

RICHARD COX

PAN-
AFRICANISM
IN PRACTICE

PAFMECSA 1958-1964

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PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE

An East African Study

PAFMECSA 1958-1964

RICHARD COX

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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


It would have been impossible to write this book without the help of the leaders connected with PAFMECSA. In particular I want to thank Mr. Tom Mboya who lent me his files, Mr. Joseph Murumbi, for the use of his library, Mr. Francis Khamisi, who checked part of the MSS, Mr. Charles Njonjo, Mr. Ronald Ngala, Mr. Keith Kyle, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, Mr. Nsilo Swai, Mr. Roland Mwanjisi, Miss Joan Wicken, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, who spared time when he was especially busy, the Ethiopian Consul in Nairobi, H. E. Abdulrahim Abbe Farah and Mr. Abdulrachman Hussein, all of the Somali Foreign Ministry. Mr. Duma Nokwe of the South African A.N.C., Mr. Michael Lofchie of the University of California, Prof. Carl Rosberg of the same university who very kindly checked the whole MSS, Mr. Aaron Segal and Mr. George Bennett who made valuable suggestions, and finally my wife who typed it.

I have also incorporated material from past interviews with President Nyerere, Mr. Oscar Kambona, Mr. Mbiu Koinange, Dr. Milton Obote and many others.

RICHARD COX

Nairobi

December 1963



MAP OF AFRICA SHOWING
MEMBERSHIP OF PAFMECSA
AND OF THE
EAST AFRICAN COMMON SERVICES ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

PAFMECSA¹ has been a unique organisation in the annals of Pan-Africanism, one born from the currents of thought and emotion swirling so powerfully through the whole Continent, felt by its members to be an integral part of the All African Peoples' Conference, yet essentially East African.

This may not appeal to those who with President Nkrumah now regard regional organisations as potentially divisive, and East African federation as a retrograde step in the march to African unity. PAFMECSA never was in the West African tradition of Pan-Africanism. Nonetheless its achievements speak for themselves.

By 1963 its membership embraced the Governments or African leaders of eighteen countries stretching from Ethiopia to the Cape and from Leopoldville to Dar es Salaam. For a local East African grouping to spread outwards so widely was no mean feat of diplomacy. Alone of Pan-African organisations it met regularly, indeed more frequently than its Constitution required. Unlike the Casablanca or Monrovia Groups it grew organically, not by imposition of a dogma, and did a great deal to maintain a sense of identification between East and Central African leaders when their countries' individual independence might have caused them to drift apart—as the English-speaking territories of West Africa have. Whilst fighting against the Central African Federation it promoted and kept alive the idea of East African federation. Whilst accepting different types of Constitution in member countries, it debated ideas on citizenship, racial equality and other specific issues which have now become law in East Africa.

¹ PAFMECA, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, became in 1962 PAFMECSA, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa.

It took very positive steps to conciliate between rival nationalist leaders in Zanzibar, Uganda and the Rhodesias. It led the South African boycott campaign and supported the many refugee movements from Southern Africa. Finally it helped to make Ethiopia acceptable in Pan-African circles and also demonstrated support for Adoula's Government in the Congo in December 1962 when the Congo's frail unity threatened to collapse again.

In all these endeavours a major reason for its success was its pragmatic as opposed to doctrinaire approach and its relative humility, a gift imparted to it by Julius Nyerere as much as anyone. In Kenneth Kaunda's words, 'Our leaders don't shout about the organisation, they leave it to grow and develop.'

Though born as a fighting organ against colonial rule, its hope was equally 'to serve as a vanguard for African unity'². Later the original aims broadened to include economic objectives. 'If the present 60 million Africans within the PAFMECA area can properly be organised under a sound economic planning, they can harness the 2½ million square miles of land at their disposal [and] thus build a potential African Common Market.' The existing Common Market in British East Africa fortified this conception. By 1963 the Chairman, Kenneth Kaunda, considered the functions of PAFMECA could change to forging economic links by mutual consent, as more and more of its anti-colonialist aims were met by the granting of independence to former colonies. Once the countries of East and Central Africa were used to collaborating economically, then aims of political federation between them could be pursued.

However, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May 1963 threw PAFMECSA's future into uncertainty even though the one showed the way for the other. Kaunda and others, while

² Mbiu Koinange in a letter to Tom Mboya, 14 October 1961.

recognising that its functions in the liberation of Southern Africa should be taken over by the OAU's Liberation Committee, still maintained their belief in its value. Kaunda went to the final Conference prepared to dissolve PAFMECSA as it stood, but hoping to reconstitute it in another form. 'It can still form a nucleus on which economic links are built without being a competitor to the OAU.'³

PAFMECSA's whole history illustrates the major African political problem of how to forge the swords by which colonialism is destroyed into the ploughshares of development and unity: how to change the destructive into the constructive. At the start, in the words of Francis Khamisi, the first Chairman, 'We thought it would last only until each member country was independent. After that it wouldn't be necessary because the countries would be federated.' But as its membership and influence increased, so did realisation of the obstacles to federation. At Mbale in 1960 Tom Mboya warned: 'African unity is not going to come about just because we are all black We have to ask ourselves whether it is in our interests now to discuss an East African Federation, agree upon it, plan it and determine the various steps to implement it, or wait until after independence—when people will be too busy with their own domestic problems to pay attention to it.'

This percipient speech went unheeded, in action at least, and PAFMECSA never did initiate detailed federal planning. By mid-1963 when the need for this was pressing East Africa's leaders, PAFMECSA itself was effectively in decline. Not only did the creation of the OAU make PAFMECSA seem an unnecessary regional affair to many, the dynamism with which the OAU leapt into the world's headlines threw into sad relief the fact that PAFMECSA had already outgrown its organisational strength.

At the time of writing the final Conference had not yet been held. It seemed that PAFMECSA might be recreated

³ Conversation with the author, 8 October 1963.

and given fresh impetus with a new Constitution. One could however say with certainty that a major period in its life was finished and emphasise that although it ended in the doldrums this should not detract from its many positive achievements.

I. ORIGINS

PAFMECA came into being on 17 September 1958 at Mwanza in Tanganyika, but its ancestry extends further back. In 1954 there was an abortive attempt at a Regional Conference of Central, Southern and East African leaders organised by Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia. He invited Walter Odede from Kenya, Walter Sisulu from South Africa and other delegates from Tanganyika, Uganda, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. All save a Burmese observer were refused entry by immigration officials so the meeting ended up as only a local one.

There was also a student movement heading in the same direction. This was the Makerere College Political Society founded in 1953 and strongly influenced by Nyerere's ideas. Its journal *Politica* published a draft constitution for an East and Central African Federation. Its founders included Kanyama Chiume, Mwai Kibaki, Josef Mathenge, Arthur Wina, Abu Mayanja, and Nsilo Swai. All these later entered politics and played important roles in PAFMECA.

However, Kenya was at this time in the height of the Mau Mau emergency. Tanganyika had only nominated African Members in its Legislative Council, though Nyerere was just forming the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

Little concrete was done until in March 1958 a number of East African politicians went as observers to the first meeting of Independent African States in Accra. Among them were Joseph Murumbi, then in voluntary exile from Kenya and working for the Moroccan Embassy in London, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, who had founded the Zanzibar Nationalist Party in 1956, and Julius Nyerere. Kaunda was not present.

During this visit they discussed the formation of the All African Peoples' Conference with Kwame Nkrumah and

the late George Padmore. The idea of regional groupings of States as a step towards overall unity was also raised (and later accepted at the first AAPC meeting in December 1958). Nkrumah advocated it—he had not then suffered the disappointments of the Ghana–Guinea Union. Yet even then a divergence emerged between him and Nyerere which illuminates vividly one subsequent difference between PAFMECA's approach to problems and that of Ghana. A question arose over the recognition of African organisations, one at least of which in East Africa, the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar, was genuinely African but at the same time influenced by the colonial administration. Nkrumah maintained that all stooge movements should be liquidated. Nyerere argued for inviting them to conferences and converting them.

It was Nyerere's view which subsequently prevailed, a view typical of the man. Coming from one of Tanganyika's smallest tribes, the son of its Chief, he had turned in 1954 from teaching at a Roman Catholic Mission school to organise TANU as a party representing all the multifarious tribes of his vast but poor country. '*Uhuru na Umoja*' (Freedom and Unity) was his motto and became Tanganyika's. So effective were the unabated good humour, patience and determination that he gave to this task, bringing together Christians and Moslems, that he created unity within five years, albeit helped by the common bond of poverty and the absence of any strongly competitive tribes. This spirit, which did not abate the strength of his nationalist convictions, was to animate many of PAFMECA's future resolutions. Equally his own principal failing—a tendency to neglect routine organisation in favour of theorising—also became PAFMECA's after its Headquarters were established in Dar es Salaam.

During succeeding months the idea of a Regional Grouping flowered. There are varying accounts of how this seedling was, as it were, watered. Tom Mboya, in his book *Freedom and After*, related that Nyerere came to his house in

the Ziwani location of Nairobi and 'we agreed it would be good, ahead of the All African People's Conference meeting (held in December 1958), to bring together the nationalist movements throughout Eastern and Central Africa. We were both at that point facing a rough period in the independence struggle in our countries . . . so we planned PAFMECA, to co-ordinate the struggle in all these countries.'

Nyerere was in a better position than anyone else to organise such a meeting. Although he himself had recently been charged with criminal libel against a District Commissioner, and freedom of association was to some extent restricted, his country was politically more advanced than either Kenya or Uganda. His party, TANU, had won a substantial majority in the first elections to the Legislative Council held in 1958. He himself had testified before the UN Trusteeship Committee and the colonial authorities in Tanganyika were aware that as the administrators of a Trust Territory they had to accede more readily than others to the pressure of world opinion towards African self-government and independence.

By contrast Kenya was under the State of Emergency declared in 1952 at the onset of the Mau Mau rebellion. By 1958 the worst of the Mau Mau was long past and the Emergency in some ways only nominal, though the Kenya African Union (KAU) remained proscribed and colony-wide political parties were still banned. Progress had been gradual since June 1955, when the ban on all-African political organisations was relaxed though they were confined to a district basis. The Lyttelton Constitution had been succeeded in November 1957 by the Lennox Boyd Constitution and after the elections of March 1958 there were fourteen African seats out of thirty-six in the Legislative Council, while four out of twelve Specially Elected Members were Africans. Attempts were made to guide the district associations they represented by holding African Leaders' Conferences, but these were placed under

legal restraints. Thus in January 1958 Nyerere and Mboya were stopped from addressing the Mombasa African Democratic Union. In May 1958 the Government refused to register a Convention of African Associations, designed to deal with the mounting problem of fragmentation. African unity within Kenya was being riven by innumerable conflicts of personality and tribal interest, although Tom Mboya was the acknowledged leader of the African Legco (Legislative Council) members. He had come to pre-eminence through his General Secretaryship of the Kenya Federation of Labour, which had tried to fill the void caused by the Emergency by playing an increasingly political role, until it was acted against by the Government in February 1956. Thereafter the problem of co-ordination had mounted to a point where neither Mboya or anyone else could control it. Significantly June 1958 brought the first mention of Kenyatta in a Legco debate, when Oginga Odinga referred to him and other detainees as leaders respected by the African people.

In Uganda the divisions between politicians were if anything more complex. Parties developed slowly even though nominated Africans had first entered the Legislative Council in 1945. The first direct elections of Africans to the Legco were, as in Tanganyika, in 1958. But nationalism roused no great passions, partly because there was no white settler community, partly because of the internal clashes of North and South, Catholics versus Protestants and both versus Muslims, and finally of the supporters of the traditional kingdoms against the rising nationalists. The Kabaka of Buganda had returned in 1955 immensely strengthened by his two years of deportation. In 1958 the problems of Buganda's constitutional relationships with the rest of the country were just beginning to bedevil political life there. Furthermore Ugandans have always been highly individualistic and this not only complicated their internal affairs, it was to make many of them suspicious of PAFMECA as 'another foreign thing'.

Thus when the first PAFMECA conference was called by Nyerere one overriding question within the countries of East Africa was unity. But at the same time the African leaders in all three countries had in fact crossed the watershed in their political history. All three countries had African elected members of Legco who could justly claim to represent the majority of their electorates.

For them 1958 would have been a significant year without the formation of PAFMECA. But no one could doubt that by co-ordinating their struggle they would vastly increase the pace of emancipation, while in Kenya especially it was not so easy to see that the watershed had in fact been crossed. Furthermore all those involved wanted to mobilise world opinion on behalf of their neighbours to the South, where the battle for independence, only just beginning, would be harder and more bitter.

II. THE MWANZA CONFERENCE

MWANZA is a small town and port on the southern shores of Lake Victoria, connected by lake steamer services with Kenya and Uganda. It was chosen both for its convenience and as a demonstration, being in an area where TANU's registration had been withdrawn (the authorities were trying to establish a Sukamaland Federal Council and there had been much local opposition to the idea). Nonetheless TANU leaders from Dar es Salaam were able to organise the Conference in the Ladha Meghji Library and local TANU members to arrange entertainments for the delegates. Excited crowds gathered outside during the sessions demonstrating their support for PAFMECA. The creation went completely unreported in the *East African Standard*, which ironically published a leader on 16 September, the eve of the meeting, warning Tom Mboya that 'he and his colleagues cannot be unaware of the risks they invite in challenging the (Kenya) Government's ruling against mixing Trade Unionism with outright politics.'

TANU paid the Conference expenses, but not the cost of delegates getting there, and Nyerere issued the invitations, those for Kenya being channelled through Mboya. Although the Conference was originally intended as a meeting of East African Legco members, Nyerere personally invited delegates from Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, but the latter had trouble at the border and could not come. Eventually a total of twenty-two arrived, including some prominent Trade Unionists. Tanganyika sent seven, Zanzibar eight, only one, E. M. K. Mulira of the Uganda Progressive Party, came from Uganda. Nyasaland also sent only one delegate, M. W. Kanyama Chiume, then a Legco Member and Publicity Officer of the Nyasaland African Congress. The Kenya delegation was notable for the absence of Oginga Odinga. He was a Legco Member for Central Nyanza

and had been invited, but objected to the way the Conference had been called, no doubt because Mboya was involved. He sent D. O. Makasembo in his stead with a letter of protest, and subsequently accused Mboya and Khamisi of failure to consult him. As a result it was nearly four years before he took part in PAFMECA affairs.

Francis Khamisi, President and founder of the Mombasa African Democratic Union and Legco Member for Mombasa, was elected Chairman at the Conference. He had been one of the founders of the Kenya African Union, an educated, widely respected man. Bhoke Munanka, National Treasurer of TANU, was chosen Secretary.

The first item on the agenda was the promotion of Pan-Africanism. Nyerere stressed the importance of its spirit and urged that all Africans in East and Central Africa should unite under one militant organisation. Agreement was soon reached on a committee of three to draft the Charter and Constitution of the new movement (see appendices A and B). Dr. Julius Kiano, a Kenya Legco Member, Chiume and Mulira were appointed. PAFMECA's first aim, as drafted by them, was 'To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to rid East and Central African territories of imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation, and social degradation, by stepped-up nationalist activities to attain self-government and establish parliamentary democracy.'

Two major points covered during discussion were militancy and unity. Mboya spoke of strikes and boycotts and the Trade Unions taking part in positive political action. It was agreed that it was necessary to 'organise the masses into mass movements under dynamic leadership'. This should be done by building up Co-operatives and Trade Unions and reserving collective funds for Positive Action. It was also resolved that the coming AAPC meeting in Accra should discuss inter alia:

'Independent States to take Positive Action in the United Nations and in all its agencies, the Prime Ministers'

Conference of the Commonwealth and in any other place on all matters affecting the freedom of the African people, and in this connection to reject completely such matters as Domestic Affairs of Colonial or Metropolitan Country.'

This was the precursor of countless similar resolutions on anti-colonialist policy. It is a line of attack that has proved most effective.

However, as Khamisi had emphasised in his opening speech, PAFMECA's methods should be non-violent. This credo was supported and as a result the fifth aim stated in the Constitution was 'To champion non-violence in the African nationalist struggles for freedom and prosperity'. It was only abandoned four years later at the Addis Ababa Conference of February 1962.

Unity, essential from the start, presented thorny problems. Whilst readily congratulating TANU on the unity it had achieved within Tanganyika, delegates admitted the failings elsewhere. Unity was a recurrent theme in the speeches. The fourth item on the agenda, 'co-ordination of policy and tactics of the nationalist movements', finally brought agreement that the nationalist movements should be co-ordinated in each country and splinter groups be discouraged. This principle inevitably led to some agonised appraisal as to which were splinter groups and which worthwhile parties, an appraisal difficult to make when there were so many differing elements in Kenya and Uganda politics, though at subsequent meetings of PAFMECA several movements were refused membership. The problem continued with rivalry between South African, Angolan and Moçambique parties, and at the time of writing, the split between Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. N. Sithole in Southern Rhodesia, Sithole having left ZAPU to form his own ZANU, is still unhealed.

The answer clearly lay in constructive efforts at conciliation rather than dogmatic argument over who should be banned. Mediation became and remained a major feature

of PAFMECA's efforts. The immediate need seen at Mwanza was to bring unity in Zanzibar and Uganda.

Zanzibar's divergencies were all too evident from the rival speeches of its delegates. Abeid Karume, President of the Afro-Shirazi Party, and Abdul Rahman Mohammed (known to everyone as Babu), then General Secretary of the Arab-backed Nationalist Party, were soon at loggerheads over the issue of Arabs dominating Africans. Mboya remarked that since the Nationalists had just lost the elections, the Afro-Shirazis were clearly the popular movement. This presaged an opposition to the Nationalists because they were a predominantly Arab party, which Kenya and Tanganyika politicians developed and maintained long after the Nationalist party came to power, despite the part its leader, Shiekh Ali Muhsin, played in PAFMECA (he missed this first meeting), and despite the peculiar fact that because the Afro-Shirazi Party refused actually to sign PAFMECA's Charter the other delegations did the same and in the end Khamisi and Munanka alone signed it. The ASP claimed that the ZNP was not an African party and to condone its existence by signing a joint document was impossible. The ZNP denied this and asked for a delegation to be sent to Zanzibar to investigate.

Privately it was pointed out to the ASP that theirs was a weak case. However, the emphasis lay on genuine conciliation, so Khamisi, Kiano and Chiume were chosen to form a delegation to Zanzibar, one which had a profound effect on the subsequent course of Zanzibar politics, if not quite that which Afro-Shirazi supporters expected. The delegation's terms of reference are given in the next chapter.

Next Mulira described how difficult it was for nationalists in Uganda to carry on their struggle when traditional forces were working against them. This obvious allusion to the Kabaka of Buganda and the three kingdoms needed little annotation. It was agreed that Nyerere and Mboya should go and study the position. Their terms of reference

were to find out the differences between the parties, their relative strengths and popularity; to examine the possible effect of traditional influences on the development of a nationalist movement; and finally to report back to PAFMECA's Co-ordinating Freedom Council, making recommendations on suitable action and on which of the Uganda parties qualified for PAFMECA.

After agreeing these steps and other ways to make Positive Action effective, as well as the eradication of tribalism, especially in Kenya, the Conference went on to one of the most far-reaching resolutions PAFMECA ever passed. This was on African nationalism and the problem of non-Africans. Nyerere thought it should be possible 'to draft something positive for the other races'. What he, Chiume, Kiano and Mulira produced read as follows:

Whereas human rights are not based on racial or cultural aspects of men and women but are based on precepts of justice and equality,

And Whereas no country in the World is entirely homogeneous racially or culturally,

And Whereas in genuinely democratic countries it has been found, that the surest ways of safeguarding the rights of any groups, is the protection of individual rights and the uncompromising safeguarding liberty of every citizen irrespective of his race, colour, religion or national origin,

This Conference wants it to be publicly known that:—

- (a) We are dedicated to the precepts and practices of democracy.
- (b) Under the democracy which we seek for our motherland there will be no discrimination, victimisation or any form of segregation based purely on race or colour or religion.
- (c) Those of foreign origin residing in Africa by accepting the rules of Governments of the Majority by being naturalised African Citizens, or by being Citizens by birth who unreservedly uphold the system of true parliamentary democracy, social justice and the principles of Equality will enjoy the full rights and protection of a citizen.

- (d) In order to protect the economically weak communities as well as accelerating the social progress of these communities the democratically instituted governments will guard against unfettered economic competition and against political trickeries which could jeopardise the civil liberties of the people.
- (c) The safeguards and protection of citizens' rights and human liberties will be buttressed by:
 - (i) Uncompromising adherence to the Rule of Law.
 - (ii) The maintenance of the absolute independence of the Judiciary.
 - (iii) The exercise of the right to vote or stand for any office or the exercising of any other rights of citizen by every person whether of indigenous or of foreign origin provided he or she is a full fledged citizen.
 - (iv) The constant observance of the declaration of the Universal Human Rights and the United Nations Charter.

The principles here expounded have now been embodied in the Constitutions of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya and will no doubt be found in any Federal Constitution. In particular the rights of any person who takes out citizenship have indeed been protected, though it is worth noting that no more than now did the East African leaders undertake to preserve the former status of Asians and Europeans who wished to retain British or other nationality. It was made clear, in Mboya's words, that 'there should not be any minority class with privileges'.

At this time, surprisingly, the only non-racial party represented was the Zanzibar Nationalist Party. TANU was officially closed to Asians and Europeans, while in Kenya political equality regardless of race was far in advance of current African thinking which tended to denounce anything not purely African as a 'stooge' movement. That the Conference accepted the non-racial idea (while denouncing 'so called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism and white settlerism') was partly due to the mixed Arab,

Asian and African membership of the ZNP. Unfortunately, later on, as the African leaders realised that power was entirely theirs, the practice of non-racialism declined.

Other resolutions covered the Co-operative movement, Trade Unions, the AAPC, Freedom of the Press, and East African Federation. Co-operatives were raised by the Afro-Shirazis, who essentially wanted political backing, having since the July 1957 elections in Zanzibar started a chain of consumer co-operative stores, which had successfully put hundreds of Arab shopkeepers out of business. As well as this anti-Nationalist Party aim, the ASP's co-operatives were a means of bringing Zanzibar Africans rapidly up to the same standards as Arabs. The idea of co-operatives as a way of boosting the economy appealed greatly to Tanganyikans, who have since forged ahead in co-operative development. Mboya mentioned expert Israeli help, now extensively relied on. The resultant resolution's condemnation of 'unnecessary legal restrictions which hamper the growth of the Co-operative movement and its essentially democratic and independent spirit' contained, however, a certain irony in view of the ASP's co-operatives being a major cause of racial unrest in Zanzibar.

On Trade Unions the Conference attacked restrictions imposed on their freedom of action by Colonial Governments and stressed 'the fact that Trade Unions must remain free from the control or direction of any political parties'. (This was a very fundamental declaration on a most controversial issue in African politics though the delegates do not seem to have realised this at the time.) Ghana, by contrast, had already decided that the Unions should be a wing of the Party. Their freedom has since been maintained in Kenya, largely owing to the Industrial Charter drawn up by Tom Mboya, and Uganda feels the same, but Tanganyika has deviated from this declaration, making the TFL part of the Ministry of Labour subservient to the Government, and curtailing the right to strike.

It was decided to send Francis Khamisi as a joint delegate

for all four countries to the AAPC Conference in December. As well as the Positive Action motion already mentioned, they wanted the AAPC to discuss the establishment of a Pan-African Freedom Movement, with a Permanent Representative at the United Nations, the setting up of a Freedom Fund and the 'Democratisation of all Independent African States'. This last was a dig at Ethiopia, which was then regarded as an anachronistic State, but which later triumphantly regained the mainstream of Pan-Africanism, partly through the medium of PAFMECA itself. The discussion on preparing for the AAPC Conference revealed strong 'go it alone' feelings. Indeed it was only later that PAFMECA came to feel itself an integral part of the AAPC. The theory of attaining eventual unity through regional groupings still had plenty of life in it.

The meeting decided that 'the question of East African Federation is irrelevant and does not arise at this time' and the delegates contented themselves with condemnation of the Central African Federation. The reasons for this were partly that Federation was seen as an Imperialist idea and to support any Federation might seem a betrayal of Africans in Central Africa, partly because 'we only expected PAFMECA to last until each member country was independent'.¹ But in view of their natural preoccupation with anti-colonialism, it was remarkable that the Federal idea was discussed at all.

Organisationally PAFMECA would now have its Headquarters in Dar es Salaam with a Secretariat. There would be an Annual General Meeting every August, a Co-ordinating Freedom Council (CFC) elected annually as the Governing Body of the movement, subject only to the AGM, and Territorial Freedom Committees in every member country. The PAFMECA symbol was a raising of the right hand with the fingers stretched together for unity, and the fingers and thumb forming a U for *Uhuru*.

¹ Khamisi in conversation with the author.

Financially there was an inevitable discrepancy betwixt aim and achievement. The Constitution laid down a membership fee of £25 per member on joining and an annual subscription of £250 per member organisation. In practice an on-the-spot collection from delegates yielded £21 10s. plus a cheque for £50 passed on by TANU, who had been given it by Chiume's Nyasaland African Congress as a contribution to Nyerere's defence in the criminal libel action. This being the true financial state it was not immediately possible to provide the full-time paid officials (Executive Secretary and Financial Secretary) envisaged in the Constitution. In practice, though not in theory, TANU would have to provide the Secretariat. At this stage members simply did not possess much money. A month before the AAPC Conference total funds stood at only £146 10s. It was with difficulty that Munanka gathered in enough to send Khamisi there. PAFMECA began, and was unhappily to remain, chronically short of funds, despite constant appeals for payment of subscriptions on time.

Nonetheless, the first Conference had been remarkably successful, with few clashes of personality, and great unanimity of opinion. There had been free discussion on each item, sub-committees had worked well, the principle that every delegate had an equal voice in decisions was established. The result was evident in the constructive quality of the resolutions.

To sum up—a Pan-African institution had been created that owed little to the traditional West Coast roots of Pan-Africanism and that was pledged to fight black chauvinism as much as white racialism. The only East African veterans of the 1945 Manchester Conference and before were Jomo Kenyatta and Peter Mbiu Koinange—and the former was still in jail, the latter in exile. The men of PAFMECA, though honouring Kenyatta as their true leader, were a new generation. Unlike the West Africans they were not canvassing an ideology, but

constructing an organisation for the immediate purpose of liberating colonies. Furthermore PAFMECA's links, informal because they were not dogmatic, were in the future to minimise the effects of territorial separatism, a direct contrast with West Africa where those effects broke economic links bequeathed by Britain and competitive nationalism has killed co-operation. PAFMECA was the only grouping to survive of the five propounded at the Accra AAPC Conference in December 1948 and it prepared the ground in many ways for the formation of the greater Organisation of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May 1963.

III. ZANZIBAR MEDIATION

ZANZIBAR still bears the marks of the slave trade in the relationship between Arab and African. The promotion of nationalist unity was the reason for the second PAFMECA Conference being held there in April 1959.

The 50,000 Arabs, 17 per cent of the whole population, established since ancient times and reinforced by subsequent waves of immigration from Muscat and Oman, are proportionally the second largest non-African minority in any country South of the Sahara. Yet Zanzibar nationalism was the creation of this minority.

In part Arabs looked back to the days before the British Protectorate when Zanzibar was an independent Sultanate, in part perhaps they hoped to wrest power from Britain before mainland African nationalism overtook it. At all events 1954 saw the Arab Association demanding common roll elections, universal suffrage and a ministerial system. Its newspaper, *Al Falaq* ('The Dawn'), published anti-colonialist articles that led to the entire Association's executive being found guilty of sedition, including Ali Muhsin, then a journalist. In June 1954 the Association began an effective year and a half long boycott of Legco and other governmental bodies. By the end of 1955 this very boycott was precluding it from taking advantage of election concessions being made by the British. Despite the racial intolerance implicit in the Moslem faith, it could not enter politics on such a platform without being accused of a bid for Arab domination. The solution proved to lie in Ali Muhsin gradually taking over an obscure, but separate and non-racial party called 'The Nationalist Party of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar'. During 1956 he transformed it into the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.

At this time the Africans were divided and disorganised. The indigenous inhabitants prefer to call themselves

Shirazis, owing to their claim to descent from tenth- to twelfth-century Persian immigrants. Predominantly fishermen and farmers, they have a tradition of friendship with the Arabs, whereas the mainland Africans, town dwellers or squatters on Arab-owned land, see the Arabs historically as slavers. Whether descendants of slaves brought to the clove plantations, or voluntary migrants from the mainland, they long maintained separate communal associations from the Shirazis.

These 'mainland' Africans had founded an Association in 1934, which had at once affiliated to the Tanganyika African Association. So when the announcement that elections would be held in 1957 shocked them into realisation that they were totally unprepared and their low economic status would prevent many from enjoying the new suffrage anyway, it was natural for Nyerere to visit them. Whereas they had called for postponement, and finally boycott, of the election, he proposed unity between Africans and Shirazis.

Although such unity was already under discussion among Shirazis, the idea provoked a crisis. In Zanzibar island leaders of the two communities formed an Afro-Shirazi Union. But in Pemba island, where relations between Shirazis and Arabs were closer than in Zanzibar, and there were fewer mainland Africans, the Shirazis stood aloof. When the election came in July two Pemba Shirazis, Mohamed Shamte (later Prime Minister) and Ali Sharif Musa, won as Independents. Three of the four Zanzibar island seats fell to Afro-Shirazi candidates. The ZNP won no seats. After these elections the Shirazi and African Associations of Pemba merged and the Afro-Shirazi Union officially became a Party.

Great harm, however, had been done by the African electoral campaign being based on ethnic fears of Arab domination, and vice versa. Although the Afro-Shirazi programme was of gradual constitutional progress (which would enable Africans to catch up socially with Arabs and

Asians), and the ZNP's demanded immediate self-government and independence, the real contest was racial. After it was over, plantation-owner supporters of the ZNP began evicting squatter Africans, while the ASP opened the chain of consumer co-operatives referred to in the last chapter. By late 1958 tension had so mounted that serious racial violence seemed inescapable.

This was the complicated situation that the PAFMECA delegation of Khamisi and Chiume found in December (Dr. Kiano could not come). Their terms of reference were to study the relevant facts, explore possibilities of mutual respect 'or even co-operation' between the two parties, and assess opportunities for PAFMECA activities in Zanzibar. Following this none too hopeful brief they investigated, negotiated, and then called the various leaders together at the Aga Khan School. Happily there was a general feeling that PAFMECA could save the situation, being a supra-national power. Agreement was reached on forming a joint Freedom Committee in accordance with the PAFMECA Constitution, and a formal declaration signed, though not without some opposition.

Two days later delegations left for the Accra AAPC Conference, of which Mboya was elected Chairman. The PAFMECA resolutions were all eventually dropped during debate, though the same ideals were emphasised, including that of non-violence, Mboya nonetheless warning that force might eventually have to be used. In particular the sub-Committee on unity decided to achieve closer unity in five defined regions, within which nationalist movements would work for independence followed by economic integration and political federation. Later the regions would come together in a United States of Africa. PAFMECA's existing plan fell in excellently with this, indeed probably influenced it, save that the AAPC saw Ethiopia and Somalia as part of an East African Region, a stage PAFMECA only reached in 1962. Later in December the first meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa discussed regional economic

planning in Addis Ababa. Effectively PAFMECA had been ahead of the leaders.

The Zanzibar problem was also considered at Accra and to strengthen the agreement already reached Nkrumah gave both factions letters urging unity for them to show their supporters, though apparently these had little effect.

By the time PAFMECA met in Zanzibar for its second Conference on 4 April 1959 the carefully wrought unity was shattered again and the new Freedom Committee had ceased functioning. Karume of the ASP explained that the British M.P. who had come to the island had sparked off the present misunderstanding. The M.P. had said the British Government would not grant independence to minorities, an idea the Nationalists did not welcome.

This was in fact the Labour M.P. and Trade Unionist, Mr. James Johnson, who was there as the guest of the Afro-Shirazi Party. The Nationalists' version was that he told the ASP that Britain would back them because they were the majority, and in consequence the ASP felt there was no longer any need to co-operate. It was also alleged that he criticised Zanzibar as a racially stratified society, and raised the bogey of Arab domination again. At all events both sides claimed his visit had sown the seed of the breakdown. This debate took part of the first morning and three hours in the afternoon. All the old accusations were raked up. Nyerere commented that the atmosphere of masters and slaves still existed in the minds of some citizens, a suggestion the Afro-Shirazis naturally supported. Khamisi advocated public meetings at which both main parties would address the masses together from one platform and with one policy, whilst Makasembo put an unsuccessful motion that the parties should amalgamate.

Eventually it was resolved that Khamisi, Kiano and if possible Makasembo should confer in Zanzibar again. Equally Mboya, Nyerere and Karume should try again to settle the Uganda case. Nyerere had regretfully reported failure in their first mission, though they had met leaders

of the three main parties, the Uganda National Congress, the United Congress Party and the Progressive Party. Hopes were expressed that a new Uganda National Movement might provide unity. It was also suggested that the next meeting of PAFMECA should be convened in Kampala (Uganda) during August.

It was not easy to discuss Uganda on this occasion. The Zanzibar Conference had been postponed once and then reconvened hurriedly. No one had come from Uganda, nor from Nyasaland, and only two, Khamisi and Makasembo, from Kenya (Mboya being in the United States and Kiano with a multiracial delegation headed by Odinga demanding a new Constitution from the Colonial Secretary, Lennox Boyd, in London). All the rest of the eighteen members present were Tanganyikans or Zanzibaris. One declared aim had been to debate results of the AAPC Conference, but local problems dominated.

Kenyatta's release was a major topic. On 15 April, while the Conference was sitting, he was freed from prison, but immediately served with a restriction order confining him to Lodwar. In Nairobi Mboya had made the last anniversary of his arrest (20 October) a day of fasting. At Accra Dr. Kiano had called him a Freedom Fighter equal to Nkrumah. PAFMECA now sent a cable to the Governor of Kenya urging his unconditional release so that he could contribute to political and constitutional discussions.

At the opening, to which the Press were admitted, Nyerere said plans for a Kenya of equal citizens, irrespective of colour, should be started immediately. This was fairly widely reported. PAFMECA was beginning to attract attention. Later, during a review of Constitutional Development in each member country, Nyerere suggested working specifically for the end of the Kenya Emergency and Common Roll Elections. The African Elected Members had been boycotting the Legco since January in an effort to get new Constitutional talks. Unknown to the delegates, Michael Blundell was about to quit the Government in

order to lead the New Kenya Party on a multiracial platform.

February had brought spontaneous rioting in Nyasaland against the Central African Federation. Dr. Banda had been arrested and the Nyasaland African Congress (a PAFMECA member) banned. A strong resolution was passed condemning the Federation and calling for release of the arrested African leaders. More practically a fund was opened for the latter's legal defence. Full support was also pledged, and in due course given, to Kanyama Chiume's attempts to publicise the Nyasaland case in Britain, whither he had fled to avoid detention. He was appointed official PAFMECA representative in London. Publicity for PAFMECA abroad, and even locally, was considered an urgent necessity. Delegations were also planned for 1960 to the USA and to independent African States, though the one to the U.S.A. never materialised.

The purpose of the territory-by-territory review was to lay down specific targets and tactics, like the above. The Zanzibar Freedom Committee was urged, if functioning, to demand universal adult suffrage and a new legislature of twenty-five seats. Nyerere hoped 1960 would see full responsible Government in all the countries discussed—Nyasaland, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda. In the opening session he incidentally shed a curious sidelight on the emotionalism used to ginger up the start of conferences when he compared the Kenya and Cyprus Emergencies, remarking that Dedan Kimathi was hanged whereas Grivas was given a safe conduct out to Greece, and concluding that 'these political incidents have no difference in their meaning except the colour of the skins of the people in Kenya and those of Cyprus'.¹ In fact the British had never managed to catch Grivas.

This Conference cost £104 to arrange, as against £151 14s. for the Mwanza one. It ended, after thanks had been

¹ Conference Minutes, page 2.

expressed for the peaceful progress in Tanganyika, with Nyerere formally taking over the post of Chairman. He had been elected during the meeting with authority to employ a paid Secretary. Khamisi had never expected to be chosen at Mwanza and felt Nyerere was the right person to take on the leadership. He has now retired from politics and is Editor of the Swahili newspaper *Baraza*.

Khamisi's contribution to PAFMECA was crowned by his second mission of conciliation to Zanzibar. During the Conference he and Nyerere had repeatedly emphasised to the local leaders that the most important objective was the struggle against colonialism. On his return he reiterated that racial conflicts were an obstacle to winning freedom. After two days with each side he organised a joint public meeting on 4 August at which unity was achieved, though the individuality of the two was still recognised. By a happy chance it was his birthday.

The Freedom Committee was re-instituted and a noticeable lessening of inter-racial tension quickly resulted. The bulk of the credit for avoiding outbreaks of violence between the parties during 1959 and 1960 unquestionably rests with PAFMECA. During the remainder of 1959 party leaders toured the constituencies together, the boycott of Arab shops was called off, relations between squatters and landlords improved. The British Resident was so impressed that he agreed to the Freedom Committee's demands for hastening constitutional change and introducing a Ministerial system of government.

Thus PAFMECA had given a lead to East Africa in improving race relations and shown that sincere, impartial mediation could overcome racialism born of colonialism (in this case the Arab colonialism which preceded Portuguese and British)—albeit that this racial agreement was founded on the pressing need to unite against the common colonial master of the present time—Britain.

IV. EXPANSION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOYCOTT

AFTER the success in Zanzibar it was hoped to do the same in Uganda. The 1959 Annual Conference was convened 17-20 August in Kampala. All Kenya and Uganda African Legco members were invited. Unfortunately, the Uganda Government banned leaders from outside the country from entering and the date and place had to be changed to 8-12 September at Moshi in Tanganyika. In the event the conference's main achievements were expansion of the membership and introduction to East Africa of the South African boycott.

In Uganda itself the situation had deteriorated further, owing to the Buganda boycott of European goods which led to severe persecution of Asian shopkeepers. The Uganda National Movement, which was involved, was proscribed, and three of its leaders exiled for a year, among them a founder member of PAFMECA, E. M. K. Mulira. Something very near a state of emergency existed. The internal schisms of Uganda political life continued. But Mboya and Karume could not find time to carry out their appointed mission, despite urging from the PAFMECA Executive Secretary, Jeremiah Bakampenja. Obote (UNC) told this Moshi Conference that he was trying to bring the various parties together and asked for the services of an independent Chairman.

However, there had developed a very personal and genuine feeling of common purpose among PAFMECA leading members. It was echoed in their correspondence. More often than not the formal 'Dear Comrade' gave way to Christian names and the concluding 'Yours in the struggle' or 'Yours in the Freedom Army' was lightened by more familiar greetings. These characterised the informality which made PAFMECA so successful in keeping the East

African leaders together when they might easily have fallen prey to competitive dogmas of nationalism as the West Africans did.

Organisationally not all the Mwanza decisions had been implemented. Local Freedom Committees had not been, and indeed never were, created in all member countries. However, the Co-ordinating Freedom Council was first elected at this Moshi meeting.¹

After agreeing on the agenda and deciding to use Swahili in preference to English, the meeting turned to the question of membership. Immediately the conflict between the two factions of Kenya politics brought violent argument. The rivalries of personality and tribal interest described in Chapter 2 had led to an open split amongst the African Elected Members in July 1959. Two groups emerged, the Kenya National Party and the Kenya Independence Movement, precursors of KADU and KANU respectively. The KNP was basically a rural party, represented at this meeting by Ronald Ngala and J. N. Muimi and supported by E. E. Khasakhala. The KIM had arisen from Mboya's Nairobi Convention People's Party; it was predominantly urban, militant, Kikuyu and Luo. Colony-wide organisations still being banned, it substituted the image of Kenyatta as a binding force. This merely heightened KNP supporters' fear of Kikuyu domination. Mboya and D. I. Kiamba represented it at Moshi, aided by D. O. Makasembo who as before spoke for the absent Odinga.

Although only six of Kenya's fourteen African Elected Members supported KIM, as against eight behind the KNP, the KIM was admitted to PAFMECA membership without trouble. The KNP's admission was opposed by Makasembo. A vehement debate followed, Ali Muhsin (ZNP) supporting the KNP, Mboya maintaining that it

¹ Its members were now Nyerere, Munanka, Karume, Muhsin, Mboya, Ntale (of Uganda Democratic Party), Mashango (Union Africaine du Ruanda Urundi—UNARU), Obote, and Marcelli (Centre du Regroupement Africain—CEREA—of the Congo).

was a splinter group, and as such barred by the Constitution. A vote on the issue was postponed for a day and when taken turned down the KNP by eighteen to three with three abstentions. Its members were invited to stay as fraternal delegates, but walked out, a move tactfully omitted from the official minutes of the meeting. They claimed that Mboya had arranged the vote against them with TANU before the Conference opened. Since the KNP had been formed a month before the KIM and had a preponderance in the Kenya Legco the vote certainly seems to need explanation.

Both Benedicto Kiwanuka's Uganda Democratic Party and Milton Obote's Uganda National Congress were admitted to membership. The Uganda Action Group, an Asian movement, withdrew its application after some debate but its members were allowed to stay as fraternal delegates, participating at the Chairman's discretion, but with no vote. The racial question involved caused some embarrassment in view of PAFMECA's charter. How far the Asian communities could help in the nationalist struggle was under active consideration. Since the 1920s they had fought European supremacy, but only on their own behalf. Their concern for African advancement was very recent. Four Asian observers had been invited from Dar es Salaam and a joint resolution submitted by them and the Uganda Asians was adopted calling on the Asians of Kenya to support the cause of freedom. But within a few months it was evident that nowhere in East Africa save Zanzibar would Asians be allowed parity in the struggle of African nationalism, 'virile and unrelenting' (a phrase from the Freedom Charter much quoted by members), though some came to the next Conference at Mbale. Their position has deteriorated ever since, worsened by gathering African demands for Asian-held jobs and commercial influence.

At least there were no difficulties over admitting the Ruanda Urundi and Congo delegates. The Union Nationale Africaine du Ruanda Urundi (UNARU) was basically a

creation of the ruling Watutsi tribe, backing the hereditary monarchies of Rwanda and Burundi. But it had no love for the Belgians and was energetically demanding independence for the Trusteeship, which before the 1914-18 War had been part of German East Africa. In practice UNAR was almost solely a Rwanda party, and the Watutsi a one in five minority. In July 1959 the Mwami (King) of Rwanda died. The Belgians who had ruled through him, began changing their policy so as to bring the Bantu majority into power. A month after this PAFMECA meeting plans for the country's independence were announced and violent civil war broke out, in which thousands of Watutsi were killed or forced into exile. UNARU fought on politically until after the independence in 1962, allying itself with Lumumba and Gizenga in the Congo and getting strong support at the United Nations from Casablanca Group countries on the grounds that it was a truly nationalist party whilst the Bahutu party (Parmehutu) was a Belgian creation, which indeed it very largely was. For PAFMECA the whole thing was unfortunate. UNAR attended later Conferences but as disturbances mounted its membership became of less and less practical use. It also prevented the governing Bahutu parties from joining until late 1962.

The Centre de Regroupement Africaine (CEREA) of the Congo was a unitarian party founded by Anicet Kashamura in the Kivu Province, the part of the Congo bordering on Uganda. In the pre-Independence elections of 1960 it won ten seats in a Parliament of 137. In 1961 Kashamura forcibly took over Kivu on behalf of Gizenga's Stanleyville régime. At this time PAFMECA regarded CEREA's attendance as a starting point for Congolese participation, and listened attentively to the appeal of its President, Jean Chrysostome Weregemere, for moral and material help against Belgian settler interests and traditional authorities who were standing in the way of independence. A resolution was passed urging early independence and it

was agreed that a letter should be sent to all political organisations in the Congo saying PAFMECA's doors were open to them.

By now many of the resolutions were becoming predictable. The States of Emergency in PAFMECA countries were attacked. The death of eleven detainees at the Hola Camp in Kenya was noted 'with horror'. An immediate, impartial enquiry into the Uganda situation was called for from the colonial Government, though the Uganda Democratic Party disassociated itself from this motion. Dr. Banda's release was demanded (it transpired that the money collected in Zanzibar for the Central African leaders had never been sent to them, but Nyerere undertook to rectify this at once). Kenyatta's release from restriction was again demanded, PAFMECA declaring itself 'thoroughly disgusted with the blatant indifference of the Kenya Government to its resolution passed at the Zanzibar Conference'. In addition a special appeal was made to the Kenya Government to end the Emergency and allow Colony-wide political organisations.

A preoccupation with the rivalries of Kenya politics already described showed itself in the debate on co-ordination of tactics. Although Mboya insisted that proposals for unity between different organisations should first be discussed in the individual territories concerned, a resolution was moved by Abu Mayanja (UNC), and passed, urging African Elected Members to withdraw from both the KIM and the KNP, revive the Elected Members' Organisation and go to the forthcoming Round Table Conference as one United Group. Evidently many of the delegates were not altogether happy with the way in which the refusal to admit the KNP to membership the day before had made PAFMECA into the vehicle of factional power politics, the bugbear of so many Pan-African organisations and the opposite of the unity PAFMECA was pledged to construct.

In the event the KIM and KNP did come together for the

1960 Lancaster House Conference, with highly gratifying results, but this was due more to pressures within Kenya than PAFMECA's urging, and though both (as KANU and KADU) came to the next Conference at Mbale (October 1960), the chance of lasting conciliation through PAFMECA had been undermined by TANU's support of the KIM, just as its support of the ASP helped destroy unity in Zanzibar later on.

Inevitably with Nyerere's personality, the headquarters in Dar es Salaam and most of the routine work done by TANU officials, TANU had become the 'leader' party in PAFMECA. The unity and strength of TANU, pointed out vigorously by Bibi Titi at this Conference, contrasted impressively with disunity elsewhere. Increasingly TANU policy influenced PAFMECA policy.

Bibi Titi Mohammed, an imposing lady who organised the women's side of TANU, and is now famous in East Africa, was incidentally the first and only female member of PAFMECA.

Condemnation of France's intended atomic tests in the Sahara was unanimous and demonstrations were decided upon in all PAFMECA countries during a forthcoming visit by the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld.

However, the most far-reaching resolution was that on the boycott of South African goods. It was in accordance with the one passed at Accra by the AAPC nine months earlier and called on all Independent African States to impose economic sanctions against South Africa. A letter was also sent to Heads of State throughout the world on this subject. But the important points were that the Labour Movements in East Africa were asked to submit detailed plans for a boycott by all the transport unions, and importers and manufacturers' agents to cease assisting in the sale of South African goods anywhere in East and Central Africa. Unlike some larger nations that have loudly proclaimed the boycott whilst having no South African trade anyway, the East African territories had an appreciable exchange

of goods, and the boycott might in the end hurt them more than South Africa. The immediate plan agreed was a selective boycott starting on 1 November and directed against imported hoes, wines and spirits, tomatoes and other produce.

A detailed plan for extending the boycott was to be worked out by the PAFMECA Secretariat, acting as Central Research Committee. Although no total boycott could be introduced until the East African territories were independent, and even at the time of writing it is by no means complete, PAFMECA's resolution was taken to heart by quite a few businessmen. A major European brewery in Nairobi hastened to assure Munanka that it would cease using South African printed beer labels 'immediately' and thanked him obsequiously for giving 'his valuable time' to discuss the matter. His letter to the Manager acknowledging this began not with the words 'Dear Sir' but with '*Uhuru na Kazi*' and ended '*Uhuru!*' Imposing the boycott gave PAFMECA's Secretariat some moments of delighted amusement.

All in all, however, the Moshi Conference had caused divisions in PAFMECA's ranks to worsen, rather than healing them. The organisation was becoming a vehicle of power politics, especially in Kenya. Its declared non-racialism was suffering too, as the realisation grew that African nationalism did not need Asian support in order to triumph.

V. REBIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CONCEPT

BETWEEN the Moshi Conference and the following June there was a lull in PAFMECA's activity, though for the individual territories the period was far from quiet and its constituent events combined to make the idea of Federation blossom again, after neglect since the Mwanza Conference.

Moreover when the AAPC met at Tunis in January 1960 the PAFMECA affiliated delegates, albeit mostly second-string leaders, formed a strong PAFMECA lobby there. Its main point of application was against Nkrumah's attempt to discredit the AAPC Chairman Tom Mboya. About three months earlier the two leaders had quarrelled, the root cause being Mboya's reluctance to accept all his elder's advice. Nkrumah promptly suggested that instead of the AAPC Chairman presiding at Tunis, the host country should provide a Chairman. In consequence Mboya did not attend but sent Dr. Mungai Njoroge as his representative. Njoroge was backed by Josef Mathenge and Argwings-Kodhek of Kenya, by Kakonge of Uganda, Munanka, Chiume, Mainza Chona (UNIP) and Ali Muhsin. As well as defending Mboya they insisted on taking a middle course on the question of Trade Union affiliation, declining to agree on immediate disengagement from the ICFTU. Thus the caucus of the old Makerere College Political Society¹ came into action internationally for the first time. It is also worth noting that though not present, Joseph Murumbi had beforehand done most of the organisational work for the Conference.

Tunis incidentally saw the final nail hammered in the coffin of Zanzibari unity when Jamal Nasib of the ASP attacked Ali Muhsin and the ZNP in a speech. The unity so hard won the year before was already crumbling, because

¹ See Chapter 1.

Ameri Tajo, Mohammed Shamte and Ali Sharif had broken away from the ASP to form the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP). Tajo was booed in the streets by ASP supporters and his Koranic school defiled. Tension rose. Muhsin at once asked Nyerere for a meeting of the CFC to try and restore matters. Nyerere agreed, but partly owing to the AAPC Conference the CFC meeting never took place.

Macleod's appointment in place of Lennox Boyd as Britain's Colonial Secretary was a most important change. At the same time British policy altered fundamentally. She was now going to disengage from Africa as quickly as possible. The first fruit of this had been the announcement on 11 October 1959 by Sir Richard Turnbull, the new (and last) Governor of Tanganyika, that Tanganyika would reach self-government in 1960, which it did in September. Macleod was adversely impressed by the Hola Camp incident in Kenya, to which PAFMECA among others had given great publicity. He was also influenced by both African and European objections to the Lennox Boyd Constitution. During the Lancaster House Conference in February 1960 he came to terms with the African delegates, led by Ronald Ngala. 'At one swift blow, power was transferred to the African.'² Unhappily, the consequent lifting of the ban on colony-wide African parties resulted in the united front established for the Conference falling apart. In March 1960 a joint Committee started drafting a Constitution for a combined party. But when it was created—as KANU, the Kenya African National Union—Ngala was abroad and was made Treasurer without being consulted. In May he and his supporters finally refused to join KANU on the grounds that it was dictatorial and Luo-Kikuyu dominated. In June they formed KADU, the Kenya African Democratic Union.

Thus both Tanganyikan and Kenyan leaders were busy

² Sir Michael Blundell in conversation with the author, September 1963.

at home, whilst Ugandan rivalries were re-kindling the demands for Buganda's secession, following upon the boycott. However, the overriding obstacle to federation had been removed. So long as Europeans held the reins in Kenya the other two countries saw in federation the risk of domination by the white settlers. In 1953 a casual reference to federation by the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, at a dinner in London had sparked the Buganda secession trouble and led to the Kabaka's two-year exile. The 1960 Lancaster House Conference killed that bogey. The way was clear for re-statement of the idea in African terms. At the second Conference of Independent African States (14-24 June 1960 in Addis Ababa) Julius Nyerere argued that a 'dignified African personality' required political unification in East Africa.

This was a re-statement rather than something new because the conception was at least sixty years old. A brief resumé of steps taken towards it by the Colonial Power is relevant since they made federation economically feasible. Nor is this to understate the natural geographical unity of the area, bounded by the Indian Ocean, the Ethiopian Highlands to the North and the Rift Valley Lakes of Albert, Kivu and Tanganyika on the West, within which Swahili is a lingua franca. The trading patterns from the interior to the Coast took no regard of the present national boundaries, they were East African and included Nyasaland.

Nonetheless the multitudinous tribes of the area achieved no unity before the colonial era. The first concrete proposals came from Sir Harry Johnston, Special Commissioner to the Uganda Protectorate in 1899, who visualised joining Uganda with Kenya, both being under British protection. At intervals from 1905 onwards white settlers urged federation, their aim being a white dominion reaching to the Rhodesias and dominated by Kenya. Opposition came from the Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron. Gradually this expanded as recognition of African interests grew. In 1931 a Joint Select Committee of the House of

Commons found that political union was unacceptable to all the East African racial communities though economic co-ordination should be studied.

A Customs Union had been created in 1927. This was followed in the 1930s by amalgamation of posts and telegraphs and establishment of air service (now East African Airways). There were annual Governors' Conferences. The 1939-45 war, with the Italians to be fought in Ethiopia and Somalia, forced closer interterritorial planning. After the war an East Africa High Commission was set up (1 January 1948). Basically this consisted of the three Governors, assisted by a permanent Secretariat. Through it economic development could be co-ordinated. The railway systems were merged. The Civil Aviation Directorate became in time one of the most, if not the most, efficient in Africa. British Government grants enabled a variety of non-self-contained services to be established—Marine Fishery Research, the Royal East African Navy (now disbanded), the East African Currency Board, etc. The benefits were undeniable; equally undeniable was the mistrust in which the High Commission was held by the African Leaders.

This was only slightly less true of the Central Legislative Assembly, authorised to act on specified interterritorial matters, and providing backing for the High Commission. After fierce European attacks on the principle of equal racial representation first proposed, its constitution was revised in December 1947. It came into existence with a Speaker, seven *ex officio* members from the High Commission staff, three nominated official members (one from each country) and thirteen unofficial members (of these last one Asian and one African per territory). The thirteenth unofficial member was an Arab appointed by the High Commission. This distribution of seats provoked an outburst of protest from Asians and Africans in all three territories, and from Europeans in Uganda. But it lasted until the imminence of Tanganyika's independence forced revision in 1961 and, on the basis of the Raisman Commission's report, the High

Commission was transformed into the present East African Common Service Organisation. (See below and Chapter X.)

By mid-1960 the African leaders could see that progress in their territories would bring in its wake changes in the High Commission and the CLA. The time was ripe to bring the Federal concept out of the cupboard, dust it and hang it out for the African electorate to applaud. As mentioned above Nyerere canvassed it at Addis Ababa in June, quoting the example of British and Italian Somalilands' integration at their independence. On 16 June the Co-ordinating Freedom Council of PAFMECA met in Dar es Salaam and passed a resolution on economic co-operation in East Africa. This mentioned the detrimental effects of co-operation felt by some countries—i.e. that Uganda and Tanganyika suffered loss of potential revenue through Nairobi being the main business centre. It declared that with political separation this was bound to continue and resolved 'that constitutional changes envisaged for all PAFMECA countries be brought into uniformity with one another', also that General Elections be held immediately and arrangements be made for complete independence in all the member countries 'not later than 30 June 1961 A.D.'

This CFC meeting attacked Kaunda's being declared a prohibited immigrant in Kenya while on his way to the CFC, asked for intensification of the South African boycott, reiterated past demands for the freeing of political prisoners and condemned both the American satellite tracking station in Zanzibar and alleged British plans for dispersing H-bombers in East Africa.

Next came the Mbale Conference in Eastern Uganda on 24 October. Though notified a month beforehand Nyerere, Banda, Kaunda and even Obote and Kiwanuka of the host country were absent. The Conference suffered accordingly. The first day was greeted outside by hundreds of banner-waving Buganda secessionists, whilst inside violent disagreement arose on the election of a President for the next year.

This day began with a meeting of the CFC at which

Mboya was elected Chairman and Jeremiah Bakampenja Secretary, with two Zanzibaris, three Ugandans and one delegate from Ruanda Urundi making up the members. Delegates from Central Africa, headed by Chiume of what was now the Malawi Congress Party, objected so strongly to the composition of the new CFC which they had arrived too late to vote on, that the plenary session had to be postponed to the next day. Though shorn of so many leading lights, there were delegates from Kivu Province of the Congo, Ruanda Urundi, and Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as well as the East Africans; observers came from South Africa and Asian groups in Uganda, plus the AAPC Secretary-General, Abdullahi Diallo.

One constructive initiative stood out amongst the wealth of bickering (not least between KANU and KADU). This was Mboya's opening speech. He stressed the need to define even at this stage what future 'positive independence' meant: 'It is not enough to be merely neutral. As we become a force and group in the United Nations and other places then surely we shall begin to take a stand on every issue.' Again and again in the years since then, notably in the negotiations on Federation towards the end of 1963, Mboya has insisted that neutralism should not be a cover for evasive expediency, that a foreign policy must be based on principles thought out and abided by. He has told Makerere College students that there is no such thing as non-alignment. Whether this has made him any more popular is questionable, but it has needed saying.

He then tackled federation—'a word which people are scared to use because, unfortunately, it has been associated with the wrong history, background and psychology'. He urged discussion of an East African Federation (as quoted in Chapter 1). 'I believe this is the time to plan, time to agree upon it.' He was here speaking for the absent Nyerere too, as on 27 August they had met in Dar es Salaam and discussed concrete moves towards a federation that might also include Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. They were

agreed that, in Nyerere's words, 'a Federation would enable all of the States involved to move to independence as a political unit'.³ Formal discussion of this now had to wait until a summit meeting the following January, for which the Mbale Conference called. It also recognised Jomo Kenyatta as the true leader not only of Kenya but of East and Central Africa.

The other resolutions included support for Lumumba's Government and demands for the dissolution of the Central African Federation. The ending of the South African Treason trial, military bases in Africa, 'atrocities inflicted on the indigenous people' of Ruanda Urundi (i.e. the suppression of UNAR's Watutsi supporters), and 'the existence of strong tribalist forces in Uganda as manifested by the Buganda Lukiko's determination to secede' were strongly condemned.

An increasing inclination towards the use of force in Southern Africa emerged. Christopher Mutizwa of the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia declared to roars of applause that if Britain discouraged their demands then revolution would be necessary. An observer from South Africa, Tennyson Makiwane, called for a ban on ships and aircraft from South Africa, thus foreshadowing prohibitions made legal in 1963 by Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. In the closing speech Mboya announced that PAFMECA had decided to 'consider South Africa as part and parcel of this organisation' and 'on attaining independence we shall marshal our forces to move into South Africa'. He also assured Angola and Moçambique of moral and material support.

This expansion of PAFMECA and agreement on a summit Conference were the valuable products of Mbale, to which Nkrumah incidentally sent his greetings. Significantly Diallo delivered a warning against falling a victim to the divide and rule policy that exploited tribalism and racialism.

³ *New York Times*, 28 August 1960.

These emotions were both very evident, albeit that the quarrelling was usually cheerful and good humoured.

Between Mbale and the Summit meeting innumerable speeches by East African politicians re-inforced the federal initiative. Dramatically Nyerere offered at the end of October to delay full independence for Tanganyika until 1962 so that all the East African territories could achieve 'uhuru' together and immediately federate. In November he had been discussing it with Macleod in London. But he was worried about opposition not only within Tanganyika. Odinga had publicly scorned his plan, claiming that federation should come after independence and the initiative for it from the people rather than from London.⁴ KADU felt federation ought to be discussed by the territories' leaders after *uhuru*. Dissension in Uganda was so severe that it was being suggested the others should go it alone and leave her to join later. 'If Kenya and Uganda don't want it', Nyerere commented, 'why should I fool my people?'⁵ In the end the generous offer to delay Tanganyika's independence was dropped, for although Uganda did get hers in 1962, Britain was not prepared to move so fast in Kenya. Meanwhile Nyerere came with his offer to the summit in Nairobi on 12 January.

It had been intended for the CFC to meet in December and prepare a paper on federation, but Mboya thought this unnecessary after Nyerere himself said he would prepare one. Additionally Bakampenja, the Acting Secretary, had no funds in hand to finance a CFC meeting. So decisions were left to the Summit.

The leaders themselves fixed the meeting for January. Indeed Bakampenja first learnt of it through the 23 November issue of the *Tanganyika Standard*. It was only confirmed by telegram two days beforehand, drawing vigorous protests from both the Uganda Democratic Party and KADU, the latter refusing to attend. The Secretariat had been under

⁴ *Daily Nation*, 19 November 1960. Odinga now fully supports federation.

⁵ Interview with author, November 1960.

fire from the UPC too, for failing to settle the Mbale Conference expenses of £608 11s., eventually met by a special fund appeal.

Nonetheless, the summit was a success, the most impressive gathering of East and Central African leaders yet held. Nyerere, Kaunda, Joshua Nkomo (of Southern Rhodesia), Mboya, Dr. Kiano and Odinga, Benedicto Kiwanuka (UDP) and Aziz Hamisi (ASP) all came. Nyerere's treatise entitled 'Freedom and Unity' was discussed. It reiterated Tanganyika's willingness to wait for the others and the risk of neo-colonialism supporting nationalist pride in order to keep the territories apart if they became independent separately. It laid out the dangers of balkanisation. It specifically argued against Kiwanuka's belief that the territories should put their separate houses in order first, 'Federation before independence can help put each house in order.' (Para. 12.) Nyerere's impassioned aim was to convince his colleagues that 'there is a right moment for everything and the right moment for unity is certainly not after the achievement of sovereign independence'. After quoting Shakespeare on 'There is a tide in the affairs of men', it ended, "behold how good and pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity", Psalmist.'

The summit adopted a resolution that 'A federation of Eastern Africa is essential now for the unity and social betterment of the peoples of these countries', and the best time to do it would be when all four countries had popularly elected responsible Governments, but before independence.

Unfortunately it was left to another Summit of Prime Ministers, after the forthcoming elections in Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, to work out details. This meeting did not take place until June 1963, because Kenya's Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, came into head-on collision with KANU over Kenyatta's release and first a KADU and then a Coalition Government intervened, with endless constitutional wrangling delaying full internal self-government.

Nyerere feared that if the leaders were not conditioned

to the idea before the psychological moment of responsible self-government arrived, the prospects of federating might sink into the mud of national pride and interterritorial dispute. But his paper deliberately did not deal with 'the details of ultimately what form of Federation we are going to have' (Para. 7). This was partly because detailed proposals might rouse opposition, partly because he felt the immediate problem was 'how to bring it about' in principle.

The defect was that shelving detailed investigation at a moment when federation was really beginning to grip people's minds meant that it stayed shelved until June 1963, and then when the long-delayed psychological moment for unity did come action had to wait upon a Working Party producing Constitutional proposals—during which delay doubts of exactly the kind Nyerere feared began to obstruct the doing of the federal deed. (See Chapter X.) Whilst it is easy to be wise after the event, a major opportunity was undoubtedly lost by failure to do the planning Mboya himself had urged at Mbale.

The summit also passed a lengthy resolution on the Congo, condemning Belgium, Tshombe and the United Nations, and demanding that all UN troops be African under an African commander. A sad cable came from UNAR—'implore PAFMECA discuss Ruanda Urundi'—but no decision was made on the involved situation. The emphasis lay on strengthening ties with Central Africa in order to help break up that Federation. The Colonial Secretary was asked by cable to release Kenyatta. The meeting ended, as it had begun, with public accusations and counter-accusations between KANU and KADU. KADU claimed KANU was using PAFMECA to strengthen its electoral position. Mboya replied that KADU's refusal to attend had been 'childish'.⁶

The KANU-KADU quarrel, and divisions within KANU (between Odinga and Mboya) were also topics at the next

⁶ *Daily Nation*, 14 January 1961.

AAPC meeting at Cairo in March 1961. Here two old-established Kenya leaders in exile reappeared on the scene, Joseph Murumbi and Peter Mbiu Koinange, since 1959 Secretary of the African Affairs Bureau in Accra. Koinange had also been at the 1960 Lancaster House conference. His name had for some months been bruited about as future PAFMECA Secretary General, and he now chaired a special Kenya meeting to explore KANU-KADU differences. The main issue was Kenyatta's release. Gichuru and Mboya had been obliged in the AAPC sessions to defend themselves against charges of not wanting the absent leader back in active politics, although they played a recorded message from him to the assembly. Koinange achieved agreement on the subject between the two parties, but it was contradicted when they returned to Nairobi. No one however now disputed that the future of East Africa was tied up with Kenyatta. His prestige was too great.

More constructively the AAPC heard Gichuru put the case for East African federation and mention the possibility of Nyasaland and Ruanda Urundi joining the East African Common Market, though attempts by the AAPC to mediate between two future PAFMECA members, Somalia and Ethiopia, failed.

During 1960 and early 1961 the momentum of East African progress had increased vastly. So had PAFMECA's international prestige. President Kennedy, answering a cable from Mboya in March 1961, said 'I want you and your fellow-members of PAFMECA to know that I share your concern at the deplorable situation in the Congo.' To its credit PAFMECA was keeping the East African leaders on a common path and so arousing interest elsewhere, especially in Somalia and Ethiopia. On the debit side not only was non-racialism more and more being limited to admitting observers, the non-violent credo was also being forgotten. PAFMECA's organisation, too, was still haphazard and urgently needed day-to-day guidance.

VI. THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

THE announcement in March 1961 that Tanganyika would become independent in December that year, albeit a blow to Nyerere's ideal of federation before independence, gave PAFMECA a considerable fillip. Dar es Salaam became an open city for liberation movements and 'freedom fighters', who operated in association with PAFMECA. Mbiu Koinange (he dropped the Peter in 1963) was able to leave Accra and take up the Secretary Generalship, despite his still being a 'special person' liable to detention if he entered Kenya.

Koinange was born in 1907 in Kiambu, a son of Senior Chief Koinange, head of a renowned Kikuyu family. From 1927 to 1936 he studied at American Universities, followed by two years in Britain, a time divided between St. John's College, Cambridge, and the London University Institute of Education. In 1938 he returned to Kenya, found to his intense dismay that for all his education he could hardly be accepted by the dominant white society, and became Principal of the Kenya Teachers' Training College, Githunguri, which Jomo Kenyatta later took over from him. Like Kenyatta he would certainly have been arrested at the start of the Emergency, had he not left for England in 1951. From then until 1959 he was the Kenya African Union representative in Europe and incidentally a TGWU shop steward in London. In 1959 he went to Nkrumah's African Affairs Bureau and took up his post with PAFMECA in June 1961, a time when an organiser was urgently needed as Bakampenja had left in April to take over as Administrative Secretary of the AAPC in Accra and the job was being filled on an honorary acting basis by TANU's Administrative Secretary, T. A. Kibhogya Msonge, a man with enough on his plate already.

At the time of Koinange's arrival a number of refugee

political offices were established in Dar es Salaam. They were scattered around the town and even though dependent in varying degrees upon Oscar Kambona, TANU's Secretary-General, for both official recognition and money, tended to get out of hand. Only one, the Moçambique African National Union (MANU) was an accredited PAFMECA member. But MANU was an artificial party founded in February 1961 in Mombasa by a Kenyan politician (Chokwe) and fifty Moçambique-born delegates from Tanganyika, Kenya and Pemba. In the course of trying to amalgamate them with a more genuine group of Moçambicans, the Tanganyikans got their fingers burnt. The rival organisation, Ghanaian financed, was called UDENAMO (Democratic Union) and led by an irresponsible militant called Adelino Gwambe. Within a few weeks of applying for Tanganyikan registration on 23 April 1961, Gwambe suddenly declared to the Press that he was going to lead a military expedition against Moçambique, armed by Ghana, from Tanganyikan soil. Whilst Nyerere was getting ready to declare the Portuguese Consul *persona non grata*, this was too much. Gwambe was deported. He eventually returned via Cairo to Ghana.

Kambona suspected the Portuguese of engineering the whole thing to discredit Tanganyika. Others believed Gwambe's claim that the Ghanaians were behind him all along the line.¹ Whatever the truth the incident made it clear that even if TANU had to go on supporting them financially, refugee organisations should be brought together and kept under Koinange's parental eye. A building was found. By the autumn of 1961, PAFMECA was established there and so were MANU, the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), a branch of Kaunda's UNIP, and the South African United Front (which subsequently broke up again into its constituent parties, PAC, ANC, etc.).

The liberation movements liked Dar es Salaam both

¹ Conversations with the author, 18-20 July 1961.

because of its proximity to their homelands and because Nyerere did not exploit them for his own advantage in Pan-African circles. The city had already been greatly boosted by Nyerere's intervention in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in March 1961, at the instance of the South African United Front. Though not attending the Conference his private communications to the assembling Prime Ministers, plus a vigorous article in the *London Observer* threatening that Tanganyika would not join the Commonwealth if South Africa remained in it, helped considerably in keeping South Africa out after she became a republic.

A secondary effect of TANU's support for the liberation movements was that it became difficult to say where its support ended and PAFMECA's began, especially since it also kept PAFMECA from bankruptcy. 'So far', wrote Koinange, four months after his arrival, 'PAFMECA's existence is due to the generous help received from TANU through our leader Julius Nyerere. Members have not paid their annual agreed contribution amounting to £250. Since we took up our new office, we have not been able to pay the rent, stationery, etc. We have in our Bank ten pounds and outstanding commitments not yet met.'²

Depressing as this was, Koinange still tried to strengthen PAFMECA. He saw it having an economic as well as a political meaning, particularly after the June Conference in London agreed to transform the East African High Commission into a Common Services Organisation that would be controlled by the African leaders themselves. He saw the 60 million Africans in the PAFMECA area organised as one 'economic market'; an African news agency replacing the foreign owned press of East Africa; a new educational system not based on tribal or provincial outlooks; a Central National Bank developing African resources. The Common Services Organisation should be brought 'within the

² Letter from Koinange to PAFMECA members, 14 October 1961,

framework of PAFMECA—in action'. Koinange estimated that a minimum of £10,000 a year was needed to enlarge PAFMECA's activities suitably.

This was a far cry from the £10 actually in the Bank and most of Koinange's spirited hopes went unrealised. The organisation never even produced a regular news-sheet about itself, though the issue of Press releases was stepped up. Significantly one of these (29 September) justified the pursuit of East African Federation. 'PAFMECA decided to put their house in order first as a prelude to African unity.' The first stirrings of criticism on the grounds of 'balkanisation' by other Pan-African circles were being felt. Curiously and certainly unintentionally, Koinange used the very phrase Nyerere had argued against in his 'Freedom and Unity' when the Uganda Democratic Party invoked it.

On 25 September KADU had produced their first plan for regionalism in Kenya, often referred to as 'Majimbo'. It is perhaps worth explaining that though bearing superficial resemblances to a scaled-down version of East African Federation the core of *Majimbo* lay in keeping power away from the centre, whilst Nyerere, Mboya and their political allies wanted the reverse—namely a strong Central Government.³

That Nyerere's hope of achieving federation at Independence was dead became evident at the East African summit in October. It was the first Kenyatta attended. He had been released from restriction in August and was now the nearest thing to a Delphic oracle East Africa possessed. Leaders came from far and wide to see him. To question his pre-eminence in Kenya was political suicide. It was in Dr. Hastings Banda's words a 'momentous occasion' when at the weekend of 14-15 October he conferred in Dar es Salaam with Banda himself, Kaunda, Nkomo, Nyerere and Karume. Mboya, as PAFMECA Chairman, was also present.

³ Whether *Majimbo* will achieve Pan-African respectability under another name as the initial basis for a future United States of Africa remains to be seen.

Yet the outcome of this the most important gathering of East and Central leaders so far held was small. In an agreed statement they reasserted 'our belief that our strength, and the strength of the whole of Africa, lies in unity'. No mention was made of federation, though at a mass rally Nyerere, sharing the platform with Kenyatta, declared 'I want to see first East Africa united and then the whole of Africa as one.'⁴ The other points in the agreed statement included delight at a date being fixed for Uganda's independence, determination to do the same for Kenya, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia (now known in advance as Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia, and shock at the assassination of Burundi's Prime Minister, Prince Rwagasore.

The Uganda Government was then in the hands of Kiwanuka's Democratic Party with Obote as Leader of the Opposition. Kiwanuka could not come to the Summit because Uganda's last Constitutional Conference was still sitting in London. This absence was one reason why no declaration was made on federation. A second was that the Central African leaders were so concerned with getting out of one federation that, despite earlier enthusiasm, they were slightly unwilling to commit themselves to another. A third reason was probably that the underlying motive of the Summit was to bring Jomo Kenyatta back into the circle of Pan-African leadership after his long absence. At this point it would have been tactless to delve into federal relationships, especially because, although the PAFMECA Mbale Conference had officially accepted Kenyatta as the leader of East and Central Africa a year before, it had done so in a Kenya-dominated session from which Nyerere, Kaunda, Banda and Nkomo were all absent.

The Summit, with which was combined a CFC meeting, drained away enthusiasm for staging a 1961 Annual Conference. Earlier Kaunda had invited PAFMECA to hold it in Lusaka. When the Northern Rhodesian Government

⁴ *East African Standard*, 16 October 1961.

warned that they would forbid the entry of the other leaders, Koinange tried to organise a Conference in Zanzibar instead. But this came to nothing.

Nevertheless the last months of 1961 saw the seeds sown for a dramatic expansion of PAFMECA. On 15 October, the President of the Somali Republic stopped in Nairobi on his way to Accra and, stimulated no doubt by the Summit in Dar es Salaam, announced that he would welcome an invitation to take part in talks on federation. He also referred to the secessionist movement among Somali inhabitants of Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD), now gaining strength and attracting much local attention, saying, 'There is no question of aggressive policy being sponsored by our country,' but adding the ominous rider, 'We are anxious to see that our brethren in the Northern Province and elsewhere are given the right to choose for themselves.'

Ethiopia instituted a more positive diplomatic initiative. The Emperor invited Kenyatta to visit Addis Ababa. Haile Selassie had long assisted KANU and was naturally anxious that the future Kenya Government should be in agreement with him over Somali claims to the NFD, since he had enough trouble already to his east from intermittent fighting in the Ogaden, a state of affairs that might have been open to settlement had the conciliatory tactics he adopted after the abortive revolution in Addis Ababa in December 1960 lasted longer. As it was he wanted East African support. By the end of 1961 he had asked for membership of PAFMECA. By mid December the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and Koinange were deep in correspondence over the holding of the fourth PAFMECA Annual Conference in Addis Ababa from 2 to 10 February 1962, to which Nyerere and Mboya had previously agreed.

The organisation was on the threshold of considerable expansion and a year of previously unparalleled influence. It was also about to encounter public Ghanaian disapproval for the first time.

VII. ADDIS ABABA AND A NEW CONSTITUTION

HAILE SELASSIE's transformation of Ethiopia's position in African politics has in many ways been a far greater achievement than any decolonisation to date, with the sole exception of Algeria. Whereas the African nationalists were demanding recognition from colonial powers already on the run, he had to manoeuvre it out of those Africans just when they were becoming increasingly aggressive.

In 1958 the Mwanza Conference of PAFMECA attacked him without naming him by asking the first AAPC to discuss 'the democratisation of all Independent African States'. Less than four years later it was holding its Annual Conference in his capital. Yet between 1958 and 1962 the feudal character of the Ethiopian régime had barely changed, though the face of Addis Ababa had been modernised. Trade Unions were officially illegal until 1963. The Imperial Army was often in action against Ogaden Somalis. Eritrea was finally absorbed into the Ethiopian Empire, the United Nations obligingly forgetting about its former ward. The East African correspondent of the *Guardian*, writing in another journal, commented on the February 1962 PAFMECA meeting, 'One of the most curious of African paradoxes is a Pan African Conference in Addis Ababa. The "freedom fighters" graciously thank his Imperial Majesty for welcoming them to the Imperial capital; they then switch over to their best nationalistic oratory to condemn the "bloodsucking parasitic imperialists".'¹

Any study of the nobility in Ethiopia reveals that in fact Haile Selassie has pursued as progressive a policy as his fellow nobles will stand. At the start of his reign he was approximately in the same position as a fourteenth-century

¹ Clyde Sanger writing in *The World Overseas*, 10 February 1962.

English king who sensed the advent of the Renaissance across the water on the Continent.

He has brought Ethiopia forward as fast as anything short of a 1789 revolution could. That he himself has survived so many attempted *coups d'état* is another measure of his superbly acute political ability. It is no cynicism to say that Haile Selassie at 72 is the most experienced and astute politician on the African Continent. He is also a great statesman. By the end of the 1950s he knew the necessity of Ethiopia moving into the forefront of Pan-African activity, both for his internal and external policies. He could offer a meeting place, independent not only of colonialist influence, but also of Pan-African traditional dogmas. PAFMECA was not by any means the first international conference held in Addis Ababa. The first Conference of Independent African States in 1960, various United Nations Conferences, the establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa's headquarters, all these preceded it. But it was nonetheless most significant, for it gave Ethiopia membership of a well-recognised, active, close-knit group of countries and a positive identification with the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

Furthermore PAFMECA provided a forum in which both the Emperor and his Foreign Minister were able to press their wider idea of an Organisation of African States, which Ethiopia had raised at the sixteenth U.N. General Assembly and which the Lagos Conference of Independent African States had recently accepted. A year later, in May 1963, Haile Selassie called together 32 Heads of States and, almost single-handed, brought the Organisation of African Unity into being, making the older African groupings obsolete, including PAFMECA itself.

Technically the PAFMECA Constitution only allowed membership to 'nationalist, labour and co-operative organisations'. When Tanganyika became independent on 9 December 1961 the omission of the word 'Governments'

became manifestly absurd. There was no practical obstacle to admitting Somalia and Ethiopia.

Organisationally the Conference far exceeded anything PAFMECA had previously known. This was, after all, their first meeting in an independent country. The vast and splendid Africa Hall, a deliberately tempting bait to Conference promoters, was finished and ready to receive them. When Getachew Mekasha in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote 'Please be assured, Mr. Koinange, of our sincere help when needed for the sacred aim of African Freedom and Unity,'² he meant that the delegates were going to get a welcome that was not merely royal, but also detailed and efficient. Hotels, air transport and a magnificent banquet were all provided.

Just as it was more luxurious, so was it larger than any earlier PAFMECA meeting. There were sixty delegates, if one includes ten Ethiopians, and fifteen observers. This reflected expansion in two directions, both important achievements of the Conference, at which Kaunda was elected Chairman for the coming year.

Firstly Ethiopia and Somalia as well as becoming members of PAFMECA committed themselves to federating with East Africa. The Emperor made it clear that 'the problem of establishing such a federation would not be very difficult, even though Ethiopia is a constitutional monarchy'. When the Conference came to passing resolutions it pledged itself 'to work relentlessly for a Federation of Eastern Africa, i.e. Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, to be established immediately the now colonial territories . . . attain their independence'. It affirmed that the door would be kept open for the Central African countries to join this federation. The Sudan was also mentioned, though not formally a PAFMECA member. (Although Burundi was represented by its governing party, and during 1961 the possible union of Ruanda Urundi with Tanganyika had

² Letter of 22 December 1961.

often been mentioned, it was left out now.) EACSO was called on to start discussions about its own and the East African Common Market's extension to Ethiopia and Somalia.

Secondly PAFMECA extended southwards by extending membership to nationalist organisations in Southern Africa. As well as MANU, UNIP and the Malawi Congress Party, which had joined in 1961, ZAPU (successor to Nkomo's banned NDP in S. Rhodesia), the Basutoland African Congress, the Bechuanaland Peoples Union, the African National Congress (of South Africa), the Pan-Africanist Congress (also S.A.), the South West African National Union and its rival SWAPO were all allowed in. Because of this PAFMECA's name was officially changed to PAFMECSA—the S standing for Southern. An important point was that though the Constitution was changed at this meeting, and independent States were henceforward only to be represented by their Governments (a wise ruling in view of the unrepresentative 'representatives' who appeared at AAPC and AAPSO assemblies), the parity between members was retained. Everyone had an equal say. This gave the Liberation movements a confidence in PAFMECSA which they have not yet bestowed upon the OAU's Liberation Committee (see below, Chapter IX).

The Liberation Movements, in addition to swelling PAFMECSA, changed its policy fundamentally. The use of violence was a recurrent theme. Nelson Mandela, the burly, bearded 'black pimperl' of South Africa made an unexpected appearance and, to great applause, spoke of sabotage, of people turning their faces from the paths of peace and non-violence. But his mood was one of regret that this should be necessary—a mood not shared by other delegates who had been in far less physical danger than Mandela himself. J. D. Msonthi (Malawi Congress) in a highly emotional speech said, 'Force is bound to be used because it is the only language that imperialists can hear.' No country ever became free without some sort of violence.'

Kaunda was, reportedly, the only delegate who did not applaud this.³ However, his summing up on being elected Chairman ended, 'Brothers and sisters it is time to act—go back and act now!'

The delegates readily agreed to changing the aims and objects in the Constitution (text at Appendix C). The original fifth aim of championing non-violence, to which little more than lip service was being paid anyhow, was dropped. Fostering the spirit of Pan-Africanism became a separate one. A sixth aim was added—'To promote the union of independent African States of the PAFMECSA area as a step towards the greater union of African States.' The other original aims laid down at Mwanza needed only the addition of Southern Africa to their wording to fit the new mood perfectly.

The change in attitude led to a more practical way of going about liberation. The Freedom Fund was properly established, the annual subscription being raised to £50 per organisation and £1,000 per Government. Henceforward aid given would be divided into two kinds—practical day-to-day assistance to nationalists; and special aid for fighting elections. So that its effectiveness should not be spoilt by over-dispersal PAFMECSA would allot one country top priority each year. At the urging of Odinga and others it would be Northern Rhodesia for 1962. Robert Mugabe of ZAPU, speaking on behalf of Nkomo, voiced a widely held feeling when he asked that PAFMECSA should 'work now for the establishment of an enlarged Secretariat which incorporates representatives of territories still under colonial rule'.

While this was all to the good, animosity between Arabs and Africans came to the surface in the ASP delegates' speech on Zanzibar. The joint ASP-ZNP Freedom Committee had broken up in mid-1960 through the ASP fearing it would harm their electoral prospects. Since the January

³ *Guardian*, 9 February. All quotations are from the Conference Report published by the Ethiopian Foreign Office for PAFMECA.

1961 elections, in which they won a majority, the islands' peace had been shattered by severe racial riots. The ASP now denounced subsequent British security measures as designed to cripple them and bolster the ZNP. Tanganyikans and Kenyans supported them. Babu (ZNP) refrained from counter accusations and concentrated on what might be done to help Kaunda and Nkomo. But outside the Conference room he and the UAR observer, Dr. F. Galal, had to be active in fighting anti-Arab sentiment.

Equally no rapprochement was achieved between Ethiopia and Somalia over Somali claims to the Somali-populated Ogaden grazing areas. During the Conference the Emperor pointedly arranged visits to his jet fighter squadrons and his military academy. The chief Somali delegate, less impressed by this than under pressure from other delegates not to bring discord into a promising Conference, contented himself with urging the settlement of inter-African disputes 'within the context of African solidarity and unity'. When another delegate raised the question of French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Conference gave him little encouragement despite the relevance of this to the main subject of liquidating colonialism.

This indeed was the time when PAFMECSA should have tackled the Ogaden and NFD quarrels. The latter was obviously going to come to a head as Kenya's independence drew nearer. But, though Kenya leaders later visited Mogadishu, PAFMECSA as an organisation took no positive action. Occasional references during 1963 to solving the quarrel in the PAFMECSA spirit have been little more than sops to an ideal undermined on both sides of intransigence and national pride, precisely the evils that PAFMECSA was originally pledged to overcome.

Latent hostility between PAFMECSA and the AAPC also revealed itself at this Conference. Odinga, leading the Kenya delegation, wanted PAFMECSA 'revitalized within the framework of the AAPC' and made it clear that the AAPC should become 'a permanent and effective

consultative Council of Africa'. He pointedly thanked Ghana for enabling him to get to Addis Ababa at all. It was now for the first time that Ghanaian suspicion of PAFMECSA came into the open.

John Tettegah, there as leader of Ghana's observers, joined with Abdullahi Diallo in discussions over the AAPC-PAFMECSA relationship. Since he had no official position in either organisation this was, in Mboya's words, 'the kind of thing people resented'.¹ Tettegah also gave a Press Conference restating Ghana's policy on African unity. 'It is our President's view that local associations, regional commonwealths and territorial groupings will be just another form of balkanisation, unless they are conceived within the framework of a larger union. . . .'

Kaunda stated that PAFMECSA was so conceived and the Ghanaians left Addis Ababa outwardly happy. But in fact the relationship with the AAPC was not really clear. PAFMECSA had grown far beyond the size suggested at the 1958 AAPC conference and had become disconcertingly influential. It had even recommended that the AAPC's own Steering Committee should be replaced by a Consultative Council because of 'the need to strengthen and broaden the administrative structure of the AAPC'. There was discontent on both sides.

No one could deny the increased strength of the changed PAFMECSA, though the CFC would now only meet twice a year or never had met the full four times anyway. The Liberation movements would now get firmer direction. The need for improved African education in the PAFMECSA region was recognized and both a Scholarships Committee and an education fund were set up. The resolutions on Southern Africa made specific demands, many of which were to be realised before the end of the next year—the closure of ports and airfields in Africa to South African

¹ Conversation with the author, 16 November 1963. Tettegah did of course hold office in AATUF which however few East Africans supported and which had no official link with PAFMECSA.

craft, the cessation of arms supplies by Britain and America. Investors in South Africa were 'warned'. Much was said about 'the unholy alliance' of Verwoerd, Welensky and Salazar—a phrase actually coined for African use by whites in London. 'Onslaught', 'bloodshed' and 'fighting' were on every delegate's lips. So was the urgent need for ever greater African unity.

Whilst there were European and Asian observers (World Peace Brigade, American Congress of Racial Equality, Indian Government) the tenor of the speeches was overwhelmingly anti-white, and sometimes anti-Arab. Koinange in the foreword to the Conference report referred to 'four million European aliens' in the PAFMECSA area. Benedicto Kiwanuka (Uganda) said 'the white man has got to yield or quit . . . there is plenty of land in Australia'. Only Tanganyika, Somalia and Ethiopia reminded delegates that the fundamental rights of man should not be affected by colour and that there was need for harmony among all the peoples of Africa. The large Asian communities in the PAFMECSA area went virtually unmentioned and when the resolutions and the new Constitution were drawn up there was no reference to the equality of all races.

VIII. 1962 SPECIAL CONFERENCES: MBEYA AND LEOPOLDVILLE

THE resolve to support Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP, made at Addis Ababa, was implemented with remarkable speed. Indeed when Koinange arrived back in Dar es Salaam he found Africa Freedom Action already established there for this very purpose. Its working Committee was composed of representatives of TANU, UNIP, the World Peace Brigade and PAFMECSA.

Volunteers for a protest march from Tanganyika into Northern Rhodesia, or Zambia as PAFMECSA now called it, were standing by in Dar es Salaam under the leadership of the Reverend Michael Scott, assisted by others, all of the World Peace Brigade. They came from the USA, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Norway and India. Koinange wrote a hurried letter on 7 March to PAFMECSA members saying 'Although this support from overseas is very encouraging, it is up to us, particularly those in PAFMECSA, to be the first to respond to the call from our brothers in Zambia.' He wanted three representatives, including one prominent personality, to stand by for positive action which might involve civil disobedience. The risks they should be prepared for included being shot at, beaten, arrested and imprisoned, with or without trial. He also asked for funds, demonstrations and publicity. But, and Koinange underlined this, 'Remember that for this campaign the working Committee has agreed upon the method of non-violence and all activities and writing must be consistent with this discipline.'

This same day the Northern Rhodesian Government banned any march in the Abercorn and Isoka areas (i.e. along the Tanganyika frontier). Contrary to Press reports the march was not called off. Africa Freedom Action immediately re-affirmed that it would continue unless

various conditions were fulfilled. These were release of all political prisoners in N. Rhodesia, cessation of mass arrests, lifting of any bans on UNIP activities, elections before October, appointment of an independent commission on delimitation of constituencies, no Federal review until majority government achieved in N. Rhodesia and lastly no barriers to any candidate standing on the national roll.

This support was of considerable assistance to Kaunda, whose position at home was precarious as a result of the protracted negotiations on a new Northern Rhodesian Constitution. His supporters in UNIP were increasingly demanding violent action. But the non-violence which he insisted upon in the march was vital if UNIP was not to be proscribed, even though this eventuality had been prepared for by setting up an alternative party HQ in Dar es Salaam.

PAFMECSA thus helped him by rallying Pan-African support, by putting pressure on Great Britain and, not least, by the personal prestige that the office of Chairman bestowed upon him. The error PAFMECSA made was in discounting his rival, the African National Congress led by Harry Nkumbula. Conciliation between Nkumbula and Kaunda had been tried, but Nkumbula was now co-operating with the Federal Government. For two months the protest march hung fire. In April it became known that Mr. Butler, the British Minister for Central African Affairs, would visit the Federation in May. PAFMECSA accordingly arranged a meeting of the Co-ordinating Freedom Council, coupled with a mass rally, to coincide with his visit. It was to be at Mbeya, a small highland town in Tanganyika very close to the Rhodesian border.

Mr. Butler's visit was from 10 to 26 May. The Mbeya meeting started a day late, on 13 May. Rashidi Kawawa, Tanganyika's Prime Minister at this time, opened the rally in pouring rain. He told a crowd of some five thousand people, 'The Tanganyika Government cannot accept the things which are happening in Northern Rhodesia now.' He also urged that 'The people of Northern Rhodesia must

unite, and unite strongly, even if it means death, and we, the people and Government of Tanganyika, will die with them. Welensky should know this.'

It was indeed very much a Tanganyikan meeting. Of PAFMECSA's top leadership, only Kaunda, Nyerere (who had stepped down from the Prime Ministership in order to revitalise TANU) and Koinange were present. Obote, Mboya, Kenyatta and Dr. Banda were absent though Aleki Banda came. Kenya was represented by Mwai Kibaki. Various of the Liberation Movement's exile leaders were there, including Makiwane of the South African ANC.

It was also badly organised. There was no rigid timetable. Despite the major aim of getting publicity the Press were treated with a lack of consideration that resulted in critical, and sometimes openly antagonistic, reports. On the second day the CFC held a five-hour meeting, the most important conclusion of which was that the newly created Freedom Fund should be devoted to helping Kaunda now that he had decided to fight the elections which Butler set for October. It was established as a PAFMECSA principle that any colonially ruled PAFMECSA country could come forward and get aid from independent members whether for non-violent or violent programmes.

Despite Butler's amelioration of the situation, which included recognising Dr. Banda's mandate to secede from the Federation, and which resulted in the WPB Protest March being abandoned eventually, the CFC passed resolutions condemning Britain for introducing 'racialistic and undemocratic Constitutions in Northern and Southern Rhodesia'. Kaunda had made it clear on 10 May that although he appreciated Britain had great difficulties in the Central African Federation he had no sympathy towards her.¹ The Tanganyika delegates offered military aid against Welensky if necessary.

As a result of this KADU, who had not been invited to

¹ *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, 11 May.

Mbeya, attacked the meeting bitterly. 'If PAFMECSA is adopting a policy of terrorism', declared Martin Shikuku on 15 May in Nairobi, 'it will not achieve independence in any territory of Africa.' Ironically this was not far removed from Kaunda's own views on actual violence.

The CFC also considered, and rejected, an application by the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union for PAFMECSA membership. This was a Southern Sudanese organisation in exile opposing the suppression of the African leaders in the South by the Arab-orientated Sudanese Government. What to do about these unquestionably persecuted brother Africans has remained a nagging problem, especially to Uganda's leaders. On the whole preference has been given to keeping on good terms with General Abboud's Government, but the suggestion raised just before the Addis Ababa Conference that the Sudan should join PAFMECSA was never ratified.

The second most important outcome of Mbeya was that Koinange was instructed to go to Zanzibar and report back on ways by which harmony could be achieved there. In June 1961 riots had greeted a second election designed to end the deadlock of the January one when the ASP won ten seats, the ZNP nine and the ZPPP three. In March 1962 the Colonial Secretary (Maudling) had stopped further Constitutional progress after the ASP refused to join a Coalition Government. In mid-June Babu was jailed for 15 months for publishing seditious statements in the ZNP's *Zanews*, a Communist Chinese-backed news-sheet. All the time the British Resident, Sir George Mooring, made strenuous efforts at conciliation. On 5 July Thabit Kombo announced agreement on a ZNP-ASP Coalition, limited to five months' duration, after which there should be elections.

This failed to work. In July Koinange arrived. His visit was unsatisfactory on two scores. First many leaders were away testifying to the UN Committee on Colonialism (which gave them until September to compose their differences). Secondly Koinange made a series of pro-ASP

speeches. On their return from New York the ZNP leaders objected strongly and he came back to the island in August, divided his time scrupulously between the two parties, and achieved agreement. Both parties would co-operate with the Electoral Boundaries Commission. Both would help reduce tension. The ASP would collaborate with the joint ZNP-ZPPP Government in power. Agreement was not reached on a date for elections, the ZNP offering July 1963, the ASP demanding January, but it was hoped for later.

Most unfortunately a diligent reporter of the Nairobi *Sunday Nation* found out these details. They were published on 26 August before the leaders had talked their followers into accepting them. By mid-September the accord was broken and the situation exacerbated by the UN Committee adopting a Tanganyika-sponsored resolution demanding immediate elections and *uhuru*. It is, however, doubtful whether the agreement would have lasted anyway in view of the militant Tanganyikan interference on behalf of the ASP, which had long been undermining PAFMECSA's authority as an arbitrator. In Sheikh Ali Muhsin's view it had lost its ability to get all sides together because 'it has ceased to be a peoples' organisation, it has become one of Governments'². It certainly became subject to majority party policies, which were against the Arabs. It also had a regrettable tendency to stick to certain *protégés*, thus in 1962 disregarding KADU because though KADU had formed Kenya's Government, Mboya, Nyerere and others considered it a stooge Government. This was the path of power politics, not of unity.

Its snags at the pre-independence stage became uncomfortably clear after the October elections in Northern Rhodesia. Most valuable support had been given Kaunda in the shape of vehicles, money, and propaganda, both from PAFMECSA and from its individual members. Tanganyika Radio broadcast on his behalf, turning down Nkumbula's

² Conversation with this author, 27 July 1963.

request for similar facilities. His election manifestos were printed in Tanganyika. But in the election, despite winning 59,648 out of 76,313 Lower Roll votes UNIP came out with only 14 seats. The United Federal Party had 16. And Nkumbula's ANC won 7, more than was expected. A coalition with the ANC became essential if a Government was to be formed and the UFP, backed by Sir Roy Welensky, kept out of power.

Harry Nkumbula had, however, been being helped by Tshombe and Radio Katanga. When PAFMECSA decided it would have to mediate between him and Kaunda, and despatched Koinange and Munanka to Lusaka on the very day the election results were out, he demanded that either Tshombe's Government, or the CONAKAT party, should be admitted to the organisation. The secessionist Katanga régime was at this time increasingly feeling world pressure against it and Tshombe not only wanted to see Northern Rhodesia in friendly hands, he wanted Pan-African recognition. Koinange and Munanka knew well that Kaunda was hostile to Tshombe. However, they did try to send an emissary to Elisabethville, but without success. (Radio Katanga, as part of a campaign to make it seem that PAFMECSA was accepting Tshombe, announced that a Somali delegate had arrived. This was untrue.) In any case, as Kaunda later made clear in direct communication with Tshombe, Katanga would not be admitted to PAFMECSA membership.

After four days' discussion Koinange and Munanka persuaded Nkumbula to try out an alliance with Kaunda and to come to Dar es Salaam. After talks there and with Kenyatta in Nairobi he agreed to go to London and present a joint case with Kaunda for Northern Rhodesia's right to secede from the Federation.

Meanwhile the Congolese Central Government was becoming increasingly concerned lest this agreement between UNIP and the ANC were purchased at the price of

support for Katanga, a fear given currency by Tshombe's claims that PAFMECSA was admitting him. In fact this would have directly contravened the Organisation's new Constitution, as the Congo was already a Governmental Member, having taken on the mantle of CEREA and the MNC-Lumumba a few months previously. Nonetheless Cyrille Adoula, the Congo Prime Minister, was worried. With Kaunda's encouragement, Koinange met Justin Bomboko, the Congolese Foreign Minister, when the latter was returning home from the United Nations, and a special Conference was arranged to take place in Leopoldville at the end of December, which would show the world that PAFMECSA backed the Central Government and not Katanga.

The Conference was opened on 28 December by Cyrille Adoula. He raised the question of Katanga's secession, which was taken farther by Justin Bomboko, who pointed out that the claims of both the CONAKAT Party and the Katanga Government to PAFMECSA membership were inadmissible. A commission was set up to study the Katanga situation. Bomboko also emphasised the economic and social problems facing young African States and the hope that PAFMECSA's unique position would enable it to become 'un élément catalyser pour l'ensemble d'Afrique'.

Anti-colonialism, however, was the main theme and three more commissions were set up on the Portuguese colonies, East and Central Africa, and South Africa respectively.

It was a large Conference with delegates from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Moçambique. It was the first time both Rwanda and Burundi had sent Government members. The Rev. N. Sithole was described as 'Prime Minister of the Southern Rhodesian Government in exile'. (Joshua Nkomo was in jail.) The five Kenya delegates were all KANU headed by Jomo Kenyatta, despite KADU being the party in power,

the reason given being that the proximity of independence justified a single delegation.³

Immediate good news came from a Moçambican, Uria Simango, who told how MANU, UDENAMO and others had just united in the Frente da Libertacao de Moçambique (FRELIMO) of which he was Vice President and Dr. Mondlane President. He thanked PAFMECSA and TANU for helping to bring this about. The Conference at once set about doing the same for Angola, represented by no less than five parties. Two were rejected straight away and in the end PAFMECSA decided to back Roberto Holden's MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), because he accepted their proposals for unity. He was also the organiser of the Angolan rebellion. The decision did not bring Dr. Agostino Neto's UPA, until then Congolese-assisted, into line. For one thing Neto had other sources of income. However, both supported PAFMECSA's resolutions that Angola and Moçambique were colonies and not part of metropolitan Portugal, that they should have immediate independence and that United Nations members should apply economic sanctions against Portugal.

The Commission on Katanga got in touch with the UN's Congo HQ and Kenyatta, Mboya, Kaunda, Obote, Kawawa and Kakonge prepared to fly to Elisabethville and demand the end of Katanga's secession. This interesting initiative came to nothing through the UN military action against Tshombe starting before they could get there. So PAFMECSA had to be content with a lengthy resolution urging the UN to make its action decisive, appreciating the recent shift in American policy on the Congo, warning Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal to cease their 'disruptive tactics' and finally condemning 'that petty self-seeking tribalist Tshombe and his clique together with his

³ KADU had been persuaded to accept office by Kenya's Governor and their minority turned into a majority by the appointment of a balance of official members, and the support both of Michael Blundell's New Kenya Party and the Kenya Indian Congress.

white supremacist collaborator Roy Welensky'. Cables were sent to the UN Secretary General, President Kennedy, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Bunche condemning pressure to stop the military action before secession was ended.

The third commission on East and Central Africa demanded Nkomo's release and urged Britain not to transfer power to the newly elected white Southern Rhodesian Government. Southern Rhodesia was laid down as the next target for PAFMECSA activity. Public meetings were to be organised against Winston Field, the Prime Minister, and cables sent to the British Government asking Britain to reconsider her policy. Resolutions on Kenya demanded elections, independence and the 'liquidation of the British military bases'.

The resolutions on South Africa were concerned with the adoption of UN recommendations on South West Africa, with intensification of the boycott to cover arms supplies and the movement of labourers from neighbouring territories to work in the South African mines. PAFMECSA countries would now regard as enemies any States that either supplied arms or, and this was a most significant addition, maintained normal diplomatic and commercial relations with South Africa.

The Conference ended on 31 December. Its chief achievements had been showing the Congolese people that so many African leaders supported Adoula and that compromise with Tshombe was out of the question, as well as giving unqualified support to the UN, whose Congo policies had in the past been under attack so often. It gave West Africans and East Africans a chance to meet and understand each other. The smooth running of the Conference was also a diplomatic success for Leopoldville.

Thus an extremely active year ended, one in which the policy of concentrating activity on one target at a time had provided gratifying results for both Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. The failure in Zanzibar seemed small by comparison. Southern Rhodesia had been chosen as the 1963

target. The CFC had met twice as now prescribed (in Dar es Salaam and Leopoldville). The Freedom Fund had been extended to cover refugees as well as Freedom Fighters.

Finally it was clear that despite PAFMECA's expansion it was still the East African leaders, plus Kaunda, who made the running in the organisation, as the composition of the planned mission to Tshombe showed TANU, KANU, and the UPC were the parties which by mid-1963 were all in control of their countries, and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, especially if Kenya followed Tanganyika's example of a projected One Party State. Not that there was an alternative group offering leadership within PAFMECSA. But this triumvirate had made it absolutely clear during 1962 that they regarded KADU almost in the same light as Tshombe. Nor, and with no discernible reason save that very 'black chauvinism' which the first PAFMECA Conference denounced, did they cease privately backing the ASP in Zanzibar even after the ZNP-ZPPP alliance had become the Government. This was to bring unexpectedly violent and bloody results in the January 1964 Revolution in Zanzibar, when all the old resentment flared into a widespread slaughter and imprisonment of Arabs.

IX. THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND PAFMECSA'S DECLINE

THE next Conference was expected to be in Kampala at Easter 1963. Kaunda was giving much thought to the organisation's development. After bringing political emancipation he foresaw it 'shaping into a strong economic force'. The difficulties of transport facilities, legal systems and language within the PAFMECSA area needed to be faced. 'If we start dealing with these difficulties and with emancipation we shall reach the stage where economic links will have become a foregone conclusion.'¹ From economic unity would eventually follow a political line-up. He gave two reasons why PAFMECSA could succeed in this great aim. 'First our leaders have allowed us to function in the organisation without fear so that no one can accuse any of our leaders of territorial ambitions. Secondly, our leaders don't shout about the organisation, they leave it to grow and develop.'²

This summed up the basis of PAFMECSA's past success. It was also almost an epitaph. In May the African Heads of State met in Addis Ababa and the Organisation of African Unity was formed with a membership of thirty-two independent countries. The Casablanca and Monrovia blocs (to neither of which PAFMECSA had been connected) became redundant overnight. Nyerere, on leaving Addis Ababa, commented that PAFMECSA too was now 'obsolete'. The Kampala Conference, already postponed, never took place.

In fact the OAU owed more than a little to PAFMECSA's example which showed that a constructive Pan-African organisation—something the Monrovia and Casablanca

¹ Conversation with author, October 1963. ² Ibid.

Groups were not—was possible, and that the failings of the AAPC could be avoided. History repeated itself in a small way when Nkrumah's massive attempts to enforce his ideology on the OAU by Press Conference and canvassing met with much the same lack of response as had attended them a year previously at the PAFMECSA Conference in the same city. It was a considerable compliment both to Tanganyika and to PAFMECSA's running of the Liberation Movements that the OAU's nine-nation Liberation sub-committee made Dar es Salaam its Headquarters.

Unexpectedly PAFMECSA did not die. Its organisation had, even before the OAU came into being, suffered a grievous blow when Koinange moved back to Kenya to stand for a Parliamentary seat in the May elections, though he had started organising help for ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia. Only a skeleton staff continued to run the house in Independence Avenue in Dar es Salaam that had become PAFMECSA's Headquarters. The Liberation Movements also held weekly meetings there despite the existence of the Nine-Nation Committee. But quite apart from the Constitutional provisions which appear to make it impossible to dissolve the organisation without a meeting, many East African politicians were reluctant to abandon their creation. There was sharp division over its further usefulness. In October 1963 Kaunda himself made a tour of most of the member countries to sound out opinion and arrange a last Conference. No date had been fixed for this up to the time of writing but he told the author that he himself still held the same views as earlier this year on its future potential.

He hoped to dissolve and recreate PAFMECSA at the same meeting. The Liberation work would definitely remain with the Nine-Nation Committee, to which it had already been handed over. But in a new form and with a new Constitution PAFMECSA could form 'a nucleus on which economic links are built, without being a competitor to the OAU'.

Two important points lay behind this considered statement of Kaunda's. First, as he admitted publicly, the

Liberation Movements were far from happy with the Nine-Nation Committee. As may be imagined it was galling to South Africans of the ANC, founded sixty years ago, veterans of underground organisation and sabotage, to be under the orders of politicians who had no such experience, and whose States, save for Algeria, had never really had to shed blood for freedom, indeed had barely existed sixty years ago. The Freedom Fighters asked Kaunda to keep PAFMECSA going but if he was to be loyal to the OAU he had to abide by the decision that they should come under the Nine-Nation Committee. This committee, incidentally, at once found itself with the problem that had beset PAFMECSA in Moçambique and Angola, namely of unifying competing nationalist parties. There are at least two in every Southern African country and to date this problem has proved exceptionally intractable. The Nine-Nation Committee's answer is to give funds to one only, but in practice it is clear that only long and patient mediation such as PAFMECSA devoted to the Moçambique movements will bring rivals like Sithole and Nkomo together. In the words of one ANC leader, 'It is unrealistic to *demand* unity. This fails to understand what running an underground movement is like.'³

The second, ideologically important, point of Kaunda's statement was that a new PAFMECSA would not compete with the OAU: 'It does not conflict with the larger goal of African unity. One must build up from small units to larger ones.' This is the core of East Africans' belief in East African federation, and the principle on which Nkrumah now attacks them because he believes in creating total African unity at one fell swoop—a United States of Africa or nothing. As, if it comes about, East African federation will be the greatest of PAFMECSA's achievements, the subject deserves a final chapter to itself.

³ Duma Nokwe in conversation with the author, 25 July 1963.

X. FEDERAL INITIATIVES IN 1963

At the beginning of June 1963, after a triumphant electoral victory, KANU formed a Government under Jomo Kenyatta, who was sworn in as Kenya's first Prime Minister. He at once summoned together the East African Prime Ministers (as recommended at the Dar es Salaam Summit and CFC meeting of October 1961). Mboya, Murumbi, Kakonge and Oscar Kambona (Tanganyikan Minister of External Affairs), together drafted a Declaration of Intention to Federate which the three Prime Ministers signed on 5 June 1963 in Nairobi. They said 'We believe that East African Federation can be a practical step towards the goal of Pan-African unity. . . . For some years we have worked together in the PAFMECA where we have accepted common objectives and ideas and created the essential spirit of unity between ourselves and among other people.' Tribute was paid to the value of 'the East African High Commission and its successor the Common Services Organisation [which] have taught us the value of links in the economic field . . . a leading aspect of economic working together is the East African Common Market'. In the future, 'Economic planning, utilisation of manpower and our other resources, the establishment of a Central Bank and common defence programme, and foreign and diplomatic representation are areas in which we need to work together.' The statement ended by demanding immediate independence for Kenya, which would otherwise hinder establishing a federation 'this year', and stating that Zanzibar, though not represented at the Conference, was 'invited to participate fully in our plans'. Finally it was made 'clear that any of our other neighbours may in future join this Federation'.

A working party was set up to draft a Constitution, which according to the statement would be considered by a full-scale Conference in the third week of August. This working

party composed in theory though not always in practice of two delegates from each country plus the Attorney Generals, met six times, including an extraordinary meeting in Zanzibar to explain to the leaders there what it was all about. A Constitution was agreed at Kampala in September and drawn up by the Attorney Generals immediately afterwards.

Unfortunately by then disagreements between the Heads of State prevented its acceptance and up to the time of writing it has not been published. It is presumed to provide for a Republic with a strong central Federal Government having power over foreign affairs, defence and internal security, economic planning, etc., and for EACSO to form the basis of a Federal Civil Service. It does not, apparently, deal with details such as a Central Bank, but is mainly concerned with the relationship and powers of the Federal and territorial Assemblies, the executive powers of the President, the status of territorial Prime Ministers and so on.

It was over these basic questions of who was going to have what power that disagreement arose in August 1963. The main objections came from Uganda and, to a lesser extent, Zanzibar.

The Zanzibar leaders in fact only attended three Working Party meetings and their role in them was passive. They saw two main objections to federation: first that Zanzibar's budget depended on a different customs structure from East Africa's, secondly, that if there were a strong Federal Government there would be an equally strong temptation for TANU, KANU and the UPC to interfere in local politics to put the ZNP out of power, possibly encouraging large-scale African immigration from the mainland. The ASP, needless to say, did not share this view, but Zanzibar came to independence on 10 December with a ZNP-ZPPP Government. The Sultan being Head of State as a monarch was not thought an insuperable obstacle to federation.

The difficulties Obote faced in trying to implement the

June agreement soon became evident. The Kabaka of Buganda did not attend a Heads of State Meeting in Kampala in July. Even after his election to the Presidency of the Ugandan Republic in mid-October the Baganda and their Parliament, the Lukiko, still feared that whereas no Uganda Government could function without their support, in a Federation they would be overruled as a factional minority. Under the Constitution which, after years of wrangling *between them and the British Government*, led to Uganda's independence, Buganda kept its own sources of revenue and controlled its own education, police, health services and local government. Jealous of its rights, Buganda is likely to insist on limitations of East African Federal power.

There were also general fears in Uganda that industry and commerce would, as in the past, concentrate on Nairobi to Kampala's detriment. This was an old complaint which the Raisman Commission had tried to settle in 1960 by creating a distributable pool of East African revenue that redressed the financial balance. The Commission pointed out that although the East African Common Market assisted the growth and prosperity of East Africa as a whole it 'intensifies internal strains, while the mitigation of these strains which would occur in a closer political union is lacking'. The truth of this became very evident during 1963. To cite only two examples, Uganda broke away from the E.A. Tourist Travel Association and formed its own Tourist Board, and there were constant complaints from Trade Unions about Uganda's share in such matters as the Africanisation of the railways.

Yet in allowing these feelings to impede acceptance of federation Uganda was ignoring the World Bank's 1962 report on the country which said 'Uganda will find it difficult to share equitably in the gains of economic integration without a substantial degree of political integration.' Despite this report, and the obvious dangers inherent in being dependent upon Kenya for access to the sea, the Ugandan attitude was that she would prefer expansion of

EACSO into a Federal Government to which more responsibility would gradually be given, but which at the outset would have very limited political powers. This was quite contrary to the Tanganyikan and Kenyan (KANU) vision of starting with a strong centralised Government.

Ugandan fears of being submerged in a federation were made public on 20 August 1963 by Adoko Nekyon, the Minister of Information and also a member of the Federal Working Party. He said 'I must know exactly where we are going and to whom we are surrendering our powers. As a small State Uganda needs certain guarantees for her future within a larger unit.'

There were strong, though unmentioned, fears among politicians about their personal status. These were not confined to Uganda. It is difficult, without inviting libel actions, to comment on the never-ending struggle for power that characterises political movements the world over and from which the African Continent is in no way immune. Suffice it to say that while in Tanganyika TANU's one-party system had settled down, in Uganda and Kenya the jockeying for position was intense. The likelihood of real power devolving on a Federal Government added a further dimension to the struggle and, inevitably, brought the Tanganyikan leaders' minds back to it. Kenyatta's paramountcy was virtually unquestioned. Nyerere was assumed to be the obvious choice as Federal Vice-President. But what about all the others? The rivalries and the divisive effects of newly acquired vested interests in sovereignty which Nyerere had visualised so clearly in 1961, and tried with great statesmanship to avert by bringing the three countries to Independence and federation at the same moment, began to plague the federal initiative.

This unhappy situation was immediately exploited and made worse by Ghana. It soon became clear that Ghanaian lobbying was partly responsible for Ugandan hesitancy and there was also extensive Ghanaian intrigue in Tanganyika. This strong covert attack on federation had two main

themes. The first was that federation was an imperialist and neo-colonialist plot devised by Britain and the U.S.A. to perpetuate Western domination and exploitation of East Africa. This was not only a peculiar expression of Commonwealth relationships and a libel on Britain, which mindful of Central Africa had studiously kept its fingers out of this federal pie. It also went directly against the World Bank's advice to East Africa.

The second theme was that Mboya and Nyerere were Western stooges and it would be dangerous to let them gain further ascendancy in East Africa through a federation. Letters were sent to Kenyatta warning him against them. These manoeuvres did not however seem to lessen his enthusiasm for federation, whilst Oginga Odinga, though wooed on a visit to Accra, came out publicly in favour of it and was Chairman of a week's Seminar on Federation organised by the University of East Africa at the end of November 1963. President Nkrumah found himself unable to attend Kenya's Independence Celebrations on 12 December 1963.

The ostensible reason for Ghana's attack on federation was that federation would be a form of balkanisation. When in November 1963 Joseph Murumbi commented publicly on the obvious inconsistency of this approach from a Government that had itself formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, the Ghana High Commissioner in Uganda issued a Press Statement claiming the Union was merely 'an emergency measure when Guinea was politically and economically isolated by France'. It ended: 'President Nkrumah thinks in terms of Africa as one and indivisible whole but not just of a section of Africa.'

This was as much a volte-face as the change of heart towards PAFMECSA which I have already described. On 15 January 1961 Nkrumah had cabled good wishes to the Nairobi PAFMECA Conference and referred to federation as a 'noble cause'. Mboya, the Conference Chairman, had replied, 'Once again I reaffirm your

foresight in initiating steps towards African unity.' The first that Mboya knew of Ghana's volte-face extending to federation was on 26 June 1963 when he was at a party at the Ghana High Commission in London and was abruptly handed a formal statement attacking federation. It was three weeks after the East African Prime Ministers had declared their intention of federating.

During the succeeding months feeling against Ghanaian interference mounted rapidly in East Africa, though Ghana itself was seldom named. The clearest statement of what one might call the East African ideological position came from President Nyerere on 9 December 1963. After saying that the failure to establish a federation in 1963 was perhaps the biggest disappointment of the year he said, 'Genuine difficulties do exist, as in any other move to unity. But in understanding the difficulties that do exist we must reject some of the pretensions that have been made from outside East Africa. We have already heard the curious argument that the continued "balkanisation" of East Africa will somehow help African unity, that in some way existing federations like that of Nigeria are within the Charter of African Unity, but new federations like that of East Africa would be contrary to it. These are attempts to rationalise absurdity.'

Nyerere went on, 'One of the hard facts we have to face on the way to African unity is that this unity means on the part of countries the surrender of sovereignty, and on the part of individual leaders the surrender of high positions. We must face quite squarely the fact that so far there has been no such surrender in the name of African unity.'

When Kenya became independent it was clear that unless immediate steps were taken to bring about the federation there was a severe danger of the concept dying a slow death. Mboya warned that this was the testing time when speaking to the University seminar. This seminar was itself one of the most promising initiatives towards the end of 1963. It met for a week at the Royal College in Nairobi and was attended both by academics and by leading politicians from

the countries involved. Detailed studies were made of such future problems as the integration of legal systems, economic planning, agricultural development, trade union policy, etc. The aim was to assist the East African leaders by doing research for which they themselves might not have time, and its reports were forwarded to the Federal Working Party. Altogether it was a fruitful example both of East African co-operation and of how the University of East Africa is taking part in the area's development.

EACSO, though frequently referred to as a basis on which federation might be built, could not enter into negotiation with Governments on the subject because it is an agency, not a political body, and acts under the orders of the Central Legislative Assembly. There are however five Ministerial Committees on which all three countries are represented and to which EACSO staff work in much the same way as if they were civil servants submitting papers to the Cabinet of a territorial Government. These committees cover Finance, Communications, Commerce and Industry, Social and Research Services (including High Education), and Labour. The decisions of these committees must be unanimous if they are to be acted upon. In the last half of 1963 they were often unable to achieve much because of the political uncertainty surrounding federation. Decisions were shelved until there was a federal decision. This brings out two points about the capability of EACSO for expanding into a Federal Government under its present Constitution.

The first is that this is really putting the cart before the horse because EACSO could not expand without political agreement between the three countries. All the indications are that unless the three countries are integrated politically their development will become competitive and EACSO more likely to stagnate than to expand.

Secondly it would not be easy for, say, Ethiopia and Somalia to participate in EACSO save under a federal governmental system. Their joining would increase the number of Ministers on each committee and, inevitably,

the difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement on controversial questions. The need for EACSO's civil servants to consult five masters all the time would delay day-to-day work.

During 1962, as a result of the Addis Ababa PAFMECSA Conference, both Ethiopia and Somalia did send observers to the CLA meeting at Kampala in November 1962, as did Zanzibar. The Secretary General, Mr. Adu, also visited the Ethiopian and Somali Governments to explain EACSO's working. But no concrete steps were taken towards their participation.

Politically 1963 brought keen interest in the federation from both these countries. However, at the same time, the quarrel between Somalia and Kenya over the NFD grew worse. Britain refused to hand over any part of the NFD without Kenyan permission and despite the persistent Kenyan suggestion that if only Somalia would join a federation the problem could be solved afterwards, the Somalis began to draw back. Their view was that there was no question of joining a federation until the dispute was settled. Kenya refused to give way and then the terrorism in the NFD began in the last two months of 1963, effectively poisoning relations between the two countries, despite the exchange of diplomatic missions.

Ethiopia's friendship, by contrast, blossomed towards the end of the year, much assisted by both Kenya and Ethiopia having quarrels with the Somalis. It was agreed that Ethiopia would come to Kenya's assistance in the NFD if asked and the long-disputed frontier between the two countries was amicably settled. It was felt by many East African politicians that Ethiopia could easily fit into a federation, even that the Emperor might become its Head.

The other PAFMECSA members who in the past had talked of joining a federation made no moves. Kaunda made it clear that, friendly as Northern Rhodesia felt toward East Africa, it was premature to think of new federations when the old Central African Federation was only just being dismantled (31 December 1963). Nyasaland too

appeared to feel that having so often been spoken of as unable to stand on its own feet it would rather try to do so for a few years.

In any case there could be no negotiations to join a federation that had not yet been established and that at the end of 1963 seemed to be receding rather than getting closer. If it does fail it will be a real tragedy for East Africa, though not the fault of PAFMECSA, which by this time had handed over negotiations to the Governments concerned. But a successful federation would be the greatest single triumph of the PAFMECSA spirit, the voluntary subordination of individual ambitions to the general good.

PAFMECSA achievements have been summarised in previous chapters. In conclusion the achievement to dwell on is unquestionably PAFMECSA's prevention of competitive nationalism arising in its member countries, an achievement sadly pointed by the speed with which these feelings arose after PAFMECSA had ceased to function effectively in 1963. Territorial separatism and personal ambition are the greatest enemies of unity anywhere. In East Africa appeals to the spirit of Addis Ababa and the Charter of African Unity proved perhaps not as meaningful as appeals to a meeting of PAFMECSA might have been. This was East Africa's own organisation and, at the time of writing, it seemed possible that it might yet hold a last Conference at which the rivalries undermining the formation of a federation would be overcome, a final and most enduring accolade for a unique organisation.

NOTE

Since this book was written, the Zanzibar Revolution and the Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika have materially altered the balance of East African politics though not the remaining aims of PAFMECSA.

APPENDIX A

THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF THE PEOPLES OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

FREEDOM is our birthright; self-government our heritage as sons and daughters of the free men and women who inherited Africa for the Africans. It is, therefore, not only just but imperative that we restore our birthright which is freedom and our heritage—self-government—for ourselves, our children and our children's children. This we must do now. Every hour that passes under imperialism takes in its train a measure of our freedom and a portion of our noble heritage as Africans, the true and just and rightful masters of Africa's destiny. Every hour that passes means one more hour of subjection, degradation, exploitation, and humiliation by imperialists, white supremacists, and foreign self-seekers.

Therefore we, the undersigned, on behalf of the African people of East and Central Africa, dedicating ourselves to the great task of restoring our freedom, devoting our energies to the cause of African Freedom and prosperity, and pledging ourselves individually and collectively to this task and this cause until imperialism is wiped out of our motherland, hereby declare:

- I. That democracy must prevail throughout Africa from Senegal to Zanzibar and from Cape to Cairo.
- II. That colonialism, the so-called trusteeship, and so-called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism, and white-settlerism are enemies of freedom and can be eradicated only by African nationalism—virile and unrelenting.
- III. That the right of self-determination is God-given and no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the destiny of others.
- IV. That poverty, ignorance, ill health and other human miseries cannot be satisfactorily eradicated under imperialism but only under self-government and international co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefaction.
- V. That we of East and Central Africa, believing in the above declarations, commit our lives, our wealth and all our endeavour to the following set of purposes:

- (a) The setting up of the Pan-African Freedom Movement to establish in each territory, in East and Central Africa, a government of Africans by Africans for Africans on Pan-African lines.
- (b) The Movement shall fight white racialism and black chauvinism.
- (c) The Movement shall seek liberty of the subject within the law and pledges itself to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter.
- (d) Economically the Movement shall press for full industrialisation and the enhancement of co-operative methods and for the control of the major means of production by the peoples themselves through their democratically instituted government.
- (e) The Movement shall press for the recognition of full trade union rights in every country in Africa.
- (f) The Movement shall work for complete equality and justice in all social, educational, political and economic affairs.
- (g) The Movement shall work for the establishment and perpetuation of true parliamentary democracy in every territory within the African Continent.
- (h) The Movement shall carry on the national struggle against poverty, ill-health, ignorance and imperialistic exploitation so that the African may lead a progressively decent, informed, and dignified life within the community of free and democratic nations.

Signed on the 18th September, 1958, Thursday, at 10.45 a.m., in the Conference Room at Mwanza, for and on behalf of the PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA by:

(Sgd.) FRANCIS JOSEPH KHAMISI
CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE

(Sgd.) I. M. BHOKE MUNANKA
SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE

APPENDIX B

THE APPROVED CONSTITUTION OF THE PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

NAME:

The name shall be the 'PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA' (*PAFMECA*).

AIMS AND OBJECTS:

- (a) To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to rid East and Central African territories of imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation, and social degradation by stepped-up nationalist activities to attain self-government and establish parliamentary democracy.
- (b) To co-ordinate nationalist programmes, tactics, projects, and efforts for the speedy liberation of the said territories.
- (c) To assist in the establishment and organisation of united nationalist movements in African territories through political education, periodic conferences, encouragement of inter-territorial African endeavours in all fields and by any other means that this organisation may determine.
- (d) To establish a joint East and Central African Freedom Fund.
- (e) To champion non-violence in the African nationalist struggles for freedom and prosperity.

MEMBERSHIP:

- (i) Membership shall be open to all nationalist, labour and Co-operative Organisations which accept and conform to the policy of Pan-Africanism and the liberation of Africa.
- (ii) Sectional or splinter groups shall not be eligible for membership.
- (iii) The movement, through its Territorial Freedom Committees, shall decide on applications for membership and shall reserve the right to reject any applications or expel any member without necessarily divulging the reason for such action.

FEES:

- (i) Membership fee shall be Shs. 500/- per member-organisation payable on joining.
- (ii) Annual Subscription shall be Shs. 5,000/- (£250) per member-organisation. Annual subscription shall be payable on joining and before the closing of the financial year, which shall be June 30th of every year.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE:**I. *Annual General Meeting:***

The final authority of the movement shall be the Annual General Meeting to be convened during the month of August of every year. The Annual General Meeting shall consist of not more than 5 delegates from each member-organisation, but each delegation shall have three votes.

II. *Co-ordinating Freedom Council:*

The Co-ordinating Freedom Council shall be the governing body of the movement subject only to the Annual General Meeting. The C.F.C. shall be elected annually by the Annual General Meeting. The C.F.C. shall meet at least once every four months on the basis of 1 member per delegation. Office Bearers of PAFMECA shall be ex-officio members of C.F.C.

III. *Territorial Freedom Committees:*

There shall be established in every country a territorial Freedom Committee to concern itself with the Freedom Movement affairs. The Committees shall meet as frequently as the need arises. They shall constantly keep in touch with the C.F.C. and shall exercise powers delegated to them by the C.F.C.

HEADQUARTERS:

The Headquarters of PAFMECA shall be at Dar es Salaam where the Secretariat shall be maintained.

OFFICE BEARERS:

THE PAFMECA shall have the following officers:

Chairman to be elected at Annual General Meeting. He shall preside over the

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| | Annual General Meeting and the meetings of C.F.C. |
| Vice-Chairman | to be elected at the Annual General Meeting. |
| Executive Secretary | shall be a full time paid officer appointed by the Interterritorial Governing Council. |
| Financial Secretary | shall be a full time paid Officer appointed by the Interterritorial Council. |

The PAFMECA shall authorise the establishment of any other Offices, as and when necessary.

QUORUM:

The Quorum for the Annual General Meeting shall be half of the member-organisations. For the C.F.C. one-third of members shall constitute a quorum.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT:

The constitution of the PAFMECA shall not be altered, amended, modified or otherwise changed except at the Annual General Meeting and with the approval of at least two-thirds of the delegates present.

APPENDIX C

THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION OF THE PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF THE EASTERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (1962)

1. NAME:

The name of the organisation shall be the 'PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF EASTERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA' hereinafter referred to as 'PAFMECSA'.

2. AIMS AND OBJECTS:

The aim and objects of PAFMECSA shall be:

- (a) To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism;
- (b) To unite the people of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa in order to rid these countries of imperialism, white supremacy, exploitation and social degradation by stepped-up nationalist activities to attain self-determination and establish democratic governments for the social and economic well-being of the people;
- (c) To co-ordinate nationalist programmes, tactics, projects and efforts for the speedy liberation of the said countries;
- (d) To assist in the establishment and organisation of united nationalist movements in African countries within the PAFMECSA area through political education, periodic conferences, encouragement of African endeavours in all fields and by any means this organisation may determine;
- (e) To establish a joint Eastern, Central and Southern Africa Freedom Fund;
- (f) To promote the union of independent African states of the PAFMECSA area as a step towards the realisation of a greater union of African states.

3. MEMBERSHIP:

- (a) Membership shall be open to all nationalist organisations and governments which accept the aims and policy of PAFMECSA and are striving for the liberation of Africa.

- (b) Tribal or parochial groups shall not be eligible for membership.
 - (c) In the case of an independent state only the government shall be eligible for membership.
 - (d) Application for membership of PAFMECSA shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General for consideration by the Annual Conference.
4. FEES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS:
- (a) A membership fee of Shs. 500/- (£25) per member organisation and Shs. 1000/- (£50) per member government shall be payable on joining.
 - (b) There shall be an annual subscription of Shs. 1000/- (£50) per member organisation and Shs. 20,000/- (£1000) per member government, payable first on joining and thereafter during the course of each succeeding financial year, which for the purposes hereof shall be deemed to end on the 30th day of June.
5. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE:
- 1. ANNUAL CONFERENCE
The Annual Conference shall be the supreme authority of PAFMECSA, and shall consist of member organisations and member governments represented each by not more than five delegates.
 - 2. CO-ORDINATING FREEDOM COUNCIL
There shall be a Co-ordinating Freedom Council elected by the Annual Conference and consisting of:—
 - (a) Chairman and Vice-Chairman;
 - (b) Two members from each of the three regions of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa;
 - (c) One member nominated by and representing each member government.The administration and control of the affairs of PAFMECSA shall rest in the C.F.C. which shall be answerable to the Annual Conference and to such extraordinary or Emergency Conferences as the C.F.C. may convene from time to time. Meetings of the C.F.C. shall be held at least twice in each year.

3. FREEDOM COMMITTEES:

There shall be established in every Region regional Freedom Committees which shall co-ordinate the activities of the liberation movements in the region. THE REGIONAL FREEDOM COMMITTEE shall operate as part of the machinery of PAFMECSA, such duties as may be assigned to it by the C.F.C. It shall consist of representatives of member organisations and/or member governments in the Region.

6. HEADQUARTERS:

The Headquarters of PAFMECSA shall be situated in DAR-ES-SALAAM; provided that the C.F.C. may establish branch offices as and when the need arises.

7. OFFICE BEARERS:

PAFMECSA shall have the following Officers:

CHAIRMAN, who shall be elected at the Annual Conference. He shall preside at all conferences of PAFMECSA and at meetings of the C.F.C.

VICE-CHAIRMAN, who shall be elected at the Annual Conference. He shall preside at PAFMECSA Conferences and C.F.C. meetings in the absence of the CHAIRMAN.

SECRETARY-GENERAL. The C.F.C. shall appoint a SECRETARY-GENERAL who shall be a full-time paid officer of PAFMECSA and who shall be assisted by full-time paid secretaries.

8. QUORUM:

One-half of the member organisations shall form a quorum for annual conferences. For the C.F.C., one-third of the members shall constitute a quorum.

9. FINANCE:

(a) All money received by or on behalf of PAFMECSA shall be deposited with a bank approved by the C.F.C.

(b) Cheques issued in the name of PAFMECSA shall be signed by any two of the following, namely: the Secretary-General and three signatories nominated by the C.F.C.

(c) Proper books of account shall be kept and a Financial Statement and Balance Sheet, duly audited, shall be submitted to the Annual Conference by the C.F.C.

10. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION:

This constitution shall not be altered, amended, modified or otherwise changed except by approval of two-thirds of the delegations present at an annual conference, or a special conference called for the purpose; provided that adequate notice of the proposed amendment, alteration, modification or change shall be given to member organisations and governments.

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
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