

# A PRIMER OF NAVYA NYĀYA LANGUAGE AND METHODOLOGY

(Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa  
of  
MM Mahesha Chandra Nyayaratna)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
(With Graphic Exposition)

UJJWALA JHA



The Asiatic Society  
KOLKATA

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A PRIMER OF NAVYA NYĀYA LANGUAGE AND METHODOLOGY  
*by Ujjwala Jha*

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॥ श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

श्रियः प्रदुग्धे विपदो रुणद्धि  
यशांसि सूते मलिनं प्रमार्ष्टि ।  
संस्कारशौचेन परं पुनीते  
शुद्धा हि बुद्धिः किल कामधेनुः ॥

To

“My Students”

॥ तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु ॥

— Ujjwala Jha

## FOREWORD

Navya Nyāya represents one of the finest products of human intellect that has been sustaining India's intellectual culture for the last few centuries. It offers devices of logical argumentation and supplies us with a novel set of terminology for mapping reality. It originated at Mithilā, flourished in Bengal and traversed the whole of India to influence the thought processes of Indian intelligentsia in diverse fields. It exerted influence on different systems of thought so much so that they adopted the Navya Nyāya methods to counter their opponents and propagate their thesis. That Navya Nyāya can still serve our academic needs need not be overemphasised. A re-look of Navya Nyāya language and methodology at this I. T. age may be highly rewarding.

The Asiatic Society, Kolkata has been successfully organizing Courses on Navya Nyāya : Language and Methodology since October, 2000. It was conceived, developed and imparted by Professor V. N. Jha, Director, CASS and by him with Dr Mrs Jha of CASS, Pune at the Asiatic Society. On the first level course Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa by Mahesh Chandra Nyayaratna was taught by Mrs Jha. The mission is to revive the rich intellectual tradition of Nyāya and to relate it to the universal model of thinking and modern theories of language communication. At the first level (repeatedly given in various parts of India including Kolkata), the course was primarily concerned with the methodology of the philosophical understanding of the Nyāya system. In the more selective second level (Kolkata having the rare experience of being one), Professor Jha concentrated exclusively on the language communication theory of the Naiyāyikas. The issue is seminally important to the diverse disciplines of modern knowledge system from humanities to sciences including social sciences, where the need for perfect communication through language is very important. Before entering into the intellectual dialogue, one can learn different aspects of the problem of communication from this rich Nyāya tradition. The Śābdabodha process explained on the basis of

Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa and Bhāṣā Pariccheda with Siddhānta-Muktāvalī is really enchanting in many respects.

The Asiatic Society is happy to publish the Navya- Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa with Introduction, translation and annotations in English, prepared by Dr Mrs Ujjwala Jha in the light of deliberations and interactions in the workshops held earlier. The book will serve as a primer of Navya Nyāya Language and Methodology for those interested in understanding our rich cultural heritage in modern context.

Kolkata  
December 20, 2004

**Dilip Coomer Ghose**  
*General Secretary*  
The Asiatic Society

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## PREFACE

In May, 2000 Prof. V. N. JHA began his mission of spreading Navya-Nyāya studies country-wide. He had conceived the idea of an intensive course in Navya-Nyāya Language and Methodology since long but the mission of teaching this course in various places in India actually began in May 2000. Prof. N. P. Unni, the then Vice-chancellor of Śrī Śankaracharya university, Kalady, took an initiative in organising the said course in his university from 15 th May to 26th May 2000. The course attracted the attention of Sanskrit teachers as well as philosophy- teachers. In this very first course of its kind around 20 to 25 teachers from different colleges of Kerala and university departments participated.

The course was devised as having two components : (1) Exposition on basics of Indian Philosophy and (2) Reading of a 19th Century Navya-Nyāya-text. Both the components were taught every-day in two sessions of two hours each. Prof. Jha alone taught this course. It was welcomed and well appreciated by all the participants.

The same course was repeated in Kolkata at the Asiatic Society from Oct., 22 to Nov. 3, 2000. Prof. Manabendu Banerji was the secretary of Asiatic society. It is because of him that the course was organised at the society. He insisted that I must take at least some classes. Prof. Jha suggested I should read some portion of the text. So, for three days I taught the text of *Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa*, the 19th century text at the Asiatic society. It was well-received by the participants coming from Sanskrit and philosophy departments of universities and colleges. It was here that I thought of helping prof. Jha more meaningfully by reading the whole text. It would serve two purposes: (i) the text-reading could be completed within stipulated time and (ii) more importantly, for me, it would give some relief to Prof. Jha. Otherwise it was certainly a strenuous job. Thus, when the same course was organised at the oriental Research Institute, Baroda, I taught the whole of the above-

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mentioned text written by Maheshachandra Nyāyaratna. This course was held between 17th May and 28th May 2001.

In Kolkata and in Baroda teachers from philosophy-departments participated enthusiastically. In Kolkata about twenty teachers participated and in Baroda the number went to above forty. The demand for the course by those who participated was ever-increasing. Many of them wanted to repeat the same course and some teachers actually did do so. And why not? Here was an opportunity to listen to an ideal teacher with his unique way of presentation and collect the vast panorama of Indian Philosophy in the most palatable and lucid manner just in the span of ten-twelve days. Another speciality was that those who were really interested in studies alone participated as the course would end in an examination. Though, procuring higher number of marks was not the aim of the mature teachers and participants, still, the spirit of examination could achieve quite a great amount of seriousness on the part of the participants as desired and anticipated.

The same course was repeated in two more places : Pune and New Delhi. (1) It was conducted at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Pune from 17th Sept. to 29th Sept. 2001. This course was sponsored by the Indian council of philosophical Research, New Delhi. and (2) It was conducted at the Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, New Delhi from 1st Oct. to 12th Oct. 2002. This was sponsored by Rashtriya Sanskrit Samsthan, New Delhi.

In both these courses also I shared the responsibility of teaching the same text. I had started translating the text into English in the period of Baroda and Pune-courses but I could complete the same only after I taught it for the third time in JNU, New Delhi. Thus, readers will find an English translation of the text of *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa* (NNBP), in this work, along with notes and the same graphs and diagrams which I used while teaching the text all the three times. In some places some more diagrams have been added. These diagrams really make the point more understandable. In this attempt the original text has been edited carefully and some of the lacunae

have been removed from it. Still, if some mistakes are left in the text, they are always revisable.

In this context let me express my gratefulness towards those because of whom I could complete this work. My husband is my sole source of inspiration. He not only works hard himself but is never tired of asking me just one question, “Did you complete your work?” This work is some times translation, some times a critical edition still some times an article or some times a monograph ! His question induces me into ‘work’ like anything, refuting all mīmāṃsā declarations that only ‘optative suffix’ induces an activity in a listener !! I must be grateful to god Almighty for giving me my most revered ‘guru’ and husband in just one act of kindness and compassion.

I must mention also a very special person’s name here. It is Vedashree, our daughter. Though she helps me in every writing of mine in her own small little ways always, she has a special relationship with this course. She has been ‘the invigilator’ of the examination held at the end of the course since the course at Kolkata in 2000. She is addressed as ‘the strict invigilator’ or ‘the special person’ or sometimes ‘the youngest participant’ by many an honourable person of this country. May God bless her.

I am sincerely thankful to Prof. Manabendu Banerji, the then secretary, Asiatic Society, for inspiring me into coming forward and teaching the text. It is because of his insistence that I could help Prof. Jha more meaningfully in conducting these courses.

I am grateful to Prof. Rajendra Nanavati, the then director, Oriental Institute, Baroda, who organised the course in his Institute. He took all possible measures to make our stay at Baroda comfortable in the scorching Sun of May !

I sincerely thank all the participants of the four courses mentioned above for both listening to me patiently and also for their appreciation.

I should specifically mention here the name of Prof. Sitamshu Mehta, famous Gujrathi Poet, Ex-Vice-Chancellor, Saurashtra University, who participated in the Baroda-course. He not only attended the course with all patience and sincerety but



also appeared for the examination with all seriousness. He admired my way of reading the text so much that I felt really embarrassed. But, he himself being a poet, a lover of language, perhaps, could enjoy the real rhythm of Sanskrit language in his heart. He also praised my way of controlling the class and technique of teaching. I take Prof. Mehta's comments as his blessings and affection for me and bow down to him as he is quite senior to me in all respects. I should also remember Prof. Kane, the then V.C. of the M S University, Baroda, who did not only grace the Inauguration and valedictory sessions but also attended our classes for one whole day ! I am thankful to him.

Dr. Uma, Dr. Madhu, Dr. Anamika, Dr. Piyali, Dr. Bhavani etc. were quite senior participants to listen to me in the Kolkata-course. I am grateful to them for their genuine appreciation of the course. Mrs. Reeta and Miss Meeta also deserve mention for their love and care. Dr. Uma and Dr. Piyali Palit repeatedly attended the course.

Dr. Kanshiram, Dr. Mithilesh Chaturvedi, Dr. Shashiprabha Kumar etc. were some senior persons who participated in the course at JNU, New Delhi. (The number of participants was fifty-nine). Dr. Kanshiram and Dr. Mithilesh attended the course with all sincerity and also appeared for the examination wholeheartedly! I am thankful to them.

The whole idea behind the mission which was conceived solely by Prof. Jha was this : Through these courses teachers should be trained and then they in turn should go on training their students. If this continues the tradition of navya-nyāya will be revived. It is a matter of immense pleasure for me to put on record that when I am writing this preface, 'the first such course' by the trained teachers of Kolkata, independent of Prof. Jha and Dr. Mrs. Jha is being taught at the Asiatic Society of Kolkata from 13th May to 31st May 2003. Thus, the dream seems to be coming true. If the same happens also elsewhere the day of revival of Navya-nyāya will not be very distant ! Let us pray to God that let India again thrive with her age-old intellectual tradition.

Pune

22nd May, 2003

A gap of one year has lapsed since I wrote the above. In the meantime, the course has been repeated at the Chinmaya International Foundation (CIF) at Kochi, Kerala from 24th May to 5th June 2004. The manuscript could not reach the publisher only because I wanted to add some more diagrams in the notes. In the course at CIF the participants were not only Sanskrit scholars and teachers. They came from varied fields like commerce, science, engineering, computer and what not. There, even, were such participants who did not know Devanāgarī script what to talk of Sanskrit language? There also were swamijis of the CIF who had come from various centres of the CIF such as Mumbai, Chennai, Pondicherry, Coimbatore and also from USA.

This course was appreciated by one and all. The text of *NavyaNyāyaBhāṣāPradīpa* was taught again completely and was enjoyed by everybody. Swami Advayananda, the Ācārya of the CIF, Ādiśaṅkaranilayam, a staunch Vedāntin and many of his colleagues and students enjoyed the text. They almost are convinced that here is a method of convincing others. It is a tool for proper thought process and is useful in every walk of life. There were students who personally told me that they never thought of learning Sanskrit in their Life time but now it is inevitable ! They just have to capture it ! I think this is the best certificate that a teacher can get. There is no bigger reward for a teacher than this ! We both of us are so lucky to have many such blessed souls around us ! This is the best kind of blessing that the Almighty has showered upon us, for which we both are grateful to Him.

Another special feature of this course was, Pūrvamīmāṃsā system of Indian Philosophy was introduced and I tried to impress upon the participants the significance and relevance of Pūrvamīmāṃsā (PM) in the 21st century and in the centuries to come. This was very well appreciated by the audience and they put the demand to have one full-fledged independent course on PM next vacations. Many participants of the Kolkata course like Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Piyali, Mrs. Rita and at least one participant

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of the Baroda course Prof. Nanavati. Repeated the course at the CIF.

The Asiatic Society of Kolkata has been organising this course since the year 2000. After the first course in October 2000, the Asiatic Society organised 2nd Level Course in Navya Nyāya Language & Methodology and also an advanced level course in June 2002 and December 2003 respectively. They showed their interest in bringing out an English Translation of *Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa* as it is not available. I am thankful to them for this act of kindness.

Thus, to sum up, one may say, whenever a certain thing is accomplished many a hand has helped the accomplishment ; many a mind has worked for the same and many a brain has exerted itself. I bow down to all those who encouraged me to bring out this volume and actually contributed towards its success.

I am thankful to the Research committee of the CASS, Pune University for accepting this as my Research Project. I, received the grant of Rs. 5000/- for this work as the Departmental Research grant. This made my work easier on the financial front. I thank the university authorities for the same.

Ujjwala Jha  
Pune, 15-6-2004

Finally, my manuscript is ready and is going to reach the publishers shortly. It is a matter of pride (which actually is a vice in different contexts!) that the enthusiastic participants of the first course at Kolkata have been meeting regularly at the prestigious Asiatic Society to continue the activity of understanding navya-nyāya since last more than six months. They, with the grace of almighty and good wishes and full co-operation of the Asiatic Society authorities, are going to conduct the course for new participants, again independent of Jhas (!) and the number of participants accepted by the Society so far is 68! This course will take place from 25th October to 3rd November 2004. The Dream

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has turned to Reality. This, by all means, is the grace of the almighty and the proof that अधिष्ठान, कर्ता, करण, चेष्टा and दैव, all the five have come together favorably. I must be grateful to these 'beloved students' of mine many of whom are older than me, for taking the mission of Prof. Jha further with all faith and kindling the lamp of more and more interest in the minds of younger generations ! They are doing their duty honestly and wholeheartedly ! I bow down to my students (!) for this. May God bless them and always be on their side !

Last but not the least, my thanks are due to Mr. Nandkishor Khurjekar for neatly preparing the camera-ready press-copy.

22nd Oct. 04,  
Vijayādaśamī.

Ujjwala Jha

## INTRODUCTION

The Nyāya system of Indian philosophy has two phases : (i) ancient and (ii) modern. The first phase marks the beginning of the Christian era and continues almost upto 10th century A.D. The second phase begins around the 10th century A.D. and continues up to the date. The second phase, though began around 10th cent. A.D., reached its best around 14th cent. A.D. when the *magnum opus* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, namely, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* was written. As the ancient nyāya developed through the commentary of Vātsyāyana (on the Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama) and then many sub-commentaries over one thousand years, the modern nyāya also developed through the commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa over centuries.

The main focus of modern i.e. navyanyāya was to define terms in a precise manner and then to formulate or evolve a language which may be called 'the precise medium of communication'. It was necessary to evolve a new or should we say an artificial language to do away with the possible ambiguity which is a basic quality of any natural language. Natural language cannot be totally ambiguity-free. Let us take an example : Suppose someone says : 'x' is in the room; someone else says : 'x' is not in the room. Both of them claim that their statements are true. If both these are true and we conjoin them by adding one 'and' what will be the result ? Let us see : After joining both the statements the following statement will emerge : 'x' is in the room *and* 'x' is not in the room. Now, if we name the first statement, 'x' is in the room' by the name 'p' then the statement after conjoining both of them will be: 'p' and 'not p' which is written in the symbolic logic as :  $p \cdot \sim p$ . This is an obvious contradiction. In other words, both of them cannot be

true simultaneously. One can notice that we have introduced the notion of 'time' to understand the contradiction. In other words, the two statements are not contradictory if they are made in two different segments of time, say, one in the morning and the other in the evening. Thus, by inserting the element of 'time', apparent contradiction is removed.

Let us think of another possibility. One may argue that both the statements stand 'true' at 'the same time'. Yes, this also is possible, only if we modify the meaning of the word 'room' in the original statement. As 'x' has a limited size, 'x' cannot pervade the whole of the room. Accordingly, 'x' may be present in the room at a particular point, say, a chair, and certainly everywhere else in the room 'x' is not present i.e. 'x' is absent. Thus, if we are talking about, 'x's existence and absence in the same room at the same time, then 'the part' or 'portion of the room' may be inserted in the statement by which all contradiction, doubt, ambiguity are removed. This, precisely, is the technique adopted by the modern nyāya to remove any ambiguity that may occur by the use of natural language.

Now, why should navya-nyāya focus its attention to this feature alone? This was the need of the hour. Let us begin at the very beginning. 'Dialectics' is the only method for any philosophical discussion. This was adopted by all philosophers and the same was going on through many centuries, particularly, between buddhist logicians and naiyāyikas. Many a time, the discussion, the definitions, the arguments made by one side were mistaken to be otherwise by the other side. If one goes through the texts on ancient nyāya, one finds ample proof to the statement made here. This is why the definitions have been revised and restated by the later philosophers. This situation must have led to the evolving of a new language, which, if used in 'dialectics' will not lead to any ambiguous or misunderstood conception. Thus, navya-nyāya language is an outcome of rigorous thinking of indian philosophers in this direction.

One can experience the focus of navya-nyāya on the precise means of communication if one goes through the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* and the commentaries on the same. From this it may be clear why the ancient nyāya is described as issue-oriented (प्रमेय-प्रधान) and the modern one as epistemology-oriented (or rather methodology-oriented) i.e. प्रमाण-प्रधान. Even our author of *Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa* (NNBP) Maheshchandra Nyāyaratna comments : “A hair -splitting subtlety in the discussion of meanings of terms is, thus, the distinguishing characteristic of modern nyāya. Poverty of matter is its great drawback” but adds in the same breath, “Notwithstanding this drawback, however, it is an excellent training for the intellect, which, under its discipline, acquires a power of precise thinking that is beyond all price. Without a study of modern nyāya, it is impossible, again, to thoroughly understand certain Sanskrit works on philosophy, Law, Rhetoric and even Grammar; for example, the *Citsukhī*, a commentary by Citsukhācārya on *Nyāyamakaranda* (a treatise on the Vedānta philosophy by Ānandabodha), the *Dāyabhāga-prabodhini*, a commentary by Śrīkrṣṇa Trakālaṅkāra on *Dāyabhāga* (a treatise on the Hindu Law of inheritance), the *Kāvyaprakāśādarśa*, a commentary by Maheśvara Nyāyālaṅkāra on *Kāvyaprakāśa* (a work on Rhetoric), and *Paribhāṣendu-śekhara* and *Mañjūṣā* (works on Grammar) by Nageśa Bhaṭṭa”. (vide : pp 2-3 of the NNBP under the sub-title “Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya system of philosophy and Its Technical Terms)

This comment of our author of the *Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa* makes the scope as well as limitation of navyanyāya amply clear. This is not the occasion to discuss the limitation of modern nyāya rather we should get acquainted with the scope of it here. Our author has mentioned a few śāstric texts, which cannot be understood in a proper manner unless one is well versed in navyanyāya. This is so, because, once the language and methodology were evolved, all systems adopted it as the means of

communication. Hence almost all texts after 14th century A.D. are written in navya-nyāya language.

If one wishes to study different texts he must know the modern nyāya. It is like this ; If one does not know mathematics one cannot do physics or chemistry or biology (or even psychology or sociology for that matter) in a perfect manner. The same is the case with navya nyāya. Thus, it makes it essential for one to learn and master the language and methodology of navya-nyāya (of course, if one cares to study any śāstric texts written after 14th century A.D.) to understand various systems.

To facilitate his very learning of the same, our author presented the methodology through his learned, lucid and simple paper on navya-nyāya technicalities. Yes, the text of *Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa* was originally a paper written by our author Maheshchandra. He wrote it somewhere in early nineties of 19th century A.D. It turned into the form of a book when Kalipada Tarkacharya added his Bengali translation and the commentary *Suprabhā* to the paper. The same is published by the Sanskrit College, Kolkata in 1973 in the Book-form. (vide : Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. Lxxix)

### **The Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa**

Before we say something about the text that we are going to study, let us look into what the author has to say about it. He says, 'The technicalities of modern Nyāya have hitherto repelled student of Sanskrit from its study. The immemorial practice has been for Naiyāyikas to explain verbally to their pupils the meaning of each term as it turns up in the course of their teaching, and the explanations are after certain set formulæ. A book called the Nyāyakoṣa was brought out in Bombay by Bhimacharya Jhalakikar in 1875, and this book is a Dictionary of Technical terms used in Nyāya. The explanations it gives are, however, not full enough, and the work itself has not yet come to be generally known. I propose, therefore, in this paper to explain some of these technicalities and this in simple Sanskrit,



as I cannot hope to be able to make matters equally clear though the medium of English. My method of interpretation is not the orthodox one usually followed by Pandits, which I have thought proper to abandon as it is not one calculated to make matters quite intelligible'.... (vide : p. 5 of the Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya system of Philosophy and its Technical Terms in the *NNBP*, Kolkata, 1973)

I think, this comment of our author, makes the purpose of writing *Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa* quite clear. It also becomes obvious that the purpose of our course and the purpose of *NNBP* are one and the same. This is why, the same text was selected by Prof Jha, for our course in Navya Nyāya Language and Methodology : Level I, to bring home many an idea of navya nyāya for the Sanskrit and philosophy-teachers of the Universities and colleges primarily and also for the teachers and researchers in various other fields like computer, engineering etc. Later on. That, 'this text is an appropriate choice to achieve our goal' will be felt by every reader of this book.

Let us now say something about the text that we are going to study. The purpose of writing the text is made clear by our author in his comment stated above. One may say that he has more than fulfilled our expectations from him. He has confined himself to the technique of navyanyāya through which the language of the same is evolved.

The metaphysics accepted by the modern nyāya system is taken for granted and as per the purpose of the text he has never tried to elaborate on the metaphysics or epistemology of navya-nyāya. He straight away begins with the technique and discusses the important concepts which are involved in formulating the artificial language. They are :

- (i) Property and property-holder (*dharma* and *dharmin*)
- (ii) Universal and Extraneous Factor (*Jāti* & *upādhi*)
- (iii) Relations : Direct & Indirect (*sambandha* : *sākṣāt* and *paramparā*)

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- (iv) Relation of completion (collective and simultaneous relation. (*Paryāpti sambandha*)
- (v) Counterrelatum and Base-relatum (*Pratiyogin* and *anuyogin*)
- (vi) Absence : Mutual and Relational (*abhāva* : *anyonyābhāva* and *samisargābhāva*)
- (vii) Delimiters : Property, Relation, Time, etc. (*avacchedaka* : *dharma, sambandha kāla* etc.)
- (viii) Cognition : non-qualified and qualified (*nirvikalpaka* and *sa-vikalpaka jñāna*)
- (ix) Qualification : Already known and yet to be known (*siddha* and *sādhyā-viśeṣaṇa*)
- (x) Determinate cognition and Doubt. (*niścaya* and *saṁśaya*)

The above-mentioned are the main topics covered by our author. In course of the discussion he has touched upon many more points in his lucid manner. His speciality is : he makes the point; then gives appropriate example to bring home the point which is made and lastly tries to simplify the matter by giving a formal criterion to grasp the point just at the expression level itself. One may mention his tricks to obtain a delimiting property (vide:Text no/ 30) ; his criterion to distinguish between two absence (vide:Text no. 36) etc.

Some times, however, what our author says may be revised a little. For instance, while explaining the difference between occurrence-exacting and non-occurrence-exacting relations, our author comments: पुनश्च सम्बन्धो द्विविधः वृत्तिनियामकः वृत्त्यनियामकश्च।... यस्मिंश्च सम्बन्धे पूर्वोक्तरूपा वृत्तिता आधाराधेयभावश्च न प्रतीयते, केवलं सम्बन्धितामात्रम् स वृत्त्यनियामकः सम्बन्धः। तत्र सप्तमीविभक्तेः मनुबादिप्रत्ययस्य च प्रयोगो न भवति। किन्तु सम्बन्धित्वबोधकाः इन्-ईय-प्रभृतयः प्रत्ययाः प्रयुज्यन्ते। यथा -स्वत्व-सम्बन्धो न वृत्तिनियामक इति मन्त्रिणि सत्यपि स्वत्वसम्बन्धे 'मन्त्री राजवान्' इति किंवा 'मन्त्रिणि राजा' इति न प्रयोगः किन्तु 'राजकीयो मन्त्री' इति प्रयोगः ।

Here, two points should be noted. As usual our author has tried to give a formal criterion to differentiate between the वृत्तिनियामक and वृत्त्यनियामक सम्बन्ध (vide Text no. 16) As we can look into the detailed discussion in the Text mentioned, let us simply look into the point which needs to be revised. It is regarding the formal criterion to recognise the non-occurrence-exacting relation. The author says, 'मत्तुप् प्रत्यय' i.e. possessive suffix cannot be used in case of this type of relation whereas we do have expressions like, 'धनवान् चैत्रः', 'Thus, it is a possible expression. It does not create an idea of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* between चैत्र and his धन. Both of them are related by the स्व-स्वामि-भाव relation. The understanding simply is: धननिष्ठस्वत्वनिरूपकः चैत्रः। So what one should observe is, the rule stated by the author is, though general, not very hard and fast.

The second point is regarding the expression मन्त्री राजवान्. As we have discussed it in the notes on the Text no 16 let us not discuss it here.

Still one more point needs our attention. It is the definition of universal (जाति) given by our author. It runs as follows: येन परस्परं विभिन्नरूपाणामपि एकजातीय-द्रव्याणामेकश्रेण्यामन्तर्भावो भवति, स धर्मो जातिः। It is obvious that the term 'जाति' should not occur in the definition of 'जाति'. 'प्रकार' would have been a better choice.

While discussing the entities which are known only through their *Pratiyogins*, our author mentions two such entities. The third entity, one may remember, which is known as *sa-pratiyogika-pradārtha* is 'similarity' i.e., *Sādṛśya*. (vide Text no. 25.)

Another important point discussed by our author is that of 'पर्याप्ति सम्बन्ध'. The expression 'अयं न द्वौ किन्तु द्वित्ववान्' is an expression which represents a 'fact'. Therefore, though a little ambiguous it has to be explained in a proper manner. Our author has succeeded in making us understand the same. He explains that 'number two' has to exist in each of the two things first and then it can exist in both of them. Now, this will be easy to understand if the relations, by which number two

exists individually in each of the two and collectively in both, are different. Thus, our author explains, number two exists individually in each by the relation of inherence (as it is a quality) and it exists collectively and simultaneously in both by the relation called पर्याप्ति.

Kalipada Tarkacharya, however, brings to our notice that Jagadīśa differs from others on this point. According to him by only one relation, namely, पर्याप्ति, number two exists in two entities individually as well as collectively. The logic behind this opinion is : ‘that which does not exist by a certain relation in something individually cannot exist in a group of things collectively by the same relation’. (vide : *Suprabhāṣā* : 19 of the text of *NNBP*)

One can see that both these positions have some logical stand behind them. They are held by the philosophers to answer different situations. Those who are interested may look into the *Jāgadīśi* on *Avacchedaktva-Nirukti-Dīdhitih* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. (vide : *Avacchedakatvanirukti* of Jagadīśa, Master Maṇimālā Maṇi no. 200, Benares, 1948, pp.38-44)

Our author, however, has made clear that his approach is not the orthodox one and the way he has tried to explain the necessity of accepting पर्याप्ति सम्बन्ध is logical as well as simple.

To sum up, one may observe that whatever apparent shortcomings one comes across in the text are actually the shortcomings of scarcity of time, sometimes energy etc. In other words, these are human limitations, because, in the case of any human work one can always say, ‘had there been some more time, the work would have been better’. In reality, there never is ‘more time’. Thus, these are inevitable limitations of God’s supreme (imperfect) creation. What one is always free to do is to look into the positive points, the plus points of any human work. So far as our *NNBP* is concerned, one may say, though brief it is the only work of its kind. It is simple, lucid, easily understandable and capable of removing all fear about navya-nyāya from the mind of its reader. Our author flourished in the 19th century A.D. That he was well versed in *nyāya* is obvious

from the work. One may get some more information about our author in the Calcutta Sanskrit College publication mentioned before (pp.95-98.).

The above mentioned publication also contains one appendix (*pariśiṣṭa*) by Kalipada Tarkacharya. In this appendix Kalipada has touched upon those points which are relevant and our author could not include them in the *NNBP*. The points are:

- (i) Definition of definition (*lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇa*)
- (ii) Fallacies (*hetvābhāsāḥ*)
- (iii) Five types of (ii) (*pañcavidha-hetudoṣāḥ*)
- (iv) Obstructor (*pratibandhaka*)
- (v) Reason (*hetuḥ*)
- (vi) Cause (*kāraṇa*)
- (vii) Effect (*kārya*)
- (viii) Two Types of cause (*kāraṇa-dvaividhya*)
- (ix) Three types of cause (*kāraṇa-traividhya*)
- (x) Meaning of the expression 'one of the two'  
(*anyataraśabdasyārthaḥ*)







One can see that even if some more points are added by Kalipada Tarkacharya, still, the text cannot become 'complete' in the true sense of the term. But let us say that no text can be 'Complete' in the true sense of the term; perhaps that is not the aim of writing any book. The purpose of our author behind writing the *NNBP* and the purpose of the present translator behind the present work, namely, English translation of the *NNBP* are identical : To facilitate understanding of the beginners of the study of *nyāyaśāstra*. If readers find it useful the purpose of both the works will be served.

## THE LAYOUT OF THE PRESENT WORK


The text of *Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa* which appears continuously in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Publication, is presented here by dividing it into different numbered units, such as : Text 1, Text 2 etc. While dividing the text the care, generally, is taken that one unit covers one point. Wherever the point is too long, it is further divided into meaningful units by cutting the text meaningfully. This will facilitate the understanding of new students, on one hand, and will be easy to refer to for anyone, on the other. The unit of text is followed by English translation of the unit and it is followed by understandable notes. The notes contain diagrams which make the point under discussion visible. After this introduction appears the key to read the diagrams where meanings of different signs have been given. At the end of the book is added one glossary of technical terms followed by a select Bibliography. One can look into the English parallel of a Sanskrit term in just one glance in the glossary. Sometimes I have translated *paṭatvatva* as 'clothness-hood'. I am aware that this is not good English and the state of being clothness' would have been better translation. But I have translated in the above manner just to show that it is something very much abstract which one does not need generally ! In special cases, however, when one is speaking about the universal 'clothness' the more abstract concept like 'cloth-ness-hood' comes into the picture (of the content of cognition).


## ABOUT THE GRAPHS


In the notes I have used graphs or diagrams to make the point visible to eyes. But one must know how to see and read the diagram. For facilitating the same let us now look into the signs and their meanings for which they stand.

Sign	Meaning
(1) 	'x' is in or on 'y' which means x is located on the locus 'y'. The line stands for the relation between the two.
(2) 	'x' and 'y' are mutually described which means 'x' describes 'y' and 'y' describes 'x'.
(3) 	'x' delimits 'y' or 'y' is delimited by 'x' which means 'x' is the 'delimitor' and 'y' is 'delimited'.
(4) 	'x' and 'y' are related
(5) 	1) 'x' causes/produces 'y' which means 'x' is the cause and 'y' the effect.  (2) 'x' is related to 'y' which means 'x' is counter-relatum and 'y' is base-relatum of the relation between them.
(6) 	'x' resides in all the four loci simultaneously and collectively pervading all of them fully.

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- (7)  'x' is the counter- positive of the absence. which means it is an absence of 'x'.

- (8)  'x' is inherent property of 'z' and 'y' is a contextual property of 'z' which is delimited by 'x'.

- (9)  'x' is inherent property of 'z', and 'y' is a contextual property of the same 'z'. 'R' is the relation by which 'z' resides in 'p' (i.e. its locus).

Both 'x' and 'R' delimit 'y' the contextual property of 'z', which resides in it only in a particular context.

It needs to be mentioned that absence is sometimes shown with '-' sign. e.g. घटाभाव is shown as '- घट.'

These are some of the basic structures which appear in our diagrams or pictures. If these are understood and remembered it will not be difficult to read the pictures.

□□



## TEXT - 1

धर्मः ध्रियते तिष्ठति वर्तते यः स धर्मः । आकाशादिकं विना सर्व एवं पदार्थाः यत्र कुत्रचिदपि वर्तन्त इति सर्व एव धर्मा इत्युच्यन्ते । यत्र यः वर्तते स तस्य धर्मः । यथा द्रव्ये जातिगुणकर्माणि तिष्ठन्तीति जातिगुणकर्माणि द्रव्यस्य धर्माः । सूत्रादौ अवयवे पटादि अवयविद्रव्यं तिष्ठति इति द्रव्यम् अपि पटादि सूत्रादेः धर्मः । पात्रे जलं वर्तते इति पात्रस्य धर्मः जलम् । आकाशादिकं तु न कुत्र अपि वर्तते इति आकाशं न कस्य अपि धर्मः । अत एव आकाशम् अवृत्तिपदार्थ इति उच्यते ।

### English Translation

Property : that which is contained, which resides, which exists is called a property. Excepting ether etc. Everything exists somewhere or the other, therefore, everything is called a property. Whatever exists somewhere is called a property of that. For example, in a substance reside universal, quality and action so universal, quality and action are properties of a substance.

In the threads i.e. parts exists 'the whole' substance, namely, cloth, therefore, the cloth, though a substance is called a property of threads. 'Water' is contained in a 'pot' so 'water' is the property of pot.

As ether etc. do not exist anywhere (in a fixed locus) they are not property of anything. This is why ether is called an unlocated entity.


**Note :** If one wishes to know and master the neo-logical language one has to understand the methodology of the neo-logic. The author, thus begins with the basic concepts of neo-logic. A Neo-logician looks at the world as a meaning i.e. the referent of a word. Everything which can be an object of true cognition is said to be referred to by a word. The fictitious things, therefore, cannot be referred to by any word. Thus, a criterion to decide whether something really exists in the world

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
is two-fold as per the neo-logic. The thing must be knowable and the thing must be namable, When both these conditions are fulfilled, the thing in question has to be real. Thus, the general definition of a thing (*padārtha*) which is nothing but a referent of a word is : jñeyatvam abhindhēyatvam padārtha-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam.

Thus, every word in language refers to something and everything in the world has a naming word or name in simple language. Another point to remember in this connection is everything is referred to only by its own name. The same thing neo-logicians put in this way- a word is used by a speaker only when there is a ground to use that word. This ground has a beautiful name in Sanskrit : *śabada-pravṛtti-nimitta*. Now, what should be this 'cause of using a word' ? The neo-logic says: it is nothing but the inherent property of the particular thing which is i.e. which functions as the 'ground for using that particular word with reference to that particular thing'. This implies, whenever a word is uttered by a speaker with reference to a particular thing that person has located the inherent property of that particular thing in the same. To take a concrete example, when one utters the word 'pot' he or she has located 'potness' in the thing about which the person is talking. This may be confirmed by the fact that one never uses the word 'pot' with reference to, say, pen or cloth or wall or anything which is not a pot. Therefore, the neo-logicians argue that, first the inherent property of a thing is located and through the property does one identify the property-holder, namely, the thing.


Thus, to cut the long story short, according to our system, ( let us refer to the navya-nyāya-system as 'our system' henceforth in this work), 'reality' appears in a specific structure. The structure may be represented in the following diagram :



In the structure shown in the above diagram, whatever may be the 'x' it is a property of 'y' by the straight-line relation. Thus, 'x' is a property, y is the property-possessor and the straight line is the relation between the two. Because of this relation alone 'x' becomes the property of 'y'. In other words, 'x is on y' or 'x is in y' or 'x resides in y' or 'x exists in or on y' are all feasible expressions which point to the basic structure of reality i.e.




In all such cases 'x' is called a property of 'y' no matter what 'x' is. To make the point clear some examples have been taken : Firstly, the author shows that substance holds in it : the universal, the quality and the action. This may be understood through the following two sets of graphs :



It is easy to understand that a substance possesses properties such as universal, qualities and action or activity as these abstract or abstract - like things need some concrete substratum to reside in. They simply cannot exist without the help of a substance. But the concept of 'property' in our system is much comprehensive than we think it to be. This needs to be borne in mind while understanding the statement

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mentioned above that 'x' is called a property of 'y' no matter what 'x' is in the case of




To bring home the comprehensiveness of the concept of *dharma* or property the author has taken up two more examples : one that of cloth and the other that of water. The locus of cloth is the threads and the locus of water mentioned by the author is a vessel. Thus, the two sentences : 'in the parts, namely, threads resides the whole, namely, cloth' and 'there is water in the vessel' represent or depict the following two realities :



One can remember the basic structure of reality, namely, 'x' resides in 'y' and can just replace 'x' by (1) *paṭa* or cloth and (2) Water, whereas 'y' by (1) threads and (2) a vessel respectively. In the basic structure of reality we have seen that 'x' is a property and 'y' the property possessor- or locus of that property. If we apply our understanding in the present two cases then in the first case, cloth is the property of threads which is its locus and in the second one water is the property of the vessel which is its locus.

This shows that even substances like cloth or water are properties when they are located in their locus. We can add any amount of examples like 'pen on the table' or 'book on the shelf' which will only make our work bigger. It will certainly not add anything more to our knowledge. So let us refrain from it and go further. The point that we have made through these examples is this that the concept

of 'property' is not restricted to anything abstract alone but it stands for anything which is located somewhere. The Sanskrit terms for *dharma* and *dharmin* are also *ādheya* and *ādhāra* respectively. So to remember the basic structure of reality let us have the same graphs again :



Let these graphs be printed in our brains and then let us proceed further.

The discussion so far gave us the impression to the effect that anything in this universe can become a property provided it is located somewhere because the most independent of the categories namely 'substance' also is or can become a property. True. But there are certain substances which, in our system, are omnipresent. They exist everywhere. Let us take the case of ether. Ether is present everywhere. So if a question is asked, 'where does ether exist?' It may be answered in two ways : (1) Everywhere and (2) Not in any particular locus. One feels, the two are different only on the level of expression. Semantically, there is no difference. To explain : Something exists everywhere or something is omni-present means something does not exist anywhere in particular. In other words, If we stick to the example of ether given by the author, we may say, one cannot show, one cannot locate ether anywhere. Therefore it is called unlocated (a-*vṛtti*). That is, ether does not possess *ādheya* with reference to a restricted *ādhāra*. It cannot be described as an *ādheya* of any specific locus.

This is the reason why the author says : As ether etc. do not exist anywhere (in a fixed locus) they are not property of anything. This is why ether is called an unlocated entity. Here, one question is still unanswered and that is : what is included in 'etc.'? The answer is one can include all omni-present substances as well as the atomic ones.

**TEXT-2**

धर्मश्च प्रथमतः द्विविधः जातिरुपाधिश्चेति । येन परस्परं विभिन्नरूपाणामपि एकजातीयद्रव्याणामेकश्रेण्यान्तर्भावो भवति, स धर्मो जातिः। यथा विभिन्नदेशीया मनुष्या विभिन्नाकाररूपस्वभावा अपि एकया मनुष्यत्वजात्या एकश्रेण्यामन्तर्भाविताः। जातिश्च सामान्यं नाम कणादोक्तश्चतुर्थः पदार्थः।

**English Translation**

Primarily, property is of two types : (i) universal and (ii) an extraneous property. Universal is that property, by which, substances of same type, though different from each other in appearance, are included in the same class. For example, human beings, belonging to different regions, different in shape, appearance and nature are included in the same class by the universal human-being-hood (or mankind). Universal or *Jāti* is same as *sāmānya* which is enumerated in the fourth place by *Kaṇāda* (in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*) in the list of categories (of entities).

**Note** : After grasping the basic structure of things, namely, the structure of *dharma-dharmin-bhāva* in general, it is necessary to understand the nature of *dharma*, that of *dharmin* and that of *bhāva* in particular. Accordingly, the author has taken up the first concept first. It is the concept of *dharma*.


*Dharma*, the author says, is divided into two types, i.e. *Jāti* and *upādhi*. This division is primary one. Because, as we have seen before, anything can become *dharma*. Even one substance can become *dharma* or property of another substance. But that will be taken up later. The very basic question in this connection is, what do we understand when we hear the word *dharma*. To answer this, the author says, the primary classification of *dharma* is two-fold, namely, *jāti* and *upādhi*. Between the two, *jāti* or universal is an inherent special feature or characteristic of a thing by which the same belongs to a particular class. Say, for instance, *manuṣyatva* (or human-being-hood) is a special feature, an uncommon, inherent characteristic of human beings by

which i.e. on the basis of which they form a class of human beings. All human-beings do not look exactly alike. They are different so far as the shape, colour or nature are concerned. They also belong to different regions but still all are called human-beings only because all possess human-beings-hood. Kaṇāda, the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-kāra has accepted 'universal' as an independent category of entities. He counts the categories as follows : *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*.

In this list the fourth one is *sāmānya*. This is the same as *jāti*. In other words, '*jāti*' and '*sāmānya*' are synonymous. One can use one for the other. Therefore, our author says: *jāti* is the fourth category stated by Kaṇāda, i.e. *sāmānya*.

So far as *upādhi* is concerned, one has to say that it is not inherent as the universal is. It is somewhat extraneous to the thing. For example, *ākāśatva* is an *upādhi* why? Because to understand it, we have to take recourse to *śabda*. We understand *ākāśatva* as a property of the locus of *śabda*. So, one needs an external help, as it were, to understand an *upādhi*.

If one tries to remember the basic division of *dharma* in a picture-form the picture may be drawn as :



One point may be noted here : while defining the term *jāti* our author has stated : येन परस्परं विभिन्नरूपाणामपि एकजातीयद्रव्याणामेकश्रेण्यामन्तर्भावो भवति, स धर्मो जातिः। One feels that while defining *jāti* one should not use the same term in the definition. This is known as a fault of *ātmaśraya*. The word *jāti* is used in the definition in the sense of type. So our author could have very well said एकप्रकारीय द्रव्याणाम् .... जातिः । But somehow, he has used the same word which needs to be understood in the sense of 'type' as we have done while translating the text into English. □□

**TEXT-3**

उपाधिरपि पुनः सखण्डोपाधिरखण्डोपाधिश्चेति द्विविधः। खण्डेन (अंशेन) सह वर्तते इति सखण्डः। यश्च अंशतो विभक्तुं शक्यते स सखण्डोपाधिधर्म इति यावत्। यथा पशुत्वम्। तद्धि लोमवल्लाङ्गूलवत्त्वम्। ततश्च तस्य लोमलाङ्गूलादय अंशाः बहवो वर्तन्ते इति द्रव्यरूपं पशुत्वं धर्मः सखण्डोपाधिः। एवं रूपवानयम् इत्यत्र गुणात्मकं रूपं धर्मः। स च सखण्डोपाधिः। रूपत्वजात्याश्रयो हि रूपम्। ततश्च रूपस्य रूपत्वजाति आश्रयश्चेति अंशद्वयमस्ति ।

**English Translation**

*Upādhi* (the other type of property) is also of two types: divisible and indivisible. That which has part (parts) is divisible and that which cannot be divided into parts is called an indivisible property. For example, beasthood. It consists of possessing bristle and tail. Thus, that possesses many parts like bristle, tail etc and hence, beasthood in the form of a substance is a divisible extraneous property. Similarly, in the case of a sentence, *rūpavān ayam* (he is handsome), *rūpa* which is a quality, is a divisible property. *Rūpa* (color or beauty) is nothing but the locus of the universal *rūpatva*. Thus, *rūpa* has two parts or aspects one is the universal *rūpatva* and the second is *āśraya* or locus.

**Note :** The second type of property, namely, *upādhi* (which should be translated as an extraneous property ) is, further, divided into two kinds : (i) with parts and (ii) without any parts. The example given is *paśutva*. Beast-hood is not a *jāti* but it is an *upādhi*. Why? Because it can be defined as, 'possessing bristle and tail.' Now, this definition shows that *paśutva* can be divided into various parts like bristle, tail, etc.etc. Therefore, it is said to be a divisible *upādhi*. Similarly, the author says, *rūpa* i.e. colour or beauty is a divisible property. When one says that, 'this man is *rūpavan*', *rūpa* becomes an *upādhi*. What is *rūpa*? It may be defined as the locus of a universal called *rūpatva*. This shows that *rūpa* has two constituents. It has the universal *rūpatva* and its locus. So *rūpa* is an *upādhi* which can be divided into two parts.



**TEXT-4**

यस्यांशविशेषो नास्ति मनुष्यत्व-द्रव्यत्वादजातिवत् यस्तु अंशतो विभक्तुं न शक्यते अंशरहितत्वमेव यस्य स्वरूपमङ्गीक्रियते सः अखण्डोपाधिः। यथा भावत्वम्। तद्धि अभावत्वविरोधी कश्चन धर्म इति। पशुत्वादिवद्भावत्वम् अंशतो विभक्तुं न शक्यते।

**English Translation**

That which does not have any particular parts i.e. which cannot be divided into further parts, like humanhood, substancehood etc. By nature which is partless is an indivisible property e.g. *bhāvatva* or being. It is some property opposite to non-being or absence. This cannot be divided into parts as beastness can be.

**Note :** Exactly opposite of *sa-khaṇḍa* is *a-khaṇḍa upādhi*. That which cannot be divided, in other words, that which cannot be defined in terms of its various parts is an *akhaṇḍa upādhi*. For example, *bhāvatva* or being or positiveness. What is it? If this question is asked, the answer will be : It is something other than non-positive. In a way, it does not give you any new information, as it were.

□□

**TEXT- 5**

जातेरपि अंशविभागो नास्ति। किन्तु जातेः समवाय-सम्बन्धेन सत्त्वं नियतम्। अखण्डोपाधेस्तु न तथा। तस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन सत्त्वमिति अनयोः पृथगुल्लेखः।

**English Translation**

Even *jāti* or universal does not have any parts. But universal resides (in its locus) always by the relation of inherence. such is not the case of *akhaṇḍa-upādhi*. It exists (in its locus) by the self-linking relation and this is why both have been mentioned differently.

**Note:** A question may arise, at this juncture in the mind of an alert reader : does a universal have any parts or it doesn't? The answer is : universal also is partless. Then the further question may be : Then why is it mentioned specifically that the indivisible extraneous property does not have any parts? The author tries to meet with this question in the present paragraph. He states : universal resides in its locus always by the relation of inherence, and never by any other relation. This is not true about an *upādhi*. *Upādhi* resides in a locus by linking itself with the locus i.e. by a self-linking relation . Thus, the difference between the two is maintained and it becomes necessary to mention them independently.

□□

### TEXT- 6

जातेरखण्डोपाधेश्च प्रतीतावनुल्लेखे (शब्देनानुच्चारणे) निरवच्छिन्ना (तयोर्विशेषण-प्रतीतिरहिता) प्रतीतिः भवति । यथा 'पटो भाव' इति प्रतीतौ पटत्वं जातिः भावत्वम् अखण्डोपाधिश्च पटपदार्थ-भावपदार्थान्तर्भावेनैव प्रतीयेते न तु शब्देन ते उल्लिखिते इति न तयोः प्रतीतावत्र सविशेषणं भानं किन्तु पटत्वांशे भावत्वांशे च विशेषणभानरहितमेव निरवच्छिन्नं भानं जायते । यत्र तु तयोरुल्लेखः तत्र तयोः प्रतीतिरपि सावच्छिन्ना (विशेषण-प्रतीतिरहिता) भवति । यथा 'अस्मिन् द्रव्ये भावत्वं पटत्वं चास्ति' इत्यत्र पटत्वं भावत्वं च स्पष्टत एव शब्देनोल्लिखितमिति तयोत्र यथाक्रमं पटत्वत्वेन भावत्वत्वेन च सावच्छिन्ना प्रतीतिः । अत एव 'अनुल्लिख्यमानजात्यखण्डोपाध्यतिरिक्तपदार्थानां निरवच्छिन्नभानानभ्युपगम' इति ग्रन्थकृद्भिः सिद्धान्तितम् ।

### English Translation

Universal and the indivisible extraneous property when not mentioned in knowledge i.e. When not expressed in words, are known as they are i.e. they do not appear in knowledge with their qualifiers. For instance (let us take a sentence which is nothing but an encoded cognition) 'A cloth is (a) positive (entity).' In this cognition the universal namely clothness

(*paṭava*) and the indivisible extraneous property, namely, positiveness (*bhāvatva*) are understood as included in (the meanings) of 'cloth' and 'positive'. As they are not mentioned by words, their cognition does not occur as qualified. But the cognition (of both the properties) takes place without any cognition of their qualifiers i.e. not qualified (by any qualification). On the other hand, when they are expressed in language, there, their cognition also occurs as qualified i.e. with the cognition of their qualifiers. For example (let us take a sentence :) 'In this substance both positiveness and clothness are there'. Here, both positiveness and clothness are mentioned in words clearly and hence the state of positiveness and the state of clothness appear as qualifiers to positiveness and clothness respectively. This is why

'It is not accepted (in the system) that anything other than un verbalized universal and un verbalized indivisible extraneous property is known without its qualifier.'

**Note :** *Jāti* i.e. universal and *akhaṇḍopādhi* i.e. indivisible extraneous property are grasped without any qualifier when they are not verbalized. To understand the exact import of this let us begin at the very beginning : every verbalized cognition is a qualified cognition and 'qualified cognition' presupposes the cognition of qualifier. This may be understood with a simple example. It is that of 'blue pen'. If one does not know the meaning of the term blue (i.e. if one does not know what is 'blue') then one cannot grasp 'blue pen'. Now, 'a pot' is also a qualified cognition and hence, it is necessary to understand 'potness' beforehand if one has to know 'a pot'. Here, a question may arise in the mind of an alert observer : 'what about potness? Does one have to know the state of potness to know potness?' In answer to this question the attention must be drawn to the very first statement of the explanation above. It says that every verbalized cognition is a qualified one i.e. occurs along with its qualification. In other words, non-verbalized cognition is not a qualified one. It means it does not take place after the cognition of its qualifier. In the above example, 'potness' is not expressed in words. What is expressed is 'a pot'. Therefore, 'a pot' is a qualified cognition and its qualifier, namely, potness as is


not expressed appears in the cognition of a 'a pot' as non-qualified one. Thus, the answer to the question above is, for knowing potness in the cognition of 'a pot' one need not know the state of potness beforehand.

This stand is based on the following logic : (1) No qualified cognition is possible without the cognition of the qualification (acquired before-hand); and (2) If it is accepted that the qualifier of the qualifier also must be known then the very qualified cognition will not come into being ever. Simply because if this is allowed then it will result into an infinite regress. (3) Thirdly, whatever is an immediate cause, alone should be treated as the cause to a certain effect and not also the mediate one. Only because the mediate one is not a necessary one. Here, the concept of superfluosness of a cause is involved. All that is to be treated as superfluous or redundant which is not directly or immediately involved in the coming into being of an effect.

Thus, if 'potness' is expressed in a sentence it is a qualified cognition as it is verbalized and in such a case it is necessary to know the state of potness for the one who wants to know potness.


This is how the system has formed a maxim that, 'a universal and an indivisible extraneous factor, when not verbalized, alone appear in cognition without their qualifiers.' In other words, excepting non-verbalized universal and indivisible extraneous factor each and everything is known through some property which is its qualifier.

We may try to present the same through the following :



The above picture is the picture of the cognition of 'a pot' or 'ghaṭaḥ'. It may be described in Sanskrit as : घट इति ज्ञानं घटविशेष्यकं घटत्वप्रकारकं समवायसंसर्गकं ज्ञानम् ।

The other picture may look like this :



Thus, it may be observed that there, practically, is no difference in the two pictures excepting the names of the qualifieds and the qualifiers, Just because when *ghaṭatva* is mentioned in words, it becomes the object of qualified cognition and hence its qualifier appears in its cognition.

□□

## TEXT - 7

सम्बन्धः सन्निकर्षः। स च विभिन्नयोर्वस्तुनोः विशेषण-विशेष्य-भावप्रयोजकः। यथा दण्डी पुरुष इति विशेष्य-विशेषणभावप्रयोजकः संयोगसम्बन्धः। दण्ड-पुरुषयोरन्तरा संयोगं विना दण्डी पुरुष इति विशेषण-विशेष्य-भाव-प्रतीतिरेव न स्यात्।

### English Translation

Relation is closeness or proximity. It causes the qualificierness and qualificandness in two different things. For example : Contact is the relationship which causes the relation of qualificand and qualifier such as (between) 'A man with a stick'. Had there not been contact between the stick and the man the cognition 'a man with a stick' which is (the cognition of) the relationship between the qualifier (the stick) and the qualificand would not have arisen at all.

**Note :** The cause of the cognition 'a man with a stick' is the 'contact' between the stick and the man. It is understood from the simple fact that if the stick is placed somewhere in the corner of the


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room and the man is located somewhere away from it then the cognition 'man with a stick' never arises. It may be picturised like this :

दण्ड

पुरुष

So long as the picture lacks the line of relation between the two, the cognition *daṇḍī puruṣdḥ* is not possible. But when both the things are close to each other i.e. when the man holds the stick the picture above changes. One (of the two i.e. stick in this case) becomes the qualifier because of the proximity and the other (of the two, man in this case) becomes the qualificand. The picture becomes something like the following :



In short, the main function of relation is that it assigns the status of qualifier and qualificand to two different things. In our present example, when the stick is at a distance from the person it is not in a position to act as a qualifier to the man whereas when the man holds it it necessarily qualifies the man.

Thus, the points to be remembered in this context are :

- (i) Relation is closeness
- (ii) It exists between two entities
- (iii) Because of it one of the two entities qualifies the other.

**TEXT - 8**

सम्बन्धश्च द्विविधः। साक्षात्परम्पराभेदात् । सम्बन्धान्तराघटितः सम्बन्धः  
साक्षात्सम्बन्धः। स च समवाय-संयोग-स्वरूपादिभेदाद् बहुविधः। रूपवान् पुरुषः,  
पात्रे जलमस्ति, गृहे पटो नास्तीत्यादौ पुरुषे रूपस्य पात्रे जलस्य गृहे च पटाभावस्य  
यथाक्रमं समवाय-संयोग-स्वरूप-नामानः सम्बन्धाः प्रतीयन्ते।

**English Translation**

Relation is of two types : direct and indirect. That relation which does not consist of any other relation is called direct relation. It is of many types, such as : inherence contact, and self-linking relation. For instance, in the case of 'handsome man', 'there is water in the vessel' or 'there is absence of cloth in the house' etc, handsomeness in man, water in the vessel, and the absence of cloth in the house are related respectively to the man, the vessel and the house by inherence, contact and self-linking relations (respectively).

**Note :** To exemplify the relations or direct relations, our author has given three cases and they are :

- (i) Handsome man
- (ii) there is water in the vessel, and
- (iii) there is no cloth in the house

The first case is the case of inherence. Inherence is said to be the eternal relation in our system. Here, the word 'eternal' has a certain restricted sense. It means inherence is a relation which brings two interdependent things together. They are interdependent in the sense that they are never known separately. In other words, so long as one exists, it exists depending upon the other. When this much is said the question arises what could be the pairs of things which are related by this relation? In our system five pairs of entities are accepted to be related by the relation of inherence. In other words, inherence is possible only in these five cases. The five pairs are :

- (i) *guṇa* and *guṇin* i.e. quality and substance
- (ii) *kriyā* and *kriyāvān* i.e. action and substance


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(iii) *Jāti* and *vyakti* i.e. universal and individual

(iv) *avayavin* and *avayava* i.e. whole and parts  
and

(v) *viśeṣa* and *nityadravya* i.e. particularity and eternal substance.


To understand and remember it through concrete manner :



The second type of relation is *samyoga* or contact. Contact is a non-eternal relationship which is possible, as per our system, between two substances. It does not mean that *samyoga* or contact is the only possible relation between two substance but it simply means contact does not and cannot but reside between two substances alone. That is to say, two entities, if both are not substances, cannot be related to each other by the relation of contact.




The example taken up by our author is that of water and vessel. Both of these are substances and hence are related by contact.



When water is kept in the vessel, the two have the relation of contact. If water is thrown away, the contact between the two is lost. Again, if water is kept in the vessel, again the contact is produced. Thus, one may remember about contact the following :

- (1) Contact is possible only between two substances.
- (2) It is a product, hence can be produced and destroyed.
- (3) It is included in the list of *guṇas* in our system, hence it is a quality and therefore, exists in its locus by the relation of inherence.

The third type of direct relation is *sva-rūpa* or self-linking relation. Let us try to understand its nature little more closely. Actually, the very name and its translation into English as 'self-linking' relation makes it clear that it is not really an additional category of entities but either of the two things which are related is treated as a relation. The example taken up by our author is that of absence of cloth in the house. Let us draw the picture :




In fact, the above picture is drawn just to show the relationship of *sva-rūpa* between the locus and the located. In reality it is very difficult to show the two relata differently. However, the sentence '*gr̥he paṭābhāvaḥ*' expresses the reality of house being the locus of absence of cloth. This compels us to draw the picture in the above manner and also to understand the relationship as locus and located. But if a

question is asked about the name of the relationship it will be answered either absence (of cloth) or the house may be treated as a relationship between the two.

To try to look into the logic behind accepting this type of relationship, let us first look into some of the cases where the self-linking relationship is accepted. One example we have already seen and it is that of absence and its locus. Another case is that of inherence and its locus. Still another is that of indivisible extraneous property and its locus. Thus, these are those cases where *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* cannot be the relationships.

Absence, for instance, is a negative entity and it cannot get related to any positive entity through contact or inherence, just because these two are possible only among positive entities. One cannot argue here that let there not be any relation between absence and its locus. Because it is expressed by the syntax of *grhe paṭābhāvaḥ*. Thus, it is accepted that let one of the two relata itself act as a relationship. This is why the name of the relation is *sva-rūpa* 'one's own form' literally. It is translated into English as self-linking relation meaningfully as it hints to the fact that a relatum links itself (through itself) to the other relatum.

If we take the second example, namely, that of inherence, it is clear that inherence persists in cases of the five pairs of entities mentioned earlier. But, a question may be put, such as, how is inherence related to the two entities which are said to be related through inherence? For example, if universal and individual are related by inherence, the question is, how is inherence related to universal and also to the individual? This question is relevant because unless inherence is related to both, the two cannot be said to be related ! If the answer is, 'by another inherence', then the same question persists ad infinitum. This will result into the contingency that the universal and the individual would never be related. To avoid all this, the answer is *samavāya* is related to both *jāti* and *vyakti* by self-linking relation. In other words, one of the two relata may be treated as the relationship. Thus, there is no question of infinite regress. Let us say it graphically as follows :



Thus, we may remember about *svarūpa-sambandha* the following :

- (1) It is accepted where both contact and inherence are not possible.
- (2) It is not an additional category of entities but either of the relata acts as a relation
- (3) It may be translated into English as, 'self-linking relation.'

NB generally, the order of discussing relations in our system is (i) *saṁyoga* (ii) *samavāya* and (iii) *sva-rūpa*. However, our author has changed it and has discussed *samavāya* or inherence first and *saṁyoga* or contact next.

□□

## TEXT - 9

समवायश्च षष्ठपदार्थतया कणोदेनोक्तः नित्यः सम्बन्धः। यथा 'रूपवान् ब्राह्मणोऽयं चलति' इत्यादौ ब्राह्मणत्वजातेः रूपगुणस्य चलनक्रियायाश्च ब्राह्मणे समवायः सम्बन्धः। यावदाधारं यावदाधेयं वा समवायस्तिष्ठतीति 'समवायो नित्यसम्बन्ध' इत्युच्यते। समवायस्यैव 'अयुतसम्बन्ध' इति नामान्तरम्। संयोगादिकन्तु नैवम्। सतोरपि आधाराधेययोः (दण्डपुरुषयोः) संयोगादेरपायदर्शनात्।

### English Translation

Inherence is the sixth category of entities mentioned by Kaṇāda, which is an eternal relationship. For instance in the sentenc, 'the handsome brahmin walks', the universal, namely, brahminhood; the quality, namely, handsomeness and the action

of walking (all the three) reside in the brahmin by the relation of inherence. Inherence is called an eternal relation because it continues (to exist) so long as either the locus or the located exists. Inherence is also known by another name, namely, *a-yuta-sambandha* (*a-yutayoḥ sambandhaḥ*) i.e. the relation of or between the two which cannot be separated from each other. Contact etc. are not (of) such (a nature). Because, even when the locus and the located exist (e.g. a man and a stick respectively) contact is seen to cease to exist (between the two).

**Note :** Inherence is accepted to be a separate category of entities. It is mentioned at the sixth position in the list enumerating categories of entities accepted in the Vaiśeṣika system by Kaṇāda. It is said to be eternal because the two relata of this relation can never exist separately. In other words, *saṁavāya* between two relata continues to exist so long as one of the two is not destroyed. We have discussed before the five cases where *samavāya* is accepted to exist in our system. The members of these pairs are never known to exist separately of each other.



### TEXT - 10

संयोगश्च कणादोक्तगुणविशेषः। अभावादेः सम्बन्धः स्वरूपसम्बन्धः। यथा  
‘भूतले पटो नास्ती’ त्यादौ भूतले पटाभावस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धः प्रतीयते।  
स्वरूपसम्बन्धस्यैव विशेषणता इति नामान्तरम्।

### English Translation


‘Contact’ is a quality mentioned by Kaṇāda. The relation of absence (with its locus) is self-linking relation. For instance, ‘There is no cloth on the ground’. In this case, ‘absence of cloth’ is known to be related to the ground by the self-linking relation. Self-linking relation is also known by another name, namely, *viśeṣaṇatā*.

**Note :** Saṁyoga or contact is included in the list of *guṇas* by the Vaiśeṣika and our system. This is a non-eternal relation in the sense

that it comes into being by the action in either one or two substances, (as in touching the table with hand and as in joining two hands for prayer or for shaking hands. It also can be destroyed by the same cause, i.e. action in one substance (as in taking away the hand from table) or action in both the substances (as in taking away both the hands from the position of *namaskāra* or after shaking hands is over). Thus, it is different from *samavāya* which is an eternal relation, accepted as an independent category of entities by the metaphysics of our system.


The third type of relation accepted by the metaphysical frame-work of our system is named as, 'sva-rūpa sambandha' which we have discussed before to a certain extent. Here, let us look into the example given by our author. It is that of absence and its locus. When a sentence, '*bhūtale paṭaḥ nāsti*' is heard, absence of cloth on the piece of ground is understood from the heard sentence, and it is understood that absence exists on ground by the self-linking relation.

This can be understood in the following way : The structure of the sentence is such that it says that ground is the locus as the locative case-ending appears after the stem *bhūtala*. The meaning of locative case is 'locus'. So ground is the locus of absence. Here, a question may be asked that by which relation the absence is related to ground? The answer is : by *svarūpa sambandha*. Because, 'absence' is not a 'substance' to have the relation of contact with another substance, namely, *bhūtala*. It also is not a positive entity of a certain kind to have the relation of inherence with the ground. Thus, absence cannot be related to ground either by contact or by inherence. Nevertheless, it is related to *bhūtala* as the expressions *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na* or *bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ* explicitly say so. Here, as there is no other go, one has to say that absence is related to ground through itself i.e. through self-linking relation.



## 42 / Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa

Let us now look in to the last statement above : Another name for *svarūpa-sambandha* is *viśeṣaṇatā*. Before elaborating upon this point let us look into the following picture :



From the picture it is clear that 'absence of pot' is on the 'ground' which means that absence of pot is the (property i.e.) qualifier of the ground which is the qualificand. In other words, absence of pot qualifies the ground. When one perceives absence of pot on the ground, the eyes are connected with the absence which is the qualifier of the ground through the ground itself which is the qualified one. Thus, the relation or contact between the 'eyes' and 'absence of pot' may be described as : the contact of eyes with the qualificierness in the absence of pot which is described by the qualificandhood in the ground. If we say the same in Sanskrit it may be expressed as : चक्षुः संयुक्त-भूतलनिष्ठ-विशेष्यता-निरूपित-घटाभावनिष्ठ-विशेषणता. Now, the statement, 'another name for the self-linking relation is 'qualifierhood' becomes clear.

**TEXT - 11**

सम्बन्धान्तरघटितः (यस्य सम्बन्धस्य निर्माणे सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षा विद्यते तादृशः) सम्बन्धः परम्परा-सम्बन्धः। यथा स्व-समवायि-समवेतत्वरूपेण सामानाधिकरण्यनामकेन परम्परा-सम्बन्धेन पटे तन्तोरपि रूपमस्ति। अयञ्च सम्बन्धः समवायघटितः। एवं दण्डकमण्डलुधारिणि पुरुषे गृहे तिष्ठति सति स्व-संयोगि-संयोगित्वरूपेण स्वाश्रयाश्रयत्वेन परम्परासम्बन्धेन दण्डकमण्डलू अपि गृहे स्त इति। अयञ्च सम्बन्धः संयोगघटितः।


**English Translation**

A relation which consists of another relation (i.e. a relation such that it expects another relation to come into being) is called an indirect relation, namely, co-locatedness in the form of being inherent in a locus where it itself is inherent', the colour of threads also resides in the cloth. This relation is consisted of the relation of inherence. Similarly, when a person having a stick and a pitcher is present in the house, (one can rightly say that) the stick and the pitcher are also present in the house by the indirect relation, namely, 'being the locus of its own locus' in the form of 'being connected with that which is connected with itself.' This (indirect) relation consists of the relation of contact.

**Note :** 'Relation' is being divided here into two groups, namely, direct and indirect. Direct relation is easily understandable as persisting between two things. To explain : when two things are related with each other, the relation between the two is said to be direct. But when two things are related through another relation i.e. an additional relation having some other relatum or relata in between, then it is called an indirect relation. Our author has taken up two examples which make the point clear. When a statement is made that colour of threads is in the cloth also, it means that the colour of threads resides in the cloth by an indirect relation. Directly, the colour


#### 44 / Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa

is in the threads but it also is in the cloth indirectly i.e. through its relation with threads. To make it concrete let us draw the following:



The picture makes it visible that both the colour of threads and also the cloth are directly related to the threads by the relation of inherence. Thus both of them are collocated in the threads. So, as their meeting point is the threads, both of them are related through threads. Thus, if one wants to say that colour of threads also resides in the cloth what one means to say is both the colour of threads and the cloth are inherent in the threads and hence the relation in both of them may be named as 'being inherent in the locus where it itself is inherent'. As both the relata are collocated and both reside in the same locus by inherence it is said that this indirect relation consists of inherence.

The other example shows how an indirect relation also consists of contact (*samyoga*). A person having a stick and a pitcher is in the house. In this case, one can also say 'the stick and the pitcher are in the house'. The relation of the stick and the pitcher with the house is through the person possessing them and thus it is indirect. The two things are related with the person directly to whom the house also is related directly. We can understand it as follows :





In the above picture, thus, there are two direct relationships shown at right namely contact between the person and the house and contact between the person and the stick and pitcher. Through the person the stick and pitcher exist in the house. How? Both the stick and the pitcher are connected with the person through contact and the person is connected with the house through another contact. Thus, if we understand *daṇḍa-kamaṇḍalū* as the starting point of the relation, namely, *sva* and the relation is with the house which may be named as *sva-saṁyogi-saṁyogin* because, it is related through contact with the person who is related through contact with *sva*. So *sva-saṁyogin* is the person and *sva-saṁyogi-saṁyogin* is the house. Now, the property of *sva-saṁyogi-saṁyogin* is *sva-saṁyogi-saṁyogitva* which is treated as a relation in the present case between *daṇḍakamaṇḍalū* and the house. Therefore, the picture shows the dotted line to point out that the relation is indirect.

One can also call the indirect relationship by the name *sva-āśraya-āśrayatva*. It is easy to understand as the locus (*āśraya*) of the stick and the pitcher is the person and the locus of the person is the house. Thus, the house is the locus of the locus of the stick and the pitcher. Therefore, it is, indirectly, the locus of the two things, namely, the stick and the pitcher. This way, another name of the indirect relationship between the stick and the pitcher and the house is, *sva-āśraya- āśrayatva*.

Thus, to conclude, the house is the locus of the stick and the pitcher indirectly.

□□

## TEXT - 12

समवायादि-साक्षात्सम्बन्धवत् परम्परासम्बन्धो न नियतसङ्ख्यकः नापि च नियतपरिमाणः यथेच्छं सम्बन्धि-सम्बन्धादिकमादाय दीर्घ-दीर्घतर-दीर्घतमा असङ्ख्या एव ते कल्पयितुं शक्यन्ते । सर्वतोऽ संसृष्टावपि पदार्थौ परम्परासम्बन्धेन सम्बन्धौ भवतः । तत्र च दूरत्वादि न प्रतिबन्धकम् । तथा हि स्वसम्राडधिकृतराज्यत्वसम्बन्धेन भारतवर्षीयाः सर्व एव आर्या, अनार्याश्च इङ्ग्लण्डे सन्ति । इङ्ग्लण्डीयाश्च तत्र स्थिता अपि स्व-राज्येश्वरी-साम्राज्यत्व-सम्बन्धेन भारतवर्षे तिष्ठन्तीति ।

### English Translation

As the direct relation like inherence etc. is restricted in number and also in degree or extension, it is not so in the case of indirect relation. One can imagine an indirect relationship, long-longer and longest, by arbitrarily taking any relatum and any relation of any number. (In this process what happens is this :) two things, apparently not at all related with each other get related by an indirect relationship. There distance etc., does not act as an obstacle. To explain (i.e. for example) : All Indians - *aryas* as well as *anāryas*- exist in England by the indirect relation, namely, 'the state of being the kingdom under the authority of their own king (actually queen)'. Similarly, all English people reside in India, though actually they are in England, by the (indirect) relation, 'the state of being the empire of their own queen'.

**Note :** Three types of relations have been discussed by the author : inherence, contact and self-linking relation. These are, as it were, direct relations. Among these, contact has a limitation, namely, it can exist only between two substances; inherence is an eternal relation which persists only between entities belonging to five pairs already discussed earlier. *sva-rūpa* or self-linking relation has to be accepted in the cases where both contact and inherence are not possible. Thus, these relations occur in specific circumstances. Our author, here, has drawn a line of difference between these relations and indirect relations. He points out that indirect relation has no restriction in number or in measure. One is free to imagine any number of these (indirect relations) taking any number of relations and relata in between. The examples, as usual are sufficient to clarify the intention of the author. The examples are : (i) All Indians reside in England and (ii) All English people reside in India.

Now, so far as direct relation is concerned, it is an impossibility. But when it is a case of indirect relation, it is quite possible to imagine both the cases mentioned above. The logic is simple. 'A' is related to 'B' and 'B' is related to 'C', therefore 'A' is (said to be) related to 'C'. This is possible only through 'B', because 'B' is the point to which both

‘A’ and ‘C’ are related directly. Thus, an indirect relation consists of more than one direct relation and more than two relata always. In other words, this is the minimum requirement of an indirect relation.

□□

### TEXT - 13

परम्परासम्बन्धस्य गूढं रहस्यमिदम् - स्वशब्देन यमभिप्रेत्य यस्य परम्परासम्बन्धस्यारम्भो, यस्मिंश्च पर्यवसानं तत् तेन परम्परासम्बन्धेन तस्मिन् तिष्ठति । यथा पूर्वोक्ते उदाहरणे स्वशब्देन भारतवर्षीयानभिप्रेत्य स्वसम्राडधिकृत-राज्यत्व-सम्बन्धस्यारम्भः, तच्च राज्यत्वम् इङ्ग्लण्डे वर्तत इति तस्य इङ्ग्लण्डे पर्यवसानम्, अतः तेन सम्बन्धेन भारतवर्षीया इङ्ग्लण्डे तिष्ठन्ति।

#### English Translation

The deep secret of the indirect relation is : whatever is intended to be referred to by the word ‘itself’, which is the beginning point of some indirect relationship, ‘that’ exists in something which is the termination of the same (indirect relationship) by that (i.e. the same) indirect relation. As, in the example mentioned before, the people of India are intended to be referred to by the word ‘itself’, which is the beginning (point) of the relationship, namely, the state of being the kingdom under the rule of one’s own emperor, such a state of being the kingdom, is existent in England and so England is the termination (point) of the same (relation) and hence the people of India exist in England by that relationship.

**Note :** Our author has made a significant point here. The very discussion on relation started with a statement : *sambandhaḥ sannikarṣaḥ* which means : relation is closeness. But, now it is clear that this is true for all practical purposes, only with reference to the direct relation. So far as an indirect relation is concerned, distance is not a hindering factor. Rather, anything can be related with anything else in the universe by an indirect relationship. As per the traditional example any human being can be related to any other human being by

an indirect relation, namely, 'the state of being an object of grabbing by the same Death', as all human beings are mortal.

Thus, the author makes it explicit by stating that anything referred to by the word 'oneself' will be the beginning point i.e. the first relatum of the indirect relation and the first relatum will exist in the second relatum (which actually is the terminating point of the same) by that indirect relation. Thus, in the example given in the text, by the word 'oneself' the Indians are made the first relatum and England is said to be the second relatum. Hence, the first relatum, namely, Indians reside in England by the indirect relation, 'being the empire of one's own emperor.' Thus, the relation of Indians to England is through the king who rules over both India and England. Same is the case with English people. They are related to India through their queen. This is not possible by direct relation. Directly Indian people reside in India alone. By indirect relation, however, the two which are apparently unconnected are said to be connected or related.

□□

### TEXT -14

पुनश्च सम्बन्धो द्विविधः वृत्तिनियामकः वृत्त्यनियामकश्चेति । यस्मिंश्च सम्बन्धे सति एकस्मिन् अपरस्य वृत्तिता, आधाराधेयभावः आश्रयाश्रयिभावो वा प्रतीयते स सम्बन्धः वृत्तिनियामकः । वृत्तिनियामकसम्बन्धस्थले आधारे सप्तमी विभक्तिः प्रयुज्यते। यथा भूतले घटः। आधेये च मतुबादयः प्रत्ययाः भवन्ति । यथा भूतलं घटवत् ।

### English Translation


Again, relation is of two types : (i) occurrence - exaction and (ii) non-occurrence- exacting. When there is relation between two things and one is known to reside in or on the other or there is substratum-superstratum relationship or location-located relationship it is called an occurrence-exacting relation. In case of occurrence-exacting relation locative case is added after the word standing for substratum. e.g. (There is) a

pot on the ground. Similarly possessive suffixes (like *matup* etc.) are added after the stem standing for the located. e.g. The ground is the possessor of a pot.

**Note :** Here, the author has divided 'relation' from another angle. As relation can be classified as direct and indirect, the same, looked at from a different angle, may be classified as 'occurrence-exacting' and 'non-occurrence-exacting'. Occurrence-exacting relation is that relation, where the notion of location and located is created.

All our knowledge or cognition is expressed through language. Hence, our system (i.e. *navya-nyāya* system) makes it a point to discuss various aspects of language to show that a certain type of sentence expresses or represents a certain type of reality. This is the reason why our author always discusses how a particular reality is expressed by a particular Sanskrit sentence.

In the present context, after stating the two types of relation, namely, occurrence-exacting and the other, he makes it a point to specify how to recognise an occurrence-exacting relation from a sentence. In other words, he is trying to show how the occurrence-exacting relation is reflected at the linguistic level. The author states : either a locative suffix will occur after the stem denoting locus of the located or a possessive suffix will occur after the stem denoting the located. To demonstrate his claim he has chosen traditional (i.e. well - discussed in the tradition) examples : (i) there is a pot on the ground (*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*) and (ii) the ground is the possessor of pot (*bhūtaḥ ghaṭavat*). Here, 'pot' is the thing located on the 'ground' which is its locus or location. The reality, however, is simply the following :



The same reality, our author points out, may be expressed in at least two different ways. One can either say that there is a pot on the ground,

making the 'pot', the prime qualificand i.e. the thing of intended focus expressed by the words in the sentence. This may imply that it is a pot and nothing else which is on the ground. Thus, here, 'ground' is not focussed and hence is of secondary significance. There, as mentioned before, is one more possibility also. Here, the speaker may, sometimes, say that the ground is the possessor of pot. In this case, all significance is given to the ground and the pot simply becomes the thing possessed by the same. Thus, the speaker has made 'ground' the prime qualificand as he perhaps intends to say that the ground is such that it possesses a pot or that it is not empty. He focusses the ground.

□□

### TEXT - 15


वृत्तिनियामकसम्बन्धाश्च समवाय-संयोग-स्वरूप-प्रभृतय एव केचन । तेषु सम्बन्धेषु सत्सु - पृथिव्यां रूपम् ; कुण्डे बदरम् ; भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादिप्रयोगात् । समसूत्रपातेन स्थितयोरुभयोः संयोगोऽपि न वृत्तिनियामकः । अत एव अञ्जलिरूपतया समसूत्रपातेन स्थितयोर्हस्तयोः संयोगो न वृत्तिनियामक इति तत्र न 'हस्ते हस्त' इति प्रयोगः । तयोरेव हस्तयोः उपर्यधोभावेन स्थितयोः पुनः संयोगो वृत्तिनियामक इति तत्र 'हस्ते हस्त' इति प्रयोगोऽपि भवति ।


### English Translation

Occurrence-exacting relations are only inherence, contact, self-linking relation etc. When these relations exist (between things) then (we come across) the usage of sentences like (there is) colour in the earth ; (there is) a berry (fruit) in the vessel or (there is) no pot on the ground etc. When two things are vertically related by the relation of contact, the contact is not occurrence-exacting. This is the reason why when two hands are at vertical position., the relation (namely, contact) between them is not occurrence-exacting and therefore, we do not find the expression, 'one hand is on the other' with reference to this case. (But) when the same two hands are placed one above and one below, the contact between them is occurrence-exacting and so,

to refer to this case, the expression, 'the hand is on the hand' is also found.

**Note :** Here, the point to be remembered, in short, is : *Vṛttiiniyāmaka sambandha* is the relation of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* between any two things. Whenever and wherever the notion of 'y' is the locus of 'x' is created,



such a relation is occurrence-exacting one and also that when such a notion is not there but only that 'x' and 'y' are related  is known then such a relation is not an occurrence-exacting relation.

Here, one may keep in mind that inherence is always an occurrence-exacting relation and there is no case where inherence is non-occurrence-exacting one. The reason seems to be this : inherence resides in its locus, pervading the whole of it but contact is not of this type. Contact does not pervade the locus where it exists. It resides only in the part of the locus. In other words, it resides in its locus along with its own absence. This is why *sanyoga* or contact is not always *vṛtti-niyāmaka* but it sometimes (i.e. when two substances are vertically connected) is *vṛtti-anīyāmaka*. □□

### TEXT-16

यस्मिंश्च सम्बन्धे पूर्वोक्तरूपा वृत्तिता आधाराधेयभावश्च न प्रतीयते केवलं सम्बन्धितामात्रम्, स वृत्त्यनियामकः सम्बन्धः । तत्र सप्तमीविभक्तेः मतुबादिप्रत्ययस्य च प्रयोगो न भवति । किन्तु सम्बन्धित्वबोधकाः इन् ईय-प्रभृतयः प्रत्ययाः प्रयुज्यन्ते । यथा स्वत्वसम्बन्धो न वृत्तिनियामक इति मन्त्रिणि सत्यपि स्वत्वसम्बन्धे [‘मन्त्री राजवान्’ इति किंवा ‘मन्त्रिणि राजा’ इति न प्रयोगः,] [‘राजा मन्त्रिवान्’ किंवा ‘राज्ञि मन्त्री’ इति न प्रयोगः किन्तु ‘राजकीयो मन्त्री’ इति प्रयोगः ।

## English Translation

In case of the relation where the locatedness or substratum-superstratum relationship is not cognised but only relation (in general) is understood such a relation is (said to be) non-occurrence-exacting one. In such cases the locative case or the possessive suffixes like *matup* etc. are not used (in a Sanskrit sentence which expresses such a relation in general). But the suffixes like *-in* or *-īya* are used which denote the relatedness alone. For example, the relation of ownedness is not an occurrence-exacting one, therefore, even when the king is related to the minister by the relation of ownedness, (literally - even when there is a relationship called ownedness in the minister) still, the usage like the king is the possessor of the minister or the minister is on the king is not found in such a case but we simply find the expressions like king's minister.


**Note :** The original text in this context reads : मन्त्रिणि सत्यपि स्वत्वसम्बन्धे 'मन्त्री राजवान्' इति किंवा 'मन्त्रिणि राजा' इति न प्रयोगः किन्तु 'राजकीयो मन्त्री' इति प्रयोगः।

The text should be corrected as follows : ..... स्वत्वसम्बन्धे 'राजा मन्त्रीवान्' इति किंवा 'राज्ञि मन्त्री' इति न प्रयोगः .....



To explain : the relationship between the king and his minister is known as *sva-svāmibhāva* in Sanskrit which may be translated into English as : owned-owner-relationship. In the present example of the king and his minister, the king is the owner and the minister is owned by him. The possessive suffix, namely, *matup* should occur after the thing which is owned (vide : Pāṇini's rule तदस्यास्ति अस्मिन् इति मतुप् (P. 5. 2. 94)) just like in *dhana-vān* Caitraḥ ; *buddhimān* brāhmaṇaḥ and so on . As *dhana* i.e. wealth is owned by Caitra, Caitra is said to be *dhana-vān* . Thus, *dhana* which is owned takes the *matuP* suffix to show Caitra's ownership on it. Similarly, in our present context as the *mantri* is owned by the king the king should be said to be *mantrivān* i.e. the owner of the minister and not vice-versa. In other words, *mantri*, the owned, should take the *matuP* suffix and not the king who is the owner. Thus, *rājavān mantri* is not the correct expression to denote the fact that king is the possessor or owner of the




minister. It will mean the minister is the owner of the king, which is not the case. Hence the correction is suggested in the text. The other expression, namely, 'मन्त्रिणि राजा' is also not correct. It should have been *rājñi mantri* as suggested by the present translator, for the same reason. The point seems to have missed the notice of the Bengali translator of the text, namely, shree Kalipada Tarkacharya. He, in his translation, has explained the text as it originally reads. (Vide *Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-prdīpa* of M. Nyāyaratna with the Bengali translation by Kalipada Tarkacharya, Sanskrit College Research series 79, Kolkata, p.17.)

The author, here, tries to explain the concept of non-occurrence-exacting relation. To understand it clearly, one should note its difference from the occurrence exacting relation. Let us remember that the occurrence-exacting relation always generates the notion of locus and located such as the picture shows.  Whenever such a notion is there it is a case of occurrence-exacting relation and vice-versa.

To come to the non-occurrence-exacting relation the above notion is never present there. In other words, one is a vertical relationship and the other horizontal. The horizontal one creates the notion of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* in our mind. Our author has also pointed out that such a notion is expressed through an expression either containing a locative case after the stem denoting the locus or the possessive suffix added to the stem denoting the located, such as: either *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ* or *ghaṭvad bhūtaḥ* respectively.

But, when the relationship is not horizontal like  this but is vertical like  this (for the vertical relationship, the beautiful expression, in Sanskrit is : *Sama-sūtrapātena sambandhaḥ* which may be noted) then the use of either locative case or of the possessive suffix is never found. The suffixes like *in* or *īya* etc. are used or the genitive case is sufficient to express the relation in general. An example will make the point clear : '*Caitrasya dhanam*' (wealth of Caitra) from this expression, no one understands that the wealth and Caitra are related by *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*. One simply understands that Caitra is the owner of the wealth which is owned by him. If we try to make the diagram of *Caitrasya dhanam* it will be a vertical one :




The relationship is that of owner and owned-relationship. Both the *relata*, namely, Caitra and his wealth, describe each other. The diagram of the above expression can never be horizontal like :




Because one never has the notion of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* after hearing the expression : *Caitrasya dhanam*.

Similarly, one can explain the example taken up by our author, namely, that of the king and his minister. The diagram will be vertical such as:



Here also,



is not possible just because the relation expressed by *rājakīyo mantri* is vertical i.e. *ṛtti-a-niyāmaka*. This is why one will never find the expressions like *mantrivān rāja* or *rājñi mantri* in this context.

□□

## TEXT - 17

परम्परासम्बन्धाः प्रायशः सर्व एव वृत्त्यनियामकाः । अत एव शिखिनि पुरुषे गृहे तिष्ठति सति स्वाश्रय-पुरुषाश्रयत्व-सम्बन्धेन 'शिखावद् गृहम्' इति न प्रयोगः ।

### English Translation

Almost all indirect relationships are non-occurrence-exacting. This is why when a man with tufted hair is present in the house nobody says (i.e. there is no usage) that the house possesses

tuffed hair by the relation of the state of being the locus of the man who is its own locus.

**Note :** We have seen that any two things, which are not at all connected directly may be called to be related by an indirect relationship. But whenever we talk about such an indirect relation this indirect relationship does not create a notion of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* in our mind but only makes us know about the indirect relation between the two. In other words, the relation is not horizontal but it is vertical.

The example, our author, puts forth is that of 'a person having tufted hair' we never think that the tuft is in the house when the person having tufted hair is in the house. We only understand that the tuft is related to the house through the person.

Actually, what our author has stated here is the fact. In the very first example of indirect relation, the author said that the Indians reside in England through the king who is ruling over them and England is his kingdom. But here also no one thinks about England being the actual locus of Indians or India being the actual locus of British people. In other words, that Indians reside in England has to be understood as Indians are related to England. Thus, the relationship is only vertical.

□□

### **TEXT - 18**

कालिकनामकः सम्बन्धः कश्चित् वृत्तिनियामकः कश्चित् वृत्त्यनियामकोऽस्ति।  
वृत्तिनियामकेन कालिकसम्बन्धेन काले सर्वं वर्तते । स च कालः महाकालरूपः,  
खण्डकालरूपश्च । 'काले सर्वम्' इति महाकालविषयिणी प्रतीतिः।

### **English Translation**

There is one relation called temporal relation which is sometimes occurrence-exacting and sometimes non-occurrence-exacting one. Everything resides in Time by the temporal relation which is of occurrence exacting type. Time is of two types : The great Time and the Segmented one. The cognition,

‘everything resides in Time’ refers to the whole, Indivisible Time as its content.

**Note :** Our author, so far, has demonstrated that relations can be looked at from different points of view. From one angle, one can classify relations as direct and indirect, from another angle one can divide them into two groups, namely, occurrence-exacting and non-occurrence-exacting. Here, he wants to point to a peculiar type of relationship accepted in our system, namely, ‘temporal relation’. This is a special type of relation because, ‘Time’ is a concept which is or rather should be treated specially.

What is temporal relation ? : According to our system ‘Time’ is the locus of everything. Everything exists in ‘Time’. The system accepts ‘सर्वाधारः कालः’। *Kāla* or Time is only one. We have divided it into seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, fortnights, months, years and what not for our own purpose, for our convenience. The basis for this division originally is the movement (!) of the Sun. In other words, for our limited understanding’s sake we have delimited Time by various parameters just because if we do not have them we cannot grasp and hence talk about Time, which is only one, beginningless and endless. Nevertheless, we understand that Time must be one indivisible whole. This is the reason why our system accepts that everything in the universe exists in Time.

Let us try to understand *kālika sambandha* a little more. Our author wants to specify that *kālika* relation is, sometimes, occurrence - exacting and some times it is not. To get the point straight let us consider the following two examples : (i) Everything exists in Time and (ii) X and y are contemporaries. The first example, as it expresses that ‘Time’ is the locus of everything, is that of the occurrence-exacting-relation. The second one, however, does not make *mahākāla* the locus of ‘x’ and ‘y’. It rather, talks about a segment of Time to which ‘x’ and ‘y’ belong. So this expression may be understood as (i) ‘x’ exists in the segment of Time when ‘y’ exists.

Or

(ii) ‘x’ exists in ‘y’ by temporal relation. The first understanding, here, gives us the idea that a segment of Time is the locus of ‘x’ and

‘y’ both. And the second understanding though apparently says that ‘x’ is on ‘y’ it also means only this much : ‘x’ and ‘y’ are contemporaries. Thus, the understanding differs only on linguistic level and not on the semantic one.

Our author, however, does not wish to discuss the point elaborately here. Later on also he has made just a passing remark in the context of absence that by temporal relation everything exists everywhere. It may be discussed there when we come to that particular Text.

□□

### TEXT - 19


‘अयं न द्वौ किन्तु द्वित्ववान्’ इति प्रतीतेः ‘द्वौ’ ‘द्वित्ववान्’ इति पदयोः अर्थविशेषावधारणाय नवीनैः कश्चित् पर्याप्तिनामकः सम्बन्धः स्वीक्रियते। पर्याप्तिः पर्यवसानम्, साकल्येन सम्बन्धः। अर्थात् यस्य यावन्तः आश्रयाः सन्ति तावत्स्वेवाश्रयेषु मिलितेष्वेव सम्बन्धः। पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन द्वित्वसङ्ख्या मिलितयोरेव द्वयोर्वर्तते न त्वेकैकस्मिन् द्वयोर्वा। अत एव द्वित्वादयः सङ्ख्याः व्यासज्यवृत्तयः (व्यासज्य सर्वमेवाधारमधिकृत्य वर्तन्ते) इत्युच्यते। द्विशब्दस्य पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन द्वित्वाधारताप्रतीतेः एकस्य च पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन द्वित्वाधारत्वाभावात् ‘अयं न द्वौ’ इति प्रतीतिः भवति। समवायसम्बन्धेन पुनः द्वित्व-सङ्ख्या द्वयोरेकस्मिन्नपि तिष्ठतीति समवायसम्बन्धेन द्वित्वाश्रय इत्यर्थमभिप्रेत्य ‘द्वित्ववान्’ इति प्रयोगः। ततश्च ‘अयं न द्वौ किन्तु द्वित्ववान्’ इति वाक्यस्य, ‘अयं न पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन द्वित्ववान्, किन्तु समवायसम्बन्धेन द्वित्ववान्’ इत्यर्थः।

### English Translation

Neo-logicians have accepted a (n additional) relation called *pariyāpti* to decide the exact meaning of the words, ‘two’ and ‘possessing number two’ in the encoded cognition ‘this (one) is not two but possesses number two.’ *Pariyāpti* means relation in totality, it means, as many loci or substrata a thing has, it is related to all of them (and only to those many) collectively. (To explain it more clearly:) The number two resides by the relation of *pariyāpti* in two (i.e. in both the loci) collectively and not in

the two (i.e. each of the loci) individually. Similarly, number three resides in the three (and only three) collectively and not in each one (individually) or in both. This is why, number two onwards, all numbers are called collectively existent ('collectively' means existing in the locus in totality). Thus, when number two is known to exist by the relation of *pariyāpti* the cognition arises : 'this (one) is not two'. But number two resides in each of both by the relation of inherence and hence the usage: (this) possess number two occurs with the intention that this is the locus of number two by the relation of inherence. And thus, the sentence, 'this is not two but possesses number two', simply means, "this does not possess number two by the relation of *pariyāpti* but by it has number two by the relation of inherence."

**Note :** The following figure will make the meaning of the sentence, 'this (one) is not two but possesses number two,' clear.



The figure helps visualize how *dvaiva* resides individually in each pot by the relation of inherence and collectively in both the pots simultaneously by the relation of *pariyāpti*.


The navya-hyāya system has contributed to the explanation of the thought- structure reflected through the sentence, *ayam na dvau kintu dvitvavān*. The system helps in understanding the reality expressed by the above sentence, and the reality is : number two resides in two things. Now, to reside in two things, it has to reside in each of them first. This is a logical necessity. The same, actually, is reflected in the expression, 'this is not two but has number two'. To understand the authentic meaning of this sentence and to explicate the logical necessity expressed by this sentence our system postulated a relation called

*pariyāpti* (saturation / inclusion) - a relation by which something exists in its loci collectively and simultaneously when there is such an expectancy.

Let us take another example known to us. *Ghaṭatva* or potness exists in pots. It exists in each and every pot and only pot. i.e. it does not exist in anything other than pot. So also it resides in each and every pot at a time. Thus, one can make two statements regarding the existence of potness :

- (i) Potness exists in all pots, and
- (ii) Potness exists in each and every individual pot.

As we have discussed the relation of *pariyāpti* already, it is not difficult to understand that potness resides in each pot by the relation of inherence and it resides in all pots collectively and at a time by the relation of *pariyāpti*. In the same manner one can also understand how delimitoriness (*avacchedakatā*) resides in all delimiters collectively and simultaneously by the relation of *pariyāpti* and in each delimiter by *svārūpa*. Let us draw two pictures and conclude our discussion on this point.



These two figures help one understand the significance of accepting *pariyāpti* as an additional relation, over and above the relations of *Samīyoga*, *samavāya* and *svārūpa*. □□


**TEXT - 20**

सङ्ख्यादीनामिव वक्ष्यमाणाया अवच्छेदकताया अपि पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धोऽङ्गीक्रियते।

**English Translation**

As in the case of number so also in case of the delimitoriness, which will be explained later, the relation of *pariyāpti* has been accepted.

**Note :** The above text simply states that the delimitorhood resides simultaneously and collectively in its loci namely different delimiters by the same relation, discussed before, namely, *pariyāpti*. Let us remember that *pariyāpti* is a relation, accepted by our system, to explain the fact that a property exists in a collection or a group of entities simultaneously and collectively when it resides in each of those same entities also individually. In the present example of delimitorhood, it exists in each delimiter individually by the self-linking relations. It also resides in all the delimiters simultaneously and collectively by the relation of *pariyāpti*. Let us draw a picture to make the point visible.



The above picture shows *ghaṭa* i.e. a pot as an effect. Any effect is preceded by a causal complex which brings about the same. Thus, *ghaṭa* is preceded by various causes such as the potter, clay, water,



stick, the wheel, the movement of the wheel etc. etc. Each of the causes has causeness which is delimited by the inherent property (i.e. the qualifier) of the cause. Thus, as many causes are there so many are the delimiters of the causality existing in them. All these delimiters, certainly, possess delimitorhood individually as well as collectively & simultaneously. The relation by which a delimitor has delimitorhood individually is *svarūpa* and the same delimitorhood is shared by all delimiters collectively by the relation of *paryāpti*.

Thus, wherever there arises such a situation, namely, a property is shared by more than one locus at the same time, the *paryāpti* relation comes handy to explain the situation.

□□

## TEXT - 21

विषयता विषयिता चेति अपरौ द्वौ वृत्त्यनियामकौ सम्बन्धौ स्तः। तत्र विषयाः घटपटादयो ज्ञानेच्छादौ विषयितासम्बन्धेन वर्तन्ते। विषयतासम्बन्धेन च ज्ञानेच्छादयो घटपटादौ विषये तिष्ठन्तीति।

### English Translation

There are two more relations, namely, contentness and containerness i.e. *viṣayatā* and *viṣayitā*, which are of non-occurrence-exacting type. In this case, the contents (of cognition, desire etc.) such as a pot, a cloth etc. reside in the cognition, desire etc. by the relation of *viṣayitā* and cognition, desire etc. reside in the content such as a pot, a cloth etc. by the relation of *viṣayatā*.


**Note :** To understand the present text, let us look at the different statements made to express a relation. Let us take an example : 'x' and 'y' are related. Now, this fact that 'x' and 'y' are related can be stated in different ways :

- (i) 'x' and 'y' are related
- (ii) There is a relation between 'x' and 'y'
- (iii) 'x' is related to 'y', and
- (iv) 'y' is related to 'x'.


The first two statements are 'general' in nature whereas the last two statements are more of a specific type as they define the direction of the relation. The statement 'iii' says that the direction of relation is towards 'y' whereas the statement 'iv' says that the direction of relation is towards 'x'.

To understand these statements without any ambiguity our system has labelled, 'x' and 'y' i.e. two relata of any relation, by special terms. The relatum which is the beginning point of a relation is named as a *pratiyogin* i.e. counter-relatum and the endpoint of the relation towards whom the arrow of relation is pointed is named as *anuyogin* i.e. base-relatum.


Thus, if 'x' is related to 'y' then 'x' is a *pratiyogin* and 'y' is an *anuyogin* but if 'y' is related to 'x' then 'y' is a *pratiyogin* and 'x' is an *anuyogin*. This may be remembered in the following manner :



Further, in our system a maxim is accepted : अनुयोगिनिष्ठः धर्मः सम्बन्धः। This means the property of the base-relatum should be accepted as a relation between two things. Thus, for instance, if 'x' is a father and 'y' the son, then father is related to son by the relation of 'son-hood'. (पिता पुत्रे पुत्रत्वसम्बन्धेन अन्वेति). This is because, the father is related to son i.e. the father is the beginning point of the relation which is pointed towards the son who is the endpoint. Thus, father is the *pratiyogin* and the son, the *anuyogin*. The property of the son is 'son-hood' and hence it is the relation by which father is related to Son.




The same son, however, is related to the father by the relation of fatherhood. This is because, now, the arrow of relation is pointed towards the father and hence he has become the base-relatum. His property is fatherhood by which the son is related to his father.



There are two more entities which are named as *sa-pratiyogika* (i.e. an entity having a *pratiyogin*) but to that our author will come later. Here, let us think of 'relation' alone as a *sa-pratiyogika padārtha*.

Once the point discussed above is clear namely, the property of the *anuyogin* is said to be the relation of a *pratiyogin* to an *anuyogin*, it is easy to understand how an object of a cognition will be related to cognition and vice-versa. When we speak about cognition or knowledge we must remember that in our system knowledge is a *sa-viśayaka padārtha* (i.e. an entity having an object). This means, knowledge cannot be contentless or devoid of an object. If there is knowledge - if someone has knowledge, it has to be 'of something', and that something is the object of that knowledge. The same is the case with desire, inclination, attachment and aversion. These all are said to be *sa-viśayaka*. They cannot exist without their objects. As they have *viśayas* they themselves are *viśayins* (it is another name for *sa-viśayaka*). Therefore, the general relation between these pairs such as knowledge and its contents etc. is *viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*. But when this relation is specified by stating the direction of the relation as knowledge is related to its content or otherwise, then the same maxim, namely, 'अनुयोगिनिष्ठः धर्मः सम्बन्धः' has to be applied because in these cases the *anuyogin* is known. Thus, if knowledge is related to the object, object-hood is the relation between the two and if object is related to knowledge or cognition i.e. *viśayin* then the relation between the two is *viśayitā*. The same may be remembered through the following pictures :



□□

### TEXT - 22


सम्बन्धो यद्यपि उभयनिष्ठः, यथा कुण्डबदरयोः सम्बन्धः कुण्डे बदरे च अस्ति, तथापि केनचित् सम्बन्धेन कश्चिदेव कुत्रचिदेव तिष्ठति। यथा-संयोगेन सम्बन्धेन कुण्डे एव बदरं तिष्ठति न तु बदरे कुण्डम्। एवं भूतले एव घटः वर्तते न तु घटे भूतलमिति। अत्र कारणमेतत् : सम्बन्धस्य एकं प्रतियोगि अपरश्च अनुयोगि भवति। यस्य सम्बन्धस्य यत् प्रतियोगि भवति तेन सम्बन्धेन तदेव तिष्ठति। यच्च यस्य सम्बन्धस्य अनुयोगि भवति, तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्र प्रतियोगि तिष्ठति। यथा - कुण्ड-बदरयोः संयोगे बदरं प्रतियोगि कुण्डश्चानुयोगीति कुण्डे बदरं वर्तते। धर्म-धर्मिणोः सम्बन्धस्य धर्मः प्रतियोगी धर्मी चानुयोगी, अत एव धर्म एव धर्मिणि वर्तते न तु धर्मी धर्मे।

#### English Translation

Though relation resides in two (exists between two things) - for example, the relation between a vessel and a berry resides in both, the vessel and the berry, - still by a (particular) relationship something (one between the two) alone resides in

the other (of the two). For instance, by the relation of contact (between the berry and the vessel) the berry only exists in the vessel, the vessel does not exist in berry. Similarly, the pot alone exists on the ground, the ground does not reside in the pot. Here, the reason is this : A(ny) relation has a counter-relatum and (it has) a base-relatum. Whichever is the counter-relatum of a relation, that alone exists (in or on the base-relatum), i.e. the counter-relatum alone is located and whichever is the base-relatum of a relation in it resides the counter-relatum by the same relation. For example, in case of contact between berry and vessel, berry is the counter-relatum and vessel is the base-relatum, therefore, berry exists in the vessel. When there is a relation between property and the possessor of the property, property is counter-relatum and the possessor of property is the base-relatum, and therefore, property alone exists in the possessor of property and never does the possessor of property reside in the property.

**Note :** The point that we discussed earlier is well explained here with the example of a vessel and berry. Thus, the concepts of counter-relatum and base-relatum can be understood in terms of property and the possessor of property. Actually, this is the note on which our author began his discussion. Everything in the universe - except a few exceptions - is located somewhere i.e. in some locus or the other. Something which is located was given the name - *dharma* - a property. Now, one more name is given to *dharma* or property, namely, *pratiyogin* or counter-relatum. Similarly, the property-holder or possessor of property which was known as *dharmin* so far, is given one more name, namely, *anuyogin* or base-relatum. Thus, in a nutshell, *pratiyogin* of a relation is always a *dharma* i.e. a thing located and an *anuyogin* of a relation is always a *dharmin* or the locus of the thing located. To revise our basic diagram in this context:



After understanding these points let us look into one important statement that our author has made in the Text under discussion. The statement is : केनचित् सम्बन्धेन कश्चिदेव कुत्रचिदेव तिष्ठति। The theory of 'संसर्ग मर्यादा-वाद' put forth by our system has been stated by our author in just one simple and clear sentence. It is believed and is a theoretically accepted doctrine that in the case of all occurrence-exacting relations the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* are fixed. What is or should be the locus and what is or should be the located is predetermined. The author states: There is contact between the berry and the vessel. But by this contact berry alone exists in the vessel and not Vice-versa. Take another example: pot and ground. The *pratiyogin* in this relation is definitely pot and never the ground. Ground is the *anuyogin* or the substratum. The author has explained same point through the terminology of *dharma* and *dharmin*. He says: धर्म एव धर्मिणि वर्तते, न तु धर्मो धर्मे। One should remember that *pratiyogin* is nothing else than *dharma* when it is a case of the relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* & *anuyogin* should be understood as the *dharmin*. Now it is clear that *dharma* or property alone can reside in *dharmin* i.e. the property-holder and not vice-versa. This is known as संसर्गमर्यादा: (the basic) limitation of relation!

□□

### TEXT - 23


यच्च यत्र वर्तते तत् तस्य आधेयम् आश्रितं तद्वृत्ति इति चोच्यते। यत्र तु यद् वर्तते तत् तस्य अधिकरणम् आधार आश्रय इति च उच्यते। यथा कुण्डे बदरं वर्तते गृहे पटो वर्तते इति। बदरं पटश्च आधेयं कुण्डं गृहश्च आधार इति। यच्च यस्य आधेयं तस्मिन् तन्निरूपिता वृत्तिता तिष्ठति। एवं यच्च यस्य अधिकरणं तस्मिन् तन्निरूपिता अधिकरणता वर्तते। यथा - पूर्वोक्तयोरूदाहरणयोः कुण्डनिरूपिता वृत्तिता बदरे गृहनिरूपिता आधेयता च पटे वर्तते। एकस्य वृत्तितायाम् अपरस्य अधिकरणता अवश्यम्भाविनी।

#### English Translation


Whatever exists somewhere is called 'located' or 'superstratum' or 'existent there'. On the other hand, where

something exists is called its 'locus', or 'substratum' or 'base'. For instance, 'in the vessel exists a berry' or 'in the house exists a cloth' etc. (In these cases) 'berry' and 'cloth' are 'located' and the 'vessel' and the 'house' are the 'loci' respectively (of berry and cloth). Whatever is located in (of) a locus, in that (located one) resides locatedness described by that (locus). On the other hand, whatever is the locus of (i.e. with reference to) a located, in that (locus) resides the locusness described by that (located). For example, in the examples, mentioned before, in the berry lies the locatedness described by the vessel and in the cloth resides the locatedness described by the house. When something has locatedness it is necessary that something else has locusness.


**Note :** The relationship of 'describer and described' (*nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva*) has been introduced here. The point is : the terms 'locus' and 'located' are pair-terms. To explain : if something is a locus then it is a locus 'of something else' i.e. it is a locus with reference to something which is 'located' there. In other words, 'locus' and 'located' have mutual expectancy. Both are described by each other. This means, something is a locus because something else is located there and something is a located because something else is locus of it. The examples given by our author make the point clear. The two examples are : There is a berry in the pot and there is cloth in the house. As berry is in the pot, it is said to be located in the pot and pot is its locus. As cloth is in the house it is said to be located in the house which is its locus. In other words, if the pot is devoid of berry, if it is empty (as nothing exists in it), nobody calls it a 'locus'. It becomes a 'locus' only when something is 'located' in it.

Thus, let us remember : If 'x' is located in 'y' like  then in

'x' resides 'locatedness' described by 'y'. In the same manner, if 'y' is the locus of 'x' then 'y' has 'locusness' described by 'x'. Therefore, whenever there is an *ādhāra*, there has to be some *ādheya* which describes the *ādhāratā* of the *ādhāra*. In simple language, something is *ādhāra* because there is some *ādheya* located there. Let us draw a picture which says the same thing :




Similarly :




If we take the concrete examples discussed by our author, we may draw the following :

(1)




Similarly :



And



(2)



In this context let us remember some important points :

(i) *Kuṇḍa* or vessel is a vessel even if it is empty. But it is *not* a locus if it is empty. It is called to be so only if and when something is located in it. Thus, the difference between vesselness and locusness becomes obvious. 'Vesselness' is an inherent property of a vessel (because of which it is called a vessel) which resides in the vessel so long as the same is not destroyed. But locusness is just an occasional property which comes to reside in the vessel only if something else is 'located' in it. Thus, the property 'locusness' depends upon (i.e. expects) 'located'. In other words, 'locusness' is caused by the located and vice-versa.

(ii) The relation between locus and located or rather locusness and locatedness is said to be describer-described-relation. Only because one is described by the other and the other is the describer of the first.

(iii) Because this describer-described-relation is mutual; the line of relation is drawn as two-pointed arrow in the pictures above.

(iv) Just like locus and located, there are more pair-terms such as : *viśaya* and *viśayin*, *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* etc. etc. Whatever we discussed about the locus and located all those points are applicable in the cases of these pair-terms. The reason being, these

are pair-terms and therefore, have mutual expectancy and the properties are occasional.

(v) There is a special relationship between the inherent and occasional property residing in one and the same locus. Which is the very key-note of *navya-nyāya*. To this our author will come a little later.

□□

### TEXT -24


एवञ्च एकस्य अधिकरणतायाम् अपरस्य वृत्तिता नियता। अत एव वृत्तिताधिकरणतयोः परस्परनियतसापेक्षतया वृत्तिताधिकरणतयोश्च परस्परं निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽस्ति। वृत्तिनिरूपिता अधिकरणता अधिकरणतानिरूपिता च वृत्तिरिति। ततश्च 'कुण्डे बदरम्' इति वाक्यस्य 'कुण्ड-निरूपित-वृत्तितावद् बदरम्' किंवा 'कुण्डनिष्ठ-अधिकरणता-निरूपित-आधेयता-वद् बदरम्' इत्यर्थः प्रतीयते। एवं बदरवत् कुण्डम् इत्यस्य प्रयोगस्य 'कुण्डं बदर-निरूपित-अधिकरणतावत्' इति किंवा 'बदरनिष्ठवृत्तिता-निरूपित-अधिकरणतावत्' इत्यर्थः पर्यवसीयते।

### English Translation


Similarly, when one has locusness, it is regular that the other has locatedness. In this way (literally *ata eva* means therefore) as the locatedness and locusness have regular mutual expectancy, both of them are related by the mutual relation of described and describer ('निरूप्य' literally means describable). (This means) locusness is described by locatedness and locatedness is described by locusness. Thus, when there is a sentence, 'there is a berry in the vessel', then the meaning understood from this sentence is either : the berry possesses locatedness described by the vessel; or : the berry possesses locatedness described by the locusness residing in the vessel. And when there is a sentence, 'the vessel possesses a berry', the resultant meaning of the sentence is either : the vessel has locusness described by the berry or : the vessel has locusness described by the locatedness residing in the berry.

**Note :** Once the describer-described-relation (*nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva*) is explained in brief, it is further made clear by taking a simple example of a sentence 'there is a berry in the vessel' and also another sentence, 'the vessel has a berry.' The author explains : these (and such) sentences can be understood in two different ways. One way is that the locatedness in the berry is described by the vessel and the other way is actually the full form of understanding which is : the locatedness in the berry is described by the locusness in the vessel.


To explain : describer-described-relation exists between the two things which are denoted by the pair-terms, such as, *ādhāra* and *ādheya*, *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* etc. This can be explained in simple language as : something is said to be a locus only when something else is located there; something is said to be a *pratiyogin* only when something else is an *anuyogin*. In other words, something cannot become a locus unless something else is located there and vice-versa. This may be remembered through the following :




Now, we have been familiar with the technique of *navya-nyāya*, namely, the property (*dharma*) in the thing is located first through which the thing (*dharmin*) is identified. Thus, a thing is called a locus only when locusness is understood there. If we try to analyse further, it becomes clear that actually the relation of described and describer is between these two properties which are understood to exist in those particular things, i.e. the locatedness in one thing is described by the locusness in another and vice-versa.



But if we make a short statement regarding the same fact we may say that the locatedness in one thing is described by the locus or the locusness in one thing is described by the located. The two pictures of these two short -forms will look like the following :



And



Thus, the vessel describes the locatedness of the berry being its locus in the first picture and the berry describes the locusness of the vessel being located in it. These are the short ways of understanding the sentence (i) *kuṇḍe badaram* or (ii) *kuṇḍam badaravat*. The full form of understanding of the meaning of the same two sentences would be : the locatedness in berry (*badara*) is described by the locusness in the vessel (*kuṇḍa*) and the locusness in *kuṇḍa* is described by the locatedness in *badara*. There may not be any further expansion of meaning of these sentences.

□□

## TEXT - 25

सम्बन्धवद् अभावस्यापि एकं प्रतियोगि अपरञ्च अनुयोगि अस्ति। यः अभावः यस्य विरोधी प्रतिपक्षः यश्चाभावो यस्य, घटस्य अभावः, पटस्य अभावः इत्यादिरित्या यत्सम्बन्धितया अभावः प्रतीयते, तत् तस्य अभावस्य प्रतियोगि भवति। यथा यत्र घटाभावोऽस्ति तत्र घटो नैव तिष्ठतीति घटाभावो घटस्य विरोधी। एवमयम् अभावो घटस्येति घटाभावस्य घटः प्रतियोगि, रूपाभावस्य रूपं प्रतियोगि। यत्र अभावो वर्तते

तद् अभावस्य अनुयोगि भवति। यथा वायुः रूपाभावस्य अनुयोगि। घटादिः  
जडपदार्थः ज्ञानाभावस्य। प्रतियोगिनि प्रतियोगिता, अनुयोगिनि च अनुयोगिता वर्तते।

### English Translation

Just as the relation has, absence also has one counter-positive and one locus. (To explain :) when an absence has a counter-positive; it is an absence of whatever (object) like absence of pot, absence of cloth etc. as the absence is understood as related to something then that something is the counter-positive of that absence. Just when there is absence of pot (in a particular place) there (in that place) pot does not exist and therefore, absence of pot is opposite of pot. Similarly, (as we say) this is 'absence of pot' therefore, 'pot' is the counter-positive of 'absence of pot' ; in case of 'absence of colour', 'colour' is the counter-positive of its absence. The place where the absence exists is the locus of absence such as air is the locus of the absence of colour. And the material objects like pot etc. are the loci of absence of knowledge or cognition. In the counter-positive resides counter-positive-ness and in the base-relatum resides base-relatumness.


**Note :** In case of relation, our author has already explained that the two relata (as relation exists in two at least) are further named as counter-relatum and base-relatum depending upon the relation 'of whom' and 'to whom'. Thus, in case of a relation of 'x' to 'y', 'x' is a counter-relatum and 'y' is the base-relatum as 'x' is related 'to y'. Let us try to remember like this : There are two questions in the context of a relation :

- (i) Relation of whom? and
- (ii) Relation to whom?

whatever is the answer of the first question is the counter-relatum of that relation and whatever is the answer of the second question is the base-relatum of that relation. Therefore, in the above case 'x' is the counter relatum and 'y' is the base relatum of the relation between the two. This, we have seen before, may be remembered through the following simple picture:  $x \xrightarrow{\quad} y$   
R

In the present text at hand, our author has discussed one more context in which *pratiyogitā* i.e. counter-positiveness comes to reside in something and therefore, *anuyogita* i.e. base-relatumness comes to reside in something else. The context is that of absence. Let us look into the example that our author has discussed, namely, 'absence of colour in the air'. We should concentrate on two points. It is the absence 'of colour' and it is 'in the air'. These two points will decide what the counter-positive is and what the base-relatum of the said absence is if we try to remember it as we did in case of 'relation', the two pertinent questions in this context are : (i) absence 'of what' and (ii) absence 'where'? Whatever is the answer to the first question is the counter-positive of the absence and the answer to the second question is the base-relatum or locus of the absence. Thus, in the example mentioned above, *rūpa* i.e. colour is the counter-positive of the absence and *vāyu* or air is the base-relatum or locus of the same.

To remember this in an easy way let us draw a simple picture:



one may describe this absence in navya-nyāya language as : रूपप्रतियोगिक- वायु - अनुयोगिक - अभावः। It is an absence, counter-positive of which is colour and locus or substratum of which is air.


Before proceeding to the next 'Text' one point may be noted here. The point is regarding *sa-pratiyogika-padārtha* i.e. entities which have one *pratiyogin* or rather those entities knowledge of which depends upon the knowledge of their *pratiyogins*. Such entities are said to be three in our system. They are : (i) relation (ii) absence and (iii) Similarity. Our author has discussed the first two. Let us remember the third one namely similarity to make our understanding of *sa-pratiyogika-padārtha* complete.

Similarity always has two aspects. They are (i) comparison (or similarity) of something and (ii) comparison or similarity in something. The traditional example of similarity is : the face is like the

moon (*candra iva mukham*). It is similarity of the moon which is in the face.

Thus, to understand what is the *pratiyogin* of similarity and what is the *anuyogin* of the same let us take recourse to the two questions like before. They are : (i) Similarity of what? and (ii) Similarity where or in what?

Just as before, the answer to the first question gives us the information about the counter-comparative of the similarity and the answer to the second question gives us the locus or substratum of similarity. Let us draw the simple picture which will help us understand it in a vivid manner.



One may describe this similarity in navya-nyāya language as : चन्द्र-प्रतियोगिक-मुख-अनुयोगिक-सादृश्यम्। This means : similarity, counter-comparative of which is the moon and locus or base-comparative of which is the face.

It may be noted here that the three entities named as *sa-pratiyogika* do not carry any meaning unless and until their *pratiyogins* are known. In other words, their knowledge depends upon the knowledge of their *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin*. When their *pratiyogins* and *anuyogins* are known their knowledge is complete. Otherwise not.

□□

## TEXT - 26

एकत्र एकेन सम्बन्धेन वर्तमानस्यापि सम्बन्धान्तरेण अभावो वर्तते। यथा - भूतले संयोगेन सम्बन्धेन वर्तमानस्यापि घटस्य समवायसम्बन्धेनाभावः। एवम् एकेन रूपेण वर्तमानस्यापि रूपान्तरेणाभावो भवति। यथा शुक्लपटवति गृहे पटत्वरूपेण सामान्यधर्मेण वर्तमानस्यापि नीलपटत्वरूपेण विशेषधर्मेण बहिर्वृत्तिरूपेण वा

विशिष्टधर्मेण पटघटोभयत्वरूपेण वा उभयत्वपुरस्कारेण अभावो भवति। न हि शुक्लपटस्य विद्यमानत्वेनैव नीलपटस्यापि वृत्तिता भवति। एवं गृहे केवलस्य पटस्य सत्त्वेऽपि घटस्याभावेन पटघटोभयस्यापि अभावोऽस्त्येव एकाभावेन उभयाभावस्य अवश्यंभावित्वात् । इत्येवम् अभावस्य सम्बन्धविशेषकृतं धर्मविशेषकृतञ्च वैलक्षण्यं भवति ।

### English Translation

When something exists somewhere by one relationship, it is absent by another relationship (in the same locus). For example, the pot, even if present on the ground by the relation of contact, is absent by the relation of inherence. Similarly, when something is present (somewhere) in one form, it is absent in another form. For example, in the house, where (only) white cloth exists, even if it exists in the form of cloth (in general), it is absent in the house by the specific property (in the particular form) of blue cloth or (in the form of) by the specific property of being existent outside or by promoting (the absence) both-ness in the form of cloth and pot both. Only because there is presence of white cloth, there cannot be presence of blue (or black) cloth. So also when only cloth exists in the house because there is absence of pot, both cloth and pot are really absent there. Because when one is absent both are necessarily absent.

Thus, absence is different as per the difference in relations or as per the difference in properties.


**Note :** Our author, here, wishes to discuss different *abhāvas* or rather the grounds on the basis of which occurs difference in absence. The two grounds are mentioned here :

(i) relation (ii) property.

The author explains : Relation is that factor which can bring difference in *abhāva* or absence. Why? Because when 'x' exists on 'y' by the relation, say, 'z', it does not exist in the same 'y' and at the same time by another relation, say 'p'. In other words, 'x' may exist in some other locus say Q by the relation 'p'. But this is not the point here. The point is : even when 'x' is present in 'y' by the relation 'z' it is absent in the same locus by another relation say 'p'. Thus,




difference in absence is caused by the relation. We may remember the same :



The second point is : when 'x' is present in a locus 'y' as 'x', it is absent as (i) qualified 'x' or (ii) 'x' and 'y' both. The example taken up by our author is that of 'white cloth is in the house'. When white cloth is in the houses, 'black cloth' is absent and 'cloth and pot' both also are absent. Let us remember the same through the following pictures :


The basic fact :

'शुक्लपटः गृहे अस्ति' :




It is possible to say :

(१) नीलपटः गृहे नास्ति :




(२) बहिर्वृत्तित्वविशिष्टपटः

गृहे नास्ति :



(३) पटघटोभयं नास्ति :



It is, however, impossible to say: पटः गृहे नास्ति।

Impossibility:-



Thus, in case of the second example one may say that when, 'there is white cloth in the house' is the statement at hand, what one cannot deny is the fact that 'there is cloth in the house' and 'there is white cloth in the house'. But one can very well deny, (i) The existence of 'black cloth' in the house (ii) the existence of cloth having the property of existing outside and (iii) the existence of cloth and pot both in the house.

Therefore, our author says, the difference in absence is caused by the different properties of the *pratiyogin* (i.e. the thing which is absent). In other words, it is the difference in the *pratiyogin* which causes the difference in absence. This very point is discussed in the next Text.

□□

### TEXT - 27

तच्च अभावस्य वैलक्षण्यं प्रतियोगितावैलक्षण्य- निबन्धनमिति तदेव उच्यते - अभावस्य प्रतियोगिता केनचित् सम्बन्धेन केनचिद् धर्मेण च अवच्छिन्ना भवति। येन सम्बन्धेन येन वा धर्मेण अवच्छिन्ना भवति स सम्बन्धः स च धर्मः तस्याः प्रतियोगितायाः अवच्छेदको भवति। यथा 'भूतले समवायसम्बन्धेन घटो नास्ति' इत्यादौ घटाभावस्य प्रतियोगिता समवायेन सम्बन्धेन घटत्वेन च धर्मेण अवच्छिन्ना । ततश्च तस्याः प्रतियोगितायाः समवायः सम्बन्धः, घटत्वञ्च धर्मः अवच्छेदकः। अत एव समवायेन घटो नास्तीत्यस्य समवाय-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकोऽभावो वर्तत इत्यर्थः।

### English Translation

Also the difference in absence is caused by the difference in the counter-positive. It is being explained thus - counter-positiveness of an absence is delimited by some relation and also

by some property. By whatever relation or by whatever property the counter-positiveness is delimited, that relation of that property is (said to be) the delimitor of that counter-positiveness. For example, in the case of the statement like, 'there is no pot on the ground by the relation of inherence', the counter-positiveness in pot is delimited by the relation of inherence and by the property, namely, potness. So then the relation of inherence and the property potness are the delimiters of counter-positiveness. This is why when it is said, 'the pot does not exist by inherence' it means : there is an absence whose counter-positiveness is delimited by the relation of inherence.

**Note :** If we begin our discussion over the present Text with a question : what is *abhāva* ? then our system will answer this question as : *a-bhāva* is an independent category of entities. It is negative in nature as the very name suggests. One must remember here that our system is the realist system. Therefore, the entity is negative in nature but is as real as any positive entity. The main ground to accept *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha* is : the necessity of explaining the consistent behaviour of human being who utter/use sentences like, 'there is no pot on the ground' (and even expressions like, 'there is absence of pot on the ground as an alternative! Actually this alternative must have compelled /led our system to the acceptance of *abhāva*.)

Let us think a little elaborately. The main aim of our system is to explain human behaviour. Linguistic behaviour covers quite considerable portion of human behaviour, (which incidentally is a unique feature of humans). Our system believes in a relationship of language and reality. Accordingly the system believes that each and every word of a language refers to something and each and everything in the universe can be referred to by a word. (This view one may find discussed by *nyāyabhāṣyakāra* also who belonged to the beginning of the Christian Era.)

Our navya-nyāya system has defined word as *śaktam padam..* The word *śakta* means : *śakti-viśiṣṭa*. *Śakti* is the relation between word and meaning. Thus, word is that unit of language which has a (relation with) meaning. When one reads this definition and understands the same, one is reminded of the definition of word as per modern

linguistics. According to them word-which in their terminology is a morpheme - is the minimum meaningful unit of a language. It is the same way that our system has defined 'word' i.e. *pada*. As, thus, our system holds that word is the smallest unit of language which conveys certain meaning, it logically follows that stems, case-endings, roots, personal and other suffixes etc. all are words because all of them express some meaning or the other. The same is the idea of morpheme. Thus, the definition of *pada* (word), offered by our system, which may be labelled as semantic one, exactly matches with the definition of morpheme in modern linguistics.

With this, let us now turn to our discussion on *a-bhāva*. *Na a-*, *an-* etc. are negative particles in Sanskrit. '*Na*' (technical term for *nā* is *nañ*) is a free morpheme whereas *a-*, *an-* etc are bound ones. The question regarding these is : what do these particles refer to ? In simple language what is their meaning ? In our system, as we already know, meaning and referent are one and the same. To come to the question raised above one can ask the same question in a different manner : suppose there is a sentence : *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na* ; what is the meaning of *na* in the sentence ? To answer the question satisfactorily our system holds : the primary meaning of negative particle is twofold : (i) *Saṃsargābhāva* i.e. relational absence and (ii) *anyonyābhāva* i.e. mutual absence. (For the detailed discussion on this issue, one may look into the *Nañvāda* of Raghunātha śīromaṇi) And *a-bhāva* is an independent category of entities. (For the detailed analysis on this issue one may refer to the *Abhāva-vāda* of the *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* of Gaṇeśa.)

Let us come again to our example, namely, *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ na*. The meaning of this sentence will be : भूतल-निष्ठ-आधारता-निरूपकः घटाभावः। How does one understand this meaning from the sentence भूतले घटः न ?

Let us look into the process of verbal understanding to answer the question. 'Verbal understanding' means understanding of 'sentence meaning'. Thus, it arises from a heard/read sentence. According to our system the process is as follows :

- Step 1 - the sentence is heard/ read.
- Step 2 - Word-meanings are remembered.
- Step 3 - Word-meanings are related.

‘Related word-meanings’ is the meaning of the sentence. Thus, the hearer arrives at the sentence-meaning. This is known as verbal understanding or *śābdabodha*. For the above procedure, to be completed successfully, the basic requirement is that both the speaker and the hearer are conversant with the language they are using as the medium of communication.

Let us come back to our sentence : ‘भूतले घटः न’ to see how it gives rise to certain understanding by applying the same process to it

Step one : ‘bhutale ghatah na’ is heard.

Step two : ground locusness pot one absence are remembered.

Step three: Absence of pot is the describer of the locusness in ground. - word-meanings are related.

Understanding of the related-word-meanings is verbal understanding.

To say the same in Sanskrit :

Step 1 - भूतले घटः न—is heard.

Step 2 - भूतल आधारता घटत्व विशिष्ट एकत्व विशिष्ट अभाव remembered.

Step 3 - भूतल-निष्ठ-आधारता-निरूपकः घटाभावः। word meanings are related.

In the step 3 the word-meanings are related. The understanding of these related word-meaning is the *śābdabodha*. How do we get the relation between two word-meanings? How do the word-meanings get related? These are two pertinent questions which are answered by different systems of philosophy differently, leading to different theories of verbal understanding. Let us confine ourselves to our system only. Let us think of the same example that we discussed. In the sentence, ‘भूतले घटः न’ there are five morphemes (*padas*): The stem भूतल, Locative case-ending after it, the stem घट, nominative case-ending after it and the negative particle न. (Actually, there is one nominative case-ending after the negative particle, which has been dropped as per the Paninian rules. But as the same is dropped let us forget it.) Thus, there are five morphemes which convey their meanings. According to our system, once the word-meanings are remembered they get connected with each

other by *saṃsarga-maryādā*. *Saṃsarga-maryādā* literally means: limitation of relations. It is pre-determined, as it were, what should be related to what and as what. In other words, the meanings of words have a defined structure through which they get related to each other naturally i.e. without any efforts of the hearer. Our author had hinted at this when he stated that, 'केनचित् सम्बन्धेन कश्चिदेव कुत्रचिदेव तिष्ठति'। (vide Text no above.)

To come to our present Text, our author wants us to remember that the difference in absence is caused by the difference in the counter-positive. We have seen that unless one knows the counter-positive of *abhāva* one does not know anything of *abhāva* because one's understanding of *abhāva* solely depends upon one's knowing the counter-positive of the *abhāva*. This is why, one can very well understand that difference in *abhāva* depends upon the difference in *pratyogitā*.

Another point made in the present Text is the counter-positiveness of an absence is delimited by one property and by one relation. Let us understand this point in a clear manner. We have mentioned before that there is a special kind of relation between an inherent and an occasional property in one and the same thing. Actually it is this relation posited by our system through which navya-nyāya language is said to be the best way, the best medium of *śāstric* discourse. Śāstric discourse cannot afford to be ambiguous. In other words, if discussion on śāstric issues takes place through natural language the discussion may not be successful, may not be fruitful, as the medium of dialogue namely, natural language is not free from ambiguity. This has been the matter of concern of our system since its inception. The very first systematic presentation of Nyāya system namely the *Nyāyasūtra* gives utmost importance to dialectics as this is the only way to resolve a conflict between different (contradictory) ideas and facts.

By the rigorous process of continuous thinking of centuries navya-nyāya could achieve the goal of developing an ambiguity-free, precise medium of communication. For achieving this various concepts were evolved and used effectively. The most important among them is the concept of delimitor or *avacchedaka*. To understand this let us revise

our memory regarding the inherent property of a thing and an occasional property that comes to reside in the same thing. For this, let us take an example : A human being is born. Then the child has human-being-hood the moment it comes into being. This human-being-hood which is the inherent property of the person since he is born will reside in him till his death. In between he will become a student later on perhaps a teacher or an engineer or a doctor or a businessman still later he will become a husband, a father then grandfather etc etc. All these properties such as studenthood, teacherhood ..... fatherhood, grandfatherhood etc. are later 'acquired properties' as against his 'inherent property' *manuṣyatva* or *puruṣatva*. Let us note the difference between these two types of properties. Inherent property of a thing is a sort of permanent one in the sense that it does not cease to exist in the thing as long as the thing does not cease to exist. The 'acquired property' is a temporary one which comes to reside in the thing in a particular context or at a particular occasion, and ceases to exist when the context or occasion is over.


Inherent property of a thing is unique to the class to which the thing belongs whereas 'acquired property' may be common to many classes!

Thus, if we take the example of pot, 'potness' is in the pot so long as the pot exists. But the same pot becomes the 'object' of our cognition; it becomes '*kārya* or effect' when we talk about its cause or causes ; it becomes *kāraṇa* when we talk about its effects ; the same pot becomes a *pratiyogin* when we talk about its absence. Thus, 'potness' is unique to the class of 'pot's but objecthood, effecthood, causehood, counter-positiveness etc. are common to pot, cloth, book, table and what not. It is so because all these things can become the objects of cognition, effects of their causes, causes of their effects, counter-positives of their absences.

To come to our present discussion, it is just because of this fact that 'anything' can become the object of cognition 'anything' can be an effect, a cause, a counter-positive, there is a scope of ambiguity when one talks about these 'occasional' or 'contextual' or acquired properties of a thing. This ambiguity will lead to the mistake in understanding and ultimately 'communication' will not take place. Dialectics will fail and there will not be any precise resolution of the doubt or problem or question regarding the issue at stake.

To avoid all this mis-communication and its undesired results our system has evolved a technique of delimiting (specifying) the occasional properties. The question what will be in a position to delimit these occasional properties was obviously solved by the inherent properties of the things. Thus, to say in one sentence, 'inherent property of a thing delimits all those properties which come to reside in the thing only occasionally -only in a particular context. These are the 'acquired properties' of the thing. Thus, the relations between 'an inherent property' and 'an acquired property' existing in one and the same thing is : delimitor-delimited relation *avacchedaka-avacchinna-bhāva*.


To remember this in an easier manner, let us draw some simple pictures depicting the reality through some simple expressions



As *ghaṭa* is the object of knowledge, *ghaṭa* has *viśayatā*. Knowing that anything can become object of knowledge and hence *viśayatā* could reside in anything, to avoid the ambiguity regarding this point by specifying that what one is talking about is the pot as an object (and nothing else), the inherent property of pot, namely, *ghaṭatva* is made use of. It delimits the *viśayatā*, which, occasionally has come to reside in the pot. This happened just because of the expression *ghaṭaḥ jñānaviśayaḥ*.


Once we have explained the first picture, let us draw some more pictures and read them by ourselves. Let us not have explanation for each of them as we know it fully by now.

घटस्य कारणं दण्डः।






घटः जलाहरणकारणम्।



घटाभावः



In all the above cases, घटत्व, the 'inherent property' of pot delimits all those properties which come to reside in the pot in those particular contexts such as : cognition ; causality ; effecthood, and absence. The purpose of this delimitation is to make a specific and precise statement about the locus of the occasional properties.

As is clear now, the context of our present Text is that of absence and hence the author specifies that the counter-positiveness of absence has to be delimited by a property and by a relation.

why the author has said this is amply clear now. So far as 'delimiting the counter-positiveness by a relation' is concerned the author has taken it up for discussion in the next Text. Let us also discuss it there only.

□□

## TEXT -28

सम्बन्धस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वस्वीकारे युक्तिरियम्-सामान्यतः कस्यापि कुत्रापि प्रायशः अभावो नास्ति। अन्ततः कालिकसम्बन्धेन सर्वस्य सर्वत्र विद्यमानत्वात्। ततश्च अभावस्य अन्तरा कश्चित् सम्बन्धोऽस्तीति अवश्यमङ्गीकार्यम्। अभावस्यान्तरा प्रविशन् सम्बन्धः प्रतियोगितामेवावच्छिन्दन् (विशेषयन्) सम्भवति नान्यथा। येन सम्बन्धेन यत्र यन्नास्ति, स एव सम्बन्धस्तत्र तदभावस्य प्रतियोगितामवच्छिनन्ति (विशेषयति)। अत एव स एव सम्बन्धस्तस्याः

अवच्छेदको भवति। प्रतियोगिता च तेन सम्बन्धेनावच्छिन्ना भवति। यथा ---  
 भूतले समवायसम्बन्धेन घटो नास्तीत्यत्र समवायसम्बन्धः भूतले घटाभावस्य  
 प्रतियोगितां विशेषयतीति घटाभावस्य प्रतियोगिता समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना।  
 समवायसम्बन्धश्च तस्याः प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदकः। तथा च सम्बन्धस्य  
 अवच्छेदकत्वं विशेषकत्वरूपमिति फलितम्।

### English Translation

The argument/reason behind accepting relation as the delimitor of counter-positiveness is this : generally, nothing is absent anywhere because, ultimately, by temporal relation everything exists everywhere. And therefore, it has been accepted that there is some (other) relation between absence (and its locus). If relation enters into absence (and its locus) it is possible only by delimiting i.e. specifying the counter-positiveness, not otherwise. The relation by which something does not exist somewhere itself delimits (specifies) counter-positiveness of that absence. Thus, the same relation becomes the delimitor of that (counter positiveness) and the counter-positiveness becomes delimited by that relation.

For example, in case of the statement, 'there is no pot on the ground by the relation of inherence', as the relation of inherence specifies the counterpositiveness of absence of pot on the ground, the counterpositiveness of the absence of pot is (said to be) delimited by the relation of inherence. Thus, inherence is the delimitor of that counter positiveness. In this way, the delimitorhood of/ in relation is nothing but specifier-hood (of the same).

**Note :** Our author explains here why a relation also has to delimit the counterpositiveness of absence. To understand the point clearly, let us remember an important pertinent point : when one uses a negative particle and states, 'भूतले घट न' or घटः पटः न', these are the cases of relational and mutual absence respectively. Be it any case of absence, it aims at denying some relationship between some two things. The first statement denies the relation between the ground and the pot. the second one is the denial of relation between the pot

and the cloth. The hearer understands both these statements only because the speaker's intention regarding the relation that he wants to deny is understood by him. In other words, the hearer has guessed clearly which relation the speaker wants to deny. If relation had no role to play in the context of absence it would not have been possible for the hearer to understand the above statements. Why? our author explains that by temporal relation everything exists everywhere. And hence nothing is absent anywhere.

If one takes into account the temporal relation alone then nothing is absent in any locus. This leads to the impossibility of understanding the negative statements i.e. *abhāva* statements. (Only because there is no *a-bhāva* of anything anywhere by *kālika sambandha*.) Therefore, it becomes necessary to specify the relation by which a speaker intends to talk about absence of something in or on something else. In other words, whenever there are negative statements, the speaker does not have temporal relation in mind. He has some other relation such as *saṁyoga*, *samavāya* etc. by which he wants to talk about the absence, say, of pot on the ground etc.

Now, the next point is : how does the relation enter in between absence and locus? It is possible to do so only by delimiting the counter-positiveness by that relation.

This is necessary for one more reason. When one says that there is no pot on the ground even when a pot is present on the ground, he perhaps intends to say that the pot does not exist on the ground by the relation of inherence. Thus, by introducing a relation as a delimitor of counter-positiveness one can specify his intention. After all the main aim of our system is to make specific statements for the precise understanding of the hearer.

Thus, it is also clear that the relation which is the delimitor of the *pratiyogitā* is that relation by which something is (intended to be) absent in a particular locus. This is made clear by our author by taking the example, 'there is no pot on the ground' by the relation of *samavāya*. Here, the counter positiveness of pot on *bhūṭala* is specified by the relation of *samavāya*. In other words, it is not the case that the pot is absent on *bhūṭala* by any other relation but it is (the case that it is) absent only by the relation of inherence. Thus, if we say the same

thing in navya-nyāya language, we have to state that 'the counter-positiveness of the absence of pot is delimited by the relation of inherence.'

Thus, the relation between the relation of inherence and the counter-positiveness in pot is that of delimitor-delimited relationship.

Now, it is amply clear that a particular relation must delimit the counter-positiveness of absence just because there is a possibility of many relations by which a thing may be absent in a particular locus.

□□

### TEXT - 29

धर्मस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वे युक्तिरियम् - अभावस्य प्रतियोगिता कुत्र वर्तते कुत्र वा न वर्तते इति निर्णयाय प्रतियोगितानियामकः कश्चिदस्तीति अवश्यम् अङ्गीकार्यम् । सर्वेषु प्रतियोगिषु वर्तमानः, तदन्यत्र अवर्तमानः प्रतियोगितः कश्चन असाधारणो धर्म एव प्रतियोगिताया नियामको भवति। य एव नियमितः स अवच्छिन्न इति। तथाहि - घटाभावस्य घटगता प्रतियोगिता कुत्र कुत्र वर्तते, कुत्र कुत्र वा न वर्तते, इति प्रश्नस्य उत्तरमिदमेव भवति, यत्र यत्र घटत्वं वर्तते, तत्र सर्वत्रैव घटाभावस्य घटगता प्रतियोगिता वर्तते। नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् घटत्वशून्ये; नापि च कस्मिन्नपि घटे तस्या अभाव इति घटत्वमेव घटगताया घटाभाव-प्रतियोगितायाः स्थितिनियामकम् । घटत्वेनैव घटाभाव-प्रतियोगिता नियमितेति नियामकत्वमेवावच्छेदकत्वम् । नियमितत्वमेवावच्छिन्नत्वमिति ।

यश्च प्रतियोगी भवति तत्र विशेषणतया प्रतीयमानोऽसाधारणो धर्मः तद्गतप्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदको भवतीति फलितार्थः।

### English Translation

The argument behind accepting one property to be the delimitor of counter-positiveness is this : 'where lies the counter-positiveness of absence and where does not' needs to be decided and for that it has to be accepted that there is some controller or regulator of the counter-positiveness. This regulator could be only that uncommon property in the counter-positive which

resides in all the counter-positives and does not reside anywhere else. The one which is the regulator or controller is (said to be) 'the delimitor' and that which is regulated or controlled is (said to be) the delimited. To explain : If a question is asked, ' where does the counter-positiveness of the absence of pot (in pot) exist and where it does not' then the answer, certainly, will be, 'wherever there is potness (or pothood) in all those cases exists the counter-positiveness of absence of pot (in pot) and it does not reside anywhere where there is no potness. Not even in one pot is it absent and hence, potness alone is the regulator of the existence/position of the counter-positiveness (in pot) of the absence of pot. And as the counter-positive-ness of the absence of pot is regulated by potness so the regulatoriness itself is delimitorhood. Regulatedness is delimitedness.

Thus, the resultant meaning (of all the discussion above) is : whatever appears as the qualifier in that which is a counter-positive, that uncommon property (alone) becomes the delimitor of the counter-positiveness in that (counter-positive).

**Note :** This Text is well understandable only if we remember our discussion on the inherent and acquired properties residing in one and the same thing. Let us just refresh our memory and then go on to the next 'Text'. Inherent property of a thing is always present in the thing since its production to its destruction. Our author has talked about the same in the present 'Text' as an *a-sādhāraṇa-dharma* i.e. an uncommon property of the thing. It is also nothing else but the qualifier of the thing or the property which qualifies it. An 'acquired property' is 'acquired' by a thing at a particular occasion or in a particular context. It leaves the thing when the occasion or the context is over. It is also common to many things and is not at all, in any sense an uncommon property.

Now, this very fact is used by our system to regulate the locus of the common or contextual property residing in a particular thing, and the inherent property which is always present in the thing is given the task of regulating the position of the common acquired property which occasionally comes to reside in its own locus. Therefore the inherent

property is the regulator or *avacchedaka* and the occasional property is regulated (by it) or *avacchinna*.

Thus, if we wish to expand the simple expression, 'घटाभावः' in navya-nyāya-language we will have the following steps :

1. घटाभावः (natural Sanskrit expression)
2. घटप्रतियोगिक-अभावः
3. घटनिष्ठप्रतियोगिताक-अभावः
4. घटत्वावच्छिन्न-घटनिष्ठ-प्रतियोगिताक-अभावः
5. घटत्वावच्छिन्न-घटनिष्ठप्रतियोगिता-निरूपक-अभावः।


After this exercise, there is no doubt that we are talking about the absence of pot.

The above expression, namely, *ghaṭābhāvaḥ* needs some more information to give one composite meaning to the hearer. That is regarding : (i) What is the locus of this *ghaṭābhāva* ? and (ii) What is the relation by which *ghaṭa* does not exist in that locus?

If the statement is revised as, 'भूतले संयोगसम्बन्धेन घटो नास्ति' then all the information about the absence of pot is obtained and this may be put in the navya-nyāya language as follows :

- (i) भूतले संयोगसम्बन्धेन घटः न ।
- (ii) भूतल-अनुयोगिक-संयोग-संसर्गक-घट-प्रतियोगिक-अभावः।
- (iii) भूतलनिष्ठअनुयोगिताक-संयोग-संसर्गक-घटनिष्ठ-प्रतियोगिताक-अभावः।
- (iv) भूतलनिष्ठ-भूतलत्वावच्छिन्न-अनुयोगिताक-संयोग-संसर्गवच्छिन्न-घटनिष्ठ-घटत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताक-अभावः।
- (v) भूतलनिष्ठ-भूतलत्वावच्छिन्न-अनुयोगिताक-संयोग-संसर्गवच्छिन्न-घटनिष्ठ-घटत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिता-निरूपक-अभावः।

Here, all information regarding the absence of pot has come together. It is the absence of pot only on the piece of ground by the relation of contact is unambiguously stated here. Let us have a simple presentation of the same :



The points to be remembered in a nutshell regarding the property and the relation acting as the delimiters of the occasional properties in a thing are :

(i) Delimitation is nothing but specification; preciseness ; accuracy.

(ii) It is necessary to dis-ambiguate the statement.

(iii) Ambiguity is there mainly in the cases of : (a) the common i.e. acquired / occasional/ contextual properties which come and go in a thing and also (b) the relations by which the thing is related to something else. This is so because both of these are common to many things i.e. exist in very many places. This fact may lead to misunderstanding in the hearer regarding an important śāstric issue which may lead to non-understanding of the same. This is the most undesired thing in dialectics i.e. in special śāstric discourses.

(iv) The inherent property which is uncommon takes care of delimiting the common i.e. acquired property in its own locus.

(v) The relation by which a thing is intended to be related or not to be related with the other thing is the relation which delimits the common property in a thing.

(vi) Let us remember the beautiful definition of delimiter : अन्वून-अनतिरिक्त-धर्मत्वम् अवच्छेदकत्वम्।

(vii) Some inherent properties are : घटत्व , पटत्व , भूतलत्व , पुस्तकत्व etc.

Some common properties are : कारणता , कार्यता , प्रतियोगिता अनुयोगिता etc.

**TEXT - 30**

अथवा स्थूलत एवं रीत्या बोध्यम् - प्रतियोगिबोधक-विशेष्यपदोत्तरं 'त्व' 'तल्' (ता) प्रभृतिभावप्रत्ययनिष्पन्नो (निष्पन्नपदवाच्यः) धर्मः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदको भवति। यथा - घटाभावस्य घटः प्रतियोगीति प्रतियोगिवाचकं घटपदं, तदुत्तरं 'त्व' प्रत्ययेन (घट + त्व) निष्पन्नो धर्मः (घटत्वं जातिः) घटगतप्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदक इति। एवं रूपाभावस्य प्रतियोगिवाचकं रूपपदं तत्र त्वप्रत्ययनिष्पन्नपदस्यार्थः रूपत्वं जातिः रूपाभावस्य प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदिकेति। यद्यपि अवच्छेदकत्व-नियामकत्वयोरैक्यं तथापि ग्रन्थकृद्भिरवच्छेदकपदस्यैव प्रयोगात् अवच्छेदकशब्द एव प्रयोक्तव्यः न तु नियामकशब्दोऽपि; तथात्वे अप्रयुक्ततादोषः स्यात्।

**English Translation**

Or in a broad manner one should understand like this : whichever word stands for a counter-positive, a suffix standing for abstraction such as *tva* or *tā* should be added to it and the whatever word is thus obtained - the property which is the meaning of such a word is the delimitor of counter-positive.

For example - as 'pot' is the counter-positive of absence of pot, the *ghaṭa* ('pot') stands for the counter-positive. When the suffix *tva* is added to it (such as : *ghaṭa* + *tva* = *ghaṭatva*) then the property which is obtained (as the meaning of this word) is the universal- potness or *ghaṭatva* and that is the delimitor of counter-positiveness in the pot. Similarly, the word *rūpa* i.e. colour stands for the counter-positive of the absence of *rūpa* i.e. colour, here when the suffix *tva* is added, the meaning we obtain from the word (*rūpa* + *tva* = *rūpatva*) is the universal *rūpatva* or colourness and the same (*rūpatva*) is the delimitor of the counter-positiveness of the absence of colour.

Even if delimitor and controller (or regulator) are one and the same, still, as the authors (of *nyāya* and *navyanyāya*) have used the word delimitor (*avacchedaka*) alone, the word delimitor only should be used (by everybody working on *navya-nyāya*) and the word regulator (or controller) should not be used along with the use of the word 'delimitor'. If it is so used, the fault of 'using a word not used (by the authorities)' will be committed.



**Note :** This 'Text' is in a way a special piece from our author. What he has tried to do in this one is : giving a 'formal principle' to find out what is the delimiter of a counter-positiveness (or actually of any occasional property, for that matter). He says, (in case of counter-positiveness) take the word which stands for counter-positive and add to it an abstract suffix like *tva* or *tā* in Sanskrit (or 'ness' or 'hood' in English) and whatever word we get by doing so is the word which stands for delimiter. This is the easiest way (i.e. the shortest cut) to obtain a delimiter. One thinks that the matter cannot be made simpler than this. Still he has taken two examples to make it more understandable or should we say transparent. The first example is that of 'absence of pot'. Here 'pot' is the word which stands for the counter-positive when one 'ness' or 'hood' is added to it we get the word which stands for the delimiter of the counter-positiveness in the pot, namely, 'potness' or 'pot hood'. One can easily explain the other example, namely, *rūpābhāva* in the same manner. But our author has, even, explained that also vividly.

Another important point that our author has made in the present 'Text' is about the usage of the word delimiter (actually, he is talking about the word '*avacchedaka*') He says, *avacchedaka* (the delimiter) is nothing other than *niyāmaka* (regulator or controller) or *viśeṣaka* (specifier) but this explanation is made only for the sake of understanding. It does not mean that one (a modern author on navya-nyāya) is free to use any of these words to mean *avacchedaka*. Why? Just because the great authors of navya nyāya have never done so. If one (modern person working on navyanyāya) does so what will happen? Our author simply says, he will be committing a fault of 'using a word not in use'!

**Dogma!** These Indian philosophers are dogmatic! They believe more in the authority of word. One is apt to hear these comments from the modern (!) philosophers. But I look at it in a different way! It is just a matter of systematization. It is a principle of methodology. It is avoiding ambiguity by unnecessarily using the synonymous expressions. This is the greatest virtue in the field of Literary Art. It is a fault in a *śāstra*. Aims and goals of both of these are different and hence the difference in methodology. □□

**TEXT - 31**

वृत्तितावत् प्रतियोगितापि अभावेन निरूपिता भवति, अभावश्च प्रतियोगिताया निरूपकः (नियामकः (?))। एवं अवच्छेदकता-प्रतियोगितयोरपि परस्परं निरूप्य-निरूपकभावोऽस्ति। अवच्छेदकतानिरूपिता प्रतियोगिता, प्रतियोगितानिरूपिता च अवच्छेदकता भवति। ततश्च समवायेन घटो नास्तीत्यस्य समवाय-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितानिरूपकोऽयमभावः इत्यर्थः।

**English Translation**

Just as *vṛttitā* (is described by *adhikaraṇatā*) the counter-positiveness also is described by absence (and so) absence is the describer of the counter-positiveness. In the same manner *avacchedakatā* (delimitor-ness) and *pratiyogitā* (counter-positiveness) also have mutual describer-and -described relationship. In other words, counter-positiveness is described by the delimitor-ness and delimitor-ness is described by the counter-positiveness.


Thus, the statement, 'there is no pot by the relation of inherence means : this absence is the describer of the counter-positiveness which is delimited by potness and which is delimited by the relation of inherence.

**Note :** The original text of *NNBP* is given in the bracket which we change to 'निरूपकः' to make the same meaningful. There should not be any difficulty in understanding the present 'Text' as we have already discussed the points of the same earlier in different contexts. Let us only refresh our memory to make sure that we remember all those points. Before going to them let us mark the main point that our author has made here. It is about the relationship between absence and its counter-positiveness as well as the relationship between the delimitorhood and counter-positiveness. The relationship is : describer-described-relationship

Let us remember that *vṛttitā* i.e. *ādheyatā* and also *pratiyogitā* are contextual or occasional properties. They come to reside in a thing in a particular context or at a particular occasion. The context for *pratiyogitā* to come to reside in the pot is : 'absence of pot'. It is

because someone speaks about the 'absence of pot' somewhere that the pot becomes the counter-positive of that absence (this in simple language means: if *ghaṭa* had been there, there would not have arisen the cognition of its absence. As *ghaṭa* is opposed to *ghaṭābhāva*, it is called counter-positive of its absence.) Obviously counter-positiveness comes to reside in pot in the context of its absence. In other words, it is because of the context of absence that the pot is named as or rather renamed as counter-positive. It can be said still in a different manner as absence describes the counter-positiveness in pot and vice-versa. Pot has its inherent property, namely, 'potness' which becomes the delimiter of counter-positiveness in pot. Now, it is because the counter-positiveness that 'potness' is renamed as delimiter. (Just because counter-positiveness is an occasional property it needs to be delimited and as potness delimits the same, it is the delimiter.) In other words, counter-positiveness and delimiterhood are mutually described.

Let us remember only one point to keep the whole discussion in mind and the point is : all contextual properties are pair-properties which come to reside in two related things when there is such an expectancy in some knower or the other. In other words, they are not *saha-ja* or inherent. *Therefore, they always, being in pairs, describe each other.* Some of these pairs are :



(3) हेतुता-साध्यता (4) विषयता-विषयिता; (5) प्रतियोगिता-अनुयोगिता; (6) अवच्छेदकता-अवच्छिन्नता etc. etc. One can draw similar pictures for many such pairs just to fix the point in mind. One should note that the arrow of the relation of describer-and-described relationship is pointed both ways which suggests the relation being mutual or reciprocal.

**TEXT - 32**

एकस्य अभावस्य बहूनि प्रतियोगीनि सन्ति । सुतरां प्रतियोगिताः तदवच्छेदकसम्बन्धाश्चापि बहवो भवन्ति। तथा हि द्वितीयाभावः (घटाभावाभावः) प्रतियोगि-(घट) स्वरूपः। तृतीयाभावः (घटाभावाभावाभावः) प्रथमाभाव-(घटाभाव) स्वरूप इति प्रथमाभावस्य (घटाभावस्य) घट इव द्वितीयाभावोऽपि (घटाभावाभावोऽपि) प्रतियोगी । तस्मिंश्च एका अपरा प्रतियोगिता वर्तते। तस्याश्च प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदको धर्मः द्वितीयाभावत्वम् (घटाभावाभावत्वम्)। अवच्छेदकसम्बन्धश्च स्वरूपम्। एवमन्यदपि प्रतियोगि ऊह्यम्।

**English Translation**

There are many counter-positives of one absence. And hence counter-positivenesses and the relations delimiting them are also many. To explain : The second absence (absence of absence of pot) is same as the counter-positive ; the third absence (absence of absence of the absence of pot) is same as the first absence (namely, absence of pot) and therefore, the counter-positive of the first absence (i.e. absence of pot) is pot as well as the second absence (i.e. absence of a absence of pot) also. In that resides one more counter-positiveness and its delimitor property is the second absence-hood (or the absence-hood of absence of pot) and the delimiting relation is *svarūpa* i.e. self-linking relation.

One may think of different counter-positives as well in the same way.

**Note :** The point is about the equivalence. 'Double negation is equal to affirmation or assertion' is the principle of negation. In symbolic logic it is represented as  $p \equiv \sim \sim p$ . Only one point needs to be borne in mind is that 'p' stands for proposition. So, if we try to replace 'p' by a proposition like : 'it is raining' then the two equivalent propositions will be : 'It is raining' is equivalent to 'It is not the case that it is not raining.'

Similarly, our author says, 'a pot' is equivalent to 'the absence of absence of pot.' Apparently, the two seem to be different but if we

think a little more the apparent difference disappears. Let us see: one may make a proposition : 'There is a pot'. An equivalent proposition to this will be : 'It is not the case that there is no pot' this may be rewritten as 'It is not the case that the pot is absent there.' Thus, 'pot & absence of absence of pot is understood in this manner.

When this equivalence is accepted then what our author says stands correct. (But one should note that there is no unanimity regarding the issue. Those who do not agree with the equivalence have a point of difference that there cannot be equivalence between a positive and a negative entity just because the two are diagonally opposite to each other.) In such a situation a pot will be equivalent to (i) absence of absence of pot (ii) absence of absence of absence of absence of pot and so on! If one however takes logical steps it will i.e. should result into only two equivalences, namely,

(i) Pot  $\equiv$  absence of absence of pot

(ii) absence of pot  $\equiv$  absence of absence of absence of pot.

What our author has in mind is :

घट  $\equiv$  घटाभावाभाव

घटाभाव  $\equiv$  घटाभावाभावाभाव

घटाभावाभाव  $\equiv$  घटाभावाभावाभावाभाव and so on and so forth. This is why he uses the terminology of first *abhāva*, second *abhāva*, third *abhāva* etc.

He wants to point out that (if the equivalence is accepted then) in such a situation one absence will have more than one counter-positive. (Actually, as many equivalences will be there, so many counter-positives will be there) If so, then counter-positivenesses will also be many, delimiters will be also many and the delimiting relations will also be many.

However, one need not be puzzled over this because the decision in the matter solely depends upon how speaker expresses it and therefore, there should be only one 'counter-positive' at a time. Only thing is that one should be aware of the equivalence accepted by some in our system.

**TEXT - 33**

भावपदार्थवत् अभावोऽपि व्याप्यवृत्तिरव्याप्यवृत्तिश्च भवति। 'व्याप्य' सर्वमेव आधारस्यांशं कालं देशं वा अवलम्ब्य वर्तते यः स व्याप्यवृत्तिः। कस्मिन्नपि अंशे कालविशेषे देशविशेषे वा यस्याधिकरणे अभावो नास्ति, स व्याप्यवृत्तिः। यथा मनुष्ये मनुष्यत्वं जातिः, आकाशे रूपाभावः, शशे विषाणाभावः।

स्वाधारेऽपि यस्याभावो वर्तते, सः अव्याप्यवृत्तिः। यथा वृक्षे कपिसंयोगः कपिसंयोगाभावश्च अव्याप्यवृत्तिः।

**English Translation**


Just like the positive entities absence also is of two types: that which pervades its locus fully and that which pervades its locus partially. The term *vyāpyavṛtti* means: that which resides in its locus pervading all parts of the locus or all time or all space. In other words, that which is not absent in any part of its locus or in a particular time or in a particular space is known as *vyāpyavṛtti*. For example, the universal human-hood in a human being or absence of colour in *ākāśa* or absence of horns in hare.

On the other hand, that is known as *a-vyāpyavṛtti* whose absence exists on or in its own locus. For example, on a tree, the contact of a monkey and the absence of the same both are *a-vyāpya-vṛtti* (i.e. existent partially, not pervading the whole of the tree).

**Note :** In the present 'Text' the concepts of *vyāpya-vṛtti* and *a-vyāpya-vṛtti* *padārtha* have been mentioned. All *padārthas* can be divided into two classes, namely, *vyāpya-vṛtti* and *a-vyāpya-vṛtti*. The names are significant. They themselves make their meanings obvious. A *vyāpya-vṛtti padārtha* is an entity which exists in its locus by pervading the locus entirely. There is no space in the locus which is not covered by the located. Such a located is, for example, a universal. A universal pervades its whole locus. It is not the case that the universal, human-hood does not pervade some of the human beings (i.e. some of the loci of human-hood). It covers its locus in its entirety.

*A-vyāpya-vṛtti padārtha*, on the other hand, is an entity which covers its locus only partially. For example, contact between two things covers only that portion of both the things where they are actually connected. Elsewhere in both of the connected entities, there is absence of contact. In other words, *a-vyāpya-vṛtti padārtha* resides in its locus along with its own absence. Thus, if there is contact of monkey in the tree it is only in the branch where the monkey sits, everywhere else in the tree it is absence of contact of monkey. This is why our author says, the contact of monkey and also absence of contact both are *a-vyāpya-vṛtti* in the tree.

It is not difficult to understand that as positive entity is twofold as *vyāpya-vṛtti* and *a-vyāpya-vṛtti* so also is its absence the negative entity. As contact resides in its locus along with its absence so also its absence resides in its locus along with its own absence (i.e. actually along with its own counter-positive). To say the same through a single picture :



□□

### TEXT - 34

अव्याप्यवृत्तिपदार्थस्य वृत्तितायाः कश्चित् सीमापरिच्छेदकः अस्ति। परिच्छेदक एवात्र अवच्छेदकनाम्ना व्यवहियते। स च क्वचित् आधारस्य अंशविशेषः, क्वचित् कालविशेषः, क्वचिच्च देशविशेष इति । तथा ‘शाखायां वृक्षः कपिसंयोगी, न मूले’ इत्यत्र वृक्षे कपिसंयोगस्य वृत्तितायाः सीमापरिच्छेदकतया शाखा अवच्छेदिका। कपिसंयोगाभावस्य तु मूलम् अवच्छेदकम्। ‘उत्पत्तिकाले पुष्पं न गन्धवत् किन्तु तदुत्तरम्’ इत्यत्र पुष्पे गन्धाभावस्य वृत्तितायाम् उत्पत्तिकालः अवच्छेदकः। “वसन्ते यवाः मगधे तिष्ठन्ति, न तु गिरौ” इत्यत्र वसन्ते यववृत्तितायाः मगधदेशः अवच्छेदकः, यवाभावस्य वृत्तितायां गिरिप्रदेशः अवच्छेदकः।

### English Translation

There (always) is a definer of the limit of existence of an *a-vyāpya-vṛtti* entity. The definer is called a delimitor here. It (the definer) is sometimes a particular part of the locus ; sometimes a particular time and sometimes a particular place. For example, in case of the statement, ‘the tree is connected with the monkey in its branch and not in its root’, the branch is the delimitor by defining the limit of the existence of contact of the monkey in the tree. The root, however, is the delimitor of the absence of contact of monkey (in the tree).

But in case of the statement ‘at the time of its production the flower is not fragrant but it is so afterwards’, the time of production (of the flower) is the delimitor of the existence of the absence of smell or fragrance.

In case of the statement, ‘In the spring, *yava*-grains are found in the region of Magadha but not in (the region of) *giri* or mountain’, Magadha region is the delimitor of the existence of *yava*-grains in the season of spring and the *giri* region is the delimitor of the existence of the absence of *yava*-grains.

**Note :** The next point to be remembered in connection with the *a-vyāpya-vṛtti padārtha* is this that as the entity does not pervade its locus entirely, there must be something which will specify the area covered by the entity. Our author makes it clear that the specifier or definer of this area is sometimes some part of the locus, sometimes it is time or sometimes some region.

For explaining the three possibilities three examples have been taken :


- (i) शाखायां वृक्षः कपिसंयोगी न मूले।
- (ii) उत्पत्तिकाले पुष्पं न गन्धवत् किन्तु तदुत्तरम्। and
- (iii) वसन्ते यवाः मगधे तिष्ठन्ति न तु गिरौ।

Let us take them one by one.

The first example is that of the contact of a monkey with a tree. When a monkey sits on a branch of a tree its contact is only with the




branch on which it sits. Therefore, in the first example the branch of the tree becomes the specifier of the existence of the contact of monkey on the tree. So, it is the example of the first type of specifier, (of existence of an *a-vyāpyavṛtti padārtha*,) namely, a part of the locus. 'Tree' is the 'locus' of the non--locus-pervading entity, namely, 'contact' of the monkey and the 'branch' is the 'part' of the 'locus'. Let us remember that specifier is nothing but the delimiter, as our author reminds us. We may remember it also through the following :




In the second example 'time' becomes the delimiter of the existence of absence of fragrance in the flower. It is only in the first moment of its production that fragrance is (logically) absent in a flower. Hence, the first moment specifies i.e. delimits the existence of absence in the flower. In the time which follows the flower is fragrant i.e. it is the locus of sweet fragrance afterwards (so long as it exists).

To remember the same thing let us draw a picture :



Thus, the *utpattikāla* specifies and hence becomes the delimiter of the existence of the absence of fragrance whereas *taduttarakāla* specifies and hence becomes the delimiter of the existence of fragrance in the flower.

The third and the last example is : *yava*-grains exist in Magdha region in the spring season and the same do not exist in the *giri* region in the same spring season. Thus, here, time, namely, the spring-season is the common locus of both existence and non-existence of *yava*-grains. Both of these are specified-delimited by two different regions, namely, *Magadhadeśa* as well as *giripradeśa*. Let us draw a picture :



If we try to understand the similarity and dissimilarity between the second and third examples the following points may be noted. In the second example, flower is the common locus of both fragrance and absence of fragrance. How is it possible? It is possible only because उत्पत्तिकाल and तदुत्तरकाल delimit the existence of both गन्धाभाव and गन्ध respectively. In the third example, on the other hand वसन्त-काल is the common locus of both *yava*-grains and their absence. How is it possible? It is so because the regions such as मगधदेश and गिरिप्रदेश specify or delimit the existence of both *yava* and its absence respectively. Thus, a maxim accepted in our system, namely, 'देशे वृत्तौ कालः अवच्छेदकः काले वृत्तौ देशः अवच्छेदकः' is well understood and explained. when space is the locus of something, its locatedness is delimited by Time and when Time is the locus of something, its locatedness is delimited by space.

**TEXT - 35**

अव्याप्यवृत्तिताया अवच्छेदकवाचकपदे प्रायशः सप्तमी भवति। यथा 'अग्रे वृक्षः कपिसंयोगी न मूले' इति प्रयोगः।

अव्याप्यवृत्तिरभावः प्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणो भवति। यथा वृक्षे कपिसंयोगाभावः, वृक्षे कपिसंयोगः कपिसंयोगाभावश्च अस्ति।

व्याप्यवृत्तिस्तु प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणः, यथा -- आकाशे रूपाभावः। आकाशे रूपाभाव एवास्ति, न तु रूपमिति।

**English Translation**

Generally the word denoting delimitor of the existence which is partial (non-locus-pervading), is in locative. For example, 'the tree is connected with a monkey in the top and not in the root - this is the (proper) usage.

Absence of partial existence is (always) in the same locus which is the locus of the counter-positive. e.g. 'there is absence of contact of monkey in the tree', in this case there is contact and absence of contact in the tree.

Absence of total existence is (always) in a different locus than the locus of the counter-positive. e.g. 'there is absence of colour in *ākāśa*. In *ākāśa* the absence of colour alone exists, there is no colour in *ākāśa*.

**Note :** After explaining the *avyāpyavṛtti-padārtha* clearly, our author talked about the different delimiters of the existence of an *avyāpya-vṛtti* entity. It could be positive entity or it could be negative one. When one looks at the descriptive definition of an *a-vyāpya-Vṛtti-padārtha*, namely, 'an entity which resides in its locus along with its absence,' it becomes evident that both, 'the entity' and also 'its absence' share the locus. In other words, both pervade their locus only partially. Thus, it is clear that a positive entity (*bhāva-padārtha*) as well as a negative entity (*a-bhāva-padārtha*) both can be *a-vyāpya-vṛtti*. The example, our author has been discussing is that of the contact and its absence. Here, he wants to point to the fact that generally, the word

denoting delimiter of the existence of a partially existent entity takes a locative case. The same example of contact he states : 'Agre' *vrkṣaḥ kapiśamyogī na 'mūle'*. The statement says : The tree is possessor of contact of a monkey in the 'branch' (literally the 'top') and not in the 'root' (literally the 'bottom'). 'Agra' and 'mūla' are the parts of the tree which are delimiters of the existence of contact and its absence, respectively. One can see that both the words, denoting 'top' and 'bottom' namely, 'agra' and 'mūla' are in locative case (*agre* and *mūle*).

The rule is a general one. It is the style of our author that after explaining the concept thoroughly, he points to the 'linguistic presentation' of that concept to help us recognise the same.

The next point mentioned in the present Text is the basic difference between 'partially existent' absence and 'fully existent' absence. Actually we have already grasped the point from the detailed discussion, so far, regarding the same. But, perhaps, he wants us to remember two terms which occur in this context quite frequently. They are : '*Pratiyogisamānādhikaraṇa*' and '*pratiyogi-vyadhikaraṇa*'. The first term means : 'collocated with the counterpositive' (in the same locus) and the second term means 'not-collocated with the counterpositive'. Absence which does not pervade the whole of its locus stays in the locus with its counterpositive whereas absence which pervades the whole of its locus does not stay in the locus along with its counter-positive. The examples taken up are :

- (i) absence of contact of a monkey in a tree and
- (ii) absence of colour in the ether.

In the first case absence of contact of a monkey stays in the tree along with the contact of monkey (i.e. its counter-positive). In the second case the absence of colour does not exist in the ether anywhere along with colour (i.e. its counter-positive).

**TEXT - 36**

अभावश्च पुनर्द्विविधः। अन्योन्याभावः संसर्गाभावश्च। तादात्म्यं (तत्स्वरूपता, ऐक्यम्, अभेदः) नाम कश्चित् सम्बन्धो ऽस्ति । तेन सम्बन्धेन तस्य प्रतियोग्य-नियोगिनोरभेदः प्रतीयते । यथा ‘सुन्दरो नर’ इत्यत्र नरसुन्दरयोरैक्यं प्रतीयते । तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेनाभावः (भेदः) अन्योन्याभावः। यस्य अभावस्य प्रतियोगिता तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेनावच्छिन्ना सः अन्योन्याभावः इति । यथा – ‘घटो न पट’ इति। ततश्च न्यायभाषायाम् — अन्योन्याभावस्य ‘तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिता - निरूपकाभावत्वम् अन्योन्याभावत्वम्’ इति लक्षणं पर्यवसितं भवति । अन्योन्याभाव एव भेदः।

अन्योन्याभावभिन्नः अभावः संसर्गाभावः। नञा अभावबोधने यत्र प्रतियोगिपदे अनुयोगिपदे च प्रथमा भवति, तत्र अन्योन्याभावः प्रतीयते। यथा – ‘घटो न पट’ इति ।

यत्र पुनः प्रतियोगिपदे प्रथमा, अनुयोगिपदे च सप्तमी भवति, तत्र नञा संसर्गाभावः प्रतीयते । यथा – ‘भूतले घटो नास्ति’।

**English Translation**

Absence is of two types : Mutual absence and relational absence. There is a relation called identity (being of the same form; unity; non-difference). By that relation, counter-relatum and the base-relatum of a relation are one and the same. For example -- ‘a handsome man’, here the unity of the handsome and man is understood. Absence by identity relation is mutual absence. When counter-positiveness of an absence is delimited by the relation of identity, it is a mutual absence. For instance -- pot is not cloth. In navya-nyāya language the resultant definition of mutual absence is : the absence, which is the describer of the counter-positiveness delimited by the relation of identity. Mutual absence only is (known as) difference.

Absence, different from mutual absence is ‘relational absence’ - When a negative particle i.e. *nañ* denotes absence, it

is mutual one if both the words denoting a *pratiyogin* and an *anuyogin* are in nominative case. For example -- *pot* is not *cloth*.

But when the word denoting the counter-positive of absence is in nominative and the word denoting base-relatum is in locative the *nañ* stands for relational absence, e.g. There is no *pot on the ground*.

**Note :** We have discussed before (vide Text no. above) that our system accepts that negative particle stands for (i) mutual absence and (ii) relational absence. (grammarians accept six meanings of a negative particle but navya-nyāya accepts only two.)

Let us remember that any negative statement is basically a denial of relation between some two things. On the basis of this fact, because relations are divided into identity and non-identity (i.e. difference) negative statements are either the denials of identity - relation or they are denials of relation of difference.

Mutual absence is the denial of identity relation. We know that the relation which is denied is the relation that delimits the counter-positiveness. Thus, if identity is denied, the same is the counter-positiveness delimiting relation and hence this absence is described as, 'the absence, counter-positiveness of which is delimited by identity-relation'. This is mutual absence. When any other relation is denied it is a case of relational absence. Our author, as usual, has pointed out the formal criterion to understand the type of absence just from the linguistic expression. He says if both the words, denoting the counter-positive and the base-relatum are in nominative, it is a case of mutual absence. But if the word denoting counter-positive is in nominative and the word denoting the base-relatum is in the locative case then it is a case of relational absence.

**TEXT - 37**

स्थूलत इदमत्रावधेयम् — अन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यस्य अभावः (तादात्म्याभावः भेद इति यावत्) अन्योन्याभावः । संसर्गस्य प्रतियोगिनः सम्बन्धस्य अनुयोगिनि अभावः संसर्गाभावः । अन्योन्याभावस्थले प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिनोः घटपटयोः परस्परम् अभेदाभावः (भेदः) प्रतीयते । संसर्गाभावस्थले तु प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिनोः घटभूतलयोः सम्बन्धो नास्तीति पर्यवसाने प्रतीतिः । अतएव प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिनोरभेदेऽपि 'घटे घटो नास्ति' इति संसर्गाभावप्रतीतिः ।

**English Translation**

In a broad manner this should be remembered : when one thing is absent as another thing (i.e. when there is absence of identity i.e. when there is difference) it is called mutual absence and when the relation i.e. the connection of *pratiyogin* is absent in the *anuyogin* it is called relational absence. In the case of mutual absence it is understood that there is an absence of identity between the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* (e.g.) between the pot and the cloth. But in the case of relational absence, however, the resultant cognition is that there is no relation between the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* (e.g.) a pot and the piece of ground. This is the reason why there arises the cognition of relational absence from the sentence 'there is no pot on or in the pot', even if both the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* are identical.

**Note :** We have already discussed the two *abhāvas* namely, *anyonyābhāva* and *samsargābhāva*. Here, our author wants to point to the formal criterion to distinguish between the two. If this criterion is known, it will be easy to grasp which absence is it when the statement is read or heard. Let us remember that absence always has a counter-positive and it has a locus or base-relatum. So, any statement regarding absence necessarily contains a word denoting a *pratiyogin* and also a word denoting an *anuyogin*. Our author says, if both these words are in nominative case then it is a case of mutual absence whereas if one of them (denoting a *Pratiyogin*) is in nominative and the other (denoting an *anuyogin*) is in locative case then it is a case of relational absence.

The main point to be remembered in this connection is this : mutual absence is nothing but difference. To explain : when one says, 'x' is not 'y' what one wants to convey ultimately is : 'x' is different from 'y'. Everything is different from everything else. Everything is one and hence unique. Therefore mutual-absence-statement is virtually a statement of difference. This is why the Sanskrit name, '*anyonyābhāva*'. The statements that we made above may be restated as 'everything' in the universe *is identical* with 'itself'. It is *not identical* with *anything else*. Therefore the statement of mutual absence, our author points out always has two words in nominative case and one negative particle. Thus, mutual-absence-statement denies the relation of identity. Thus, when a statement says 'x' is not 'y', what is denied is the identity between 'x' and 'y'. So, if we try to analyse the implications behind this statement we may say that there are at least three statements hidden in this one. They are :

- (i) 'x' is identical with 'x'
- (ii) 'y' is identical with 'y' and
- (iii) 'x' is not identical with 'y'.

In all these statements talking about identity relation, we observe that both 'x' and 'y' are in nominative case. This exactly is the point to be remembered, our author says.

On the other hand, when this agreement in the cases is not seen, rather 'x' is in nominative case and 'y' is in the locative case, then it is a case of relational absence. This needs to be remembered through an expression where apparently both the words representing 'x' and 'y' are one and the same. e.g. *ghaṭe ghaṭaḥ na*. Even this is a case of relational absence and not of mutual absence. Thus, what one should look for is the agreement of cases or disagreement of the same. If both are in nominative case such as, '*ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ na*', it, certainly is a case of mutual absence. But, even if we have the same word for 'x' and 'y', and there is no case-agreement such as *ghaṭe ghaṭaḥ na*, then, it is a case of relational absence, no doubt.

One feels that our author always tries to give us the formal criterion or criteria, so that the point becomes apparent at the expression level itself.



**TEXT - 38**

प्रतियोगितावत् अवच्छेदकता साध्यता-कार्यता-विधेयता-हेतुता-कारणता-प्रकारतादयोऽपि धर्मगताः सापेक्षधर्माः केनचिद्धर्मेण केनचिच्च सम्बन्धेन अवच्छिन्ना भवन्ति । अत्र वृत्तिता-प्रतियोगितास्थलीया युक्तिरिव युक्तिः स्वयम् उद्भावनीया । तत्र कियन्ती उदाहरणानि दर्शयामि ।

**English Translation**

Just like the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitā*), the *Sādhya*tā, *kārya*tā, *vidheyatā*, *hetutā*, *kāraṇatā*, *prakāratā* etc. all the dependent properties (i.e., pair-properties or contextual properties) among the properties are delimited by some property and by some relation. Here, one should oneself understand the reasoning just like in the case of the state of being or counter-positiveness etc. Here, how many examples should I show?

**Note :** For elaborate discussion on this point please refer to the note on the Text no. 29 above. This only is required to refresh our memory. We have already grasped the point.

□□

**TEXT - 39**

अवच्छेदके विशेषणीभूतः धर्मः अवच्छेदकताया अवच्छेदको भवति । अवच्छेदके विशेषणीभूतः धर्मः येन सम्बन्धेन तिष्ठति स सम्बन्धः अवच्छेदकता-वच्छेदकसम्बन्धो भवति । यथा ‘दण्डी नास्ति’ इत्यत्र दण्डिनि प्रतियोगिनि विशेषणतया उपस्थितो दण्डो दण्डिगत-प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदकः । दण्डश्च दण्डिनि संयोगसम्बन्धेन तिष्ठतीति दण्डगता प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना । दण्डे च दण्डत्वं विशेषणतया उपस्थितमिति दण्डगतायाः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकताया अवच्छेदकं दण्डत्वम् । दण्डत्वं च दण्डे समवायसम्बन्धेन तिष्ठतीति दण्डत्वगता अवच्छेदकता समवाय-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना । दण्डत्वे च किमपि विशेषणतया न प्रतीयत इति दण्डत्वगता अवच्छेदकतावच्छेदकता निरवच्छिन्ना । ततश्च ‘दण्डी


नास्ति' इत्यस्य नैयायिकभाषायामयमर्थः -- समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-दण्डत्व-  
निष्ठ-अवच्छेदकता-निरूपित-संयोग-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-दण्डनिष्ठ-अवच्छेदकता-  
निरूपित-संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-दण्डनिष्ठ-प्रतियोगितानिरूपकः अभावः।

### English Translation

The property which is the qualifier of the delimitor becomes the delimitor of the delimitorhood. The relation by which the qualifier to the delimitor exists is the delimiting relation of the delimitorhood. For instance, in the case of (the sentence) 'there is no man with a staff', the staff which is present in 'the man with a staff' i.e. the counter-positive, as the qualifier, is the delimitor of the counter-positiveness in the 'man with a staff' and the staff resides in 'the man with a staff' by the relation of contact, therefore, the delimitorhood of the counter-positiveness in the staff is delimited by the relation of contact. In the staff is present the staffhood as its qualifier (and) therefore, the delimitor of the delimitorhood of the counter-positiveness in the staff is the staffhood. The staffhood resides in the staff by the relation of inherence, therefore, the delimitorhood in the staffhood is delimited by the relation of inherence. And (finally) in the staffhood nothing appears as the qualifier (vide : note on the Text no. 6) therefore, the delimitor-hood of the delimitorhood in the staff-hood remains un-delimited. Thus, the meaning of (the sentence) 'there is no man with a staff' in the logical language (i.e. in the navya-nyāya language) is: (It is) an absence which describes the counter-positiveness in 'the man with a staff' (which is) delimited by the relation of contact (which is) described by the delimitorhood in the staff (which is) delimited by the relation of contact (which is ) described by the delimitorhood in the staff-hood (which is) delimited by the relation of inherence.

**Note :** Our author wants to make it clear that delimitor-hood also is an acquired property and hence needs to be delimited. What should be the delimitor of the delimitor-hood? This question is answered in just the same manner as the question regarding the delimitor of any

acquired property is answered. Therefore, whatever is the qualifier of the delimitor is the delimitor of the delimitor-hood in the delimitor. Thus, the question regarding the delimiting property of the delimitor-hood is answered but there is also another question regarding the relation which should delimit the delimitor-hood in the delimitor. The author says, it is 'the relation by which the qualifier of the delimitor resides' which delimits the delimitor-hood in the delimitor. To explain the same through an example, our author has taken up an expression 'daṇḍī nāsti' : There is no man with a stick. Actually, we should add one locus to the absence to complete the expression. We may say, 'there is no man with a stick in the house'. In Sanskrit, 'gr̥he daṇḍī nāsti'. Let us first draw the picture to understand visually what our author explains in words :



The picture should be read from the bottom. There is no दण्डिन् in the गृह. Therefore 'दण्डिन्' is the counter-positive of the absence. He is not in the house by the relation of contact. So the counter-positiveness in दण्डिन् is delimited by both : (i) 'दण्ड' which is the qualifier of दण्डिन् and (ii) संयोग which is the relation by which 'दण्डिन्' is not in the house. Thus, 'दण्ड' has become the delimitor of the counter-positiveness and hence now possesses delimitor-hood.

This is delimited by both: (i) दण्डत्व which is a qualifier of दण्ड and is obtained by adding one 'त्व' to the delimitor 'दण्ड' and (ii) संयोग which is the relation by which दण्ड resides in 'दण्डिन्'. Now, दण्डत्व resides in दण्ड by the relation of inherence, therefore, the relation of inherence is the delimitor of the delimitor-hood of the delimitor-hood residing in दण्डत्व. There is only delimiting relation, namely, समवाय, as mentioned above so far as the delimitor-hood in 'दण्डत्व' is concerned but there is no property which is a qualifier of 'दण्डत्व' as दण्डत्व is not expressed in words, and therefore, the delimitor-hood in 'दण्डत्व' is not delimited by any property, so it is called 'un-delimited'.

We have added 'गृहे' दत्त the expression just to complete the sense of the same by providing one *anuyogin* to the absence. Thus, in गृह is अनुयोगिता which is delimited by 'गृहत्व'. दण्डिन् does not exist in the house by the relation of contact (संयोग) and so 'संयोग' is the delimiting relation to प्रतियोगिता in दण्डिन्. We, already, have discussed these points and hence we need not elaborate more on the issue. We only should remember that the relation between अभाव and प्रतियोगिता; प्रतियोगिता and प्रतियोगिता-अवच्छेदकता; प्रतियोगिता-अवच्छेदकता and प्रतियोगिता-अवच्छेदकता-अवच्छेदकता is निरूप्य-निरूपक-भाव as all these are pair-properties and hence describe each other. This is so shown in our picture of 'गृहे दण्डी नास्ति'. Once we grasp the picture, the meaning of the sentence in nyāya-language given by our author is not at all difficult to understand.

□□

### TEXT - 40

येन सम्बन्धेन यत् साध्यते, यत् क्रियते, यत् विधीयते, यो हेतुः, यत्कारणम्, यश्च प्रकारो भवति स सम्बन्धः तन्निष्ठ-साध्यता-कार्यता-विधेयता-हेतुता-कारणता-प्रकारतानामवच्छेदको भवति । 'सुन्दरो नर' इत्यादौ नरस्य केवलं विशेष्यतयैव प्रतीतिः, तस्य सम्बन्धो न कुत्रापि बोध्यते इति धर्मिगता अधिकरणता-अनुयोगिता-विशेष्यता-पक्षतादयः सापेक्षधर्माः न केनापि सम्बन्धेन अवच्छिन्नाः, केवलं धर्मैव ते अवच्छिन्ना इति ।

### English Translation

The relation by which something is established, something is done, something is prescribed (asserted), something is a probans, something is a cause and something is a qualifier the same (relation) is the delimitor of the *sādhyatā*, *kāryatā*, *vidheyatā*, *hetutā*, *kāraṇatā* or *prakāratā* in the respective cases.

In the case of (the expression) 'a handsome-man' the man is grasped only as a qualificand, his relation with anything else (literally anywhere) is not understood and so the relative properties in the qualificand (*dharmin*) such as *adhikaraṇatā*, *anuyogitā*, *viśeṣyatā*, *pakṣatā* etc. are not delimited by any relation, they are related only by (the respective) property.

**Note :** This Text may be remembered as a *mantra* of navya-nyāya if one wishes to grasp the technique of navya-nyāya in a nutshell. Our author has made it precise here. Another important point may be noted that navya-nyāya wants to stick to the expression, which, as it were, pictures the reality. If the expression does not reveal any relation of the qualificand with anything then one need not think about it at all while understanding the expression. Thus, the relationship of expression with reality is 1:1. Noting more noting less. This is the contribution of particularly *pūrva-mīmāṇsā* and navya-nyāya.

Thus, our author explains that if the expression is just, 'a handsome man', then whatever 'acquired' or 'occasional' or 'contextual' properties will be located in the 'man', the qualificand, will be delimited only by the inherent property in the qualificand. And no relation comes in the picture as it is not in the expression. Another beautiful name for the 'acquired property' is used by our author in this 'Text'. It is : *सापेक्षधर्म* . It is a relative property i.e. a property which is necessarily related with something else and hence is expectant of that something (to which it is necessarily connected).


**TEXT - 41**

यो धर्मः साध्यादौ विशेषणतया प्रतीयते, स धर्मः साध्यतादीनामवच्छेदको भवति । यथा ‘पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमात्’ इत्यत्रानुमाने पर्वते पक्षे धूमेन हेतुना वह्निः संयोगसम्बन्धेन साध्यते इति यथाक्रमं पर्वतत्वं पक्षतावच्छेदकम्, धूमत्वं हेतुता-अवच्छेदकम्, वह्नित्वं साध्यतावच्छेदकम् संयोगश्च साध्यतावच्छेदकः सम्बन्धः हेतुरपि संयोग-सम्बन्धेनैव कृत इति हेतुतावच्छेदक-सम्बन्धोऽपि संयोग एव ।

**English Translation**

Whichever property appears as a qualifier in the *sādhya* etc. the same (property) is the delimitor of the *sādhya* etc. For instance, in the case of the inference, ‘the mountain has fire, because it has smoke’, in the ‘subject’ (पक्ष), namely, the mountain the fire is established on the basis of smoke by the relation of contact, therefore, respectively, the mountain-hood is the delimitor of the subject-hood, smoke-ness is the delimitor of the reason-hood, fire-ness is the delimitor of the *sādhya* and contact is the delimiting relation of the *sādhya*, reason also is taken to be by the relation of contact, hence, the delimiting relation of the reasonness also is contact.

**Note :** This ‘Text’ is the second half of the ‘mantra’ to be remembered. If these two ‘Texts’ are learnt by heart, one has mastered the key to the navya-nyāya language. We, by now, have mastered the same and hence we may not elaborate on the point. Let us only remember the *mantra* through a simple picture; which shows that in any qualificand when a relative property comes to reside in a particular context, the qualifier (i.e. the inherent property) of the qualificand delimits the same (relative property) and the relation by which the qualificand resides in its locus delimits the same relative property in the qualificand. This is how the statement regarding the ‘relative’/ ‘contextual’/ ‘acquired’ / ‘occasional’ property is made precise (specific).



This should be remembered as the basic picture of the technique of our system, which will help understand any navya-nyāya-statement containing the terms अवच्छेदक and अवच्छिन्न. The beginning point of the double-lined arrow is the अवच्छेदक (delimitor) and where the arrow is pointed is the अवच्छिन्न (i.e. delimited).

□□

### TEXT - 42

यत्र साध्यतावच्छेदको धर्मः सखण्डः तत्र साध्यता-अवच्छेदक-अवच्छेदकोऽपि अस्ति, यथा - 'शतायुरपि अयं वृद्धः मरिष्यति, मनुष्यत्वात्', इत्यनुमाने मरणं साध्यम्, मरणत्वञ्च साध्यतावच्छेदकम् । मरणञ्च श्वास-प्रश्वास-विरामत्वरूपम्, मरणत्वं सखण्डोपाधिः धर्मः । ततश्च मरणत्वत्वेन धर्मेण मरणत्वमत्र विशेषणीभूतमिति मरणत्वत्वं साध्यता-अवच्छेदकता-अवच्छेदकम् । एवमन्यदपि ज्ञेयम् ।

### English Translation

Where the property (which delimits) delimiting *sādhya* is with parts, there one has the delimitor of the delimitor-hood of *sādhya* also. For example, in the case of the inference, 'even if hundred-year-old, the old man will die, because he is a human -being,' 'death' is the *sādhya* and death-hood is the delimitor of *sādhya*. Death is (nothing but) stoppage of inhaling and exhaling of the breath; therefore, the property

death-hood has parts. And thus, death-hood is the qualifier here in the form of death-hood-ness (the state of being death-hood in good English) and so the delimitor of the delimitorhood in *sādhya* is death-hood-ness. One should think of the same elsewhere (in the similar cases).

**Note :** Here, the point is only this : if the delimiting property (i.e. the inherent property of a thing) is with parts then one has to go a step further in the context of the delimitor. This is because the delimiting property is divisible. The example makes the point clear: The example is that of an inference. The object of inference is death (of an old man) and the ground for this is human-hood. All humans are mortal therefore, the old man (even if he is a hundred years old) will die (one day).

Our author explains as 'मरण' is the 'साध्य', मरणत्व is the delimitor of the relative property 'साध्यता'. But मरण can be defined as 'the stopping of breath' and so it is a divisible property.

□□

### TEXT - 43

अवच्छेदकपदस्य क्वचिद् विशेषणमित्यर्थः। अवच्छिन्नपदस्य च विशिष्टम्, आश्रय इत्यर्थोऽपि भवति । 'अवच्छेदकत्वमात्रेणान्वयः' इत्यत्र अवच्छेदकत्वपदस्य विशेषणत्वमर्थः । 'वह्निवावच्छिन्नस्य यस्य कस्यापि' इत्यत्र 'वह्निवाश्रयस्य इत्यर्थो बोध्यते'।

### English Translation

Some times the word *avacchedaka* stands for a 'qualifier'. The word *avacchinna* sometimes denotes the meaning of 'qualified' or the locus also. In the case of the expression, '*avacchedaka-mātreṇa anvayaḥ*', the word *avacchedakatva* means qualificierness. In the case of the sentence, '*vahnitvāvacchinnaśya yasya kasyāpi*', the meaning understood is : of the locus of fire.

**Note :** So far, we have discussed the significance of the terms अवच्छेदक and अवच्छिन्न in quite a clear manner. In the present 'Text' our author has shown at least two cases where the term '*avacchedaka*' is




not i.e. may not be used in the sense of 'delimiter' but in these and such expression the term stands for just (i) a qualifier or (ii) a locus.

For instance, if there is an expression, *avacch edakatvamātreṇa anvayaḥ* it simply means, 'it should be construed only as a qualifier', and if there is an expression, '*vahnitvāvacchinnyasya yasya kasyāpi*' , it means, 'of any locus of fire'. Thus, in the former example the word *avacchedaka* stands for the qualifier only. (One can think of the reason why it is so. Our author has many a time made it clear that a 'qualifier property' of a thing which is the thing's inherent property acts as an *avacchedaka* or delimiter of an occasional property. Now, as an *avacchedaka* is always a qualifier, the word is sometimes used in the sense of 'qualifier'. This may be called an extension of 'meaning' originally, the term means, 'delimiter', but as 'delimiter' is always a 'qualifier', the term is sometimes used in the sense of 'qualifier'.)

'In the latter the term *avacchinna* stands for *āśraya* or locus' says our author. It has its connection with the former. If the term *avacchedaka* stands for a qualifier, naturally, the term *avacchinna* will stand for 'qualified'. When our author says, 'it stands for 'the locus' what he actually means is 'qualified'. As 'qualified' is always 'the locus' of 'the qualifier' he has said that the term *avacchinna* stands for the (*āśraya*) locus. Let us take, for example, an expression, '*vahnitvāvacchinnyasya yasya kasyāpi*'. This expression includes the word *avacchinna* which simply means '*viśiṣṭa*' , 'qualified' and therefore, 'locus'. Locus of *vahnitva* i.e. any case of fire (*vahni*).

Thus, to conclude, one must remember that it is not the case that in 'each and every' case of the usage of the terms *avacchedaka* and '*avacchinna*' they stand for 'delimiter' and 'delimited' respectively. They sometimes do stand for 'a qualifier' and a 'qualified' i.e. 'locus'. In this sense when the terms are used the picture to represent the expression will be :



**TEXT - 44**

ज्ञानं द्विविधम् -- निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं च । 'निः' नास्ति 'विकल्पः' विशेष्य-विशेषणभावः, विशेष्यविशेषणयोः सम्बन्धो वा यस्मिन् तत् निर्विकल्पकम् । निर्विकल्पके हि ज्ञाने केवलं धर्मधर्मिणोः पटत्वपटयोः परस्परम् असंसृष्टयोः (पट-पटत्वे इत्याकारकं) भानं (प्रकाशः) भवति । न तु तयोः सम्बन्धस्यापि भानम् । विषय-इन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्षे सति जायमानं प्राथमिकं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकं भवति ।

**English Translation**

cognition is of two types : 'qualified cognition' and 'non-qualified cognition'. (The prefix) *niḥ* (stands for) 'not' *vikalpa* i.e. (where there is no) qualifier-qualified- relationship, is called the *nirvikalpaka* (cognition). In *nirvikalpaka* cognition, only the property, its locus e.g. clothness and cloth which are not connected with each-other appear. But their relation does not appear. Thus, when the object and sense-organ-contact takes place, the first perceptual cognition (that comes into being) is *nirvikalpaka*. It may be presented as :

clothness
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
' cloth
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**Note :** In the present Text our author has referred to the process of perceptual cognition i.e. the way-perceptual cognition is produced. He divides perceptual cognition into two : *nir-vikalpaka* and *sa-vikalpaka*, and explains the meanings of these clearly: '*Vikalpa*' here stands for 'the relationship between the qualifier and the qualified'. Once the meaning of *vikalpa* is clear, it is easy to grasp what *nir-vikalpaka* and *sa-vikalpaka* mean. *Nir-vikalpaka* is that cognition where the relationship between the qualifier and the qualified does not appear (is not revealed) and the term *sa-vikalpaka* stands for the cognition where the relationship between the qualifier and the qualified (also) appears (and the cognition can be verbalised in clear terms, such as *Paṭaḥ* (cloth)).

To get the point more clearly, let us look into the process of perceptual cognition in our system. (The beginning point on this discussion is the *Nyāya-sūtra* I.1.4. One may look into the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana on the *sūtra* for vivid discussion on the issue.) Perceptual cognition is basically produced out of the contact between sense-organ and object. That the person (the knower who will have 'perception') is alive and attentive (i.e. not absent-minded) is taken for granted. In other words, the process culminates into cognition successfully under all normal conditions only.



Thus, the first necessary cause is the contact between sense-organ and object. After this contact takes place what takes place next is the immediate perceptual cognition which our author has named as 'the first perception'. This alone is the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. One cannot verbalise it in clear terms -- in clear terms means 'in the terms understandable by the hearer'. Language is the medium of communication, which is successful only when the expression is grasped by the hearer or reader for that matter. '*Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* cannot be verbalised in the terms understandable by the listener. We say this because if at all one can express his or her *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, one has to take recourse to the expression, '*idaṁ kiñcit*' (this is something) which cannot give any (concrete) idea to the hearer. This is why the term for such a cognition, used by Gautama, our *sūtrakāra* is '*avyapadeśya*' "non-verbalisable". This needs to be understood the way we have understood it above. Otherwise there may remain some confusion, such as, '*idaṁ kiñcit*' also is an expression and thus even the *nirvikalpaka* is a verbalisable cognition.

Our author takes an example of cloth. We know the picture of the cognition *Paṭaḥ* looks like :



in our system. This is true only, when one says : *paṭaḥ*. Let us try to understand more : *Paṭatva* is the qualifier of *paṭa*. So in the verbalised (qualified) cognition of *paṭa* we have grasped the qualifier

(*paṭatva*) the qualified (*paṭa*) and the relation (*samavāya*) between the two . But this is not the immediate perception. Immediate perceptual cognition comes into being immediately after the contact between the sense-organ and object takes place. In this cognition the relation between the qualifier and qualified is absent. Therefore, if one wishes to draw a picture for the immediate perceptual cognition one has

to draw it something like :  or if we take the example that our author has taken then the picture will be : 

Thus, the points to be remembered are :

(i) Immediate perceptual cognition is the result of contact between sense-organ and object.

(ii) The same is not verbalisable.

(iii) the cause for (ii) is that the relation between the qualifier and qualified is absent in this cognition. This makes it impossible to grasp the structure of the cognition clearly which results into non-verbalisability of the same.

(iv) the reason why this type of cognition is accepted in our system is logical to which our author comes in the next 'Text', hence, we shall also discuss it there.

□□

### TEXT - 45

तत्रेदं कारणम् - 'विशिष्टबुद्धिं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वम् । न हि अज्ञातशुक्लरूपस्य जनस्य 'इदं शुक्लं वस्त्रम्' इति प्रतीतिर्भवति । ततश्च पटे चक्षुःसंयोगात् पूर्वं तत्समकालं वा पटत्वज्ञानस्य नियतमसम्भवात् पटत्वज्ञानं विना पटत्वस्य विशेषणतया पटे ज्ञानासम्भव इति, पटे चक्षुःसंयोगानन्तरं प्रथमं पटत्वस्य ज्ञाने जाते ततो द्वितीयेन ज्ञानेन 'अयं पट' इति पटत्व-विशिष्टबुद्धिर्भवति।

### English Translation

There, the cause is this : the cause of qualified cognition is 'the cognition of the qualifier'. Certainly, a person who does not know 'white colour' cannot have understanding of the meaning of (the expression) 'this is a white cloth'. There, it is altogether impossible to have the cognition of clothness 'before or simultaneously with the contact of eyes with the cloth' and without the cognition of clothness it is impossible to know that the clothness is the qualifier of cloth, and therefore, (it is logically accepted that) when eyes are connected with cloth, first cognition of clothness takes place and then secondly (i.e. the second cognition) the clothness-qualified-cognition 'this is a cloth' arises.

**Note :** This 'Text' shows the logical necessity of accepting a non-qualified cognition immediately preceding the qualified one. The reason to accept such a cognition is simply this that there cannot arise a qualified cognition unless the person has the cognition of the qualification. This cognition of qualification has to precede the qualified one, at least by one moment. The fact becomes obvious when our author takes the example of 'white cloth'. Now, 'white cloth' is a qualified cognition where the qualification of cloth is the white colour. If 'x' does not know what is 'white colour' he is not in a position to understand 'the white cloth'. Similarly, when 'cloth' is the qualified cognition 'clothness' is the qualifier which has to be essentially known prior to the cognition of cloth. Thus, our author explains when our eyes are connected with the cloth, at first the cognition of 'clothness' takes place and then it leads to the second cognition of cloth qualified by clothness. This implies : cognition of clothness can neither be simultaneous to the cognition of cloth nor can it be posterior. It has to occur prior to the cognition of cloth. We have already discussed why.

Thus, the causal complex that leads to the occurrence of perceptual cognition could be understood as follows :

Step 1 : the soul and mind connection

Step 2 : the mind and sense-organ connection

Step 3 : the sense-organ and object contact

Step 4 : occurrence of un-qualified cognition

Step 5 : occurrence of qualified cognition


Step 6 : awareness of qualified cognition.

Step 6, however, is optional in the sense that it may occur immediately after the step 5 or it may occur some time later.

The same procedure may be noted in Sanskrit as follows :

- १ आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते
- २ मनः इन्द्रियेण
- ३ इन्द्रियम् अर्थेन
- ४ निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षम्
- ५ सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षम् (व्यवसायः)
- ६ अनुव्यवसायः

The same one may remember through the following :



□□

### TEXT - 46

विशेष्य-विशेषण-भाव-अवगाहि-ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं (विकल्पेन सहितं) ज्ञानम्।  
'अयं घटः', 'सुन्दरो नरः' इत्यादि विशिष्टज्ञानं सर्वमेव सविकल्पकम्।

द्वितीयप्रत्यक्षं सर्वमेव विशिष्टज्ञानमेव भवति । प्राथमिकेन निर्विकल्पकेन प्रत्यक्षेण अवगतस्य घटत्वादि-सामान्यस्य घटादौ विशेषणतया प्रतीतौ बाधाभावात्। 'तृतीयन्तु प्रत्यक्षं प्रायशो विशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि भवति। यथा 'कृष्णपशुपूर्णा पशुशाला' इति । अत्र कृष्णरूपविशिष्टस्य पशोः पशुशालायां सम्बन्धो भासते। 'दण्डिपूर्णा मठ' इति ज्ञाने दण्डविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्य वैशिष्ट्यं (सम्बन्धः) मठे प्रतीयते ।

### English Translation

The cognition, the content of which is 'the relation between qualified and qualifier is (called) *sa-vikalpaka* (i.e. that which is along with *vikalpa*). 'This is pot', 'handsome man' etc. all are qualified cognitions.

All second perception is 'qualified cognition' only. The cause behind this is, there is no obstruction to know the potness as (an adjective i.e.) a qualifier to pot, once the universal potness is known by the first *nirvikalpaka* perception.

The third perception is generally (that) which has the content in the form of the relation of the qualified (to something else, generally its locus). For example, the cattleshed is full of the black cattle. Here, the relation of the cattle qualified by black colour appears in/with the cattle-shed. From the expression, 'the monastery is full of the persons with sticks', the relation of the person with a stick with the monastery is understood.


**Note :** We have already seen that once the *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* is there, next moment *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* arises. Thus, *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* i.e. qualified cognition contains the qualificand, the qualifier and the relationship between the two. Our author has made this point with the examples of 'this is a pot' and 'handsome man'. In short, let us remember any verbalisable cognition is a qualified cognition, simply because, unless the property (which is the qualifier), the property-holder (the qualificand) and the relation between them is known, one is not in a position to name the thing, and unless one names the thing, one cannot speak about it. Thus, if one speaks or is able to speak about a thing, one has qualified cognition. This qualified cognition has two more names in Sanskrit :

(i) *sa-vikalpaka-jñāna* and (ii) *vyavasāya*.

Our author has made the point by saying 'second perception is all qualified cognition'. We have seen before the procedure of perceptual cognition. Step- 5 in the same is the step when the qualified cognition arises. This is, as we know, immediately preceded by the cognition of qualifier which is not verbalisable. The former is labelled as 'second perception' by our author and the latter as the 'first perception'.

The 'third perception' should logically be the anu-vyavasāya i.e. the awareness of the second perception but our author does not mention it in this manner. He gives the name 'third perception' to the 'cognition of the relation of the qualified cognition with its locus'. The example that he gives is that of 'a cattle-shed full of a black animal'. our author explains : 'black animal' is a qualified thing and its relationship with the cattle-shed is revealed by the cognition, 'cattle-shed is full by black-animal'.

Thus, as per our author, when all causes i.e. the whole causal complex is present, the first perception is the cognition of qualifier, (which logically must precede the qualified cognition) the second perception is qualified cognition and the third perception is the qualified cognition of the qualified cognition. This we may remember with the help of the following :






**TEXT - 47**

विशिष्टज्ञाने एकं विशेष्यम् अपरं विशेषणं भवति । विशेष्यस्यैव उद्देश्यमिति नामान्तरम् । विशेषणस्य प्रकार इति । यथा 'सुन्दरो नरः' इत्यत्र नरः विशेष्यः, सौन्दर्य प्रकारः, विशेष्ये प्रकारे च यद् विशेषणतया प्रतीयते तद् यथाक्रमं विशेष्यता-वच्छेदकं प्रकारतावच्छेदकं च भवति । यथा, 'मृन्मयोऽयं गिरिः, आश्विने मासि मनोहर-पुष्प-समृद्धो भवति' इत्यादौ गिरौ विशेष्ये मृत्तिका गिरित्वञ्च विशेष्यता-वच्छेदकम्, मृत्तिकात्वं तु विशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकम् । एवं मनोहर-पुष्प-समृद्धौ प्रकारे मनोहरपुष्पं विशेषणं तत्र च मनोहरत्वं पुष्पत्वं च विशेषणतया - प्रतीयत इति । पुष्पं प्रकारतावच्छेदकं मनोहरत्वं पुष्पत्वञ्च उभयमेव प्रकारता-वच्छेदकतावच्छेदकम् ।

**English Translation**

In the qualified cognition one is qualificand and the other is qualifier. Qualificand has another name, namely, 'subject' and qualifier has (another name, namely) predicate. For instance, in case of 'handsome man', 'man' is a qualificand and 'handsomeness' is qualifier. Whatever appears as a qualifier in the qualificand and in the qualifier that respectively is the delimitor of qualificandness and qualificierness. For example, 'this mud-hill is prosperous by (abundant in) beautiful flowers in the month of Aśvin (October)' -- in this with reference to the mountain 'mud' and 'mountainness' are the delimiters of qualificandness and 'mud-hood' is the delimitor of the delimitorhood of the qualificandness. Similarly, with reference to the qualifier, namely, 'prosperity of beautiful flowers', 'beautiful flowers' is the qualifier and there beauty and floweriness are known as qualifiers. 'Flower' is the delimitor of qualificierness and beauty and floweriness both are delimiters of the delimitorhood (in the delimitor) of qualificierness.


**Note :** In the present 'Text' our author, further, explains the qualified cognition in a vivid manner. He begins again at the very beginning and says a qualified cognition consists of a qualificand and a qualifier. Then he gives us the synonyms of these two, they are : subject and predicate. He explains with the example 'handsome man'.



Now that there is no doubt that we remember the whole discussion he proceeds to make his real point.

He wants to say that the delimitorhood will also have a delimitor if the qualifier is divisible. He takes the example :

‘मृन्मयोऽयं गिरिः आश्रित्ते मासि मनोहरपुष्पसमृद्धो भवति’। Let us draw a picture to catch the point; then if necessary we will elaborate upon the same.



The picture makes it clear that 'मृन्मयगिरि' is the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) in which *viśeṣyatā* is the occasional property. In the -गिरि, abundance of beautiful flowers (मनोहरपुष्पसमृद्धि) is the qualifier (*prakāra*) and hence it has *prakāratā*. The relation between the two is describer and described relationship as both of them describe each other. As in the abundance 'beautiful flower' is the qualifier it is also the delimitor of the *prakāratā* in the abundance. Now, in the 'beautiful flower' again the qualifiers are beauty and floweriness, hence both of them become the delimitors of the delimitorhood in the 'beautiful flowers.'

The picture may be read in the *navya-nyāya*-language and then it may obtain the following form.

मनोहरपुष्पावच्छिन्न - मनोहरत्व - पुष्पत्वावच्छिन्न - अवच्छेदकता - निरूपित  
- अवच्छिन्नता - रूप-प्रकारता- निरूपित- मृत्तिका - गिरित्वावच्छिन्न - विशेष्यतावान्  
आश्रितमासवृत्तिः मृन्मयगिरिः ।

□□


### TEXT - 48

विशेष्ये विशेष्यता प्रकारे च प्रकारता वर्तते । ते च परस्परं निरूप्य-निरूपक-  
भावापन्ने । विशेष्यता-निरूपिता प्रकारता भवति, प्रकारता-निरूपिता च  
विशेष्यतेति, एवं प्रकारता विशेष्यनिरूपिता भवति, विशेष्यता च प्रकार-निरूपिता  
भवति । एतत् सर्वं वृत्तितावर्णनास्थले उक्तप्रायमेव ।

### English Translation

In the qualificand lies qualificandness and in the qualifier (lies) qualificierness. Both of them are related by the mutual describer and described relationship. Qualificierness is described by the qualificandness and qualificandness is described by qualificierness. Similarly, the qualificierness is described by the qualificand and qualificandness is described by the qualifier. All this is already explained while describing the locatedness.

**Note :** We are now well versed in the relation of निरूप्य-निरूपकभाव; hence we actually do not need any elaboration regarding the same. Let us only revise the following :



The first one above is the full form of understanding the describer-described- relation between विशेष्य and विशेषण whereas (2) and (3) are the shorter forms of the same.

We have discussed it while discussing ādhāra- ādheya-bhāva, our author reminds.

□□

### TEXT - 49

विशेषणं द्विविधम् – सिद्धं साध्यञ्च । सिद्ध पूर्ववगतं विशेषणम्, विशेष्यस्य इतरेभ्यो व्यावर्तनाय विशेष्यान्तरा प्रयुज्यते । साध्यञ्च पूर्वमप्राप्तं प्राधान्येन

विधीयते । साध्यस्य विधेयमिति नाम । यथा - 'दया- दाक्षिण्यादिगुणैरलङ्कृतो जनकानुरक्तोऽयं रामः सर्वैः नमस्य' इत्यत्र विशेष्यस्य रामस्य दया-दाक्षिण्यादि- गुणैरलङ्कृतत्वं जनकानुरक्तत्वञ्च पूर्वाविगतमिति सिद्धं विशेषणम् इतरव्यावर्तनाय विशेष्यमध्ये प्रयुक्तम् । नमस्यत्वन्तु पूर्वमसिद्धमिति विधीयते ।

### English Translation

Qualifier is of two types : (i) already known and (ii) yet to be known. Already known is that qualifier which is used along- with the qualificand to distinguish it from others. The qualifier yet to be known is mainly predicated. So 'yet to be known' (qualifier) is the predicate. For example, 'Rāma, who is adorned by the qualities like compassion, politeness etc. and who is devoted to his father should be bowed down by all.' Here, the qualifiers of Rāma such as 'being adorned by the qualities' and 'being devoted to father' are already known ones, which are used to distinguish the qualificand from others. 'To be bowed down', however, is predicated as it is not known before.

**Note :** In the present 'Text' the *viśeṣaṇa* or qualifier is divided into 'already known' and 'not yet known'. The function of a qualifier is to distinguish the qualified. Obviously, the condition is it must be known before. If it is not known then it cannot distinguish the qualified (for the person who does not know it). Thus, it is the function of the *siddha viśeṣaṇa*, already known qualifier to differentiate the qualified from others. In the example taken by our author, the first two qualifiers of Rāma are already known and the last one is predicated of the qualified Rāma.

□□

### TEXT - 50

विधेयस्य विधानं च क्वचित् विशेष्यतावच्छेदक-सामानाधिकरण्येन, क्वचिच्च विशेष्यतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन भवति । यस्मिन् कस्मिन्नपि विशेष्ये यद् विधानं तत् विशेष्यतावच्छेदक-सामानाधिकरण्येन (विशेष्यता-अवच्छेदकस्य समाने एकस्मिन् अधिकरणे वृत्तितया विधानम् । यथा - 'ब्राह्मणो विद्वान् भवति' इत्यनेन न सर्व एव ब्राह्मणाः विद्वांसो भवन्तीति विधीयते, किन्तु यत्र यत्र ब्राह्मण्यं वर्तते तेषां मध्ये

केषुचित् विद्या वर्तत इति । यत्र यत्र विशेष्यतावच्छेदकं वर्तते, तत्र सर्वत्रैव (अर्थात् सर्वस्मिन्नेव विशेष्ये) विधेयस्य विधानं विशेष्यतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन (विशेष्यता-वच्छेदकस्य अवच्छेदेन व्याप्त्या) विधानम् । यथा – ‘मनुष्यो मरणशीलः’ इत्यनेन न केषुचित् मनुष्येषु मरणशीलत्वं विधीयते, किन्तु सर्वेष्वेव मनुष्येषु । मनुष्यत्वं व्याप्य सर्वेष्वेव मनुष्येषु मरणशीलत्वं विधीयते इति ।

### English Translation

Predicate is prescribed somewhere as collocated with the delimitor of the subject-hood and somewhere as a qualifier to the delimitor of the subject-hood. When something is asserted with reference to some subject then it is asserted as being present in the same locus (subject) alongwith the delimitor of the subject-hood (i.e. existing in one and the same locus of the delimitor of subjecthood). For instance, when it is said, ‘brahmin is learned’, then it is not asserted that all brahmins are learned but it is said that wherever there is brahminhood, in some of them (loci of brahminhood) there is learnedness.

Wherever there is delimitor of subject-hood there everywhere (i.e. in every instance) the predicate is asserted as a qualifier of the delimitor of subjecthood (by the relation of co-extensiveness alongwith the delimitor of the subject-hood). For instance, when it is said, ‘man is mortal’, then mortality is not asserted of some men or some human beings, but it is asserted of all human beings. This means : wherever there is human-being-hood there everywhere motality is there.

**Note :** As our author has stated that an unknown qualifier is predicated or enjoined, here he wants to point to the two ways of enjoining something. The two ways are :

- (i) By being collocated with the delimitor of qualificandhood.  
and
- (ii) By being co-extensive with the delimitor of qualificandhood.

The example of the first is : ‘ब्राह्मणो विद्वान् भवति’ and the example of the second is : ‘मनुष्यो मरणशीलः’ । The first example states that sometimes the learnedness is collocated with the delimitor of the

qualificandhood in the ब्राह्मण namely ब्राह्मणत्व and the second example states that mortatity is co-extensive with the delimiter of the qualificandhood, namely, मनुष्यत्व.

□□

### TEXT - 51

विधेये मुख्यप्रकारता तिष्ठति । मुख्यप्रकारता-निरूपिता विशेष्यता च मुख्यविशेष्यता भवति । विधेयभिन्ने या प्रकारता सा न मुख्या । एवं या च विशेष्यता मुख्यप्रकारता-निरूपिता न भवति सापि न मुख्यविशेष्यता । अत एव 'जनकानुरक्तोऽयं रामः पूज्यः' इत्यत्र पूज्यत्वरूपविधेयनिष्ठा प्रकारता मुख्या, तन्निरूपितैव च रामनिष्ठा विशेष्यता मुख्या । जनकानुरक्तत्वरूपविशेषण-निष्ठा च प्रकारता न मुख्या, सुतरां तन्निरूपिता रामनिष्ठा विशेष्यतापि न मुख्या।

#### English Translation

In the preicate lies the main qualifier-hood. The qualificand-hood described by the main qualifier-hood is the main qualificandhood. Other than the predicate whatever has qualifierhood that is not main or prime. Similarly, whatever qualificandness is not described by the main qualificierness is not main qualificandhood. This is the reason why in the expression, '(this) Rāma who is devoted to his father should be worshipped', the qualifier-hood which resides in the predicate, namely, worshippedhood is main and the subjecthood in Rāma which is described by the same (namely worshippedhood) is main. The qualifierhood in the qualifier 'being devoted to father' is not main and hence, subjecthood in Rāma, described by the same is also not main.

**Note :** Here, the author has introduced the concept of 'main qualificandhood'. This is an important issue so far as different schools of Indian philosophy are concerned.

Let us look into it a little more. Basically the structure of reality which reflects in cognition is that of qualified type. This is why we call the cognition as qualified cognition. The cognition, thus, has the

structure of qualifier and qualificand. Now, if the structure is more complex, it will have more than one qualifier and it will also have more than one qualificand. When such is the case, what should be understood as the main qualificand and what should be understood as the main qualifier are the two pertinent questions. Our system holds that the main qualificand is the meaning of the nominative form. This works fine if there is only one nominative form. But if there are many? Then there will be a question which one among them is the main or prime qualificand?

Our author answers the question by stating that the qualifier which is predicated or enjoined is the main qualifier and the qualificand whose qualificandhood is described by the main qualifierhood is the main one. All other qualifiers and other qualificands are subordinate or not main. The example of Rāma is taken up by our author. He says, when there is a sentence 'जनकानुरक्तोऽयं रामः पूज्यः' Rāma is the main qualificand but it has two different qualificandhoods. One is described by qualifierhood in the qualifier 'जनकानुरक्तत्व' and the other by the one in 'पूज्यत्व'. The qualificandhood described by the qualifierhood delimited by 'पूज्यत्व' is the main one because it is विधेय.

□□

### TEXT - 52

पुनश्च ज्ञानं द्विविधम्, निश्चयः संशयश्चेति । यत्र ज्ञाने एकमेव तदेव तदभाव एव वा प्रकारतया भासते स निश्चयः । यस्मिंस्तु पुनः तद् तदभावश्च उभयमेव भासते स संशयः । यथा 'अयं मानुषः' इति निश्चयः, 'दीर्घोऽयं मानुषो न वा' इति संशयः । पूर्वत्र एकमेव मनुष्यत्वं प्रकारः, परत्र मनुष्यत्वं तदभावश्च उभयमेव प्रकारः । संशये हि एकस्मिन् विशेष्ये प्रतियोगी तदभावश्च परस्परविरुद्धावपि उभौ प्रकारतया भासेते इति नियमः । तत्र भावाभावोभय-प्रकारतानिरूपिता एकैव विशेष्यता भवति । यथा उक्ते उदाहरणे मनुष्यत्वनिष्ठा या प्रकारता या च मनुष्यत्वाभावनिष्ठा प्रकारता एतदुभयनिरूपिता एकैव विशेष्यता अस्मिन् दीर्घे विशेष्ये वर्तते । समूहालम्बनस्थले तु प्रत्येकप्रकारता-निरूपिता पृथक् पृथक्



विशेष्यता भवति इति संशयात् समूहालम्बनस्य भेदः । संशये प्रकारस्य कोटिरिति नाम । ‘अयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा’ इत्यादौ संशये कोटिचतुष्टयमस्ति । स्थाणुत्वं स्थाणुत्वाभावः पुरुषत्वं पुरुषत्वाभावश्चेति । अत एवायं संशयः चतुष्कोटिक इत्युच्यते । केचित्तु वदन्ति –अत्रापि कोटिद्वयमेवास्ति स्थाणुत्वं ; स्थाणुत्वविरुद्ध-पुरुषत्वश्चेति ।

### English Translation

Again (from another angle) cognition is of two types : determinate and doubt. The cognition, in which only that (say ‘x’) or an absence of that (say absence of ‘x’) appears as a qualifier, is determinate one. Again, the cognition, in which that and absence of that (say ‘x’ and absence of ‘x’) both appear, is (the case of) doubt. For instance, ‘this is a man’, is determinate cognition, whereas, ‘this long (thing) is a man or not’ is doubt. In the former only one i.e. ‘manness’ appears as a qualifier whereas in the latter both, ‘manness and its absence’ appear as qualifiers. In the case of doubt, in one and the same qualificand, ‘counter-positive and its absence both appear as qualifiers regularly. There only one qualificandness appears as described by both positive and negative qualifiers just as in the above-mentioned example the qualificandness in the long qualificand is described by both the qualierness in manness and qualierness in the absence of manness.

In case of the cognition having a collection as its content, however, there is different qualificandness described by each qualifier-ness and this is the difference of the ‘cognition having a collection as its content’ from ‘doubt’.

In case of doubt, qualifier is known by the name ‘side’ / ‘aspect’. In the case ‘whether this is a post or a man’, there are four sides or aspects, such as, postness, its absence, manness and its absence. This is why, this doubt is called four-sided doubt. Some, however, say even here only two sides or aspects are there, (i) postness and (ii) manness which is opposite of (absence of) postness.

**Note :** In the above 'Text' the following points are discussed:

- (i) Difference between 'determinate cognition' and 'doubt'.
- (ii) Difference of 'doubt' from the 'cognition content of which is a collection of things', and (iii) Difference of opinion regarding 'doubt'

(i) If one looks from an angle, one can divide the cognition into determinate and doubt. The main difference between the two is in the first type only one qualificand describes the qualificandness in only one qualificand; in the second type, namely, doubt there are more than one qualifiers to describe only one qualificand. The main marker of doubt on the linguistic level is *vā* i.e. *or*, which is invariably absent in the determinate cognition.

(ii) The point of difference between 'doubt' and 'the cognition having more than one thing or rather a collection of many things as its content is only this that in doubt, there is only one qualificand and many qualifiers but in *samūhālambanajñāna* there are many qualificands (also) which are described by respective qualifiers.

(iii) Third point is, there are differences in doubt depending upon the quantity and quality of its aspects. Our author says : the case of doubt, 'whether the long (object) is a post or a man' has four aspects. They are post and its absence and man and its absence. But it must be noted that some people do not accept the four aspects. As per them, there are only two aspects. Postness and manness. These two are themselves absence (mutual absence) of each other so there is no need to accept the four sides. About the quality difference, our author speaks in the next i.e. the last Text.

□□

### TEXT - 53

संशये च क्वचित् कोटिद्वयं समानं भवति । क्वचिच्च काचिदेका कोटिरुत्कटा भवति । 'आश्विने मासि वृष्टिरधिका भवति न वा' इति सन्देहे अधिकवृष्टेः तदभावस्य वा बोधकं किमपि चिह्नमधुना नास्तीति नैकापि कोटिरुत्कटा । परन्तु, 'भाद्रे मासि वृष्टिर्भवति न वा' इति संशये भाद्रमासस्य वर्षाकालतया वृष्टिकोटिरुत्कटा इत्ययं संशयः उत्कटैककोटिकः । उत्कटैककोटिकः संशय एव

‘सम्भावने’- त्युच्यते । अत एव, ‘भाद्रे मासि वृष्टिर्भवति न वा’ इति ज्ञानं  
‘सम्भावना’ इत्यलम् ।

### English Translation

In doubt, sometimes, both the probabilities are equal. Sometimes one probability is stronger. (For instance,) in the case ‘whether there will be rains in the month of *Aśvina*’, as there is no indicator at present to decide or know either of the two probabilities, no probability is stronger. But, when there is a doubt, ‘whether there will be rains in the month of *Bhādrapada*, because the month of *Bhādrapada* falls in the rainy season- this case is called the case of doubt where one probability is stronger. This ‘doubt’ alone is known as “possibility.” This is why, the cognition, ‘whether there will be rains in the month of *Bhādrapada*’ is known to be “possibility”.

That is all,

**Note :** In this last ‘Text’ our author has classified doubt into ‘more probable’ and ‘equally probable’. In other words, this classification of doubt is qualitative.

The example makes the point clear. If there is doubt regarding rains in the month which falls in rainy season, obviously the probability of rains is stronger whereas if the month does not fall in rainy season then no probability is stronger i.e. (perhaps) both are equal.

He makes a reference to one *pramāṇa* accepted by *paurāṇikas* and it is possibility. Our author points out, doubt having one probability stronger alone is known as “possibility.”

Here our Text, *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpa* is complete.



## GLOSSARY

। अंश	= same as अवयव
* अंशविशेष	= particular part
, अखण्ड	= without parts
/ अतिरिक्त	= additional
अधिकरण	= locus
अधिकरणता	= locusness
अनुयोगिन्	= base - relatum
अन्योन्याभाव	= mutual absence i.e. difference
अभाव	= absence
• अभ्युपगम	= an assumption of a system.
अवच्छिन्न	= (i) delimited (ii) qualified
अवच्छेदक	= (i) delimitor (ii) qualifier
✓ अवच्छेदकता	= delimitorness
अवयव	= part
अवयविन्	= whole
अवृत्ति-पदार्थ	= un-located entity
अव्याप्यवृत्ति	= existing by not pervading the whole locus
• अ-संसृष्ट	= unrelated
१ आकाश	= ether

आधार	=	same as आश्रय
आधेय	=	located
आधेयता	=	locatedness
१ आश्रय	=	locus, substratum
१ इच्छा	=	desire
१ उच्चारित	=	uttered
१ उत्कटैककोटिक- संशय	=	doubt whose one side is more probable
० उद्देश्य	=	subject
१ उपर्यधोभावेन	=	horizontally
उपाधि	=	extraneous factor
१ उल्लेख	=	mention
१ ऐक्य	=	identity, unity
१ कणाद	=	the <i>sūtrakāra</i> of the Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy
१ कर्मन्	=	action (same as <i>kriyā</i> )
कारण	=	cause
कारणता	=	causality
कार्यता	=	effectness
१ कालविशेष	=	particular segment of time
० कालिक	=	temporal
१ क्रिया	=	action (same as कर्मन् )
१ खण्डकाल	=	segmented time
१ गुण	=	quality
१ चतुष्कोटिक-संशय	=	doubt having four aspects

चिह्न	= indicator/mark
जाति	= universal (same as <i>sāmānya</i> )
ज्ञान	= cognition
तादात्म्य	= identity
तृतीयप्रत्यक्ष	= third perception
तृतीयाभाव	= third absence (absence of absence of absence of 'X')
देशविशेष	= particular part of space
द्वितीयप्रत्यक्ष	= second perception
द्वितीयाभाव	= second absence (absence of absence of 'X')
द्रव्य	= substance
धर्म	= property
धर्मिन्	= property-holder
नित्य	= eternal
नियत	= regular
नियामकत्व	= regulator-ness
निरवच्छिन्ना	= (i) without any qualification (ii) without any delimitation
निरूप्य-निरूपक-भाव	= describer-described-relation
निर्विकल्पक	= non-verbalisable immediate perception
निश्चय	= determinate cognition
पक्षता	= subject-hood (context : <i>anumāna</i> )
पदार्थ	= entity

परम्परा	=	indirect
परस्पर-नियत-सापेक्ष	=	regularly dependent on each-other
पर्यवसान	=	culmination
पर्याप्ति	=	simultaneously and collectively
प्रकार	=	qualifier (mostly in the context of <i>jñāna</i> , <i>icchā</i> , <i>kṛti</i> )
प्रकारता	=	qualifierhood
प्रयोग	=	usage
प्रतिबन्धक	=	obstructor
प्रतियोगिता	=	counter-positiveness
प्रतियोगिन्	=	(i) counter-positive (ii) counter-relative (iii) counter-comparative
प्रतियोगि-समानाधिकरण	=	collocated with the counter-positive
प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरण	=	not collocated with the counter-positive
प्रतीति	=	cognition
प्रथमप्रत्यक्ष	=	first perception
प्रथमाभाव	=	first absence (absence of 'x')
प्रयोजक	=	causal factor
भावत्व	=	positiveness
भावपदार्थ	=	positive entity
भावप्रत्यय	=	abstract-suffix
भेद	=	difference (same as <i>anyonyābhāva</i> )



मतुप्	=	possessive suffix
महाकाल	=	one indivisible Time
मुख्यप्रकारता	=	main qualificierness
मुख्यविशेष्यता	=	main / prime qualificandness
रूप	=	(i) colour (ii) beauty (very rare in the system)
रूपत्व	=	colourness (inherent property of 'colour')
वस्तु	=	thing
विधेय	=	predicate
विधेयता	=	predicateness
विरोधिन्	=	opposite
विशिष्ट	=	qualified
विशिष्टबुद्धि	=	qualified cognition
विशेषधर्म	=	un-common property
विशेष	=	Particularity
विशेषण	=	qualifier / qualification
विशेषणता	=	qualifierhood
विशेष्यता	=	qualificandhood
विशेष्य	=	qualificand
विशेष्यतावच्छेदक- अवच्छेदेन	=	being co-extensive with the delimitor of the qualificandhood
विशेष्यतावच्छेदक- सामानाधिकरण्येन	=	being collocated with the delimitor of the qualificandhood
विषयता	=	contentness
विषयिता	=	containerness

वृत्ति-अनियामक	=	non-occurrence-exacting
वृत्तिता	=	locatedness (same as <i>ādheyatā</i> )
वृत्ति-नियामक	=	occurrence-exacting
वैलक्षण्य	=	difference
व्याप्यवृत्ति	=	existing by pervading the whole locus
व्यासज्य-वृत्ति	=	pervading all the loci
शब्द	=	(i) word (ii) language
संयोग	=	contact
संशय	=	doubt
संसर्गाभाव	=	relational absence
सखण्ड	=	with parts
सन्निकर्ष	=	closeness, proximity
समवाय	=	inherence
समसूत्रपातेन	=	vertically
समूहालम्बनज्ञान	=	cognition whose content is collection of things
सम्बन्ध	=	relation
सम्बन्धिन्	=	relatum
सम्भावना	=	possibility.
सविकल्पक	=	verbalisable determinate cognition
साक्षात्	=	direct
साध्य	=	to be known, probandum
साध्यता	=	probandumness
सापेक्षधर्म	=	relative aquired / occasional / contextual property

सामानाधिकरण्य	=	collocatedness
सामान्य	=	universal (same as <i>jāti</i> )
सामान्यधर्म	=	common property
सिद्ध	=	known
सिद्धान्त	=	conclusion/decision
स्वरूप	=	own nature
स्वरूपसम्बन्ध	=	self-linking relation
हेतुता	=	probans-hood

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## About the Book

Mahesh Chandra Nyayaratna wrote the text of Navya-nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa in a very lucid and easily understandable Sanskrit to explain some technical aspects of Navya-nyāya language. A Bengali translation and even a Bengali commentary of the text has been available for quite some time (since 1973 to be precise). But there was no English translation or any exposition of the same and hence readers and researchers who can not read and understand Bengali and Sanskrit were deprived of making use of this text.

The present work, therefore, will bridge that gap in its own modest way. The work contains English translation along with detailed notes and diagrams which aim at making the abstract ideas not visible. It will be useful to the beginners as well as advanced learners of Navya-nyāya.

Even students and scholars of Logic and Computer Science may find this work interesting and profitable.

## About the Translator

Dr. Ujjwala Jha, Reader, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Pune, has been working in the centre since February, 1987. Her fields of interest are : Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Dharmasāstra and Veda. She has been engaged in active research in these fields.

She has been associated with the course in Navya-nyāya in different levels since the year 2000. The Text of Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa has been taught in these courses by her at least five times.

Dr. Mrs. Jha has five books and more than fifty research papers to her credit.



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