

**THE IMPACT
OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE
(1905) WAR
ON
INDIAN
POLITICS**

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R. P. DUA

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by

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
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*My maternal grandfather —
thoughts that lie too deep for tears*

The nationalist sentiment which took its birth in the nineteenth century as a result of social and political effects of the Western impact upon India, grew in strength and volume as the century advanced. Many factors were responsible for this development, and their cumulative effect was that in the beginning of the twentieth century it was ready to burst forth into a powerful movement for independence.

At this juncture it received considerable impetus from the sudden triumph of Japan in the war against Russia, one of the great powers of Europe. The news of the Russo-Japanese war both on land and sea and the amazing victories of Japan electrified the atmosphere in India and stirred the country with enthusiasm and hope for its own future. The influence of Japanese success on India was twofold—psychological and practical.

It shattered the illusion of European invincibility which had hypnotised the East into the belief

of its inferiority. It raised the self-esteem and self-confidence of the people of India. It brought home the lesson that the greatness of a nation did not depend merely upon size of territory and number of people, but mainly upon their moral qualities—self-sacrifice, patriotism, self-reliance. The other lessons which India learnt were that state played an indispensable and large part in the development of a nation, in wealth and power; and therefore that good government by a foreign nation was no substitute for self-government.

Mr. Dua the writer of this thesis has drawn attention to the psychological effects of Japanese success on the Indian mind. But this has been done by others before him. His real contribution is to bring into prominence the less known effect on practical affairs. He shows how the Japanese recognition and interest in the Indian political movement was a source of encouragement to the fighters for liberty, how the movements of Boycott and Swadeshi launched in India received support from Japan's sympathy, and attracted Indian youngmen to Japan for practical and technical training and how the commercial relations between the two countries were greatly extended to the mutual advantage of both.

Mr. Dua has rendered a distinct service by writing this monograph to the advancement of

understanding of the history of the struggle for freedom in India.

29-3-1965.

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*Chairman, History of Freedom
Movement in India.*

The study of the subject of this monograph was suggested to me by Professor Toshio Ueda of the University of Tokyo, when he was the Visiting Professor, Department of East Asian History and Institutions, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi. But due to his sudden departure from the school, a delay was caused in finalization of the draft and therefore in its publication.

I cannot claim to be the first to have examined the subject but, I am sure, that a full-fledged study had so far not been undertaken. However, this is an attempt to bring to light the extent of the impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on the Indian national-freedom movement.

The monograph is divided into Sections, and it is mainly based on the contemporary material available such as, the files of the then Home Department (Government of India), the "Reports from the Native Newspapers", translated in English and preserved in the National Archives, New Delhi,

and the important English language newspapers of Japan.

In the completion of this work, I am especially indebted to Dr. Tara Chand, M.P. In spite of his numerous preoccupations, his guidance was always readily available to me throughout. He has also been kind enough to write the foreword.

My grateful thanks are also due to Dr. A. Appadorai and Dr. M. S. Rajan, the former and the present Directors, Indian School of International Studies, and to Mr. M. H. Musavi, Principal M. M. Begg and Dr. Bisheshwar Prasad, Head of the Department of History, University of Delhi, for their kind interest and patronage which had been a source of strength to me.

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I

Socio-political Upsurge at the time of the Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War, fought for Korea but in Manchuria, restrained Russia in Asia and gave Japan the Great Power status. It had also a tremendous effect on Asia. In India, particular interest was shown over the outcome of the War, not so much 'because of fight over Korea, but because it was a victory of the so-called barbarians and uncivilized Asians over a major European Power.

The Japanese success came at a time when India was forging ahead to find for her a legitimate place in the comity of nations. Political subjugation and economic exploitation had reduced the Indians who were "proprietors of the vast tract of country" to "tenants of mud huts." The alien rule was responsible for the failure to solve the economic problems and for being out of touch with the

masses. It was charged for refusing education, for increasing poverty, and for imposing taxes without people's consent.¹

The Indians failed to achieve their object in 1858. The authorities both in India and in London equally failed, or were slow, to understand the Indian mind. India was agitated against the indifference of her rulers who had grown fatter with her income while their heart lay elsewhere.² Breach of Statutes and Queen's proclamation of 1858³ and the policy of discrimination in regard to public services while in possession of favourable reports⁴ about the ability, capacity and reliability of the Indians made the latter distrustful of the Governments.⁵ Tilak questioned the sincerity of the

1. G. K. Gokhale, Presidential Address at Banaras in 1905, *Speeches*, ed., (Madras, 2nd ed., 1916) 806-28.

2. Even Chirol bears testimony to this.

Sir Valentine Chirol, *India* (London, May 1930), 111-2.

3. For the text of Queen's Proclamation of November 1, 1858, see Viscount Morley, *Indian Speeches* (London, 1909), App. B, 155-9.

For text of Statutes see A. B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India* (1600-1935) (London, 1936), 131, 167.

Lord Curzon had declared that Queen's Proclamation was an impossibility. Quoted in Bal Gangadhar Tilak, *Writings and Speeches* (Madras, Feb. 1919), 44.

4. For such reports see *The Indian Review*, June 1905, 416-8. For other connected statements, *ibid.*, 412-4.

5. *Bihar Bandhu*, 8 January, 1905. (Reports on Native Newspapers of Bengal—hereinafter referred to as *Reports I*—p. 16).

Government in their "proclaimed welfare State".⁶ Many Englishmen of repute also favoured greater association of the Indians "in the art of governing themselves".⁷

Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1899 to 1905, could have considerably satisfied the Indians then had he conceded to such views. Instead he chose to further provoke the Indians which greatly stirred their agitated mind. His speech at Calcutta on February 11, 1905, while addressing the University Convocation in his capacity as its Chancellor contained the following remarks:⁸

"... I say that the highest ideal of truth is to a large extent a western conception. . . . Undoubtedly truth took a high place in the moral codes of the West before it had been similarly honoured in the East, where craftiness and diplomatic wile have always been held in much repute. . . . 'Oriental diplomacy' meant . . . something rather tortuous and hyper-subtle. The same may be seen in Oriental literatures . . ."

6. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, *Writings and Speeches*, ed. (Madras, 1919), 44.

7. F. H. Skrine, *Life of Sir William Wilson Hunter* (London, 1901), 291.

Lord Lawrence, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1864-69. Quoted in Lajpat Rai, *Young India* (N. Y., 1916), i.

Samuel Smith, M. P., "On Indian Affairs" in *The Indian Review*, May 1905, 306.

8. *Lord Curzon in India—Speeches* (London, 1906), II, 222.

The address found an echo in the press with severe criticism. "His Lordship", it was remarked, "took great advantage of his position as Chancellor to make attacks on the character of the Indian people".⁹ Curzon's words were particularly resented since those were used after an assurance, earlier in his address, that what he was going to say was personal to the 'under-graduates' and that his observation had no political bearing.¹⁰

Some of the newspapers were more vocal in their comments. They referred to the address as "capricious";¹¹ "absurd";¹² "living testimonies to the veracity of truth-loving occidental Statesmen";¹³ "it exposed the true character of British administration in India";¹⁴ "a violation of his own ideas . . . when himself Governor-General and Viceroy, see (the Asians) with contemptuous eyes";¹⁵ "a deliberately planned calumny to do

9. *The Indian Review*, February 1905, 73.

10. *Ibid.* Also *Curzon's Speeches* (refer footnote 8).

11. *Sandhya* (Calcutta), 14 February, 1905. (Reports I, 147).

12. *Kerala Patrika* (Calicut), 18 March, 1905. (Reports from Native Newspapers of Madras—hereinafter referred to as *Reports II*—p. 119).

13. *The Daily Hitavadi*, 15 & 17 February, 1905 (Reports I, 147, 170).

14. *New India* (Calcutta), 18 February, 1905 (Reports I, 76).

15. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 18 February, 1905. (Reports I, 79). The esteemed paper while making this remark obviously had in view Curzon's book "Problems of the Far East" published in London in 1896.

immense harm to the country";¹⁶ "Lord Curzon has committed a grave indiscretion in casting unjust aspersions on the character of the Indians".¹⁷

The Partition of Bengal, above all other actions of Lord Curzon, worsened the situation. His assertion that the Partition was "for administrative convenience",¹⁸ or as Chirol called it "a measure of administrative redistribution and for better progress of the people"¹⁹ was as much discounted then²⁰ as is the result of the latest research.²¹

Ramsay MacDonald, an English statesman who visited India during that period, held that the Partition of Bengal was "not merely a blunder; it

16. *Ibid.*, 24 February, 1905. (Reports I, 80).

17. *Indian Mirror* (Calcutta), 3 March, 1905 (Reports I, 85).

18. Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After*, (London, 1912), 369.

19. Chirol, *India*, 115-6.

20. Replying to Curzon's contention it was remarked in a journal, "If administrative convenience is the aim of the proposed Partition of Bengal, then the most rational course would be to sever Bihar from Bengal. In this course there is surely a wisdom. This would satisfy the Biharis with their own administration and also keep Bengal intact."

Bihar News, 21 January, 1905. (Reports I, 39).

The observation of the journal came true. The Partition of Bengal was undone in 1911 and Bihar made a separate Province soon after.

21. *The Modern Review*, April 1959.

Article on "Genesis of the Partition of Bengal (1905)" by Dr. P. C. Chakravarti.

was an indictable offence".²² Mr. Morley confessed "that nothing was ever worse done so far as the disregard which was shown to the feeling and opinion of the people concerned".²³ The Partition was an "utter contempt for public opinion", voiced Gokhale at Banares".²⁴ It "stirred (the whole country) to its deepest depths with sorrow and resentment" for this act of "a cruel wrong on the Bengalees".²⁵

Curzon added insult to injury when he described the opposition to the Partition of Bengal as "manufactured".²⁶ His refusal to receive the Resolution (of protest) of the Indian National Congress at the hands of Sir Henry Cotton was another illustration of his attitude.²⁷

In this way the Curzonian rule was telling upon the patience, feelings and the hardships of the Indian people. "We are subjects of the British Empire, but of the advantages of British Citizen we enjoy none", wrote a journal and complainingly added, "... (we are) constantly harassed by the

22. J. Ramsay MacDonald, *The Awakening of India*, (London, 1910), 199.

23. *The Indian Review*, March 1906, 162-3.

24. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 815-6.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Curzon, *Speeches*, I, 154.

27. *Bihar News*, 21 January, 1905, (Reports I, 41).

King's Officers'.²⁸ Consequently, the recall of Curzon and direct administration by the British Government had been demanded.'²⁹

In spite of the omnipotent character of the (British) administration and as a result of the general apathy of the people, efforts were being made to reorientate the life of the Indians, of course not altogether unsupported by some of the Englishmen in position.

Dayanand's efforts to remodel Indian Society on the basis of the Vedas,³⁰ Rammohan Roy's founding of Brahma Samaj³¹ and Devendranath's

28. *Sri Sri Vishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta) 15 March, 1905 (Reports I, 279).

29. *Swadesamitran*, 21 February, 1905. (Reports II, 74), *Ibid.* 27 September, 1905. (Reports II, 377).

Curzon's other measures like the University Reforms (1904) which officialised higher education brought him into collision with the educated India; his views on Army Administration brought him into conflict (1905) with Lord Kitchner, ultimately leading to his resignation.

A. Yusuf Ali in his book, "*The Making of India*" (London, 1925), on page 277 remarks : "All other viceroys were liked by either atleast in India or in London, but Curzon was neither".

30. For this ideal Swami Dayanand established Arya Samaj at Bombay on April 10, 1875. It took final shape at Lahore in 1877.

Lajpat Rai, *The Arya Samaj* (London, 1915), 52, 57; also 81.

31. Brahma Samaj preached against idolatory and started the theistic movement in India.

Upendra Nath Ball. *A Century of Service by the Brahma Samaj* (1828-1928), (London, 1928).

Raja Rammohan Roy has been called "the Father of Modern India".

(Contd. on next page)

association therewith marked the first National Movement in India.³²

Foreign nationals, like Madam Blavatsky, Colonel Olcott³³ and Mrs. Annie Besant³⁴ also promoted social and educational cause of the Indians. The viceroyalty of Lords Lawrence³⁵ and Ripon³⁶ marked, perhaps, the climax of the 19th century 'liberalism' in India.

(Contd. from previous page)

Satish Chandra Chakravarti, ed., *The Father of Modern India* (Calcutta, November 1935), 69.

32. Quoted in Bipin Chander Pal, *Beginning of Freedom Movement in Modern India* (Calcutta, 1959), XIV.

33. Madam Blavatsky, of Russian parentage, first visited India in 1852 and later with Col. Olcott in 1879. Both were connected with the establishment of Theosophical Society. The Renaissance in India, writes Chirol, "has been largely stimulated and to some extent promoted by Madam Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott". Valentino Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, (London, 1910), 29.

34. Annie Besant, an Irish by birth, adopted Hinduism during her tour in India in 1893-4. The establishment of Central Hindu College (now the University) in Banares, remarks Geoffrey, was the first fruit of her propaganda. She became active in politics and was the leading member of the Indian Home Rule League. Geoffrey West, *The Life of Annie Besant*, (London, 1933), 1, 24, 202, 222.

An Englishman holds that no Indian has done so much to organise and consolidate the Renaissance Movement as Mrs. Annie Besant. "She gave fresh impetus to it". Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, 28.

35. Lord Lawrence's rule has been included in "the Period of Reconstruction"—1861-80. Lovett, *India*, (London, 1923), 137.

36. Lord Ripon has been called as "the Champion of Indian Freedom". S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon*, (London, 1953), 224.

W. C. Bonnerjee, the first President of the Indian National Congress, also paid a tribute to him. *The Indian National Congress—Presidential Speeches, etc.* (Madras, 2nd ed., November 1917), 3.

The publication of the 'Samachar Darpan', a Bengali weekly, in the early part of the 19th century was a welcome augury. With all its potentialities, the Indian press became a powerful organ of public opinion in the other half of the century. It developed through the struggle it conducted against the alien rule.³⁷

In organizing political opinion and activities in India, the British Indian Association (1851), Madras Mahajan Sabha (1884) and Bombay Presidency Association made a great headway.³⁸ But it was the birth of the Indian National Congress, fifteen years before the close of the 19th century, which ultimately proved to be the chief instrument of people's independence from the English rule. Started with the approval of Viceroy Dufferin in the hope that it would be something like "His Majesty's Opposition" in India, with no chance of getting into power, it made rapid strides by capturing the heart as well as the brain of India.³⁹

37. For details see Atulchandra Gupta, ed., *Studies in the Bengal Renaissance* (Jadavpur, 1958), 423-38.

38. S. K. Mitra, *Indian Problems* (London, 1908), 384.

39. Annie Besant, *How India Wrought for Freedom*, (Adyar, Madras, 1915), 15.

II

“*Russo-Phobia*” or
“*Yellow-Peril*”

Thus it was in the time of Curzonian Imperialism and the emancipation struggle, organized by the Indian National Congress, that the news of the Russo-Japanese War and that of latter's victory was received in India. A section of the enlightened population, however, felt concerned over the results of the Russo-Japanese War inasmuch as that occasional reference of ‘Russo-phobia’ and ‘yellow-peril’ were made in the press. Those who talked of ‘Russo-phobia’ observed, “since she (Russia) has lost fertile land of Manchuria she would now likely turn her eye to India”.⁴⁰ “The idea of a Russian invasion of India is neither chimerical nor impractical. Russia will not easily abandon her long cher-

40. *Suryodaya Prakasika* (Bangalore), 4 January, 1905. (Reports II, 15).

ished intention of invading India," observed another journal.⁴¹ A well-informed paper of the time, before conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, had written, "It is certain that Russia ousted from Manchuria would turn her attention towards India. If Russia triumphs, she will seriously threaten the (Indian) Empire". In either case, the paper concluded "the (Russo-Japanese) war was an unmitigated evil to India".⁴² Quoting Cairo's daily *Al-Muvayyid*, another Indian newspaper wrote:⁴³ ". . . in case of Russian defeat she will never remain quiet but will seek compensation in the possession of some other country, viz., either Persia, India or Afghanistan".

The journals could get credence in the well-known views of Lord Curzon. Writes his biographer,⁴⁴ "On account of the views which he (Curzon) held of the necessity for a definite policy to check the advance of Russia towards India via Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, Lord Curzon has often been

41. *Hitavadi* (Calcutta), 3 February, 1905. (Reports I, 118).

42. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 24 January, 1905. (The Report I, 35). The Paper's calculated possibility of Russian attack on India was based on the theory that after her (Russian) "dismal defeat in Manchuria, she must have an outlet". *Ibid.*, 14 January, 1905 (Reports I, 23).

43. *Shams-ul-Akhar* (Madras), 16 January, 1905. (Reports II, 29).

44. Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (London, 1928), II, 114.

depicted as a prancing pro-Consul afflicted with acute territorial megalomania. . . . On the North West Frontier and the North East Frontier alike he was constantly vetoing proposals for . . . reducing commitments urged on him by his military advisers”.

The appointment⁴⁵ of Lord Kitchner as the Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces in India, and his views that Russia, even after her defeat in 1905, must not be thought of as “crippled for a generation”⁴⁶ together with the inclusion of India in the scope of the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance⁴⁷ must have given added strength to the contention of the Indian journals.⁴⁸ Lord Kitchner, consequently

45. It is said Kitchner was sent to India with a particular object to secure frontiers of India from any possible Russian attack, and he had planned to meet the challenge if it came. Philip Magnus, *Kitchner*. (London, 1958), 209.

46. Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchner*, (London, 1920), II, 152.

47. India was included in the scope of the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance on August 12, 1905. For text see John V. A. MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919*. (New York, 1921), I, 516-8.

Commenting on the alliance, writes Chang, “the main purpose... of the second (Anglo-Japanese) alliance was to deprive Russia of any hope of success in any future aggressive policy toward India. . . .” Chung-Fu Chang, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Baltimore, U.S.A., 1931), 124.

48. Even before the armistice and the actual conclusion of the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an Indian journal had recommended the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (of 1902). *Sarvajanamitran* (Tinnevely Bridge), 28 April, 1905 (Reports II, 161).

proposed reforms⁴⁹ in the Armed Forces which obviously involved increase in the expenditure. Since this would further burden the Indian taxpayer it created hue and cry both on the platform⁵⁰ and in the press.⁵¹

There may not be two views about the apprehension, at that time, in the minds of the British authorities that war between the British and the Russian Empire seemed very close.⁵² This is also clear from the comments then made in the Indian journals. But was the British apprehension true in respect of India? Perhaps, not. The comments seem more related to the fear of increase in the defence expenditure which would, in turn, be shouldered by the Indians than to the actual danger from Russia. Towards the fall of the year 1905 the Indian leadership found no justification for an increased military expenditure. Complaining of the incessant and intolerable burden of taxes,

49. Kitchner had drawn a Memorandum called "The Preparation of the Army in India for War". Arthur, *Lord Kitchner*, 130.

50. *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Madras, 1916, 2nd edition), 128-9. Also the *Indian Review*, March 1905, 147.

51. *Amrit Bazar Patrika* (See footnote 42). It said that the reforms would make the poor Indians poorer.

Hitavadi, 20 January, 1905, (Reports I, 65) remarked "heavy taxation and no relief".

52. Particularly after October 1904 when Russian Baltic Fleet, on its way to the War against Japan in the Far East, had fired off the Dogger Bank on a British trawling fleet from Hull mistaking it for torpedo-boats. Magnus, 217 (footnote 45).

that the Indian tax-payer would have to shoulder as a result of the Armed Forces Reorganization Scheme, Gokhale, in his famous Budget speech on 28th March, 1906, pointed out⁵³ :

This (the Reorganization) scheme was projected in the early stages of the Russo-Japanese War . . . when the issue of the struggle was not only uncertain but the odds seemed to be against Japan, and after apprehensions were entertained of hostile movements of Russian troops in the direction of Cabul. Now, however, that the situation has undergone a complete change and the North-Western Frontier, our one danger-zone, has for the time ceased to be a danger-zone, there is no justification for proceeding with a costly scheme. . . .”

There were other newspapers which, after analysing the situation, could write with confidence that “fear from Russia at a time when she had been defeated at the hands of Japan is groundless”.⁵⁴ A few considered the Russian “bogey” of an invasion of India as “improbable”.⁵⁵ An Englishman writing in the Times, London, had emphatically declared, “In view of the terrible strain exercised by the present (Russo-Japanese) campaign on Russia, she may be safely disregarded as an aggressive power (in so far as India was concerned) at least

53. *Speeches* (footnote 50).

54. *Vrittanta Chintamani* (Mysore), 31 May, 1905. (Reports II, 208).

55. *Bengalee* (Calcutta), 7 January, 1905. (Reports I, 3).

during the life time of the present generation.”⁵⁶ Similar were the views of another contemporary expert who said that “If Japan won (the Russo-Japanese War), Russia would no longer be dangerous on the Indian frontier”.⁵⁷

Russia's repeated defeats both on land and at sea led also to mark a radical change in Lord Kitchner's views. He wrote to Mr. Balfour⁵⁸ that there was no ‘immediate’ danger of an attack by Russia. “Still less do I do so now”. He characterised that the immediate problem was “the integrity of the Amir's dominions (Afghanistan)”. This might lead us to a real factor that necessitated the Army Reorganization scheme. Wrote Kitchner in May 1905 :

“... the problem before us is something more than a mere Indian one, inasmuch as we have solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Amir's dominions, and have pledged ourselves to defend his frontier. If we are to fulfil our obligations in this respect . . . for the integrity of the Afghan frontier, that frontier thereupon becomes in a military sense our own” . . .⁵⁹

56. Quoted in the *Hindoo Patriot*, 25 January, 1905. (Reports I, 35).

57. A. M. Poolcy, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (London, 1920), 13.

58. Quoted in Arthur (footnote 46).

59. *Ibid.* About British guarantee for the integrity of Amir's dominion, see letter from Sir M. Durand to the Amir dated the 11th November, 1893. *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, comp. C.U. Aitchison (Calcutta, 1909), 363.

Mr. A. J. Balfour, then the British Prime Minister, on 11th May, 1905, speaking on the question of the defence of India in the British House of Commons said, “. . . I am not intending to lead the House to suppose that . . . a War with Russia . . . is either possible or probable . . .”.⁶⁰

The above letter (from Lord Kitchner to Mr. Balfour) written by no less an authority than the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the categorical statement of the British Prime Minister prove beyond doubt that there was not so much the danger of an immediate Russian aggression on India but a fear “that the Afghans may form an alliance with Russia or Persia”.⁶¹ Hence the British concern.

The cardinal point of the British Indian Foreign Policy at that time must have been either to have sway over or at worse make Afghanistan a buffer state between India and Russia. In that event what could be the possible reason for war hysteria? It seems, it was to dissuade the Amir of Afghanistan from conceding any facilities to Russia

60. *The (British) Parliamentary Debates* (Fourth Series, Vol. CXLVI, 1905), 79.

61. *Roznama-i-Mukaddar Hablul Mateen* (Calcutta), 19 June, 1905. (The Report I, 596).

There was a rumour about Russo-Afghanistan alliance which would be detrimental to British interests in North-West.

and to convince the Amir of "the British as his dependable ally".⁶²

But so far as India was concerned the Press interpreted that the "Russo-phobia" was nothing but a "bogey" for making provision of subsistence to a few more Europeans.⁶³ Kitchner had, it is on record, formulated many a scheme which involved a regular substantial increase in the employment of British officers in the Indian army.⁶⁴ It was this which created an uproar and the sincerity of the Kitchner Reform scheme was questioned. The reforms, in so far as India was concerned, were called the "gloomy political aspect".⁶⁵ There was a force in the report published in one journal that with Russia defeated at the hands of Japan, with the (revised) Anglo-Japanese Alliance, no justification was there for any fear of Russian aggression⁶⁶

62. There was a rumour that Afghanistan might agree to Russian Railway construction programme within Afghan territory which would connect with the Russian strategic railways. Arthur, 149 (footnote 46).

Rightly or wrongly, similar apprehension had also been felt by the British statesmen in 1830s when Russian Agent was found at Herat. This led Lord Auckland to adopt an ambitious policy. See Sir Alfred Lyall, *Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London, June 1929), 313-7.

63. *Vrittanta Chintamani*, n. 55.

64. Various schemes are detailed in Kitchner's biography. Arthur, 184-5.

65. *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 14 January, 1905. (Reports I, 23).

66. *The Kerala Patrika* (Calicut), 24 June, 1905. (Reports II, 242).

or increase in the military expenditure. The later events, when Russia turned her attention towards the Balkans in Europe, proved the correctness of the view.⁶⁷

Moreover, it was argued that defence of India had a simple solution. Increased number of Indians should be imparted better military training.⁶⁸ They would thus hold their own in any eventuality as Japan had done.⁶⁹ Wrote another paper,⁷⁰ "the interests of India demand that her sons should, like the children of the land of the Rising Sun, acquire the power to adapt themselves to ever-changing circumstances". The *Vrittanta Chintamani*,⁷¹ quoting Colonel Younghusband in support of its view, suggested and commended the Japanese method of training for the Indians to defend their motherland. The Japanese military training has not only proved itself against the Russians but also, cited another journal,⁷² "the Chinese undergoing training in the military school at Tokio would soon

67. Whatever remained of the Russian danger even after her defeat in 1905 was removed in 1907, on the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian alliance.

68. *Vrittanta Chintamani*, 5 August, 1905. (Reports II, 284).

69. *Hindoo Patriot* (Calcutta), 18 April, 1905. (Reports I, 153).

70. *Bengalee*, 8 February, 1905. (Reports I, 55).

71. *Vrittanta Chintamani*, 12 July, 1905. (Reports II, 203).

72. *Swadesamitran* (Madras), 27 July, 1905. (Reports II, 283).

become redoubtable as the petulant Jap.” It was even complained, “The Government do not provide military training to the natives because of fear that they (Indians) would learn Japanese sense of patriotism”.⁷³

It would be apt to say, therefore, that not only there was no actual Russian danger, the reforms scheme, too, was not in the interest of India or the Indians. The sense of Russo-phobia may thus have been engendered by the British (in India) in order to convince the Indians so as the latter might regard the former “the saviours”. At the same time, it must have been in the mind of the British rulers that the panic-stricken Indians would not too much criticise the Army Reform scheme, which was considered to be a good avenue for increased employment of Britons. A journal correctly concluded the Englishman’s fear of Russia as “. . . a man is never afraid of losing what he has legally acquired, but is in constant fear of being deprived of what he has wrongfully acquired and misappropriated”. “This explains the Englishman’s fear of Russia with respect to India”, the journal said.⁷⁴

The only possible justification, at the hands of the British, for the introduction of the Army

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Bharat Mitra* (Calcutta),¹17 June, 1905. (Reports I, 596).

Reforms, it seems, was the maintenance of integrity (not of India but at the cost of India) of Afghanistan⁷⁵ and be prepared for any Russian aggression on the "Indian" frontiers.⁷⁶

As to the question of "Yellow-Peril" there did not seem to be any substance in it. The official sources did not record any note of apprehension (obviously in view of growing friendly ties with Japan). The public leaders were referring to Japan with reverence. A singular comment in a newspaper⁷⁷ viewed Japan as highly ambitious, "with ambition not limited to the Far East, and hence a danger to India". This may, in the absence of any cogent argument, seem an inference, arrived at after Japan's fight with China in 1895 and against Russia in 1905. Japan's ambitions, at that time, did not go beyond grabbing a part of Chinese territory,⁷⁸ much less casting covetous

75. Sec. n. 47.

76. *The Parliamentary Debates*, 78-9 (footnote 60).

77. *Roznama-i-Mukaddar Hablul Muteen* (Calcutta), 3 April, 1905. (Reports I, 329).

78. Kanichi Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Boston and New York, 1904) 30-32.

Japan was even prepared to concede Russian preponderance in Manchuria and not fight her if the latter accepted Japanese protectorate over Korea. This shows the limitation of the Japanese interests. Chung-Fu Chang, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 145.

Moreover, after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan wanted to

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eyes on the Indian Empire. Rather, after the defeat of Russia in 1905, most of Japan's overseas aspirations seemed satisfied.⁷⁹

On the other hand, in India there was all-round praise for Japan. The Japanese success was, in fact, considered as a relief to India inasmuch as it had "deprived the Russian Bear of its claws" and hence "will no longer excite groundless and needless alarm in the mind of the British lion".⁸⁰ Secondly, the Indians would not change the English for the Japanese rule although they would "prefer to follow the Japanese example for the development of her industry".⁸¹

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act in accordance with the standards of Western international law and was determined to avoid any impression that she was fishing in muddy waters.

Delmer M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955), 158.

79. *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*, comp. Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Donald Keene, (New York, 1958), 762.

80. *Burdwan Sanjivani*, 21 June, 1905. (Reports I, 633).

81. *Swadesamitran* (Madras), 30 March, 1905. (Reports II, 126).

III

Public Response

The real significance for India of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war was not so much the concern over "Russo-phobia" or "Yellow-Peril" but that the Japanese success had touched the imagination of the people. The Press introduced Japan to the people of India for the "brilliant success in humbling a great European Power".⁸² The people responded to it with great enthusiasm.

One reason for Indian enthusiasm was that the Russo-Japanese War was taken to be a struggle between Europe and Asia and that of latter's victory proved that the European superiority was a myth. It was said to be "the victory of a just cause, of heroism and of patriotism",⁸³ and which has con-

82. *The Indian Review*, January 1905, 1.

83. *The Daily Hitavadi*, 6 January, 1905. (Reports I, 21).

ferred "lustre on all Asia".⁸⁴ Another preferred to call it as "the glorious victory" and added,

"We (the people in the East) who are hated as cowards and imbecile, are proud of this triumph of the East in its terrible struggle with the West. We heartily congratulate thee, Japan, on thy wonderful courage, thy discipline, thy iron will, and thy indomitable energy . . . thou alone hast saved the honour of the East, the down-trodden East".⁸⁵

Some even went so far to say that "the Asiatic race has broken the pride of the greatest Power in Europe so thoroughly that not even hope of retirement is left".⁸⁶

Giving an account of the interest the Indians had evinced in the War, an Indian student in Tokyo wrote to a Japanese journal,⁸⁷ "You (the Japanese), perhaps, cannot imagine to what extent they (the Indians) loved her (Japan)". During the War, he added, "so great was the interest of our people in Japan, that our weekly papers turned into daily ones, and the Press had sometimes to publish extra issues."⁸⁸ "Every morning the people anxiously waited at their doors for the news-

84. *Ibid.*, 2 June, 1905. (Reports I, 553).

85. *Samay*, 6 January, 1905. (Reports I, 21).

86. *Bengalee*, 26 March, 1905. (Reports I, 123).

87. Quoted in Lancelot Lawton, *Empire in the Far East* (London, 1912), II, 806.

88. *Ibid.*

boy, and the students could not attend to their books without reading the telegrams (giving an account of the War). After the fall of Port Arthur we shared your joy and pride to not a small degree, and the city of Calcutta and many other towns and villages were grey with illuminations. Indeed, we in India shared your pride more than, perhaps, the rest of the world, because to us the victory of Japan meant more than what met the eyes of the ordinary world". The same student concluded, "Today even the very common man who can just read the newspapers, can narrate the story of the Russo-Japanese War from the beginning to the end."⁸⁹

Ramsay MacDonald, a contemporary British statesman, who visited India then, made similar observation in his book "The Awakening of India".⁹⁰ Mr. Nehru, recalling the days of his early youth when the war took place, has written, "... I remember well how excited I used to get when news came of the Japanese victories ..."⁹¹ "Japanese victories stirred up my enthusiasm and I waited

89. *Ibid.*

90. J. R. MacDonald, *The Awakening of India*, 180 (footnote 22).

91. Being a letter to his daughter written from jail on 22nd November, 1932. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (London, January 1949), 401.

eagerly for the papers for fresh news daily. I invested in a large number of books on Japan. . .”⁹²

Another contemporary bears testimony that the Russo-Japanese War did not fail to be noticed even by the simplest members of the community; and it was a source of “a stir of excitement” in them. C. F. Andrews who was a witness to the developments taking place in India and who had frequently moved among the common-folk writes that “the war between Russia and Japan had kept the surrounding peoples on the tip-toe of expectation. A stir of excitement passed over India. Even the remote villages talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in their circles and passed round the ‘huqqa’ (Indian Pipe) at night.”⁹³ He further records a conversation with an older man; the latter saying to him, “There has been nothing like it since the (Indian) Mutiny (of 1857). Even the most ignorant peasants ‘tingled’ with the news of Japan’s success”.⁹⁴

The enthusiasm and excitement with which the victories of Japan were received in India, besides on account of “Asian success over Europe”, were due to the hope that the repulse of Russia might call a halt to the European expansion in

92. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, (New Delhi, 1962) 16.

93. C. F. Andrews, *The Renaissance in India* (London, 1912), 4.

94. *Ibid.*, 5.

the East.⁹⁵ Even before the conclusion of the War, it had been remarked, "If Japan comes out thoroughly victorious from the War, it would mark an end of exploitation of the East by the West."⁹⁶ Hence the expectation of the people that the result of the War would save "the Musalmans (Turkey) and Buddhist (India) from the clutches of the Christians".⁹⁷

95. *Bharat Mītra* (Calcutta), 10 June, 1905. (Reports I, 575).

96. *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 14 January, 1905. (Reports I, 23).

97. Russia had also been encroaching upon Turkey. *The Soltan* (Calcutta), 24 March, 1905. (Reports I, 299).

IV

Political Consequences

The success of Japan was regarded particularly as a blow to Great Britain, which represented the West to the Indians. It served as an eye-opener inasmuch as the latter now thought "that given opportunities, Asiatics (Indians) can successfully compete with Europeans (Britons) . . ." ⁹⁸

A Bengali journal wrote, ". . . the delusive belief (of the Europeans and Americans) that Easterns are destined to remain in perpetual tutelage and servitude to Western will now probably disappear from many a Western mind". The journal then asked, "If the rice-eating Jap is capable of throwing into utter rout and disorder the Russian Soldier, cannot the rice-eating Indians (meaning

98. *Charu Mihir* (Mymen Singh—Bengal), 20 June, 1905. (Reports I, 632). See also, Sir John Cumming, ed., *Political India* (1832-1932), (London, 1932), 288.

Bengalees) also if properly trained, do the same?" With these words it cautioned the English that their "distrust of the Indians in employing them in higher services would further deepen disaffection as a result of Japan's victory over Russia". It ended with an advice to the (English) rulers to make "no more attempt to trodden down (the Indians) like flies in the dust", and assured the countrymen, "the East (India) is sure to triumph over the West (Britain) if it studied and emulated Japan".⁹⁹

A contemporary English writer has observed that the victory of Japan put the question into the minds of Indians, "where now was the vaunted superiority of the white men over the coloured men? Where was England's particular claim to hold the gorgeous East in Fee? (And) if the young Asiatic David could smite down the European Goliath, what might not 300,000,000 Indians dare to achieve".¹⁰⁰

In other words, besides clearing the illusions that the West was unconquerable, the victory of Japan infused the much-needed confidence among the Indians. If the Indians obtained equal opportunities, which had been deliberately denied to them, they thought they could match the English.

99. *Sri Sri Vishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 8 June 1905. (Reports I, 587).

100. Chisol, *India*, 113.

Wrote the daily *Hitavadi* thus :

“ . . . (The Russo-Japanese War) has helped us to clear away with the western illusions. So far the flesh and blood of the lamb (Indians) were transformed into the materials in the body of the tiger (the English). We have now found out our mistakes. The lamb can also be transformed in a tiger”¹⁰¹

The same newspaper repeated its contention on 22nd April, 1905, by adding :

“ . . . With the victory of Japan, signs are visible of the awakening of a new life . . . looking forward to enjoying equal rights with the white subjects of Britain. The employment of Indians in increasing numbers in the higher offices of States ; the meting out of equal justice between black and white . . . these are the points to which the aim of educated India is now-a-days prominently directed”.¹⁰²

A section of public opinion, however, thought that the Indian joy (over the Japanese success) was due to the Japanese being ally of the British Government, which also ruled over India. Their argument was that Japan had “defeated a Power (Russia) which was the bitterest foe of our (British) Government”.¹⁰³ It was also realised that Asia would have to remain pupil of Europe for many

101. *The Daily Hitavadi*, 28 March, 1905. (Reports I, 347).

102. *Ibid.*, 22 April, 1905. (Reports I, 411).

103. *Tripura Hitaishi* (Comilla), 20 June, 1905. (Reports I, 632-3).

years to come.¹⁰⁴ The latter statement remains a fact till even today in spite of Japan's victory over Russia. Europe, on the whole, was decidedly superior in every aspect. But the argument that Indian happiness in 1905 was on account of Britain being an ally of Japan does not seem to be convincing in view of the bitterest agitation started in 1905-6 against the British regime.

Besides, Japan had reminded the Indians of the need for a common religion and language, which were the important elements of nationalism leading to her success in 1905. This inspired the people to trace the secrets of her success for which Gokhale, too, had advised his countrymen to study the history of Japan.¹⁰⁵

104. *Charu Mihir* (Mymen Singh, Bengal), 20 June, 1905. (Reports I, 632).

105. Gokhale in a public speech on 25 July, 1905. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 1069.

*Elements of Japanese Nationalism—
Lessons for Indians—Need for a
Common Religion and Language*

The important secrets of the Japanese success, among others, were their deep-rooted patriotism, their playing with death, their discipline, compulsory education and the national language.¹⁰⁶ The common language, for instance, had provided the Japanese “with still another unique, exclusive possession to excite the thoughts and sentiments of ardent nationalists.”¹⁰⁷

It were these ideals which the leaders put before the people and frequently referred to the

106. Article on the subject by Sister Nivedita. *The Indian Review*, July 1905, 512.

Later an Indian had made an intensive study of the subject and held similar views. Chaman Lal, *Secrets of Japan* (Tokyo, 1928).

107. Delmer M. Brown, 2.

example of Japan so as to inculcate the spirit of patriotism in a land sometimes referred to as "a geographical rather than historical names."¹⁰⁸ The lesson, said Gokhale, that one draws from Japan "is the tremendously strong national feeling which had been a great secret of Japan's success".¹⁰⁹ "The Indian people, whether living in palaces or huts," he asked, "should follow the Japanese sense of patriotism". "Patriotism", he added, "is the corner-stone of national existence. It is the motive power for all national action". "There (in Japan)", it was said, "exists no distinction between the individual and the State. Whosoever attacks the State attacks each and every Japanese subject."¹¹⁰ In other words, "Devotion to mother-land should be in the same way as it is in Japan."¹¹¹

Again, Gokhale warned the people that mere one feeling would not help unless they were disciplined and gave obedience to their leaders as in Japan.¹¹² Discipline as was exhibited by the Japanese army.¹¹³ Loyalty and obedience as their

108. Lancelot Lawton, *Empires in the Far East*, 806.

109. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 819.

110. Alfred Stead, "Japanese Patriotism", in *Hindustan Review*, August and September 1907.

111. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 819.

112. *Ibid.*, 831.

113. *The Indian Review*, July 1905, 512.

(Japanese) religion teaches. "It is here that Japan supplies an invaluable object lesson by which we firmly trust that India will surely profit."¹¹⁴

India had also to learn from Japan in the field of education, particularly practical education. Because "education emancipates the lower classes and lessens the gap in society; and on women's education depends largely the welfare of future generation." These ideas of compulsory and women's education were responsible for "levelling democratic spirit in Japan."¹¹⁵

Emphasising on the practical education, it was said, "The greatest lesson to India from Japan (in the field of education), is not the theoretical education but practical which would enable the pupil to earn his living in a better way."¹¹⁶ The schools should be linked up with the manual training. Each successive grade of school on the literary side should be accompanied with a parallel grade of craft development. "In Japan, agricultural education was given in the primary schools; in the higher primary natural science was taught."¹¹⁷ With

114. *Ibid.*, January 1905, 2.

115. *Hindustan Review*, March 1907, G. A. Nateson on "What India ought to learn from Japan".

116. *The Indian Review*, April 1907, 291.

117. Annie Besant, *Shall India Live or Die?* (Bangalore, 1925), 107-8.

this aim in view as a first step, "The Elementary Education Bill," was introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council on March 16, 1911.¹¹⁸

VI

*Japan's Strong Impetus to
National Movement—Adoption of
the Ideal of Self-Government*

The Indians thus drew comparison to every aspect of life in Japan.¹¹⁹ The frequent references to the achievements of Japan and to the conditions in India not only deepened unrest but also helped in the clearer realization by the Indians of the significance of freedom. Naturally, the Indians set their mind to be what Japan was, a free country. In this way Japan became an ideal for the political advancement of the country.

Gokhale in his Presidential address at Benares analysed the difference between the progress made by independent Japan, and India under the English rule. He said,¹²⁰

119. *The Indian Review*, April 1907, 291.

120. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 831.

“Japan within 40 years of western influence was, in the matter of education, in line with the most advanced nation. But in India, after hundred years of English rule, four out of five villages were without a school house, seven out of eight children grew in ignorance and in darkness”.

This, he explained, “was the difference between a subject nation and an independent nation”. Even the Gaekwad of Baroda, it was pointed out, who enjoyed an amount of autonomy, “was spending 6½d per head for education against 1d per head in the provinces under the direct British rule”. “Is it not a matter of shame”, it was asked, “to see our (British) Government, boasting of its superior civilization” and not caring for the education of the people under its rule even like the ‘Maharaja’.¹²¹ More and more people realised, therefore, that what England, Japan and Baroda had achieved, the Indians could do if they were self-governing.¹²² And Japan became a symbol and a standard of their achievements to be. The people were, therefore, asked to come out of the rut and follow Japan in order to achieve similar results.¹²³

Sir Verney Lovett who had watched the progress of the Indian National Movement from close quarters for nearly thirty-five years from the incep-

121. *Hilavadi* (Calcutta), 11 June, 1905: (Reports I, 585).

122. Annie Besant, *India : A Nation* (Madras, 1930), 135.

123. Tilak, *Writings and Speeches*, 222. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 831.

tion of the Congress till the end of the First World War also held the same view. He said that the nationalists had made Japan as the standard of their aspirations—self-rule. Because the nationalists believed that united self-governing India could rival the success of Japan.¹²⁴ That is, she could in 10 or 15 years be as great as Japan.¹²⁵

The War, nay the success of Japan, had made deeper impressions inasmuch as it changed the basis of the Indian movement. The year 1905, in fact, may be regarded as a dividing line in the history of the National Movement in India. The Indian National Congress, “the emblem of National feeling”,¹²⁶ which had given rise to the National

124. Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (London, 1921), 94.

125. Tilak, *Writings and Speeches*, 330.

Some went to the extent of asking if it was proper for India to share rejoicing over the Japanese success as done by other oriental nations “for we do not possess national independence”.

Daily Hitavadi (Calcutta), 4 June, 1905. (Reports I, 564).

126. J. Ramsay MacDonald found the history of the National Congress and that of the National Movement in India as synonym. MacDonald, 197.

Many an English statesman from time to time had admitted the national character of the Congress. In 1890, when the Congress was nearly five years old, Sir Charles Dilke said, “. . . there is so much reason to think that the Congress Movement really represents the cultivated intelligence of the country . . .”

Mr. Herbert (later Lord) Gladstone observed, “The national movement in India expresses through the Congress”. Quoted in A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution* (Madras, 1915) first ed., 154-5.

Movement, had grown both in status and importance.¹²⁷ It was now a force to be reckoned with.¹²⁸ It had become increasingly popular.¹²⁹ The "real National Movement" may be dated from the year 1906.¹³⁰

The maturity of the Congress may be gauged from the ideals it set forth in 1905 and put on clearer pattern in 1906. India should be governed "in the interest of the Indians themselves", declared Gokhale at Benares in 1905.¹³¹ It was clear from his address that mere enlargement of representation in Legislative Assemblies would not satisfy the aspirations of the people. The other point on which Gokhale was firm and resolute, while speaking on behalf of the people his organization

127. Prince of Wales (later George V) who visited India in 1905 referred to the National Congress as "rapidly becoming a great power". See John Viscount Morley, *Recollections* (London, June 1918), II, 171.

128. Advising Lord Minto (Viceroy of India from November 1905 to November 1910) on Indian affairs Morley wrote on 6 June, 1906, "Cast-iron bureaucracy won't go on forever. You cannot go on governing in the same spirit (referring to Curzon's rule); you have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles." *Ibid.*, 173.

129. Sir Henry Cotton, President of the Bombay (1904) Session of the Congress, later wrote in his book that a large number of people from different shades of life joined and attended the Congress Sessions. He called that a stirring spectacle. Sir Henry Cotton, *New India* (London, 1907), 11.

130. Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, 148-50.

131. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 804-46.

represented, was not to tolerate other than the treatment "of perfect equality". The condition for going together was to be "self-respect of the other side". The methods to attain the end, however, were still, in his view, to be peaceful and constitutional.¹³²

The twenty-second session (1906) of the Congress was a remarkable departure from the past. The Presidential speech of Dadabhai Naoroji was not of a conventional type. His address was brief, pointed and spirited. Dadabhai quoted Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, the British Prime Minister's words that good government could never be a substitute for self-government. The Congress, so far, had good government as its ideal. Under Dadabhai's Presidentship it was changed to self-government. Swaraj became the new slogan.¹³³

The Congress resolutions exhibited the growing

132. *Ibid.*

Gokhale's methods and views were appreciated by the English rulers. But in India he was considered "Moderate" (as more and more people favoured the goal set in 1903). Morley, *Recollections*, II, 171.

133. *The Indian National Congress*, containing Presidential Addresses, Congress Resolutions, etc., compiled by P. A. Natesan (Madras, 1917), 820.

The new goal of the Congress—the self-Government—meant to attain a status similar to other self-governing colonies of the British empire, like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa.

Morley, *Recollections*, II, 181.

Daily Hitavadi, 2 July, 1905. (Reports I, 652).

political consciousness of at least its followers. It was now increasingly asked, "Is it in any way strange that India should be anxiously desirous to obtain a share in the administration of the country and a proper place in the Councils of Europe"?¹³⁴

The Western ideas of political liberty, it may be conceded, were of assistance in the initial stages of the formation of the Congress,¹³⁵ but the Congress resolutions of 1905 and 1906 were the expressions of a legitimate demand of the people which (the example of) Japan had helped in bringing forward in clearer terms. In a leading article the *Kesari* wrote, "...A knowledge of (Japanese) history has kindled in their (Indians) minds a strong desire for 'Swarajya'."¹³⁶ The *Bengalee*, another prominent newspaper, had conveyed the prevailing idea by saying that "... Japanese success have . . . evoked pan-Asiatic feeling which India shares to the fullest extent. In the Home affairs there is a new-born spirit which

134. *The Indian Review*, April 1907, 291.

135. Ramsay MacDonald, 196.

Gokhale, "East and West in India", *Speeches*, 1222.

S. K. Mitra, *Indian Problems* (London, 1908), 384.

A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution*, 154-5.

Charu Mihir (Mymen Singh), 13 June, 1905. (Reports I, 612).

Swaraj, 1 April, 1909. See in Ramsay MacDonald, 154.

136. *Kesari*, 12 May, 1908. See Ram Gopal, *Lokamanya Tilak* (A Biography) (Bombay, 1956), 285.

is striving to bring the reactionary Government of the country within the sphere of popular control. These are clear indications of the great Eastern revival".¹³⁷

Discussing "the probable consequence of the rise of Japan on India", another journal remarked, "It (the rise of Japan) will encourage the Indians to demand more and more political privileges, though they may not entertain any idea of casting off the British yoke to which they are implicitly loyal . . .".¹³⁸

Japan, therefore, not only helped in creating greater appreciation of the practical value of "liberty" but also provided a practical example to argue the case for. The example of Japan focussed the attention of the people to a new political goal—Swaraj. The new slogan for Swaraj helped the Congress to rally the masses under its banner although among other factors, Curzon, indeed, was one.¹³⁹ In

137. *Bengalee*, 12 June, 1905. (Reports I, 223).

138. *Divakaran* (Calicut), 18 September, 1905. (Reports II, 360).

139. Curzon's rule may be called as "a blessing in disguise inasmuch as it united the Indians on a common basis." *The Indian Review*, November 1905, 747.

Curzon stimulated national feeling.

Howrah Hitaishi, 22 April, 1905. (Reports I, 432).

"An indirect cause of national awakening".

Jasohar (Jessore), 12 May, 1905. (Reports I, 505).

(Contd. on next page)

other words, if the policies and attitude of the English had caused a sense of unity in the Indian politics, Japan had taught the fruit that accrued from such strength. She had successfully proved that the nation might use its total strength for national cause. "Boycott" and "Swadeshi" were to prove them later.

(Contd. from previous page)

"Awakener of national life in India".

Joyti (Chittagong), 25 May, 1905. (Reports I, 544).

The partition of Bengal—"a landmark in the history of India's national progress".

Gokhale, *Speeches*, 817.

VII

Japan's Interest in the Indian Movement

Japan had been showing keen interest in the Indian movement. While a few doubted India's capacity to "self-rule", others expressed full confidence in her demand. Count Okuma, the Japanese statesman, advised the Indians "to endeavour to invigorate the national spirit"; but had added :

"A nation is entitled to talk of independence only after it has entirely abolished its own evil customs, ennobled its own character and attained the same qualifications as any other powerful rising nation. Neither the evolution theory nor any modern advanced thought admits that the evils consequent on the Hindu caste system and religious superstition should have a place in any civilized nation".¹⁴⁰

Okuma's comments on the Indian society and

140. See *Towards Home Rule*, ed., Ramananda Chatterjee (Calcutta, 1917), Pt. I, 147.

religious beliefs were received with a retort. "Is Japan's commercial morality above reproach"? It was asked, "Do the institution of the Geisha and other similar customs indicate a high level of social, domestic and individual morality"? However, advice and interest of the Japanese elder-statesman was welcomed inasmuch as it was a reminder of India's shortcomings.¹⁴¹

In a lengthy leading article under the caption "The Nationalist Party in India", the *Japanese Chronicle*, an English Daily of Tokyo, upheld the Congress demand. It wrote, "The people in India, it is declared, are not fit for self-government. But it must be remembered", the article explained, "that this is said by the holders of power, who, naturally, do not want to surrender it" The *Chronicle* added, "A nation cannot be treated as a child or a minor . . . A nation cannot learn the use of liberty except by using liberty". "It is curious" the journal asked, "that the argument now used against granting self-government to the Indians . . . that they could never unite, and that anarchy would be the result, was applied to the American colonies just before the establishment of American independence". Answering itself the question of Indian unity and citing the case of Japan, the article concluded, "A nation will in almost

141. *Ibid.*, 148.

any circumstances of internal heterogeneity, act as a united whole when it understands that it is necessary for its existence to do so". Moreover, "with European Powers always ready to aggress on weaker brethren, with an ambitious, expansive Japan for close neighbour, and with China growing stronger every day, India could not afford to be other than united".¹⁴²

In reply to certain statements, not written by the Japanese but appearing in their press, in support of the British rule in India, an Indian student in Tokyo published an article. The article rebutted the statements by concluding "... We strongly believe that India, whatever she might have been in the past, is sufficiently prepared now to govern herself as a whole. . . ." ¹⁴³

The views on India's capacity to self-rule manifested Japan's genuine interest in the Indian struggle. She always gave prominent space in the press to the matters Indian.¹⁴⁴ The Indian residents there were so much impressed that a few even expected Japan's actual assistance in the struggle. "... At present", wrote one Raoji I Amin in an

142. *The Japanese Chronicle* (Tokyo), 17 December, 1908. *Ibid.*, Pt. II, 97-8.

143. See Lancelot Lawton, *Empires of the Far East* (London, 1912), II, 807.

144. This is supported by Lancelot Lawton who had made on-the-spot study. *Ibid.*

English Daily from Tokyo, "India awaits the help of an oriental nation (Japan) which has already been a success in civilization, and by its virtue has taught a good lesson to the countries of the West". Many such instances were to be found in the Japanese newspapers.¹⁴⁵

Japan had also warmly responded to the Indian feelings. The government there allowed the celebrations of Sivaji festival. The celebrations, it was reported, "partook of the nature of the pan-Asiatic demonstration".¹⁴⁶ But the Indians were much more encouraged by the declaration of the Speaker in the Japanese House of Peers that "it was the sacred duty of Japan, as the leading Asiatic state, to stretch a helping hand", among others, "to India who is capable of civilization and free them from their European yoke".¹⁴⁷ This declaration from a Japanese dignitary, in spite of the avowed Anglo-Japanese friendship¹⁴⁸ was particularly welcome to India. Besides, the expression of sympathies by Japan towards the late earthquake (in Bihar) led an Indian journal to write, "What a thrill of pleasure and hopes does this friendship between Japan and India send through our hearts"? The Japanese

145. *Ibid.*, 805.

146. *Bengalee*, 15 June, 1905. (Reports I, 229).

147. Quoted in *East* (Calcutta), 16 July, 1905.

148. The negotiations for the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) were then almost complete.

attitude (the expression of sympathies) had added so much to the rising spirit that, it was observed, "the pulse of a new life was beating fast in the nation".¹⁴⁹

Valentine Chirol, the contemporary English writer and *The Times* correspondent, believed, on the other hand, that the Japanese Government did not show other than general interest in the Indian movement although conceded that the Indian students were well received in Japan. But, he added, they were "innowise specially petted or pampered"; and when "they (the students in Japan) begin to air their political opinions and to disclaim against British rule they are very speedily put in their place". In order to support his contention Chirol narrates in his book his conversation with "a pleasant and intelligent young Indian student" who had spent "two-three years at Tokyo". He wrote that the student had received "a great deal of kindness from his (student's) Japanese professors". "But the general attitude of the Japanese was by no means friendly, and there was no trace of sympathy with the political agitation in India".¹⁵⁰

It is not understood what Chirol meant by "the general attitude" (*of the Japanese*) and "no trace of sympathy" when he admitted that the Indian student received "a great deal of kindness

149. *Sanjivani* (Calcutta), 27 November, 1905 (Reports I, 459).

150. Valentino Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London, 1910), 148.

from his Japanese professors". In this connection we have also the evidence of Lancelot Lawton, another contemporary writer. He writes that "prominent space was given to the Indian matters in the Japanese newspapers".¹⁵¹ There are on the other hand on record, the statements of prominent Japanese statesmen. On the subject of "The Relations between Japan and India" Baron Eiichi Shibusawa wrote, ". . . I cannot help expressing the strong opinion of the urgent necessity of endeavouring to create close relationship between Japan and India, and so simultaneously to promote the development of trade between the two countries. . . ."¹⁵² On the same subject Baron Sakatani, an ex-Minister of the Financial Department and later the Lord Mayor of Tokyo, and Masayoshi Kato, Vice-President of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, paid glorious tribute to India and her civilization.¹⁵³ These statements read with the reported remarks of the Speaker in the Japanese House of Peers¹⁵⁴ are a sufficient proof of the immense interest Japan had evinced in India.

True, there may not have been any "material" Japanese support to the Indian cause. But the

151. *Ibid.* See also footnotes 144 and 145.

152. *Japan and India*, comp. 2nd ed., Shun Saitoh (Kyobashi, Tokyo, 1912), i.

153. *Ibid.*, ii-vii.

154. See n. 147.

fact that the Indian revolutionaries, expelled from India on account of "seditious" activities, often found refuge in Japan proves the sympathetic attitude of the Japanese. The revolutionaries, it is told, were not asked to leave Japan until pressed by the British envoy.¹⁵⁵ As far as the "material" support was concerned, no responsible Indian leader could expect in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

155. The information had been given to the author by Dr. Bhagwan Singh Gyance, an Indian revolutionary, when he returned to India five years back to settle in the Panjab. From Japan Dr. Gyance went to the United States and became a Naturalized citizen.

VIII

Indian Response to Japan's Encouragement

The success of Japan (in 1905) had influenced the national struggle in India in another aspect, too. This was in regard to the methods to be adopted for the attainment of the goal—"Self-rule". Perhaps, it was here that Japan was to be a better model to India.

The Congress so far (till 1905) had been under the leadership of the "Moderates", who favoured peaceful and constitutional means for the realization of the ends.¹⁵⁶ A section in the (Congress) organization soon started doubting the utility of the indefinite adoption of such measures. Tilak who was to assume the leadership of this section, cited the example of Ireland and Japan to the Indians to

156. Gokhale was the leader of the "Moderates". (See footnote 1). Also, *The Indian Review*, January 1906, 2.

follow. He said that "protests are of no avail. Days of protests and prayers have gone". He warned the people not to rely upon "the sympathy of Mr. Morley", when he was "unable to overthrow the bureaucracy"¹⁵⁷. If at all a change comes, "it will be enlightened despotism in place of pure despotism". "And this", he added, "would not do"¹⁵⁸.

The undoing of the partition of Bengal and the Indians' agitation in order ultimately to become the master of their destinies had become the national issues.¹⁵⁹ The solution of these issues required the mobilization of the national strength. Here Japan was to serve as an ideal because she had shown the way to solve the national problems. Even Chirol admitted, "The emergence of Japan has created so powerful an impression in India that one is not surprised to find the Indian revolutionaries...looking in that quarter (Japan) for guidance and even, perhaps, for assistance"¹⁶⁰.

"It is extremely desirable", wrote an Indian journal, "that India should make Japan her ideal

157. With the coming of the Liberals into power (in late 1905) in England, some Indians hoped a change in at least the tone of the administration after the "strenuous reign" of Curzon.

The Indian Review, March 1906, 162-3.

158. Tilak in a public speech at Calcutta on 7 June, 1906. *Tilak Writings and Speeches* (Madras, 1909), 112-7.

159. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 806-46.

160. Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, 147.

and try to imitate her..." Reminding the Indians of their strength the journal asked, "Why will not the Indians do what the inhabitants of a small island like Japan have done"?¹⁶¹ Tilak had already asserted that "Three P's—pray, pleasure and protest—will not do unless backed by solid force". Recommending revolutionary methods to achieve the ends, he made a pointed reference to Japan. He said, "Look to the example and follow her methods".

Tilak further made an appeal to the Indian sentiments in order to bring home the Japanese example. He emphasised that "self-sacrifice, ardent devotion, and disinterested action", incidentally the three main secrets of the Japanese success, were necessary for the attainment of aspirations. He asked the people to appreciate the spirit of Sivaji and follow the national hero.¹⁶² Another social worker of note advised the Indians: "Service for the nation was a duty—a duty as taught in Gita". "Better for a man is his own duty, however badly done, than the duty of another, though that be easy".¹⁶³ The Press, too, had exclaimed that that was a day

161. *Pratijna* (Calcutta), 14 June, 1905 (Reports I, 612).

162. Annual celebration of Sivaji festival became a regular and popular feature particularly in Bengal and Maharashtra. *The Maharatta*, 24 June, 1906. See Tilak, *Speeches*, 48-51.

163. Sister Nivedita in *The Indian Review*, March 1906, 165.

(time) of sacrifice. It appealed that everybody should contribute his bit for the cause of national regeneration.¹⁶¹

Lord Curzon had already alienated the Indian people. He had paid no heed to the advice from within and without. A journal called upon him "to follow the example of Japan for the formation of Representative system of Government in India". "In Japan", it had added, "where the Emperor is much esteemed by the people, a representative government was established as it was thought that such a form of government alone would contribute to the strength and greatness of the country".¹⁶⁵ Another newspaper had quoted Mr. J. M. Robertson who gave a lecture at the New Reform Club (London) saying, "A policy of repression toward the people of India cannot fail to increase disaffection and discontent". Warning, he had said, "It were idle to disguise the fact that the people of India look upon Japan in a light way".¹⁶⁶ One Mr. Arnold White had been quoted as saying, "The policy of ignoring

164. *The Indian Review*, October 1905, 713.

Ramsay MacDonald regarded the publication during that period of Ranade's *History of the Mahrattas* (setting Mahrattas' example to devotion to national cause); Dutt's 'Ancient India' (signifying the glorious past and the similar goal to achieve); Shaikh Mohammad Iqbal's 'Hindustan Hamara' (a patriotic song denoting India, a nation and one ideal) as the contribution of the intellectuals in arousing the national spirit.

165. *Swadesmitran*, 22 February, 1905 (Reports II, 74).

166. *Indian Mirror*, 13 April, 1905. (Reports I, 143).

Indian public opinion is foolish and dangerous, and England must recognise the change in the relations between Asia and Europe after the battle of Mukden (a decisive battle in the Russo-Japanese War)".¹⁶⁷

Lord Curzon's enthusiasm in the revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had, too, been looked upon as "distrusting the Indians".¹⁶⁸ His refusal to see the Japanese Consul in India who had gone a long way to Simla (the Summer Capital) to express sympathies on behalf of his Government over India's sufferings in the late earthquake had the "desired" effect on the Indians. The action of Curzon, it was observed, was, perhaps, due to apprehension of the British Government lest Japan come closer to India and the national movement might get accentuated.¹⁶⁹ The movement did, however, receive an impetus in spite of Curzon's action. In fact, Curzon brought about amity between the peoples of Japan and India while his own "deeds" alienated the Indians further away from the British Rule.

167. *Bengalee*, 15 April, 1905 (Reports I, 143).

168. *Bengalee*, 29 May, 1905 and 10 June, 1905 (Reports I, 218, 19).

Swadesamitran, 11 September, 1905 (Reports II, 346).

Vrittanta Patrika 5 October, 1905 (Reports I, 372).

169. *Swadesamitran* (Madras), 5 May 1905 (Reports II, 171).

Hitavadi (Calcutta), 12 May, 1905 (Reports I, 494).

IX

Partition of Bengal and After : The Swadeshi Movement

The final announcement (from Simla on 19 July 1905) of the 'Government Resolution on the Partition of Bengal'¹⁷⁰ was the signal for an agitation such as India had not witnessed before. A storm of indignation was raised everywhere over the abuse of the public opinion. The announcement "fell like a bombshell" upon the people who had, of late, become accustomed to the news of victory of "the East over the West" both on land and at sea.

The success of Japan was the spirit and the partition of Bengal was the occasion when on 7th August 1905, which may be regarded as a memorable

170. For the text of the Resolution see Prithwis Chandra Ray, ed., *The Case Against the Break-up of Bengal* (Calcutta, September 1905), Appendix B.

day in the Indian National History, was inaugurated the 'Boycott-Swadeshi' movement. The former was to be "a general boycott of foreign goods and British goods in particular". The latter was its obverse.¹⁷¹

With the declaration of "Boycott" as "legitimate" and making a mass appeal for the success of "Swadeshi" the Congress gave the movement a political character.¹⁷² The "Boycott" was "the end of the policy of begging" or "the last resort" of the Indians.¹⁷³ In brief, the Swadeshi marked a beginning of the practical form of protest (to the British Government) where the "Boycott" was used as "a political weapon".

It is interesting to note that a few Chinese were present in the meeting when vow of 'Boycott' and 'Swadeshi' was first taken at Calcutta.¹⁷⁴

171. To Madan Mohan Malviya, 'Swadeshi' meant the protection of indigenous industries.

Annie Besant, *How India Wrought for Freedom*, 454.

To Tilak, it meant self-help, determination and sacrifice on the part of the nation in order to end the sad spectacle of the middle class using foreign goods. To Lala Lajpat Rai, it was the conserving of capital while Dadabhi Naoroji regarded it as a "cry for economic reforms". Pattabhai Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, (Bombay, 1946), I, 84.

172. For details see the Congress Resolutions passed at Calcutta in 1906. *The Indian National Congress* (Part II), 123-4.

173. *The Daily Hilavadi*, 24 July, 1905 (Reports I, 724).

174. Prithwis Chandra Ray, op. cit., V-XV.

“They would certainly have been surprised to learn that their countrymen had inspired the boycott resolution”,¹⁷⁵ which was the first manifestation of the newly aroused sense of nationality after the success of Japan.¹⁷⁶ The Indians must have been encouraged by the Chinese action. Wrote a Bengalee journal, “American goods were boycotted by China so should India do in case of England”.¹⁷⁷ India’s boycott of the English goods, as in the case of China, was called “a patriotic movement”.¹⁷⁸

The ‘Boycott’ was to do away with the foreign goods, in general, and the British goods in particular. The local needs were to be met by greater use of ‘Swadeshi’ (home-made) goods. It was, in other words, to infuse more and more self-reliance, on which depended the success of the movement. Self-reliance was the one idea that the Indian leaders had understood from the Japanese success.

“India’s future salvation”, said an Ex-member of the British House of Commons, “does not depend on the grace of its rulers. ...If India ever attains political independence, she will attain it by her own

175. *The Englishman*, 8 August, 1905. China had boycotted American goods at that time (May-Sept. 1905).

176. H. B. Morse and H.F. MacNair, *Far East International Relations* (Boston & New York, 1931), 548.

177. *Sanjivani*, 22 June, 1905 (Reports I, 635).

178. *Daily Hitavadi*, 15 August, 1905 (Reports I, 807).

efforts, not as a gift from the ruling race".¹⁷⁹ "One thing", explained Sister Nivedita, "that taught Japan to India was self-help". "The former", she added, "did not ask for any outside assistance (to defeat her superior rival)". "So should India" muster her own strength to achieve the object, was her advice to the Indians.¹⁸⁰ It was the spirit of self-reliance that had enabled the Japanese make tremendous progress. For a nation to stand on its own legs, emphasised another writer, "self-confidence was the first requisite". "A little over fifty years since, Japan was not what she is today in the concert of world powers. One hundred years ago, no one believed that the United States would be what she is now". If India followed their example, her future would be equally bright.¹⁸¹ Tilak had also imbibed this spirit among the Indians.¹⁸²

The "Boycott" (of British goods) was used as a political weapon for a definite purpose. It was first to demonstrate deep resentment at the treatment meted out to the Bengalees, and secondly

179. J.M. Maclean, ex. M.P., letter to 'The Englishman' of 24 January 1905. See *The Samvad Prabhakar*, 25 January, 1905 (Reports I, 88)

180. *The Indian Review*, March 1906, 163.

181. Ramananda Chatterjee, Brochure on "Towards Home Rule" (Calcutta, 1917), Part III, 205-6.

182. Tilak, *Speeches*, 401.

to attract attention of the people in England.¹⁸³ Never before had the Indians resorted to such practices. The Government circles believed that the fury of the anti-Partition agitation was particularly prominent as a result of the impact of the Japanese victory over Russia.

Frequent meetings were held at different places to preach the doctrine of 'Boycott'.¹⁸⁴ The contribution of the students was by no means small. Babu Ramakanta Ray, a Japanese-trained mining engineer, with his student followers "patrolled the streets" to take to each home the message of the 'Boycott'.¹⁸⁵ In Bengal, it was stressed that "every individual will make it a point not to purchase foreign articles".¹⁸⁶

183. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 819.

184. *Sanjivani* (Calcutta) which played a leading role in the 'Boycott' reported a number of meetings in and around the province. *Sanjivani*, 24 August, 1905 (Reports I, 850).

185. Surendranath Banerjee, *A Nation in the Making* (London, 1925), 196-7.

186. *Prapancha Tarakai* (Madras) 2 September, 1905 (Reports II, 232).

In Bengal the people were also asked to renounce government offices, to sever all connections with the British and to observe mourning for one day. *Sanjivani*, 27 July, 1905 (Reports I, 700).

Under the Presidentship of Tilak two thousand students pledged to boycott European goods. *Bharat Mitra* (Calcutta), 26 August, 1905 (Reports I, 852).

Soon the example was followed by other provinces. *The Englishman*, 3 September, 1905.

See Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, 169.

The 'Boycott' had gravely affected the British interests. Those having imports-trade connection with England got alarmed.¹⁸⁷ This led the Anglo-Indian paper advise the Government that "Boycott must not be acquiesced in, as it will surely ruin British connection with India more than an armed revolution." It also recommended stern measures against the boycotters for "...in boycott the enemies of the (British) Raj (rule) have found a most effective weapon for injuring British interests in the country."¹⁸⁸

The official circles in England had been taken aback. The Secretary of State for India had ordered a fortnightly report on the situation from the Government in India to keep himself and the Government regularly informed.¹⁸⁹

In India, the Government evolved every

187. The same newspaper which had started a campaign to minimise the importance of the movement, described the situation thus: "It is absolutely true that Calcutta warehouses are full of fabrics that cannot be sold....Many prominent Marwari (merchants in Upper India) firms have been absolutely ruined and a number of the biggest European import houses have had either to close down their piecegoods branch or to put up with a very small business. As for stocks...they tend to grow larger....These facts are now so well-known that it is idle to attempt to hide them..." *Ibid.*

188. *Ibid.*

The Statesman on 15 September, 1905, gave, in a table, an alarming picture of downward trend of sale of British cloth stored in different parts of Bengal.

189. *Home Deptt. Progs. No. 114/115, October, 1905.*

possibility to undermine the boycott. It even associated with the private English firms and induced them to do business at half the cost price.¹⁹⁰ But the overall result continued to be serious as late as 1907. The reports confirmed the "well-marked influence of the boycott".¹⁹¹ The trade in English goods remained stagnant.¹⁹² Even till the beginning of the year 1908 "...stocks (were in) a worse state of congestion" in view "more or less of the determined efforts (of the Indians) to enforce the boycott..."¹⁹³

The British officials were surprised that the Boycott did not apply to the Japanese goods. Large quantities of Japanese cotton hosiery were being openly sold. The agitators knowingly encouraged their sale as such. The Government feared lest "this may further adversely affect the sale of recognized British goods".¹⁹⁴

The movement soon spread to other fields—the schools, the courts, and the bureaucratic administration. The idea was to open new Swadeshi or

190. No. 64-T.P., dated 22nd August, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 661/September, 1907.

191. No. 2453-P, dated G.G.'s Camp, Simla, the 29th June, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 187/July 1907.

192. No. 3237-P, dated Calcutta, the 19th August, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 115/August 1907.

193. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 49/January 1908.

194. No. 2770-P.D. dated 23rd October, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 16/November 1907.

indigenous institutions “to train the youths of the nation...in institutions conducted on ‘national’ lines and subject to ‘national’ control and calculated to help the realisation of the ‘national’ destiny”.¹⁹⁵ Aurobindo called Boycott “a blessing” inasmuch as it “paved the way for the emancipation of education from bureaucratic control.”¹⁹⁶

The Boycott gave stimulus to the “Swadeshi” indigenous industry. A report of the Government said, “...as a result of the boycott, Bombay dhoties are now established in the market to an extent formerly unknown”.¹⁹⁷

The people spared no effort to popularise and make the Swadeshi movement a success. Fired by patriotic fervour, many songs and poems were published in newspapers or sung by groups in the streets.¹⁹⁸ Supporting the Congress resolution on the Swadeshi at the Calcutta (1905) session, Tilak had said that the masses comprising mostly of village folks did not have many requirements,

195. Bipin Chandra Pal, *The Spirit of Indian Nationalism* (London, 1910), 43.

196. Sri Aurobindo, “The Possibilities of the Boycott” published in the *Daily Bande Mataram*, 10 October, 1907. For Text see Mukerjee’s “India’s Fight for Freedom”, App. II, 247.

197. No. 3865-P dated 6 September, 1907, *Proceedings of the Home Deptt.* October 1907.

198. *Jyoti* (Chittagong), 24 August, 1905 (Reports I, 850).

“probably none at all for any of the foreign goods”.¹⁹⁹ Therefore they were asked to “show preference above all others to native and next, to Japanese manufactures.”²⁰⁰

Many new factories/mills, with the aid of Japanese machines, were started and a few existing ones strengthened. The names of the Maharaja of Kolhapur and a few Marwaris were given prominence. The former had started a weaving and spinning mill. At Sholapur, too, it was reported, a new mill had been started and an existing one considerably augmented. In the town of Hathras (modern Uttar Pradesh) the Marwaris had decided to start a Swadeshi spinning and weaving concern.²⁰¹ This is supported by the report received by the then Government in India. It stated “...considerable additions have been made to weaving plants both in Calcutta and Bombay within the last year in response to the Swadeshi movement, and it is natural that the Indian mills should be deeply interested in keeping the agitation alive”. It was also reported that the Indian mills were carrying out proving tests

199. Tilak called the middle classes the greatest offenders since mostly they were the consumers of foreign goods. Tilak, *Speeches*, 374.

200. This was the theme of two articles published in *The Kesari* in September 1905, a paper published by Tilak from Poona. Ram Gopal, *Lokamanya Tilak* (Bombay, 1956), 233.

201. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 1 January, 1906 (Reports I, 14); *Hindoo Patriot*, 6 January, 1906 (Reports, II, 7).

of the spindles manufactured in Japan.²⁰² Japan supplied experts to keep the Swadeshi industries alive.²⁰³

A large number of young Indians was sent to Japan for technical and other training.²⁰⁴ In fact, the beginning of the year 1906 marked a record number of Indian students undergoing training at one time in different universities in Japan. This "indicates", remarked the Japan Weekly Mail, "the great trust India reposes in Japan..." "Let us hope", the paper continued, "that the Indian youngmen now in Japan...on their return home may not only render invaluable service to the Indian arts and industries (they were studying here) but also add their mite in the true political, social and moral advancement of their peoples."²⁰⁵

In India the Swadeshi leaders had appealed to the people to contribute liberally in the "Paisa Fund", started under the patronage of Tilak. The Fund was to help the Indians to get advance training in industrial and agricultural education in Europe, America and Japan.²⁰⁶

202. No. 2236-P.D. dated Darjeeling the 20th September, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 59/October 1907. Also *The Bengallee*, 12 January 1905 (Reports I, 19).

203. *The Swadesamitran*, 10 June, 1905 (Reports II, 212). *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 28 April, 1906, 440 and 441.

204. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 13/October 1906.

205. *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 26 May, 1906.

206. Ram Gopal (see footnote 200).

The Swadeshi movement was mainly economic, blended with politics, but it was a necessity. It was justified on moral and legal grounds because the people were "trying to do for themselves what the Government ought to have done years and years ago."²⁰⁷ Again, throwing a challenge to the Government, Tilak said, "If the Government dissociates itself from the commercial aspiration of the British nation, then it will be time for Swadeshi workers to consider the question of dissociating their movement from politics."²⁰⁸ Moreover, "If the Government were interested in the material advance of this country why was it endeavouring to put down the Swadeshi movement."²⁰⁹ The "Swadeshi" was the only hope for "the regeneration of the indigenous industry."²¹⁰

Another writer had blamed the English for the "Boycott-Swadeshi" movement. He wrote, "The introduction of Manchester goods has been accom-

207. Tilak had asked in a public speech on 23 December, 1906, "If the Government was sincere in its profession that its rule was in the interest of the Indians, it should have protected the Indian industry instead of opposing the Swadeshi movement". Tilak. *Speeches*, 53.

208. *Ibid.*, 54. See also No. 2770-P.D. dated 23rd October, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 66/September, 1907.

209. *The Swadeshi* (Madras), 15 November, 1905 (Reports II, 420).

210. *Sri Srivishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 4 January 1906 (Report I, 28).

panied by the collapse of indigenous industries".²¹¹ The Government confidential reports confirmed that (the Swadeshi movement) "was a genuine and for the improvement of Indian industry",²¹² and "...a movement for the preference of indigenous manufactures is historically inevitable in the development of a country..."²¹³

The "Boycott-Swadeshi" movement had touched so deeply the patriotic feeling of the Indians that even "the Pandas of Hardwar (the holymen of the sacred place of the Hindus situated on the bank of the Ganges in U.P.) resolved not to accept offerings of sweets, etc., made of imported sugar."²¹⁴ The Government recognized that "...with Swadeshi is bound up the growth of national strength".²¹⁵ It was also feared that the police in Calcutta might also get "infected" with the "Swadeshi views."²¹⁶

The movement, besides giving an incentive for the production of utility goods, opened an avenue of employment to the local population and as a result, became a means of social reform. Much of

211. *The Indian Review*, "Swadeshim in Excelsis", October, 1905, 683.

212. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 18/October 1907.

213. *Ibid.*, Prog. No. 38/December 1908.

214. *Hindoo Patriot*, n. 201.

215. *Home Deptt. (Pol.) Progs.* No. 18/October 1907.

216. No. 2529-P.D., Dated the 3rd October, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 77/October 1907.

the poverty-stricken populace was addicted to opium. They, very often, resorted to stealing in order to satisfy their craving for opium. The result was that they spent most part of the year, nay life, in jail. The following example will show how the movement reformed the society of this ill. A Bengali Mohammedan, while the (Swadeshi) movement was making headway, addressed the crowd thus :²¹⁷

“Brothers, a while ago, we could not earn four annas a day. You know that a man had to steal for his opium and how many of us spent eight months of every year in prison ! But now, everything is changed ! Ten annas a day, with comfort and decency. No more stealing, no more prison.”

The movement may thus be said to have infused the idea of self-reliance and dignity of labour which converted the offenders ultimately to be respected citizens. Exactly it were these secrets of the Japanese which had brought them tremendous progress in every field of peace and war and had, in turn, won them appreciation all the world over. Now these ideas, through the help of Swadeshi leaders, had reached even the neglected members of the (Indian) society.²¹⁸

217. See *The Indian Review*, March 1906, 165.

218. The Swadeshi movement, however, could not maintain the strides for long. It faced criticism from within and obstacles from without. Some told that wealth could not be secured by making the people consume articles of Indian origin alone. Others opined that it should be experimented in a small way at first. (*Contd. on next page*)

Nevertheless, the programme for national education, which followed, was a logical out-growth of the Boycott and Swadeshi movements. Mrs. Besant and the Theosophists founded the Hindu University at Benares "to reteach the classical values and to prepare the younger generation for fruitful participation in the affairs of national life".²¹⁹ The Swadeshi, the Boycott and the national education were, as Aurobindo wrote, "part of a single co-ordinated attempt to obtain an organized independence". They were merely the component parts of Swaraj.²²⁰

(Contd. from previous page)

See *The Indian Review*, January 1906, 8.

Moreover, it was advised that India should follow, in matters of production, Japan's method of selection, not imitation. Because the latter counteracts one evil by running the risk of falling into another. *Ibid.*, 6.

Marwaris, too, did not act wisely. They renewed their orders for Manchester goods. *Behar News*, January 1906 (Reports I, 14).

The Government, besides laying its heavy hands on the movement, manipulated the sale of English cloth and other commodities by stamping as India made. No. 1495-P.D., Darjeeling 12 June, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 186/July 1907 and No. 33/T.P., dated Bengal Govt. Camp, the 21st July, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 112/August 1907.

219. Theodore L. Shay, *The Legacy of the Lokamanya* (1956), 97.

220. *Ibid.*, *Bande Mataram*, 30 June 1907.

*Emergence of
Revolutionary Spirit*

A still better appreciation of the working of the Japanese spirit in India, which also heralded a new era in Indian politics, was noticeable in another aspect of the Boycott-Swadeshi Movement. This was the birth of a school of violent revolutionary activities.²²¹ Its sway was so great that even the 'moderates' "were compelled to quicken their pace". It quickly enveloped the political, social and religious fields. "The bomb first made its appearance in Indian politics".²²²

An important significance of the new spirit was that if not putting into the background, it

221. It was dominant in the intervening period between the twenty first session of the Congress (December 1905) and the Twenty-second (December, 1906).

222. J. Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, 441.

placed, at least temporarily, the agitation for undoing the partition in a subordinate position. Now the question was, as Chirol admitted, "not whether Bengal should be one unpartitioned province or two partitioned provinces under British rule, but whether British rule itself was to endure in Bengal or for the matter of that anywhere in India."²²³ It was at this time that an article under the caption "The Decline and Fall of the British Empire" appeared in a Japanese paper. It asked England to learn from the event of 1905 (defeat of Russia) and predicted the downfall of her Empire in India.²²⁴ The people in India, too, had warned the English rulers that with knowledge of the History of the rise of Japan, they (the people) would not hesitate to commit deeds of violence in a fit of exasperation and despair if there was no gradual fruition of their desire (for Swarajya— independence).²²⁵

What struck the Indians was that the Western nations "admit Japan's equality with themselves only when they know that Japan also possesses the key to open the floodgate of hellfire".²²⁶ And that

223. Bengal then was the capital province of British India. Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, 88.

224. *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 7 April, 1906, 359.

225. See footnote 136.

226. Japan after her success against Russia in 1905 had been accorded an equal status in the council of nations. The western powers recognized it a fact.

the Western nations felt no respect for Japan till she proved (in the Russo-Japanese war) that the "blood-hounds of Satan are not only bred in the kennels of Europe but can also be domesticated in Japan".²²⁷ Without any effort to minimise the achievements of Japan, it was remarked, "It is a strange way of calling Japan a civilized nation when she has killed 70,000 Russians while no such status is accorded to India". "(Is it) because she (India) has not indulged in this method (of blood-shed)? Does civilization signify an out-right slaughter of human beings"?²²⁸

These comments although meant no direct appeal to the Indians to use violence against the English in order to obtain results similar to Japan, yet there were others who did not hesitate to follow Japan. The *Daily Hitavadi* observed that "only a ten years ago the Western Powers called Japan a nation of Semi-Civilized barbarians (and after the war) is now greeted by them as highly civilized and enlightened". It advised the Indians to take a lesson from Japan "in order to be qualified as civilized and enlightened".²²⁹

"The secret of the victories", it was remarked,

227. Sir Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* (London, 1920), 83.

228. *Shams-ul-Akhbar* (Madras), 5 June, 1905 (Reports II, 208).

229. *The Daily Hitavadi* (Calcutta), 12 June, 1905 (Reports. I, 589).

"which Japan is gaining over Russia lies in the fact (that) a Japanese knows how to lay down his life for the service of his country...So long as we do not learn how to die, the path of our progress will not be clear".²³⁰ *Pratijna*, a Calcutta newspaper advocated the use of sword to eradicate the evil of the British rule.²³¹ Many newspapers followed suit.²³² "Bande Mataram" started in 1906, became "a feeder" of the movement. "Yugantar", started in the same year, openly preached murder²³³ and although it was suppressed in 1908, yet "it had left an indelible mark on Indian History". The newspaper which preached and justified revolutionary ideas had roaring business.²³⁴

The revolutionary spirit had received momentum at the hands of Aurobindo, Har Dayal and

230. *Hitavarsha* (Calcutta), 16 April, 1905 (Reports I, 385).

231. *Pratijna* (Calcutta), 26 July, 1905 (Reports I, 753).

232. Such preaching incidentally gave impetus to newspaper industry. See footnote 88.

233. Annie Besant, *India : A Nation* (Adyar, Madras, 1930) 165.

234. Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, 96.

Chirol admitted this when he wrote that the circulation of the *Yugantar*, which usually, published principal articles forming a complete gospel of revolution, rose to over 50,000.—a figure never attained before by any Indian newspaper. Sometimes when the paper ran a special number "the newsboys would get a rupee for a single copy before the issue was exhausted". Again, he referred to the immense sale of the photograph of Khudiram Bose who threw a bomb, intended for the Magistrate, Mr. Kingford, on Mrs. and Miss Kennedy on 30 April, 1908.

Also see Cumming, ed., *Political India*, 228-9.

others. Many Sabhas, Samities and Akharas (respectively societies, Associations and Gymnasias) came into existence where the youngmen began to take lessons in fencing and other games.²³⁵ Surendranath Banerjee and Bipin Chandra Pal played a notable part in imparting to the people the idea of forming secret societies. These organizations although were founded as “a way to national emancipation” and were without “any real revolutionary motives or any plan of secret assassination” yet it became easier for the advocates of organized rebellion to impose revolutionary spirit in the already organized societies.²³⁶ The influence of Japan on the existence of these societies is evident from the Government Records. The records also refer to the establishment of a physical force party (National Volunteer Movement) among the Bengalis who, the records add, “appear to have been inspired by the result of the Russo-Japanese war”.²³⁷

Another significant contribution in infusing the revolutionary spirit in India was by a person who had, of course, left the world three years before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war. He was Swami Vivekananda. He had created ferment among the intellectuals in India. He had been so

235. Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, 167, 176.

236. *Ibid.*, 195.

237. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 19/October 1907.

much impressed by the work of the Japanese Nationalist that not only he inspired his countrymen to follow Japan but had made known in 1902, just before his demise that "what India needs to-day is bomb".²³⁸ Romain Rolland, the French Biographer of Swami Vivekananda, noticed the influence of his preachings. He records, "The Indian nationalist movement smouldered for a long time until Vivekananda's breath blew the ashes into flame and erupted violently three years after his death in 1905".²³⁹

So much was the spell of the revolutionaries that even the avowed constitutionalists and 'Moderates' condoned little excesses in an agitated atmosphere.²⁴⁰ Another contemporary justified violence as the only means of the subject-nation to take their demands to the ears of particularly the alien rulers.²⁴¹

Apart from the "heat" that it introduced in the Indian agitations the Japanese Victory may be said to have inculcated the reverberatory spirit among

238. Bhupendranath Dutta, *Swami Vivekananda, Patriot Prophet* (Calcutta, 1954), 212. The author of the book is the brother of Swami Vivekananda.

239. Romain Rolland, *The Life of Swami Vivekananda*, 125. Also by the same author, *Prophets of the New India* (London, 1930), 497.

240. Gokhale, *Speeches*, 826.

241. Yashpal, '*Singhavlokani*' (Violent Revolution) in Hindi, (Lucknow, 1951), 13.

the Indians. This change was noticed by 'the Bengalee'. The paper referred to the incident where a British army sergeant assaulted a Punjabi shop-keeper at Rawalpindi "but got more in return than he was able to give." In 1907-8 the spirit tended to be aggressive. A frequent use of bomb was made to do away with a few Englishmen.²⁴³ "It was the first occasion on which...had (been) used (bomb) this product of modern science with murderous effect."²⁴⁴

Another Englishman who had made on the spot study also testified that the use of bomb in the agitated India was a result of a "widespread influence" of "the triumphal progress of Japan", although it was an "evil". The bombs were used under the belief to oust the British Government and to establish native rule.²⁴⁵ In a trial in connection with the discovery of bombs case, "the police stated that they found in the possession of the prisoners series of manuscript notes on the Russo-Japanese war". At another trial "the revelation was made that a work entitled 'The awakening of Japan' was much to the liking of the revolutionaries"²⁴⁶

242. *Bengalee*, 7 May, 1905 (Reports I, 83).

243. Chisolm lists a number of incidents, see footnote 234.

244. *Ibid.*, 96.

245. Lancelot Lawton, *Empires in the Far East*, II, 808.

246. Lawton quoted these cases. *Ibid.*, 809.

Two contemporary Englishmen of eminence, Prof. L.F. Rushbrook Williams and Mr. J. Campbell Ker, in their respective study on the causes of the "Rise of the Left" in the Congress and those of "Subversive Movement", point out that "victory of Asiatic Japan over European Russia...(was) epoch making" inasmuch as it turned the tide of the national movement."²¹⁷ A well known modern historian similarly expresses that the defeat Japan inflicted in 1904-5 upon Russia had a great repercussion upon the Indians. The emergence of extremism was also partly influenced by contemporary events...(one of which was) the rise of Japan as a great power..."²¹⁸ Lovett has also concluded that the restlessness (in India) was stimulated by the achievements of Japan.²¹⁹ It was this "stimulation" which was an important factor of Extremism in India.

The years 1905-1907 were years of anti-British propaganda by every means, short of recourse to actual war. The Government was not to be a silent spectator, and allow the national movement to grow under its feet. Lord Curzon deployed the troops. Minto, who succeeded him, was not to yield. In

247. Cumming, ed., *Political India*, 54, 228.

248. R.C. Mazumdar, "The Genesis of Extremism", *The Studies in the Bengal Renaissance*, ed., Atulchandra Gupta, (Jadavpur, 1938) 201.

249. Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalism*, 229.

other words if Curzon followed "a policy of repression, Minto inaugurated a reign of conciliation with repression".²⁵⁰ The authorities were perturbed over the use of ammunition by the Indians. The Government in India therefore issued an order to put a strict control on the sale of war ammunitions.²⁵¹

The Indian press,²⁵² regarded as the "class-rooms" of the national leaders, was severely dealt with at the hands of the Government.²⁵³ Editor after editor was sent to prison. Many of the high priests, as the national leaders of the time are referred to, were either deported or given long term imprisonment on charges of sedition²⁵⁴. Curiously enough, the struggle continued and with vehemence despite these measures.²⁵⁵ The repressive measure that the rulers had chosen to take despite the early warning, had deepened the effect of the Russo-Japanese war on Indian minds.²⁵⁶

250. Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, 180.

251. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 65/April 1906.

Chirol blamed his fellow Europeans for indiscriminate sale of bombs and guns when he said. "The people of the West will sell their own Motherland for money". Chirol. *Indian Unrest*, 94.

252. The Indian press should be distinguished from the Anglo-Indian press. The latter all along followed pro-government attitude.

253. The Government further armed itself with the Indian Newspaper (Incitement to Offences) Act in June 1908.

254. Lajpat Rai. *Young India*. 180-3.

255. *Ibid.*

256. *Hindoo Patriot*, 19 April, 1905 (Reports I, 158).

We learn from the authoritative sources that the Government found it hard to deal with the situation. They could not legally declare the campaign of the newspapers as "Incitement to offences" or that of the leaders as "sedition". After his departure from India, Lovett wrote, "The effect of the Russo-Japanese war on Indian political thought had confronted both the men on the spot (The Governor-General and his Council) and the Secretary of State (for India) with a novel and complex state of things".²⁵⁷ The Government could not punish Tilak and others of seditious activities as, in the legal opinion²⁵⁸, in the absence of any limitation put upon the words "self-Government", it could not amount to sedition. "The words might ordinarily be read as indicating a course by which the method of Government might be changed without overturning the Government itself". The Governor-General, Lord Minto, agreed that "we can do nothing...till we have decided a general line of action".²⁵⁹ This proves that not only the Government recognized the Japanese impact on the Indian

257. Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (London, 1921), 86.

258. The Government had sought the legal views from its attorney before deciding its course of action to curb the Indian movement. This was sent in the form of a Demi-official letter on which gave Lord Minto his remarks. D.O. No. 119 (Public) dated Simla the 19 April, 1907. *Home Deptt. Progs.* No. 3/July 1907.

259. *Ibid.*

agitation and its character but more so found itself "incapable" to curb the same. The measures that the Government undertook were the result of its determination to suppress the movement with force after having decided the "general line of action". The bomb cases might have hastened the "general line of action".

XI

Results of the Agitation :
Political Consequences of the
Swadeshi Movement : Morley-
Minto Reforms

Were the Government to bow before the new national spirit in India? The Japanese victory often reminded the British that they should show more favour to the people. One Bhupendra Nath Basu in his presidential address delivered at the Mymensingh Provincial Conference, had told the audience that “no Government, however autocratic, could stand divorced from the people’s allegiance and no allegiance is possible without mutual understanding”.²⁶⁰ “Loyalty can be best expected from the people if they are benefited from the rule”, was the advice of the *Swadesmitran*.²⁶¹

260. See *The Indian Review*, May 1905, 351.

261. *Swadesmitran*, 16 June, 1905 (Reports II, 221).

There is evidence to prove that the British authorities' thought of gradual introduction of reforms before it was too late, was the result of this new wave of Nationalism. Thereby "meeting" the Indian demands.²⁶² John Morley had received warning from many eminent British statesmen that "a new spirit is growing and spreading over India"; and to backup executive authority in order to suppress the new spirit would be nothing short of "playing the agitators' game".²⁶³

262. Before the war the immediate demand of the Indians did not go far beyond one-half elected members in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, appointment of three Indians in the Secretary of State's Council, and creation of Advisory Boards in all Districts. The object was limited one—first, to create strength in the Council sufficient to put moral pressure; secondly, (Indian) association in the policy making, even without significant powers. Last but not least, the administration to be in touch with the masses. In brief, the aim was good Government and not self-government.

The Congress under Gokhale's leadership (1905) wanted some effective change (path of gradual reforms) in the existing Governmental set-up; under Tilak (1906) the ideal was self-Government with British connection; under the Bengal Extremists leaders (after 1906) the end was to attain complete separation. Ultimately, in 1947, the aims of the Bengal leaders with the methods of the 'Moderates' were to succeed.

For details see :

- (i) Gokhale, *Speeches*, 123D, Appendix 'B'.
- (ii) *The Indian National Congress*, I, 840-1;
- (iii) Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, 148;
- (iv) Mukerjee : *Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought*, 175-81.

263. Among the statesmen, were Sir W. Lawrence, Chirol, Sidney Low.

John Viscount Morley, *Recollections*, II, 173.

It was, consequently, in June 1906 that John Morley had repeatedly suggested to Lord Minto²⁶⁴ "to make a good start in the way of reform in the popular direction". He had argued, "If we don't... the demands will widen and extend into 'National' reasons". He went as far as to suggest "as practical and immediate things—the extension of the native elements in (the Viceroy's) Legislative Council; ditto in local (Governor's) Council; full time for discussing Budget in the L.C. (Legislative Council) instead of four or five skimpy hours; right of moving amendments..." The only fear Morley had was from the Anglo-Indian community because he was "certain" that the native (Indian) representation in the Viceroy's Council "would frighten that nervous personage (meaning the Anglo-Indian Community)."²⁶⁵

Morley's suggestion of June 1906 is significant inasmuch as it marked the date when the future Morley-Minto Reforms (1909) took "a definite sort

264. In two letters written on 15th and 23rd June, 1906. *Ibid.*, 174.

It is significant to note that the Reforms of 1909 increased the representative element in the Legislative Council and enlarged their powers. The additional members of the Governor-General's Council were increased from 16 to 60. While the Provincial Councils did not have official majority, the Central Legislature was to have.

For details and discussion see

A.B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935* (London, 1936), 229.

265. *Ibid.*

of shape". When Minto expressed his general agreement with the Secretary of State, the latter "made the material advance" by appointing two Indian members on his Council (in London) as early as in August 1907.²⁶⁶

Morley's "material advance" and later the Reforms of 1909 were not destined to be received with satisfaction by the Indians. Neither the Whitehall nor the Governor-General in India were working for the same. Chirol clearly stated that if the people of India aspired at that time to attain something like the parliamentary system of Government or an amount of autonomy, they were completely mistaken in the calculation. He added, "neither the struggle nor the Indian Councils Act of 1909, 'if at all resulted therefrom', touched the British frame work of Government"²⁶⁷. He quoted Morley as saying, "if my existence either officially or corporeally were to be prolonged twenty times longer than it is likely to be, is not at all the goal (parliamentary system of Government in India) to which I would for a moment aspire"²⁶⁸. Morley himself had made it clear to Gokhale in August 1906 when the latter met him in London that "for many a day to come—long beyond the

266. *Ibid.*, 177.

267. Chirol, *India*, 155.

268. *Ibid.*

short span of time that may be left to us—this (India—to be a self-governing colony) was a mere dream”.²⁶⁹

If this was the conviction of the Englishmen to which they had made no secret, one could foresee the resentment the Morley-Minto Reforms would cause in India. Nevertheless, it was a part of Morley’s statesmanship to make an attempt to bring the (British Indian) Government into “harmony” with the political instincts of the governed. If there was no early hope from Britain of a true representative Government of India, Morley was at least fully convinced and had disclosed to Gokhale on August 2, 1906, that “for reasonable reforms in your direction, there is now an unexampled chance”.²⁷⁰

What were to be the “reasonable reforms” depended more on the conviction of the Englishmen than on the aspirations of the Indians. When the Reforms of 1909 were announced even the Indians held divergent views on their acceptance. Moreover, if the reforms of 1909 had been introduced in 1892 when the Indian Councils Act²⁷¹ was passed,

269. Morley, *Recollections*, II, 181.

270. *Ibid.*

271. The Indian Council Act 1892 was passed to further enable the natives to take part in the work of government. Among other things,

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the "irreconcilable forces", as Chirol called the Extremists, might have been arrested. But after the Russo-Japanese war, it was impossible to reconcile them (with the reforms of 1909).

It is true that the real object of introduction of "some reforms" in India (in 1909) was not to pave the path of freedom (although unconsciously it led to), but to keep the moderates with the Government, and the English strategy was successful. Lord Morley had explained that it (the reforms), in the first place, "will tend to reconcile liberal opinion (not in the party sense) here (in London), and that is something. In the second place, it will make it easier for the Moderates to resist the Extremist attack. Such an attack is sure to come, and it is our business, as I think, not to do anything that will give substance to Extremist taunts and reproaches against their Moderate opponents".²⁷² Yet there is no denying the fact that the Morley-Minto Reforms were the first instalment of reforms which had been necessitated, as were even observed by the English authorities, with the rise of a new spirit in

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the additional (Indian) members of the Governor-General's Council were to be increased.

P. Mukherji, *Indian Constitutional Documents* (Calcutta, 1918), 228-32.

272. Morley, *Recollections*, II, 260.

India after the victory of Japan in 1905.²⁷³ It did at least temporarily check the agitation. Thus the Indian agitation, after the Russo-Japanese war, was not the “cankers of a calm world”, as Sir Alfred Lyall likened to call it.²⁷⁴

273. There was another example in which, it showed, the English had forsaken the occidental vanity. They now “addressed the Amir of Afghanistan no longer as ‘His Highness’ but ‘His Majesty’ and ‘King’”.

The Bengalee, 4 June, 1905 (Reports I, 213).

274. Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London, 1910), Introduction, XV.

XII

Closer Economic and Cultural Ties between Japan and India

After the Russo-Japanese war, besides her interest in the Indian National movement, Japan took bold steps in establishing close Indo-Japanese bonds, both at official and public levels.²⁷⁵ The response from the Indian public was equally encouraging. In 1906, the Japanese took part in Sivaji festival celebrations, held under the auspices of the Tokyo's Oriental Students' Association.²⁷⁶ While the Japanese expressed deep sympathy with the Indian (Bihar's) famine-stricken people, the Indians made liberal contributions, as a token of growing friendship, towards the Japanese sufferers

275. This may also be due to the Anglo-Japanese friendship although the British officials could not reconcile to the Indo-Japanese amity at 'popular' level.

276. Ram Gopal, *The Lokamanya*, 237.

in the late earthquakes. The contributions were gratefully acknowledged.²⁷⁷

There were also exchange of visits. Rabindranath Tagore visited Japan and gave a series of lectures which were very well attended. From Japan there were increasing visits to India of responsible merchants, educators and journalists.²⁷⁸

The Indo-Japanese amity gave impetus to the mutual trade. Export to Japan in five years since 1905 increased by four times. Similarly, import to India found increase by a little less than three times.²⁷⁹ A Japanese businessman put it that the export-import "trade between India and Japan has increased by leaps and bounds".²⁸⁰ Later, to accelerate the commercial connections, the steamship service was inaugurated, in addition to Bombay, between Yokohama, Calcutta and Madras.²⁸¹ Some commercial concessions were also given to the Indian exports to Japan. This demonstrated that the latter's political alliance with England would not stand in the way of a preferential tariff against

277. *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 5 and 19 May, 1906.

278. See Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* and Tarakanath Das, *India in World Politics* (New York, 1923), 83.

279. For complete statistics see *Japan and India* ed. and comp. Shun Saitoh, 200-227.

280. *Ibid.* Also see James A.B. Scherer, *Japan's Advance* (Tokyo, 1934), 99-102.

281. *Ibid.* Also *the Japan Weekly Mail*, 22 July, 1911.

her ally. There was an increased inflow of the private Indian capital into Japan.²⁸²

Notwithstanding the English attitude, the understanding between India and Japan had grown after the Russo-Japanese war. India had benefited from Japan despite the actions of the English. Lord Curzon, for instance, had not allowed the Japanese Consul in India to express his Government's sympathies with the Indian people.²⁸³ He had expressed concern over a number of Punjabis working (near the Japanese) in Manchuria.²⁸⁴ Similar attitude had been adopted by the British firms when they were reluctant to admit Indians even as apprentices to their works "lest young Indians should afterwards turn their knowledge to too good an account as the Japanese have often done, in the promotion of competing industries in their own country."²⁸⁵

The success of Japan had thus helped the cause of nationalism in India. From that year it was on a clearer path. It may be said that nationalism (*in its modern concept*) in India gradually expanded since 1905. Lovett wrote from his

282. *Ibid.*, 300.

283. See footnote 169.

284. *Suryodaya Prukasika* (Bangalore), 7 June, 1905 (Reports II, 213).

285. Chitrol, *Indian Unrest*, 152.

intimate knowledge of the Indian affairs that the "Indian national sentiment is one of the most remarkable phenomena of our time. Nourished originally by the Congress movement...it took definite shape in 1905.²⁸⁶ He added, "It is easy to conceive how the victories of Japan over, what used to be, one of the proudest European nations, must have intensified such feelings."²⁸⁷ The service of the motherland became "as great and overmastering a passion as in Japan".²⁸⁸ The "pillars of the popular (national) movement made frequent reference to Japan for the promotion of national feeling".²⁸⁹ 'Bande Mataram' became a 'national'²⁹⁰ song, and a source of inspiration to the people in their struggle for freedom.²⁹¹ Speaking about the rise of nationalism in India, Viscount Morley had also said, "The victories of Japan...did not pass unobserved."²⁹² While others were not pessimist : on the contrary, they observed clearer and definite impact of Japan on the rise of nationalism in India.²⁹³

286. Lovett, 237.

287. *Ibid.*, 238.

288. *Ibid.*, 61.

289. *Ibid.*, 62.

290. J. Ramsay MacDonald, 191-5.

291. *India : 1958, A Reference Annual* (Government of India Publication), 32.

292. Morley, *Recollections*, II, 154.

293. William I Hull, *India's Political Crisis* (Baltimore, 1930), 6.

XIII

Victory of Japan and Asia

The hope, the awakening and the realisation of potent strength (of the results of the Russo-Japanese war) gave a new turn to the national movements in other countries of Asia also. In Vietnam, for instance, the nationalists, who had learnt of reform from China, democracy and revolution from France, now looked to Japan as a model and guide. Prince Chong De had taken refuge in Japan and organized Vietnam Restoration League.²⁹⁴

In Indonesia, although an organized nationalist movement did not take shape till after the First World War, the modernization and emergence of Japan as a Great Power stimulated the growth of nationalism there.²⁹⁵ Burma, too, was impressed

294. Lawrence K. Rosinger, and Associates. *The State of Asia* (London, 1951), 225.

295. *Ibid.*, 408.

by Japan's improved living standard as a result of impact of Western trade and industry. So much was the inspiration for her dormant nationalism that for the first time the monks entered politics and nationalism grew militant. The influence of Japan was noticeable in the formation of a socio-political organization, the Young Men's Buddhist Association, with the object to revive national cultures and institutions by remodelling them on the basis of Western counterparts; exactly what Japan had done. The organization opened national schools for this purpose.²⁹⁶

Korea, which as a result of the war had fallen on the knees of Japan, was not reconciled to the idea of "Japan's God-given superiority". In fact, the success of Japan (in 1905) marked an increase in the number of Koreans urging for independence or for a more liberal regime. They even offered armed resistance and made an unsuccessful attempt in what was called the Mansei Movement until they were suppressed by force ten years later.²⁹⁷

In China, the war convinced many people of the necessity of reforms. They believed that Japan's success in 1894 and again in 1905 was due to

296. Philip W. Thayer, *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore, 1956), 87-8.

297. Cornelius Osgood, *The Koreans and their Culture* (New York, 1951), 130, 278.

her system of Constitutional Monarchy and the introduction of modern scientific technical measures. The Government that has roots in the masses, they realized, makes a nation strong. Thus the war gave the Chinese a new faith in political reforms.²⁹⁸ They exhibited their national awakening by their decision to discard foreign goods and refusing the Western Capitalist permission to construct rail-road in their country.²⁹⁹

298. Chion-Nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, trans. by Teng Ssa-Yu (New Jersey, 1956), 198.

299. *The Hitavadi* (Calcutta), 27 January, 1905, approved of the Chinese action.

XIV

Conclusions

India, as other countries in Asia which had for centuries been subject to the Western exploitation, saw for the first time in 1904-05 an Asian country in a major conflict with a major European power. The Indians showed keen interest in this struggle between the East and the West. There was, from the beginning, a deep sympathy with Japan, which was natural for she was a weaker party in the struggle (in the sense the whole of Asia then was) and a fellow Asian country.

India, where the story of the exploitation, at the hands of the British, was darker and latter's rule particularly strenuous, and which had, of late, been the scene of unrest, was generally jubilant over the results of the war. The whole of India may be said to have stirred with excitement over the victory of

Japan. The excitement was so complete that it was even noticed among the remote villagers.

The jubilation or the excitement was not due to the success of the ally of the (British) Government, although there were a few admirers of the British regime, but that the success of Japan had exploded the myth of the White's God-given superiority. This gave them the much-needed confidence in themselves. It also strengthened their urge to be what Japan had recently achieved—an equal member in the comity of nations. Secondly, since Japan had removed the Russian menace India no longer felt the need of the British protection. She realised that she could hold her own with proper training.

It is important to note that the idea of independence, the meaning of which was understood differently at that time was not new to India. She had already made an effort in 1857 and had been organising herself for the purpose since 1885. What Japan had exhibited was the fresh example, that too from a fellow Asian, that it was only in an atmosphere of self-rule that a country could prosper. India was not to forget the example till she had attained the object. It was more from this point of view, it may be said, that Japan strengthened the Indians' urge for independence.

There could not be nor there were direct

Japanese assistance for the attainment of self-rule or the Swaraj except for the appreciation of the Indian demand as exhibited in the Japanese press and through the speeches of the leaders of Japan. But this in itself was by no means small contribution to the Indian cause. Secondly, the Congress which was, at that time, making singular efforts towards Swaraj appreciated and explained to the people the value of unity more after the (Russo-Japanese) war. The Congress leaders frequently cited the example of Japan. Moreover, if the negative policies of the Curzonian administration of oppression and repression brought the Indians closer, the Japanese victory well-knitted (for at least demanding Swaraj) the Congress organization. Thirdly, the aim of good government of the Congress was also changed to self-government after the war. Dadabhai Naoroji's slogan of Swaraj was no coincidence with the victory of Japan, but it was the impact of the latter on the Congress organization.

The Japanese impact was more apparent in the means to achieve the end. The Boycott exhibited the recently-learnt sternness by the Congress and the people. The Swadeshi, on the other hand, showed as much the sense of patriotism as the spirit of self-reliance, the two most outstanding secrets of Japan ('s success over Russia) that her example had imbibed into the Indians. In order to

make the Indians' Swadeshi drive successful the Japanese had helped with expert-knowledge (inasmuch as they provided technical training to the young Indians) and with machinery. The Indo-Japanese trade also received an impetus after the war. In this way, the example of Japan introduced a new spirit in the minds of the Indians. This did not mean that the Indians lacked patriotism before but the success of Japan infused afresh vigour in it. This, in turn, inculcated in them a feeling—India, a *nation*. The establishment of the national industry and the opening of national institutions were some of its direct outcome.

The newly-acquired sense of nationalism, with Japan's example before it, propounded Extremism or the violent methods in the Indian politics. Some of the Indians in order, perhaps, to obtain rapid results made a frequent use of these methods particularly when the (British) authorities besides turning deaf ears to the reasonable demands of the Indians, used all sorts of measures to curb the agitation.

The English ultimately sensed the situation. They could not shut their eyes for long neither they could tie the hands of the clock. They realised the impact the Japanese victories had made. The Morley-Minto Reforms late by twenty years, were decidedly a result of the agitation which had got

heated after the Japanese victory. Whatever may have been the motives of the English in introducing the reforms, the reforms significantly confirmed, to an extent, that the Indians are capable of holding high offices. It was in this way that Japan had awakened the people and the rulers of India.

The Russo-Japanese War had thus no mere psychological effect on the Indians. It, on the other hand, had a definite impact. This was noticed and appreciated by contemporary leaders and writers, both Indian and others. Moreover, the then frequent references to Japan and her victories in 1905 were not cursory but with a purpose. It were these victories of Japan which later gave a new slogan, that is, Asia for Asians.

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