


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BOMBAY PRESIDENCY IN
THE MID-EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY

HOLDEN FURBER

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
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The Heras Memorial Lectures honour the memory of an eminent historian and archaeologist, the Rev. Henry Heras, S. J. Father Heras came to India from Spain in 1922 at the young age of 32 to be Professor of Indian History at St. Xavier's College, Bombay. He died there in 1955 after spending half of his life in digging up India's past to display to the world the glorious traditions and culture of the land he made his own and whose citizen he became. After his death, the Indian Historical Research Institute which he founded at St. Xavier's College was renamed the Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture.

Sponsored by the Fr. Heras Memorial Fund and by St. Xavier's College, the Memorial Lectures, which deal with themes pertaining to Indian History and Culture, were held for the first time in 1960. They were delivered by Dr. H. D. Sankalia, and have been published under the title *Indian Archaeology Today* (Asia Publishing House, 1962). The 1962 lectures by Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri have also appeared, entitled *Sources of Indian History with Special Reference to South India* (Asia Publishing House, 1964). The present volume contains the third series of Heras Memorial Lectures.



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
PREFACE

IT WAS A great pleasure for me to return to Bombay as Visiting Professor in the University's Department of Civics and Politics, twenty-six years after being welcomed by Father Heras on my first visit to St. Xavier's College, and to be invited to deliver the Heras Memorial Lectures for 1962. I was especially happy, in doing this, to follow in the footsteps of my friend, Professor Nilakanta Sastri whose lectures have recently appeared under the title, *Sources of Indian History*. In publishing these, I have thought it better to present them as they were delivered, with a minimum of change, reminding the reader that the material on which they are based will be used in a somewhat different form in a larger work on European expansion in India in the early and mid-eighteenth century now in preparation. There is no attempt here at a full treatment of Anglo-Portuguese relations or of several of the other topics touched upon. I have simply endeavoured, chiefly from Dutch materials, to throw interesting side-lights on the history of Bombay Presidency in the mid-eighteenth century.

I wish to express my thanks to the Governing Body of the Heras Memorial Fund, to the Principal of St. Xavier's College, and to Fr. John Correia-Afonso, Director of the Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture, for their invitation to deliver this series of Memorial Lectures which now appears in print.

University of Pennsylvania

HOLDEN FURBER



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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCES

*Manuscripts in the India Office Library, and Records,
Commonwealth Relations Office, London.*

- Corr. Repts.: Reports of Committee of Correspondence.
Corr. Refs.: 'References' to Committee of Correspondence.
Corr. Mem.: Memoranda of Committee of Correspondence.
Court Book: East India Court Books (minutes of the meetings of
the Court of Directors).
Eur. Inhab.: List of European Inhabitants.
Fac. Rec.: Factory Records.
H.M.: Home Miscellaneous Series.
Marine Rec.: Marine Records.
Misc. Let. Rec.: Miscellaneous Letters Received.

*Manuscripts in the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague,
Netherlands.*

K.A.: Koloniaal Archief.

I

BOMBAY AND THE MALABAR COAST IN THE 1720'S

IN THIS AUTUMN of 1962 three hundred years after Sir Abraham Shipman and the Earl of Marlborough arrived off this island with their small force in a vain attempt to persuade the Portuguese Viceroy to deliver it over to them in accordance with the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1661, it is not inappropriate that I should ask you to go back in imagination with me to the Bombay of the early eighteenth century.

The Bombay of that era does not lack for historians. To the contemporary accounts of Fryer, Ovington, and Burnell, and the standard works of nineteenth century writers such as Forrest, Danvers, Douglas and Kaye, have been added the more recent works of Da Cunha, Malabari, Khan and Bombay's own Shri R. A. Wadia who has so recently told the story of Bombay ship-building from that day to this.¹ I do not propose to rehearse these accounts but to supplement them at certain points chiefly

¹ John Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia* ed. William Crooke, 2 Vols., London, 1909-19. John Ovington, *A Voyage to Surat in the year 1689*, ed. H. G. Rawlinson, London, 1929. John Burnell, *Bombay in the Days of Queen Anne*, ed. S. T. Sheppard, London 1933. Sir George W. Forrest, *Selections from the Travels and Journals in the Bombay Secretariat*, Bombay, 1906. F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, London, 1894. James Douglas, *Bombay and Western India*, 2 Vols., London 1893. J. G. Da Cunha, *The Origin of Bombay*, Bombay, 1900. P. B. M. Malabari, *Bombay in the Making*, London, 1910. Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations relating to Bombay*, London, 1922. R. A. Wadia, *The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master-Builders*, Bombay 1957.

by drawing on material from the Dutch archives—again, not inappropriate on this third centenary of the British coming to Bombay, for the Portuguese King justified the treaty of 1661 on the ground of his need of English help against the Dutch. Because of the later decline of their influence, we are tempted to forget how powerful the Dutch were on this coast until the middle of the eighteenth century.

Let us then go back in imagination to this city and the other trading factories subordinate to it in the early 1720's. For the city, we shall have to think away all but the Fort and Ramparts, their limits indicated to us today by such street names as Rampart Row, and Ravelin Street. We shall also have to remember that the seven or so islets of the later Bombay island were not yet all joined together even at low tide, and that the work of filling in the 'Great Breach' where Breach Candy now is was still far from completed. Indeed its story has a very modern ring. The work started because a certain Captain Elias Bates estimated he could do it in nine months at a cost of eighty thousand rupees. It dragged on for eight years, and cost three lakhs twenty thousand, four hundred and twenty-three rupees [Rs. 3,20,423], and the East India Company's Court of Directors on May 15, 1730 expressed their displeasure that Captain Bates should have asked for a gratuity of six thousand rupees.²

The tiny English community living within the ramparts in the 1720's was very conscious of its isolation in the midst of the Portuguese settlements to the north and to the south. In this connection, we often forget the strength of the Portuguese impact on this coast and the role of the Portuguese language as the lingua franca of all commercial intercourse in which Europeans took part. The English East India Company then had two hundred Portuguese dictionaries in stock; every trading factory had

² Corr. Repts. 2, May 15, 1730.

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its Portuguese linguist, and the Court of Directors in London complained to Bombay that translation of Portuguese correspondence must be done locally because the Portuguese spoken in India differed so much from that spoken in Portugal.³ Affrays between the English and Portuguese on both land and sea in which lives were lost were frequent. The English community were constantly calling for more troops, even though they were defended by 145 Europeans and 848 Goanese 'topasses' formed in ten companies, and by 815 Indian sepoys forming another ten companies. Even then, military charges of Rs. 1,34,991 accounted for almost half the annual expenses of the Bombay settlement, Rs. 2,98,457. The annual deficit for the whole Presidency—Bombay, Surat, Broach, Tellicherry and Anjengo—to be made up by the profits of trade was at this time estimated at three lakhs of rupees [Rs. 3,00,000].⁴

Bombay was already looked upon by the Company's servants as less attractive than Madras or Calcutta both because of its unhealthiness, and the unsettled conditions on the Malabar coast. The small community of approximately thirty-five Company servants, fifteen 'Free Merchants' and thirty country-captains, about thirty of whom were accompanied by their wives, saw frequent changes of governors and councillors.⁵ Their letters to England are full of recrimination and charges and countercharges of corruption which cannot be sifted to the bottom. More often than not, accusations did not stand up under investigation in London.

A most interesting example is the case in 1723-24 of two Parsi brothers Framjee and Bowmanjee Rustumjee who, while acting as brokers to the East India Com-

³ Home Gen. Comm. Journal: May 1, 1709-June 30, 1714.

⁴ Corr. Repts. 1. March 11, 1724 Report on Bombay garrison and accounts ending July 1722.

⁵ Eur. Inhab. 5A. Bombay 1719-22.

pany, were accused of engaging in a secret correspondence with the Mughal Governor of Surat to get the Company's trading privileges revoked. Apparently through the favour of Commodore Mathews who had quarrelled with the Company's Bombay Council, and whose fleet was returning to England, a third brother, Naoroji Rustumjee was able to go all the way to England in the winter of 1723-24 to petition the Court of Directors in his brothers' behalf. This reminds us that more than a century before Ram Mohun Roy's famous visit and a half century before the less well known visit of the envoys of Raghunath Rao in 1781, an Indian of the educated classes visited London for some length of time. Naoroji Rustumjee, who took his family with him, remained in London for almost a year, April 1724 to February 1725. He quickly secured an order for the release of his brother Bowmanjee at Bombay and a promise that the Company would do its best to get the release of the other brother who was imprisoned by the local authorities at Surat. He was awarded damages of £19,125, £15,000 of which he invested in goods to take back with him on the Company's ship *Windham*. He asked for special permission to embark 16 brass guns, 10 pieces of sheet lead, 10 copper pots, 7 hundredweight of copper plates, 4 large standing clocks, 7 table clocks, 12 pewter distilling worms, 3 small stills, 60 or 70 dozen knives, 100 sword blades, as well as clothing and provisions.⁶

The Company's rather critical views of their servants in Bombay are well expressed in the documents captured when their ship *Cassandra* fell in with pirates off Madagascar on August 7, 1720. These papers found their way to the Dutch archives, probably when the pirates called at the Dutch factory in Cochin. The papers include,

⁶ Corr. Mem. 9. Petition of Feb. 10, 1725; also Corr. Refs. 2, entries of Apr. 22, May 13, June 10, July 1, 1724, Jan. 22, March 17, 1725; Corr. Repts. 1, June 9, July 3 and 7, 1724.

not only the Company's general letters, but the original charter party, the invoices, and private letters.⁷ The Company's accountant wrote: 'your Bombay journal and leger [sic] are the worst and most erroneously copied that ever the Company received from any part of India ... If we had time to have copied them we would have sent them back to you to let you see what a shameful pair of books they are.' The accountant charges that the losses on the subordinate factories are concealed and that the profits on the 'Europe' goods sold are less than the figures indicate because of over-valuing the Bombay rupee.⁸ From these letters, it appears that the Company are still trying to market woollens in Persia. They criticize their Bombay servants for not more vigorously combating the import of woollens into Persia from Smyrna by Turkish merchants. As a matter of fact, the cargo which the pirates captured in the *Cassandra* consisted of £25,000 in silver ducatoons, and £10,000 in woollens.⁹ The Directors in London insisted Bombay could do more to make it worth while for Armenian merchants trading in Persia to buy the Company's woollens.

The general letter despatched from London to Bombay in the *Cassandra* was, however, not all criticism. The Directors realized their trade with Western India must suffer from the recently imposed restrictions on the import of piece-goods for consumption in England. They consequently stressed the need of the cheaper quality 'gruff goods', and cowries for the African trade. They were happy that their servants at Bombay had ceased to do business in terms of the Portuguese coins, the xeraphins, and were strengthening the Bombay rupee minted in their own mint. Hence xeraphins could no longer be dumped at Bombay. European country captains and Indian money dealers were encouraged to recoin all their

⁷ K. A. 1841, *passim*.

⁸ K. A. 1841, f. 84.

⁹ K. A. 1841, ff. 119-126.

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silver at Bombay. The Directors approved of the recent introduction into Bombay of an Italian bishop and six Carmelite priests, but admonished their servants to watch them carefully and make certain they were not trying to convert any European Protestants in the garrison or elsewhere. These measures were intended to make Bombay completely independent of Portuguese influence, as well as of the influence of the Mughal Emperor or other Indian powers. The Directors, however, were fully aware that it would be some time before Bombay could rival Surat either in population or in wealth. In their view, the value of Bombay lay in its independence and its increasing maritime power which gave it an opportunity to make reprisals for insults. In the opinion of these Directors of the new United Company of 1708 the root of the Old London Company's troubles in former times was that their servants were under the Moors' power at Surat.¹⁰

We thus see that the new Company's servants in Bombay were laying the foundations for Bombay's later commercial supremacy. In the 1720's, however, Surat still far surpassed Bombay as the emporium of Western India. Let us visit Surat in February 1722 with the crew and passengers of the *Sint Pieter*, one of the independent, Ostend ships sent out to India in defiance of English and Dutch protests shortly before the establishment of the Ostend Company. Although most of her crew were Flemings, the *Sint Pieter* had a Polish first mate, an Italian supercargo, a German surgeon, a French gunner, and a Malay cook. When they went ashore they found a city with a population of between three and four lakhs surrounded with new walls pierced with twelve gates. It took an hour and a half to walk from the river gate near the fort to the land-gate opposite, and at least two hours to make the circuit of the walls. They were impressed

¹⁰ K. A. 1841, Gen. Letter to Bombay Nov. 4, 1719 para 45.

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with the usual things—the different castes, the burial customs, the Muslim government's prohibition of *sati* in the city, the narrow streets, the elaborate weddings. The English Company's chief Indian broker had just given a huge feast at the nuptials of his daughter. This entertainment was in keeping with the status of a man who secured from the English Company a commission of two per cent on all local business carried on by the Company and English free merchants and one per cent on all other local business transacted at the English Factory. In return he was happy to supply the Company with eight thousand eight hundred rupees toward the annual payment of Rs. 10,000 required by the imperial *firman* and the additional present of at least Rs. 1,000 to the local governor. The Flemish seamen saw ships 'as good as any in Europe' building on the shores of the Tapti. They admired the English Factory's great clock, the only one in the city. They called on the Capuchin fathers 'beloved by all' for their free care of the sick and noticed with surprise that a curtain divided men from women during Church service. Realizing that as interlopers and Roman Catholics, they would be unwelcome at the Dutch and English factories, they found open house at the French Company's *loge* where Monsieur Gramont and his council of seven offered hospitality.¹¹

In Surat at this time, the Dutch East India Company still had the largest foreign trading factory with a European and Eurasian personnel of 57—among them fourteen senior merchants, eight letter-writers, three book-keepers. The Dutch Chief kept up his prestige with a guard of 20 soldiers under three officers.¹² In the Dutch godowns was an ample stock of spices, invoiced at almost nothing in Batavia, which the book-keepers were

¹¹ Univ. of Ghent, Library, MSS H. Hoys, 929, 'Beschryvinghe van de stad Zurrate.'

¹² K. A. 1907, f. 237.

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bringing to account at profits of thousands of per cent. Also on hand were 631,000 pounds of powdered sugar, 182,000 pounds of copper from Japan, and 366,000 pounds of tin from Malacca and Siam.¹³ These commodities would eventually be exchanged for the hundreds of thousands of pieces of hand-woven Surat cotton goods which were marketed both in Europe and throughout Asia.

During the trading season 'Swally-hole', the anchorage at the mouth of the Tapti, presented an animated scene when both 'country' and 'Europe' ships were loading and unloading. Every year, the port normally welcomed approximately forty-five larger trading ships, all but seven or eight of which were country-ships. The lists compiled by the Dutch show us that at least two-thirds of the country-ships' hulls—'bottoms' to use the contemporary term—were owned by non-Europeans, nearly all Muslims. In fact, one shipowner, Mohamed Ali, owned twelve of the Muslim-owned fleet—three of his ships were giants of 900-1000 tons and five were of 700 tons. Two wealthy Muslim owners are called 'Turks'—probably meaning that their ancestors came from the Persian Gulf. There are only two Hindu owners and it is highly probable they are the two who lived outside Surat, one in Ahmedabad and one in Baroda. Unfortunately we do not have their names. Of the dozen English-owned country-ships, half clearly have Calcutta as their home port, and more are engaged in trade to the east of Cape Comorin as far as the China seas than in trade to the Persian Gulf. Of the four French-owned country-ships two are trading to the Gulf and two to Bengal.¹⁴

The data about country-voyages clearly shows that the bulk of the Persian Gulf trade was in non-European

¹³ K. A. 1907, f. 53.

¹⁴ K. A. 1907 ff. 230-33.

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hands. There is no way of being sure as to the ownership of country-cargoes and the extent to which non-European owners employed European captains and mates, but we may be certain both that the bulk of the capital invested was Muslim and Parsi, and that its owners often employed European captains and mates, especially for the half-dozen voyages they were annually financing to Malacca and the China seas. From what we know of itemized invoices of cargoes—inward and outward—taking both country-trade and European East India companies' trade into consideration, it is clear that the bulk of the outward trade consists of cotton 'piece-goods' to be marketed in the Persian gulf and south-east Asia plus raw Indian cotton for both Bengal and China in considerable amount. The inward trade was, of course, infinitely various. The itemized invoices which we have show gold from China and Sumatra—Spanish dollars arriving both via Europe and via Manila—pearls from Ceylon and the Persian gulf—tin from Malaya—lead and iron from Europe—sugar and sugar candy from Java—ivory from Africa—mercury, alum, camphor and spices from the China seas. Surat was, indeed, still the greatest mart of trade in western India, despite the disadvantage of having no harbour at the city's gates.¹⁵

It is when we turn from Surat to consider the affairs of Anjengo and Tellicherry on the southern Malabar coast that we appreciate the serious dangers threatening this trade in the early 1720's. Looking at it from the point of view of the Governor of the Presidency of Bombay, we can see how the two major tasks confronting him were closely interlocked. In his private capacity as a country trader he must protect the country-trade from the two great hostile maritime forces which then threat-

¹⁵ Lists of shipping and summaries of cargoes were regularly sent to Batavia, see e.g. K. A. 1748, ff. 224-38 (1713-14) K. A. 1907, ff. 230-33 (1723-24).

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ened it—the one, European, centred in the islets and harbours of northern Madagascar led by pirates of many European nationalities; the other, Indian, centred on the Malabar coast itself led by the redoubtable Maratha admiral Kanhoji Angré. In his public capacity, the Governor must not only do this but at the same time strengthen the English East India Company's power against its Portuguese, French, and Dutch rivals. In the struggle to protect the country-trade the governor's chief weapon is the authority to issue the Company's pass entitling country captains, whether European or non-European, to the protection of the Company's ships and of its Bombay Marine. As these passes have been much discussed, but seldom quoted, I will read you the pass which Robert Adams, the Company's chief at its pepper factory of Anjengo, issued to the captain of one of his own country-ships:

To all commanders of ships or vessels or whomsoever subjects, friends or allies to his majesty, George, King of Great Britain, etc. Whereas Robert Adams, Chief of ye Malabar Coast, owner of this Munchua, burden sixty candies or thereabouts, now riding at anchor in the road of Calicut and bound by God's permission trading to several ports to the N^oward and S^oward of this port whereof goes Muckadam Chimbie for her more secure navigating or by an order derived us from the Hon. Wm. Aislabie, Esq., General [President] etc. and Council of India do give them this our pass desiring and requiring all such as above mentioned that shall meet with them in this their intended voyage that they do not molest them in vessel, men, or goods treating them civilly during their abode with you provided this our pass be of validity, being for the term of this present monsoon and no longer, sealed with the Honorable British East India Company's seal, 29th day

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of September 1715.¹⁶

It should be noted that the pass covers the whole lascar crew as well its captain [*noquedar*]. The issuance of passes for one monsoon only is for the purpose of charging fees for their renewal. The English Company's objective was to make its pass respected both by its European rivals and by any local authority against whom its ships or marine might take reprisals. The amount of the fee charged was based on the value of the cargo.

I do not propose to retell the story of the early Bombay Marine and its struggles with Kanhoji Angré and his sons which has been so well recounted in Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, and in the works of V. G. Dighe, C. K. Srinivasan, Manohar Malgonkar and others.¹⁷ The activities of European pirates in Indian waters are however, not so well known, especially their curious effort to achieve respectability as the principals in a Swedish East India Company chartered by the Swedish crown. As background for an understanding of these activities we have to bear in mind the interconnections between the East India trade and the African slave trade at the close of the seventeenth century. Two slave trades were then of interest to the European East India companies. On the one hand, the expansion of sugar plantations in the West Indies increased the market for the coarse types of India cotton piece-goods bartered for slaves on the West African coast. These goods could legally only reach Africa by being trans-shipped in Europe to the smaller vessels of the African companies which brought them back down the African coast. On the other hand, the English, Dutch,

¹⁶ K. A. 1773, f. 633.

¹⁷ C. R. Low, *History of the Indian Navy*, 2 Vols. London, 1877. Manohar Malgonkar *Kanhoji Angrey*, Bombay, 1959. C. K. Srinivasan, *Baji Rao I, The Great Peshwa*, Bombay, 1961. V. G. Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, Bombay 1944.

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and French East India Companies had a need for slaves in their trading factories in the East Indies. They preferred to buy these slaves independently rather than through the Arab traders of Arabia and East Africa. The logical places to get them were on both the African side and the Madagascar side of the Mozambique Channel. The Dutch, as they developed the gold mines of Sumatra, had most need of slaves; the English Company needed them only for their plantations on their island of St. Helena, their pepper plantations at Benkulen, in Sumatra, and the few used as domestic servants at their other factories—the Bombay Governor for example had forty slaves and the Dutch governor at Cochin, twenty-six. The French needed a few for plantation labour at the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon.

If the mercantilist navigation laws of Britain and other European nations had not prevented it, there would have been a brisk direct trade in India cotton piece-goods between India on the one hand and both West Africa and the Caribbean on the other. This was the situation of which pirates drawn from all the European maritime nations sought to take advantage. In the great days of buccaneering in the late seventeenth century, the time of captains Kidd and Morgan, the pirates' headquarters had been in the Caribbean; in the first decade of the eighteenth century during the War of the Spanish Succession, those who were harried out of the Caribbean turned to smuggling between the East and West Indies. The end of the European war found a formidable nest of pirates 'holed up' as it were in the Madagascar region where no European power had established its authority. These pirates had accumulated a large stock of goods and treasure. The English and Scots among them had been joined by several Irish exiles, who had fought for the Stuart Pretender to the British throne either in Spain or the Caribbean.

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Some of these men quite naturally felt that their only hope of escaping the net which the English and Dutch Companies were drawing around them was some form of collaboration with those who were abetting a direct East India Trade in defiance of both great companies. The Irish Jacobites among them, preferring not to collaborate with the group of Scots and Flemings who were setting up an Ostend Company in the dominions of a monarch whom the Irish had fought in Spain, turned instead to the King of Sweden.

According to documents in the Swedish archives, the first intimation that the pirates wanted the protection of a European government reached the German port of Hamburg on July 3, 1714.¹⁸ The idea evoked no enthusiasm in the Senate of that Free City but reached the ears both of the Swedish diplomat Baron de Höpken, and the Danish nobleman, Jean Henri Hugaetan, Count Gyldenstern, who informed the King of Denmark. Probably at the instigation of Baron Höpken, a copy of Hugaetan's report to the King of Denmark was brought to the notice of the King of Sweden, the famous Charles XII, at Lund early in 1717. At any rate, two Irishmen, former boyhood friends of the most notorious of the pirates, Robert England, were soon at the castle of Strömstad outside Stockholm negotiating on behalf of the pirates. The plan was that a group of returned and pardoned pirates would constitute in Sweden the East India Company to be established. An expedition was to go out to Madagascar carrying colonists along with a Mr. Kolmeter as a mining expert, and a Mr. Neresius as an expert on commerce. It was naively proposed that the pirates should cast lots to determine who should go to Sweden to become the directors of the new Swedish Company and who should remain in Madagascar. By

¹⁸ Unless otherwise indicated, the following account is based on MSS in Stockholm, Rigsarkivet: Handel och Sjöfart, 192.

September 1718, Charles XII had actually approved all this, appointed one of his chief ministers to carry it out, and associated with him the famous admiral, Baron Wrangel. Meanwhile the two Irishmen William Morgan¹⁹ and Andrew Galwey²⁰—uncle and nephew—had raised 540,000 French pounds from their friends in Paris and Ostend. Two ships, one of 50 guns and another of 32 guns, were in the harbour of St. Malo, France, ready to sail for Madagascar, when Charles XII's death in December 1718 and the threatened outbreak of war between France and Spain ruined all prospects of a speedy consummation of these plans.

The two ships were disarmed and sold on the orders of the French government. Nothing daunted, Galwey and Morgan finally secured fresh authority from the new Swedish King Frederick I. Galwey went to London under the assumed name of Andrew Gardiner, had two new ships of 52 and 26 guns built in the Thames, named them *La Révolution* and the *Lady Mary* and sailed them to Morlaix in Brittany. Some idea of the support such ventures in defiance of the English East India Company could find, even in London itself in 1720-21, is shown by the names of those with whom Galwey dealt on this occasion. His associates were all described to the Swedish King's ministers as 'persons of distinction, all established in London'—among them were Captain Lane, formerly a Director of the English East India Company, and Captains Coward and Sanderson, former captains of

¹⁹ For Morgan's connections with Jacobite exiles, with John Law, and with a Captain Evan Morgan, a smuggler of slaves from Madagascar to Virginia, see Misc. Let. Rec. 13, letters of Charles Adamson (alias Forman?), dated Paris, July 15, 1722, and of John Walker, customs officer, dated York River, Va., August 22, 1722.

²⁰ No Andrew Galwey is mentioned in C. J. B. Bennett, *The Galweys of Lota*, (Dublin 1909), but an Antony Galwey was in business as a merchant at La Rochelle in the mid-eighteenth century. Andrew presumably belonged to this family.

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Company ships. In return for becoming proprietors, along with the pirates in a Swedish East India Company ostensibly trading from Gothenburg, these persons agreed to insure the two ships for 60,000 crowns in Amsterdam with the utmost secrecy, to pay the ships' crews not at the English East India ships' rates of wages, but at the higher rates applicable in the British Navy. They guaranteed to furnish 50 non-Swedish sailors (of course, chiefly Englishmen) with previous experience on East India voyages. They agreed to transport the Swedish envoys to Madagascar with the pardons for the pirates, and to bring back the selected group of pirates with the pirates' booty. Moreover, they were to be allowed, having left the Swedish envoys and colonists at Madagascar, to take the ships on a trading voyage in the East Indies, on condition that they give the Swedish King ten per cent of their profits up to £37,500.

All these brave schemes ultimately came to naught because of quarrels among the promoters, necessity to raise more capital, and delays which aroused the British government's suspicions. Galwey and Morgan took the ships to Cadiz in Spain where they and their friends remained for months in 1722 bickering, corresponding with Sweden through the Swedish embassy in Paris, trying to assemble their crews. Finally, to make more money as well as avert suspicion, Galwey had to take one ship on a trading voyage to Genoa where she was seized in November 1723 on the plea of the British government that she was involved in a plot to land the Stuart Pretender on the coast of Scotland. Galwey, on shore at the time, escaped to Spain. Twenty-one years later, still a Jacobite exile in Madrid, he wrote on March 1, 1744 in a trembling hand, a pathetic letter to the King of Sweden. The affair, he said, had ruined his family fortune; the King should realize that had the venture succeeded, Sweden would rule Madagascar and perhaps control 'the

greater part of the commerce of the two Indies'.

We should know nothing of all this if the Swedish King had not after 1724 vainly sought damages for the ship from the British government. The affair affords further testimony to the strength of the forces behind the South Sea Company, John Law's Mississippi scheme, and the Ostend Company. It is astonishing that these pirates and their booty, which cannot really have been very large, should have the Swedish King, the Ostend Company, and even the Russian Czar contending for their favour—the Swedish baron Höpken heard in May 1722 that another Jacobite refugee named Norcross had arrived at Calais with a commission from the Czar offering the pirates asylum at Archangel on the White Sea if they would pay the Czar two million crowns.

While all these strange negotiations were going on, the pirates themselves were, of course, continuing those raids on Bombay shipping which supply Colonel Biddulph, author of *Pirates of Malabar*, with many a story of high adventure and hairbreadth escapes. Perhaps the most famous is the story of the ship to which we have already referred, the *Cassandra*, of which we learn more from the material in the Dutch archives. We can now supplement the narrative of the *Cassandra's* second mate, Richard Lazinby,²¹ with that of Jacob de Bucquoy²², a sailor of the Dutch hooker *De Caab* which was seized by the pirates after Lazinby had escaped from their clutches. Those of you who have read the *Cassandra* story will recall that this Indiaman, the outward bound Bombay ship of the season of 1719-1720, was seized on August 7, 1720, off northern Madagascar by the pirates in the *Fancy* and *Victoria*. George Taylor, the pirate leader,

²¹ K. A. 1841, f. 113 'Deposition of Richard Lasinby', March 30, 1722, with the original signature, a clearer and more legible MS than the copy in the India Office Records.

²² K. A. 1907, ff. 151-165.

made a bargain, whereby he freed the Captain of the *Cassandra* and let him and most of his crew go in the *Fancy*. This gave Taylor two big well-armed ships with which he raided the Laccadives, took and pillaged a British country-ship, refitted it at Cochin, and then headed for Mauritius. Off Mauritius, he had the good luck to find the great Portuguese 70-gun ship carrying home the viceroy from Goa lying helplessly disabled by a storm without her masts and with only 28 guns ready for action. He took her, along with an Ostender lying near by, in April 1721. He now had far too many mouths to feed and prisoners to control. Hence, Lazinby was allowed to go ashore. Lazinby concludes his account by saying that the pirates were planning to let the Viceroy and Portuguese go free in one of the two captured ships while they themselves would hurry back to Madagascar, clean the *Cassandra* there, and then head for the Red Sea, the best place to dispose of the diamonds they had captured in the Portuguese ship.

We are now able to pick up the story from Jacob de Bucquoy, ordinary seaman of the Dutch hooker *De Caab*, collecting slaves at the Dutch trading post in Delagoa Bay on the southeast African coast. On April 19, 1722, three ships, the *Victoria*, the *Cassandra*, and the former Portuguese 70-gun ship, sailed into Delagoa Bay under English colours. When the Dutch chief on shore asked who they were, the answer came back, 'We are kings of the sea and gentlemen of fortune.' The three ships raised the Jolly Roger, destroyed the Dutch post, captured the hooker. De Bucquoy was carried off to a series of adventures which lasted two years. He describes the former Portuguese ship 64-guns, and the refitted *Cassandra* 40-guns, as a very strong force manned by a crew of 750, both white and black. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1722, Taylor and the other pirate leaders decided to go back to the West Indies. On November 4, 1722, Taylor

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left to their fate on the African coast De Bucquoy, twenty other sailors, and one African cabin-boy. They were given rice and wheat by the local chief, and tried vainly to build a boat. One after another died until eight were left. Their spirits were further depressed by rumours that the pirates had abandoned 125 Europeans along the coast, all but a dozen of whom were massacred. After surviving the winter, they were joined by a few Portuguese who, after being abandoned by a French country-captain, had found a small ship wrecked on the beach. The whole group then repaired and put a deck on this boat, and succeeded in reaching Mozambique. The Portuguese governor there told the eight Dutch they were welcome to take service on any country-ship. When no ship offered them jobs, he finally sent them to Goa in August 1723, but their troubles were not over. While trying to get to Mangalore from Goa on a Dutch country-ship, they were again captured by pirates who plundered them and left them on the coast near Cannanore. On April 16, 1724, De Bucquoy finally reached Cochin safely.

It is against this background of menace from European pirates and from Kanhoji Angré that the affairs of the two southern outposts of the Bombay Presidency in the early 1720's should be viewed. Neither the chief at Anjengo nor the chief at Tellicherry had an easy task. It is debatable whether the English East India Company would not have done better either to prevent its servants from taking any share in the pepper trade, or to close its posts on the coast. The posts were unquestionably run at a loss for the private benefit of their chiefs and factors as country-traders. The Company's servants at Anjengo and Calicut lived in the shadow of the Dutch in Cochin, and were constantly embroiled with them. The Dutch then had a Cochin establishment of 80 European households and 250 Eurasian households, served by 600 slaves

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and 1200 Indian employees.²³ They considered themselves the paramount power on that coast, and were particularly incensed that the English chief should freight on his own country-ships the goods of Hindu merchants living under Dutch protection at Cochin. The Dutch were also infuriated by what they regarded as the English chief's ineptitude in getting himself and his suite murdered on April 14, 1721, when bearing gifts from Anjengo to the Queen of Attinga, sister of the Maharaja of Travancore.

This affair caused a great sensation on the coast. It apparently arose from a quarrel in the house of the English Company's Portuguese linguist outside the fort at Anjengo. In the week after Easter, the linguist appears to have given a party at which members of all communities were present. His mistress bedaubed a visiting Muslim merchant on his face and body, presumably by throwing coloured water or powder at him, whereupon the Muslim had to be restrained from running her through with his sword and the whole party were taken before the chief, William Gyfford, who tactlessly ordered the Muslim merchants' swords to be broken over their heads. When news of this reached the Queen of Attinga, a very tense situation ensued. Governor Boone sent an emissary from Bombay to compose matters and give the customary annual present to the Queen. Gyfford rashly insisted on travelling the six miles from Anjengo to Attinga in great pomp leaving the port almost deserted. Even more foolishly, after presenting the gifts, he had the sepoys fire a salute which was mistaken for a hostile act. The whole party was attacked, the Europeans killed, the Eurasian linguist's body was cut to pieces, and several others were slain in the ensuing riot.²⁴ Three Eurasian topasses and a Christian child escaped to reach the fort where the lone

²³ K. A. 1766, f. 1079.

²⁴ Fac. Rec. Misc. 22. Treatise on Attinga by John Wallis enclosed in letter to E. I. Co's Sec'y Thos Wooley, Dec. 7, 1727.

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gunner got the three widows of the Europeans off on Captain Samuel Cooper's country-ship *Prosperous*, and bravely organized the defence until help arrived from Tellicherry.²⁵ Catherine Gyfford, aged 25, having lost her third husband, hence survived to continue her romantic career so graphically described by Mr. Malgonkar.²⁶

Bombay was thus obliged to throw a force of 300 sepoy into Anjengo and by 1728 the labours of the three successors of the tactless Mr. Gyfford had only succeeded in bringing the Queen's pepper production up to 1,000 candies in a region which had formerly produced 3,000. The second chief to follow Mr. Gyfford was Alexander Orme, father of Robert Orme, the historian of Clive's military campaigns. Alexander Orme intrigued with the Queen of Attinga's daughter against the Queen. He loaned money to the Maharaja of Travancore and persuaded the raja to interfere in the Queen's quarrels with her husbands, all of which necessitated keeping a large military force at Anjengo. For this, Orme was relieved of his post and sent as a surgeon to Bengal.²⁷ It was left to his successor, John Wallis, to stabilize affairs at Anjengo in 1727-28 by getting in the purchases of pepper and obliging the country-traders off that coast to take the Company's passports.²⁸

We have from Mr. Wallis a most interesting account of Attinga. He represents the once powerful Queen of Attinga as a mere puppet in the hands of four *pulas* [lords]; each *pula* ruled one of the four regions into which the kingdom stretching sixty miles along the coast was divided. These *pulas* were constantly struggling with

²⁵ K. A. 1849, ff. 1343-49.

²⁶ Malgonkar, *Kanhoji Angrey*, pp. 151-159.

²⁷ Corr. Repts. 2. Petition on behalf of A. Orme, Jan. 12, 1731; Misc. Let. Rec'd. 28, f. 6; K. A. 1870, f. 812.

²⁸ Fac. Rec. Misc 22. 'A perfect account of the pepper trade in general' by John Wallis.


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each other, and the Europeans must make the right decision as to which *pula* was in the ascendant in order to get in the maximum amount of pepper. The Europeans were not allowed to buy in the pepper-producing country, but must receive the pepper through merchants on the coast. It was customary for the Queen of Attinga to take her husband from the Brahmins attending the temple. Polyandry existed and she might have two husbands, the other being one of the four *pulas*. If there were no daughter by the Brahmin, the succession passed out of her line, and a new Queen was chosen from Colastre near Cannanore in a manner Mr. Wallis could not ascertain. Wallis points out that in 1697, when the English built their fort at Anjengo after the Dutch had instigated the murder of the English Company's factors at Vittoor, the Queen of Attinga was a powerful ruler who supplied 3,000 candies of pepper per season to the English, Dutch, and Danes. The unfortunate Mr. Gyfford seems to have been the victim not only of his own rashness, but of the sins of his predecessor who is spoken of as 'having stuck at nothing to enrich himself and thought of little else than driving a private trade in pepper even to quarrel with the heads of the country on the least interruption of it.'²⁹ Wallis's early history of the English Company's activities in Attinga thus enables us to see more clearly why the Directors were never able to withdraw their pepper factories.³⁰ The necessity of reinforcing Anjengo certainly weakened the governors of Bombay in their struggle against Kanhoji Angré.

Those of you who have visited Tellicherry know that a short taxi ride will take you to the former French settlement of Mahé. The story of French intrusion here in the early 1720's gives us a foretaste of the struggle for

²⁹ *Ibid.* Wallis's treatise on Attinga.

³⁰ Cf. Corr. Repts 1, Recommendation to Gov. Phipps, March 27, 1726.



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empire which was later to supersede the struggle for trade. The man who had to confront the French was Robert Adams. He had been over thirty years on the Malabar coast as 'country-trader' and English Company servant and had risen to be chief at Tellicherry.³¹ The quarrels with the French embittered his last years in India, and he returned to England with a far smaller fortune than he expected. The English and Dutch were jointly sharing the exclusive right to the pepper trade in the raja of Colastre's country when the French bought permission from a vassal of the raja called the Boyanore to establish a factory at Mahé in October 1722. The raja was successfully reducing the Boyanore when the French Company's chief at Mahé loaned the Boyanore enough money to raise a force of 14,000 men. The French brought up ships of 50 or 60 guns, pillaged the English Company's ship *Southgate* in Tellicherry road, seized the ship *Decoy* sent to Tellicherry by the Governor of Bombay. They hoisted the *Decoy's* Union Jack upside down as an insult—all this of course at a time when England and France were not only not at war in Europe but might be said to be in alliance with each other.³²

Informal accounts of Tellicherry in the 1720's are very rare. The only one I have found is a letter dated September 24, 1726 from William Forbes—a name destined to become famous in Bombay's commercial history—to John Fletcher, the East India Company's accountant in London.

Since I came here which was in January last, I have been partly employed in keeping the books (now sent by this ship); under the Chief's direction, there may

³¹ Corr. Repts. 2. Memorial of Robert Adams, June 25, 1730.

³² Corr. Mem. 9 'Abstract of Proceedings of French East India Co's Chiefs and Servants on the Coast of Mallabar' 1722-24; also K. A. 1907 ff. 81-130, 'Memorie' of Johannes Hertenberg, Dec. 24, 1723.

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be some superfluous entries; old men are tenacious of their own ways and not easily put out of them; but, in the main I am persuaded everything is right and justly balanced. It is to be lamented that this settlement has been so very burdensome to the Honble Company occasioned by warrs and carrying on the fortifications, etc., and after having made it convenient, that the French should come by open violence and settle within three miles of us and force the pepper trade out of their [the Company's] hands excluding them from that part of the country to which they have a just right; the French coming in by conquest, they think to drive everything before them; it is to be wished some expedition were to be found out to put a stop to their proceedings. At present, they are a little embroiled in warrs with the country which hinders them from insulting us as much as formerly but no sooner at peace but they incite the natives against us, and in short are very troublesome neighbours. You may observe by the books, the Charges for last year is about £10,000 including buildings, loss by exchange and interest, etc. Garrison on account the French being so near us, and the unsettled condition of the country, and though we have about 300 in numbers there is not twenty Englishmen among them, including officers; but are made up of scrub topasses and rascally Portuguese that are daily deserting to the French though they have the same pay as those of our own nation; had we but 100 English (40 or 50 is absolutely necessary) with the like number of topasses we need not fear the threats of the Mallabars nor the insults of the French and our charges would be considerably less. You may likewise observe the balance of the books to amount to Rs. 5,90,032 of which there is Rs. 13,222 in cash and Rs. 24,938 in pepper and cardamoms, Rs. 1,59,428 in debts, and Rs. 4,02,444 lying dead in forts, stores, etc. We owe

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Mr. Adams Rs. 30,000 at interest since May last at 12 per cent per annum. This is the state of the books Pepper 1535 candies 15 maunds bought last season.³³

Thus at Tellicherry at this date, the Company's factory is, in effect, bankrupt, and depends on advances from its own Chief who charges 12 per cent interest.

Despite all this, the vigorous efforts of such chiefs of the subordinate factories as John Wallis and Robert Adams coupled with those of Governors William Phipps and Robert Cowan at Bombay in the 1720's reduced the dangers to country-shipping, constantly strengthened the British position against Dutch, French, and Portuguese, and hence prepared the way for the development of the country-trade to which we shall turn tomorrow evening.

³³ Corr. Mem. 9. William Forbes to John Fletcher 'received 5 July 1727, from Mr. Drummond'.

II

THE COUNTRY TRADE OF BOMBAY AND SURAT IN THE 1730'S

It is now, I think, fully realized by economic historians that the steadily increasing participation in the maritime trade of Asia by Europeans in partnership—voluntary and involuntary—with local traders and seamen was the foundation upon which the imperialism of more recent times was to be built. Nowhere is the process to be more clearly seen than in this city and on this coast where the interconnections between European and non-European enterprise were both more numerous and more various than elsewhere. If we think of the servants of East India companies primarily as servants of these companies rather than as servants of their own private interests we gain but an imperfect understanding of their activities. Every such servant had his private as well as his public 'concerns' to use the word then in vogue. For the former, he kept his own set of books, and, as he became more prosperous, employed his own Asian staff of linguists, writers, cash-keepers and peons. Coming out to the East usually with a small capital or none, he was in early life primarily a borrower from, and in later life primarily a lender to, his friends and business associates—both European and non-European. In his middle or later life, the East India Company whom he served was normally more in debt to him than he to them. The English East India Company placed less restrictions than any other on the private concerns of its servants. The Company's policy at this time is best expressed in their admonition to their captains in Siam:

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The Company give an equal liberty to trade from all their settlements to any other parts of India; if any who trade under the Company's protection shall be found to create an ill opinion of the British subjects so trading under that protection or endeavour to prevail with the natives to put harder terms upon them than are allowed to the Company's servants in general, they [shall] be sent home.¹

Through knowledge of the private lives of country-traders, we gain the best insight regarding the economic history of the time. Let us first look at the Indian career of Robert Cowan, the Irishman who was Governor of Bombay from 1728 to 1734. Cowan, who hailed from Londonderry in Ulster, first tried his luck overseas in Lisbon. Having failed there in an effort to make money by selling naval stores, he went out to Bombay on the ill-fated *Cassandra*, the ship of which I spoke yesterday. He behaved so gallantly in the action with the pirates and in assisting Captain Macrae to get the survivors to Bombay in the former pirate-sloop *Fancy*, that Macrae loaned him £22,000. In the spring of 1721, Cowan was sent to Goa to negotiate the agreement with the Portuguese of August 1721 for common action against Kanhoji Angré. He was rewarded with a seat in Council, and took a prominent part in the series of events which led to the breakdown of that agreement later in the year. He was briefly in command of the Bombay land forces until superseded by Commodore Mathews. He refused to be present when the Portuguese Viceroy negotiated an agreement with the Marathas in January 1722. He regarded this as a base and treacherous repudiation of the Viceroy's obligations to the English. By 1723 Cowan was owner of at least one country-ship and freighter of others. We know

¹ Corr. Repts 1, Feb. 2, 1721, Committee's consideration of the quarrels between captains Powney and Hamilton in Siam.

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about his later activities because he was accused of having, when governor, overstepped the proprieties in merging his private with his public concerns. He was dismissed from the service in 1734. He was, however, warmly defended by his predecessor in the governor's chair, William Phipps.

The accusations against Cowan were chiefly two; first, that he bought coffee on his own account and resold it to the Company instead of having the Company buy it direct; second that he charged a private commission for the use of the Bombay mint. With regard to the first of these, the position was as follows: Cowan, as Governor, loaned to himself as country-trader, at 2 per cent interest, enough rupees from the Company's treasury (reckoning the rupees at 216 per 100 dollars) to buy a cargo of cotton piece-goods to be bartered at Mocha by his friend John Dickinson, the Company's agent, for 100,000 dollars worth of coffee. These piece-goods were shipped from Bombay to Mocha on one of Cowan's own country-ships, the *Carolina*. His accusers contended that this was unnecessary because there were available at Mocha for the purchase of coffee 100,000 Mocha dollars in bills of exchange on Bombay or Surat at the lower rate of 198 Bombay rupees per 100 dollars or 200 Surat rupees per 108 dollars. His defenders held that coffee must be bought early long before the late spring when bills of exchange for a lakh or more became available, and that Cowan's behaviour was perfectly proper. Whatever may be thought of the merits of this transaction, it would seem clear at any rate that two per cent interest was far too low and that the Company was certainly cheated in that aspect of the affair, if in no other. Cases of this kind make vividly clear why the Company made so little headway when in conflict with the private interests of its own servants.

The private commissions on coining rupees illustrate the same point in a different way. Here, Cowan's defense

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was that the practise was well established and had been begun by Phipps. Having supplanted the Portuguese xeraphin with the Bombay rupee, Phipps had worked to make the Bombay rupee the equal of the Surat rupee. Testifying in Cowan's behalf, Phipps said 'it was my negotiating bills at Cambay, Surat, and other places and accommodating the [Indian] merchants with money that raised the rupee; my opinion is that if you cramp your governor in his Commission you will actually bring your mint into disrepute.' The Company's Directors in fact found it impossible to stop this practice; all they could do was to insist that the Company receive a commission of 1 per cent, additional to the governor's 2 per cent. Cowan likewise was accused of lending money to Indian shroffs without interest in return for private favours and of freighting his own ships in preference to the Company's ships. He defended himself on the ground that at the same time he procured considerable freights for the Company's ships from Hindu and Muslim merchants who had formerly never been asked to fill the empty space often available in a Company ship when she was leaving one Indian port to proceed to another to load cargo for Europe.

In such ways, a Bombay governor of this period could build a private fortune. Dismissal might mean little to such a man. Cowan was apparently trying to remit home four lakhs of rupees [Rs. 4,00,000] when he died in Bombay late in 1737; Rs. 1,20,000 of this was certainly held back on the ground that it arose from his transactions with Henry Lowther whom the Company's Directors accused of malpractices at Surat. Cowan's will, probated at Bombay December 7, 1737, is a very interesting document. By it, he left his spinster sister in Londonderry Rs. 40,000 and made provision for the repayment of those who had suffered from his youthful failure in Lisbon: 'For payment of my share of the debts of the unfortunate house that I was concerned in at Lisbon in Portugal, I

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give and bequeath eighty thousand rupees to be equally distributed among the lawful creditors of Cowan and Lort in proportion to their respective credits'. He left the residue of his estate to his brother at home with instructions to invest it in land in England or Ireland. Should all his brothers and sister's heirs fail, he gives it to his closest Bombay friends William Phipps and John Gould. This provision, along with small bequests to his godsons—boys whom his fellow country-traders have named Cowan Henry Draper and Robert Cowan Kellett—show how clannish the community of Bombay country-traders was becoming.²

Cowan was certainly a far more estimable character than his business associate at Surat, Henry Lowther, who rose to be chief of the Company's factory there in 1734-35. Lowther's career reveals corrupt practices of a most flagrant character. His method was to place large sums of the Company's money in the names of Indian brokers on the Company's books, speculate with the money himself for months gaining 9 per cent interest on it and then repay sufficiently frequently to avoid suspicion. Between 1724 and 1735 he never had less than a lakh of rupees on the books in Indian brokers' names, and thus defrauded the Company of more than £120,000 until he was found out.³ It seems quite clear that the country-traders who held high positions in the Company's service had the whip-hand over the independent country-captains and free merchants in the 1730's. Not until later in the cen-

² Corr. Repts 2. Committee meetings of January 6th, 7th, 13th and 18th 1732; proceedings on accusations of Messrs. Waters and Page against Robert Cowan; Bombay Wills 1732-1738, probate of will of Robert Cowan Dec. 7, 1737 (will drawn January 4, 1735).

³ Public Record Office, C.O. 77/17, papers in the case of the East India Co. vs. Henry Lowther, James Ramsden, and others. India Office, Corr. Mem 11, papers on the frauds of Henry Lowther from 1724; Corr. Repts 2, committee proceedings *re* Lowther Oct. 23, 1735, March 25, 1736.

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ture did any free merchants like the Forbes's become merchant princes overshadowing the Company's chiefs and governors.

In the 1730's, the power of a Company governor could make or break a country-captain. This, the career of Captain Francis D'Abbadie well shows. In 1714, young D'Abbadie came out a midshipman on the Company's ship *Catherine* to Bombay, and immediately went into Governor Aislabie's service and that of several other merchants as a mate of the country-ship *William* trading to Sumatra. It took D'Abbadie thirteen years to become part owner of the ship he commanded. He had £16,000 invested in her. Nevertheless, he charged that he remained at the mercy of Governor Phipps. He told the Court of Directors in London that Phipps denied him the Company's pass, forced him to go on a voyage to Basra and Bandar Abbas in Persia against his better judgement and influenced the other owners to relieve him of the command.⁴ We also know that governors could favour their own private interests in exercising the Company's power to take into custody the books and property of deceased country-captains.

The surviving wills probated in Bombay in the 1730's show us something of this society dominated by the 'country-trading' governors of the period.⁵ There is no evidence of great fortunes, only one reference to a 'great' house, and little mention of Eurasian children. Domestic slavery is an accepted institution, and manumission appears less common than it was a half century later. Perhaps the most interesting will is that of Daniel Taudin

⁴ Corr. Mem. 9, case of Captain Francis D'Abbadie, undated but no citations later than 1728.

⁵ All wills quoted here from two vols., *Bombay Wills 1732-38, and 1738-45*, in the India Office Records; dates of probate, Taudin, July 29, 1741; Tranter Dec. 8, 1742; Ingram Oct. 6, 1736; Annesley, Dec. 9, 1732; Southcott, April 25, 1741.

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who was either a Frenchman or an Irish Jacobite refugee with relatives in Bordeaux. He makes token bequests to his relatives in Bordeaux, large bequests of £500 each to his two daughters, with residue to his widow and enjoins her to keep the estate invested in the East India Company's securities. He leaves fifty rupees to 'the poor people of Surat to be distributed among the very ancient lame and blind but no part thereof to those common healthy beggars following every Dead Corpse to all the Tombs.'

Other sizable estates were those of Dorothy Tranter, of Jonah and Jane Ingram, and of Samuel Annesley. Mrs. Tranter's husband was a country-captain who had accumulated several thousand pounds. The bequests of Jonah and Jane Ingram show a country-trading family with roots both in Bombay and Calcutta. Their four slaves are all freed, and given twenty rupees apiece. The three slave-girls may have free passages to Calcutta if they wish. Samuel Annesley, the well-known merchant of Surat, was a brother-in-law of Samuel Wesley, the father of John and Charles Wesley, the founders of Methodism. Annesley's will probated in Bombay December 9, 1732 left one shilling 'to Samuel Wesley, Rector of Epworth in the county of Lincoln and to my sister Susannah his wife and to their sons and daughters to cut them off from all and every such pretense of benefit'. Wesley appears to have failed to repay a loan from Annesley. Annesley's widow who died in Bombay two years later indirectly forgave the debt by making it an obligation of Wesley to his own daughters. The wills of ordinary people, gunners, carpenters, smiths, hairdressers reveal that a large number of these were Irishmen one of whom asked that former governor Cowan, a fellow Irishman, invest his money for him in Irish land. There is the pathetic will of Richard Southcott written February 3, 1741 at a place called 'Garia' [Gheria] on the Coast of Malabar.

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where he is 'prisoner with that noted rogue Angrey, he having the power at present under God to destroy my body at his pleasure'. On August 9, 1732 letters of administration are granted to Rustomjee Dorabjee for the estate of John Everitt, ensign in the Company's service. The wills also show that Hanoverians, His Majesty's electoral subjects, have appeared in Bombay.

These are a few of the people whose lives, intermingled with those of hundreds of Indians, of whom we unfortunately know far less, make the maritime history of the time. Let us look at the two branches of trade which were of most concern to the merchants of Bombay and Surat—the coffee trade of the Red Sea and the trade of the Persian Gulf.

Fortunately, the English East India Company's agents at Mocha kept accurate records on the commercial activity of that port on the Yemeni coast. Mocha then welcomed approximately thirty large ships in every trading season. The port was indeed the Aden of those days. With Jedda and Hodeida it welcomed the pilgrims for the Haj. In the season of 1731-32, twenty-eight ships called. Only four of these were European East India Companies' ships. A Dutch Company ship brought Java sugar, pepper, and spices, en route to Europe via Colombo. Two English Indiamen brought out silver and base metals from London en route to Bombay. The fourth, the largest of all, was the French East India Company's ship *De Bourriers*, 800 tons, 54 guns, bringing silver and base metals from France en route to Mauritius (then Isle de France). The rest of the 28 ships were country-ships. Among them, those freighted and commanded by Indians outnumbered those commanded by Europeans both in numbers and in tonnage; the thirteen primarily Indian-financed ships totalled 4390 tons, and the European-controlled ships only 2440 tons. The explanation is that the Cheliahys, described as 'Turkish' merchants at Surat, and

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other Muslim ship-owners there owned the largest country-ships then afloat. Among the eleven European country-captains, seven were English, one Portuguese, and three French. Typical of the big Surat country-ships is the *Faziatim*, 800 tons, 20 guns, carrying Surat piece-goods to Mocha. In fact, the bulk of the country-cargoes coming in to Mocha consisted of all varieties of India piece-goods, raw cotton and rice. Although coffee is the most important component of outward cargoes, it is quite clear Mocha was a mart of transshipment and many of these ships must be thought of as distributing sugar, spices, copper, and lead to East Africa and ports on both coasts of India. Although most of the voyages of the Indian-commanded ships are between Surat, Cambay, Bombay and the Red Sea, the European country-captains often include Madras and Calcutta in their itineraries.⁶

Compiling statistics merely on the basis of captains and cargoes gives no clear idea of the way in which European and non-European personnel and capital are intermingled in the Mocha trade. Fortunately, there is one shipping-list, that of 1738-39, which records the ownership of cargoes as well as of ships. This shows us the ship *Diu*, 300 tons, 30 guns, Portuguese captain, lascar crew of 8, 'freighted by banians with piece-goods and cotton' plying between Diu and Mocha; the *Enterpriser*, 250 tons, 40 guns, English captain, crew of 10 'freighted by Surat Borahs with piece-goods'; the *Resolution*, 350 tons, 50 guns, English captain, crew of 12, likewise 'freighted by Surat Borahs with piece-goods'; the *Jenny*, 250 tons, 40 guns, 13 lascars, English captain and supercargo taking piece-goods, silk, iron and sugar from Pondicherry to Mocha, then to Jedda, presumably with pilgrims, then back to Mocha to load with coffee, drugs, and treasure

⁶ Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea, 2, Mocha shipping list 1731/32 (incorrectly dated as beginning Oct. 1732 but corrected to Oct. 1731 and endorsed 'year 1732').

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for Madras and Bengal. An item like the last shows how country-ships in peace time traded at any Indian port where profit could be found.⁷ In the previous season 1737-38 there were 27 ships, 14 under European captains, 13 under Muslim captains. The 13 under Muslim captains had twice the carrying capacity of the 14 under European captains.⁸

Thus it appears that the trade to the Red Sea was surely just as important to Bombay and Surat in the 1730's as the trade to the Persian Gulf. For so-called 'overland' communication with Europe, the European East India companies used both the Red Sea and Persian Gulf routes. We have the instructions of the English Company of 1736 that if the Suez route is to be used, outward despatches should go via Leghorn and Latakia to Cairo and homeward despatches should go via Suez, Cairo, Alexandria to Marseilles.⁹ It is a great mistake to suppose that at this period the Persian Gulf route was always used for despatches and the Suez route never. The Suez route was often used, and the East India Company had regular agents in Cairo.¹⁰

The correspondence of the English East India Company's agents in Mocha, who were on the Bombay civil establishment, shows that the naval force of the Bombay Marine was needed to stabilize and expand the Red Sea trade. As one of these agents, Francis Dickinson, said in his general letter home from Mocha in April 1729: "The Bombay galleys have gained a great reputation, they are here more afraid of one of them than of two ships from

⁷ *Ibid*, list for 1738-39.

⁸ *Ibid*, list for 1737-38.

⁹ Corr. Mem. 11, instructions of Court of Directors to Messrs. John Coke, Lisle, W. Leake & Co. of 'Grand Cairo' undated, but may be attributed to April or May 1736.

¹⁰ Holden Furber, "The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", *Journal of Indian History*, 29 (1951) 105-133.

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England.¹¹ The English Company's agent had two main tasks in this decade of the 1730's. On the one hand, he must adapt himself to the frequent local revolutions in the Yemen and force whichever Imam was in power to allow the Company to trade and to buy free of customs the number of bales of coffee agreed upon. On the other hand, he must cope with Dutch, French, and Portuguese competition at a time when other sources of coffee—Java, Bourbon, and West India—were beginning to challenge the supremacy of Mocha.

Since 1716, the English Company had decided it was absolutely essential to keep a European agent on shore in Mocha the year round if they were going to collect safely enough bales for even two cargoes a year. This agent naturally had to be a European country-trader on his own account, and his activities made the Company's coffee trade not just a matter of having one or two 'Europe' ships a year call at Mocha to pick up coffee. In the 1730's, the trade became linked with the English country-trade of the Arabian Sea, and much of the coffee went through Bombay before being sent to Europe. In order to understand what was happening, we must picture the turbulent scene in the Yemen. The coffee was first brought to the great mart at Bet-el-fakih in the interior which was nearer to Hodeidah than to Mocha. Normally Europeans did not venture there, and had to depend on their Muslim agents. A local revolution might easily prevent the European East India companies from getting in their coffee. This happened in 1728. It happened again in 1730 when 700 tribesmen descended on Bet-el-fakih and plundered it. On such occasions, the country's production dropped from 60,000 or 70,000 bales of coffee to 30,000 bales. All the companies' agents could do was wait for the country to settle down under a new governor,

¹¹ Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea, 2, General Letter from Mocha, April 25, 1729.

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resist his exactions by threatening to use their maritime power to close both Hodeidah and Mocha to trade. As the English Company's agent possessed the most force it was he on whom the main burden of bargaining fell and he sometimes had to forego the Company's right to load 600 bales duty free in order to load any coffee at all. Much depended on his ability to hold in line his European competitors for if the Dutch or French allowed a governor of the port to exact greater tribute, the English were forced to pay as much or risk losing the season.¹²

The Dutch at this period posed the greatest problem. On January 7, 1729, a Dutch Company ship arrived from Batavia with a whole new staff, including a few soldiers to re-establish the Dutch factory at Mocha. Their object was not to buy Mocha coffee, but to embarrass and harass the English, French, and Portuguese. Since the Dutch were developing their Java coffee and had enough to supply their own home market, they desired to manipulate the price of Mocha and hold it at a height which would discourage their competitors. The Dutch ship's arrival raised the price of coffee to 113 Mocha dollars a *bhar*. The Dutch seemed to want to sell only spices and keep up the price of coffee, landing over 70,000 dollars in silver to impress the Arab merchants.¹³ In the following year, they still were able to keep the price high, forcing the English to buy 3,000 and the French to buy 1,500 bales at 114 dollars a *bhar* while they themselves bought about 300 bales.¹⁴ This policy caused the Directors of the English Company at home to reconsider the whole position of Mocha coffee in the struggle with the new Java, Bour-

¹² Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea 2, Phipps to Dickinson, Dec. 2, 1728; Dickinson to Court of Directors, Jan. 15, 1729, March 30, 1730, June 18, 1730, August 9, 1731.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Dickinson to Court of Directors Jan. 15, 1729, March 28, 1729, July 29, 1729; General Letter from Mocha Apr. 25, 1729.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Dickinson to Court of Directors June 30, 1730; David Wilkie to Court of Directors Aug. 9, 1731.

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bon and West India coffee. They limited their demand to 2,000 bales and forbade their agent to offer more than 130 dollars a *bhar* in 1733.¹⁵ By that time they had already heard that the price had risen to 166 dollars a *bhar* because of the wreck of two Turkish cargoes off Suez.¹⁶ The Dutch had no need themselves to deal in coffee. In the trading season of 1732-33, they made a profit of 50,000 florins on the sale of 1494 pounds of nutmeg, 9716 pounds of cloves, and 80 pounds of cinnamon, and they made half as much profit on their powdered and candy sugar and Malabar pepper.¹⁷

The Portuguese made one extraordinary attempt to reassert themselves at Mocha and then withdrew. In May 1729, the Viceroy at Goa, probably in consequence of feeling more secure following the death of Kanhoji Angré suddenly sent a large 'Europe' ship to Mocha accompanied by a smaller escort ship to demand the large sum of 507,000 dollars from the Imam of Yemen. This sum represented all Portuguese arrears since their treaty of 1672 with the Imam's ancestor. They even told the English Company's agent he had no right to freight Muslim treasure and goods on the English Company's ships. In July, the Portuguese actually attempted to threaten the governor of Mocha into concessions. The governor promptly imprisoned the Portuguese envoys in his palace, and called the chiefs of the English, Dutch and French factories into consultation as to what he should do. They told him that, in international law, he had done wrong and should release the envoys. He did so, but ordered the fort to fire on the Portuguese ships. This brought about new negotiations, and the Viceroy was finally persuaded to give up this absurd attempt to

¹⁵ Corr. Repts. 2, Oct. 11, 1733, committee's draft *re* Mocha coffee.

¹⁶ Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea 2, Issac Houssaye et al, super-cargoes at Mocha to Court of Directors May 30, 1732.

¹⁷ K.A. 2213, f. 173.

revive Portuguese power in the Red Sea. He attributed his defeat to the machinations of the English, though Francis Dickinson had in fact not advised the governor to take strong measures against the Portuguese.¹⁸

By the end of the 1730's, however, the English Company's agent controlled the ports of Yemen. He had two galleys and a bomb-ketch of the Bombay Marine to support his demands. He had actually extracted 8,000 dollars in damages for past wrongs from the governor of Mocha and a promise of 10,000 dollars more, and he had brought down the price of coffee to a reasonable figure.¹⁹ He was the most important figure in the country-trade of the Red Sea. He had persuaded the Indian merchants of Surat to use him as their agent.²⁰ He controlled the disposal of the Company's treasure, and copper and lead sent out from Europe. He could market the copper and lead to English country-captains and he could freight piece-goods to both coasts of Arabia. Not only that, he could and did buy coffee on his own account and ship it into the Persian and Ottoman empires via Basra. The activities of the Company's three agents in the 1730's, Francis Dickinson, William H. Draper, and Thomas Waters make it perfectly clear that the Mocha trade was less and less profitable to the Company and more and more profitable to the agents and their friends among the country-traders of Bombay, Surat and even Bengal.²¹ As early as 1725, the Directors at home recommended withdrawal, though they wrote to Bombay 'a settlement may be very beneficial to a chief and to the English country-traders

¹⁸ Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea 2, Dickinson to Court of Directors July 29, 1729.

¹⁹ Misc. Let. Rec. 28, f. 65 Petition of Thomas Waters June 7, 1738.

²⁰ Fac. Rec. Egypt and Red Sea 2, Dickinson to Court of Directors, August 9, 1731.

²¹ Misc. Let. Rec. 28, f. 28, W. H. Draper to Court of Directors Sept. 30, 1737.

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at Mocha yet as the same has been hitherto managed. it has not proved so to the Company.²² The Directors' instructions to withdraw were not carried out either then or later.

Let us now turn from Mocha to the Persian Gulf where the situation was much the same. There the Directors did succeed in the 1730's in withdrawing their factors from Ispahan, but it took two years before the Bombay government actually carried out the orders from home in 1735-36.²³ This made the Company's Persia books show a small profit during the 1730's of £1,277 but even this was illusory, for the Directors calculated that, if they took into consideration the demurrage they paid ship-owners because of delays at Persian ports, Bombay Presidency was losing £1,000 a year because of the retention of the Company's factory at Bandar Abbas. In 1740, Bandar Abbas (then called Gombroon) was costing Bombay four lakhs [4,00,000] Persian shahees a year—the military costs and the presents to local officials alone absorbed over a lakh of shahees. The factory's only revenue was the consulage allowed the Company at Gombroon and Basra. The presents and items put down as 'charges extraordinary' had doubled since 1727 'whilst our trade was declining only to serve the corrupt ends and purposes of our servants formerly there'.²⁴ Nevertheless, the English Company did not withdraw from the Persian Gulf. The country-trade though declining, was of too much concern to the Bombay civil servants in their private capacities, and Basra was indispensable to the regular use of the 'overland' route for dispatches. Moreover,

²² Corr. Repts. 1, Sept. 28, 1725, committee's examination of Mocha affairs.

²³ Corr. Mem. 10, summaries of references to Persia in General letters to Bombay, items from letter of March 7, 1733.

²⁴ Corr. Repts. 3, Considerations on Gombroon affairs, Dec. 6, 1743.

the Bombay civil servants could not desert the Muslim traders of Surat who supplied the Gulf with piece-goods. Had the Bombay government withdrawn its protection from the English and Muslim country-merchant, the French were ready to supplant both the English and Dutch. They were already at work building up their influence in Muscat.²⁵ Half the country-shipping plying between Western India and the Persian Gulf was English, and nearly all the rest of it was Muslim shipping carrying the English Company's pass.²⁶ As in the Red Sea, this Muslim shipping had about twice as much carrying capacity as the English shipping.

After 1739 the English were to have only four undisturbed trading seasons before the War of the Austrian Succession would make its influence felt in the Eastern Seas—the Anglo-Spanish war of 1739 had no immediate effect in India. It was therefore most fortunate that the Bombay government did not allow itself to become embroiled with the Marathas as an ally of the Portuguese. The last years of the 1730's are, as you realize, the years in which the Goa government lost Bassein and Salsette. As the Viceroy made an outright appeal to the English on the ground that all Europeans should unite when faced with Maratha power, these events are of more than usual interest. Eighteenth-century Indian history would surely be very different if all Europeans had united against the Marathas or any other Indian power, or if all Indian powers had united against Europeans.

The Bombay government's policy toward the Portuguese was much influenced by previous experience. In their view, the Portuguese Viceroy had left them in the lurch by making a separate peace with the Marathas in 1722 when there were four English king's ships off the

²⁵ K.A. 1754 f. 2611.

²⁶ K.A. 1726 ff. 2669-2671; K.A. 1748 ff. 1143-46; K.A. 1754, f. 2562.

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coast available to defeat Kanhoji Angré if he had not been allowed to go into Goa harbour and refit.²⁷ There were also rather bitter memories of the events of 1730 when Governor Cowan rushed to Portuguese aid without any security, and, by spending £5,000, prevented the Marathas from taking Thana. In return the Portuguese Viceroy made no concessions whatever; Bombay goods were subjected to 10 per cent custom duties at Thana, and the British ambassador at Lisbon had no success in getting full payment of the loans.²⁸ When the Marathas seized Thana in March 1737 and a new crisis arose, Governor Horne of Bombay sent Onslow Burrish as a special envoy to Goa in October 1737 to remind the Viceroy that he must not think lightly of Maratha power. Burrish was to point out that a policy of intransigence was folly. No aid Bombay could give would under the prevailing circumstances help.²⁹ It was the Bombay Council's secret hope that by mediating in the quarrel they might get Salsette for themselves. For this, they were severely reprimanded by the Court of Directors in London.³⁰ Baji Rao I then had twenty thousand men available. He had occupied most of Salsette, and was besieging Bassein. Thus from the Portuguese point of view, the English aid was too little and too late during the critical year before Bassein fell in May 1739. From the Bombay Council's point of view, the Viceroy should have realized his weakness and allowed the English to mediate a peace settlement while Bassein, Versova, and Bandra were still in Portuguese hands. As it was, the Bombay government did continue its loans to the Vice-

²⁷ Misc. 8, ff. 93-99 A. G. Pereira's memorial from Lisbon and Court of Director's reply Sept. 9, 1738.

²⁸ *Ib'd.* f. 85.

²⁹ Public Record Office. C.O. 77/17, Horne to Burrish (copy) Oct. 4, 1737.

³⁰ C. K. Srinivasan, *Baji Rao I*, pp. 118-19.

roy. After the fall of Bassein, it provisioned the Portuguese troops and refitted the ships until they could be repatriated.³¹

The Portuguese Viceroy was no more successful in convincing the Dutch that all Europeans should stand together than he was with the English. His letter on the subject was more forthright. Written February 27, 1739, it pictured the military situation in the blackest terms, described Goa as in danger, and said Maratha victory would harm all European nations. The Dutch admiral, Siersma, refused help, and held Angré was the power to be feared.³² Angré then had 9 'grabs' mounting 10 to 12 guns, and 25 'gallivats' of 4 guns each, served by about 4000 seamen.³³ The Portuguese in 1737-1740 were truly in desperate straits. In September 1737, the Viceroy appealed to all classes of the population to support the government with a loan, and raised over a million xeraphins—the churches, the municipalities, and the wealthy India merchants being the chief subscribers.³⁴

It is noteworthy, in considering this whole affair, that the Bombay civil servants were very cool to the idea that the British government in London should send the king's ships into the Indian ocean to help the Portuguese. Quite as was to be expected, the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State, was continually urged from Lisbon to give aid to Portugal. On June 1, 1739, before the fall of Bassein was known in London, the East India Company considered the whole situation in the light of their letters

³¹ Misc. 8, ff. 308-310, extracts from Bombay advices and consultations, May 5, 1739, July 6, 1739.

³² K.A. 2366, ff. 1168-1187, letters exchanged between Don Luis de Botelho, the Viceroy's envoy and R. Siersma.

³³ K.A. 2355, ff. 1880-1885, information supplied by a Dutch sailor Jorge de Rotjes who had escaped from captivity with Angré.

³⁴ Arquivo Ultramarino, Lisbon, India bundle 87, lists of loans to Government 1737-41 (copy sent from Goa to Lisbon in 1828) total xeraphins 1,116,655.

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from Bombay. In replying to the Duke, who obviously would have been glad to send out some naval support, the Directors said that, if ships were sent to help the Portuguese, the Company would be glad if they were of help, but that they frankly could not see any point in it. The war, said they, was a land war; their Bombay governor and council had assured them it would require no less than three thousand regular European land forces with a train of artillery to regain Salsette alone, to say nothing of the Marathas' prior conquests, and concluded: 'If we should be drawn into a War with that Powerful Nation, it would endanger the loss of the Island of Bombay.'³⁵ Somewhat later the same attitude is reflected in a paper on the 'State of the Portuguese in the East Indies and the Relation of English affairs to them' which Captain Gough, an East India captain, delivered to Sir Robert Walpole on October 2, 1738.³⁶ The whole burden of this paper was that the Portuguese are in a decline which the English should do nothing to arrest—that, if the Dutch are so unwise as to assist Goa, the English should seize the opportunity to improve their good relations with the Marathas. In fact, Gough thought the Bombay civil servants had given Goa too much help, and the Court of Directors' Committee of Correspondence took the same attitude: 'With regard to the affair of Salsette it appears to the Committee they [the Governor of Bombay in Council] have engaged and involved the Company in very Dangerous and Chargeable Measures more than was requisite for the just and necessary defence of the Island of Bombay.'³⁷ The whole episode in short shows that there was no clear cut division between European

³⁵ Public Record Office C.O. 77/17, E.I. Co. to Secretary of State, June 1, 1739, signed by Christopher Mole; see also Misc. 8, f. 21 Mole to Newcastle Jan. 18, 1738.

³⁶ Misc. 8, f. 85.

³⁷ Corr. Repts. 3, June 8, 1738.

and non-European powers on this coast at this period. Just as the Europeans depended on non-European support, so the Indian powers depended on European support. Both Baji Rao I and Angré had Europeans in their service.

This humbling of the Portuguese in the last years of the 1730's served only to further enhance the power of the English. It is the Dutch shipping lists for Cochin which give us the most dramatic evidence of the increase of English commercial power on this coast. Every ship, every cargo was meticulously recorded in Cochin. The careful reproduction of these hundreds of entries, and the use of a computer upon them would be a great service to India's economic history. I am here only able to give the results of sampling the data of five trading seasons 1723-24, 1733-34, 1738-39 and 1741-42.³⁸ There seems no doubt whatever that English country-shipping doubled between 1724 and 1742 in terms of tonnage, 3,000 tons in the mid-1720's increased to between 6,000 and 7,000 tons. The number of ships and English country-captains increased from approximately 17 to 28. A study of the names of captains shows apparently that few captains spent more than five or six seasons in this sort of life. They either died or went back to Europe within a half dozen years, but there was no lack of adventurous souls to replace them. It is interesting that nearly all these captains' names are English. The increase of Scots and Irish among the English Company's servants was apparently not paralleled by a like increase among the 'free merchants'. A study of their voyages leads to the conclusion that most of the captains were based in Bengal rather than Bombay. The increase in English country-shipping tends to accelerate; every new ship, every replacement of an old ship by a larger ship means more demand for

³⁸ K.A. 1907 f. 473, 1723/24; K.A. 2212, f. 1318, 1733/34; K.A. 2366, f. 1048, 1738/39; K.A. 2472 f. 5640, 1741/42.

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marine stores, and marine stores are in their turn one of the most important bulwarks of the outward 'privilege trade' of the captains, mates and crews of the 'Europe' ships.

There also seems no doubt that it is only the English country-shipping which increases. At the end of the 1730's, the Dutch writers at Cochin need three folios to record the arrival, departures, and cargoes of English country-ships. The Portuguese and French entries remain the same and require only one folio. The Portuguese never rose above their usual four ships a season, and the French, once they had become a power on this coast with the occupation of Mahé, never rose above five ships a season. As for the Dutch, they strengthened their position on this coast, but not in private country-trading; the increase was in the business of the Dutch Company on the coast. This represents a mingling of Company interests and private interests but if the situation in 1741-42 is compared with that in the early 1720's, it is the growth of the English country-shipping which stands out. When comparison is made with the much more scanty information which we have for Surat it is clear that this increase is not made at the expense of Indian-commanded country-shipping. This certainly does not decrease, but it remains primarily based at Bombay and Surat, and its ships make fewer calls at Cochin. Armenian and Jewish capital is involved to some extent in both European and non-European country-shipping. Time does not permit us to explore further the extent of its participation. Jewish capital in Cochin should certainly be regarded as Indian. Armenian capital, though more fluid, can hardly be regarded as European. At this time Armenians do not seem to have played as great a role in the commerce of this coast, as they did in that of Madras and Bengal.

We have been dealing so far primarily with European country-traders and their lives. It would have been a

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great help to us if we had even a little information about the Indian country-traders, merchant princes, and sea-captains and their lives. The diary of a Muslim sea captain or a Parsi capitalist might help us with many problems, especially the vexed one of whether the Europeans were resented, and whether as early as this there were any situations comparable to those which arose later on with the development of European exclusiveness. My own judgement is that at this time the Europeans were not resented, that there was business enough for all and that the European development of lines which Indians would not otherwise have pursued in its turn stimulated greater Indian economic activity especially in Bombay and in Surat. A study of the country-trade in the 1730's gives us another illustration of the process whereby Bombay was slowly supplanting Surat as the commercial centre on this coast. It shows how as country-trading activity increases the English part therein grows out of all proportion to the other interests involved, how the English profit by others' misfortunes without experiencing any comparable misfortunes themselves, how the English so act that they do not as yet come into direct conflict with any Indian power, as the Dutch did with Travancore, and the Portuguese with the Marathas, how Bombay benefits from being an island centre of maritime and economic power which is Indian-based as well as British-based. In the light of these developments in the 1730's, we can better appreciate why the European community on this coast, and especially the British community, after the curbing of the pirate menace, regarded peace as the key to its greater prosperity, and hence struggled vainly to preserve it here even after the outbreak of another major war in Europe, which was to lead India on the road to Plassey and submission to European domination.

III

BOMBAY PRESIDENCY IN WAR TIME 1740-1750

THE EUROPEAN TRADING communities on this coast regarded the course of events in Europe in the early 1740's with great misgivings. It was of course vain to hope that a spread of a major European war to India could be prevented. However much the servants of European East India companies might wish to continue their, on the whole cordial, though illicit, business relations with each other, they could not prevent naval forces from being despatched to the East Indies. Anglo-French naval warfare led to the whole sorry business of the involvement of English and French in local quarrels in the Carnatic which in its turn led on to the events of the 1750's which are so familiar to us all. Even as regards the effects of the War of the Austrian Succession of 1744-48 in India so much has been written that I would prefer not to rehearse that story, but to tell you three others which are, I hope, unfamiliar, and which do concern the history of Bombay Presidency—these are the stories of Captain Robert Jenkins, of Governor William Wake, and of the Dutch factory at Surat.

Before the recent trend to eliminate colourful tags and traditional, though perhaps not strictly true, anecdotes from history text-books, the Anglo-Spanish war of 1739 which served as a curtain-raiser to the War of the Austrian Succession was known to every schoolboy as the 'War of Jenkins' Ear'. A paragraph or two was spent in describing the scene in March 1738 when Captain Jenkins exhibited before the House of Commons a bottle containing his severed ear as evidence of Spanish brutality. When:

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asked his feelings at the time of his injury, Jenkins is said to have replied 'I recommended my soul to God and my cause to my country.' The old-fashioned textbook writers never troubled to point out that, whatever the precise nature of the injury to Jenkins, it occurred in April 1731 when Spanish customs guards boarded Jenkins' ship *Rebecca* off Havana in the West Indies. Referring to *The Gentleman's Magazine* for 1731 as his authority, Archdeacon William Coxe in his famous *Memoirs of Walpole* wrote: 'On his arrival in England Jenkins is said to have gone to Court and laid his case before the King, and as some compensation for his treatment or to pacify him, to have been appointed captain of an East Indiaman.'¹ *The Gentleman's Magazine* later quoted an account of the incident off Havana from the *Craftsman* of July 10, 1731 referring to 'the case of Captain Jenkins when they [the Spanish coast guards] bid him carry his ear, after they had cut it off, to King George.'² Although there has been thorough modern investigation of the incident itself and of its revival for propaganda purposes by Walpole's opponents in 1738, no one except the British novelist Philip Gosse, who deals only with Jenkins' brief governorship of the island of St. Helena, has paid any attention to Jenkins' career as an East India captain.³

On August 23, 1732, among the tenders of ships opened before the Court of Directors was one for a new ship of 490 tons to be named the *Harrington* after the Earl of Harrington, then His Majesty's Secretary of State, and to

¹ William Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, I, 579. See also J. K. Laughton's note 'Jenkins's Ear', *English Historical Review*, IV, 741-49 (Oct. 1889); H. W. V. Temperley, 'The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739', *Royal Historical Society Transactions*, 3rd Series, III, (1909), 197-236. Cf. *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1731, f. 265.

² *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1731, f. 288, quoting from the *Craftsman*, No. 262 of July 10, 1731.

³ Gosse, Philip, *Saint Helena 1502-1938*, pp. 176 ff.

be commanded by Robert Jenkins. Her commander was however, to get no special favours; his ship was the last on the list taken up that season, and, as was usual, she was to begin with the least attractive and lucrative of East India voyages, the voyage to St. Helena and thence to the Company's most unhealthy station, the pepper 'factory' at Benkulen on the southern coast of Sumatra.⁴ On September 25, 1732 'a good many persons of distinction' attended the launching of the *Harrington* at Blackwall drydock, and Captain Jenkins, in a bold round hand, described the occasion on the first page of the ship's log.⁵ On November 15, 1732, he appeared before the Court, and took leave of them.⁶ His first voyage was uneventful. He was warmly received at Batavia, made two or three calls at Sumatran ports, and safely brought home his cargo of Benkulen pepper in June of 1734.⁷

Captain Jenkins' next voyage was more adventurous. Apparently because of previous experience in the illicit slave trade between Madagascar and the Caribbean, he was instructed on September 12, 1735 to purchase two hundred slaves at Madagascar for the East India Company—this number to be divided between St. Helena and Benkulen.⁸ He sailed December 31, 1735, and arrived at Port Dauphin in Madagascar May 13, 1736. Here he found some of his old acquaintances among the tribal chiefs still alive who he says 'professed a great deal of joy to see the English return to their port who had been so long absent.' Slaving, however, was a laborious process on the Madagascar coast; it involved much bargaining, much skill in handling the chiefs, flattering them, firing salutes in their honour, and at the same time overaweing them

⁴ Court Book 55, fols. 114, 123, 132.

⁵ Marine Rec. Logs 654 A.

⁶ Court Book 55, f. 201.

⁷ Marine Rec., Logs 654 A.

⁸ Corr. Repts. 2, instructions to Capt. Jenkins, Sept. 12, 1735.

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with swivel guns brought ashore. Besides this, the ship-captains had the problem of controlling their own crews. Jenkins was exasperated because he had collected only 97 slaves by July 16. He could not get together 200. On August 23, 1736, he arrived in Bombay harbour with 165 slaves. After a profitable voyage to Calcutta, he wintered there, sailed for home February 24, 1737, called at St. Helena June 19, and arrived back in the Thames in September of 1737.⁹

In the following March, Jenkins made his famous appearance before the House of Commons. On July 31, he sailed off again on his third East India voyage unaware that the war which was to be associated with his name would have begun before he returned. It was now his turn to share in the profits of a 'Bombay and China' voyage. On such a voyage, calls at Anjengo and Tellicherry and at ports in the China seas gave East India captains greater opportunities for private trading. At Anjengo in February 1739 Jenkins took aboard five boat loads of the private goods of Mr. William Wake, a gentleman destined three years later to become Governor of Bombay. In March, at Tellicherry, Jenkins embarked Stephen Law, the new Governor of Bombay, with all his private goods and servants. On April 8, 1739, the *Harrington* arrived in Bombay, and Governor Law landed with the usual ceremony. Sixteen country-ships were then riding at anchor in the harbour. Jenkins then loaded cotton for China, much of it no doubt on his own account. He called again at Tellicherry to load pepper, and then made off for the China seas, finally arriving at Canton on August 8, 1739. There he unloaded the cotton and pepper,

⁹ Marine Rec., Logs 654 B; see also H.M. 628, f. 503 'Terms of trade at Madagascar settled by Capt. Jenkins' showing prices in terms of 'buccaneer guns'. At Port Dauphin in 1736, a male slave could be bought for 1 gun and one-half gun with 30 shot, 30 flints, and 3 lbs. of powder.

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and took on tutenague, chinaware and tea.

Next winter he was back on this coast calling again at Anjengo and Tellicherry on his own and the Company's business. On January 9, 1740, the *Harrington* sailing up the coast in company with three country-ships sighted Angré's fleet. Jenkins later wrote in his log: 'At 6 P.M. saw 15 saile ahead which we took to be Angrea's fleet, and found it so; we got everything ready for engaging; the ship was very clear; the people well trained in the use of their great guns and small arms as we had taught them on the passage.' In the ensuing battle, Jenkins first attacked two of Angré's grabs on his larboard side, forced them to bear away, and then exchanged broadsides with four grabs to his starboard, forcing them to fall astern and form a line. The *Harrington* and the three ships with her then formed their own line, outweighed Angré's ships and dispersed them with broadsides and musketry. 'It gave me great pleasure' concluded Jenkins, 'to see Angria's great fleet run from a small ship, the rest of my fleet was at that time astern.' The next day, some of Angré's ships returned, and another victorious engagement took place. On March 5, 1740, the *Harrington* sailed from Bombay for the Cape of Good Hope, and arrived on June 8th at St. Helena where Jenkins was put in command of the whole home-going fleet of East Indiamen, on account of the war with Spain. He therefore arranged the convoy—*Rochester* ahead, *Chester* astern, *Harrington*, *Walpole*, *Shaftesbury*, *Grantham*, *Duke of Lorraine*, *Lynn*, *Houghton* in the first line, *Richmond*, *Marlborough*, and *Defence* in the second. On October 9, 1740, they safely arrived in the Thames.¹⁰

Jenkins was now a captain of note, as the battles with Angré were made much of. On December 23, 1740, the Court of Directors' Committee of Correspondence, confronted with evidence of great corruption among their

¹⁰ Marine Rec., Logs 654 C.

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servants at St. Helena 'took into consideration the affairs of St. Helena and are of opinion that Captain Robert Jenkins [should] be sent out supervisor thither with a good accountant as his assistant.'¹¹ He was therefore sent out in the *Royal George* in February 1741 and took over charge on May 9, 1741.¹² Constituting himself, his two councillors, and the two senior captains of Indiamen a special court of enquiry, he tried and imprisoned the former governor, Crispe, but removed his guards after the ships sailed. A few days later he wrote, 'We find that, in spite of our handsome Treatment, he will be Mr. Crispe still; however we resolve not to let him abuse longer either our masters or ourselves. We let him alone for a few days to his meditations, he having asked and we granted him the Loan of a book on Divinity.'¹³

The St. Helena records show that Jenkins was regarded as a fair and just governor. Typical of his conduct are his dismissal of a Company servant for not being 'as good an overseer of slaves as he ought to be,'¹⁴ and his disposal of a case of malicious harassment with the order, that 'Mr. Doveton be fined fifty shillings for his rashness as a warning to the Wealthy hereafter not to impose upon the poor.'¹⁵

In the following winter the Company were well satisfied that Jenkins had completed his mission. On March 22, 1742, the *Harrington* arrived at St. Helena from England under the command of Jenkins' first mate, David Foulis with Jenkins' successor on board. At 6 P.M. on April 23, 1742, 'Captain Jenkins came on board and took possession of the command of the ship as ordered by the

¹¹ Corr. Repts. 3, meeting of Dec. 23, 1740.

¹² H.M. 24, f. 84, copy of Jenkins' commission as governor; Fac. Rec., St. Helena 10, consultations, May 9, 1741.

¹³ Fac. Rec., St. Helena 10, consultation, May 13, 1741.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1742.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1741.

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Honourable Company, the fort fired twentyone guns at his putting away from the shore, we firing an equal number at his coming on board.¹⁶ On November 26, 1742, Jenkins went ashore at Bombay. His crew were by that time restive at not having received the rewards they expected for their gallant conduct against Angré two years before. A delegation consequently waited on the newly appointed Governor of Bombay, William Wake, who persuaded Jenkins to advance the men two months pay. A few days later, Jenkins fell ill, and on Saturday December 18, 1742, David Foulis wrote in the *Harrington's* log 'This evening about six, died Captain Robert Jenkins of a fever and flux, the eleventh day of his illness' and on Sunday the 19th, 'P.M., Captain Jenkins' Corps was committed with the usual Ceremony of prayer to the earth, a command of soldiers ordered to attend the Corps fired three Volleys, fort fired 18 half-minute guns, our ship 60 the number of years he was old—and the *Salisbury* 18 with which the Ceremony ended Sun set hauled down our broad pendant and at Sun rise hoisted a common one. Winds as usual.'¹⁷

Jenkins thus becomes not a mere name in a text book but a seaman typical of his period, neither a ruffian nor a rascal, despite the early voyages to Madagascar, never questioning the institution of slavery, but kind withal and apparently just, not an illiterate, for the logs of the *Harrington* are well and painstakingly written. In Jenkins' life, though he became an East India captain by accident, we can see what the lives of most of the Company's captains were really like. His ear however, retains an element of mystery; not a word about it in any of the East India records. Had he really carried it about with him as a cherished possession, it seems odd there was no mention of it at his death.

¹⁶ Marine Rec., Logs, 654 D.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*

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The second story I would like to tell you tonight concerns but one business venture of Governor William Wake as a country-trader in wartime, but as you will see, it tells us much of value for an understanding of the economic history of Bombay and Surat. The story is set in the trading season of 1747-48, and it has many characters. Besides Governor Wake himself, there are the country-captains Josias Holmes and Thomas Purnell who were often in his employ, the Muslim merchant and ship-owner Mulna Fackieruddin, Jacob Mossel, second in council of the Dutch East India Company's government at Batavia, Mossel's business agent at Batavia Jean Andreas Paravicini, Jan Schreuder, chief of the Dutch Company's factory at Surat, and his 'second' J. C. Pecoek, and finally Dom Pedro Miguel de Almeida e Portugal Marquez de Alorna, Marquez de Castelo Novo, Conde de Assumar, the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa.

William Wake, whose activities this story chiefly concerns, came out to India in the early 1720's. On February 22, 1732, the Court of Directors' Committee of Correspondence considered the petition of William Wake 'several years a free merchant at Bombay, and supercargo of several country ships, and very knowledgeable [sic] regarding the trade of the Malabar coast.' The Committee recommended that he be the youngest of Council at Bombay and be chief at Anjengo.¹⁸ From that start in the Company's service, Wake rose to be second in council at Bombay by the end of the 1730's and became governor in 1742. His country-trade like that of all the English was endangered when the Anglo-French war spread to the Indian seas in the autumn of 1744. During his years trading on the Malabar coast, he had met Jacob Mossel who, in the 1730's, rose to be chief of the Dutch Company's factory at Negapatam on the Coromandel coast. Mossel, in a career much like Wake's, rose to be

¹⁸ Corr. Repts. 2, meeting of Feb. 22, 1732.

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second in council at Batavia shortly before the outbreak of war. Since the Dutch were neutral in the early years of the war, Wake had more reason than ever to continue his business relations with Mossel. Because the Dutch Company imposed restrictions on the private trading of their servants, Mossel's dealings with the English were carried on through his agent John Andreas Paravicini who seems to have had a status at Batavia similar to that accorded to 'free merchants' at Bombay.

Our story begins on May 1, 1745 when Jacob Mossel authorized William Wake or his friend the country-captain Josias Holmes to buy a ship for Mossel's account and send her to Batavia on a voyage under Dutch colours protected by the Dutch Company's pass which was to be issued by the Dutch chief at Surat.¹⁰ In consequence, a ship named *Fackiero Mirachub* made one if not two successful trips from Bombay to Batavia with Surat cotton piece-goods before July 2, 1747. On that date, Mossel's agent, Paravicini, wrote as follows, in poor English:

To the honourable William Wake, Esq., Prezident en Governour of his Majesty's Castle and Island of Bombay Honourable Sir, I renewed [received] the favour of your letter by the Fackiero Mirachub and am very much obliged tho your Honour for the trouble you were pleased to take about her Leading according to mi desire which fully satisfiejth my attend. In hope your honour's excusing me I take with much respect the liberty to direct again to you aforesaid ship the Fackiero Mirachub and her cargo as per enclosed en-voyce bound for Souratte flattering myself your Honour will be so kind to cause this cargo to be sold to my gratest advantage whether in Souratta or Bombay and

¹⁰ Copies of the correspondence and documents concerning this affair cover 175 folios, 978-1153, in K.A. 2645. This account is based on these MSS, unless otherwise indicated.

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the need proceeds thereof sended to me in sundry goods of Souratta abating ten ropias which your Honour is desired to name for freight off the said ship to the Moor Malna Fackierodin Merchant in Souratta and the other necessary charges als to the sorts of goods petitioned in rat [council] will your Honour be please to regulate himself in the enclosed list, and hiring the ship again to despatch her in one time if your Honour thought myself able off serving you in anything in this cite or somewhere else, I desire humbly the favour of your Commands promitting obey em with all speed to ye utmost of my power. In the meanwhile I take the respectuous liberty to call myself with all possible reverence and devotion Honourable Sir, your Honour's most obedient humble servant to command.

This accompanied a letter from Paravicini to Jan Pecoock, at Surat, saying he was interesting himself more and more in the private trade to Surat. He had promised Wake 35 per cent on the net profits of the Surat piece-goods Wake sent to Batavia. He pointed out that as a matter of fact the Malays make no distinction between gruff goods and fine goods so it is pointless to send fine goods. Paravicini also says ships of 600 to 800 tons costing Rs. 10,000 each are best for this sort of trade.

So, on July 10, 1747, the *Fackiero Mirachub*, commanded by Wake's friend, Thomas Purnell, who had been duly enrolled as a 'burger' and resident of Batavia sailed for Bombay and Surat consigned to 'Mr. Jan Pecok, senior factor and second of the Dutch factory in Surat or to the noble Gentleman William Wake, Governor of Bombay.' She was carrying a cargo invoiced at fortysix thousand nineteen [46,019] rix dollars or Rs. 73,360, consisting chiefly of powdered sugar and sugar candy plus some wine, ivory, iron, camphor, porcelain, velvet and sapan wood.

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We now turn to the entry for August 21, 1747 in the Bombay Consultations: 'Imported the *Fuckhiro Mirakhib* Captain Thomas Purnel from Batavia with Dutch freight and passport but belonging to Mulna Fuckero-Deen.'²⁰ She unloaded very little of her cargo, and, apparently without Wake's knowledge, Captain Purnell allowed a Parsi merchant Maneckji Nowranjee to embark Rs. 20,000 in silver. Purnell then sailed for Surat on August 25th. Two days later, the grabs, *Bombay* and *Restoration* and the ketch *Drake* arrived with news of seeing three ships in the offing wearing French colours, one of 70 guns and one of 50 guns, and a third which looked very much like the *Fackiero Mirachub*. At once there was a great uproar in the fort; Wake convened the Council at 4 P.M. After some discussion, all agreed they had no forces strong enough to attack the French ships. The best they could do was order two country-captains out disguised as fishermen to reconnoitre. These returned on the 29th to say the *Fackiero* had undoubtedly been taken.²¹ The moment the first report of French ships in the offing came, Wake wrote overland to Pecoock at Surat of the ship, speaking of her as 'consigned to you by Mr. Paravicini in behalf of Jacob Mossel,' asking that boats be ready for her at Swally Hole, and enjoining him in case she had been 'detained' to represent to the French that 'she sailed from hence under Dutch colours and had a pass from the General at Batavia.' She was, however, taken into Goa as a prize of war.

On September 26, 1747, Jan Pecoock wrote a very indignant letter to Paravicini in Batavia, expressing astonishment that the cargo should have been consigned to him, and hoping that most of the ship's papers had been thrown overboard before capture. He wrote 'Fishing in the trou-

²⁰ Bombay Consultations, range 341, vol. 15, f. 289, Aug. 21, 1747.

²¹ Bombay Consultations, range 341, vol. 15, fols. 292-298, Aug. 27-29, 1747.

bled waters that the English and French make, may be most healthy but it should be done with a secure and impenetrable net.' Pecock was most incensed that the English Company's chief in Surat, Mr. Marsh, should have publicly started collecting piece-goods for the *Fackiero Mirachub's* return cargo three days before she was captured. In Pecock's opinion this alerted the French chief who immediately got word to the French ships. Pecock found it especially annoying that Wake had written him: 'Although I have not the pleasure of being known to you, I would have wrote to the Director [chief] on this occasion but am sensible for many reasons it is not altogether so proper as all the papers relating to the consignment run in your name' and even worse Wake had said 'If you find the ship and cargo is not to be restored, please to advise me if she with her entire cargo from Batavia can be ransomed and on what terms.'

Under these circumstances, Wake's problem was to prod Pecock into action to demand the ship at Goa. His letters to Pecock of December 1st and 7th 1747 are masterpieces. He says nothing in them of the ship's being consigned to him as well as to Pecock. He says that Purnell and his officers 'would declare upon oath that none of them ever said to the French or others, myself or any of the English were in any wise concerned in ship or cargo.' This, despite the fact that Purnell (probably on Wake's authority, though he denied it) had offered to ransom the ship for Rs. 40,000 at Goa. Wake pointed out that he had hired the ship from Mulna Fakiruddin for eight months for Rs. 10,000. Wake's letter shows that the contract for the first voyage was in Persian; for the last voyage, Mulna, who was with the Nizam at Aurungabad, accepted the terms by mail. On the strength of this, Wake had the effrontery to write Pecock 'Now, I cannot see what excuse even a Frenchman in the present case can have the assurance to make for his seizing this ship except

the King of France is at war with the Mogul as well as with the King of England.' The goods, said Wake though put on board at Batavia by English subjects, were not the property of English subjects. The treasure belonged to a Parsi. His view was that Pecoock should make representations at Goa on the ground that a claim based merely on the presence of the English master and two ship's officers could not stand up.

Wake was further upset by news from a Scottish country-captain at Tellicherry who reported on December 23, 1747 that, though he did not tell the French agent at Goa anything that would lead the French to think Wake was greatly concerned in the *Fackiero*, he did see the Frenchman hand back to Purnell several bundles of letters and heard Purnell say [not very grammatically], 'I thought I had left them letters at Bombay.' It would seem quite clear from this that Wake was more concerned in the *Fackiero's* voyage than Mossel.

After much further prodding from Wake, Pecoock at Surat finally agreed to send a Dutch agent to Goa to demand the ship. He chose for this purpose a young man named Charles Anton de Schoning who had a fluent command of French and kept a full diary of his mission to Goa. Schoning left Surat March 11, and arrived in Bombay March 23. He took a room at a modest hotel at four rupees a day for himself and servant. Wake, however, would have none of that and insisted he move to a hotel where he could be treated 'comme gentleman'. As Wake and Schoning strolled on the ramparts of the Fort on the day after Schoning's arrival, Wake remarked on letters from Pecoock in which Pecoock had reproached Wake for not opening his heart to Pecoock who was, after all, an intimate friend of Mossel. Pecoock must be a curious man, said Wake, it was useless to ask him, Wake, what was in his heart; as far as the ship went, he had done his best;

it was not his fault he had failed. Pecoock would never know what was in his heart for he, Wake, was the kind of man who often concealed it even from his wife.

Next day, Wake sent Schoning off to Goa with a letter of credit on John Alexander, Procurator-General of the Jesuits at Goa. Six days later, Schoning presented the letter from the Dutch chief at Surat to the Viceroy at Goa. The Viceroy laughed and said Wake was playing a pretty comedy with him. Schoning should know Wake was one of the world's boldest trouble-makers; Schoning should also know that, to the English, the Dutch were nothing but a cow to be milked. Everybody on the coast knew Wake and Mossel were in it together but why was Mossel such a fool as not to get in his demand first instead of letting Wake try to ransom the ship through the Jesuit Procurator-General. The Viceroy told Schoning he quite candidly suspected Wake of double-crossing the Dutch. Did Schoning not know Wake had now forbidden any British subject to buy back the ship so that Wake might make another attempt through the Jesuits if the Viceroy refused the Dutch request?

At a second interview, the Viceroy urged Schoning to let the French agent show him the paper signed by Captain Thomas Purnell. Schoning accordingly called on the French agent and was shown a document reading as follows: 'The undersigned avows the ship Fackeiro Mirachub and her cargo belongs to Mr. Wake, Governor of Bombay, and that Mr. Mossel is no more than an agent. For this reason, I demanded the ship and cargo for Rs. 40,000 payable to a Jesuit in Goa.' Schoning had two more fruitless interviews with the Viceroy who finally told Schoning he would use as toilet-paper any protest the Dutch might make and ordered Schoning out of town. The Viceroy provided an escort of a sergeant and two sepoys and poor Schoning had to leave Goa before the *dhobi* could

bring back his laundry.²²

Schoning returned to Bombay to meet a torrent of abuse from Wake who accused him of not having had sense enough to bribe the Viceroy. As Schoning had the courage to repeat most of what the Viceroy said about Wake, Wake ripped out a stream of oaths and called in his clerk to read letters from his private correspondence. Later Wake made Schoning pay his own hotel bill. On his last evening in Bombay, Schoning dined with English officers who said Wake was never generous, was full of compliments which cost nothing, and never voluntarily spent a rupee for others. From Schoning's account book we learn he paid Rs. 137 to go to Goa on a *galvet*, and Rs. 5 a day for his better hotel accommodations, drinks included.

From subsequent correspondence, it is clear the Dutch at Surat believed Wake was later successful in ransoming the ship quietly from third parties. Now what does this story show? It is not only a commentary on the characters of the people involved, and upon the sort of governors which Bombay Presidency all too frequently had at the time, but it is also a commentary on the economic history of this coast. Here is private entrepreneurship breaking through not only the barriers set up by European war but transcending most of the mercantilist principles then in vogue. We see free trade within Asia already powerfully on the march under European auspices.

²² The Viceroy's rage is reflected in his letter to Dupleix at Pondicherry, dated April 1, 1748, in which after referring to the arrival of the *Fackiero*, he says "et pour parer seulement les invectives des anglais et des hollandais au sujet d'une des prises que vos Vaisseaux ont porté ici il m'a falu un temps infini—Diable de tous cottes (cotés)—Voila qu'arrivent les deux moines que vous avez envoyé ici—leurs plaintes contre Fr. Antoine me mirent aussi dans la dernière confusion". Arquivo Historico, Goa, Reis Vizinhos, Vol. 12, f. 143.

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I wish to close this evening with further reflections on Anglo-Dutch relations at Surat on a somewhat broader canvas which will show that rivalry was present side by side with co-operation; and that the Dutch, contrary to the Portuguese viceroy's slurring remark had not sunk to being merely milch cows for the English. In the statement concerning the condition of the Dutch factory at Surat which Jan Schreuder prepared in September 1750 for the guidance of Johannes Pecoek as his successor, we have an unusually detailed picture of the operations of the Dutch factory at this period.²³ Let us first look at the European staff of 105: twenty-four upper staff, fifty-nine in clerical posts, eleven in posts such as those of surgeon, male-nurse, book-binder, smith, cooper, and twelve military, one ensign, four sergeants, seven corporals. There were only eighteen Dutchmen in Surat not in the Company's service, and of them only three were 'country-captains', the other fifteen were ordinary seamen, and a few soldiers serving Indian princes. The director (called 'chief' by the English) was in charge of the Company's trading operations, and the general supervision of the staff. He was expected to supply the head clerk with the material for entry in the diary twice a day. Immediately under him was the 'second' who was president of the court of justice, and was responsible for keeping the Company's books, checking the godowns, and presiding over all auction sales of goods. It was his business to check weights and measures, and see that every cotton bale weighed 372-375 pounds. As was common at that time, there was a rigid check on the keys to warehouses, in particular, the 'second' kept the key to the spice warehouse and could deliver it to no one but the warehouse keeper who must return it. The 'fiscal' was the clerk of the court when proceedings were taken against anyone subject to the

²³ K. A. Collectie Hoge Regering, 838, "Memorie" by Jan Schreuder, Sept. 30, 1750.

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Company's authority and was in charge of all matters of discipline of staff, prevention of smuggling and the like. The 'cashier' gave bond of Rs. 4,000 before taking charge of the small cash-chest. The secretary kept the seals, was postmaster, recorded European marriages, saw to it that half the 'poor-box' collections at church went to the head of the Dutch church overseas at Batavia and half to the upkeep of the Dutch cemetery. The duties of the lesser staff were what one might expect. The Dutch arrangements for the health of the staff seem unusually thorough. The hospital and the medicine-shop must be checked every three months; every ship must be inspected four or five days before departure to discover ill seamen; no autopsy could be performed without the chief's consent; no Indian prince or other Indian might be treated without the chief's consent. The Dutch Company owned its cemetery and its garden but it rented the factory building with the stable, well, and peons' houses for sixty-two rupees a month. Some idea of land values in Surat may be gained from the Company's offer to purchase these for Rs. 20,000 and the iron godown for Rs. 8,000.

The Company's non-European staff numbered about 300. They included forty-nine sepoy, five jemadars, and eighty-seven peons; fifty-nine peons were assigned to the chief, thirteen to the second, and two or three each to each of the upper staff. There were ten household servants, euphemistically called indentured for life who were undistinguishable from the five slaves; in addition six syces, three porters, three *malis*, three messengers, a sail-maker, three water-carriers, and a watchman. Far more important, of course, were the thirty-three local brokers and businessmen who were listed as under the Dutch Company's 'protection'. These were the people on whom the Company really depended for carrying on its activities at Surat. The Company operated through its brokers and the men who really made the contracts for the collec-

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tion of cotton piece-goods. Everything really turned on eleven of these. The others were lesser dealers and insurers. All these people except two, Moses Tobias, the wealthy Jewish 'free merchant', and Peter Pompeius Phoonsen, the Eurasian son of a former chief, were Indians.

In an analysis of the ownership of trading capital at Surat, Mr. Schreuder estimates the total at eighty-seven lakhs, fortytwo thousand [87,42,000] rupees. He considers that twentyseven lakhs, eightysix thousand [27,86,000] of this operates under the 'protection' of the Portuguese crown and the three East India companies, English, Dutch and French. According to him, seventeen lakhs, sixty thousand [17,60,000] operates under Dutch 'protection', eight lakhs, eightysix thousand [8,86,000] under English, one lakh, thirty thousand [1,30,000] under French, and only ten thousand [10,000] under Portuguese. There are thus about sixty lakhs [60,00,000] of 'independent' capital, twentyseven lakhs, seventyone thousand [27,71,000] controlled by Muslims, twentysix lakhs, seventy thousand [26,70,000] controlled by Hindus, and five lakhs, fifteen thousand [5,15,000] controlled by Armenians. Looking at the figures in another way, it is clear that all the Parsi capital five lakhs, four thousand [5,04,000] operates under European 'protection', sixteen lakhs, fortytwo thousand [16,42,000] of Hindu capital has fallen under European 'protection', and twentysix lakhs, seventytwo thousand [26,72,000] of Hindu capital is still independent, while only one lakh, seventyfive thousand [1,75,000] of Muslim capital has fallen under British protection. None of the Armenian capital has fallen under European 'protection'. It can be said therefore that no more than a third of Surat's trading capital is operating under European 'protection'.

Mr. Schreuder proceeds to a further analysis of this capital. The most interesting data are those that show a

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total of eight lakhs, sixtynine thousand [8,69,000] of Parsi capital, none of it independent, three lakhs, sixtyfive thousand [3,65,000] under Dutch 'protection' and five lakhs, four thousand [5,04,000] under English 'protection'. Of the sixteen lakhs, fortytwo thousand [16,42,000] of Hindu capital under European protection, twelve lakhs, eighty-five thousand [12,85,000] is under Dutch, two lakhs, seventeen thousand [2,17,000] under British, one lakh, thirtyone thousand [1,31,000] under French and ten thousand [10,000] under Portuguese protection. Moses Tobias' lakh is of course, under Dutch 'protection'. These figures point strongly to the conclusion that Muslim capital was more resistant to European 'protection' than Hindu, and that Parsi capital was leaving Dutch for British 'protection'. This of course opens up intriguing vistas for further investigation. Do we see even at this time on the west coast circumstances that have of late been receiving so much attention on the east, namely the greater economic involvement of the Hindu capitalist with the British?

However that may be, the Dutch and English companies increasingly dominated the scene in Surat. It was their rivalries, as Dr. Banaji, the author of *Bombay and the Sidis*,²⁴ has pointed out, that determined the allocation of Indian governing power in Surat. The contending Muslim chieftains struggling for power in that city were not masters of their own fate, even if the two European East India companies were not entirely masters of theirs. Before discussing the rivalries between the Dutch and English companies, let us see how the Dutch chief viewed his competitors. The English come first on Mr. Schreuder's list. He says of them, most significantly: 'They behave as if they are the government'. He recognizes that the source of their strength is having Bombay so close by and ready to aid them with maritime force.

²⁴ D. R. Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*. London, 1932, pp. 110, ff.

The decline in their trade on account of the war is already being arrested. The Company is recovering faster than the business of its servants as private traders. The English chief remains in debt of Rs. 2,75,000 on his private account. The English believe they can profit by promoting discord among other Europeans and engaging in many shady kinds of transaction for petty profit. The French are of little consequence; they have only a chief and one assistant who are content simply to maintain a respectable establishment. These men know only a substantial import of silver will restore the French position. The Portuguese viceroy at Goa has only one agent at Surat whose sole business is to collect the fees from the captains of small boats using the Portuguese flag. It seems clear the Portuguese flag may be bought by any private trader. The Armenians still carry on a 'reasonably great' trade in silk and piece-goods, chiefly with Bengal and Persia. Many Armenians own their own ships. The three or four Turkish traders are having difficulties and are carrying much freight for others. The Arab and Sindhi traders are of little account. Mr. Schreuder concludes this section of his report with the observation that Surat is less prosperous than formerly because its trade with the mofussil has been much hurt by the Marathas.

On September 15, 1749, Mr. Schreuder sent to Governor Wake at Bombay a vehement protest against the conduct of the English at Surat since 1740.²⁵ He summed up his position by accusing the English of hindering his work, breaking contracts, enticing his men to desert to their service, mishandling one of the Dutch magistrates, and allowing a Dutch soldier to be executed on the public maidan. He reviewed the history of the past nine years, pointing out that even before the death in 1746 of Tegbakt Khan, civil and military governor of Surat, the Eng-

²⁵ K. A. Collectie Hoge Regering, 858, "Memorie" dated Sept. 15, 1749.

lish Company's chief began to harbour Dutch deserters and the salutary custom of the chiefs of the European factories holding an annual reception in the Dutch Company's garden to impress the local authorities with their unity was given up. After Tegbakt Khan's death and the subsequent division of local authority, with his son-in-law Mia Achand in possession of the Castle, and Safdar Khan in charge of the civil administration, the English soon found themselves champions of Mia, while the Dutch were said to favour Safdar Khan. The stage was thus set in Surat for the intrigues of contending European companies with quarrelling local authorities which were at this time breaking out in the Carnatic with greater violence as a prelude to European conquest. By 1748, we have a situation in which Mr. Marsh, the English Company's chief, when approached by four prominent Indian merchants who were trying to arrange a meeting for the discussion of peace between Mia and Safdar Khan, said he would not attend a meeting in the Dutch factory if ten cities as large as Surat were at stake. Marsh even descended to the pettiness of refusing to call on Schreuder and ordered all his subordinates and their wives not to talk to the Dutch. Schreuder accused Marsh's successor, Thomas Dorrill, of putting in irons a messenger from the Dutch factory who came into his presence with loaded pistols.

Thus, side by side with co-operation such as that which existed between Wake and Mossel in their private capacities, there went on this acrimonious quarrelling between English and Dutch chiefs in their official capacities, so much so that Schreuder's successor would say in the 1750's that all the Dutch Company could do was await some turn of affairs in Europe which would enable it to take revenge upon the English.

The execution of a Dutch soldier at Mia Achand's orders deserves more than passing mention for the light

that it throws on the reactions to such an incident as early as the 1740's.²⁶ On November 27, 1748, Jan Schreuder wrote in an extraordinary letter to Thomas Dorrill: 'We shall here not minimize in the least the shock and the affront that has been given not to ourselves alone but to all Europeans in General. Your Honour, yourself, well knows that the blood of the least of Europeans/we shall not say Christians and fellow-believers/is far too noble [Edel] to be spilled with such impunity and that this act is contrary to the law of all civilized peoples'. To this, Dorrill replied that he thought the soldier had brought his fate upon himself; Dorrill's understanding of the matter was that the soldier was strolling about looking at the English guns, and was not molested by the guard. When, however, he prowled among Mia Achand's guns, he was taken and later publicly executed. Dorrill said that if an English gunner had been in the service of an enemy of the English and had done the same, he [Dorrill] would not have blamed Mia Achand for making an example of him. However, Dorrill remarked that had he been informed in time, he would of course, have intervened to prevent the soldier from being put to death. Dorrill said bitterly: 'I must observe that the Dutch gunners in Safdar Khan's service are very remarkable in endeavouring to kill any of our people who appear upon the walls; I would not willingly impute it to any orders of their superiors'.

The Dutch version of the affair was that the soldier, seen prowling about the English guns, was brought to Dorrill. Then Dorrill asked if he wished to enlist with the English, the soldier refused. Dorrill then had the man escorted out, not by the English Company's peons, but by others. The account is not clear as to whose peons these

²⁶ K. A. Collectie Hoge Regering, 858. *bijlagen* to the *Memorie* of Sept. 15, 1749, papers concerning the death of Jan Barend Krumelman.

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were. The soldier was subsequently picked up by Mia Achand's men and accused of being a spy in Safdar Khan's service. At first, Mia had him put in irons but, after Jaggernath, the English Company's broker, had spoken to Mia, Mia ordered the soldier publicly beheaded on the maidan.

On the evening of the death, Vazir Mohamed, 'court crier' for the Dutch Company assembled a distinguished gathering; the cadi, the mufti, and three leading citizens Sali Jellaby, Goodji Aseem, Omar Sindi. After discussion, the cadi, mufti, and Sali Jellaby sent their servants to Mia. These servants brought back word that Mia said in the presence of Mulna Fakir-ud-din who was with him that the English had told Mia the soldier was a gunner for Safdar Khan, and that he, Mia, did not know the soldier was Dutch. The full story is therefore screened from us. It would seem to indicate that the Dutch chief's views were exceptional and that there was no unanimity of opinion that Europeans either did or should enjoy a special status.

In bringing these lectures to a close, I am all too conscious that I have talked mainly of Europeans and that you have heard more about Cowans and Wakes than about Sidis and Rustumjees. This is largely the consequence of the richness of the European material and the relative scarcity of the Indian. Some of you may be descendants of persons whom I have mentioned. How fascinating it would be to find their letters. For the west coast, we have nothing comparable to the diary of Dupleix's dubash Ananda Ranga Pillai. Even so, we may venture on certain conclusions from the stories we have been telling. The first is that British power is steadily growing in these decades before their military conquests really began. That growth is chiefly manifested through the country-trade. Whatever shipping lists you examine whether Mocha, Surat, Gombroon, or Cochin, the English coun-

try-captains outnumber all the rest.

Furthermore, circumstances conspired on this coast to give the English the aid of economically powerful Indian interests, notably the Parsi interests. Muslim maritime interests on both sides of the Arabian Sea were also of great assistance. In plain truth, Parsi, Muslim, and Hindu interests interacted in such a way that the English went from strength to strength without the necessity of building any territorial power outside this island of Bombay. Nowhere in India was the territory they directly ruled less than on this coast and such was to be the case for some time to come. It is also of much significance that the English were clever enough in these decades to bargain with the Maratha power and not to oppose it. They respected its capabilities and quite clearly saw that, if Europeans were to unite against Indians, enough Indian power might be brought against them to ruin their trading profits.

Moreover there are appearing at this period the tendencies of individual European entrepreneurs to build up a free trade along the whole coast of southern Asia. Remittance of English fortunes to Europe through non-English channels is not yet taking place to any extent. That process is to develop as a by-product of European military activity in the mofussil; but the participation of Englishmen in foreign East India companies is already extensive; various forms of private partnership between Europeans and Indians are making their appearance. The rivalries of the East India Companies can exist side by side with the co-operation of their servants in private enterprises.

The Dutch Company does not realize until too late that an East India company as a country-trader in India is no match for the individual private European. When it finally grants its servants extensive privileges of private trade at the outbreak of the War of Austrian succession,

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the damage has already been done and the English are far ahead. True, the Dutch Company's returns from its factories on this subcontinent are almost as great as they were in the 1680's; its establishment is more imposing—witness our description of its activities at Surat. Nevertheless its power to influence the course of events has disappeared and it does not realize it. This is, I think, the explanation of its extraordinary behaviour in bringing Malay mercenaries into the Hugli in 1759 to meet the inevitable consequences of Clive's famous note to Colonel Forde 'Dear Forde, fight 'em immediately. I'll send you an Order in Council tomorrow'.²⁷

It seems very strange indeed that the Dutch failed to build greater maritime power on this coast in the 1720's, 1730's and 1740's. The activities of five ships in the Arabian Sea were no substitute for the steady growth of the Bombay Marine and the despatch of the English king's ships to Indian waters. Had the Dutch possessed Goa, the whole story might have been different. In short, the English development of this city and its harbour determines most of what I have said to you in this tercentenary year of Bombay's relinquishment by the Portuguese. Bombay Presidency may in the eighteenth century have lacked the attractions of Madras and Bengal but it certainly presented a varied scene which I hope some of you may be tempted further to explore.

²⁷ R. J. Minney, *Clive of India*, London, 1937, p. 170.



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