WHY NATO?

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Secretary-General of NATO

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FOREWORD

This pamphlet is not intended as a history of NATO, nor does it describe in detail the Organization's structure and activities. Readers requiring more detailed information will find it in other publications, such as that of my predecessor, Lord Ismay. I have confined myself to recalling the events and ideas which led to the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and which have informed its actions.

During the past ten years, this Alliance has come to play a leading part in our destiny as individuals and as nations; but what is topical is so confused that the full meaning of even the most important contemporary events is often obscured. It therefore occurred to me that it would be useful on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of NATO to give a brief general reply to the question: Why NATO?

CHAPTER ONE

THE WEST THREATENED

IN Prague at dawn on 13 March 1948, the body of Jan Mazaryk, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, was found on the pavement below the windows of his flat. Suicide or murder? We still do not know. But whether Jan Mazaryk was the victim of crime or of his own despair, the significance of the calamity is the same. He was dead, and the world, faced with his mortal remains, could no longer deny that liberty in his country had died with him.

Eleven years have now gone by since that day, and with the passage of time it has acquired a new meaning. That tragic dawn marked the hour of awakening for the West – a tardy awakening of the instinct of self-preservation. If Jan Mazaryk died by his own hand, it may be that he wished by that supreme gesture to dispel the illusions of those Europeans who were still free – to make them react before it was too late and they in their turn slid into the abyss where his country had fallen.

It was high time to react, for the Prague tragedy was only the culminating point in a whole series of events which, little by little, had destroyed all hope of seeing international order, founded on justice and liberty, established after the war.

The democracies, having been allied with the Russians in war, intended to continue working with them in the interests of peace; but the USSR refused. Instead she resorted to threats and subversion in

order to establish her dominion over Central and Eastern Europe.

The Russians first of all annexed the Baltic States, and parts of Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Germany. In 1945 they began to involve themselves in the civil war in Greece. Wherever the presence of their armed forces enabled them to apply direct pressure, they insisted upon Communist agents participating in the government, although the first post-war elections had everywhere shown that the Communists represented only a minority.

In 1947, the movement gathered speed. The Communist party seized power in Hungary, after forcing the resignation of the Nagy Government; in Bulgaria, where the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged; in Rumania, where Maniu, leader of the peasant party, was condemned to life imprisonment; and finally, in Poland, where Mikolajczyk, also the leader of the peasant opposition, had to flee to the West. There remained Czechoslovakia, where the régime, though still democratic, maintained the most friendly relations with the USSR. In February 1948, however, the scheme devised by the Soviet Ambassador, Zorin, brought about the capitulation of President Benes, who handed over power to the Communists.

Meanwhile, the USSR was preparing new conquests; the Comintern, which had been dissolved during the war, was resuscitated in October 1947, under the name of Cominform. According to the communiqué – in which the establishment of the new organization was announced – its principal object was to fight and destroy the Western political régimes. On the diplomatic level, the Soviets simulta-

neously sealed the complete solidarity of the Communist bloc with a network of alliances between themselves and their satellites: 23 bilateral treaties were signed between 1945 and 1948.

Any illusions we may still have had vanished after the events in Prague: half Europe, composed of countries close to us by virtue of their civilization and history, had fallen into slavery.

After the war, the Soviet Union had kept a large military force mobilized and had pushed it right to the very heart of the Continent. At the same time, she exercised unlimited authority over her satellites, thanks to the overwhelming superiority of her forces and the complete political and ideological solidarity of the Soviet bloc.

Facing this Bloc was the Western world, which had been hastily disarming since the armistice of 1945. The European countries were absorbed in the arduous task of reconstruction. They were struggling against economic difficulties; their strength was often sapped by the Communist parties; the only bond between them was moral, and, furthermore, they were exposed to all the risks inherent in a democratic form of government.

How did liberty and security come to be faced with so deadly a threat so soon after a war waged in the name of those very principles which should have guaranteed their survival?

It became only too obvious that liberty and security meant one thing to the Soviets and another to the West. The Russians could only conceive of liberty in the interests of Communism and its agents, whilst security to them meant dividing and weakening just those people they most threatened.

It is this complete opposition of views which is responsible for the fact that the United Nations has hitherto failed to carry out its primary function, namely to maintain peace and security and to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. The founders of the League of Nations had set themselves the ideal of organizing international society in such a way that law and the dictates of the universal conscience, as expressed by the majority, should prevail. The first experiment had failed. When the authors of the San Francisco Charter resumed it, they believed it was only realistic to grant the five principal powers who were permanent members of the Security Council the right to veto their decisions. The Soviet Union, however, seized upon this as an opportunity to paralyze the Security Council whenever it seemed about to take any step which was likely to hinder Soviet expansion or which aimed at a general security policy which would involve controlling atomic energy, reducing armaments, and creating an international armed force. Thus, by 1949, 30 Soviet vetoes had destroyed any hope which the free peoples in Europe might still have pinned on the United Nations: they could no longer entertain any illusions as to the protection it could afford them.

Under the impact of the Prague tragedy, and in view of the impotence of the United Nations and the striking disproportion between the forces aligned facing one another in Europe, the Western peoples took fright. Was the free world to sink before the onrushing tide for lack of effective defence? At the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 I expressed this fear on behalf of my country and, I believe, of many others who were weak and disarmed.

It was a justified fear, and in no way humiliating, since it was the starting-point for determined action. Action could mean but one thing – we must unite and pool our resources and energies. This was the only way to alter a situation which was likely to prove dangerously tempting to the united and strongly armed Soviet camp, and to discourage and demoralize the disorganized and practically disarmed Western camp.

On 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed. The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries created a defensive alliance and decided to coordinate the organization of their forces in order to establish a common front in the event of aggression. There was something moving, but also, if I may say so, something almost pitiful in this alliance between countries which had emerged exhausted from a ruthless war and which had to a great extent dismantled their military apparatus. Nobody could reasonably believe that the new allies alone would be capable of setting up an effective bulwark against a possible attack by the Soviet Union which maintained 200 divisions on a war footing.

There was only one world power whose cooperation in the defence of free Europe could compensate for the crippling disproportion in forces: the United States of America. Her vast industrial potential and financial resources, and her possession of the atom bomb, of which she still held the monopoly, meant that she alone was in a position to redress the balance which had been so tragically lost. Europe, in order to defend herself, had therefore to ally herself with the United States.

The Americans were already aware of their responsibility towards the free world. After the brief period

of enchantment following victory, the US leaders faced up resolutely to Russian political manoeuvres. From 1947, aid to Greece and Turkey, followed by the vast undertaking of the Marshall Plan, made a decisive contribution to Western recovery. The United States had actively encouraged the negotiations which led to the Brussels Treaty. Then, on the day on which the treaty was signed, they promised to support the five signatories in their mutual defence effort.

A big step, however, remained to be taken. It was necessary to cement relations between free Europe and the United States, permit the fullest possible collaboration between the partners, and to set up a common defence system; and this could only be achieved through a treaty of alliance. But a treaty of this kind implied what amounted to a revolution in American diplomacy. George Washington in his farewell address advised his co-citizens to keep well away from European affairs and not to make any agreements with the countries on this continent. This tenet is so firmly rooted in the public conscience of the United States that during the First World War they did not declare themselves the 'allies' of the Entente, but only the 'associates'. The question now was: would they agree in peace-time to ally themselves with Europe?

The Senate, the traditional guardian of the principles governing American foreign policy, faced the urgency of the situation. On 11 June 1948, by 64 votes to 4, it adopted a resolution sponsored by Senator Vandenberg. This authorized the United States government to associate itself with mutual defence agreements if these contributed to the security of the United States.

The way was clear for negotiations. They started immediately between the five Brussels allies, the United States, and Canada, whilst Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal, conscious of the Russian threat, also took part in the conversations. Thus, on 4 April 1949, the most extensive and most powerful defensive alliance ever to exist in peace-time was signed in Washington.

CHAPTER TWO

DISCOURAGING AGGRESSION

THE word alliance brings to mind, I know, a long history of bloody conflict; it implies division, rivalry, and suspicion. Many of us had hoped that the lesson learned in two World Wars would force humanity to end the state of anarchy in which world society lives, and that it would no longer be necessary to resort to this traditional solution. However, the failure of the United Nations, even if it is only temporary, illustrates the difficulties such a revolution would face in a world which is divided by ideologies, partly conquered by Soviet imperialism, and torn by nationalist passions. But I am convinced that the day will come when the very excess of disorder and, above all, the danger of death which a nuclear conflict would mean, will force us to establish a world order which gives effective guarantees of peace and security for all.

Until that day, statesmen can but see things as they are and make the best of such possibilities as exist of establishing, in the interest of their peoples, at least some kind of order through which the essentials can be safeguarded.

This is the primary aim of the Atlantic Alliance. It is based on the elementary principle underlying the whole of society, namely, the incontestable right of self-defence. Since it is not possible in the international field to rely on the police or the law courts, this right can only be effectively exercised by collective action guaranteed by a treaty of mutual assistance and

organized in advance. The Charter of the United Nations expressly sanctions the right to 'individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs'.

The alliances of the past were, of course, based on the same principle; but their authors were certainly more intent upon ensuring victory in the event of conflict than upon preventing the conflict itself. This is clear from the extreme secrecy which surrounded the terms, and often even the very existence, of alliances in Europe before 1914. Naturally, the governments which negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty also wished to give their countries the best chance of successfully resisting a possible aggressor, and of finally defeating him. But their highest aim was, by declaring their common purpose, actually to prevent aggression. They had to ensure that there was no repetition of the disastrous gamble which always ended in the adversary throwing in his hand without a word, or in world war.

If the victorious alliances of 1918 and 1945 had been set up in peace-time, the Central Powers and Hitler's Germany would have hesitated to embark upon ventures which were doomed in advance to failure. There would have been no World War; there would have been neither *Anschluss*, nor Munich. The fundamental idea of the Atlantic Alliance is to unite sooner to ensure peace, so as to avoid having to unite later to win a war.

How does NATO act as a preventive?

First of all, the point at which hostile action would provoke a collective reaction is laid down. The essential point about this is that no doubt can exist as to the obligations of each member state. These are laid down by Article 5 of the Treaty, according to

which the parties agree 'that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all' and that 'if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.'

Nevertheless, the Alliance derived insufficient preventive powers from this mutual assistance clause. In view of the disparity between our forces and those of the USSR in 1949, a declaration of solidarity was not enough to deter a potential aggressor; he would probably not have considered the price too high. We had, therefore, to replace the mere desire for collective defence with deeds; in other words, we had to set up the required force and define a common strategy.

The first and most urgent task of the Alliance was, therefore, to build up its defences. This process was an essential part of its evolution towards what is today not merely a classic alliance, but a real community served by permanent organs which prepare and discuss collective action, and which constitute the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The supreme organ of NATO, the Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries, should, according to Article 9, 'consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty' – that is, it must ceaselessly adapt the action and resources of the fifteen member countries to the Soviet threat. The Council therefore had to create specialized agencies to work out a common defence system.

Its first task was to evaluate Soviet military strength, and then, on the basis of this evaluation, to establish

a common strategy, a plan of the forces required, and a coordinated military production programme. It was up to the governments of the fifteen countries to put the plans into effect.

The common strategy to be pursued was plain – the NATO countries had to be defended along the line of the Iron Curtain itself. For obvious moral reasons, there could be no question of surrendering part of an ally's territory and population. For military reasons, it was equally imperative not to fall back westwards and thereby reduce yet further the already dangerously limited depth of our defence area.

The 'shield' forces, which were to defend the Alliance along its frontiers, were supported by another all-important element in Western strategy – atomic weapons. Carried by the American and British air forces, these constituted both a compelling argument against aggression (the 'deterrent') and a potential means of reprisal.

If the 'shield' forces were to be effective, however, they must be based on strength. They needed far more than the 14 divisions which they comprised in 1950, as against the 200 odd Soviet divisions; but a whole series of difficulties had to be overcome before the necessary forces could be raised.

Rearmament is costly, and when NATO's military authorities had made an evaluation of the forces considered necessary to an efficient 'shield', and to common defence in general, it appeared that it would be difficult to carry out their recommendations without endangering the economic and financial stability of member countries. The principle of mutual assistance written into the Treaty had, of course, been put into effect since 1950 through a programme of

military and financial aid laid down in a series of agreements between the United States and their European partners. Nevertheless, however generous this assistance might be, it could not provide more than a partial solution.

It would have been unrealistic and dangerous to sacrifice the economy to rearmament. Inflation and social disorder would immediately have undermined the very basis of the military effort; and in any event, it would also have encouraged the spread of Communism.

The Alliance, therefore, sought for the solution which would best harmonize defence requirements with those of the economy. Thus it was that the defence plans adopted in 1952 at the Lisbon Conference were made. The methods which were then perfected for formulating such plans have since been applied permanently. They aim at coordinating defence efforts in order to render them more efficient and less costly, as well as adapting them to changing conditions. They also help to harmonize the programmes with the resources of individual members and to distribute the burdens equally.

NATO's military strategy also created a political problem. In view of the effort which was required, it was essential that all the peoples covered by the 'shield' forces should participate in the common defence system: a means therefore had to be found of associating the Federal German Republic with the Atlantic Treaty partners. This question was put to the Atlantic Council in November 1950, after the Communist aggression in Korea; but it was only solved four years later, by the actual entry of Germany into the Alliance.

Finally, the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in 1952 extended the frontiers of our defence system to the Caucasus.

This, then, is how the broad lines of our defence policy have been laid down. In order to achieve our principal objective, that of deterring the potential aggressor, we do not aim at achieving complete parity with the adversary's forces. It is enough for us to have at our disposal sufficient means of reprisal for the price of aggression to become exorbitant.

Thus it has been possible to set up a satisfactory 'shield' with far fewer effective forces than those which we face. Our numerical inferiority is proof of the purely defensive nature of Atlantic strategy, but it does not diminish our capacity to react. In this connexion, the tactical nuclear arms with which the 'shield' forces are being increasingly equipped greatly improve their ability both to defend our territory and to give warning of aggression. As for the strategic nuclear arms, whether delivered by aeroplanes or by rockets, they make up the 'deterrent' *par excellence* and are therefore invaluable to our security.

For ten years, the 'shield' forces, together with the strategic nuclear arms which form the 'deterrent', have ensured peace for the West. There is too great a disparity, it is true, between our forces and those of the adversary, and a considerable effort will still be needed to bring our defences up to the required level. Nevertheless, the balance has to a certain extent been corrected. Because it depends primarily on nuclear arms, it has been called the 'balance of terror'. Obviously, this is not the ideal balance, but it is better to have this – the only balance we can hope to achieve at present – than no balance at all. Those in



the West who, in all good faith, call for the abolition of nuclear weapons outside the framework of general controlled and balanced disarmament, and who would thus deny the 'shield' forces their indispensable tactical nuclear arms, should reflect well upon the consequences of what they propose. If there were no nuclear weapons, what weight could the 30 divisions of the 'shield' forces hope to carry compared with the 200 Soviet divisions? Would peace be better guaranteed and free Europe better preserved from Soviet pressure? On the contrary; we should once again be faced with the alternatives of capitulation or war – a war which the West would not have one chance in a million of winning.

CHAPTER THREE

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

ONCE the war was over, the USSR understood perfectly that, if the Western nations ever achieved unity, they would bar her way to expansion.

The Soviet Union therefore fought bitterly, and during the first years successfully, against any idea of regional organization, particularly in Europe: and it was inevitable that they should do everything possible to prevent the formation of our Alliance. They tried to intimidate the governments concerned by sending them abusive notes, and worked up violent opposition among the various Communist parties, whilst, at the same time, they exploited the latent neutralism and defeatism of certain sectors of opinion in Europe.

Once the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and ratified, the Russians, with their usual realism, made the best of the new situation. They could no longer resort to threats or force against the Western nations united in the new Alliance except at great risk. A few specific dates, considered together, make it strikingly clear that Moscow immediately reached this conclusion. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949. In June 1949, the Berlin Blockade was lifted; in October of the same year, the civil war in Greece ended. In June 1950, the Communist forces in North Korea attacked South Korea. It is obvious what was behind all this: Stalin was renouncing the use of force in Europe and liquidating whatever remained of the old policy. At the same time, he was

directing part of the Soviet effort to the Afro-Asian world.

Thus, the Atlantic Alliance had almost immediately called a halt to Soviet expansion in Europe. This was a considerable achievement; but it left no room for illusion. We were well aware of the fact that the Russians would not relinquish the struggle to impose Communism on the whole world. Their objectives remained the same; they merely proposed to attain them by different methods.

In order to weaken the West, the Soviet Union has embarked upon a series of political, economic, and psychological offensives aimed at reducing the cohesion of the Alliance and at weakening its moral resistance by playing on the hostility and lassitude of public opinion. At the same time, the Western nations are to be isolated and their influence in other parts of the world sapped.

I shall deal first with the successive offensives based on the themes of 'relaxation' and 'peaceful coexistence'. By presuming a relaxation of tension and the peaceful intentions of the USSR, the Soviets try to create in the Western countries an illusory sense of security and thereby to slow down the defence effort which is depicted as both pointless and ruinous. Simultaneously, they denounce the aggressive intentions of those who refuse to be convinced. In recent years, these specious arguments have frequently been used in an attempt both to obstruct Western rearmament and to set European opinion against the United States, which are accused of warmongering. They have also been invoked to undermine the positions of the political parties which most resolutely suport NATO.

Other offensives, involving diplomatic and propa-

ganda activity, have aimed at countering our defence policy by attacks on certain of its more important aspects. For instance:

Nuclear weapons are today essential to the West as a compensation for our inferiority in conventional weapons.

In the United Nations, the USSR has constantly claimed that nuclear weapons should simply be banned. Thus, she refuses to admit that disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, can only be treated as a whole, and that it must be balanced and controlled. Simultaneously, the USSR has tried to whip up world opinion in favour of this over-simplified, demagogic argument.

The defence of Europe could not be planned without German participation.

The USSR opposed this as long as possible, and exploited unpleasant memories and nationalist passions to the full.

The strategy of the 'shield' makes the presence on Europe's frontiers of American, British, and Canadian contingents an essential part of our defence organization, and a moral and political guarantee of solidarity.

All Soviet proposals for disarmament, or for the establishment of a European security system, naturally stipulate that our overseas allies must depart, and Communist propaganda has kept up a violent campaign against their presence on our soil.

Intermediate range ballistic missiles and the sites from which they are launched are, in view of the present state of armaments, essential to the balance of

forces which, as we have seen, is today the best guarantee of our security and peace.

The USSR has tried, by a violent campaign of intimidation, to prevent certain NATO governments from allowing these rocket sites to be installed on their territory. In fact, the Russians know very well that the problem facing any aggressor would be how to destroy simultaneously all the bases from which reprisals could be launched. The more these bases are dispersed, therefore, the more dangerous an undertaking will aggression become, and the more uncertain will be the results for whoever embarks upon it. The bases are, therefore, essential to the balance of forces and so to our security.

Our defence in Europe has to be organized within a small space, and we have too little military potential. We must therefore keep the front as far to the East as possible and equip our forces with the most modern weapons – namely, tactical nuclear weapons, since they alone can compensate for our numerical inferiority.

The USSR has called for the prohibition of all nuclear weapons in Central Europe; the Soviet disarmament and 'disengagement' proposals, and the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's plan, all contain this stipulation. Russia hopes in this way to dismantle the Western military organization, render Europe incapable of defence, and provoke the withdrawal of American troops. Ultimately she aims at dragging Germany, and then all her Western neighbours, into neutrality and so having them at her mercy.

In each of these offensives, the USSR has sought to divide the allies by trying to exploit certain differences

of interest or sentiment, and also the internal political situations in the various member countries. The controversies about German rearmament and nuclear weapons are good examples of these manoeuvres.

However, the most dangerous Soviet moves have for some years been in another quarter, in Africa and Asia. Lenin himself predicted that Europe's colonies would become Communist before their mother countries. Today the Communist bloc, greatly strengthened by the conquest of China, is increasing its efforts to squeeze the Western nations out of the positions they still hold in those parts of the world and to supplant them.

The Communist bloc starts this struggle with considerable advantages. Anti-colonialist feelings are widespread in Africa and Asia. Poverty and over-population have sown the seed of revolution. The Communist régime, which has enabled the USSR to make spectacular technical progress, enjoys considerable prestige among Africans and Asians, who suppose that it will also accomplish the rapid industrialization of their own countries. Finally, when it comes to adapting economic resources to political ends, the Communist bloc has the benefit of a planned authoritarian system. In this the USSR possesses a weapon which has proved most effective. The economic and technical assistance which she offers overseas is not one-tenth of that supplied by the United States; yet the benefits she derives from it are, relatively speaking, higher. Partly no doubt for psychological and propaganda reasons, but also because she need not consider market conditions, she is in a position, for instance, to buy a cotton harvest at a price far above that offered by a Western purchaser. She can

even resell it to the would-be buyer at a price well below what he offered. Commercially, the operation will be unprofitable, but politically it will pay.

The Soviet offensive in Africa and Asia has already made great strides. In the Middle East, especially since the Suez crisis, the USSR has conquered a great number of positions formerly occupied by the West. She almost succeeded in implanting Communism in Syria, and is trying to do so in Iraq. From now on, the armies of several Arab states will be supplied with Soviet equipment and instructed by Soviet military missions.

Supported by China, the USSR is today redoubling her efforts in Black Africa in order to exploit the nationalist movements which are now developing before our very eyes. Finally, thousands of young Africans and Asians are studying at universities in the Soviet bloc.

This offensive seriously threatens the Western nations:

on the strategic front, because the USSR is trying to drive them from the bases they still hold and to outflank the European front through the Middle East and Africa;

on the economic front, because the USSR aims at depriving them of certain sources of essential raw materials, particularly Middle Eastern oil;

on the political and psychological fronts, because the USSR is trying to destroy the bonds of tradition, sentiment, and mutual interest which unite them with Africa and Asia. By promoting the accession of opponents of the West to power in those territories, the Soviet Union hopes to reduce

the Western powers to relying solely on their own strength, and ultimately to being left isolated, weakened, and impotent in the midst of a hostile world.

In all the activities to which I have referred, the USSR makes the utmost use of a weapon of which she is a master – propaganda. In this, too, she often has the advantage of us. The Western nations, we must admit, are often slow to react. Furthermore, since their policy is aimed at a positive and balanced solution, it generally leads them to adopt fairly complex attitudes which are poor material for propaganda. The USSR, on the contrary, is in a position to react rapidly. Since her object is to hustle her adversaries and put them on their guard, she can resort to the over-simplified and spectacular formula which catches the imagination of the masses, such as: 'Ban the atom bomb!', 'German rearmament means war!', 'Colonialist exploitation is the curse of the underdeveloped countries!', etc. Even in the Western countries themselves, campaigns such as these often have an effect on opinion, and frequently it requires courage for statesmen and political parties to resist the current.

These few pages sketch the picture, as I see it, of the vast offensive – on a multiplicity of fronts – which the Soviets call 'peaceful coexistence'. The Soviet threat, which at first was military and European, has been transformed into a global challenge covering the whole world.

CHAPTER FOUR

A GLOBAL RETORT TO THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Moscow's interpretation of 'peaceful coexistence' has brought the Atlantic partners face to face with one imperative necessity: by extending the sphere of the East-West conflict, the Russians have obliged the Western nations similarly to extend their sphere of cooperation. The allies could only meet the global challenge of the Soviet Union with a global retort. This necessity, which developed gradually, was an essential factor in the development of NATO's organs, methods, and actions.

At the time the Treaty was signed, the NATO governments envisaged collaboration in one sphere only, that of defence. As regards foreign policy, they certainly had nothing in mind beyond a review of the situation every six months – the original frequency of Council meetings. In the economic sphere, Article 2 was no more than a vague declaration of intention. There was no question of anything else.

Very soon, however, problems arising out of defence led the allied governments to set up a political organ, created in May 1950, which was composed of the Council Deputies. In February 1952, the NATO Ministers met at Lisbon and decided to make the Council permanent, endowing it with the same powers of decision whether it was composed of the Ministers themselves or of their Permanent Representatives, who were given ambassadorial rank. This

was an all-important reform in the history of the Alliance, because it provided the directing organ which was essential to allow for the growing cooperation made necessary by the Soviet world challenge. The Permanent Representatives meet at least once a week and are in personal touch almost daily. This creates the most favourable conditions for exchanging views, developing a common approach, and concerting action.

Peaceful coexistence, whilst it called for greater cooperation between NATO members also, in some ways, made this more difficult to achieve. In fact even though the Alliance had attained its primary objective – that of protecting the member countries and discouraging aggression – there was the danger that a less acute sense of immediate danger might result in a slackening off of both the defence effort and the movement towards political solidarity. Member countries might be encouraged to follow up national objectives at the expense of the common good. Furthermore, the risk of division would be greater outside Europe, because the Soviet threat would seem more remote. This risk became a formidable one when the USSR embarked on a global offensive, designed to exploit western differences everywhere.

This was dramatically demonstrated three years ago by the Suez crisis. France and the United Kingdom fully believed that they were serving the general interests of the West by their armed intervention in Egypt. Several member countries of NATO, including the United States, felt that they were doing the same in associating themselves with the USSR in the majority at the United Nations which condemned this intervention. Thus, members of the Alliance found

themselves in opposite camps in a conflict involving common interests of paramount importance. The crisis undermined the Western position in the Middle East and encouraged Soviet expansion. It would be impossible to demonstrate more clearly the absolute need for the NATO countries to coordinate action whenever common interests are at stake. If this is not done, there is a danger that the Alliance might disintegrate.

The test proved in a way to be salutary, for it was largely this which drove the allies to adopt the principles of cooperation which are indispensable now that they face a global challenge.

The challenge created the need for far greater unity. Hitherto this had only existed within the most narrow limits, since it rarely applied beyond what was expected under the clause of mutual assistance; unity was only envisaged within the European military framework which at the outset had been considered the only sphere for cooperation. Yet was it possible to be allies in one sphere and opponents in others where common interests existed?

The NATO governments had been watching the Soviet threat spread and had already examined the problems to which it gave rise. In spring 1956, they asked the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Canada, Italy, and Norway – Mr Pearson, Signor Martino, and Dr Lange – to submit recommendations for closer 'non-military cooperation' within the framework of NATO. The Ministers – known as the 'Three Wise Men' – submitted their report shortly after the Suez crisis, when the atmosphere was favourable to an examination of conscience and an appeal for wisdom.

The most important chapter of the report dealt with what had just proved to be sadly lacking – namely, political cooperation. This cooperation, it said, should take the form of constant consultation: that is to say, discussion in common of problems, in order that common and concerted attitudes might be adopted. To be effective, consultation should precede action and should take place 'in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.' Even if a unanimous viewpoint could not be arrived at, this method would at least ensure the lesser of several evils: 'At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.' Finally, the three Ministers recognized the need for 'global' consultation. 'The common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area'; thus the NATO countries should 'be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas.' In the event of differences within the Alliance, the three Ministers suggested settlement through 'good offices' procedures. At the same time, they recommended extending Allied cooperation to the fields of economics, scientific and technical development, culture, and information.

The adoption of this report was a very important step in the history of NATO. It proved that the Alliance had definitely become conscious of the global challenge it faced, and was trying to adapt its methods and actions to the situation.

What form does this action take today on the various fronts on which peaceful coexistence is an issue?

In the military sphere, NATO'S defence front seems to be stablized. The USSR has reduced some

of her military forces, but her power has, nevertheless, greatly increased, thanks to her progress in the use of nuclear weapons and rockets. Clearly, we can only maintain the military balance upon which our security depends at the price of constant effort. Therefore the defence question continues to be of primary importance.

Another front – that within the NATO countries themselves – seems to have been not only stabilized, but reinforced. The great economic progress that has occurred in the last ten years has everywhere raised the standard of living and generally ensured social harmony. The creation of a European economic union, first through the Coal and Steel Community, and later through the Common Market, augurs well for the future. Communist influence is generally on the decline, and the peoples of the West have regained confidence in the principles which guide their political, economic, and social life.

It is in the field of political cooperation that NATO has recently witnessed the most remarkable developments. The member countries needed to coordinate their foreign policies much more thoroughly if the Alliance was to present a united front to the USSR; and this they managed to do by means of mutual consultation within the Council. This method had, of course, been applied from the outset; but the evolution of the world situation, which had led the 'Three Wise Men' to make their recommendations, also constantly broadened the sphere to which this method could be applied.

The proper field for political cooperation is obviously that of East-West relations. If the Alliance is not to become dislocated, the member countries

must at all costs adopt a common attitude in their dealings with the Soviet bloc. Hitherto, this has been the case on all major occasions when the USSR and the West have come politically face to face. In 1955, at the 'Summit Conference' in Geneva and at the Conference of Foreign Ministers which followed, the position adopted by the representatives of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on the question of Germany and European security represented that of the Alliance as a whole. In 1957, during the most thorough-going discussions which have so far taken place between East and West on disarmament, the proposals made to the USSR by Canada, the United States, France, and Great Britain expressed the common viewpoint of all the NATO countries on this vital issue. During 1958, the NATO partners undertook to prepare together for the Summit Conference proposed by the USSR, and last December they took a firm stand against the Soviet Union over her threat to Berlin. Indeed it can be said that today no important political communication is sent to the USSR by a member government without its having first been discussed in the Council.

However, it is no longer sufficient to ensure solidarity between the NATO members in their relations with the Soviet bloc. They must show their solidarity in dealing with all problems in which the interests of the Alliance are at stake, in whatever part of the world the problems arise.

The increased range of NATO's activities has given rise to certain objections. NATO, it is sometimes said, is not the proper body to discuss political problems of a global nature; this is the function of those countries who have world responsibilities.

Is this a valid point of view? It is not only legitimate, but desirable, that countries such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom should discuss together questions for which they are individually responsible. But if these questions affect the common interests of the Alliance, the countries concerned should also inform the Council of the results of their conversations and submit them to discussion by their partners before they take any action. In this way, the right of each country to express its opinion can be respected; without this it is impossible to achieve solidarity in the interests of all.

Furthermore, it is imperative today that the NATO countries cooperate in those parts of the world most exposed to Soviet penetration. Indeed, this penetration is the greatest threat to the West. We should, therefore, do everything possible to prevent the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia from drifting towards Communism, not only because we need them, but also because they need us. Many, including some among those whom circumstances have alienated from us, have, nevertheless, innumerable historical, economic, and cultural ties with the West. Even if they have taken advantage of help from the USSR in order to free themselves from our control, there are many who fear they may now fall under a heavier yoke. We can best help them to resist penetration, develop their resources, and recognize the superiority of our institutions and economic system if we follow a general, coordinated policy. Our aim today is to develop this global form of political cooperation between the NATO members. It is a long-term undertaking, but the results so far obtained are encouraging.

The activities I have just proposed in connexion with the underdeveloped countries must obviously involve economic resources. Unfortunately, the economic field is one in which cooperation between the NATO countries has hitherto made least progress. But unity is none the less necessary, whether on the question of facilitating exchange between member countries – this is the problem which has arisen between the six countries of the Common Market and their partners in OEEC – or on that of organizing concerted action in relation to outside countries, particularly the underdeveloped territories. Possibly NATO is not the body best equipped for undertaking these activities; what is essential is that they should be efficiently organized and should further NATO's principal aims – namely, the defence and strengthening of the West. In this connexion, the proposed undertakings of the Common Market in Africa are a step in the right direction.

Finally, new possibilities for the NATO countries to cooperate have now arisen in the scientific and technical fields. The era of the 'global challenge' is also that of the artificial satellite, which is a symbol of the rivalry between East and West. Scientific and technical progress are today as essential to security as economic and social progress. But here again, collective action is the best guarantee of success. NATO's Science Committee, set up in December 1957, tries to promote this: through it, efforts are better coordinated and scientific knowledge is pooled.

In ten years, the global challenge of the USSR has, therefore, multiplied the tasks facing NATO. It has been able to attain its primary objectives – to maintain peace, defend freedom in Europe, and halt the

Soviet Union's westward expansion. It has organized our defence, and preserved and strengthened the political unity of its members in their relations with the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, much remains to be done if, as is expected of us, we are to meet the Russian challenge on a world-wide scale. Our Alliance is composed of sovereign and equal States, and the close cooperation which is necessary today often calls for considerable effort and sacrifice. In foreign affairs, particularly if mutual consultation is carried on seriously, it imposes on the governments concerned a sort of revolution in diplomatic practice. Might it not be valuable if large nations, especially, were now to disclose their intentions to their allies for discussion?

This is, however, the only way to coordinate action and maintain solidarity. Indeed, unity and cooperation are the price of our future; and the endeavour to achieve them constantly forges new links between us and daily helps to transform the Alliance into a genuine community.

CONCLUSION

What is at Stake

The Atlantic Alliance was born of the need to defend ourselves; but it is not concerned merely with protecting a group of countries from the threat of political and military hegemony; for it is not only the territory and national independence of the NATO partners, but also the very principles upon which their civilization is based that are threatened. In the

name of human progress and happiness, Communism aims at imposing upon the world a system founded on the subjection of the individual; wherever Communism rules, it destroys liberty in all its forms.

Our civilization, on the contrary, is based on the supremacy of man, whose free development it tries to promote. Our civilization is the heir of Greek humanism, of the Christian tradition, of the message of social freedom and justice handed down from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it is open to all man's new needs. In it liberty and social justice are largely reconciled. Through it we have based our society on principles to which men of all races and creeds subscribe. The values of this civilization are, indeed, universal, and throughout the world there are men who admit them as their own. Our Alliance, therefore, is not only an association of interests, however legitimate they may be; it is in some measure the advance guard of a vaster community which stretches far beyond our frontiers. This community includes all the peoples in Europe and America who spring from the same tradition, and all those who, though heirs to a different past, have assimilated its fundamental values.

It is to the credit of our countries that we have taken up the most dangerous challenge ever flung at this civilization. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that one day our adversaries themselves may recognize its superiority.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C., 4 April 1949

THE Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of

individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Govern-

ment of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

A protocol was signed by the Council Deputies in London on 22 October 1951. After final ratification by all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty on 18 February 1952.

The text of the Protocol follows:

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4 April, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Altantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

'For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack –

(1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(2) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.'

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A protocol was signed in Paris on 23 October 1954, by the members of the North Atlantic Council assembled in Ministerial session. After its final ratification by all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the Treaty on 5 May 1955.

The text of this Protocol follows:

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4 April, 1949.

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has, by a declaration dated 3 October 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3 October 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when (a) each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, (b) all instruments of ratification of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and (c) all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

DECLARATION AND COMMUNIQUÉ

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
16–19 December 1957

I. DECLARATION

WE, the representatives of fifteen nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, believing in the sanctity of those human rights which are guaranteed to all men of free nations by their constitutions, laws and customs, re-dedicate ourselves and our nations to the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty has been in effect for nearly nine years. It was founded to protect the right of our peoples to live in peace and freedom under governments of their own choice. It has succeeded in protecting this right. Building on our experience and confident in the success already obtained, we have agreed together upon means to give added strength to our Alliance.

At the end of the Second World War, the armies of the West were largely disbanded. The Soviet Union did not demobilise. Its expansionist policy impelled us to establish our Treaty and to build up our armed forces.

We are an organization of free countries. We have learned to live and work together in the firm conviction that our fundamental unity and our combined strength are indispensable to our own security and to the peace of the world.

The meaning of our Alliance is clear. We have

given a solemn guarantee, each to the other, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, to be resisted with all the forces at our command. Faithful to the Charter of the United Nations we reaffirm that our Alliance will never be used for aggressive purposes. We are always ready to settle international problems by negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all. We seek an end to world tension, and intend to promote peace, economic prosperity and social progress throughout the world.

We continue firmly to stand for comprehensive and controlled disarmament, which we believe can be reached by stages. In spite of disappointments, we remain ready to discuss any reasonable proposal to reach this goal and to lay a solid foundation for a durable peace. This is the only way to dispel the anxieties arising from the armaments race.

The free world faces the mounting challenge of international Communism backed by Soviet power. Only last month in Moscow the Communist rulers again gave clear warning of their determination to press on to domination over the entire world, if possible by subversion, if necessary by violence. Within the North Atlantic Treaty there is no place for the concept of world domination. Firmly believing in peaceful change through democratic means, cherishing the character of our peoples and vigilant to safeguard their freedom, we will never yield to such a threat.

For the entire world it is both a tragedy and a great danger that the peoples under international Communist rule – their national independence, human liberties and their standard of living as well as their scientific and technological achievements – have been sacrificed to the purposes of world domination and

military power. The suppression of their liberty will not last for ever. Already in these countries there is evidence of the growing desire for intellectual and economic freedom. If the free nations are steadfast, the totalitarian menace that now confronts them will eventually recede.

Established to defend the peace, our Alliance will also enable us to reach our objectives of economic and social progress. For this purpose we have agreed to cooperate closely to enable us to carry the necessary burden of defence without sacrificing the individual liberties or the welfare of our peoples. We shall reach this goal only by recognizing our interdependence and by combining our efforts and skills in order to make better use of our resources. Such efforts will now be applied particularly to the peaceful use of atomic energy and to the development and better organization of scientific cooperation.

To the many nations which have gained their independence since the end of the Second World War and to all other peoples, who like ourselves are dedicated to freedom in peace, we offer our cooperation on a basis of complete equality and in a spirit of fraternity.

Conscious of our intellectual and material resources, convinced of the value of our principles and of our way of life, without provocation but equally without fear, we have taken decisions to promote greater unity, greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also, we believe, for the world at large.

International Situation

1. The aim of the Soviet bloc is to weaken and disrupt the free world. Its instruments are military, political and economic, and its activities are world wide. To meet this challenge the free world must organize its resources – moral, military, political and economic – and be ready to deploy them wherever the situation demands. Our Alliance cannot, therefore, be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defence. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence, and must take account of developments outside its own area.

2. In the course of our meeting we have therefore reviewed the international situation and, in particular, the dangers to world peace arising from Soviet actions and threats. In spite of the dangers of the situation which are obvious to all, the Soviet Union has made no real contribution to the solution of major problems causing international tension. We have especially in mind the problems of the reunification of Germany in freedom, and the continuing anomaly of the isolation of Berlin – the capital of Germany. We renew and reaffirm our declaration of 23 October 1954 which had in view the establishment on a firm basis of the security and freedom of Berlin. The perpetuation of injustice to the German people undermines international confidence and endangers peace. At the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government in July 1955, the Soviet leaders took a solemn commitment that 'the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the

national interests of the German people and the interests of European security'. We call upon the Soviet Government to honour this pledge.

3. We have reviewed the situation in the Middle East. In line with the peaceful aims of our Alliance, we confirm the support of our Governments for the independence and sovereignty of the states in this region, and our interest in the economic well-being of their peoples. We believe that the stability of this important area is vital to world peace.

4. We express our interest in the maintenance of peace and the development of conditions of stability and economic and political well-being in the vitally important continent of Africa. We hope that the countries and peoples of that continent who are disposed to do so will cooperate within the free world in efforts to promote these purposes. We affirm the readiness of our countries to cooperate for our part with the countries and peoples of Africa to further these ends. Historic, economic and other friendly ties between certain European countries and Africa would make such cooperation particularly desirable and effective.

5. In the course of our review of the international situation we have given consideration to recent serious events in Indonesia. We view them with concern.

The Working of the Alliance

6. The strength of our Alliance, freely concluded between independent nations, lies in our fundamental unity in the face of the danger which threatens us. Thanks to this fundamental unity, we can overcome our difficulties and bring into harmony our individual points of view. In contrast, as events in Hungary have

shown, the Soviet bloc is held together only by political and military coercion.

7. Although progress has been made, further improvement is needed in our political consultation. We are resolved to bring this about. Our Permanent Representatives will be kept fully informed of all government policies which materially affect the Alliance and its members. In this way, we shall be able to draw fully on each other's political experience and to ensure a broad coordination of our policies in the interest, not only of the Alliance, but of the free world as a whole.

In addition, to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, the Permanent Council and the Secretary-General should ensure effective consultation, including, where necessary, procedures of conciliation at an early stage.

Disarmament

8. We recall that in the course of this year, the Western countries taking part in the London Disarmament talks put forward to the Soviet Union, with the unanimous agreement of NATO, a series of concrete proposals providing, subject to effective controls:

- for reduction of all armaments and military forces;
- for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons;
- for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;
- for measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack.

9. We note with regret that these various proposals, which would halt the armaments race and add to world security if they were accepted, were rejected *en bloc* by the Soviet Union, although they had been approved by 56 members of the United Nations.

10. We regret that the Soviet Union has brought about a deadlock in the disarmament negotiations by declaring their intention to boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission which had been extended, by a strong majority of the General Assembly, to include 25 nations.

11. We denounce Soviet tactics of alternating between peace propaganda statements and attempted intimidation by the threat of nuclear attack.

12. We deplore, also, that the leaders of the USSR do not allow the Soviet populations to be impartially informed and enlightened by the services of the United Nations at the same time as the populations of other member countries, as to the danger of destruction to which all peoples would be exposed in the event of general war. A resolution to this effect was adopted in November 1957, by the General Assembly of the United Nations by 71 nations against 9 nations of the Soviet bloc.

13. We emphasize that, in order to be effective, any disarmament agreement implies adequate international control, that the acceptance of such control is the test of a true desire for peace and that the Soviet Union refuses to put this principle into practice.

14. We have decided to establish a Technical Group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments.

15. In spite of the successive setbacks given by the Soviet Union to the cause of controlled disarmament

and of peace, the NATO Council will neglect no possibility of restricting armaments within the limits imposed by security and will take all necessary action to this end.

16. We state our willingness to promote, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the USSR likely to lead to the implementation of the proposals recalled above.

We are also prepared to examine any proposal, from whatever source, for general or partial disarmament, and any proposal enabling agreement to be reached on the controlled reduction of armaments of all types.

17. Should the Soviet government refuse to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission, we would welcome a meeting at Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock.

Nato Defence

18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defence. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved.

22. Recognizing the rapidly growing interdependence of the nations of the free world, we have, in organizing our forces, decided to bring about closer coordination with a view to ensuring that each NATO member country makes its most effective contribution to the requirements established by the Alliance. Better use of the resources of the Alliance and greater efficiency for its forces will be obtained through as high a degree of standardization and integration as possible in all fields, particularly in certain aspects of air and naval defence, of logistic support and of the composition and equipment of forces. We have agreed that a military conference should be held at Ministerial level in the early months of 1958 to discuss progress made in these fields in the light, in particular, of the results of the 1957 Annual Review.

23. As regards defence production, we have decided,

in view of the progress already made, to take further measures within NATO to promote the coordination of research, development and manufacture of modern weapons including intermediate range ballistic missiles.

24. The best means of achieving coordinated production of advanced weapons needed by our forces will be studied as a matter of urgency. Those NATO countries whose programmes have already reached a very advanced stage have offered to share with their allies significant production techniques and results of their research work in order to stimulate a truly productive effort in the defence production field.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation

25. We recognize that in most of our countries more should be done to increase the supply of trained men in many branches of science and technology. The full development of our science and technology is essential to the culture, to the economy and to the political and military strength of the Atlantic Community.

26. We realize that progress will depend on vigorous action within individual states and in particular on the devoted contribution of teachers and scientists. We must increase the provision for the training of young people in scientific and technical subjects and must also ensure that the free pursuit of fundamental research continues to flourish. Each of our governments will, therefore, reappraise the support being given to scientific and technical education and to fundamental research.

27. We seek to increase the effectiveness of national efforts through the pooling of scientific facilities and information and the sharing of tasks. We must build

on the established tradition of the universality of true science. Our governments will support the international organizations doing work in this field.

28. We have decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee on which all of the NATO countries will be represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific policy. In addition, a scientist of outstanding qualifications will be appointed as Science Adviser to the Secretary-General of NATO.

29. The Science Committee will be responsible in particular for making specific recommendations to the Council for action on a proposal by the French Government for a Western Foundation for Scientific Research and on the many other valuable proposals which have been put forward by the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Cooperation and by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.

Economic Cooperation

30. We are united in our common purpose to promote the economic and social development of our peoples and to assist the peoples of other countries to achieve the same objective. We consider that the purpose of government in a free society is to enlarge the opportunity of the individual rather than to subordinate him to the state.

31. We will cooperate among ourselves and with other free governments to further the achievement of economic stability, a steady rate of economic growth, and the expansion of international trade through the further reduction of exchange and trade barriers.

32. We reaffirm the desirability of a closer economic association between the countries of Western Europe, which we deem to be in the interest of all countries,

and we will accordingly lend encouragement to the successful development of the European Economic Community and of a European Free Trade Area in which full account would be taken of the interests of the less developed member countries. We attach particular importance to these initiatives being worked out in such a way as to strengthen not only the participating countries but also the relations within the Atlantic Community and the free world as a whole. We recognize the interdependence of the economies of the members of NATO and of the other countries of the free world.

33. We affirm the interest of our governments in an enlargement of the resources, both public and private, available for the purpose of accelerating the economic advancement of the less developed areas of the free world.

34. We have decided that the North Atlantic Council, without duplicating the work of other agencies, shall from time to time, and in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, review economic trends and assess economic progress, and may make suggestions for improvements either through existing organizations or by the efforts of individual countries, or in special cases by new initiatives.

35. Under present circumstances, our defensive Alliance takes on a new significance. Only an intensified collective effort can safeguard our peoples and their liberties. We have, together, ample capacity in freedom to defend freedom.

36. We have taken a series of decisions which will promote greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also for the world at large.