

ASIAN STUDIES 1

EDITED By B. G. GOKHALE

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GROWING INTEREST in the history and culture of the newly emerged Asian nations is evident in the western countries, especially in the United States of America. Many scholars have undertaken intensive as well as extensive studies of Asian art, culture, language and history. Many universities and colleges have opened faculties for Asian studies. The present work is an outcome of one such 'adventure in scholarship'—Asian Studies Program organised by three colleges in Winston-Salem, N.C., U.S.A. The themes of the contributions included in this volume relate to various countries extending from East Africa to Korea. As varied are the subjects: Russian-Chinese Relations and the American presence in Eastern Asia—1898-1905; Themes in Burmese Culture; Literary Movements in North Korea; the French Theory of Imperialism in Vietnam before 1914; Lucknow Pact; the Relation Between India and Africa before 1860; Ottoman Domination of Moldavia in the sixteenth century; Political-Religious sect in South Vietnam; and New Soviet Interpretations of Tsarist Colonial Policies in Asia.

These interesting papers have been written by eminent scholars who have made a specialised study of the subject of their research. A book of wide scope it is bound to evoke further interest in researches of this type being undertaken at various universities.

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
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*A collection of Papers on Aspects of
Asian History and Civilization*

Edited by

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
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PREFACE

The present volume is the result of an exciting adventure in scholarship. With a grant from the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, providing the initial stimulus, Wake Forest College and Salem College and Winston-Salem State College joined forces in projecting a program in Asian Studies that, so far as I know, is unique. Wake Forest College is a Baptist coeducational liberal arts college, with a School of Business Administration, a School of Law, a School of Medicine, and a program of graduate studies. Salem College is a Moravian liberal arts college for young women. Winston-Salem State College is a coeducational state-supported school for Negroes. To lead this program we secured Dr. Balkrishna Govind Gokhale as Professor of History and Director of Asian Studies. He came to Winston-Salem in 1960 from Seattle, Washington, where he had served as Visiting Lecturer at the University of Washington. Prior to his service there he had taught at St. Xavier's College and Siddharth College in Bombay, India, and at Oberlin College and Bowdoin College in the United States. He received his bachelor's, master's, and doctor's degree from the University of Bombay.

Under Dr. Gokhale's leadership other scholars have been brought into the program, either to offer courses or to participate in seminars or group discussions. A good collection of library materials has been brought together. Efforts have been made with considerable success to enlist student interest. An invitation has been extended to other college teachers and to certain groups

PREFACE

of high school teachers to participate in some of the discussions. No barriers as to racial or religious identifications were erected.

When topics for seminar papers were selected by participants in the program extensive research resulted and significant papers were read. Now in this volume a first effort is made to share some of these papers with a wider public. I leave it to the readers to judge the merits of each paper, but for us this has been a valuable experience which we hope to continue with future editions.

HAROLD W. TRIBBLE
President
Wake Forest College

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The nine papers included in this first volume of a projected series of *Asian Studies* represent the interest of faculty members of the three colleges participating in the Asian Studies Program in Winston-Salem. Many of these papers were discussed first at various sessions of our faculty seminars during October 1960 and December 1964. The subjects were not "assigned" but were selected by each scholar depending upon his special interests and competence in the handling of source materials in the various languages of Asia and Europe. Each paper first appeared in a mimeographed draft circulated to members well in advance of the seminar meetings. The seminar was primarily devoted to a detailed discussion of the various points raised by the draft paper. It was a most stimulating experience for all of us and we feel that what has been done has been quite worthwhile.

Three of the papers were also presented in one form or another at meetings of professional associations. Dr. Banks' paper on *Two Themes in Burmese Culture* was read in part at a meeting of the American Anthropological Association held in Chicago in November 1962. Dr. Chee's paper on *Literary Movements in North Korea* was presented at the first Southeastern regional meeting of the Association for Asian Studies held at Duke University in Durham, N.C. in January 1962. B. G. Gokhale's paper figured as a part of the panel on *Constitutional Movements in Asia* at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association held in December 1964 in Philadelphia. Dr. Jumper's paper *The Cao Dai of Tay Nihn* was specially prepared for this volume and has not been presented before.

In their scope the papers cover a broad area extending from East Africa to Korea and Siberia. Their subject matter too is varied. Two of the papers relate to South Asia (Gokhale and Gregory), three are on Southeast Asia (Banks, Garrett and Jumper), three deal with East Asian subjects (Africa, Chee and Tillett) and one discusses a West Asian subject (Hitchins). Five subjects belong

to the discipline of history, one is in the field of historiography, and one each in the areas of sociology, political science and literary history.

I may be permitted to anticipate some legitimate points of criticism here. It is likely to be pointed out that the volume lacks a unity of theme. This is true but may be explained by the fact that this is a collection of papers by various individuals with special interests in the diverse aspects of non-Western history and civilizations and not a work on a single theme by diverse hands. It may also be stated that the area covered is too wide to be significant and some may specially question the propriety of the inclusion of a paper on an East European subject. But I must submit that all the papers are, in one way or another, related to Asia and this is as much true of Dr. Gregory's paper on *Indo-African Relations* as Dr. Hitchins' on *Ottoman Domination*. Dr. Keith Hitchins discusses concepts like *Dar-al-Islam*, *Jehad* and *Jezia*, concepts which for those interested in the Islamic history of Asia will be found significant in their application to a European context.

Of the merits of the different papers it is not for me to say anything. Our readers will judge them on their own merits. All of us who participated in these seminars felt that they were useful. We hope to continue this experiment and look forward to issuing the subsequent volumes in this series at regular intervals in the future.

Our thanks are due to Mr. Charles H. Babcock of the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, Drs. Harold W. Tribble and Edwin G. Wilson of Wake Forest College, Drs. Dale H. Gramley and Ivy Hixon of Salem College and Dr. Kenneth R. Williams of Winston-Salem State College for their support to the Asian Studies Program. I also wish to thank Mrs. Harold L. Grogan for her ungrudging secretarial assistance. Finally, we are grateful to Mr. Ramdas Bhatkal for undertaking to publish this volume.

B. G. GOKHALE

Wake Forest College
Winston-Salem, N.C., U.S.A.

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RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS
AND
THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EASTERN ASIA
1898-1905

by
PHILIP AFRICA

Far as the result [of the impact of outside influences on China] lies beyond our present horizon, it is difficult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.

Alfred Thayer Mahan
The Problem of Asia 1900

...to speak of an ideology binding Russia and China is to place a faith in that ideology which the events in Yugoslavia, in Hungary, and in Poland do not command. Nor, if tensions between Russia and China are further exacerbated in the next ten years, can we expect economic interest alone to hold the Chinese...

Stillman and Pfaff
The New Politics 1961

TODAY'S RELATIONS between China and Russia seen in historical perspective would seem to confirm the French adage that the more things change the more they remain the same. The unresolved status of the border lands—the Steppe Empire of Chingghis Khan that has kept the great empires of the north Asian land mass from being contiguous still exists: “a cushion of sparsely inhabited steppelands” and deserts still divides and

insulates the two at the same time it exacerbates the principle of socialist solidarity.¹ Moreover, the vast reaches of sparsely inhabited Siberia, the Amur and Maritime provinces, stretching away to the north, poses a standing temptation to an under-nourished and over-populated China, whose estimated numbers may comprise one-half of the human race by the end of the century.²

It has also become increasingly clear that China's dependence upon military and economic assistance from Russia have not been adequate inducements for the Chinese to submit to unfavourable territorial adjustments. On the contrary, ideological differences, serious food shortages in both countries, and the traditional xenophobia of the Han people toward the "long noses," including the Russian proboscis, have augmented past controversies over control of the border lands. To point out the obvious, however, is not to insist that one or the other will ultimately dominate a Steppe Empire equivalent to that of the thirteenth century by totally excluding or subjugating the other. Both sides have known peaceful, if grudging, co-existence before and will probably continue to do so. Russian probing into the border lands opened the problem and brought about the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), "the first ever to be concluded by China with a foreign power on terms of equality." This treaty may also be viewed both as evidence of Chinese realism when confronted by a stronger aggressor, as well as of Russian awareness of over-extension. Subsequent treaties in later centuries, and the withdrawal of Russia from Manchuria in the 1950's, while retaining paramountcy in Outer Mongolia, confirmed the still

¹J. V. Davidson-Houston, *Russia and China: From the Huns to Mao Tse-Tung* (London, [c.] 1960), 175. To speak of borders in the interior of Asia can be done in only a general sense. As Owen Lattimore makes plain in *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, if Russia is taken as the geographical vantage point, inner Asia becomes a frontier stretching from the Black to the Yellow Seas. If one looks outward from China, the Pamirs, the Himalayas, and the Yellow Sea rim the Inner Asian border lands. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York, 1951), xxii and 3. My reference to Chingghis Khan, therefore, is not intended to refer to a precise area, but only to recall the most ambitious attempt to eliminate the frontier problem by the absorption of the entire land mass into one imperial system.

²A Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York, [c.] 1960), 380; Arnold J. Toynbee, "Is a 'Race War' Shaping Up?", *New York Times Magazine*, 29 Sept., 1963.

unsettled status of the border lands. More recently, reports of unrest and Chinese troop movements in Sinkiang have pinpointed one source of current Sino-Soviet disagreement, and once again reminded us that the frontiers of inner Asia remain inadequately defined. For Americans in particular the unrest recalls an earlier time when limiting Russian power in China first became an objective of our diplomacy.³

This article is intended to canvass opinions held by some Americans about the significance of Russo-Chinese relations at the opening of the twentieth century, both to see how much things do remain the same after some sixty years, if they have; and secondly, to evaluate the worth of the predictions made by men who because of education and interest, if not first-hand experience, were in a better position than most Americans to assess a situation that would become of increasing importance to this nation. What they thought was by one means or another thrown into the hopper of public opinion and entered into the decision-making process of the government itself. The image of Eastern Asia, and what the United States' relations with that part of the world should become, would condition to some immeasurable extent what would come to pass in the lifetime of those who are reading this article. This is, of course, not to say that American policy determined the course of events in Eastern Asia; merely that what the United States chose to do, or not do, and the reasons given, deserve to be taken into account whenever we seek understanding.

The group whose opinions I have chosen to include might be called, for lack of a better term, "Teddy's boys" (If America were England "The Establishment" might do): men whose articulate and forceful opinions were before the country at the time when Theodore Roosevelt moved front and center on the American, and to a large extent, the world scene. Matthew Josephson had the same group of conservative intellectuals in mind in his two books: *The Politicos* and *The President Makers*. Others, like Julius Pratt, have referred to the same group as the "Expansionists of 1898". But "Teddy's boys" is intended to single out those individuals who had Roosevelt's ear, which is not to

³Davidson-Houston, *Russia and China*, 72; Harrison Salisbury, *To Moscow and Beyond: A Reporters' Narrative* (New York, 1960, 182; Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), 22-23.

say that before or after he became President he necessarily took their advice.

1898 was the year of the "great aberration" according to Samuel Flagg Bemis, careful historian of American diplomacy. Yet such a chronological demarcation cannot be taken literally. Well before 1898 the Cushing Treaty with China was signed (1844); Commodore Perry had made his historic visit to Japan in 1853; William H. Seward engineered the purchase of Alaska in 1867 and coveted Hawaii, and Samoa came into the American orbit in 1872. In 1895 the American Chinese Development Corporation was organized to pursue American economic interests in Eastern Asia. These expressions of American interest in the world of the Far Pacific were reinforced and broadened by the simultaneous acquisition of Hawaii, Guam, Wake, and the Philippines, all in the momentous year of 1898. Arguments against the extension of the American frontier into the Pacific were of no avail. When opponents of expansion argued against the addition of non-contiguous territory, Senator Albert J. Beveridge snapped back: "Our navy will make them contiguous." Mark Hanna answered those who charged that increased trade with China was a gross materialistic motive for holding onto the Philippines with, "if it is commercialism to want the possession of a strategic point giving the American people an opportunity to maintain a foothold in the markets of that great Eastern country, . . . for God's sake let us have commercialism."⁴

The United States was indeed in Eastern Asia, whatever the motive. Whether it was there to stay depended upon three, perhaps more, uncertainties: 1. In the nineteenth century Britain had done our fighting in that part of the world for us even though, "We seldom acknowledged that our first century or more of access to China rested in part upon American enterprise and philanthropy and in part upon the harsher facts of British imperial control and exploitation, which we considered an evil thing."⁵ 2. The role of Japan—a source of increasing concern

⁴Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956), 178; Claude G. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1932), 76; Foster R. Dulles, *China and America* (Princeton, 1946), 103.

⁵John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China* (revised edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 253.

to Europe and the United States after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. 3. The subject of this article—the intentions of Czarist Russia with regard to China and the presence of competitors operating in China. Trying to deal with only one leg of a three-legged stool obviously can't be done; but if the one is stressed to the slight of the other two, it is an emphasis that has once again, in 1964, become the most important.

The official United States estimate of the situation in Eastern Asia flowered in the Open Door Policy of 1899-1900. Treated in the past as a policy of expediency, a policy without a future, the Open Door Policy has been refurbished and extolled by its latest investigator, William A. Williams, University of Wisconsin historian. Williams contends that the policy was soundly based on the premise that America's "overwhelming economic power" would give it an advantage over other interested nations; and that because the policy worked all too well it engendered opposition.⁶ One need not accept Williams' amoral pragmatism to agree with his analysis of Hay's motives. In 1899 it was Hay's intention to follow up a British proposal of the previous year to secure equal application of tariffs, railroad rates, and port dues in all spheres of interest for all countries interested in the China trade. Preoccupation with Korea and Manchuria led Russia to evade Hay's proposal, while Germany accepted only on the condition that other interested parties do likewise.⁷ Even though Hay blandly chose to interpret silence as consent, it was apparent from the outset that the future of Sino-Russian relations would necessarily have much to do with the viability of the Open Door Policy. The Boxer Rebellion, followed by Russia's occupation of all of Manchuria in force, led to Hay's second circular note of 3 July 1900, calling for great power observance of the integrity of China. Again Russia failed to agree. Significantly, later that same year (1900) an Anglo-German agreement, while recognizing the principle of the integrity of China, made it clear that Manchuria should not be considered as a part of China proper.⁸

⁶William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959), 43.

⁷Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York, 1946), 984-85.

⁸Elting E. Morison (Ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (4 Vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951), II, 1422-23.

In light of the recent Russian activity in Manchuria, prominent Americans in 1900 saw ruptured Russian-Chinese relations as a danger not only to Eastern Asia but to world peace, and they were momentarily willing to subordinate their suspicions of imperial Germany to the interest of a tacit understanding on the part of the "Teutonic nations" to bring pressure to bear on Russia to desist from further encroachments on China. Andrew D. White, United States Ambassador to Berlin, confided to the Empress Frederick, widow of Frederick III, that he "hoped to see the day when Germany, Great Britain, and the United States would stand together in guarding the peace of the world."⁹ Theodore Roosevelt, Vice-President elect, who had seen Germany as the *bete noire* of the United States in the Pacific in 1898, now, in November 1900, saw Germany in a more favourable light; and he tried to persuade his friend, the British diplomat Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, that a strong Germany should be welcomed by the British as a necessary ally in Eastern Asia. Roosevelt was angered by statements in the English press which had interpreted the Open Door Policy as anti-English when "most emphatically our policy has been anti-Russian rather than anti-English."¹⁰

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, geopolitican and ardent expansionist, agreed with White and Roosevelt. In 1900 he was writing a series of articles to be published at the end of the year entitled *The Problem of Asia and its Effect Upon International Policies*. The southward drive of Russia, prompted by "natural law and race instinct," must necessarily encounter opposition south of "the broad dividing belt between the thirtieth and fortieth parallels." Because the center of the Russian advance was insulated from interference by the sheer bulk of the Asian land mass, opposition would come on the flanks, both in China and in the Middle East, in the form of a meeting of the minds on the part of the Teutonic seapowers—Britain, Germany, and the United States, plus Japan. Russia, Mahan believed, must be allowed to reach the sea and acquire a warm-water port in Eastern Asia; but there must be a *quid pro quo* :

⁹Andrew D. White, *Autobiography of Andrew D. White* (2 Vols., New York, 1905), II, 195.

¹⁰Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 772, II, 1422-23, 1880.

In acknowledgment of their willing acquiescence in this coast tenure, opening free communication into the seas of the world, the sea powers may reasonably claim [with?] equal candor of admission that the navigable stream of the Yang-tse-kiang is their necessary line of access into the land, and the nucleus essential to the local spread of their influence. Like all arrangements here suggested, this reciprocal agreement should not be in the nature of formal convention, but of an understanding; which is not arbitrary, but rests upon existing facts that receive recognition in a spirit of mutual concession. It carries the corollary that there shall not be established upon the banks of the Yang-tse-kiang, by fortification or otherwise, any military tenure by which its waters can be forcibly closed to the sea powers.¹¹

The balancing of land and sea power in the dangerously weak environment of a hapless China would demand an enlightened realism on the part of the foreign powers and due respect for the difficulties facing the Chinese people as they emerged into the civilization of the twentieth century.¹² Hence, in the third essay in the book *Effect of Asiatic Conditions*, written after Hay's second circular note, Mahan applauded the tenor of the United States' position implying our commitment to obtaining a solution for the Asian Problem in China; but he warned that that commitment should be geographically limited:

Assuming our resolution to maintain our commercial rights and to exert influence in China by encouraging and supporting native action, though not by any assumption of authority or acquisition of territory, the valley of the Yang-tse is clearly indicated as the central scene of our general interest. . . . The open door, both for commerce and for intellectual interaction, should be our aim everywhere in China; but it can most easily be compassed in this middle region, and there find the surest foundation for impression upon other parts, because there seapower can most solidly establish itself. . . . this valley is the decisive field where commerce, the energizer of

¹¹Alfred T. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and its Effect Upon International Policies* (London, 1900), 120-21.

¹²*Ibid.*, 104-06.

material civilization, can work to greatest advantage, and can most certainly receive the support of the military arm of seapower, . . . It must also for some time to come to be the main reliance of the Chinese people in resistance to foreign domination as *distinguished from legitimate foreign influence* (italics mine).¹³

For Mahan, then, the problem of Asia was the containment of Russia in order to give the Chinese the time to regroup and enter the twentieth century under what he maintained was the "legitimate" aegis of the Western nations rather than subservience to Russia. To that end, he was more concerned with upholding the first of Hay's circular notes rather than the second, and thus in agreement with the position taken by Britain and Germany in the same year (see page 5).

Not all the Roosevelt circle were so sure that Manchuria and northern China would go to Russia by default. Brooks Adams, younger brother of Henry Adams, world traveller, geopolitician, and congenital pessimist, was just back from a trip to Western Europe, including Russia, in 1900. But for once in his life he was anything but pessimistic about the future of the United States, particularly when it came to our position in Eastern Asia. On the contrary, it was his contention that Eastern Asia would more likely than not fall under the sway of the United States; and he looked forward confidently to "vast prosperity" for this country. Eastern Asia would fall to the United States by manifest destiny. Great Britain's poor showing in the Boer War revealed her inability to hold her position as a world leader; Germany was incapable of expansion, except into territory adjacent to her own; while Russian administration was too sluggish to act with force in Asia.¹⁴ Adams had expressed these views privately at first to Henry Adams, and then written them into articles in the first part of 1900.

Hay's second circular note in July, 1900, had caused Adams' cup of confidence to run over:

¹³*Ibid.*, 176-7.

¹⁴Letter from Brooks Adams to Henry Adams, 26 Feb., 1900, Brooks Adams MSS, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

The news today assures us all that you [Hay] have won for us the greatest diplomatic triumph of our time. No living minister, in the world, has done the like. . . . I accept it as certain that but for you no immediate advance would have been made, and that finally the Russians and the Germans would have gained control. As it is we hold command in the East with possible consequences which I cannot measure, but which are certainly greater than anything which has happened since 1870.¹⁵

Brooks Adams believed that what was at stake in Asia were the great iron and coal resources of China; "some of the richest mines in the world" were in Shansi province. The only way in which the European powers could stave off American hegemony in the twentieth century would be to acquire control of these resources. Thus, while the United States could subsist on its own mineral resources for its domestic market; international leadership demand that it deny exploitation of the Shansi mines to European powers. The chief risk to the United States would come from a German-Russian agreement to combine forces in Asia and exclude the United States. This prospect posed the problem of Asia for Adams:

Our geographical position, our wealth, and our energy preeminently fit us to enter upon the development of Eastern Asia, and to reduce it to a part of our economic system. And moreover, the laws of nature are immutable. Money will flow where it earns most return, and investments once made are always protected. Evidently Americans cannot be excluded from China without a struggle, . . . The Chinese Question must, therefore, be accepted as the great problem of the future, as a problem from which there can be no escape. . . .¹⁶

On the fringe of the Roosevelt group, not a fully accepted member of "the club", stood the least abashed nationalist of all of the conservative intellectuals, Senator Albert J. Beveridge.

¹⁵Letter from Brooks Adams to John Hay, 17 August, 1900, John Hay MSS, Library of Congress.

¹⁶Brooks Adams, *America's Economic Supremacy* (New York, 1900), 220-21.

While he was not as sure as Adams that the future of China would be shaped in accordance with American interests, he was equally insistent that the United States must involve itself in the affairs of Eastern Asia. In 1901 he took an extended trip through Russia, including Siberia, in order to get into Manchuria to see at first hand what the prospects for the United States were in that part of the world. An expansive soul, Beveridge saw not only China but all of eastern Siberia as a potential market for the United States:

Then [in addition to the European Russian market] there is Asiatic Russia, chiefly Siberia. Our sales to her are inconsiderable. Yet all eastern Siberia, as far as Irkutsk, is our natural market. The Russian occupation of Manchuria (if Russia continues to let our goods in free and does not differentiate against us on her railroad rates) will double our trade there.

Here, then, are virgin markets. Why not have them? . . . But be it remembered that they are not to be occupied by polite notes or banquet speeches. They have got to be occupied by ships, commercial agents, modern methods, the expenditure of money; and the resourceful vigilance of a firm and comprehensive business policy.¹⁷

So the United States would have to act! And the title of Beveridge's book *The Russian Advance* expressed his thesis that the Russians were acting, and acting effectively, particularly in Manchuria. The Russians, over and above geographical proximity, had an advantage in dealing with the Chinese that other Westerners did not have. Not only was there an absence of any attitude of racial superiority, but the Russian willingness of wanting to help their fellow-men was sensed and appreciated by the Chinese:

'But you see,' explained the Russian physician [to Beveridge]. . . 'it is our policy to help the people among whom we have come, from the highest to the lowest, in every possible way we can. . . Nothing pleases a Russian more than to help some other person who is in need. Apparently the Chinese feel this.

¹⁷Albert J. Beveridge, *The Russian Advance* (New York, 1904), 206-07.

for, as you see, they come on their own motion and very willingly . . .'

Greater credit was given this statement from having observed, again and again, in Siberia, many instances of the same personal kindness and helpful desire of the Russian nature. And so, once more, it appeared that . . . the hand of the Russian when opposed is a hard hand; but when the opposition is crushed a soft, soothing, and even caressing hand.¹⁸

Dissenting from Adams' view that Russians were poor administrators (Beveridge was a great admirer of General M. D. Skobelev, who had crushed Turcoman opposition in Central Asia), he insisted that the Russians could deal with Asiatics better than any other power. The Russian system of brutality followed by kindness both worked and was understood and respected by the Chinese:

At any rate, no man can deny that it has been successful wherever employed; for be it remembered that Russia has absorbed more territory, assimilated a greater number of different people, and fought more border wars than any modern nation; and that in the whole course of her ceaseless march there has never been a single serious uprising against Russian authority, once that authority has been established. That is a fact worth examining and reflecting upon.¹⁹

The evidence of Russian activity in Manchuria, the number and variety of functions exercised by the branches of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the vigorous expansion of the Odessa-based Russian volunteer fleet measured for Beveridge the ever-widening extent of the Russian advance in Asia; and it was his conviction that there was something to the rumors that the Chinese welcomed what was going on:

It may be said, however, that the observer becomes impressed with a sort of atmosphere of Russo-Chinese unity quite

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 41; Beveridge cited former Boxers working as laborers on the Manchurian railroads who now expressed their satisfaction in working for the Russians: "We like the way the Russians treat us. . . We don't know and we don't care who governs the country. All we want is to make money, . . ." *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 47.

impossible to intelligently analyze. Despite Chinese protests against the Russian advance and all the hostile words exchanged between the two governments, things usually come out as Russia wishes. Of course this may be due to the superiority of Russian diplomacy, backed as it is by armed force; but the rumors of a secret understanding between the two governments are worth noting merely to fill in the general picture.²⁰

Theodore Roosevelt, not yet President, was inclined in 1901 to concede Russian hegemony in China. As he told Captain Mahan, American ignorance about China made it unlikely that opinion in this country would countenance an Anglo-American alliance to withhold the Yang-tse valley from Russian penetration in the interests of civilization and the future of Asia. All of Manchuria, all of China, was not worth the bones of an American marine in the eyes of the general public. It was indeed deplorable that the Russians had not withdrawn their troops from Manchuria after the Boxer uprising had been put down, but who was to bell the Russian bear and protect China? China had no alternative but to succumb to force; or, as John Hay put it, "The open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club."²¹ In a letter written later in the year to his friend, George F. Becker, official geologist with the United States Army in the Philippines, Roosevelt accepted a China dominated by Russia as a victory for civilization:

From all I can gather I believe that neither Germany nor Great Britain had the slightest idea that they could or would prevent Russia's entering Manchuria... I think that if no outside powers interfered Japan could at the moment give Russia a stiff fight in the far [sic] East, for I do not believe her line of communication across Siberia is as yet in sufficiently good order to enable her to use effectively her enormous mass.... Undoubtedly the future is hers unless she mars it from within. But it is the future and not

²⁰*Ibid.*, 102-03, 153.

²¹Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 23. Roosevelt had written to Mahan expressing his general agreement with Mahan's analysis of events in the *Problem of Asia*; William R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay* (2 Vols., Boston, [c.] 1908), II, 369.

the present. . . As you know, I feel that it is an advantage to civilization to have a civilized power gain at the expense of barbarism. Exactly as Turkestan has been benefited by Russia's advance, so I think China would be. But then I look at the matter from a rather visionary standpoint, and it may be that if I knew more of the trade needs between China or Asia generally and our Pacific slope, I might alter my views.²²

Brooks Adams, for his part, still refused to share in the opinion that Manchuria, and possibly all of China, would go to Russia by default. He returned to print in 1902 with a sweeping reassertion that the future of Asia would be determined by the United States. *The New Empire* took the measure of all the major powers and found them wanting. The New Empire, dwarfing all predecessors would be the United States, athwart the lines of world trade like a colossus:

The world seems agreed that the United States is likely to achieve, if indeed she has not already achieved, an economic supremacy. The vortex of the cyclone ['westward migration of the seat of energy and the center of mineral production'] is near New York. No such activity prevails anywhere; nowhere are undertakings so gigantic, nowhere is administration so perfect; nowhere are such masses of capital centralized in single hands. And as the United States becomes an imperial market, she stretches out along the trade routes which lead from foreign countries to her heart. . . Supposing the movement of the next fifty years only to equal that of the last, instead of undergoing a prodigious acceleration, the United States will outweigh any single empire, if not all empires combined. The whole world will pay her tribute. Commerce will flow to her both from east and west, and the order that has existed from the dawn of time will be reversed.²³

But if these Americans, except Adams, were willing to write off Manchuria, and possibly all of China, to the Russians, Japan was not. Disturbed by the presence of 20,000 Russian "forest

²²Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 112.

²³Brooks Adams, *The New Empire* (New York, [c.] 1902), 208-09.

rangers" in Korea,²⁴ which added insult to the forced disgorgement of territory on the mainland of Asia in 1895, the Japanese sought and obtained an alliance with Great Britain in January, 1902, looking toward the isolation of Russia from Germany or France when Japan chose to act. The Russians, for their part, correctly interpreting the Japanese intent, redoubled their efforts in Manchuria, but confused the whole situation by signing an evacuation agreement with China in April, 1902.²⁵ Yet, a year later Russia was still in Manchuria, and Theodore Roosevelt, now President, was angry. In a letter to his friend Lyman Abbott in June, 1903, he wrote:

...I am having great trouble with Russia, simply because of the extra-ordinary mendacity with which we are being treated by the Russian authorities. In this Manchurian matter we are not striving for any political control or to help any nation acquire any political control of the territory in question. All that we ask is that Russia shall do what over and over again she has agreed to do and shall not prevent the Chinese from giving us the rights for which we have fought in connection with the open door policy. We wish for our people the commercial privileges which Russia again and again has said we shall have . . . but which China refuses to give because Russia threatens her with dire consequences. . . I do not know what action may be necessary in the future, but I wish you to be acquainted with some of the inside facts of the situation so as to be prepared for whatever comes up in the way of a new phase.²⁶

John Hay was equally disillusioned and angry with Russia. "Dealing with a government with whom mendacity is a science. . . is an extremely difficult and deliberate matter," as he put it. Yet Hay had written off Manchuria and thought Roosevelt

²⁴Raymond Aron, *Century of Total War* (Boston, 1955), 59.

²⁵Bemis, *Diplomatic History of the United States*, 490; Davidson-Houston, *Russia and China*, 89.

²⁶Morison, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, III, 500-01; Ernest R. May, "The Far Eastern Policy of the United States in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War: A Russian View," *American Historical Review* (January, 1957), 345-51. May suggests that Hay's willingness to exclude Manchuria from the terms of the Open Door may have encouraged Russia to prolong her stay in Manchuria.

should do likewise. However, he was not above allowing the Russian ambassador to think that the United States might be goaded into joining the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and he had the subsequent satisfaction of negotiating an agreement with Russia opening up ports in Manchuria to the United States and concluding a new commercial treaty with China. Then according to Tyler Dennett, his astute biographer, Hay sat back and "waited for Japan to bring on the war."²⁷

Unfortunately, when the Russo-Japanese War did break out in February, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt was deeply involved in domestic politics looking toward his nomination for a second term. His correspondence for the year reveals a grudging respect for the Japanese, an attitude which alarmed the Russian ambassador to Washington, Count A. P. Cassini; but Cassini was sure that the President's views were not those of "serious-minded Americans who deplored the President's adventurous Japanophile policy."²⁸ Had Cassini known the length to which Roosevelt had gone in talks with the Japanese minister, Baron Takahira, he might have had even greater concern, as might the Chinese themselves:

I [Roosevelt] then said that as far as I was concerned I hoped to see China kept together, and would gladly welcome any part played by Japan which would tend to bring China forward along the road which Japan trod, because I thought it for the interest of all the world that each part of the world should be prosperous and well-policed; I added that unless everybody was mistaken in the Chinese character I thought they would have their hands full in mastering it. . . .²⁹

What Hay and Roosevelt were able to accomplish on behalf of China, however passive the role of the United States may have been, was to administer a rebuff to an ambiguous and essentially dishonest overture from Germany to write off North China to the belligerents. Hay, especially was quite aware that Germany had the unstated purpose of encouraging Russian dabbling in Eastern Asia as a means of detaching Russia from

²⁷Tyler Dennett, *John Hay: From Poetry to Politics* (New York, 1934) 404-06.

²⁸May, "Far Eastern Policy of the United States," 348.

²⁹Morison. *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, 830-31.

its entente with France, as well as enlarging German holdings in China.³⁰

After Hay's death in 1905, Roosevelt's position became more openly pro-Japanese than ever, but with a significant reservation. The outcome of the war must not permit Japan to dictate the exclusion of American interests in China, despite what Roosevelt had told Takahira the year before. Just before his death, Hay had brought to Roosevelt's attention the sagging affairs of the American-China Development Company. Committed to build a railroad between Hankow and Canton, the company had violated its charter by allowing control to pass to Belgian entrepreneurs while completing only 28 out of 850 miles of the road in five years. The Chinese had informed Hay in December 1904 that the concession was forfeited. Interpreting American prestige in China as being at stake, Roosevelt besought J. P. Morgan to insist on having the concession extended, but Morgan thought otherwise and withdrew—obtaining a 100% profit from the Chinese government.³¹

That same year—1905—E. H. Harriman, the American railroad builder, undertook steps to buy out the Southern Manchurian and the Chinese Eastern railroads in order “to save the commercial interests of the United States from being entirely wiped from the Pacific Ocean in the future.” Japanese opposition brought the plan to naught the following year. Subsequent attempts to deal with the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Russians to clear the way for American management of the Manchurian railroads, although backed by Roosevelt, came to nothing with Harriman's death in 1909.³² The Japanese and the Russians went

³⁰*Ibid.*, 1099, footnote.

³¹The extent to which Roosevelt was pro-Japanese, cautious, or anti-Russian is revealed in his instructions to George von Lengerke Meyer, soon to be appointed Ambassador to Russia, instructing him to be prepared to talk over the situation with a member of the English embassy from whom Roosevelt had gained “better information than I have ever gained from our own people abroad, save [two exceptions]...”. Considering that Britain had a formal alliance with Japan, Roosevelt's reliance on British sources to inform a newly-appointed diplomat is indicative of his acceptance of Japan's anti-Russian role. Mark A. DeWolfe Howe, *George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services* (New York, 1920), 111; Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, 200-11.

³²George F. Kennan, *E. H. Harriman: A Biography* (2 Vols., Boston, [c.] 1922), II, Chapter XVIII.

on to sign a convention in 1910 to freeze all other countries out of Manchuria.

This brief period between the acquisition of the Philippines and the Russo-Japanese War found the United States confronted with the necessity of formulating a policy for Eastern Asia which would permit individual American interests to function in that part of the world, particularly in China. The terms of the Open Door Policy, accompanied by Russian penetration of China, marks the beginning of concrete Russian-American antagonism, as the economic interest of the two countries confronted each other in Manchuria and northern China. At the turn of the century the "problem" of Asia for the United States was the fact that we could relate ourselves to China only in terms of what appeared to be the inevitable domination of much of China by Russia. The only apparent alternative to being frozen out was to ally ourselves with those nations capable and willing to interpose their power between Russia and China. But most of the Americans whose views have been set forth here realized that American opinion would not countenance anything smacking of entangling alliances in Eastern Asia. Brooks Adams alone thought that America could of itself forestall Russian domination of China. Hence the opportunity to try to bring about a China independent of Russia, probably at the cost of writing Manchuria off as lost to Chinese suzerainty, was not seized. Japan's effort to do what the United States did not attempt to do, in conjunction with others or unilaterally, came to grief in 1945, suggesting the wisdom of the American refusal to make the effort.

In the 1960s the gray zone of the border lands of inner Asia has again become an area of considerable interest to American policy makers. When the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China signed a treaty of friendship in 1950, thereby apparently slamming the open door shut for once and all, Captain Mahan's apprehension of "a politically effective" China, powerful in its own right, seemed to be realized. The United States found itself not only excluded from China but virtually alone and without allies in trying to stay in Asia, even on the perimeter. As the Chinese shouldered the burden of fighting in Korea, secured the withdrawal of the Russians from Manchuria, occupied Tibet,

imposed a border settlement on Burma, and invaded India, it appeared possible that the borders of inner Asia would in time be those deemed desirable by the Peoples Republic of China, and that China would go on to strike a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union regarding its northern and western borders that would confirm modern China's ability to handle her own interests in her own way.

However, the disclosure to the world of the nature and extent of the dispute between Russia and China in the last few years, accompanied by Russian determination to maintain its influence in autonomous Outer Mongolia, continued aid to India, and acceptance of refugees from Sinkiang, emphasizes that China, for all of its recently acquired strength, is still not in a position to write her own ticket on border settlements. Is it, therefore, entirely out of the question, however unlikely it may appear at the moment, that the Peoples Republic of China, acting in her own interests, might seek to set in motion some sort of rapprochement with the United States that would re-open the door to this country on terms acceptable to both countries, with or without the concurrence of the Soviet Union?³³ If the need for a make-weight against the Soviet Union in 1964 is less obvious than it was against Tsarist Russia in 1904 (before the Russo-Japanese War), it is still possible that in order to lock the back door, China might invite company in the front:

'For the unexpected, gods always find a way
This is what the gods did here, today.'³⁴

³³The speech of Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman in December 1963 seemingly gave the instigating role to the United States rather than the Peoples Republic of China; although Mr. Hilsman has since denied any alteration of U. S. policy was intended. Whatever the intention of the U.S., China, as far as I know, did not respond to the overture. *New York Times*, 12 Jan., 1964.

³⁴Guy Wint, *Common Sense About China* (New York, 1960), 176. As 1964 opens it would seem that President DeGaulle is prepared to assist the gods.

TWO THEMES IN BURMESE CULTURE¹

by

E. PENDLETON BANKS

INTRODUCTION

ONE OF the most fruitful approaches to the study of culture that anthropologists have tried during the last three decades is the structural approach. The key to the problem of accounting for the specific and diverse features of human cultures is seen as assuming that a culture—Navaho, Chinese, French—has a definite structure and in devising ways of analyzing and describing that structure. If sufficiently objective and systematic ways can be found and the structure of a number of cultures can be analyzed and described, either the task of explaining cultural features has been accomplished or at least has been made easier.

The structural approach has emerged slowly from the efforts of a number of anthropologists; sometimes it has appeared as a by-product of descriptive ethnography (as when Dutch ethnologists were almost forced into a structural way of thinking by the characteristics of Indonesia culture),² sometimes as a consequence of a prior theoretical commitment (as in the case of Clyde Kluckhohn).³ There has been no single line of development, no special school of thought, and as a result there is still no generally accepted terminology or collection of techniques.

¹A paper with the same title was read at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Chicago, November 1962; the present article represents a considerably expanded and revised version. I wish to express my gratitude to the U. S. Educational Foundation in Burma and the Fulbright Program of the Department of State, the Graduate Council of Wake Forest College and the Public Health Service for financial support, and to Miss Katie Ku, Dr. Hla Bu, Dr. Khin Maung Win, Dr. Jane R. Hanks and Dr. F. K. Lehman for assistance and suggestions.

²See Rassers 1959.

³C. Kluckhohn 1951.

Ruth Benedict was one of the pioneers in the field; in a series of papers⁴ she called attention to the need for a new approach to the study of American Indian cultures to supplement the conventional ethnohistorical and trait-distribution methods that had prevailed. Her research culminated in a book⁵ that broadened the scope of the new approach by applying it to non-Indian cultures and that incidentally appealed to a wide audience.

It is certain, however, that the work of Benedict and many other structuralists was stimulated by the anthropologist and linguist Edward Sapir. Impressed by the fertility of the concept of structure when applied to language, Sapir made frequent suggestions about applying similar concepts to the analysis of culture, although he published no systematic body of work along these lines.⁶ In the background too was A. L. Kroeber, whose lifelong insistence on the relative autonomy of culture had an influence on many.⁷

Following Benedict's explorations a number of anthropologists proceeded to use the structural approach on a variety of bodies of data, usually making in the process some conceptual modifications and improvements in technique. Gregory Bateson worked out an elaborate scheme in the course of studying a culture in New Guinea, contributing a demonstration of the desirability of separating cognitive and affective structures.⁸ Morris E. Opler selected a single insight from the structural approach—the assumption that most of the details of a culture can be seen as expressions of a limited number of themes, or basic assumptions—and applied it systematically to several variants of Apache culture.⁹

One variation that developed in the basic strategy of structural research was an emphasis on the study of values. In a sense the search for the values of a culture is simply a search for those things—objects, persons, behaviors—that the culture considers important, a search that is implicit in any structural analysis

⁴Benedict 1923, 1930 and 1932.

⁵Benedict 1934.

⁶Sapir 1949.

⁷See Kroeber 1952.

⁸Bateson 1936.

⁹Opler 1945 and 1946.


of a culture. In another sense, though, the introduction of the term "values" introduced a new approach, if only because of the philosophic implications of the word itself. A whole new set of propositions suggested themselves, some derived from the age-old controversies among philosophers: what is the difference between facts and values? Are such categories commensurable? Can values be studied empirically? Are values absolute or relative?

Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn and their associates have pursued the search for values perhaps as assiduously as any.¹⁰ They were responsible for introducing a number of ideas in this connection; for example, the concept of "value orientation" in which a culture is thought of as containing a number of value orientations, each composed of a mixture of assumptions about reality, goods or purposes, and positive and negative evaluations of behavior. Analyzing the structure of a culture consists of identifying and stating the principal value orientations of that culture. F. Kluckhohn emphasized the important point that most cultures contain more than a single set of value orientations, a healthy corrective to the naive assumption that a society can consist of a number of people who share the same outlook on everything. (This point has been clarified also by A. F. C. Wallace.)¹¹ C. Kluckhohn urged the desirability of separating the normative patterns of a culture from the behavioral patterns, and studying them separately; he showed convincingly that much of the confusion in studying culture is caused by the failure to consider these two kinds of patterns separately.

So far we have been concerned mainly with the work of American anthropologists. To a great extent the structural approach has been the product of American thought. The British anthropologists under the influence of Radcliffe Brown and Malinowski have tended to focus on social structure rather than on culture; thus, when they talk of "structure" it is the ordering of relations among people that they mean, and this tends to divert their attention from the problems that Americans have been preoccupied with. On the other hand, they have discovered that some social structures can best be explained in terms of the under-

¹⁰C. Kluckhohn 1941, 1943, 1956 and 1958; F. Kluckhohn 1950; and F. Kluckhohn and Strodbeck 1961.

¹¹A.F.C. Wallace 1961.



lying world-view of the cultures in question, and some of their work in laying bare such world-views has brought them close to the American point of view after all.¹²

Another school of thought is represented almost entirely by one man: Claude Lévi-Strauss, who boldly entitled a collection of theoretical essays *Structural Anthropology*.¹³ Influenced by Durkheim and heavily exposed to American anthropological literature he seems however to have developed his ideas about structure independently. According to a statement in his volume of memoirs,¹⁴ he arrived at his position from an early interest in geology: structure in a culture is a hidden phenomenon that accounts for visible details in much the same way that in geology the nature of the underlying rock formations determines the soil, vegetation, drainage and other surface features. This position is not far from the one held by Benedict, Opler *et al*; what is strikingly original about the work of Lévi-Strauss is the method by which he proposes to search for the underlying structure. He leans heavily on art, ritual and myth, finding in them the key to a culture. The behavior of men, he suggests, is a series of messages in code; the task of the anthropologist is to translate these messages, and in order to do that he must first discover the code that is being used. He finds myths especially rich in evidence leading to the decoding of cultures, and has developed a brilliant technique for their analysis.¹⁵

THE STRUCTURE OF BURMESE CULTURE

I have been attempting for some time to apply the structural approach to the study of Burmese culture, and the purpose of this paper is to present some of the results of this work. I am not ready to present more than a highly tentative and preliminary statement of some aspects of Burmese culture; the work is far from completion. There are many problems connected with the study of Burmese culture: inadequate documentation and the geographic remoteness of the subject are two obvious handicaps.

¹²Fortes 1959.

¹³Lévi-Strauss 1958b.

¹⁴Lévi-Strauss 1961.

¹⁵Lévi-Strauss 1955 and 1958a.

In addition there are all the problems inherent in taking methods that, like most anthropological techniques, have been developed in the study of relatively simple non-literate cultures and attempting to use them in the study of a high culture. To give an example: if it is misleading to think of the least sophisticated "primitive" culture as a single unified whole, how much more bewildering diversity is one likely to encounter in a culture such as that of Burma, with its regional, class and occupational variations? How can one mind grasp, or one statement encompass, all of the significant variations in values and premises, theory and practice, that exist in such a society? These are serious difficulties and I would not minimize them; still the job seems worth attempting.

One thing that encouraged me was the admittedly subjective impression that despite regional variations there is a distinctive Burmese culture. Many of the details of the culture, of course, can be found in neighboring countries, but the combination found in Burma is always distinctive. In religion, for example, there is a certain homogeneity throughout most of Southeast Asia; yet an experienced traveler who was set down in a Burmese pagoda would not be in any danger of thinking he was in Thailand or Cambodia (even without the clue of language). The regional variations within Burma are interesting and significant for close analysis; but Burmese culture is enough of a "great tradition" to retain its unity. It has been helped by such institutions as that of the *pwe*, the travelling show, which brings to villagers and city dwellers alike a mixture of drama, music and dancing that serves to perpetuate a standardized version of court life, among other things. For the literate, always a high proportion of the population of Burma, literature both classical and popular performs much the same function.

While living in Burma in 1960-61 I had an opportunity to visit a number of pagodas and monasteries, ranging in time and space from the well-preserved ruins of Pagan, dating from the 11th and 12th centuries, to buildings still under construction in Mandalay and Rangoon. The architecture of these buildings and the arts of painting, sculpture, etc., that embellish them show a remarkable continuity over the centuries. To be sure there have been changes in style and technique, but the underlying

continuity parallels and demonstrates the conservatism of Burmese culture in general.

It occurred to me that it might be possible to see in the art and architecture of Burma some clue to the structure of Burmese culture. There are obvious correlations between the art and some other aspects of the culture, in which specific traits are depicted or echoed in artistic form; the pagodas are full of religious symbolism, for example. What I had in mind was something less explicit, some general theme or themes that would be suggested by pervasive characteristics of form.

Before long it became apparent that the art and architecture could be described by two sets of terms that are easily distinguished. Some features clearly could be described by such terms as simple, symmetrical, uncomplicated, austere. Others suggested such terms as elaborate, complicated, asymmetrical, even gaudy or grotesque. Examples of the first type would be the ground-plan and overall design of the square temples of the Pagan period, with their cruciform internal passages, four symmetrical images facing the cardinal directions, neatly graduated terraces, etc.; also the stupas found in many modern pagodas with a radially symmetrical shape and a general simplicity of design. Examples of the second type would be the grotesque statues of demons and mythical animals that are found at most pagodas and the proliferation of wood or metal "gingerbread" work on many religious structures.

We are not merely dealing with two different schools of architecture. The two types frequently occur together. Much of the statuary, frescoes and other embellishments of the Pagan temples must be classified with the second type, leading some observers to speak of "wedding cake" architecture, while most modern pagodas contain numerous auxiliary buildings, carvings, etc., of the second type.

If these two types or styles of art are taken as representing two themes in Burmese culture it is not difficult to find expressions of them in other aspects of the culture. (Technically these are not themes in the sense in which Opler uses the term; they are not so much "postulates or positions" as they are motifs or elements of ethos. They are non-discursive elements, to use the

terminology of Susanne K. Langer,¹⁶ whereas Opler's themes can be stated in propositional, discursive form. It is expected, however, that ultimately these points can be stated more discursively, and the present terminology will be retained for convenience. The general motif of simplicity, symmetry, austerity will be designated Theme I; the opposite motif will be known as Theme II.) To begin with religion, which many regard as the key to Burmese culture, the Theravada Buddhism that prevails in Burma provides many examples of patterns that belong with Theme I. The doctrines and rituals emphasize simplicity and austerity, while avoiding the extremes of asceticism and self-torture that are found in some neighboring religions. Both monks and laymen are enjoined to avoid extravagance and intemperance, and much space is taken up in the scriptures with detailed prohibitions; the Vinaya, one of the three parts of the Tripitaka, is entirely concerned with monastic discipline. At the same time this school of Buddhism eschews elaborate theology and fantastic mythology (with some exceptions), basing its spiritual life on a series of simply phrased principles, the holy eight-fold path: right views, right intentions, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. The principal activity of a Buddhist should be meditation on the truths as set forth by the founder; and it is all made explicit by the relative austerity of Buddha images.

For examples of Theme II, on the other hand, it is necessary to look no further than that aspect of Burmese religion known as *nat*-worship. The world is peopled with *nats* or spirits in large numbers and their propitiation occupies much of the time of the Burmese. The pictures and statues of *nats* always portray them in elaborate and fantastic costumes and surrounded by objects such as swords or tigers that are grotesque or frightening. Nothing could show more of a contrast with the calm, simple representations of the Buddha. The myths that accompany *nat*-worship are full of violent and extravagant events: poisonings, assassinations, betrayals. The myth concerning Min Mahagiri and Taunggyi Shin, the two spirits who are supposed to live on Mt. Popa and who are worshipped as leaders among the thirty-seven principal *nats* will

¹⁶Langer 1948.

serve as an example. They were brother and sister; the brother was a blacksmith of superhuman strength who caused earthquakes when he smote his anvil. An envious and fearful king plotted against the smith, finally luring him to destruction by marrying his sister. The king had the smith tied to a tree and burned to death, whereupon the sister threw herself into the flames. The two spirits lived in the tree and brought death to all who came near; and when the king had the tree cut down and cast into the Irrawaddy River it was rescued by people downstream and carved into images of the spirit pair. These images were installed on Mt. Popa.¹⁷

While much of *nat*-worship involves activities similar to those of Buddhism, such as visits to shrines and simple offerings of flowers or food, one aspect of the complex stands in striking contrast to the serene, unemotional approach to the Buddha. This is the practice of employing mediums, known as *natkadaws*, to communicate with the *nats* on certain occasions. These women go into trances, speak with the voice of the appropriate *nat*, dance, sing and in general behave in abnormal fashion. One *nat*, for example, was noted for drinking and dissipation while on this earth; a *natkadaw* who specializes in communicating with him will give a dramatic imitation of a drunkard.

Many other aspects of Burmese supernaturalism illustrate Theme II. Not all of these can be identified either with Buddhism or *nat*-worship. The practice of alchemy has until recently been a serious pursuit in Burma, and it involves unusual behavior on the part of the would-be alchemist, to say the least. At one point he must allow himself to be buried alive for seven days. When successful he can not only transmute base metals into gold but also live forever, fly through the air, and enjoy pleasures of the flesh with complete freedom.¹⁸

If we turn to the social structure and everyday social life of Burma we find other expressions of the two themes; and as in the case of religion and supernaturalism, they are sometimes carefully segregated and sometimes inextricably combined. An example

¹⁷For descriptions of *nat*-worship see Htin Aung 1962 and Temple 1906.

¹⁸See Htin Aung 1962 and Nash 1963a.

of segregation would be the explicit distinction made between the *Thanga*, or monastic order, and the laity. The normative patterns associated with the *Thanga* require (as pointed out above) behavior that is governed almost entirely by Theme I, and actual behavior conforms rather closely to the patterns. Monks must avoid worldly pleasures and lead a quiet life; there are at least two schools of thought among the *Thanga*, however, differing mainly as to the strictness of the regimen that must be followed. But the differences appear minute to the outsider: should monks wear sandals and smoke cheroots? Does the rule that prohibits eating after noon include tea drinking? The laity, on the other hand, needs only observe the simple commandments against lying, stealing, taking life, using intoxicants and lascivious behavior. In practice, of course, many laymen are pious and avoid worldly temptations as assiduously as the monks; but many Burmese are fond of gambling and other extravagances forbidden to the monks, and most Burmese take great pleasure in attending *pwees*, or theatrical performances, which include low comedy, secular music and dancing, etc.—in short, expressions of Theme II.¹⁹

Other aspects of the social structure illustrate the themes; for example, the contrast between the simple, unsophisticated, relatively democratic social structure of the villages and the elaborate, formalistic structure of the royal capital. However, this kind of contrast seems to be inevitable in a peasant society that is governed by a monarchy and little is gained by “explaining” it in terms of themes.

A look at Burmese personality traits reveals a series of polar contrasts that fit the formulation of themes very neatly. Numerous observers have described the “typical” Burmese personality as containing a paradoxical mixture of two sets of traits. On the one hand, the Burmese are described as being cheerful, spontaneous and carefree; on the other, as being sensitive, aggressive, cruel. Lucian Pye, in a recent study of cultural and personality factors in Burmese politics,²⁰ lists a series of paradoxes in Burmese personality: gentleness vs. violence, need for controls vs. fear of

¹⁹For a detailed and on the whole sympathetic description of traditional Burmese social life see Scott 1963.

²⁰Pye 1962.

provoking others to violence, inaction vs. overaction, and *anahde* vs. *awza*. *Anahde* is an untranslatable expression often heard as an explanation of Burmese behavior that seems passive and lacking in initiative; it implies that one failed to act out of consideration for another, to avoid causing him embarrassment or loss of face. *Awza* means roughly the same as *charisma*; it is the power, the personal aura, of a natural leader, who incidentally will be praised for action that violates the rule of *anahde*.

DISCUSSION

If the structural approach has any value as applied here to Burmese culture it will be in the explanations it suggests and the questions it raises, both for Burmese culture in particular and for the theory of culture in general. I should like to discuss a few of these explanations and questions without claiming an exhaustive coverage.

Why do we find these two themes in Burmese culture? The most obvious explanation is suggested by the fact already mentioned that Theme I is associated with Buddhism and Theme II with other forms of religious and supernatural belief and practice: Theme II represents a historically older stratum of culture overlain by an imported religion that embodies Theme I rather explicitly. History supports this explanation by dating the arrival of Theravada Buddhism in the heart of Burma during the reign of Anawrahta in the 11th century and by emphasizing the contrast between the new religion and the corrupt practices of the Ari monks who were superseded, and by describing the efforts of Anawrahta to stamp out *nat*-worship. But a careful reading reveals that this history is heavily infused with myth; it represents a Burmese attempt to explain some of the contrasts in their own culture and carries the truth of symbolism rather than of literal fact. Buddhism (as other versions of Burmese history, as well as what is known of the history of South and Southeast Asia in general make clear) in various forms was introduced into Burma long before Anawrahta, and the old religion was probably not as bad, nor the new religion as good, as the myth would have us believe. Furthermore, it has already been pointed out that the cleavage between Buddhism and *nat*-worship is far from clear-

cut, with expressions of Theme II turning up in Buddhist contexts. Thus, if the historical explanation were accepted and we assumed that everything associated with Theme II is ancient and indigenous while everything associated with Theme I is modern and imported, we would be led into many erroneous conclusions about specific details. The situation is complicated by the fact that later importations—for example, dance and the drama, most forms dating from the conquest of Ayuthia (Siam) in the 18th century—are rich in expressions of Theme II.²¹

A psychological explanation for the contrasts in Burmese personality has been suggested by Pye, based on the work of several psychologists and anthropologists. The personality traits are seen as the product of certain incidents in the socialization process of Burmese children. Early permissiveness is followed by capricious vacillation between attention and indifference on the part of the mother. The carefree boy is disciplined in school, and other events in adolescence reinforce the earlier experiences and leave the Burmese male, at least, with a mixture of generalized optimism and a specific distrust of human relationships.²² My chief criticism of this formulation is that it is based on hasty and superficial interpretations of inadequate data. In terms of current psychological theory it makes sense, but we do not know whether it really applies to Burma. There is also considerable doubt if all aspects of any culture can be explained in purely psychological terms. Often it is much easier to see the personality of the individual as being influenced by the art, literature, and religious dogma of a culture than it is to see these sometimes ancient and enduring patterns as the expression of something as tenuous as the "typical personality" or "basic personality."

Some light is shed on the problem, however, if we look at the two themes as representing not merely two historical traditions or two conflicting collections of personality traits but as two states, or conditions, between which individuals may move. There is, for example, the *amok*-like pattern of most Burmese homicide in which a previously quiet, dutiful, even pious person suddenly breaks and lays about him with a *dah* (sword or bushknife) until

²¹See Nash 1963b.

²²Pye 1962.

he is subdued—or, more likely, killed. There is the interesting pattern of relatively free alternation between the *Thanga* and the laity, whereby a man may enter or leave the monastery with a minimum of difficulty, undergoing drastic changes of status that in most societies would be either impossible or highly restricted. There is the fact that individual Burmese could and did move freely from the world of the village to the world of the royal court; many kings began life as peasants or servants, and there was no stable aristocracy. And there is the well known pattern of the individual life cycle, in which a person is expected to be worldly and indulge in behavior of the Theme II variety in youth but to become more pious and to observe the Theme I rules of Buddhism in old age.

We might go further and take the position that most cultures can be analyzed as the product or embodiment of conflicting themes. What is distinctive about a specific culture is thus not the presence of a paradox as such but rather which paradox is emphasized. It is customary to analyze Western European culture in terms of the conflict between reason and feeling—reason is displayed in opposition to faith, intuition or passion in much of European thought and literature and art, and the classic debates between philosophers, theologians and politicians are typically phrased in terms of this opposition. If my formulation of Burmese themes is correct we would not expect a Burmese to think in terms of this opposition or to understand readily what some of the great controversies in our history were about.

Much remains to be done before the structural approach as applied to Burmese culture can be fully tested. A more detailed analysis of the culture must be made, searching for other expressions of the themes that have been postulated as well as for other themes, possibly even other polar contrasts. Following Lévi-Strauss we would expect a thorough analysis of myth and folktale to be illuminating, along with a study of the symbolism inherent in ritual practice. The morphology of the language must be analyzed to discover the classification of phenomena that it, like all languages, contains implicitly. This is a promising line of research. The fact that Burmese is morphologically very different from Pali, the language in which Theravada Buddhism

took form and was presented to the Burmese, suggests an explanation for the changes that Buddhism and other Indian patterns underwent in Burmese hands. The goal is a deeper understanding of Burmese culture and hopefully of cultural structure and process in general.

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THE RISE OF MODERN LITERARY MOVEMENTS IN
KOREA : 1880-1935
A STUDY OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON
LITERATURE

by

CHANGBOH CHEE

LITERATURE, AS an abstract and artistic expression of man and place, reflects and interprets society. The primary interest of this paper is to present and discuss the rise and the trends of modern literary movements in Korea, their continuity and growth in relationship to the underlying total socio-cultural conditions which seem, to a great extent, to have influenced the popular themes, characters, and symbolic expressions presented in literary writings by major writers of the periods.

Modern literary movements in Korea cover a period of about fifty years, from 1880 to 1935. This period roughly covers those years in which Korean writing is characterized by literary movements as such. In the 1880's the door to the Hermit Kingdom was opened to western influences for the first time. Under the impact of foreign culture and literary norms the old conventions of the traditional literature were abandoned. Korea's literary history from the 1880's becomes a series of movements reflecting the changing patterns of the society. By the middle of the 1930's, approximately by 1935, these movements as such had virtually come to a standstill because of the pressure of the Japanese suppression being exerted on Korea, especially on Korean intellectuals, at that time.

These modern literary movements have been shaped by two powerful social and cultural influences; one, the flow of western philosophical thought and its reflected influences in Korean

literary movements and the other, the turbulent currents of social and cultural change within Korea itself.

Korea's own social and cultural history during this period is characterized by her assimilation of western influences. There is a marked tendency to compress and accelerate the various western movements into much shorter periods of time than we find in the maturation of the European and American literary movements. There is also the tendency to assimilate western influences as they become compatible expressions of Korean attitudes and sentiments arising from her own social and cultural history. This tendency makes Korea's modern literary movements frequently depart from the same order of development we find in the European influences on American literary movements which follow the European pattern fairly consistently up to W. W. II.

The modern literary era in Korea began with the Enlightenment Movement. This was a period in Korean history characterized by a passionate but blind zeal for new things and ideas from the West. This first literary movement was followed by a second movement known as "National Independence" literature which expressed the struggle and agony of the Korean people in their efforts to achieve independence after Japan's conquest of Korea in 1910. When Korea's struggle for independence failed in 1919, the Korean intellectuals reacted to their despair and disillusionment which contributed to the rise of a third literary movement, Naturalism. Naturalism followed western deterministic philosophy and analytical or scientific thought about human life and social reality. The naturalistic literature was often expressed in the form of realism in style by pursuing a realistic interpretation of man and his world. Naturalism was expressed in dichotomous reactions to the defeat of the National Independence movement in 1919. One aspect was a cool, cynical approach to life that revealed itself in a decadent nihilistic literature; the other was romantic in reacting to the cold naturalism and to the cynical nihilism and was characterized by its romantic escape into the fantasy kingdom of the "White Tide" group. In the middle of the 1920's both the decadent literature and the romantic literature were challenged by "Social Literature" in which the writers expressed their social concern and self-

involvement with the betterment of the society. This trend formed an ardent action-centered Proletarian literary movement which unfortunately, ended prematurely in 1935 under the external suppression of the Japanese imperialistic policies in Korea. After the tragic ending of this literary movement there was no well defined literary movement as such up to 1945, the national emancipation from Japan's domination.

Modern literature is synonymous with "new" literature in the context of Far Eastern languages; new in contrast to old. The movement of "new" literature in Korea was a series of rebellions: rebellion against the old traditional feudalistic life pattern and rebellion and protest against social and political adversity and despair. It is no surprise to notice that the modern literary movements began with the upsurging westernization or modernization campaign of the society. These movements played an extremely important role in the social and political movements of the country. Korea, then called the Hermit Kingdom, was forced to open her doors to the outside world, following the painful Kangwha Incident which forced Korea to open her door to Japan in 1876.¹

The "open-door" brought significant changes in the society self-realization of her own backwardness and weakness, the creation of a burning hunger for western style education, and the aspiration of the young generation to acquire western knowledge or new ideas to combat Korea's own backwardness. These influences formed the Enlightenment or the modernization movement which was then sweeping national sentiments. This modernization movement was formally spelled out in the form of government decrees by the Kabo Social and Political Revolution in 1894² under the leadership of King Kozong, Taewongun and the premier, Kim Hongjip, in their attempt to rescue the

¹Korea concluded (open-door) treaties with Japan in 1876, with the U. S. A. in 1882, with Britain and Germany in 1883, with Russia and Italy in 1884, with France in 1886, and with other major western powers soon after.

²It was the last drastic reform attempted by the declining Yi Dynasty (1392-1910). It included such reform items as: denunciation of the ancient social class system of Yangban and Sangnom; prohibition of early marriage practices as well as traditional family arranged marriage system; permission for the remarriage of widows; prohibition of the Shaman practice of the superstition cult; and the like.

nation and maintain her national sovereignty and integrity. This national zeal penetrated into every facet of the society and of the literature, quickly prompting young minds to grasp new progressive ideas and to free themselves from old feudalistic ideologies.

The first phase of modern literature appeared as the "new novel" in its structure and as the Enlightenment novel in its motivation. This Enlightenment movement was led by such authors as Yi Injik, Yi Haejo, and Choe Chansik, all then ardent champions of western civilization. Reflecting the above-mentioned social and cultural milieu, new novels of these writers, without exception, created almost identical characters in similar themes and similar philosophies, such as: a happy ending for the young people who struggle successfully against the bondage of traditional social customs and go abroad to study; a western educated young man who is always good, right and victorious; the depiction of a contrast between father and son in their old and new world perspectives with symbolic dialogues between the age-old traditional moral doctrines and the new ideas of individual freedom; obvious rebellion against the practice of early marriages imposed by the family-arranged marriage system; advocacy of free association between the sexes and equality of men and women. To illustrate only a few examples of the Enlightenment novels, *The Tears of Blood* (1906), the first novel in the new style, by Yi Injik, emphatically expresses these set themes through creating the leading character, Okryon, a girl who triumphantly carries out her ambition to study in Tokyo, Japan, and Washington, D.C., both capital cities of advanced nations. She and a young student, Ku Wanso, decry the old family-arranged marriage system and become advocates of free-choice marriage at the end. Yi Injik, in his most controversial novel, *The Voice of the Devil*, fiercely attacks the old system of marriage by letting the leading character, Kang, an ignorant common man, murder a nobleman. Kang, at the end of the story, exclaims that one of the greatest crimes he ever committed in his life was the crime of having sold his daughter to a nobleman as a concubine. He murders the nobleman as an expression of his new consciousness of his daughter as a human being deserving of humane treatment and equal status. Contrast between old and new ideologies was characterized

through all of Yi Injik's writings including his other major works : *Pheasant Hill* (1912), *The Silvery World*, and *The Plum in the Snow*. Yi Injik was followed by other writers of his contemporaries in a similar vein.³ Among these, Yi Haejo's *The Liberty Bell* deserves special attention because the leading characters in this novel are all housewives, symbolically protesting the old conception about women's status and inspiring emancipation of women, who toll the "liberty bell" for freedom and equality of women.

From a strictly literary viewpoint, however, the "new novel" movement in this pioneer period was not more than a naive and immature attempt to produce literary works, only by amplifying or directly preaching national motives. Nevertheless, according to Lim Hwa,⁴ a literary critic in a later period, we can not underestimate its lasting contribution as a transitional literature bridging between the old and the new : first, by adopting the descriptive style departing from the old traditional narrative style which, was mainly story-telling of the past; second, by developing fictional literature in contemporary settings with present-day problems and characters in contrast to myths and legendary stories of the old literature; and third, by bravely adopting the colloquial prose style in Korea's own written language, Onmun,⁵ divorcing itself from the traditional Chinese verse style which had been the only acceptable literary writing in the past. It thus paved the way to the future development of full-fledged modern fiction and poetry in the 1910's which marked the second stage of the modern literary movement.

The "Enlightenment" literary movement was superseded by a strongly nationalistic movement in literature resulting from a reaction to Japan's occupation of Korea in 1910. As the title

³Among them, Yi Haejo and Choe Chanshik were notably outstanding for the following novels: by Yi, *The Blood of Flowers*, *The Liberty Bell*, *The Screen of Peonies*, *The Voice of the Devil*, *The Devil-Chase Sword*; and by Choe, *The Beams of Autumn Moon*, *A Dream in the Spring etc.*

⁴Lim Hwa, *Shin Munhak Sa* (A History of New Literature), Seoul, Korea, 1939. (in Korean)

⁵Onmun (meaning "vernacular writing") or Han'gul (meaning "Korean letters") is a phonetic language consisting of 24 phonetic symbols; 10 vowels and 14 consonants. This written language of Korea was created and developed by King Sejong and was officially adopted by royal decree in 1446. Unfortunately, the importance of the Korean phonetic language was not recognized until the time of the new literature movement in the late 19th century.

of Yi Kwangsu's novel, *Mujong* (*The Heartless*), published in 1917. indicates, the 1910's was a heartless and heart-breaking period in the history of the country. Contrary to high hopes and strenuous efforts, Korea fell to the Japanese conquest. Korea's struggle for national integrity and independence from Japan continued to grow and especially, after the W.W.I., Korea was deeply inspired by western democracy and ardently desired to regain her independence. This desire formed a strong nationalism which was reflected in the literature, as well as in all other facets of the country's life, and this period can well be named the "Independence Literature" era.

Circumstances were extremely adverse in Korea. Japan deprived Koreans of many human rights, politically, economically, and culturally. To mention only a few restrictive measures by the Japanese military government—by the so-called "Assembly" law of 1911, the rights of the press, assembly and free speech were eliminated; by the "Land Reallocation" decree of 1910, most of the agrarian land was exploited by the East Cultivation Company controlled by Japanese firms; and, Japanese suppression was manifested in the use of fear and in the exercise of brutality in making arrests of intellectuals with "Dangerous thoughts and ideas."

Amidst the adverse circumstances, major moods and themes in the literature of the 1910's were characterized by the desire for national independence and political freedom and liberty. The two most influential literary figures of this period were Yi Kwangsu and Choe Nam-son—Choe Nam-son through his poetry in the vernacular and Yi Kwangsu through his poetry and more importantly through his new style of fiction.⁶

⁶Choe Nam-son started his literary activities at the very early age of 19 by publishing a literary magazine for the young generation titled *Sonyon* or *The Boy* in 1908. Through this publication he established the use of the vernacular in poetry, divorcing it from the Chinese verse style, and he also inspired the youth of the country with nationalistic idealism. Yi Kwangsu, a contemporary of Choe, also started his literary life at an early age beginning with his short story, "To Our Young Friends" in 1914. As one of the most outstanding and influential literary figures in the history of modern literature in Korea, Yi continuously produced countless literary works up to the national tragedy of the Korean War in 1950, at which time he was taken north of the 38° parallel. He left more than twenty long novels such as, *Mujong* (*The Heartless*), *Chaesaeng* (*Revival*), *Kaechokja* (*The Pioneer*), *Hulk* (*The Soil*), *Sahrhang* (*Love*) and countless short stories, essays, poems, and literary critics. He is also credited with the use of the vernacular and the Korean written language, Hangul or Onmun.

The first prose work expressively directed towards inspiring the nationalistic spirit was a short story, "To Our Young Friends," written by Yi Kwangsu in 1914. However, the era of modern literature did not fully develop, in the strict sense of literature, until the publication of Yi Kwangsu's *Mujong* (The Heartless). *Mujong* or *The Heartless*, his first long novel, was the most important and epoch-making masterpiece of this time for this novel employed the new style of fiction writing with no remnants of the traditional style nor the age-old Oriental moral preaching of reprimanding vice and rewarding virtue. As author, Yi Kwangsu himself argues:⁷ he established literature as an independent artistic activity of artists rather than as a side-line hobby of leisure-class scholars as it had been in the past. Not only did he distinguish literary works from the form of religious or ethical preachings, but he also attempted to create an illusion of reality through the plausibility of his characters rather than maintaining the stereotypes of the old style of fiction.

Mujong was the most symbolic expression of the time and the society in that period. The reader meets various kinds of people in the novel; students, educators, farmers, landowners, ministers, evangelists and even socially ostracized Ki'saeng, or women entertainers, all of whom are equally concerned with the single goal of the country—national independence. There is a heroic and ideal type of social leader who is imbued with the spirit of social consciousness. Serving as the principal of the newly built Taesong School, the first of the people's private institutes in Korea, he delivers inspiring lectures every evening to students and common people. This heroic leader is, of course, imprisoned by Japanese police on the charge of subversive anti-Japanese activities and "dangerous thought" (enlightening Korean people for their national integrity). There are equally social-conscious students, Hyongshik and three other girl students, who finally go to Japan and to the United States to grasp new ideas of the West. The reader also meets a very attractive girl character, Wolhwa, a woman entertainer, who characterizes a new type of equal and free woman

⁷Li Kwangsu, "A Critique on a Fiction Contest," *Chongchun* (The Youth) a literary magazine, Seoul, Korea, Nov., 1917 (in Korean). This was of his impression and critique on fiction writing after he judged a fiction contest.

daring to expose her romantic love for a student from an aristocratic family.

The "Independence Literature" as a utopian theme came to an abrupt close with the defeat of the Independence Revolt in March of 1919. This drive for political independence was crushed under Japanese arms, resulting in the death of 2,000 Koreans and about 20,000 arrests. Idealistic dreams and promise of national independence and freedom collapsed and the people were once again plunged into cold human reality. After this time the theme of independence was rendered in the minor keys of either romantic escapism or nihilistic naturalism. The theme of political independence was not revitalized in positive tones until the period of socialistic literature in the late 1920's.

Nevertheless, the "March 1st Independence Movement," (March 1, 1919), even if it failed to achieve its primary political objective, brought about new outlook and a new trend for modern literature in Korea. The impact of the Independence Movement upon literature was two-fold: one is external and the other internal. First, externally, it alarmed the Japanese government so effectively that Japan was forced to adopt an appeasement policy by relaxing the rigid military "fear" policy in Korea.⁸ Under a new cultural administration, a relatively relaxed policy, Koreans were allowed for the first time to publish Korea's own language newspapers, the "Choson Ilbo" (The Korea Daily) and the "Tongah Ilbo" (The East Asia Daily). Under such a comparatively favorable atmosphere, literary magazines sprang up as bamboo shoots after a summer shower, thereby giving rise to the name "the era of literary magazines" for the early 1920's. Countless young aspirants for literary fame were given a golden chance to express their talents and were able to organize various literary circles, after a long oppression. Indeed, many of the famed writers in later years made their literary try-outs during this period, such writers as Kim Tongin, Park Chonhwa, Yom Sangsop, Chon Yongtaek, and many others. The

⁸Immediately after the March 1st Independence Movement, Saito Minoru, a civilian was appointed to the post of "Governor in General" in Korea, replacing the military man, Terauchi. Consequently, the military police system was replaced by the civil police system; Japanese government officials and school teachers were prohibited to wear sabers with their uniforms; and local as well as the central administration hired some Korean advisors.

second influence of the Independence Movement was the internal or aesthetic. Literature itself established a new outlook expressed in the theory that literature should be a pure art in itself. This was in defiance of Yi Kwangsu's belief and practice that literature was to be used for the tools of social reform or enlightenment of the people. This "pure art in literature" trend was initiated by a group of young students of literature, then studying in Tokyo, Japan.⁹ They published their own Korean language literary magazine, *Changjo* or *The Creation*, in February of 1919, which accidentally coincided with the outbreak of the national independence movement on March 1 of the same year. Many members of this "Creation Circle" as it came to be known in later years, became famed writers. Their new conception about literature was faithfully explained by Kim Tongin: "Our aim in the Creation Circle then was not to write themes of social reform programs but to depict faithfully the reality of man as it is—his life, his problems, and his agony as man."¹⁰

The "pure art in literature" philosophy of the "Creation Circle" was influential in the third movement of modern Korean literature, Naturalism and also in the fourth literary movement, Romanticism. The Naturalistic movement was characterized by a tendency towards realism in style and naturalism in content. It was a transitional period expressing the developing maturity of Korean literature. This new tendency seemed to have emerged out of the reality of man's world and the deterministic philosophy of the period. Man and his world were no longer the idealistic dreams which had been ardently expressed in the literature of the preceding period. "The Sorrow of the Weak," a short story by Kim Tongin in 1919 was an arrow dipped in the poignant poison of realistic naturalism. Elizabeth, the leading character in the work, was a real person in real society, and she was a product of the social environment. Her seduction by a count was followed by the cold reality of pregnancy and abortion. The realistic description of her psychological moods and fear was especially

⁹The leading figures in the "pure art in literature" (known as Creation) group were; Kim Tongin, Chon Yongtaek, Yom Sangsop, Min Taewon, and Chu Yohan.

¹⁰Kim Tongin, *Kundae Sosol-Ko (A Study of Modern Literature)*, Seoul, 1939.

credible. Such works by the "Creation" group as Chon Yongtaek's "Idiot or Genius?" (1919), "Certain Girl" (1920) by Min Taewon. "Poor Wife" (1921) and "The Trample" (1922) both by Hyon Chinkon, and "Lunatic Flame Sonata" (1920) and "The Mad Painter" (1921) by Kim Tongin and other works in this period resembled very much Oscar Wilde's *Salome* for the aesthetic flavor and Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, de Maupassant's *Une Vil*, and Zola's *The Beast* for their expressions in naturalism.¹¹

The most outstanding writer in the realistic style to express the naturalistic philosophy was Yom Sangsop. Especially, his short story, "The Green Frog in the Specimen Lab," (1921), presents a naturalistic interpretation of man, as we are led to observe a performance of an autopsy of a green frog on an operating table. Yom followed this noted work with numerous short stories, in addition to more than ten long novels written in the realistic and naturalistic vein.

Realistic naturalism already conceived in its own destiny a decadent tendency and it quickly gave way to a form of diletant and often nihilistic literature. Following the failure of the national independence movement the young generation as well as all intellectuals in the society were suddenly thrust into an emotional state of despair, frustration, and melancholy. For instance. Yi Sehmin, the leading character in "The Curtain of Mystery," a short story by Kim Hwan,¹² decries the vanity of the twentieth century saying "I am more attracted by the ancient primitive life than by this so-called civilized world of today." And more eloquently, the following lines from a poem "The Sinking of the Sun"¹³ by Hwang Sokwu may exemplify the decadent nihilism of the period:

The Sun has sunk and
curled up in a cave with no end

¹¹ Some representative works of Yom: "The Green Frog in the Specimen's Lab," (1921), "A Gold Ring" (1924), "Telephone" (1925), "Rice" (1927), "The New Year's Eve" (1922), "The Dark Night" (1922), "Two Minds" (1930), "When The Peony Blossoms" (1933).

¹² Kim Hwan, "The Curtain of Mystery." Changzo (The Creation), Feb., 1919, Tokyo, Japan (in Korean).

¹³ Hwang Sokwu, "The Sinking of the Sun" (poem), *Peh'ho* (The Ruins), July, 1920. Translation by Yi Hy'ongu "Modern literature: poetry" in *Korea: Its Land, People, and Culture of All Ages, Seoul, Korea*, 1960.

As the evening clouds appear like mad
 Leper's foam.

The Sun has sunk
 Amid the darkening eve

Into the sorrowful heart of a maid
 Lost in a wide field.

The Sun is sinking
 As into the hollow eyes of a corpse
 Lying before an alien Altar.

Thus, literary people lived in twilight and dark, yet passionately singing a mysterious charm of despair and sorrow. Such a nihilistic spirit was the overflowing flavor of the time. This despair of the literary people was expressed in their own magazine, *Peh'ho* or *The Ruins* which appeared first in July, 1920, soon after the end of *The Creation* magazine. *The Ruins* was initiated by a number of then rising young men of literature, all of whom ardently expressed a naturalistic and oftentimes a decadent tendency, recalling the French decadent literature of "*Petits poems en prose*" of "*fin de siecle.*" The "Peh'ho" or the "Ruins" Group produced some strikingly nihilistic works including "The New Year's Eve" (1921) and "The Dark Night" (1922) by Yom Sangsop and "A Wretch" (1923) and "A Society Offering Drinks" (1923) by Hyon Ch'inkon. This nihilistic tendency in literature was undoubtedly a reflection of the time. Even after the "appeasement" cultural policy, Japan's gradual but continuing strangulation of Korea pierced into the country like an irresistible poison spreading over the body, numbing bit by bit. An example of this despairing attitude is Yoni's "The Dark Night" in which he portrays an intellectual young man as exhibiting no ambition or purpose in life and no courage to even face life. The young man is held by an attritious inactivity of despair, waiting only for the mask of death to appear and release him from this world of life.

Decadent nihilism in literature was not, however, the only expression of the adversity of the time. The despair of the society was expressed also in another equally important literary movement—Romanticism. The cold reality of society and the deathmask of human life was not everything; to some authors there must be a

bright dawn on the other side of the night screen and there must be a warm bright and green pasture beyond the snow-covered hills. Essentially, to ignore and even to escape from reality in reacting to the then prevailing decadent nihilistic tones in literature, a group of young poets and novelists formed their own circle under the name of "Paekjo" or "The White Tide" which was also the title of their literary association magazine. Riding high on "The White Tide," they started to sing songs of white clouds and blue spring sky rather than grey winter sky, life instead of death, and bright sunshine rather than the waning moon behind dark clouds. Yi Tongwon, then a young champion of romanticism expressed this new attitude in his poem, "I am Still a Youth" (1922).¹⁴

I am still a youth
 My future road is a blue sky
 of ninety-thousand miles high oval
 My life is a red morning sun
 soaring out of the eastern sky.

With such a high fever for romanticism and sentimentalism as this, numerous aspiring young writers appeared on the scene through the magazine, *The White Tide*, pouring out their escapist emotions into poems, poetry, lyrics, immortal love songs and romantic short stories, thus forming the fourth distinctive stage of modern Korean literature. The "White Tide" group members¹⁵ were all young, in their early twenties, characteristically with long hair, and they were champions of the bohemian life flying on the wing of the immortality of love and life.

This aesthetic romanticism could not, however, completely free itself from the grim overtones of decadent or nihilistic pessimism, underlying the morbid desire to escape from human reality. Out of the two trends of the early 1920's; namely, the nihilistic naturalism school and the romanticism school, literature turned to the fifth literary trend around 1923. The new trend was distinguished by its reassertion of the role of literature in society.

¹⁴Translation by the writer of this paper.

¹⁵Major figures of the group were: Yi Tongwon, Yi Sanghwa, Park Chonghwa and Park Yonghi. Some of their well-known poetry is: "To My Chambre," "To A Dream-world" by Li Sanghwa; "A Praise for Death" by Chonghwa; and "A Golden Tower of Illusion" and "The Ward in Moon Beams" by Park Yonghi.

This time, it was not a literature of inaction as the immediately preceding periods had been, but it became an action-inspired and positive literature. This new trend was a decided revolt against the grim naturalism and decadent romanticism of the past. The new direction in literature was a positivism arising from a negation of negation in its mood and in its spirit. This new literary movement was later referred to as the "New Trend" literature which became the predecessor of the politically oriented proletarian literature.

The socialistic literature of the "New Trend" first appeared in the group of "Yomgun Sa" (The Torch-flame Society) in November of 1922. The Society was initiated by some young militant socialistic writers and poets of the "White Tide" Group.¹⁶ Divorcing themselves from the pure romantic philosophy of literature of the "White Tide," the newly formed Society staged a rather obviously pronounced campaign for socialism in literature with their tenet which read, "The objective of the 'Yomgun Sa' is to study and to promote the culture and arts of the people towards liberation of the proletarian class." The young writers of the "Yomgun Sa" Group quickly formed their own literary organ, the *Yomgun* (The Torch-flame) through which they asserted the role of literature to be an important promoter of the proletarian class struggle. The Society thus paved the road to the "New Trend" Literature.

The "New Trend" Literary movement seemed to have reflected the general social sentiments towards socialistic movements in the early 1920's. It was in this period that socialistic activities swept Korea attempting to inspire the masses for a proletarian unity against the capitalistic and imperialistic infiltration of Japan in Korea. This resulted in the organization of various front-line groups,¹⁷ to combat capitalism and to promote a social class consciousness in the masses, rather than to escape into sentimentalism.

¹⁶Some initiators of the "Yomgun Sa" were Cho Myonghi, Han Solva, Lee Kiyong, Song Yong, Park Schyong, Park Palyang, Kim Pokjin, Kim Kijin, Park Chongwha, Yim Chong-jac, Lee Yiksang, Ryang Myong.

¹⁷The Korean Communist Party (formally called The Korean Revolution Party) was formed in 1920 in Shanghai; The Shinkanhoe or the New Stem Association as a unified Independence Front Organization was organized in 1927; The Proletarian Comrade Federation in 1922; The Proletarian Youth Organization in 1922; The Laborer Federation in 1922; and the Korea Labor Cooperative Association in 1922.

Amidst this new ideological setting, the "New Trend" literature became heavily charged with the philosophy of socialistic actions and social revolution. Several members of the romantic "White Tide" group, notably Kim Kijin, Park Yonghi, and Park Chonghwa denounced the escapist tendencies of the Romantic movement and stood at the forefront of the "New Trend" movement. They began to fire theoretical attacks, through their literary organ *Kaebiyok* or the *Beginning*, the successor of the *Yom-gun*, on the romantic and nihilistic literature.¹⁸ Literary arguments of the "New Trend" were mainly centered upon the purpose of literature as reflected in its slogan, "What is literature for?" For instance, Park Chonghwa, in his literary essay, "A Critique on Social Class Literature" (1924), which appeared as the statement on his withdrawal from the "White Tide" group, charged that the romantic, nihilistic and naturalistic literary groups were all the reflection of their bourgeois ideology and were no more than "ivory towerish" poets or lifeless "mentally sick" souls who disregarded the reality of the world and the needs of the masses. And Kim Kijin defined their new direction literature as "a literature for revolution, literature of struggle, literature of strength, and literature of action." These heated attacks on the old bourgeois literary groups were soon to be followed by several others of the "Kaebiyok" magazine members.¹⁹

The "New Trend" literature was characterized by its theme of extreme poverty of the lowest social bracket people and one kind or another of revolt against adversity, which was often expressed in the form of destructive violence and murder or arson. Hopelessly caught in the chains of despair, the society was forced to break loose and to be free from adverse situations. The "New

¹⁸The *Kaebiyok* magazine, the organ of the "New Trend" group, came out in the fall of 1923, soon after the close of the "White Tide". Notable writers of this new group were: Kim Kijin, Park Yonghi, Park Chonghwa, Choe Sohae, Yi Posok, Yi Iksang, and Yi Kiyong. Especially, see their literary essays such as: "Literature of Today and Literature of Tomorrow," (1924) and "Promenade Sentimental" (1923) by Kim Kijin, and "The Shattered Pieces" (1923) and "A Critique on Social Class Literature" (1925) by Park Chonghwa.

¹⁹Notable essays in this vein were: Yim Chongjae, "A Letter to our Proletariats" (1923); Ryang Myong, "The Class Ideology in Literature and the Decline of the Neutrality Groups" (1923). In the field of short story representative ones were: Choe Sohae, "A Memoir of Escape" (1925), Lee Kiyong, "A Story of Mouse" (1925).

'Trend" Literature created characters full of vigor, the will of action, and fierce hatred of existing social injustices.²⁰ These characters showed a good contrast to the pale young man commonly used in the old literature of decadent nihilism such as the character referred to earlier in "The Dark Night" by Yom Sangsop in 1921, who curses himself as an intellectual prostitute and who murmurs to himself that he does not even have courage enough to kill himself.

Strictly from a literary point of view, however, the "New Trend" Literature was so heavily coated with socialistic ideologies that it looked as if it were a series of soap operas thickly larded in slogans and propagandistic theories of socialism rather than literature. To illustrate with one or two examples, Park Yonghi's short story "The Struggle" concludes with a shouting of "All the proletariats in the world are comrades" and in the same vein, in his "The Event," condemning the corruption of society which forced the leading girl character into prostitution, news reporters shout, "Yes, that's it. Let's smash the bourgeoisies!" A more radical example was "The Madness" (1925) by Yi Iksang in which a young middle-class man, Yongsun embezzles his company's money only to toss it up into the air at cafés and on the streets. This madness was a defiant renunciation of the evil of money in capitalism.

Such violent and destructive moods of the "New Trend" Literature of the 1920's cast one of the most interesting and controversial topics in the history of Korean literature in later years. Since the "New Trend" Literature was the immediate predecessor of the Proletarian literature of communism, the communistic interpretation by North Korea today is particularly worthy of mention. Communist critics of North Korea today seem to agree that the "New Trend" period was a necessary evil of transition towards today's proletarian literature in Korea. But they admit the fact that the "New Trend" Literature was very much anarchistic in its content and destructive in its character with no

²⁰Among many, the following were expressive in the line of the "New Trend" themes: "The Death of a Young Idealistic Man" (1925) and "Red Mouse" (1925) by Kim Kijin, "The Escape" (1925) by Choe Sohae; "The Murder" (1925) by Chu Yosop; "Starvation and Slain" (1925) by Choe Haksong; "The Struggle" (1924) by Park Yonghi; and "The Madness" (1925) by Yi Iksang.

definite directions to guide its society. Thus, that literature only incited the passion to destroy the old bourgeois ideologies of the society and to denounce the Japanese imperialism in Korea. On the other hand, today's communist critics and historians defend the 1920's literature by reviewing the shortcomings and faults of the "New Trend" Literature. They are to be viewed as inevitable reflection of the society in the early 1920's; namely, the lack of solid proletarian class consciousness among the peasants and workers in Korea. Therefore, their spokesmen, artists and writers, were merely progressive intellectuals of the petit-bourgeois middle-class, not the workers and peasants themselves. The writers of the "New Trend", thus, tended to be rather theoretical and sentimental, aloof from reality of the masses.²¹

Despite its short two-year life span and its shortcomings, the "New Trend" Literature made a very significant contribution in two respects: one was that it ignited heated debates among different schools of literature on the question of the purpose of literature, a debate which later reached the peak in the Proletarian literature era; and the other was that it laid milestones for the route of the Proletarian literary group. This Proletarian group became firmly established by 1925, following the organization of The Korean Artists' Proletarian Federation (commonly referred to as KAPF) in July of 1925. The KAPF was organized by several former "New Trend" members²² who had realized the importance of political party affiliation.

The major difference between the "New Trend" movement and the sixth stage, the Proletarian movement, was to be found not in the philosophies and purpose of literature, but in the new emphasis of the latter on the necessity and importance of organizational power in literary activities under a unified command of political party or front-line political organizations. Thus, the pro-

²¹For reference, see Kim Myongsu's essay, "The 'New Trend' Group as the First Stage of the Proletarian Literature in Korea" and Shin Kubyon, "The KAPF in the struggle against the Bourgeois Reactionary Literature." Both in *The Revolutionary Tradition of our Literature*, Pyongyang, North Korea, 1956, Pp. 128-154, Pp. 42-90 respectively. (in Korean).

²²The initial members of the Proletarian literature group were: Kim Hyongwon, Kim Bokjin, Kim Kijin, Yi Iksang, Park Yonghi, Ahn Sokchu, Kim Ok, Song Yong, Cho Myonghi, Yi Kiyong and a few others. They began in January of 1926 the organ magazine, *Munye-Undong* or the *Literary Movement*.

letarian group utilized literature as a means for political party activities. Such a shift towards organizational importance in literature was clearly stated by Park Yonghi's essay, "The 'New Trend' Literature and the 'Proletarian' Literature" (1927). The role of literature in society was definitely defined as a force to promote class consciousness and class struggle collectively rather than individually. Similar arguments²³ followed by many other writers who fiercely argued that literature must be pursued with a content of the proletarian class ideologies and with the Marxian perspectives of the world, as stated in the new 1927 charter of KAPF that the principal task of KAPF was to promote and pursue "the historical inevitability of the Marxism in the struggle of the Proletarian class."

The radical move towards a unification of progressive writers and artists under one command of KAPF in 1925 and the subsequent re-organization of KAPF in 1927 evidently reflected their determination of the proletariats' struggle. They were convinced that Korea's political, economic, and social independence could not be achieved without a final and permanent victory of the proletarian class under one strong united-front organ of the literature of resistance. A similar trend towards united-front movements also permeated in various labor and political organizations—labor and peasant unions were united under one command of The All-Korean Federation of Workers and Peasants' Unions in 1925. Also various local communist groups were united into one single party operation of The Korean Communist Party in 1925.

Under such a strong emphasis on the organizational unity of literary writers and artists, the Proletarian literary group (KAPF) soon started publishing organ magazines, *The Literary Movement* for KAPF in 1926²⁴ and *The Third Front Line* for the

²³See Han Solya, "A Declaration of Proletarian Literature" (1926) and Cho Myonghi, "A Profile of Life" (1926) both in *The Chosen Ji Kwang* (The Light of Korea). Also see Lim Wha, "An Introduction to a Purpose-conscious Literature," *Choson Ilbo* (Korea Daily News), May, 1927; Yun Kijong, "Creativity of the Proletarian Literature," *Choson Ilbo*, Oct., 1927.

²⁴*The Literary Movement (Munheh Undong)*, the official organ magazine of the KAPF was published with a sub-title of "The Organ of the Korean Proletariats" in Tokyo, Japan by several initial members of the KAPF then in Tokyo. But the organ was banned by the Japanese authority immediately after the first issue and was never circulated.

Tokyo Branch of KAPF in 1927 and establishing various cultural front-line groups. The keenest interest of the KAPF in that period was the question of how to instill proletarian class consciousness in the peasants and in the factory workers through their literary and other cultural activities. The KAPF promptly organized various front-line organs including *The Mass Flags* in 1930, and *The Mass* in 1932, two powerful magazines for the mass workers and the peasants, along with the organization of a theatre group, "The New Construction" in 1931. Most of the members of the KAPF later came to play extremely important roles in establishing communistic literature in North Korea after the end of W.W. II., even though some of them were purged in the 1950's in North Korea, after the Korean War, including Lim Wha, Cho Ilmyong, Sol Chongshik, and Lee Seungyop.

From a literary point of view, the Proletarian literature of the KAPF group showed its own distinctive features in the following three areas: first, it emphasized the contents of literature more than the forms or beautiful articulation of writing; second, it tended to be more analytical and more descriptive than emotional or naively idealistic in presenting social and human problems; and third, it attempted to create characters in novels as representatives of their own peasant or workers' class with their own feelings, emotions, their own real language, and their own thinking with positive directions in contrast to the petit-Bourgeois type of characters of the middle-class intellectuals in the "New Trend" Literature. On these lines, the KAPF produced some excellent and powerful works of "resistance literature" including Cho Myonghi's *The Rakdong River* (1927), Han Solya's "The Transitional Period" (1929), Han Solya's "Wrestling" (1930), Lee Kiyong's *The Farming Village* (1930), *The Field Fire* (1929), and also Lee's *The Homeland* (1932), all of which vigorously dealt with the deterioration process of the peasants under the gradual capitalistic invasion in the form of agricultural exploitation. Besides the peasant literature, Lee Bukmyong, a factory worker himself, successfully pursued proletarian literature with such outstanding fictions as "3 A.M.," "A Factory Town," and "An Ammonia Factory."

Not only in the field of novels and short stories but also in the fields of poetry and drama, the KAPF produced some active

figures such as; Park Palyang, Kim Changsul, Lim Wha, Kwon Hwan, Park Seyong, and Song Yong, all of whom pursued enthusiastically highly passionate and agitative proletarian fervor.

The most interesting and even constructive phenomenon in the era of the Proletarian literature, from about 1926 to 1934, was the persistent competition and literary stimulation between different remnants of previous schools of literature in the form of lively contests for supremacy in issuing essays and fiction one after another, thereby creating a golden era in literature. As the Proletarian literature group rode on the high tide of the literary trend, other already established writers clashed head-on with the monopoly of the Proletarian literary group. In defiance of the politically affiliated socialistic literature of the KAPF, the naturalistic literary group, under the command of Yom Sangsop and Chon Yongtaek, maintained their position of the superiority of literature above political ideologies, while the nationalistic group, flocked under the leadership of Li Kwangsu and Choe Namson, persisted in the slogan of "Let's Return to Korea's Korea." The nationalistic group concentrated their efforts upon historical literature²⁵ emphasizing the glories of the past history of Korea and upon revival of "Shijo," Korean classical poetry.²⁶

The hostile competition between these divergent literary groups yielded to the so-called "Compromise" group or the "Middle-road" group, called "The New Stem Associated (Shin Kan-hoe)" in 1926, under the command of Yang Chudong. This third power group, with its literary magazine, *The Literary Perspectives (Mundan Chon-mang)*, proposed a unification of all writers under one common cause of anti-Japanese literature. Its partly successful merit was seen in the rise of nationalistic literature with great

²⁵Some representative writers and their works are: *The Sorrow of Prince Tan'chong* (1932) and *Admiral Li Sunshin* (1933) by Li Kwangsu; *Spring at Palace Unhyon* (1932) by Kim Tong-in; and *The Story of the Great Robbery* (1933) and *The Black Head Wear* (1934) by Yun Baeknam.

²⁶The "Shijo" was originated in Korea in the middle of the 14th century and it developed its literary sophistication through many centuries, reaching its height in the 17th and 18th centuries. It is simple and concise, a stanza of three verses, expressing simple "popular" emotions of Korean people. The group of "Shijo" revival in the late 1920's was led by Son Chintae, Li Pyongki, Cho Un, Choe Namson, and a few others.

emphasis on the importance of the peasants in the maintenance of the life of Korea. Such works as Yi Kwangsu's *The Soil* (1932) and Shim Hun's *The Evergreen Trees* (1934) and *The Eternal Smile* (1932) resulted from this effort.

The reign of the Proletarian literary group over other groups during 1926 to 1935 in Korea was almost an inevitable reflection of the then sweeping inclination of the society towards socialism. International socialism made a strong appeal to almost every intellect in that period and this was the case especially among men of literature. Even non-KAPF members showed in their works great sympathy for the socialistic ideology.²⁷

Unfortunately, this stimulating out-put in Korean literature was soon blocked by the Japanese revival of stringent imperialistic policies in Korea. Even such a powerful group as the KAPF was forced to rapidly dissolve as a dominant literary force from 1931 on because of this renewed Japanese cultural suppression. Soon after the Manchurian Incident in June, 1931, Japan's suppression of Korean intellectuals suddenly became severer by their issuing orders and decrees to dissolve all socialistic as well as nationalistic organizations in Korea with the charge of the so-called "dangerous thought and ideas." The first blow on the KAPF came in June of 1931, almost at the same time as Japan's military invasion into Manchuria. A sudden police raid arresting some seventy important staff members of the Proletarian literary group (KAPF) on the charge of illegal possession of the magazine, *The Proletariats*, then banned in Korea. Other raids of secret underground meetings in succeeding years caused external as well as internal disintegration in the KAPF. Another large-scale raid on the KAPF and the "New Construction" theatre members in 1934 arresting some eighty members, practically paralyzed the function of the Proletarian literary movement which was officially dissolved in 1935.

With these incidents literary movements as such ceased to function. The problem was then how to survive. Some writers

²⁷Some of the outstanding writers of the sympathetic 'fellow travellers' and their noteworthy works were: Chu Yosop with "The Rikshawman" (1925), Yu Chino's "Shopgirls" (1931) and "A Job-seeker in May" (1929), Yi Hyosok with "The Coast of the Russian Territory" (1930) and his later year's long short story "The Hog" (1933), and Park Hwasong with "A Water-line Construction" (1931) and her long novel *Before and After the Flood* (1932).

have continued to write in the vein of extreme pessimism while other writers sustained themselves on simple native sentimentalism or folk song style lyrics, notably so in the cases of Kim Sowol and Kim Yuchong. These writers have totally divorced their literature from the social implications of the KAPF group. Some other writers of the present day survived under the pretense of "art for art's sake." The group advocating "art for art's sake" is known as the "Nine Men Association."²⁸ This kind of "pure literature" association was probably the only acceptable means for survival and salvage of the then shattered literature of Korea. This was also the time that Buddhistic philosophy penetrated in literature with partial success until the end of W.W. II. Especially, Han Yongun, a Buddhist poet successfully appealed to the public as well as other writers with his songs of "the hermit" which sang of detachment from this sorrowful floating world. Li Kwangsu, one of the most influential pioneers in Korean literature, turned to be a devout Buddhist in the late 1930's. His personal conversion from the action-centered philosophy of Christianity to the ever-accepting and non-violent philosophy of the East may well symbolize the disappointing and hopeless hardship that Koreans were enduring under the growing Japanese suppression of Korea, especially during the W.W. II. However, such personal conversion as Li Kwangsu's in the 1930's cannot be totally justified in the critical eyes of literary critics of later years. Cases like Li's may very well be criticized as escapism and defeatism rather than as philosophical renunciation of this floating-world.

Korean writers, thus, were virtually forced into a silent hibernation in the "age of darkness." Their hibernation was not death, but it was a waiting period for a high leap, a time for sharpening their literary skills. They secretly developed their literary styles and contents furthering literary maturity. Indeed, those survivors became important literary figures after W.W. II. both in North Korea and in South Korea and represent the dominant writers of contemporary Korean literature.

²⁸The "Nine Men Association" (Ku-in Hoc) was organized in August of 1933 by the following nine young poets and writers: Yi Taejun, Yi Hyosok, Park Taewon, Chong Chiyong, Kim Kirim, Yi Muyong, Yi Chongmyong, Yu Chijin, and Kim Yuyong. And Yi Sang, Cho Yongman, and Cho Byokam joined the group.

As literature tends, in the main, to reflect rather than predict social, political, and philosophical influences, the future of Korea's literature lies hidden in the future of the country, whether or not the new movements will reflect the aspirations of a united country or mirror the continuing despair of a divided country remains to be enacted in the literature.

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THE MYTH OF ASSIMILATION
THE FRENCH THEORY OF IMPERIALISM IN VIETNAM
BEFORE 1914

by

CLARKE W. GARRETT

THE FRENCH Empire is no more; but in its lifetime of three centuries it twice achieved a size and importance second to but one other empire in the world. During the lifetime of the Empire, France was ruled by two royal dynasties, two Bonapartist dictators, and five republics. Yet in its long and varied history, one theme recurs over and over again: the theme of "assimilation". Frenchmen were never absolutely certain what it meant. It suggested both what the French called their *mission civilisatrice*—the propagation of French religion and culture in those areas of the world which had the misfortune not to be France—and a belief that all the areas of the world over which the French flag flew should be parts of a unitary French state with one administration and one set of laws.

The religious and cultural side of assimilation had a fairly continuous history. Its first clear expression may be found in the edicts of 1635 and 1645 which declared that natives of territories under French control, once they had been converted to Roman Catholicism, were to be considered "citizens and natural Frenchmen."¹ In fact Herbert Luethy, in his searching study of France past and present called *France Against Herself*, argued with much justice that the notion of assimilation could be pushed back at least to the Middle Ages, when the Normans in particular spread French culture in such diverse areas as England, southern Italy, and the Holy Land. Throughout France's history, Luethy wrote, there had existed "an infinitely naive and calm confidence in the human

¹Quoted in Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914* (New York, 1961), 12.

and intellectual indestructability of a nation which never aimed at 'racial' unity but at a cultural unity capable of assimilating all elements of human civilization."² And because Frenchmen have had this cultural self-confidence, assimilation has been a two-way street. Just as in the Middle Ages the scholastic philosophers at the University of Paris successfully fused elements of Greek, Arab, and Jewish thought with medieval Christian theology, so in modern times elements of Asiatic and African culture have been successfully adapted to French art and literature.

The political side of assimilation has been expressed more sporadically. Its clearest expression is to be found in the hopeful early years of each of the first four French republics. In the Constitution of the Year III (1795) for example, it was stated that "the French colonies, in all parts of the world, form an integral part of the French republic, and submit to the same constitutional laws."³ The identical conception was expressed two centuries later at the 1944 Brazzaville conference of the Free French Empire, at which M. Pleven, de Gaulle's Commissioner for the Colonies, declared that "in the greater colonial France there are no peoples to enfranchise or racial discrimination to abolish...There are populations whom we intend to lead step by step to personality, and the most mature of them will be given political franchise, but they desire no independence other than French independence."⁴ Even when both the dream of assimilation and the French Empire itself were collapsing, the historian and former colonial official Hubert Deschamps could write of political assimilation that "it reflects the French temperament, universalist, and centralizing, in love with the grandeur of his fatherland...Our present Parliament, with its men of all races and all colors, appears as the logical fulfilment of French colonization; it expresses the character of a people which, through its origins and its classicism, has preserved the meaning and the desire of human unity."⁵

²Herbert Luethy, *France against Herself* (New York, 1955), 209-210.

³*Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, seule histoire authentique et inaltérée de la Révolution française depuis la reunion des Etats-généraux jusqu'au Consulat (mai 1789-1799) avec des notes explicatives* (Paris, 1843-45), XXV, 420.

⁴Quoted in Luethy, *France against Herself*, 218.

⁵Hubert Deschamps, *Les methodes et les doctrines coloniales de la France* (Paris, 1953), 213-214.

Yet this paper asserts that the French conception of assimilation has been largely a myth. It has been a myth partly because historically the French have fallen far short of their professed ideal. It also has been a myth in the broader sense of the term. Assimilation has been an oversimplified but still valid expression of the mission of Frenchmen through the centuries to evangelize the world and give to it the blessings of French religion, French culture, and (under her first four republics) the message of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The myth of assimilation has a contemporary tragic expression in the fate of Georges Bidault, one of the few first-rate men to lead the Fourth Republic, who has become a stateless exile rather than reconcile himself to the disappearance of the French imperial dream.

The French experience in Indochina serves as an illustration of the disparity between theory and practice in French imperialism.

The French interest in the area that now comprises North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos dates from the second half of the seventeenth century. French missionaries began going there in the 1660's, sent by the newly organized Society of Foreign Missions. In 1664, some commercial ventures were begun in the area by the French East India Company. The missionary society and the trading company worked together in seeking the establishment of French influence in the area. Because both Portuguese missionaries and the Jesuits had prior evangelizing rights to Indochina, the French missionaries frequently operated there as part-time traders for the East India Company. The interest of the French government in the area was never strong, and when the French claims to empire in India and Canada were ended by the Peace of Paris in 1763, French activities in Indochina, except for the missionaries and a few private adventurers, ceased altogether. Royal ministers drew up plans for French expeditions to the Vietnamese coast in 1769 and again in 1775, but largely because of apathy and shortage of money at court, neither project came to anything.

The last French venture in Indochina during the Old Regime was somewhat more fruitful. In 1765, a young French priest named Pigneau de Behaine was sent to Cambodia by the Society of Foreign Missions. He was forced out of Indochina by native

opposition and settled at the French enclave of Pondichery in south India. When he returned to Indochina ten years later, as bishop in charge of the area, he found the regions of Annam and Cochin China in a state of civil war; a rebellion had driven the ruling Nguyen family from the throne. Pigneau de Behaine decided to do what he could to restore the deposed emperor to his throne, hoping through him to bring about the establishment of both Roman Catholicism and French influence in the Annamese kingdom. In 1787 Pigneau took a delegation to Versailles to seek royal support for his venture. After three months at court, he finally obtained an interview with Louis XVI. His speech to the king has been reconstructed by his biographer from the notes left by two royal ministers who were present. Assimilation played no part in the bishop's arguments; he concentrated instead on the commercial and military importance of Cochin China as a counterpoise to the British. An establishment in Cochin China, he said, would enable the French to dominate the seas around China and would make her master "of all the commerce of that part of the world."⁶

Pigneau's arguments appeared to have persuaded the court. When the little party sailed back to India at the end of the year, the bishop carried with him a treaty between France and the Nguyen pretender, by which France agreed to provide military aid in exchange for control of the port of Tourane and protection and trading privileges for Frenchmen. Pigneau's triumph was illusory, because the French monarchy, now approaching its final crisis, had neither the money nor the interest to complete its part of the agreement. As a result, the governor at Pondichery was able to refuse assistance to Pigneau. The bishop is reported to have said that he would "make the revolution in Cochin China alone,"⁷ and, having rejected an English offer of aid, he obtained money from a group of French merchants. Pigneau and a small army of French volunteers arrived in Cochin China in late June of 1789. They trained the Nguyen pretender's army in French military techniques, they built French-style fortresses (some of

⁶Quoted in Alexis Faure, *Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, eveque d'Adran* (Paris, 1891), 84.

⁷Joseph Buttinger, *The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam* (New York, 1958), 239-241.

which still survive), and Pigneau became the pretender's chief minister.

Pigneau died of dysentery in 1799. Only four of the French volunteers remained with Nguyen Anh in 1802 when he brought Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin under his control and proclaimed himself the emperor Gia-Long. The Europeans were honored with high positions in the government, but the French influence at court gradually faded. The war in Europe prevented Napoleon from establishing diplomatic and commercial relations with the new emperor. When the French finally got around to doing something about a treaty with the Vietnamese empire, the year was 1820. Gia-Long had died and had been succeeded by his son, Minh-Mang, a young man violently opposed to having any dealings with Europeans or to tolerating their religion. Thus the exploits of Pigneau de Behaine and his handful of French volunteers had come to almost nothing. The French missionaries had had more success; in 1800 there were an estimated 310,000 Roman Catholics among the native peoples of Indochina, the majority of them Vietnamese.⁸ Now in 1820 there began for them some sixty-five years of violent persecution.

France, meanwhile, had undergone momentous changes. The great Revolution was getting under way just as Pigneau set sail from Pondichery. The question of a policy concerning the colonies led to bitter controversy in the National Assembly in 1789 and 1790. A group of deputies, members of the Society of the Friends of the Blacks, advocated immediate emancipation and citizenship for the West Indian Negroes. They were violently opposed by the colonial interests. A compromise on the colonial question and, in effect, on assimilation was worked out in 1790 in a decree which gave limited self-government to the colonies and promised that no law concerning the status of nonfree persons would be adopted unless it was first proposed by the colonies' own assemblies.⁹

By 1794, their policy had been reversed. As long as the First Republic lasted, it asserted the universalism and radical

⁸Kenneth Latourette, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: a History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1958-62), III, 423-424.

⁹Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 13.

equalitarianism which was one inheritance of the Enlightenment. The National Convention freed the slaves and declared that "all men resident in the colonies, without distinction of color, are French citizens and enjoy all the rights assured by the Constitution."¹⁰ In the debates concerning the Constitution of the year III in the summer of 1795, a doctrine of political assimilation based on the same premises of the Enlightenment was given further expression. In a long speech on August 4, a prominent deputy, Boissy d'Anglas, urged that the Constitution be extended to the colonies. "The revolution which you have consummated," he said, "was not only for Europe; it was for the universe." The Revolutionary principles did not belong exclusively to a few privileged peoples; they were "the property of the human species." Boissy reminded the assembly of the economic benefits interdependence provided both to the colonies and to the homeland. Also, possession of the colonies both strengthened France militarily and protected the natives from conquest by "brigands". He concluded: "Let the colonies be always French, . . . let them form part of our indivisible republic. . . Thus you will give to these portions of the French Empire the certitude that they have never had, of being essentially assimilated. . . to the other parts of the republic."¹² The same ideas of equality and universality and the same sense of mission were to characterize the verbal expressions of colonial policy of the Second, Third, and Fourth Republics. Colonial practice, however, was often something else. One partial explanation for this lies in the fact that for most of the nineteenth century, French colonial policy was marked by a reversion to the pre-1789 practices of separate administration for colonies and separate legal and social status for Frenchmen and natives. This was the case under the two Bonapartist empires and both the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies. The Second Republic proclaimed the reintegration of the colonies into France in 1848, but the republic survived only three years. The carving out of an empire was almost entirely the achievement of the non-republican regimes. Even after the establishment of the Third Republic in

¹⁰Quoted in Martin Deming Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen: the 'Assimilation' Theory in French Colonial Policy", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4 (1962): 129-153, 134.

¹¹*Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur* XXV, 415.

¹²*Ibid.*, 419.

1870, the majority of the builders of empire were military men or clerics indifferent or indeed hostile to the republican era in which the assimilationist ideal of Enlightenment and Revolution had had its fullest expression. Conversely, good republicans in the nineteenth century were often indifferent or hostile to the colonial empire, the achievement of Royalists and Catholics.¹³

French interest in Indochina in the period between 1820 and 1860 was hesitant and inconsistent with one exception: the missionaries. The Society of Foreign Missions, disbanded in 1792, was reestablished after 1815. A genuine religious revival swept France, and one facet of the revival was renewed missionary activity in Indochina and elsewhere. The missionaries' efforts were acknowledged by the Pope in 1839 when he recognized the primacy of the French in Far Eastern missionary activities.

In France, the political influence of the Catholics increased steadily under the Orleanist Monarchy, the Second Republic, and the Second Empire. They became more and more disturbed at the persecutions which Minh-Mang and his successors on the Vietnamese throne inflicted on the French missionaries, a few of whom had been executed. In 1857, a latter-day Pigneau de Behaine appeared in the person of Monsignor Pellerin, a missionary who had been rescued from Vietnam earlier by an emissary of the French Foreign Office. He urged Napoleon III to intervene militarily in Indochina. He pointed out the economic and political advantages which would come to France and told the Emperor that the survival of Christianity in Indochina was at stake. Napoleon was interested; the time seemed especially propitious because the British were involved in the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and would therefore be powerless to prevent France's gaining a foothold in southeast Asia. And so it transpired that a French naval detachment, accompanied by Monsignor Pellerin, made a landing at Tourane in 1859 in order to force concessions out of the Vietnamese emperor, a young man named Tu-Duc. The French had to withdraw. Illness, the absence of the native support Pellerin had predicted, and French military commitments in China and Italy in 1859 all threatened to turn the expedition

¹³Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 14-18; Luethy, *France against Herself*, 213.

into a nineteenth century Bay of Pigs. Pellerin urged the navy to attack Hanoi in the north, where Catholics were relatively numerous, but the navy chose instead the weaker target of Saigon in Cochin China to the south. By 1862 the French had succeeded in making Tu-Duc accept their terms: French possession of half of Cochin China, a heavy indemnity, and a promise that French religious and commercial interests in Vietnam would be respected.

The series of events by which France acquired an empire in Indochina in the decades after 1862 are too confusing to be described here in any detail. The point that must be emphasized is this: France as a whole soon lost interest in Indochina. Its creation was the work of a few naval squadrons, some adventurers, and a handful of imperialistic politicians in Paris. The notion of assimilation of the Vietnamese into the French political and cultural community played a small part in the motivation of most of these men; so did the fate of the French missionaries. As Henri Brunschwig has pointed out, there is much irony in the fact that France acquired the bases for her African and Asian empires between 1820 and 1860 when public opinion was uninterested and overseas trade was reduced. The explanation lies in the varied but insistent pressures of Catholics, shipping interests, and the spokesmen for the army and navy. Above all, there was the desire of Charles X, Louis Philippe, and Louis Napoleon "to affirm, in the face of the world, the presence, the grandeur, the radiance of France."¹⁴

By 1873, the Vietnamese emperor had been forced to submit to French control of Cochin China. The problem of translating a naval occupation into a civilian administration had to be resolved. The Minister of Marine informed the president of the French republic that if the *mission civilisatrice* which the French had assumed in that area was to be accomplished, there must be a civil administration trained in the laws, language, and customs of both France and Cochin China, who could carry out the "work of assimilation" of the two cultures.¹⁵ The civil service in Indochina

¹⁴Henri Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités de l'imperialisme colonial français 1871-1914* (Paris, 1960), 16; see also Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times: 1760 to the Present* (Chicago, 1960), 257.

¹⁵Georges Taboulet, ed., *La Geste française en Indochine: Histoire par les textes de la France en Indochine des origines à 1914* (Paris, 1955), II, 585.

never fulfilled these expectations. The French government, with its penchant for centralization and bureaucracy, employed a large staff of Frenchmen, even in fairly lowly white-collar jobs. Since pay and conditions in Indochina were generally terrible before World War I, the men who went out there were generally a sorry lot. There were some men who went out to Indochina burning with a *mission civilisatrice*, but indifference of French government and public opinion to colonial problems and the incompetence of the colonial bureaucracy soon defeated them.¹⁶

A young man named Eliacin Luro was one of the exceptions. In 1874 he organized a short-lived training school for future colonial administrators in Indochina. In the course of study which he wrote for the school, Luro gave clear and attractive expression to the ideal of assimilation, adapted to suit the Indochinese situation. The colonizing power, he wrote, must go slowly in changing native customs, languages, and laws: "It is necessary to comprehend, to penetrate the civilization of the conquered, to know his language. . . . then, little by little, patiently, direct his steps. . . . Finally, to the extent that the exchange of ideas between the two peoples is accomplished; to the extent that the economic revolution, born of a free concurrence, has come little by little to change traditions, it is necessary slowly to modify and to change the laws."¹⁷ Despite Luro's efforts, the government abandoned his project after only four years. Training of colonial administrators after that was generally inadequate. The government operated henceforth on the assumption that no specialized training was necessary for the colonial service.

A symbolic victory for the principle of assimilation was won in 1880, when the small colony of French settlers in Cochin China persuaded Paris to let them elect a deputy to the French Chamber of Deputies. In their petition the settlers announced proudly that their electoral list for that year had totaled 1142 voters, more than several other colonies which already had representation in Paris could boast. In the future, the petition went on, all Frenchmen in Cochin China should have a voice in naming the

¹⁶Denis W. Brogan, *France under the Republic: the Development of Modern France (1870-1939)* (New York, 1940), 239.

¹⁷Taboulet, *La Geste française*, II, 600.

deputy; and later, after "une etude speciale", the natives could be included.¹⁸ The voice of assimilation can be heard, if rather faintly.

The Roman Catholic religion continued to be an avenue to assimilation, although here too the reality was a far cry from the dream which Pigneau and the nineteenth century missionaries had had of an Indochina in which Catholicism was triumphant. The Church survived the persecutions; an estimated million people in Indochina were Christians in 1914. But the triumph of the French in Indochina, undertaken in part in the name of the missionaries, was a mixed blessing at best for the church. Although both government officials and missionaries agreed that the natives should be made both French in culture and Christian in religion, the church-state issue which was of such importance in France reached to Indochina as well. There was scant cooperation and periodic friction between the republican bureaucracy and the (frequently royalist) missionaries. As a result, government and Church were frequently competitors in welfare and educational activities and wasted time and effort they could have saved by cooperation. The Church continued to make native converts, but an eclectic and apathetic Buddhism continued to be the religion of most Vietnamese. Christianity was too stern and too alien, and the Papacy refused to allow the missionaries to adapt their religion to native practices. There were no more wholesale conversions of villages and districts after the French conquest, largely because the missions were no longer the sole haven from bandits and petty dictators or the sole places where Western skills could be learned.¹⁹

Back in France, those men who were interested in colonial policy continued to favor assimilation, especially with the assured triumph of the Republic and republicanism after 1879. Typical of this relatively small but dedicated band was Paul Gaffarel, a professor of history at the University of Dijon. In a collection of essays published in 1880, he spoke of the glory and the commercial benefits France had received from the acquisition of

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 607.

¹⁹Latourette, *Christianity*, III, 423-424; Virginia Thompson, *French Indochina* (New York, 1942), 272-274.

Cochin China, but his emphasis was on France's duty to direct and educate the natives, whom he described as "great children who are just being admitted to civilization." He continued: "Our most useful auxiliaries will be missionaries and schoolmasters. What force can resist the two levers of religion and science? Let us know how to use them and we shall have accomplished a useful and patriotic work."²⁰ Arthur Girault, a professor of law and the author of a widely read study of colonial legislation, described assimilation as a "policy of patriotic concord and broad fraternity" whose "incontestable moral superiority" was to be found in France's "unique Parliament, composed of men speaking the same language despite the difference of their origins, having come from all parts of the world. . . in order to discuss the general interests of their common fatherland."²¹ And at the Colonial Congresses held in Paris in 1889-1890 in connection with the Paris Exposition, the general resolution adopted by the group declared that "in all the overseas lands under French authority, the efforts of colonization should propagate among the natives the language, the methods of work, and, progressively, the spirit and civilization of France."²²

If the French never approached this assimilationist ideal in practice, one of the reasons was that Indochina was highly unsuited to it. The Vietnamese were not uncivilized "great children", but an overcivilized, rather decadent people possessing an extremely intricate social system and a history and culture older than France's. The colonists considered the Vietnamese shifty, ugly, and without the vitality they found in the peoples of their Indian and North African colonies. In the coastal lowlands and river valleys where most of the people and most of the wealth were, the land was flat and dull, the air muggy and enervating. Since the French refused either to adapt their habits to life in the tropics or to build a series of hill stations like the British, there was from the beginning a high death toll and a rapid turnover of European personnel.²³

²⁰Quoted in Agnes Murphy, *The Ideology of France Imperialism 1871-1881* (Washington, 1948), 204-205.

²¹Quoted in Deschamps, *Les methodes et les doctrines coloniales*, 144; see also Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 27, 31-32.

²²Quoted in Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen," 143.

²³See especially Thompson, *French Indo-China*, 429-450.

Partly as a result of experience in Indochina and elsewhere, partly as a result of new theories, in the 1890's assimilation began to be reevaluated. The criticisms were vigorous and varied. Studies by anthropologists and sociologists pointed to the diversity of human societies. Racists and social Darwinists talked of life as a struggle in which the superior Europeans must dominate. The colonial success of the Dutch and particularly the British led critics to contrast their policies with those of the French. In one of the more influential attacks on the doctrine of assimilation, Leopold de Saussure, an obscure former naval officer, argued that to attempt to transfer French language and institutions to an area like Indochina was futile; the natives were not Frenchmen and never would be. Assimilation was the product of the Enlightenment and the false Revolutionary dogma of human unity; and it was a colossal mistake.²⁴

Perhaps the most perceptive critic of assimilation was Jules Harmand, who, after a distinguished career as an administrator and diplomat in Indochina and India, published a book called *Domination et Colonisation* in 1910. A colony, he said, was an area in which European settlement was substantial; therefore, areas like Indochina in which authority was imposed by a few Europeans on a sizeable and cohesive native society should have some other name: he called them dominations. Because they formed the vast majority of the population and therefore were essential for its prosperity, the *natives* were the important element in the success of a domination. The Europeans should guide and protect them, but the ideas and institutions of the native societies should be left alone as much as possible. Harmand believed that an area of European domination such as Indochina should have the same kind of administrative and financial autonomy that India had. In fact, he said, they should be distinct states in everything save political independence.²⁵ He accepted acquisition of empire by military force as a necessity, if an unpleasant one, in a world of rival states. Harmand went further: since conquest was in fact immoral, the conqueror could not expect the conquered people ever to accept either him or his

²⁴Deschamps, *Les methodes et les doctrines coloniales*, 146-147; Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 69-70.

²⁵Deschamps, *Les methodes et les doctrines coloniales*, 148-149; Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 52-54.

ideas.. "This is the punishment for his violence," he wrote, "the stain of blood which nothing can eradicate from his hands."²⁶ Therefore any talk of assimilation into the motherland was ridiculous, and dreams of liberty, equality and fraternity irrelevant.

Harmand proposed an alternative to assimilation, which he called association. The term caught on; it became in fact quasi-official. But Harmand had meant by association that the French would limit themselves to public works, basic and technical education, and economic development. As Lugard had done in Nigeria, European administration should be indirect, with native institutions encouraged and native customs respected. As applied by the French government, however, association soon became very hard to distinguish from assimilation. The only difference seemed to be that now only a native elite would be Gallicized.²⁷ Control remained in the hands of the authorities in Paris, who continued to act as if the empire were politically, economically, and culturally part of a great French motherland. The ghost of Boissy d'Anglas still walked.

The hollowness of the assimilationist creed as applied to Indochina can be further illustrated by looking at the writings of the two men most directly responsible for France's acquisition of the province of Tonkin: Francois Garnier and Jules Ferry. Both men spoke of *mission civilisatrice* and of France's duty to bring benighted peoples to civilization, but both were primarily concerned with persuading their apathetic countrymen to accept France's need for an empire. Perhaps for this reason they concentrated on economic and diplomatic advantages and, above all, on de Gaulle's favorite theme: *la gloire de la France*.

Garnier, the scion of an unreconstructed Royalist family, had attended the Naval Academy, where, because of his small size and grandiose ideas, his classmates called him "Mademoiselle Bonaparte."²⁸ He went to Cochin China as an administrator soon after the area was annexed in 1862. He became interested in exploring the Mekong River which ran north from Saigon, in

²⁶Quoted in Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 104.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 165-168; Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen", 149-151.

²⁸Taboulet, *La Geste française*, II, 542.

order to see if its navigation would enable the French to penetrate southern China before the British were able to extend their influence there from Burma. After an exciting expedition up the river in 1866-1867, Garnier knew that the Mekong was not a satisfactory route. He found, however, that the Red River, which emptied into the sea at Hanoi in Tonkin, would be a perfect route. Determined to see the French established in that area, he and a few sailors attempted to seize the city in 1873. Garnier was killed in the assault. The French government, still shaken by the disaster of 1870 and furthermore fearing British intervention, refused to complete the project.

Most of Garnier's ideas were expressed in two pamphlets he wrote in 1864-1865 and in his famous report on the Mekong expedition. He was obsessed with the greatness of France and horrified at the prospect of a world dominated by the Anglo-Saxons. He argued that the French base in Cochin China should be the nucleus for the extension of influence northward. The natives, he contended, would welcome French control if it brought order, hygiene, and commerce.²⁹ He spoke vaguely of France's responsibility to civilize the area, but Garnier's primary mission was to glorify France (and himself) by carving out the Asian empire the British had taken from France in the eighteenth century. Especially after the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian war, France must prove herself a great power, and the acquisition of empire was the best way to do it.³⁰

Jules Ferry is often presented as a classic example of an economically-motivated imperialist. Apparently this is a distortion; Ferry seems to have had the same zeal for *la gloire* and *la mission civilisatrice* as other members of the imperialist band. It is not clear what led Ferry to become an imperialist. Before his second Ministry of 1883-1885, he had been concerned primarily with public education, weakening the power of the Roman Catholic Church in France, and resuming peaceable relations with Bismarck's Germany. And as a good 1848 republican, Ferry looked with distrust on the colonial adventures of royalists and Catholics. His speeches and writings suggest that gradually, between 1881 and

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Ibid.*, 544-545; Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 24-25.

1883, Ferry became convinced that colonial expansion would provide the French people with a sense of grandeur and mission that could enable the nation to recover from the trauma of 1870.³¹ Never a popular figure, Ferry became the target of attacks from the Right and the far Left because of his policy of imperial expansion. Nevertheless, it was his Ministry that made possible what Garnier and others had sought: an empire in Indochina, consisting of the colony of Cochin China, the protectorate-kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, and now the protectorates of Annam and Tonkin.

In 1885, the opposition politicians and newspapers inflated a military defeat in Tonkin into a major disaster. The old Radical warhorse, Clemenceau, who had earlier said Ferry's colonial policy endangered French security in Europe, now accused him of "high treason". In one of those scenes of utter tumult in which French parliaments specialize, Ferry was forced out of office, too discredited ever to be able to serve as a minister again. His cold and secretive personality, his domestic policies, and his "soft" attitude toward Bismark had contributed to his fall, but Tonkin had been the catalyst.³² Ferry left office knowing that peace in Tonkin was near and with it Chinese recognition of French suzerainty over all of Indochina. On a very close vote, the new ministry succeeded in persuading the Assembly to vote the money necessary to incorporate Tonkin into an Indochinese empire. Whether she liked it or not, France had an empire in Asia.

Almost all of Ferry's writing on imperialism was done after the successful annexation of Tonkin. He concentrated on three justifications for colonial expansion: the economic, the political, and the humanitarian. The economic arguments seem to have come late to his thinking and served as rationalizations after the fact. He knew that the new Indochinese empire had great economic potential and hoped to interest a hitherto uninterested French public in exploiting it.³³ Ferry did believe that France had a duty

³¹On Ferry's motivations for imperialism, see Wright, *France*, 309-310, 382-383; the adulatory biography by Maurice Reclus, *Jules Ferry, 1832-1893* (Paris, 1947), 291-292, 296-298; and Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 55.

³²E. Malcolm Carroll, *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914* (New York, 1931), 101-107.

³³Wright, *France*, 382; Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 61.

to spread civilization in her new empire. He wrote: "The superior race does not conquer for pleasure, in order to exploit the weaker race, but rather to civilize it and to raise it to the superior's own level."³⁴ Yet in Ferry's thinking, the glory of France was the primary reason for expansion. As he wrote in 1881 to Leon Gambetta, the aim of their imperialist policy must be to restore "France to her rank of a great power."³⁵

It is an interesting commentary on Ferry's estimation of French public opinion that, in his most important work concerning Indochina, he concentrated entirely on the economic and political arguments and ignored the humanitarian. In *Le Tonkin et la Mère-Patrie* (1890), a collection of documents prefaced by Ferry's long introduction, he wrote that "an irresistible movement sweeps the great European nations to the conquest of new lands. It is like an immense steeple-chase on the way to the unknown."³⁶ In this race, the emphasis must be on economics. Colonial policy, in his famous phrase, was the daughter of industrial policy. Because Europe was "saturated", the great powers must expand overseas in order to find new markets. To those doctrinaires and professional patriots who claimed that France must concentrate on defense against the German ogre, and who said that France was still weak from her 1870 humiliation, he exclaimed: "Vous doutez trop de France!" France was a great nation, and one test of greatness was participation in the race for empire.³⁷ France, he concluded, should be grateful to the colonists, administrators, and military leaders who, despite being constantly thwarted by Paris, had created a great and profitable empire. The natives were "governable", peaceable, and hardworking, and under the colonists' direction Indochina would prosper. All the colonists asked was to be allowed to borrow money in France. They neither wanted nor needed the control from Paris that was imposed upon them.³⁸ Not one word in Ferry's fifty-five pages has any reference to assimilation or to the ideals connected with it. The colony exists purely for political and economic reasons. The "mission" is ignored.

³⁴Quoted in Reclus, *Jules Ferry*, 304.

³⁵Quoted in Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 55.

³⁶Jules Ferry, *Le Tonkin et la Mère-Patrie* (Paris, 1890), 37.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 46-48.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 53-55.

What was the situation in Indochina on the eve of World War I? According to Albert Sarraut, twice governor-general between 1911 and 1919, the French had provided the natives with all the blessings of Western civilization. In a speech at Hanoi in 1912, Sarraut began: "I have seen what France has realized in Indochina, and I am proud of our country... We came here charged with a great *mission civilisatrice*; we have amply kept our promises."³⁹ French officials in Indochina, Sarraut continued, should tell the natives: "Compare your present situation with what it was before the radiation of the French soul in your country." France had provided peace and security, civil liberties, and western justice; she had established mines and plantations, built roads, and made available "the products of labor of the great civilized peoples." The natives should contrast the "white schoolhouse which smiles to your children" with their former "miserable ignorance." "Look well at all of this," he concluded, "and ask yourself if French protection has been an idle word, if any other nation of the world would have been able to give you such advantages, and if you yourselves would have been able... to procure for yourselves this ensemble of progress and of benefits."⁴⁰

The reality was less rosy. Indochina had indeed been pacified by 1914, but only after years of native resistance. Some schools were built, but not nearly enough. A Gallicized elite was produced, but the Vietnamese had to go to France itself to learn of the Revolutionary ideas and ideals which formed much of the basis of the supposed French "mission". The French-educated Vietnamese differed little in attitude from the British-educated Indian or Dutch-educated Indonesian. He might, if anything, be more hostile to European rule because he was excluded from most government jobs in Indochina, where a "white proletariat" filled even minor posts open to natives in other colonial empires.⁴¹

Having acquired Indochina, France seemed unsure what she wanted to do with it. The conquest and pacification of Tonkin

³⁹Taboulet, *La Geste française*, II, 916.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 916-917. Sarraut uses the familiar form *tu*, suitable for addressing dogs, children, and servants.

⁴¹Ellen Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, 1954), 60, 73; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 69.

and Annam had cost much more than most Frenchmen thought it worth, and as a result not nearly enough public and private money was spent on their development. In 1913 there were only 24,000 Europeans in all of Indochina, and most of these were either administrative or military personnel. Very few of these ever came to regard Indochina as "home". Public interest in the newly won empire was scant and superficial when compared with the general enthusiasm for empire in England during the same period. In the Assembly, colonial policy was seldom a topic of debate and never an election issue. The French public simply did not care. Jules Ferry, attending the sideshow at the 1889 Paris Exposition, is said to have remarked in disgust: "There's all *they* know about the empire—the belly dance."⁴²

In the decades before 1914, French colonial theorists shifted from a doctrine of "assimilation" to one of "association", but this change had no lasting effect on the government's policy. Indochina had a rapid succession of governors, most of them non-entities taking orders from Paris. Their goal was vaguely the inculcation of French values and the establishment of French institutions, but most of the time French officialdom was content merely to keep order.

During the terms in office of two energetic governors-general, Paul Doumer (1897-1902) and Albert Sarraut (1911-1914 and 1916-1919), there was some improvement. Public works projects were begun and agriculture and public health improved, but at a price. Taxes on the natives ate up around one-fifth of their income; especially irritating was the indirect taxation through government monopolies on salt, opium, and alcohol, all three of which the natives were forced to buy. Doumer improved government efficiency by being a thorough authoritarian and by increasing the monopoly of Europeans on all official positions. And his budgets for the years 1899-1902 reveal two disturbing facts: well over half of the government's income each year came from indirect taxation, and as much was spent on maintaining the military and administrative personnel as on public works of all kinds.⁴³

⁴²Quoted in Wright, *France*, 383; see also *ibid.*, 377; Brunshwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 139-141; and Charles Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China*, tr. by Isabel A. Ward (New York, 1944), 21-25.

⁴³Paul Doumer, *Situation de l'Indo-Chine* (1897-1902) (Hanoi, 1902), 3, 551-554.

In summarizing his own administration, Doumer wrote that Indochina had enjoyed "perfect order" and that "material pacification, achieved since 1897, had succeeded the moral conquest of the population."⁴⁴ Doumer spoke too soon; in 1908 another rebellion broke out in Tonkin. It was only with Sarraut's appointment in 1911 that another governor was found with sufficient prestige and determination to direct his own colonial policy. Like Doumer, Sarraut expanded public works, especially in the fields of education and medicine. Sarraut continued the efforts of several predecessors not only to prune the unwieldy bureaucracy but also to replace a large number of white clerks and petty officials with natives. Although native unrest continued intermittently, Sarraut was a popular governor, who respected Vietnamese institutions more than many and in addition was less concerned with being the policeman. On the surface, Indochina was in fine condition in 1914. Prosperous and self-sufficient, it appeared that even if Sarraut had exaggerated, Indochina might eventually evolve into something resembling his description in the 1912 speech.

She never did. French policy continued to exhibit neither coherence nor continuity. The war brought increased prosperity but it also brought forced conscription and unkept promises. The respected Sarraut returned to France after the war to become Minister of Colonies, but he was never able to carry out the reforms he had promised, let alone to satisfy the demands of the emerging Vietnamese nationalists. Taxes remained heavy, final authority remained in Paris, and the colonial government failed to protect the natives against exploitation by Europeans. Very few Vietnamese received French citizenship; worse yet, at the slightest suspicion of unrest they were denied the ordinary political and civil liberties which were supposedly part of the French heritage.⁴⁵

It cannot be denied that French occupation brought tangible benefits to Indochina and its peoples. Western science and ideas have left a permanent imprint, but at a high cost. The French uprooted much of the old family- and village-based social structure in the name of individualism and modernity. but the result was a severe disorientation of society and economy which brought much

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 126.

⁴⁵Thompson, *French Indo-China*, 89-91; Le-thanh-khoi, *Le Vietnam, histoire et civilization* (Paris, 1955), I, 401.

suffering. Large numbers of young Vietnamese of the upper classes did assimilate French culture, but because not only in the bureaucracy but also in finance and industry the great majority of white collar jobs went to Europeans, jobs were still not available to them. And despite the censoring efforts of the French authorities, the new generation learned of two facets of the Western tradition dangerous to the French ideal of empire: nationalism and Marxism.⁴⁶ Yet despite native hostility, bureaucratic ineptitude, and public indifference, the dream remained: Indochina would someday, somehow, become part of a Greater France, linked to the motherland by indissoluble bonds.⁴⁷

Blinded by national pride and the myth of assimilation, the French refused to recognize the fact that Vietnam already had a civilization. However corrupt, the government had functioned; however unprogressive, nobody starved. The French distorted or destroyed the old institutions without offering the Vietnamese anything better. Despite three hundred years' effort by the missionaries, Christianity had not been accepted save in a few areas. French planters, Indian usurers, and Chinese merchants got rich, but to the great majority of the population, French rule brought only taxes, debts, and sometimes starvation. In defence of the French, two factors which hampered them should be mentioned: the continued apathy of French opinion toward the Empire and a population explosion which doubled the population of Indochina.

It is impossible not to consider the French experience in Indochina a failure. Professor Cady was a good prophet in 1954 when he wrote that "it may prove to be one of the tragedies of the decline of Western influence in Asia that France could not admit the possibility of cultural or political equality with herself . . . without seeming to repudiate not only her position as a world power but also the very rationale of her role in world affairs."⁴⁸

⁴⁶Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités*, 187-188; Hammer, *Struggle for Indochina*, 63-74.

⁴⁷See, for example, Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China*, 9-13; or Deschamps, *Les méthodes et les doctrines coloniales*, 213-214.

⁴⁸John Frank Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca, 1954), 295-296. Similar estimates of the paradox of French imperialism are expressed by Luchty, *France against Herself*, 218 and Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, 174-175.

Assimilation proved to be a myth which blinded Frenchmen to the inadequacies of their colonial administration and the impossibility of their imperial aims. The tragedy is that assimilation, like all true myths, represented something noble: the ideals and institutions of Old Regime and Revolutionary France which had made her truly great. France had failed to transplant herself overseas, but it would take eight years of war in Indochina and then eight years of war in Algeria before she would accept the fact.

THE "LUCKNOW PACT"

A RE-EXAMINATION

by

BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

I

THE two important land-marks in the constitutional history of British India are the Government of India Acts of 1909 and 1919 well known as the Morley-Minto and Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. The Act of 1909 was the last expression of the British Constitutional policy in India which began as far back as the opening decades of the 19th century. The Act of 1919 marked a revolutionary departure from that policy when, in its preamble, it stated that the ultimate aim of the British administration was the establishment of institutions of self-government. This period of 10 years, therefore, is of great interest for its effects on the history of modern India. The Morley-Minto Reforms introduced the principle of communal representation which created a polarization of political forces in the country. This polarization was based not on any differences in political philosophy as such but rather on differences in religious and cultural affiliations of the two great communities inhabiting the country namely, the Hindus and the Muslims.¹ Such a division went counter to the general intentions of the Act of 1919 namely, the introduction of self-governing institutions. Self-government could be meaningful, in the context of the British period of Indian history, only on the basis of a single political community undivided in its allegiance to the state by any considerations of loyalties to religion. The two Acts, therefore, created a paradoxical situation wherein British constitutional intentions and practice appeared at variance with each other.

¹Mahatma Gandhi remarked to Lord Minto in October 1932 that the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 were "our undoing." Mary, Countess of Minto, *India, Morley and Minto*, (London, MacMillan and Co. 1934), P. 20, Note 1.

The introduction of the principle of communal representation has often been attributed to a deliberate British policy of "divide and rule."² Such an argument, while true in parts, cannot adequately and completely explain a complex historical process. The present paper intends to analyse the course of British constitutional aims in India in some detail. The main argument is that there were three parties involved in it. They were the British administration in India under the control of the Parliament in London, the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. On the British part, it may be stated here, there was a dramatic change in constitutional aims between 1912 and 1917 and this change created a situation which was beyond the control of any of the three parties involved. On the Muslim side it is argued that a significantly large segment of the Muslim League leadership never accepted the concept of a common and equal citizenship with the Hindus in India without serious reservations. The Indian National Congress, even when it was espousing an ideal of a secular nationalism, was unable to win the confidence of the Muslim leadership and was compelled to accept a principle of representation that negated the major premise of its nationalist philosophy.

The events between 1912 and 1917 posed a challenge to the three parties. Their responses determined the course of events which culminated in 1947.

II

The evolution of the British Empire in India is a fairly well-known historical process. It began with the Battle of Buxar in 1764 as a consequence of which the East India Company became the *Diwan* for the Bengal *Suba* of the rapidly disintegrating Mughal Empire. The Subsidiary Alliance System of Wellesley (1798-1805) created the structure of British Paramountcy³ to which Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856) added the coping stone of Sovereignty with

²C. Rajagopalachari and J. C. Kumarappa, (Eds), *The Nations' Voice*, A Collection of Gandhiji's Speeches in England, (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1947), P 193.

³See the Duke of Wellington's Note on the Marquess of Wellesley's Government of India, Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, (Manchester, The University Press, 1915), Pp 220-223.

his Doctrine of Lapse.⁴ The assumption of sovereignty raised the problem of the precise nature of British rule in India and its ultimate aims. In the flush of enthusiasm generated by the phenomenal success accruing to the British arms, leaders like Sir Thomas Munroe (Governor of Madras, 1820-1827) could philosophize that the British mission in India was "to raise the minds of the Natives" through Western education, economic progress and social change. But the basic attitude was to "look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently." There was a vague awareness that some day the people of India may become "sufficiently enlightened to have a regular government of themselves"⁵; but such a possibility was so remote that it could scarcely become a basis for actual policy. The Great Uprising of 1857 failed to shake this conviction which remained the corner-stone of British policy in India until 1912.

The pragmatic acceptance of the near-permanence of the British Empire in India after 1857 created an unprecedented situation both in India and in England. The British Administration in India was heir to the autocratic traditions of the Indian past and this autocracy was further strengthened by the alien nature of British Rule. But whereas the British Indian Administration was autocratic in the past Indian tradition, it was also subject to a parliamentary control that was to become increasingly democratic. This paradox was well spelled out by Lord Minto on March 21, 1907 when he argued in favour of the idea of creating a "constitutional autocracy" which alone could give the administration "a definite and permanent shape."⁶ This concept of a "constitutional autocracy" was the basis of British political objectives in India from 1861 to 1917 and it was in response to the continuing problems raised by it that the British enacted the series of Acts beginning with the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and ending with the Government of India Act of 1909.

The Great Uprising and its post-mortem revealed the need for a system of association of Indian opinion with the legislative activities of the Administration. This association could scarcely

⁴Minute by Lord Dalhousie, 28th February 1856; Muir, Pp 357-358.

⁵Minute by Sir Thomas Munro, 31st December 1824; Muir, Pp 282, 285.

⁶Mary, Countess of Minto, *Op. Cit.*, Pp 110-111.

be in the form of an acceptance of the principles of representative government in the Western sense of the term, since the British were committed to the view that India was not a nation but a conglomeration of interests, classes and communities. Nor were the British alone in this kind of thinking for politically conscious Indians were also aware of the difficulties in achieving a firm sense of nationhood.⁷ The association, the British were convinced, could only be on the basis of communities and interests and this attitude was first reflected by Lord Ellenborough (1841-1843) and Lord Dalhousie who suggested the inclusion of a few Indians in consultative and legislative bodies.⁸ These suggestions were first implemented under the Indian Councils Act of 1861. The purpose was clearly explained in a Despatch by the then Secretary of State for India when he said "the introduction of intelligent Native gentlemen into the Council will bring to its deliberations a knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the Native population, which cannot fail to improve the laws passed by the Council by adapting them to the wants of the great mass of the population of India."⁹ This principle of association was further developed under the Indian Councils Act of 1892 when a system of indirect election was introduced and the number of members increased. The principle underlying these changes was explained by Lord Lansdowne (1888-1894) in his statement of March 16, 1892: "(1) It is not expected of us that we shall attempt to create in India a complete or symmetrical system of representation. (2) It is expected of us that we shall make a *bona fide* endeavour to render the Legislative Councils more representative of the different sections of the Indian community than they are at present."¹⁰

⁷See e.g. the statement of Sir Phiroze Shah Mehta (1845-1915) in his presidential address at Calcutta in 1890: "We have not learnt the lessons of history so badly, as to demand the introduction of the full-blown representative institutions which, in England, have been the growth of centuries." Report of the *Sixth Indian National Congress*, (Calcutta, 1897?), Pp 10-11.

⁸According to R. C. Majumdar Ellenborough suggested the creation of two separate councils of Hindus and Muslims, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, (Calcutta, 1962), I, P 474; for Dalhousie's ideas see R. C. Majumdar, A. K. Majumdar and D. K. Ghosh, (Eds), *British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance*, I, The History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. IX, (Bombay, 1963), P 342.

⁹C. H. Philips, (Ed), *The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, (London, 1962), Pp 38-39.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Pp 66-69.

Between 1892 and 1909 India witnessed a growth of the nationalist movement and in 1905-1906 saw the first mass movement against the partition of the province of Bengal during the administration of Lord Curzon (1898-1905). The two major slogans of the movement were *Swadeshi* (Buy Indian) and *Swaraj* (self-government) and when Lord Minto arrived in India in 1905 he was confronted with the problem of political unrest. He freely conceded the need of granting some further constitutional reforms. But he emphatically declared "I am no advocate of 'representative government for India' in the Western sense of the term. It could never be akin to the instincts of the many races composing the population of the Indian Empire."¹¹ There may have been some differences of opinion between Lord Minto and the liberal Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, on the method of representation but in the matter of constitutional aims there was complete harmony between the two. Speaking in the House of Lords on December 17, 1908 Lord Morley said: "If I were attempting to set a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly and necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it."¹² This was further amplified by Lord Crewe (Secretary of State for India, 1911-1915) as late as June 1912, three years after the passing of the Morley-Minto Reforms, when he said in the House of Lords: "I do not believe that the experiment—for it would be an experiment quite new, so far as my knowledge of history goes, in the whole world—of attempting to confer a measure of real self-government, with practical freedom from Parliamentary control, upon a race which is not our own, even though that race enjoyed and appreciated the advantages of getting the best services of men belonging to our race—I do not believe that that experiment is one which could be tried."¹³

Thus for half a century (1861-1917) it was never the British intention to introduce responsible self-government in India on the model of the colonies like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The British felt that the conditions in India made the experiment

¹¹ Mary, Countess of Minto, *Op. Cit.*, P. 110.

¹² Philips, *Op. Cit.*, P 85.

¹³ *Ibid.*, P 94.

not only impractical but also dangerous. In the context of such thinking, then, the innovations introduced by the Government of India Act of 1909 fall into place.

It has been argued, and with much force, that communal representation in India was introduced at the behest of Muslim leaders who were maneuvered into making that demand by interested British politicians in India. The names of T. Beck and W. A. V. Archbold have been implied in these intrigues.¹⁴ Historians of Pakistan, on the other hand, have tended to discount the importance of these British activities.¹⁵ The demand for separate electorates and "weightage" was first formally put forward by the Muslim deputation led by the Aga Khan on October 1, 1906, and the alacrity with which the suggestion was accepted by Lord Minto clearly suggests the fact that the demand was in close consonance with British intentions at this time. The demand also served a political purpose as is revealed by Lord Minto's observation that it enabled the British to do "nothing less than the pulling back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition."¹⁶

Whatever the politics involved in the Muslim demand and the British response to it both were culminations of a long historical process. The only new element was the acceptance of "weightage" claimed by the Muslims not on their numerical strength but on their "political importance."¹⁷

These two principles of representation according to community and representation in excess of the numerical strength of the Muslim community cut at the very roots of representative democracy as commonly understood in the West. The Muslims had long demanded special representation and the right of the

¹⁴See Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements*, (Agra, 1954), Pp 35 ff; P. C. Ghosh, *Indian National Congress, 1892-1909*, (Calcutta, Firms K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1960), Pp 148 ff; R. C. Majumdar, *Op. Cit.*, Pp 484 ff; Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, (Bombay, 1947), P 112.

¹⁵See A Hamid, "The Simla Deputation" in *The Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference*, (Sixth Session) Karachi, Pakistan Historical Society, 1959, Pp 153 ff; S. Razi Wasti, "The Simla Deputation, 1906", *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, X, ii, April 1962, P 167.

¹⁶Marv, Countess of Minto, *Op. Cit.*, Pp 47-48.

¹⁷C. H. Philips, *Op. Cit.*, P 191.

Muslims to secure some kind of safeguards in representation was acknowledged even by nationalist leaders like Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915) and Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920).¹⁸ This system was embodied in the Government of India Act of 1909 and became a part of the Indian political process.

The British constitutional aims in India underwent a profound change in 1917. Until 1912, as we have seen earlier, the British had firmly held to the view that the introduction of self-governing institutions was both impractical and risky. On August 20, 1917, however, Edwin Montague, Secretary of State for India, in his now famous statement, indicated that the British position had undergone a radical change. The new constitutional aims were stated by Mr. Montague as "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British empire."¹⁹ There were several underlying assumptions in this statement. The first one was that India was to be helped, by gradual stages, to establish self-governing institutions on the model of the other colonies. Secondly the assumption was that the western institutions of self-government could be, under British tutelage, transplanted to an Asian setting. Thirdly, such self-government as practised in the West rested on the basis of a single political community undivided by loyalties other than to the state itself. But, as later British observations were to point out, the principle of communal representation went counter to the third assumption. As the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918 pointed out: "We conclude unhesitatingly that the history of self-government among the nations who developed it, and spread it through the world is decisively against the admission by the state of any divided allegiance, against the state's arranging its members in any way which encourages them to think to themselves primarily as citizens of any smaller unit than itself."²⁰ The report

¹⁸Gokhale's support to communal representation of some kind is referred to by Lord Minto, Mary Countess of Minto, *Op. Cit.*, P 20, Note 1; in one of his editorials Tilak admitted that the Muslims found it difficult to be elected in areas which were predominantly Hindu, see N. C. Kelkar *Lokmanya Tilakanche Kesareeteel Lekha* (Poona, 1922-1930), II (Ed.) (1924), P 20.

¹⁹C. H. Philips, *Op. Cit.*, P 264.

²⁰*Ibid.*, P 209.

finally concluded: "We regard any system of communal electorates as a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle."²¹

Two questions necessarily arise at this point. One concerns the causes of the sudden change in British constitutional aims for India between 1912 and 1917. And the second is that if in 1917 it was felt that communal representation went counter to the professed aim of the creation of self-governing institutions, why was it continued in the Act of 1919 and thereafter?

It has been pointed out that the First World War acted as a catalytic agent in the transformation of British thinking relating to the colonies. India's response to Britain at the outbreak of war was magnificent both in its declarations of loyalty as also in the contributions in money and men towards the British war effort. India had contributed over a million men who fought with British and Dominion soldiers in the far-flung theatres of War. The response in donations from the princes and the landed aristocracy was expected but the loyalty shown by the nationalist leaders was surprising.²² This response urged the British to approach the Indian problem from a "new angle of vision."²³ Within England itself the War brought about far-reaching changes. The franchise underwent significant changes and in 1918 women received the right to vote under certain conditions for the first time.²⁴ Moreover, the War saw the emergence of new attitudes among the Dominions, especially Canada. As has been pointed out, Canada entered the War as a colony and emerged a nation.²⁵ Then there were the Imperial Conferences at which India was being represented as a separate entity. On April 13, 1917 Robert Laird Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, moved and Edmund Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, supported the motion that the Dominions be

²¹Quoted in *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), I, P 25.

²²Valentine Chirol, *India Old and New*, (London, MacMillan and Co., 1921), P 139.

²³*Ibid.*, P 141.

²⁴Ramsay Muir, *A Short History of the British Commonwealth*, (London, 1956), II, P 843.

²⁵See Gaddis Smith, "Canadian External Affairs during World War I", *The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs*, (Durham, 1960), P 33.

recognized as important parties to the Imperial Conferences.²⁶ Sir Satyendranath Sinha, (member of the Viceroy's Executive Council in India for some time and President of the 1915 session of the Indian National Congress) moved for a specific inclusion of the wording that India be "represented in all consultations" involving considerations of imperial defence and foreign relations.²⁷ The demands for full autonomy by the Dominions and India's recognition as a part of the Commonwealth could not but affect British thinking about India and her constitutional status.

There was also another influence at work. Ever since the inception of the Indian National Congress there was a British Committee working in London in behalf of the Congress with which were associated spokesmen like Charles Bradlaugh and Sir William Wedderburn. These friends of India carried on a ceaseless propaganda for liberal constitutional reforms for India and influenced the thinking of many members of the Parliament on the question.²⁸ These spokesmen published newspapers and pamphlets focussing attention on aspects of British rule in India and were instrumental in creating a feeling of considerable sympathy for India among the Liberal elements in British politics.

There were also pressures from Indian nationalists. In 1915 Sir S. Sinha urged that the British should clearly spell out their goals in India and indicated that Indian opinion could be satisfied with nothing less than self-government. Lord Chelmsford, the Governor-General of India (1916-1920) echoed these aspirations and came to the conclusion in 1916 that the goal of British rule in India should be the creation of a self-governing India as an integral part of the British Empire.²⁹ The ideal of *Swaraj* was articulated by the radical Indian nationalists like Tilak as early as 1906 and seven years later, in 1913, the Muslim League had also adopted the attainment of "self-government suitable to India" as one of its aims. Furthermore, the Nationalists had effectively

²⁶M. Olivier, *Colonial and Imperial Conferences*, (Ottawa, 1954), II, Pp 188-189.

²⁷A. B. Keith, *Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1763-1917*, (London, 1953) II, Pp 401-403.

²⁸See *The Indu Prakash* of Bombay, May 6, 1887.

²⁹H. H. Dodwell, (Ed.), *Cambridge History of India*, (Delhi, 1958), VI, P 587.

demonstrated their ability to create successful pressures on the British administration resulting in the annulment of the Bengal Partition in 1911. Pressure from the Dominions, lobbying in London, the demands of radical nationalism, the declared goal of attainment of "self-government suitable to India" by the Muslim League and the promptings of the Indian Liberals, all converged on creating a sense of urgency in British policy expressed in August 1917 by Edwin Montague, Secretary of State for India. The Radicals returned to the Congress in 1916 and in the same year was forged the organizational compact known as the Lucknow Pact marking the zenith of Hindu-Muslim co-operation in Indian politics. Indian politics had clearly come of age and that too in the surprisingly short period between 1912 and 1917.

In 1918 the British policy-makers had clearly recognized the fact that communal representation was a serious hindrance to the growth of self-governing institutions in India. However, there were serious difficulties in the way of correcting this anomaly. The Muslims had enjoyed separate electorates for 10 years (1909-1919) and it was a well-entrenched privilege with them which could not be easily given up. Secondly, the Congress, which had earlier denounced the principle of Separate Representation based on religion, had now come to the position of making it a part of its official policy as signified by the Lucknow-Pact of 1916. This Pact has been described by the official historian of the Congress as a "Hindu-Muslim Concordat"³⁰ and no less a leader than B. G. Tilak had taken a prominent part in getting the Pact accepted by the Lucknow session of the Congress in 1916.³¹ It was precisely this fact that was pointed out by the *Report of the Franchise Committee* in 1918 when it stated that "both Hindus and Muhammadans are in substantial agreement that the latter should everywhere enjoy communal electorates and we have no hesitation in recommending that effect should be given to this common desire."³²

³⁰B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Congress*, (Allahabad, 1935), P 215.

³¹M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, (Bombay, 1959), II, P 541.

³²Quoted in *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, 1930, I, P 189.

III

We have so far traced the development of British constitutional policies in India. These represented the British responses to the demands made by politically conscious Indians. Of these the Muslims were the most directly concerned with the demand for separate representation. The Muslim awakening has been ascribed to the rise of the Aligarh Muslim movement led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Sir Syed was a great admirer of Western education and felt that the Muslim community could not make any significant progress until it had accepted Western education and Muslim society had begun to modernize itself. In this there was a marked difference between the Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus had enthusiastically accepted Western education and had made great progress in education, trade and government service. Sir Syed felt that the first task of the Muslims was not to divert their attention by getting involved in political agitation. He also was convinced that the Muslims could make great progress only in co-operation with the British. He was disturbed by the Congress demands for representative government for he was convinced that these demands would ultimately become demands for responsible government of a parliamentary type. Sir Syed was opposed to such a form of government in India. In this he reflected the general sentiment of significant segments of the Muslim community.³³ He exhorted his followers to keep away from the Indian National Congress and in this he succeeded remarkably well. This is revealed by the number of Muslim delegates attending the Congress sessions from 1885 to 1906. The first session in Bombay (1885) was attended by two Muslims both of whom were local attorneys. The largest number of Muslims attending a Congress session was 311 at Lucknow (1899) and of these 308 were from the area itself. The total number of delegates at this session was 789. This was despite the fact that of the 26 Presidents of the Congress sessions between 1885 and 1906 two were Muslims. (Mr. Baddruddin Tayabji, Madras, 1887 and Mr. M. R. Sayani, Calcutta, 1896).³⁴

³²See R. C. Majumdar, *Op. Cit.*, I, Pp 466-467.

³⁴See S. Razi Wasti, "The Simla Deputation, 1906", *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, X, ii, (April, 1962), Pp 163-164, Note 5.

The history of the demand for separate representation goes back to 1882-1883. In 1882 a demand for separate arrangements for the education of the Muslims was made before the Hunter Commission. In 1883 Mr. Mahomed Yusuf of Patna, while speaking in the Bengal Legislative Council, demanded separate representation for the Muslims in the local bodies.³⁵ In 1896 Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan, a friend of Sir Syed, made a suggestion to the Congress President Rahimtulla Sayani that the Congress pass a resolution asking for equal number of seats for the Muslims in the Legislative Councils, District Local Boards and the Municipalities. Here was the first demand for "weightage".³⁶ In the anti-partition movement in Bengal the large majority of Muslims did not participate and quite a few even opposed the *Swadeshi* movement.³⁷

We have already referred to the Muslim Deputation to Simla led by the Aga Khan demanding separate electorates and "weightage". In the same year was formed the All India Muslim League with the object of promoting among the Muslims a sense of loyalty to the British Government and to "protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India."³⁸ This was a clear indication of Muslim thinking that the Muslims were a separate community with special rights and privileges and that the Congress was not capable of protecting these rights. This was evidence of the fact that since 1875 there was coming into being a separate Muslim nationalism which was willing to accept British Rule but was not prepared to accept the rule of a parliamentary majority on Western lines since that majority would always be that of the Hindus. This was also proof of the fact that the Congress leadership had failed in winning the confidence of the Muslim leadership and had also failed to adequately appreciate the fact that there were growing in the sub-continent

³⁵B. Majumdar, *History of Political Thought*, from Rammohun to Dayananda, Vol. I, Bengal, (Calcutta, 1934), Pp 398-399.

³⁶R. C. Majumdar, *Op Cit.*, I. P 486.

³⁷See S. N. Banerjee, *A Nation in Making*, (London, 1925), P 231; *Indian Review*, July 1907, P 538; Mr. Gopal Krishna Gokhale also felt that the anti-partition movement was mainly Hindu; see his letter to Sir William Wedderburn dated May 24, 1907 on the files of the Servants of India Society in Poona.

³⁸A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League, Yesterday and Today*, (Lahore, 1948), Pp 19-20.

two nationalisms which would polarise political forces in the country along religious and cultural lines.

The Muslims secured their demands under the Act of 1909. They had acquired a new political importance far beyond their actual numerical strength and they were unwilling to give up these gains. Even when the Muslim League accepted the goal of self-government in 1913 the two major planks of its programme were "to protect and advance the political and other rights and interests of the Indian Musalmans" and to work for the "attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India."³⁹ This concept of self-government, therefore, had nothing in common with the one prevalent in the West for it was based on the assumption that the Muslims had two sets of loyalties: namely, loyalties as Muslims and loyalties as Indians. That this was a persistent trend in Muslim thinking is shown by the statements of Maulana Muhammad Ali (1878-1931), President of Coconada Session of the Indian National Congress in 1923, when he said "We must clearly recognize that the Hindus and Muslims dwell apart in thought and sentiment" and that "because the immediate and practical issues of the day divide the Hindus and Muslims that communal representation has become a cardinal feature in the political evolution of the country." He further urged that "any true patriot of India working for the evolution of Indian nationality will have to accept the communal individuality of the Muslims as the basis of constructive effort."⁴⁰ This concept of dual, and somewhat exclusive loyalties, persisted down to 1930 when the Maulana argued, at the First Round Table Conference in London, that he belonged to two circles of equal size which were not concentric. The one circle represented the Muslim World and the other India.⁴¹

Such an awareness of a separate identity and, by implication, a separate political destiny, did not preclude co-operation with the Indian National Congress. On quite a few occasions the sessions of the Congress and the League were held in the same place and

³⁹Lal Bahadur, *Op. Cit.*, P 91.

⁴⁰Quoted by K. P. Karunakaran in *Modern Indian Political Tradition*, (New Delhi, 1962), Pp 274-276.

⁴¹V. P. Varma, *Modern Indian Political Thought* (Agra, 1961), P 525.

almost simultaneously. They were also attended by Hindus as Muslims attended the Congress. The climax of this co-operation came in the Congress-Muslim Pact of 1916 in Lucknow when the Congress officially conceded the Muslim demand for separate representation in return for a modification in "weightage" and the Muslim's right to vote in any other electorate save his own.⁴² This was less than year before the change in the British constitutional aims as discussed above.

IV

As the vanguard of Indian Nationalism the Congress aimed at creating a common platform on which all those who desired political advancement could gather. Its early leadership was liberal in its philosophy and concentrated its attention on the dominant political, administrative and economic problems confronting the country. It did not desire an immediate severance of the British connection but urged continuous broadening of opportunities for Indians to serve the country through the judicial and civil services and through a larger representation in the local bodies and legislative councils. But, as shown above, the Congress failed in its attempt to win the support of the Muslim League leadership. The Hindi-Urdu controversy (1867) in Uttar Pradesh, the Ganesha and Shivaji festivals (1893 and 1896) and the general revival of Hinduism and its espousal by many of the nationalist leaders were pointed out by the Muslim League leaders as indications that the Congress was predominantly a Hindu organization. In 1907 the Congress was split into two open factions called the Extremists and the Moderates and the former left the Congress. At the time when the Morley-Minto Reforms were inaugurated the Moderates were in control of the Congress and though they deplored the introduction of communal electorates seemed almost helpless to oppose them.⁴³ It was not until 1916 that the Congress was reunited. In 1916 came the Lucknow Pact which officially committed the Congress to the acceptance of the system of communal representation for the Muslims.

⁴²B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *Op. Cit.*, Appendix, II; Pp vii-viii.

⁴³*Ibid.*, Pp. 41-42.

The question that poses itself at this point is why did the Congress accept the Lucknow Pact, the central part of which was separate electorates? The Pact was described by S. Satyamurthi in 1923 as an "unfortunate blunder"⁴⁴ and Lala Lajpatrai followed him in 1925 with his remarks that the "Muslim's insistence on communal representation is the very negation of nationhood. Nowhere in the three continents of which I have experience does it exist. This poison has been instilled into the national system of India by the Congress leaders."⁴⁵ The reason seems to be the necessity felt both by the League and the Congress to bring about an *operational* unity between the two political organizations. It was remarked earlier that in 1913 the Muslim League had also adopted the goal of self-government though in a manner quite different from that understood by the Congress. But the very acceptance of this goal by the League brought it close to the Congress. In 1915 the Aga Khan had resigned his leadership of the League and there was a new leadership taking shape in the League. The position of Turkey in World War I had also brought home to the more perspicacious leaders among the orthodox Muslims the state of jeopardy into which the institution of the *Khilafat* was placed.⁴⁶ The earnest appeals made by leaders like Gokhale and Gandhi to the Hindus to seek an accommodation with the Muslims also had their desired effect and the time was ripe for a tactical unity between the League and the Congress.⁴⁷ The League, as much as the Congress, was in need of an ally.

Though the Congress leaders had adopted the goal of self-government as far back as 1906 it was becoming increasingly obvious that the goal remained distant in view of the British attitude that self-government on the Western model was unsuitable for India, a view reiterated by Lord Crewe in 1912. In 1915 the Congress was beginning to feel that successful political pressures to secure self-government could be created only if the Congress and the League came together. The Muslim League resolution on self-government in 1913 strengthened the hope of such unity. The Congress, therefore, agreed to accept the Lucknow Pact as a

⁴⁴M. R. Jayakar, *Op. Cit.*, II, P 518.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, P 715.

⁴⁶Lal Bahadur, *Op. Cit.*, P 100.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, P 84.

tactical instrument for strengthening the demand for self-government.

It is clear then that in 1916 both the Congress and the League were of the opinion that each needed the help of the other. Neither had expected that the constitutional aims of the British would change so radically in less than a year. And when the change came both were taken by surprise. But already the two parties had forged an instrument of mere tactical co-operation called the Lucknow Pact and the Congress had officially accepted the principle of representation based on religion, a principle that went directly counter to the philosophy of a secular nationalism that it had preached for many years. The Lucknow Pact sealed the fate of secular nationalism and when the course of the development of self-governing institutions was set in the Act of 1919 it was determined by the system of communal representation. The Lucknow Pact was a tacit admission of the failure of the philosophy of a secular nationalism in India for a system of representation based on religion was found to destroy, in course of time, the concept of a single political community. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 and the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 created a fundamental paradox in Indian constitutional development, a paradox which could be finally resolved only by splitting the country into two separate and independent political communities.

THE INDIAN-AFRICAN RELATIONSHIP BEFORE 1860

by

ROBERT G. GREGORY

BEFORE THE establishment of the European hegemony in Africa, the relationship between India and Africa evolved through five principal chronological phases. The first, the obscure initial period, includes the development of early geological and geographical ties between the two continents as well as the exchange of peoples and cultures during the Paleolithic and Neolithic Ages. The second, which is far less speculative, covers the two milleniums from about the fourth century B.C. to the late fifteenth, during which Indians and Arabs established a monopoly of trade with eastern Africa. The third embraces the two and a half centuries of Portuguese influence, from the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth centuries. The fourth concerns the revival of Oman and the rise of the Zanzibar sultanate. The last, beginning in the early nineteenth century and continuing till about 1860, is devoted to the coming of Britain.

I

The ties between India and Africa are, according to one theory, almost as old as the earth. One billion years ago in the Cryptozoic Eon, as water condensed on the surface, all the lighter rock of the crust buckled, shriveled, and thickened until it was concentrated on one side of the globe. The result was Pangaea, a single land mass comprising all the present-day continents and islands. Composed mainly of granite and gneiss some sixty miles thick, it floated in a sea of denser, molton rock 900 miles deep and as slick as liquid glass. In the course of millions of years as the pull of gravity smoothed the surface of the globe, the land mass developed huge fissures and began to break apart. As rifts occurred, the sea poured in, pushing the fragments apart. One sizeable chunk

slid off to the southwest and became South America. Another drifted away to the northwest and became North America, and a third glided out to the southeast and was later to be known as Australia. In the same way Africa separated from Eurasia at the line now marked by the Mediterranean Sea. And from what is now southeastern Africa the land mass that is India slipped away to the east and finally moved northwards to merge with Asia. Meanwhile the group as a whole revolved slowly on the face of the earth, and each unit in turn passed the equator and the northern or southern pole.

This "displacement theory," first postulated in 1912 by the German scientist Alfred Wegener,¹ appears plausible when one glances at a map of the world and notes the similarity between the coastal lines of the continents. The western bulge of South America fits into the Gulf of Guinea; and the eastern coast of North America, especially if Greenland, Ice-land, and the British Isles are fitted into the interstices, conforms roughly to the line of western Europe. Other evidence, most of it compiled since the time of Wegener, supports the theory. Similarities substantiating a common origin between Africa and India can be found in their plant and animal life. All Indian fish and fresh water creatures, for example, have close relatives in Africa. Mountain ranges can be matched on facing coasts; and the Himalayas can be explained by the presumption that as India glided northwards folds occurred on its northern edge because of friction with the cooled, resistant ocean floor—folds that were heightened further by the impact with Asia. In addition, huge cracks and chasms have been found in the ocean beds between the continents paralleling their coast lines. The most recent proof is the discovery of fossil magnetism. Particles of iron oxide, which lined up with the earth's magnetic field before fossils solidified, indicate that Africa was once over the South Pole and that India only 70 million years ago was south of the equator.²

¹Alfred Wegener, *The Origin of Continents and Oceans* (trans. by Skerl, London, 1922). Wegener's theory is accepted by some Indian scholars. See, for instance, V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *Pre-Historic South India* (Madras, 1951), pp. 6-7.

²Rutherford Platt, "Are the Earth's Continents Adrift?" *Reader's Digest*, March 1961, pp. 181-88.

Wegener's theory has not won universal acceptance from scientists. Some cling to the concept that India and Africa have remained stationary, shifting vertically so that one part was above sea level at one time and below at another, but never horizontally. They explain the similarities in flora and fauna by stressing the possibility of land bridges that have sunk beneath the water, and they believe that much of the remaining proof for the displacement theory can be accounted for by shifts in the poles rather than movements of the continents. Most authorities, however, now accept the idea that continents drift, though they remain skeptical of the claim that the present coastal configurations represent the old lines of separation. The early geologic relation between India and Africa is thus still largely a matter of conjecture.³

There is substantial agreement that in the late paleozoic Era, more than 200 million years ago, Africa and India were joined by an Arabo-Somali massif, a high land mass south of present-day Arabia. A migration of animals has been traced from southern Africa to India and thence into western Europe and eastward across Asia to Alaska and into North America. At the time of the land bridge Africa and Europe were separated by a body of water much larger than the Mediterranean. A Sea of Tethys, 3,500 miles long and twice as wide from north to south as the Mediterranean, extended from western India across the Arabian, Greek, and Italian peninsulas all the way to Spain; and it probably joined the Atlantic Ocean. The union between Africa and India continued for millions of years. In the Mesozoic Era more than 100 million years ago, the Arabo-Somali massif was finally cut by the development of a vast depression. Extending southwards from the Tethys along what is now the eastern side of Africa, this Trans-Erythrean trough, as it is called, combined with the Tethys completely to isolate Africa. It lasted into the mid-Tertiary period of the Cenozoic Era, perhaps between thirty and fifty million years ago; and then the trough and the Sea of Tethys both receded, the Arabo-Somali massif sank into the Indian Ocean, and India and Africa gradually assumed their present configurations. Today

³*Ibid.* See also A. L. du Toit, *Our Wandering Continents* (London, 1937); Walter Fitzgerald, *Africa, a Social, Economic and Political Geography of Its Major Regions* (London, 8th edition, 1955), pp. 4-9; and Allan L. Bensen, *The Story of Geology* (N. Y., 1927), pp. 20-23.

the remarkable similarity in topography and natural resources and the striking resemblance in the lower forms of plant and animal life are reminders of the physical unity that once existed.⁴

Any human ties between Africa and India developed long after the disappearance of the connecting Arabo-Somali massif. Man appeared at the earliest on earth only two million years ago.⁵ There is indication, however, that the earliest human inhabitants of India and Africa were closely related. During the Paleolithic Age the two areas appear to have been inhabited by a Negroid race, characterized by short stature, dark skin, curly hair, and flat noses. The Chellean-Acheulean peoples of North and East Africa and the Stellenbosch peoples of South Africa, on the one hand, and the "Quartzite men" of India, on the other, had these traits in common. As people of the old Stone Age, they relied on rude stone implements for weapons and tools; they were nomadic hunters and gatherers, as distinct from settled agriculturalists; and they had no domestic livestock or homes other than caves and crude huts fashioned of trees and leaves. From a common origin in Africa or Asia they spread eastwards as Proto-Australoids into Indonesia and the South Pacific archipelago. They seem to have been the ancestors of the modern South African Bushmen, the Australian Aborigines, the Melanesians of New Guinea, and the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands. They may be more remotely related to the African Negro and the Indian Kol, Bhil, and Munda.⁶ Some scholars have speculated that the Neolithic Mohenjo-Daro and Harappan cultures of northwest India may have developed as the result of a later land bridge, only a few thousand years B.C.,

⁴There is substantial agreement on this explanation in Dikshitar, chap. I; E. C. Case, *Environment of Tetrapod Life in the Late Paleozoic of Regions other than North America* (Washington, 1926), chap. XIII; and W. J. Arkell, *Jurassic Geology of the World* (N. Y., 1956), pp. 255-303.

⁵L. S. B. Leakey has been the chief scientist and popularizer engaged in tracing man's early development in Africa. See Leakey: *Stone Age Africa: an Outline of Prehistory in Africa* (London, 1936); *The Stone Age Races of Kenya* (London, 1934); "Finding the World's Earliest Man," *National Geographic Magazine*, Sept. 1960, pp. 420-35; "Exploring 1,750,000 Years into Man's Past," *ibid.*, Oct. 1961, pp. 564-89; "Adventures in the Search for Man," *ibid.*, Jan. 1963, pp. 132-52.

⁶Stuart Piggott, *Prehistoric India to 1,000 B.C.* (London, 1962), pp. 38, 148-49; and R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (London, 1960), pp. 11-14.

connecting East Africa and the Kathiawar peninsula; but as yet their theory is not supported by geologic evidence.⁷

Long after the decline of these Paleolithic peoples as the dominant ethnic group in Africa and India, after more advanced peoples with different racial strains had swept over each area in successive waves, a further large-scale exchange of peoples may have taken place by sea. The theory that India colonized Egypt was held by many Ancient writers, including Philostratus and Eusebius; and it was developed further in the Modern Age by Charles Francois Dupuis, Sir William Jones, Colonel Wilford, Dr. Robert Taylor, and Edward Pococke.⁸ Among the many writings on the subject, one of the fullest and most convincing is an article published in 1908 by an American political economist and Orientalist, Alexander Del Mar. He maintained that Egypt was invaded by thousands of Indian gold-seekers between 2,000 and 1,500 years B.C. Egyptian records of names and myths, according to Del Mar, reveal that the first invaders were Cingalese and that they were followed by Indians from Malabar, the Gulf of Cutch, and Orissa, and finally by Tibetan-cultured colonists from the Bay of Bengal. Eventually all the coastal tribes of Bharata Varsa were involved. When the supply of gold was exhausted, they remained in Egypt and gradually lost contact with their homeland. But it was they and their descendants, asserted Del Mar, who employed the cultural attainments of Ancient India to found and develop the great civilization of early Egypt. Though these Indians had no special name in Egyptian records, they were referred to by Ancient Greeks as Pelasgians and Phoenecians.⁹

The chief attraction in Egypt was gold. Early Egypt is known to have had extensive and very rich deposits of gold, some of which was scattered in placer fields over the Great Bisharee Desert, others embedded in quartz in the foothills of Nubia and the mountains

⁷See, for instance, H. D. Sankalia, "Stone Age Finds in Saurashtra: a Link with Harappan Era," *Times of India*, April 28, 1963, p. 8.

⁸Cited by Alexander Del Mar, "Indian Marks upon Early Egypt," *Indian Review* (Madras), Jan. 1908, pp. 4-8.

⁹*Ibid.* Some Indian scholars believe that the Dravidians were indigenous to India and that they migrated west, where they became known as the Mediterranean type represented by the Ancient Egyptians. See, for instance, Dikshitar, pp. 133-34.

of the east coast. According to Egyptian epigraphy, the Cingalese and Indian adventurers arrived first at the land of Punt, a Red Sea area near Bab-el Mandeb, and thence gradually spread into the interior to exploit the placer fields. By the sixteenth century the easily accessible gold of the placer variety presumably was exhausted, for at that time, as shown by Egyptian records, the quartz deposits first began to be mined. Although it is now fairly certain that coinage originated in both the East and West during the eighth century, Del Mar believed that gold coins were widely used by China and India as early as 1900 B.C., at least five centuries before their manufacture in Europe;¹⁰ and he cited this as proof that the gold-seekers of Egypt came from the East. But that the Kathiawar peninsula may have been their home is indicated by recent discoveries in Saurashtra which show that the Harappan people well before 2,100 B.C. were richly adorned with gold jewelry and had at Lothal an extensive dockyard.¹¹

In addition to the circulation of gold and the record of Indian place names, much more evidence of Indian influence can be cited. According to Del Mar, Sanskrit and the Ancient Egyptian language had at least 560 words in common, and *punt* was the Sanskrit name for gold, and *nile* the Sanskrit word for blue. Many fruits and vegetables common in Ancient Egypt, such as artichokes, figs, oranges, peaches, rice, and gourds, were described by Athenaeus and Pliny as coming from India; and the same was said of Egyptian iron and steel. Pieces of teak, medicinal plants, balsams, gums, and drugs which could have come only from India have been found in early Egyptian tombs. The similarities in astronomical systems indicate a common origin; and Lucian ascribed the origin to India. There is also a close affinity between the religions. The Egyptian lawgiver Menes, who was deified as Amen or Ammon, and his deified wife Mut and son Maneros were, in Del Mar's opinion, Egyptian counterparts of the Indian Manu, Mut, and Matsya. The Egyptian Menes and the Indian Matsya images were both painted blue. Moreover, the Egyptians called Menes a *Piru* or *Piroumis*, a title which the Greeks corrupted into Pharaoh; and *Piroumas* or *Biroumas* was an Indian title of Brahmah. Del Mar

¹⁰Del Mar, *loc. cit.*

¹¹Sankalia, *loc. cit.* See B. G. Gokhale, *Ancient India: History and Culture* (Bombay, 3rd edition, 1956), p. 17.

maintained that even the pyramids and rock-temples of India were plainly the prototypes of those in Egypt. He pointed out that the Indian and Burmese colossi of the Buddha and the Egyptian colossi of Menes or Memnon were a type that has been found only in countries colonized from India. The fact that the architecture and sculpture of early Egyptian dynasties excelled those of later dynasties in proportion and good taste could be explained, Del Mar believed, only by the assumption that the earlier was imported. He accepted Lucian's theory that the decline of the great Egyptian civilization was the result of a gradual infiltration by a less advanced "Ethiopian" culture.¹²

II

Despite the mass of evidence offered by Del Mar and others who trace the origins of Egyptian civilization to India, the ties between India and Africa remain largely speculative until well into the Christian era.¹³ The great Persian empire established by Cyrus in the sixth century B.C. and expanded in the next century by Darius and Zerxes extended at times from the Indus valley to Asia Minor and on into the Balkans of Europe; and it can be presumed to have affected at least indirectly the north-eastern coasts of Africa. A more definite tie between the two countries was established by Alexander in 327 B.C. when, having conquered northern Egypt and founded Alexandria, he crossed the Hindukush and subdued the people of the Indus valley; and Greek influence continued in Egypt beyond the Roman conquest and in India intermittently for three centuries under successive invaders from Antiochus the Great of Syria to Demetrios of Bactria. But at no time under Persian or Greek emperors was any significant connection established between India and Africa. There was merely the loose tie of a sporadic trade. During this period as before, it is probable that Indian and Arab merchants plied from port to port in small ships and that their trade on the whole extended from southern India and Ceylon to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and

¹²Del Mar, *loc. cit.*

¹³Sir Mortimer Wheeler reflects the prevailing opinion that Mesopotamia was the ancestor of both the Nile and Indus civilizations. See Wheeler, *Early India and Pakistan to Ashoka* (N.Y., 1959), pp. 104-06.

the eastern coast of Africa below Cape Guardafui. Some of these merchant-sailors may even have ventured directly across the Indian Ocean to Africa.¹⁴ The *Puranas*, chronicles of Indian history for several centuries B.C., show that Hindus even then had accurate knowledge of many East African localities.¹⁵

To these early relations between Asia and Africa the climate and geography were both an aid and a hindrance. Communication by sea was greatly facilitated by prevailing winds. Between December and February the monsoon blew steadily across the Indian Ocean from the northeast; and between April and September the winds were reversed, coming from the south-southwest. It was thus easy for merchants to sail from any part of India, even from the eastern side of the peninsula, or from the Persian Gulf and Arabia to the eastern coast of Africa. They could sail as far south as Cape Delgado, at which point the winds became feeble, then barter for a few months as the winds changed, and finally ride the monsoon home by the same route. If they sailed out in winter, they could return in summer. The distance from Bombay to Mombasa was only 2,500 miles, not much greater than the length of the Mediterranean Sea; and Zanzibar was only 2,200 miles from Muscat and 1,700 from Aden. But anything more than a trade with the East African coastal towns, any large-scale migration like the supposed colonization of Egypt, for instance, was almost prohibited by the African geography. Africa is a vast uplifted shield with a higher mean elevation than any other continent and with an unusually even topography. Where the high plateau meets the ocean there often are high cliffs; Africa's rivers are few, and they tumble down dangerous cataracts before almost disappearing in shallow, shifting deltas. The continent lacks broad, fertile valleys leading successively up to the interior highlands, and its few coastal plains are narrow strips of steaming jungle. These conditions, combined with the rigors and diseases of tropical and

¹⁴Major F. B. Pearce, *Zanzibar: the Island Metropolis of Eastern Africa* (N.Y., 1920), p. 253.

¹⁵Paper by Lieut. C. P. Rigby, *Proceedings of the Bombay Geographic Society*, 1843, vol. VI, p. 89; cited by R. B. Ewbank, "Summary of the Part Played by Indians in the Economic Development of East Africa up to 1895," appended to letter, Ewbank to J. B. Bhore, Jan. 14, 1925, "Proceedings," Overseas Branch, Dept. of Education, Health and Lands, Government of India, Sept. 1925, Nos. 1-92, Part A. All "Proceedings" cited below were consulted in the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

equatorial climates and with the presence of hostile native tribes, especially the warlike Bantu, obstructed coastal settlement and penetration of the interior.¹⁶

That by the first century A.D. Indians and Arabs were utilizing the monsoons to carry on a flourishing annual trade with the coasts of eastern Africa is evident from an extant document, the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*. Written about 80 A.D. by a Greek merchant-seaman of Berenike, an Egyptian port of the Red Sea, it is a description of the east coast of Africa as far south as the Zambezi or Rufiji River. It referred to this area as the "Ausanitic" coast, perhaps because of a conquest several centuries earlier by the Arab state of Ausan; and it described the native Negroid inhabitants as having "very great stature" and owing allegiance to "the Mapharitic chief," obviously one of the Sabaeen kings of South Arabia.¹⁷ Arabs and Indians, according to the author, carried on an extensive trade across the Erythrean Sea, the Greek name for the Indian Ocean. To Africa they brought "iron and steel, and Indian cloth, wheat, rice, clarified butter, sesame oil, girdles and honey from the reed called 'sacchari' (Sanskrit 'sarkara': sugar)."¹⁸ Some of these goods were used for barter, but much of them served "for getting the goodwill of the savages." From Africa the merchants carried away rhinoceros horn, tortoise shell, a little palm oil, and many slaves.¹⁹

Not until the sixth century is there further description of such activity. Between the sixth and fifteenth centuries the Arabic *Chronicles of Kilwa*, the Swahili *History of Pate*, the map of the Arab Al-Idrisi, and the travelogs of Masudi of Bagdad in the tenth century, Yaqut the Greek freedman and Marco Polo in the thirteenth, and Ibn Battuta of Tangier in the fourteenth present a revealing picture of Indian relations with Africa. Early in this period the Arabs and Indians built up a thriving trade, which extended

¹⁶Sir Reginald Coupland, *East Africa and Its Invaders* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1956), pp. 2-4. Coupland was the foremost authority on the Indian Ocean of the Modern Age and thus is the principal source for most of the information in this article.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 4-8.

¹⁸Quoted by R. J. Udani, "Our Countrymen in Kenya," *Indian Review* (Madras), Dec. 1928, p. 841.

¹⁹Coupland, pp. 4-8.

through the Red Sea to Europe at the one end and to Indonesia, China, and the Philippines at the other. It also embraced the Zinj (Negro) coast, and the whole of eastern Africa gradually became known in Arab terminology as Zanzibar. Chinese coins, dating from the eighth century and found throughout the area, indicate the extent of the Indian and Arabian trade. Apparently the Arabs were more active in these centuries than Indians. They founded permanent trading settlements, similar to the later European factories, at Calicut on the Malabar coast of India, at Malacca on the Malay peninsula, and eventually throughout the Eastern world. But Indians were active too, and during this period they definitely were crossing the Indian Ocean. In 1260 Marco Polo visited Mombasa. "It had a good port," he wrote, "where there were always many ships, both of those which sail for Sofala and those that come from Cambay."²⁰ Polo's account, coupled with those of other observers from Medieval Europe, substantiated twentieth-century Indian claims that "India discovered East Africa before Britain discovered India." From Africa the Indians continued to import ivory, gold, yellow sandalwood, ambergris, coconuts, and slaves; and in course of time slaves became the most valuable commodity.²¹

Between the sixth and fifteenth centuries the most important development affecting Indian-African relations was the invasion of East Africa by Oman. In the southeast corner of Arabia lived a people of mingled Arab stock who owed a vague allegiance to the Arabian Caliph. Cut off by desert from expansion on land, they took to the sea; and their principal city, Muscat, became a center of shipbuilding and trade. In 695 A.D. when the Caliph, Abdul Malik, attempted to assert his suzerainty over Oman, two of the leading chiefs, Suleman and Said, fled with their families and friends to settle somewhere in the land of Zinj. Other refugees also moved. About 740 A.D. as a result of a schism among the Shiites, the Arabs of the Zaidiyah sect fled to East Africa. About 920 the seven brothers of El Hasa escaped persecution by founding Mogadishu and Barawa on the African coast. They were followed later in the century by the family of Hassan-bin-Ali, the half-caste

²⁰Quoted by Udani, *loc. cit.*, p. 841.

²¹Coupland, pp. 20-21.

son of the Sultan and an Abyssinian slave woman, who was outrivalled in his homeland by his better-born brothers. He and his six sons sailed in seven ships, each with his own retinue, to found Mombasa, Pemba, and Kilwa on the African coast and Johanna in the Comoro Isles. These invaders brought their religion with them, so that in the ninth and tenth centuries the whole area was converted to Islam.²²

By the fifteenth century the east coast of Africa was dotted with prosperous little city-states, each with a central mosque and a ruling Arab family. From north to south they were Mogadishu, Barawa, Siu, Pate, Lamu, Malindi, Kilifi, Mombasa, Vumba, Mafia, Kilwa, Mozambique, and Sofala. The settlements included Zanzibar, the name of which had by this time become restricted to the island, and also Pemba and the Comoro Islands; and they were even scattered down the western coast of Madagascar. Almost all the settlements, even some described as on the mainland, were little islands protected by a barrier of water from the more unhealthy and precarious continent. The Arabic city-states tended towards autonomy, but each sought to exert an influence over its neighbors; and many little dynastic wars occurred. In the twelfth century Kilwa dominated the gold trade of Sofala; and two centuries later Kilwa itself was conquered by Pate, which extended its rule as far north as Malindi. The feuds between neighbors were notorious; Mombasa and Malindi, for instance, were bitter rivals. But except for occasional forays and raids, which briefly absorbed the energies of the inhabitants, the Arab settlements were on the whole peaceful and flourishing. About the Arab nucleus in each center there grew a half-caste community of varied hue and status, with the more Asiatic clinging near the Arab location and the more African inhabiting the outskirts. This new community, with its Muslim faith and hybrid speech, was the Swahili. There were also the African slaves who tilled the Arab gardens and attended to the household chores; there were Persian merchants, and there were the Indians. The last two, the Persians and Indians, had accompanied and followed the Arabs and were able to carry on a lucrative business.²³

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 21-26.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

Although the Indians of the Arab settlements did not constitute a part of the ruling class, their connection with the coast was just as old, and they were an influential community. They owned much of the merchant marine and manned many of the ships. They were also the masters of finance, the bankers and money-changers and money-lenders. Since the Arabs seldom bothered with finance but concentrated on land-holding and developed as a landed aristocracy, the Indians monopolized the major business transactions as well as the lesser retail trade. It was the increasing dependence on Indians in this respect that for a time made the Arabs wealthy but in the long run weakened their initiative and rendered them economically subservient.²⁴ The Indians eventually even surpassed the Arabs as navigators. It was a Gujurat named Cana, rather than an Arab, who piloted Vasco da Gama directly across the Indian Ocean to Calicut.²⁵ The Indians also grew rich on the customary trade in ivory, Sofala gold, coconuts, palm oil, ambergris, and slaves. With the Arabs the Indians share the responsibility for building up the Eastern trade in human life. They too carried slaves to Egypt, Persia, Arabia, and India.²⁶

India's association with the institution of African slavery is well illustrated by the fifteenth-century insurrection in the old Muslim kingdom of Bengal. King Rukn-ud-din Barbak, who ruled at Gour from 1459 to 1474, had 8,000 African slaves; and he made the mistake of becoming the first Indian king to promote them in large numbers to high rank in his service. The slaves became insolent and licentious. In 1486 they rebelled against Barbak's successor, Fath Shah, murdered him, and set a eunuch on the throne. But the new king, entitled Barbak Shah, was in turn soon overthrown by another African, Indil Khan, a high-ranking military officer who had remained loyal to Fath Shah and intended to reinstate the royal family. Since the deceased king's son was only two years old, Indil Khan was persuaded by the king's widow to assume the rule himself with the title Saif-ud-din-Firuz. His

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

²⁵Pearce, p. 254.

²⁶See, for instance, "Slave Trade in Zanzibar by Merchants from India," Bombay Political Despatch from Court of Directors, No. 30, Dec. 19, 1856, "Proceedings," Foreign Dept., Government of India.

benevolence cause his downfall. He wasted the public treasure on beggars, and in 1489, after only three years on the throne, he was ousted by another African who set himself up as regent in the minority of Fath Shah's young son. Within a year this man and the boy-king were both murdered by Sidi Badr, another former slave. "This bloody monster, in the course of a reign of three years, put most of the leading men in the kingdom to death."²⁷ The reign of terror came to an end in 1493 when he was killed in a sortie against rebel forces besieging Gaur. So terminated the remarkable African regime. Subsequently an Asiatic from the Oxus country was elected to the throne; and one of his first acts was to expel all Africans from the kingdom. The exiles, many thousands in number, were turned back from Delhi and Jaunpur and finally drifted to Gujarat and the Deccan; and there, where the slave trade had already created a numerous African population, they eventually were absorbed.²⁸

III

The Arab-Indian monopoly of the Indian Ocean terminated near the end of the fifteenth century with the coming of the Portuguese. In 1486 Bartolome Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope and sailed up and down the East African coast. He was followed in 1497 by Vasco da Gama, who visited the Arab settlements from Mozambique to Malindi and thence, guided by his Indian navigator, crossed the ocean to Calicut. His return to Lisbon in 1499 prompted a general assault. During the next ten years, under the leadership of Francisco d'Almeida and Affonso d'Albuquerque, the Portuguese subjected all the principal Arab settlements except Malindi from Barawa to Sofala, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia; and Malindi became a Portuguese ally. Only Mogadishu, Madagascar, and the neighboring island groups, the Comoros and Mascarenes, escaped conquest. In the same decade the Portuguese sacked Muscat, took Hormuz, and subdued the Arabian and Persian coasts. The conquest was complete by 1509 when in the Battle of Diu they destroyed a great,

²⁷Coupland, pp. 32-33.

²⁸*Ibid.*

combined Egyptian, Arab, and Persian fleet. The same year they appointed a separate Governor-General for Africa and Arabia. The center of the whole system was Goa.²⁹

Though disastrous for the Arabs, the conquest did not drastically curtail Indian activity and influence. The Portuguese sought a complete monopoly of trade. Since they effectively drove all rival shipping from the Indian Ocean, they severed the ancient Arab connection with India and areas farther east. For the same reason they restricted the Arab trade with the interior of Africa. On the southeast African coast, where they undertook an extensive colonization, the Portuguese completely displaced the Arab landed aristocracy and commercial enterprise. Farther north, where the conquest and enforcement of monopoly was less complete, the Arabs maintained a hold on commerce and property, but their former position was gone. All the settlements declined under Portuguese rule, and historic Kilwa was reduced to a slave port. Like the Arabs, the Indians were driven from the major sea lanes and forbidden access to the African interior. Since the Portuguese failed to send out long caravans and made only one serious attempt to penetrate the interior—the ill-fated expedition from Sena in 1572—the trade of the whole coast sharply declined. But otherwise for the Indians the advent of the Portuguese meant only a change of dominion. The Indians continued to be the shopkeepers and artisans of Africa, and they became the accountants and bankers of the Portuguese as they had been for the Arabs. Although the Portuguese had usurped the carrying trade and assumed the position of middlemen, the flow of goods between India and Africa continued.³⁰ In 1512 when the Portuguese hold on East Africa was fairly strong, Barbarosa recorded that “the Moors of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia used to purchase silks and cottons from the merchants of Cambay resident in Mombasa”;³¹ and in 1591 shortly after the onset of Portuguese decline, a Captain Lancaster noted during a stay in Zanzibar harbor that some vessels arrived directly from Indian ports.³²

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 47.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 48-51.

³¹Quoted by Pearce, p. 254.

³²*Ibid.*

After little more than a century the Portuguese lost their monopoly of the Indian Ocean. In 1580 two unrelated events of major significance in world history portended the end: Philip II of Spain assumed the Portuguese throne; and one of Sir Francis Drake's ships, homeward bound on its historic voyage around the world, sailed across the Indian Ocean. Philip's action began sixty years of foreign domination that sapped the vitality of the Portuguese nation; and the presence of the ship heralded a rivalry from other European powers in waters that the Portuguese, with the sanction of the Church, had claimed as their own. The English founded their East India Company in 1600, and within a few years they were conducting a profitable trade with India and other Eastern countries. They were followed closely by the Dutch, who established a similar organization in 1602, and rather belatedly by the French, who did not form their *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* until 1664. The Dutch were at first the most enterprising. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century they supplanted the Portuguese in the East Indies and established factories at Surat and Chinsurah on the Indian mainland. They occupied Mauritius in 1644, Table Bay in 1652, and Ceylon in 1658; for a time they even had factories in the Persian Gulf. The English, driven from the East Indies by the Dutch, concentrated on India. They established factories at Surat in 1612, Madras 1639, Calcutta 1650, and Bombay 1665. The French took Bourbon in 1642 and shortly afterwards began to colonize Madagascar. In 1715 they moved into Mauritius, which the Dutch had abandoned; and naming it Ile de France, they soon made it the headquarters of their activities in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile the French contested with the English for mastery of India by establishing trading depots at Pondicherry in 1664 and Chandernagore in 1676 and subsequently making them centers of expansion.³³

Since the British, Dutch, and French for two centuries tended to by-pass the east coast of Africa in their concentration on the lucrative trade with India and the spice islands, the declining Portuguese were able to maintain a precarious hold over the east coast of Africa long after they lost most of their other overseas possessions. They eventually were driven from East Africa by the

³³Coupland, pp. 52-54.

depredations of pirates, harassment by hostile African tribes, and above all by a resurgence of Arab peoples. In 1585 an adventurous Turk, Mirale Bey, cruised down the African coast, plundering the Portuguese settlements and taking prisoners; and three years later during a second voyage he captured Mombasa. This even prompted a successful Arab revolt on Pemba. In 1589, as Mirale Bey was preparing for an assault on Malindi, Mombasa was stormed by a militant Bantu tribe, the Zimba, who two years before had slaughtered 3,000 inhabitants of Kilwa. The Zimba captured Mirale Bey and handed him over to the Portuguese, who sent him in chains to Lisbon, but eventually the Zimba turned against the Europeans. It was to protect Mombasa from warlike tribesmen as well as Turkish pirates that the Portuguese in 1593 built Fort Jesus. During the next fifty years the Portuguese consolidated their hold on East Africa and regularly exported gum-coal, ivory, and slaves to India in return for cloth.³⁴ That they were not entirely successful in monopolizing the carrying trade is evident in the fact that one of Captain Kidd's chief prizes in the Indian Ocean near the end of the seventeenth century was the ship of a Khoja merchant from Cambay.³⁵

IV

The Portuguese were finally expelled from East Africa by the Arabs of Oman. In 1622 when the Persians reclaimed Hormuz, all the people of the northern coasts were recovering energy. By mid-century the Omani, led by the dynamic Imam Sultan-bin-Seif, had ejected the Portuguese from Muscat and the whole Arabian seaboard. In 1662, having built an efficient little navy, he captured Mombasa town; and skirting Fort Jesus, he sailed down the African coast, kindling the fires of rebellion. After besieging the fort at Mozambique, he crossed to India and in 1670 sacked Diu. In 1696 Seif's son, Imam Seif-bin-Sultan, concentrated seven warships, ten dhows, and about 3,000 men in an attack on Fort Jesus; and after an historic siege of 33 months he succeeded in taking it. Though the Portuguese after repeated failures recaptured the fort in 1728, when Oman was weakened by civil disorder and

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁵Pearce, p. 254.

a Persian invasion, they were able to hold it only two years. After 1740 when the great Ahmed-bin-Said established the Albusaid dynasty, freed his country from the Persians, and began to renew Omani aggression on the African coast, the Portuguese realized the futility of trying to reassert their authority in East Africa. The Arabs recaptured the coast as far south as the trade winds carried them. As a result the eastern side of Africa was divided at the Rovuma River between Arabs to the north and Europeans to the south. In withdrawing, the Portuguese left little behind to commemorate their period of rule. They had introduced manioc, maize, and pineapples but had not engaged in extensive cultivation; nor had they expanded trade with Europe or Asia. They had been exploiters rather than colonizers.³⁶

From the middle of the eighteenth century for more than a hundred years, the Arabs remained virtually undisturbed in their domination of East Africa. Though the French were strongly entrenched on Ile de France, they were interested primarily in contesting with the British for mastery of India. Some French traders, intent chiefly on buying slaves, made high profits in their dealings with the Arabs; and in 1877 one of them, a Frenchman named Morice, submitted a bold scheme to his government for chartering a company to exploit the area from a headquarters at Kilwa. His plans came to naught, partly because of the interest in India, partly because of the outbreak of war in 1878, and perhaps mainly because the government did not want to antagonize Oman, which controlled the gateway to the Persian Gulf and thence the Middle East. But the French were more active than the British. They established a residency at Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf in 1755 and made it a consulate ten years later; and they set up a factory at Oman in 1785. Until the end of the Napoleonic War the British interest in the northeastern coast of the Indian Ocean was chiefly a product of the fear that France would somehow gain access to India through the Middle East. In 1786 Britain appointed a Consul-General and Agent of the East India Company at Cairo. In 1798 Britain concluded the first treaty with Oman; Mirza Mehdi Ali Khan, a trusted Persian agent, obtained for Lord Wellesley an agreement that accorded the English commercial

³⁶Coupland, pp. 70-71.

privileges and excluded the French. Two years later the treaty was renewed and enlarged to include the permanent residence at Muscat of "an English gentleman of respectability" as the intermediary between the Imam and the East India Company. In 1807 a similar treaty, granting the British most-favored nation status, was concluded with a new sultan, Seyyid Said. But all these agreements, British and French, were relatively unimportant; and the northeastern Indian Ocean was largely unaffected by the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era.³⁷

After 1815 when Britain was confirmed in its possession of Cape Colony and Mauritius, Oman found the British supremacy in the Indian Ocean more an aid than a hindrance to the furtherance of its designs on East Africa. At this time Oman was harassed on land by an aggressive Arab people, the Wahabi, and at sea by the powerful Jawasmi pirates. The latter from a stronghold at Ras al Khyma preyed on the shipping between East Africa and India and made no distinction between British, Arab, and Indian vessels. They were raiding as close to Bombay as the coast of Kathiawar and Sind. In 1820 Britain forced the Jawasmi chiefs to sign treaties that practically terminated their piracy; and the pacifying of the Jawasmi enabled Seyyid Said to concentrate on crushing the Wahabi.³⁸ In the 'twenties Said began to reassert the authority of Oman over East Africa. He was temporarily thwarted by Capt. William Fitzwilliam Owen, commander of a British expedition to map the coast. In 1823 Owen, entirely on his own initiative, had hoisted the British flag at Tembe and in 1824, at the request of anti-Arab tribesmen, the Mazrui, had annexed Mombasa. He also laid plans for acquiring Pemba, Lamu, Pate, and other former possessions of Mombasa. But Owen's design to incorporate East Africa in the British Empire never had the approval of authorities at Bombay or London, and it collapsed in 1826. The next year Said called at Mombasa with a large fleet and compelled the Mazrui to accept his overlordship, and then he easily obtained a similar recognition from other coastal cities.³⁹ Although the Mazrui subsequently rebelled, Said by clever treachery destroyed all their leaders; and by 1838 he was undisputed master of Mombasa

³⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 90-98.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 140-52.

³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 229-74.

and most of the coast. In 1840 he transferred his court to Zanzibar and made it the new capital of the Omani realm.⁴⁰

Under Said's wise direction Zanzibar became the flourishing center of an empire that reflected many of the glories of the past age of Arab greatness. He encouraged commerce by a policy of free trade. The only customs duty was a flat 5% charge on all goods except bullion landed or transhipped from one vessel to another at any of his ports. There were no excise taxes on internal production, no export duties, and no harbor dues, pilot fees, nor other shipping or navigation charge; no monopolies were permitted; and about the time of his move to Zanzibar, to improve the medium of exchange, he imported \$5,000 worth of pice, the small copper coins of British India. The pice spread all along the coast and, together with the Maria Theresa dollars, became the common currency of East Africa. A decade before his shift to Zanzibar, Said had introduced cloves from Mauritius. Clove production soon surpassed that of sugar and rice, and Zanzibar and its sister island Pemba became renowned as the chief source of the world's supply. From the island headquarters trade expanded once more to the far side of India, the Dutch East Indies, China, and points farther east. It also spread again into the interior of Africa. Little Arab colonies grew up along the inland trade routes. Former centers, such as Sena, acquired a new vigor, while new ones, like Tabora, Masansa, and Ujiji, appeared. Population rapidly expanded. By 1859 Zanzibar alone had 60,000 inhabitants, far more than any other East African town and nearly ten times as many as Mozambique, the capital of Portuguese East Africa.⁴¹

Despite the prosperity of Zanzibar, the appearance of new Arab settlements in Africa, and the general rejuvenation of the whole coast, Said was never able to enjoy a tight political control over his dominions; and by 1856, the year of his death, the area still had not attained its former splendor. The coastal settlements, once proud and wealthy little city-states, never became more than drab townlets or villages. North of Mombasa Said's suzerainty was very weak. It was the last area over which he attempted to assert his authority. Mogadishu was virtually an outpost of a

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 303-20.

Somali kingdom of the Sheikh at Geledi, a warrior chieftain with 20,000 spears. Even in his southern dominions Said's overlordship was only nominal over the non-Arabic peoples, especially the Swahili and banyan merchants who were trafficking in ivory, cereals, cattle, and slaves.⁴²

For the Indians the revival of Oman and the substitution of Arab sovereignty for that of the Portuguese were highly rewarding. To the degree that Portuguese influence in the Indian Ocean declined, the Indians prospered; and they were especially attracted to Said's dominions because of the favored status he conferred on them. Before the move to Zanzibar, there were more than a thousand Indians at Muscat. They had come from Cutch, Gujarat, and the Konkan. When Said arrived at Zanzibar, from three to four hundred were already there; and despised by the Arabs, they were subjected to insults and indignities. But Said effected a drastic reform. He granted the Indians full religious toleration, removed all dues and restrictions on them, took them into his confidence, and entrusted them with responsible positions in his personal service and the government. He put them in charge of government finance and always kept an Indian in the most important post, collector of customs. Because of this favored treatment and also because of Said's unusually liberal fiscal policy, Indians were attracted to Zanzibar and its dependencies in large numbers. By 1844 when the Sultan had been at Zanzibar only four years, the Indian population had swelled to more than a thousand. By 1860 it was over 5,000.⁴³

Among the newcomers the most numerous community was the Ismailia Khojas, Muslims from Cutch whose spiritual leader was His Highness the Aga Khan. As recent converts from Hinduism, they retained many of their former practices. They did not, for instance, attend a mosque for religious purposes but assembled in a community house, the Jamat-khana, for devotions and festivals. Nor were they obligated like other Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, or to rely heavily on the *Koran* for spiritual illumination; and they often gave their children Hindu

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 351.

⁴³Lieut. Col. C. P. Rigby (H.M.'s Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar) to W. L. Anderson (Secretary to Government of Bombay), Despatch No. 36, June 1, 1860, "Proceedings," Political Branch, Foreign and Political Dept., Government of India, No. 218, Part B, pp. 169-70.

names. The men were conspicuous in their small, black "polo caps," white or black frock coats, and tight fitting, white trousers, or on festive occasions in their richly embroidered turbans and flowing robes ornate with gold thread and gold lace. Adopting the Swahili tongue, progressive in outlook, accompanied by their women in everyday work, and raising large families, the Ismailias became permanent residents of Zanzibar and prosperous merchants. Closely related to them was another Khoja group, the Ithasheris, who had similar social customs and were almost as numerous. Unlike the Ismailias, they adhered strictly to the *Koran* and performed their devotions in the ordinary Muslim mosques. A third Muslim group, less than half the size of either of the Khojas, was the Bohra people from Cutch and later from Kathiawar. Like the Khojas, they had engaged in trade across the Indian Ocean for centuries, and many of them were wealthy and influential. Their dress was very similar in that they wore a small, round cap and a long, white coat for everyday affairs or, if wealthy, a cloth-of-gold turban and robe for special occasions; but they were distinguished by very loose white trousers. Moreover, the Bohra women kept closely veiled and did not participate in business.⁴⁴

The Hindus, despite caste differences, tended to cling together and as a whole outnumbered any particular Muslim group. They were almost exclusively lower-caste Hindus from Cutch, Gujarat, and the Konkan; and collectively they were known as *banyans*.⁴⁵ "Interfering with no one, seeking nothing beyond their direct line of business, unobtrusive, courteous, and above all far more skilled in the mysteries of the ledger and the counter than ever Arab was or will be, they made the good fortune of Muscat and were its favourable genius."⁴⁶ The largest group of banyans was the

⁴⁴Pearce, pp. 255-56.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 257-58.

⁴⁶William Gifford Palgrave, *Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, (London, 1865), II, 369-70. Quite a different description of the banyans was given by Capt. M. Guillaing, who was at Zanzibar 1846-48: "Ce sont les plus ruses commercants de ces contrees, et peut-etre du monde entier. . . . Ne consommant rien, qui n'ait ete apporte de ses pays et convertissant tous ses benefices en especes metalliques qu'il y envoie, le banian est, pour les contrees ou il trafique, un parasite, qui prend toujours et ne rend rien." *Documents sur l'histoire, la geographie et le commerce de l'Afrique orientale* (Paris, 1856), II, 123-24; quoted in Coupland, pp. 301-02.

Bhatias, the extremely shrewd businessmen who had a virtual monopoly of money-lending. Affluent, quiet, law-abiding, and deeply religious, the Bhatias were distinguished by a costume consisting of a close-fitting, red and gold cap, a white or brown tweed coat, an ample loin-cloth or *dhoti*, and a shawl, the *chudda*, girt over their shoulders. Unlike the Muslims, the Bhatias and other Hindus usually did not bring their wives and children to Zanzibar. They clung to their native languages, dress, and religious customs and retained a hope of an eventual return to India.⁴⁷

In addition to these Muslims and Hindus from British India and to the Arabs, Zanzibar had many other Asiatics. Among the latter the most numerous and influential were the Goans, one of the few legacies of the Portuguese conquest.⁴⁸ As Roman Catholics and Portuguese citizens, they had adopted many western ways; and since they quickly learned English, the Goans were increasingly brought into the lower ranks of the government service, especially after the British took over the administration. Otherwise they remained in business as shopkeepers, boot-makers, and tailors. Zanzibar also had a colony of Cingalese, all of whom were engaged in the manufacture and sale of precious stones, gold and silver jewelry, and fancy articles of tortoise shell, ebony, and ivory. The island also had some Baluchis and Persians, both remnants of the Sultans' army, as well as a few Parsis, Syrians, Japanese, and Chinese.⁴⁹

The Asiatic civilization of Zanzibar was typical of that in other cities throughout Said's domain. A ruling, landed, Arab aristocracy, becoming increasingly decadent and impoverished, was surrounded by a larger, faster growing, far more vigorous and prosperous Indian community. In the mainland settlements the Indians were chiefly small retailers, the *duka-walas*, engaged in barter with the African natives. It was during Said's time that the Indians, lured by increased trade and greater profits, began to penetrate the interior. The first non-African to reach Uganda was a Baluch soldier Isa bin Hussein from Zanzibar. Arriving in 1849-50, he preceded even the Arab caravans, and at the court of Suna, the King of Uganda

⁴⁷Pearce, pp. 257-58.

⁴⁸Sir Charles Eliot, *The East Africa Protectorate* (London, 1905), p. 20.

⁴⁹Pearce, pp. 257-58.

he acquired considerable influence.⁵⁰ But the most enterprising and successful of the Indians who moved inland was reputedly Musa Mzuri, a resident of Tabora described by the British explorers Burton and Speke. From his birthplace in Surat, Muza Mzuri had followed his elder brother to Zanzibar, and he soon was making excursions into Africa's interior at the request of the Governor of Zanzibar. Before long he was undertaking private ventures of his own, setting forth with a small stock of beads and returning with some 28,000 pounds of ivory; and he made fantastic profits. After moving to Tabora, he led the Arabs in exploring the unknown country to the west. When visited by Burton and Speke, he was the pre-eminent businessman of the interior, the banker of the Arabs, and the agent and warehouseman for the commercial body. His hall was usually full of Africans, Indians, and Arabs who came to buy or trade for the wire, beads, and cotton cloth which he regularly imported from the coast.⁵¹ He travelled with greater pomp than the Arabs; and his house, finer than theirs, was almost a village in itself, with lofty gates, spacious courts, and many servants and visitors. "Thin-bearded, tall, gaunt, with delicate extremities and with the regular and handsome features of a high-caste Indian Moslem," Musa Mzuri was further distinguished from the Arabs by "his clean new dress, perfumed with jasmine-oil and sandal-wood, his snowy skull-cap and well-fitting sandals."⁵²

Musa Mzuri and other Indians of East Africa were engaged in a flourishing trade with Africa on the one hand and Europe, America, and Asia on the other. Since Zanzibar was Said's capital, and since it had "the most commodious and safe harbor on the east coast," it was the center of Indian activity. Almost all the trade with other parts of the Sultan's realm passed through the hands of the Zanzibar Indians. "This community," observed a British official in 1864, "may be said almost entirely to monopolize the trade of Zanzibar, as, although there are European and other merchants settled here, they are supplied with produce for export,

⁵⁰Harry H. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate* (London, 1902), I, 216.

⁵¹John Hanning Speke, *What led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1864), pp. 254-55.

⁵²Sir Richard Francis Burton, *Lake Regions of Central Africa* (London, 1860), I, 223-36.

and their imports are nearly all purchased by Indians."⁵³ In 1859, a typical year, eighty large ships totalling 23,340 tons—35 American ships, 17 Hamburg, 12 French, 9 Arabian, 2 Portuguese, and 1 British, Danish, and Spanish—docked at Zanzibar along with numerous Indian and Arabian dhows.⁵⁴ It was the Indians who purchased the cargoes of these ships and supplied the goods that re-stocked the holds. Only one-twentieth of the Zanzibar trade did not pass through their hands.⁵⁵ Moreover, "all the shopkeepers and artizans at Zanzibar" were "natives of India," and by purchase or foreclosure they had acquired possession from the Arabs of "a considerable number of landed estates."⁵⁶

The important role of India in Zanzibar's trade is revealed by the following statistics for the year 1856-57:⁵⁷

<i>Country</i>	<i>Exports (£)</i>	<i>Imports (£)</i>
British India	103,888	99,606
Cutch	69,644	57,872
Africa, East Coast	274,200	363,666
Africa, West Coast	51,111	none
Madagascar	16,411	19,777
Arabia	23,377	17,606
Great Britain	5,566	none
France	55,000	114,790
Hamburg	35,777	101,296
United States	118,688	126,389
Singapore	none	7,895
Total	753,662	908,897

⁵³R. L. Playfair (H.M.'s Consul and Political Agent, Zanzibar), "Memorandum on the Trade and Prospects of Zanzibar," Oct. 3, 1864. "Proceedings," Political Branch, Foreign Dept., Government of India, March 1865, Nos. 72-73, Part A.

⁵⁴Rigby to Anderson, *loc. cit.*, p. 201.

⁵⁵Playfair, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁶Rigby to Anderson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 169-70. Indians charged only 8% to 12% interest: *ibid.*, p. 207.

⁵⁷Compiled from *ibid.*, pp. 184, 196. Rigby at various places in his report referred to the statistics as compiled for the year "1856-57," "1859," and "last year." A close check of the figures indicates that they all pertained to the financial year 1856-57 and that Rigby at times erred in his description of them. Coupland's acceptance of the year 1859 for all the statistics appears unfounded.

If the exports to British India are added to those to Cutch, the total exports to India in 1856-57 amounted to £173,532, which is 23% of the whole. On the same basis the combined imports from India that year were £157,478, or 17% of the total. In indicating India's share in Zanzibar's trade, however, these figures are somewhat deceptive, for while the amount of trade between the two areas, carried almost entirely in Indian dhows and buttelas, increased rather steadily year by year, the exchange of goods between Zanzibar and the western countries varied with the number of ships that called there and fluctuated widely from year to year. A report in 1864, for instance, listed the value of exports at £427,016, of which £119,631 went to British India, in fact to Bombay, and £100,586 went to Cutch.⁵⁸ During that year, presumably 1863-64, India thus received not 23% but 51% of the total. The statistics are also misleading in that they indicate that Britain's trade with Zanzibar was very negligible. Actually many of the imports from British India were industrial goods from England.⁵⁹

A wide variety of goods was exchanged between India, Zanzibar, and the African mainland in 1856-57. The chief item imported from India by Zanzibar was cloth—dyed cottons, shirtings, juggonaths, handkerchiefs, broad cloth, turkey-red cloth, dhoties, Surat cloth, chintz, and gold lace. Next, in descending order of value, came rice, Bengal sugar, copper utensils, ghee, anchors, black pepper, iron pig, iron bars, oil sesamum, cutlery, china ware, wheat, sugar candy, and coir rope. Then followed opium, spices, spelter, cardamoms, Lillespun, coffee, frankincense, lead, molasses and wooden boxes. At the bottom of the list were pewter, betel nut, Bajree, and chain cables.⁶⁰ From Cutch Zanzibar imported cloth, as the principal item, along with ghee, muskets, wheat, Bajree, gunpowder, and percussion caps.⁶¹ Some of these commodities were consumed in Zanzibar; some were exported to Europe and America; but many of them, together with goods imported from other countries, were shipped to the east coast of Africa. The chief items exported to the east coast,

⁵⁸Playfair, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁹Coupland, pp. 485-86.

⁶⁰Rigby to Anderson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 176-81.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.

including Madagascar and lesser islands, were cloth, Venetian beads, muskets, gunpowder, and brass ware. Less important were ghee, coconut oil, china and glass, copper cooking utensils, coconuts, Bengal sugar, rice, pepper and spices, dates, and dried casava. At the bottom of the list were red Fez caps, spelter, dates, lead, iron ware, molasses, salt, and soup. Zanzibar also had a trade with West Africa that consisted entirely of cowrees, the medium of exchange in Guinea, and was equivalent in value to only one-tenth of the exports to East Africa.⁶² The trade with Africa as a whole constituted 43% of Zanzibar's exports.

The flow of goods in the opposite direction, from Africa to Zanzibar and thence to India, consisted of a lesser number of commodities. From the east coast of Africa, including Madagascar, Zanzibar received ivory and slaves as the chief items, closely followed in value by gum copal, cowrees, and hides, and more remotely by salt fish, Iowaree, sesamum seed, masts and spars, coir rope, and dhall.⁶³ Its chief exports to British India were bullion, ivory, and cloves; and its less important were gum copal, sandalwood, hippopotamus teeth, cowrees, coconuts, beeswax, and ebony. To Cutch Zanzibar exported great quantities of bullion and ivory and small amounts of coconuts, rafters, and sandalwood.⁶⁴

In at least two respects this description of commercial relations between India and Africa is incomplete. In the first place, it does not reveal the magnitude or nature of India's trade directly with other parts of Africa. Since the Portuguese imposed exorbitant customs duties in Mozambique and sought a monopoly of business within their dominions, and since most of the trade with the Sultan's coastal settlements passed through Zanzibar, this direct trade was relatively insignificant; but it did exist and must be allowed for in assessing Indian-African commerce. Secondly, the statistics for 1856-57, though generally representative of Indian-African exchange over the preceding century, do not reveal India's role in the slave trade. In the year under review 19,000 slaves were imported into Zanzibar, where the adults sold for £2 to £7 and children for £25 to £50. Most of the slaves had come from

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 192-95.

⁶³*Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

the region of Lake Nyasa, the last extensive recruiting ground. From Zanzibar they were carried by northern Arabs mostly into Persia and Arabia.⁶⁵ At mid-century the long history of slavery in India had almost concluded, and so few of the 19,000 slaves brought to Zanzibar were taken to India.⁶⁶ A half century earlier, however, India's share would have been considerable. Slavery then was prevalent in the area under British domination as well as in the Native States. Before the nineteenth century the long-standing policy of non-interference with native customs had permitted Muslims and Hindus to maintain their tradition of keeping slaves; and the British merchants, who themselves kept African slaves in India as in other parts of the Empire, set an example. It was common for "Coffrees" (Kaffirs) to be advertised in Indian newspapers.⁶⁷

V

The revolution in the official British attitude toward slavery, which began in 1807 with the act abolishing the slave trade, eventually effected the suppression of slavery throughout India and prompted the British government to take an active interest in the politics of East Africa. For a long time the effects were not apparent in India. Just after the imperial Act of 1807, the Bombay government issued a regulation prohibiting the trade in the presidency. In 1811 Bengal enacted a similar measure, and it was followed by prohibition throughout India. But according to an official report in 1812, Arab traders were shipping at least 100 slaves to Calcutta each year; and in 1823 an observer described Calcutta as a "mart in which the manacled African is sold like the beast of the field to the highest bidder."⁶⁸ On the west coast, much closer to Africa, slavery was more prevalent and its suppression more difficult. Because of the official respect for Indian customs, the imperial Act of 1833, which provided for the eventual

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁶⁶As late as 1856 the Bombay government was corresponding with its Agent at Zanzibar about suppressing the slave trading activities of merchants from India. See "Slave Trade in Zanzibar by Merchants from India," *loc. cit.*

⁶⁷Coupland, p. 203.

⁶⁸*Calcutta Journal*; quoted in *ibid.*, p. 204.

termination of slavery in the empire, contained a clause expressly exempting India from its provisions. But the same year the new Government of India Act urged the Governor-General in Council to take steps to extinguish slavery as soon as practicable and safe; and the step was taken in 1843 when the Government of India abolished the legal status of slavery. In 1860 the government made it a penal offence to own or trade in slaves.⁶⁹ All these measures, however, were ineffective in achieving a complete termination of slavery, even in the British areas of India, and they had slight effect on the steady traffic with the Indian States. As late as 1881, for instance, the Government of India was considering how to terminate the employment of African slaves in the Jail Department of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.⁷⁰ Into Lucknow and the Deccan, the areas of British India where slavery was most rife, and especially into the Native States of Kathiawar and Cutch where there were no regulations at all slaves filtered in disguised as legitimate seamen; and from the Portuguese enclaves the infiltration was notorious. Though the British government was able to compell some of the Indian princes, such as the Raja of Cutch in 1836, to issue proclamations prohibiting the import of slaves, smuggling thwarted all efforts toward an effective suppression.⁷¹

Because the slave trade also had to be attacked at its source, Britain began to exert diplomatic pressure on the Arabic dominions of East Africa. In 1812 the Bombay government asked Seyyid Said to inform his subjects that slavery had been prohibited in British India. In 1820 after crushing the Jawasmi pirates, Britain exacted a promise from them to refrain from the slave trade as well as piracy. Two years later with the Moresby Treaty, the British resident at Muscat secured a pledge from Said to abolish from his dominions all external traffic in slaves.⁷² In the late 1840's, with Said's permission, British ships began to patrol the Indian Ocean to enforce conformity to the Sultan's decree of prohibition. By a similar arrangement with Portugal, which through British persuasion had abolished the trade in 1830, they were able to

⁶⁹Coupland, p. 205.

⁷⁰"Proceedings," General Branch, Foreign Dept., Government of India, Aug. 1881, Nos. 275-76, Part B.

⁷¹Coupland, pp. 501-02.

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 208-15.

intercept the traffic between the Portuguese dominions. In this way the British navy during the closing years of the century finally severed the age-old nefarious tie between India and Africa.

Although the British interest in combatting slavery terminated one phase in Indian-African relations, it promoted closer political and economic association between India, Zanzibar, and the whole of East Africa. In 1839, the year before the Sultan's move to Zanzibar, the British government signed a treaty of commerce with Said, whereby he agreed to levy only a 5% duty on imports, grant consular rights, and forbid monopolies.⁷³ The Bombay government at once took advantage of the consular provision by proceeding to add the title and duties of Consul to those of its former Political Agent; and though this official was still to be appointed and paid by the Government of Bombay, he was empowered to correspond directly with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as well as with his home government.⁷⁴ The first Consul, Capt. Atkins Hamerton, who arrived at Zanzibar in 1841, immediately faced a problem involving the resident British Indians. The banyan Customs Master, Jairam Sewji, was attempting to increase his arbitrary power by compelling the local banyans to sign a declaration repudiating their status as British Indians and accepting that of subjects of the Sultan; and many of the banyans were on the verge of quitting East Africa. Hamerton successfully intervened to thwart Sewji's design. In 1845 he had to intercede again to prevent unauthorized charges being levied on banyans at some of the mainland ports. In these ways the Consul became a protector of Indian interests in Africa, and his presence served as an inducement to Indian interests in commerce, banking, and industry.⁷⁵ During the same period, British explorers were opening new possibilities for exploiting the heart of Africa. Burton and Speke explored Lake Tanganyika in 1858; Speke saw Lake Victoria Nyanza later the same year; and in 1859 Livingston reached Lake Nyasa.⁷⁶ These discoveries, combined with the new sense of security resulting from the active British interest, greatly

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 481.

⁷⁴Bombay Political Despatch to Court of Directors, No. 38, Oct. 25, 1858, "Proceedings," Foreign Dept., Government of India, 1850-60.

⁷⁵Coupland, pp. 484-86.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 305.

stimulated Indian enterprise in Africa. During the latter half of the nineteenth century at Zanzibar and all the coastal settlements, the Indian population and the trade with India steadily increased. The old era of Arab domination, with its institution of slavery, its dynastic quarrels, and its general economic instability, was terminating; and with the decline of Arab power and the growing influence of British interests, a new era in the history of Indian-African relations was beginning.

OTTOMAN DOMINATION OF
MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY

by

KEITH HITCHINS

THE OBJECT of the present paper is to examine the extension and the effects of Ottoman Turkish control of the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in the sixteenth century. The discussion will be divided into three parts: a brief account of Rumanian-Ottoman relations prior to the sixteenth century, and Ottoman political and then economic domination of Moldavia and Wallachia during the sixteenth century.

Several generalizations need to be made at the beginning. The extension of Turkish control was a gradual process, with the result that both principalities were able to assert their independence for long or short periods of time up to about the middle of the sixteenth century. In the last half of that century, however, they became in fact vassal states of the Ottoman Empire, and no prince could long maintain himself on the throne in defiance of the Sultan's will. For reasons which we shall examine later on, the Turks did not elect to incorporate Moldavia and Wallachia into their empire as provinces, as they had done with the conquered territories south of the Danube. Instead, they allowed the princes to administer the internal affairs of their respective countries in accordance with ancient laws and customs as long as they fulfilled their obligations. It was not Ottoman political control itself, but rather the economic exploitation which it made possible, which bore most heavily upon the two principalities.

I

Moldavia and Wallachia had been independent states since the middle of the fourteenth century, but within a few decades

first Wallachia and then Moldavia had to confront the full power of the Ottoman Empire, which had committed itself to the rapid subjugation of the whole of the Balkan Peninsula. The Turks destroyed the medieval Serbian Empire at the Battle of Kossovo Field in 1389 and completed the conquest of Bulgaria in 1393 with the capture of its capital Trnovo. Both countries suffered the fate of incorporation as provinces into the Ottoman Empire. The Danube, never an effective barrier to an invading army, was all that separated the victorious Turks from the rich agricultural plains of Wallachia.

The first direct contact between the Ottoman and Wallachian armies occurred in the last decade of the fourteenth century. The initial skirmishes were indecisive, but it appears that the Prince of Wallachia, Mircea cel Batrin (1386-1418), paid a tribute to the Turks for the first time in 1394.¹ Mircea regarded the tribute as a payment to secure peace and maintained that it in no way signified the subjection of his country to the Turks. He could point to the fact that the princes of other states had made similar payments to the Turks without thereby becoming their vassals. Mircea next paid the tribute in 1415, but once again Wallachia preserved its independence. In fact, this was an arrangement between equals, for the Turks on their part assumed certain obligations, the most important of which was to prevent the *akincis* (irregular cavalry) from carrying out raids for plunder and slaves north of the Danube.²

After the death of Mircea Ottoman pressure on Wallachia became steadily stronger. Finally, in 1431, Sultan Murad I launched a major offensive which resulted in the complete defeat of the Wallachian armies. Prince Alexandru Aldea (1431-36) had to agree to pay an annual tribute, to render military service whenever the Sultan requested it, and to send to the Sultan's capital the sons

¹Franz Babinger, "Beginn der Turkensteuer in den Donaufurstentumern", *Sudost Forschungen* (Munchen), VIII (1943), 1-35. The Ottoman chronicler Hodja Husein asserts that Mircea had already acknowledged himself the vassal of Sultan Bayezid I in 1391, and that in 1394, he agreed to an *increase* in the tribute as punishment for his raids south of the Danube: *Beda'i ul-veka'i (Udivitel'nie Sobytia)*, edited by A. S. Tveritina, (Moscow, 1961), fascicule 91a.

²*Istoria Rominieii, II* (Bucuresti, 1962), 383.

of *boiers* (nobles) at hostages.³ This act of submission signified the beginning of Wallachia's vassalage to the Turks.

Several of Alexandru Aldea's successors attempted to regain their independence, but without success. Vlad Dracul (1436-46) saw his country devastated by a Turkish army in retaliation for his defiance, and, to save his throne, had to appear in person before the Sultan and pay two years' tribute and offer numerous supplementary gifts.⁴ In 1462, Mohammed II drove Vlad Tepes (1456-62) from the throne for rebellion and again laid waste the country. As a result, the Turks "made slaves of the Wallachians. . . and the Sultan gave (their country) to the brother of Tepes".⁵ The fact that Mohammed II could dispose of the succession so freely indicates the degree of Wallachia's subjugation. Afterwards, the princes rarely disputed the payment of the tribute. In 1513, Neagoe Basarab (1512-21) sent ambassadors laden with costly gifts and the "regular" tribute to Istanbul to congratulate Sultan Selim I on his accession to the throne.⁶

Moldavia, further removed from the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire than Wallachia and ruled by the most able of its princes, Stefan cel Mare (1457-1504), was able to resist Turkish encroachments on its sovereignty until the fourth decade of the sixteenth century. The first serious clash between Ottoman and Moldavian armies took place in 1420, when the former unsuccessfully besieged Cetatea-Alba, a Moldavian port on the Black Sea.⁷ In the period up to 1456, the princes of Moldavia maintained generally peaceful relations with the Turks by means of gifts.⁸ The Turks themselves designated these as *peskes* (gifts) and not *harac* (tribute), and as such they did not compromise Moldavian independence.

³Ioan Bogdan, *Documente si regeste privitoare la relatiile Tarii Romanesti cu Brasovul si Tara Ungureasca in sec. XV si XVI* (Bucuresti, 1905), 49-53.

⁴Husein, *Beda'i ul-veka'i*, fasc. 163a.

⁵*Ibid.*, fasc. 239a-240a.

⁶*Ibid.*, fasc. 425a.

⁷Constantin Giurescu, *Capitulatiile Moldovei cu Poarta Otomana* (Bucuresti, 1908), 54.

⁸Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria Romanilor*, II, partea 2. (Bucuresti, 1891), 51-52, 670.

In 1456, Mohammed II demanded that Prince Petru Aron (1451-52, 1454-57) pay 2,000 *galbens*⁹ in tribute to help defray the expenses of a projected invasion of Hungary or "suffer the consequences." The prince, to save his country from the calamity of a Turkish campaign and possible conquest and to gain time until allies could be found, agreed¹⁰. The Sultan accepted the tribute and promised peace as long as it was paid, but made no other demands.¹¹ Moldavia remained autonomous.

Stefan cel Mare continued to pay the tribute annually except from 1473 to 1488, when he was at war with the Turks. He hoped to free himself completely from their control, but by the end of this period had come to the painful conclusion that Moldavia alone did not possess sufficient resources to keep the Turks in check. In 1489, he resumed payment of the tribute—now doubled to 4,000 *galbens*—and agreed to send one of his sons to Istanbul as a hostage, as the price for peace. On his death-bed in 1504, he urged his son and successor, Bogdan III (1504-17), to remain on friendly terms with the Turks as the only means of assuring Moldavia's independence.

Bogdan and his successors were able to maintain a precarious independence until 1538, when Sultan Suleiman I decided to bring Moldavia more closely under his control. He drove the troublesome and unreliable Petru Rares (1527-38, 1541-46) from the throne and put in his place the more manageable Stefan Lacusta (1538-40). The new prince solemnly did homage to the Sultan as his suzerain and thereby made Moldavia a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.

II

The juridical basis for the relationship between Moldavia and Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century lay in the Islamic principle of *dār al-sulh*. They were thus considered an intermediate and temporary territory between *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-harb*. In Islamic constitutional law the world was divided

⁹A gold coin which circulated in Moldavia and Wallachia and which varied considerably in value at different periods.

¹⁰Stefan Pascu and Vladimir Hanga (editors), *Crestomatie pentru studiul istoriei statului si dreptului R.P.R.*, II, (Bucuresti, 1958), 389-390.

into two parts: *dār al-Islām* the "abode of Islam,"¹¹ where Islamic ordinances were in force and a Muslim sovereign ruled, and where the inhabitants were Muslims and non-Muslims who had submitted to Muslim rule and under certain conditions were allowed to retain their lives and property; and *dār al-harb*, the "abode of war", territory outside the borders of Islam, but which is or may be at war with it and may by conquest be incorporated into *dār al-Islām*.

Moldavia and Wallachia were in *dār al-sulh*. Muslim troops had not conquered them, but they had bought peace by payment of the tribute which guaranteed them a truce (*sulh*). Ottoman jurists seem to have regarded them as territories acquired by treaty. Consequently, landed property remained in the hands of its former proprietors and did not become the common possession of the Muslim community. In return for this concession the proprietors paid a tribute.

Under the terms of various *'ahd-nāmes* (treaties) granted by the Sultans and *berāts* (writs of appointment) issued to the princes on their accession, the Ottoman suzerain allowed Moldavia and Wallachia a large measure of internal autonomy. He acknowledged the right of the prince and his *boiers* to rule "in accordance with custom" and forbade Turkish civil and military officials to interfere in the domestic affairs of either country. The *boiers* continued to elect the prince, but the Sultan reserved to himself the right to approve their choice and to invest the prince with the insignia of office. The Sultan took over the direction of the principalities' foreign affairs. He forbade the princes to conclude treaties and maintain diplomatic relation with foreign states, since he regarded these matters as the concern of the whole empire.¹² The Ottoman army took upon itself the obligation to defend the principalities from foreign attack and to ensure the maintenance of their territorial integrity.

Neither the princes nor the Sultans respected these norms. During the whole of the sixteenth century the princes, on the one hand, attempted to free themselves from Turkish control and to regain their independence. On the other hand, the Sultans,

¹¹ Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, II/2, 671.

¹² *Ibid.*, III/1, (Bucuresti, 1880), 35; IV/2, (Bucuresti, 1884), 164.

beginning with Suleiman I, left no device untried which would make the principalities completely subservient to their will. In this endeavor they were largely successful, for by the end of the sixteenth century, they had succeeded in transforming the prince into an Ottoman official, whose tenure in office depended solely upon the Sultan's grace.

Moldavia provides an interesting illustration of how this took place. Since the first payment of the tribute in 1456, the Sultan had attempted from time to time to impose other burdens upon the prince, notably military service and the provisioning of Ottoman armies, in spite of the fact that the payment of this tribute did not imply vassal status.

During the first four decades of the sixteenth century, the prince was successful in avoiding fulfilment of these obligations, which, if they had become customary, would have limited his independence still further. In 1523, Suleiman ordered Prince Stefanita (1517-27) to send his army into neighboring Transylvania to attack the Hungarians while he himself moved against Belgrade, the key to southern Hungary. Stefanita consulted the *boiers* of his council and together they decided to reject the Sultan's demand and to maintain their traditional friendship with Hungary.¹³ Suleiman, enraged at this defiance, threatened to unleash his vassals the Crimean Tartars against Moldavia. To this Stefanita, aware of the Sultan's desperate need for money for his military campaigns, bravely inquired who would pay the tribute if the Tartars devastated his country. Although he was certain that Suleiman was too busy elsewhere to carry out his threat, he took the additional precaution of bribing the Sultan's emissary "to take all the Moldavians' troubles upon his back."

After his armies had crushed the Hungarians at Mohács in 1526 and had driven to the gates of Vienna in 1529, Suleiman became more demanding in his dealings with the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia than any of his predecessors had been. In a letter to the King of Poland in 1531, he insisted that both princes were his "slaves and tributaries", and that he had

¹³B. Petricicic-Hajdeu, *Arhiva Istorică a României*, I, (București, 1865), 9-13.

incorporated their countries into his empire and that they were his property "just like Bosnia¹⁴ and Serbia".¹⁵

In the same year, Suleiman ordered Petru Rares to assemble his army for a new campaign against the Emperor Charles V.¹⁶ Rares, however, was determined to maintain his freedom of action and to limit his obligations to the Turks to the payment of the tribute.¹⁷ In foreign affairs he pursued policies of his own. Suleiman, preoccupied with plans for the campaign against Charles V, was anxious to avoid complications with Poland. As Rares's suzerain he ordered him to abandon his claims to the province of Pocutia, the possession of which had long been in dispute between Moldavia and Poland.¹⁸ Rares ignored the injunction and repeatedly sent raiding parties into the territory. In 1537, when the Poles threatened to invade Moldavia in retaliation, Rares had the audacity to appeal to Suleiman, as his suzerain, to come to his aid. This request is significant in that Rares publicly acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan over Moldavia.¹⁹ At the same time Rares was openly carrying on negotiations for an alliance with Suleiman's sworn enemy, the Habsburg King Ferdinand of Hungary.

Rares was obviously not to be trusted, and Suleiman decided to replace him with someone more amenable. His invasion of Moldavia in 1538 accomplished its purpose, and after Stefan Lacusta's act of homage, he could announce proudly to the King of Poland that "Moldavia is mine, and those who live there are my subjects in the same way as are the inhabitants of Turkey and my other lands".²⁰ After the subjugation of their country by force of arms, the princes of Moldavia found it increasingly difficult to act contrary to the wishes of their suzerain. In 1594, Aron Tiranul (1591-95) lamented to the Emperor Rudolph II that he was only a custodian in his country and that he could not in safety

¹⁴Conquest completed in 1463.

¹⁵Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, Supliment II, v.1. (Bucuresti, 1893), 26.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, II/1, (Bucuresti, 1891), 78.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, XI, (Bucuresti, 1900), 21.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, S. II/1, 60.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, II/1, 147: "Istud Regnum [Moldavia] est supremi ac Invictissimi Imperatoris Turcarum Domini nostri Clementissimi, ac nobis concessit possidendum."

²⁰Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, S. II/1, 112.

communicate even this message to him so great was the oppression of the Turks.²¹

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Sultan treated both Moldavia and Wallachia as conquered territories and referred to them in official documents as *vilayets* (provinces). He regarded the princes as imperial officials subject to the same treatment as any other servant, who held office only as long as they performed their duties satisfactorily. For example, in 1574, he removed Ioan cel Cumplit of Moldavia (1572-74) for having led an uprising against Ottoman rule. In 1577, on the other hand, he put the loyal Petru Schiopul of Moldavia (1574-79, 1582-91) back on the throne after a group of *boiers*, incensed at the exactions of his tax-collectors, had driven him from the country.

Although the *boiers* were occasionally permitted to exercise their prerogative of electing the prince, subject always to the Sultan's confirmation, it became customary for the Sultan to appoint the prince directly. As we shall see later on, a candidate had to have "connections" with high Ottoman officials or members of the Sultan's family and had to pay enormous sums of money to obtain his appointment. The Sultan regarded the accession of any prince without his sanction as an act of treason.²² Even the princes, who had customarily styled themselves "rulers by the grace of God", no longer regarded their succession as an act of the divine will, but simply as an exercise of their suzerain's prerogative.²³

It was customary for the prince to go to Istanbul for his installation. Upon arrival, he first paid half the sum he had promised to the Sultan and various officials in return for his appointment, after which he received the insignia of his office: a *burk* (a kind of tall bonnet adorned with ostrich feathers worn by high Ottoman dignitaries), a *tug* (a horse's tail suspended from a lance; the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia had two each, the grand vizir three), a *bairak* or *sancak* (a flag or banner made of expensive red cloth), a *kalpak* (a kind of fur cap), and a *bargir* (a white horse which he received personally from the Sultan). As soon as

²¹*Ibid.*, III/1, 177.

²²*Ibid.*, S. II/1, 232-233.

²³*Documente privind istoria României*, veacul XVI, B. Tara Românească, III, (Bucuresti, 1951), 71.

the prince had arranged to pay the remainder of the money he owed, he requested the Sultan's permission to leave the capital for his country.²⁴

The prince left behind in Istanbul an agent to protect his interests and to act as an intermediary between him and the imperial government. The institution of the *capuchehaia* (Turkish: *kapikâhyasi*), as the agent was called, had its origins in the last decade of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century.²⁵ At first, his function was diplomatic, but as both principalities became *de facto* provinces of the empire, Ottoman officials treated them as administrators, in the same way as the representatives of provincial governors. The *capuchehaia* was indispensable to the prince, for it was he who had to convince the Sultan and Ottoman officials of his master's continued loyalty and to distribute the gifts which served as tangible evidence of it. He also acted as a contact with the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul, which enabled the prince to circumvent the Sultan's prohibition against direct relations with foreign states.

Although the princes usually exercised considerable discretion in administering the internal affairs of their country, the Sultan demanded absolute obedience in foreign affairs and economic matters. He employed numerous devices to ensure this. He provided the princes with a special guard of janissaries (regular infantry) or spahis (cavalry), whose duty it was to see that they carried out his instructions and to protect them from rebellious *boiers* and peasants. This guard functioned in Moldavia from about 1538 and in Wallachia from about 1552.²⁶ To make the princes more accessible, the Sultan had their capitals moved from mountain fortresses to cities of the plain—Suceava to Iasi in Moldavia, and Tîrgoviste to Bucharest in Wallachia. In 1564, at the Sultan's behest, Alexandru Lapusneanu (1552-61, 1563-68) demolished all the fortresses of Moldavia except Hotin as part of the bargain

²⁴Stefan Pascu, *Petru Cercel și Tara Romanesca la sfârșitul sec. al XVI-lea* (Sibiu, 1944), 162-169; M. Guboglu, *Paleografia și diplomatica turco-osmana* (București, 1958), 84.

²⁵Aurel H. Golimas, *Despre Capuchehaile Moldovei și poruncile Porții către Moldova până la 1829* (Iasi, 1943), 27.

²⁶*Istoria României*, II, 798.

which had made him prince.²⁷ The Crimean Tartars provided the Sultan with an especially effective instrument of political pressure. He could often bring a refractory prince to heel by the mere threat to send them on a pillaging expedition through his country. One of the most frightful of these incursions took place in Moldavia in 1574 as a punishment for Ioan cel Cumplit's rebellion. The horror of it left a profound impression on later generations; three-quarters of a century later the great Moldavian chronicler Grigore Ureche recounted in vivid detail the almost total devastation of the countryside and the enslavement of whole villages.²⁸

By the second half of the sixteenth century, it would have been a comparatively easy undertaking for the Turks to have occupied Moldavia and Wallachia and to have turned both into *pasalics* (provinces), as they had done with Hungary. That they did not was owing largely to their new conception of imperial administration. An administrative bureaucracy was replacing the feudal tenants (*timar*-holders) and the marauding *akincis*, who had constantly to be rewarded for their services with fiefs and booty, as the dominant influence in the empire. This new bureaucracy of accountants regarded fiscal exploitation as more profitable than direct occupation.²⁹ This was especially true in the Rumanian principalities, whose economic development had been greatly accelerated since the fifteenth century. Their natural wealth made them indispensable to the economic well-being of the empire.

As the Turks strengthened their control over the principalities, the new system of economic exploitation brought great sums of money into the personal treasuries of the Sultan and of high officials, and of merchants and money-lenders, who in the sixteenth century, had assumed a more important role in Ottoman affairs. So profitable had this system become that successive Sultans rejected out of hand all proposals to transform the principalities into *pasalics* under a Turkish governor and bureaucracy.³⁰ They seem to have

²⁷Grigore Ureche, *Letopisetul Tarii Moldovei*, edited by P. P. Panaitescu, (Bucuresti, 1955), 179.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 192.

²⁹Istoria Rominici, II, 792.

³⁰Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, III/1, 145-146; IV/2, 141; Andrei Veress, *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului Moldovei si Tarii Romanesti*, III, (Bucuresti, 1931), 108, 198.

accepted the fact that their own people made poor economic administrators and that they merely drained a country of its resources without taking the trouble to put anything back into it. Throughout the Balkan Peninsula the Turks ravaged the forests and never replanted and left rich mineral deposits unworked.³¹ The Rumanians, on the other hand, were skilled agriculturists and organizers, which helps to explain why the Turks did not interfere in their internal affairs.

III

In the sixteenth century, the political subservience of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Ottoman Empire meant at the same time their subjection to a system of spoliation unparalleled in their history, which was to have a profound effect upon their subsequent social and economic development.

As tributary states, they had numerous obligations to their suzerain: the *harac*, additional special money payments, the delivery of provisions to the Ottoman army and to Istanbul, military service, and labor services. In addition to these formal, state obligations, the princes had to present gifts periodically or on special occasions to the Sultan and a whole host of officials and favorites. The most odious of these were the sums which the newly appointed prince distributed to those who had helped him gain the throne. In fact, by the second half of the sixteenth century, gifts to individuals far exceeded in value the obligations to the state.

The principal state obligation was the *harac*, the juridical sign of dependent status. As we have already seen, the Rumanian princes at first regarded it as a voluntary payment to obtain peace from the Turks. According to Islamic law, however, it was an obligatory land tax levied on the whole territory of a vassal state. This was the interpretation which Ottoman jurists were applying by the end of the fifteenth century. In the next century, as both countries lost more of their independence, the Turks turned the *harac* into *cizye*, a capitation tax which every male non-Muslim inhabitant of the empire was required to pay and which was also imposed upon conquered countries.

³¹ P. P. Panaitescu, *Interpretari romanesti* (Bucuresti, 1947), 154-156.

The Ottoman government determined the total amount of the tribute, but entrusted its division among individuals and its collection to the prince. In Moldavia the prince's officials, and in Wallachia, the landowning *boiers* supervised its collection. The total amount was apportioned among the various districts into which each principality was divided, and each commune of each district had its own quota to meet. In free communes the elders and the representatives of the prince, and in the dependent communes the landowner and the abbot, if it were the possession of a monastery, decided what the share of each individual would be. In general, every head of a household paid for himself, his unmarried sons and his servants or laborers.³²

Annually, usually in April, either the prince in person or his representatives brought the tribute from Iasi or Bucharest to Istanbul and presented it before the imperial divan in the name of their respective country. The amount rose steadily during the sixteenth century: in Wallachia in 1503, it was 8,000 *galbens*; in 1542, 24,000; in 1593, 155,000; and in Moldavia in 1503, it was 4,000 *galbens*; in the 1560's, 30,000; in 1593, 65,000.³³ It was less in Moldavia because its princes had been more successful in resisting Ottoman armies and had thus been in a better position to bargain.

Included in the tribute were fine horses and hunting hawks, which the Turks, as former nomads, prized highly. The first documentary evidence for deliveries of this sort date from 1523, when Stefanita of Moldavia sent—“according to custom”—an ambassador to Istanbul with hawks.³⁴ In 1585, Petru Schiopul sent 60 horses and 60 hawks to the Sultan.

In addition to the regular tribute, both principalities were obliged to make extraordinary contributions to the Ottoman treasury. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the Sultan demanded special payments for his war chest: in 1548 for a campaign in Transylvania,³⁵ and in 1550 for a naval expedition

³²N. Jorga, *Geschichte des rumanischen Volkes*, II (Gotha, 1905), 81-82.

³³M. Berza, “Haraciul Moldovei si Tarii Rominesti in sec. XV-XIX”, *Studii si materiale de istorie medie*, II, (Bucuresti, 1957), 7-45.

³⁴B. Petriceicu-Hajdeu, *Archiva*, I, 11.

³⁵Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, II/1, 255-256.

in the Danube.³⁶ Up to this time the principalities had been exempt from such contributions.

As faithful vassals the Rumanian princes were expected to make periodic deliveries of animals and foodstuffs and to give all possible assistance to their suzerain in time of war. The deliveries of supplies probably began in the fifteenth century, but it was only in the sixteenth that they became a regular feature of Rumanian-Ottoman relations. In the second half of that century, Moldavia sent annually to Istanbul 500 horses and varying quantities of oxen, sheep, butter, honey and wax.³⁷ The Sultan also frequently ordered large quantities of timber for use in repairing fortresses and in building ships. The Rumanian principalities, which possessed extensive forests, supplied much of the timber for Ottoman war vessels.

In time of war the Sultan made special demands upon his vassals. The most important was military service. Although he was careful to keep their standing armies small during peacetime for fear that they might be turned against him, before the start of a foreign campaign he permitted them to swell to as many as 10,000 men. In 1566, for example, Suleiman instructed Petru cel Tinar of Wallachia (1559-68) to assemble 7,000 soldiers with full equipment and to send them to Timisoara to join the main Ottoman army for war in Hungary.³⁸ In 1587, Murad III ordered Petru Schiopul and Mihnea Turcitul of Wallachia (1585-91) to assemble men and supplies for a campaign "against the Christians". Since he had doubts about their loyalty, he followed the usual Ottoman practice and did not reveal the objective of the campaign until just before he was ready to launch it.³⁹

The princes were also required to provide a variety of transport services. In 1559, Suleiman instructed Petru cel Tinar to send rowers to Braila, a Wallachian port on the Danube, to bring 62 ships laden with barley upstream to Nicopolis. In 1579, Murad III demanded 3,000 horses for use in transporting supplies

³⁶*Ibid.*, S. I/1 (Bucuresti, 1886), 6.

³⁷I. C. Filitti, *Din arhivele Vaticanului*, II, (Bucuresti, 1914), 114.

³⁸Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, xvi.

³⁹*Ibid.*, IV/2, 134.

to the battlefield in Persia. In 1587, he obtained from Petru Schiopul 3,000 wagons and 15,000 laborers to rebuild the fortress of Ochakov, on the north shore of the Black Sea, which the Cossacks had destroyed.⁴⁰ In 1590, he ordered Mihnea Turcitul to build bridges across the Danube, so that he could keep his armies in Transylvania supplied more easily.⁴¹

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Turks transformed their commercial relations with the principalities into a monopoly. The needs of the army for provisions and the dependence of Istanbul on foodstuffs from Moldavia and Wallachia caused Suleiman and his successors to reserve the right to purchase their chief export products, mainly cattle, sheep, grain and honey. With this in mind, Suleiman, in 1564, instructed customs officials on the Moldavian-Polish border to count carefully the number of sheep which Moldavian shepherds took into Poland to pasture and to see that they brought back an equal number.⁴² In 1566, he ordered Alexandru Lapusneanu not to allow his subjects to sell their cattle abroad but to dispose of it all in the empire. In 1568, Selim II ordered Bogdan Lapusneanu of Moldavia (1568-72) not to allow the export of cattle and sheep to Poland or to other non-Muslim countries.⁴³

This monopoly manifested itself chiefly in three ways. First, the officials of each principality were expected to collect the provisions themselves. In 1579, for example, Murad III instructed both princes to assemble horses in one convenient place to facilitate purchases by Ottoman merchants.⁴⁴ Second, the princes had to supervise and guarantee the shipment to their destination, usually Istanbul, of these and other purchases. Third, and most important, the princes were obliged to assist these merchants to obtain provisions in the necessary quantities and at the lowest prices possible. This gave foreigners a privileged status *vis-à-vis* native merchants. As a result, Moldavia and Wallachia were flooded with Turkish and Levantine merchants—*kasaplar* and *celepler* (cattle and sheep

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 107, 110, 134.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 149.

⁴²*Ibid.*, S. II/1, 245.

⁴³*Istoria Rominiei*, II 785-786.

⁴⁴Huřmuzaki, *Documente*, III/1, 40.

merchants) and *balclar* (honey merchants)—most of whom were actually Greeks. They would usually pay the prince for the right to take a fixed quantity of animals or grain from a certain district. In 1589, for example, one sheep merchant paid 420,000 aspers⁴⁵ to take sheep from the district of Soroca, and another paid 100,000 aspers to take sheep from the district of Neamt. In 1591, the whole of Moldavia was opened to sheep merchants on this basis. They took an average of three sheep from each peasant and by the end of the year had collected 141,000 animals. The peasant received no recompense; his sacrifice was considered a tax due the prince.⁴⁶

The Sultan's court and the population of the capital became dependent upon the principalities for their supplies of meat and grain.⁴⁷ Any interruption in their flow caused extreme hardship. In 1578, the ambassador of Venice at Istanbul reported a great shortage of food in the city and the surrounding area owing to destructive raids by Cossacks in Moldavia.⁴⁸ Another source of concern to the Sultan was the practice by which Ottoman merchants themselves diverted supplies purchased in the principalities from Istanbul to more profitable markets in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was one of the reasons why he insisted that the princes oversee the shipment of these goods to their intended destination.

Gifts to individuals constituted a heavier drain on the resources of the principalities and exercised a more pernicious influence on political and social life than the obligations to the Ottoman state. There were two main types of gifts. First, there were those given at fixed intervals or on special occasions. They signified the personal loyalty and devotion of the prince toward the Sultan in the same way that the *harac* represented the homage of the state. They were as old as the tribute itself; both Mircea cel Batrin and Stefan cel Mare had sent gifts to accompany the tribute. At least by the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the presentation of gifts had

⁴⁵Ottoman silver coin first minted in 1327. In the time of Suleiman I it was ninety percent silver, but afterwards declined in value. It is called *akce*, "little white", in Turkish.

⁴⁶*Documente privind istoria României*, veacul XVI, A. Moldova, III, (Bucuresti, 1951), 446, 447; IV, (Bucuresti, 1952), 19-27.

⁴⁷G. Bratianu, "Etudes sur l'approvisionnement de Constantinople", in *Etudes byzantines d'histoire economique et sociale* (Paris, 1938), 172-177.

⁴⁸Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, IV/2, 104.

become a permanent obligation. The prince and Ottoman officials determined by negotiation the kinds and the amounts. At first, only the Sultan received them, but eventually a whole complement of officials from the grand vizir on down became beneficiaries. Gifts were always offered when a new Sultan ascended the throne, when the prince ascended his, when the prince visited the Sultan in Istanbul, when a high official assumed office, and when Ottoman officials were on some mission in the principalities. It became customary also for the princes to present gifts to the Sultan and members of his family, and to the grand vizir and other important officials during *bairam*. These gifts consisted of money and goods. For example, Ioan Despot of Moldavia (1561-63) gave to an official bringing his *bairak* from Istanbul, 1,500 *galbens*, 100 horses, and 40 pieces of fine cloth.⁴⁹ By the second half of the sixteenth century, the value of gifts of this sort amounted to as much as the *harac*.⁵⁰

The second type of gift was unfixed in time and unlimited in amount. It consisted of all the various payments—in effect, bribes—which pretenders to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia made to the Sultan, members of his family, and officials of all degrees of importance in order to gain their support. Its origins went back to the gift which each new prince offered to the Sultan on his [the prince's] accession. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the succession to the princely throne had become the occasion for a spirited auction, in which the candidate making the highest bid usually won the prize.

The most urgent problem for the candidates was to obtain enough money to stay in the running. They were forced to borrow large sums at high rates of interest, often twenty percent. Money-lenders and merchants were willing to make the loans because the returns were high and the investment safe. Custom decreed that the successful candidate assume responsibility for the debts of his predecessor.⁵¹ These debts were considered state, not personal, obligations. The sum which a candidate might be obliged to pay reached fantastic proportions by the end of the sixteenth century. It has been estimated that Petru Cercel (1583-85) spent

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, II/1, 404.

⁵⁰Pascu, *Petru Cercel*, 177.

⁵¹Filitti, *Din arhivele Vaticanului*, II, 47.

over one million *galbens*, or over seven times the tribute, to obtain the throne of Wallachia.⁵²

Once in office, the prince's immediate concern was to pay off his creditors. He used various means. Petru Rares dipped into the state treasury and contracted new loans. In 1542, he appealed to the King of Poland for a loan of several thousand Polish florins, which he promised to repay with produce from his country. This, he wrote, would assist him greatly "in my present difficult situation and in view of the penury of my treasury, which I have exhausted by giving much of it to the Turks... that I might thus become *Hospodar* (prince) of my country".⁵³ His successors frequently raised taxes and had recourse to various forms of extortion against peasants and *boiers* alike. For example, in 1582, Iancu Sasul (1579-82) levied an extraordinary tithe on oxen in order to repay certain *celepler*, from whom he had borrowed large sums to obtain his appointment.⁵⁴ These and other measures finally drove his people to revolt. In order to restore internal peace, essential for maintaining the uninterrupted flow of money and provisions to Istanbul, the Sultan deposed him.⁵⁵ Sometimes, the Sultan sent along an escort of soldiers to help the new prince extract from his reluctant subjects the sums he had promised. In 1591, Aron Tiranul, who, according to a foreign diplomat in Istanbul, had left behind a debt of one million ducats, could not have satisfied his creditors in any other way.⁵⁶

The succession in Moldavia and Wallachia thus presented the Sultan and the members of his court with a unique opportunity to enrich their personal treasuries. To obtain the maximum benefit, princes were on the average changed about every two and a half years in Moldavia and every three years in Wallachia.

This system of gifts was greatly extended in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. During the reign of Mihnea Turcitul the Sultan introduced the custom of confirming the princes only after three years. This made it necessary for them to pay an additional

⁵²Pascu, *Petru Cercel*, 21-35.

⁵³Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, S. II/1, 158.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, XI, xlix.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, III/1, 78.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, IV/2, 158.

sum of money, called *mukarer*, which in the eighteenth century amounted to as much as they had paid at the time of their appointment.⁵⁷ It became customary for every agreement or negotiation between the princes or their representatives and Ottoman officials to be concluded with the presentation of a gift. Other foreigners were expected to observe the custom, too. In 1563, the grand vizir complained that Western Europeans came to Istanbul with many demands but no gifts, not even a simple basket of fruit, and that they became indignant if no official paid them any heed; but there was "no Ragusan, Sciote, Wallach, or Moldavian who comes to the Palace of the *Grand Seigneur* with empty hands".⁵⁸

IV

The consequences of Ottoman domination were deeply felt in all areas of public life in the principalities. It stunted their political and economic development by bringing to a halt the impressive growth of the fifteenth century. The frequent changes of princes made orderly and systematic government extremely difficult. The administrative apparatus became geared to satisfying the fiscal demands of the suzerain state, which permitted institutions little opportunity for normal development. The principal *boier* families, who ought to have provided leadership, devoted their energies to sterile competitions for the throne. The Turks, whose chief concerns were financial, contributed no little to the resulting disorder by playing off one pretender against another. Venality contributed to a general lowering of public morality.

Economic exploitation had even more serious consequences. In the first place, it accelerated the enserfment of the peasantry. As was customary in a feudal society, the peasantry bore the heaviest burdens, and in both Moldavia and Wallachia the sixteenth century was a period of rising prices and taxes. The small and middle peasant found it increasingly difficult to maintain his independence. All Ottoman economic demands were

⁵⁷C. C. Giurescu, *Istoria Romanilor*, III, partea 2, (Bucuresti, 1946), 462-463.

⁵⁸Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, S. I/1, 17.

ultimately passed on to him. Frequently, he was unable to pay the new tax or the extraordinary tithe and, as a result, had to suffer the confiscation of his land and a dependence akin to serfdom on the *boier* who had bought it. Thus, a double process was at work: a reduction in the number of small peasant holdings, on the one hand, and, on the other, the extension of large estates. It must be emphasized, however, that this process had begun before the period of Ottoman vassalage; it was now simply accelerated.

The poverty of the peasantry discouraged exchanges of goods between city and village and thereby helped to retard the development of handicraft industries and cities as economic centers. The comparative insignificance of the native merchant class, which could have formed a strong urban middle class, also hindered the growth of cities. Native merchants found it difficult to compete with the privileged Turkish and Greek merchants who operated within the framework of the Ottoman commercial monopoly. To escape their heavy burdens, many peasant families emigrated to neighboring countries, especially Transylvania. Emigration reached such serious proportions that in some districts there were not enough people to pay their quota of the tribute.⁵⁹ It also explains in part why there was no appreciable growth of population in either principality during the sixteenth century.

Ottoman domination of Moldavia and Wallachia was to last until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The conditions we have described above lasted, with some modification owing to time and circumstance, throughout the intervening two centuries. It was only after 1821 that the Ottoman hold over the principalities began to be weakened decisively. By 1859, Moldavia and Wallachia had achieved *de facto* union, and in the 1860's virtual independence.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, III/1, 154.

THE CAO DAI OF TAY NINH: THE POLITICS OF A
POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS SECT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

by

ROY JUMPER

A MILITARY junta seized power in Saigon on November 2, 1963. One of the first public acts of the junta's executive organ, the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), was its proclamation of a new policy of conciliation towards and collaboration with South Vietnam's two principal political-religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.¹ The MRC hoped to use the sects to help stem the resurgence of the Communist guerrillas, the Viet Cong.² The action constituted a reversal of the policy of the preceding Diem regime which denied the legitimacy of the temporal authority of the sects and attempted to suppress them in their respective territorial spheres.³ It also was an acknowledgement by the Saigon government that it had overcome neither of the two most important political obstacles to the establishment of a viable central government in South Vietnam: the rice roots power of the Communists and of the sects.⁴ The present paper aims to trace the political evolution of one of the sects, the Cao Dai of Tay

¹Cooperation with the third armed sect, the Binh Xuyen, was ruled out at least for the moment by the professed neutral position of its leadership which fled to France in 1955 after Binh Xuyen forces were dislodged from their posts in Saigon and subsequently dispersed by units of the national army.

²The South Vietnamese government uses the term Viet Cong rather than Viet Minh to refer to Communist guerrillas and thus attempts to distinguish the Communists of today from those who fought the French before 1954.

³The MRC's leader, General Duong Van Minh, directed the fight against the Binh Xuyen and then against the Hoa Hao; its civil premier, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was Diem's special adviser on sect affairs during the 1955-1956 period of repression.

⁴Roy Jumper, "Sects and Communism in South Vietnam," *Orbis*, III (Spring 1959), 85-96.

Ninh, to analyse its structural components, and to assess its role in the political process.⁵

Cao Dai religious doctrine is believed to date from the First World War period when play with ouija boards was a popular pastime for Vietnamese employees of the French colonial government in Saigon. Particularly adept at evoking spirits during these seances was a young civil servant, Ngo Van Chieu, who was said to have made contact with a voice that cried out: "I am the Supreme Being! I am the most ancient of the Buddhas! I am Cakya Mouni and Jesus Christ! I now take the name Cao Dai and command that a new religion be brought forth in the world." Unwilling to permit mortal men to direct the religion, Cao Dai supposedly declared that he would take a personal hand in its management and would make his views known through the means of spiritualistic mediums. Young Chieu was displaced almost immediately from the leadership of the bantling movement by an enterprising businessman and member of the Colonial Council, Le Van Trung. The new leader assumed the title of pope and teamed with Pham Cong Tac, a clerk in the customs house, to build Cao Daism into a powerful political-religious movement.⁵ Tac emerged as the central figure in 1932. The main instrument behind his rise was the Pham Mon secret society whose members bound themselves to Tac by a pact written in blood and then helped him to infiltrate the Cao Dai religious structure. Tac contrived charges of theft and corruption to discredit the first pope in order to gain for himself the pontifical post in 1934.

A holy see was eventually founded near Tay Ninh, about fifty miles from Saigon. At its center stands the Cao Dai cathedral, an architectural wonder that blends the pagoda with baroque forms. A single large eye, the symbol of divine omniscience, stares down as if to guard the temple's main entrance. Inside, green dragons twirl around pink colonnades. Although the Cao Dai failed to obtain the legal status of an independent state for the

⁵The essay is based upon field observation and interviews in Vietnam in 1954-1956 and in 1962. Although there exists no comprehensive political study of the Cao Dai, literature on the subject includes Nguyen Van Tam, "Le Caodaisme et les Hoa Hao," in M. Bayen, ed., *Conférences d'information sur l'Indochine* (2 vols.; Saigon, 1949); and Bernard B. Fall, "The Politico-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVIII (September 1958), 235-253.

holy see which englobed the villages of Long-Thanh, Hiep-Ninh, and Trung-Hoa, it did develop to be the main political-religious force in Tay Ninh province which spreads along the Cambodian border. It also expanded to neighbouring provinces in the southern region and even to a few communities in central and northern Vietnam. Temples were constructed in the large towns throughout the south and even in Saigon where there are four. By the time of independence the Cao Dai claimed to represent about fourteen per cent of the population of South Vietnam.⁶ However, the Tay Ninh sect no longer spoke for the entire movement since a number of schisms, especially between 1930 and 1935, resulted in the formation of twelve dissident organizations, the most important of which are those in Ben-Tre,⁷ My-Tho, Can-Tho, and Bac-Lieu.

Cao Dai theology is not original but rather borrows from other religions and literary works in an attempt to involve a synthesis of eastern and western thought.⁸ The basic theory, worship, and ritual was taken from the Minh Ly Buddhist sect; other details from Taoism, Confucianism, and Christianity, and from the contributions of such figures as Joan of Arc, William Shakespeare, Victor Hugo, and Sun Yat Sen. The religion also reflected the imprint of the writings of Allan Kardec and Leon Denis.

Cao Dai doctrine is not fixed and has changed according to the whims of religious leaders, whose primary concern has been to develop, often in complete disregard of logic and compatibility, a formula of beliefs and symbols to attract the greatest number of followers. The aim is to satisfy the need of an unsettled and wavering mass population for immediate metaphysical security. The Cao Dai moral code is not rigid. To avoid harm to animals who are considered to be inferior brethren, a vegetarian diet is encouraged; however, new converts are asked to break away from eating meat only gradually. One is taught to serve, not kill thy neighbor, yet force and coercion are frequently used to compel

⁶Republique du Viet-Nam, Mission Economic et Humanisme, *Etude de quelques facteurs humains du developpement du Vietnam*, (Saigon, 1960), p. 71.

⁷There are two dissident branches in Ben-Tre.

⁸The most complete study of the religion is an "authorized" account by Gabriel Gobrun, *History and Philosophy of Caodaism* (Saigon: Le Van Tan Printing House, 1950).

compliance. Priests and deacons are permitted to have wives but must vow to live as brother and sister, foregoing all sexual relations. Sex and alcohol should be avoided, says Cao Dai, lest the brain become dominated by perverted spirits. The faithful may pray, burn joss sticks, and offer flowers and tea. However strange the religion may seem to the westerner it is in harmony with the prevailing religious customs of South Vietnam where fortune tellers hawk their trade in Buddhist pagodas and images of the Virgin Mary compete with those of dragons in the Catholic churches.

EVOLUTION OF CAO DAI POLITICS

Cao Dai leaders easily mastered the basic techniques of Vietnamese politics which incorporate ambition and cunning with armed might. Forever mindful of the old Vietnamese maxim, "Profit from troubled waters to cast your fishing line," they have allied at various times with Japanese, French, Viet Minh, and national governmental forces. Internal rivalry and the need for outside financial support, rather than ideological considerations, are the primary factors conditioning these alignments. Policies are calculated soberly in terms of what is practical and expedient at a given moment.

France's official traditional neutrality toward religion and their own attraction to the aim of attempting a synthesis of eastern and western thought probably influenced colonial officials to sanction the propagation of the cult. By 1938 the religion had begun to take on a political orientation, marked by anti-French nationalism. Cao Dai agitation for independence increased after the events in Europe of June 1940, and led eventually to the closure of Cao Dai temples and to the deportation of the pope and his principal collaborators to Madagascar. The group was thus held in check until the Japanese occupation when it began to support Prince Coung De, then in exile in Japan, to replace Emperor Bao Dai. The principal Cao Dai liason with the Japanese government was a local businessman, Matusita, who doubled as head of Japan's espionage in Cochinchina. By 1943 the Japanese Kempeitai had armed several indigenous groups, including the Cao Dai, for eventual action against the French. A political bureau was set

up in Saigon under the direction of Tran Quang Vinh, the former head of the Cao Dai branch in Phnom Penh. The Japanese blocked several attempts by the French to arrest Vinh and his cohorts by claiming them to be employees of the Japanese government. Then in early 1945 the Cao Dai participated with some 3000 troops in the Japanese coup d'etat, only to have their wing clipped soon afterwards when Japan capitulated to end the Second World War.

The Cao Dai next allied with the Viet Minh, but internal dissension was a barrier to effective collaboration. When Vinh balked at political and military integration (which to him meant absorption by the Viet Minh) he was captured by partisans of Ho Chi Minh. However, several Cao Dai commanders, namely Nguyen Thanh Phuong, Nguyen Van Thanh, and Duong Van Dang, agreed to fight the French. Their compact with the Viet Minh was ephemeral, and before the end of 1946 these men were hired by the French. The initial agreement with the French was negotiated by Vinh. Soon afterwards General Phung brought over his 1000 troops to fight on the side of France and the Cao Dai pope, Pham Cong Tac, was brought home from exile to proclaim that the French presence was a necessity in Vietnam. The pope's return to Tay Ninh was followed by the coming into the fold of such military commanders as Thanh, Dang, and Trinh Minh The. A Viet Minh attack upon the holy see helped the pope to reestablish his position; and in January 1947, he ratified the military agreement initiated by General Vinh and providing arms and subsidies in return for "loyal collaboration" against the Viet Minh. The French further agreed to set up a Cao Dai adherent, Dr. Le Van Hoach, as the second President of the Republic of Cochinchina. The Cao Dai of Tay Ninh were at their zenith of power.

All Cao Dai chieftains did not remain loyal to France. General Thanh favored a neutral course between the French and the Communists and when he became commander-in-chief of all the pope's armed forces he secretly ordered his troops to cease as of February 1949 all offensive acts against the Viet Minh. Trinh Minh The deployed his partisan force of 1000 men against both

the French and the Viet Minh. By 1952 most of the military chiefs were in full revolt against the pope, and a number of internal clashes occurred. Finally, in March 1953, the pope was able to replace Thanh with Vinh as commander-in-chief and to moderate the major differences among most chieftains until the advent of the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.⁹

The Cao Dai relationship with the Diem regime was marked by great duplicity on both sides. Certain Cao Dai chiefs participated in the second Diem cabinet named in the fall of 1954, while others took part in the formation of the United Front of Nationalist Forces whose aim was to prevent Diem from consolidating his position. The Cao Dai pope became Chairman of the rival government, the United Front Presidium, which was set up on the outskirts of Saigon shortly before fighting erupted in and around the capital at midnight on March 29, 1955. The two most powerful military chiefs at that time, Generals The, and Phuong, abandoned the Front and supported Diem after receiving large bribes.¹⁰ General The sparked the pursuit of Binh Xuyen troops (the only major sect force to engage the national army) from Saigon. He was killed in action and thus removed as a major contender for power.

Pope Pham Cong Tac threatened to join the Viet Minh in North Vietnam but escaped instead to Phnom Penh in March 1956 when General Phuong, his military chief-of-Staff, seized control over the holy see. The major portion of the Cao Dai forces (the troops of Generals Phuong and Van Thanh Cao, the successor to General The) were ultimately absorbed by the national army or demobilized. However, some fled with their arms to form guerrilla bands and others joined the Viet Minh.

In response to the military junta's "open arms" policy toward the sects, oppositionist sect leaders began to re-emerge in late 1963. A number of Cao Dai officers returned from exile in Cambodia

⁹The best study of the rise of the Diem regime is a field report by Marjorie Weiner (Normand), *Government and Politics in South Vietnam, 1954-1956* (unpublished M. C. thesis, Cornell University, 1960).

¹⁰William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXV (January 1957), p. 287.

¹¹In preparation for his power grab in Tay Ninh General Phuong charged the elderly pope with the rape of nineteen vestal virgins of Cao Dai *Time*, March 5, 1956.

to re-establish themselves in Tay Ninh under the leadership of General Le Thanh Tat and Tran Van Vinh, who aspired to become the supreme religious leader.¹² However, it was doubtful that these men could reunite even the Cao Dai of Tay Ninh. At the same time that General Tat met with newsmen in Tay Ninh to announce his pledge to help the central government fight the Viet Cong, a splinter faction held a news conference in Saigon to advocate eventual union of North and South Viet-nam under a neutral coalition government headed by intellectuals from each region.¹³

STRUCTURE

Cao Dai formal structure bears some resemblance to the organization of the early Roman Catholic Church. At its head a pope reigns over two spheres: the spiritual (Hiep-Thien-Dai) and the temporal (Cuu-Trung-Dai). The spheres embrace four types of activity: legislation, administration, the military, and economics. A Supreme legislative body is invested with the "spiritual" power of Cao Daism and receives divine messages that form the base of Cao Dai law. These messages regularly come by means of a tapping basket, the original ouija board having been discarded for this more efficient instrument. Holy words are canonized, usually by the pope, and then articulated to the Cao Dai faithful.

The Cao Dai administrative apparatus replaced that of the government in some areas. In others there were in effect two "states"—one headed by a governmental chief, the other by a Cao Dai. In many such districts the Cao Dai chief was the real ruler, and governmental agents travelled outside their headquarters only at the pleasure of the Cao Dai. In still other districts where its power was nominal the Cao Dai was represented by a delegate whose influence was measured less by the number of worshippers visiting the local temple than by the size of the Cao Dai military post in the vicinity. The Cao Dai also claimed to have established in Tay Ninh ministries parallel to those of the national government in Saigon. It is most likely that these ministries existed largely on

¹²Dispatch by Hedrick Smith, *New York Times* (International Ed.), December 28, 1963.

¹³*The Star* (Beirut), November 16, 1963.

paper since the author's request to visit one particular administrative office evoked from a startled cardinal the reply that there was none as the matter was handled directly by Cao Dai, the holy spirit himself. An administrative bureau was maintained in Saigon to handle liason with the central government.

Military organization did not exist in the singular even for the Tay Ninh sect. The pope named the commander-in-chief of the Cao Dai armed forces but did not always control his nominee. Nor was the commander-in-chief a real "chief" in practice, as several field commanders functioned with minimum regard to their chief in Tay Ninh. Fighting between Cao Dai military units was not unusual especially during the Franco-Viet-Minh war. Still in 1964 the military arm of the Cao Dai was not in fact subordinate to its religious head.

Cao Dai economic affairs fell under the jurisdiction of an entity known as the Charity Corps. Revenue came primarily from government subsidies, land, business, and involvement in such illegal operations as the piastre traffic, opium smuggling, and gambling. The main Cao Dai wealth consisted of land which included an estate that totaled forty square miles. On the estate Cao Dai followers were permitted to occupy a small plot large enough for a house and garden: in surrounding areas they rented from wealthy Cao Dai many of whom resided in Tay Ninh or Saigon. Throughout Tay Ninh province the Cao Dai collected taxes on yields and on the transport of goods to market. Loyal Cao Dai enjoyed special tax reductions and were exempted from the security tax collected from all others. The main Cao Dai business interests in Tay Ninh included a brick kiln, a saw mill, a furniture factory, a weaving mill, and a printing house. There were also Cao Dai owned shops, a produce market, a hospital, a school,¹⁴ and even a funeral home to bury the Cao Dai dead. A special company was formed to control the purchase of rice and its transport. The main Cao Dai enterprises in Saigon were several import-export houses. An economic adviser functioned in the capital to pull the political strings necessary to keep the various business ventures operating.

Profits and revenue were not sufficient to meet the organization's requirements of personnel and material. The sect

¹⁴Private hospitals and schools are usually run for profit in South Vietnam.

needed outside subsidies if it was to become a national political force and became heavily dependent first upon Japanese and then French sources. Some sect leaders began to benefit from United States aid on the eve of independence and a few were supported by the Communists. After independence a shift in United States aid policy vitally affected the Cao Dai and, indeed, reshaped the internal power structure of the country, permitting Ngo Dinh Diem to rise as the undisputed ruler in South Vietnam. The United States and France reached an agreement in Washington on September 29, 1954 to continue to support Diem and to channel military aid directly to his government, rather than through the French government, starting January 1, 1955.¹⁵ This decision required the sects to look to Diem rather than to France for their subsidies. Diem in turn would be propped by United States aid. Almost immediately after the signing of the Washington accords there developed a difference of opinion in Saigon between the United States Ambassador, General J. Lawton Collins, and Colonel Edward C. Lansdale, the American intelligence chief.¹⁶ Ambassador Collins wanted rival nationalist forces to settle by negotiation their differences while Lansdale sought to impose the personal rule of Diem and to destroy sect power, by armed force if need be. Lansdale's view prevailed in Washington and in Saigon, and for the next two years the main energies of the Diem regime were expended to fight or otherwise pacify the sects. However, the sects survived the onslaught to emerge in 1963 as strong as ever at the rice roots level. Their leaders' price for collaboration with the military junta was a monetary subsidy and a voice in national policy making.

A number of political parties developed under the patronage of individual sect chieftains. The two most important parties to identify with the Cao Dai were the Nationalist Restoration Party (Phuc-Quoc-Hoi) and the National Resistance Front (Mat Tran Quoc-Gia Khang-Chien). Neither was incorporated into the formal organization of the sect. Tran Van An, a leader in the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, actually launched the Nationa

¹⁵*New York Times*, September 30, 1954.

¹⁶Analysis by Homer Bigart, *New York Times*, July 25, 1962.

Restoration Party in 1942.¹⁷ His party had the support of Prince Cuong De and it enjoyed the patronage of the Japanese government. Several Cao Dai chieftains joined the party in May 1943 and eventually took over its leadership. General Phuong emerged as leader and dominated the party until 1956 when he was cast aside, his power broken, by Diem.¹⁸ The National Resistance Front, founded by General Trinh Minh The, became a force of national importance in 1955 when its leader allied with Diem. General The affiliated the Front with the People's Revolutionary Committee which professed loyalty to Diem but probably aimed to seize power. However, General The was killed on May 5, 1955 (the government said by a Binh Xuyen sniper), and the Committee was thus deprived of its principal leader. General Van Thanh Cao took control of the Front after The's death and secured for it two posts in the revised Diem cabinet. Diem made General Cao a regional delegate (weak governor) but soon relieved him of his troops. The party was left in the hands of its Secretary General, Nhi Lang, who had been the political adviser to General The. Nhi Lang was quickly discredited as an alleged Communist agent and the party began to decline.

THE POLITICAL ROLE

The Cao Dai evolved in the 1930's as one of several nationalist political forces. After 1947 most but not all Cao Dai leaders supported the creation of a separate Cochinchina state protected by France. Thus the Cao Dai became one of the most valuable political groups to ally with France during the struggle against the Viet Minh. After the 1954 ceasefire and partition France moved quickly to withdraw her army and to turn over to the national government her remaining vestiges of political authority. Several appendages of French power including the Cao dai were necessarily abandoned and left to fend for themselves in the troubled waters of Vietnamese politics. Their political and

¹⁷Tran Van An later became political adviser to the Binh Xuyen and was reported captured in October 1955 during an offensive action by the national army against the Binh Xuyen.

¹⁸He lived in Saigon under surveillance but was permitted to run as an opposition vice-presidential candidate against Nguyen Ngoc Tho in the 1961 presidential election.

military structure, dependent on a territorial base and personal retenués, the sects had no place in the centralized state which Diem attempted to erect.¹⁹ Sect leaders tried to negotiate for political and economic guarantees before relinquishing their armies. Their main demands were recognition of their territorial autonomy, representation in the central government, and the guarantee of financial assistance. But Diem would dicker and sought by force and trickery to suppress the sects in their respective spheres.

Still other factors limited the capacity of the Cao Dai to develop as a national force in independent Vietnam. Most sect leaders built over the years a reputation of duplicity and shifting loyalties that prevented them from building the confidence of others. Pope Pham Cong Tac, for example, deceived friend and foe alike. His leadership weakness did not derive from his many different and seemingly contradictory policies and pacts for these were required to keep pace with a rapidly changing political scene. His flaw was rather that he tried to play several sides simultaneously, and events moved too quickly for this kind of manoeuvring.

Intense internal rivalry was also a barrier to effective participation by the Cao Dai in national politics. Religious leaders promoted the schisms of 1930-1935 in order to direct and exploit their own flocks. These men have since died and their successors have declined to consider a reconciliation with the Tay Ninh sect. Reunification was further complicated by the defection of Cao Trieu Phat, head of the dissident sect at Bac Lieu, to North Vietnam and to the subsequent recognition by the Communist government of his claim to be the legitimate Cao Dai pope. Rivalries in the Cao Dai military ranks have also been great. Although some cooperation among the chieftains who have begun to converge upon Tay Ninh is to be expected, it is doubtful that these men can now take direction of the many small bands which multiplied as a result of Diem's pacification campaigns against the sects.

The excessive sectarianism of its religious leaders and their failure to evolve an ideology that could appeal to the educated

¹⁹Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

class restricted the development of the Cao Dai in urban areas. Although Pope Pham Cong Tac boosted that Caodaism would become the state religion he reacted to national political issues with views that were always narrow and particularistic. Trinh Minh The said he rebelled against the religious leaders when he realized finally that he could never build a "nationalist" movement while tied down to the Caodaism of Tay Ninh. The early leaders expected that the inclusion in the Cao Dai creed of Christian and other western ideas would attract many persons with a modern education. However, Vietnamese intellectuals found the theology to be both artificial and feigned and were generally repelled by its appeal to superstition and mysticism. Trinh Minh The was the only Cao Dai leader to appeal to university students and this was due primarily to his military prowess. The resurgence of Buddhism as a political force in 1963 and its strong appeal to university students are factors which will limit Cao Dai recruitment in the future.

The Cao Dai continued to be a major political force in Tay Ninh and surrounding areas despite its internal dissensions and repression by the national government. Survival was possible only because of the fundamental weakness of national institutions at the rice roots level.²⁰ The breeding ground of the sects in southern Vietnam was developed for settlement agriculture only in the early part of the nineteenth century by means of military colonies. Still today Tay Ninh evinces many characteristics of a frontier province. Trinh Minh The, for example, dominated frontier areas, contiguous to Cambodia, like the Ba Den mountains and the Plain of Reeds which have never been under central control. This frontier-military character of the area helped the Cao Dai to persist at the village level. The affinity of Cao Dai cadres for the local environment led to the decision by the military junta to try to reconstruct the sect as a buffer against Viet Cong Communists. The decision does not augur well for the development of central rule in South Vietnam but neither will it help the Communists who hold at the present juncture more territory and

²⁰A Cao Dai radio station was established at Tay Ninh but its reception was limited largely to several rural towns having electricity. There were also two Cao Dai newspapers, *Thoi Dai* and *Quoc Gia* but their distribution was mainly in Saigon.

control more people in the southern delta than the government. Should the tide of the guerrilla war turn against the Communists then Cao Dai leaders will achieve new glory and perhaps recoup some of their former prestige in the national political arena. This would in turn require the Cao Dai leadership to put some cement in the superior hierarchy of the structure and to integrate newly acquired values with those of their rural environment.

NEW SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS OF
TSARIST COLONIAL POLICIES IN ASIA

by

LOWELL R. TILLET

I

WHEN THE history of colonialism and empire building is related, the Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and Dutch usually receive primary consideration. Seldom mentioned is one of the most intensive feats of territorial expansion among alien peoples in history—that of the Great Russians, who in four hundred years subjugated over a hundred nationalities and merged them into the largest political unit in the world. It has been estimated that from 1552, when Ivan IV stormed Kazan, to the beginning of World War I, Russia expanded at the rate of fifty square miles per day.¹

The main difference between the Russian Empire and other empires is that the territories involved in Russian expansion were contiguous to the homeland. The new lands were usually incorporated into the state without clashes with other colonial powers and without stirring diplomatic capitals or world opinion. But the Russian Empire was unquestionably an empire: its acquisitions were generally made by military conquest and maintained by military garrisons; its institutions and culture were imposed on the annexed areas; the peoples themselves were non-Russian (so much so that the Russians constituted a minority of the population by 1900).

At the time of the Russian Revolution, the minorities problem was a pressing one. Hatred of the tsars had been aggravated by the oppressive policies of the last two Romanovs. During World War I large areas on the western rim of the empire were occupied

¹Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective," *Problems of Communism*, IX, No. 3, 25-34.

by the Central Powers, and there were serious revolts in Central Asia. The centrifugal forces were intensified during the tenure of the Provisional Government, and the Bolsheviks inherited the problem of preventing the immediate disintegration of the empire. Through a variety of methods, including a frequent resort to force, they managed to hold almost all the territory of the former state.

One of the most publicized accomplishments of the Soviets is their "solution" of the nationalities problem. It is claimed that under Soviet leadership a hundred nationalities live in harmony, enjoying equal opportunity, with every encouragement for distinctive development. A recent Soviet statement of the case, written under UNESCO auspices, holds up the Soviet experience as an example to the world, offers it as a proof of the historical correctness of Communism, and suggests that any opinion to the contrary is malicious anti-Soviet propaganda.²

But for a problem which has been solved, the nationality question is receiving an inordinate amount of attention from Soviet leaders. Virtually every major political figure who has been disgraced in recent years has been accused of "bourgeois nationalism" or of "sowing distrust among the peoples." Khrushchev accused the anti-Party group of 1957 of "mistrust of the ability of the peoples of the national republics to cope with statewide tasks."³ All the orators at Stalin's funeral referred to the problem, and all the Party Congresses since the war have featured speakers from the national minorities who have expressed their gratitude to the Russian people and have sung the praises of the "eternal friendship of peoples." The hundreds of books and articles on the subject strongly suggest that the Party still finds it necessary to do much persuading in this field.

One of the major ideological weapons used by the Party to prove the solidarity of the Russian and non-Russian peoples has been the extensive revision of history. Since the middle 1930's the Russians have been reinterpreting their history in order to create a new Soviet patriotism and to educate their people to the correct-

²I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin, *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR* (Paris: UNESCO, 1962).

³Alfred D. Low, "Patriotism, 'Bourgeois Nationalism' and the Nationality Policy of the USSR after Stalin," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy*, IX (1961), 126-146.

ness of current policies. Many of the former villains of Russian history—tsars, generals and statesmen—have been found to be “progressive” in the context of their times. But because of Marx’ popular dictum that the Russian Empire was a “prison of peoples” and the strong Communist position against colonialism and imperialism, tsarist conquests remained black historical deeds in the Soviet view for a long time. Indeed, Soviet histories stated that the subject peoples of Asia were under a “double oppression” as a result of their incorporation into the Russian Empire—a “national-colonial oppression” and a “feudal oppression” under the native upper classes which cooperated with the tsarist conquerors. The resistance efforts of these peoples to tsarist conquest were typed as “national liberation” movements which failed only because of the overwhelming superiority of numbers of the conqueror. Leaders of these ill-fated movements were considered heroes and martyrs.

The road to the rehabilitation of tsarist colonialism was opened in Stalin’s commentary “Concerning Engels’ Article ‘The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism,’” in which it was argued that Engels, writing in 1890, had been short-sighted in naming Russia as “the last bastion of European reaction.” Such a designation, Stalin argued, belonged to the imperialist powers of Western Europe. Engels’ contention that Russian colonialism was a major cause of World War I was also said to be in error.⁴

During and immediately after World War II the Party promoted the concept of the “friendship of peoples” of the Soviet Union, an idea which minimized national differences and former conflicts and helped to build a multi-national Soviet patriotism. This concept was given official support in the 1948 Central Committee resolution on Muradeli’s opera *The Great Friendship*. The opera dealt with relations between the peoples of the North Caucasus and the Russians at the time of the formation of the USSR. The composer had cast some of the Caucasian peoples as friendly to the Russians, approving the new federation, and others, who opposed the move, as “counter-revolutionary.” His error, according to the resolution, was that he did not make friendship

⁴I. Stalin, “O state Engelsia ‘Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsarizma,’” *Bolshevik*, 1941, No. 9, 1-5 (originally a letter to the Politburo dated July 19, 1934).

general enough. The opera was condemned for popularizing an historical falsehood. The only peoples of the Caucasus who had been guilty of hindering the formation of the USSR were the Chechens and the Ingushi—groups which had been subjected to mass deportation during World War II.⁵

Under Party guidance, Soviet historians in the next few years were to revise many tenets of their own scholarship concerning tsarist colonialism. They found friendship and cooperation with the Russians where they had formerly found bitter conflict; they discovered cases of "voluntary union" with Russians instead of con-discovered cases of "voluntary union" with Russians instead of con-quest; they found that the greatest heroes of the resistance movements against tsarism were actually hirelings of British imperialists; and without exception they came to interpret Russian annexation of territories as historically progressive events.

II

The revision was by no means an easy one, but was characterized by zigzags, with historians from the national areas holding out for the old interpretations. The earliest attempts at revision were made in the history of Kazakhstan, whose people were proud of the long and determined resistance they had made against incorporation into the Russian Empire under the banner of one of the most popular national leaders, Khan Kenesary Kasimov. All the early Soviet histories of the Kazakhs had had high praise for these resistance movements. In 1943 this interpretation was upheld in the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.*, published by the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnology of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and co-edited by one of the most respected Party historians, A. M. Pankratova. However, the book was severely criticized in *Bolshevik*, because the authors had considered the history of the Kazakh people exclusively as "a process of forming militant traditions" and the Kazakhs' struggle for their independence, having forgotten "productive forces and the development of classes." The glorification of the Kazakh leader was also

⁵*Vstupitelnaia rechi vystupleniia na soveshchanii deiatelei sovetskoi muzyki v TSK VKP (b) v ianvare 1948 g* [Introductory speech and address at a meeting of Soviet musicians in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in January, 1948] (Moscow, 1952).

deplored, and it was pointed out that he was actually a member of the exploiting landlord class.⁶ But in 1947 E. Bekmakhanov, a distinguished Kazakh historian, published his *Kazakhstan, 1820-1840*, in which he glorified Khan Kenesary even more:

The insurrection of Kenesary, with its clearly anti-colonial character, played a progressive role in the history of the Kazakh people. . . . This movement became an excellent school for the education of the masses.⁷

Bekmakhanov's volume not only invoked Party rebuke, it was made the object of a public debate organized by the Kazakh Institute of History in 1948. A large number of historians and Party intelligentsia engaged in the debate. A majority condemned the author, but he won the support of a sizable minority. According to later Party criticism, he had among his supporters some of the most distinguished Soviet historians.⁸ In 1949 the second edition of the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.*, also co-edited by Pankratova, met some of the Party demands, but continued to idealize Khan Kenesary by pronouncing his movement progressive "according to the political demands which Kenesary put forward."⁹ The history journal *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), which published an article condemning these volumes, was itself taken to task by *Pravda* for the half-heartedness of its tone.¹⁰

During the same years, some effort was made to revise the history of tsarist colonialism in the Caucasus, but with even less success. The most celebrated of all the "national liberation" leaders against the tsars had been Shamil, the fiery leader of the Murids, a fanatical sect of Muslims. For twenty-five years, from 1834 to 1859, Shamil had held down Russian armies far outnumbering his own, and built such a reputation that he was treated with special respect after his capture. In early Soviet histories Shamil had

⁶*Bolshevik*, 1945, No. 6, 74-80. For a detailed account see Serge A. Zenkovsky, "Ideological Deviation in Soviet Central Asia," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXII (1953), 424-437.

⁷E. Bekmakhanov, *Kazakhstan v 20-40 godakh 190 go veka* (Alma Ata, 1947), 360.

⁸*Voprosy Istorii*, 1949, No. 4, 114.

⁹*Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*, ed. I. O. Omarov and A. M. Pankratova (Alma Ata, 1949), I, 296.

¹⁰*Pravda*, December 26, 1950.

been a star of first magnitude. Even the briefest popular histories contained his picture, along with accounts of his outstanding courage and leadership. But in 1947 this thesis was challenged in the course of a discussion of the Muridist movement held by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. Kh. G. Adzhemian read a paper on Shamil, in which he declared that the long-established and respected interpretation of Shamil's movement was naive, one-sided and erroneous. He condemned the Murid leader because he had headed a reactionary religious sect and had received help from Britain and Turkey. Muridism was not an anti-feudal movement, because the Caucasus at that time was not in a feudal stage, but in a patriarchal-tribal stage. And Shamil, declared Adzhemian, was not a leader of the people but a representative of the exploiting patriarchal class. The Russian Empire, he asserted was not to be condemned for the annexation of the Caucasus because it had brought these people the "first gleam of civilization undertaking their well-being, opening the road for Dagestan to broad European development." Since Shamil had led the opposition to annexation, his movement must be characterized as reactionary. As for the much quoted passages favoring Shamil in the writings of Marx and Engels, Adzhemian dared to state that they had been deluded by the British press, which had an anti-Russian bias.

Unlike the situation in the public debate on Khan Kenesary, the champion of revision at this session found himself along Adzhemian's colleagues resoundingly refuted his thesis, accused him of idealizing tsarist colonial policies, and questioned many of his facts. In concluding the discussion the president of the Institute of History, N. M. Druzhinin, declared that Adzhemian's arguments had not changed the general view that Shamil's movement was progressive. "The speaker," he said, "gave no criticism of the sources and showed no acquaintance with many factual materials."¹¹

If Adzhemian's paper had been intended as a Party warning against hero worship of national minority leaders, it went unheeded

¹¹ "Diskussia o dvizhenii Shamilia" [Discussion on the movement of Shamil], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1947, No. 11, 134-40. For a detailed discussion of the Shamil question see Lowell R. Tillett, "Shamil and Muridism in Recent Soviet Historiography," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XX (1961), 253-69.

History textbooks published during the next two years made no change in their interpretation of Shamil,¹² and in 1949 two scholars from Shamil's area published monographs which carried his praise to new heights. *On the Movement of Shamil* appeared to give the glorification of Shamil an official vote of confidence, since its author, R. M. Magomedov, was vice-chariman of the Dagestan branch of the Academy of Sciences. And G. Guseinov's celebrated volume, *From the History of Social and Political Thought in Azerbaidzhan in the Nineteenth Century*, made Shamil a great democrat and progressive leader, "a hero and creator of heroes." Muridism was considered to be a logical protest against tsarism in the historical context of the Caucasus at that time.¹³ The book received excellent reviews and was nominated for a Stalin Prize—a prize which its author was never to receive.

It was apparently the publication of Guseinov's book, its favorable reception and nomination for the Stalin Prize which convinced Party leaders that they must leave off their scholarly admonitions and institute a crackdown in the style of the recent *Zhdanovshchina*. The tipoff came in an announcement, published in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on May 14, 1950, that the Committee on Stalin Prizes had "acknowledged as erroneous" its earlier decision to nominate the book for the prize and had petitioned the Council of Ministers [!] to ask that the nomination be withdrawn. The article went on to state that Guseinov's book "radically distorts the real meaning of this movement, which was reactionary and nationalistic and which was in the service of British capitalism and the Turkish Sultan." Two days later the newspapers announced tersely that the petition had been granted. The argument used to rob Guseinov of his Stalin Prize was that made by Adzhemian in his paper three years earlier.

The chief spokesman for the new line was M. D. Bagirov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party and a close associate of Beria. Writing in *Bolshevik*, he attacked Guseinov's work in unusually harsh terms. He declared

¹²For example, see M. N. Tikhomirov and S. S. Dmitriev, *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow, 1948), I, 373-74; *Istoriia SSSR*, ed. A. M. Pankratova (Moscow, 1948), II, 174-76.

¹³G. Guseinov, *Iz istorii obshchestvennoi i filosofskoi mysli v Azerbaidzhane v XIX veka* (Baku, 1949).

that "Shamil was from the beginning, like his predecessors, closely linked with Turkey and acted in her interests." He was not a leader of the people, but represented the "reactionary Muslim leaders and the feudal tribal aristocracy" who had chosen him as leader. His movement, therefore, was against the interests of the common people. Annexation of the peoples of the Caucasus was "the only possible path for the development of their economy and culture"; annexation was "a spur to the development of the revolutionary movement of the peoples of the Caucasus; by annexation they "obtained protection from external enemies." Guseinov was labelled a "bourgeois nationalist" and a number of editors and historians were reprimanded by name for their lack of vigilance.¹⁴

The article brought quick results. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, which had published a favorable review of the work now apologized and joined in the denunciation of "Guseinov's vicious book."¹⁵ Conferences were held to discuss Bagirov's article at Baku and at Makhachkala in Dagestan.¹⁶ The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences passed a sweeping resolution reprimanding several historians, relieving Magomedov of his position of vice-chairman of the Dagestan Branch of the Academy, and calling on his organization to hold a conference "devoted to the exposure of the reactionary nationalist nature of the Muridist movement and Shamil." The resolution assured dissemination of the new line by requesting that several other conferences be held on Bagirov's article, by requesting *Voprosy Istorii* to publish a series of articles on "the reactionary role of the Muridist movement and Shamil" (the next three consecutive issues carried such an article), and by appropriating 150,000 rubles for the publication of a new history of Dagestan.¹⁷

Meanwhile the Party was renewing its fight with the historians of Central Asia. In December 1950 *Pravda* published a long article,

¹⁴M. D. Bagirov, "K voprosu o kharaktere dvizheniia Muridizma i Shamilia," [On the question of the character of the Muridist movement and Shamil] *Bolshevik*, 1950, No. 13, 21-37.

¹⁵Review in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, March 22, 1950; apology *ibid.*, July 27, 1950.

¹⁶*Pravda*, July 18, 1950.

¹⁷*Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Otdelenie literatury i iazyka* [Journal of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Division of literature and language], 1950, No. 3, 245-46. Translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, II, No. 48, 13-14.

similar in tone to that of Bagirov, on a half dozen histories of the Central Asian republics, reserving its sharpest criticism for Bekmakhanov, who had not yet made redress for his *Kazakhstan, 1820-1840*. *Pravda* charged that Bekmakhanov's book had done great harm by continuing to idealize the movement of Khan Kenesary, who "desired to obtain power for himself" and to strengthen feudal institutions. The uprising he had taken over had originally been a revolt of the masses (and therefore progressive) but he had made it reactionary. "The Kazakh working people were vitally interested in the annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia. The rebellion of the Kasimovs, by retarding annexation, was contrary to the hopes of the advanced part of Kazakh society." Corrections of Bekmakhanov's outmoded thesis were long overdue, *Pravda* asserted. It was time for historians to close ranks behind the new Marxist-Leninist interpretation.¹⁸

But the notice of official displeasure had come too late. The Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Republic had sponsored a new history of their country which was to replace several works of the last decade, all of which contained the condemned theories. The new two volume *History of the Kazakh Republic from Ancient Times to Our Day* had been rushed to press in 1949 and 1950. Extensive revisions had been made, mainly in the direction of establishing historic ties of friendship between Kazakhs and Russians, and of emphasizing the "progressiveness of annexation." But the authors, described in a review as "a young collective of Kazakh historians," could not bring themselves to a complete denunciation of their main national hero. Although they detailed the seamy side of Khan Kenesary's activities—his brutal raids, his heavy taxes, his relations with other feudal leaders—they interpreted his movement as a progressive one. For this "error" the work was denounced by reviewers, who had been warned by the *Pravda* article that such views could not be tolerated.¹⁹

Early in 1951 the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party discussed the matter and passed a resolution declaring that the criticism was fully justified. Their

¹⁸*Pravda*, December 26, 1950. Translation in *Current Digest*, II, No. 52, 14-16.

¹⁹Review in *Sovetskaia Kniga* [Soviet Books], 1951, No. 2, 80-85. Translation in *Current Digest*, III, No. 17, 11-12.

admission of guilt, however, carried a note of recrimination against the Moscow authorities: "responsibility for the errors . . . also lies with the History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which did not provide a prompt and correct evaluation of the book *Kazakhstan, 1820-1840*."²⁰ A few months later *Voprosy Istorii* dealt Kasimov the *coup de grace* in an article which branded him "a typical example of the feudal beast of prey, a cruel exploiter and plunderer."²¹

Other former "national liberation" heroes were suffering the fate of Shamil and Kenesary. Ormon-Khan of Kirgizia, Shammi-Kel of Turkmenistan, and a number of others were denounced as leaders of reactionary movements. The question was of such importance to the Party that it was discussed in the speeches of the Nineteenth Party Congress, where both Shamil and Kenesary were denounced.²² Large conferences of historians were called to discuss these questions, and new textbooks were planned. In their thoroughness, Party authorities carried the battle against "bourgeois nationalism" to the museums, where art objects were removed, and into literature, by condemning dozens of national epics, whose heroes were reduced to brigands and reactionaries.²³

Soviet historians attempted to give the apparent contradictions of the new line a more solid theoretical footing. They claimed that they had subjected their data to a new "scientific Marxist-Leninist" analysis, which explained the new conclusions, so frequently sharply opposed to their older ones. Two far fetched formulas were applied to the question. One was the concept of the "elder brother," which holds that the Great Russians had pioneered the path to socialism, and had rendered a great service to the other peoples by helping them avoid the perils of domination of "imperialist" powers (Britain or Turkey) and by leading them to the current felicitous state in the multi-national Soviet family.

²⁰*Pravda*, April 25, 1951.

²¹"O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii narodov Srednei Azii" (unsigned) [On certain questions of the history of the peoples of Central Asia], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 4, 3-15. Quotation is on page 9.

²²G. A. Von Stackelburg, "The Twentieth Party Congress and the Soviet Evaluation of Historical Figures," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, IV, No. 6, 30-39.

²³Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (London, 1953), 223.

The idea had been given official approval in an article by Bagirov titled "Elder Brother in the Family of Soviet Peoples," in which he had asserted that the overwhelming majority of the common people of the Caucasus looked to the Russians as liberators from Turkish threats. Contacts with the Russians brought these people many benefits: stable government, increased trade and production, an introduction to a higher culture. It was, therefore, a progressive event for the subject peoples.²⁴

The other formula was "the lesser evil," which had been devised by Party historians in 1937 as a means of supporting Stalin's new emphasis on the Soviet Motherland. One feature of this burgeoning patriotism, which ran counter to earlier internationalist themes, was the solidarity of the multi-national Soviet state. But it was difficult to reconcile the picture of the friendly multi-national society, unanimous in its support of the Party, with historical accounts of the savage and prolonged fighting which preceded the formation of this happy family. The "lesser evil" formula was to be the *deus ex machina* which would explain the apparent contradiction. The term first appeared in a critique of a history of Georgia. A committee of experts, under Party prodding, examined the book and declared that

Georgia's passing under the protectorate of Russia ... is regarded by the authors as an absolute evil, without regard for the concrete historical circumstances of those times. The authors do not see that Georgia was at that time confronted by the alternative of either being swallowed up by the Shah of Persia and the Sultan of Turkey or of coming under Russian protectorate. They do not see that the second alternative was nevertheless the lesser evil.²⁵

According to this dialectical scheme, the evils of tsarism, while not denied, were subordinated to the long range positive consequences of tsarist policies. This formula had been applied

²⁴M. D. Bagirov, "Starshii brat v seme sovetskikh narodov" [The elder brother in the family of Soviet peoples], *Kommunist*, XXIX, No. 3, 64-68.

²⁵M. Nechkina, "K voprosu o formule 'naimenshee zlo'" [On the question of the "Lesser Evil" formula], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 4, 44-48. For a fuller discussion of the "Lesser Evil" formula, see Konstantin F. Shtepa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1962), Chapter 11.

(though not in name) to the Shamil issue in an article by A. Daniialov in 1950. He called on historians not to do away with the "well known concept of Russia as the prison of peoples," but at the same time declared, "it must be remembered that Dagestan's annexation to Russia was a great blessing for our peoples, because the peoples of Dagestan, in spite of tsarism and its colonial policy, joined the great advanced Russian culture, the Russian culture, the Russian revolutionary movement."²⁶

A spirited discussion of the application of the "lesser evil" formula was initiated by M. Nechkina in a letter to *Voprosy Istorii* in 1951. She asked her colleagues to give primary attention to the peoples in question, aside from governments and leaders. These peoples, including the Great Russians, were engaged "in the struggle against the common enemy, tsarism," and out of this struggle eventually came "a brotherhood of peoples based . . . on the construction of a new socialist society." This was accomplished "under the leadership of their elder brother—the Russian people."²⁷

For eighteen months after the publication of this letter, Soviet historians discussed the "lesser evil" formula, relating it to many peoples and situations. The following excerpt from a resolution adopted by historians at a symposium in 1951 illustrates the application to Central Asia:

The conquest of the Central Asian Khanates by Russia, in spite of the cruelties of the colonial yoke imposed by tsarism, had for the peoples of these Khanates an objective and progressive significance. This significance has to be considered in the light of a comparison with the hard circumstances in which those people had lived previously; and also in the light of the lot which would have awaited them in the event of the establishment in Central Asia of British or German imperialism, or their pan-Islamic agents.²⁸

²⁶A. Daniialov, "Ob izvrashcheniakh v osveshchenii miuridizma i dvizheniia Shamilia" [On distortions in the interpretation of Muridism and the movement of Shamil], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1950, No. 9, 3-18. Quotation is on page 14.

²⁷M. Nechkina, *loc. cit.*

²⁸*Central Asian Review*, 1953, No. 3, 2.

But Party leaders preferred a "no evil" or "absolute good" formula, and *Voprosy Istorii* was rebuked by Bagirov at the Nineteenth Party Congress (October, 1952) for having "concocted a pointless, abstract discussion of the so-called 'lesser evil' formula . . . instead of a presentation of the full progressive and fruitful nature of Russia's annexation of non-Russian peoples based on numerous historical data, archive materials and documents."²⁹ This statement brought prompt apologies from Nechkina and the journal.³⁰

Now that the "lesser evil" had been condemned, the "elder brother," which had no negative ramifications, was employed more widely. Obsequious articles and speeches from the national leaders thanked the Great Russians for services rendered. Historians re-examined their materials and discovered that the warfare between tsarist armies and the border peoples had not been nearly so extensive or cruel as had been supposed earlier. Bagirov insisted that terms like "conquest" and "subjugation" be eliminated from the histories of Siberia, on the ground that these terms had been borrowed from "the vocabulary of bourgeois historiography."³¹ In many cases historians came to the view that the border peoples had voluntarily come under the wing of the Russian double eagle. Thus a Kazakh historian asserted that

the Kazakh steppes were not conquered by the Russian state, and the incorporation of the . . . Kazakh Hordes was carried out by their own free will. In the second place, the union of the Lesser Horde with the Russian Empire did not involve the restriction of its territory or of its nomadic practices. The isolated punitive expeditions carried out by the Russian frontier troops in reply to marauding expeditions of Kazakh batyrs, in the course of which many innocent Kazakh villages also suffered, cannot be regarded as a general campaign of conquest . . .

The writer went on to reject the contention of an earlier historian that the Russian government fortified its frontiers with the object

²⁹*Pravda*, October 7, 1952.

³⁰*Voprosy Istorii*, 1952, No. 8, 4; No. 11, 152.

³¹*Central Asian Review*, 1953, No. 2, 47.

of conquering the Kazakhs. Such a contention, he stated, "is too one-sided and therefore incorrect The Russian construction of military forts was progressive, designed to bring order to the area." The inhabitants, who had been impoverished by the internecine feuds of the local chieftains, "approached the Russian fortified line in search of protection and because they were attracted by the prospect of a more stable existence."³²

The next edition of the *History of the USSR*, whose main editor was Nechkina, contained none of the passages of earlier editions relating to tsarist brutalities in border warfare. It even contended that in Central Asia the expropriation of land by tsarist forces was beneficial, since it showed the natives the superiority of a non-nomadic way of life.³³

Another interesting feature of the revision was the "rehabilitation" of a number of Russian generals, formerly known as "tsarist satraps," who now became benevolent administrators, even civilizers. Witness these two accounts of the activities of General Ermolov, the "proconcul of the Caucasus" after 1816, in successive editions of Pankratova's textbook for the ninth grade. The 1947 edition stated that Ermolov "applied military and administrative measures of a very drastic nature," that he built fortifications "with such awe-inspiring names as 'the Dread' and 'Wicked Trench,'" that he forced the mountaineers into submission "by means of arms and hunger." The 1953 edition omits all these passages and substitutes the following:

In the areas occupied by Russian soldiers, Ermolov brought about economic improvements, in particular the development of the silk industry, and promoted the extension of instruction, opening schools for the local population. He attempted to regulate land relationships

³²S. E. Tolybekov, "O reaktsionnoi borbe kazakhskikh sultanov i batyrov mladshevo zhuza protiv dobrovolnogo prisoedineniia k Rossii" [On the reactionary struggle of the Kazakh sultans and batyrs of the small horde against voluntary union with Russia, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk Kazakh SSR* [Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR], 1955, No. 6 43-59. Partial translation in *Central Asian Review*, 1955, No. 4, 270-71

³³*Istoriia SSSR* [History of the USSR, ed. M. V. Nechkina, third edition Moskva, 1955] II, 556.

between local feudal lords and the peasants. On pain of the death penalty it was forbidden to sell people into slavery.³⁴

In their new research, the historians also found numerous examples of another of Bagirov's favorite themes: the unshakeable friendship of the peoples before and during the period of the formation of the Russian Empire. One writer declared that

the annexation of the lands of the Transcaucasus to Russia took place not only through the efforts of the Russian army, but also with the active participation of the Caucasian peoples themselves, whose representatives in the ranks of the Russian army fought courageously against their age old enemies, the Persian and Turkish invaders.³⁵

A revised history of Kazakhstan stated that the participation of some Kazakhs in Pugachev's rebellion in the 1770's "was the first common action of the Kazakh and Russian peoples against the despotic and serf owning regime In the course of this long and difficult struggle national hostility gradually vanished and a sense of the common historical destiny of the two nations germinated." The same history declared that the Kazakhs, in their border warfare with the Russians, "confined their attacks to the Russian posts and military personnel and left the peaceful Russian peasants alone."³⁶

The friendly ties of the peoples were also found to be of long standing. Trade relations between the Uzbeks and the Slavs were traced back to the seventh century A.D., and the ancient state of Khorezm was said to have traded with areas north of the Black Sea in the fourth century B.C.³⁷

³⁴*Istoriia SSSR*, ed. A. M. Pankratova (Moscow, 1947), II, 171; *ibid.*, 1953 edition, 172-73.

³⁵M. Mustafaiev, "O formule 'naimenshee zlo'" [On the "lesser evil" formula], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 9, 97-101. Translation in *Current Digest*, III, No. 50, 11.

³⁶*Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR* [History of the Kazakh SSR] (Alma Ata, 1957), I, 177, 274.

³⁷*Central Asian Review*, 1954, No. 1, 308.

III

For two years after Stalin's death, Soviet historians were comparatively quiet on tsarist colonialism. Two scheduled conferences on Central Asian history were held at Frunze (1953) and Tashkent (1954), at which much attention was given to the role of Britain and Turkey in the resistance movements and to a detailed study of the revolts of 1916 in the area.³⁸ Histories published in these years carried the revised views, but there was no outpouring of articles and editorials on the subject as there had been in the early 1950's. Undoubtedly one reason for lagging enthusiasm for these themes was that their main champion, M. D. Bagirov, had been arrested as an associate of Beria, and was eventually executed in the spring of 1956.

The beginnings of a moderation of views can be detected in an article on Shamil's movement published in the middle of 1955 by A. V. Fadeev, who changed some of his own views of 1951 about the role of Turkey and Britain as Shamil's backers. He also denounced a volume of documents, *Shamil—Henchman of Turkish and British Colonizers*, which had been published just two years earlier. He avoided characterizing Shamil or his movement in detail, but did maintain that the annexation of the Caucasus was progressive, in spite of the brutality of the tsarist conquest.³⁹

Shamil was discussed further at the conference of readers of *Voprosy Istorii* in January, 1956, on the eve of the Twentieth Party Congress. E. N. Burdzhakov, deputy editor of the journal, stated that Soviet historians had tremendous tasks ahead in setting right the falsifications and distortions of the last few years. He used Shamil as a case in point, and put the blame on the fallen Bagirov. The most outspoken critic of the Bagirov school was a middle school teacher, A. M. Pikman, who told the conference that documents had been falsified and the writings of Marx and Engels

³⁸*Materialy obedinennoi nauchnoi sessii, posviashchennoi istorii Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana v dooktiabrskii period* [Materials of a general scientific session, devoted to the history of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the pre-revolutionary period] (Tashkent, 1955).

³⁹A. K. Fadeev, "O vnutrennei socialnoi baze miuridistskogo dvizheniia na Kavkaze v. XIX veke" [On the internal social basis of the Muridist movement in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1955, No. 6, 66-77.

had been distorted in order to impose a false view of Shamil's movement on Soviet historians. He denounced a number of compliant historians by name, and charged that opposing views had been denied space in journals for the last six years.⁴⁰

At the Twentieth Party Congress the question of historical writing was discussed by a number of speakers, including Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Pankratova confessed many errors of her colleagues to the Congress. Among other things, she declared that "our textbooks and histories of individual peoples devote almost no attention to exposing the national-colonial oppression of tsarist autocracy, while stressing quite correctly the progressive significance of the incorporation of these peoples into Russia."⁴¹ In view of the many denunciations of the "cult of personality," culminating with Khrushchev's secret speech against Stalin (which included specific charges about Stalin's suspicions and brutality in nationality policy), the road seemed to be cleared for Soviet historians to correct all the distortions of the Stalin era. And this the editors of *Voprosy Istorii* set out to do.

The next issue of the journal gave Pikman an opportunity to elaborate the views he had expressed on Shamil at the readers' conference. He declared that Shamil's government was essentially democratic, and that he had received no direct aid from Britain or Turkey. He insisted that the resistance was a national liberation movement. If anyone doubted that it was an uprising of the masses, he should consider the number of tsarist troops used to put it down. He omitted any reference to the progressiveness of the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia—a lapse which the editors tried to remedy in a footnote stating that "the progressive consequences of the annexation . . . are evident."⁴²

That summer *Voprosy Istorii* published an article by G. D. Daniialov, a historian from Dagestan, which virtually returned Shamil to his 1949 status. Shamil's movement was again pro-

⁴⁰"Konferentsiia chitatelei zhurnala *Voprosy Istorii*" [Conference of readers of the journal *Questions of History*], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 2, 199-213.

⁴¹*Pravda*, February 22, 1956. Translated in *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 12, 911.

⁴²A. M. Pikman, "O borbe kavkazskikh gortsev s tsarskimi kolonizatorami" [On the struggle of the Caucasian mountain people with tsarist colonizers], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 3, 75-84.

nounced progressive without qualification. He did not draw his support from the feudal lords, but from the masses, and there were no documents to indicate that he received aid from Britain or Turkey. Like Pikman, Daniialov declined to comment on the progressive nature of annexation.⁴³

During 1956 Soviet historians engaged in more controversial debates and expressed a greater variety of opinions than at any time since the late 1920's. The unsettled state of Soviet historiography can be demonstrated by a number of developments relating to the history of tsarist colonialism. In April the history faculty of the University of Moscow held a conference at which there were sharp exchanges about the tasks of historians after the Twentieth Party Congress. Some defended Pikman; others spoke about his "flippant and dogmatic" revision. There was an admission that documents had been falsified and that tsarist colonialism had been idealized, but no agreement about how far the revision of the former line should go.⁴⁴

That fall Soviet schools opened with old textbooks and new interpretations. A pamphlet was hurriedly prepared as a guide to teachers. They were cautioned not to use certain sections of the textbooks, and even to avoid the use of some maps. The brutalities of tsarist colonialism were not to be soft-pedalled, but at the same time annexations of territories must be considered progressive. Shamil was to be characterized as a "gifted ruler, warrior, and military leader," but also as a "representative of the feudal ruling class" who was "inconsistent" in his fight for independence.⁴⁵

Two conferences on the Shamil movement were held in the fall of 1956 at Makhachkala and Moscow. The views of Pikman and G. D. Daniialov were stoutly defended by some and denounced by others. It is possible to detect in the reports of these meetings a defense of nationalist interests by historians from the Caucasus

⁴³G. D. Daniialov, "O dvizhenii gortsev pod rukovodstvom Shamilia" [On the movement of mountain peoples under the leadership of Shamil], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 7, 67-72. Condensed translation in *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 40, 3-5.

⁴⁴*Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seria obshchestvennykh nauk* [Bulletin of Moscow University. Social sciences series], 1956, No. 4, 143-150.

⁴⁵Quoted in *Uchitelskaia Gazeta* [Teachers Gazette], September 22, 1956. Translation in *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 38, 3-6.

and a go-slow attitude by the Russian participants. The thesis of the British-Turkish alliance with Shamil had only one defender (Adzhemian), and there seemed to be general agreement that the movement had popular support. But they did not agree on the essential character of Shamil or his movement.⁴⁶

The Dagestan Party Bureau felt sufficiently assured about the rehabilitation of Shamil that it passed a new resolution revoking its 1950 decree on Shamil. The resolution called for new research on the mountain peoples' "struggle for independence and freedom" and ordered libraries and museums to restore to public use their materials on the subject.⁴⁷

But even as these events were taking place, a retrograde motion inspired by the Party was discernible. As early as July, 1956, E. Bugaev condemned *Voprosy Istorii* for the rash viewpoints of its editors, for its "unsubstantiated and peremptory assertions."⁴⁸ In August another readers' conference of the journal was held, and the press reports were very hostile to the views expressed by E. N. Burdzhhalov, the editor who was chiefly responsible for the journal's new policy.⁴⁹ In the next few months *Voprosy Istorii* carried two further articles on the Shamil movement, both indicating that the Bagirov thesis was not dead. They returned to the anti-popular character of the movement and to the British-Turkish ties. Both articles declared annexation to be progressive.⁵⁰

⁴⁶*O dvizhenii gortsev pod rukovodstvom Shamilia. Materialy sessii dagestanskogo filiala akademii nauk SSSR, 4-7 oktiabr, 1956 goda* [On the movement of the mountain peoples under the leadership of Shamil. Materials of a session of the Dagestan branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, October 4-7, 1956] (Makhachkala, 1957). The Moscow Conference is reported in *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 12, 191-98.

⁴⁷"K diskussii o kharaktere dvizheniia gortsev Dagestana pod rukovodstvom Shamilia" [From a discussion on the character of the mountain peoples' movement under the leadership of Shamil], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1957, No. 1, 195-96. Translation in *Current Digest*, IX, No. 16, 33-34.

⁴⁸E. Bugaev, "Kogda utrachivaetsia nauchnyi podkhod" [When the scientific viewpoint is lost], *Partiinaia Zhizn* [Party Life], 1956, No. 14, 62-72. Translation in *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 41, 16-19.

⁴⁹*Leningradskaa Pravda*, August 5, 1956. Translation in *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 39, 5-7.

⁵⁰S. K. Bushuev, "O kavkazskom miuridizme" [On Caucasian Muridism], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 12, 72-79 and M. V. Pokrovskii, "O kharaktere dvizheniia gortsev zapadnogo Kavkaza v 40-60kh godakh XIX veka" [On the character of the movement of the mountain peoples of the western Caucasus from the 1840's to the 1860's], *ibid.*, 1957, No. 2, 62-74.

The period of indecision ended with the publication of a sharp rebuke of *Voprosy Istorii* in *Kommunist* in March, 1957. The Party organ specifically condemned Pikman's article, declaring that "It is clamorous in tone, weak in argumentation, and ignores the attained level of scientific knowledge." Pikman was denounced for representing Shamil as a democrat, for denying the role of Britain and Turkey, and for not mentioning that annexation was progressive.⁵¹ Shortly after the appearance of this article, the editorial board of the journal was purged and the new editors condemned their predecessors in a long lead editorial. The new editors declared that "the publication of Pikman's article was totally unjustified. . . The underlying theme of this article is a veiled denial of the progressive nature of the unification of the Caucasus with Russia."⁵²

Voprosy Istorii fell silent on the Shamil question after the purge of its editors (one article on the subject appeared during the next three years), but the historians of Dagestan, backed up by a directive from their Party Bureau, continued to keep the issue alive. They published two editions of the proceedings of the Makhachkala Conference of October 1956, at which they had been outspoken, while the Moscow Conference held the following month seems to have been reported only in summary. In 1957 they brought out a history of Dagestan which left Shamil in the role of a hero leading an independence movement, without direct aid from Britain or Turkey.⁵³ In 1958 G. Guseinov was posthumously vindicated (he had committed suicide after Bagirov's threats)⁵⁴ with the publication of a second printing of his book which had been denied the Stalin prize.⁵⁵ In 1959 the Dagestan Academy of Sciences

⁵¹"Strogo Sobliudat leninskii princip partiinosti v istoricheskoi nauke" [Strictly observe Leninist principles of party loyalty in historical science], *Kommunist*, 1957, No. 4, 17-29.

⁵²"Za leninskuiu partiinost v istoricheskoi nauke" [For Leninist party loyalty in historical science], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1957, No. 3, 3-19.

⁵³*Ocherki istorii Dagestana* [Outlines of the History of Dagestan] (Makhachkala, 1957).

⁵⁴*Central Asian Review*, 1962, No. 2, 127.

⁵⁵G. Guseinov, *Iz istorii obshchestvennoi i filosofskoi mysli v Azerbaidzhane v XIX veka* (Baku, 1958). The two editions of the book were eventually reviewed by A. V. Fadeev in *Voprosy Istorii*, 1963, No. 1, 121-30. The reviewer exonerated Guseinov of ideological deviation and claimed that he had been the victim of the same cult of personality which eventually destroyed him. Guseinov was praised for his presentation of the progressive consequences of annexation and his emphasis on contacts between Azerbaijani and Russian intellectuals but was criticized for idealizing Shamil.

published a volume of documents on Shamil as a sequel to the Tiflis documents of 1953, which had made Shamil the henchman of foreign imperialists. The principal editor was G. D. Daniialov, and the preface defended the movement as a fight for independence, although in the cloak of a reactionary religious movement.⁵⁶

Central Asian historians did not go so far toward revision as their Caucasian colleagues, however there are ample indications that such a development was under way but was nipped in the bud. The same issue of *Voprosy Istorii* which contained Pikman's article on Shamil also carried a revised view of progress in Central Asia before the arrival of the Russians. According to O. D. Chekhovich, the current view that the Russians had found a decadent and chaotic society in Central Asia was incorrect. He maintained that internecine fighting was already on the decrease, that the khanates were consolidating, and that the building of canals and new towns and the increase of trade all indicated that Central Asia was making progress before annexation to Russia.⁵⁷ The reviewer of a book on a Central Asian poet took the author to task for including a chapter on the significance to annexation, which he said was superfluous, and for attributing the poet's views too much to "outside influences."⁵⁸ At the first Congress of Uzbekistan Intelligentsia in October, 1956, N. A. Mukhitdinov, First Secretary of the Uzbek Party Central Committee, recalled at length the greatness of Central Asian writers and scholars before the Russians came (a theme counter to the Bagirov thesis) and reminded those historians who had attempted to refute the national liberation character of the nineteenth century movements that "the entire history of Central Asian peoples has been saturated with their struggle for freedom and independence."⁵⁹ But these ideas were

⁵⁶*Dvizhenie gortsev severo-vostochnogo kavkaza v 20-50 gg. XIX veka. Sbornik dokumentov* [The movement of the mountain peoples of the northeast Caucasus from the 1820's to the 1850's. Collection of documents], (Makhachkala, 1959).

⁵⁷O. D. Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii srednei Azii XVIII-XIX vekov" [On certain questions of the history of Central Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 3, 84-95.

⁵⁸*Central Asian Review*, 1957, No. 1, 3-4, citing *Kommunist Kazakhstan*, 1956, No. 9, pp. 61-64.

⁵⁹Cited by P. Urban, "The New Soviet Drive against Nationalism in Turkestan," *East Turkic Review*, 1960, No. 4, 13-23. Quotation on page 15.

never expressed in histories because of the timing of the crisis. The revised histories of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had still not gone to press at the time of the Party crackdown on *Voprosy Istorii*, and when the volumes appeared later in 1957 they carried old views acceptable to the Party. Bekmakhanov published a long study entitled *The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia* in 1957, the tenth anniversary of his humiliation by the Party. The book pleased the reviewers, since it discussed at length the meddling of foreign "imperialists" in Kazakhstan, represented annexation as a liberation by the Russians, called annexation largely voluntary, and devoted much space to the progressive consequences.

In 1959 the "Conference on the Question of the Progressive Significance of the Annexation of Turkestan by Russia" was held in Tashkent—the third such conference to be held in that city in a decade. The papers emphasized the theme of "British machinations" in Central Asia, the falsehoods of the "bourgeois falsifiers" of Central Asian history, and the friendship of the Russian and Central Asian peoples. About the only controversial issue was the question of the benefits received by the subject peoples under tsarism, one group contending that they were immediately much better off, while the other emphasized the harshness of tsarist colonial rule.⁶⁰

This question of the nature of tsarist colonial rule is the only one which has been revised in the long run. After the Twentieth Party Congress historians were directed to emphasize both the brutalities of tsarism and the friendship of peoples. The two propositions are not easy to reconcile, and in fact have not been reconciled in recent Soviet historical writing. Thus one can find in some histories detailed accounts of the confiscation of land and destruction of crops, the burning of villages, the requisitioning of foodstuffs "which sometimes degenerated into plain robbery,"⁶¹ while other histories ignore these aspects of Russian conquest

⁶⁰*Obedinennia nauchnaia sessiia, posviaschennaia progressivnomu znacheniiu prisoeдинeniia srednei Asii k Rossii* (Tashkent, 1959).

⁶¹*Istoriia Turkmenskoi SSR* [History of The Turkmen SSR], I, Book 2 (Ashkhabad, 1957), 123.

almost entirely and dwell on the advantages brought by the conquerors.⁶²

While the Party ideologists have been comparatively tolerant of varying interpretations of the nature of tsarist colonial rule, they have stood absolutely adamant on the thesis that annexation in all cases has been a progressive phenomenon, working for the ultimate good of the conquered peoples. No Soviet historian in recent years has dared to suggest that any tsarist acquisition of territory was a reactionary development, or that it worked to the detriment of the inhabitants. And the most severe Party denunciations have been aimed at historians who omitted mentioning the progressive consequences of annexation. The amount of space devoted to this question in recent Soviet historical writing suggests that it is of high priority in the thinking of the planners of Soviet historiography.

Between these areas of fluidity and rigidity, there are themes which have undergone some degree of change during the period of de-Stalinization. The resistance movements have been examined in great detail, and while most of them are still labelled reactionary, a few have been designated progressive. The main determinants seem to be the class composition of the leaders and their followers, the degree to which religion was involved, and the extent to which the movements opposed the Russians. Uprisings are considered reactionary when their leaders were of the feudal landlord class, when they were under the auspices of a religious group, when they had the objective of either maintaining a separate existence from the Russian Empire or of detaching themselves from it, or when they fought primarily with Russian troops. Movements are considered progressive when they are of peasant composition, aimed primarily at feudal lords or "foreign imperialists," and when they are not separatist. Apparently a movement must meet all these requirements to receive an approved place in Soviet history, and consequently the number is small. There have been several mixed verdicts—cases in which a revolt was partly progressive and partly

⁶²For example a recent history of the peoples of the Soviet North mentions weapons only once in connection with annexation to Russia when it states that "the firearms they [the natives] received from the Russians were instrumental in greatly increasing the development of hunting" (V. Uvachen, *Peoples of the Soviet North* [Moscow, 1960], 13).

reactionary, or cases in which a movement began in one category and ended in the other. The revolts of 1898 and 1916 in Central Asia have been especially complex when viewed in this light, and several minor changes in interpretation have been put forward.

The Party has insisted that the resistance movements be examined in the context of the class struggle, with the result that any leader of aristocratic origin is *ipso facto* reactionary. Both Kenesary Kasimov and Shamil failed to meet this requirement for progressive leadership. Sometimes Soviet historians are obliged to find the class struggle in hitherto undiscovered areas, or to define classes in arbitrary fashion. In the case of the peoples of the Soviet North, for example, a recent history defines classes on the basis of the number of reindeer which an individual herded.⁶³

IV

The reason for the Party's concern about rewriting the history of tsarist colonialism is the current problem of nationalism within the Soviet Union, which acts as a centrifugal force opposing the increasing centralization toward Moscow. The liquidation of "bourgeois nationalism" has been one of Khrushchev's most constant themes in the struggle for ideological purity. The new Party Programme recognizes nationalism as "the chief political and ideological weapon used by international reaction" against the unity of Communist countries. Nationalism is undoubtedly the main deterrent to that fusion of cultures and elimination of internal boundary lines which the Programme envisions. The former "national liberation" leaders had to be denounced because they were symbols for present day nationalism: the recounting of their deeds might inspire a new Kenesary or Shamil.

The term "national liberation movement" is reserved at present almost entirely for foreign countries, where the Communists hope to use nationalism as a means of overthrowing capitalism. Nationalism, as Richard Pipes has pointed out, is considered by Soviet leaders to be their worst enemy or their best ally, depending on whether it is of the foreign or domestic variety.⁶⁴

⁶³*Ibid.*, 21-22.

⁶⁴Richard Pipes, "Nationalism and Nationality," in Leonard Schapiro, *The USSR and the Future* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 72.

Several recent developments have prompted Party leaders to be cautious about revising the Bagirov thesis, which would have been in line with the general process of denouncing the excesses of Stalin. Within a few days of Khrushchev's secret speech against Stalin nationalist demonstrations occurred in Georgia on the third anniversary of Stalin's death, and before the year was out the revolts in Hungary and Poland must have served as a warning on the power of nationalism within Communist countries. Rehabilitation of the leaders and movements might have encouraged Muslim leaders to more resistance. It has been suggested that a major factor in the cautious Soviet policy may be the desire to keep the peace between Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the Caucasus.⁶⁵ Finally, Soviet leaders have had to be on guard against irredentist movements in which Soviet peoples in the borderlands might join their kinsmen in a foreign country. Soviet scholarship and the press have denounced in unusually harsh terms such movements as Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Iranism and Pan-Arabism.

Central Asia, which is ideologically unreliable, is also a key pawn in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. It is significant that the recent Soviet denunciation of alleged border violations by the Chinese in Kazakhstan also charged that the Chinese leaders, "by concentrating the attention of people on border questions... artificially stir up nationalistic passions, and hostile relations with other peoples."⁶⁶

Soviet leaders are evidently counting on "historical science" as an important weapon in their struggle to liquidate internal nationalism and establish the solidarity of Soviet peoples. The history journals have emphasized the themes of the friendship of peoples and progressiveness of annexation in lead articles since the Twenty-Second Party Congress and the adoption of the new Party Programme. The projected eleven volume history of the USSR, whose table of contents has been published, will devote considerable space to these themes.⁶⁷ They are mentioned

⁶⁵*Central Asian Review*, 1958, No. 3, 242.

⁶⁶*Pravda*, September 22, 1963.

⁶⁷M. P. Kim, "Ob osnovnykh problemakh otechestvennoi istorii" [On the fundamental problems of native history], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1961, No. 2, 14-53.

frequently in Central Committee resolutions on propaganda and education.

It is impossible to predict whether current Soviet interpretations on this subject will last for long. There are several apparent inconsistencies which future Soviet historians may be called upon to reinterpret. But it seems likely that such future interpretations will be made in response to political demands of the moment. Since his brief interval of comparative freedom in 1956, the Soviet historian has been more firmly harnessed than ever to Party controls. There is more "coordination", i.e. control from Moscow, in historical writing than ever before, so that the historian is now generally a part of a team engaged in work on a sector of the Seven Year Plan. This was made clear in a Central Committee resolution of 1960, which stated that

a primary task of our historians is to reveal the Soviet peoples' extremely rich experience in solving the nationalities problem, to inculcate socialist internationalism, and to show the indestructible friendship of the peoples, which is constantly growing stronger and is inseparably bound up with implacability toward survivals of bourgeois nationalism.⁶³

⁶³Cited by Shtepa, *op. cit.*, 386.

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
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
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