

**A
DECADE
OF
MAO'S
CHINA**

**A
SURVEY
OF
LIFE &
THOUGHT
IN
CHINA
TODAY**

**CHANDRASEKHAR • DR. HAROLD C. HINTON
E. WILLIAMS AND TEN OTHERS**

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This volume brings together a collection of specially written articles on life and thought in China during the period October 1, 1949 to September 30, 1959. The authors, 13 well-known scholars in the field of Far Eastern and Chinese studies have written 17 articles based exclusively on personal observations and material drawn from Communist Chinese documents and sources. Each article is an entity in itself, reporting on one aspect of the Chinese scene. As a collection, the articles cover most of the major changes which have taken place in China during its first decade.

The book includes a "Who's Who" in Chinese Communist Party and the Government and a chronology of events during the first decade of Mao's China.

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A SURVEY OF LIFE AND
THOUGHT IN CHINA TODAY

By

DR. S. CHANDRASEKHAR, DR. HAROLD C. HINTON
DR. LEA E. WILLIAMS
AND TEN OTHERS

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
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INTRODUCTION

This volume brings together a collection of articles on life and thought in China today.

The authors are well-known scholars in the field of Far Eastern and Chinese studies and they have drawn exclusively on Communist Chinese sources for their documented reports.

Each article is an entity in itself, reporting on one aspect of the current Chinese scene. As a group, the articles cover most of the major changes which have taken place in China during its first decade.

One series of related articles shows how the Chinese Communist Party has been able to control the country's vast population, while another shows how this population has fared under its rule. Other articles discuss the Party's colonial ambitions, and report briefly on the successes and failures in its attempt to impose Communist Chinese rule on alien peoples and in previously independent or semi-independent areas. A discussion of the problems faced by religious believers in their efforts to practise their faiths in a society controlled by militant materialists is also included, as are two significant appraisals of today's China by nationals of other Asian countries.

The articles were selected with a view to providing the lay reader with a concise, factual glimpse of the results of ten years of communist rule in the world's most heavily populated country, and the vast changes it has wrought in the material, cultural and religious lives of the people.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I: OBJECTIVES	
THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA ..	1
II: THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS METHODS	
THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHINA ..	13
THE MINOR PARTIES AND THE "UNITED FRONT" ..	19
III: TWO ASIAN VIEWS OF COMMUNIST CHINA	
REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR OF COMMUNIST CHINA ..	24
LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY	29
IV: THE CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER COMMUNISM	
THE PEASANTS, COLLECTIVISATION, AND COMMUNES ..	33
RELIGION IN CHINA SINCE 1949	44
YOUTH AND THE FAMILY	50
CHINESE WRITERS: REVOLUTIONARIES OR DOGMATISTS ?	57
V: THE CHINESE ECONOMY : CLAIMS AND REALITIES	
THE CHINESE ECONOMY SINCE 1949	62
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA ..	69
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ..	75
VI: CONTINUING PROBLEMS	
THE SINO-SOVIET AXIS	81
POPULATION AND COMMUNES	92
CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY	98
VII: COMMUNIST CHINA AS A COLONIAL POWER	
CHINA'S MINORITY NATIONALITIES ..	105
TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST RULE ..	114
VIII: CHARTS AND CHRONOLOGY	
CHINA'S COMMUNIST LEADERS	121
COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949-1959: A SUMMARY	
CHRONOLOGY	136

I: OBJECTIVES



THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

by Lea E. Williams

ON October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it had taken control of the mainland, and a new regime was proclaimed. During the decade which has followed, the policies of the Chinese Communists have appeared to alter direction repeatedly. Their fundamental objectives have, however, remained unchanged.

Their programmes have passed through periods of experimentation, followed by periods of rapid change, intensive pressure, and then temporary relaxation. There have been shifts of emphasis in response to opportunities or practical difficulties, but the Communists have consistently sought to attain five basic objectives. They have temporarily de-emphasised one objective in order to seek another, but they have always returned to their original course.

In order to understand these objectives and the means used by the Communists to attain them, it is first necessary

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to consider the political materials available to the regime. They make use of two traditions. The first of these, and the most important, is Marxism: an ideology alien to China, transformed by Lenin, Stalin and their successors into a formula for winning and maintaining political control. Although the Chinese Communists have at times diverged from Soviet practice, the Soviet Union has been their principal model and the source of both doctrine and methods.

Secondly, the Chinese Communists make use of many precedents in the historical tradition of imperial China. They have selected those aspects of China's traditional system which facilitate totalitarian control and the imposition of Marxism. At the same time, they are endeavouring to eliminate the traditional Chinese values which tend to obstruct central political control; (and it is these values, on the whole, which have contributed to the greatness of Chinese civilisation). An interplay between Marxist methods and imperial precedents can be seen in the Communists' approach to each of their basic political objectives.

The first of these objectives was to achieve control over all of China. This was the Party's goal ever since its founding in 1921 and throughout the long period of "armed struggle". On October 1, 1949, it was not entirely accomplished, but organised military opposition was eliminated on the mainland by the middle of 1950.

In the eyes of the Communists, "China" included all areas which had been under the actual or nominal control of the Manchu empire or the Nationalist government. They made no exception of areas like Tibet and Sinkiang which had enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy and had overwhelmingly non-Chinese populations. The Communists took over Sinkiang in late 1949 and began the invasion of Tibet in October 1950. In May 1951 the Tibetan government was forced to accept Chinese Communist occupation. Taiwan has remained the only area over which the Communists claim sovereignty but do not exercise control.

Peking's suppression of the Tibetan rebellion provides a tragic example of the importance attached to this objective by the Communists. Tibetan resistance to Communist rule began in 1952, and armed revolt broke out in eastern Tibet in 1956. Making a temporary tactical retreat, the

Communists postponed the communisation of Tibet. In March 1959, however, the people of Lhasa began an open rebellion which spread throughout Tibet. Faced with the possibility that Tibet might win its independence, the Communists ruthlessly put down the rebellion despite condemnation from every part of the world.

The second objective of the Chinese Communists was to consolidate political control over the mainland and assure its maintenance. This was to some extent a conventional exercise in military and civil administration: army units were posted around the country, a police network was rapidly built up, pockets of armed opposition were eliminated, and an administrative structure was established. Similar measures have been taken in China whenever one dynasty supplanted another.

Analogies with China's dynastic history are, however, inadequate. The Communists applied modern totalitarian techniques which were not available to the old imperial regimes. Political consolidation was carried out with unprecedented thoroughness.

It is important to note, however, that it was carried out gradually. Immediate elimination of all opposition and rapid imposition of Communist institutions would have alienated most of the population, added to the disruption of the economy, and made it impossible to administer the state.

So the Communists declared a policy of "New Democracy" and used the method of the "united front"—a method utilised by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but applied with greater subtlety by the Chinese Communists. The peasants were told that they would receive land taken from the landlords. Promises were made to businessmen, intellectuals, members of national minorities, religious leaders, the overseas Chinese, and other groups with a specific social identity. They were told that they could continue to play a part in China's political and economic life as long as they accepted the "leadership" of the Communist Party. Each group was assured that its interests, traditions, and property would be respected.

The peasants were the most important, and the most numerous, element in Chinese society. "Land reform" redistributed the land, but this was not the Communists' only

purpose. Between 1948 and 1952 carefully-organised and minutely-trained teams of Communist cadres moved across China, beginning in the Northeast (Manchuria) and ending in the South and remote Southwest. Their principal duty was to identify village leaders who were likely to be centres of opposition. All were branded as "landlords", "oppressors", "reactionaries", and "bad elements", although in fact many were simply smallholders, traders, and independent peasants.

Demonstrations and "popular tribunals" were organised in order to humiliate and neutralise these actual or potential opponents. Their property was taken away, reducing the economic basis of their prestige and influence. Millions were executed, but a number were left alive. The Communists wished to appear reasonable and lenient, and they wanted the peasants who had received land to fear retaliation at the hands of surviving landowners. Their intention was to give the greatest number of peasants a personal and economic interest in the preservation of the regime.

City populations were less important in terms of numbers and were easier to control, but the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns of 1951-52 were a rough parallel to "land reform". These were intended to weaken the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty merchants and make them economically dependent on the state. Their resources were drained off by heavy fines for alleged economic offences and corruption. These campaigns also eliminated any remaining influence of non-Communist officials in local administrations. Some were executed, tens of thousands were discharged, other thousands sent to do forced labour. The remainder were forced to conform to Communist orders.

Although the appearance of a "united front" has been preserved, the Communists have retracted their early promises whenever it appeared practicable and convenient. In late 1955 and early 1956 all privately-owned factories, business firms, and even small pedlars were put under direct or indirect state control. The national minorities were organised into "autonomous" administrations which were in fact mechanisms controlled by the Communist Party. The Communists organised a persistent attack on the national and religious traditions of the minority peoples. Intellectuals were required to accept Communist domination and the non-

Communist parties became shadows with no political power. The third fundamental political objective has two aspects: the Communists seek to establish a Marxist-Leninist society in China and build a powerful modern economy. Communist statements always link these two elements; it is consistently claimed, in fact, that economic advance is possible only if accompanied by social transformation along Marxist lines.

Industrialisation and an improved standard of living can, of course, be achieved by non-totalitarian methods. This has often been implicitly admitted by the Chinese Communists themselves, who have at times laid their doctrines aside for brief periods in order to recover a drop in production or prevent a serious interruption of economic growth. At these times the Communists have temporarily moderated their efforts to form Marxist institutions and returned to ordinary economic incentives.

After these periods of relaxation, however, the Communists have always returned to their basic programme, which has been to collectivise the peasantry and industrialise the economy as rapidly as possible. Collectivisation was considered necessary in order to facilitate political control and increase agricultural production without a corresponding increase in peasant consumption. Industrialisation, with an emphasis on heavy industry, has been sought in order to provide the Chinese Communist state with the economic and military power considered necessary for influence in world affairs.

During the early years of the regime Communist spokesmen declared that the peasantry would be collectivised only after industry was able to provide them with modern farm machinery.

Soon this was reversed; in 1955 and 1956 the peasants were forced into collective farms in order to provide greater savings for investment in industry. The Communists considered that the peasants, farming as individuals, ate too much of their own crop, and collectivisation seemed the only effective way to limit their consumption. In this they followed the pattern set by the Soviet Union, although in China collectivisation was ordered much sooner after the formation of the regime and was carried out more rapidly.

It should be pointed out that, although the Communists employed an imported form of organisation and applied it with unprecedented severity, they made use of a basic practice of China's imperial dynasties. The Chinese peasantry has always been forced to provide its rulers with grain for the imperial storehouses, taxes to support the bureaucracy, and wealth and manpower to further imperial ambitions abroad. Today the Communists are doing the same, and with much greater thoroughness and ruthlessness.

During the last six months of 1958 the Chinese Communists carried out a programme which had no precedent in imperial China and only limited antecedents in the history of Communism. This was the drive to organise communes—collective farms of enormous size, with ten to thirty thousand members organised into semi-military labour brigades.

Communist policy toward China's peasants provides an indication of the increased pace at which Marxist doctrine is being applied in China. "Land reform" was accompanied by protracted preparation, explanation, and persuasion, and was carried out over a period of several years. Collectivisation was completed much more rapidly, but about nine months passed between Mao Tse-tung's call for nationwide collectivisation in July 1955 and the end of the drive. Communes were formed at whirlwind speed. All but a small percentage of collective farms were transformed into communes during the single month of September 1958.

The purposes of communes are the same as those used to justify collectivisation: they place the peasants under closer political control and limit consumption. The communes, by doling out rations in communal mess halls, reduce consumption to an absolute minimum. Communes also tighten political control by putting peasants in local militia and labour brigades under the centralised direction of Party cadres.

Nor are China's workers exempt. It would be logical to assume that the dogma of Marxism and Peking's emphasis on industrialisation would put the urban labour force in a favoured position. Marxist theory gives the industrial proletariat a role of unique prestige, power, and historical destiny. The Chinese Communists constantly repeat this doctrine, but they apply it in a Leninist sense: the proletariat is allowed to

rule only through the Communist Party. The Party, not the proletarians themselves, decides what the interests of the working man shall be.

Factory workers in mainland China are somewhat better off than the peasants; millions of peasants have streamed into the cities from the countryside, creating serious urban unemployment despite the Communists' attempts to stop this migration. Nevertheless, the industrial worker in China has no right to strike. His labour union is under the direct control of the Party, which also determines the policies of the state enterprises which employ him. His wages are low and he is constantly required to meet higher production targets. According to the Communists' plans, wages are to be increased much more slowly than productivity, giving a growing proportion to the state for its own purposes.

The pattern is relatively simple. The Communists took power and assured each social group in China that its interests would be served under the new regime. They then consolidated their political control over every village and every factory. When these preparations were completed, the Communists ordered collectivisation, rapid industrialisation, the takeover of private industry, and then communes. All these measures had one purpose: to add to the power exercised by the Chinese Communist Party and further its ambitions.

The Communist Party and Imperial Precedents

In mainland China today the Communist Party exercises absolute control over the state, the economy, and the people. Party statements about every conceivable subject always include a declaration that nothing would be possible without the "wise and correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and the central people's government, and by firm reliance on the labouring masses".

Throughout the history of Communism in China, one objective has been paramount: to maintain the Chinese Communist Party as a political entity, preserving its organisation, the position of the central leadership, its doctrinal purity, and its control over the armed forces.

On many occasions the Communist Party has retreated from advanced positions, abandoned cherished programmes, or scuttled carefully-prepared propaganda campaigns because the Party itself seemed in danger. Military strategy provides the clearest example. During the civil war against the Nationalists the Communists abandoned their revolutionary efforts south of the Yangtse and made an arduous trek to Yen-an in China's remote Northwest in order to consolidate and strengthen their forces for a later attack.

The "hundred flowers" experiment of 1957 is another example of the over-riding importance accorded to the party as an entity. Mao Tse-tung urged Chinese intellectuals to speak out, but they went beyond the limits he had set and criticised the basic assumptions of the Communist regime. One purpose of Mao's offer to the intellectuals was to give the world the impression that freedom of speech was possible under Communism in China. This propaganda advantage was sacrificed when the Communist leaders saw that criticisms were being directed at the Party itself. While the world watched with concern, dismay, and disappointment, Peking forced its critics to make self-abasing "confessions", removed them from their posts, and sent many to labour in the countryside.

A series of campaigns, intended to maintain the obedience and orthodoxy of Party members at all levels, has been launched since 1949. There have been drives against bureaucratism, "localism", wasteful expenditure, and corruption. All Party cadres are required to carry on constant study of Marxism, Leninism, and the writings of Mao Tse-tung. This is supplemented with periodic campaigns intended to focus the Party's attention on important current problems within the organisation. In most cases these "study movements" involve special attention to some work by Mao or Liu Shao-chi (the Party's expert on ideological and organisational conformity), a directive issued by the Central Committee, or an important editorial statement in the Peking *People's Daily*, official newspaper of the Central Committee.

The role of the Party in China today has many aspects derived from the Leninist principles of party organisation, but it is also true that the Communist Party makes use of historical precedents when they are to its advantage.

Today, as in the past, China is ruled by a relatively small body of men. The Chinese tradition which justifies rule by an exclusive elite was of obvious utility to the Communists. When they speak of the "revolutionary vanguard" or the "dictatorship of the proletariat" they are in effect admitting the elitist nature of their organisation.

It is interesting to note that now, as in the past, this governing elite has been recruited from a relatively well-to-do literate minority. The persons who hold the top positions of power on the mainland today include few former peasants and ex-workers. Most are intellectuals of petty-bourgeois background. This remains true of the Party in general despite periodic efforts to recruit more peasants and workers. Mao Tse-tung's humble origin is often extolled, but his "peasant" father employed hired hands and was able to launch young Mao on a costly formal education.

The Communist elite has also taken advantage of China's tradition of political centralisation. Every dynasty has attempted to centralise all power in the capital and eliminate the counter-tendency toward provincial and regional autonomy or semi-autonomy. The Communists have gone farther in this respect than any earlier regime. Modern techniques of communications and totalitarian political methods have made it possible for the Communists to regiment the Chinese people to an unprecedented degree.

Communism is a foreign ideology, imported into China. Some commentators have made a comparison with the adoption of Buddhism, which was imported from India fifteen hundred years ago. It is more than far fetched, however, to argue that there is a similarity between the gradual spread of a gentle religious philosophy and the current insistence upon adherence to an alien and uncompromising political doctrine.

With an intensity and thoroughness never before seen in China—or, indeed, anywhere else—the Communists have thrust their doctrines on the Chinese people. Study of the official dogma is not limited to party members; peasants, workers, minor officials, intellectuals, soldiers, and housewives must also spend part of every day repeating their doctrinal lesson. If they learn too slowly, question the official line, or have violated some petty rule they must carry out

“self-criticism”. The pressure is such that no one can maintain silence; all are required to declare their support for Communism.

The final fundamental objective of the Chinese Communists is to propagate Marxism abroad and, whenever an opportunity presents itself, bring about the establishment of Communist regimes in other countries. During the early years of the regime, Communist policy in Asia was one of “revolutionary armed struggle”. Peking gave support to the Communist guerrillas in Malaya (most of whom were Chinese), assisted the Communist forces in Vietnam, took part in the occupation of North Korea and the attempt to seize South Korea, and gave help to Communist dissidents in Burma, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Policy shifted in 1953 and 1954. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai declared his support for the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Once North Vietnam and North Korea had been brought under Communist rule, there were no other Asian countries in which the local Communist Party was strong enough to seize control and keep it. Secondly, Peking presumably realised that a Communist takeover in one country would cause its neighbours to have doubts about the desirability of a neutralist policy. Finally, since 1954 Peking has considered the diplomatic support of neutralist Asian countries of more immediate importance than revolutionary activity. This does not mean, however, that Peking has severed connections with foreign Communist parties. A constant stream of Asian Communist leaders visits Peking as well as Moscow in order to lay plans for disrupting governments and economies abroad. Presumably they also prepare for a future shift back to a declared policy of “armed struggle”.

There are ample historical precedents for Chinese expansionism. Every strong imperial regime has attempted to expand its borders. At one time or another Chinese imperial governments have controlled Vietnam, Korea, the Ryukyus, and most of central Asia in addition to the territory now regarded as Chinese. Nepal and many Southeast Asian states have at one time or another rendered tribute to the imperial court and accepted vague Chinese suzerainty.

In this area as in others, however, the Communists are

following an imperial precedent but using radically different methods. The imperial regimes never had anything approaching disciplined, well-organised local political parties serving the interests of Peking abroad. The tribute relationship was exceedingly loose, was intended to facilitate trade rather than establish political control, and usually involved limited infringements on the sovereignty of the tributary states.

The ultimate objective of Chinese Communist foreign policy is apparently to turn China's neighbours into duplicates of North Vietnam. The Hanoi regime obediently reflects and repeats Peking's directives and has attempted to indoctrinate and control its people through the same methods employed by the Communists in China. The goal may be the same as that of the old emperors, but the Communists' plans are much more absolute and the methods employed are both new and ominous.

In working toward these fundamental objectives the Chinese Communist Party has, as we have seen, selected certain aspects of the traditional Chinese system and used them for its own ends. These included, on the whole, the worst features of China's imperial political structure: political centralisation, rule by an elite, dogmatism, exploitation of the peasantry, and expansionism. The intellectuals, political figures, and ordinary people who took part in the Chinese revolutionary movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries wanted, for the most part, to establish some form of democracy in China. Consequently, most of them were opposed to precisely those aspects of the imperial system which the Communists have found it expedient to exploit.

And at the same time the Communists have carried out a determined assault on the aspects of Chinese tradition and society which have been the foundation of Chinese civilisation. The family has always been the basis of the social order in China; society was bound together by ties of kinship. The Communists have denounced these customary relationships as "feudal", and normal ties of affection have been termed "reactionary".

Communes are, in part, intended to weaken the family. Members are fed in mess halls, children are taken from their parents and placed in communal nurseries, and husbands

and wives are separated during the day for work in labour brigades. Older people, the focus of influence and respect under the traditional system, are sent off to homes for the aged where they are required to do as much work as their strength permits. Peasants have been ordered to tear down family shrines and allow the communes to plough up grave plots.

Communist editors have gone through the Chinese classics, revising them, making excisions, and annotating them in order to make them conform to Communist doctrine. The leaders of religious groups have been required to serve Communist ends, and many have been imprisoned, executed, or forced to make public confessions of alleged crime. A steady effort is made to obliterate the local traditions and customs of China's various regions and minority nationalities; along with the Chinese people, they are being absorbed into a vast, conformist mass culture. It is the Party centre in Peking which dictates the form and content of life in "New China".

The record of Chinese Communism during its first ten years of power cannot simply be calculated in terms of steel production and kilowatt-hours of electricity. It must be considered in human terms, and by these standards the cost of a decade of Communist rule in China has been appallingly high.

II: THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS METHODS



THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHINA

by Peter S. H. Tang

IN mainland China today the most noticeable, most important, and most symbolic figure is the cadre. Cadres, clad in uniform blue suits and soft cloth caps, are everywhere: posting Party newspapers on streetcorner billboards, managing communes, organising rallies, checking on the political reliability and "labour enthusiasm" of peasants, steelworkers, or former businessmen.

A cadre may be a high-ranking official of the Communist Party, an ordinary member of the Party or Young Communist League, or even a non-Party "activist". *Kan-pu*, the Chinese term for cadre, can be translated as "someone who gets things done". In every case they are trained in Marxist doctrine, are under the direction of the Central Party leadership, and are supposed to "get things done" only as the Party orders. It is through millions of cadres at every level of Chinese society that the Communist Party controls the

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Domestic and Foreign Policies and Russian and Soviet
Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931.*

lives of 650 million Chinese.

The Party and its cadres are directed from the top. In China the Communists have adhered strictly to the Leninist concept of a society controlled by a tightly-organised core of elite Party members. According to the Party constitution, decisions are made by the Central Committee and Party congresses. But these bodies are large and meet infrequently.

In practice the centre of power is the seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo. This is headed by Mao Tse-tung, who has been chairman of the Party since 1935. The other members are Liu Shao-chi, who recently replaced Mao in the post of chief of state, Premier Chou En-lai, Party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping, Marshal Chu Teh, economic specialist Chen Yun, and Marshal Lin Piao.

Mao and his associates are at the apex of a pyramidal hierarchy. The members of the Standing Committee are also members of the full Politburo, with twenty members and six alternate members, and of the Central Committee, which has nearly 100 full members and an equal number of alternate members.

Members of these bodies fill all the important offices of the Party, the state, and the armed forces. The state is an administrative facade, carrying out policies which have been determined by the Party. The premier and the members of the State Council, or cabinet, are all members of the Central Committee and most are members of the Politburo. Most of the ministers, members of the National Defence Council, and first secretaries of provincial Party Committees are members of the Central Committee. All key posts in provincial and local administrations, down to the county and rural administrative district, are held by Party members.

Members of the Party also direct the National People's Congress, composed of 1,226 Party and non-Party delegates. Elections are indirect; provincial and municipal People's Congress merely approve slates nominated by the Central Party authorities. Members are also appointed to represent overseas Chinese and the army. It meets for a few weeks every year to approve Party decisions, which are never criticised in delegates' speeches. Its Standing Committee, which meets every few weeks, is headed by Marshal Chu Teh, who replaced Liu Shao-chi in April 1959.

Similar Party control is exercised over the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, members of which are appointed from "popular organisations", various social classes, national minorities, and other groups. It serves as a supplementary sounding-board for Party directives.

A complex structure of other organisations provides additional conduits of power and lines of communications for the Party. The Young Communist League, similar in organisation and functions to the Soviet Komsomol, is intended to assist the Party and provide cadres for propaganda, political work, and special "shock work" brigades. It also serves as a testing ground for future Party members. Its 24,000,000 members are controlled by its own network of committees and by regular Party members delegated to supervise its work.

"People's organisations" are controlled by the Party's United Front Department, and in every case at least one key office is held by a high-ranking Party member. They are referred to in Communist documents as "transmission belts", intended to bring professional and mass organisations under Party control. Some of the most important are the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, whose honorary chairman is Liu Shao-chi, the All-China Students' Federation, the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.

Other "people's organisations" have been established to serve as "popular" sounding-boards for Party policies, especially in foreign relations. These include the China Peace Committee, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade. "Friendship Associations" have been set up to provide non-diplomatic channels of communication abroad. The oldest, largest and most important, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, is used to generate popular acceptance of the alliance with the Soviet Union.

Since the "socialist transformation" of 1955-56 China's industry and agriculture have been under direct state control. This means that Party cadres and their non-Party associates supervise, and in most cases direct, the management of every

factory, rural commune, and commercial establishment. Through "street committees" and the police net-work they also supervise the home life of the people.

Media of information and opinion are also controlled by the Party. It supervises the radio, directs the posting of bulletins and propaganda posters, and organises a constant succession of mass campaigns and rallies presided over by cadres. Newspapers and magazines are either outright organs of Party bodies or supervised by Party committees.

All these activities are directed by a Party with only twelve million members. This makes the Chinese Communist Party the largest Communist Party in the world, but it is still small relative to China's enormous population. In order to meet its requirements for skilled and politically-reliable personnel the Party has added to its membership. It is now ten times larger than it was at the time of the Seventh Party Congress in 1945.

There have been periodic suspensions in recruitment, the most recent in 1957, when the Party leaders decided to concentrate on consolidation. On the whole, however, the Party has grown steadily, and, in late 1958 and early 1959 there was a new membership drive. Like earlier drives, it concentrated upon "activists" who had served as non-Party cadres.

On December 27, 1958, the Peking *People's Daily*, official organ of the Central Committee, announced that Kuo Mo-jo, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, Minister of Health, Mme. Li Teh-chuan, Minister of Geology, Li Sze-kwang, and eminent physicist Ch'ien Hsueh-shen had become members of the Party. All were identified as former activists. During 1958 new Party members included 57,000 activists in Hunan province, over 16,000 in Honan province, and more than 10,000 women activists in Chekiang province.

Pressure is applied on prominent intellectuals in order to induce or compel them to join the Party. This is intended to demonstrate that the Party enjoys the allegiance and service of leading members of a class whose technical skills are needed by the Communists. The recent recruitments indicate that a greater degree of Party and social pressure was applied during the 1958-59 drive than was the case in the past.

Certain activists are kept outside the Party because they can be used to maintain Peking's claim of a "united front". The most prominent is Mme. Soong Ching-ling, widow of China's revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen. Her long collaboration with the Communists, which began before they took power on the mainland, culminated in her selection in April 1959 as a vice-chief of state. Other activists or fellow-travellers are given roles in "popular organisations", "friendship societies", and the non-Communist parties which have been permitted to maintain a shadow existence.

Unlike Communist Parties in the Soviet Union, East Europe, and most other countries, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has remained remarkably stable during the twenty-five years since Mao Tse-tung assumed its chairmanship. Differences of opinion have been apparent, even in official statements released by the Party press, but there has been only one high-level purge. This took place in 1954, when Kao Kang, a member of the Politburo, principal Communist official in Manchuria, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, was accused of "anti-Party activities".

Jao Shu-shih, chief of the Party's organisation department, was accused of conspiring with Kao Kang. Kao committed suicide and Jao was jailed. The rarity of high-level purges does not mean, however, that the Chinese Communist party has had no organisational problems. The Communist leadership has found it difficult to maintain both efficiency and political reliability in the Party and its appendages.

There has been a constant tendency for Party members to lapse into bureaucratism, to lose contact with the people, and engage in "commandism"—the practice of relying on orders and coercion rather than propaganda and persuasion. Especially in the provincial and lower levels of the Party, there have from time to time been "deviations" and rejections of central discipline.

These "deviations" have resulted in a series of low-level purges and "rectification" campaigns. From 1940 to 1942, while the Communists were still based in the hills of Shensi province, Mao launched a programme for the "correction of unorthodox tendencies". He opposed "sectarianism", "subjectivism", and "party formalism".

Similar campaigns, on a smaller scale, were carried out

in succeeding years. In early 1957, however, Mao evidently felt that another major effort was necessary. At first the stress was on efficiency and the elimination of Party bureaucratism. In a February 1957 speech Mao Tse-tung approved the policy of "let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend". One purpose of this limited freedom of speech was to secure corrective criticism of minor Party errors from non-Communists as well as Party officials. Mao found, however, that the "hundred flowers" included some dangerously unorthodox blooms; there was widespread criticism of basic Party policies as well as local errors.

So in June 1957 the emphasis was again placed on political reliability: critics were required to recant, and there was a general "rectification" campaign for both Party members and non-Communists in every walk of life. Hundreds of Party members were dismissed, 63 delegates were removed from the National People's Congress, and many high officials, including three ministers, lost their posts.

Purges of lower-level Party functionaries continued throughout 1958: more than fifty provincial officials, including governors, vice-governors, or members of provincial Party committees, were removed. The pendulum appeared to have swung back during the early months of 1959, when some of the "rightists" suspended in 1957-58 were partially rehabilitated.

In an attempt to maintain discipline and decrease the Party's aloofness from the people, the Communist leadership has since 1957 ordered functionaries to work in factories and villages and serve in army units. In theory, they are to remain there for one month per year. Mao, Liu, Chu and the entire Central Committee put in a few afternoons of well-publicised work on a dam near Peking. The *People's Daily* for March 4, 1959 reported that the first secretaries of provincial Party committees of Yunnan, Shantung, Kuangtung and other provinces took part in labour in communes. Marshals, generals, and lesser officers have been required to serve as common soldiers for varying periods.

After ten years in power the Chinese Communist Party has changed from a relatively compact band of doctrinaire revolutionaries into a vast organisation directing the affairs of a complex state. This has involved widespread changes in

the tone and morale of the Party as well as problems of structure and leadership. The Party's central authorities have made attempts to counteract these changes, but as time passes they are likely to prove increasingly difficult to control. Whatever happens, however, it is clear that as long as the Communist Party remains in power it will continue to exercise close supervision over every aspect of life on the mainland.

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THE MINOR PARTIES AND THE "UNITED FRONT"

by Herold C. Hinton

FOR many years Communist Parties struggling to gain power have made a practice of infiltrating and exploiting non-Communist political parties and other public bodies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the years preceding its rise to power in 1949, was no exception to this rule. Under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, it showed exceptional skill in de-emphasising its long range objectives and stressing others of a kind more acceptable to Chinese public opinion.

It is in the period since 1949, however, that the CCP

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has shown the greatest originality (from a Communist standpoint) in its treatment of non-Communist political parties and other organisations. In Eastern Europe, Communist Parties after seizing power have usually swallowed one or more socialist parties, given the resulting Communist-dominated amalgam some such name as the Workers Party, and suppressed all other parties. As a result it has been very difficult for the regimes in question even to pretend that they are anything but one-party (or rather in theory, one-class) dictatorship. In Communist China, on the other hand, the CCP found a way to render this pretence somewhat less difficult to maintain.

No real socialist or peasant parties have ever existed in China. Even if they had, the CCP would not have established even nominal co-operation with them, for it has long insisted that it alone could represent the interests of the workers and peasants. The parties with which it collaborated earlier, and which it succeeded to a considerable degree in manipulating, were all bourgeois parties composed largely of intellectuals and business men. After 1949 the CCP neither suppressed the minor parties nor merged with them, but carefully preserved them as powerless showpieces.

The elaborate pretence that the CCP shares its power, or at least consults with the eight remaining minor parties, is still maintained. This is intended to foster the illusion at home and abroad that Communist China is not a one-party dictatorship or even a one-class dictatorship, but rather a dictatorship exercised by "the people" over "the reactionaries". The minor parties, together with other technically non-Communist organisations, are represented—by Communist-screened delegates—in a large and powerless body known as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. It is supposedly the representative organ of the "united front" theoretically existing in Communist China, but in reality it serves as a sounding board for Communist policies and pronouncements.

Minor party leaders have been appointed to high positions in the government and in mass organisations, but they have never been allowed to exercise real authority. Since 1954 even this nominal participation has steadily been pared down.

In the autumn of 1955, simultaneously with its campaign for the collectivisation of agriculture, the Communists launched a campaign for the "transformation" (in effect, the nationalisation) of private business. This step not only threatened the economic position of the bourgeoisie and its existence as a class but raised the question whether the minor parties, which are bourgeois in character for the most part, would be allowed to survive in an era of drastic socialisation.

The Communist Party's answer to this question was evidently determined by the consideration that the political usefulness of the minor parties as ornaments and evidence of the "united front" was too great to risk abolishing them. Early in 1956, accordingly, the CCP began to reassure the minor parties that their existence was not in danger. "So long as the Communist Party exists", promised the *People's Daily* on September 15, 1956, "the other democratic parties will also exist". In theory, the relationship between the Communist Party and the minor parties was to be one of "long term co-existence and mutual supervision".

From April 1956 to May 1957, the CCP carried out a modest programme of domestic "de-Stalinisation". In the course of this, non-Communists were invited, and even encouraged, to criticise the government and the CCP itself. The principal purpose was to prevent discontent from reaching Hungarian proportions. After much urging, a number of non-Communists spoke out in sharp criticism of the Communists in May 1957. Worse still, from the standpoint of the regime, there were large scale demonstrations of discontent by students. A number of minor party leaders had been prominent among the critics, so they were among the victims of the "antirightist struggle" which the Communists launched in June 1957. Within a few months they were required to recant, deprived of their posts in the government and in their own parties, and in some cases given what amounted to forced labour sentences of a year or two.

The machinery of the minor parties was brought more closely than ever under Communist control. The bourgeoisie in general was made to intone the line that having lost its economic base it was now voluntarily transforming its ideology in a working class (i.e., Communist) direction.

A rally of minor party members and "non-party democrats" in mid-March 1958 approved the following "charter". They were to be required to "reform their political standpoint, devotedly and resolutely taking the path of socialism under the leadership of the Communist Party; to be loyal to the socialist system, faithfully carrying out the state's policies and laws, and wholeheartedly contributing their knowledge and strength to the nation's construction; to study from the workers and peasants through practical work, establishing a proper attitude toward physical labour and actively developing the ideology and sentiments possessed by the working people; to study Marxism-Leninism and the advanced experience and technique of the Soviet Union; to carry through the policy of letting the hundred flowers bloom, the hundred schools of thought contend; to accelerate self-education to provide conditions for long term co-existence and mutual supervision, and firmly to carry out the united front policy in the service of socialism."

China's Communist leaders understandably refuse to admit the fact that the "anti-rightist struggle" has shattered what was left of the "democratic" facade which had been erected so carefully. Indeed, the Communists insist that the "united front" in China is firmer than ever.

Presumably in order to bolster this claim, in December 1958 the Communists allowed leading civilian "rightist" Chang Po-chun, and the leading military "rightist", Lung Yun, to be elected to the Standing Committees of their respective parties, the China Democratic League and the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. In April 1959 Chang, Lung, and sixteen other non-Communists who had been denounced as "rightists" were appointed as delegates to the 1959 sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Thus face has been saved all around and the myth of the "united front" is to be preserved.

In order to preserve the appearance of a "united front", the Chinese Communist regime has permitted eight "democratic parties" to continue in existence and participate nominally in the administration. Their memberships are small, their organisational structures are vestigial or nonexistent, and they have no effective power. Their importance was further reduced during the "anti-rightist" campaign of 1957-58, when a large proportion of the minor parties' leading members was attacked for criticising basic Communist policies. These criticisms were made in response to 'Mao Tse-tung's briefly-honoured offer of free speech during the "hundred flowers" period.

1. *China Democratic League*: Largest of the minor parties, it was given a relatively prominent role by the Communists until the "anti-rightist" campaign. Recently, in an attempt to restore the myth of the "united front", some of its leading members have been restored to positions on its standing committee.

2. *Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang*.

3. *Taiwan Democratic Self-government League*: These parties are used as sounding-boards for Peking's claims to Taiwan (Formosa.)

4. *China Democratic National Construction Association*: Composed principally of former businessmen, this party was used to urge them to accept the state's takeover of private enterprise in 1955-56.


5. *China Association for Promoting Democracy*.

6. *Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party*.

7. *Chiu San Society*: These three parties are intended to facilitate the Communist Party's supervision and control over teachers, public functionaries, doctors, scientists, and other non-Communist intellectuals.

8. *China Chih Kung Tang*: The outgrowth of a revolutionary society organised in the 19th century, this party has been used by Peking for appeals to the overseas Chinese and their relatives in China.

III: TWO ASIAN VIEWS OF COMMUNIST CHINA



REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR OF COMMUNIST CHINA

by Maung Maung

LAST year I was in Communist China for nearly two months. I was a member of the Burmese Press delegation that was invited by the All-China Journalists' Association. This means that we were invited by the Chinese Communist Government; because in China the press, which is a monolithic structure, is but a department of state. We travelled quite a lot in China and had discussions with several individuals who occupied important positions in the Chinese Communist hierarchy; but China being a vast country, and our stay short, it was difficult for me in some cases to perceive what was actually going on.

The first thing that impressed me in China was its cleanliness. Everywhere in China, whether it was a big city or a small village in a remote place, I found everything clean and tidy. No dirt, no filth. It was difficult to find a piece

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of discarded refuse on the streets. It is only 10 years since the advent of the Communist government in China, yet the dirt and the squalor for which old China was notorious, have been eliminated. How have the Chinese Communists accomplished it?

In democratic countries the Government passes a law when it wants something done. In China it starts a movement. Indeed the whole history of the 10 years of Communist China might be written in terms of the great movements or drives carried on under the direction of the regime. At the time of my visit to China a drive against the 'Four Evils' (rats, sparrows, mosquitoes and flies) was under way and I had the opportunity of picking up some information about a mass drive in operation. The drive is a method of consolidating control by the state in order to facilitate the ruling of the vast land in an all-pervasive manner. Whole masses of the people are mobilised and a state of tension is maintained among the people, who are kept in an almost perpetual state of mass hypnosis. When a drive is launched all the mass media of communication, all the mass support of organisations and all the administrative organs of the Government join in the campaign, so that it is enough to convince the psychologically isolated Chinese that his resistance would be useless, when so many people are supporting the effort of the leaders.

And that was how the drive against dirt and filth was made. By these means, a condition was created under which a Chinese would not dare to throw his cigarette end down on the street, instead of into a dust bin, lest it should be considered an anti-social act.

It is indeed a laudable thing that the Chinese Communists have wiped out dirt and filth in their cities and villages in so short a time; but it has been possible only because Mao's regime is a dictatorship, under which the various chains of command are linked together by the security police, the party propagandists, the press, and other methods, with their ability to penetrate and consolidate control over every aspect of life.

And now I should like to write something about collectivisation. What China is doing in this respect is not consistent with its earlier policies—in fact, it contradicts its

earlier policies. During the early stages of Communist power in China, it was categorically stated that there could be collectivisation only when the conditions are mature enough for the extensive application of mechanised farming. Then, it seemed to the Chinese Communists, collectivisation in agriculture, minus mechanisation, is not socialism. But now I am told almost all the peasants have been organised into collective farms, and this has been done without extensive application of mechanised farming.

In China I travelled hundreds of miles by train. I passed through vast regions of agricultural lands, but I never saw a single tractor or any other mechanical appliances being used in cultivation, except at a model farm in Wuhan. Cultivation is done purely by human labour and by some draught animals. The methods are primitive indeed. In Wuhan I was shown a model collective farm. Only in this model farm did I see a tractor and some mechanical implements. The argument now is that in agriculture, under the conditions prevailing in China, collectivisation must precede the use of big machinery. The Chinese Communists now say it is a dogmatic view to hold that there cannot be collectivisation without tractors.

China has retracted many of its past policies in its frenzied drive towards a communist society. For instance, according to the earlier policy of Mao's regime, the preservation of a rich peasant economy was not a temporary, but a long-term measure. Then it was said that a rich peasant economy would be preserved throughout the whole stage of New Democracy. The New Democratic stage is still in existence in China but no longer the rich peasant economy.

The same thing applies to the Chinese bourgeoisie. According to earlier policies, in the New Democratic stage the national bourgeoisie would still be permitted to exist. It was said that complete and genuine independence can be achieved only when China's industry has developed. The New Democratic stage, or what they call "The Transition Period" is still in force, but the Chinese bourgeoisie as a class is about to disappear.

In Shanghai I interviewed a Chinese capitalist, a Mr. Lieu. During Chiang Kai-Shek's regime he belonged to one of the three biggest families in Shanghai. He is an Oxford

graduate and his wife, who also was educated in England, is a very attractive Chinese lady. She was the only sophisticated Chinese woman I saw in the whole of China who was smartly dressed in expensive Chinese brocades.

Though Mr. Lieu is still said to be a capitalist, his enterprises are no longer owned privately. They are jointly owned and operated by the state. He receives a small fraction of the profits. And what shares he still retains in his joint venture with the state would be surrendered "voluntarily" to the state in a few years' time, Mr. Lieu told me. When I asked him, "Would you be happy to do this?" he answered, "Of course, I would be happy—very happy!"

I suppose Mr. Lieu was not in a position to say otherwise, because also present at this interview was the Chinese girl who had been provided to serve as an interpreter for our delegation by the All-China Journalists' Association. She had told me earlier that as Mr. Lieu spoke fluent English I would not need her help in my interview with this Chinese capitalist. Yet she had accompanied me to my meeting with Mr. Lieu. In the presence of this girl, Mr. Lieu would not have dared to make any statement which the Chinese Communists might not like.

Communist China, as I saw it, is making tremendous progress in industrialisation. The emphasis is on an ever-increasing expansion of heavy industry and in the accumulation of capital goods. Even May Day in Peking, which is a very big affair, is, in fact, a drive towards production of more and more capital goods. A long procession of men and women, carrying placards goading the workers to produce more capital goods, marched past the *Tien-An-Men* (The Gate of Heavenly Peace) on which were assembled all the top leaders of the Chinese Government.

In Northeast China I visited an iron and steel plant, a motor-truck plant and several other factories, where I saw the achievements of the Chinese Communists in heavy industry. I was told that it is the basic policy guiding China's socialist construction that heavy industry be given priority in development. But heavy industry has been built at the expense of consumer goods. Clothing is rationed and food is rationed. China has shifted from a food-importing country before the war to a food-exporting country now. This is

not because there is a surplus in food products. Food is exported to buy machinery from abroad for China's industries. China produces very beautiful silks and brocades; but with the exception of Mrs. Lieu, the wife of the Chinese capitalist, all the other Chinese I saw wore a drab looking blue cotton uniform. The interpreter told me, "It is not that we Chinese don't like to wear nice clothes. It is not that Chinese girls don't like to beautify themselves with lovely clothes and cosmetics. Of course, we do. But personal adornment will have to wait until some time in the future." Some time in the future means until socialism is achieved. In the meantime, in the period of transition, the individual must be subordinated to the cause of building socialism.

"If a girl in China uses lipstick and rouge, would that be frowned upon as a bourgeois trait?" I inquired.

"Well, not exactly", she replied, "but, we don't attach much importance to such things, you know."

But women are women. No amount of Communist indoctrination could change inherent feminine characteristics. For one of the lady members of our Burmese press delegation told me that this Chinese interpreter, who claims to be a Marxist, is very much conscious of her personal appearance.

"You should see her in her hotel room spending some time arranging her hair and her clothes to look attractive", the lady member of our delegation confided.

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by Dr. S. Chandrasekhar

THERE are countless aspects to the communisation of contemporary China, all of which deserve attention. China covers an area equal to that of Europe, with a population of more than 650 millions, and her rise to power will have repercussions not only in South-east Asia but in the world as a whole.

Ten years ago, in 1949, the Communists came to power in China through a long and bloody civil war. They did not come to power through elections or legislation or in any peaceful manner. Force is obviously their weapon in settling national and international issues. Whether it is in consolidating their formerly loose-knit, far flung realm, or bringing their various religious and national minorities into line, expelling the foreign missionaries or dispossessing the landlords of their land, the Chinese Communists have resorted to force and violence without the slightest hesitation.

They promise autonomy for Tibet but that autonomy in action means forcing the Dalai Lama to sign on the dotted line; they start shooting if the Dalai Lama or anyone else disagrees with Peking. And yet, paradoxically enough, the Chinese Communists are loudest in their protestations of peace. Anyone who travels through China, as I did in late 1958, and meets the people in different walks of life will be impressed with this paradox of talking about peace incessantly on the one hand and, on the other, promoting hatred and violence toward countries and causes they dislike.

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Ideologically, Communism and peace are apparently poles apart.

The second aspect of life in China, which even the most casual of observers cannot escape, is the Communist regimentation of almost every aspect of life. Whether it is one's dress or haircut, what to eat or read, what job to hold or where to go for entertainment, when to exercise or whom to marry, and even more important, what to think—all are directed by the Communist code and no deviation will be tolerated. This regimentation has been so perfected during the past ten years that China today is like one vast prison. In a word, I believe Communism as practised in China, and freedom as the world understands it, cannot co-exist.

This denial of freedom and this total regimentation are witnessed in the vital field of education. Perhaps the most powerful weapon in the hands of a government for moulding its people's thinking is a nation's educational organisation. Nowhere is this fact better understood than in China today. The Chinese regime is doing everything in its power to mould the reading, thinking and behaviour of 650 million people, from very young children to old people, through a new education that will fit them into the regimented pattern of "socialist reconstruction". China is building numerous technological institutions. For instance, the former American-supported Tsing-hua University in Peking has now become a big technological institute. I asked the Dean about requirements for admission into this college. He replied, "We have laid down three important criteria for admission and we follow them strictly. The first is that the prospective student must be oriented in socialist thinking; that is, he must be familiar with the Marxian approach to all our problems and must be a good young Communist. Secondly, the student must be in excellent health; these courses are strenuous and we don't want students dropping out of college for health reasons. And third and last, the student must have the requisite intellectual ability to cope with his studies."

Recently the Communists have introduced the communes—and here the Chinese are very proud to have surpassed the Soviet Union. A great majority of the rural population is now organised into communes. I visited four of these in

different parts of the country. In the model commune near Chengchow that I visited, the Communist principle of everyone working according to his or her ability and all receiving according to their needs was in force. Money has been abolished as a medium of exchange except in very rare cases.

What is a working day like in this commune? Men and women wake up in the morning to the blare of the loud speakers on the streets. Half an hour of exercise in the open air—there is tremendous emphasis on physical fitness—and they go off to the canteens for a communal breakfast. Then they break up to form different production teams based on the individual's ability and aptitude to work. Husbands and wives, parents and grown-up children are not necessarily on the same team. The teams go off to their allotted tasks in the field or factories. They reassemble at noon at the various canteens (if they are working in far-off fields lunch is taken to them to save time) for a lunch of rice, cabbage and sweet potato and occasionally a little meat. Lunch over, they march off to their appointed tasks. In the evenings all have regular classes where they listen to the radio which pours out the latest editorial from the *People's Daily* in Peking. Then there is a film or a play or an acrobatic show. And last is the Party meeting which every worker attends. Here the art of self-criticism is practised. Thereafter everybody returns to his room for the compulsory eight hours of sleep.

This commune near Chengchow, which has become a much visited model, is called the Commune of Sixteen Guarantees. The Communists have declared, however, that it is possible to provide these guarantees in only a few selected communes. The guarantees are: (1) clothing (clothing is still a problem because of the cold climate and there is a need for padded clothing because heating is poor); (2) food; (3) housing; (4) transportation (from residence to place of work); (5) maternity benefits (expectant mothers are given 45 days leave and one *catty*—one-half kilogram—of red sugar which is a must for expectant mothers in China); (6) sickness leave and free medical aid; (7) free old-age care; (8) free funeral and burial (the Director of the Commune told me that they would like to give up the burial for

cremation but the people were prejudiced in favour of traditional burial. So they are now adopting what is called "deep burial." The dead body is buried at least ten feet deep so that they can use the land, which otherwise might be a graveyard, as an orchard; (9) free education; (10) free bringing up of children; (11) free recreation; (12) a small marriage grant on the eve of one's marriage and free reception and dinner in honour of the couple; (13) twelve free haircuts per year; (14) twenty free bath tickets per year (hot water baths); (15) free tailoring—making of the blue boiler suit as well as repairing it; and (16) free electricity.

The Communists someday hope to make the entire nation one big happy commune. People will be given all the basic necessities and made to work hard. Men and women will have no choice or freedom and the entire population will be reduced to the level of robots that respond to the radio. When that day arrives China will have ceased to be a civilised country of human beings. It will be like Orwell's *Animal Farm* on earth.

IV: THE CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER COMMUNISM



THE PEASANTS, COLLECTIVISATION, AND COMMUNES

by A. J. Roy

ON August 29, 1958 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ordered that all collective farms in China be immediately consolidated into communes. The new programme was intended to be a universal solution of the political and economic problems which had troubled the Chinese Communists since 1949.

Communes were supposed to increase agricultural production, not by five or ten per cent, but two or three-fold. Although basically enormous collective farms—the average size is 5,000 families—communes were also to operate their own factories and steel furnaces. Mess halls would provide inescapable control over consumption of grain. Communal nurseries would take children in their infancy and mould them into Communist youth. Centralised administration and

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a peasant militia would facilitate supervision over stubborn villagers and lagging cadres.

The enthusiasm of the Central Committee went even further. It declared that with the formation of communes "the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event". Peasants were to be given a fixed ration of food and consumer goods instead of wages; the era of "to each according to his needs" was said to be close at hand.

Less than a year later even the Communist leadership admitted, in effect, that communes were not a universal solution. The commune programme became simply an addition to the series of experiments which the Communists have carried out in the Chinese countryside.

All but a few of the communal factories were closed, and most of the roadside blast furnaces were abandoned. The regime found it necessary to permit peasants to withdraw from mess halls. In order to reduce serious food shortages, especially acute in the cities, peasants were again allowed to raise hogs and vegetables for their own profit. In place of the earlier claims of enormous harvests, there were references to the natural obstacles to greater production. There was no more talk of communism in the immediate future, or, for that matter, in the foreseeable future.

In August 1959 the Party authorities attacked the "rightist conservatism" of Party members who "lacked the confidence needed to overcome difficulties." The new slogan was "the continuous leap forward," not as ambitious or unrealistic as that of 1958, but nevertheless offering no prospect of an easier or more prosperous life for China's 650 million peasants.

Although there was no indication that communes were to be abandoned, important modifications in the commune system were made in 1959. These were the result of a belated recognition of certain basic facts about the Chinese countryside.

China has too many people and not enough land; moreover, nearly all the arable land was being farmed with considerable efficiency long before Marx was born. Large increases in agricultural production would require better farm tools and, especially, more fertiliser. But the Com-

munists were unwilling to invest in plough factories and fertiliser plants on the massive scale required; they concentrated on heavy industry as a basis for military power and international prestige.

The Communists maintained that the solution lay in social change and more efficient use of rural labour. Technical improvements were not to be carried out for several decades at least.

"Land reform" was the first step. It served many purposes. There is no question that land tenure had been one of China's most serious problems. There were obvious inequities in the old system, and the landless peasants lived very hard lives indeed.

The basic concern of the Communists, was not, however, to remedy injustices and improve the lot of the landless. They needed political support in the villages; land taken from the landowners and richer peasants could be used to win over the poorer peasants. The Communists also wanted to liquidate the leaders of rural society and replace them with Communist cadres (political activists).

"Land reform" was intended to accomplish these essentially political purposes. Broadly speaking, those who owned land held the leading positions in village society. The elastic labels "bad element" and "counter-revolutionary" could be stretched to cover anyone else likely to oppose Communist control.

Violence was an essential part of "land reform". Between 1949 and 1952 the cadres went from village to village, classifying peasants according to their landholdings and political views. The peasants were called together; mass trials were held; and millions were executed. This was intended to convince every villager that the Communists were there to stay.

In order to carry out their industrial plans the Communists needed more savings for capital investment. The villages were the only source of adequate size. Trade in grain was declared a monopoly of the state, and the peasants were required to sell a fixed quota of their crop to the state at low prices.

This conflicted directly with the desires of the peasants. If they grew more food, they wanted to eat more of it. So

they concealed grain and evaded requisitions. In many cases—far too many to please the Communist leadership—cadres in the villages permitted this.

The Communists decided that it was necessary to set up collective farms in order to secure more grain and keep both the peasantry and the cadres under control. At first an elaborate plan was drawn up; the peasants would be led gradually and imperceptibly into collectives over a period of years.

This approach was abandoned in 1955 after Mao Tse-tung made a dramatic speech calling for immediate collectivisation. By the middle of 1956 all but a small percentage of China's peasants were members of full-scale collective farms. They lost all rights to land ownership but were permitted to retain small vegetable plots and raise a few hogs or chickens.

The leaders of the Communist Party were dissatisfied with the results of collectivisation. Many collective farms were poorly-organised and badly managed. Inexperienced cadres could not cope with the complicated accounting procedures, and often they knew little of agricultural techniques.

More important, the peasants had little incentive to produce. If they worked harder or harvested a larger crop, most of it went to the state or was retained by the collective. Peasants continued to hoard grain. Chengchow's *Honan Daily* reported on August 9, 1958 that "the struggle between two roads [toward communism and toward capitalism] is still quite acute in the collection and purchase of grain . . . there are still instances where output is under-stated, distributed without authority, and stolen. By the end of July, 145 million *catties* (about 72,000 tons) had been concealed in the Hsinhsiang administrative district alone."

Peking considered that the cadres themselves were to a considerable degree responsible for the collectives' failure to meet state demands. On August 7, 1958 the Peking *People's Daily*, official organ of the Party, reported the results of an investigation in Szechwan province. It revealed that ". . . a situation was found almost everywhere, namely, that the leadership of some *hsiang* [a rural administrative district roughly analogous to a township] and collectives were still in the hands of elements who strongly resisted socialism or cadres who had serious rightist tendencies. . . . As a result,

work in those *hsiang* and collectives remains in a state of extreme backwardness”.

The regime experimented for a time with economic incentives in an attempt to encourage production. On September 14, 1957 the party Central Committee urged members of collective farms to emulate the small percentage of peasants who had been permitted to farm individual holdings. These were of course not rich land-owners, but peasant families who tilled their own land. The Central Committee declared that it was a “primary task in rural work henceforth to catch up with and surpass the production level of the well-to-do middle peasants within five years.”

Commenting on this decision, a *People's Daily* editorial explained it in highly un-Marxist terms. “For the sake of family wealth and prosperity, many well-to-do middle peasants have always risen early and retired late, devoted their entire labour power to production, and economised every penny that could be economised. Collectives should learn from them concerning such an assiduousness and frugal spirit in perfecting their own management”.

Peasants were permitted to carry on a carefully-controlled “free market” in vegetables and other subsidiary products grown in their household gardens. Collectives were reduced in size in the hope that they would be more efficient.

These measures were only partially successful, and many highly-placed Communists were alarmed at their implications. It was believed that continued emphasis on economic incentives would turn the peasants away from the “Communist road”. During the early months of 1958 the party leadership searched for a new solution, and the first experimental communes were formed.

Concessions to Reality and a Reaffirmation of Doctrine

The Communist Party's decision to form communes throughout China was based on several assumptions. By July of 1958 it was apparent that the harvest would be a good one. The Peking's *People's Daily* declared optimistically on October 1, 1958 that “the food problem of our country has been basically solved”.

It was believed that the peasants would accept the commune programme, despite its radical effects on village

life, provided the state could assure an adequate food supply. Communes, which were 25 times as large as the old collective farms, were expected to increase production still further by using peasant labour more effectively.

Communal "labour brigades" would build irrigation works, plough the soil more deeply, and make more intensive use of the land. Thus, the Communists' reasoning went, the state could take more grain without lowering the peasants' living standard. And, if this did not work out, the mess halls would provide an effective means for limiting peasant consumption.

Political and doctrinal considerations played an important part, probably a decisive one, in the decision to form communes. The Communists had convinced themselves that "mass mobilisation" of the "great leap forward" provided a key to China's economic development. They believed that political exhortation and tighter discipline would make economic incentives unnecessary.

Communes were also intended to serve the Communists' long term political purposes. If all peasants ate in mess halls and all children were raised in communal nurseries the traditional family could not be expected to survive long. This would dissolve the strongest existing centre of loyalty. Everyone would have to attach himself to the state and to the Party because there would be no alternative.

The commune system was also intended to simplify control over the villages. The former *hsiang* administration was absorbed by the commune. Twenty-five thousand communes replaced 700,000 collective farms. It would be easier to assure that every commune manager was experienced and politically reliable. The new communal militia was principally an instrument for tighter control and discipline.

Dogmatic Communists were presumably exhilarated by the thought that communes would enable China to achieve "pure communism", the ultimate stage of Marxist dialectic, in the near future. This was very odd Marxism. The Soviets, at any rate, maintained that communism could not be attained without a high level of industrialisation.

Communes were formed almost immediately. According to Peking's statistics, 125 million village families, nearly 100 per cent of the peasantry, were members of communes by the

end of September, only five weeks after the Central Committee's order. Peasants were told of the new programme—often in meetings which lasted all night or even for several days and nights—and then suddenly found themselves members of communes. Undoubtedly most communes were only nominal organisations for the first few months, but the intent of the regime was clear.

The Communists made a number of serious errors. The first was to demand too much of the new communes. Peasants were not only required to submit to semi-military discipline and work harder on the land; they were also told to set up communal factories, construct more irrigation works, and make iron and steel.

It was assumed that the reservoir of manpower was limitless, that the peasants did not require rest. A large percentage of the labour force—Peking claimed the total was 100 million people—was put to work hauling coal, making crude blast-furnaces out of mud bricks, and scratching ore out of hillsides.

The hours of work were fantastic. Peasants laboured 12, 14, even 20 hours per day. In what was intended to be a note of moderation, the *People's Daily* suggested on November 9, 1958 that "The hours of shock production activities should not exceed two days and nights at a stretch."

This lavish use of manpower caused basic agricultural tasks to be neglected. Crops were left standing in the fields, and much of the grain harvested was not sent to state warehouses. Peking radio reported on November 25, 1958 that ". . . a comparative study indicates that the 1958 farm procurement programme lags behind last year's, particularly in the varieties of crops". On January 11, 1959 the State Council was still calling for "shock movements" to harvest grain before Chinese New Year's Day in February—nearly four months after the harvest would normally be completed.

Under the collective farm system most vegetables and meat had been produced by individual peasants. These activities were neglected after communes were established.

These miscalculations and errors in management caused a shortage of food. Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance, said on December 28, 1958 that the supply of supplementary foods—meat, vegetables, eggs, and cooking oil

—was “relatively tense . . . especially in some major cities and industrial and mining areas.” He attributed this to the manpower shortage, the lack of a “diversified economy” in the communes, and difficulties in transportation.

Food was also short in the countryside. The state did not make good its implicit promise to supply more food to the peasantry. Although the mainland press reported many complaints about mismanagement of mess halls and lack of variety in communal meals, the peasants apparently did eat somewhat better during the first months after communes were established.

It was a brief improvement. Emphasis soon shifted from boundless plenty to strict economy. Party spokesmen complained that commune members were eating too much of their crop. Communes were repeatedly urged to reduce their rations, and a system of meal tickets was introduced.

On March 7, 1959, the *People's Daily* referred approvingly to a commune in Hopei province which “by serving two light meals a day, reduced per capita food consumption from 1.2 or 1.3 *catties* to 0.8 or 0.9 *catty*”. This meant that the ration was cut from about six-tenths of a kilogram of grain per day to slightly more than four-tenths of a kilogram.

The Communists' most serious miscalculation was political. As members of communes the peasants had even less incentive to produce, and they disliked many features of the new system. The cadres were still an unreliable instrument of Party control.

In a series of articles beginning on January 12, 1959 Canton's *Nan-fang Daily* described the problems encountered in a typical commune. It said that “After checking of accounts it was found that during the previous period, the damage incurred through neglect of harvests, failure to show up for work, and loss of ploughing oxen and farm tools amounted to about 1,500,000 *Yuan* (equivalent to £215,827 Sterling). . . . The members' enthusiasm for labour was not properly developed. . . . In the entire commune there were always more than 2,000 people absent from work every day”.

Other problems were caused by the impersonality of the communes and the “supply system”, under which commune members were provided with a fixed ration of food, and occasionally of other goods and services, in place of most of

their wages.

The *Nan-fang Daily* pointed out that "working under the conception that they were working only for the government, there appeared unhealthy signs such as complaining about low wages, exodus of labour power, pursuit of personal aggrandizement, and so forth. Out of four members of Chang Chen-po's family, three able-bodied workers left the place, leaving behind an old man to burden the commune". The newspaper added that in one commune almost eight per cent of the labour force was absent without permission at any given time, and many of the rest loafed on the job.

In an article in the *People's Daily* of February 25, 1959 Tao Chu, party chief for Kwangtung province, criticised commune members who thought that "since the government provided them with free meals and medicine anyway, production became a matter of no importance to them".

Tao described other serious difficulties he found in communes. He said that "departmentalism among the cadres is not eliminated, but each one occupies his 'small sphere of influence' and asks for division of authority, so there is danger that the commune may become an empty structure. Not only that, but further development of this departmentalist thinking will even erode the cadres—in fact certain cadres have already become corrupt and degenerate".

The peasants continued to hoard grain for their own use. Tao said that in a commune in Kwangtung ". . . a meeting was held recently which lasted for more than a week, and after which about 100,000 piculs (approximately 5,000 tons) of grain were surrendered". One production team had concealed 17,000 *catties* of grain (about eight tons) in order to assure its own food supply in case communal allocations were insufficient.

Peasant resistance lay at the base of all these problems. It was difficult for the peasants to express their complaints openly, but some Party publications took notice of their sentiments.

Changchun's *Kirin Daily* reported on January 10, 1959 that "Among some sections of our people, there is a growing fear that the rise of the commune spells doom to the family institution.

"Is there any foundation for this fear? There is, they

say. They point out that living under one roof, commune members eat together at public mess halls, children are sent off to nurseries and kindergartens, the old are sent to homes for the aged, and primary school students are boarded at school. This amounts to a disintegration of the family which is abolished as an institution. . . . Proceeding from this conviction, they surmise that the rise of the commune system means the end of the natural and kindred relationships of man."

It seems certain that the peasants shared these fears, and that as a result they regarded the new communal institutions with hostility.

Peking's assertions that communes provided a short and easy path to pure communism led to friction with Moscow. Soviet ideologists evidently considered the Chinese claims presumptuous and absurd. The Soviet press and radio rarely mentioned communes; Soviet leaders, including Mikoyan and Khrushchev, referred pointedly to the failure of communes in the U.S.S.R. Presumably Moscow applied much firmer pressure on Peking in private.

Faced with this multitude of difficulties caused by the commune programme, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party began a gradual modification of communes.

On December 10, 1958 the Central Committee adopted a long resolution which called for better management of communes, especially the mess halls and nurseries. Commune members were to be paid according to their labour; the "supply system" was to be abandoned for the present.

Cadres were ordered to be more considerate of commune members, to make better provision for their working and living conditions. They were chided for using the militia to "infringe on the democratic life of the commune". The ideological claims were forgotten.

The regime admitted, in effect, that its own policies had caused the "manpower shortage". It was revealed that the communal blast-furnaces produced unusable steel, wasted raw materials, and put extreme strains on the transport system.

Communal factories were told to close down unless they were directly concerned with agriculture, and all commune members were to be released for work in the fields during periods of peak demand for rural labour. Plans for

irrigation were cut back. An "emulation campaign" in short-distance transport was ordered. Claims of high production targets were scaled down. There was even greater emphasis on thrift in the use of food.

Once again, Communist spokesmen referred guardedly to the importance of economic incentives. On May 20, 1959 *People's Daily* directed that members of communes should be allowed to raise pigs and vegetables on their own account, and cadres were told to set aside land for use by individual peasants.

Teng Tzu-hui, director of the Rural Work Department, wrote in the June 16, 1959 issue of Peking's *China Youth* magazine that peasants should be permitted to withdraw from commune mess halls. He said that only a minority of peasant families were in favour of mess halls; the rest were either indifferent or opposed. According to Teng, it was necessary to allow voluntary withdrawals because many peasants would stop using the mess halls in any case.

These concessions involved important changes in communes, but the Communist authorities seemed determined to preserve the basic commune structure. They continued to believe that political methods were more effective than economic incentives.

On August 6, 1959 *People's Daily* published an important editorial which asked for more discipline and effort from both cadres and peasants. It said that ". . . a hardship-evading sentiment has found breeding-grounds among some of the cadres. These cadres have exaggerated certain difficulties encountered in work. . . . They lack the confidence needed for overcoming difficulties. . . . They have maintained that it is better to have a simple plan and low targets."

Raising the new banner of "the continuous leap forward", *People's Daily* said that cadres must abandon their "rightist conservative attitude". Everyone was told to "press ahead consistently" in order to achieve a bumper harvest.

Whatever further modifications the Communists may introduce, the Chinese peasant is certain to remain more regimented than he was before communes were introduced. As the *People's Daily* editorial pointed out, "All these tasks call for close leadership by the Party committees in various localities and at all levels".

by Harold C. Hinton

THE policy of the Chinese Communists toward religion has always included two contradictory elements.

As Communists, they are declared atheists, aware that the Marxist texts contain many attacks on religion as the "opiate of the people". This is, moreover, not an incidental part of Marxist doctrine, but a basic tenet of "dialectical materialism".

On the other hand, the Communists realised that an immediate direct attack on religion in China would cause widespread disaffection and have serious repercussions abroad. During the early years of the regime this latter consideration prevailed; the Communists declared that there would be freedom of religion in China.

They made it clear, however, that religious organisations would not be allowed to carry on their activities as before. The Communists employed a technique which combined manipulation, propaganda, and outright terror.

Before 1949 a number of religious systems existed side-by-side in Chinese society. The most universal were the ceremonies of respect for the dead (often referred to, somewhat misleadingly, as "ancestor worship") and a deeprooted feeling for man's place in the natural order, reflected in the practice of *feng-shui*, or geomancy. There was also an elastic pantheon of gods and spirits which were worshipped and propitiated. Taoism was an amalgam of popular beliefs with concepts absorbed from Buddhism and early Chinese philosophy. Confucianism, basically a philosophy, had over the centuries added a religious aspect and had been in part assimilated with Taoism and the traditional religious practices which were a fundamental part of family life.

The principal organised religions were the Mahayana school of Buddhism, including its lamaistic form in Tibet and Mongolia, Theravada Buddhism among the Chuang (Thai) peoples of South China, Islam, and Christianity. The Chinese took a tolerant, pragmatic and eclectic attitude toward reli-

gion, as they did toward all aspects of life before the advent of Communism in China.

Communist control over religion has been established by a subtle manipulation of religious organisations. The Communists have formed new national religious organisations, ostensibly in the name of patriotism and national unity. Existing religious organisations are either absorbed by these dummy associations or are left to fend for themselves—without official sanction and suspected of harbouring “reactionaries”, “imperialist agents”, or “feudalists”.

In 1953 the China Islamic Association was established under Peking’s sponsorship. The chairman was a Uighur Muslim from Sinkiang, and Muslims of all ethnic stocks and major schools were nominally represented. The China Buddhist Association, formed the same year, was headed by a Tibetan and include Chinese Mahayana Buddhists, lamaists from Tibet and Inner Mongolia, and Theravada Buddhists from South China. A National Committee of Protestant Churches in China was set up in 1954, and in the same year a Religious Affairs Bureau was organised under the State Council to supervise the newly-formed religious associations.

Although the constitution promulgated by the Communists in 1954 guarantees “freedom of religion”, religious bodies are in practice virtually prohibited from carrying on proselytisation on their own behalf. The constitution further provides that “all citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda” and “freedom of holding processions and demonstrations” against religious organisations. Such demonstrations, staged by Communist cadres, have at times played an important part in the Communists efforts to neutralise and control religious bodies.

Severe limitations were also placed on religious schools. Proselytisation—defined as “religious propaganda in public places or areas plagued with complications of class relations”—is not permitted. The Communists presumably expect organised religion to die out from lack of recruits.

Persecution and terror have been used when other methods appeared inadequate or too slow. It is always disguised, however. Religious leaders are not attacked for their religious beliefs: they are accused of being “reactionaries” or “counter-revolutionaries operating under the cloak of religion”

• They have been accused of upholding "feudalism" and rural landlordism, of maintaining organisational or financial relations with foreign organisations, opposing the leadership of the Communist Party, stimulating "local nationalism" among the national minorities, and other alleged offences. Religious leaders, missionaries, and members of religious congregations have been forced to confess to these "crimes". The "confessions" are not necessarily used as evidence against the accused; their principal purposes are to induce obedience and conformity and to discredit religion.

Specific policies toward the different organised religions have varied, but there has been a consistent pattern of increasing pressure which has reached a peak since 1956.

Buddhism: Buddhism was treated with relative leniency by the Communists until the first popular revolts broke out in Tibet in 1956. One obvious reason was the Communists' concern that harsh measures against Buddhists in China would bring protests from Buddhist nations in Asia.

Nevertheless, Buddhism has not escaped pressure, especially since 1956. During the "rectification" campaign of 1957-58 a number of "rightists" were uncovered in Buddhist circles. The most prominent was Pen Huan, abbot of the Nan-hua monastery near Canton. On June 11, 1958 the *Nan-fang Daily*, official organ of the Kwangtung provincial committee of the Communist Party, reported that Pen Huan had told Buddhists that "there is no freedom of religion in China". He also said that "he was not allowed to summon novices for initiation into the Buddhist priesthood or recruit followers". According to the newspaper, Pen Huan said in 1957 that "the Communist Party is too despotic". Buddhist organisations were required to approve his arrest.

The Buddhist Association was used as a channel for intensive propaganda. During 1958 a series of "study meetings" was held. Buddhist monks and nuns were told that they must give up their life of prayer and contemplation and engage in "productive work". The *Chieh Fang Daily* said on November 11, 1958 that "some Buddhist practices of the past which are disadvantageous to socialism and production . . . have been changed. . . . The interests of socialism and production must be taken care of first, and all kinds of religious activities disadvantageous to national construction and pro-

duction must be reformed”.

Millions of Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhists live in Kansu, Tsinghai, and other western provinces of China. During the second half of 1958 lamas and monks in this region were the target of an intensive campaign intended to discredit them and weaken the people's belief in Buddhism. Communist cadres organised mass “struggle meetings” at which the Buddhist monks were accused of “oppression and exploitation”.

Similar attacks were made, often at the same meetings, against Muslim imams. They were accused of charlatanism, fraud, and crimes against the state. A Communist spokesman told one meeting that “there are no such things as spirits and gods. All this religious nonsense was designed to deceive the people. The reactionary imams and lamas speak good but do evil”.

The suppression of Buddhism in Tibet is a story in itself. Its scale can be indicated briefly by this quotation from the statement made by the Dalai Lama at Tezpur after his arrival in India in April 1959. He said that after the Tibetan revolt began in 1956 “the Chinese armed forces destroyed a large number of monasteries. Many lamas were killed and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China, and as the interference in the exercise of religious freedom increased the relations of Tibetans with China became openly strained . . .”

Islam: There are about ten million Muslims in China. The most numerous are the “Hui”—Chinese-speaking Muslims—most of whom live in the Northwest. There are also about four million Muslim Uighurs, mostly living in Sinkiang, and eight smaller Muslim nationalities.

Since 1949 the Communist regime has discouraged the building of new mosques, confiscated much land which had been owned by mosques, and restricted education and the use of the Arabic language.

When the intensive anti-religious campaign began in 1956 the Communists charged that Muslims, especially those in Sinkiang and the Kansu-Ninghsia area, were guilty of “local nationalism”. This term meant that they resented Communism, Chinese control, Chinese immigration, and collectivisation, and wanted more genuine freedom to run

their own affairs. A number of Muslim officials were purged in Sinkiang. On October 11, 1958 the official *New China News Agency* reported that Ma Chen-wu, an imam and vice-chairman of the China Islamic Association, had been arrested for organising a series of popular revolts in Ninghsia. Other imams in Tsinghai were arrested on similar charges.

As already noted, imams as well as Buddhist monks were targets of the "struggle meetings" held in Tsinghai province during 1958.

Christianity: Christianity has played a special part in Chinese Communist religious policy. Christian churches had before 1949 been directed and generously supported by institutions and organisations abroad. The Communists considered it necessary to discredit these foreign institutions, many of which had excellent reputations in China for their charitable and educational work. They were labelled as "imperialistic".

Shortly after the takeover in 1949 the Communist Party declared that Christianity and Communism could co-exist in China provided the Christian churches immediately implemented a programme which came to be known as the "three autonomies": self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation. This meant that Christian churches must break their ties with churches abroad, eliminate all foreign control, and acquiesce in the expulsion of foreign missionaries. Many Christian churches had for a generation or more been attempting to make their Chinese congregations self-sufficient and truly national. To the Communists, however, the "three autonomies" programme was the first step toward the total elimination of Christianity from China.

After the Korean War began and the "hate America" campaign was launched, Christian schools, hospitals, and orphanages were seized. Foreign missionaries were exiled, often after years in jail. Missionaries and Chinese Christians were arrested for "counter-revolutionary activities" and forced to make "confessions" which included charges that Chinese children in orphanages had been killed and mistreated by Catholic nuns.

The Catholic church had, on the whole, the highest percentage of Chinese priests, but it was selected for especially strong pressure because it was more highly organised and

was, like other Catholic churches, under the general direction of the papacy in Rome. In 1956 the Communists set up a "national" Catholic church which had no ties with Rome. The "Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association", formed in July 1957, approved the designation of 32 bishops. Under Communist pressure, Chinese bishops were required to consecrate 20 of these nominees even though they had not been approved by the Pope. Rome consequently declared these consecrations to be sacrilegious and has excommunicated those who participated.

Similar pressure was brought to bear on the protestant churches. Meetings have been organised to accuse "rightists" and "counter-revolutionaries" within the protestant churches, and many protestant leaders have been imprisoned or sent off for virtual forced labour in the countryside. Protestant congregations have been consolidated to facilitate political control.

Until 1958 Communist pressures were concentrated on the organised religions. There was little interference with traditional religious practices, although an indirect attack was made through collectivisation and other measures which weakened the Chinese family. In the spring of 1958, however, just as the commune drive was beginning, the Communists inaugurated a campaign against "superstition". Many local cults and festivals were abolished, religious holidays were converted into work days, and religious images were melted down.

This campaign was described in the official Peking *People's Daily* of May 12, 1958 by Lo Tien, first secretary of the Communist Party's district committee for Swatow, in Kwangtung province. He said that "ancestral tombs long regarded as sacred have been removed by the masses themselves. In many localities, family altars, gods of the city, gods of thunder, local gods, and the Queen of Heaven have been eliminated." He added that "grave stones, coffins, etc. are used by collective farms for building irrigation works, pigsties, latrines, carts, manure buckets, sheds, small water gates . . . many temples which formerly housed images have been turned into pigsties or processing plants, thus saving large amounts of expenditure for the collectives."

The intensified pressure on religion in China since 1956

is evidence that the Communists feel that they can now abandon their temporary policy of qualified toleration. The direction in which Communist policy appears to be moving was indicated in an article in the Peking monthly *Nationalities Unity* for March 6, 1959. Under the title "Communists are Thoroughgoing Atheists", it said that, in the eyes of a Communist, religion is a "mental shackle capable of producing on the system the same effect as inferior wine or opium".

It concluded that "the world view of religion is reactionary, anti-scientific, anti-socialist, and anti-communist. For a Communist to be a true Communist fighter, he must be a thoroughgoing atheist, regardless of his nationality."

* * *

YOUTH AND THE FAMILY

by Nils Stefansson

THE long-range policies of the Chinese Communists are based upon the assumption that time is on their side. In the relatively near future, persons who have grown up under Communism will be a majority of China's adult population. An estimated 27 per cent of China's total population of 650 million people have been born since 1949, when the Communists took power; another 19 per cent were only ten years old in 1949.

Thus perhaps half of the Chinese population is less than

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25 years of age. The Communists believe that if these young people are insulated from the "bourgeois influences" of their parents, brought up in state institutions, and thoroughly indoctrinated, they will become skilful and obedient servants of Communism.

In order to bring this about the Chinese Communists are carrying out a programme intended to cause the disintegration of the traditional family. The commune system with its nurseries, kindergartens, and boarding schools, is the most recent and far-reaching step.

Events have shown, however, that the Communists' assumption is open to serious question. Despite careful indoctrination, young people in Communist countries have objected to restrictions and injustices and even questioned the basic assumptions of Communism. This has happened in Hungary, in Poland, and in the Soviet Union itself. Political controls are even more rigorous in Communist China, but nevertheless there has been widespread disillusionment among Chinese youth.

The Communists have established a network of organisations intended to control young people and provide an outlet for their energies. The most important is the Young Communist League of China, for youths aged 14 to 25. Patterned after the Soviet Komsomol, it is a testing and training ground for future members of the Communist Party, a channel for political education, and a reserve of "shock brigades" for labour on state projects.

All activities of the Young Communist League are directed by the Communist Party. The League's first secretary, Hu Yao-pang, a "youth leader" over 50 years of age, is a member of the Party's Central Committee. Local Party Committees supervise the League down to the lowest levels.

The Young Pioneers, for children aged 9 to 15, is intended to begin the political education of young people. This organisation serves as a means for indoctrinating children who are not members and is used as an auxiliary for mass labour and propaganda campaigns. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth links the league and the Young Pioneers with a number of non-Party youth organisations.

Despite this formidable structure—and, it appears, often

because of it—there has been considerable dissatisfaction and unrest among Chinese youth. The Chinese Communists' educational policies have been an important cause of this disillusionment.

In 1949 the Chinese Communists promised universal free education. When carefully read, their promises were found to include many qualifications, but Chinese youth had a vision of unlimited opportunities.

Many new schools and universities were founded; old ones were reorganised and redirected. The emphasis was on science and engineering, and nearly all universities were transformed into specialised institutions teaching one narrow field. The Soviet educational system was taken as a model. Soviet textbooks were used for higher education and even in middle schools (age 12 to 18). Free scholarships were given to all college and university students.

It was soon apparent, however, that education on this scale was expensive. The regime could not provide instruction for everyone of school age without cutting back appropriations for heavy industry, military equipment, and other expenditures which were assigned a higher priority. On August 11, 1953, Peking declared that "in view of the present economic conditions in China, universal education has not been achieved and cannot be achieved in a short time".

Admissions to upper middle school (age 15 to 18) and to colleges or universities were placed under stricter controls. Students were assigned to courses with little regard for their preferences. On May 20, 1955 the Peking *People's Daily* announced that only a "small number" of graduates from primary schools and lower middle schools would be given a chance to continue their education.

"Part of them will be drawn into industrial production, and a greater part will be urged and organised to take part in agricultural production," the newspaper said. Chinese youth was told that it was a "glorious duty" to go to work rather than keep on with their studies. Graduates from colleges and universities were allocated jobs by the state, often in frontier regions far from their home provinces.

Scholarships were put on a selective basis; in order to qualify, students had to demonstrate financial need and political acceptability. Strict economy measures were taken

in the schools. Food, dormitories, and living conditions were reduced to minimum standards.

Pressure on students was intense. The curricula imported from the Soviet Union were ill-adapted to Chinese conditions. When students were not studying, their time was taken upon in political meetings, organised activities, and "practical work".

An article in the *China Youth Daily* of Peking for March 22, 1955 pointed out that ". . . an extra heavy curriculum encroaches on the time in which students otherwise would be able to rest . . . In this way the problem of the health of students has become a matter of major concern. Outside of usual diseases such as eye trouble, stomach ailments, and others, there have been found diseases of the nervous system and even high blood pressure which is usually known only among older people. Tuberculosis has also become quite prevalent among students."

The intense political atmosphere of the schools also contributed to the strain. An article in the *Shansi Daily* for November 8, 1954 directed professors ". . . to inject a socialist political direction into instruction in language, literature, history, geography, etc., and to inject a world outlook based on historical materialism into instruction in natural sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc. Education in political ideology also may be and must be injected into the instruction in music, physical training, and the fine arts."

Politics was not confined to the classroom. The *Yangtze Daily* for January 7, 1955 told Party and Young Communist League secretaries that "it is necessary to be deeply interested in the students' extra-curricular activities, take pains in organising these activities, and treat all aspects of cultural pastimes and athletic training as a classroom for improving the student's Communist moral quality". Even vacations were devoted to activities organised by the Party or the League.

The students' reaction ranged from indifference to open hostility. The November, 1955 issue of the Peking magazine *China Youth* complained: "Some of them (students) refrain from politics, do not read newspapers, pay no regard to the study of political theory, and hold themselves aloof from comments on social and political struggles, big events, whether domestic or foreign, and the various kinds of wrong

thinking pointed out by the party. They think that technique is the real thing and politics is only castles in the air."

Delinquency and truancy were also reported. The deputy director of the educational department of Kansu province wrote in the *Kansu Daily* for February 3, 1955 that "... based on materials gathered from 57 secondary schools, over 260 students committed thefts within the last year. In a certain school, more than 30 thefts were committed in a single term. . . . Some climbed across walls, broke windows, and stole other students' board money. Some disappeared from school for more than a month without coming back." He attributed this to their "mental uneasiness in study."

These tensions exploded in 1957. The spark was applied by Mao Tse-tung himself, who urged Chinese intellectuals to "bloom and contend". His invitation was not extended to students, but Chinese youth joined in the criticism of Communist policies.

At Peking University, the premier institution of Communist China's educational system, students established a "democratic wall" and posted manifestos of a "movement for freedom and democracy." Their slogans included "Marxism is out of date" and "dictatorship of the proletariat is out of date."

At a meeting on June 6, 1957 attended by six professors from Peking University, noted anthropologist Fei Hsiao-tung said: "The university students have been set in motion and their feelings have been worked up. . . . Things are simply too dark. A new feeling arises in my mind today. I sympathize with the students in the things that are brought to light. Once the students are aroused to action, the situation is likely to deteriorate. The students are looking for leaders everywhere. If teachers join in, there will be more trouble. Of course, it is easy to put it down. Three million soldiers will put it down, but public support will go and the Party's prestige among the masses will be finished."

Fei's predictions were close to the truth. The mainland press later reported that students formed organisations, went on strike, circulated anti-Communist statements, demonstrated in the streets, urged the citizens to join them, and attacked party officials. Students protested throughout China: in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Chungking, Kunming, Tsinan,

Lanchow, Canton, Wuhan, Nanking, Taiyuan, Sian, Mukden, Kweilin and other cities.

One of these demonstrations was reported in detail by the Communist press. Students at the Hanyang Number One Middle School in Wuhan rioted for two days in July 1957. They attacked the jail, the country administration, the arsenal, the electric power plant, and the office of the Communist Party district committee. Others went to the countryside to seek the support of the peasants. On the third day the demonstrators were firmly suppressed by Communist police. Three student leaders were condemned to death and executed on September 6 before a crowd of 10,000 people. Others were imprisoned.

Strict measures were taken to prevent a recurrence. The *People's Daily* reported on July 31, 1957 that all graduates from institutes of higher learning would be required to take political examinations before being assigned to jobs. A State Council directive ordered "education through labour" for rebellious students and other "lawless elements".

In Communist China the state has always made two conflicting demands upon students' time: they must study, and they must also work. During the "great leap forward" of 1958 the emphasis was on work in order to "struggle" toward the state's ambitious economic targets and because it was believed that labour would help to correct "bourgeois tendencies". Special youth squads worked full-time in communes and factories. In many schools the students devoted most of their time to constructing and operating crude factories.

Emphasis on political education was increased. "Technique without politics" was condemned; students were told that they must be "both red and expert".

"Collective life" was the rule for every activity. The secretary of the Young Communist League in Peking's Tsinghua University described the methods of study used there in 1958. He wrote in the Peking *Kwang Ming Daily* for June 13, 1959 that "lectures and notes were studied collectively; lessons were discussed collectively, chapter by chapter and paragraph by paragraph; exercises were done collectively; and solutions to problems were also worked out collectively."

The commune system was intended to begin indoctrina-

tion of youth in infancy and strike at the roots of "individualism". Children were to be taken from their parents soon after birth and raised as wards and pupils of the state.

Liu Shao-chi, now Communist China's Chief of State, provided a detailed rationale for this programme in a September 1958 speech. He said that it was necessary for the Party to "lay considerable stress on juvenile education. One of the most important measures to mould them into a new type of person is to adapt juvenile education to social needs. In other words, they have to be sent to nurseries and kindergartens to begin collective life early and be boarding students from primary school all the way to college. Thus they can rid themselves at an early stage of the . . . influences of backward and selfish concepts born with the old family institution, and to temper themselves with labour so as to foster Communist morals and train themselves into new persons . . . with an ardent love of collectivism and labour."

In 1959, however, the Party leadership discovered that the excesses of the "great leap forward" had weakened the Young Communist League, interfered too much with studies, and affected the health and morale of youth.

A resolution approved by the central committee of the league, following a meeting from July 13 to July 19, 1959, referred to "slackness in some basic-level league organisations, resulting in improper leadership and inability to carry on work in a normal way. This has to a certain extent lowered the leading role of the basic-level organisations among the youth, and has actually affected the Party's leadership in youth work."

These shortcomings were most serious in the villages, "especially since the commune movement in the rural areas", the resolution said.

The League central committee was also alarmed over the effects of 1958's labour campaigns on morale and health. It asked League branches to "show more concern for the spare-time activities of youth, so that they will be able to labour, study and rest in harmony and with rhythm".

It was realised, somewhat belatedly, that collective study was a failure; students were reminded that "independent contemplation" is more effective. The *Kwang Ming Daily* reported on May 7, 1959, that factories attached to schools

are being closed or consolidated. In contrast to the students' work-weeks of 30, 40 or even 80 hours during 1958, the new rule is eight hours of labour per week for senior middle school students, six hours for students in junior middle school.

These scattered concessions do not mean, however, that the Chinese Communist leadership has abandoned its ultimate objectives. The communes remain an instrument for separating children and youths from their families. And, in the words of the July 1959 league resolution, league branches "must fully assert their role, by intensifying political-ideological work among the youth, actively expanding the Party's influence, and faithfully acting as a tool of the Party in uniting and educating the youth".

* * *

CHINA'S WRITERS: REVOLUTIONARIES OR DOGMATISTS?

By A. J. Roy

CHINA'S literary revolution began more than 30 years before the Communist assumption of power. After the "May Fourth Movement" of 1919 most Chinese writers used the *pai-hua*, or vernacular, and they wrote about the contemporary scene.

The effect of this revolution was to free China's writers from the formalism which had characterised Chinese literature. Writing was no longer an exercise in the use of the classical style.

During the period between the two World Wars, Chinese writers were not only exploring new styles; they were exploring new ideas. Some were Western-style liberals, some were anarchists, and a large percentage were Marxists. They disagreed about many things, but nearly all were, in one way or another, revolutionaries. They were dissatisfied with Chinese culture and Chinese society, and they called for change.

It might be assumed that under Communism, the literary revolution would go on; that the Communists, revolutionaries *par excellence*, would encourage the writers to continue as before. Nothing could be further from the truth. The period since 1949 has not been one of revolution; a new dogmatism has been established, and writers must conform.

Like other intellectuals, Chinese writers were required to participate in a programme of re-education, confess to "bourgeois tendencies", and reject their past work. A Writers' Union was formed. As in the Soviet Union, membership in the union and approval by its authorities became a prerequisite to successful authorship. All periodicals and publishing houses were placed under close control. Nothing can be published without the approval of Communist Party committees.

Literature on the Chinese mainland is now under the domination of Chou Yang, a writer turned bureaucrat, who serves as Vice-director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Party. Chou outlined the official Communist attitude toward literary creation in an article published in the April 29, 1958 issue of the Peking newspaper *Kwangming Daily*.

Chou quoted Mao Tse-tung's declaration that "party committees must assume leadership over literary and all other ideological work." He added that "Our literary and art work and literary criticism should help the people to increase their Communist consciousness and set up a Communist style, which is the greatest and most beautiful." Who decides what is beautiful and what is artistic? The Party.

He noted that authors accustomed to writing books of protest and accounts of individual protests against injustice would find it difficult to adjust to the new dispensation. They must nevertheless learn, he said, that "the hero of the new age should be congenial to the collective."

Shao Chuan-lin, Vice-Chairman of the Writers' Union, propounded the same doctrine. He wrote in the *Peking People's Daily* for March 24, 1958 that "the subservience of art to politics is an objective law".

Most Chinese writers have found themselves stifled by this new conformity. The intense literary activity of the 1920's and 1930's was a thing of the past. Since 1949 there have been few new literary works; only 38 new full-length novels were published in 1957.

The books which did appear were dull. A few writers, mostly younger men like Stalin prize-winner Chou Li-po, wrote books about land reform and industrialisation. Some of the subjects approved by the regime permitted a more dramatic plot. The most promising was the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and Nationalists; books of this sort have evoked more interest from Chinese readers than stories glorifying the "hero of the new age".

Another minor genre has also been popular. This could be described as the Communist Western or the Communist detective story. In place of cowboys and Red Indians, they concern cadres and counter-revolutionaries. Despite the inevitable political morals, such books do provide action and excitement. But they are not literature.

Chinese writers complained frankly about this situation when, along with other intellectuals, they were permitted to speak their minds during the "hundred flowers" period of 1957.

Pa Chin, an anarchist by inclination and a prolific novelist in pre-Communist days, said that literature and art should be given back to the people. The criticisms of a few Communist officials should not decide what would be written. Ting Ling, China's leading woman writer, winner of a Stalin prize and a Communist for more than 20 years, spoke out against the Party's control over literature. She condemned the Party for "sectarianism"—the practice of putting its own interests above all others—and "political blackmail" of writers.

Chin Chao-yang, former deputy chief editor of the Peking magazine *People's Literature*, urged his colleagues to "free themselves from the heavy shackles of dogmatism". Chin added that "writers are not free in their creation under the present society; while writing, the writers are apprehensive,

ill at ease and always cautious, lest someone grab them from behind”.

Many other writers joined in the criticism. Even Chou Yang and Kuo Mo-jo, chairman of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the regime's semi-official laureate, admitted that some aspects of the literary scene required improvement.

Criticism by writers and other intellectuals was too much to the point. Beginning in June 1957, the Communist Party re-asserted political control. Ting Ling was labelled a “poisonous weed” and accused of conspiring with other editors and writers to “disrupt the unity of Chinese writers.” In ordinary terms, this meant she advocated less strict Party direction. Ting Ling refused to confess her “errors”, so she was dismissed from her posts in the Party and administration and reduced to menial labour.

Chin Chao-yang and a number of other writers and editors were sent for unspecified terms of manual work in factories and collective farms. Some of the critics, like Pa Chin, were subjected to a series of attacks in the Chinese press but not given more serious punishment.

The inevitable effect was more dullness and few finished manuscripts. On April 26, 1958 the Peking *People's Daily*, complained that a number of writers were apathetic and “some of them have even felt depressed and pessimistic”.

Communist attempts to correct this situation have taken two forms. The first is an assembly-line approach to literary work. Writers were told to take part in the “great leap forward”, not only by labouring alongside peasants and workers in communes and factories, but by producing more books.

In late 1958 the Writers' Union announced that hundreds of professional and amateur writers throughout China had been assigned quotas of poems, articles and stories to be completed by October 1, 1959, when the Communists would celebrate the tenth anniversary of their regime.

Amateur authors were lavishly praised. During the height of the “great leap forward” the Party press spoke of tens of thousands of poems being written “spontaneously” by peasants and workers. It was apparently assumed that if professional authors were unwilling to write, indoctrinated amateurs would fill the gap. It is difficult, however to find

much talent or literary merit in this mass-produced literature. The Communists have also begun to speak once again of the "hundred flowers" policy. In a speech before the National People's Congress on April 18, 1959 Premier Chou En-lai complained about "distortions" of the hundred flowers policy by "bourgeois rightists". He went on to say, however, that "Through free debates among different schools and views in science, through free competition between different forms and schools in art, we are confident that before long our scientific and cultural work will enter a prosperous era and achieve great successes."

It would appear, however, that the hundred flowers of 1959 are very different from the hundred flowers of 1957. If debates have taken place, they have not been reported in the mainland press or resulted in any significant new writing.

In any case the Communist authorities will continue to keep a close watch on any blooms which appear. In an interview published on June 21, 1959, Kuo Mo-jo declared that "it goes without saying that we cannot allow free sway of political activity or organisation hostile to Communism under the cover of some sort of freedom for writers; when acting against this we cannot be satisfied with criticism alone."

Kuo added that "various trends of literature and the arts must exercise an influence in the direction of one mutual aim—in the direction of Communism." This means, he explained, that "we must carefully analyse and assess works of art, and mould and educate their creators in the right direction."

It is apparent that China's literary revolution is not to be renewed; the new dogmatism will continue to rule.

V: THE CHINESE ECONOMY: CLAIMS AND REALITIES



THE CHINESE ECONOMY SINCE 1949

by Yuan-li Wu

THE Chinese Communist Party declared 1958 to be the year of the "Great Leap Forward" for the Chinese economy. Peasants, workers, and officials were urged to work harder and produce more. Political methods were employed in an effort to speed up China's economic development.

During the first Five-year Plan, from 1953 to 1957, China's heavy industrial plant had been increased. The Government collectivised agriculture and put all private business under state control. But development was uneven, and agricultural production was not growing rapidly enough to meet the demands of industrialisation and an expanding population.

The Party thus decided to exploit China's major resource, its labour force, more intensively. Coercion, exhortation, and close political control were relied upon rather than

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economic incentives. Collective farms were transformed into communes, a drastic reorganisation which placed peasants under semi-military discipline. There was a new emphasis on small local industries.

The "Great Leap Forward", which is continuing in a somewhat more cautious form in 1959, has created new economic and political problems. In order to understand the current situation it is necessary to consider some general principles and the course of economic development in China since 1949.

It is essential to bear in mind the general principles which govern economic activity in a centrally-planned underdeveloped economy dominated by a totalitarian political party. Once the general direction and overall plan are determined, implementation is of course conditioned by the state of technology, the availability of resources, and other external factors. The path of development is also affected by the need of the ruling party to consolidate its control over the people and develop a large number of politically reliable planners, administrators, and technicians.

Consequently, totalitarian economic planning inevitably involves a succession of twists and turns, and occasional relaxation in order later to increase tension more effectively, which would be inexplicable in a free economy. These general observations apply to the Chinese case.

In 1949 the Chinese Communists inherited a predominantly agricultural economy. Manchuria, China's principal industrial base, had been ravaged by Soviet removals of industrial plant after World War II, and by civil war. Other industrial centres in the coastal cities and river ports were disrupted by extreme inflation, the breakdown of the transport system, and nearby fighting. Wartime and postwar inflation had left a deep imprint on the Chinese mind.

Economic disruption was most marked in the urban centres, but a sharp drop in production and a widespread impatience for change could also be found in China's predominantly agricultural interior. In the villages, the fundamental economic problem was the small size of peasant farms and the poor distribution of farm produce.

The Communists took advantage of this economic chaos, for which they themselves were at least partly responsible.

But once in power, the government had to solve its problems. The immediate task was to halt the runaway inflation and restore agricultural and industrial production. The first objective was largely accomplished during the first half of 1950. In order to reach their goal, the Communists adopted drastic measures: compulsory loans, increased taxation, and fiscal reform. Propaganda and coercive measures, including the assessment of extravagant taxes and fines for alleged violations and profiteering, were used to liquidate business inventories, restrict "non-essential" public and private expenditures, and secure cash for the state's needs.

It was much more difficult to restore production. This required co-operation and hard work on the part of technicians, industrial managers, and China's millions of small peasants. In order to win the co-operation, if not the wholehearted support, of the businessmen, the Communist Party declared a policy of moderation. This policy was a temporary one, but at first a number of businessmen had faith in it.

During the period of "New Democracy", small-scale private enterprises were allowed to continue in operation. The "national bourgeoisie"—a flexible term applied to businessmen willing to work for the Communists—were also tolerated. Businessmen who pledged allegiance to Peking were allowed to remain in business, although subject to gradually increasing control by government and by state-controlled enterprises.

The support of the peasants was even more essential. Capitalising on their reputation as "friends of the peasants", the Communists carried out a programme of land redistribution from 1950 to 1952. This had a political as well as economic purpose.

Land was taken from landlords and the richer peasants and given to poorer peasants. Land redistribution was a violent process, involving carefully-staged mass demonstrations at which landowners were accused of crimes and exploitation. According to Communist statistics millions were executed after these "mass trials"; those who received land were implicitly required to share responsibility for the executions.

New strains were put on the Chinese economy by the Korean War, which threatened to renew inflationary pres-

tures. But the Communist Party also took advantage of the war, building up an image of an external enemy. This was used to justify calls for greater exertions in production and provide an excuse for tighter controls and more rapid communisation.

The first phase of the Chinese economy under Communism ended in 1952-53. By 1953, facilities of production had been rehabilitated, the Korean War had ended, and Communist control over the people had been established.

A new phase in China's economic development began in 1953, when the first Five-year Plan was proclaimed. Up to that time there had been little genuine planning: the economy was too disorganised; the Communists lacked statistical information, experienced personnel, and fully-formulated objectives. Peking economic authorities continued to be unsure of their ground, but by July 1955 basic requirements and methods had been worked out and the goals of the first Five-year Plan were published.

The First Five-year Plan and the "Great Leap Forward".

The first Five-year Plan, from 1953 to 1957, called for radical social change as well as economic development. By the end of the plan period all large-scale industry and commerce had been either taken over by the state or transformed into "joint state-private enterprises" under state control. Both capital accumulation and current production could thus be controlled by state planning authorities.

Small traders and handicraftsmen were organised into co-operatives to facilitate supervision and planning. These social changes, incidentally, were carried out much more rapidly than originally provided for in the plan.

An even more drastic change was carried out in the villages. When the peasants had been given more land in 1950-52, they were assured that they would be permitted to retain it "for a considerable period of time". Collectivisation was to proceed in gradual steps, and was not to be completed until the second Five-year Plan. Nevertheless, collectivisation and the takeover of industry by the state were accelerated abruptly during the second half of 1955, and both processes were completed during 1956. All but five per cent of the peasants were organised into collective farms which

removed the land from individual control.

The state established a monopoly on trade in foodstuffs and a system of compulsory purchase of agricultural products was set up. A large part of agricultural income was already taken by the state as taxes; these new measures channelled most agricultural output into the government sector, thus providing more food for export and limiting domestic consumption. Rationing of food, cloth, and other basic commodities was also introduced. These actions increased the regime's capacity to exact more savings from the economy.

During the first Five-year Plan, and especially since 1956, there was a rapid growth of industrial output on the mainland. It was not, however, accompanied by a comparable increase in products available for consumption by the Chinese people. Most of the increased production remained in the hands of the state.

Agricultural production lagged behind. This was partly due to the stress laid on heavy industry. There were also numerous bottlenecks and areas of disorganisation caused by the abrupt transition from individual to collective farming.

The government were faced with a basic question: how to provide an incentive for the peasants? During 1957 Peking briefly allowed peasants to withdraw from collectives, but the decision was reversed after millions of peasants chose to return to individual farming. In Chekiang and some other provinces a majority of peasants withdrew, and Peking complained that in those areas collective farms had "collapsed". The government were also alarmed because the small number of peasants who had remained outside collectives were considerably more effective than the collective farms; one Party spokesman said that they produced 20 per cent more grain per hectare of comparable land.

This situation threatened the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, which needed more grain for export, more food to feed the new industrial workers, and more agricultural raw materials. After some hesitation and experimentation, the Party launched the third phase of their economic policy: the "great leap forward" of 1958.

Established industrial enterprises were ordered to produce "more, better, faster, and more economically." More important, however, was the Party's new stress on small-

scale local industrial units. This was intended to raise industrial production and make more effective use of China's abundant labour supply.

Small local factories required less capital and fewer modern machines. The burden of finding capital resources for the small-scale plants fell on provincial and other local bodies rather than the central state planning authority.

Heavy industry, however, was not to be forgotten. The Party emphasised that large and small-scale industry must be developed simultaneously. This policy, summed up in the slogan "walking on two legs", led to a considerable increase in gross industrial production during 1958. Much of the increase, however, was in products of low quality and limited usefulness. The formation of numerous small industrial units created serious problems: planning was disrupted, raw materials were often used inefficiently, and the transport system was overstrained.

Between September and December 1958 virtually all Chinese peasants were enrolled in communes, an extreme form of collective farm much larger than the collectives set up in 1955-56. Communes, averaging about 5,000 peasant families, were intended to make farming more efficient and make better use of peasant labour. Equally important, communes limited consumption. All grain was put under central control and commune members were fed in mess halls. Both the communes and the new local industries, organised under close party direction, served to maintain a vigilant political control over peasants and workers.

In carrying out these policies of the "great leap forward" the Communist Party is running considerable risks. In order to exploit the labour force more intensively the Party has made unprecedented demands on the Chinese people. The working day has been lengthened to fourteen and even eighteen hours, and some special "shock brigades" have been required to work around the clock for days at a time. Steel workers have been asked to cultivate vegetable gardens when their shift is finished. Peasants are required to tend crude roadside blast furnaces after a hard day in the fields. Their pay has not been increased commensurately, and in many cases pay and food rations have been cut.

The Communists' attempt to rely on political controls,

coercion, and exhortations rather than economic incentive adds a political dimension to their problems of economic development.

One question must be asked: are these Party policies necessary? They face two principal dangers. In the long run, coercion may not be an effective means of increasing output, and sooner or later is likely to cause popular opposition. Furthermore, taxation, rationing, and other controls may not succeed in restricting consumption, and China's suppressed inflation may become runaway inflation once again.

The outcome rests upon imponderables of political discipline as well as upon economic factors. Will the Communist Party and its political workers be able to disregard the wishes of the population indefinitely? Will the Party members always be willing to follow the orders of their leaders? It is impossible for an outside observer to answer these questions at this time. It is equally probable that the Chinese Communists themselves are also apprehensive about the outcome of their gamble.

As a decade of Communist rule draws to a close it is clear that the radical social and economic changes brought about by the Communists cannot be regarded simply as an attempt to solve the economic problems faced by any underdeveloped country.

The basic determinant of these changes has been the Communist presupposition that only the Communist Party is to be the agent of Chinese economic development.

Only time and experimentation will show whether the Communists' radical policies will work, and in the meantime the political fortunes of the Communist Party will remain at stake.

* * *

by L. H. Hsia

RAPID industrial development has been one of the Chinese Communists' fundamental objectives ever since they took power on the mainland. They wish to increase their prestige, influence and power by building up a heavy industrial base. Aware that peoples all over the world seek a rapid improvement in their living standards, the Communists are also attempting to convince the world that their method is the most effective.

This article is intended to appraise mainland China's industrial development since 1953, when the rehabilitation of industry was largely completed, the output of most major industries was restored to the prewar level, and the first Five-year Plan was launched. Quantitative data used here are either obtained or derived from official Chinese Communist statistics; no detailed data are available from any other source.

This reliance on official claims makes it necessary to insert a word of caution. The accuracy of Communist statistics cannot be ascertained with precision. They are often ambiguous and misleading in order to give an impression of continual success and enormous increases.

According to the *Communique on the Results of Implementing the First Five-year Plan* issued by the State Bureau of Statistics on April 13, 1959, the gross value of industrial output increased 141 per cent between 1953 and 1957. The rate of overall industrial growth thus came to 19.2 per cent per year. This use of gross value output is, however, somewhat misleading. This includes not only the value created during manufacturing, but also the value of raw materials and of intermediate products consumed during the process of production. Thus, any splitting-up of producing units or

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any increase in the wastefulness of raw material consumption is reflected in *gross* output by value, although neither represents any change in final *physical* output.

The reported annual rate of industrial growth varied widely, between 7.0 per cent in 1957 and 31.7 per cent in 1953. This year-to-year variation can be traced ultimately to agricultural production during the preceding year. Thus the good harvests of 1952 and 1955 were followed by high rates of industrial growth in 1953 and 1956, while the poor harvests of 1954 and 1956 were among the factors causing much lower rates of industrial growth in 1955 and 1957.

Agricultural production has increased much more slowly. Communist China's overall rate of development can be estimated by considering the actual growth of the economy's net national product: the total net output of industrial goods, agricultural products, and services. An accurate estimate is difficult to achieve, but it appears that from 1953 to 1957 the average increase in net national product was in the order of eight to nine per cent per year. This rate, while high, is not exceptional. Comparable rates have been achieved at various times by other economies, including Japan, Germany, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A.

Because of China's expanding population, the net national product per person has risen more slowly, at about six to seven per cent per year. A large part of this increase is taken by the state, so the annual increase in actual consumption by the people has been much smaller, and is further limited by rationing and marketing regulations.

The Chinese Communists have made undue claims regarding production increases during 1958. According to the Statistical Bureau's *Communique on the Development of the National Economy in 1958*, the increase in industrial output for that year amounted to 66 per cent. This rate of growth, however, is not comparable to the rates quoted for previous years because of the change in coverage. For the period 1953-57, only the value of factory products was included in the figures for industrial output. For 1958 the output by value of individual handicraftsmen and handicraft co-operatives was also included. A number of these were set up during the "great leap forward" of 1958, which stressed the formation of small, local industrial units.

It must be remembered, however, that a majority of these small-scale enterprises had been engaged in handicraft production along traditional lines before the "great leap forward" and, indeed, before the Communists took power. The inclusion of handicraft production in the industrial output figures for 1958 appears to be intended to inflate the rate of industrial growth claimed for the year of intense industrial effort.

The rate of increase in output has shown considerable variation between different industries. Generally, it has been much higher in metallurgical and engineering industries than in food-processing and textiles, which are of course the industries having the greatest immediate effect on the standard of living in China.

This is the result of development planning which has adhered rigidly to the principle of concentrating economic resources on capital goods industries. During the period 1953 to 1957, the output of capital goods increased 220 per cent, and that of consumer goods 86 per cent, both expressed in gross value at 1952 prices. The annual average rate of increase was thus 26 per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively.

During 1958 the emphasis on heavy industry was more pronounced. The Communists claimed an increase in capital goods production of 103 per cent and a 34 per cent increase in consumer goods production, both expressed in gross value presumably at 1957 prices. These different rates of growth resulted in a marked change in the composition of China's industry. Capital goods were 39.7 per cent of total industrial output in 1952, 52.8 per cent in 1957 and 57 per cent in 1958. It should be pointed out that the Communists have concentrated on producing heavy industrial products which were not produced in China in the past. These new products are priced according to test-manufacturing expenses. Consequently, the Communists' figures on total industrial output by value carry a distinct statistical bias emphasising heavy industry.

The comparability of 1958 statistics with those of preceding years is limited. This is true whether value or quantity is used as a basis. As we have noted, the inclusion of handicraft production in the figures for total output by value in 1958 tends to inflate the industrial production for that

year. Similar considerations apply to official 1958 data on the physical quantity of industrial output. It is claimed, for instance, that 11,080,000 metric tons of steel were produced in 1958. From official reports we are able to figure out that 2,448,000 tons, or 22 per cent, consisted of low-quality steel from small native-style converters. When the latter figure is excluded, the 1958 output of steel of comparable quality would total 8,632,000 tons, which represents an increase of 56 per cent over 1957.

In 1958 the Chinese Communists began a wholesale re-orientation of the pattern of industrial development. Contrasting with the practice from 1953 to 1957, equal or even preponderant emphasis began to be given to local industry, small or medium-sized enterprises, and indigenous methods of production.

Steel was chosen as the pilot industry and given unquestionable priority. All other industries were subordinated to the needs of the steel industry. Concomitantly, a mass movement for industrial construction and production was launched in conjunction with a campaign for a "technical revolution." Workers in Anshan and other steel centres were urged to work additional shifts and develop new techniques. Peasants in the communes, which were formed while the steel campaign was at its height, were ordered to set up small-scale blast furnaces in the villages and produce iron and steel. City dwellers refined ore a few kilograms at a time in back-yard furnaces. The Communists compared this approach to "ants gnawing at a bone".

This new pattern of economic development has given rise to a number of problems. First, the output of small producing units using crude methods is, in most cases, of low quality. The pig iron produced by native blast furnaces is unfit for steel making. Steel billets produced by native methods are too small to be handled by modern rolling mills. The problem of charging modern steel converters with iron made by small-scale methods became so serious that it was the subject of a special conference called by the Minister of Metallurgy on October 16, 1958.

Secondly, the emphasis on crude methods of production results in uneconomic use of labour. For instance, from 50 to 60 mandays are required to produce one ton of pig iron

from a native furnace. These high labour inputs in industrial production coincided with an increase in labour-intensity in irrigation works, farming, and other activities. The result was a labour shortage throughout the economy which caused, among other things, considerable waste of crops which could not be harvested in time. The essence of industrialisation lies in greater and more efficient use of capital so that the productivity of labour is enhanced. The Communists' "mass mobilisation" approach, by stressing labour-intensive methods of production, contradicts this principle.

Thirdly, the mass movement for industrial construction and production has greatly increased the strain on China's transport system. Railway transport is the most important example. Although the number of freight-car loads handled per day increased from 26,000 in August 1958 to 32,300 in December of that year, thirty to forty million metric tons of freight remained unshipped on January 1. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the "big leap forward" in industry contributed to this piling-up of freight. It is known, however, that coal had to be transported from the northern provinces to the south in order to meet the needs of the scattered native blast furnaces, that steel was given top priority in transport facilities, and that in normal years steel and coal, together with grain and cotton, take up 50 per cent of railway freight. It is therefore, reasonable to assume that the steel campaign added significantly to China's transport problems.

Fourthly, the mushrooming of small local factories has complicated the task of economic planning. It is only necessary to realise that half of the 1959 pig iron output is expected to be produced by small blast furnaces scattered all over the country. It is highly unlikely that planning authorities would be able to draw up labour and material requirements which could adequately take into account the numerous small producing units. This would mean that they would be unable to regulate the allocation of economic resources among the various branches of production. Thus the very basis of economic planning is shaken.

Finally, the policy of granting the steel industry a special role has upset the relatively balanced pattern of growth achieved between 1953 and 1957. Steady growth requires

careful balance between industries, each of which contributes to the development of the others. The imbalance between the machine-building industry and the steel industry became apparent by the end of 1958. At that time, the annual output of the steel industry was reported to be 20 million tons, but only ten million tons could be utilised by the machine-building industry.

Development of coal and power facilities has lagged behind steel-producing capacity. To justify all this, a new theory of balance has been advanced by Chinese Communist theorists. They stress the temporary, conditional, and relative nature of any balance. According to this theory, a new balance between the various sectors of the economy can always be achieved after an imbalance develops. Sectors which have lagged behind can be pushed ahead, and, in theory, the new balance is on a higher level.

During the early months of 1959, however, this theory was apparently questioned by the Communist economic authorities. In his April 21, 1959 speech before the National people's Congress, Vice-Premier and Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien repeated the Communist regime's new slogan: "co-ordinating, as in a chess game, all the activities of the nation." In what appeared to be an attempt to correct the excesses, waste, and imbalance of 1958, he stressed that "our national economy is developing in a planned and balanced manner."

Such vacillation may well indicate that China's Communist leadership is still searching for the "objective law" governing the planned and proportionate development of the economy.

* * *

by *Lea E. Williams*

The Export Paradox

THE policies of China's Communist regime are often paradoxical, but to many Southeast Asian businessmen and government official the strangest paradox is Peking's large-scale export of products which are in short supply in China. It becomes understandable, however, when Peking's motives are taken into account. Although economic considerations undoubtedly play a part in mainland China's trade policies, the basic objectives of the Communists' export drive are political rather than economic.

Since 1954 Communist China's exports to Southeast Asia have increased 500 per cent, reaching a total value of £160 million sterling in 1958. This rapid increase can be explained in two words: low prices. China has won a large share of the Asian market by offering its products at prices 10 to 50 per cent lower than those of its principal competitors. Traders in Hong Kong report that "the Chinese don't take labour cost into account in setting their export prices."

At first glance, this would seem to be beneficial to the economies of Southeast Asia. Everybody seeks bargains. But recently an increasing number of questions have been raised regarding China's trade policies. There is concern over the effects of Chinese competition and a growing realisation of the political consequences of trade with the mainland.

Peking's pricing policy was revealed succinctly by the Chinese Communist minister in charge of foreign trade. He said: "In our trade with the capitalist countries, it is generally true that when prices for our exports and imports in the foreign markets—after conversion into Chinese currency according to official exchange rates—are compared with domestic prices, we have been suffering a loss in the export trade and netting a profit in the import trade."

This amounts to an admission that Chinese exports are sold abroad at artificially low prices, while imports bought by

China are distributed to the Chinese people at unnecessarily high prices. In other words, Peking is engaging in mass dumping. The Chinese Communists have also sold abroad, at a loss, penicillin, machinery, and other products which have been imported into China. Thus the people of China are forced to bear the burden of Peking's campaign for increased trade with Southeast Asia.

The burden is increased by the fact that many of the goods exported by the Chinese Communists are in short supply in China. Peking is continually telling workers, peasants and even Party functionaries that they must work hard and deny themselves now so they can enjoy a better life in the future. Then, the Communists say, the Chinese people will be able to purchase bicycles, sewing machines, and plenty of food and clothing. But it is precisely these items which have been prominent in China's exports to Southeast Asia.

These shortages have been admitted by the Communists themselves. In his April 21, 1959 speech on the 1959 budget Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance Li Hsien-nien said: "So far as supplies on the market are concerned, since the autumn of 1958 there has been a little tension due to short supplies of some nonstaple foods and manufactured daily necessities in the cities." "Nonstaple foods" means meat, cooking oil, vegetables, and practically all other foods, with the exception of basic grains. The cotton cloth ration has been cut several times during the past few years, despite Peking's claims of bumper cotton crops.

The motives lying behind this paradoxical trade deserve detailed consideration. Four chief objects shape Peking's trade policy. Economic and political considerations are mixed together; indeed, the Communists themselves maintain that it is meaningless to consider economic questions separately.

Communist China's first objective is to secure from Southeast Asia raw materials needed for its programme of industrialisation. Rubber, petroleum, and tin are the most important of these primary products. It can be assumed that Communist China hopes to make Southeast Asian producers dependent on sales to the Chinese market. If this dependence is established, it can of course be used to obtain political concessions—the classical pattern of a colonial economic relationship.

Secondly, Communist China urgently needs foreign exchange with which to pay for imported goods, particularly machinery and industrial plants supplied by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The volume of Soviet aid and grants to China has been much exaggerated. The Soviet Union demands payment in barter goods or world currencies. By selling in Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communists are able to make up for their trade deficit with the rest of the Communist bloc. In 1958 Communist China imported only £34 million sterling worth of goods from Southeast Asia, while exports were valued at £160 million sterling—a difference of £126 million sterling.

Thirdly, China's heavy industry is still limited in size. Most of China's factories produce light industrial products. In other economies these would be sold on the domestic market, but the Communists have sent a large part of their production abroad. There is limited demand in Europe, Japan, and even in the Soviet bloc for China's light manufactured goods. Southeast Asia, the only readily available market, has consequently become a dumping ground for Chinese-made textiles, flashlights, thermos-bottles, and bicycles.

The fourth motive behind Communist China's trade with Southeast Asia is unquestionably the most important. Peking regards export products as instruments of propaganda. The Chinese Communists are well aware that the Asian peoples are eager for rapid economic growth. Since it is generally known that China had a relatively undeveloped economy at the time the Communists took power, Peking now wants to give the impression of rapid industrial advance by flooding Asian markets with manufactured goods. The Communists hope to convince Asians that rapid development is possible only if totalitarian methods are adopted.

This was explicitly admitted by Kuo Ching-yen, a Chinese Communist writer, who declared that "The political significance of the export of industrial products is primarily to show the superiority of the economic system of our country."

Political Trade and Economic Difficulties

The political nature of Chinese Communist trade was graphically demonstrated in 1958 when commercial negotiations with traders in Japan were broken off just before the

Japanese elections. Peking radio and the Communist press said repeatedly that trade would be resumed only if the Japanese government accepted political conditions. These included displaying the Chinese Communist flag over Peking's trade office in Japan and the granting of virtual diplomatic status to Communist commercial representatives. Peking also alleged that the Japanese government showed a "hostile" attitude toward Communist China and declared that no further trade was possible unless this attitude was changed.

Some of Peking's exports are particularly adapted to political pressure. Although Communist China is a net importer of newsprint, it exports considerable quantities to Asian countries at prices 25 per cent below those quoted by European suppliers. By threatening to cut off supplies or raise prices, the Chinese are able to put pressure on foreign newspapers to take an editorial line favourable to Peking.

In Burma, overseas Chinese businessmen who borrow from the Communists' government-controlled Bank of China have been required to send their children to Communist schools and make statements praising Communist policies. Similar pressures have been brought to bear on overseas Chinese businessmen in other Southeast Asian countries.

Since 1956 Communist China has also offered increasing amounts of aid to Southeast Asian countries. During 1958, foreign aid provided for in the Chinese Communist budget reached a total of just under 200 million *yuan*, about £28 million sterling at Peking's somewhat artificial official rate of exchange. A large part of this went to Communist regimes in North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia, but economic aid to Southeast Asian governments is to be increased during 1959. The budget for 1959 allots 600 million *yuan* (about £89 million sterling) for foreign aid, an increase of 218 per cent over allocations made during 1958.

This aid policy places Communist China in a unique position: it is the only country with a serious deficiency of capital which is offering large-scale aid to foreign governments. Since this cannot be justified on economic grounds, it is obvious that here, even more than in Peking's trade policy, the fundamental motives are non-economic. Whenever the Chinese Communists have offered aid they have sought the maximum propaganda benefit. They seek additional

publicity when agreements are signed and whenever a major shipment arrives. There has, moreover, often been a considerable discrepancy between the impressive total figure quoted in an aid offer and the actual value of goods eventually shipped.

Asian countries have also found that trade with Communist China often has economic disadvantages. These include peculiar Communist trade practices, the uncertainty of Peking's trade policy, and China's cut-price competition with established Asian exporters.

Much of Peking's trade with China's Asian neighbours has been on a barter basis. The Burmese, for instance, concluded trade agreements with Communist China in 1955 and 1956. Burmese rice was to be exchanged for Chinese products, but the Burmese found that the goods they wanted were "not available". When the Chinese finally settled the account Rangoon was obliged to accept products which Burma did not want to import. Burmese traders also found that Peking raised its prices by ten to thirty per cent while negotiations were in progress, and Chinese exports, when they arrived, were often of inferior quality or did not meet Burmese specifications.

Communist China has proved an uncertain and unreliable supplier. In late 1958 and early 1959, for instance, the volume of Chinese exports was abruptly reduced. Contracts for sales to England, Finland, and Canada were cancelled. Exports of foodstuffs and other products to Hong Kong dropped sharply. Traders found that Communist commercial officers suddenly showed no interest in making additional export deals. Observers in Hong Kong attributed this to bottle-necks in China's over-strained transport system and the general confusion created by the economic "great leap forward" ordered by Peking in 1958. Such abrupt and unpredictable changes in China's trade policies are always possible under a system in which all economic activities are directed by the state and used to serve non-economic ends. This unpredictability can, of course, work considerable hardship on foreign economies and individual businessmen who come to depend on trade with China.

Competition from Communist China has already reduced the markets available to other Asian exporters, and the threat

of further competition has important economic and political consequences. During 1958, mainland exports of cotton textiles to Hong Kong increased from 1957's figure of 100 million square yards to 127 million square yards. Japanese exports of cloth to Hong Kong dropped from 150 million square yards to 117 million during the same period. Indian cloth exports to Malaya have also been affected by Chinese competition. Peking has cut its cement prices several times in order to invade Asian markets, reducing sales by local producers.

Goods sold to Communist China by Asian exporters have in some cases been resold to traditional customers of the original exporter. The most striking example of this was the resale of Burmese rice to Ceylon. Rice sold by the Burmese to Peking has also ended up in West Germany and other European markets.

The economies of several Asian countries, notably Burma and Thailand, depend on rice exports. Peking has exported large quantities of rice, other grains, and meat to countries in the Communist bloc, but up to now Peking's exports of Chinese rice to non-Communist countries have been relatively limited in quantity. Peking's strict control over food consumption in China makes it possible for the Chinese Communists to export large quantities of rice at low prices whenever it is politically advantageous. The Communists may in future threaten Southeast Asian countries with massive competition if they do not follow diplomatic and political policies approved by Peking.

Whatever the future changes in the pattern of Communist China's trade with Southeast Asia, it is certain to continue to be directed toward political objectives. As the *Eastern Economist* of New Delhi said in its issue of January 3, 1958: "China's foreign economic policy was bound to be directly influenced in a profound degree by her political ideology."



THE SINO-SOVIET AXIS

by G. F. Hudson

ON December 16, 1949, two and a half months after the inauguration in Peking of the "Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic", Mao Tse-tung arrived in Moscow. It was a great historic occasion when the new ruler of China, fresh from the conquest through civil war of the most populous country in the world, came to pay his respects to his elder brother in the Marxist-Leninist faith, the man who was the heir of the Russian October Revolution and the conqueror of Berlin.

Mao had long talks with Stalin, toured the Soviet Union, and did not get back to China until the beginning of March 1950. On Soviet soil he could feel proud of his own achievement and carry himself as a person of real importance; he did not have to behave with humility as if he were a leader of a Communist party which had never made a revolution. His relations to the master of the Kremlin were nevertheless

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those of a junior to a senior, of a pupil to a teacher. His regime was less than a dozen weeks old, but 32 years had passed since the Bolsheviks took power in Russia; the new China looked to Moscow for instruction and advice, for material economic aid and for military protection. Mao might or might not follow Soviet recommendations in making his own major policy decisions, but he was certainly not at this time disposed to tell Stalin how to conduct Soviet foreign policy or to explain to him the implications of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the current world situation.

Just seven years after this visit of Mao Tse-tung to Stalin, a Chinese Communist leader again arrived in Moscow, not this time Mao himself but his Prime Minister Chou En-lai acting on instructions from Peking. Chou came to mediate between the Soviet Union and Poland, after the revolts of the autumn of 1956 in Poland and Hungary had shaken to its foundations Moscow's authority in Eastern Europe and caused dismay and bewilderment in the ranks of communism throughout the world. In Hungary, Communist rule had collapsed completely and had only been restored by Soviet tanks; in Poland, the party still held power, but under a leader who had been elevated in direct defiance of an attempt made by Khrushchev in person to prevent it, and there remained the strong possibility of a Soviet resort to force in order to crush the recalcitrant nationalism of the Poles.

Both in Moscow and in Warsaw Chou En-lai played an important part in patching up a reconciliation between the Soviet and Polish leaders. It was the first Chinese intervention in the political affairs of Europe, something which could not have been imagined while Stalin was alive. But what was even more remarkable in this crisis of international communism was the fact that the ideological pronouncements, which seriously sought to analyze the causes of the recent upheavals and adapt Communist doctrine to the new situation, were coming not from Moscow, but from Peking. While confusion appeared to reign in the Kremlin, the Chinese Communist Party made declarations which, if far from profound, were at any rate marked by a certain clarity and comprehensiveness of theoretical conception.

This increased prestige and influence of Communist China in relation to the Soviet Union has been, to some

extent, a development which was inevitable with the consolidation of the new regime in China and the enhanced self-confidence of its leaders. But it also reflects the advantage possessed by Mao Tse-tung since the death of Stalin, on account of his unchallenged personal ascendancy in China as compared with the prolonged dissensions and struggle for power in the Soviet Union—a source of uncertainty and confusion in Soviet policy which has left the authority of the Kremlin in the Communist world seriously impaired.

Mao Tse-tung is a figure comparable to Lenin in that he is the founder of the regime of which he is the head, the man who led his party to the conquest of power. He was not a successor to an authority already established; he was the creator of that authority. He holds today the position that Lenin would presumably have held had he still been alive nine years after the final victory in 1920 over General Wrangel. But in the U.S.S.R. there have been two demises of the supreme leadership, and each has been followed by a period of "collective leadership" marked by instability, dissension, and a struggle for power resulting in the emergence of a new personal autocracy. Whatever the theory of "democratic centralism" on paper, the Communist party-state requires in practice at its apex a single potentate who can be the final arbiter between cliques and factions within the party. Collective leadership simply does not work for more than a brief interval of time. On the other hand, the emergence of a new dictator evokes intense jealousy among those who were previously his equals in rank, and a widespread fear of the ways in which he may use his power, particularly if party members have suffered excessively under the rule of the last boss. The contest for the succession can thus become extremely bitter, with consequent dislocation and uncertainty in domestic and foreign policy. Such a critical period could in China follow the death of Mao Tse-tung, but so far the Chinese Communists have had the advantage of a decisive personal leadership, whereas the Soviet party from the spring of 1953 onwards had to cope with the problem of the succession to Stalin's vacant throne.

There is no evidence of any serious conflict in Sino-Soviet relations during the three and a half years between the founding of the Chinese People's Republic and the death of

Stalin. On the contrary, this was a period of close Sino-Soviet co-operation. Mao Tse-tung's visit to Moscow resulted in the conclusion of a treaty of military alliance between the two Communist powers, and this was put to the test during the war in Korea; the outcome was such as to confirm Chinese Communist confidence in Soviet capacity and will to provide protection in a major clash with the "imperialists". The U.S.S.R. not only supplied the Chinese forces in Korea with an abundance of equipment but also, even without directly intervening in the war, gave Communist China a degree of support sufficient to deter the United States and its allies operating under the United Nations command in Korea from attempting to enforce withdrawal of the "People's Volunteers" from the peninsula by action against industries and communications in Chinese territory. Mao Tse-tung was thus enabled to carry on a major war for nearly three years against a coalition of 16 states, including three great powers, to the great enhancement of the prestige of his regime, without a single shell or bomb falling on Chinese soil.

The Soviet leaders also placed their potent international propaganda machine at the disposal of the Chinese Communists, particularly for the mendacious germ warfare campaign. On the Chinese side there was an enthusiastic willingness to learn from the "Soviet experience" and a great propaganda drive by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association to glorify Russian (as against American) technology and culture. The material economic aid from the Soviet Union was meagre, but numerous Russian technicians were sent to China and played an important part in starting new industries.

After Stalin's death, Communist China had no direct concern with the political jockeying for position among the "collective" leaders of the Soviet Union, but did have an interest in the stability of the Soviet regime and in the continuation of Stalin's policies of support for the government in Peking. This interest caused the Chinese Communists to favour Khrushchev rather than Malenkov in the conflict over the priority of heavy industry, for China was in need of capital goods from the Soviet Union and a large-scale switch of Soviet industry to the production of consumer goods would reduce the supplies needed for China's own industrialization. Moreover, in October 1954, Khrushchev further established

himself in Chinese goodwill by going to Peking and negotiating an agreement which restored Port Arthur and the Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies to Chinese ownership. Chinese Communist sentiment was now becoming resentful of any restrictions on national sovereignty and appreciated Khrushchev's willingness to abandon rights which, even as vested in the Soviet Union, had a flavour of imperialism. The determination to maintain full sovereignty in relations with Moscow also made the Chinese sympathetic to the aspirations of the European Communist satellites for greater independence, and they viewed with favour the moves made under Khrushchev's leadership to relax Soviet control in Eastern Europe, including the reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Mao Tse-tung had given unreserved support to the Moscow line as long as the Soviet Communist Party kept up its feud with Tito, but when Khrushchev went to Belgrade and said that the whole affair had been a misunderstanding due to the machination of the deceased Beria, Peking accepted the reversal of policy without demur.

In the field of domestic policy also China responded to the current trend in the Soviet Union, even though there were no directives which required conformity. Accustomed to look to the Soviet Union for the pattern of correct Communist behaviour, the Chinese Communists could not be unaffected by the new climate of relative relaxation in the U.S.S.R., particularly the "thaw" in literature and scientific work. The turn of the line came later in China than in Russia; 1955 was the year of the witch-hunting campaign against Hu Feng and his followers, but by the end of the year the intimidated and brain-washed intelligentsia was being assured that those who were not counter-revolutionaries had nothing to fear from the regime and would be protected against overzealous inquisitors.

Finally, early in 1957, Mao proclaimed the famous "Hundred Flowers" policy, which appeared to introduce a freedom of thought going considerably beyond anything yet permitted in the Soviet Union. After years of the most ruthless regimentation and crushing of dissent, the Chinese Communists suddenly acquired the reputation of being in the vanguard of liberalisation in the Communist world. This toleration was never what it seemed, but at least in form

Communist China was going the same way as the Soviet Union.

A difference became manifest, however, when Khrushchev went on to launch the attack on the memory of Stalin which, although delivered at a closed session of the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress, soon became known throughout the world. It is not proposed here to speculate on the problem of Khrushchev's motives for this extraordinary performance or to go into the question whether any advance warning of it was communicated to non-Soviet Communist Parties. It is sufficient to state the fact that on February 15, 1956, just ten days before Khrushchev demolished the reputation of the dead Stalin with furious invective, Chu Teh, as Chinese fraternal delegate to the Congress, read out a message from Mao Tse-tung which spoke of "the invincibility of the Soviet Communist Party created by Lenin and nurtured by Stalin and his closest comrades-in-arms". Such language on such an occasion was not used lightly; it signified that Mao was upholding the old conception of the "party of Lenin and Stalin". If he had not been informed of the impending demotion of Stalin, he was made to look foolish by what happened ten days later; if he had been informed, the phrasing was a protest against what was intended. In either case the policies of the Soviet and Chinese leaders had fallen apart.

In retrospect, it is clear that Khrushchev's speech against Stalin was a colossal blunder. It may have been popular with the upper ranks of the Soviet Communist Party, which were only too well informed already about Stalin's atrocities and sought guarantees for themselves against their repetition. But elsewhere, throughout the world, its effect was to discredit the regime which now admitted to such a record, to vindicate its critics who were now proved to have been justly accusing it, and to bewilder and demoralise all those party zealots who for 30 years had seen communism as incarnate in the figure of the Genial Secretary. Nowhere was the repudiation of Stalin more embarrassing than in China, where such great efforts had been made to build up the prestige of the Soviet Union; the attack on the cult of personality was likewise deleterious to the organised adulation of Chairman Mao, which fully rivalled Stalin-worship in its fulsome extravagance. The inevitable consequence of all this was a loss of confidence among

the Chinese Communists in the wisdom and reliability of the Soviet leadership—doubts which were intensified when later in the year the increasing political confusion in Eastern Europe produced the major upheavals in Poland and Hungary. The Chinese now came to the conclusion that they must formulate a policy independently of Moscow for dealing with the new situation, and take an active part in restoring the edifice of Communist power in Europe now threatened with collapse.

There is no doubt that Mao Tse-tung regarded the events taking place in Europe as seriously endangering the regime in China; he later declared in a speech that the news of the rising in Hungary had at once stimulated hopes of a similar overturn among anti-Communist Chinese. What was most alarming in the situation for Peking was the apparent incapacity of the Soviet government to give a clear lead to the Communist world in a crisis which was not only a local military problem but a challenge to the Marxist-Leninist faith. The Soviet tanks were effective enough in breaking the armed resistance of the Hungarian people, but Moscow's ideological artillery seemed to be firing blindly, while Yugoslavia denounced the initial Soviet intervention and Poland refused to recognise the Kadar government. The main reason for the Soviet political disarray was undoubtedly the dissension of cliques within the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev, having staked his reputation on his policy of conciliating Tito and relaxing controls over the satellites, had to put the blame for the disorders in Poland and in Hungary on the past errors of their veteran party chiefs Boleslaw Bierut and Matyas Rakosi, but a strong faction in the Kremlin attributed them to the policies of Khrushchev himself, which had had the effect of weakening and discrediting the Communist Parties of Poland and Hungary without allaying discontent.

With such a controversy raging in the Kremlin, it was impossible for the Soviet Union to make clear and consistent pronouncements on the crisis. Khrushchev had not yet sufficient personal authority to silence his critics, and even if he had, his incapacity for any formulation of abstract ideas precluded him from composing the kind of declaration the emergency required. It was, therefore, left to the Chinese Communists to straighten out the tangle; in Peking there was a

single leader supreme over factions, and who, whatever practical tasks he had undertaken, had always been primarily an intellectual. The Peking *People's Daily*, in an article which was stated to be based on discussions in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, and thus had the force of an official manifesto, reviewed the course of recent events in Eastern Europe and laid down principles for judging them. By stressing the need for application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to national conditions, the Chinese pronouncement gave support to the aspirations of the satellite Communist Parties for internal autonomy, but at the same time it dwelt on the need for maintaining the unity of the Communist camp on the basis of a common creed, and drew a definite line between permissible claims to "different roads to socialism" and the heresy of revisionism.

This declaration—which was reproduced in full in *Pravda* the day after it was published in Peking—had a great influence throughout the Communist world and provided a formula for the subsequent diplomatic activities of Chou En-lai, who was sent to Moscow and Warsaw to mediate between the Soviet and Polish leaders. In Moscow, according to Polish reports, Chou dissuaded the Soviet authorities from an intention to use force against Gomulka; in Warsaw he did his best to get Gomulka to endorse the Soviet intervention in Hungary and accept Soviet "leadership" of the Communist camp. The Chinese insistence on this last point surprised the Poles, who had become accustomed to think of the Chinese Communists as their allies against Moscow's pretensions to supremacy, and indeed it seemed strange that China should be thus bolstering up the Soviet position at a time when Moscow had lost so much prestige as a result of recent events. But Chou argued that the Communist states must stand together in opposition to imperialism, that the Soviet Union's economic and military strength gave her a natural primacy in the bloc, and that recognition of such a primacy need not involve any surrender of sovereign rights by its other members.

The Chinese attitude was coloured by the fear that Poland, under the impetus of popular anti-Russian feeling, would break away from the bloc altogether and move into a neutral position, like Tito's Yugoslavia. For Mao the right

of Communist-governed nations to follow different roads to socialism did not extend to the right to be neutral in the struggle against imperialism, which was "the class war in the international field". For this reason the Chinese Communists were sharply critical of Tito, though they still hoped for his return to the fold of orthodoxy, and a prominent member of the Chinese Communist Party visited Belgrade at the same time Chou En-lai was in Warsaw and Budapest.

This Chinese initiative in European affairs, which had previously been the exclusive sphere of Soviet political action, profoundly altered the basis of relations between Peking and Moscow. Mao's China had become a power whose voice was heeded by all Communists and not only by its own citizens; its interests and ambitions henceforth had to be taken into account in the making of Soviet general policies and not only on specifically Far Eastern issues. Although the leadership in the Soviet Union has been more concentrated and unified since the purge of the Presidium in July 1957, this has not restored the former Soviet possession of an exclusive initiative in the common affairs of the Communist camp. During 1958 the independent initiative of China has been manifest on two issues which were not of direct concern to Peking: the new campaign against Tito beginning in May, and the Middle East crisis following the revolution in Iraq in July. In both cases the Chinese Communist influence was not a moderating but an exacerbating factor in the direction of Soviet policy.

The drive against Tito followed on the Yugoslav Communist Congress at Ljubljana in April, when the main points of the Titoist heresy were defiantly reasserted. Moscow had already shown its displeasure by polemical press articles and by dissuading the Communist satellite parties from sending fraternal delegates to the congress. But the Soviet attitude was still mild and indecisive as compared with the uncompromising invective of an editorial in the *People's Daily* which appeared on May 5. This virtually restated the arguments of the Cominform resolution of 1948, which Khrushchev had in effect repudiated by his attempts to placate Tito since the spring of 1955. This Chinese attack set in motion a new campaign against Titoism throughout the Communist world, culminating in a denunciation of Tito by Khrushchev himself, speaking in Sofia a month later; but even so the Soviet

attitude continued to be less extreme than the Chinese. It has been suggested that the Kremlin put up the Chinese to lead the new attack on Tito because it was difficult for Khrushchev, with his pro-Tito record, to take the initiative in this matter. But the Chinese Communists' blast against the leader of a nation so far away from the frontiers of China, was part and parcel of their own bitter persecution of "revisionism" which had been carried on since the end of the brief experiment with free speech in the spring of 1957.

By this time the tide was running strongly against revisionism all over the Communist world; the Moscow Declaration of the 12 ruling Communist Parties, issued to mark the fortieth anniversary of the original Bolshevik Revolution, had denounced revisionism as now a more serious danger than dogmatism (equivalent to Stalinism) to the international Communist movement. But in China the pendulum was swinging more violently than elsewhere; all kinds of people were being accused of revisionism as the most deadly of sins, and Tito was attacked as a symbol of revisionism in the outer world. The evidence indicates that in their purgative zeal the Chinese Communists were pushing the Soviet leaders further than the latter wanted to go.

In the Middle East crisis of July 1958, although the Soviet claim that the world was on the brink of war was artificially worked up in order to force the Western powers into an unprepared summit conference, the Soviet Union had at any rate solid ground for concern over events in a region so close to its Transcaucasian frontier. But China, with no frontier nearer than the Pamirs, went much further than the Kremlin in provocative gestures against the United States and Britain; Peking threatened to send "volunteers" to fight together with the Arabs against the imperialists, and the Chinese press talked of American "paper tigers" whose bluff should be called by bold action. Then when Khrushchev showed himself willing to accept the Western counter-proposal for the requested summit conference to be held "within the framework" of the United Nations Security Council, it was presumably a Chinese protest which sent Khrushchev off on an unheralded visit to Peking and caused him afterwards to abandon the whole idea of a summit conference.

Three weeks after the visit of Khrushchev to Peking, the

Chinese Communists began the bombardment of Quemoy. During the month that followed, the Soviet Union demonstrated its support for Mao's China, culminating in the abusive and threatening letter which President Eisenhower refused to receive. It was a notable fact, however, that the Soviet attitude did not become really tough until it had become evident that American forces would not intervene directly in the Quemoy fighting. Since Defence Minister Malinovsky accompanied Khrushchev to Peking, it must be assumed that the projected operations against Quemoy—the build-up began in July—were discussed, and the absence of any attempt to capture the island by assault suggests a Soviet refusal to cover China against the possible consequences of such a commitment of forces. It was probably hoped to reduce Quemoy by blockade, but improved methods of supply by sea and Nationalist superiority in the air frustrated this aim.

Part of the motive for both the Chinese bellicosity over the Western interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, and the offensive against Quemoy, has certainly been to arouse Chinese patriotic and anti-imperialist sentiment in support of the regime, at a time when the drive for "leaping progress" in industrialisation and the establishment of the ultra-collectivist "people's communes" has been imposing unprecedented strains internally on the Chinese nation. The new line in social and economic policy represents a victory of the party zealots and extremists over the more moderate planners of the state bureaucracy, and it necessitates a phase of acute tension comparable to that in the U.S.S.R. during the crucial period of economic transition between 1928 and 1933. Communist China may not want a major war during such a period, but it is unlikely either to want an international detente; the Chinese people must as far as possible be reconciled to their lot by being made to believe in an imminent imperialist threat. Whatever tendencies may recently have existed in the Communist camp toward a genuine reduction of tension in world affairs, the influence of Peking is likely for a long time to come to be adverse to them. The Chinese People's Republic today stands for communism in its most extreme, rigorous, and uncompromising form, and the mantle of Stalin rests on the shoulders of Mao Tse-tung rather than of Khrushchev.

* * *

by Irene B. Taeuber

THE size and growth of the mainland Chinese population are fundamental problems, affecting the organisation, economic advance, and power of the Communist state in China. Communist approaches toward Chinese population problems have been contradictory, limited, and naive.

Before 1954, official Communist pronouncements claimed that a large population was desirable, apparently assuming that if Communist China were the largest nation, it would in time become the strongest.

By the fall of 1954, questions were raised in Peking about the implications of continuing increase. From 1955 to 1957, there was widespread propaganda for birth control.

Late in 1957, however, the line was changed, and birth control was officially identified with deviationism. Since then the official position on population has been the following, from an editorial in the official Peking *People's Daily* for October 1, 1958: "The decisive factor besides the leadership of the party is the 600 million people. The more the people, the more the views and suggestions, the more intense the fervour and the greater the energy."

The return in 1958 to the old Marxist attitude toward population was accompanied by the establishment of communes, a new form of enlarged collective farm which places the peasantry under close political control. Equally important, communes seem designed to bring an end to the mobility of the rural population. Peking now claims a "labour shortage" in the villages.

The commune programme, if continued, cannot fail to have a marked effect on China's population. In order to

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understand its consequences and the erratic course of Communist policy it is first necessary to review some basic considerations.

The Chinese are the world's most numerous people. They are in 1959, they were in 1937; and they were in 1850 and in 1750. On November 1, 1954, the State Statistical Bureau in Peking announced that the population of mainland China in the middle of the year 1953 had been 583 million. The effect was electric, in China and abroad, as if somehow a hundred million Chinese had appeared from nowhere to multiply the power—or the problems—of the Communist state.

In fact, of course, nothing extraordinary had happened to the population of China. If there were 583 million people in China in 1953, there must have been about that number ten or twenty years earlier. But 1954 was the first time that a figure of that magnitude had been arrived at after an enumeration which, although not a scientific census, was at least fairly comprehensive.

How many Chinese were there in the past? What were their birth rates and their death rates? No one in China or abroad has anything but speculative answers to these questions. The last reasonably acceptable comprehensive estimates prior to the Communist count of 1953-1954 were the Ching (Manchu) Empire reports for the years around 1790.

At that time, more than a century and a half ago, there were about 300 million people in China. Thus there was a tremendous increase in the Chinese population between the late eighteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century. The average rate of growth was slow, however. It amounted to about one-third of one per cent a year.

It is probable that birth rates were 45 or more per 1,000 total population, but death rates were almost equally high. Families accepted both abundant childbearing and frequent death. This was the historic situation in all the great Asian cultures. It existed in Japan until the middle of the nineteenth century, in Korea until the second decade of the twentieth century. It existed in China when the Communists achieved and consolidated power.

The ancient balance of births and deaths no longer exists in mainland China. Measurement is difficult, for pronouncements and propaganda are far more numerous than statistics.

It is apparent, though, that there have been no major changes in birth rates and that there have been appreciable declines in death rates. The Communists claim a rate of population increase of 20 to 23 per 1,000 total population. If the birth rate is 45 per 1,000 population, a rate of natural increase of 21 per 1,000 implies a death rate of 24 per 1,000.

By modern standards, a death rate of 20 or more per 1,000 is high. However, it is low enough to transform the population prospects and the population problems of China. Growth at something like two per cent a year has replaced the slow and irregular changes of the century from 1850. If the Communist regime were to provide adequate food, improved health services, and enough chemical insecticides and antibiotics, the death rate would be further reduced. If the birth rate remains at its present high level, the natural increase could easily become 3.0 to 3.5 or even 4.0 per cent a year. If a population of 600 million increases at 2.0 per cent a year, the annual addition is 12 million. Increase at 3.5 per cent gives an annual addition of 21 million. It should be noted that growth is cumulative, a constant rate of increase resulting in ever larger annual increases to an ever larger base population.

The arithmetic of human growth is simple, but hypothetical computations of geometric increases into the indefinite future would not predict the future population of mainland China. The elementary requirement for the maintenance of life is food. How long can the increasing population be fed, clothed, sheltered, and assured of health protection? This is a direct question of resources, organisation, economic development, and public health. It primarily involves the course of the death rate. But growth may be slowed by a reduction in the birth rate rather than an increase in the death rate. Will the birth rate in mainland China decline soon enough and rapidly enough to prevent mounting population pressures that would slow economic growth and threaten power?

This was the problem which the Communist leaders in Peking approached with such hesitation, and about which they changed their minds so often. The 1953 statistics evidently strengthened the hand of those who were alarmed at the prospect of too many people all attempting to live on the produce from a limited area of land.

It was not possible, however, to put the question so bluntly; that would conflict with Marxist dogma and cancel out a hundred years of polemics against Malthus. From 1955 to 1957 birth control achieved limited ideological respectability, but it was justified on grounds of maternal health, the advance of women, and opportunities for children.

Ideologists and propagandists favouring birth control were bucking the general doctrinal line of the regime, so their arguments developed haltingly over a period of many months. These arguments disappeared abruptly in 1957, without any explanations from Peking. Perhaps the birth control programme was a failure; the Communists' policies and actions were formulated without much consideration for peasant behaviour.

It is also possible that the broad strategies of economic and political development adopted by the Communists depended upon the assumption that people represent strength in a direct ratio. Possibly the demographic understanding of the Communist leaders is so limited or so doctrinaire that they have really convinced themselves that present or future growth of the population will be no problem.

Explanations are speculative, but the facts are firm. There were reports of unused labour in the collective farms. The official press repeatedly complained about the drift of rural people into the cities, which continued despite tighter police controls. There was also the threat of heresy; analyses of the situation and arguments for reduced population growth were drifting further away from Marxist doctrine. In late 1957 an editorial in the *People's Daily* identified arguments for birth control as "deviationist". The arguments ceased.

Since the economic "great leap forward" was declared a basic policy in early 1958, the Communists have claimed that China's population problem is one of scarcity of labour rather than redundancy of labour. They even assert that the "bourgeois" theory that returns from additional effort applied to the land tend to diminish has been proven false.

The demographic implications of organising half a billion peasants into communes are extraordinary. Free movement is eliminated; the registration system and travel permits are under direct control of commune managers—who are party cadres—and the security police. The communes can be com-

pared to a vast network of walled compounds, all controlled at the entrances and exits.

Manpower is mobilised in a military fashion. Workers are militia and militia are workers. The domestic activities of women have been reorganised into production activities. Communes have set up mess halls and collective child care; in time, communal living will be the rule. Many women will, as workers, carry out the duties which they formerly did as daughters, wives, or mothers. This permits a greater number of women to labour in groups in the fields or in crude local factories.

Communes are not simply an organisation for mobilising manpower and increasing production. There is also a social motive: the communes are intended to carry out the final liquidation of the Confucian ethic. The aged are housed in separate settlements. Men work with groups of men, women with groups of women. Children are taken from their homes at an early age; a majority are already in kindergartens or nursery schools. Prestige is attached to the youth, who are considered products of the new order, rather than to the aged, who are viewed as survivors of a defunct historical system.

Labour is "scarce" in China today only because the Communists have ordered a vast variety of labour-intensive activities, some of them productive, other primarily or entirely political. Agriculture is to be transformed and rural industry developed with little use of either domestic animals or machines. There is the ordinary farm work of preparing the soil, planting, cultivation, irrigation, and harvest. Added to this are other projects—irrigation works, mining, construction, even steel making, all to be done by human hands using only the simplest tools.

There is also the time-consuming succession of political campaigns—to study Marxism-Leninism, to protest against the policies of the United States, England, India, or some other foreign country, or mobilise support for a new Communist programme. There is military drill, before work, at lunch time, and between dinner and the compulsory indoctrination sessions. There are health campaigns—to eliminate pests, swat flies, clean streets and houses, and improve sanitation. There are drives to build communal facilities and

rehouse the people in dormitories.

Have the Communists succeeded in transforming China's population problem into one of manpower scarcity? The answer is a categorical no. If the Communists' expressed production goals are achieved along with their plans for more adequate health facilities, the number of people will increase even more rapidly. Industrialisation has in almost every country involved a large-scale migration of rural youth seeking city employment.

In China this migration would exceed any other in world history, not alone because of the size of the population but because growth would be so rapid. But the Communists do not appear willing to permit this. There will instead be two types of industrialisation. There are to be the inefficient handicraft methods of the communes and mechanised production using advanced methods in the industrial areas. Even this would be a temporary condition. As time passes, and especially after mechanisation reduces the demand for industrial labour, the increasing populations of the communes would have to find outlets.

When this happens, there will be labour surpluses of an order of magnitude never known even in traditional China.

Thus the communes are inherently unstable demographically. To the extent they are successful, they add to the population problem. In themselves, they solve no population problems. It is possible that the Communists plan to use the communes for an ultimate and drastic assault on the birth rate. So far, there is no indication that this plays a part in their plans.

In the communes, the Chinese Communists are striving to liquidate the institutions, the values, and the attitudes which sustained the society, the family, and the high birth rate of old China. It is, at the least, highly questionable that this will have any positive effect on China's basic problems. And it must be borne in mind that this is a path of no return.

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CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY

by Ting Hsun-li

THE Chinese Communist Party has long enjoyed a reputation for unique stability and unity. With a few exceptions—notably the purge of Kao Kang in 1954—the Chinese party has managed to avoid the open disputes and abrupt changes in leadership so characteristic of Communist Parties elsewhere.

It should not be assumed, however, that there are no disagreements within the party. Basic differences on ideology, foreign policy, the role of the army, the pace of communisation, and other fundamental questions have been revealed during the past ten years.

Industrial and agricultural policy has been one of the most important subjects of controversy and certainly the best documented. The Communist leadership appears to have been agreed that industrialisation and collectivisation were to be fundamental policies, but there have been sharp differences over the speed of collectivisation and the pattern of industrialisation. Economic policy is also related to basic questions of party organisation: many Communist leaders want all decisions made in Peking, while others favour decentralisation.

During the years since 1949 widely-contrasting economic policies have prevailed for varying periods. The relations between the factions supporting these different policies appear to be exceedingly complex. Moreover, it is difficult to make a positive identification of this or that leader with this or that faction. Individual positions have shifted, and statements printed in the mainland press rarely identify the opponents.

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It is possible, however, to describe and document the conflicting positions adopted within the party with respect to basic economic issues: some party members have attempted to apply Marxist dogma in a rigid way, favouring Stalinist methods and unimaginative imitation of the Soviet Union; still others have endeavoured to dilute dogma with innovation and experiments intended to adapt it to Chinese conditions.

These ideological differences have revealed themselves in disputes over concrete economic policies.

Collectivisation of agriculture has been a fundamental question, and certainly the one affecting the Chinese most seriously. The Communists fought their way to power in China on the backs of a peasant army. The regime could not be consolidated without the support of the peasants. The peasants' demand was for more land, so the Communists gave it to them.

The question was not whether the peasants could keep the land, but for how long, and how to take it away from them. Close political control over individual peasants was difficult to establish and even more difficult to maintain. Peasants farming individually could easily conceal part of their crop, eat it themselves, and evade state requisitions. Furthermore, the Communists declared that continued private land ownership would encourage "bourgeois tendencies"—that is, the peasants would want more benefit from their own labour.

To any Communist the solution to this problem was obvious. The peasants would be organised into collective farms, which would simplify political control and enable the state to exact a larger share of the crop. There was, however, a protracted and bitter controversy within the party over the timing of this programme and the manner in which it would be applied—a dispute which has yet to be settled definitively.

At first the policy was to collectivise the peasants in gradual steps over a long period of time—decades rather than years. But by 1954 many party leaders became alarmed. Collectivisation was proceeding slowly and fitfully. The peasants were becoming accustomed to land ownership; an unfortunate development in the eyes of doctrinaire Communists, because collectivisation would be increasingly diffi-

cult in the future.

The gradual policy was abandoned abruptly on July 31, 1955. Mao Tse-tung declared that collectivisation must be accelerated; the formation of collective farms on a nationwide scale was to begin immediately. In doing so Mao reversed the moderate policy which had been reaffirmed at a meeting of the National People's Congress the day before.

Mao ordered the establishment of "lower-level agricultural producers' co-operatives"—a form of collective farm in which members retained nominal title to the land—throughout China by 1960. Full collectivisation was to be completed by 1967.

His twelve-year programme was completed by the end of 1956. All but a small percentage of China's peasants were in "higher-level co-operatives"—collective farms which had eliminated individual land ownership. The reasons for this super-acceleration are obscure, but it is clear that some party leaders regarded Mao's 1955 programme as too conservative.

This faction appears to have prevailed over a considerable number of Central Committee members who had serious doubts about the practicality of moving so rapidly.

A considerable number of these "conservatives" were later purged for their views. Ku Ta-chun and Feng Pai-chu, alternate members of the Central Committee and Vice-Governors of Kwangtung province, were subjected to "criticism" in late 1957. *Shang Yu*, official organ of the Party's Kwangtung provincial committee, declared that these "rightists" and their adherents had "shouted in one voice that collectivisation was a mess". They did not welcome the "high tide of socialist reform" but even "maliciously attacked the production high tide in 1956". In other words, the critics believed that rapid collectivisation was a mistake, and presumably they feared that it would lead to peasant resistance which would imperil the Party.

The magazine declared that Ku and Feng had also said that "the increase in agricultural production is a lie", that "peasants were short of food", and described collectives "as utterly worthless".

During 1958 Pan Fu-sheng, another alternate member of the Party Central Committee and Party secretary for Hunan province, was purged for similar opinions. He said that the

Communist Party was "sitting on a volcano" in the countryside and predicted peasant uprisings unless the Party changed its policy. About 50 other high provincial officials, including the governors of Chekiang, Tsinghai, and Shantung provinces, were dismissed during 1957 and 1958. Official party statements explaining these purges included many charges of "rightist" attitudes toward collectivisation.

It is worth noting that a large percentage of these purged provincial officials were directly responsible for agriculture, transport, or other aspects of economic affairs. The accusations against them revealed that they did not simply disagree with the programme of the Party centre; they made active efforts to modify and even discredit it.

The decision to transform collective farms into communes, made abruptly in August 1958, led to renewed controversy.

From September to November 1958, the period when communes were in the process of formation, Party propaganda enthusiastically predicted that China had found a quick road to Communism and a shortcut to accelerated production.

Soon, however, the hasty and ill-planned commune programme ran into difficulties. The moderates—who had maintained discreet silence while immediate formation of communes was the declared policy—were able to offer convincing proof that the commune drive had gone too far too fast. Resources were wasted. Labour was being used inefficiently; harvesting and other important tasks were neglected. The peasants were dissatisfied with mess halls, nurseries, and other communal institutions.

Central Party authorities met with officials throughout the country. This prolonged series of conferences culminated in the sixth plenum of the Central Committee, held from November 28 to December 10, 1958. The report of this session, enlarged upon in later commentaries, reviewed and criticised the errors, conflicts, and struggles which took place during the commune drive.

The Central Committee adopted a resolution which attacked the "adventurists" and "utopians" in the Party who had predicted that the stage of pure communism would be reached very soon. The resolution noted delicately that "They are good-hearted people from our own ranks, but they are

overeager." The Party evidently discovered the truth of Lenin's description of left-wing Communism as "an infantile disorder".

In its resolution the Central Committee declared that other Party members were taking advantage of the economic and administrative decentralisation which was related to the commune programme. It said that local officials had set up their own "independent kingdoms". Commune managers used the new militia units under their control to "infringe on the democratic life of the commune."

This meant, in more direct terms, that the Party authorities believed that commune managers were using too much force; it was feared that this would lead to serious repercussions in the villages.

A parallel and closely-related dispute has been carried on regarding the pace and direction of China's industrialisation. Again the fundamental policy was obvious to any well-schooled Communist. Heavy industry, the basis for modern state power, was to receive priority. But it was not so easy to make detailed decisions regarding the areas in which investment and effort should be concentrated.

One group argued that since China had a relatively limited industrial base when the Communists took power, it would be best to concentrate on modern facilities and on regions like Manchuria which were already partially industrialised. Another faction advocated decentralisation and emphasis on simpler enterprises which would require less capital investment, could make better use of existing plants, and would make fuller use of China's vast supply of unskilled manpower.

The former view prevailed during the first Five-year Plan, from 1953 to 1957. But in 1958, when the second Plan began, an attempt was made to shift the emphasis. In his May 1958 speech to the Communist Party Congress Liu Shao-chi indicated that he opposed the earlier programme.

Liu said that "In the period of the first Five-Year Plan, we paid attention first of all to the development of industries run by the Central Government, to giant enterprises. This was absolutely necessary. But not enough attention was paid to the development of local industries and small and medium-sized industries; this was a shortcoming."

As a result of this policy change, small cottage-style industry was established throughout the mainland during the "leap forward" of 1958. Liu, Tan Chen-lin, and other Politburo members called for intensive efforts to raise production sharply. They referred caustically to "tide-watchers" and "those who await the autumn harvest"—an evident reference to a Party faction which felt the crash programme would not succeed.

This opposition faction appears to have been composed of planners and officials in charge of industrial combines. They were concerned over the dislocations and imbalance which would be caused by one-sided emphasis on steel, grain, a few other sectors of the economy. They apparently agreed with the agricultural moderates that excessive economic pressures would further alienate the peasants and workers.

In 1959 these "tide-watchers" triumphed—temporarily at least—over the "leftist adventurers". They could point to dislocations in transport, shortages of meat, fish, and other foods, the low quality and inadequate supply of consumer goods, and interruptions in foreign trade.

Vice-Premier Li Fu-chun, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, said in April 1959 that "these small enterprises use comparatively more labour power and other materials and their products are not good enough". Economic priorities were once again shifted in favour of larger, more modern enterprises.

The Chinese Communists have in the past repeatedly ignored the practical aspects of a situation and pressed through dogmatic decisions. However, in this case these reversals of policy appeared to have been a response to the practical requirements of the situation. Furthermore, factions which had opposed the "leap forward" from the beginning extracted the greatest possible advantage from the economic difficulties which it created.

Conflict between provincial officials and the Central Party authorities has, however, made it difficult for Peking to reverse its industrial policy completely. In 1959 nearly every official discussion of economic problems contained the new slogan, "consider the country as a co-ordinated chess game". But many provincial Party officials were unwilling to play the game. Each had begun a number of local projects

and was no doubt eager to carry out his pet schemes, securing all the credit for himself rather than sharing it with anonymous functionaries in Peking. During the session of the National People's Congress in April 1959 there were many complaints about local officials and their "independent kingdoms".

This review of a key area of disagreement within the Chinese Communist Party reveals that the Party's top leaders dispute both the application of doctrine and the implications of facts. Once adopted, policies are often resisted by local administrators. The appearance agreement is maintained, but there are tensions and conflicts behind the bland screen of Party unity.



CHINA'S MINORITY NATIONALITIES

by Roderick MacFarquhar

ACCORDING to the Chinese Communist census of 1953, there were 35,000,000 people of minority races in China. While they comprised only some six percent of the population, they were spread over areas—mainly frontier ones—totalling about 60 percent of the country. In most areas the minority races are outnumbered locally by the Chinese; the largest minority, the 6,600,000 Chuangs, are outnumbered almost three to one in Kwangsi province, where most of them live. The major exception is the vast north-western frontier province of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), a sixth of all China and seven times the size of Great Britain. In 1953 the Chinese there formed only six percent of a population of 4,800,000, made up largely of Uighur peasants and traders.

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The census listed 10 minorities comprising over 1,000,000 members; apart from the Chuangs, the most important of these were the Mongols (1,400,000 living mainly in Inner Mongolia), the Tibetans (2,700,000), the Uighurs (3,600,000), the Yi (3,200,000) and the 3,500,000 Chinese Moslems known as the Hui. At the other end of the scale the census registered such minute minorities as 2,000 Olunchuns in Inner Mongolia and 2,400 Tulungs in Yunnan.

The earliest Chinese Communist statement of policy on these minorities was made in 1931. It appeared in the constitution of the Kiangsi Soviet, of which Mao Tse-tung was then chairman, and it promised them the right to self-determination and secession from any union of Chinese Soviets that would be established in the future.

In his 1945 statement "On Coalition Government", Mao reaffirmed the idea that the various races should form a Union of Democratic Republics of China. This would have meant setting up a state on the Soviet model with each of its numerous component republics enjoying a theoretical right to secede. But when the Communist Chinese state was founded in 1949, the idea of independent republics had been dropped in favour of "autonomous areas", and there was no mention of the right to secession in the "Common Programme" by which the new Government was guided. When a national constitution was promulgated in 1954, it stated unequivocally that China was a "unified, multi-national state".

Speculation as to why the Soviet model was dropped is somewhat academic, since there is no difference in the degree of central control exercised by Moscow and Peking through their respective systems. Possibly Mao feared suggestions from Stalin that "independent" republics in north and northwest China might care to unite with their kindred across the border. More probably Mao just did not fancy that most un-Chinese idea, federalism. China to the Chinese has for most of its history been a civilisation rather than a nation, a civilisation into which anyone could be accepted. Modern Chinese look upon themselves as one race (the Han, after the Han dynasty, 206 B. C. to 221 A. D.) among the five major races of China (Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui, Tibetans). Why make even formal splits in the traditional state structure just for the sake of an unimportant

foreign dogma promulgated during a period of Russian influence and accepted for the purpose of gaining support against the Nationalists?

The institutional structure which the Chinese have in fact set up stems from a "General Programme for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities", promulgated in August 1952. Its main feature is the provision for a large number of autonomous areas from the level of province down to that of county (*hsien*). Each autonomous area government is guided by the government at the next highest level, all being under the unified leadership of the central government. Thus, according to the programme, the financial powers of autonomous areas are subject to the unified control of the state, and subsequent modifications seem to have made little difference.

Even without such provisions, however, autonomy would have little real meaning. Institutional structure is as irrelevant to Chinese Communist minority policy as it is to any Communist policy. The major power centre in every administrative area is the local Communist Party branch, which is closely controlled by the all-powerful Politburo in Peking and does not have even a theoretical right to regional autonomy. The only way to assess Chinese Communist minority policy is to piece together the official reports on what has actually taken place.

Chinese policy toward the nationalities from 1949 until the summer of 1957 is reminiscent of Russian policy in the same sphere during the first decade of Soviet rule. The main characteristic was the firm consolidation of centralised rule balanced to some extent by moderate attention to national susceptibilities. Like the Soviet cadres, Chinese cadres were warned against excessive arrogance and bossiness—in the case of the latter, it was the sin of "Great Han Chauvinism".

Despite these cautions, basic policies such as land reform and collectivisation were implemented in the minority areas too. Among some of the southern tribes "democratic reforms" were held off for some years. The Canadian journalist, William Stevenson, relates in his recent book "The Yellow Wind", how as late as December 1956 Yunnan chieftains were permitted to retain concubines and were paid high salaries. The Kawas were still permitted to make the human

sacrifices which they believe help their agricultural production.

In the north and northwest, an early attempt was made to adopt the Russian formula of emphasising class differences within the national minorities and of playing down national differences between the national minority and the majority race. Doubtless the main reason for this was that the races of the northern frontiers had traditions of independence from, and warfare with, the Chinese. It must have been considered essential to weaken the internal cohesion of these peoples; the urgency of such a policy was underlined by the Kazakh revolt with which the Chinese Communists had to contend during the first two or three years of their rule in Sinkiang.

Even so, the process was often slower than among the Chinese proper. Land reform, which quickly followed the Communist conquest in Han areas, did not take place in Sinkiang until 1952-1953. Particular resistance was encountered among the nomadic minorities. After a few months the Chinese admitted "excessive harshness" and apparently released some of the landlords who had been arrested and returned confiscated herds. But in general the process continued; by the end of 1953, some 500,000 acres had been distributed.

Resistance also was encountered in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, where land reform was initiated as early as 1947, soon after the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region had been set up. In one year the number of cattle, sheep and horses declined from 600,000 to 200,000; officially, the disaster was attributed to disease, but almost certainly owners, as in the U.S.S.R., had slaughtered their livestock rather than surrender it. By 1953, a policy of "protecting the owners of herds" had been formulated.

The lesson was learned. When the collectivisation movement was launched late in 1955, herdsmen were allowed to progress at a much slower rate. Only some 50 percent of Mongolian herdsmen were in collectives by the end of 1957, for instance, and the process was not then scheduled to end before 1962. In the agricultural areas, both in the north and in the south, things were at much the same speed as among the Chinese. By September 1956, collectivisation was

far advanced among the 30 million people of minority race who had already undergone "democratic reforms".

Some of the southern tribes, whose social structure defied precise Marxist categorisation, were still treated with care. It was only at this point that a reform was launched among the 3,200,000 Yi people, in the form of abolition of slave-ownership. Even so, it took from October 1956 to March 1958 for the liberation of 10,000 slaves in the Yi autonomous *hsien* of Ninglang, in Yunnan.

The Chinese have tried to smooth the way for the cautious enforcement of policies by the rather artificial bolstering of the minorities' self-respect. One means toward this end is the proliferation of the theoretically autonomous regions, of which there were 87, according to the 1958 "People's Handbook". Since then, the two at provincial level (Inner Mongolia and the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region set up in 1955) have been increased to four by the creation of the Kwangsi Chuang and Ninghsia Autonomous Regions. In such regions, Han Chinese have formally to take a back seat despite their often vastly greater numbers. After the inauguration of the Kwangsi Chuang Region, the official list of leading members of the new government contained four Hans and seven members of minority races.

A similar device is the allotment to the minorities of seats in the National People's Congress far in excess of what their numbers justify. At the Congress held in April 1959, for example, Sinkiang had the same number of seats as Kiangsi province, which has over three times its population. Minority delegates to such conferences and to the various national celebrations in the capital are assured of an especially warm welcome.

Independent-minded minority leaders may have been more impressed by Peking's language programme. Twenty of the minority peoples did not have a written language when research work started on this problem in 1952. Early work was slow and a speed-up was ordered in 1956. As a result, Peking was able to announce in the spring of 1958 that scripts had been designed for 18 languages and that 24 minorities now had their own written languages.

In the north and northwest, the rule had been to introduce the Cyrillic alphabet, presumably because it is used by

people of similar race in the Soviet Union; people like the Chuangs, in the south, have been provided with Roman-type scripts. While these reforms are intrinsically beneficial, they are mainly used for the better dissemination of propaganda.

Minorities also have been wooed by Peking with a policy by respect for their cultures. But there is no doubt that Peking does not hesitate to discourage cultural distinctions when it considers them to have bad effects on the economic and intellectual life of the country. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, Chinese sociologist then serving on the Minorities Affairs Commission, said that minority customs should be accepted "in a selective manner and not all of them should be retained and developed as national characteristics."

Religion is a case in point. The Uighurs, Kazakhs and other minorities of the northwest are, like the Hui, Moslems, and they are officially accorded freedom of worship. But as Moslem priests pointed out at a forum in May 1957, the Bureau of Religious Affairs is not interested in supporting Islam and was not giving sufficient financial assistance for the upkeep of mosques. Asian Moslems visiting China have noted that while there are Moslem schools, the Koran cannot be taught in them. In after-school hours, the youths are corralled into the Communist Youth League and other organisations in which they receive anti-religious propaganda.

The official line of respecting the national minorities while "helping" them advance along the socialist path is of course universally disseminated, but selected members of minority nationalities are given intensive courses in Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese aims and policies. These are the potential recruits to the Communist Party, or cadres for Government offices. By the beginning of 1958 this training process had produced over 450,000 Communist Party members and 400,000 cadres of minority stock.

There seems no reason to doubt that Peking would welcome the "indigenisation" of power in the minority areas, provided the minority nationality party members and officials are completely loyal to Peking. Thus, the trusted Mongol, Ulanfu, has risen to alternate membership in the Party Politburo and, as a Deputy Premier, has been put in charge of Inner Mongolia. In Sinkiang there is apparently no local man of such ability and standing, and a Chinese, Wang En-

mao, heads the Party committee, while the leading Uighur, Saifudin, who is Governor, is only the Party's third secretary.

At the lower levels, Chinese still have to provide the main strength of the leadership. In Inner Mongolia, where the Mongols are outnumbered seven to one (partly as a result of Peking's rearrangement of boundaries), 20,000 Mongol cadres were trained between 1947 and 1957, as compared with 100,000 Chinese. The progress of "indigenisation" seems to have gone somewhat faster in Sinkiang. But even there Peking cannot trust the products of the National Minority Institutes, which are the major centres for the indoctrination of minority cadres. This was clearly revealed in 1957.

The minority peoples, like the Chinese themselves, had benefited from the general relaxation in China that began in January 1956. In that year more vigorous moves were made against Great Han Chauvinism. Nor did the tide turn when in June 1957 the Communist Party switched from rectifying its own faults to attacking its "rightist" critics. The reason for this was probably that the minorities had not yet been given much chance to respond to the Party's call for criticism of its methods.

Minority officials did seem to get their opportunity to criticise, at a conference at Tsingtao in August 1957—and they apparently used it. Though full reports of the conference were never released, it was officially stated that many erroneous views had been advanced. It was these views that led to the virtual abandonment of the campaign against Great Han Chauvinism in favour of an all-out drive against "local nationalism".

In view of the kind of opinions expressed by minority cadres, as later officially revealed, this policy reversal is hardly surprising. Some had demanded autonomous republics, some even independence: "We want independence even if it means we have to forego socialism." Among the Mongols, separatist activities were said to be "brisk", though it was claimed they were confined to a small number of intellectuals and students of upper-class origins. They apparently tried to organise their own party and government, and a group of students were prepared to flee abroad.

The Mongols were particularly afraid of assimilation as a result of Chinese immigration into the area. Some advo-

cated division of the area into purely Mongol and purely Chinese districts. They were prepared to do without the Paotow Iron and Steel complex, a major project of the second Five-Year Plan, because it was leading to the immigration of Chinese into the area. In Sinkiang, there were those who advocated an "independent republic" or the transformation of the autonomous region into a federal republic called Uighurstan or East Turkestan. Some even hoped for a "Hungarian incident" which would enable Sinkiang to achieve independence.

Anti-Chinese feelings were also expressed through opposition to the monopoly of positions of power held by Chinese Party officials. In Sinkiang, the Chinese were told to "go home"; a Chuang "rightist" probably expressed the feelings of most minority patriots when he said: "So long as the Han cadres remain (in the minority areas), the national minorities will not be able to exercise their powers. All Han cadres should be evacuated from national minority areas." Communist Party leadership was opposed because it was simply Chinese leadership, and Party members of minority nationalities were despised as traitors and sycophants. And there was also opposition to learning the Chinese language.

The outburst of nationalist feeling appears to have been strongest in Sinkiang, where a number of senior minority Party officials were expelled. They included the director of the Region's cultural department, who was concurrently secretary of the department's Party branch and chairman of the local writers' union; the director of the civil affairs department of the Region, concurrently Party secretary of that department; the deputy head of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District; the mayor of Urumchi, the Region's capital, and many others.

One effect of these outbursts of nationalism was to make the Han Communist cadres doubt the wisdom of the conciliatory policies they had broadly pursued until then. They had to be told that the risk had to be taken—that though the minority of local nationalists might indeed influence their compatriots, there could be no basic change in the policy of attempting to win over the minorities.

Nevertheless, 1958 brought a distinct lessening of Chinese tolerance, in part as a by-product of the strengthening of

Communist Party leadership that was a feature of the Great Leap Forward throughout China. Local customs, such as sacrifices to the gods of the harvest, were eliminated "by persuasion" because they were economically wasteful. As more emphasis was put on class struggle, local leaders and priests, especially in Tsinghai, were denounced for crimes against the people. The class struggle doctrine was emphasized so as to facilitate the erection of communes in the minority areas. On this occasion there was no lag between the time the reform was initiated among Chinese and among non-Chinese, though communes among Mongol herdsmen had few of the features of collective living visible elsewhere.

Finally, toward the end of the year, the call went out for a new migration of Chinese from the overcrowded provinces of the North China and Yangtse plains to the northwest, in particular to Sinkiang. It would appear that the Chinese leaders have decided that the final, and tidiest, solution is assimilation. As one spokesman put it, "the fusion of one nationality with another is an inevitable process of historical development which no nationality can avoid".

Apparently Peking has decided to speed up that historical process. Army units have been working as land reclamation corps in Sinkiang for some years, and 1,500,000 migrants went to the northern frontiers between 1955 and 1958. The present move will be more concentrated and is likely to result in the transfer of 600,000 people to Sinkiang in the near future.

As the first decade of Chinese Communist rule draws to a close, a moderately new policy toward the minorities is being formulated. The minorities are still being accorded the trappings of autonomy and will continue to receive special treatment in the formal life of the state. But the minorities are increasingly expected to behave much the same as the Chinese. Peking's reaction to the outburst of "local nationalism" has been to modify its previous policy of treating the minorities with a certain degree of caution and patience. In particular, the "upper strata" of the minorities will be treated with greater severity, and a more determined attempt to emphasize class differences within the nationalities is already apparent.

These new policies will certainly be even more firmly

enforced as a result of the Tibetan revolt. The Tibetans are the most nationalistic of all the non-Chinese races controlled by Peking, and the Chinese had exercised the greatest caution toward them. Since the result was the outbreak of a revolt that has dealt an immense blow to Chinese prestige in Asia, the Communist leaders will doubtless conclude that firmness toward minorities is the only policy to be followed.

TIBET UNDER COMMUNIST RULE

by Nils Stefansson

THE outside world knew little of Tibet before the Communist invasion of 1950, and the Chinese occupation did little to dispel the cloud of misinformation and mystery which has always seemed to cling to the "roof of the world".

Since the revolt of March 1959, however, a number of authoritative documents have become available. These include official statements by the Communists, the results of independent investigations, and statements by the Dalai Lama. They make it possible to describe in some detail the circumstances of the Communist takeover and the effects of Communist rule in Tibet.

Until the Chinese Communist invasion of October 1950, Tibet had enjoyed almost complete autonomy; the civil and ecclesiastical government of the Dalai Lama directed both the

domestic and foreign affairs of Tibet. On June 20, 1959, in a statement made at Mussoorie, India, the Dalai Lama said that in view of Tibet's previous autonomy, "when Chinese armies violated the territorial integrity of Tibet they were committing a flagrant act of aggression".

On May 21, 1951, Tibetan representatives in Peking signed a 17-point agreement which provided that "The (Communist) central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama. . . .The religious beliefs, customs, and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries. . . .The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet."

In his June 20, 1959 statement the Dalai Lama said: "The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its people and government by threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of their own free will. Consent of the government was secured under duress and at the point of a bayonet.

"My representatives were compelled to sign the agreement under a threat of further military operations against Tibet by invading Chinese armies, leading to the utter ravage and ruin of the country. Even the Tibetan seal which was affixed to the agreement was not the seal of my representatives, but a seal copied and fabricated by Chinese authorities in Peking and kept in their possession ever since."

The Dalai Lama added that it was "clear from the very beginning that the Chinese had no intention of carrying out the agreement. Although they had solemnly undertaken to maintain my status and power as Dalai Lama, they did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority, and sow dissension among my people."

The effects of Communist rule in Tibet were revealed by the Dalai Lama in his Mussoorie statement. He described it as a "reign of terror which finds few parallels in the history of Tibet. Forced labour and compulsory exac-

tions, systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries—these were the glorious achievements of Chinese rule in Tibet.”

He added that up to 1958 over 1,000 monasteries had been destroyed by the Communists, and still more were being destroyed. Many valuable Buddhist manuscripts and rare printing blocks had been destroyed, and “many are being taken to China”, he said. In an earlier statement, made at Tezpur, India, on April 18, 1959, the Dalai Lama said that “many lamas were killed and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China . . .”

In answer to a question submitted at his June 20 press conference, the Dalai Lama said that the ultimate Chinese aim with regard to Tibet seemed to be “to attempt the extermination of the religion and culture and even the absorption of the Tibetan race”. He declared that a full-scale campaign against religion was carried on in several Tibetan provinces, aiming at the final extermination of the Buddhist religion. He said that “we have documentary proof of these acts and also accusations directed against the Lord Buddha himself who had been named a reactionary element.”

Purshottam Trikamdass, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India, submitted a report on conditions in Tibet to the International Commission of Jurists at Geneva in June, 1959. He said that “soon after 1951 the first impact of Chinese control was felt in the feverish construction of roads and highways. The labour for this work was Tibetan men, women and children, laymen and monks, many of them forcibly drafted for the work.”

Mr. Trikamdass also pointed out that “through the Chinese press, which became firmly entrenched as the sole source of press information in Tibet, a precise and deliberate campaign has been conducted against the Buddhist religion and the lamas, and against Buddha himself.”

He added: “Our information indicates that this attack on religion was combined with a systematic religious persecution. We have evidence of instances and cases where the heads of monasteries have been killed, imprisoned, and publicly humiliated. One case in our files, for instance, refers

to a very highly respected lama who was stripped and dragged with a rope over rocky terrain, as a result of which he died, his abdomen being ripped open by the dragging. In the Kham province alone 250 monasteries were destroyed: cases have been reported of head lamas being dragged to death by horses, and a fairly large number sent as prisoners to concentration camps in China. Of seven leading lamas charged with offences which fit into the general scheme of attack on religion, only one—Zongsar Khentse Rimpoche—escaped into India. The others have been executed or are now in prison.”

Mr. Trikamdas said that “a veritable terror has been let loose on the (Tibetan) population. Reliable estimates of the persons killed come to about 65,000. The number of persons deported is stated to be about 20,000.” In answer to questions submitted at his Mussoorie press conference the Dalai Lama said that the number of Tibetans killed was actually more than the figure of 65,000 submitted to the International Commission of Jurists by Mr. Trikamdas.

In an attempt to justify their suppression of Tibetan autonomy the Communists have repeatedly said that they wished to carry out “reforms” in Tibet but were thwarted by “reactionary” Tibetan officials. These claims were refuted by the Dalai Lama, who said that “I wish to emphasise that I and my government have never been opposed to reforms which are necessary in the social, economic, and political systems prevailing in Tibet.

“We have no desire to disguise the fact that ours is an ancient society and that we must introduce immediate changes in the interests of the people of Tibet. In fact, during the last nine years several reforms were proposed by me and my government but every time these measures were strenuously opposed by the Chinese in spite of a popular demand for them, with the result that nothing was done for the betterment of the social and economic conditions of the people.

“In particular, it was my earnest desire that the system of land tenure should be radically changed without further delay, and large landed estates acquired by the state on payment of compensation for distribution among tillers of the soil. But the Chinese authorities deliberately put every obstacle in the way of carrying out this just and reasonable reform. I desire to lay stress on the fact that we, as firm

believers in Buddhism, welcome change and progress consistent with the genius of our people and the rich traditions of our country; but the people of Tibet will stoutly resist any victimisation, sacrilege, and plunder in the name of reforms—the policy which is now being enforced by the representatives of the Chinese government in Lhasa.”

The Dalai Lama also described conditions in Tibet after the Communists began all-out efforts to put down the rebellion. He said: “The people of Lhasa have been divided into three groups. The first group has been deported to China where their fate is not known. The second group is in prison and interrogated and punished without limit in various military headquarters in Lhasa. The third group is kept with the meanest food and driven to forced labour, each individual being made to carry 150 loads of earth daily, failing which no food is given.

“Armed troops are posted in the streets of Lhasa, where conversation between two Tibetans is restricted and where only aged men and women are to be seen,” the Dalai Lama continued. “The central temple and all other places of worship are closed. All-out propaganda for the formation of people’s communes is being carried on. The Chinese have not only taken my treasures after breaking the lock, but have also looted the reserves of my government and properties of monasteries and my people.” He added that tens of thousands of homes had been seized or destroyed.

On March 28, 1959, the Chinese Communist authorities announced that the government of the Dalai Lama had been dissolved and would be replaced with a new administration under the “Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet”. The Panchen Lama was made acting chairman of this body, which was reorganised so that it consisted entirely of Chinese Communist representatives and Tibetan collaborators. The Dalai Lama commented on these developments in his June 20 press conference, saying that “The Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region is nothing but a nominal one with all powers concentrated in the hands of the Chinese. The Panchen Lama has no alternative but to carry out the orders of the Chinese.”

In other areas inhabited by national minorities the Chinese Communists attempt to consolidate their control by

recruiting collaborators among local leaders. This policy was applied in Tibet. Ngapo Ngawang Jigme and a limited number of other Tibetan officials consented to work for the Communists. In order to facilitate permanent Communist control of minority areas, members of minority peoples have been trained as Communist cadres. This was attempted in Tibet: several thousand young Tibetans were sent to Peking and other cities in China for indoctrination.

Neither of these policies had much success in Tibet. Peking found it difficult to interest Tibetan youth in Marxism. The *Tibet Daily* of Lhasa, organ of the Communist military administration, admitted on October 15, 1957 that only about one thousand Tibetans had become members of the Communist Party.

An overwhelming majority of Tibetan officials remained loyal to the Dalai Lama and to Tibet's traditions. Lt. Gen. Chang Kuo-hua, Communist military commander in Tibet, said on April 8, 1959 that Tibetan officials, including some of the leading members of the Dalai Lama's cabinet, began to organise opposition as early as 1952. They formed a "people's conference"; their slogan was "the Communist army must withdraw from Tibet". Chang declared that anti-Communist Tibetan officials assisted the armed rebellion which began in the Kham region of eastern Tibet in 1956 and spread to Lhasa and all Tibet in 1959.

The Communists have attempted to justify their suppression of the Tibetan rebellion by claiming that it was not supported by the people, but was entirely due to the efforts of "reactionary officials".

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru commented on these claims in a speech to the Indian lower house of Parliament on April 27, 1959. "To say that a number of 'upper strata reactionaries' in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation," Mr. Nehru said. "Even according to accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude, and the basis of it must have a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also."

These Communist charges were also rejected by the Dalai Lama, who said in answer to a question submitted

at his June 20 press conference that the leaders of the Tibetan revolt were drawn from various sections of the Tibetan people.

The Dalai Lama added that under Communist rule “the situation grew steadily worse until it became impossible to control the spontaneous upsurge of my people against the tyranny and oppression of the Chinese authorities.”

The charts which follow show how the Communist Party and the state administration of mainland China are organised. As these charts demonstrate, members of the Communist Party's Politburo and Central Committee dominate the central organisation of the party and the high positions of the state.

The Standing Committee of the Politburo is at the apex of power. Its seven members consist of the chairman of the Party's Central Committee, the five vice-chairmen, and the Party's secretary-general. Like the Politburo, the Standing Committee is in theory a creature of the Central Committee, and all its members are concurrently members of the Central Committee. The Standing Committee sets basic Party policy. Major decisions are made after consultation with the full Politburo, which meets irregularly, and occasionally by a plenum of the Central Committee. The Central Committee, which has 97 full members and 93 alternate members, meets once or twice a year. The Secretariat, highest administrative organ of the Party, is under the direct leadership of the Politburo, and five of its nine secretaries are Politburo members.

Members of the Central Committee—and hence of the Politburo—are in theory selected by Party congresses. Party congresses are the supreme authority of the Party, but they are held infrequently—the last four in 1927, 1945, 1956, and 1958. Delegates approve nominations and declarations of policy already prepared by the Politburo and the Central Committee.

Because of limited space, several important parts of the state structure are not shown on the charts. The National Defence Council, headed by the Chief of State, has 14 vice-chairmen and 99 members, most of them Central Committee members. Its functions are obscure, but it provides a separate body, not responsible even in theory to the National People's Congress, to direct military affairs. In this sphere as in others, however, decisions are in fact made by the Politburo or the Standing Committee. The Supreme State Conference has no fixed membership, but can be called by the Chief of State at his discretion. Mao Tse-tung used it as a sounding-board for important policy statements.

The Central Committee's domination of the state administration reaches down to the provinces. The first secretaries of provincial Party Committees are, with a few exceptions, members of the Central Committee, and four are members of the Politburo. About one third of the governors of provinces and major municipalities are concurrently members of the Central Committee.

THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Standing Committee of the Politburo

MAO-TSE-TUNG (Chairman of the Politburo and the Central Committee),
LIU SHAO-CHI, CHOU EN-LAI, CHU TEH, CHEN YUN, LIN PIAO,
TENG HSIAO-PING.

The Politburo

(Members of the Standing Committee are also full members of the Politburo. The additional members and alternate members are listed below.)

Full Members

LIN PO-CHU, TUNG PI-WU, PENG TEH-HUAI, PENG CHEN, LO JUNG
HUAN, CHEN I, LI FU-CHUN, LIU PO-CHENG, HO LUNG, LI HSIEN-NIEN
KO CHING-SHIH, LI CHENG-CHUAN, TAN CHEN-LIN.

Alternate Members

ULANFU (WU LAN-FU), CHANG WEN-TIEN, LU TING-I, CHEN PO-T.
KANG SHENG, PO I-PO.

The Central Committee

(In addition to the 26 members and alternate members of the Politburo, the Central Committee consists of 71 other regular members and 93 alternate members.

An alphabetical list of the members and alternate members of the Central Committee is on a following page.)

THE PARTY ORGANISATION

(Names in capital types are those of members of the Politburo; those in italics are members or alternate members of the Central Committee.)

The Secretariat of the Party

Secretary-General : TENG HSIAO-PING

Secretaries : PENG CHEN, LI FU-CHUN, LI HSIEN-NIEN, TAN CHEN-LIN,
Wang Chia-hsiang, Tan Cheng, Huang Ko-cheng, Li Hsueh-feng.

Alternate Secretaries : *Liu Lan-Tao, Yang Shang-kun*, Director of the General Office, *Hu Chiao-mu*.

CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE PARTY

Propaganda Department

Director : LU TING-I

Dept. Directors : CHEN PO-TA, *Hsu Teh-li, Chang Chi-chun, Chou Yang, Chang Tzu-i, Chang Pan-shih, Hu Sheng.*

Secretary-General : Hsiung Fu.

Organisation Department

Director : *An Tzu-wen*

United Front Department

Director : *Li Wei-Han*

Dept. Directors : *Hsu Ping, Liao Cheng-chih, Liu Ko-ping, Ping Chieh-san, Wang Feng, Chang Chih-i, Yu I-fu, Hsu Ti-hsin*

Control Commission

Secretary : TUNG PI-WU

Dept. Secretaries : *Liu Lan-tao, Hsiao Hua, Wang Tsung-wu, Chien Ying, Liu Hsi-wu*

Industrial Work Department

Director : *Li Hsueh-feng* Dept. Director : *Li Li-san*

Rural Work Department

Director : *Teng Tzu-Hui*

Dept. Directors : *Liao Lu-yen, Chen Cheng-jen.*

Women's Work Committee

1st Secretary : *Tsai Chang*, 2nd Secretary : *Teng Ying-chao.*

3rd Secretary : *Chang Yun.*

Senior Party School

Director : *Yang Hsien-cheng.*

(Names in capital types are those of members of the Politburo; those in italic types are members of the Central Committee; CP denotes ordinary members of the Communist Party. The offices indicated are those held after the reorganisation of April 1959.)

Chairman (Chief of State): LIU SHAO-CHI

Vice-Chairmen: Soong Ching-ling, TUNG PI-WU.

Standing Committee: National People's Congress

Chairman: CHU TEH

Vice-Chairmen: LIN PO-CHU, Li Chi-shen, LO JUNG-HUAN, Shen Chen-ju, Kuo Mo-jo (CP), Huang Yen-pel, PENG CHEN, Li Wei-han, *Saifudin* and six others.

Members: 62

Supreme People's Court

President: *Hsieh Chueh-tsai*

The State Council (Cabinet)

Premier: CHOU EN-LAI

Secretary-General: *Hsi Chung-hsun*

Chairman of the State Planning Commission: LI FU-CHUN

Chairman of the State Economic Commission: PO I-PO

Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission: *Nieh Jung-chen*

Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission: *Liao Cheng-chih*

The Major Ministries

Foreign Affairs: CHEN I

Communications: *Wang Shou-tao*

Defence: PENG TEH-HUAI

Light Industry: Li Chu-chen

Internal Affairs: *Chien Ying*

Agriculture: *Liao Lu-yen*

Public Security: *Lo Jui-ching*

Labour: *Ma Wen-jui*

Finance: LI HSIEN-NIEN

Culture: Shen Yen-ping

Commerce: *Cheng Tzu-hua*

Education: *Yang Hsiu-feng*

Foreign Trade: *Yeh Chi-chuang*

Public Health: Li Teh-chuan

Metallurgical Industry: *Wang Ho-shou*

Geology: Li Ssu-kuang (CP)

Railways: *Teng Tai-yuan*

Water Conservancy: Fu Tso-yl

The Armed Forces

Chief of General Staff: Senior General *Huang Ko-cheng*

Navy Chief of Staff: Senior Admiral *Hsiao Ching-kuang*

Air Force Chief of Staff: Senior General *Liu Ya-lou*

Director-General of Political Department: Senior General *Tan Cheng*

Deputy Director-General, Political Department: Colonel General *Hsiao Hua*

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

NOTE: On this and the next page is an alphabetical list of the members and alternate members of the Central Committee, including the 25 additional alternate members elected at the May 1958 Party Congress. The numbers following each name refer to the official ranking of Central Committee members. The last official ranking was released in September 1956; it corresponds roughly, but not exactly, to the relative importance and influence of Central Committee members.

Asterisks (*) indicate alternate members who have been attacked in the official Party press as "rightists" or for "localist tendencies". Peking has not revealed whether these persons have been dismissed or punished.

Full members :

An Tzu-wen (85)	Hsu Kuang-ta (73)
Chao Erh-lu (81)	Hsu Te-li (15)
Chang Chi-chun (57)	Hu Chiao-mu (54)
Chang Ting-chang (28)	Hu Yao-pang (80)
Chang Wen-tien (67)	Huang Ko-cheng (31)
Chang Yun-i (45)	Kang Sheng (49)
Chen I (21)	Ko Ching-shih (35)
Chen Keng (25)	Li Ching-chuan (88)
Chen Po-ta (11)	Li Fu-chun (13)
Chen Yu (59)	Li Hsien-nien (24)
Chen Yun (8)	Li Hsuch-feng (70)
Chen Shao-min (71)	Li Ko-nung (41)
Chen Shao-yu (94)	Li Li-san (87)
Cheng Tzu-hua (58)	Li Pao-hua (72)
Cheng Wei-san (77)	Li Wei-han (47)
Chia To-fu (86)	Liao Cheng-chih (23)
Chien Ying (63)	Lin Feng (27)
Chou En-lai (6)	Lin Piao (9)
Chu Teh (5)	Lin Tieh (76)
Ho Lung (37)	Lin Po-chu (3)
Hsi Chung-hsun (83)	Liu Chang-sheng (60)
Hsiao Ching-kuang (33)	Liu Hsiao (46)
Hsiao Hua (79)	Liu Ko-ping (84)
Hsiao Ko (62)	Liu Lan-tao (51)
Hsieh Fu-chih (95)	Liu Ning-i (52)
Hsu Hai-tung (78)	Liu Po-cheng (20)
Hsu Hsiang-chien (18)	Liu Shao-chi (2)

Liu Ya-lou (69)
 Lo Jui-ching (17)
 Lo Jung-huan (14)
 Lu Cheng-tsao (90)
 Lu Ting-i (16)
 Ma Ming-fang (66)
 Mao Tse-tung (1)
 Nieh Jung-chen (26)
 Ouyang Chin (82)
 Peng Chen (29)
 Peng Teh-huai (22)
 Po I-Po (53)
 Shu Tung (56)
 Su Yu (36)
 Sung Jen-chiang (44)
 Tan Chen-lin (68)
 Tan Cheng (34)
 Tao Chu (92)
 Teng Hsiao-ping (4)
 Teng Hua (65)
 Teng Tai-yuan (32)
 Teng Tzu-hui (40)

Teng Ying-chao (19)
 Tsai Chang (12)
 Tseng Hsi-sheng (93)
 Tseng Shan (75)
 Tung Pi-wu (7)
 Ulanfu (Wu Lan-fu) (30)
 Wang Chen (74)
 Wang Chia-hsiang (48)
 Wang En-mao (97)
 Wang Shou-tao (38)
 Wang Shu-sheng (91)
 Wang Tsung-wu (64)
 Wang Wei-chou (39)
 Wu Chih-pu (89)
 Wu Hsiu-chuan (61)
 Wu Yu-chang (10)
 Yang Hsien-chen (96)
 Yang Hsiu-feng (55)
 Yang Shang-kun (42)
 Yeh Chi-chuang (50)
 Yeh Chien-ying (43)

Alternate members :

Chang Ai-ping (189)
 Chang Chi-lung (135)
 Chang Chin-fu (183)
 Chang Ching-wu (101)
 Chang Chung-liang (167)
 Chang Han-fu (106)
 Chang Lin-chih (139)
 Chang Ping-hua (182)
 Chang Su (175)
 Chang Ta-chih (143)
 Chang Te-sheng (130)
 Chang Tsung-hsun (115)
 Chang Yun (148)
 *Chao Chien-min (157)
 Chao I-min (171)
 Chao Po-ping (187)
 Chen Cheng-jen (165)
 Chen Chi-han (119)
 Chen Hsi-lien (113)

Chen Pei-hsien (156)
 Chiang Hua (161)
 Chiang Nan-hsiang (160)
 Chiang Wei-ching (150)
 Chien Chun-jui (158)
 Chou Hsiao-choi (178)
 Chou Huan (154)
 Chou Pao-chung (127)
 Chou Yang (116)
 Chu Te-hai (133)
 Chung Chi-kuang (155)
 Fan Wen-lan (132)
 Fang I (179)
 *Feng Pai-chu (126)
 Han Hsien-chu (184)
 Han Kuang (162)
 Hsieh Chueh-tsai (102)
 Hsu Ping (149)
 Hsu Shih-yu (109)

Hsu Tzu-jung (120)	Pan Tzu-li (107)
Huang Huo-ching (117)	Peng Tao (169)
Huang Ou-tung (121)	Sai Fu-ting (Saifudin) (145)
Huang Yung-sheng (136)	Shao Shih-ping (134)
Hung Hsueh-chih (147)	Shuai Meng-chi (110)
Kan Ssu-chi (105)	Su Chen-hua (125)
Kao Ko-lin (144)	Sun Chih-yuan (188)
*Ku Ta-tsun (122)	Sung Shih-lun (152)
Kuei Pi (129)	Tan Chi-lung (153)
Kung Yuan (172)	Tang Liang (173)
Li Chang (163)	Tao Lu-chia (168)
Li Chien-chen (137)	Tien Pao (142)
Li Chih-min (123)	Wan I (114)
Li Hsieh-po (185)	Wang Feng (177)
Li Ta-chang (108)	Wang Hao-shou (163)
Li Tao (118)	Wang Jen-chung (166)
Liao Chih-kao (186)	Wang Shang-jung (180)
Liao Han-sheng (146)	Wang Shih-tai (140)
Liao Lu-yen (151)	Wei Kuo-ching (99)
Liu Chen (181)	Wu Te (128)
Liu Chien-hsun (170)	Yang Cheng-wu (104)
Liu Jen (112)	Yang I-chen (176)
Liu Lan-po (124)	Yang Te-chih (98)
Liu Tzu-hou (174)	Yang Yung (111)
Lo Kuei-po (100)	Yao I-lin (190)
Ma Wen-ju (138)	Yeh Fei (103)
Ou Meng-chueh (131)	Yen Hung-yen (141)
*Pan Fu-sheng (159)	

**CONCURRENT POSITIONS HELD BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY**

Abbreviations :

CCP — Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC — Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
NDC — National Defence Council
NPC — National People's Congress
SSFA — Sino-Soviet Friendship Association

Note : Positions given are those held following the new appointments made in April 1959.

Chang Wen-tien : Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC

Chen I : Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Premier, State Council
Director, Office in Charge of Foreign
Affairs, State Council
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Chairman, NDC
Vice-Chairman, National Committee,
CPPCC
Deputy, NPC
Chairman, Central Work Committee for
the Popularisation of Standard Spoken
Chinese
Chairman, National Association for the
Elimination of Illiteracy
Marshal of the Armed Forces

Chen Po-ta : Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
Deputy Director, Propaganda Department,
Central Committee, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Editor-in-Chief, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag),
fortnightly journal of the CCP
Central Committee

Vice-President, Chinese Academy of
Sciences
Member, Philosophy and Social Sciences
Department, Chinese Academy
of Sciences
Member, Standing Committee, National
Committee, CPPCC
Deputy, NPC

Chou En-lai : Vice-Chairman, Politburo, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
CCP
Vice-Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
Chairman, National Committee, CPPCC
Deputy, NPC
Honorary Chairman, Chinese People's
Institute of Foreign Affairs

Chen Yun : Vice-Chairman, Politburo, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, Politburo
CCP
Vice-Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
Chairman, State Capital Construction
Commission, State Council
Deputy, NPC

Chu Teh : Vice-Chairman, Politburo, CCP
Member, Standing Committee,
Politburo, CCP
Vice-Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC
Marshal of the Armed Forces

Ho Lung : Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
Chairman, Physical Culture and Athletics
Commission, State Council
Vice-Chairman, NDC
Deputy, NPC
Marshal of the Armed Forces

- Hu Chiao-mu :** Alternate Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Deputy Director, Propaganda Department,
Central Committee, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC
Member, Philosophy and Social Sciences
Department, Chinese Academy of
Sciences
Vice-Chairman, Committee for the
Examination and formulation of the Han
(Chinese) Language Phoneticisation
Programme
Member, Executive Committee, National
Association for the Elimination of
Illiteracy
- Huang Ko-cheng :** Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces
Vice-Minister of National Defence
Member, NDC
Senior General
- Kang Sheng :** Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Chairman, Central Work Committee
for Popularisation of Standard Spoken
Chinese
Vice-Chairman, National Committee,
CPPCC
Deputy, NPC
- Ko Ching-shih :** Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Secretary, Shanghai Bureau, Central
Committee, CCP
First Secretary, Shanghai Municipal
Committee, CCP
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal People's
Government
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Committee,
CPPCC
President, Shanghai Branch, SSFA
Deputy, NPC
Member, Executive Committee, China
Welfare Institute

- Li Ching-chuan :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 First Secretary, Szechwan Provincial
 Committee, CCP
 Political Commissar, Szechwan Military
 District Chairman, Szechwan Provincial
 Committee, CPPCC
 Member, National Committee, CPPCC
- Li Fu-chun :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Secretary, Secretariat, Central Committee,
 CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Premier, State Council
 Chairman, State Planning Commission
 Deputy, NPC
- Li Hsien-nien :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Secretary, Secretariat, Central Committee,
 CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
 Director, Fifth Staff Office, State Council
 Minister of Finance
 Member, NDC
- Li Hsueh-feng :** Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
 Director, Industrial Work Department,
 Central Committee, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Member, Standing Committee, NPC
 Deputy, NPC
- Lin Piao :** Vice-Chairman, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
 CCP
 Vice-Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
 Vice-Chairman, NDC
 Vice-Chairman, SSFA
 Deputy, NPC
 Marshal of the Armed Forces
- Lin Po-chu :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC

- Deputy, NPC
Vice-Chairman, SSFA
- Liu Lan-tao :** Alternate Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Deputy Secretary, Control Committee, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC
- Liu Po-cheng :** Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Chairman, NDC
Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC
Marshal of the Armed Forces
- Liu Shao-chi :** Chairman of the Republic (Chief of State)
Vice-Chairman, Politburo, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
CCP
Vice-Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Deputy, NPC
- Lo Jung-huan :** Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Chairman, NDC
Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC
Deputy, NPC
Marshal of the Armed Forces
- Lu Ting-i :** Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
Director, Propaganda Department,
Central Committee, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
Vice-Chairman, Central Work Committee
for the Popularisation of Standard
Spoken Chinese
Deputy, NPC
- Mao Tse-tung :** Chairman, Politburo, CCP
Member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
CCP
Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Deputy, NPC
Honorary Chairman, CPPCC

- Peng Chen :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, NPC
 Secretary General, Standing Committee,
 NPC
 Deputy, NPC
 First Secretary, Peking Municipal
 Committee, CCP
 Chairman, Peking Municipal People's
 Government
 Vice-Chairman, National Committee,
 CPPCC
- Peng Teh-huai :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Chairman, NDC
 Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
 Minister of National Defence
 Deputy, NPC
 Marshal of the Armed Forces
- Po I-po :** Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
 Director, Third Staff Office, State Council
 Chairman, National Economic Commission,
 State Council Deputy, NPC
- Tan Chen-lin :** Member, Politburo, CCP
 Member, Secretariat, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
 Deputy, NPC
- Tan Cheng :** Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
 Member, Central Committee, CCP
 Director, General Political Department,
 Armed Forces
 Vice-Minister of National Defence
 Member, NDC
 Deputy, NPC
 Senior General
- Teng Hsiao-ping :** Member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
 CCP
 Member, Politburo, CCP

Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Secretary, General, Central Committee,
CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Chairman, NDC
Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)

Tung Pi-wu : Vice-Chairman of the Republic (Vice-Chief
of State)
Member, Politburo, CCP
Secretary, Control Committee, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
President, Political Science and Law
Association of China
Vice-Chairman, Chinese People's Relief
Association
Deputy, NPC

Ulanfu : (See Wu Lan-fu)

Wang Chia-hsiang : Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member, Standing Committee, National
Committee, CPPCC

Wu Lan-fu (Ulanfu) : Alternate Member, Politburo, CCP
Member, Central Committee, CCP
Vice-Premier, State Council (Cabinet)
Chairman, Nationalities Affairs Commission,
State Council First Secretary,
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Committee, CCP
Chairman, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region
Commander, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region Military District
Political Commissar, Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region Military District
President, University of Inner Mongolia
Vice-President, SSFA
Member, NDC
Deputy, NPC
Senior General

Yang Shang-kun :

Alternate Secretary, Secretariat, CCP
Director, General Office, Central
Committee, CCP

Secretary, Committee for Organs Directly
Subordinate to the CCP Central
Committee

Member, Central Committee, CCP

Member, Standing Committee, National
Committee, CPPCC

A Chronology

1949

January-March: Communist armies enter Peking on January 31 and occupy the city. The headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is established in Peking in March.

July 1: 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', by Mao Tse-tung, is published. Mao describes the basic principles of the Communist government during the period of "New Democracy" which is to be followed, after an indefinite period of years, by socialism.

Mao declares that the policy of the "united front" will apply. This means that businessmen, intellectuals, religious bodies, national minorities, overseas Chinese, and other non-Communist elements would be tolerated and given political representation—in name at least—provided they accepted the leadership of the CCP.

He also says that the new government would "lean to one side"; that is, would be closely allied with the Soviet Union.

September: The CCP organises the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, an appointive body which is an institutional expression of the united front policy. It meets toward the end of the month and adopts the Common Programme and Organic Law (respectively a general statement of principles and a provisional constitution) submitted to it by the CCP. Provincial, regional, and central administrations are formed.

October 1: The People's Republic of China is declared to be China's sole legal government. Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the CCP Central Committee since 1935, is named chairman (head of state) of the new government.

October-December: Chinese Communist armies virtually complete their occupation of the Chinese mainland, reaching the Vietnam border on December 16.

December 16: Mao Tse-tung travels to Moscow, remaining there two months.

January 16: Peking recognises Ho Chi Minh's forces (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) as the legal government of Vietnam. The Soviet Union follows suit on January 31.

February 14: Sino-Soviet treaty signed at Moscow. The USSR retains control of Manchurian railways and the naval base at Port Arthur and is to loan Peking the equivalent of £107 million sterling with repayment to begin in 1954. Mao returns to Peking on February 20.

March: A supplementary Sino-Soviet agreement provides for joint Sino-Soviet corporations which are to carry on mining and petroleum operations in Sinkiang, form a civil air line, and build ships at the Chinese port of Dairen.

June 30: The Land Reform Law is promulgated. In accordance with usual CCP practice, this formalises a policy which had already been carried out in most of Manchuria and large areas of North China. Land reform is not limited to the simple redistribution of the land; it is a mass movement with far-reaching social, political, and economic objectives. CCP cadres move from village to village, carrying on intensive propaganda, classifying villagers according to their economic status and political attitudes.

When the campaign reaches its climax in each village, People's Tribunals are organised. Landowners and local leaders are executed or subjected to public humiliation and stripped of their influence. Their land is then distributed to the poorer peasants, who are ceremoniously presented with deeds and told that the land will remain theirs for an indefinite period. This is intended to eliminate centres of possible opposition to the regime and consolidate CCP control of the countryside.

Nearly half of the rural population is affected by land reform by the end of the year.

October: Chinese Communist armies invade the Kham region of eastern Tibet on the 10th and, partly as the result of treachery, take the fortress of Chamdo on the 20th. The Chinese armies advance toward Tibet proper, which is left virtually defenceless.

October 25: The Chinese People's Volunteers, composed of whole divisions and armies of regular Chinese Communist forces, are formally established in Korea, which they entered some days

earlier. This follows the launching of another mass movement in Communist China, the Resist America and Aid Korea campaign. During 1950-52 this campaign is used as a pretext for establishing closer political control over the mainland and a means for organising popular support for the regime. The people are required to make "voluntary" contributions of money and overtime work.

1951

February: Regulations for the "Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries" are issued. This formalises the police procedures used since the end of 1949. The elimination of groups or individuals who oppose government or are unwilling to submit to CCP control is continued. People's Courts are formally established in the cities; their purpose is similar to that of the People's Tribunals in the village.

May 23: Tibetan representatives in Peking sign a 17-point agreement which provides for Chinese occupation of Tibet but guarantees the preservation of Buddhist institutions in Tibet, the autonomy of the Tibetan government, and the status of the Dalai Lama.

'After the Lhasa revolt of March 1959' Chinese spokesmen admitted that organised resistance began in Tibet soon after the 1951 agreement was signed. On June 20, 1959, while in exile in India, the Dalai Lama declared that the agreement had been signed under duress and that the Chinese had forged the seals of the Tibetan government.

May: Efforts to control Chinese art and literature formally begin when the CCP Central Committee attacks a film which had praised the 19th century popular educator Wu Hsun.

September: The Ideological Remoulding Movement begins. It carries out intensively and on a nation-wide scale the indoctrination of intellectuals which began in the early days of the regime. They are organised into small discussion groups for self-examination, repeated confessions, self-criticism, and training in Communist doctrine.

October-December: The Three-anti and Five-anti movements begin on a nation-wide basis. The Five-anti movement is intended to weaken the economic and social position of businessmen, shopkeepers, and other members of the middle class. They are accused

of bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of state property, and divulging state economic secrets. Crippling fines are exacted; these are an important source of state funds during this period and serve to facilitate state control over private business. The Three-anti campaign is directed against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism. It serves to eliminate administrative and judicial personnel carried over from earlier administrations. Those who are not dismissed are placed under close Party control.

1952

The campaigns of 1951 continue through most of the year, with the Three-anti and Five-anti movements slackening after the first six months. Nearly all the peasant population is affected by land reform by the end of the year. During the year the government largely completes its efforts to control inflation and bring production back to pre-war levels.

In November the State Planning Commission is formed, with Kao Kang as chairman, to prepare for the first Five-year Plan. A few thousand collective farms are organized on an experimental basis.

Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh's guerrilla operations in Viet Nam continues to increase. Shipments of Chinese Communist military equipment to Ho Chi Minh's forces, begun in 1950, by 1952 include artillery and other heavy equipment.

1953

January 1: The first Five-year Plan officially begins (but is not published in concrete form until July 1955).

During the year there is a general relaxation of the pressure on the people which had been so intense during 1951-52. An attempt is made to reassure peasants and businessmen that they will be free from further interference. The fund-raising drives slacken off and propaganda concentrates on tasks of economic development rather than the elimination of external and internal enemies.

July 27: Korean armistice signed after more than two years of negotiations.

September: Another Sino-Soviet economic agreement is signed; the USSR agrees to build or reconstruct 141 major plants in China. These are to be paid for with Chinese exports.

1954

January : The "General Line of the State for the Period of Transition to Socialism" is announced. In effect, if not in theory, this marks the end of the period of New Democracy. It calls for austerity, hard work, and obedience to the central authority of the CCP.

January-June : The Viet Minh continue their offensive in Viet Nam, making use of the large quantities of military equipment supplied by Peking. Viet Minh forays into Laos and Cambodia.

February 6-10 : At a CCP Central Committee session, Liu Shao-chi, acting in Mao's absence, announces a party movement to improve discipline. This follows a drive launched during the second half of 1953 against bureaucratic methods and an excessive number of unproductive meetings.

Kao Kang, chairman of the State Planning Commission and of the regional administration of Manchuria, and Jao Shu-shih, party chief for Shanghai and East China, are purged soon after the February 1954 meeting of the CCP Central Committee. Kao commits suicide and Jao is presumably imprisoned. The purge is not revealed by the Party until April 5, 1955.

March : The State Council and CCP Central Committee announce the state monopoly of grain trading, which had been put into practice after the harvest of 1953. Food rationing, which had been ordered earlier in many areas, is established throughout China.

April-July : Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai visits India and Burma and represents Peking at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. On April 29, while in India, Chou and Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru sign a Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet. Its preamble enunciates for the first time the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence". These are : mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

July 21 : The Geneva Agreement on Indo-China is signed. Viet Nam is divided into two areas north and south of the 17th parallel. The entire northern section comes under the control of Ho Chi Minh's regime in May 1955 after one-half million refugees

are evacuated to the south through Haiphong. Statements by Ho and other Viet Minh leaders indicate that they will apply policies similar to those used by the Communists in China and follow Peking's ideological lead.

July: The regional administrations, formed in 1949 to facilitate Communist consolidation of power on the mainland, are abolished, and the provinces are brought under direct central control.

August 3: Peking's 'The People's Daily', official newspaper of the CCP Central Committee, reports that 65 per cent of collective farms already organised have poor production records or are otherwise unsatisfactory. Formation of collectives continues, however, and 400,000 are organised by the end of the year.

September 3: Chinese Communist forces begin intensive shelling of Chinese Nationalist troops on the Quemoy island group. Communist military activity in the Taiwan straits is intensive until February 1955, and is sporadic in 1956 and 1957.

September 20: A formal constitution is adopted by the new National People's Congress, which takes over the nominal legislative functions of the People's Political Consultative Conference. The latter body continues to exist as an instrument of united front policy.

October 12: A new Sino-Soviet agreement provides for the dissolution of the joint-stock corporations formed in 1950 and returns the naval base of Port Arthur to Chinese control. Peking is to receive a new credit of 520 million rubles (£46 million sterling at the official rate of exchange, less in terms of actual purchasing power). This agreement is concluded following a visit to Peking by high Soviet leaders, including Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev.

1955

February: A new campaign against "bourgeois and idealistic thought in literature and art" begins. Hu Feng, a well-known Marxist writer, is used as a target and bad example. He is expelled from the Writers' Union on May 25 and arrested on July 16.

April 18-24: Chou En-lai attends the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia. The conference adopts ten principles similar in intent to the five principles adopted by Chou and Nehru

a year earlier. The ten principles of Bandung are: (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (6) (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers; (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; (7) Refraining from acts of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; (10) Respect for justice and international obligations.

July: Second session of the National People's Congress (NPC). The first Five-year Plan (1953-57) is formally presented for the first time. The NPC is also told that a "tense" grain situation existed during early 1955, and it hears a report on the renewed campaign against counter-revolutionaries which was carried on intensively during the year. During the NPC session, which ends on July 30, there is no indication that government plans to abandon its relatively gradual schedule for agricultural collectivisation; the NPC endorses the Central Committee policy, which still stresses gradualism.

July 31: Mao tells a special meeting of provincial Party secretaries that collectivisation of agriculture must be speeded up.

August-September: Mao's new decision is not published, but collective farms are organised at a rapid rate. These are called "lower-level agricultural producers' co-operatives". Although peasant members farm collectively, they retain title to their land and in theory can withdraw.

October 15: Mao's collectivisation decision is announced following a session of the Central Committee and his July 31 speech is published.

October-December: Collectivisation continues at a rapid rate, and by the end of the year 70 million peasant households—more than half the total—have been enrolled in collective farms.

The transformation of private businesses into state-controlled concerns is also accelerated drastically following Mao's July speech and the October meeting of the Central Committee. These two drives are linked together as the "high tide of socialist transformation".

1956

January 14-20: A Conference of Intellectuals is called at Peking. Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung call for unity between Party and non-Party intellectuals in an effort to surpass world scientific levels. Chou reveals that a majority of Chinese intellectuals are either unwilling to support communism or are actively opposed to it.

February: N. S. Khrushchev denounces Stalin at the Soviet 20th Party Congress.

April 5: The 'People's Daily' published an editorial based on discussions in the Politburo; called "On the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" it is Peking's official commentary on Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. It admits that Stalin made errors but is less critical than Khrushchev.

May: By the end of the month nearly all private businesses have been taken over by the state or have been placed under state control through "joint public-private ownership".

A large majority of peasant households have been enrolled in collective farms. In most cases the "lower-level co-operatives" existed only briefly, if at all; nearly all collectives have been converted to the "higher level," in which private land ownership ceases. This ultra-fast collectivisation far exceeds the targets called for by Mao in July 1955.

May 26: The relatively lenient policy toward intellectuals initiated in January is termed "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend". It is emphasised that this is a transitional policy and is to be accompanied with intensive study of Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung endorses this policy in a series of speeches.

June : The CCP begins a "rectification" movement intended to reduce bureaucratism, sectarianism (the tendency for units of the CCP to seek independent authority, separating themselves from both the people and other party units) and commandism (the tendency for Party cadres to rely on coercion rather than propaganda and persuasion).

August 7 : An official of the NPC admits that Tibetans have revolted in Szechwan province. This admission, and a similar guarded statement by Chou En-lai on December 10, appear to confirm press reports from India that a widespread revolt against Chinese control had broken out in Tibet.

September 15-27 : The first session of the CCP 8th Party Congress is held. It approves proposals for the second Five-year Plan, votes on a slightly-revised Party constitution, and approves a Party decision to consolidate and overhaul collective farms.

December : Peking announces that 96.1 per cent of the peasantry are in collective farms as of the end of the year. Chou En-lai visits the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland.

December 29 : The 'People's Daily' publishes another authoritative editorial, "More on the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." It gives Peking's official response to the Hungarian revolt, asserts that the USSR must be the leader of the Communist bloc, and attacks Titoism.

1957

February 27 : Mao Tse-tung delivers a major speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," to a meeting of the Supreme State Conference. He repeats the "hundred flowers" slogan and invites non-party intellectuals to point out shortcomings in both the party and the state.

Mao also announces that "reforms" in Tibet will not be carried out until after 1962—presumably a concession to the rebellious Tibetans. He also criticises the "Great Han chauvinism" of Communist cadres of Chinese race who are disrespectful toward minority peoples and employ coercion.

In an important doctrinal innovation, Mao declares that even after "class enemies" have been eliminated, there may still be "contradictions" among the people and between the people and the state. He says that this may be tolerated, even to the extent

of permitting open criticism of the regime and strikes by workers or other groups.

His speech is not published until June 18, and only after Mao has made additions stressing the leading role of the Communist Party.

April: An editorial in the 'People's Daily' on the 1st says that Mao's offer to intellectuals to "bloom and contend" should be acted upon, and another on the 23rd calls for a nation-wide "rectification movement" aimed at improving the discipline of the Party and establishing closer relations with the people.

May-June: The first of a series of "democratic forums" is held on May 8. Organised by the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, these meetings permit intellectuals and members of the non-Communist shadow parties to express their criticisms. Some limit their criticisms to matters of detail, but many oppose the CCP's control and direction of every aspect of Chinese life. Representatives of the non-Communist parties ask for a genuine role in political affairs. In other meetings, journalists, professors, and students ask for more freedom, emphasis on professional rather than political criteria in their work, and less CCP control. Marshal Lung Yun attacks Soviet policy toward China.

In Hanyang and other cities these protests take the form of major student demonstrations and riots. Evidence appears as early as May 20 that the Party is displeased by the unorthodox opinions which have been expressed, but criticisms of the CCP continue to be published through early June.

June 8-15: The 'People's Daily' publishes a series of five editorials attacking the "rightists" who "exploited the rectification campaign". A nation-wide campaign of counter-criticism, with Party-organised rallies and demonstrations, is begun.

June 26-July 15: During the session of the NPC a large number of "rightists", including many high officials, confess to "anti-party activities". The term "rectification movement" is retained, but it is transformed into an intensive campaign against the "rightists" and becomes a drive for more rigid orthodoxy and obedience to the CCP. Mao's doctrine of "internal contradictions" receives only perfunctory attention.

June-October: The rectification movement, in its new form, continues intensively through the rest of 1957. A number of

"counter-revolutionary plots" are uncovered and broken up. Hundreds of writers, engineers, scientists, journalists, other intellectuals, and officials are criticised by CCP spokesmen and required to "confess". Those accused include many who have been members of the CCP for 20 years or more and have held high positions.

Policy toward the national minorities shifts; emphasis is placed on the elimination of "local nationalism", the CCP's derogatory term for efforts by minority peoples to achieve genuine autonomy or independence and preserve their traditions. A considerable number of officials, including high figures in the Party, who are of minority origin or have worked in minority areas are accused of this deviation. "Great Han Chauvinism" is still mentioned, but is de-emphasized.

August 14: A directive intended to improve the work of collective farm managers and reduce the size of collective farms is issued.

September 1: The "anti-rightist" campaign is applied specifically to literature; the 'People's Daily' attacks the "distortions" of the "rightists" and calls for a return to the "socialist line" in literature and the arts. During succeeding months this line is repeated by Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the CCP Propaganda Department, and other CCP specialists in literary affairs.

In a parallel move directed at rightist tendencies in education, the CCP Central Committee orders the transfer of high CCP cadres to universities and cultural organs to "strengthen party leadership".

November: The rectification campaign continues to stress attacks on "rightists", but it partially returns to its original purpose; Party press and radio organs discuss methods of improving the "working style" of CCP cadres and state officials. Officials are told to spend a month or more working in fields and factories. There had been several earlier calls of this nature, but this appears to be the first time that this policy is applied on a large scale.

November 2: Mao Tse-tung again travels to Moscow, where he makes a speech emphasizing the importance of Soviet leadership.

November 15: Partial decentralisation of industrial, commercial, and financial management is ordered.

December 30: The governor of Chekiang province and 12 other provincial officials are purged. They are accused of "rightist conservatism", a deviation which is said to have expressed itself in a negative attitude toward collectivisation; the purged officials are held responsible for the "collapse" of collective farms in Chekiang.

1958

January 1: Second Five-year Plan (1958-62) begins.

January 31: Three ministers (Chang Nai-chi, Food; Lo Lungchi, Timber Industry; and Chang Po-chun, Communications), all non-Communists, formally dismissed as "rightists". They had been required to make "confessions" in August and September. Fifty-four members of the National People's Congress, including noted woman writer Ting Ling, removed on similar charges. The Nationalities Affairs Commission reports on the same day that "agitation for republics . . . exists principally among the non-Party intellectuals of the Mongolian, Korean, Hui, Uighur, and other nationalities."

February 11: Chou En-lai formally resigns as foreign minister and is replaced by fellow Politburo member Chen Yi. Chou continues as premier.

March 11: The governor of Tsinghai province is removed for deviations which include "local nationalism". This follows the purge (announced January 27) of four members of the CCP Anhwei provincial committee for "rightist, anti-party, anti-socialist crimes", and the expulsion of eight top scientists from the planning commission of the State Council (cabinet) on March 5.

February-early May: Mao Tse-tung and other high CCP officials tour the provinces. Visits to villages are reported in great detail with high praises of the party leaders. During this period the first experimental communes are formed.

May 5-23: Eighth Congress of the CCP (2nd session). Higher production targets and the economic "great leap forward" officially endorsed after speeches by Liu Shao-chi and Tan Chen-lin urge more ambitious policies. Political orthodoxy and close ties with the Soviet Union are emphasised and a sweeping attack is made on the Yugoslav form of Communism. Mao Tse-tung writes in the new official CCP magazine 'Red Flag' on June 1 that

the economic and political revolution can proceed more rapidly in China than had been anticipated. From June 10-24 a series of editorials in the 'People's Daily' attacks "empiricism and rightist conservatism" in economic policies and criticises "on-looker" factions who want to "settle accounts after the autumn harvest".

July 1: In the regime's first authoritative reference to communes as a fundamental policy, Chen Po-ta calls communes a "basic unit of Chinese society" which could create the appropriate conditions for the transition to communism.

July 31-August 3: Khrushchev flies suddenly to Peking for a meeting with Mao.

August 17-30: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo, at Peitaiho, near Peking, approves the transformation of all collective farms into rural communes. Communes are to consolidate the collective farm and village administrations, include an average of about 5,000 families, have integral militia units, and organise peasants into labour brigades with semi-military discipline.

Communes are also to feed members in communal mess halls, establish communal nurseries, set up homes for the aged, and "free more women for productive labour". These measures, and the emphasis on small factories in the communes, are said to bring the attainment of the stage of "pure communism" within relatively easy reach.

The Peitaiho meeting also announces much higher targets for grain and steel production and calls for production of steel in small local furnaces.

August 23-24: Another intensive artillery bombardment of Quemoy begins, following a build-up of Communist air and surface forces near the Taiwan Straits.

August 27: The Communist radio predicts imminent landings on Quemoy and calls on the Nationalist forces to surrender. Intensive shelling continues through October 6.

September: According to an official report released on October 29, 122 million families, or 98.2% of the rural population, were organised into communes by the end of September. About 750,000 collective farms were consolidated into 26,425 communes. Travellers later reaching Hong Kong and Tokyo from the mainland said that this rapid organisation of communes was largely on paper, and few of the new communal institutions were functioning until much later.

September 29 : Communes in cities and industrial or mining areas are mentioned for the first time. On October 4 a speech by CCP secretary-general Teng Hsiao-ping urges "experimental" formation of urban communes, and later statements imply that this is to be official policy.

October : Statements by Liu Shao-chi, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin and other members of the Politburo imply that "pure communism" will be achieved in the near future; it is suggested that communes be enlarged until they are identical with the county, ('hsien') which would mean that each would have hundreds of thousands of members.

October 22 : Radio Peking admits a "tight food situation" in the cities, and the official press urges more attention to harvesting, transport, and storing crops. Later statements admit that diversion of manpower to steel production, deep plowing, and other commune projects is responsible for food shortages.

October 23 : Two vice-governors and party secretaries removed from the Shantung provincial administration for "right opportunism, localism, and factionalism". High officials also dismissed from the provincial administrations of Liaoning and Kwangsi at about the same time for "conservative" opposition to the "high tide" of communism.

October 25 : Peking announces that henceforth Quemoy will be shelled on odd dates of the month only. Sporadic bombardment on even dates continues through the first half of 1959.

November 7 : Soviet Ambassador Yudin makes a speech which, by implication, rejects Peking's thesis that communes will permit China to achieve communism quickly even though China is still only partially industrialised. Disapproval of Peking's ideological claims by the Soviet Communist leaders is also implied by the nearly complete absence of comment on communes in the Soviet press and radio. During November Chinese Communist discussions of communes de-emphasise the earlier doctrinal claims.

November 25 : Provincial CCP secretaries and most of the members of the Politburo attend a special meeting in Wuhan.

December 16 : The Central Committee releases a statement that Mao Tse-tung will not seek re-election as "Chairman of the Republic" (head of state) but will continue to be chairman of the CCP.

December 18: Central Committee directive on communes, dated December 10, is released. Its provisions include: (1) urban communes will not be formed for the present, although they may be established in the future; (2) commune members will be paid according to their labour, not supplied with goods according to their needs; (3) more attention should be paid to the living conditions, rest, and work arrangements of commune members, implying that they had been overworked; (4) the ideological stage of communism is still remote in China, and "utopians" are criticised.

1959

January 23: The session of the new National People's Congress, due to meet in January, is postponed to April. The agenda of the session is to include the approval of a new head of state to replace Mao Tse-tung.

February 24: The 'People's Daily' stresses the importance of considering the entire economy as "a co-ordinated chess game". During February and March other high-level statements imply renewed attention to balanced economic planning to correct the dislocations caused by the "great leap forward". The emphasis in economic planning shifts back toward large, centrally-controlled industrial complexes. Mainland exports to Hong Kong and South-east Asia drop sharply, and Peking cancels several export contracts.

March 7: The end of a six and one-half month conference against "local nationalism" in Sinkiang is announced. Five prominent officials of Sinkiang "bow their heads" and admit "guilt". They are accused of undermining national unity and carrying on activities against the Party.

March 10: Tibetans in the capital city of Lhasa, aroused by reports that the Chinese plan to abduct the Dalai Lama, begin demonstrations outside Chinese offices. Chinese officials and Tibetan collaborators are attacked, and Chinese troops attempt to suppress the demonstrations.

March 17: The Dalai Lama flees Lhasa and open fighting breaks out in the capital. Chinese forces bombard monasteries and centres of resistance and attempt to intercept the Dalai Lama and his party.

March 28: Peking dissolves the local government of the Dalai Lama and replaces it with an administration nominally

headed by the Panchen Lama, who is made acting chairman of the "Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet." Eighteen members of the Committee are removed for having supported the Tibetan revolt and are replaced with collaborators. Military control committees are formed throughout Tibet by the Chinese army.

March 31: The Dalai Lama reaches safety in India and is given asylum. An editorial in the 'People's Daily' demands complete suppression of the Tibetan revolt.

April 17: In a statement at Tezpur, India, the Dalai Lama affirms that he left Tibet of his own free will. He charges that the Communists did not honour their 1951 promise to preserve Tibetan autonomy and describes how the Communists interfered with Buddhism in Tibet and required monks and other Tibetans to do forced labour.

The flood of Tibetan refugees into India begins; by the middle of May, the total reaches 12,000.

April 18-28: The second National People's Congress holds its first session. The NPC approves the selection of Liu Shao-chi as Mao's successor to the post of head of state. Soong Ching-ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and long-time Party member Tung Pi-wu are elected vice-chairmen of the state. Marshal Chu Teh succeeds Liu Shao-chi as chairman of the standing committee of the NPC. The nominations were made by meetings of the CCP Central Committee and the Supreme State Conference which preceded the NPC session.

Delegates' speeches emphasise, however, that Mao Tse-tung retains his leading role in government and during May and June Mao's appearances at ceremonial occasions are as numerous as when he was chief of state.

Statements by high economic officials Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-chun continue to speak of the "great leap forward" but also point out dislocations and shortages caused by the policies of 1958. These include transport bottlenecks, poor harvesting and storage of crops, and shortages of many types of food in the cities.

From April 22-25 speakers at the NPC condemn the revolt in Tibet and express "indignation" over the "support given by imperialists and Indian expansionists" to the Tibetan rebels.

May 6: The 'People's Daily' publishes the CCP's official statement about the Tibetan revolt. It is the culmination of attacks on "Indian expansionists" which include unfavourable references to Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru deplures Peking's propa-

ganda campaign and says that the Chinese are "using the language of the cold war". Despite Nehru's comments, the attacks continue through the rest of May and a number of "protest rallies" are organised throughout China.


May 15: An editorial in 'Red Flag' urges "more realism" in economic plans and, by implication, rejects the "mass mobilisation" approach to economic development employed during 1958.

June 16: Teng Tzu-hui, director of the CCP Rural Work Department, writes in the Peking magazine 'China Youth' that peasants are to be permitted to withdraw from commune mess halls. He states that a large percentage of peasants are opposed to mess halls, with only a minority of "activities" welcoming them.

During June and July a number of editorials in the 'People's Daily', 'Red Flag', and other CCP organs repeat the call for better planning, more efficient use of manpower, raw materials, machines and other resources, and say that even relatively moderate increases in production constitute a "great leap forward". These semi-official statements also order communes to close manufacturing units not directly related to agriculture; even those commune factories which support agriculture are to be shut down during periods of peak demand for farm labour.

June 20: The Dalai Lama tells a press conference at Mussoorie, India, that the Communists were guilty of a "flagrant act of aggression" in Tibet. He says that the 1951 agreement was "thrust on the (Tibetan) people . . . at the point of a bayonet." He describes Chinese rule in Tibet as a "reign of terror" and emphasises that he attempted to moderate the Chinese programmes. He also points out that the Tibetan government had not, as the Chinese alleged, been opposed to reforms; he states that the Chinese had in fact refused to carry out the reforms proposed by the Tibetan government.

June 28-July 20: The Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet meets at Lhasa. The Panchen Lama, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, and Chinese military commander Lt. Gen. Chang Kuo-hua announce that the communisation of Tibet (referred to as "democratic reforms") will be carried out in the near future. In language and content the sessions resolution is closely similar to the declarations issued by the Communists and by bodies like the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949-50. It implies that the pattern followed in China proper will be repeated in Tibet.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I: OBJECTIVES
The Basic Objectives of Communism in China.
Dr. Lea E. Williams
- II: THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS METHODS
The Role of the Communist Party in China.
Dr. Peter S. H. Tang
The Minor Parties and the "United Front."
Dr. Harold C. Hinton
- III: TWO ASIAN VIEWS OF COMMUNIST CHINA
Reflections on a Tour of Communist China.
U. Maung Maung
Life in Communist China Today.
Dr. S. Chandrasekhar
- IV: THE CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER COMMUNISM
The Peasants, Collectivisation and Communes.
A. J. Roy
Religion in China Since 1949.
Dr. Harold C. Hinton
Youth and the Family.
Nils Stefansson
Chinese Writers: Revolutionaries or Dogmatists?
A. J. Roy
- V: THE CHINESE ECONOMY: CLAIMS AND REALITIES
The Chinese Economy Since 1949.
Dr. Yuan-li Wu
Industrial Development in Mainland China.
Dr. L. H. Hsia
Trade, Aid, and Influence in Southeast Asia.
Dr. Lea E. Williams
- VI: CONTINUING PROBLEMS
The Sino-Soviet Axis.
Dr. G. F. Hudson
Population and Communes.
Dr. Irene B. Taeuber
Conflicts within the Chinese Communist Party.
Ting Hsun-li
- VII: COMMUNIST CHINA AS A COLONIAL POWER
China's Minority Nationalities.
Roderick MacFarquhar
Tibet Under Communist Rule.
Nils Stefansson
- VIII: CHARTS AND CHRONOLOGY
China's Communist Leaders: A Who's Who.
Communist China: 1949-1959 A Summary Chronology.