijans did not find any good opportunity, but they came and settled in Mahuva just as other weavers did in the hope of turning to some other occupation. They did find something or the other, at least some unskilled work. They are happy that the educational opportunities are open to the new generation, and the new social pull of government jobs, e.g. postman, clerk etc. is very strong. Yet they are in a sizeable bulk, among the workers in the spinning mill.

The dyer or *Khatri* was a specialist in dyeing cloth. Only a few old-fashioned dyers, working on a small scale, could survive even in a town like Mahuva. Others realised the decline of their craft and turned in large numbers to the new lines like timber business, turner's craft, making bangles, toys, cradles, cots etc.

This change from a dyer's occupation has been so common that it has almost become a part of their tradition for *Khatri* caste to be one of the three: dyer, turner or timber merchant.

There were instances of a "pull" as well, when anyone could

buy land and set up as an agriculturist and then move onwards to small business and so on. This seems to have been the case with the lower castes in particular.

A Koli, aged 50, described the process of change initiated by his grandfather who was a peon on the polo ground of Junagadh durbar.

Farming the agricultural land was his side business. Later on he purchased land in a village called Sathra and became a cultivator. His son, the father of the present head, concentrated on cultivation, to which the present head added a new occupation of plying a bullock cart. This brought him to Mahuva as a better location, and his son in particular has made carting his main occupation.

The female head in the family has added one more occupation of milk-supply, throwing in a buffalo along with all the pairs of bullocks she has to look after. Her primary attention however, is to the village land of 20 *bighas* which is cultivated under their supervision.

No Koli is a cultivator by tradition. On the coast line he is a sailor, a member of the crew on a country-craft, otherwise he is a field-labourer. Yet we find them in possession of something better, even from their forefathers' days. Those who left for Bombay or other ports might have earned really good wages and lived well; others have at least become small landholders.

"Push" factors worked on many tenants and agricultural labourers, smiths and priests, and even some land-owners at the turn of the century—Vikram Samvat 1956 or 1900 A.D.—remembered still with dread as the terrible famine year in this area.

This second exodus from the countryside had two aspects. Some could survive by a mere change in their location, while others had to change their occupation as well. Smiths, priests, barbers, cobblers and washermen found in Mahuva, a place "neither so small as a village nor so big as a city", and thus an ideal location for their traditional occupations. It was not however the case with the dyers and the weavers.

There was a similar wave of immigration after the crisis of 1921 and that of 1931, mainly from a semi-agricultural background, but also from some rural trader-moneylender groups.

The last wave was of the Sindhi refugees in the post-Partition period, mainly with a mercantile background.

The past generations: All the present heads in the (male) sample are above the age of 20, except one in the 15-20 age group. Therefore putting a reasonable distance to the age of the grandfather, it takes one to the critical years—last decades—of the last century, so full of pressures and opportunities to change the occupations. The adjustments made by their generation may solve the problem for at least one generation, and the fathers may not hunt for an occupation different from their previous generation.

In some instances of " old " heads, one meets the father's generation at the critical turn of the last century, and hence they rather than the serene, old grandfathers of the mid-19th century had changed the family-occupation.

Even then, there seems to be no end to the adjustments. On the whole a span of three generations gives a more emphatic picture of the change in occupations than a mere comparison with the immediately preceding generation. Moreover one or two sons in a large family may continue the tradition for sentimental reasons, but they do relieve the overcrowding by seeking new occupations for the rest of the earners in the family. There are only 39 families, i.e. not even 10 per cent of the sample, where all the earners in the family have the same occupation as the father and the grandfather.

Some families may be inert as well as ignorant, and may not be able to cope with the new forces, but there is no feeling of nostalgia for the hereditary occupation. The change is accepted as a matter of fact, i.e. the mere fact of change is never frowned upon. One can even say that changing the occupation is so general as to create a recognised tradition—an approved range for changing in many groups.

Castes like dyers or *Khatri* have a sense of range within which they should change. Similarly the smiths consider it normal so long as they are *Suthar* (carpenter) or *Lohar* (blacksmith).

But in defining such a range, they only seem to sanctify the change which has taken place on a large scale.

Similar change of occupation is found among potters becoming masons, and carpenters becoming tailors. They almost made a new " tradition " out of it. The former was named mason-potter (*Kadia-Kumbhar*) and the latter was named tailor-carpenter (*Sai-Suthar*), as against others who were *Lohar-Suthars* (smiths in the range of blacksmith or carpenter skills). So long as there has been something like a major trend in changing their occupations, it is possible to give it a name and a semblance of tradition. But the fact remains that this particular direction of change is a tradition to them.

Lohars from Chittod side are most interesting in that respect. There are only 40 families of this caste, but they have changed their occupations without any pattern or range, and to do anything that suits one has become a normal thing for this caste. Yet it is quite alive as a caste.

One respondent, Koli-turned-goldsmith, had remarked as an afterthought: " I don't think caste has any relation with occupation. " A Soni's mother remarked: " The occupation has got to change as the family expands. We cannot afford to hang on to one occupation for all the members ".

The present generation: The present generation of family-heads is forced to think of a change in occupation, either for themselves, if they are young enough or for their sons even while the sons are of a school-going age.

There are many social pulls as well for the low castes and the service-castes.

A barber, 38 years of age, is a member of this occupation for generations. He is in Mahuva since the last 25 years. He says that he hates his occupation and wants his son to enter into something different. What he really wants is a status higher than his.

A young dhobi (washerman) is a permanent resident of Mahuva; his family is almost as old as Mahuva being residents for 300 years. So far as he knows about his three generations, they all did this work, and had no more than a very elementary education (2 grades). But they have developed a taste for some prestige-jobs now. One brother is serving as a shop-assistant in a cloth shop, another is a machine operator

in an ice factory and a radio repairer too. He himself had a job in an oil mill. Now that the oil mill is closed, he is unemployed and hence forced to revert to his washerman's occupation. He says: " I would leave this any day. I hate this work. I would rather go to Bhavnagar city (headquarters of Bhavnagar district in which Mahuva is also located) and start a washing company. "

Thus we may note that laundry is quite a prestige business to him. He is as well prepared to do some skilled technological work in an oil mill. What he hates is the " donkey-work " —sheer labour set in a dull routine.

Thus it is not just a change from one skill to the other or from one business to the other with a continuity of status. They take up unfamiliar skills, adopt even modern techniques, and go in for white-collar occupations too.

Many small, independent, self-employed workers (i.e. 46 per cent of the sample) also feel the overcrowding, either as businessmen or as artisans. They also feel the pressure of competition of some substitute as in transport, or sometimes a change of demand, taste etc. They realise that hardly one son could be accommodated in the family occupation. Where would the others go?

A tailor's wife complained about the tendency of anybody and everybody to take up this occupation. " Where shall *we* go when even blacksmiths and cobblers are taking up tailoring ? "

A *Kansara* (tinsmith) with three generations behind him in this occupation, feels it impossible now to maintain his family, and to hand over the family business to the next generation. The demand or rather the taste of the people has changed and he himself had been reduced to the level of a repairer, rather than a manufacturer-dealer.

Those who ply bullock carts are conscious that the truck is their greatest rival.

A Muslim head gave an instance of far-sightedness and planning in his family. His father was trained to take up to using the bullock-cart rather than the camel as was the practice of his grandfather to carry goods. He himself was well advised to have a horse-driven coach for Mahuva's railway passengers

in particular; and he trained his son to be a taxi driver though at present, so long as the horse-coach trade is flourishing, both father and son earned a handsome amount by running one coach each.

The fact of change in occupations is general. It remains to be studied or analysed how the generations are changing from one occupation to the other. We shall study it in the light of " push " and " pull ".

CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF OCCUPATIONS

THE COMPONENT SECTIONS OF THE PATTERN

MOST of the sample heads (386), could give the information about their grandfathers' occupations. It was thus possible to plan a sort of a resurvey by checking what the third generation was doing to earn its living.

All the grandfathers with their various occupations did not earn their living in Mahuva, and hence the survey is not intended to be a picture of the rise or decline of certain categories in Mahuva's economy. Again even when the number engaged in a certain line is steady, it is no proof that this " line " runs in the family for generations. One can observe no more than the pattern of occupations as it has changed in these 423 families taken together.

The listing of these occupational categories cannot at this stage claim to represent any actual order of ranking.

TABLE II

THE CHANGING PATTERN THROUGH GENERATIONS

	Category	*Number of Persons Engaged in Various Grades*	
		Grandfathers' occupations	*Present heads' occupations*
1.	Unskilled manual work	63	92
2.	Skilled manual work	79	77
3.	Lowest professions, primary teachers etc.	40	21
4.	Small business	44	53
5.	Highly skilled and technical or supervisory work	22	22
6.	Clerks and shop-assistants	10	26
7.	Intermediate professions	6	10
8.	Medium business	30	54

Category		Number of Persons Engaged in Various Grades	
		Grandfathers' occupations	*Present heads' occupations*
9.	Owners of big shops and factories	2	3
10.	Cultivators of own or other peoples' land	76	20
11.	Non-cultivating land-owners	14	9
		386	387
	Not earning	—	35
	Not known	36	—
	Rejection	1	1
	Total	423	423

The general picture is that of families becoming less agricultural but more white-collared rather than more skilled or technological, though the skills are more modern today. The trend towards business is significant; that is, a new generation of businessmen is coming up, though present-day Mahuva has less commerce than before. The increase in unskilled manual workers can only mean a net " push " in the economy.

The Unskilled Manual Worker

Reverting to the pattern, unskilled manual labour is the largest single group in this list, and this group claims more persons in the present generation than in the grandfathers' generation. How has this come about? Analysing 92 present heads in this category, they come from varied background, as under:

TABLE III

Background, i.e. *Grandfathers' Occupations*		*No. of Persons in Unskilled Manual Work Today*
1.	Unskilled manual labour	37
2.	Cultivators of own or other peoples' land	25
3.	Lowest professions, etc.	9
4.	Skilled manual work	7
5.	Small business	4

Background, i.e. *Grandfathers' Occupations*	*No. of Persons in Unskilled Manual Work Today*
6. Medium business	1
7. Highly skilled technical and supervisory work	1
	84
Not known	7
Rejection	1
Total	92

Looking to the occupational background alone, only 37 heads have been traditionally in it. In terms of one's own reference-group, even the 25 families with cultivator background have moved downwards. In the broader social context, one may think only of the common element of labour in both the occupational roles, but there are shades of social differentiation to the cultivator himself, particularly in view of the compensating factor of independence. For others, not even a possible independent role in unskilled manual work can serve as a significant compensation. The economic pressure has pushed them down in the social ladder, to which they have no positive attitude born of familiarity in the family tradition; this is an occupation on the boundary, on the indifference curve, so to say, compensating status-loss by economic survival.

There are other castes and groups that are not so indifferent to unskilled manual labour. They have a definite negative attitude, hence nothing seems to compensate for the stigma of unskilled labour. We find no higher-caste man here, except one *Mewada* (not-so-local) Brahmin, who keeps cattle for milk-supply, though he has stated that the milk is intended mainly for consumption at home. We do not find any "educated" man, not even a matriculate, in such work. So far as the background is concerned, none of their grandfathers had an "upper-class" status—higher castes and higher professions or services. The grandfather was neither a non-cultivating land-owner, nor a big businessman in any instance. Such families also face a bad day in the course of economic changes, but they would rather leave Mahuva, if ever they have to go

beyond their boundary to an unskilled manual occupation. There is a *Bania* head, whose brother is an ordinary mill labourer in Ahmedabad, but even such cases are exceptions: they try to avoid " blue-collar " work even in outside places.

There are no *Banias*—even with a middle class background —as vendors or *lariwalas* or selling things on the roadside, in this town of once " wealthy merchants ". These things are not worthy of a native *Bania*. He does this sort of work, and of a still lower status, unknown in Ahmedabad where a Mahuvaite is not very common. He often works as shop-assistant or a private clerk, in Bombay, Calcutta or in foreign countries like Africa, Burma and so on. All these are his stepping stones of course, but he has to do it outside. The higher the status enjoyed by his family in Mahuva, the greater the compulsion to leave it, to avoid " service " or at least becoming a " blue-collar ", in Mahuva.

While a high caste Hindu of Mahuva does not take to any labour, a Muslim with an equally upper class background has no objection to any sort of labour at all.

It is said by an Indian historian of Islam that " no profession of honest sweating was looked down upon "; and it is true, at least, of Mahuva's Muslims.

Thus, there are groups like the high caste Hindus and Jains as well that do not consider unskilled manual work acceptable under any circumstances. Others have been driven to this level as the last resort, only when they are pushed.

On the other hand, those presently engaged at this level are at the lowest possible social grade from every point of view, and hence, the changed occupation takes them socially upward, whether they change for positive reasons or not.

The unskilled manual workers are the best group to study the processes of " push up " as well as " pull up ". They have hardly any scope to go down even by way of forced adjustment.

There are in all 63 heads whose grandfathers were engaged in some unskilled manual work; it is already observed how 37 unskilled manual workers of the present day have the same background, hence the remaining 26 families of low background have been able to rise up in the social scale, i.e. 41 per cent have moved up from the low background. Where did they arrive?

TABLE IV

New Status	*Number of Heads*
Skilled worker (own-account)	2
Plying a bullock cart or a coach	4
Factory-work (semi-skilled)	2
Peons	2
Lariwalla vendors and small shopkeepers	3
Highly skilled and technological etc.	4
Medium business, including a factory for aerated waters	9
Total	26

This wide range of a variety of occupations to which these families have changed, by the force of ambition or that of sheer pressure in their earlier state, suggests an area of almost unlimited choice. There are more " independent " persons than employees, and there are only two persons—peons—whose occupation has neither skill nor independence.

This distribution of occupations of their choice would suggest a high preference for independence and/or skill among these low background families, and incidentally they are low or intermediate caste families, or Muslim families. They do not seem to have a social pull away from manual work as such, and hence here is a group that has almost an unlimited area of rational choice before them. A Muslim among them might be more particular about being independent; an artisan caste may long for reverting to a skilled work, but on the whole, they have no overriding boundary as the higher castes have, i.e. no forbidden line or area, overriding other rational considerations.

This notion of the range in which one would choose becomes more meaningful as one looks at other categories. While looking at the change from one occupation to the other, it is also possible to locate their basic area of choice, and the orientation of their range.

The unskilled worker stands out as unique among all the occupational levels. His area of choice of occupations is unlimited, when he is forced to change by economic necessity. At the same time, in terms of effective pull of various occupa-

tions, even an unskilled worker chooses from a limited range of occupations in keeping with his caste-background. Thus, for instance, a craftsman reduced to the level of an unskilled worker, continues to have his preference for skilled work, just as a man from the so called cultivating-castes of Mahuva becoming an unskilled worker at some stage has only one source of effective pull, viz. cultivation. It is with the lower castes, without any status-background, that one finds an unmitigated operation of economic pull from any occupation.

As a group, contrary to the general belief, it is the unskilled worker that is most open to changes in response to new opportunities.

The Skilled Manual Workers

79 grandfathers were skilled manual workers, covering many old-timers of Mahuva, as well as many families that left their villages in recent times.

36 (or about 50 per cent) have continued in the same skill or in a traditional range of skills only, e.g. interchange between carpenter's and blacksmith's skills, or potter's and mason's skills which have become traditionally recognised ranges. 3 have gone over from lower to a higher level in traditional skills, e.g. tailoring or goldsmith's skill. These are considered higher not only because of their degree of skill, but also because they are " cleaner " as explained by one artisan. From carpentry to tailoring is also one of the recognised channels of change.

Moreover, 4 have " climbed up " to modern skills like welding and vulcanising.

At least till the present generation " ritually clean " artisans experienced less pressure to change; there is a lowering of their customary standard of living, but this is a common experience of all the old-style craftsmen around them; hence relatively speaking they feel no decline, which would push them to change. On the other hand there is a limit to which a large family can face any cut in the income of its semi-employed earners. At such a stage they try to turn elsewhere, but in Mahuva they have a real problem of where to turn, when they try to.

A tailor belonging to a tailor-carpenter caste and tradition

feels the overcrowding. Moreover being 60 years old, perhaps, he cannot lightly forget his tradition of skill.

His son (with a primary school education) can undertake to do other things, jobs of a skill-less type perhaps, but the family head expressed his views in these terms: " This tailoring is not a paying occupation, true enough, but what can be done? We are not to become labourers—working class ! "

So many goldsmiths resident at Mahuva for a long time tell us: " I wish my son takes up some other ' line ', that is why I educate him. "

A barber in sheer desperation says, " I would beg for giving an education to my son. I would train him to be a tailor, any thing, but I would not make him a barber. Apart from two or three barbers, none else is able to support a family by this occupation. "

A tailor, earning little and suffering from T.B. says: " This is an occupation which is not so paying, and it is strenuous to the body; I would beg if need be, but see that my son gets education so that something else would occur to him. "

Muslims, and lower castes in skilled occupations today are, on the other hand, quite frequently planning to apprentice their sons at someone's shop, so that they may pick up that trade and after a few years' experience, start their own shop.

A Hindu artisan is not so particular about independence, but he does care for skill; a Muslim in a skilled occupation values the element of independence in it, even more than skill as a tradition. But unlike the unskilled labourer their choice is thus circumscribed, and they feel lost more than any other group. Usually they lack both resources and education, and thus go in for unskilled work, as employees or small self-employed workers, as seven of them did.

There are still 40 per cent who moved socially upward, but only about 10 per cent of skilled families could move into " a chosen field ", e.g. two owners of flour mills, and four in highly skilled and technical work. Skill is their chosen field in the sense that even though they move out of their occupation only by the force of push, it is an economic push, and not a social push as was felt by a shepherd or a washerman. An artisan's chosen field would be something that demands skill.

He would rather be a mechanic, a truck driver etc. Being a vendor of imitation trinkets disturbs a goldsmith in this sample quite a lot. Even for a job he seeks some work in his skill, and feels sorry that his sons had to take up a job with a confectioner.

There is one more reason why his chosen field is skilled work rather than white-collar jobs. To be an engineer, for instance, is fine, is highly educated, a " merchant-like " job, and it has skill as well as good income, but when it is a choice between two jobs like an engine-driver or a clerk, both equally available to a matriculate, an artisan prefers his son to be an engine driver.

A barber respondent educated his son upto matriculaton; he could not do so further. Now that he wants the son to apply for jobs, his first choice is that he should be an engine-driver. If it does not come through, he may be a clerk. It was pointed out to him that engine-driving is a hazardous occupation, but quick came the retort: " What of that? There is more money in it too. "

In short, artisans do not have a social push from skill to white-collar, and thus they could at least be rational about " more money " being available, with a given level of schooling.

Given the finance rather than mere education, they may buy trucks or taxis; they may start small industries like flour mills or repair-shops at least.

Skilled work is not just any occupation from where money is earned, it is a status sanctified by tradition. " Carting " is defined as a skilled occupation, but no craftsman ever took it up except of course a Muslim *Ghanchi* with his preference for independence.

There are, for instance, 9 families of carpenter caste in the sample. Five are still engaged in carpentry, the other four have changed. Their occupations are as under:

Carpenters	5
Owner of a flour mill	1
Machine operator	1
Unemployed	1
Tenant cultivator	1
Total	9

As regards 11 families of the blacksmith caste, the occupations are as under:

	Blacksmiths	6
	Carpenter	1
	Truck driver	1
	Machine operator	1
(head)	Blacksmith in Bombay	1
	Retired blacksmith	1
	Total	11

The potters have experienced a greater degree of economic push than others; for instance only 4 out of 20 potters (by caste) are earning as potters, while all the seven tailors by caste are tailors today and all the four washermen are still earning as washermen.

Most of the steady ones—clinging to one or the other traditional skills are worried about their future now, and they may fast lose their sense of circumscribed choice of skill, if they are forced to take up unskilled work, manual or otherwise, say a peon's job. Many relatives had at one stage solved their problem of clinging to skilled occupation, by migrating to still bigger towns, even to Bombay. It is not a very promising way out for the future. What they need is new and modern skills which they cannot learn by their traditional contacts.

The opening of a technical high school in Mahuva during the period of inquiry provided an opportunity to see the reactions of various groups. The Banias are interested only in the commercial education, modern skills for a shop-assistant, e.g. book-keeping, accountancy, typing and salesmanship; the slogan of all others, particularly the manual workers, skilled as well as unskilled, including those from an agricultural background, is to make their son " an engineer " which is a dignified name for a highly skilled technical man. This " pull " is a pointer. Given the opportunities for modern technical training they would need no " push " to make them change. Technical skill is already a force of pull to the young men with a tradition of skill. They have perhaps experienced a sense of power and prestige in modern highly technical jobs, as one used to feel

in taking up a police or military career, only they often did not know how to go about this business of learning modern skills or starting modern plants.

In short, they are now pushed to anything they may hit upon, but they are also exposed to a " pull " which it is most desirable to develop, from the point of view of economic development. Moreover, by religion (' Vaishnavite ') as well as by tradition, these craftsmen promise to become our most enterprising puritan innovators—hard-working, thrifty and proud of the skill rather than running away from the " labour " element in it. The area studies in entrepreneurship have noted this potential in North India as well as South India and this might as well be an all-India phenomenon of the central range of choice for the skilled artisan. Economic pulls are aided by social pull here; from skill-tradition to modern technology is a direct line.

The Lowest Professions

The grandfathers in these professions, mostly priests or primary teachers, are urban residents, and even in the villages, the priests and teachers or even Kotwals are " respectable gentlemen ". There are 40 grandfathers in such professions that could have been stepping stones to something higher; they would know something about matters educational and where to change if necessary. And yet 25 per cent (10) of this promising group is lost to unskilled work in the present generation. 15 out of 40 have continued at the same status though often changing from priesthood to other professions like teaching; the rest 15 are " climbers ", in the third generation that was interviewed.

They have shown very little interest in modern skills (2), or business on any scale (2). These " climbers " seem to have chosen the intermediate profession (2) or a clerical job (1), and not just picked it up out of desperation.

This would indicate how the lowest profession family stands on a slippery ladder—so easy to be pushed down. Lack of capital and lack of skill-tradition, as is usual with landless priests, primary teachers, or peons, leads them to two extremes of educated white-collar jobs or blue-collar jobs, depending upon factors like education etc.

It is interesting to contrast the skilled worker's family with this. Only one of those 79 families sent a grandson to the lowest profession, viz. as an Ayurvedic (ancient Indian medical system) practitioner. Probing deeper he turns out to be the grandson of a Brahmin cook, not exactly an artisan. Conversely, only one head from the lowest profession background happens to take up a sort of a skilled work in a factory.

This group of the lowest profession suggests a mechanism of change oriented to something more than the caste. While pushed, they have to take up even unskilled manual labour, but they would not be pulled into doing any blue-collar work, so as to learn a skill, e.g. even tailoring, which is quite clean. Once, the family arrives in a white-collar profession, even at the lowest level of a peon, the negative attitude to labour and pull of white-collar is derived by a reference to a high i.e. white-collar " family-status ". Perhaps this equating of high status with white-collar is not as true of the Muslim community, but it is a fact for the Hindu of any caste; he cherishes the memory of a " white-collar " in his immediate ancestors or the white-collar status even in near relatives, possibly due to a Brahminic model in Hindu reference.

A young boy of the potter caste is quite steady as a tailor, and even after passing his S.S.C. he continues to earn as a tailor, an occupation he picked up after the death of his father and followed while a student. He is interested in pursuing higher studies privately to pass the LL.B. examination precisely because his father was a sanadi pleader, a professional, though not so educated in those days nor so well-to-do. Here is a craftsman by caste, and by occupation, one who is not pushed economically nor socially (so far as caste-background is concerned) but whose " associations ", to put it broadly, pull him to a white-collar status. It is necessary to remember that it is not education that makes him white-collar-minded, on the contrary his white-collar-mindedness leads him on to higher education.

Persons belonging to castes like shepherds, smiths and even untouchables in the sample refer proudly to a white-collar man in their circle of relatives, and the idea catches on when there is a demonstration-effect from one's own associates. These

white-collar men are not always rich, but they are important people in the caste-group.

No Hindu, however proud of his land or cattle or skill, seems to be free from this attitude of awe and respect for a white-collar man. He is apparently in a strange situation, since he wants at least one son to look after his agriculture or to learn his skill, and also plans to educate at least one son to be a white-collar man. This is not merely an economic necessity, but also a social necessity, once he is among white-collar " associates ", relatives, or even neighbours.

At this point, it is equally necessary to remember to keep them apart from the born-high-castes who are born-white-collar.

Clerks and Shop-assistants

There were only 10 clerks and shop-assistants in the grandfather's generation. Now there are 23, but only 3 of them hail from such a background.

20 newcomers are all from a definite range of white-collar background, either coming from lowest professions and small business, or even climbing down from medium business.

Most of the heads with this background are on their way up now, in the sense of being " own-account " workers either in small or medium business. It shows that to be a clerk or a shop-assistant cannot be a tradition here, in the sense of business or skill being a family tradition; and yet it is the safety valve, fire escape or sometimes a stepping-stone to those who cherish a white-collar status. Being a shop-assistant is also an apprenticeship to a would-be trader.

An occupation that fulfils this easily-made role of white-collar is bound to have interesting developments in such regions in the market equilibrium or supply and demand situation for such jobs. Towns and cities that are expanding commercially or industrially have a large demand for such clerical or assistant services, but the local resident population would be in a mood to set up its own enterprises rather than serve when the times are so favourable, as it happened in the case of Bombay. On the other hand the declining towns, for whatever reason the decline, would have an over-supply of precisely these " services "

(a by-product of economic push for the higher castes) that are so much in demand in expanding centres outside. Fortunately the movement of younger persons is quite prompt at least within one cultural area, and hence the supply rushes from one place to the other and helps both the centres.

Moreover, there are regions, or rather regional groups, where the over-supply is a permanent phenomenon—regional cultural characteristic of "non-business communities"—and their constant hunger for white-collar jobs leads to many tensions, economic, linguistic and political, in the process of their absorption in the centre of commerce, industry or even administration.

In view of such a social milieu, the clerks and shop-assistants provide a very puzzling industrial-relations situation too.

Concentrating at present only on the range of choice, it is found that the shop-assistant, whatever his origin, is more likely to keep an eye on becoming a man of business in the future, whereas a clerk, even in a business firm, is quite often a mixed personality. This work takes on a professional character to many who have a sort of a managerial rather than an entrepreneurial goal for the family, in mind. On the other hand, a business-man-turned-clerk regards this occupation only as a stop-gap arrangement in white-collar status, in view of the past glory.

The Big Ones

The owners of big shops were only two under the category of the grandfathers in our sample. At present, one of these family heads is a commission agent and another is unemployed. Even the commission agent is biding his time, not winding up a family-business for the sake of mere face-saving. The economic push sends him out of Mahuva in search of some respectable clerical position with the help of his relatives.

But there are three new entrants to this top level: one from a small, and one from a medium business background, and the third, an owner of a big factory who comes from non-cultivating land-owners.

This recruitment of an entrepreneur of a modern type from this background should naturally lead one to look at the non-cultivating land-owners more closely. Quite a few of them have

a large amount of block capital and, with a helpful social environment, there are no other obstacles to the supply of commercial or industrial leadership.

The Non-cultivating Land-owners

9 out of 14 such families have gone into any white-collar occupation they fitted in, priesthood, small or medium business, police department, and other professions, and even clerical work. One owns a big factory, as just noted, one has gone for a highly technical job in the Power House.

There are also 3 of them getting their land directly cultivated; this " management " is their new occupation, with quite an entrepreneurial element in it. This transformation of absentee land-owners into agricultural entrepreneurs may be hastened by legal factors, but the fact of this particular choice among the alternatives offered is significant. Entrepreneurship has faced no counter-pull for Mahuva's landlords; in this it resembles the British rather than the French situation. Quite significantly one of the agricultural entrepreneurs in Mahuva is a graduate from a high caste. The choice between professions and entrepreneurial roles has been quite rational, and the considerations have been psychological and economic, but not social, i.e. not related to caste, education or family status i.e. the " aristocratic " background.

Men Behind the Plough

As regards men from an agricultural background it should be noted that it is only the small cultivating owner or tenant farmers who were driven to do anything, e.g. one-third went to unskilled manual work. To men from a traditionally cultivating caste this was perhaps a hard choice, for others it was all the same so far as its " labour " aspect is concerned. What is important is the degree of independence one has gained or lost by giving up a deficit agriculture and taking up unskilled manual work, self-employed, or as employees, or as casual construction workers, coolies, etc.

A little less than one-fifth are still satisfied with their present income as well as status.

Except a widow, a single old lady in the family, no one in

the cultivating groups of Mahuva can be charged with inertia in the face of economic push. Her son-in-law helps her to fill in the deficit in her income.

Others have changed the occupation; they did not have any sentimental or ignorant attachment to a traditional occupation that did not maintain the family. Many persons of the *Sagar* caste have taken to the mason's skill, in the last two decades, though they can be said to be the cultivating caste of Mahuva district.

Kharak is another cultivating caste of Mahuva, and most of the *kharaks* who continue cultivation have comparatively good land and large holdings. One of them said: "our people don't go in for education as we have this land." And yet one of his nephews studies at an English school "because he is invalid (lame), and he can't do the strenuous work of cultivation. He can do something else if he is educated." A 60-year-old traditional cultivator has 80 bighas of land and his annual income is Rs. 5,000 in cash, disregarding other forms. He is sure that even his grandsons would follow the same occupation. "We cultivators would not go for service so long as we have land and cattle."

There was another man from the same caste who was not as "rich" today, but he said proudly: "We are considered the big Patels (head or chief families) in our community." So it is quite logical that his sons should stick to cultivation and look after the fields and plantations, even though some part of it has been taken on lease. Incidentally, one of his sons does go out to repair trucks as casual work but they all would be cultivators, "big Patels."

All the rest of these 76 families have changed, particularly helping the junior members with enough capital or training to leave cultivation for some other occupation, before economic push forces them out. Some artisan families, *Kolis*, Rajputs and many Muslims have been making a smooth transition like this through these generations. In such families the elder brothers or uncles might still be cultivators in their native places, and only a small section of the otherwise joint family has come to Mahuva and become non-agriculturist.

The Intermediate Professions

The intermediate professions on the one hand and small and medium business on the other, are not looked into directly for obvious reasons. The professions and business both have one thing in common, the white-collar, if we disregard the peon and the street vendor as doubtful marginal cases. The professions have a primary requirement, viz. education; business has a primary requirement in capital though both are helped considerably by " connections. "

What is said about the lowest profession is all the more applicable to the intermediate profession, with only one difference, a man at a lower level cannot at once rise very high; conversely, a man in the intermediate profession could not fall as low as unskilled work. He has more capital as well as connections to help even the less educated sons, and his choice does, in practice, operate within the overriding boundary of white-collar. Yet it is possible for a low caste to be pulled by highly technical jobs, whereas it is impossible for a high-caste.

As regards men in business, the boundary of white-collar choice has reference to higher castes rather than business tradition. The lower castes in business have not been so choosy as the lower castes in professions. Muslim businessmen in particular have not cared to " educate " their sons for " service ", so that a businessman, small, medium or big, moves in a much wider area of choice than a " professional " man. It is only the higher castes whose caste-oriented mechanism delimits the area with an overriding boundary around white-collar occupations.

These studies of a few component sections in Mahuva's changing occupational pattern indicate that the fact of change in our occupations is general, and the range in which they are changed also forms some pattern.

THE RANGE OF CHOICE

People do change their occupations; but what is acceptable or tolerable when one is forced to change for mere survival is not as significant as the area where social pull is also effective alongside the economic advantage or sometimes even against

the counteracting economic pull. In other words the observation of the range of choice of occupations, would be more enlightening in this analysis. This range is not positively affected by religion, though there is a negative margin that would be considered in the beginning to exclude certain occupations from the choice. Secondly the family-background would be examined as a mechanism by which the choice may be delimited if at all. Thirdly caste-considerations would be taken up for analysis as regards their impact on the delimitation.

ORIENTATION OF THE RANGE

Religion-oriented Margin

Viewing any Indian community might suggest one to look at the religious attitudes to occupations. In terms of major religious communities, Mahuva has its share of Hindus, Muslims and Jains. The religious attitudes, even when they are effective in delimitation, mark out certain occupations as anti-religious, and their exclusion hardly comes in conflict with their broad freedom of choice. Such occupations just do not exist in their consideration. For instance, a Hindu as well as a Jain in Mahuva would never be a butcher, or even a dealer in non-vegetarian food-items. On the other hand, it appears that particularly in non-traditional occupations, the religious attitude has not proved to be such an obstacle, and selling cod-liver oil in a medical store does not bother them and even managing a packing and distribution unit for fish has been taken up by Banias of Saurashtra coast.

The Jains of Mahuva are not directly engaged in cultivation, and hence they satisfy their religious sanctions too, but they do own and manage cultivated land, so that this is more of a caste-sanction which avoids any blue-collar work. On the other hand, a strict observance of the Jain code would require them to give up many items of trade even in groceries, e.g., butter, ghee, oil, jaggery, etc. No Jain provision store is ever stopped from stocking these. This is only one instance to show that the delimitation of occupation with reference to religious sanctions operates only in the very broad sense of " not killing ". A

Hindu does join the police or the military, though a Jain may not.

The considerations of religion, even ritual ideas of "clean" occupations for "clean" castes, are there, but one cannot say that they override the rational considerations in the choice of occupations, e.g., "nursing" is not discarded as "unclean". They leave out such a wide area of choice that religion becomes a marginal aspect in the delimitation.

Family-orientation

The consideration of family-status has no existence independent of the caste-norm. A family that has been at the top of social hierarchy likes to keep up that tradition in any society, but in India it need not be the *same* occupation for the future generation. In terms of their caste-considerations whatever points to the élite status is equally desirable. Independent professions like lawyers or doctors, occupations such as engineers, professors and high government officers are compatible with élite status not only to a big businessman but even to a big land-owner. Thus the consideration of élite family-status does not limit one to a particular occupation. Within the white-collar occupations their choice is rational.

An élite family when "pushed" from the given occupation does not stick to that particular occupation, the range in which they would choose being the same as that for any other fellow-member of the caste, only on the extremity, they would sooner leave the place than cross the limit. However, the relative decline of a family within one's caste is a great spur to man.

Caste-oriented Range of Choice

The range that is basic to any delimitation either for Hindus, Muslims or Jains of Mahuva, is neither concerned with religion nor with the status of the family.

Religion provides, if at all, only a small negative margin and the "family", however low in income or education, can bask in the reflected glory of the high caste and try to observe certain caste-norms. On the other hand, within a lower caste-group, a high family-status has direct reference only to their own caste-norms.

What are the ingredients of these caste-norms?

First of all, they seem to cover more than one caste, say caste-groups observing more or less a common set of norms.

The choice is presented in terms of one or the other occupations, but the deliberations, acceptance and rejection seem to be in terms of certain elements common to any problem of choosing occupations.

These common elements or ingredients one comes across in Mahuva are very clearly seen in the thinking aloud of the respondents particularly with reference to their attitudes to occupations they pursue, and those which they would like their children to pursue. Some ingredients in the range of the choice of occupations, as presented below, are found to be very significant.

The Three Ingredients

All deliberations regarding the choice of occupations revolve round three elements, (1) manual or physical labour, (2) skill and (3) independence. The respondents have either a positive or a negative or an indifferent attitude to these three.

The Positive, Negative and Indifferent Attitudes to the Three Ingredients

Positive attitude: By positive attitude is implied a high priority or a social pull, so that economic pull would be very effective in that particular area. For instance, a particular caste-group with a positive attitude to skill would choose quite rationally within the skilled occupations; in the event of an economic push their forced choice might take them even to unskilled occupations but these being counter to the social pull, their choice between a skilled job and an unskilled work, even a peon's job, is not dictated by merely economic considerations.

Negative attitude: By negative attitude is implied a sanction against and a social push from a particular element. For instance, a high-caste Hindu has a negative attitude to labour whereas others are at least indifferent about it. The addition of skill to mere labour may compensate an artisan but not a high-caste Hindu. In the event of economic push, unskilled labour is at least within the boundary for an artisan whereas it is outside the basic boundary to a high-caste Hindu.

The attitude of indifference: This implies a dispensable

element. One can ignore it while retaining what evokes a positive attitude. An artisan does care for an independent occupation but in fact he is indifferent while he cares still more for skill; and a skilled occupation even in an employee status is chosen rather than an independent but unskilled occupation.

Similarly a high caste man in business is indifferent to business as such, while what he really cares for is white-collar; in other words, his negative attitude to labour, even skilled labour, is more important than anything else so that, given the white-collar, he chooses rationally among various occupations.

Before discussing the range for these caste-groups in these terms, it would be useful to make the ingredients quite clear and precise at this point.

The Ingredients, their Meaning and their Balancing

Labour: By labour is meant sheer sweating for one's bread. The labour may or may not in fact be very hard, of a dull or a routine sort, but so long as it has no socially recognised importance, it becomes just a donkey-work, to translate a common term *Gaddha-majuri*—heard frequently from the respondents.

The farmer, as apart from the agricultural labourer has a traditional importance associated with his labour, and thus his work is not just one type of unskilled manual work. He is a cultivator with a recognised status, even in an urban setting.

Moreover, any social recognition of skill element in a given labour would make all the difference to that " labour ". This recognition is a fact of observation, though it might be sometimes granted quite arbitrarily. A domestic servant is an unskilled labourer, while a barber is a skilled worker. A *dhobi* is almost demoted these days to an ordinary status of an unskilled worker.

Skill: Skill as an ingredient of occupation is noteworthy only in the mechanical sense of the term. A cook is considered a skilled worker just like a tailor or a goldsmith. But skill element in non-manual operations is not a separate consideration in the choice of occupations. The skill of an accountant, or a surgeon as contrasted with a clerical job is not functionally important to their choice.

In other words, socially recognised skill element means much to a manual worker and hence skill of a manual or mechanical type is one of the important ingredients that are considered in the choice of occupations. Moreover, all skills are not on an equal footing in the Hindu view of ritual purity.

Independence: There are groups like cultivating castes that hate to serve under a boss. Their emphasis on independence leads them to give up white-collar, even skill-status, but retain some semblance of independence when compelled to make a choice; they are, within wide limits, not so rational in their choice when economic advantage has to be balanced against independent occupation.

When forced to take up a job, or serve under a boss, these groups have a great difficulty in being committed to their role. To the groups with a positive attitude to independence, nothing would be compensatory, neither skill nor a white-collar feeling. A really paternal situation might help the commitment of the low castes, an atmosphere of family system might help the others by acting as a camouflage for the dependent relationship. In a complex modern organisation a real human-relations approach is difficult and yet very essential in India when uncommitted work-force has this hurdle, viz. a push situation just forcing them to accept an " unworthy " role of an employee. A feeling of involvement and participation is the only substitute for what is known as independence in the traditional roles.

So far as " pull " forces are concerned, they do need the aid of a very high supervisory or executive role, if an employee role is ever to pull, or even satisfy, a man of positive attitude to independence.]

This is only one instance of how in actual choice a subtle balancing is operative.

The balancing: The negative attitude to labour is not common to all. People cannot afford to be so, and a norm like this has to be adjusted to suit the realities of economic life. Only a society of slave-owners can exist with a negative attitude to labour.

This implies at least an indifferent attitude to labour. Can a large group of men always toil and sweat with only an indifferent attitude?. There must be something more in the work-situa-

tion to evoke a positive attitude if the social integration is not to be strained by the conflict of " norms " and " necessity ".

This conflict, when one has to earn his living by an occupation outside the range of positive attitude, gets resolved by a balancing that satisfies some if not all. Thus even though labour as such has no positive pull, some significant element like skill or independence might be enough to make a particular role not only acceptable but also satisfying in a positive way. This is how skilled work has achieved a status-value for the craftsmen, though it may continue to be outside the range of choice for the higher castes.

There are groups that find a satisfying balance by a combination of labour plus skill, or in skilled labour. On the other hand, there are groups that find in independence the most rewarding aspect of an occupation, and thus labour when compensated by independent status is a positive force giving satisfaction in work. This is particularly the case with the cultivating castes. In spite of the labour element, a craftsman or a cultivator have a status-occupation.

A modern industrial society is based on a new relationship of management and men and how this relationship is organised by the parties, formally or informally, determines the chances of helping this essential occupational balancing, to make unskilled manual labour acceptable, and employee role satisfying in a positive sense.

The Conflict of the " Norm " and the " Necessity "

There are instances of what was described above as a conflict of " norm " and " necessity ". One is forced to earn in a particular way, but the norm that appeals to him is against this. The higher castes with a negative attitude to labour have no alternative but to leave the occupation.

One of the heads is from an Audichya Brahmin family, staying in Mahuva for the last two generations. The female head is a widow, 25 years old, just left in charge of her three stepsons when the husband (aged 50) died.

She does not know what was the occupation of her husband's grandfather but the father, as per her knowledge, began his life in an ordinary role of supplying water to the passengers

at Mahuva station. Later on he started a tea-stall at the station and her husband had inherited this stall.

As it is, this stall is not a very paying proposition but her eldest son, 20 years old (who is a non-matric) has taken it up to have a continuous source of income. They don't feel they can go into some other business, ignorant and untrained as they are. Moreover the widowed mother remarked: "I would like to see that all the three sons pass matriculation and join some service. This stall means running about to cater to the passengers. *We Brahmins are not supposed to go into this sort of occupation.* It is only due to some circumstances that they have to continue such an occupation coming down from the days of my father-in-law. I don't approve of it."

It is interesting to know that her brother-in-law is a peon-cum-sweeper in a local high school. So it is not the family background, but the caste which pulls her out of a low sort of occupation. The element of "running and rushing about" makes it blue-collar work, not fit for Brahmins. Matriculation seems to her to be the minimum qualification to get a white-collar position.

It is not the "tea-supply" which is unfit for a Brahmin, but the way a tea-stall works at the station. Having a "hotel" in the town, where they serve tea and snacks perhaps is not low at all. Nor is the shopkeeper who sells betel leaves and "bidis".

Another Brahmin family of the same caste (Audichya Brahmin) feels quite proud of an occupation like this. Right now they don't earn as much as they used to. Their "residentially joint" family of 19 persons in all is also a big unit to maintain. The female head remembers how her mother-in-law had earned her livelihood... She used to go out to work as a domestic servant; but now the times are changed. She was a widow and without any mercantile background whereas "now we are considered businessmen. Can we go out to work? People may comment if we (the women of the family) earn like that."

They had begun with a lorry, a mobile tea-stall and now reached a stage of a tea-shop. This is a white-collar status, and neither economic push nor economic pull by way of chances of supplementing the family income by women's "domestic

service" would lead them to accept any blue-collar work. Their only salvation appears to be "education" and thereby the teaching job which is quite familiar to their relatives.

On the other hand, there are other Hindus from lower castes as well who aspire to live up to the white-collar norms of "cultured" strata or the values of the dominating caste-groups. These may or may not be Brahminical in the strict sense, e.g. in Mahuva the ambitious ones wanted a "merchant-like" role; these norms do not have a proper traditional content, so that they are satisfied with the role of a postman as well. The norms of the effective élite in the local society spread to the ambitious among the lower castes, and this changes the caste-oriented mechanism for *some families* all along the line. What was within their caste-given boundary does not satisfy them any longer. The positive attitude to their occupation is lost and their dissatisfaction is a potent source of conflict, not only in their minds but also in social interaction. It is this pull that will transform the social structure.

The changing economy has two aspects of conflict, (1) the "necessity" in conflict with the given norm: a man has to earn his living, but it may not be available in a given way, (2) the opportunity beyond the "norm": a man *can* earn his living in a new "higher" way. This second aspect is a powerful engine of change in social relations.

These conflicts are not unique to modern technology, they are common to all phases of an expansion of the economy, only they are perhaps more dramatic in the present form of expansion. The second type of conflict is still to make its full impact.

Men who were once satisfied by the balancing are sometimes conscious that they can earn in a new "higher" way and need not be limited by their traditional range. In future, when they do succeed in changing over to a new way of earning, they would claim a new status. It is the beginning, the change in occupations with the appearance of the new opportunities that might well lead to a change in the ranking of their castes.

A *jogi*, permanent resident of Mahuva, is a priest of the lower castes, and he also earns in a small way by bidi-making, so that priesthood is only a subsidiary occupation. He has studied upto 7 grades, and put his son (after 4 grades) to an assistant's

job with a cloth merchant, so that he would learn the trade by experience and also some traditional book-keeping in his spare time. The idea is that the son should start some independent business.

The *jogi's* wife is quite emphatic that her sons should not take up any " labouring line " at all. Her plan for the second son who is still at school is very significant. He could study as much as he wished and take up some Government job or pick up a tailor's trade. In fact his apprenticeship at a tailor's is already arranged along with the studies. The third son is a manual worker, weaving ropes etc. (an old time subsidiary occupation in the family). She just " can't help " it, otherwise she would not approve of it.

She knows quite clearly what she wants and why. " One can stand erect with one's head high if he is following some " merchant-like occupation ". This so-called " merchant-like " or " mercantile line " is Mahuva's idiom for white-collar occupations associated with the higher castes. A tailor's job as well as a postman's job can be *vepari* (business) line to her.

A shepherd staying in a high caste neighbourhood is quite sensitive to the élite attitude to work. A well-to-do shepherd owning cultivable land and a house in his native village comes to Mahuva and intends to settle down permanently. He has bought a " plot " in Mahuva as well. He owns 80 heads of goats and sheep and earns by selling milk as well as wool. The wife, without any comments or regret as to the economic condition, remarks: " I want to educate my son. ' Service ' or job is much better than this life with buffaloes. It means also drudgery for us women, looking after, cleaning, washing and all that goes with this occupation connected with cattle. "

A cultural norm cannot remain an exclusively Hindu norm, and yet within significant limits, the élite norm of Hindu society is different from the Islamic norm in Mahuva. There is no negative attitude to labour even at the élite level in Muslims and hence a conflict for the Muslim is a common conflict for all strata of the Muslim population. The conflict at all levels is how to avoid a dependent relationship (rather than avoid labour) in the modern world.

A young Khoja (25 years old) sells vegetables; when asked

whether he regrets that he did not take up some job after education, he replied, " I prefer this ' business ' to job because here I can be independent. "

Another Muslim runs a small shop serving cold drinks and feels quite happy that he is not working under someone.

A fifty-year-old person whose grandfather (Khoja in wool business) was very rich, has never served anybody even when the old business and glory is no more. He says proudly, " we are a ' merchant community ', ours is a ' merchants' brain '. We always find out something in mercantile line. " What he does today in the same town Mahuva is very revealing. He collects—buys—old rags, torn clothes from house to house and makes out of them mattresses and pillows for folks in poor areas. Similarly he buys old kerosene lamps, and he sells them after repair.

In another instance, father and son (Muslim), run a tea-kettle service on the public square in a business area though the two generations before them were in " business. "

A Khoja, son of a tinsmith in Africa and grandson of a big cattle breeder, does odd things but all in an independent position; he sells watermelons and cowdung cakes made by his own labour in the meadows where he looks after others' cattle as a contract work. " Independence " acts as a sufficient balancing force for any drudgery.

These conflicts of one sort or the other foretell the problems of the future, the problems that are not yet solved in the present equilibrium. The " balancing " today is a picture of the " norms " and deviations that are operative today, the deviations indicating conflicts that the future must take care of.

At best, we can abstract the so-called norms of today, though, in practice, they are in a process of change at every moment.

The caste-oriented mechanism can give us the base-area that satisfies a particular group, at least a large majority of them. The ambitious minority that is pulled to make changes in occupation is within its bounds so long as the changes take place within the base-area; on the other hand social pull urges a few to cross the boundary of this base-area to a higher social status, though not necessarily a higher economic standard, e.g., a shepherd trying to be something " merchant-like ".

The economic push that forces changes in occupations is tolerable so long as the change is within the base-area, and strictly rational choice is possible within these limits. The occupations that are outside and hence lower than the base-area are accepted only as the last resort, and as a temporary " misfortune ". It is this " tragedy " in so many families that symbolises the conflict of norm and necessity.

The " Norm " and the Practice

There has been a confusion of judgement when one has tried to abstract the norm from the practice. In practice people do not change the hereditary occupations to any significant extent, in a period of normal stability in socio-economic life i.e. in relative status. They change them because of push rather than pull, i.e. the desire to change is forced on them, otherwise there exists no such desire. Does the lack of desire constitute or prove a norm? A norm refers to what you would not do, it cannot compel you to do all that is permissible, e.g., a norm is to arrange marriages within one's caste, and outside one's gotra. It does not forbid a marriage with one's caste in a different language area. The practice suggests as if one is limited to one's own language-area, or even a smaller regional circle. Thus the concept of practice cannot be equated with the concept of " norm ".

Similarly the norm in occupations is to be within a given range, but the practice does not indicate a tendency to change the traditional family occupation at all except when pushed. Both the hard-pressed and the ambitious make the change, and both are within their norm, so long as the change is within their caste-given range; those who go outside the boundary are going beyond the norm, and yet at every general crisis the norms are in the process of adjustment. Every change from the normalised range is a deviation but there is a range of approved deviations as contrasted with other deviations that are not approved today, and may or may not be approved in future.

The Approved Deviations of the Various Castes

The Low Castes: The lower castes must be distinguished from the untouchables.

The untouçhables in the traditional scheme had no range outside the unclean occupations though they had managed to get weaving and casual labour approved as deviations. These deviations are today accepted part of their range of choice. On the other hand, opportunities for education and jobs in factories and the offices have now become new deviations that are approved in Mahuva, and there is no general protest and dissent against their entry into these jobs, as it would still be in the villages.

The other low caste-groups, particularly men with a tradition of agriculture, have an approved range of choice, viz. any " labour " with an independent status. The dependent labourer or the unskilled employee is quite common even in Mahuva, but even now they have not been able to develop a positive attitude, or say reconcile themselves to this modern development. The role of an employee is outside the overriding boundary of the base-area, and hence, even a small farm or business, by which they can make two ends meet, would be preferred to a better-paid factory job. The present situation of push offers enough supply of labour, but the lack of interest, stability and commitment has its root in their positive attitude to independence rather than a " villager's heart " or cultural pull of the village. Their problem stems from the cultivator-background.

Those low-caste men who are pulled and helped to rise to non-labour occupations are also beyond the base-area, but these are now approved deviations so far as Mahuva is concerned. Yet it is instructive to know the impact of range on these deviations. A Koli respondent who trained himself to be a goldsmith is accepted as a skilled worker but not regarded with trust *as a goldsmith.* He gets only silver work so far. His caste comes in the way.

The Artisan Castes: The base-area of choice for the artisans is labour plus skill, but the change of technique leading to the modern use of power has added an approved new dimension to this base-area. Barring the ritually unclean crafts, all other crafts have been treated as open; a tailor-caste (like any other monopolist) might complain of everybody taking up tailoring, but as regards norm, any artisan taking up tailoring is within his caste-oriented base-area.

It is different when a person from the artisan caste has to take up unskilled manual work. It is a fall from the " aristocracy of labour " and not even an independent status would be compensation enough to an artisan. In his view it is a " working class " status as distinct from an artisan's status.

Skill is their big compensation, not independence. They have accepted any skilled job, traditional or modern, under a boss without a loss of status. On the other hand, the artisans do hate the " putting out system ", which means neither the security and steady income of service nor independence.

A *soni* in relation to an unsteady demand from the " merchants " says: " our occupation has become that of helpless dependence. We live on the mercy of these merchants who give orders to us to make this or that. " Another Soni remarks: " This has become mere labour now, dependent on others and helpless."

What they dislike is not " dependence " as such because they do plan to educate their sons to take up other jobs and even try to get some " employment " under big jewellers in Bombay. " Putting out system ", a transitory stage in economic evolution, hurts them.

The artisan has no social pull away from his tradition and pride of skill and yet economic push would lead him to white-collar rather than unskilled manual work. It is outside his " norm " or base-area, but it is an approved deviation, particularly " business ", which has always been " open ".

The Intermediate Castes: Castes like " Rajput " that are no longer high-castes in an urban area, slide back to an intermediate status in urban hierarchy, and on the other hand non-Brahminical priests and bards, and even cleaner merchant-like smiths (tin-smith or goldsmith), who refuse to be mixed up with the low castes, can be grouped together as an intermediate caste-group; in ritual and ethical terms they try to keep up the high-caste norms. So far as the range of choice of their base-area is concerned they do behave as a distinct type.

These castes are more alert to economic considerations than any other. They have reached a stage in social gradation where better economic opportunities pull them to any occupa-

tion, unskilled, skilled or white-collar. Independence is not of any value at all.

To a high-caste man, a white-collar occupation helps to retain his status, however low his income. To a low caste man manual labour gets him respectability in his group because of the independence. The artisan has his own status sanctioned by tradition. As a contrast to these, the intermediate caste maintains this intermediate position (rather than lowering), due to intermediate *economic grade*. They would try not to sacrifice this but to improve it *by any means*, and then *take off* to white-collar range or other luxuries of the high-caste.

These apparently normless groups are themselves the product of earlier conflicts of both types, usual to economic change, and they are the most rational and dynamic group. The Lohanas and Bhatias, Khatris and Khojas have passed through this stage, and reached an élite status (a dominating caste if not high-caste), in various regions. Kolis of Mahuva, without any traditional status are pushing their way up, and may create a new intermediate status for themselves.

The Higher Castes: The Brahmin is traditionally in this status, others like Banias have "arrived"; their sheer domination of urban economic life was enough to elevate them to the higher-caste position.

Their base-area is marked off by a definite negative attitude to labour. This is the symbolism of a high status in the Brahminical system of values. Manual labour is not only outside the boundary, but it is not even an approved deviation. Neither skilled nor highly skilled labour is worthy of a high Brahmin or a Bania of Mahuva.

Banias who came up via business have not shown a rational attitude to it. Having *arrived* at the high status, they can be as traditional as the proverbial Indian cultivator. Business often becomes a way of life and when shaken or pushed by economic forces, the attitude to try any other occupation is not often found in these castes that have *arrived* at the social apex.

Moreover, given the choice of being a "white-collar," they may quite rationally choose between a good steady income in service or profession on the one hand and an insecure small income

from a shop. And yet, economic chances being equally moderate, on both sides, they have one positive argument in favour of their " mercantile line ". They believe or at least try to rationalise that " one can come up in business. A merchant can be an employer even to an academically well-qualified person. Moreover, an independent business means no servility. "

This is an instance of a positive attitude to independent business, otherwise the Brahmins or Banias who are particular about the " independent " status of a businessman, are either personally disgusted with their experience of service in the past, or have some reason to be quite satisfied in their business, as regards income as well as prospects.

Banias and Brahmins (of the higher grades, and with a longer urbanisation) are at the top of the *social* ladder, and they are very cautious, as they fear that they might slip. This leads to inaction, lack of any creative venture whatsoever in the home-base or anywhere in its circle of social relationships. They do have adaptive response, or imitative entrepreneurship at times. Their creative ardour can only express itself " abroad ".

They are afraid to fall and yet they do fall because of the pressures of changing economy; then, instead of trying any independent venture for the sake of new adjustment, they usually swell the ranks of the shop-assistants or clerks, or non-technical supervisors. Even their modernity does not lead them to skills as such, but to " skill-minus-manual labour " professions, e.g. doctors, engineers and the managerial cadre known for their dislike of labour in the Indian set-up.

The " services " and professions are part of their range, not merely approved deviation for Banias. Business may be an approved deviation for a Brahmin but white-collar work is *the* base-area.

The Contrast of Muslims and Hindus in the Range

Muslims: All sorts of independent occupations, from big business to hawking, from plying private trucks to plying old bullock-carts or horse coaches and from selling tea at street-corners to repair services are the special lines appealing to Muslims.

Hindu society has had only one influence on them. A really "learned" or a very prosperous "servant" is higher than a common man who is independent but poor. This is natural because their norms of social respectability cannot ignore Hindu notions altogether.

The Contrast: 70 Banias in the sample are an illustration of the Hindu notions as a contrast. There are two higher grades, viz. Jains and Kapols and a third lower mixed grade of other Banias in the context of Mahuva's gradation:

Jains	32
Kapols	19
Others	19
Total	70

Only one, a Soni-Bania is a skilled manual worker, i.e. a goldsmith. There is no other "blue-collar" worker at all—not even in a self-employed position, e.g. hawking bangles or vegetables or ice-cream or buying old tins and bottles, bags and other junk.

On the other hand, one may observe 93 Muslims in the sample:

Khojas	24
Bohras	9
Ghanchis	16
Sepais	23
Others	21
Total	93

Out of these, 36 have "blue-collar" occupations:

Unskilled manual work	24
Skilled manual work	12
Total	36

Even among Khojas and Bohras (33), coming from a mercantile background, 3 men are found in "blue-collar" occupations. Those in "white-collar" occupations are not "respectable" to any greater degree for this.

It is interesting to see the caste-composition of the highly skilled and technical workers, numbering 22 out of 423.

This would indicate where the future technical men will come from—not mere supervisors but " creative " technicians, as they combine practice with theory.

Caste	*Sample strength of caste*	*No. in highly skilled technical work*
Brahmin	39	1
Soni (goldsmith)	19	4
Rajput	8	1
Suthar (carpenter)	8	1
Luhar (blacksmith)	12	1
Kumbhar (potter)	22	1
Koli	51	6
Khoja	24	1
Sepai	23	2
" Others "	35	4
	241	22
Castes like Bania, Kharak, etc.	182	0
	423	22

It is particularly noteworthy that a low caste non-artisan group like Kolis enters a new world of modern skills in such a proportion.

It may be illuminating to see how or where Kolis (51) in this sample are occupied:

Occupation	*Number*
Unskilled manual	31
Skilled manual	5
Lowest profession	1
Small business	4
Highly skilled technical work	6
Medium business	2
Cultivators	2
Total	51

This does indicate a group out to grasp the new opportunities providing an economic and social rise.

THE SUMMING UP

Our group-analysis has now reached a convenient point to allow us a comprehensive view of the process of choosing one's occupation, as it was unfolded in Mahuva's three generations.

It was found that religion hardly provided any directive at all, except marking out a sort of forbidden territory on the margin, e.g. a Jain should not enter any occupation directly connected with violence. The residual direction provided by religion leaves out a vast area of free choice where society (sometimes claiming a type of semi-religious sanction like *Varna-dharma*), tries to construct new "signboards" of "no-entry," still leaving behind quite a range of choice.

It appears that every range tends to develop its modal points in relation to the then relevant circumstances, e.g. those in the range of skilled craftsmanship tend to develop their "most favoured" occupation, say, carpentry or shoemaking, or dyeing, weaving etc. One perpetuates a particular trade in the family in the sheer rational interest of training facilities, family secrets, goodwill etc. In times of uncertain future for the local economy, they even develop a "most favoured" alternative, e.g. masonry, tailoring etc., again basing their choice on similar criteria. We saw why a grandfather in the old-fashioned transport business (with the help of his camel to carry goods) prepared the son for the same business, but using the bullock-cart instead. This son, in his turn, foresaw the coming change and took to a horse-driven coach for the passengers of Mahuva. The third generation is wisely prepared for a new eventuality, so that if and when the coach is no longer a paying proposition, he can ply a truck or a taxi. This channel in which the occupational choice flowed is neither quite accidental, nor designed by any irrational or extra-economic norms; and yet one should note that there was some sense of direction or range, that would not lead the family to any unskilled work-status, or a "labouring line" in the idiom of Mahuva.

Skill was found to be one of the significant ingredients in the definition of a range. It was a range shared by many groups

attached to various definite occupations within the range. They happened to have a sense of equality in status, except on the margins of the range, say, unclean skills on the one extreme, and very advanced modern tools, and employer status in a skilled occupation, on the other hand. They would at least dine together, if not intermarry; and in spite of an apparent rigidity of family-occupation (because of caste-association), they also had a concept of groups of one range, where the individuals can freely change the occupations within that wider boundary. "Ter Tansali" (or the thirteen brothers sharing the same bowl) is an interesting local expression for this fact of a non-hierarchical brotherhood of thirteen skilled castes in Mahuva. They are as much alive to the fact of this group of 13, as they are conscious of the existence of their own smaller sub-groups. There are the so-called cross-groups too, formed, for instance, by a definitely established trend of interchange of occupation, to give us carpenters and masons even in the same family, or carpenters and tailors even in the same home in towns like Mahuva. All this activity that apparently proves the caste-bound choice would, at a close look, lead to a completely different understanding. A choice, when it is outside the notions of purity and pollution, is governed mainly by a range that is sanctified by the universal notions of status and nothing else.

The ingredients that are fundamental for defining status in the traditional Indian society are three:

(1) the possession of some property—a farm or business—as the basis of one's occupation. This necessarily implies an independent self-employed status too;

(2) the distinctive mark of skill to indicate the "aristocracy" of labour; and

(3) sheer labour or donkey work; and without one's own property to work on. This defines the lowest possible status among the clean occupations.

Mahuva, by the very implication of a town-economy, would put the business élite higher than the landed élite. The employee status has found its modern compensations, in new skills, new education and bureaucratic privileges. The defining of status, one way or the other, is the first step in understanding the static as well as dynamic picture in an occupational equi-

librium. Caste has at the most played a role of denominator in this set-up; it is a point of reference, but it does not indicate a rigid choice, or a one to one correlation of caste and occupation at any given moment.

In short, there is a range of occupations rather than *the* occupation to be followed. Moreover a range is not exclusive to one caste, but shared by an informal brotherhood of a certain group of castes. The modal behaviour of a particular caste within this range, and the perpetuation of that behaviour through generations has no other incentives, nor pressures except strictly economic.

The range itself is determined by non-economic parameters, and it is their consideration plus economic pressures that are mainly relevant for changing the range itself, even by way of slight modifications. Economic incentives by themselves fail to disturb the range unless aided by non-economic motives; economic incentives can reinforce, but not generate by themselves, such moves beyond the range. In the strategy of socio-economic changes, a set pattern can be disturbed basically only by pressures of one or the other sort.

In a period of the least perceptible dynamism in Indian society, the stability of the range, as well as the modal behaviour, may create an illusion of rigidity at that time; but regional variations in so-called caste-occupations, and particularly the rural-urban and coastal-hinterland contrasts in the notions of occupational correctness for various synonymous groups have always been there as pointers of some dynamism in the recent past, or in embryonic stage.

It is now necessary to look back and sum up where we are led by the group-wise analysis of the range of choice. Starting from the supposedly rigid choice of occupation, we tried to assess how rigid the choice was in the experience of Mahuva's generations. In the end, we have almost arrived at the reason why and in what circumstances, the choice should be rigid at all.

Firstly, it was obvious, that in no case was there a positive compulsion of taking up only one occupation as the sacred occupation of the family, caste or religion. What remained of the so-called rigidity of the Hindu social order was a permissive norm, by way of a given range in which one can choose. The

norm like " a carpenter's son must be none but a carpenter " (or similarly for a priestly or mercantile " line "), would be of the former—compulsive norm—variety; but what was actually found instead was a sort of a status-symbol, e.g. a carpenter being a skilled craftsman would see to it that his family does not go down to the level of the unskilled, uncouth, undignified breadwinners. The man in any society is more than a mere bread winner by any means. The idea of status implies a certain manner of distinctive behaviour and consequent delimitation of one's behaviour. The choice of one's occupation is an essential and strategic part of social behaviour, and hence the limits to the range within which one is free to choose.

This fact of a norm, not a compulsive norm but a permissive norm is of course important. To locate the permitted range and its elements like labour, skill and independence as the socially significant ingredients in the occupational ranking was our main attempt in this study so far. Relating these ranges to the various stratified groups was our next important job; but our most important find so far is the reason why such things should at all matter to any given group.

The association of a sanctified range with a status-group, the established élite in one or the other context, is all the more interesting, because by the same logic, we know who would deviate, and when and why. The status is a many-sided or multi-variate concept. Taking care of occupational correctness is not enough when the status is already lost by some other social routes, i.e. it is superfluous to stick to the modal occupation, while relative poverty for many decades or even a generation makes it difficult to live upto the established group mores, in the matter of standards of housing, clothing, cleanliness, education, entertainment or hospitality and mutual obligations in general. The relative decline is always a great social event, much more important than the absolute hardships of poverty. This acts as a first breach in the otherwise complacent society.

On the other hand, neither low birth nor limited learning would put a man permanently low if he works his way up the social ladder by a fortunate choice of occupation and makes a great success of it. These are the promises to men who push through as deviants.

The Potential Deviants

Those who have lost status already, for moral or material reasons, have nothing to lose but their chains on the free choice of occupation. Secondly, there are many, in any society, who have lost status in or since a distant—perhaps unrecorded—past, and they have nothing to lose and all the good things to gain if they act with alertness, initiative and drive, in the choice and successful pursuit of their occupations. In a status-sense, they are like " foreign minorities " in their own society. The restriction on their choice is no longer of their own making, they are restricted only by the derision of the already established or newly ascendent groups, to put it in historical perspective. They themselves are only too eager to look for and grasp the opportunity and somehow circumvent these restrictions. A complex and rigid society as in India has large groups of potential deviants for both these reasons; though, those who are at the very bottom need almost a new faith, a new ethic or even a conversion, to generate a drive, and to ignite the imagination of these ever-depressed. It is a great stimulant even to the rest of them; i.e. those who are not so low, after all. In fact, the rigidly tradition-bound group is found only at the apex, and hence never in a majority. This traditional minority need not matter in a society where others are pushing up. The concept of a deviant minority, conceded by the " development sociologists " is relevant only if the minority they locate is mainly coincident with some foreign or religious minority in a society. Otherwise, at any given time, it is a majority that is seething with discontent at their statusless position, e.g. Kolis and other low castes of Mahuva, in general, sometimes converted to Islamic Agakhani sect or to the Hindu Swaminarayan sect (a typical product of villages and towns of Saurashtra); these sects, like even Vaishnavism and Sikhism are the Indian counterparts of the New Christianity, Protestant ethic, or Puritan spirit—that transformed the West. It is the ideology as such that begins with a small group, but permeates and enthuses a large mass. It captures them at any stage in their rise or fall; but in the final impact, it is the majority that shows enterprise and innovation, as contrasted with rigidly traditional behaviour.

In a simple society like the one that existed in China before the communist take-over, the would-be-élite need not be so dynamic in the economic sense. The administrative and such other potential outlets, e.g. religious or military honours for the talent and the energy seeking recognition in society, act as leakages on the potential economic motor-forces. The mode of flexibility in the society is thus also significant.

Every society has to soften sooner or later, the rigid stratified structure which is based on a sort of birth right; but the flexibility of its pattern may be secured perhaps by military or even religio-magical adventurists, or a permanent ladder (at least a myth of it), may be placed to lift a few from the base to the apex, by the test of primitive magic or medieval scholarship. In greater part of India, today, the search for social prestige takes a different course. It takes easily to economic and hence political ambition to soften the basic framework of birth right to status.

The range of delimited choice does exist for the people of Mahuva, but it does not exist for all groups and persons. There are many who, somehow know no rigidity at present. They are our entrepreneurial growth points, where people have a high propensity to save and to take risk, and to work hard for both, whenever they perceive economic opportunities for social rise etc. Having spotted these rangeless men of drive, we might ask; would they create a range for themselves at some point in the rising up process? Wealth seems to induce all the status-symbols including the white-collar; what about the impact of education?

EDUCATION AND THE RANGE OF CHOICE OF OCCUPATION

How would education affect this range of choice?

So far we have not referred to the education of these earners or the education-level of the particular families.

Only once it was noted that there was not a single matriculate in unskilled manual workers' group. This can now be the starting point.

Is there any causal relation here? Or is it just an incidental by-product of some other relationship? For instance, matri-

culates did not take up unskilled manual work in our sample. So also, the higher castes, Jains and Kapols, with varying levels of education did not take it up. Therefore it should be our attempt to answer two questions:

(1) What do the " educated " persons in various castes do, at *comparable* levels of education?

(2) How much education (and why) was desired for their sons, by different castes with varying occupations in the present generation?

Table IV-A & B, and other information help us here. The levels of education were noted in two dimensions: (*i*) to indicate the attainment of the earning head, and (*ii*) to indicate the average period of schooling for the whole family, with particular reference, if it so happens that all are illiterate, or all are without English-education, and when the family includes a graduate. Just considering the heads' education, there are:

Illiterate	143
Primary School level	129
Secondary School level	136
Matriculates and those who have attended some college	9
Graduates and above	2
Not known	1
Rejection	3
Total	423

The Observed Range

There are certain " educated " occupations that the illiterates cannot take up, whatever their caste. On the other hand, there are various occupations in which illiterates can co-exist with the educated, particularly in small and medium business. On the other hand, none from the low-caste or even from Muslims is a graduate, two graduate heads are a Bania and a Rajput, so it is not possible to demonstrate what a low-caste graduate thinks of the occupation range.

TABLE IV–A

CASTE vs. EDUCATION OF THE MALE HEAD

Level of education of the male head of the family	*Brahmin*	*Kapol Bania*	*Jain Bania*	*Other Banias*	*Soni (Pavajiya)*	*Khatri*	*Rajput*	*Kharak*	*Suthar*	*Luhar*	*Kumbhar*	*Darji*	*Dhobi*	*Valand*	*Sadhu*	*Koli*	*Mochi*	*Harijan*	*Khoja*	*Vora*	*Ghanchi*	*Sepai*	*Other Muslims*	*Other Hindu Castes*	*Total*
Illiterate	—	1	—	2	—	—	1	10	3	4	11	2	2	6	1	36	6	11	2	1	13	11	9	11	143
Upto IV Std. (Vernacular)	4	2	9	1	8	2	2	5	4	7	10	4	2	1	2	9	2	6	12	6	3	8	8	12	129
Between V and non-matric	32	13	21	13	4	6	4	—	1	1	1	2	—	—	2	6	—	—	10	2	—	4	4	10	136
Matriculates and those who have attended college	3	3	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
Graduates and above	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Not known	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Rejection	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	3
Total	39	19	32	19	12	8	8	15	8	12	22	8	4	7	5	51	8	18	24	9	16	23	21	35	423

TABLE IV–B

EDUCATION OF THE HEAD vs. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

Level of education of the head of the family	*Classification of earners into employees and employment*													
	Managerial and Executive	*Supervisory*	*Non-supervisory*	*Skilled Manual*	*Unskilled Manual*	*Piece worker or casual worker*	*Industrial employers*	*Traders (employing five or less than five employees)*	*Traders (employing more than five persons)*	*Artisans employing other artisans or labourers*	*Professional employing other professionals or clerks, peons etc.*	*Agricultural employers*	*Neither employers nor employees*	*Total*
Illiterate	—	—	1	11	26	29	—	—	3	—	—	4	69	143
Upto IV Std. (Vernacular)	—	1	10	10	15	12	—	8	1	2	—	5	65	129
Between V and non-matric	—	8	26	5	5	1	3	19	4	3	—	5	57	136
Matriculates and those who have attended some college	1	1	3	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	1	9
Graduates and above	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Not known	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Rejection	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3
Total	1	11	42	26	47	43	3	28	8	5	—	16	193	423

The common ground is very narrow even when we think of the other two levels, say, up to Primary School level and on the other hand a matriculate head.

Many low caste persons are found in this group in the Primary School level but higher castes are usually better educated, and very few cases would fall in this level. Moreover, even Mahuvaites would not call this much of an education, and therefore these low caste literates going into blue-collar jobs as well would not prove anything.

But to be a matriculate is something in this town, where " being educated " is not necessarily synonymous with graduation only. In fact the current slogan of everybody in Mahuva is to educate one's son " upto matric ". This is the minimum if one needs an education for a white-collar job, and not just for a flourish. There are 9 matriculate heads in the sample. 8 are employees or employers in white-collar status, while only one matriculate " Soni " is an own-account worker in his traditional skill. The matriculate employees are in managerial and executive post (1), supervisory post (1), and also non-supervisory posts (3).

Out of 3 matriculate employers, one happens to be a trader employing five (or less) persons, and the other two are agricultural employers, not themselves working.

But we also know that a young son of a pleader from the " potter " caste (who continued to study privately) happens to be a tailor after matriculation and again a cobbler's son did choose to apply for an engine driver's job after matriculation. There are non-matric heads whose matriculate brothers are wireless operators etc. in Mahuva or elsewhere.

This would indicate that given a proper caste background (without a negative attitude to " labour "), a matriculate does not mind a blue-collar job even in Mahuva. It is the caste-impact which creates an illusion and brings unjustified comment on the attitudes of the educated, as if the education spoils people and creates an anti-work attitude.

This is particularly visible in the big group of 136 non-matric but above primary level heads. They include all castes and religions. We find them not only in business, but all sorts of occupations, pursuing unskilled, skilled or highly skilled work,

from shepherds to tailors and from sweepers to fitters. But all these occupations would be avoided by a Bania even with a lesser education of a primary school. There are 15 such Banias, 3 of them being illiterate.

Banias in fact are not in such jobs at all, and Brahmins are very conscious of the disgrace when they happen to be in.

Banias in Mahuva have always looked to their relatives in Bombay to train, apprentice and employ those who are not fortunate enough in Mahuva. " Anyone who is without an occupation in Mahuva goes away to Bombay ", said a Bania lady whose son is earning in Bombay. They have relatives and friends scattered in many business centres of India as well as in Africa, Burma and even Malaya. They help the Mahuvaite Bania to be on the move in search of a white-collar job, rather than go down to anything in Mahuva. These " connections " of the Bania caste make it possible for him to survive in a white-collar status, even if he is less educated. They often lack capital, but not connections. Moreover, education is only an additional asset, but not a substitute for capital and/or connections, when these Banias look for occupations.

There is a Jain Bania family where the women remarked: " It is a pity we have to stick to this low business of selling betel leaves and bidis. " The ambition of a Bania family is such; otherwise Jainism does not object to this dealing in Pan-Bidi, as she herself knows. It is a poor man's business !

So far education has hardly touched any but the higher castes; when it comes to the intermediate and low castes, there may appear the diversification in our labour supply.

Education and the future choice of occupations: Would education generate a tendency to avoid blue-collar jobs?

Perhaps not, if a correct answer is supplied to our second question, viz. how much and why of it. Education is voluntary; at the most it would be compulsory upto the primary level. Moreover, in Mahuva, high-level education is never sought for " cultural " reasons apart from the utility of it.

A farmer of Mahuva or a shepherd for that matter, sees no utility, in anything more than the knowledge of the three 'R's. A well-to-do businessman of any caste or religion can afford to educate his son " as much as the son would study ", but

this does not go higher than passing the matriculation. Even this is not useful in the immediate future, but only acts as a safety valve and hence quite often one gives it up if circumstances so demand.

The circumstances can be of various types:

(1) The sons are not good at studies and consequently it is a wastage of time and money.
(2) They are wanted in the family-business. It is felt to be an economic proposition to have the assistance of one's own family members rather than employ someone.
(3) The purpose of English education is quite often "utilitarian", i.e. enough knowledge of English to fill all sorts of forms, to be able to read a telegram etc. If a bright boy has picked up enough of it, he may stop even before the matriculation and start his training in practical business.

Ordinarily, all those who seriously plan to educate their sons have a prior aim of preparing their sons for a given status in white-collar jobs, such as a postman, a teacher, a clerk, or at least a peon or so on. In the absence of such an aim, they all go about their various occupations without any reference to being a white-collar.

Thus if some educated persons did go into white-collar jobs it was not due to their education, but just the other way round, inasmuch as they went through this process precisely with a view to qualify for an "educated" white-collar job.

Muslims are quite conscious about this aspect, when they say they "do not care for education", as they "do not care for service".

The women somehow, even without education are found to be very conscious "social climbers" in all strata of society. It is the mother of a shepherd, as well as a farmer and of one Muslim who aims at white-collar; her comment is like this: "That is the only way to come up some day." Even a Muslim family in business is made conscious by the women-folk of some day "when one needs to serve", with dignity.

Graduation still signifies more than mere "education".

It changes one's attitude to the expected income and comforts. Thus any graduate, even a Muslim, would avoid certain " lines " as long as he can afford to.

This is quite clearly understood even by the educated " sons " of Mahuva. If it is desired that the son join his family business, matriculation is the maximum of education he should have. Graduation serves no end, on the contrary a son, if he becomes a graduate, " would not like this shop, or do this work " in the old-style business of Mahuva and so a son who has a first class to his credit at matriculation joins his father's business; why should he go to college?

Education and Attitude to Work

The type of education we have in our society has an ambiguous impact on such fundamental things.

Education by itself may not " spoil " or change one, but longer urbanisation and tradition of white-collar occupation-cum-neighbourhood may do so even for the hitherto unspoiled groups like shepherds, jogi and even Muslims. It is " sanskritization process ", or emulation of the dominant caste for rising up in the traditional context, and not modernisation of the low-castes which makes them ambitious for white-collar status.

Education and urbanity have a double impact, western as well as a traditional élite influence, on their attitude to work; what one would actually receive depends upon one's propensity as moulded by one's social neighbourhood.

The high-caste student is not in a position to receive from "education" enough of the modern attitude to work, to counterbalance what he had imbibed within his family and neighbourhood. On the other hand a low-caste student at the same educational institution, has a chance of getting a modern outlook on such matters, being a resident of " unsanskritized " neighbourhood.

The low caste groups in the towns and cities are at the most " half-sanskritized ". For instance, the shepherdess who aimed at a merchant-like status, emphatically disapproved of the Brahminic—high-caste—attitude to widows. Such a background and neighbourhood keeps the door open to modern

attitudes coming through education. Their sons may never be completely " sanskritized," on the other hand they may create new norms, just as the educated Parsis from artisan background created new values in modernisation of business and industry. Thus the social neighbourhood rather than education may primarily shape the range.

Social Neighbourhood

Majority of our sample-heads, more than 55 per cent stay in their own caste areas, distinctly marked out from other castes. In cases when they are found in other caste areas, we can be pretty sure (97 per cent) to find them still surrounded—true particularly of Banias and Khojas—by their caste neighbourhood. Such mixed, yet unmixed, " island " areas claim 25 per cent.

Moreover the mixed areas are not really mixing the various strata of society. The higher castes join hands to make one mixed area, the intermediate castes come together in another mixed area, and the lower castes make a third. Therefore, for instance, we may find an artisan area, and an untouchable area, as well as a well-marked Muslim area. In all, 70 per cent stay in their own caste-group area at least, if not the particular caste-area, others can make " island " areas within mixed caste-group areas.

We may come across a real mixture—without assimilation (5 per cent). This happens in fringe areas and in some modern developments like industrial housing (see tables V-A, B & C), Mahuva has a town-extension scheme. Even in their planned Nutan Nagar, persons who stay in their " caste-societies " or in their caste-group area are preponderent. Urbanity or occupational fraternity does not mix them even in the new town.

This keeps the lower caste families, even well-to-do families, safe from sanskritization, and proud of their superior energy, skill or modern technical mastery. They do not care for white-collar status and quite often they do not care for education for " service ". They do care for technical training, and now with the opening of a technical high school in Mahuva, their slogan is to be an " engineer " just as many other families equate education with matriculation.

TABLE V–A

SOCIAL NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE FAMILY AGAINST CASTE

Social neighbourhood of the family (single caste area)	*Caste*																								
	Brahmin	*Kapol Bania*	*Jain Bania*	*Itar Bania*	*Soni (Parajiya)*	*Khatri*	*Rajput*	*Kharak*	*Suthar*	*Luhar*	*Kumbhar*	*Darji*	*Dhobi*	*Valand*	*Sadhu*	*Koli*	*Mochi*	*Harijan*	*Khoja*	*Vora*	*Ghanchi*	*Sepai*	*Other Muslims*	*Jogi, Luhana, Sagar, Arya, Kansara and others*	*Total*
Those staying in their own caste area	13	11	24	13	5	8	2	15	3	4	11	6	1	—	—	26	3	18	19	9	6	13	13	11	234
Those staying outside their own caste area. (The other caste area belongs to a single caste group e.g. Mochi staying in Kharakwad)	11	1	2	1	1	—	4	—	1	1	2	—	2	1	2	6	1	—	2	—	1	2	2	7	50
Those staying in mixed caste area with their own caste	12	5	4	2	4	—	—	—	4	6	9	1	—	4	2	15	1	—	3	—	7	8	6	13	106
Those staying in mixed caste area without their own caste	1	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	14
Undecided	2	2	2	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	19
Total	39	19	32	19	12	8	8	15	8	12	22	8	4	7	5	51	8	18	24	9	16	23	21	35	423

TABLE V–B

SOCIAL NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE FAMILY AGAINST CASTE

Social neighbourhood of the family	*Caste*																								
	Brahmin	*Kapol Bania*	*Jain Bania*	*Itar Bania*	*Soni (Parajiya)*	*Khatri*	*Rajput*	*Kharak*	*Suthar*	*Luhar*	*Kumbhar*	*Darji*	*Dhobi*	*Valand*	*Sadhu*	*Koli*	*Mochi*	*Harijan*	*Khoja*	*Vora*	*Ghanchi*	*Sepai*	*Other Muslims*	*Jogi, Luhana, Sagar, Arya, Kansara & others*	*Total*
Those staying in their own caste group area	26	18	31	14	2	8	1	11	4	5	11	4	1	3	1	34	5	18	23	9	15	20	17	21	302
Those staying outside their own caste group area	10	—	—	2	3	—	5	4	2	1	2	—	3	3	3	7	3	—	1	—	1	1	2	8	61
Those staying in mixed caste group area but with their own caste group	2	1	1	2	7	—	1	—	2	5	9	3	—	1	1	8	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	5	52
Those staying in mixed caste group area but without their own caste group	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	5
Undecided	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Total	39	19	32	19	12	8	8	15	8	12	22	8	4	7	5	51	8	18	24	9	16	23	21	35	423

TABLE V–C

OCCUPATION OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY vs. SOCIAL NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE FAMILY (CASTE GROUP AREA)

Occupation of the head of the family	*Social neighbourhood of the family (Caste group area)*					
	Those who are staying in their own caste group area	*Those who are staying outside their own caste group area*	*Those staying in mixed caste group areas but with their own caste groups*	*Those staying in mixed caste group areas but without their own caste groups*	*Undecided*	*Total*
Unskilled manual work	66	9	12	1	1	89
Skilled manual work	53	10	11	3	—	77
Lowest professions	10	8	2	—	1	21
Small business	41	5	7	—	—	53
Highly skilled technical and supervisory work	9	6	6	1	—	22
Clerks and shop-assistants	24	2	—	—	—	26
Intermediate professions	7	1	1	—	1	10
Medium business	42	5	7	—	—	54
Owners of big factories	2	—	1	—	—	3
Cultivators of own and/or other people's land	15	4	1	—	—	20
Non-cultivating land-owners	7	1	1	—	—	9
Not earning	23	9	3	—	—	35
Rejection	3	1	—	—	—	4
Total	302	61	52	5	3	423

Education has been something more than a means to livelihood, to those pulled by white-collar or by technical training, implying an occupational range ex-ante. It has also been one of the alternatives forced on men who are desperate on the other hand, about a change from the present occupation, but at a loss to say anything specific about it. Their "education" has only a psychological relief-value, but no range is implied.

Education as the Forced Alternative

There are low-caste families and artisans, as well as Muslims that feel lost, as to the way of adjusting to the pressures or push they experience. In their utter helplessness, they think of two possible openings,

(1) to work at some business house, even as a very ordinary shop-assistant with a view to pick up some trade, by this sort of learning process, if they value "independence;"

(2) to see to their sons' education, upto primary or secondary standard or perhaps upto matriculation at the most, in the hope that with "education" they may hit upon some "line"—not necessarily in or outside service jobs. They hope that "something would occur" to the educated.

Education does "broaden their horizon", by the mere fact of contacts that they would not otherwise make in their own small circles. Yet we cannot say that the things that occur to an educated man are always found practicable. We come across respondents who always lament for their lack of capital rather than their lack of education. There is always a man with ideas as well as experience who claims he can run a shop of "milk and milk-products, mainly sweetmeats", "soda-lemon" or "pan-bidi" or even, "run a truck-service" or "start an oil mill". The man with enough education for "jobs" relies ultimately on his friends and acquaintance to get these jobs, and not on his education. The barber's son who applied for an engine driver's post (after matriculation) did so "because

one of the engine drivers was his acquaintance who promised to help push his case and get him this job."

The "line" after education means only the white-collar jobs or professions, to the high-caste interviewee. Even the richest Hindu trader wants his sons to have enough education, not for a flourish, but as a safety-valve, so that they can at least take up any white-collar job if business fails, or gets overcrowded.

Once a few low-caste families settle and flourish in white-collar positions, their close associates do tend to appreciate their status-value and "connection" and the white-collar cult spreads.

This has not been so important to the Muslims, and therefore the educational level of Muslims remains low even in the present generation.

STATUS-SYMBOLS

Coming back to the question of the range that might be developed at a certain stage in the process of rising up, our best approach would again be to find out why it should be so. A newly rich man or a family that makes an opening wedge in high society by the sheer pressure of money (in the absence of much else), has to learn, sometimes by painful experience of awkward moments, how to add all the other status-symbols to complete their gate-crashing, even in defiance of their unworthy caste-status. They get "culture" if not education for themselves (and their wives), send their children to the cultured schools, dress and live in high style, and try to speak the approved language and idiom in such instances, of the new rich, would-be-élite. Education to them is nothing more than a status-symbol. It is neither a means to livelihood, nor an opening wedge to enter the élite. The élite in their view is the usual traditional élite that always considered education as a close preserve, associate and hence a symbol of the higher-ups. They enter *via* wealth, or "office".

The wealthy man (from a lower background in particular) using his wealth as an opening wedge, and his deliberately adopted "education" as a status-symbol, would never work with his hands. It is the impact, not of his new education

as such, but of his new wealth and his status-orientation, where white-collar is a great symbol in itself.

On the other hand, when education comes first, and wealth perhaps later as a by-product, it is not certain that the former acts as nothing but a status-symbol. It becomes an opening wedge, almost in the same way as wealth does, but a technical education which also leads to a high income does not necessarily tempt one to enter the traditional high society as such. They make their own class—a set of semi-sanskritized, pseudo-westernised modern high-brows—a class apart from the usual traditional élite. In spite of their blue-collar, and perhaps because of their technical (hence modern) superiority, they bypass the old-style élites, and ultimately succeed in making an impact on the old values, rather than imitating the old symbols such as white-collar-work.

This development is a real possibility when the lower castes and artisan or agricultural families take to modern technical education, jobs, and new enterprises. The "growth" does not always lead to the ultimate emulation of the élite, it might even lead to the creation of a new élite that can bypass and even supersede the traditional Hindu élite.

CHAPTER III

THE MICRO-PROBLEMS OF OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

SEARCH FOR A HAPPY "FIT"

THE problems of adjustment to the new set-up are not over yet. The men choose an occupation if they are in a happy "fit" with the social system within the work-unit as well. Pushed in an unhappy choice, they are a drag on the efficiency, morale and the team work so necessary in a complex organisation.

Moreover, modern economy must obtain the employees of an organisation. The traditional image of employee-position being either personal-feudal, or master-slave relation, contractual dignity is not easy to imagine, nor is the sanctity of contract defining reciprocal roles observed automatically. In such a situation of stress, an impersonal attitude is equated with inefficiency and irresponsibility in the employee-role, while the employer of an impersonal system is identified with a heartless, mechanical if not an arbitrary role.

Muslims of Mahuva provide an interesting case-study of the stress and strain of impersonal relations at the work-place.

Muslims: A Case-study

As a consequence of the low educational level, many Muslims are bound to take up blue-collar work, but they go mainly in the independent work, and the lucky ones land into some successful business—small, medium or big.

They are even quite likely to become industrial employers when they combine their commercial capital with the work attitudes they exhibit in their resourcefulness.

A Khoja gentleman, aged 65, had a grandfather—no higher than an unskilled labourer, in Mahuva. His father became an agent for distribution of kerosene oil and mainly it was due to one of the enterprising uncles that the whole family turned to business and clerical jobs in the family business. The pre-

sent head is not only a commission agent, but earns from his acquired property (agricultural land and residential houses) as well. Moreover, in 1958 he started an oil mill in Mahuva though previously he earned outside Mahuva too—by starting a crockery-store in Bombay.

His father and grandfather were illiterate and he has been educated upto the secondary school standard without English. Neither his son nor his brother have any higher education. The industrialist head remarked: "It is good to educate the sons, but service is not a good thing, one's own business is necessary."

As it is, out of 93 Muslims in the sample, 30 are employees and 18 are employers, while 45 are neither employers, nor employees.

Thus more than 48 per cent are such independent small workers, as against more than 45 per cent in the sample, as a whole. 19 per cent are employers, as against 11 per cent in the sample.

Thus Muslims are about 68 per cent in a non-employee status. There is a relative tendency of the independent worker, on an average, to rise to an employer status rather than fall to an employee status. As against this, the sample as a whole has 57 per cent in a non-employee role which is also quite significant for a town.*

This preponderance of a non-employee status among Muslims

* Non-employee is not necessarily richer or "superior" to an employee. It is the most advanced economy which has a high proportion of employees in the modern industrial world. On the other hand, a backward economy with a particular structure of property distribution can also have a similar preponderance of employees in the earning population.

Rural India has 64 per cent in employee status and urban India too has more than 66 per cent, i.e. 36 per cent and 34 per cent non-employees respectively.

Looking at Mahuva's size-group of towns (with population range 15,000 to 50,000), their proportion of non-employees is 36.3 per cent as against our 57 per cent.

The overall backwardness of India as well as of Saurashtra is a fact. This variation in the activity-status may be the result of a different diffusion of property as well as the different degree of the spirit of enterprise.

The cause may be one or the other or both, the result being that these urban areas with a greater proportion of non-employees are apparently more traditional than the rest. But is it not possible that the presistence

is not just an accident. The community as a whole has " connections " at least in the business world, if they want jobs, but the mercantile pride of Muslims usually leads them to an independent position rather than " service ". They use their opportunities of service to pick up a trade when they lack ideas to begin with; but they aim at independent status. " It is better to have an income of Rs. 60 a month in one's own business rather than earn Rs. 75 a month as a clerk ", said one Muslim respondent. Lack of education is also not sufficient to explain this. For instance, the low-caste groups with similar lack of education do not have the same proportion of non-employee status. In fact the situation is almost the reverse among Kolis (51 in all, with 16 non-employees to 35 employees).

The value attached to independence is in a way a sufficient explanation for the existence of a large element of non-employee status. It seems they cannot fit in an impersonal service-relation particularly delicate in case of non-Muslim employers for them.

Whatever the orientation, a range of choice that limits the choice of various groups to certain broad areas of occupations may create an impossible situation for the economic development on modern lines, unless some other adaptations help to modify the range.

Reconciling the Tradition of Independence

The limitation of a high-caste Hindu to the area of white-collar is serious enough, but so long as there are many other groups available for manual labour and skilled work, this affects the economy only so as to restrict the sources of new technical skill and creative entrepreneurship. The artisan-group, the Muslim community and all those who have ambition to rise up from a lower and traditionally or currently status-less position can provide enough entrepreneurial drive, though starting inevitably from a modest level.

There is another and perhaps more serious limitation due

of this trend in rural as well as urban areas of Saurashtra indicates at least a potentially enterprising community?

Mahuva may stagnate in the absence of natural advantages, but a Mahuvaite is perhaps a potential entrepreneur, on an average.

to the general attitude to independence. The artisans would be at least indifferent to this because their skill is enough to give them a satisfying status in any set-up. On the other hand the large group of unskilled manual workers who are forced to become employees in modern industry are supposed to be thereby without any social status or even significance. The members of the cultivating castes, artisans, Muslims and various service castes are forced to become industrial workers, often unskilled. These workers would not be available but for the push, and except the untouchables the others are unhappy about the loss of independence. Their efficiency and that of the organisation would depend very much on their reconciliation to and satisfaction in the new relationship.

The manager-worker relations or the employer-employee relations need not pass through all the stages experienced by the West in its industrialisation and the traditional solution of personal relations between employer and employee is silently adapted even to the modern industry in Mahuva. Industrialisation in a local homogeneous culture has no compulsion to make relations impersonal. The two sides of industry or business may belong to the same caste-group, or at least have a plausible patron nexus.

Some feeling of involvement and personal venture is a logical consequence of such a personal relationship in any organisation, and this can help the fusion of the individual who has to satisfy the tradition of his independent status, by a new interpretation of his employee-situation.

Personal Relations

By this, we particularly emphasise the pre-modern selection process, where (1) the posts are hardly advertised and (2) the selection or recruitment is made without any real—proper—interview and (3) there is no consideration of merit alone in terms of the job-recruitment. One's own personal ties or kinship, caste, religion or friendship would work most in this sort of recruitment. There may be a sort of an advertisement or sometimes an interview, but any two indicators of pre-modern recruitment are enough to make it inherently a personal choice based on personal considerations.

The impersonal relations of the supposedly modern set-up also develop another special feature of work-relationship, viz. specific conditions of work: (1) the fixed hours of work, (2) the specific nature of work and (3) the related specific time and terms of remuneration.

This specificity may or may not yet enter the personal set-up, depending upon the size of the organisation and the consequent complexity, but the lack of specific terms is not always a sign of arbitrary despotism. In a personalised relationship it approaches the family-pattern of mutual adjustment, for instance, flexible hours of work, days of leave etc. that is equally satisfying to the employee and acts as an aid to his sense of belonging and commitment. The situation in Mahuva can be studied and judged from this angle rather than searching for so-called transformation from status to contract.

Personal relations in Mahuva: The employees in Mahuva, either in agriculture, craft and trade or in modern manufacturing, are all recruited through the personal approach. Only the governmental and semi-governmental agencies are known to adopt the impersonal method of recruitment. They do have at least proper advertisement and interview, thus satisfying the two out of three conditions; hence it may be regarded as an impersonal method of recruitment.

The Brahmins of Mahuva are predominantly concentrated in jobs where such modern impersonal relations prevail. Only about 43 per cent of Brahmin employer-employees are involved in a personal relationship, others have an impersonal method of recruitment as well as specific conditions of work. Being Brahmins they enjoy a status even as dependents. The Muslims present a contrast to this. There are 30 employees and 18 employers, but only 5 out of these 48 have an impersonal employer-employee relationship. Thus about 90 per cent among Muslim employer-employees are on a personal relation. Banias are found only in white-collar jobs, but even there, 89 per cent of the Bania employer-employees have personal relations.

It is useful to summarise the extent of personal relationship in certain groups:

Muslims	*Banias*	*Brahmins*	*Sample as a whole*
90%	89%	43%	72%

Most jobs are more or less personal even in the factories, only the managerial and supervisory posts can be an exception. By this test of majority cases the private employers of Mahuva have been traditional in their process of recruitment.

Considering all the places where the labour legislation is in force, there are in all 62 employees in the sample, working under specific conditions of work. 43 employees and 39 employers (i.e. 82) inter-act in a completely pre-modern relationship while an equal number, 62 employees and 20 employers have at least arranged for the specific conditions of work (see Tables VI-A & B).

There are two interesting by-products of this assessment. Firstly, the personal recruitment reduces the importance of mere education in itself for the jobs, particularly in the non-governmental sector. The " connection " is the recognised traditional channel and method of recruitment.

Secondly, it may be noted that specific conditions of work have been created even in an otherwise traditional set-up, but the converse does not happen, i.e. impersonal recruitment and non-specific conditions of work do not go together. Thus it follows that when the employers or the employees or both desire some non-specific elements in the conditions of work, the recruitment has to be personal in many subtle ways.

The traditional groups: A Muslim with a positive attitude to independence as well as a Bania with an indifferent attitude has his own reasons to choose personal jobs rather than impersonal.

A Muslim is very keen about the flexibility of the conditions of work; this leeway is the next best thing when he has to sacrifice his ideal of independence.

The opposition to service is particularly marked when it is the government service; otherwise a non-governmental job is quite satisfactory, in view of its " opportunities of getting leave etc. " A Muslim employer is particularly appreciated by the Muslim with the belief that all occasions of religious and ritual significance can be properly observed when the employer is also a Muslim.

TABLE VI-A

OCCUPATION vs. CASTE

Occupation of the head	*Caste*													
	Brahmin	*Kapol Bania*	*Jain Bania*	*Itar Bania*	*Soni*	*Khatri*	*Rajput*	*Kharak*	*Suthar*	*Luhar*	*Kumbhar*	*Darji*	*The rest*	*Total*
Where methods of recruitment are impersonal and conditions of work are specific	13	2	—	2	1	1	4	—	—	2	3	—	34	62
Where methods of recruitment are impersonal but conditions of work are not specific	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0
Where methods of recruitment are personal but conditions of work are specific	6	3	6	3	1	2	—	3	2	1	7	—	49	83
Where methods of recruitment are personal and conditions of work are not specific	4	6	6	7	2	2	2	7	1	1	3	—	43	84
Head is neither an employer nor an employee	16	8	20	7	8	3	2	5	5	8	9	8	95	194
Total	39	19	32	19	12	8	8	15	8	12	22	8	221	423

TABLE VI-B

OCCUPATION vs. CASTE

Occupation of the head	*Caste*													
	Dhobi	*Valand*	*Sadhu*	*Koli*	*Mochi*	*Harijan*	*Khoja*	*Vora*	*Ghanchi*	*Sepai*	*Other Muslims*	*Others*	*The rest*	*Total*
Where methods of recruitment are impersonal and conditions of work are specific	—	—	1	8	1	14	—	—	—	5	—	5	28	62
Where methods of recruitment are impersonal but conditions of work are not specific	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0
Where methods of recruitment are personal but conditions of work are specific	—	—	1	15	—	—	7	1	3	4	8	10	34	83
Where methods of recruitment are personal and conditions of work are not specific	—	—	—	15	3	—	4	1	5	6	4	5	41	84
Head is neither an employer nor an employee	4	7	3	13	4	4	13	7	8	8	9	15	99	194
Total	4	7	5	51	8	18	24	9	16	23	21	35	202	423

The desire of a Bania has its reasons in recruitment. Faced with the struggle for survival in white-collar status, Banias appreciate the advantages of personal recruitment.

A Bania's widow is very proudly referring to " a good company "—a European firm in Bombay that gave a good salary to her English-educated husband and also entitled her to a regular pension after the death of the husband. Over and above other benefits like provident fund, the company " offered to employ any son or brother-in-law or relative in that place and inquired to that effect immediately after the death of (her) husband. " She did not have anyone just at that time, but now she intends to plan it for her daughter's son who would pass matriculation after two years and would be able to join this firm. It is this aspect of the European firm which appeals to her as " good ".

This personal recruitment and non-specific conditions of work may not have the same appeal to other castes and groups and yet the traditional set-up of Mahuva's employer-employee relations has a definite impact on their outlook.

The overall impact of personal relations: Many low and intermediate castes have a " go-ahead " outlook, but it has not at all crystallized in a caste-cum-class antagonism, whether their work-place and work-situation be modern or otherwise. Own-account work is the passage through which the poor want to rise up in Mahuva and not by making a common cause of employees against employers. The present position is not accepted as their permanent lot, and looking around in their caste-neighbourhood they find many who have thus succeeded, it is thus encouraging to try the other way up.

The proportion of employees to the rest, the own-account workers plus the employers, in various castes is as follows:

Caste	*Employees*	*The rest*
Brahmin	22	17
Banias	14	56
Intermediate castes	12	31
Artisan castes	16	34
Service castes (e.g. Dhobi, Barber)	2	14
Low castes and untouchables	53	24

Caste	*Employees*	*The rest*
Various sects of Muslims	30	63
Others	17	18
	166	257

Moreover, in terms of day-to-day life it is usual to have family members, or at least near relatives in the non-employee status. The identification with employees is therefore neither natural nor so respectable in the context of their " ties " with those who are their employers, or at least with near relatives and friends of these employers. These " ties " are also supposed to help them to come out of employee status and to attain some independent position or whatever they desire for the social elevation of their family.

The conflict is successfully contained by the patron relationship that these employers have cultivated, and which has been accepted by employees and approved of by the public.

This variant of the personal relations is an outcome of the logic of inter-group relations in the traditional structure. The circle of acquaintance connects the employer and the employee either in a familial relationship or in the patron-relation of the traditional superior-subordinate hierarchy. Their relationship is structured by conventions one can refer to.

The avoidance of manual labour by the high-caste Hindus saves them as well as this patron-relationship system from the unusual strain of high-caste labourers serving under low-caste superiors or employers.

The basic social framework is able to cope with the universal strain of the employee status in Mahuva so long as the employers as well as employees are drawn from the same local society. In the event of rapid changes, the new groups, foreign to the indigenous social network, would generate strains of a different type and would need special adaptations.

CHAPTER IV

MAHUVA

WITH all this emphasis on employee-adjustment, it should be remembered that the motor force of economic change in Mahuva would be the non-employee sector.

We put all the non-employees, i.e. employers and own-account workers, together for two main reasons.

(1) They have put their capital to productive use and therefore both groups equally represent the entrepreneurial sector of Mahuva.

(2) In many units, the employer is an employer by accident. Another equally big firm can do without employing others if there are brothers, nephews, sons and such other "family-members" who are part of the business organisation.

Such non-employees can provide this motor force of economic change in the following circumstances:

1. They would save and invest and expand when they have "sufficient" income. This is, a subjective judgment, once the bare minimum is reached.
2. They would be willing to take risks with borrowed money as well as their very limited savings if they find it very prospective, to do so.

Therefore, Mahuva's families should be studied with reference to their wealth or poverty and also prospects.

THE POVERTY AND PROSPECTS OF MAHUVA'S FAMILIES

Following the basic approach of this study, it was found necessary to look at the well-being of the average family rather than the income of an average man or even a household in Mahuva. The conventional measure of *per capita* income in Mahuva cannot indicate the levels of living in different

families. It was therefore necessary to look at the family income as a total of the various contributions made by different earning members, and to view this total family income per year in relation to the size of the family or the number of persons maintained as one unit. Moreover, this *per capita* annual income of the family is specially related to the employment-status of the head of the family (vide Tables VII-A & B).

Table VII-A reveals this in small slabs of Rs. 100, starting from *less than Rs.* 100 and ending with *Rs.* 900 and *above.* Table VII-B is a special variant; the alteration is significant for two reasons: (1) the inquiry as regards total family income is not likely to lead to very definite or precise information; therefore broad categories are more likely to be reliable and also more meaningful. (2) From the point of view of family-status also, a broad classification of income-level presents a better perspective than the other approach.

In a way the dividing line (Rs. 500) is quite arbitrary; the families below the line may be considered as low-income groups, or the lower economic strata of Mahuva. The size of the average family being 6 as derived from our sample in Mahuva, this forms on an average a class that is exempt from income-tax. In fact, these families are of various sizes, and quite often it is the size over and above the total income of the family that defines the levels of living in these families.

The top level (Rs. 900 and above) is particularly suggestive. It shows the differential prospects one tends to associate with the different status-positions, in view of the way various top-level families stand out. It is no wonder they consider own-account work a more promising ladder than the employee role; and being an employer, on an average, seems to the most favoured status in terms of income-prospects as well. It is very probable that unreported incomes among the own-account workers and employers often mean very high incomes, rather than very low incomes. On the whole, the claim made by non-employees of Mahuva seems to be quite justified—" one can come up in business, " whereas " you have only a fixed income in service. "

One may not make much fuss of the " less than Rs. 100 " group. Perhaps they have exaggerated their poverty, or it is also possible that the extremely low-level families are not self-

TABLE VII–A

FAMILY'S PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME ACCORDING TO THE HEAD'S EMPLOYMENT-STATUS

Per Capita annual income of the family in 1958	Employees	*Managerial and Executive*	*Supervisory*	*Non-supervisory*	*Skilled manual*	*Unskilled manual*	*Casual and piece worker*	Employers	*Industrial employers*	*Traders (5 or less employees)*	*Big traders (more than 5 employees)*	*Artisans employing others*	*Professionals employing others*	*Agricultural employers*	Own account workers	*Total*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Rs. 100 or less	9	—	1	—	1	3	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	20
Rs. 101 to Rs. 200	75	—	—	8	15	28	24	4	—	—	3	—	—	1	56	135
Rs. 201 to Rs. 300	42	—	3	14	6	8	11	14	1	7	—	2	—	4	60	116
Rs. 301 to Rs. 400	25	1	3	11	2	6	2	7	1	3	1	1	—	1	22	54
Rs. 401 to Rs. 500	3	—	1	1	1	—	—	7	—	3	—	1	—	3	9	19
Rs. 501 to Rs. 600	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	2	1	—	—	—	8	13
Rs. 601 to Rs. 700	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
Rs. 701 to Rs. 800	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	4
Rs. 801 to Rs. 900	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	4
Rs. 901 and above	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	8	—	1	2	—	—	5	4	14
Not known	7	—	1	1	1	2	2	13	—	10	1	1	—	1	21	41
Total	170	1	11	42	26	47	43	60	3	28	8	5	—	16	193	423

TABLE VII–B

FAMILY'S PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME ACCORDING TO THE HEAD'S EMPLOYMENT-STATUS

Per Capita annual income of the family in 1958	**Employees**	*Managerial and Executive*	*Supervisory*	*Non-supervisory*	*Skilled manual*	*Unskilled manual*	*Casual and piece worker*	**Employers**	*Industrial employers*	*Traders (5 or less employees)*	*Big traders (more than 5 employees)*	*Artisans employing others*	*Professionals employing others*	*Agricultural employers*	**Own account workers**	*Total*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Rs. 500 or less	**154**	1	8	34	25	45	41	**32**	2	13	4	4	—	9	**158**	344
More than Rs. 500	**9**	—	2	7	—	—	—	**15**	1	5	3	—	—	6	**14**	38
Not known	7	—	1	1	1	2	2	**13**	—	10	1	1	—	1	**21**	41
Total	**170**	1	11	42	26	47	43	**60**	3	28	8	5	—	16	**193**	423

sufficient; it is quite natural to find small families resident in Mahuva regularly dependent on income from property in the joint-family in the native place, or alternatively on remittances from those family-members who have left Mahuva for Bombay or elsewhere to earn.

In a total of 423 families, about 10 per cent have not reported to us, but at least a few of them are bound to be in the upper-income group. However, one is not likely to find more than 10 per cent, on the whole, in the upper-income group. Ironically enough, the higher-income-earners in the family tend to reduce the proportion of earners to non-earners, and also to maintain a large-sized residential joint family—for social considerations. Therefore, in actual level of living, about 90 per cent of the families in the sample had in 1958 less than Rs. 500 per head per year.

The average family in Mahuva is poor, of course; what matters is the significant aspects of the distribution of this poverty. For instance, the employee heads give the impression of " destined-to-be-poor " families. The blue-collar employees seem to have no prospects, in spite of a relatively larger proportion of earners in the family. Quite often they live in small-sized or at least nuclear families as the family-data suggest. The white-collar employee is not in a very enviable position either. Only nine (all white-collar in a way) out of 170 employee-heads find their families in the upper income-group. This is a bare 5 per cent prospect, as against possible 10 per cent (with the unearthing of unreported incomes) in own-account worker families and anything above 25 per cent in the employer families. It is necessary to note that the employer families, particularly traders and agriculturists are so much better off in spite of the large number of non-earning dependents so usual in these social categories. Considerations of occupational status, and the economic consequences of this role jointly enhance the importance of the non-employees in Mahuva. This is the ultimate ideal of the ambitious man.

THE PERMANENT RESIDENTS

251 non-employees of Mahuva on whom we focus our atten-

tion now, are not particularly rich, but they are important to Mahuva for a different reason.

157 of them have been in Mahuva for two generations or more. Even those who are not as old have acquired a feeling of " staying permanently " in Mahuva. In all, 205 out of these 251, or about 82 per cent, said that they are " staying permanently " in Mahuva.

Only one of these 205 " permanent residents " said in 1958 that he is not likely to continue any more in Mahuva. Others would stick to Mahuva and the feeling of the head of the family is to treat the juniors' emigration as only a temporary thing, if it takes place. Even among families that are not staying permanently, all but one want to settle down in Mahuva.

As to those non-employees who talk about leaving one cannot be so sure. Some 11 families were found to be still there in 1958, though they were among those who said in 1956 that they would leave; on the other hand 4 families that were not supposed to leave had left during those two years.

On the whole, non-employees get a stake in one place and tend to settle down. They try to make the best of their situation. These are the families that may be able to balance the decline and disintegration of old commercial families of Mahuva.

Those who were once " wealthy and enterprising " merchants of Mahuva have lost the creative spirit so far as Mahuva is concerned; but the families—old or new—that are on the upswing today, rising from an ordinary background, tend to make Mahuva once again a commercial town and perhaps also an industrial centre if their problem of power (fuel) is solved.

In the absence of any creative activities Mahuva can remain merely a residential town where the older generation of " permanent residents " continues to live on income mainly earned by junior members outside Mahuva. On the other hand the new rising families can more than fill the vacancy left by the earlier generation of entrepreneurs.

This expectation rests only on the comparison of percentage distribution of occupations in the present head's generation, and his grandfather's generation. For instance, two of our present heads have gone down from the big business status of their grandfather, but there are three new entrants from a lower

background rising up to this status. Nor is the channel dried up, for there are 10.4 per cent in medium business as opposed to 7.7 per cent in grandfather's days, and there are 12.5 per cent rather than earlier 11.4 per cent in the small business.

The movement in the present generation is on the whole towards filling up the vacancy and they seem to have caught up with it.

Post-1918 competition in trade, growth of railways and development of other ports in Saurashtra led to the break-up of the old houses, and the new generation, or rather the new blood took time to come up. Right now the creative energy shown in Mahuva in the Municipal life may be only one aspect of the new upsurge. They are building the social over-heads, shaping the new élite and forging the changed élite-norms and roles by one of those silent social processes that precede any major economic reorganisation.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

THE DILEMMA OF THIS STUDY

THIS inquiry, like many other urban studies in India, was a random sample of the families of Mahuva, seeking some generalisations about the whole community. The data collected and particularly the detailed reactions and responses of various heads of the families, however, led us to doubt the possibility of any meaningful generalisation about the community as a whole. The caste-wise considerations seemed to be more meaningful and fruitful, and yet the sample was not stratified by caste. Again this sample of 423 families is good enough for generalising as regards the whole community, but a caste or a caste-group caught in the net of this random sample may sometimes be a very limited sub-sample to lead to any definite "findings" for the small strata, as such. A mere half-a-dozen families of one caste, or even more, say, about 3 to 6 dozens in a caste-group would not allow us to establish very firm conclusions; they do provide enough basis for the doubts and hunches that may arise.

SUPERFICIAL CORRELATIONS

The temptation to follow the merely aggregative analysis was resisted because it always led one to some superficial correlations like the following:

(1) Suppose, the rate of changing the occupation (from father to son) is found to be higher in the present generation than in the previous generation. Are we entitled to assert that a new norm has developed? Knowing all the reasoning and sentiments that are associated with every change, one cannot easily put aside the other pointers just to boost up the modernity or "change-mentality" of the present generation. The increasing economic push rather than any change in the norm

seemed to account for more changes in recent decades than earlier.

(2) Similarly, looking for the impact of longer urbanisation one lands into another statistical coincidence. Families staying in Mahuva for two generations or more seem to avoid blue-collar work and particularly factory jobs. Their relative share in industrial employment is the least, that in traditional employment the largest; both are out of all proportions to their relative strength in the sample. 229 such families out of a total of 423 are distributed in various jobs in a queer proportion. They contribute only 8 industrial workers as against 30 contributed by the " late-comers ". Their contribution is very substantial when it comes to jobs with trading concerns with five or less than five employees (and hence more traditional relations), or the artisans using traditional tools and employing others; 13 out of 21 employees with traditional traders and 4 out of 5 employees with traditional artisans happen to be from the " old-timers ". Truly, this is not just an accident when their contribution ranges from about 20 to 80 per cent. The crucial problem is to locate the cause. Can one ascribe this to the fact of being " urbanised "? It reminds one of the findings of Wilbert Moore that a village is more likely to contribute to industrial labour than the town, though apparently a town is considered nearer to modernisation. The problem in Mahuva at least is not difficult to grasp. The old-timer families are preponderantly high caste or business families and the second largest element therein is the artisan-group. The " late-comers " have behaved in the same way when they happen to belong to such castes. In fact, the large majority of late-comers have been recently " pushed " and have come from a low-caste agricultural background, and hence it is possibly a mere coincidence that the longer urbanisation and certain occupational preferences go together. In actual decisions, at the family-level one never comes across "urbanism" as a decisive or even a minor consideration in this preference. On the contrary, perhaps, a late-comer Bania aspiring to be on par with more " civilised " caste-man would be more particular and more strictly white-collar-minded, but not so an old-timer Koli or Muslim.

(3) The same danger of misleading coincidence faces one

in considering the impact of education; what seems to be a causal relation between education and avoidance of blue-collar work turns out to be again a matter of caste-impact.

BEHIND THE RURAL-URBAN DICHOTOMY

It is possible that the assumption of a dichotomy between rural and urban norms in the aggregative sense is not very helpful. One need not expect the urban community as a whole to exhibit certain values, similarly one cannot expect a longer period of urbanisation to make a definite impact on the norms of an individual.

The approach adopted here is based on this belief: To understand a change in norms and values in a society, one cannot and should not begin with an assumption of change as a consequence of urbanisation. Therefore the norms in our view, are supposed to have a continuity with tradition if the urban population is a part of the same society. It is the change in the economic environment that leads to any need for adjustment. The emergence of any urban area is itself the product as well as the cause of new economic opportunities and consequent economic pressures.

The problem before us was to understand the process of adjustment to this new fact. The people as a whole cannot be viewed as either static or dynamic. It was an important realisation that one's response to the new environment varied with one's current status in the social relationship. How this status was defined and how the relevant behaviour of men of that status helped or hindered the economic development in general could be seen as a process of interaction in the social system—in the part where it touches the activity of earning one's livelihood.

One's religious belief did not seem to matter much in its impact on the process of adjustment to a changing economic environment. The status of the family in our society seemed to have little significance as such, it was only via the status of the caste to which the family belonged that its behaviour was indirectly influenced. On the other hand, it was not possible to accept an independent role of education as such as influencing

the choice of occupation. Consequently, the only tenable hypothesis leads one to the analysis of the caste impact on the response of various groups. The change does take place in an urban environment, but it is in the form of different responses of different castes as follows.

FROM CASTE TO STATUS-APPROACH

The Caste-impact

The exploration of the caste behaviour suggested a possibility of framing future studies in a new way. The one-to-one correlation of caste and occupation is not found in Mahuva, not even as a norm. There is no caste-given occupation in the normative sense, but there is a norm in the form of a range from which one should choose. The scheme of choice is related, in a basic way, to something more than the caste as such. It may be called the position of the caste in the hierarchy.

The Status-groups

There are status-groups and status-less groups even in a caste-based society. It is not just high or low status in the hierarchy but also status or "no status", in the social order, which is really relevant.

The cultivator who owns land has a status, and the caste-groups which are traditionally dominant as cultivators in a particular area have a social status because of this economic role. The skilled artisans when they are ritually clean ones also enjoy a similar status associated with the skilled performance. The business group, whether Hindu (Banias) or Muslim (Khoja, Bohra, etc.) is a third group, particularly in an urban community, just as the bureaucracy or sometimes a priestly group, is in certain centres. Such status is granted only to the castes which are predominant in business, bureaucracy and priestly orders. All other persons, even while they actually follow the status occupation, would still belong to non-status castes. The non-status caste-groups, lacking a definitely pronounced caste-trend, in a status-occupation, are without any positive attitude or attachment to an occupation.

This difference is vital to a push and pull analysis. The

status-groups would not leave their status-occupations unless they are economically pushed. The status-less groups are ever ready to try new and economically attractive opportunities in the hope of gaining a social status somehow. They are determined to create a new social grade for themselves, and in actual life, so long as they do not have a status, they are pulled by economic opportunities as no other group would be.

A coastal town like Mahuva with its trading opportunities is particularly attractive to such status-less groups from surrounding areas. It is the creative entrepreneurial activities of such groups in Mahuva that gives the town an impression of dynamism, modernity, non-attachment to a traditional occupation, etc. Others—the status-groups—are as traditional in Mahuva as they are in the villages. But those in towns have to change by the mere pressure of a vigorous drive of another element in their midst, apart from other national or international changes. For instance, the fact that everyone seems to take up tailoring, forces the erstwhile tailor to improve or to change the occupation.

Thus, there are groups like Koli, Ghanchi, Sepai, Lohana, Rajput and unclean artisans, even Harijans that seek social status, sometimes by " educated " jobs, but very often by bettering their economic position. They have nothing to lose by discarding their occupation. They have almost a limitless choice of occupations, apart from the ritual considerations. They do have their castes and that association would, in the beginning, stick to them, so to say, but lacking in any status associated with that caste, they are guided or even attracted by the so-called rational economic considerations in choosing their occupations.

Others like cultivators and artisans also change for the sake of a still higher status whenever there is an opportunity, but usually their choice is circumscribed by a range in keeping with their status. It means some independent role for men with a cultivator background and some skilled occupation for those from an artisan background, and any white-collar position for the business or bureaucratic or priestly order. This is a range of deviations, but approved deviations. Certain deviations are the result of new pressures only, others are the result of new opportunities, but so long as both have been working in

a coastal town for the long past, there develops a range of approved deviations and an adaptability to changes. Thus, for instance occupations connected with new technology are attractive even in a social sense to the status-groups like cultivators and artisans. Their social attitudes suggest that the economic development is retarded by their economic limitations rather than by any social rigidity.

One of the limitations is capital, of course, but soon one faces the limitation of education, particularly technical education.

Education

The mere fact that many families are positively oriented to technical education is not enough. There is a lurking suspicion about Indian society that these technical men tend to become white-collar minded and higher education of any type has this result in India.

That would be a waste of technical training and loss of creative potential—again traced to the Indian social background. This blanket judgment on educated Indians seems to be proved again and again by the various surveys, and the large majority of those educated beyond the high-school stage does avoid the blue-collar work, if one stops at the aggregative analysis and interpretation only.

The way this problem was raised in the analysis of Mahuva's educated in a caste-wise breakdown points to a possible corrective to the analysis of the role of education in affecting the range of choice of occupations. It is a fact that there is a concentration of higher castes in the higher levels of education. This creates an illusion. Only a small, statistically insignificant minority seems to differ from the general pattern of choosing white-collar occupations. On the other hand the approach in this study would be more promising; the behaviour of various castes and caste-groups at comparable levels of education, by a properly designed disaggregative study of a bigger population might demonstrate that this "insignificant" minority among the educated was socially at least a significant pointer and not a random deviation from the general pattern. Different castes do react differently.

The future: An interesting by-product of the prevailing

segregated neighbourhoods—caste or caste-group areas—was also noticed, as it affects the future impact of widespread higher education among the neglected lower caste-groups. Education does give a notion of high status, but the traditional approach to high status can come only to those who " belong " to such groups and not merely through education. Education and urbanity have a western impact as well, and it is possible to foresee a large section of Hindu society that can by-pass the so-called " sanskritization " process of adopting the values of the socially dominant traditional élite.

The generalisations about the educated are so far based on a universe which, in fact, consists of segregated parts. India's craftsmen-entrepreneurs of the last decade as well as the constant inflow of creative, small entrepreneurs from the educated lower strata of every region should convince one of the utility of such studies in the large areas, cities or regions. It is probable that our understanding of India's creative potential is limited by the approach adopted so far.

The range of choice of occupations is primarily related to caste, and only secondarily to education, if at all.

" *Education for service* " : So long as technical education was out of the picture, the general utility of education was no more than as an asset for getting jobs. This is why various respondents would say " we do not care for education because we do not go in for service. "

In actual practice, one required more, and one had to find out proper contacts for getting jobs. This personal system of recruitment fits in best in Mahuva, so long as the employers and the employees belong to the same community or the same local culture or an organic whole kept together by other bonds of larger social relations.

The employer-employee relations: It is obvious that these relations cannot develop in a vacuum. The labels like autocratic or democratic do not have much significance when " both sides of the industry " are parts of a common culture, and the roles of the superiors coincide with those of accepted superiors in the hierarchy of larger society. It is the " fit " with the relations in the larger society which makes the family-system work in a trader's or artisan's establishment with the

employees and the employer belonging to the same caste or caste-group. Similarly it is this parallel with the basic social hierarchy that leads the low-caste employee to accept patronising superiors, as they hail from high-castes, in the work-situation. With the development of a new set of " patrons of the poor ", in society, and in the government, their relations may pass from one framework of " status " to another system of new fangled " rules " and " codes ", enforced by the modern status-society.

In short, the relations do not seem to pass from status to contract at all, when the " two sides " belong to one social whole. It would be interesting to watch the development of conflict when, for instance, the new element of Sindhi merchants in Mahuva faces the local employee. Here again the emergence of a stage of conflict does not mean the ultimate development of contract. " From status to contract " is not a universal law.

The state of conflict has to be resolved, whenever it develops. At present most of the relations are in line with the older status-pattern, so much so that formal enforcement of the new rules is not very effective. The continuity of basic relations in the larger society is so strong that no conflict has led to the emergence of a proper contractual relationship.

On the whole, the system holds the society together, and particularly keeps the employer-employee conflict on institutional lines. It is not a wild, sporadic, violent conflict of interests between groups that have no ties in the larger society. At the most it is a conflict of interpretation so to say, that is where the local élite, the public and even the municipal leaders replace the old village *panchayat* or town *mahajan*, in the capacity of informal conciliators.

This is the system that helps the commitment at this stage of Mahuva's emergent work-force. The future might bring new scales of organisation, new chances of conflict and new resolutions of the conflict, by mutual adaptations.

Earning a livelihood turns out to be a constant process of facing and resolving the conflicts, so that the tensions and strains developing in one process do not lead to total breakdown of the social network of relations.

APPENDIX

MAHUVA CENSUS, 1961, AS COMPARED TO THAT OF 1951

THE separate coverage, in the 1961 census, of what is known as the port area of Mahuva is of interest. Earlier censuses, including that of 1951 and our preliminary census of 1956, took note only of Mahuva proper, which was the area and population covered while drawing the random sample for our survey.

Since the censuses of 1911 and 1921, which recorded a decline in the population of Mahuva, there has been a consistent increase in population at the rate of over 15 per cent per decade. The highest variation (21.13 per cent) was recorded between 1941 and 1951 and the next highest (18.53 per cent), between 1951 and 1961.

In spite of emigration, Mahuva cannot be compared to Kutch because the men of Mahuva do take their womenfolk and children, to the new "homes" sooner or later. Also there is a constant flow of immigrants into Mahuva from towns and villages near enough to encourage the movement of the entire family along with the earning member.

Unlike Kutch or Bombay, one expects from such movement of population, a reasonable balance in the proportion between the sexes. This balance, with slightly less women than men, was more or less maintained through the decades of decline and increase in population, until 1941. This balance was upset after independence, the subsequent immigration of refugees and the general impetus of the post-war boom; thus the 1951 census records Mahuva's population as consisting of 13,190 males and 13,528 females. Neither the influx of refugees nor the immigration of villagers could reverse the proportion to such an extent. The only plausible explanation, therefore, lies in the extraordinary opportunities that Mahuva offered to immigrants, coinciding with new attractions to emigrants who went out in large numbers, intending to take their womenfolk and children a little later, after a period of trial and, perhaps, house-hunting.

It is only this that can also explain the sharp change of proportion in the 1961 census—16,336 males to 15,332 females. In spite of heavy emigration, the last two decades (1941-1961) have seen the highest rate of population growth in Mahuva itself. There is generally more " pull " towards, rather than " push " from, Mahuva and even those who experience " push " in their individual frame of reference, realize that this cannot be generalized. Opportunities abound, but it is not easy to discern from the tables as to which sector has the maximum growth potential.

While comparing the occupations of heads of families included in our sample with the 1951 census, we had suggested that the junior members of families were showing a tendency which may not be discernible in the occupations of the " heads." In fact, a more interesting and complex problem would arise if the number of non-working dependents "deriving their livelihood from " a given occupation were not found to be in the same ratio in the case of all occupations. This is exactly the problem posed by the concepts used in the 1961 census.

Mahuva, with a total population of 31,668, has 7,480 male and 1,523 female workers, most of the very young and very old being workers who may not be self-supporting. These 9,003 workers bear the burden of supporting 8,856 male and 13,809 female "non-working" dependents of all ages.

All children in the age-group, 0 to 10 years, would normally be in the " non-worker " category, even if none of them went to school. So a normal load of one dependent from this age-group to each earning member may be assumed. Further, one normally finds an old parent or a non-working housewife or a grown-up daughter or an invalid, indisciplined or somehow unemployed son or brother in each family. Thus, one could step up the ratio to two dependents to an earning member, from the above observation. This amounts to saying that in the field of agriculture, industry, transport, etc. one " worker " in a particular occupation, actually entails three persons "deriving their livelihood" from that occupation. A conceptual problem poses itself, when we try to apply the above dependency ratio to persons engaged in trade and commerce, " respectable services " and to those in upper-income brackets as

far as agriculture and industry are concerned. Earning members of this class, even if they are not very rich, are under social compulsions to educate their children, particularly boys, beyond ten or even fourteen years of age, to keep their women at home (more true of Mahuva than other big cities), except occasionally for teaching job, and to support widows, orphans, and old and sickly relatives. Earners from this class, therefore, can safely be assumed to have, on an average, three dependents. Hence, in this case, there are four persons deriving their livelihood from one occupation. All these presumed ratios tally neatly with the total number of non-workers in Mahuva. The neglect of this important difference may lead to awkward results when comparing the 1961 figures with those of 1951. (P. 7, table 1). According to the 1961 census, there are 1,830 workers engaged in trade and commerce. This works out to a ridiculously low 20 per cent of the total number of workers (9,003), as against 27 per cent in 1951. The normal dependency ratio of 1: 2 would give 5,490 persons deriving their livelihood from commerce as against 7,359 in 1951. The extranormal dependency ratio of 1: 3 would raise the figure to 7,320. This is more acceptable and the difference may be attributed to a slight decline in dependency on commerce or to a small margin of error. Workers in and dependents on " industry " (household, manufacturing, and construction) number 7,587. Thus, whether we consider only the workers or manipulate the dependency ratio in favour of commerce, it is obvious that "commerce" supports a decidedly lesser number of persons than "industry," according to the latest census. The 1951 position, where 27 per cent of population was supported by "commerce" as against 25 per cent by "industry," thus stands reversed. This change is in conformity with the trend of developments in Mahuva between 1956 and 1958.

The dependency load on agriculture has not increased and that on transport has not decreased, whatever manipulations are made to make the 1961 figures comparable to that of 1951.

Dependence on agriculture has declined and that on commerce increased as far as families, in contrast with their previous generations, are concerned; but this has not happened between 1951 and 1961, if the entire population of Mahuva is considered.

The special change noted by the generational approach is due to the immigrant element and is neither a true profile nor an indigenous feature of Mahuva.

Mahuva is increasingly becoming an industrial, rather than commercial centre, though generational changes in population do not make this clear. It has been noted that skills have been modernized and the unskilled worker is more likely to be employed in industrial rather than in non-industrial operations.

Transport has expanded almost two-fold, if we include the port area in our comparison, while "services," though retaining a steady share, have been modernized like "skills." The most tricky and, at the same time, most significant aspect of the 1961 census is with reference to employment in industry. It may be remarked that "industry" in Mahuva consists almost entirely of household industry. But this is an illusion created by the number of such small, household establishments. Actually, the number of persons employed in household industry is a mere 500 (274 men and 226 women), most of these being, in all probability, only partly occupied, i.e. underemployed. On the other hand, other manufacturing industries employs 1,669 men and 151 women.

Thus, the manufacturing (other than "household") industry is the growing sector of Mahuva's economy, supporting and modernizing skills and services, transport and communications.

TABLE I*

AREA, HOUSES AND POPULATION

State/Division/District/Taluka/Mahal/ City or Town-group or Town	Total Rural Urban	Area in Sq. Miles	Area in Sq. Km.	Population per Sq. Mile	No. of villages Inhabited	No. of villages Uninhabited	Number of Towns	Number of Occupied Residential Houses	Population Persons	Population Males	Population Females
1	2	3 (a)	3(b)	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Mahuva	U	12.83	33.23	2,551	..		1	5,532	32,732	17,042	15,690
(*i*) Mahuva (M)	U	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	..	..		5,359	31,668	16,336	15,332
(*ii*) Port Area	U	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	..	..	..	173	1,064	706	358

* *Census of India*, 1961: State Table A-I. *Courtesy :* Superintendent of Census Operations, Gujarat.

TABLE II*

TOWNS AND TOWN-GROUPS CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION IN 1961 WITH VARIATION SINCE 1901

State/District	*Name of Town/ Town-group*	*Status of Town*	*Year*	*Persons*	*Decade Variation*	*Percentage Decade Variation*	*Males*	*Females*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Bhavnagar	Mahuva		1901	17,549	..	..	8,935	8,614
	12.83 Sq. Miles		1911	17,063	-486	-2.77	8,817	8,246
	33.23 Sq. Km.		1921	16,232	-831	-4.87	8,271	7,961
			1931	19,019	+2,787	+17.17	9,688	9,331
			1941	22,058	+3,039	+15.98	11,168	10,890
			1951	26,718	+4,660	+21.13	13,190	13,528
			1961	32,732	+6,014	+22.51	17,042	15,690
	(*i*) Mahuva	M	1901	17,549	..	..	8,935	8,614
	N.A.		1911	17,063	-486	-2.77	8,817	8,246
			1921	16,232	-831	-4.87	8,271	7,961
			1931	19,019	+2,787	+17.17	9,688	9,331
			1941	22,058	+3,039	+15.98	11,168	10,890
			1951	26,718	+4,660	+21.13	13,190	13,528
			1961	31,668	+4,950	+18.53	16,336	15,332
	(*ii*) Port Area		1961	1,064	..	..	706	358
	N.A.							

* *Census of India*, 1961: State Table A-IV. *Courtesy* : Superintendent of Census Operations, Gujarat.

TABLE III*

WORKERS AND NON-WORKERS IN CITIES, TOWN-GROUPS AND TOWNS ARRANGED TERRITORIALLY CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND BROAD AGE-GROUPS

State/Division/District/City/Town-group/Town	Age-group	Total Population			WORKERS							
					Total Workers		I As Cultivator		II As Agricultural Labourer		III In Mining, Quarrying, Live-stock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting and Plantations, Orchards and Allied Activities	
		Persons	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Mahuva	Total	32,732	17,042	15,690	8,011	1,557	503	173	336	222	99	22
	0-14	14,381	7,700	6,681	258	45	20	6	33	13	7	2
	15-34	10,461	5,455	5,006	4,321	753	214	92	169	113	42	14
	35-59	6,188	3,174	3,014	2,991	681	212	72	121	83	42	6
	60+	1,698	709	989	440	78	57	3	13	13	8	—
	Age not stated	4	4	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(*i*) Mahuva (M)	Total	31,668	16,336	15,332	7,480	1,523	502	171	336	222	98	22
	0-14	14,001	7,519	6,482	250	44	20	6	33	13	7	2
	15-34	10,098	5,170	4,928	4,036	738	214	92	169	113	41	14
	35-59	5,893	2,950	2,943	2,767	666	212	70	121	83	42	6
	60+	1,673	694	979	427	75	56	3	13	13	8	—
	Age not stated	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(*ii*) Port Area	Total	1,064	706	358	531	34	1	2	—	—	1	—
	0-14	380	181	199	8	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
	15-34	363	285	78	285	15	—	—	—	—	1	—
	35-59	295	224	71	224	15	—	2	—	—	—	—
	60+	25	15	10	13	3	1	—	—	—	—	—
	Age not stated	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE III (Contd.)

WORKERS AND NON-WORKERS IN CITIES, TOWN-GROUPS AND TOWNS ARRANGED TERRITORIALLY CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND BROAD AGE-GROUP

State/Division/District/City/Town-group/Town	WORKERS													
	IV		V		VI		VII		VIII		IX		X	
	At Household Industry		In Manufacturing other than Household Ind.		In Construction		In Trade and Commerce		In Transport, Storage and Communications		In other Services		Non-Workers	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
1	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Mahuva	274	227	1,672	153	195	23	1,800	57	961	10	2,171	670	9,031	14,133
	16	5	38	—	—	—	33	—	9	—	102	19	7,442	6,636
	140	124	935	79	109	15	1,003	29	579	5	1,130	282	1,134	4,253
	97	93	626	70	74	8	644	23	351	4	824	322	183	2,333
	21	5	73	4	12	—	120	5	21	1	115	47	269	911
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—
(*i*) Mahuva (M)	274	227	1,669	151	195	23	1,774	56	513	10	2,119	641	8,856	13,809
	16	5	38	—	—	—	33	—	5	—	98	18	7,269	6,438
	140	124	932	79	109	15	986	29	339	5	1,106	267	1,134	4,190
	97	93	626	68	74	8	635	23	160	4	800	311	183	2,277
	21	5	73	4	12	—	120	4	9	1	115	45	267	904
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
(*ii*) Port Area	—	—	3	2	—	—	26	1	448	—	52	29	175	324
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	4	1	173	198
	—	—	3	—	—	—	17	—	240	—	24	15	—	63
	—	—	—	2	—	—	9	—	191	—	24	11	—	56
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	12	—	—	2	2	7
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—

* *Census of India*, 1961 : State Table B-II. *Courtesy* : Superintendent of Census Operations, Gujarat.