MAO TSE-TUNG :
THE LACQUERED IMAGE

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the lacquered image

by

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

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

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

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Publisher's Note

China may not be the number one communist country today, but its leader, Mao Tse-tung, is undoubtedly the world's top-most communist leader. But Mao's importance is not due to his place in the communist pantheon. By any standard he is an outstanding leader in his own right. His career is a unique blend of political adventure, military romanticism, ideological integrity and personal charisma. The qualities of leadership that he has consistently displayed invite comparison only with those of Lenin. Like Lenin, he not only made a revolution and laid the foundations of a great power but also impregnated Marxism with new insights and techniques. Lenin introduced into the Marxian theory the catalytic idea of "professional revolutionaries"; he also conceived of the revolution under the hegemony of the working class in cooperation with the peasants. Mao put the peasant to the heretical task of leading the proletarian revolution.

Lenin did not live long enough to develop the doctrine further, but Mao is still living and, perhaps, still developing it. To him, as to all Marxists, history is a constant "feedback" between theory and practice, and therefore theory must be ceaselessly developed. But Mao has the uncanny gift of turning the telescope of theory in the most unexpected direction. For instance, when the Sino-Soviet conflict came to light many students of Marxism interpreted it within the categories of Marxism; they explained it as the inevitable conflict between the psyches of two different stages of revolution. But Mao seems to have drawn theoretical conclusions from the conflict which go beyond the Marxist categories. Why must China oppose and fight Soviet Russia? Because Soviet Russia has lost her revolutionary will and turned revisionist. Why has Russia become revisionist? Because she has been ensnared by 'goulash communism'. Marxists have always claimed that with the socialization of the relations of production, the forces of production would develop. This is what, they claim, happened in Russia; Russian progress in science and industry are a witness to this claim. Naturally the Russian leaders started thinking in terms of competing with the most advanced of capitalist countries, namely America; and they became enamoured of the American standards of living. This, Mao seems to feel, is at the root of the Soviet degeneration.

Mao's present endeavour would appear to be to save China from this evil. Of course, this is no call for stalling the development of the forces of production. With the introduction of the socialist relations of production the forces of production must strengthen, but that must not allow revolutionaries to be caught in the snares of comfort and easy living. With increased production one is naturally tempted to seek the good things of life. Mao's effort is to save the Chinese from this temptation. That is the kernel of his 'socialist education campaign' which is currently invading every department of life in China. That is the secret of the accent on austerity, sacrifice and self-reliance. The increased production is not to be squandered over 'goulash communism' but to be carefully utilized for the furtherance of the revolution. Revolution is not some contingent affair; it is a permanent, Promethean struggle. It has its roots in the contradiction between Man and Nature which is at the root of all living. This is what the Chinese must know and this is what they must prepare for. They must steel themselves with revolutionary will. Mao's endeavour is directed towards this revolutionary transformation of the individual. Thus Man must transform himself, because he is the maker of history. As Marx said he may not make it out of the whole cloth, but unless he is alert the cloth would envelop him and smother him. This indeed is a radical development of Marxism, and China today is experiencing the unity of practice with this theory. Mao may or may not succeed ultimately, but this reinterpretation of the doctrine is in harmony with the Confucian genius of his country, and it cannot fail to make a deep impact on its inhabitants.

To understand the life and thought of Mao Tse-tung is, therefore, to understand the driving force of Communist China. And that is our justification for selecting for our first book Mr. Howard L. Boorman's essay. Mr. Boorman's essay is the only one so far to offer a theoretically meaningful reconstruction of the life story of Mao Tse-tung, and was first published in *The China Quarterly*, London, October-December, 1963.

Mr. Boorman is Director of Columbia University's Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China. He has edited the special China issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1959, and is co-author of *Moscow Peking Axis*. Formerly Mr. Boorman was an American Foreign Service Officer and was stationed in Peking (1947–50) and Hong Kong (1950–54).

We are grateful to the Editor of *The China Quarterly* for giving us the permission to publish Mr. Boorman's essay. Mr. C. R. M. Rao, Editor of *China Report*, has added an epilogue so as to bring the story to the current stage.

PRABHAKAR PADHYE

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*Mao Tse-tung: the Lacquered Image**

"At seventy, I could follow the dictates of my own heart; for what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right."

—Confucius, *The Analects*, Book II, 4 (Waley translation)

IN the preface to her biography of Sun Yat-sen, Lyon Sharman writes of the difficulty of drawing a realistic portrait of the symbol of modern Chinese nationalism. Even working in China immediately after Sun's death in 1925, the author attempting an untrammelled biography was hampered not only by the paucity of reliable data but also, and more seriously, by the fact that the Kuomintang had forbidden overt criticism of Sun and of his ideas.† The fact that her volume on Sun is still the best available nearly thirty years after publication is a tribute both to the author's assiduousness and to her empathy for China and the Chinese.‡

The case of Mao Tse-tung is comparable, though not parallel. While Sun Yat-sen spent many years outside China, Mao has lived all his life in his native land. Even before Mao's demise, the independent Western biographer is stopped from sustained access to his subject, and faced with the necessity of avoiding both the anti-communist bias prevalent in the United States and the lacquered image of Chairman Mao the saviour, now

* On December 26, 1963, Mao was seventy. I am indebted to the following individuals who have greatly assisted me with biographical and bibliographical details on Mao: Mrs. Anne B. Clark, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; Mr. Donald W. Klein, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong; Dr. Robert H. G. Lee, Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbio University; and Dr. Stuart R. Schram, Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris. Selection of data and interpretations are my own responsibility.

† See Lyon Sharman, "The Lacquered Image and the Biographer, a Preface," *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (New York: John Day, 1934), pp. vii-xiii.

‡ Professor Harold Schiffrin of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is preparing a new political biography of Sun Yat-sen. The first volume will deal with Sun Yat-sen and the Hsing-chung-hui; a second, with Sun and the T'ung-meng-hui.

an integral part of Peking's official mythology. Mr. Edgar Snow, the first non-Communist author to introduce Mao to Western readers, as well as to many Chinese, in 1937, spent several hours with Mao in Peking three years ago. Yet Snow's report on his 1960 visit, though vivid, adds little to the historical record.* Elementary facts remain elusive. Personal details are vague. The record of the Chinese Communist Party's conquest of power, the master's official theories and opinions are set fourth *ex post facto* in his *Selected Works* and in scattered primary sources, some interviews, bits and pieces of evidence and detail: of such materials must the life story be reconstructed. It is hardly surprising that no serious political biography of Mao now exists, and unlikely that one will be written which would satisfy the normal requirements of Western biographical writing.†

Yet the challenge remains. As was the case with Lyon Sharman and Sun Yet-sen, the student of Chinese politics since the May Fourth movement[1] must either cultivate marginal gardens or come to a reckoning with Mao Tse-tung. Like other prominent political figures, Communist and non-Communist alike, Mao Tse-tung the man has already blended into Mao Tse-tung the legend required for popular consumption. Like other successful revolutionary leaders, his biography has already merged with the history of the political protest movement through which he rose to prominence. Influences have, of course, been reciprocal. Chinese Communism has been shaped by distinctive elements in Mao's political personality, while Mao's political style has been shaped by the varieties of national frustration which nurtured and sustained the Chinese Communist movement. As Mao reaches his seventieth birthday, when the well-known passage in the *Analects* states that Confucius could follow what his heart desired without transgressing what was right, it is appropriate to attempt to place China's current Sage within the context of twentieth-century Chinese history. The present essay is a product of that effort.

* See Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York: Random House, (1962), part 2, "Where the Waves Meet," pp. 111–159.

† The personalities and careers of the individuals who have made Soviet Communism are far more thoroughly documented. In addition to Trotsky's *My Life: an Attempt at an Autobiography* (1930) and his *Stalin: an Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* (1941), the following dozen books suggest some of the published resources available. Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: a Political Biography* (1949); Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921* (1954); Deutscher, *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929* (1959); Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast; Trotsky, 1929-1940* (1963); Lazar Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power* (1961); Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (1958); David Shub, *Lenin* (1948); Boris Souvarine, *Stalin* (1939); Donald W. Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals* (1955); Gé ard Walter, *Lénine* (Paris, 1950); Edmund Wilson, *To the Finland Station* (1947); Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (1948); Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (1957).

Formative Years

NOT even the most popular fortune teller in Hunan could have predicted on December 26, 1893, that a male child born that day in the village of Shao-shan would grow up to have an influence on China greater than that of any other Chinese of his generation. Surrounded by low hills, framed by bamboo groves and pine trees, Shao-shan lies in the fertile rice-producing heart of central Hunan, some 30 miles west of the county seat of Hsiang-t'an. Agriculturally productive and culturally advanced, this section of Hunan produced two of nineteenth-century China's outstanding scholar-generals, Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang[2], while the peasantry of the province contributed soldiers for the Hsiang-chün, the well-known Hunan army which played a leading role in defeating the Taiping rebels[3] in the 1860s and, later, in suppressing the Mohammedan uprising in Kansu and Sinkiang during the 1870s.*

Family and early influences

Mao Tse-tung's family background was undistinguished. The tile-roofed family house, a museum in China today, is typical of the area, though somewhat more spacious than many of its neighbours. Had the later Chinese Communist canons of social analysis existed in Hunan in the 1890s when Mao Tse-tung was a barefooted village boy, his family might have been labelled "rich peasant." The father, Mao Shun-sheng, was a peasant who had served for a period in the army. When Mao Tse-tung was young, his father was a small landowner, by no means prosperous by

* Tseng Kuo-fan (1811–72) was a native of Hsiang-hsiang. Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812–85) was a native of Hsiang-yin, but lived with his wife's family at Hsiang-t'an from 1832 until 1844. See the biography of Tseng by Teng Ssu-yu in Arthur W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington: 1944), II, 751–756 ; and that of Tso by Tu Lien-che, *ibid.* II, 762–767.

any except Chinese rural standards, who operated a village grain business in addition to tilling the land. A man who had come from nothing, and who had been hammered hard by his heritage, Mao Shun-sheng embodied the narrow, grasping prejudices of the poor peasant once removed. Rough, autocratic, a tight-fisted tyrant for whom existence was measured by the gap between buying cheap and selling dear, he doubtless appeared a formidable man to his children. Mao's mother, Wen Ch'i-mei (d. 1919), a daughter of the land from a nearby village, was illiterate and superstitious, but warm and generous with her children. The children were four: three sons and a daughter. Mao Tse-tung was the eldest son. His younger brothers were Tse-min and Tse-t'an; the sister was Tse-hung. All the children survived to adulthood; all became Communists; all except Mao Tse-tung met violent deaths.

Mao Tse-tung had his initial education in the village school at Shao-shan between 1901 and 1906. There he learned his first ideographs and memorised his first text in the conventional fashion, sometimes attempting at home to quote passages from Confucius, whom his father admired, to calm paternal outbursts of temper. At thirteen, Mao left primary school and began work on the family farm, labouring in the fields by day and keeping accounts for his father in the evening. Like many other strong-willed children, Mao early rejected paternal authority. He disliked his father, despised his avariciousness, and regularly feuded with him. One point of contention centred about Mao's distaste for hauling manure, required for fertilizer, and his fondness for reading novels. Like countless other schoolboys in China, Mao devoured the *San-kuo-chih yen-i* (*Romance of the Three Kingdoms*) and the *Shui-hu chuan* (*Water Margin*).* These books have enjoyed immense popularity for centuries in China, their heroes and episodes well known to virtually all Chinese, including the illiterate, through itinerant storytellers and countless plays and opera plots based upon the novels. Colourful tales, rich memories of past dynasties and heroic deeds, adventure-filled stories of clever stratagems and righteous rebellion all gripped the young Mao and stirred his imagination. During his early adolescence, Mao also liked to read Cheng Kuan-ying's *Sheng-shih Wei-yen* (*Words of Warning in a Prosperous Age*), the influential and eloquent reformist tract which advocated industrialisation, improved communications, parliamentary government, and newspapers and public libraries for China.

* For a fresh estimate of these books, see the paper by C. T. Hsia, "Comparative Approaches to *Water Margin*," *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature*, No. 11 (1962), supplement, Third Conference on Oriental-Western Literary and Cultural Relations, Indiana University, pp. 121-128.

Despite his father's opposition, Mao Tse-tung left the family farm in 1909, at fifteen, and went to nearby Hsiang-hsiang, home of his mother's family, to enter a "modern" school. The T'ung-shan primary school offered natural science, in which Mao had no interest, and "Western learning," which exposed him to some Western history and geography. His knowledge of Chinese affairs expanded as he read the writings of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i -ch'ao[4], while a book on great men of the Western world introduced him to George Washington, Napoleon, Peter the Great, the Duke of Wellington and others. Washington aroused Mao's enthusiasm, since he had demonstrated an admirable combination of patriotism and military valour in fighting eight bitter years for his country's independence. The American revolution was distant, however; that in China was just approaching. Leaving his home district, Mao journeyed to Changsha, provincial capital and Hunan's political, intellectual and commercial centre. There he became an avid reader of the republican *Min-li Pao*, edited by Yu Yu-jen, and cut off his queue as a mark of his anti-Manchu stand.

Student days at Changsha

The Wuchang revolt of October 1911, which finally toppled the Ch'ing dynasty[5], came when Mao was not quite eighteen. Fired with enthusiasm, he hastened to Wuchang, but soon returned to Changsha when fighting broke out in Hunan. There he served for several months in a volunteer corps recruited from the Changsha students. With the agreement of January 1912 between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-k'ai, Mao decided that the revolutionary struggle was over, and returned to his books. He enrolled briefly in the First Provincial Middle School, and then spent several months reading by himself in the Hunan provincial library, a profitable period of self-education which exposed Mao to some Western political and social thought through Chinese translations, made by Yen Fu[6] and others, of T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, Darwin's *Origin of Species* and other works.

Precarious finances, combined with intellectual curiosity, impelled Mao to take the examinations for admission to the Hunan Provincial First Normal School. The richest school in Changsha, the First Normal offered both free tuition, and free board and lodging. Competition for entrance was thus keen; and scholastic standards, high. Gaining admission in 1913, he spent the next five years as a student in this school, a period which was of great importance in Mao's personal development as a

student leader.* As the provincial capital, Changsha reflected the conflicts between old and new which characterised the early republican period in China. A centre of classical learning as early as Sung[7] times, when the great Chu Hsi[8] had lectured there, Hunan had long produced traditional scholars known both for their personal dedication and for their intellectual conservatism. At the same time, Hunan had a reformist tradition, a radical outlook which not only permitted examination of new ideas but also action based upon new premises. Indeed Hunan produced three of the most famous revolutionary leaders of the early twentieth century—Huang Hsing, Sung Chiao-jen and Ts'ai O—all of whom died or were killed while Mao was a student at Changsha.†

As a young Hunanese patriot during the years of the First World War, Mao Tse-tung was conscious both of Hunan's fading strength in China's national politics, and of China's failing strength in Asian politics. With the appearance of *New Youth*[9] in 1915, Mao rallied enthusiastically to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's new journal, attracted both by its bold ideas and by its vigorous literary style. Writing from Changsha from the early spring of 1917, Mao contributed his first significant published article, "A Study of

* Students at the First Normal School at Changsha during the period when Mao was a student there included Ts'ai Ho-sen, Liu Shao-ch'i, Jen Pi-shih and Li Li-san. Many years later, another former fellow student described Mao at the time of his entrance into the school. "To me he always seemed quite an ordinary, normal-looking person. His face was rather large, but his eyes were neither large nor penetrating, nor had they the sly, cunning look sometimes attributed to them. His nose was flattish and of a typical Chinese shape. His ears were well proportioned; his mouth, quite small; his teeth, very white and even. Those good white teeth helped to make his smile quite charming, so that no one could imagine that he was not genuinely sincere." Siao-yu, *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 31.

† Huang Hsing (1874—1916) was one of the foremost leaders of the anti-Manchu movement in Hunan. He joined forces with Sun Yat-sen in 1905 to form the T'ung-meng-hui, in which society he ranked next to Sun himself. Best known for his part in the "Three Twenty-nine" uprising of April 1911 at Canton, later commemorated by the Kuomintang as the Huang-hua-kang revolt, Huang was the organiser and leader of many other uprisings during the first decade of the century, and figured prominently in the revolt of October 1911 and in the "Second Revolution" of 1913. He died at Shanghai on October 31, 1916. See Chun-tu Hsueh, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).

Sung Chiao-jen (1882—1913), was also a prominent figure in the anti-Manchu revolutionary movement and one of the founding members of the T'ung-meng-hui in 1905. An admirer of western-style parliamentary government, Sung was the guiding spirit behind the reorganisation of the T'ung-meng-hui into a parliamentary political party, the original Kuomintang, of which he was acting general director until his assassination by agents of Yuan Shih-k'ai at Shanghai on March 22, 1913.

Ts'ai O (1882—1916) was a leader of the 1911 revolution in Yunnan, and played his most celeberated role in the early republican period as leader of the Yunnan military forces which rose in armed revolt against Yuan shih-k'ai in December 1915. Ts'ai died of illness in Tokyo on November 8, 1916.

Athletics," to *New Youth*.* Product of a period when Mao was an ardent physical culturist (an interest which was itself of Western influence), the essay was notable for its spirit of elemental nationalism. Its objective was to propose a series of athletic exercises which, through stimulating a new national ethic blending civil and military virtues, would remedy China's weakness. Mao objected to Confucianism because of its emphasis on family loyalty at the expense of national patriotism and its deprecation of military virtues, yet he cited the eminent Hunanese scholar-official, Tseng Kuo-fan, as an outstanding example of a worthy Chinese statesman who maintained bodily fitness.

Mao's central emphasis, like that of most other patriotic students of the period, was nationalism. At the same time, he was seeking a broader intellectual foundation for his mood of social protest, and was influenced by liberal-minded faculty members at the First Normal School, including Hsu T'e-li† and Yang Ch'ang-chi. Yang Ch'ang-chi, whose daughter Mao was later to marry, was a respected scholar known locally as "Confucius." A native of Changsha, Hunan, Yang had spent about ten years studying abroad, in Japan, England and Germany, after the turn of the century.‡ Though he styled himself a neo-Kantian idealist, and was vigorous in criticising Confucianism and in rejecting many conventional Chinese behaviour patterns, Yang was nevertheless unable to evade the

* Written in the old Chinese literary style, this article, "T'i-yu chih yen-chiu," appeared in the issue of April 1, 1917 (Vol. III, No. 2). Mao signed it with a pseudonym, 'erh-shih-pa-hua sheng" (the man of twenty-eight strokes), based on the fact that his name, Mao Tse-tung, is composed of twenty-eight strokes in Chinese writing. Stuart R. Schram has prepared a full translation of this article, with critical introduction and Chinese text, in *Mao Ze-dong, "Une Etude de L'éducation physique"* (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

† Hsu T'e-li (b. 1876) is the eldest of the "elders" of the Chinese Communist Party, the group also including Tung Pi-wu, Wu Yü-chang, Hsieh Chueh-ts'ai and the late Lin Po-ch'ü. On the occasion of Hsu T'e-li's sixtieth birthday in 1936, Mao Tse-tung paid the conventional Chinese respects to his *hsien-sheng*. "Twenty years ago, you were my teacher. You are my teacher now and it is certain that in the future you will continue to be my teacher." See *Peking Review*, No. 17, April 27, 1962.

‡ The significance of personal connections in republican China is suggested by the pattern of relations linking Yang Ch'ang-chi, Mao Tse-tung, and Chang Shih-chao (1881–) venerable Hunanese educator and journalist. Yang Ch'ang-chi had travelled abroad, first to Japan (1902) and later to England (1908), with his elder brother, Yang Shou-jen, who had been closely associated with Chang Shih-chao in organising patriotic student associations during the final years of the Ch'ing period. When Yang Shou-jen committed suicide in England in May 1911 by jumping into the sea, Chang Shih-chao assumed responsibility for his burial. Years later, when Chang travelled to north China in 1949 to represent Nanking in the final, abortive peace talks with the Communists, he decided to remain in Communist territory after the breakdown of the negotiations. Chang Shih-chao was, of course, well-known to Mao personally, and has occupied a special position at Peking since Mao gained power. Richard C. Howard assisted me in sorting out this web of relationships and obligations.

ethical currents inherent in China's great tradition. His thought was dominated by two major themes: individual autonomy and self-realisation, and responsibility to society. Under Yang Ch'ang-chi's instruction, the students absorbed some Western ethical theory as well as a solid grounding in neo-Confucianism and the ideas of the late Ch'ing thinkers. The Western book which most influenced Mao at this period was Friedrich Paulsen's *System of Ethics*, translated into Chinese by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and used by Yang Ch'ang-chi as a textbook.* At the same time, the students absorbed substantial doses of traditional Chinese values, notably emphasis on self-discipline, patriotism and resistance to alien rule. Mao was Yang Ch'ang-chi's favourite student in ethics, and once wrote an essay on "The Power of the Mind" (Hsin chih li), for which Yang awarded him the maximum mark of 100 with a special added "plus 5."

The impact of Yang Ch'ang-chi's socially-oriented individualism affected Mao's extracurricular activities as well as his classroom work. From 1915 to 1918, Mao was an officer in the Changsha student association: secretary from 1915 to 1917, and general director during 1917–18. In the summer of 1917, Mao began efforts to form a new and more disciplined student organisation in Changsha dedicated to "strengthening China through strengthening Chinese youth." Ts'ai Ho-sen, a fellow student at the Normal School who was three years older than Mao, played a leading role in this effort, and the association, the New People's Study Society (Hsin min hsueh hui), held its first meeting at the residence of the Ts'ai family in Changsha on April 18, 1918.† As news of the work-study programme sponsored by several older Kuomintang leaders with European connections‡ reached Changsha, the New People's Study Society responded by sending Ts'ai Ho-sen to Peking in June 1918 to reconnoitre the situation.

Mao as radical nationalist

After five years at the Normal School, Mao graduated in June 1918. During the summer, Ts'ai Ho-sen wrote back to Changsha suggesting that

* Paulsen's *System der Ethik*, a neo-Kantian work, appeared in several editions in German. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's Chinese translation of the work, *Lun-li-hsueh yuan-li* (Commercial Press, 1913), ran to about 100,000 characters, and Mao's marginal notes on his own copy ran to over 12,000 characters. See Li Jui, *Mao Tse-tung T'ung-chih ti Ch'u-ch'i Ko-ming Huo-tung* (*Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Early Revolutionary Activities*) (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Ch'u-pan-she, 1957), p. 40.

† See Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 74.

‡ Notably Chang Jen-chieh, Li Shih-tseng and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei.

more members of the New People's Study Society should go to Peking to begin study of the French language; while Yang Ch'ang-chi, who had been invited to teach at Peking University, also advised Mao to come. In September 1918, then nearly twenty-five, Mao left Changsha for his first extended journey outside Hunan. On his initial stay at Peking during the winter of 1918—19, Mao, impecunious but eager, encountered a broader and more complex intellectual world than that which Changsha had offered. Through Yang Ch'ang-chi, Mao gained an introduction to Li Ta-chao,[10] who had recently been appointed chief librarian at Peking University. In contrast to most of his academic colleagues, Li Ta-chao's influence on the student generation of that period was due not only to his writings and lectures, but also to his willingness to lend a sympathetic ear to the personal problems of individual students. When Mao appeared in straitened circumstances, Li Ta-chao arranged for his employment as a clerk in the university library. Like many other youths, Mao was deeply influenced by Li Ta-chao's dedication to the vision of a new, self-reliant China and by his personal thoughtfulness. Mao also met Ch'en Tu-hsiu[11] and Hu Shih,[12] but failed to gain their attention. After spending the winter in the north, working and auditing some courses at Peking University, Mao went to Shanghai in the early spring of 1919, travelling with Hunanese fellow students preparing to embark for France in the work-study programme. Though assisting in the preparations, Mao did not accompany the group abroad. While in Shanghai, he received word that his mother was ill and had gone to Changsha for medical treatment. Mao thus left Shanghai in April and returned to Hunan to look after his mother, who died shortly thereafter.

In the spring of 1919, Changsha was affected by the outburst of the May Fourth movement, and Mao, responding to the stimulus provided by the patriotic demonstrations at Peking, turned again to mobilise the Hunan students.* The situation provided Mao, then only an obscure normal school graduate, with new opportunities for action, influence and increased prestige; and stamped him as a man of the May Fourth generation, though by no means a typical representative. In July 1919, Mao founded the *Hsiang-chiang P'ing-lun* (*Hsiang River Review*) a short-lived but well-written magazine published by the Hunan student union and modelled after the *Mei-chou P'ing-lun* (*Weekly Review*) edited by Li Ta-chao in Peking. Advocating "democracy and new culture," the

*See Chou Shih-chao, "My Recollections of Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Changsha before and after the May Fourth Movement," Peking *Kung-jen Jih pao*, April 20, 1959, translated in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 2011, May 12, 1959, pp. 1—14.

Hsiang River Review attained national recognition among the young intellectuals as it gained local disfavour among the Changsha authorities.* Between 1918 and 1920, Hunan province was controlled by Chang Ching-yao, a Peiyang warlord[13] of the Anhwei faction who governed tyrannically, executed freely, and was thoroughly hated by the Hunanese. As leader of the New People's Study Society and editor of the *Hsiang River Review*, Mao was violently opposed to Chang Ching-yao. He expressed these opposition views, anti-imperialist and anti-militarist, in the *Review* during the summer of 1919† and, later, in the journal *Hsin Hunan*,[14] another student organ. Both magazines were banned by the authorities. Lenin, who understood much of doctrinal questions, would have viewed Mao's political position in 1919 as primitive; Chang Ching-yao, who understood little of ideological matters, nevertheless recognised that the students and teachers in Changsha constituted a principal opposition force to his rule. Thus, when the anti-Chang drive took overt form in a general student strike in December 1919, Chang Ching-yao banned the student publications and suppressed the Hunan student association.

Conversion to Marxism

Finding it too dangerous to remain at Changsha, Mao then led a student delegation to Peking to elicit support for the anti-Chang cause. On his second trip to the north, Mao arrived at Peking in January 1920. That journey was of lasting significance, since Mao Tse-tung gained both a political creed and a fiancée. In Peking, he renewed his acquaintance with Yang K'ai-hui, daughter of Yang Ch'ang-chi, his former Changsha teacher who was then professor at Peking University.‡ In the political sphere, Li Ta-chao again proved to be a major personal influence. On arrival at Peking, Mao joined the Young China Association, a group formed in mid-1919 by Tseng Ch'i,[15] Li Ta-chao, and others to mobilise

* Though the *Hsiang River Review* published only five issues during the summer of 1919 before it was suppressed, young Chinese intellectuals at Peking such as Fu Ssu-nien and Lo Chia-lun viewed it as one of the half-dozen best magazines of that period. Mao, as chief editor, wrote most of the articles himself. See Li Jui, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-111, and Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth movement*, p. 348, note c.

† Mao's major contribution was a long article, "The Great Union of the People," published serially in three issues (July 21-August 4, 1919). There he expressed views which, though anti-imperialist and anti-militarist, were not yet Marxist. Mao wrote of the workers and peasants, and declared his support for the method of political struggle advocated by "the German, Marx." But his references to the Bolshevik revolution assessed it, not as a model, but rather as a blow to the European powers weakening their position in Asia. See Li Jui, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

‡ Yang Ch'ang-chi died at Peking on January 17, 1920.

patriotic opposition to Tuan Ch'i-jui's pro-Japanese government.* As Li Ta-chao moved left-ward in his political thinking, Mao follwed him, reading the *Communist Manifesto* for the first time in Chinese translation and exploring the elementary tenets of historical materialism. Having begun the process of conversion under Li Ta-chao's tutelage, Mao went to Shanghai in May 1920, his main objective being to coordinate activities of the Hunanese student delegations working to overthrow Chang Ching-yao. In Shanghai, Mao was in dire financial straits, but nevertheless used the opportunity to talk with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then at the centre of a cluster of young self-styled Marxists, Socialists and anarchists whose enthusiasm often exceeded their political consistency. Mao's conversations with Ch'en Tu-hsiu were crucial in his movement toward communism, and Mao himself later stated that these talks "deeply impressed me at what was probably a critical period in my life."†

Chang Ching-yao was finally forced out of Hunan in June 1920, primarily because of friction between the Chihli and Anhwei factions of the Peiyang warlords.‡ With Chang's flight, Mao returned to Hunan in July 1920, seeking practical employment and opportunities for political organisation. That autumn, in an attempt to restore the Hunan educational system which had suffered seriously under Chang Ching-yao's rule, T'an Yen-k'ai[16] appointed Yi P'ei-chi to head the First Normal School at Changsha. Yi, a local scholar who had previously taught Chinese at the school, carried out a thoroughgoing reform of its faculty, bringing in new teachers, many of them graduates of Peking universities with liberal views inherited from the May Fourth movement. Yi invited Mao Tse-tung, who had formerly been a student under him, to teach Chinese literature and to head the primary school attached to the Normal School. Mao held that post until the winter of 1921-22. Simultaneously, he began to develop channels for distributing materials on communism to the students. One major outlet for this distribution was the Culture Bookstore (Wen-hua Shu-tien), established at Changsha in September 1920 and similar to the

* Chang Wen-t'ien also joined the Young China Association at the same time as Mao. See *Shao-nien Chung-kuo*, February 15, 1920, p. 66. Conrad Brandt brought this reference to my attention.

† See Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York: Modern Library edition, 1944), p. 157. A useful edition of Mao's story as reported by Snow is *The Autobiography of Mao Tse-tung* (Canton: Truth Book Company, second revised edition, 1949); this volume gives the English text, accompanied by Chinese annotations giving personal and place names, as well as explanations of phrases used by Mao.

‡ Chinese patriots later assassinated Chang Ching-yao at Peiping on the ground that he was in the employ of the Japanese. He died on May 7, 1933.

bookshop operated at Wuchang during the same period by Yun Tai-ying and other young Hupeh radicals.*

Deliberately and decisively, Mao moved toward Marxism and toward marriage.† Yang K'ai-hui, with whom he had renewed his acquaintance in Peking the preceding winter, had now returned to Changsha, and she and Mao were married in the autumn of 1920, a union which lasted until her execution ten years later.‡ In the political sphere, Mao became increasingly outspoken. When Bertrand Russell, visiting Changsha in 1920, excoriated the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia and advocated an evolutionary approach to socialism through education and economic reform, Mao vigorously opposed Russell's views, and argued that political power should be seized by force if necessary. In October 1920, Mao received from Peking the charter of the Socialist Youth League, precursor of the Chinese Communist Party, and instructions for establishment of a branch in Hunan. With Ho Shu-heng, who had remained in Changsha in charge of the affairs of the New People's Study Society while Ts'ai Ho-sen[17] and Mao were absent, Mao personally recruited the more radical members of the society and formed a branch of the Youth League at Changsha in January 1921. Just turned twenty-seven, Mao had ended his early questing. To his new family responsibilities, he had added an uncertain career as political evangelist.

* The Nationalists suppressed the Culture Bookstore at Changsha in 1927.

† At age fourteen, Mao had been married in the Chinese fashion at Shao-shan. He never lived with the girl.

‡ An alternative view suggests that Mao and Yang K'ai-hui were married a year later, in the winter of 1921.

Years of Trial

THOUGH Mao had come to his vocation, advancement came slowly. Peking's hagiographers in recent years have deemed it fortunate that Mao Tse-tung was one of the dozen individuals present at the historic gathering which organised several fragmented nuclei into a Chinese Communist Party. Mao and Ho Shu-heng, his venerable colleague in the New People's Study Society since 1918, were the two individuals from Hunan who made the trip to Shanghai to attend the small meeting in July 1921 now labelled the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China.* Of the dozen delegates present, only Tung Pi-wu from Hupeh, in addition to Mao himself, survived to hold high office at Peking after 1949.†

* Delegates to the first Congress included:
From Peking: Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Jen-ching.
From Shanghai: Li Ta, Li Han-chun.
From Canton: Ch'en Kung-po.
From Wuhan: Tung Pi-wu, Ch'en T'an-ch'iu.
From Changsha: Mao Tse-tung, Ho Shu-heng.
From Tsinan: Wang Chin-mei, Teng En-ming.
Representing Chinese in Japan: Chou Fo-hai.

C. Martin Wilbur (ed.), *The Communist Movement in China, an Essay Written in 1924 by Ch'en Kung-po* (New York: Columbia University, East Asian Institute Series, No. 7, 1960), provides a full discussion of data bearing upon the first Congress (pp. 14–29) and texts of the only documents apparently extant from that meeting. Ch'en T'an-ch'iu (Ch'en Pan-tsu) has given an account in his "Reminiscences of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Communist International* (New York), XIII, October 1936, pp. 1361—1366. Tung Pi-wu's account, "The Main Problems of the First National Congress," appeared in the Peking *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*) on June 30, 1961, and was translated in SCMP No. 2545, July 26, 1961, pp. 1–5.

† See Howard L. Boorman, "Tung Pi-wu: a Political Profile," scheduled for publication in *The China Quarterly*. Li Ta (1889–), who later became one of China's foremost academic interpreters of Marxism, has also survived, but he left the Communist Party early.

Western students of Asian radicalism have not yet untangled the pattern of protest which began with that clandestine gathering of a dozen intellectual heretics at Shanghai in 1921 and culminated in the establishment of the Central People's Government at Peking twenty-eight years later. The story of the Chinese Communist movement during its long insurgency phase commands attention both as history and as human drama: the journalist's delight and the scholar's nightmare. Despite the movement's complexity, the circumstances of its birth and the condititions of its early years were not dissimilar to those which have bred other radical movements in Asia and elsewhere.* Urban, intense and intellectual, the young Chinese Communist Party was dominated by unrealistic Comintern policies, riven with factionalism, and remote from the central social fact that the China of the 1920s was a politically fragmented and technologically primitive country, overwhelmingly peasant in population. Between 1921 and 1935, the party's performance was unspectacular ; its political leadership unimpressive. From 1921 to 1927, when he was jettisoned to atone for Moscow's misunderstanding of the politics of revolution in China, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, distinguished iconoclast of the May Fourth movement and guiding figure in the modern Chinese literary revolt, served as general secretary of the party. Though Ch'en's intellectual stature helped to maintain party unity, the situation was less satisfactory after his political demise. From 1927 to 1935, top leadership was successively held by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai,[18] Li Li-san[19] (during the 1928—30 period when Hsiang Chung-fa was nominally general secretary) and three young Moscow-trained "returned students": Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming),[20] Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku)[21] and Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu)[22].

Communist organiser in Hunan

Following the 1921 meeting in Shanghai, Mao returned to Hunan, which was his primary area of action until 1927, when he moved to Kiangsi. After 1921, he attended only two party congresses, the Third (1923) and the Fifth (1927), prior to gaining top position in the party command. From 1921 to 1923, Mao served as secretary of the Hunan provincial branch of the party, beginning the arduous task of building an organisational structure; disseminating the Marxist gospel; and labouring,

* Yet Communist Parties, like individual Communists, are products not only of their external environments but also of their innate endowments. For verification of this point, one need only consider the varying fortunes of the Communist Parties in China, Japan and India during the past four decades. See Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), and Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

in accordance with Comintern guidance and conventional theory, to organise urban workers and miners for political purposes. As an organisational and personnel base, Mao relied heavily on the radical wing of the New People's Study Society, which formed most of the initial membership of the Hunan provincial branch of the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, Mao maintained contact with the Study Society comrades who had gone to France, corresponding regularly with Ts'ai Ho-sen and his sister, Ts'ai Ch'ang, who were at the College de Montargis south of Paris in the early 1920s. At Changsha, the fact that Mao, Ho Shu-heng and others were directly involved in educational work permitted them to utilise these channels to distribute materials on Marxism to local students. Paradoxically, an important centre was the Wang Fu-chih Study Society (*Ch'uan-shan Hsueh-she*), an institute founded by Hunan scholars in the early years of the republic for study of the works of the outstanding Hunanese nationalist and classical scholar of the seventeenth century.* Government-supported and directed by traditional scholars,† the Wang Fu-chih Study Society granted Mao permission to use its facilities for the establishment of a Marxist study group and dissemination of Marxist literature from 1921 to 1923. During the same period, Mao began work as labour organiser in Hunan, and in November 1922 was elected head of the Hunan branch of the China Trade Union Secretariat, headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao at Shanghai.‡ Liu Shao-ch'i was then also working as labour organiser in Hunan, and in September 1922 Liu led and won an important strike in the Anyuan coalfields on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. Communist successes led the provincial authorities to turn to general suppression of labour unions. Chao Heng-t'i, then provincial governor, issued a mandate for Mao's arrest, and Mao made a precipitate departure for Shanghai in April 1923.

Having missed the Second National Congress in Shanghai in July 1922, reportedly because he failed to find the meeting place, Mao did attend the Third National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party at Canton in June 1923. There he was elected for the first time to membership on the Party's Central Committee, and was appointed director of

* Wang Fu-chih (hao: Ch'uan-shan, 1619-92). See biography by Ch'i Ssu-ho in Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, II, 817-819. Founded in the early years of the republic, the Wang Fu-chih Institute was a centre of anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai sentiment in 1914-15. Mao often attended lectures there while a student at the First Normal School.

† Ho Shu-heng was a member of the Institute, and later its director.

‡ The most important Western-language study covering labour developments in this period is Jean Chesneaux, *Le mouvement ouvrier Chinois de 1919 à 1927* (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

its organisation department, following Chang Kuo-t'ao in that position. During this early period of the Chinese Communist movement, Moscow's political policies toward China were based upon the decisions of the Second Comintern Congress of 1920 regarding the revolution in underdeveloped countries, and thus upon the analyses of Lenin, who had conceived and developed the concept that Asian nationalism could be a useful ally of the Western proletariat in the common struggle against imperialism and capitalism. Lenin's theory stipulated that there should be an alliance between the proletarian (*i. e.*, Communist) revolution and the nationalist revolt against imperialism in "the East," but failed to define the precise form in which that alliance should be implemented.

United front with the Kuomintang

In China, this general theory was translated into an alliance between the infant Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. Previously, Sun Yat-sen had looked to the Western powers and to Japan for assistance in attaining his political and military objectives; but their continued refusal to consider his pleas had embittered his attitude toward these nations, and by 1922 he was prepared to accept support wherever he could find it. That summer, when approached by Russian agents in Shanghai, Sun agreed to co-operate with the Chinese Communist Party to the extent of permitting individual Communists to join the Kuomintang. In August 1922, a special plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, meeting at Hangchow under the guidance of Comintern representative Maring, confirmed the Communist decision to co-operate with the Kuomintang and stated that "part of the Party members" should join the Kuomintang "in their personal capacity."* The general terms of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang were confirmed in a joint manifesto of January 26, 1923, after which details of the new alliance, as well as plans for reorganisation of the Kuomintang, were worked out in subsequent discussions between Adolf Joffe[23] and Sun Yat-sen's trusted lieutenant, Liao Chung-k'ai. When the reorganised Kuomintang held its First National Congress at Canton in January 1924, three Communists who concurrently held Kuomintang membership were elected as members of the Central Executive Committee; Mao Tse-tung and five other Communists were elected alternate members.† Retroactively, the editors of Mao's *Selected Works* state that

* See Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p. 67.

† Communists elected to membership on the first Central Executive Committee of the reorganised Kuomintang in January 1924 were: T'an P'ing-shan, Li Ta-chao and Yu She-te. The six Communists elected to alternate membership were: Lin Po-ch'ü, Mao Tse-tung Yu Fang-chou, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Han Lin-fu and Chang Kuo-t'ao.

he "played a great role in launching the Kuomintang on the revolutionary path" in 1924. Actually, Mao was still a subordinate actor. Some sources state that leftist elements in the Chinese Communist Party criticised Mao for excessively enthusiastic collaboration with the Nationalists, and labelled him "Hu Han-min's[24] secretary" when he worked under Hu in the organisation department of the Kuomintang. In any event, Mao played that role but briefly. Toward the end of 1924, he became ill, returned to Hunan to convalesce, and thus was not present at Shanghai in January 1925, when the Chinese Communists held their Fourth Congress.

Official sources on Mao Tse-tung now state that "from 1925-27 he was mainly active in the peasant movement." Mao did press the organisation of peasant associations in central Hunan during the early months of 1925, and was involved in the sympathy strike at Changsha following the May 30 incident, when police fired on Chinese in the International Settlement at Shanghai. Chao Heng-t'i's repressive measures then again forced Mao in June 1925 to flee to Canton, where for the second time he worked with the Kuomintang apparatus. In January 1926, when the reorganised Kuomintang held its second National Congress, dominated by Wang Ching-wei[25] and the Kuomintang Left, seven Communists were elected to the thirty-six-man Central Executive Committee of that party; Mao Tse-tung, along with Tung Pi-wu, Teng Ying-ch'ao and others,[26] was elected to alternate membership.* In 1926 Mao served as acting director of the propaganda department of the Kuomintang, and served as editor of *Cheng-chih Chou-pao* (*Political Weekly*). There his duties brought him into contact with Liu Ya-tzu, Kiangsu classical scholar, poet and founder of the Southern Society, a prominent literary association of the early republican period devoted to upholding traditional forms; and the two men continued a literary friendship for many years.† In March 1926, Mao produced his *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,* a critique of the Kuomintang-Communist united front and an attack on the influential anti-Communist books written by Tai Chi-t'ao in 1925, *The National Revolution and the Kuomintang* and *The Philosophical Foundations of the Doctrine of Sun Yat-sen.* Though Ch'en Tu-hsiu reportedly refused to have the essay printed in the Chinese Communist Party journal,

* Communists elected to membership on the second Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in January 1926 were: T'an P'ing-shan, Lin Po-ch'ü, Li Ta-chao, Yu Shu-te, Wu Yü-chang, Yang P'ao-an and Yun Tai-ying.

† An adherent of the left wing of the Kuomintang, Liu Ya-tzu (1887-1958) was elected to membership on the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang at the Second National Congress in 1926, and was active for a time in the party's propaganda department. See Mao's two poems, "To Mr. Liu Ya-tse" and "Reply to Mr. Liu Ya-tse," in Mao Tse tung, *Nineteen Poems* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 24-26.

Mao published it in the second issue of *Chung-kuo Nung-min* (*The Chinese Peasant*) at Canton. It is now the first text included in the official canon of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works*.

Mao's key post at Canton in 1926 was director of the National Peasant Movement Institute, a school supervised by the peasant department of the Kuomintang* and the chief centre for training peasant cadres.† Though rising tensions were already apparent in the alliance between the apparatus of international communism and the forces of indigenous nationalism, plans nevertheless developed steadily during the early months of 1926 for the launching of the Northern Expedition. The Nationalist programme called for a drive northward through Hunan and Hupeh to strike at Wu P'ei-fu, who was viewed as the major enemy.‡ To assist this drive, many students trained under Mao at the Peasant Movement Institute at Canton were sent to the countryside, some in Kwangtung but mostly to other provinces, to mobilise poor peasants, organise peasant associations, and serve as guides and assistants to the National Revolutionary Army. With the beginning of the Northern Expedition in the summer of 1926, Mao moved to Shanghai to direct the committee in the central Communist Party apparatus designed to deal with the peasantry. He then returned to Hunan, and spent the period from about August 1926 to May 1927 working directly with the peasants. On December 20, speaking at Changsha to the Hunan assembly of peasant and worker representatives he stated that the peasant problem was the central issue in the national revolution. Without a solution of the peasant problem, Mao's view was that it was impossible to deal with the problems of anti-imperialism, anti-warlordism, or the development of industry and trade.§

1927 : year of decision

As 1927 was a watershed in recent Chinese political history, so was it also a crucial year in the political career of Mao Tse-tung. In January of that year, the Chinese Communists were allied with the Nationalists and

* The peasant department of the Kuomintang was then headed by Lin Po-ch'ü (1882-1960), a fellow Communist from Hunan.

† Other Communists who lectured at the Institute in 1926 inculded P'eng P'ai, Li Li-san, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Ch'u-nu and Ch'en Tu-hsiu's two sons, Ch'en Yen-nien and Ch'en Ch'iao-nien.

‡ The importance attached to Hunan province is indicated by the fact that three of the eight armies comprising the National Revolutionary Army under Chiang Kai-shek's overall command were led by Hunanese: T'an Yen-k'ai (Second Army), Ch'eng Ch'ien (Sixth Army) and T'hang Sheng-chih (Eighth Army).

§ See Li Jui, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

reasonably confident of their future; by December, their party structure had been virtually decimated. At the beginning of 1927, Mao Tse-tung was in Hunan surveying rural conditions in his native Hsiang-t'an and four adjacent *hsien**; at the year's end, he was an outlaw guerrilla leader in a mountain hideout on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. Rural realities dominated the year for Mao, though he viewed them in a perspective different from that of more prominent political leaders of that time. In March 1927, Mao published his *Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan,* a report based on several years of practical experience in the Communist movement, and laying dominant stress on the role of the peasants in the revolution. A significant element in the military successes of the Northern Expedition during the last half of 1926 had been preliminary organisational and propaganda work among the peasantry, work in which Mao had been directly involved. His March 1927 report understandably emphasised the peasantry as the "leading force" in the Chinese revolution and focused attention on "correct use" of the peasant organisations. In comparing the relative weighted importance of rural and urban components, Mao's tactical estimate in 1927 was that the peasants in the countryside rated 70 per cent. while the urban workers plus the military forces would rate only 30 per cent.

Mao's Hunan report has evoked extended and acrimonious debate among Western scholars of Chinese communism over the problem of what the document reveals of Mao's relation to the doctrinal authority of Lenin and to the organisational authority of Moscow in the world Communist movement. Lenin, long before Mao Tse-tung, had gone far in analysing the role of the peasantry in a Communist-type revolution in the underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the general tone and the specific emphasis of Mao's 1927 report were distinctive in forecasting the type of political revolution which Mao was to lead in the Chinese countryside in substantial isolation from the Kremlin. In 1927, Mao was incapable of providing a thorough analysis, in Marxist-Leninist categories, of what both instinct and experience told him would be the inexorable course of revolution in China. Yet he recognised that the poor peasants were in fact the most deprived class in the country. As a ranking member of both Communist Party and Kuomintang, Mao was appealing to the leaders of both parties to appreciate the fact that social revolution, though it required elite leadership, is ultimately generated by mass discontent. In part, Mao's 1927 report, as the work of a vigorous Young Communist unhampered by deep knowledge of Marxist theory, reflected doctrinal immaturity rather than political heresy. Mao's empha-

* Hsiang-hsiang, Heng-shan, Li-ling and Changsha.

sis upon the rebellious potential of the poor peasantry was to become a salient characteristic of his political style as he rose to leadership in the Chinese Communist Party.

That rise to top command was, of course, far from predestined. In the spring of 1927, Mao went to Wuhan to present his report on the Hunan peasant movement to the Fifth National Congress of the party, held during late April and early May. The Congress did not adopt his proposals. Despite strong personal reservations, despite Chiang Kai-shek's violent anti-Communist *coup* at Shanghai in April, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was still attempting to sustain a coalition with the Kuomintang, important elements of which were naturally opposed to any radical programme of land redistribution. In May 1927, Mao was elected head of the newly-established National Peasant Association, though it was an empty honour. Events during the chaotic summer of 1927 brought the Communist Party apparatus in central China close to annihilation. In July, Wang Ching-wei, head of the Kuomintang Left faction at Wuhan, broke with the Communists.* Arrests and executions followed at once. After the August 7, 1927 "emergency conference" which deposed Ch'en Tu-hsiu and installed Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai as general secretary, Mao, in a characteristic reflex action, returned to Hunan. There, in what the Communists label the "autumn harvest uprising," he attempted to mobilise rural discontent over taxes and high rents imposed by the landlords. Provincial military forces soon suppressed this effort to organise local peasant rebellion, and the September 1927 uprising ended abortively.

Peking's official image now is that, during the ten years following "the defeat of the Great Revolution of 1925-27," Mao's principal work lay in "leading the anti-Kuomintang revolutionary war, with the rural areas as its base." The 1927 defeat was essentially Moscow's responsibility, since Stalin had assumed that the Kremlin should control the Chinese Communist Party and that the Chinese Party should, in conventional fashion, concentrate efforts in the cities and on the proletariat.† Destruction of the urban base and decimation of the party structure following the 1927 split left the Chinese Communist Party struggling for survival. Mao's reaction to the debacle was essentially pragmatic. Recognising that seizure of the cities did not guarantee control of the countryside in China, he set about building an organisation largely, at times almost totally, of peasant origin, which nevertheless labelled itself the party of the proletariat

* See Robert C. North, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China: the Communist-Kuomintang Split of 1927* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

† See Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

and proposed to play the role attributed by Lenin to the Communist Party élite as the sensitised "vanguard of the proletariat" spurring the masses to action. And he set about fighting what later developed into a protracted "revolutionary war" which combined the use of planned military action to gain ultimate political objectives.

Guerrilla days in Kiangsi

Though Mao Tse-tung was elected *in absentia* to the Central Committee when the Chinese Communist Party held its Sixth National Congress at Moscow in the summer of 1928, he was not actually part of the central party apparatus. When Li Li-san in 1928 voiced the danger that the Chinese Party might become contaminated with "peasant mentality," he echoed the view of Moscow.* During the period when the Central Committee was dominated by Li Li-san (1928—30) and Ch'en Shao-yü (1930—31), both men enjoyed Moscow's support in continuing attempts to base the Communist revolution in China on the urban proletariat and on re-conquest of the cities. Yet during these very years Mao Tse-tung and his group were directing the creation of a territorial base in Kiangsi province which eventually became the only safe refuge for the remnants of the party Central Committee when it was forced to flee Shanghai and seek shelter in the countryside about 1932.

After the failure of the attempt to lead a peasant uprising in Hunan in the autumn of 1927, Mao organised a small band of remnants and volunteers, named it the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, and retreated in October to the Ching-kang mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. This was a remote district, difficult of access, where forests and terrain diluted the police power of the provincial authorities. After surviving a difficult winter, Mao's forces were strengthened in April 1928 by troops under Chu Teh which had fled from Nanchang[27] the previous year and had established a small base area in southern Hunan. They combined their forces to constitute the Fourth Red Army, with Chu Teh as commander and Mao as political commissar, and remained in the Ching-kang mountains through 1928. Nationalist military pressure then forced a retreat. Leaving P'eng Te-huai[28] to fight a rearguard action, Chu and Mao made their way across Kiangsi, settling eventually in January 1929 at Juichin,[29] a small jute and hemp centre in south-eastern Kiangsi, where they gradually built what came to be called the central soviet base. Relatively

* See Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 137.

isolated from the Central Committee of the Party at Shanghai, Mao began to formulate independent theories regarding organisation and leadership, territorial bases, and other political-military problems. These theories, later to become the foundation of his method of operation in China after 1935, were manifest in *On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party* (December 1929) and *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire* (January 1930).

The years from 1929 to 1931 were years both of danger and of exhiliration for Mao Tse-tung. Action suited his nature, and he expressed his high spirits in poems composed while "humming on horseback," in the tradition of the mounted conquerors of Chinese history such as Chao K'uang-yin, famed as Sung T'ai-tsu, founder of the Sung dynasty.* Campaigning in western Fukien and along the Kan river in southern Kiangsi, Mao was directly involved in agitation among the peasants, though unsuccessful in the frontal attacks on cities in central China called for by Li Li-san and the top party command with the aim of gaining control over urban centres. P'eng Te-huai's assault on Changsha in Hunan in July 1930 was quickly repulsed; that by the Chu-Mao forces on Nanchang in Kiangsi had no better success. When a second joint attack on Changsha in September also ended in failure, Mao and Chu withdrew support from the Li Li-san leadership in Shanghai. Bloodshed was a constant element in Mao's life at this point. His wife, Yang K'ai-hui, who had remained in Hunan when Mao fled to the countryside in 1927, was captured and executed by order of Ho Chien, governor of Hunan, following the abortive attack on Changsha.[30] They had been married for ten years, and Mao, in a poem written years later, revealed his affection for her.† In the countryside, Mao himself, in the Fu-t'ien incident[31] of December 1930, forcibly suppressed a local rebellion against his authority.‡ Though still obscure, the Fu-t'ien revolt was probably an important episode in Mao's rise to power and apparently the bloodiest purge in the pre-1949 history of the Chinese Communist Party.

On November 7, 1931, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the Chinese Reds in Kiangsi convened the first All-China Congress of

* *Jen-min Wen-hsueh* (*People's Literature*) carried the Chinese text of these six poems in its May 1962 issue, with prefatory note by Mao dated April 27, 1962. A long commentary, with annotations, written by Kuo Mo-jo accompanied the poems. Though ludicrous as literary criticism, Kuo's annotations, prepared after consultation with Communist Party archives and party veterans, contain some useful historical data on the 1929-31 period.

† Mao began his 1957 poem, "The Immortals," with the phrase, "I lost my proud poplar." The ideograph *yang*, "poplar," refers to Yang K'ai-hui, whose surname it was. See Mao Tse-tung, *Nineteen poems*, pp. 30—31.

‡ See Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 175—177.

Soviets. Meeting at Juichin, the delegates to the congress elected Mao Tse-tung chairman of the central Soviet government, with Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao as vice chairmen.* During the early 1930s, while Mao headed the government structure in the most important Communist-controlled base in China, an area with a population estimated at three million in 1934, he still did not have effective control over the party apparatus. The fourth plenum of the sixth Central Committee meeting underground in Shanghai in January 1931, following Li Li-san's political downfall and departure for Moscow, elected 24-year-old Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming) general secretary of the party.† A year later, Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), another young Russian-trained intellectual, succeeded Ch'en; Ch'in held that post until 1934, when he was followed by Chang Wen-t'ien. The political situation within the Chinese Communist leadership between 1931 and 1934 remains murky, though Peking's post–1945 line on party history states that an erroneus "leftist" line then dominated the élite. The role of Chou En-lai is especially unclear, though his party seniority, negotiating experience, and political experience must have combined to give him a prominent place in top party decision-making. Peking now credits Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i with Political Bureau membership after 1932, but is generally silent about the position of Chou En-lai during the Kiangsi interlude.‡

As Communist strength in the rural areas of south-central China grew, the Kuomintang, having established a new national government at Nanking in October 1928, worked toward the political unification of China for the first time since 1911. High on Chiang Kai-shek's agenda was the task of crushing the Red virus by force of arms. Beginning in the winter of 1930, Chiang launched five successive campaigns in an attempt to annihilate the Red army. Even when confronted with the major external threat posed by Japanese aggression in Manchuria beginning in September 1931, Chiang continued to allocate his major

* Chang Kuo-t'ao was elected *in absentia*. He was then the senior political figure in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base, with Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien as military commander.

† One student of the Chinese Communist movement suggests that the fourth plenum of January 1931 is primarily significant because it was "the last identifiable instance of outright Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party." Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 9.

‡ See, for example, the April 1945 *Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party*, and the two major articles released from Peking in July 1951 on the thirtieth party anniversary: Ch'en Po-ta, *Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the Combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinse Revolution*, and Hu Ch'iao-mu, *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China*. Chou En-lai does not apear in Ho Kan-chih's official *History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* between the Nanchang uprising of August 1927 and 1949.

military resources to fighting Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi rather than to confronting the Japanese. Though faced with numerically superior Nationalist forces, Mao and his commanders survived during the early 1930s by tactical manoeuvres which combined calculated withdrawals and carefully planned counter-attacks. Chiang Kai-shek's problem increased with the Fukien revolt,[32] launched at Foochow in November 1933 by a number of senior Kuomintang leaders with military support from the famed Nineteenth Route Army, which had gained international acclaim for its valiant resistance against the Japanese at Shanghai in January 1932. The Communist leadership in Kiangsi, divided over policy toward the anti-Chiang Kai-shek revolt in Fukien, agreed to provide assistance but failed to take practical steps, with the result that the dissident Foochow regime collapsed in January 1934. Mao Tse-tung's attitude toward the Fukien revolt remains a matter for speculation, not exposition.* When the second All-China Congress of Soviets met at Juichin in January 1934, he was re-elected chairman of the Central Soviet government. But the Communist failure to unite with the Kuomintang dissidents in Fukien exposed their eastern flank; and Chiang Kai-shek, operating with new measures recommended by German military staff advisers, finally surrounded the Communist pocket in Kiangsi and forced the Communists to evacuate in the autumn of 1934. Moving westward in October, the Communists began the now-legendary trek which took them on a year-long looping course of constant fighting and brutal marching—through Kweichow, the remote Szechwan-Sikang border, and Kansu—to the base in northern Shensi which served as their headquarters during the Sino-Japanese war.

* *Ex post facto* Mao's line is invariably "correct." In 1936, he told Edgar Snow that one of the major errors made in Kiangsi had been the Communist failure to unite with the Fukien revolt. The same line was reiterated in the April 1945 resolution of the Central Committee on party history; see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV, 1941–45 (New York: International Publishers, 1956) pp. 171–218. A review of contemporary documentation is provided by Hsiao Tso-liang *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement: a Study of Documents, 1930-1934* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 248-260. It is also interesting to note Mao's reference to the Nineteenth Route Army in a footnote (doubtless added later) to his December 1935 report, *On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism*; this reference appears in Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, 1941-45 (NewYork, 1956), note 11, pp. 313–314. When the Central People's Government was established in 1949, all principal leaders of the Fukien revolt (Ch'en Ming-shu, Li Chi-shen, Chiang Kuang-nai, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, and others) without exception joined the Peking government, and were awarded high, though nominal, positions.

Mao The Revolutionary

MAO Tse-tung was the first, and for many years the only, leader of a major Communist party to achieve his position without investiture by Moscow. According to Peking's current party line, Mao gained control of the central apparatus of the battered Chinese Communist Party during the Long March, at a time when contact with Moscow was non-existent*. An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau, held at Tsunyi in Kweichow province in January 1935, "rectified the 'Left' erroneous line which prevailed from early 1931 to late 1934, changed the composition of the Party's central leading body, established a leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and set the Party's line on the right track of Marxism-Leninism." This simplistic account screens as much as it elucidates. The situation in the Chinese Communist Party, during both the long March and the early period in Shensi, was such that Mao could not have gained dominant power without conflict, either of issues or of personalities, nor could he have consolidated power without aggressive political action. Chang Kuo-t'ao, who, with Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, had dominated the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei soviet base during the early 1930s, was still a force to be reckoned with during the Long March. In the summer of 1935, Chang's forces and those from the Kiangsi base rendezvoused at Mao-erh-kai in western Szechwan. Following sharp controversy over both political policies and eventual destination, the Communist forces split. Chang Kuo-t'ao, with Chu Teh and others, proceeded west into Sikang.† Mao Tse-tung, P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao,

* The account given by Robert C. North, based both on official Chinese Communist versions and on interviews with Chang Kuo-t'ao, is generally accepted. See *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd ed., 1963), pp. 165-166.

† This interlude in Chu Teh's career remains obscure. Chu's version states that he was held under duress by Chang Kuo-t'ao during 1935-36. See Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957) pp. 3_9-336.

and the First Front Army continued toward Shensi, where a local communist base under Kao Kang and Liu Chih-tan already existed, arriving at the remote village of Wa-yao-pao, just south of the Great Wall, in October 1935.*

Though Mao's cause appeared dubious in the autumn of 1935, the story of the ensuing fourteen years is essentially the record of the sustained expansion of Communist power in China. When Mao Tse-tung and his threadbare band arrived in the loesslands of Shensi, they represented a force which, even on an optimistic estimate, was only a marginal element in Chinese political life viewed on a national basis. Sustained principally by discipline, hope, and political formulae, Mao's group had, however, fortuitously garnered several hidden assets which were later to prove of major significance. First, through surviving both the Nationalist encirclement campaigns and the Long March, they had created a legend of indestructibility. Second, though their economic programmes in Kiangsi had not been spectacularly successful, Mao and his associates had gained intensive political and military experience, practical lessons which they were to review with great effectiveness during the Japanese war years. And, third, though the hinterland of northern Shensi was a remote and retarded area, it did nevertheless provide a geographical base from which the Communists could, when war came, extend their authority and influence into the heart of the traditionally conservative but highly important north China plain.

The biography of Mao Tse-tung between 1935 and 1949 is inseparable from the rise to power of the Chinese Communist movement. During these years, Mao was the dominant individual in planning and directing what the Communists jargonistically but accurately label "revolutionary war." Revolutionary war in the Chinese Communist sense was an unorthodox type of conflict which utilised the crisis created by the Japanese invasion to mobilise peasant support in the countryside and to project the Communist Party as the most effective spokesman for Chinese nationalism.† The Japanese invasion, and the violence and

* In his speech of February 1, 1942, inaugurating the *cheng-feng* movement, Mao said: "I came to northern Shensi five or six years ago, yet I cannot compare with comrades like Kao Kang in my knowledge of conditions here or of the people of this region." See Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44* (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1952), p. 25. The specific reference to Kao Kang was later deleted in the official English translation. See Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, 1941-45 (New York: International Publishers, 1956), p. 39, where the revised text refers only to "native cadres" in northern Shensi.

† The most systematic presentation of this thesis has been given by Chalmers A. Johnson in *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

social disorganisation which it created, presented both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party with a major challenge. In retrospect the basic political issue is clear: which party was the most responsible leader of Chinese nationalist sentiment and the most effective vehicle for Chinese resistance? The Kuomintang, controlling the legitimate National Government, in effect evaded the central problem and rather sought salvation through seeking allies outside China to bolster political power at home. The Communists, as an insurgent force, blended flexibility, pragmatism, and increasingly skilful co-ordination of political and military measures in dealing with the challenge. Mao Tse-tung's major political achievement during the Japanese war was the phenomenally rapid expansion of a competing administrative system behind the Japanese lines which showed itself more effective and efficient than the legitimate National Government, isolated as that government came to be after 1938 in the provinces of west China.

Mao as military theorist

The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, meeting at Moscow in the summer of 1935, elected Mao Tse-tung *in absentia* to its executive committee at the same time that it called for Communist Parties throughout the world to pursue a united front programme in domestic politics. Yet it was neither Stalin, the Comintern, nor the united front tactic which provided the key to Communist victory in China. Japan's military masters provided a more direct and decisive stimulus. The expansion of Japanese troop movements in north China during 1935 not only diverted public attention from the Communists but, more important, created a wave of anti-Japanese feeling antagonistic to the continuation of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war. The Communists were not lethargic in exploiting the shift in public opinion. On December 25, 1935, the Political Bureau, meeting at Wa-yao-pao in Shensi, laid down a new basis for the "anti-Japanese national united front." Mao himself, speaking at a meeting of party activists two days later, offered further theoretical analysis in a report entitled *On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism*. The outstanding characteristic of the political situation, the Communist analysis held, was Japan's determination to convert China into a Japanese colony; the Communist response was to attempt to mobilise the broadest possible political base within China for resistance to Japan.

Political programmes had to be integrated with military measures to make maximum use of the Japanese invasion as a catalytic agent of social change which could be directed to communist advantage. Mao

responded to this challenge by developing what gradually became orthodox Chinese Communist insurgency doctrine. Mao's military thinking was essentially pragmatic, influenced directly by his experience in the Kiangsi campaigns and indirectly by his reading of Chinese history and of traditional Chinese military classics, notably Sun-tzu,[33] *On the Art of War*.* Like Clausewitz, with whom he has been compared as a theorist, Mao appreciated the essentially political nature of war, seeing behind the concrete facts of the campaigns deeper and more decisive realities: the political and social forces which create violence on a grand scale, and, linked with these, the emotions of commanders and men and the human environment within which the campaigns are fought. Mao's first major statement on military doctrine was his *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, delivered as a series of lectures at the Red Army Academy in Shensi in December 1935. Published in 1936, this essay, introduced by ringing dialectical flourishes, reviewed the pre-1936 military experience of the Chinese Communist movement and cited four basic characteristics of China's "revolutionary war." First, Mao stated, China is a large semi-colonial country, unevenly developed both politically and economically, which has just gone through the revolution of 1925-27. Second, the enemy (*i.e.*, the Kuomintang at the time) is powerful. Third, the (Chinese) Red Army is weak and small in size. Fourth, the Communist Party, with its programme of agrarian revolution, is the leader of the movement. On the basis of these characteristics, Mao analysed the strategy (essentially defensive in nature) and the tactics required to combat Nationalist military operations.†

During the years after 1936, the Communists modified the details of Mao's analysis to adapt themselves to the new situation created by the Japanese invasion. Japan, even more than the Kuomintang, was indubitably a powerful enemy, capable of transporting to China well-trained and well-disciplined infantry regiments, supported by a well-organised Japanese industrial system in the home islands. The nature and violence of the Japanese invasion, however, had the inadvertent effect of arousing previously unpoliticised Chinese peasants to resistance. In the face of the Japanese attack, Chinese Communist political doctrine was simple and direct: since Japan is the national enemy of China, all responsible Chinese must support the "anti-Japanese national salvation

* See the new translation of *The Art of War* by Brigadier-General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, Ret. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

† A particularly useful edition of *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, with foreword by Mao dated February 23, 1941, is that published at Mukden by the Tung-pei Hsin-hua Shu-tien in September 1949. That edition contains five detailed maps showing campaigns of the Kiangsi period.

movement." Military doctrine flowed logically from Mao's earlier analyses. Unconventional warfare was well suited to Communist purposes, since it permitted them to avoid orthodox combat except at times of their own choosing, and to concentrate upon irregular tactics.

In May 1937, Mao delivered a report entitled *The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan* at a National Conference of the party held at Yenan. Following the Marco Polo bridge incident[31] of July 7, 1937, and the onset of full-scale Japanese action, he began to stress the divergent policies of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in confronting the national emergency. On August 25, 1937, the Political Bureau, meeting at Lo-ch'uan, Shensi, endorsed a ten-point programme intended to ensure that "the Communist Party give leadership to the people throughout the country to win the anti-Japanese war and to oppose the Kuomintang's anti-popular policy." Mao issued two major statements on military doctrine in May 1938: *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*, and *On the Protracted War*. The latter offered a comprehensive analysis of the developing conflict and outlined Mao's theory that China's "war of resistance" against Japan would be a protracted struggle embracing three distinct stages: strategic defence, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive, the decisive action to be taken when the balance of forces had shifted in favour of the party previously on the defensive.

Implicit in Mao's analysis was the assumption of ultimate victory over both the immediate foreign enemy, Japan and the long-term domestic foe, the Kuomintang. That optimism rested upon Mao's perception of the interaction of military and political factors in "revolutionary war." Mao never lost sight of the primary and immutable objective of the conduct of military operations: destruction of the enemy's armed forces. But, since Mao's goal was the seizure of power, his analyses were necessarily based on understanding of the fact that, in the long run, political mobilisation of the Chinese population was as important as annihilation of the enemy's will to resist. Civil-military relations were thus of the greatest importance. Mao saw that the war in China was ultimately a political conflict, different from conventional contests between rival armies conducted according to orthodox principles of strategy, either classical Napoleonic or classical Chinese: different also from the far more complex twentieth-century conflict in which warfare had become above all economic warfare in which the side with access to the fullest economic resources was virtually bound to win. In Mao's war, military conflict was a function of politics; military victory, only a preliminary step to radical transformation of a society; the army, only one instrument

among many in the hands of the surgeons of the Political Bureau. Like Clausewitz, Mao viewed war as an aspect of politics, as a human activity involving power relations and psychological factors, both rational and emotional.

Mao Tse-tung: insurgent leader

Mao Tse-tung was forty-three when he had his first significant, direct contact with a Westerner.* In the summer of 1936, after penetrating the civil war blockade, Edgar Snow entered the straggling village of Pao-an, then the site of the Communist headquarters, interviewed Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, and wrote what is still a primary report on Mao's career to that date. Mao was then a tall, pale figure, still gaunt from the strains of the Long March, with "large, searching eyes, wide thick lips, and a strong chin with a prominent mole. His black hair was thick and long, on a head for which the Generalissimo was offering 250,000 silver dollars." Snow's first impression of Mao the man was "dominantly one of native shrewdness." A man at once simple and complex, Snow described him in 1936: the earthiness and lively sense of humour of the peasant blended with the aloof and introspective qualities of the intellectual. An omnivorous reader, Snow reported, a student of history, a man with an unusual memory and powers of concentration, an able writer, careless in personal habits and appearance but meticulous about details of duty, a man of tireless energy, and a military and political planner of "considerable genius."† Agnes Smedly, who first met Mao at night in his Yenan cave in 1937, offers another view. "The tall, forbidding figure lumbered toward us and a high-pitched voice greeted us. Then two hands grasped mine; they were as long and sensitive as a woman's. . . . His dark inscrutable face was long, the forehead broad and high, the mouth feminine. Whatever else he might be, he was an aesthete . . . Despite that feminine quality in him he was as stubborn as a mule and a steel rod of pride and determination ran through his nature. I had the impression that he would wait and watch for years but eventually have his way . . . His humour was often sardonic and grim as if it sprang from deep caverns of spiritual seclusion."‡

* At that point Mao had never been outside China. He had apparently had little or no contact with foreigners on his visits to Peking and Shanghai between 1918 and 1920, nor was he known to have been well acquainted with Russian or Comintern representatives in China during the 1921–27 period.

† See Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, pp. 69-80.

‡ See Agnes Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China* (New York: Knopf, 1943), pp. 168-170.

Though Miss Smedley reported that she sensed that there was a door to his being that had never been opened to anyone, Mao's personal life was not entirely a mystery. Following the execution of his first wife at Changsha in 1930, Mao had married Ho Tzu-chen, reportedly also a graduate of the Hunan Normal School and a Communist Party member.* After the rigours of the Long March, which she was one of the few women to survive, Ho Tzu-chen went to Moscow, possibly for medical treatment, and she and Mao were divorced. In 1939, Mao married his present wife, Lan P'in, a former Shanghai actress.† Mao's siblings were disappearing. His only sister, Mao Tse-hung, had been executed at Changsha in 1930. One younger brother, Mao Tse-t'an, a military officer in the Communist guerrilla forces, had been killed in Kiangsi. The most prominent brother was Mao Tse-min, two years younger than Mao and reportedly close to him as personal adviser. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Mao Tse-min went to Sinkiang, where he worked under Sheng Shih-ts'ai in reforming that province's finances; he was executed there when Sheng broke with Moscow after the German invasion of the Soviet Union.‡

Mao Tse-tung remained at Yenan, attempting to combine past experience and present reality into a basis of planning for the future. Though it would be inaccurate to view Mao's career as proceeding smoothly along the predestined path to Peking described in the official propaganda of the post-1949 period, it is pertinent to appreciate Mao's long-range political vision. Nearly a decade before he gained power, he attempted to define the position of Chinese Communism within the larger sweep of modern Chinese history, and to depict the anatomy of the specific

* Various sources also give her name as Ho Chih-chien, Ho Chih-chen.

† Also known as Chiang Ch'ing at Yenan. None of Mao's wives has been a public figure. Ts'ai Ch'ang (wife of Li Fu-ch'un) and Teng Ying-ch'ao (wife of Chou En-lai) have, in contrast, been members of Central Committee of the party for many years; the present wives of Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Yi have frequently appeared in public and travelled abroad with their husbands in recent years.

‡ Mao Tse-min (b. 1895) was a moderately important figure in the Chinese Communist movement during the 1930s, supervising the currency issue at the Kiangsi base and exercising control over the gold and silver specie stocks which the Communists used to help finance the Long March in 1934-35. Mao Tse-min then went from Yenan to Tihwa (Urumchi) in 1937 as a member of the Communist group headed by Teng Fa, and reportedly played an active role in the Sinkiang provincial government during Sheng Shih-ts'ai's pro-Communist interlude. When Sheng broke with Russia, Mao Tse-min was among those executed. Sheng himself concealed the facts so well that it was several years before the senior Chinese Communist leaders knew that their comrades were dead, not merely imprisoned. Mao Tse-min was arrested on September 17, 1942, and executed in September 1943. O. Edmund Clubb has supplied me with details on Mao Tse-min's career.

system of "new democracy" which he projected for China's future. These analyses are presented most explicitly in *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China* (1939) and *On New Democracy* (1940).

Mao Tse-tung's *On New Democracy*, issued in January 1940, is an uneven document, linking questionable generalisations with a shrewd sense of the political milieu in wartime China. Within the framework of Leninist theory, it called for a conventional two-stage revolution: first, "national-democratic" and, second, "socialist." Mao knew that the circumstances of an anti-imperialist revolution in a technologically backward country like China made it both possible and desirable for the Communists to gain the support of a portion of the bourgeoisie as a long-term, pragmatic principle of action. The "new democracy" principle, as articulated in 1940, called for the Communists to champion a united front composed of four social classes: workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. Aside from inclusion of the national bourgeoisie as an approved group, little in the document was original in the tradition of communist doctrine as earlier defined by Lenin and Stalin. Yet *On New Democracy* constituted stimulating fare for many thoughtful Chinese bored with Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles,[35] weary of domestic strife and short-sighted leadership, anxious for a sense of national direction and purpose. It was essentially to these Chinese that Mao spoke in January 1940. And he spoke, not as master theorist but as practical political leader, then aged forty-six, in the prime of his professional career. "The aim of all our efforts is the building of a new society and a new nation of the Chinese people."

At the Yenan base, capital of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region government headed by his veteran Hunanese colleague. Lin Po-chü, Mao played his role as political apostle and programmer. At the same time, he began to assemble the Communist brains trust which has served him since in the party's central propaganda department,* and to define the intellectual and cultural aspects of the revolution. Mao's status as political philosopher actually followed his success as political leader, since his principal epistemological essays were only published, in revised form, in both Peking and Moscow, in 1950-51. Mao's philosophical reputation rests principally on two essays stemming from lectures delivered by him in 1937: *On Practice* (July) and *On Contradiction* (August). Unlike Mao's usual form in both style and substance, these theoretical

* Ch'en Po-ta and Hu Ch'iao-mu first emerged in Mao's entourage during the early Yenan period.

essays are of interest because they reflect a distinctive blending of Western historical materialism with elements found in the Chinese philosophical tradition.* A third philosophical text, *Dialectical Materialism*, appeared in a Shanghai journal in 1940; but only one section of it appears to be extant, and Peking has neither referred to it nor reissued it in recent years.†

Literary Guidelines

Though Mao's contact with the mainstreams of Marxist theoretical writing as developed in Europe and Russia was vicarious, his concern with the course of modern literature in China was more direct and personal. *New Youth* and the May Fourth movement were real elements in Mao's early career, and his writings of the 1939-40 period understandably placed the seminal outburst of 1919 as the principal line of demarcation running through China's "democratic revolutionary movement" and dividing the old from the new. One mark of the growing political maturity of the Chinese Communist leadership during the Sino-Japanese war was that Yenan, in its propaganda at least, emphasised the "cultural front" as being parallel in importance with military operations. At Chungking, Chiang Kai-shek viewed the war against the Communists principally in military, not political, terms, with the result that the Kuomintang during the war years gradually alienated many sensitive and articulate elements of China's intellectual minority.‡ At Yenan, Mao Tse-tung, anxious to recruit patriotic students, increasingly emphasised the role of literature as a hortatory instrument of social criticism during a period of political tension.

Decisive definition of Chinese Communist doctrine on literature and art was offered in May 1942 at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature. At this conference, a landmark in the history of Chinese Communist cultural policy,§ Mao drew a firm line across the page of Chinese creative

* See Vsevelod Holubnychy, "Der dialektische Materialismus Mao Tse-tungs," *Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungsländer* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung) 8–9, September 1962, pp. 15–59, which provides a wide citation of relevant sources in a number of languages; see also Gerhard Schmitz, *Der dialektische Materialismus in der Chinesischen Philosophie* (Kaldenkirchen, Rhineland: Steyler, 1960).

† *Pien-cheng-fa Wei-wu-lun* (*On Dialectical Materialism*) appeared in the Shanghai journal, in *Min-chu*, in 1940. The East Asian Library of Columbia University has one section of this text, *Min-chu*, 1, 2 (1940).

‡ The process reached a climax with the assassination in July 1946 at Kunming of Wen I-to, prominent poet, scholar and spokesman of the liberal intellectuals who opposed the National Government. Wen's death aroused national attention and widespread criticism of the Kuomintang.

§ See T. A. Hsia, "Twenty Years after the Yenan Forum," *The China Quarterly*, No. 13, January-March 1963, pp. 226–253.

writing and promulgated what became, with some later variations, the "correct" analysis designed to guide the "progressive writers" of China. Quoting Lenin's famous 1905 statement, *Party Organisation and Party Literature,* Mao echoed this classic definition of the ideological basis of revolutionary literature. Mao concurred that literature must be shaped by a clear "party spirit" and must be designed for the masses, specifically for the workers, peasants and soldiers. Literature should come from the masses and be consciously native: in substance drawing upon China's rich storehouse of "revolutionary tales" and folk literature capable of being interpreted in an appropriate political light; in style drawing upon the pithy language of the common people. Writing should be immersed in everyday Chinese life, and should turn its back on bourgeois themes or subjective inspiration. Mao then turned to the borader issue of the relationship between literature and politics, arguing that literature existed primarily for politics (interpreted as meaning "class politics and mass politics"), not for frivolous amusement or entertainment. At the same time, he recognised that, to be politically effective in serving the Communist Party's political purposes, literary works had also to be artistically effective. "What we demand is unity of politics and art, of content and form, and of revolutionary political content and the highest possible degree of effectiveness in artistic form. Works of art, however politically progressive, are powerless if they lack artistic quality."

Mao's Yenan talks were neither original nor unopposed. In large part, they represented his summation of theories which had been widely discussed in leftist literary circles in China since the 1930s. His call for linguistic and literary reforms echoed programmes advocated earlier by leaders of the League of Left Wing Writers. His stress on the necessity for "popularisation" was as much pragmatic as political, reflection of the fact that *pai-hua* llterature, as it had developed in China during the 1920s and 1930s, was tending to become almost as incomprehensible to the average Chinese reader as classical *wen-yen.* Nor did Mao's ideas go unchallenged, for a small but influential group of left-wing writers and literary critics continued to oppose[36] his dictates through the 1940s and even later.* Actually, Mao's personal attitude towards modern Chinese literature is ambiguous. While his 1942 statements did have widespread practical effect because of Mao's position as leader of the Chinese Communist movement, he himself has used the classical *tz'u*

* See Merle Goldman, "Hu Feng's Conflict with the Communist Literary Authorities," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12, October-December 1962, pp. 102-137.

form in his poetry,* and his political writings contain very few references to works of modern Chinese literature.†

The politics of insurgency

While Mao Tse-tung planned strategy, explored Marxist theory and drew designs for China's "revolutionary literature," he never lost sight of his primary responsibilities as leader of a rapidly growing political party. During the Yenan period, the Chinese Communists inaugurated an intramural *cheng-feng* (rectification) programme designed to sharpen discipline in an organisation which was scattered geographically, and increasingly heterogeneous in social background as it recruited individuals from bourgeois student backgrounds to supplement its predominantly peasant membership.‡ Highlighted by Liu Shao-ch'i's lecture, *On Inner-Party Struggle* (July 1941), and by Mao's statement of February 1, 1942, on *Rectification of the Party's Style of Work*, this campaign indicated that emphasis on "new democracy" was not to eclipse the essential role of the party as a professional élite controlling a mass movement. The *cheng-feng* campaign of the early 1940s was not a blood purge on the Stalinist model, though it was in part aimed at individuals in the party elite who had attracted Mao's antagonism as Moscow-trained "dogmatists." In Mao's view, these men, notably Ch'en Shao-yü, lacked sufficient experience in practical political work in China to balance their theoretical lore gained in the Soviet Union. More fundamentally, however, the rectification campaign involved intensive indoctrination of all party members and cadres in Marxist-Leninist precepts as selected and annotated by Mao and other senior Yenan editors. Its major aim was to unify doctrinal standards so that the directives of the top party command would be clearly understood and effectively implemented at subordinate echelons.

As a system of power organisation, the Chinese Communist Party as it developed during the 1940s was not intended to exist as an end in itself. The Party's primary organisation purpose was to serve as transmission belt communicating centrally-determined policies downward to

* See Kai-yu Hsu (translator and editor), *Twentieth Century Chinese Poetry: an Anthology* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 338-342.

† See Howard L. Boorman, "The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung," *The China Quarterly*, No. 13, January-March 1963, pp. 15-38.

‡ See *Cheng-feng Wen-hsien* (Peking: Hsin-hua Shu-tien, 1950). Translations of twenty-two documents used in "study" and discussion groups during the 1940s are given in Boyd Compton, *Mao's China : Party Reform Documents, 1942-44*.

the people in the Communist base areas, and relaying popular reactions upward to the top command at Yenan. An authoritative statement of the Chinese Communist code of political operations, the "mass line," is provided in Mao Tse-tung's statement, *On Methods of Leadership* (June 1, 1943). Under the mass line approach as outlined by Mao, the central function of political leadership was to attain a pattern of continuous, organised interaction between party and populace, a pragmatic process aimed at maximum mobilisation of popular support and participation of the people while arousing minimum resistance or hostility. Though the Communist Party itself was by definition a hierarchic, authoritarian structure, its operations were based upon careful, sustained and flexible attention to the points of direct contact between the party's representatives and the Chinese people.*

Between his arrival in Shensi in the autumn of 1935 and the end of the Japanese war a decade later, Mao consolidated firm control over the party apparatus. In 1943, and again in 1944, he was elected chairman of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee.† He also headed the five-man Secretariat of the Central Committee, then the top policy-forming nucleus of the party structure.‡ By the spring of 1945, when the Chinese Communist Party convened its Seventh National Congress at Yenan (April-June), party membership was put at 1·2 million, in addition to armed forces numbering an estimated 900,000. This congress, the first held in China for nearly twenty years, reviewed wartime developments; adopted a revised party constitution, explained in Liu Shao-ch'i's major report and based explicitly on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung"; and elected a new Central Committee and Politburo composed overwhelmingly of individuals who had proven their practical ability, physical durability and personal loyalty to Mao during the war years. The meeting was highlighted by Mao's political report, *On Coalition Government* (April 24, 1945), a statement summing up most major elements in Mao's political thought as it had developed during the Yenan period. Chiang Kai-shek was still the national leader of China, heading the government at Chungking which was recognised by the Western Powers. But the position

* See John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), Chap. 3, "Mass Line as a Concept of Leadership," pp. 70-100.

† In 1943, Mao became chairman (*chu-hsi*) of the Central Committee, a new title apparently intended to distinguish his position from that of general secretary (*tsung shu-chi*), which had been the top position in the Chinese Communist party hierarchy during the 1920s and 1930s.

‡ In addition to Mao, this group comprised two fellow Huanese, Liu Shao-ch'i and Jen Pi-shih; Mao's veteran military associate, Chu Teh; and his principal negotiating and foreign affairs specialist, Chou En-lai.

of both Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party had changed drastically since the executions of 1927 and the exhaustion of 1935. By the end of the war, Yenan controlled nineteen Communist-organised bases with a population of over ninety million people.* Psychologically, Yenan's resolute anti-Japanese stand, lack of venality, and Spartan way of life had bred both new vigour and new self-assurance.

The conquest of power

Between 1944 and 1946, the United States Government entered Chinese political life directly in an attempt to bridge the Kuomintang-Communist split then dividing China and the Chinese people. With Communist consent, a United States Army observation group, commanded by Colonel David D. Barrett, was sent to Yenan in 1944 to establish liaison with the Communists. In pursuit of its principal policy objective, the creation of a coalition government in China, Washington pressed for direct conversations between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. Actually, the Chinese Communists, immediately following the announcement of Japan's surrender, issued orders to troops under their command to "step up the war effort," accept the surrender of Japanese and puppet troops, and take over their arms and other equipment. In defiance of Chungking's orders, two telegrams from the commander of the Eighteenth Army Group (Communist) to Chiang Kai-shek (August 13 and 16, 1945) stated that the Communists were proceeding independently in handling Japanese surrender and takeover arrangements. It was confirmed years later that Mao Tse-tung himself had drafted these messages.†

Despite the overt competition for authority, American ambassador Patrick J. Hurley flew to Yenan and personally escorted Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei to Chungking for discussions with Chiang Kai-shek concerning the shape of the post-war political structure of China. Travelling for the first time in an airplane, Mao had his first airborne view of China on the spectacular flight from Shensi to Szechwan, a trip which provided the stimulus for *Snow*, the single poem by which Mao the poet is best known in the West.‡ Mao Tse-tung and his party

* A convenient official listing of the nineteen "liberated areas" is given in Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution*, pp. 424-426.

† See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages, Press, 1961), note on p. 34.

‡ See Yong-sang Ng, "The Poetry of Mao Tse-tung," *The China Quarterly*, No. 13, January-March 1963, pp. 60-73. The paper compares Mao's poem with Su Tung-po's famous *tz'u* composed in the metrical form of *Nien-nu-chiao*, and suggests a new interpretation of the final two lines of *Snow*.

remained at Chungking for six weeks, from August 28 to October 10, 1945, but the meetings had no practical results. In March 1946, General George C. Marshall, special representative of the President of United States, personally flew to Yenan for conferences with Mao and the Communist leaders, but again the results were negative.*

With the collapse of American mediation efforts and the outbreak of full-scale civil war in China from the summer of 1946, Mao remained in Shensi. Personally, he was deeply depressed at the plane crash of April 1946 in which several Chinese Communists were killed while returning from Chungking to Shensi.† Intellectually, he was now depicted as theoretical innovator, Communist leader who had transformed traditional Marxism-Leninism into a practical creed for an underdeveloped Asian country. Politically, he formulated his famous thesis: "All reactionaries are paper tigers."‡ Yet the essential Mao remained elusive to outsiders. Robert Payne, fresh from the war years at Kunming, met Mao at Yenan in 1946. "Then Mao came into the room. He came so quietly that we were hardly aware of his presence. He wore a thick brown Sun Yat-sen uniform which seemed to have been woven of goats' hair, and as he stood beside the towering P'eng Teh-huai he looked slighter and smaller than I had imagined him. . . . There is hardly a photograph of him which resembles any other photograph, so strangely and so suddenly does he change. Today, he looked like a surprisingly young student, a candidate for a doctorate, and perhaps he played for his college: the shoulders were very heavy. The hair was very sleek and long, the eyes large, the lips pursed, and he had no mannerisms. There was about him a kind of quietness such as you will find among people who have lived much alone. . . . He was fifty-three and looked twenty."§

Beneath the oddly feminine personality, however, Mao retained his stubborn sense of known victory. In March 1947, when a Nationalist drive forced the Communists to evacuate Yenan, the top command split

* An excellent photograph of General Marshall and Mao at Yenan appears in Harold M. Vinacke, *Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), between pp. 242 and 243. The picture also shows Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and Chang Chih-chung, senior Nationalist general present at the 1946 talks.

† Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Teng Fa, Yeh T'ing, Wang Jo-fei and others were killed in the crash.

‡ "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong" (August 1946), in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 97-101.

§ See Robert Payne, *Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1961), p. 222.

itself. Mao, Chou En-lai, and Jen Pi-shih remained in northern Shensi, while Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, and an alternate working committee moved to the Communist-controlled Shensi-Chahar-Hopei base.* During the winter of 1947-48, Mao's command post was in the small town of Yangchia-k'ou, Mi-chih hsien, in northern Shensi. There, on Christmas Day of 1947, at a special meeting of the party Central Committee, he analysed the shifting civil war situation in his report, *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*. This report, as well as other political and military estimates of the 1947-48 period, provide impressive evidence of Mao's diagnostic and planning capacities.† By early 1949, the top party leaders were reunited in Hopei, where the North China People's Government under Tung Pi-wu had been established in August 1948 to unify all areas in the north then under Communist jurisdiction. There, at Shih-chiachia-chuang, the seventh Central Committee held its second plenum (March 5—13, 1949). Meeting after the Communist capture of Tientsin and Peiping, this plenum stated that the centre of gravity of the Communist effort in China was shifting from the countryside to the cities, and announced that national industrialisation was henceforth to become the central objective of Communist economic policy. Soon thereafter, on March 25, 1949, the leaders and top organs of the Central Committee moved to Peiping.

Mao Tse-tung, now fifty-five, had returned. He had first arrived in the northern capital over thirty years before, in September 1918, and had last seen it as an obscure young radical in the spring of 1920. Now Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao were both dead; Chang Kuo-t'ao was vanquished; Li Li-san and Ch'en Shao-yü were impotent. In the context of national politics, Mao had established his supremacy over his arch-rival Chiang Kai-shek, and had restored Hunan's nineteenth-century position as major contributor to Chinese political life after twenty years of Chekiang domination under the post-1928 Kuomintang.‡ In the

* See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 132, note 3.

† See the reviews by H. Arthur Steiner dealing with Mao's writings of the 1945-49 period: *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV, 4 (Winter 1962-63), pp. 384-390, and *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 345, January 1963, pp. 176-177.

‡ Kwangtung, a third province of major political importance and the birthplace of Sun Yat-sen, had also been less than happy about Chiang Kai-shek's Chekiang clique. Two of Kwangtung's prominent sons, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, had been closely associated with Sun Yat-sen from the organisation of the T'ung-meng-hui at Tokyo in 1905, and were regarded as logical successors to Sun in the Kuomintang at the time of his death in 1925.

context of international communism, Mao had already established his autonomy from Moscow. For well over a decade, after Mao gained top position in the Chinese Communist Party and before that party gained national power, the Chinese Communists, in practical terms, had been free of direct control from Moscow. It was hardly surprising that Mao Tse-tung should view the interests of world Communism from the standpoint of China as Stalin consistently saw those interests from the standpoint of the U.S.S.R.

During the summer of 1949, some six weeks before troops of the Fourth Field Army pressed south from Changsha to occupy his native village in Hunan, Mao published a new essay at Peking. With the candor which the decisive Communist military sweep in China permitted, *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* (July 1, 1949) outlined the future direction of the communist system of governance in China. Internationally, Mao proclaimed, the new China would "lean to one side," toward the U.S.S.R. and the "camp of Socialism": China could not remain neutral or uncommitted in the long-term struggle between the Communist bloc and the "camp of imperialism" led by the United States. In domestic policy, Mao, echoing concepts which he had suggested a decade earlier, called for a "people's democratic dictatorship." The "people," including the workers, peasants and elements of the middle class, were to form the class basis of the government structure; "democracy" was for them. All other groups and individuals were labelled "reactionaries," viewed as actual or potential enemies, and marked for subjection to the new government's "dictatorship." What Mao did not make explicit, however, was as important as what he did say. Fundamentally, as in Nationalist China, the new government was to be a single-party dictatorship. The power of "dictatorship" was not actually to be exercised by the "people," but rather by the Communist party élite, the ruling political class with responsibility for China's continuity and integrity, acting with self-appointed sagacity as the articulator of the General Will. With Mao Tse-tung as duly elected Chairman, the new Central People's Government was formally established at Peking on October 1, 1949.

Mao Tse-tung and Stalin

The People's Republic of China emerged as a latecomer in the Communist world near the end of Stalin's life. Theoretical definition of

China's international position had already been provided, both by Mao's July 1, 1949, statement and by Liu Shao-ch'i's earlier pronouncement, *On Internationalism and Nationalism* (November 1, 1948). In Stalin's eyes, however, Mao Tse-tung in the autumn of 1949 was still unconventional, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable. Ruler of the most populous Communist nation in the world, Mao had never visited Russia, spoke no Russian, had had little personal contact with the Russians, and was known to distrust those members of the Chinese Communist élite whom he viewed as Muscovite "dogmatists." Mao made his first trip outside China in the winter of 1949-50 (December 16, 1949—February 17, 1950) to visit Moscow and to hammer out practical political, security and economic arrangements with Stalin. Mao's objective was to gain maximum Russian support for China's projected industrialisation programme, and to regain Chinese rights which in his view had been seriously compromised in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 which Moscow had signed with the Chinese nationalists. After nine weeks of hard bargaining with Stalin, then already seventy and increasingly obdurate, Mao was moderately successful. The negotiations led to a new Sino-Soviet treaty (February 14, 1950), a thirty-year military alliance aimed ostensibly at Japan but actually at the United States; delineation of rights in Manchuria and Sinkiang; and agreement on a modest line of Russian credit to China (U.S. $60 million annually for the 1950–54 period).

While Stalin was alive, Mao's attitude toward him was correct but distant, a posture emulated by the late Soviet dictator. Mao's reserve was based essentially upon his independence from Moscow in winning control of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and of all China in the 1940s. He recognised that the U.S.S.R. was not only far superior to China technologically but also far more advanced in "socio-historic development," with industry nationalised and agriculture collectivised; and he realised that China's overwhelming dependence on the U.S.S.R. required suppression of differences, at least on the public record. The Sino-Soviet military alliance was an important support for Peking during its initial encounter with modern Western firepower in the Korean war, since it provided China with a source of material, and the United Nations forces with a source of deterrent concern. The Korean war forced a severe drain on China's resources, though at the same time it served Mao Tse-tung's political purposes in Asia since it was widely regarded there as a conflict of East against West. The conflict ended in what Peking, technicalities aside, claimed as a psychological victory; and Peking's propaganda machine scored with the line that the "Chinese

People's Volunteers," hastening to the aid of their North Korean brethren, had fought the Western world's strongest military and industrial power without being defeated even by the alleged American use of "bacteriological warfare." Within China, the Korean war permitted Mao to demonstrate to the Chinese people that "American imperialism" was a real and dangerous threat on the national perimeter; and it permitted consolidation of political controls and mobilisation of human and material resources more rapidly than would otherwise have been feasible.

The contradictory consequences of de-Stalinisation

The death of Stalin in March 1953 opened a new phase in the relations between Mao Tse-tung and Moscow. For a period, the post-Stalin leadership in the Kremlin, aware of the importance of keeping China as a major Russian ally in Asia, showed more flexibility than had been apparent under Stalin. The major problems then complicating Sino-Soviet relations—policy towards the Korean war, and the level of economic and technical aid to China—were dealt with immediately. An abrupt shift in Communist tactics in the Korean negotiations permitted the armistice agreement signed at Panmunjom in July 1953. Shortly thereafter, in September, Peking announced that agreement had been reached in Moscow on Soviet economic support and stated that the U.S.S.R., by the end of 1959, would aid 141 large-scale enterprises in China. As evidence of the new look in China policy, Moscow bowed to Mao by eliminating patent sources of embarrassment: the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies and Russian troops garrisoned at Port Arthur. Moscow further mollified Chinese sensibilities by paying increased attention to the ideological stature of Mao Tse-tung as an original and "creative" architect of Communist revolution in Asia. And, in apparent contrast to Stalin's condescending aloofness, Khrushchev himself visited Peking for the first time in October 1954. However, though both partners stressed the durability of the alliance structure, there was no evidence that the Chinese and Soviet parties were in fact any more closely linked during the early 1950s than they had been during the period from 1935 to 1949.

The year 1956 marked a major watershed in the international Communist movement and, by consequence, in world politics. In February Khrushchev stunned the delegates to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with his bitter, unilateral denunciation of the crimes of Joseph Stalin. Once opened, the Pandora's box of de-Stalinisation released clouds of dissension and disunity in eastern

Europe. In the autumn of 1956, when the citizens of Budapest rose in revolt against the oppressive Communist regime in Hungary, direct Soviet military action was required to restore control in that "people's democracy." Seven years later, in a statement released in September 1963, Peking alleged that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists had "insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary" and had, at the critical moment, buttressed the Soviet leaders when they "intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary."* By decisively supporting Russian authority in a crisis situation, Mao for the first time played a role directly affecting European as well as Asian Communism. During 1956, Peking issued two policy statements which, more than any earlier Chinese pronouncement, marked the rise of the Chinese Communist Party to a position of major political and ideological authority in the bloc. Mao Tse-tung and his doctrinal advisors, including Ch'en Po-ta and others, were clearly responsible for the general policy line taken in Peking's then unprecedented statements.†

Within the Chinese Communist Party, the "unity-struggle-unity" formula for combating deviant "leftist" or "rightist" influences had been standard operating procedure for many years. During 1956, Peking had initiated its "Hundred Flowers" campaign, designed to mobilise the support of the Chinese intellectuals by permitting more overt criticism of political conditions. The Hungarian explosion, and the brutal Soviet suppression of that uprising, however, had definite repercussions at Peking. Mao Tse-tung, anxious to avoid anything so obvious and so deplorable as a Hungarian-type revolt in China, thus produced a new analysis of the concept of "contradictions" as a key to social relations and social change, elaborating ideas which he had expressed in his 1937 statement, *On Contradiction*. Mao's February 1957 speech, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*, was only released publicly in June of that year when Peking pressed a new "anti-rightist" drive to curb the spate of overt criticism of the régime which had finally appeared during the late spring of that year; the delay gave rise to widespread speculation outside China as to probable changes made in its

* Peking's disclosure of this and other lurid details of recent Sino-Soviet relations is given in the long article released jointly on September 6, 1963, by the editorial departments of the *People's Daily* and the journal *Red Flag*, "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves."

† *On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (April 5, 1956), and *More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (December 29, 1956).

text in the interim.* Mao's speech reiterated the view that human society develops through a continuous process of creating and resolving contradictions. It offered an extended analysis of the nature of the contradictions in Chinese society and of the manner in which the Communist Party should proceed to resolve them. Two types of social contradictions exist, Mao stated. Those within the ranks of "the people" are "non-antagonistic," and should be resolved by discussion and education aimed at showing the critic the error of his criticism and the validity of Communist policy. Contradictions "between ourselves and our enemies," on the other hand, are "antagonistic," and can only be resolved by "drawing a line between us and our enemies." Thus Mao reiterated his long-standing view that effective political action depends, first, upon distinguishing between friend and foe, and, second, upon identifying the major foe at any particular point in time; and he affirmed his belief that contradictions pervade society not only during the stage of transition to Socialism but also after the eventual establishment of Socialism (Communism). In Mao's analysis, situations creating "contradictions" in society are not only universal but also eternal, a view which the Russian comrades at Moscow were reluctant to accept.

Mao versus Khrushchev

The year 1957, marked by major Russian gains in intercontinental ballistic missiles and by the launching of Sputnik I, brought a further shift in Mao Tse-tung's international outlook and an apparent readjustment of priorities. Developments since 1953, especially China's new role as influential arbiter in bloc affairs, provided Mao with more leverage on Russian policies than had been available during the Stalin era. China's new status was confirmed by the signature on October 15, 1957, of a Sino-Soviet agreement on New Technology for National Defence, under which the U.S.S.R. agreed to supply China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. Viewing the global distribution of power, Mao estimated that these developments had brought a decisive military and psychological shift in world politics. He concluded that the Communist bloc, with its new military lead over the West, could take advantage of that imbalance to extend its authority, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, before the United States could take effective measures to deal with the recession then affecting the American

* The full text, with editorial and bibliographical comment, is given in *Communist China 1955, 1959, Policy Documents and Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 273-294.

economy and to respond to the challenge. Mao also felt that a co-ordinated effort which would focus the totality of the bloc's resources on the world scene could offset economic weaknesses and political tensions then becoming manifest within China.

On his second trip to Moscow, when the leaders of the Communist world gathered in November 1957 to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Mao Tse-tung made a militant defence of Soviet leadership in the bloc:

> The Socialist force has surpassed the imperialist force. Our Socialist camp should have a leader, and this is the Soviet Union. The enemy also has a leader, and this is America. If there is no leader, the strength will be weakened.

At the same time, in a speech to Chinese students at Moscow University on November 17, 1957, Mao presented a new formula, distinctly Chinese in flavour, proclaiming the strategic ascendency of the Communist over the Western bloc. "Today," Mao phrased it, "the east wind prevails over the west wind." It was the last trip to the erstwhile Mecca of world Communism.

Mao Tse-tung's personal role in the tangled history of Chinese domestic and foreign policies during the 1958-63 period remains obscure. Logic suggests that he must have been at the centre of the decision-making process at Peking, and that he therefore must be assigned responsibility for the gambles involved in the drastic effort at accelerated economic growth launched in 1958. The Great Leap Forward and the formation of people's communes marked a radical change in economic planning and policy, and a drastic departure from the experiences of China's first Five Year Plan (1953-57), during which Soviet economic aid and technical assistance had been of major importance. Total mobilisation of domestic resources for rapid industrialisation was paralleled during 1958 by commitment to a generally bolder strategy abroad. Peking's bellicosity was manifest in its renewed attention focused on Taiwan and the offshore islands, a crisis which raised international tensions in the Far East to heights comparable to those which had prevailed at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Khrushchev's hasty trip to Peking (July 28—August 3, 1958) to meet with Mao was doubtless motivated partly by Moscow's fear that the Chinese Communist leaders might embark on rash moves which would involve the U.S.S.R. in a direct confrontation with the United States over Taiwan, an area which had no direct bearing on Russian national interests. Though the results of the 1958 discussions were not revealed at the time, Peking charged in Septem-

ber 1963 that the "leadership of the CPSU" had then put forward "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control."

Not long thereafter, on June 20, 1959, according to the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Government unilaterally scrapped the October 1957 nuclear accord with China, thus seriously crippling Peking's nuclear programme. That autumn, shortly after his return from meeting with President Eisenhower in the United States, Nikita Khrushchev made his third trip to Peking.* Though he and Mao stood side by side atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace on October 1, 1959, witnessing the massive, day-long celebrations with which the Chinese marked the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China, Chinese adulation was directed entirely towards Chairman Mao. Despite growing economic difficulties which were apparent by 1959, despite growing Chinese frustration with the course of Soviet policy, the day was undeniably Mao Tse-tung Day, as the years since October 1949 had been Mao Tse-tung's decade. To the Chinese Communists at least, Mao was the man who had negotiated with Stalin as leader of an autonomous Communist party and nation. Khrushchev had only served under Stalin.

By 1960, it was clear to Peking that the U.S.S.R. had no intention of providing China with effective long-term assistance either in expansion of industry or in development of nuclear weapons. This fact has underlain much of the bitter political and ideological conflict which had been the major development in international Communism during the early 1960s. In July 1960, the Soviet Government, again acting unilaterally, recalled all Russian technical advisers and experts from China, voided "hundreds of agreements and contracts," and suspended shipments of equipment and materials to China. Friction between the Russian and Chinese parties was increasingly evident at the major international meeting of Communist parties held at Moscow in November 1960 (when Liu Shao-ch'i spoke for Mao) and at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet party in October 1961 (when Chou En-lai represented Mao). By the time of the Cuban and Sino-Indian crises in the autumn of 1962, effective consultation between the party élites at Moscow and Peking evidently declined to zero.

* The protocol-conscious Chinese have not lost sight of the fact that Khrushchev has come three times to Peking, while Mao has been only twice to Moscow.

Peking: new centre of neo-orthodoxy

Another major issue in the dispute which has split the two major Communist Parties of the bloc has related to the appropriate tactics to be used in the industrially backward areas of the world. Though sanitised and superficially homogenised, the People's Republic of China remains a poor and largely non-modernised peasant country, still beset, as China has been through the centuries, with recurring natural calamities, still attempting to create a viable system of state-controlled industrialisation. China's development is still, in large part, technologically primitive and heavily dependent upon human labour. Yet these very facts, combined with Peking's aggressive anti-Western political propaganda, often facilitate communication with other poverty-stricken, non-industrialised areas. Despite the serious difficulties of the past few years, Peking argues that China's do-it-yourself approach to economic development is more relevant to the practical needs of the agrarian nations than the approach of either the United States or the Soviet Union, both of which already possess mature and expanding economic systems.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung's view of the international situation in the 1960 must also be assessed against the background of original political-strategic precepts which he developed while an insurgent leader. In his writings on the period which Peking officially labels the "second revolutionary civil war" in China (1927-37), Mao emphasised the fact that "we are to despise all enemies strategically and to take account of all enemies tactically".* Strategically, with regard to the whole situation, revolutionaries must "despise the enemy," struggle against him, and dare to seize victory. Tactically, with regard to each specific struggle, revolutionaries must take the enemy seriously, be prudent, carefully study and perfect the art of struggle, and adopt forms of struggle suited to different times, places, and conditions in order to isolate and wipe out the enemy step by step.† A decade later, in August 1946, in a major statement dealing with the domestic and international situation, Mao enunciated another well-known thesis in Chinese Communist political doctrine: "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who

* For the necessity of despising the enemy strategically but taking full account of him tactically, see Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolution War*, December 1936 (Peking : Foreign Languages Press, 1954), Chap. 5, sect. 6, pp. 104-114.

† This official interpretation is given in a note in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 98n.

are really powerful."* Mao's formulations of the 1930s and 1940s still strongly influence Peking's international outlook in the nuclear age. "American imperialism," in the Chinese view, should be despised strategically but respected tactically. The short-term potency of American military power should be recognised in specific combat or conflict situations; the long-term effectiveness of American power is illusory, since that power rests in its international setting, on political bases as vulnerable as those upon which Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang took their stand in China during the 1940s. Through gaining support in the anti-colonialist new nations, and through undermining the political balance on which the American military position in these areas must rest, Chinese Communism must ultimately and irresistibly triumph over the "paper tiger."

Mao's recent idealised image of himself as leader of the underprivileged peoples of the non-Western world has introduced a radically new dimension to international politics. Many of Peking's actions in Asia may be explained rationally if viewed against the backdrop of China's traditionally dominant position in the eastern sector of the Asian mainland. Racist, as distinct from Pan-Asian, instincts have, however, been absent from the conventional Chinese *Weltanschauung*, and it is doubtful whether any responsible Chinese leader has ever identified himself directly with the "coloured" races of the world. The Chinese outlook has rather been culturalistic: the Chinese are by nature a superior people, an attitude similar in some respects to the classical Greek view that all non-Hellenes were barbarians. Yet it has been apparent that, in areas distant from Asia where Chinese interests had formerly been minimal or non-existent, a new element has activated Peking's programmes in recent years. This element may be defined as Peking's sense of manifest destiny: that China now has a long-term mission to lead the historic struggle of the non-Caucasion peoples of the world not only against Western "imperialism" but also against white discrimination and condescension everywhere.

Mao Tse-tung's sense of global mission was dramatically reflected in the public statement issued at Peking on August 8, 1963.† Signed simply "Mao Tse-tung," without the conventional identification as "Chairman

* See "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in Mao, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p, 100. See also *Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers"* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958).

† NCNA, August 8, 1963.

of the Communist Party of China" which has normally accompanied his public utterances, this was the first full statement directly accredited to Mao since his *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People* of 1957. Entitled "Statement calling upon the people of the world to unite against racial discrimination by United States imperialism and support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination," this unusual pronouncement recorded the "resolute support" of the Chinese people for the American Negroes "in their struggle . . . for freedom and human rights."

> In the United States, it is only the reactionary ruling circles among the whites who are oppressing the Negro people . . . At present, it is the handful of imperialists, headed by the United States, and their supporters, the reactionaries in different countries, who are practising oppression and aggression and making threats against the overwhelming majority of the nations and peoples of the world. We are in the majority and they are in the minority. At most, they are less than 10 per cent. of the 3,000 million population of the world. I am firmly convinced that, with the support of more than 90 per cent. of the peoples of the world, the American Negroes will be victorious in their just struggle. The evil system of colonialism and imperialism grew up along with the enslavement of Negroes and the trade in Negroes; it will surely come to its end with the thorough emancipation of the black people.

On August 29, 1963, Mao Tse-tung released another, less significant, pronouncement on the situation in Vietnam. Again signed simply "Mao Tse-tung," this document was entitled, "Statement opposing aggression against Southern Vietnam and slaughter of people there by United States-Ngo Dinh Diem clique."*

Mao's recent attitude toward the Soviet Union is a problem in plural causation; power considerations, national interests, ideological issues and cultural patterns are all involved. At the same time, personality factors, though obscure, are also operative. Mao evidently has a low estimate of Khrushchev as responsible and reliable Communist leader. Proceeding from the premise that China now has nothing to lose in political warfare with the Russians, Mao Tse-tung has pressed an increasingly violent attack on the present "leadership of the CPSU." Beginning in December 1962 and continuing through 1963, Peking's propaganda effort has embraced a massive attempt to project the theme that the Chinese Communist Party is now the defender of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and the Moscow Statement of 1960. The policies of the Soviet Party are

* NCNA, August 29, 1963.

portrayed as crude, wavering and inconsistent; Khrushchev and his associates are labelled "out-and-out revisionists", men who have deserted the true faith and become irrationally aggressive (as in placing missiles in Cuba) and then "cowardly as mice" (in withdrawing them in the face of firm United States pressure).

These political pyrotechnics suggest that Mao Tse-tung, despite China's basic weakness in the military, industrial and scientific fields, expects the Communist Party of China to gain direct leadership over the main line of international Communist policy. The attainment of such leadership may at present be only a long-range target for the Peking Politburo. Yet, even from his present position of relative isolation, Mao has tarnished the image of Soviet infallibility, sabotaged Moscow's ideological transmission system, weakened the Kremlin's hold over what was formerly described as the world Communist movement, and compromised Khrushchev's self-appointed role as spokesman for the "camp of Socialism" and for all "peace-loving humanity." The emergence of Peking as a new centre of aggressive neo-orthodox political authority has challenged Moscow's command system, and has now made it impossible for either Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader to re-establish the type of unified direction which the Kremlin did represent for four decades after the Russian revolution of 1917. Mao Tse-tung was a marginal man in the international Communist movement when he gained power in the Chinese Party during the early 1940s; he was still a marginal man in Moscow's eyes when he gained national power in China in 1949. The letter of June 14, 1963, of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, combined with the subsequent flow of disclosures from Peking challenging the authority, principles and policies of the Soviet party leadership, has again left Mao as the great Outsider.* But Mao's pronouncements have also left a major mark on the Establishment, and have posed thorny political issues for all Communist parties and leaders throughout the world.

Mao Tse-tung's present role in world politics remains anomalous. Mao's status in the socialist sodality remains ambiguous. Within China, his position is unique. Master of the Chinese Communist team which conquered power, Chairman Mao has since become China's first Marxist-Leninist ruler, though not its first peasant emperor. Political prophet, philosopher, strategic genius, male Muse of the Arts, hero of the libera-

* Full text of the Chinese Party's letter is given in *New York Times*, July 5, 1963.

tion, free-style conqueror of the Yangtze;* the image has been steadily lacquered by the most effectively geared propaganda machine in modern Chinese history. But the image is still distinctively Chinese: the wise and benevolent father of the Sinic tradition, not the grand executioner of the Russian mould. For over a quarter of a century, Mao has wielded power through and with the party, not — like Stalin — over its head. The key political fact about the power system of the Chinese Communist Party has been that Mao has kept his first team functioning together as an effective unit, not that he himself has been hierarchically in the top signal-calling slot. In September 1956, the Eighth National Party Congress re-elected Mao chairman of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the seven-man standing committee of the Politburo, at the same time that it created the new position of honorary chairman of the party, a post to which Mao will presumably retire. Chairman of the People's Republic of China for a decade after 1949, Mao announced in December 1958 that he planned to relinquish these administrative responsibilities.† In April 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i succeeded him as chief of state and concurrently chairman of the National Defence Council. Mao thus made his fellow provincial "comrade-in-arms" his successor as head of the government structure during his lifetime, an apparent attempt to raise Liu above all possible rivals and thus to ensure his later succession to the decisive position of chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. In December 1954, Chou En-lai had replaced Mao as chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Today Mao retains only the nominal post of honorary chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, his sole remaining government position.

* In May 1956, Mao reportedly swam the Yangtze from Wuchang to Hankow. He made it by "guerrilla means," floating with the current and following a zigzag course. That summer, he reportedly swam the river a second and third time from Hanyang to Wuchang.

† One aspect of Mao's decision may have been to demonstrate that, in contrast to Khrushchev, he could lead the party without heading the government.

> " Comrade Mao Tse-tung is a great Marxist thinker and theoretician. Integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of China's revolution, not only has he led the Chinese people to victory in the revolution and to transform the face of our country, he has also creatively developed Marxism-Leninism."

Thus the leading sentences of a pamphlet published at Peking in 1961.*

> " Chairman Mao Tse-tung this afternoon received Alfred Gondo, representative of the Zimbabwe Africa People's Union, Katjimnina Veil and Moses Katjiuongua, youth delegates of the Southwest African National Union, and Mahjoud Sen Seddik, President of the All-Africa Trade Union Federation and General Secretary of the Moroccan Union of Labor. He had a cordial talk with them."

Thus a news report from Peking in the spring of 1963.†

The style may be circuitous and turgid, but the intent is straightforward. Within China, Comrade Mao has been placed in a new pantheon of heroes; Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, with Mao the only living Communist in the quintet. Outside China, Peking's propaganda machinery projects Chairman Mao as major Asian nationalist leader: Lenin's self-appointed successor who has directed the process of anti-imperialist political and military mobilisation made real by the Chinese Communist example.

Critical assessment of Mao Tse-tung involves one of the central problems of the historian's craft: the conflict between present-mindedness and historical-mindedness. The remoteness of rural China from the

* Lin Mo-han *Raise Higher the Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought on Art and Literature* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 1.

† NCNA, March 18, 1963.

experience of most of us; the paucity of data on Mao's personality; the fact that most students of international Communism have only become aware of China since 1949; the understandable desire to gauge the currents of political and doctrinal strife which have brought diversity and conflict to the Communist bloc: all these factors conspire to frustrate the biographer and humanist. The result has been that studies of Mao Tse-tung, laced with overgenerous portions of hindsight, speculation and hasty analysis, have generally left the reader with a lacquered image rather than an historical Mao Tse-tung, the product and one of the shakers of the traditional Chinese world which vanished in the aftermath of the May Fourth movement.* The erosion of ethical standards, economic backwardness, social frictions, governmental slovenliness, and unrestrained militarism during the early republican period created the environment which permitted the growth and development of a Communist movement in China. But it was imperial Japan, not Stalinist Russia, which made the most direct contribution to Mao Tse-tung's political success, thereby confirming the axiom that Communism has spread most rapidly and most virulently in the social chaos created by the great international wars of this century.† Mao's role in this process of change stemmed from one practical and highly personal fact. He either possessed or acquired the combination of technical abilities and personality traits to organise an effective political-military orgnisation, to command and control respect as its leader, to utilise a period of national crisis to gain power in China, and to be willing to assume responsibility for the consequences of his decisions and his gambles.

A balanced estimate of Mao as political leader would require prior estimates, first of the nature of Communism in China and, second, of the specific role of Mao himself. The Communist revolt in China has been a complex blend of many motivations, impulses, ideas and individuals. The observation that the Chinese Communist Party has long recognised the crucial importance of power in a major social revolution is hardly surprising; the argument that Communism's only goal in China has been to gain and hold total power, however, represents a superficial reading of the varieties of frustration and aspiration which bred the movement and bore it to power. Within China, the Communist Party's goal since 1949 has been radical reorganisation of Chinese society to attain national modernisation and self-sustaining economic growth in the shortest possible time; basically, this programme represents a reaction to the pattern

* See Joseph R. Levenson. "The Day Confucius Died" *Journal of Asian Studies*, XX (February 1961), 221–226, review of Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*.

† Windfalls like Cuba are exception to the rule.

of underdevelopment and low productivity which was the most readily identifiable feature of the socio-economic horizon when Mao gained power. Outside China, Peking's goal since 1949 has been radical redistribution of power and influence to the end that China may gain generally recognised status as a great power and that Peking's political formulae may be spread to the widest possible audience; essentially, this programme represents a reaction to the fact that China for a century before 1950 counted for virtually nothing in international politics. Whatever the degree of Peking's success, whatever the criteria used to measure success or failure, Communism in operation in China has combined operational flexibility with firm retention of a power monopoly effectively exercised by the Communist party through a system of political control which to date has shown no signs of disintegrating, melting or mellowing.

Clearly there would have been a Communist movement in China had no male child named Mao Tse-tung been born in central Hunan on the day after Christmas of 1893. Probably the Communist movement in China could have gained national power had Mao never attained control of its central apparatus. Yet the fact that Mao emerged as leader at a particular point shaped the pattern of politics in China, even as Lenin's appearance at a particular point in the Bolshevik movement shaped the Russian revolution. Unlike Stalin, Mao Tse-tung himself was the principal leader of the political-military machine which gained power in China in 1949–50 and has maintained an effective totalitarian structure of power since. Like Stalin, Mao has been personally responsible for the policies which have led to the expansion of national power in his country. For over forty years, Mao Tse-tung has relied on the general theory of Communism as a guide to political action. The converse proposition has not been true. Mao's practical application of Marxism-Leninism in China outstrips any contribution which the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" has made to the general theory. Mao's main historical role has been as cultural domesticator of Communism: political leader with sufficient determination and imagination to adapt the theory to the particular conditions in China where the overwhelming bulk of the population—and of the Communist Party—is peasant. As an intelligent Chinese of peasant origin, Mao Tse-tung has been well qualified by both background and temperament to mobilise a Communist party-led revolt based on latent nationalism and actual human discontent.

How did it happen? Perhaps the most vital requirements for Mao Tse-tung have been readiness to confront deeply entrenched social problems on a realistic basis, and ability to project a forward-looking

vision of the potential perfectability of Chinese society in the future. Realistic challenge implies a sense of politics; effective projection involves a sense of history.

The greatness of a political leader is generally in proportion to the greatness of his society. As theorem, this statement may be dubious; as observation, it is relevant to the political history of China between 1911 and 1949. The republican period was not a classical era of great cultural creativity and great men. Indeed, the most conspicuous feature of Chinese political life after the decline and fall of the imperial dynasty was the lack of any effective system of social responsibility; the most notable characteristic of China's political leadership, lack of broad-scale vision and realistic planning. Mao Tse-tung has stood out as one of the very few national leaders in twentieth-century China who has shown sustained concern with the hardships, brutality, and grinding want which characterised the lot of the poorer peasants.* This concern required no sophisticated Marxist rationale. Instinctively, Mao saw that the oppression and narrowness of peasant life were wrong; pragmatically, he saw that the poor peasantry represented a class whose role was determined not by its social character but by the degree of its deprivation. Further, Mao recognised that a major source of potential political energy rested in the Chinese peasants; and that the leader able to exploit and mobilise that energy source was destined to triumph in China in the long run. Though based essentially on indigenous stimuli, Mao Tse-tung's approach to politics was not dissimilar to Lenin's. Mao argued realistically that the indoctrinated Communist élite knew the true interests of the peasants better than the unindoctrinated peasants themselves; he knew that the tradition of a ruling élite with a self-generated code of discipline and responsibility was neither novel nor heretical in China. Finally, Mao's philosophy of politics has been consistent in its recognition of the essential role of force and violence in a major social revolution.

> A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is . . . an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another.†

* Sun Yat-sen and Feng Yü-hsiang come to mind as other examples of leaders with this concern.

† "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, I, 1926-36 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 27.

Mao Tse-tung himself has survived a violent revolution. And, in surviving, he has made manifest that sense of history and of active involvement with history which marked some of the strong Western political leaders of the period before the New Frontier. Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle—the men of the Old Frontier—were all leaders with a classical style: men who craved the power to dominate events, to leave their mark on large affairs. All had a knowledge of history as well as a conception of the historical process, an instinct for the grand tendencies, a feeling for the direction in which the world, for better or for worse, was moving.* All were event-making rather than merely eventful men.† Though he comes from a totally different background, Mao Tse-tung shares that peculiar sense of daring and initiative which must inform strong leadership and buttress its loneliness. Mao has a vision of history which links past and future, and gives his immediate decisions both setting and rationale. That vision is dominated by the sense that the two major political ground-swells of our era are the emergence of a strong and unified Communist China after a century of weakness, and the psychological emancipation of the peoples of the non-Western world.

Mao Tse-tung's sense of history may be questioned by Western leaders, whose lack of understanding of China is little short of monumental. But Mao's role as twentieth-century China's major political figure cannot be ignored. Since his youthful student days at Changsha during the First World War, he has combined the extraordinary patience, ruthlessness and self-assurance of the man who links social idealism with the certainty of ultimate triumph. Nearly half a century later, Chairman Mao the lacquered image is ubiquitous, while the personality mechanism which makes Mao Tse-tung the man function remains elusive. When in Peking, he inhabits a graceful old one-storey yellow-roofed residence in the Imperial City, attending official functions, greeting selected visitors, treading China's red carpet, conferring with his Politburo associates, planning political strategy. Actually, he dislikes the north China winters, and spends several months of the year travelling or residing in the more equable climate of central China. His present wife, to whom he has been married since 1939, has reportedly long been in poor health and is rarely

* It has been one of the ironies of the post-war period that Churchill and de Gaulle, with their love of imperial power, should have presided over the liquidation of the two great European empires of the 18th and 19th centuries.

† For the distinction, see Chap. IX, "The Eventful Man and the Event-making Man," in Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943, 1955), pp. 151-183.

seen in public.* Mao's own estimate of his health, given when Edgar Snow dined privately with him at his home in Peking in 1960, was that he was "holding the *status quo*." Much heavier than at Yenan, Mao was eating moderately, drinking some *mao-t'ai*, and smoking fewer cigarettes, his principal indulgence for many years.

Incongruously, the leader and symbol of Communism in China has something of the dignified bearing of the Chinese gentry. Relaxed, shrewd, quick to perceive nuances, Mao has reportedly preserved a sense of humour, as well as the best-known chin mole in East Asia. He has also preserved a casual approach to personal appearances. When Snow talked with him in 1960, Mao was wearing brown leather shoes which needed polishing, and cotton socks which hung loosely about his ankles. With the tenacity and stubborn mulishness of the pepper-loving Hunanese, Mao Tse-tung has seen his course and followed it to his seventieth year. No man can do more.

* His eldest son, Mao An-ying, was killed in the Korean war; another son is now an engineer working in the provinces; a younger daughter has been a university student at Peking.

Bibliographical Note

The political career of Mao Tse-tung must be studied within the context of Chinese history since 1900 and of Chinese Communism since the May Fourth movement. No adequate survey of either subject is yet available. The most useful guides to the sources on party history are the annotated bibliographies prepared by Chun-tu Hsueh covering materials in the Chinese collection of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace: *The Chinese Communist Movement, 1921-1937* (Stanford: 1960) and *The Chinese Communist Movement, 1937-1949* (Stanford: 1962). A basic guide to Chinese essays and articles on recent Chinese history is *Chung-kuo Shih-hsueh Lun-wen So-yin* (Peking: 1957), I, 178-227. Allan B. Cole, *Forty Years of Chinese Communism: Selected Readings with Commentary* (Washington: American Historical Association, Service Center for Teachers of History, Publication No. 47, 1962), provides a useful introduction to English-language bibliography.

There is no satisfactory political biography of Mao Tse-tung. Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* (London: 1937) is a primary source, containing Mao's autobiographical account as recorded by Snow through an interpreter in northern Shensi in 1936; its chronology, however, is imprecise, and it contains other inaccuracies. Snow's recent book, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (1962), also contains a long section on Mao the man, pp. 113-159, as well as a note clarifying certain aspects of the complex history of the book *Red Star over China* (pp. 773-774, note 1). The most important recent source on Mao's pre-1927 career is Li Jui, *Mao Tse-tung T'ung-chih ti Ch'u-chi'i Ko-ming Huo-tung* (*Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Early Revolutionary Activities*) (Peking: 1957); though an official interpretation, this volume provides much basic data on Mao's life in Hunan not available elsewhere. The slighter books by the brothers Hsiao should also be mentioned. That by the Communist, Hsiao San (Emi Siao, Emil Siao), is entitled *Mao Tse-tung T'ung-chih ti Erh-t'ung Shih-tai, Ch'ing-nien Shih-tai, yü Ch'u-ch'i Ko-ming Huo-tung* (Peking : 1949), translated into English as *Mao Tse-tung, His Childhood and Youth* (Bombay: 1953); the semi-fictionalised account of Mao's school days at Changsha by the anti-Communist brother, Hsiao Shu-tung (Siao-yu), is entitled *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars* (Syracuse: 1959). *Mao Tse-tung yü Hung-huo* (*Mao Tse-tung and the Red Calamity*) is a 560-page summary of available published materials prepared by the sixth section of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (Taipei: no date, foreword dated June 1959).

George Paloczi-Horvath's *Mao Tse-tung: Emperor of the Blue Ants* (London: 1962) is an extravagant and sharply hostile portrayal based on selected facts drawn from secondary sources by a Hungarian ex-Communist now resident in England. Hardly an objective account, the book does not under-stress the fact of Mao's power, though it over-simplifies its foundations. Robert Payne's *Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung* (revised edition, 1961), a slightly warmed-over version of a book published originally in 1950, is neither serious biography nor sound history. Though occasionally penetrating, Payne's book is superficial and inaccurate, containing one early picture of "Mao" which upon examination turns out to be Ho Hsiang-ning (Madame Liao Chung-k'ai). Roy Mac Gregor-Hastie, *The Red Barbarians: the Life and Times of Mao Tse-tung* (London: 1961), is pure fiction, useless as history except for one excellent recent photograph of Peking's first-string backfield (Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh) following page 112. Alfred Luckenhaus, *Mao Tse-tung* (Berlin: 1958) is a 90-page undocumented sketch appraising Mao's position and policies, though the booklet summarises familiar data, it is modest in tone and reasonably accurate in fact. Kaizuka Shigeki, *Mo Taku-to Den* (*Biography of Mao Tse-tung*) (Tokyo: 1956), is a popular account by a prominent Japanese scholar of traditional China.

Chang Kuo-t'ao's account "Mao—a New Portrait by an Old Colleague," contains interesting data about Mao and his principal colleagues (*New York Times Magazine*, August 2, 1953). A useful brief sketch of Mao appears in Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today* (1961 edition), in the sections on "Mao Tse-tung: the Man and His Position" (pp. 71–77) and "The Problem of Internal Solidarity" (pp. 81–97). Richard L. Walker has written gloomily of Mao as totalitarian despot: "Chairman Mao and The Cult of Personality" (*Encounter*, June 1960, pp. 31–43) and "China's *Ancien Regime*" (*The New Leader*, October 15, 1962, pp. 19–21).

The best source on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" (*Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang*) has been provided by Mao himself. Unfortunately, we still have no complete, critically annotated edition of Mao's writings in Chinese. For the present, students of the subject must rely primarily on the Peking-edited version of his *Selected Works*, four volumes of which are available in Chinese covering the 1926–39 period and provided with useful but *ex post facto* annotations. Five volumes of unofficial English translations, released by International Publishers, cover the following periods: I (1926–37), II (1937–38), III (1939–41), IV (1941–45), and V (1945–49). The single volume of Mao's *Selected Works* thus far released in English by the Foreign Languages Press at Peking corresponds to Volume IV of the official Chinese edition, and covers the period from 1945 to 1949. When Peking publishes English-language translations of the Chinese Volumes I-III, the current official Chinese and English versions of Mao's *Selected Works* will be available in a uniform edition. Somewhat tailored since their original appearance, Mao's writings are now required reading for seventeen million members of the Communist Party of China and for all serious students of Chinese Communism elsewhere. Significant for their political and military analysis, Mao's speeches and articles often preserve in translation the pungent prose for which Hunan's most influential political pamphleteer is generally known in his own country.

Western students of Mao will benefit from the bibliographical *Guide to the Writings of Mao Tse-tung in the East Asiatic Library* (New York: Columbia Univer-

sity Libraries, 1951?) and *Supplement I* (1952?). More generally available, though far less carefully prepared, is the checklist, *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (External Research Paper 138, External Research Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 1962).

A scholarly presentation of many of Mao's writings, including his most recent texts and some never before translated, is given in Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (1963). Schram has also prepared a full translation of Mao's article in *New Youth* on physical education (April 1917): *Mao Ze-dong, Une étude de l'éducation physique* (Paris: 1962). A convenient, but limited, paperback selection of Mao's writings has been made by Anne Fremantle (ed.) in *Mao Tse-tung: an Anthology of His Writings* (1962). Selections are all taken from the International Publishers English-language edition of Mao's *Selected Works* except for excerpts from "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" (1957); Miss Fremantle has also written on the medieval philosophers.

Discussions of whether Mao Tse-tung has or has not been an original theorist in applying Marxism-Leninism in China tend to become abstruse and academic. Clearly Mao has of necessity been something of an innovator in transplanting European and Russian doctrine to China. Yet he has also shown a consistent distrust of "dogma," and will probably be remembered and recorded in the history of twentieth-century China as practical implementer rather than theoretical innovator. Discussions of Mao's political thought in relation to Maxism-Leninism include the following: Arthur A. Cohen, "How Original is 'Maoism'?" *Problems of Communism*, X, 6, November-December 1961, 34—42; Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today* (revised edition, 1961), section on "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Cult of Personality," pp. 97—104; A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (1960), Chap. 4, "The Roots of Mao's Strategy," pp. 65—96; H. Arthur Steiner, "Ideology and Politics in Communist China," *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321 (January 1959), 29—39; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, 1951), Chap. 13, "Essential Features of the Maoist Strategy," pp. 189—204. This chapter in Professor Schwartz's book should be supplemented by his later writings, "On the 'Originality' of Mao Tse-tung," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV, 1, October 1955, 67—76; "Ideology and the Sino-Soviet Alliance," Chap. 3 in *Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains* (1957), pp. 112—141; and "New Trends in Maoism?" *Problems of Communism*, VI, 4, July-August 1957, 1—8.

There is also some disagreement in professional circles as to the degree of originality of Mao's military thought. Peking's official doctrine on that subject is available in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (1963), a collection of twenty-nine important articles, speeches, and directives covering the period from October 1928 to April 1949. As the analysis of Communist "strategy," "tactics" and irregular warfare methods has developed into a major field of research and creative writing, notably in the United States, there are frequent references in the literature. See, for example, Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, Ret., *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (1961), Harold C. Hinton, "Political Aspects of Military Power and Policy in Communist China," in Harry L. Cole (ed.), *Total War and Cold War* (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), pp. 266—292; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XL, 4, July 1962, 566—575; Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict,"

World Politics, XIV, 4, July 1962, 646–661; Klaus Knorr, "Unconventional Warfare: Strategy and Tactics in Internal Strife," in J. K. Zawodny (ed.), "Unconventional Warfare," *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 341 (May 1962), 53—64; S. M. Chiu, *Chinese Communist Revolutionary Strategy 1945–1949* (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 13, 1961); Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957), Chap. 10, "The Strategy of Ambiguity—Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought," pp. 316–361; and Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX, 3, September 1955, 321—340.

Mao's philosophical, literary and economic ideas also need further study. The article by Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Der dialektische Materialismus Mao Tse-tungs," *Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungsländer* (Bonn Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 8—9, September 1962), 15-59, provides a useful summary of some of Mao's philosophical concepts, with citation of relevant secondary sources. Mao's official literary views are summarised in *Mao Tse-tung on Art and Literature* (Peking: 1960), a collection of essays and excerpts taken mostly from the *Selected Works*. See also Howard L. Boorman, "The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung," and Yong-sang Ng, "The Poetry of Mao Tse-tung," in Cyril Birch (ed.), *Chinese Communist Literature* (1963), a symposium volume containing papers stemming from the Ditchley Manor conference sponsored by *The China Quarterly* in August 1962. A systematic presentation and critique of some of Mao's economic ideas is given by Sidney Klein. "Capitalism, Socialism and the Economic Theories of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIII, 1, March 1958, 28–46.

Despite the fact that much basic work remains to be done on Mao Tse-tung, material from secondary sources is now being increasingly disseminated through various channels. See, for example, Max Nomad, *Political Heretics from Plato to Mao Tse-tung* (1963), Fr. Henri Chambre, *From Karl Marx to Mao Tse-tung: a Systematic Survey of Marxism-Leninism* (1963); S. E. Ayling, *Portraits of Power: an introduction to twentieth-century history* (London: new and enlarged edition, 1963); and Vera Micheles Dean, *Builders of Emerging Nations* (1961). A biographical sketch for young people is contained in Olivia Coolidge, *Makers of the Red Revolution* (Boston: 1963) pp. 184–231.

Notes

(Prepared at China Study Centre)

1 May Fourth Movement is the name given to the movement sparked off by the student demonstration held in Peking on May 4, 1919 against the decisions reached about China at the Peace Conference at Versailles. The Peace Conference, instead of allowing the German Concession in Shantung Province to revert to China, agreed to transfer it to Japan. The Chinese intellecuals and students reacted sharply and began a political agitation which suddenly tansformed China from a dormant into an awakened nation. However, it is possible to conceive of the Movement in a wider context; in that sense, it refers to the whole range of intellectual revolution in modern China, which includes but is far broader than the revolution in political thinking.

2 Tseng Kuo-fan was one of the ablest scholar-generals and viceroys of the Chinese Empire in the second half of the 19th century. Tseng was the chief architect of the victory of imperial forecs over the Taiping rebels (see note 3 below). Like most sensitive Chinese of the period, Tseng felt concerned about the threat posed by the West to China and like some of his other colleagues he suggested the remedy of "self-strengthening". By this he meant that China should learn Western military techniques while retaining traditional values. Tseng felt that China's moral and political values were superior to their Western counterparts, but the West had better military technology.

Tso Tsung-t'ang was also a general-scholar who fought against the Taiping rebels. Like Tseng, Tso Tsung-t'ang also believed in the possibility of strengthening China through western military techniques. In his insistence on the use of steamship as a means of China's "self-strengthening", Tso was one of the chief makers of modern navy for China. In addition to military techniques, Tso was also in favour of mechanization in other areas. Thus he was in favour of building a modern machine-industry and encouraged the opening of woollen and cotton mills.

3 Taiping rebellion was one of the greatest social upheavals in modern times. It lasted thirteen years (1851-64) and took a toll of 20 million lives. Although the professed object of the leaders of the rebellion was to establish peace and Heavenly Kingdom on earth, some of their objects were to modernize

China. The appeal of the Taiping leaders to the average peasant (steeped in misery) lay in their theocratic and communistic beliefs, but their programme included such things as the introduction of railways. It is remarkable that even in the midst of constant fighting, the rebels tried to secure equal distribution of land, to simplify the language, to prohibit prostitution, foot-binding, sale of slaves, opium smoking etc. The Taiping rebellion seemed to be succeeding and at one time controlled vast areas of China including such important centres as Nanking. If the rebellion failed in the end, it was largely because of the united opposition of the scholar officials and foreign powers.

4 Unlike Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang, K'ang Yu-wei was convinced of the need for institutional reform in China in addition to learning western techniques. K'ang proposed that the ancient Examination system should be reformed and the army reorganised. But, above all, he suggested the introduction of constitutional government in China. Although K'ang wanted reuolutionary changes, he was anxious that they should descend from above; he believed that China should modernize on the Japanese model. In 1898, K'ang got a chance to get his policy implemented when Emperor Kuang-hsu came to the throne. But within a short time, the old guard got frightened and imprisoned the Emperor and K'ang fled away.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was a student of K'ang Yu-wei and his co-reformer. Although in the beginning he believed in reforms broadly along the lines proposed by K'ang, in later years he believed in the necessity of greater westernisation and introduction of science. While in the first phase Liang was anxious to retain some of the traditional values, in the second phase he believed in the necessity of science, freedom of thought and westernization and was prepared to do away with that part of the Chinese tradition which weighed heavily like a millstone round the neck of China. But Liang was to pass through a third phase. After the First World War he dismissed western civilization as materialist and selfish and for this reason far inferior to the traditional Chinese values.

5 The 1911 revolution was the culmination of the attempts of those people who had come to indentify the weakness of China with the "foreign" Ch'ing dynasty. The dynasty fell because it was unable to find an answer or solution to the challenge posed by the West. Having failed to modernize China to enable her to face the West as an equal, it was open to the charge that the Manchus had brought humiliation to China. The revolution began in October 1911 and one by one the provinces declared their independence from the Imperial Government. Early in 1912 the young Emperor abdicated. The Republic was proclaimed on January 1, 1912.

6 Yen Fu (1853–1921) was an important figure who had studied in the West and was most thoroughly learned in western philosophy and social science. He admired the West at first but later became a conservative. His chief contribution was that he introduced western political, social, economic and philosophical thought to the Chinese Society of his time by translating western books into Chinese. However, like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Yen Fu lost his idol after the First World War. He now thought that after centuries of progress, the West stood for "nothing" more than killings, materialism and selfishness.

7 Sung Dynasty ruled China from 960 to 1279.

8 Chu Hsi (1122 to 1200) was one of the greatest thinkers of ancient China who tried to restore the vigour of ancient Chinese thought and to rejuvenate Confucianism by directing his attack on Buddhism. Buddhism had, of course, become a major force from the 5th to the 9th centuries and was still influential during the 10th and 11th centuries. Although Chu Hsi and other neo-Confucian thinkers attacked Buddhism, they borrowed its highly sophisticated philosophical concepts. By this syncretic method, Chu Hsi gave a new philosophical depth to Confucianism. It was under this stimulus that Chu Hsi was to write his commentaries of the classics which remained standard down to the end of the 19th century.

9 *New Youth* (Hsin Ch'ing-nien) was perhaps the most influential Chinese journal of the second decade of the 20th century dealing with the most fundamental problems of China. It was edited by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The question of China's plight as a nation, the responsibility of youth, the questions of democracy, female suffrage, rights and equality and the 19th–20th century philosophical and political trends were among the subjects discussed.

10 Li Ta-chao became one of the most influential leaders of the Chinese youth after his return to China from Japan, where he pursued his studies. Although Li was a historian, he combined his deep historical insight with a metaphysical bent of mind. By his personal magnetism coupled with his vision of a new self-reliant China, Li was able to attract the advanced youth. In 1921, Li became a founder member of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1927, he was executed by Chang Tse-lin, the Manchurian warlord.

11 Ch'en Tu-hsiu was one of the foremost leaders of the intellectual renaissance in China. After he founded the Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth), Ch'en became perhaps the most influential intellectual of his time. Through this journal, Ch'en advocated a radical and scientific outlook on all problems. In contrast to men like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'en demanded far more than the mere introduction of science to social problems; he rejected wholesale the ancient Chinese tradition and advocated the introduction of western social and political institutions as the means for China's resurgence. Among other things, he advocated the freeing of women from the fetters that bound them. After the Bolshevik revolution, Ch'en's attention turned towards Marxism and he began to organise Marxist study groups. In 1921, he became the first Secretary General of the Communist Party of China, a position he held till 1927. He was expelled from the party in 1929 for alleged "right opportunism" and died in 1942.

12 Hu Shih was another important figure of Chinese intellectual renaissance. Hu Shih advocated the use of vernacular in Chinese literature. In his political and philosophical writings, Hu Shih was the follower of the philosopher John Dewey, under whom he had studied in United States, and believed in a pragmatic approach to social and political problems.

13 Peiyang warlords of the Anhwei faction : From the time of the establishment of the Republic in 1912, there was a struggle for power between the revolutionary

armies in the south and the civil wing represented by men like Sun Yet-Sen on the one hand and the Peiyang military clique on the other. Power soon passed into the hands of Yuan Shih-kai, who became the President. But Yuan suspended the constitution (later called the old constitution) and a new constitution was proclaimed giving unlimited powers to the President. Yuan even tried to re-establish his own dynasty but failed to acheive his aim. After his death in 1916, the expectation of unlimited power led to an excessive struggle for power. While the old tensions between the North and the South remained (despite attempts to settle them), the Northern warlords were further split up into the Anhwei and the Chihli factions, called by these names because they were in control of the Chihli and the Anhwei areas. By 1920, a war had broken out between them.

14 Hsin Hunan means New Hunan.

15 Tseng Ch'i (1892-1936) was a vigorous Japan-returned student who formed the Young China Association in order to promote nationalism and to animate the spirit of rejuvenation. From 1923 onwards he successively formed a rightist group known as Children's China Party and later on China Youth Party.

16 T'an Yen-kai was a revolutionary military man who supported Sun Yat-Sen and Kuomintang against the Northern (Peiyang) militarists. T'an was one of the most popular military governors of Hunan. He opposed the attempts of Yan Shih-k'ai to assume unlimited powers as President and later to become Emperor. T'an Yen-Kai believed in a constitutional government. After the reorganisation of Kuomintang in 1924 and the admission of Communists into Kuomintang, T'an Yen-kai was one of the members of the sixteen-man committee which had been appointed to govern Canton.

17 Ts'ai Ho-sen was a student in France during and after the First World War. In 1921, he was the leader of the group which formed the Young China Communist Party and a Socialist Youth Corps in France. On his return to China, Ts'ai-Ho-sen soon became a leading member of ths Chinese Communist Party ; from 1923 onwards till 1930, he seems to have been a member of its Political Bureau.

18 Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was one of the earliest leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. From 1923 till 1931, Ch'u was a member of its Political Bureau. In 1927, Ch'u was elected as the Secretary General of the Party. In this capacity, he made a number of 'putschist' mistakes for which he was removed from the position of Secretary General in 1928. Besides his leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, Ch'u has contributed considerably to modern Chinese literature. Ch'u was captured by the Kuomintang police in 1935 and was executed.

19 *Li Li-San*: Like Ts'ai Ho-shen, Li Li-san was also a founder member of the Young China Communist Party in France and a labour leader. In 1928, he became the most important and powerful member of the Political Bureau and directed Communist Policy although he was not Secretary General. In this capacity, Li committed a series of blunders culminating in the Changsha

uprising in 1930 (discussed above). In 1930 he went to Moscow for "study" and stayed there till 1949 when he returned to China as second-in-command to Liu Shao-ch' i in the Chinese Labour movement.

20 Ch'en Shao-yu (alias Wang Ming) was a student in the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. In 1930, he retuned to China and in less than a year became the Secretary General of the Party at the age of 24, a position he held for less than a year. In 1932, he became a member of the Comintern and was soon promoted to its Executive Committee. Ch'en is often associated by Chinese Communist historians with leftist policies of the period 1931-34.

21 Ch'in Pang-hsien returned to China from Moscow along with Ch'en Shao-yu and succeeded Ch'en as Secretary General in September 1931. He retained that position till early 1934. Although Ch'in Pang-hsien was in control of the party for almost three years and, broadly speaking, pursued the same policies which Ch'en had followed, nevertheless he was able to get along with Mao after the latter's rise to power. In fact he remained an important member of the Chinese Communist Party till his death in an air crash in 1946.

22 Chang Wen-t'ien was educated in France during and after the First World War and like Ts'ai Ho-shen, Chou En-lai and Li Li-san was a founder member of the Young China Communist Party in 1921. Late in 1921, he returned to China. In 1926 he went to Moscow for study and returned to China in 1930. From early 1931, he was a member of the Politburcau of the Chinese Communist Party and during 1931-33 was its chief theoretician. In 1934, Chang became the Secretary-General of the Party, a position he retained till he was replaced by Liu Shao-Ch'i in 1945. After the establishment of the People's Republic he was appointed China's Ambassador to U.S.S.R. In 1959 he came into conflict with the Chinese leaders on the question of People's communes and suffered a decline.

23 Adolf Joffe was an able Soviet negotiator who had gone to Peking in August 1922, to negotiate with the Chinese Government the question of establishment of diplomatic relations. But Willington Koo, the Chinese Foreign Minister, demanded that before negotiations could begin, Soviet Union should renounce her rights in Chinese Eastern Railway and withdraw the Red Army from Outer Mongolia. With Peking demanding all sorts of concessions before negotiations, not even a beginning was made. But Joffe had better luck with Sun Yat-Sen. Sun and Joffe, the two men quickly found the basis for a broad measure of collaboration between the U.S.S.R and the Kuomintang. Joffe affirmed that the Soviet Union would support China "for the achievement of national unification and the attainment of full national independence. Thus a basis was found for cooperation between the Communists and Kuomintang.

24 Hu Han-min was one of the most important leaders of the Kuomintang in the 'twenties. Hu was somewhat to the Right of Centre of the Kuomintang organisation though not very much to the Right. In 1925 when Sun had gone to Peking for negotiations with the Peking authorities, he asked Hu Han-min to act as the

Head of the Canton Government. On Sun's death Hu Han-min considered himself to be Sun's political heir. But due to the opposition of the so-called leftist group, Hu could not become Head of the Canton Government. In later life, Hu Han-min had a chequered career, sometimes supporting Chiang K'ai-shek, while at other times opposing him and at still other times in Chiang's jails.

25 Wang Ching-wei was an important member of the Kuomintang and the leader of the radical wing during Sun's life. After Sun's death Wang became the Chairman of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1925, but was soon forced to retire after the military coup of Chiang in 1926. Early in 1927, Wang resumed his duties as the head of the Kuomintang Government at Wuhan. During 1927-37, Wang like Hu Han-min at certain times cooperated with Chiang while at other times opposed him. After the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Wang went over to the Japanese as the Head of the puppet government. He died in November 1944.

26 Teng Ying Chao is wife of Chou En-lai and has been a prominent Communist for a long time. She has been a member of the CC of Chinese Communist Party many times.

T'ai Chi-tao was founder member of the Chinese Communist Party at the time of its birth in July, 1921. However, he soon resigned and became a brilliant ideologist of the Kuomintang centre and an opponent of the Communist movement in China. In these two books he argued that the Kuomintang should fight the imperialists and the *reactionaries* on the one hand and the Communists on the other.

Wu P'ei-fu was one of the three most important warlords in China in the mid-twenties. In 1927 the Nationalist armies led by Chiang K'ai-shek swept over Southern China and defeated the armies of Wu P'ei-fu. After their invasion of China, the Japanese tried to secure the services of Wu P'ei-fu to head a puppet government, but Wu refused. He died in 1939.

27 The Kuomintang-Communist collaboration came to an abrupt end with the coup of Chiang K'ai-shek followed soon after by the anti-communist massacres of the Wuhan authorities. In sheer desperation, the Communists with the support of two leftist commanders and their soldiers organised an uprising at Nanchang, the Capital of Kiangsi Province on 1st August, 1927. The uprising failed leading to enormous losses for the Communists. The remnant of the Communist forces were organised by Chu Teh.

28 P'eng Teh-huai was one of the early organisers of the Chinese Red Army. P'eng joined his small force with Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in 1929. From that time onwards down to the end of civil war in 1949, he was one of the top commanders of the Communist armies. In 1950 P'eng commanded the Chinese People's "Volunteers" in the Korean war and was later made the Minister of Defence. In 1959, he was dismissed from that post partly because of his oposition to the Communes and partly for having passed certain secret information to Khrushchev.

29 Juichin was the capital of the Chinese Central Soviet Government established in November, 1931.

30 During 1929-30, a strong leftist current developed in the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Li Li-san-Under the impact of this ultra-leftist policy the Communists believed that the time was ripe for a revolutionary uprising and that an uprising at one place would lead to a country-wide rebellion. It was in pursuance of this policy that Li Li-san ordered an uprising at Changsha supported by an attack on the city of the Red Army. But the Communists were defeated.

31 The Fut'ien incident occurred probably on December 8, 1930 when a battalion *political* commissar of the 20th Army rose in revolt at Tungku, a town about sixty miles to the southeast of Kian, in Kiangsi Province and led his unit of a few hundred men in an attack on Fut'ien, a neighbouring town. They set free the Communist leaders who had been arrested by Mao's supporters on a charge of being anti-Communists and members of the anti-Bolshevik League and liquidationists but were actually the opponents of his policies. Basically they supported Li Li-san's strategic policies in opposition to Mao's. Mao acted firmly and on the pretext of curbing the activities of the anti-Bolshevik League annihilated many good Communists.

32 The revolt in Fukien province took place on November 20, 1933 because some people in China including the Commanders of 19th Route Army were dissatisfied with Chiang's handling of the threat posed by Japan during the 'thirties. They called a "provisional conference" of delegates of the Chinese people in Foochow, the capital of Fukien province and proclaimed a People's Revolutionary Government. The rebels, however, failed to get the support of the Communists which they had hoped for. The revolt was quelled within two months.

33 Sun Tzu was a great military strategist and a contemporary of Confucius. He has influenced generations of military men in China down to the present.

31 Marco Polo Bridge Incident: Ever since the Manchurian incident anti-Japanese feeling in China was very high. This sentiment continued to increase throughout the 'thirties because of increasing Japanese aggression and intransigence towards China. On 7 July, 1937, some elements under Gen. Sung Che-yuan's 29th Army fired on the Japanese who replied in kind. Subsequently the Japanese demanded the withdrawal of Sung's army from Hupeh province. When Sung temporised, the Japanese commander decided to expel them by force. This incident marked the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war.

35 Three people's principles *i.e.* principle of nationalism, principle of democracy, and principle of people's livelihood were developed by Sun Yat-sen and constituted the ideology of Kuomintang.

[38] Opposed the use of literary language in writing because it was incomprehensible to the masses. On the other hand, they advocated the use of pai-hua (vernacular language) in writing. By late 'twenties and early 'thirties the use of pai-hua had become common, but it had developed its own jargon, its own style.

Epilogue:

Mao Tse-tung: A Worried Man at 72?

By C. R. M. Rao

Howard L. Boorman's essay reconstructs the story of the life and thought of Mao Tse-tung up to 1963 when he was 70. Of the developments since then two are of the utmost importance. Appropriately enough, one concerns his life and the other his attitude of mind today, which makes it entirely relevant to consider them here.

The most important thing that seems to have happened to Mao in the last two years is that he has come much closer to death. He is 'soon going to see God', as he confessed to Edgar Snow, the world's only privileged journalist in Communist China, when the latter interviewed him again in Peking on January 9 this year.

There have been persistent rumours during these two years about Mao's failing health and incapacitation. The Snow interview[1] seems to confirm this. Of course, one of Mao's doctors informed Snow simply that Mao had no "organic troubles". All he suffered from was "the normal fatigue of his age." Snow himself did not find him a sick man. He rather found him "wholly relaxed" throughout his 6-7 hour long conversation with him despite the fact that for Mao it came "at the end of strenuous weeks of daily and nightly conferences". But when, far in the night before taking leave of a half-sleepy Mao, Snow observed that "judging from this evening you seem to be in good condition," "Mao smiled wryly", says Snow, "and replied that there was perhaps some doubt about that". And then he left Snow, and through him the world, in no doubt when he repeated that he was in fact 'getting ready to see God very soon'.

[1] *The Sunday Times*, London, February 14, 1965, p. 11.

This, the removal by death in the near future of the chief architect and engineer of the Chinese revolution, heightens the relevance of the question whether China's younger generation, if not Mao's immediate successors, can and will carry the revolution forward to communism. Snow did ask this question and Mao did answer it. And the answer is revealing, too, of Mao's own thinking and feeling in the matter.

It was towards the end of their conversation — which ranged wide over what Mao called "*shan nan hai pei*" i. e. "from south of the mountains to north of the seas" — that Snow asked whether under existing circumstances, Mao really saw any hope of improvement in Sino-American relations. Mao thought that there was hope but that it would take time. Maybe there would be no improvement in his generation. He was soon going to see God. This led Snow to ask the logical question: "You have fundamentally changed the environment in China. Many wonder what the younger generation bred under easier conditions will do. What do you think about it ?" Mao's answer as reported by Snow, for Mao did not want to be quoted directly, may be summarised thus:

> Mao said he also could not know. He doubted that anyone could be sure. There were however two possibilities: There could be a continued development of the revolution towards communism, or the youth could negate it and make peace with imperialism, bring the remnants of the Chiang-Kai-shek clique back to the mainland, and take a stand beside the small percentage of counter-revolutionaries still in the country. He did not hope for counter-revolution but future events would be decided only by future generations. The youth of today and those after them would assess the work of the revolution in accordance with their own values. Man's condition was changing with ever increasing rapidity. A thousand years from now all of them, even Marx, Engels, and Lenin, would possibly appear rather ridiculous.

This, indeed, is a significant statement by Mao. More so, it would seem, because it is in a long time that he has spoken out his mind about so serious an internal problem of China as the untrustworthiness of the younger generation which endangers the very future of the revolution. Since the year of the Great Leap (1958) Mao is known to have virtually confined his public statements to questions of international relations. Mao's views on this problem cannot therefore be under-rated as an inconsequential after-dinner musing by him in the presence of an old friend with whom he had no particular reason to be discreet.

Snow's question obviously had a sense of immediacy about it. Otherwise it would make no sense. If his purpose was to elicit Mao's views as to what would happen to the Chinese revolution in a thousand years from now, he might as well not have asked the question. For, in that long long run, all of us would be dead ten times over, and much

more than Marxism, Leninism and Maoism might appear absurd, or might not. We can really talk meaningfully only about the fores eeable future, or the next generation or two at most. And it is even· about this meaningfully foreseeable future that Mao is utterly uncertain: 'there could be a continued development of the revolution...or the youth could negate it...' One is just as possible as the other! Mao even seems to be indifferent: 'future events would be decided only by future generations', and pessimistic: 'they would assess the work of the revolution in accordance with their own values'. So that the values of even the next generation or two cannot be determined by changing the material conditions or the 'relations of the forces of production' in the present. To put it differently, nothing that could be done in the present could really make much difference to the future. Mao seems to have developed serious doubts about the doctrine of 'historical inevitability'.

Coming from Mao, a romantic and a revolutionary of forty years' standing, so courageous in struggle, so undaunted by adversity, so sure of his ultimate success and so implacable of will as to bend or break men, things, facts and theories to his own revolutionary purpose, the statement cannot be regarded as anything less than pessimistic.

To be sure, Mao's pessimism is relative — to his own earlier unbounded optimism which reached its highest point of expression in the idea of Great Leap Forward. It is also the kind of pessimism which in a leader of any other country today might appear as plain common sense.

Mao's statement reflects an attitude of helplessness and resignation which is not wholly explained by old age and incapacitation. For, precisely at this age Mao, both personally and as a national leader, has reasons to feel satisfied too. He has triumphed over innumerable odds and won national power. He has not only maximised this power since then but also made the world feel it. Internally, economic progress is not unimpressive by Chinese standards if not by Asian. And yet Mao does not say 'I have done my best and my successors will do the rest'. He rather seems to say 'I am not sure that I have done my best, and that my successors will not undo it.'

There seem to be good reasons, too, for Mao's feeling of uncertainty bordering on pessimism. Since achieving national power, the Party and the regime have dedicated their major efforts to transforming the individual Chinese, whom they have always regarded as the basic ingredient of all their plans to build the New China of Mao's vision. It is needless to describe here the various campaigns and movements aunched by the Party from time to time to 'remould the thinking' of

both the intellectuals and the masses. Suffice it to point out that the present fervid and all-encompassing "socialist education campaign" which has been sweeping across the length and breadth of China for some time is permeated by a kind of pervasive anxiety on the part of the leadership even about the present. It is in fact a throwback for the Party and the regime. For it only emphasizes the total failure of all efforts so far at spiritual tranformation of the people. With all his heaven-storming will and capacity, Mao seems to realise more and more now that there is nothing he could do to instil his thought and value system into the minds and hearts of the people. He can break their minds and hearts but cannot bend them to his purpose.

Mao's pessimism about the next generation seems to be as warranted as the anxiety of the rest of the leadership about the present, because the tasks which they have undertaken are stupendous. It is not merely a matter of transforming society in the classical Marxist sense. It is also one of transforming man so that the new Chinese man would never fall a prey to the snares of a life of ease and comfort, which "the socialist transformation of productive forces" — meaning simply, industrialisation or modernisation — brings within easy reach. These are the snares of 'goulash communism' which for Mao are patently the cause of Soviet degeneration into 'revisionism'. Mao may, with propaganda and discipline, be able to force the Chinese people to live austerely. His colleagues of the old guard, too, may be depended upon to live up to the exacting demands of his vision. But, who can be sure of the future generations? Mao seems to be extremely doubtful that their values would be the same as his. Obviously, he now realises that he demands too much of human nature.

It is not merely this vision of the new socialist China and the new Chinese man with an infinite revolutionary will triumphing over the frailties of human nature, that is so difficult of achievement. Even the new tasks of constructive development of the country, Mao seems to find out of tune with his own romantic and passionate idealism. The forced retreat from the Great Leap during 1960-62 and the economic realism that has come to prevail since then must also be a cause for disappointment for Mao. Not "redness" but "expertness" is what is required more and more to build a modern industrial economy. And the New China of Mao's vision, whatever else it might or might not have, has to have a modern industrial economy. With all his "Promethean urge to fashion nature", as Stuart Schram puts it in his *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, Mao cannot bend the laws of economics to his purpose. Nor can he fashion nature with bare hands even when they are as many as 1400 million. Mao seems to realise in

his own mind that the simple economic ideas, which he had developed and matured in the good old days of the Kiangsi Soviet and in the Yennan caves in virtual isolation from the outside world, are rather unsuited to the many different kinds of humdrum tasks which need to be performed every day with increasing skill and efficiency just to produce different kinds of goods.

All this however does not mean that the Party and the regime have not much use any longer for the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". The Chinese economy is still far from being capable of breeding easy conditions. At least until it develops that capability, it seems certain that the Party and the regime will continue to find a useful weapon in the 'thought of Chairman Mao', if only to curb comfort-loving tendencies among the people. For, Maoism may be characterised as spiritual communism, because Mao evidently insists that the material conditions cannot be changed until man himself has been changed from within, his thinking and feeling have been remoulded. It thus becomes a question not so much of improving material conditions as of educating people to believe that they are improving. This is the whole point of the wave-like mass movements and campaigns of post-liberation China.

But quite apart from such unspiritual, and sometimes even ridiculous, uses to which the "great" and "brilliant thought of Chairman Mao" is put, it is true that a good majority of top leaders who are at the helm today and are most likely to remain there in the years immediately after Mao's death, genuinely subscribe to his ideas and share his vision of New China. They are concerned as much with the problem of modernising the economy as with creating "revolutionary successors" for generations to come. As a historian of Chinese Communism has said recently, "as long as Mao and those close to him remain at the helm, we may expect them to be as much concerned with the vision (of Mao) as with any of the other goals of the regime".[2] But this is small consolation for Mao for whom revolutions are an endless necessity, for revolutions are "qualitative changes" generated as much by "antagonistic contradictions" between classes in a socialist society as by "non-antagonistic contradictions" between members of the society even after communism is established.

Mao's statement to Snow seems to betray his worry at the possible developments in China after him — developments such as have taken place in other communist countries and which negate his romantic revoluntarily ideal of radical transformation of Man.

[2] Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernisation and the Maoist Vision", *The China Quarterly*, Jan-Mar, 1965, p. 19.