

# The Concept of Mind: A Comparative Study of Early Buddhist and Rylean Philosophy

Mind is one of the central problems of philosophical controversy, and much of the crucial discussion in Indian and western thought clusters round this cardinal notion. In Western philosophy the dualism came to be repudiated as a result of the landmark treatise by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) titled *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Ryle argued and proposed that one should not take the substance of 'Mind' different from the substance of 'Body.' Correspondingly, in classical India, the *Upaniṣadic* tradition had spelt out the *self* (soul) as an enduring entity, different from body which is perishable. *Self* is immaterial and it does exist in body, and body is not the self. This version of "the Ghost in the Machine"<sup>1</sup> theory was eliminated by the Buddha in the sixth century B.C. through his theory of 'mind,' which, in turn, came to be called as the doctrine of *Anātman*. The Buddha's conjecture of 'mind' was taken up for more radical theorizing by his followers later on.<sup>2</sup> The fascinating similarity in the approach and the striking dissimilarity in the theory of 'mind' in these above mentioned systems, namely, early Buddhist and Rylean, is the subject matter of this thesis which has not been ventured upon hardly by anyone for a comparative study. Through this study I submit that the early Buddhist thinkers had comprehended the problem of 'mind' *in toto* which the moderners grapple with, though not with the sophistry of today.

## ***Introduction***

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<sup>1</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Visuddhimagga*, Chapters 14, 16-19, and 22 [Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification*, Bhikkhu Nanamoli (tr), (Singapore: Singapore Buddhist Meditation Centre, 1956), 479-546, 592-703, and 785-818.

landmark treatise by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) titled *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Ryle argued and proposed that one should not take the substance of 'Mind' different from the substance of 'Body.' Correspondingly, in classical India, the *Upaniṣadic* tradition had spelt out the *self* (soul) as an enduring entity, different from body which is perishable. *Self* is immaterial and it does exist in body, and body is not the self. This version of "the Ghost in the Machine"<sup>3</sup> theory was eliminated by the Buddha in the sixth century B.C. through his theory of 'mind,' which, in turn, came to be called as the doctrine of *Anātman*. The Buddha's conjecture of 'mind' was taken up for more radical theorizing by his followers later on.<sup>4</sup> The fascinating similarity in the approach and the striking dissimilarity in the theory of 'mind' in these above mentioned systems, namely, early Buddhist and Rylean, is the subject matter of this thesis which has not been ventured upon hardly by anyone for a comparative study. Through this study I submit that the early Buddhist thinkers had comprehended the problem of 'mind' *in toto* which the moderners grapple with, though not with the sophistry of today.

### *The Concept of Mind in Early Buddhist Philosophy*

The early Buddhism emphasized *dhamma* (element) as real discarding any metaphysical nuances to it. The learned Buddhist scholar Th. Stcherbatsky translated the word '*dhamma*' into 'element.'<sup>5</sup> The word element can be understood as that "which cannot be reduced to simpler terms under the condition of investigation."<sup>6</sup> In Sarvāstivāda (school of Buddhist thought), *dhamma* is the simplest element to which an empirical object can be reduced. The Buddhist cosmology regards the world as composed of an unceasing flow of the simple ultimate, called '*dhamma*', which can

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<sup>4</sup> *Visuddhimagga*, Chapters 14, 16-19, and 22 [Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification*, Bhikkhu Nanamoli (tr), (Singapore: Singapore Buddhist Meditation Centre, 1956) , 479-546, 592-703, and 785-818.

<sup>5</sup> Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, (Delhi: Motilala Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2005), 3

<sup>6</sup> As quoted in David J. Kalupahana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992), p.73

be defined as (1) multiple, (2) momentary, (3) impersonal, (4) mutually conditioned events.<sup>7</sup> The Sthāvira<sup>8</sup> take the word ‘*dharmā*’ in its moral sense.

For early Buddhism all the physical and mental phenomena of existences are five *khandhā* and they constitute human personality. The five aggregates, called as *khandhā*, constitute the category of mind and matter in Buddhism. The term *khandhā* is used in Buddhist literature to refer to the concept of “division” in the sense of a variety of constituent groups. The five aggregates are variously translated as ‘matter’ or ‘form’ (*rūpa*), ‘sensation’, ‘emotion’ or ‘feeling’ (*vedanā*), ‘recognition’ or ‘perception’ (*samāsā* or *samjāsa*), ‘karmic activity’, formation of the past residue or ‘force’ (*sankhāra* or *saṅskāra*), and consciousness (*viśeṣā* or *vijāna*). Buddhaghosa gives in his *Visuddhimagga*, that *vedanā*, *samāsa*, *samjākhāra* and *viśeṣā* are the four mental aggregates, and *rūpa* is the material aggregate.<sup>9</sup> These five aggregates or components collectively constitute the human individual or personality.

*Khandhā* is divided in two groups: *nāma* and *rūpa*. In Early Buddhism, there is a clear differentiation between *dharmā* which are intentional (part of *nāma*) and those which pertain to material form (*rūpa*).<sup>10</sup> But it does not mean that *nāma* is different from matter. For early Buddhists, mind and matter are dependent on each other. The earlier texts mention that there are many different ways to interact with each other. According to early Buddhist philosophy, consciousness and other mental states arise dependent on sense-organ and sense-object and state of mind leads the speech and physical behaviour. Let us mention one instance, in order to understand the relation of mind and matter, from *Visuddhimagga*.<sup>11</sup> Buddhaghosa gives the simile of a man

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<sup>7</sup> Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought In India : Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1983),97; Rupert Gettin, “He Who Sees Dharma Sees Dharmas: Dharma in Early Buddhism,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 32 (2004), 536.

<sup>8</sup> *Sthāvira*, one of the two main sectarian groups in early Indian Buddhism, the other being the *Mahāsāṃghikas*. The two groups went their separate ways at the council of Pāṭaliputra. The *Sthāvira* claimed to represent older and more orthodox teaching that could be traced directly back to the Buddha, and they branded their opponents as heretics, although the *Mahāsāṃghikas* appeared to have been the more populous body. See: Damien Keown, *A Dictionary of Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 279

<sup>9</sup> *Visuddhimagga* XIV: 33

<sup>10</sup> Peter Harvey, *The Mind-Body Relationship in Pali Buddhist: A Philosophical Investigation*, 39.

<sup>11</sup> *Visuddhimagga*, XVIII:35

who is blind by birth and a stool crawling cripple. Both of them wanted to go somewhere but they cannot go outside, since blind man cannot see and cripple cannot walk. The blind man said to the cripple ‘look, I can do what should be done by legs, but we have no eyes with which to see what is rough and smooth’. The crippled also express his problem and said ‘look I can do what should be done by eyes, but I have no legs with which to go and come’. The blind man was delighted, and he made the cripple climb up on his shoulder. Sitting on the blind man’s shoulder the cripple instructs him the path. Here the blind man has no efficient power to travel by his own efficient power or by his own strength. Again, the cripple also has no efficient power to travel by his own efficient power or by his own strength. But there is nothing to prevent, their going when they support each other. So too, mentality has no efficient power; it does not arise or occur in such and such function by its own efficient power. And materiality has no efficient power; it does not arise or occur in such and such functions by its own efficient power. But there is nothing to prevent their occurrence when they support each other.<sup>12</sup> There is no dualism of the mind and matter (body) in early Buddhist philosophy.

Mind and body are inter-related and inseparable. However, in the analysis one could make the distinction between them, and use the term *r@pa* to represent the matter and the term *vi@sa@a* to represent the mind and all that is related to the mind and the mental actions including the entire activity of the body. Mind is a train of thought. There is no mention of an enduring self in the early Buddhist treatises, but there is a conception of the ‘I’ existing. The ‘I’ is nothing but *n@ma-r@pa*. When one says ‘I am hungry’, it signifies the experience. Hence, the word *citta*, mind or consciousness stands for experience. Conclusively, mind or *citta* is a flux of thought or a series of mental events, and it does not belong to a single entity, but to a system of entities. It is merely the result of sensation, and again it is made to precede sensation in causal chain. The word ‘mind’ was also used to describe a complete act of perception or cognition, and it is also a link between two lives. Consciousness is the relation between the subject and the object, and that consciousness is all about awareness of

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<sup>12</sup> *Visuddhimagga*, XVIII:35

the object. It includes all of the enormous varieties of the awareness. In that sense, it is essentially subjective. It must be mentioned that there is some level of vagueness in early Buddhism in relation to the terms used, as various words are used to connote the same meaning. It could create confusion in the minds of those who take the words 'mind' and 'self' to ascertain the same meaning. The Buddha does not hold on to an eternal entity called the self, at the same time it does not imply that he replaces the self by the word 'mind'.

### ***Rylean View on Mind***

In western tradition, Descartes established the dualism of body and mind. This Cartesian dichotomy influenced the thought of many western thinkers until the twentieth century, during which Descartes' dualism was rejected. This dualism came to be repudiated as a result of the landmark treatise by Gilbert Ryle entitled *The Concept of Mind*. In this treatise Ryle has eliminated the mind-body dualism and said that Descartes has committed special kind of mistake, that is category mistake. 'It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another'<sup>13</sup>. He presents dualism as the dogma of the *Ghost in the Machine* because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial. For example 'A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific department and administrative office. He then asks but where is the university?'<sup>14</sup> It has then to be explained to him that university is just way in which all that he has already seen is organized. Likewise, we can not figure out the mind like sense organ or matter because mind is just way to express all the activity of body. Mind represents the entire function of the body. Similarly in early Buddhism the word '*Nāma*' has been used in same meaning. One should not understand *Nāma* or *viśeṣāṇā* as a 'formless' like soul and it is enter in the body. Buddha refused to accept formless and eternal self. Buddha's explanation is the abolition of ambiguity. It is not to shift the soul to the mind. However, Buddha does not reject the existence of soul. He maintains the

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<sup>13</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.17

<sup>14</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 18

middle path with silence.<sup>15</sup> So in early Buddhism *viśvavajra* represent the all activity of body.

In order to proceed toward some interesting similarities between early Buddhist thought and Ryle's concept of mind, let me look into the basic purport of both philosophies and then I take up their possible points of convergence.

There were two different traditions that were very prominent at the time of Buddha. *Firstly*, *Upaniṣadic* tradition which uphold to an eternal, self-subsisting spiritual entity was termed as *sṅsvatavṅda* or *ṅtmavṅda*. *Secondly*, materialist tradition which arose in direct opposition to the religious view of an eternal soul and later the materialist tradition rejected the belief in an eternal soul/self and subscribed to the view that soul/self was identical with body. According to this view, the self/soul gets annihilated at death without any prospect of after-death survival. This view is termed as *ucchedavṅda* in Buddhist literature. Thus, it was against this intellectual polarization of *sṅsvatavṅda* and *ucchedavṅda*, Buddha set into his newly discovered path to deliverance. This newly enunciated path was called the *majjhimṅ patipadṅ* (via media), because it is said to avoid the two extremes of *sṅsvatavṅda* and *ucchedavṅda* (eternalism and annihilationism), the metaphysical and the physical views on the soul/self. Similarly, in western tradition, Descartes established the dualism of body and mind. In his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes made distinction between mind and body. He writes that mind is indubitable and necessary but bodies are dubitable and contingent.<sup>16</sup> Knowledge of mind is "truer and more certain" as well as "much more distinct and evident" than knowledge of bodies. Mainly the essence of Descartes' distinction between mind and body is the distinction between thinking and extension. A mind is "thinking, non-extended thing," whereas a body is "an extended, non-thinking thing". This Cartesian dichotomy influenced many western thinkers until the twentieth century, during which Descartes' dualism was rejected. This dualism came to be repudiated as a result of a landmark treatise by

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<sup>15</sup> "Should anyone say that he does not wish to lead the holy life under the Blessed one, unless the Blessed one first tells him, whether the world is eternal or temporal, finite or infinite; whether the life principle is identical with the body, or something different; whether the perfect one continues after death, etc-such an one would die, ere the perfect one could tell him all this." *Majjhima-Nikaya* 63

<sup>16</sup> I have taken from class notes of Diana Mertz Hsieh on *Doubting the Doubt : An Analysis of the internal Tensions of Cartesian Substance Dualism*

Gilbert Ryle entitled *The Concept of Mind*,<sup>17</sup> in which Ryle accorded that Descartes committed 'category mistake'. He critiqued Cartesian dualism as the dogma of 'the Ghost in the Machine' because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial.

It is fascinating to note that Buddhism have also rejected the concept of self/soul and both of the thinkers are not ready to accept the existence of soul which is eternal and inter in the time of birth and quite at the time of death. Ryle rejects the Cartesian dualism and says that one should not hold that mind and body belong to the same kind of category. Similarly Buddha also rejects the ghostly existence of soul. Here it is noteworthy that when one states that something has ghostly or incorporeal existence, it means that it does not have physical body or it doest not exist in space or it is not perceivable by any one. It seems that there are some mental phenomena which are ghostly in his sense. Let me begin by explaining that in what sense some mental process can be said to be ghostly or incorporeal. For instance running consists in various movements of legs, breathing in movements of lungs and saluting in movement of hands. Likewise in the process of perception there are certain cells in the optic centers of the brain are being activated, even though it may be true that seeing a hippopotamus is, in fact, identical with having those brain cells activated. So when one says that something ghostly happened it means that one cannot find out the changes throughout the process, and in this sense both the thinkers reject the concept of soul/self.

According to Ryle's concept of mind, one cannot decipher the mind as sense organ or as matter because mind is just way to express all the activity of body. Mind represents the entire function of the body and this is the Ryle's concept of mind. He has pointed out that category-mistakes are made by those people who are perfectly skilled to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong. Taking the example from Ryle, it could be stated that, a student of politics has learned the main differences between constitutions of different country and has learned also the differences and connections between the cabinet,

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<sup>17</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Victoria: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963)

parliament, the various ministries, the judicature and the Church of England. But he is still confused about the connections between the Church of England, the home office and the British Constitution. For while the church and the home office are institutions, the British constitution is not another institution in the same sense of that noun, so inter-institutional relations which can be asserted or denied to hold between either of them and the British constitution. The British Constitution is not a term of the same logical type as the home office and the Church of England.<sup>18</sup> However, as Ryle wishes to argue, there is no such ghostlike mind that controls the body as machine that is said, forms the invisible, immaterial ego, which, knowing itself as ‘I’ remains the same amidst all that is changeable. It is the recipient of knowledge through the five gate-ways of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. It is the agent that is active in the movements of the various motor organs. Similarly in early Buddhism the word ‘*Nāma*’ has been used in same meaning. One should not understand *Nāma* or *viśeṣāṇā* as a ‘formless’ like soul and it is enter in the body. Buddha refused to accept formless and eternal self. Buddha’s explanation is the abolition of ambiguity. It is not to shift the soul to the mind. However, Buddha does not reject the existence of soul. He maintains the middle path with silence.<sup>19</sup> In early Buddhism mind has made by elements and that is not eternal. It changes every moment. It is to be mentioned here that if one is using word ‘change’ in Buddhist context, then it does not mean that one thing is replaced by another thing. According the Buddhism the word ‘change’ means, the thing remains the same, but its condition or quality changes. So in Buddhist context movement is like a row of lamps sending flashes the one after the other and thus producing the illusion of a moving light. Motion consists of a series of immobility. The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, one says that the light has moved, but in reality other flames have appeared in other contiguous places. Thus the Buddhists by purely speculative methods, I

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<sup>18</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 19

<sup>19</sup> “Should anyone say that he does not wish to lead the holy life under the Blessed one, unless the Blessed one first tells him, whether the world is eternal or temporal, finite or infinite; whether the life principle is identical with the body, or something different; whether the perfect one continues after death, etc-such an one would die, ere the perfect one could tell him all this.” *Majjhima-Nikaya* 63



would submit, came to envisage motion in a way which bears some analogy with modern analytical tradition.

The notion of 'I' is very important question for non-self theory because in *Upaniṣadic* tradition, the essence of a person is his self or soul, which enters the body at birth and quits it at death. The soul, it is said, forms the invisible, immaterial ego, which, knowing itself as 'I' remains the same amidst all that is changeable. It is the recipient of knowledge through the five gate-ways of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. It is the agent that is active in the movements of the various motor organs. The word 'I' represent our experience. Similarly, Ryle says that 'when a person utters an 'I' sentence, his statement of it may be part of a higher order act, namely one, perhaps, of self-reporting, self-exhortation, or self-commiseration and this performance itself is not dealt with in the operation which it itself is. In this regard, Ryle writes:

There is nothing mysterious of occult about the range of higher order acts and attitudes, which are apt to be inadequately covered by the umbrella-title 'self-consciousness'. They are the same in kind as the higher order acts and attitudes exhibited in the dealings of people with one another. Indeed the former are only a special application of the latter and are learned first from them. If I perform the third order operation of commenting on a second order act of laughing at myself for a piece of manual awkwardness, I shall indeed use the first personal pronoun in two different ways.<sup>20</sup>

Correspondingly in early Buddhism 'I' stand for five *khandh* ①. From the very outset Buddhism had been subjectivist and critical. Buddhism has maintained the distinction between what obtains in reality and what appears empirically.<sup>21</sup> Apparent reality is nothing but the names of the living and the non living; they also refer to the things

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<sup>20</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* P.189

<sup>21</sup>Early Buddhism accepts two kinds of realities—'apparent and ultimate'. Apparent reality is the ordinary conventional truth or the commonly accepted truth (*sammuti-sacca*). Ultimate reality is the ultimate truth (*paramattha-sacca*). It is called *paramattha* in *Abhidhamma*. Narada Maha Thera, *A M annual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha)*, (Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society, 1979), p.6

and the persons themselves. Thus not only the names but the man, the dog, the table, the house, etc., are also apparent. It is apparent that ‘names’ are not the ultimate realities because a particular thing has been given different names in different languages. For example, scientist would use the term ‘water’ in ordinary purpose but in the laboratory he would say H<sub>2</sub>O. Similarly, one can use the word ‘person’ for ordinary purpose but in ultimate sense “person” is not anything other than five aggregates or *khandh* ①. According to Early Buddhism, there are two kinds of realities—apparent and ultimate. Apparent reality is the ordinary conventional truth or the commonly accepted truth (*sammuti-sacca*). Ultimate reality is the ultimate truth which is called *paramattha*<sup>22</sup> in the *Abhidhamma* literature. For example, one can learn about the apparent depth of an object in water. The apparent depth is shallower than the real depth. It appears to be the true depth due to the deviation of light rays on passing from a denser medium (water) to a lighter medium (air). So if a fisherman throws a spike at a fish where he sees it under water, the spear will not hit the fish, because the fish is not really there. In the same way the apparent realities, though they seem to exist, do not really exist. Apparent reality is the names of the living and the non-living; they also refer to the things and the persons themselves. Thus not only the names but the man, the dog, the table, the house, etc., are also apparent. It is apparent that ‘names’ are not the ultimate realities because a particular thing has been given different names in different languages. Now according to *Abhidhamma*, not only the names but also the things and the persons the names refer to do not really exist. The important point is that by *paramattha* or ultimate reality, it would mean something which cannot be changed into another thing or divided up into other things. It can neither be created nor destroyed by man. It really exists in nature and it holds on its characteristics till it perishes. It can stand the tests or the investigation by any method about its reality and real existence. In the *Abhidhamma* there are four *paramatthas* or ultimate realities. They are *r@pa*, *citta*, *cetasika* and *Nibb ①na*. In the analysis of

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<sup>22</sup> The word *Paramattha* is of great significance in *Abhidhamma*. It is a compound formed of a *parama* and *attha*. *Parma* is explained as immutable (*aviparita*), abstract (*nibbattita*); and *attha* means ‘thing’. Therefore, *Paramattha* means immutable or abstract thing. Abstract reality may be suggested as the closest equivalent. Although the term immutable is used here it should not be understood that all *Paramatthas* are eternal or permanent. Buddhism resolves the whole phenomenal universe, outside which nothing exists, into pure psychic process (*dhamma*); it is but natural that it should categorically reject the existence of a ①man, a transcendental subject outside consciousness. *Abhidhammattha Sangaha*, p.7

*r@pa*, it is found to comprise the principles of matter and energy. *Citta* is consciousness, and *cetasikas* are mental factors or mental concomitants. As *citta* and *cetasikas* can pick up the senses and are aware of the senses, they are collectively known as *n@ma* (mind). A person is made up of *r@pa*, *citta* and *cetasikas*, or in other words just *r@pa* and *n@ma* (matter and mind). These are the ultimate realities whereas the person is just an apparent reality.<sup>23</sup> So when one use 'I', it indicates our activity

### III

The general trend of Ryle's book is undoubtedly be stigmatized as 'behaviorist'. The psychology and their theories should be based upon repeatable and publicly checkable observation and experiments. But the reputed deliverances of consciousness and introspection are not publicly checkable. So this book is very near to philosophy, Ryle himself says that "In the course of this book I have said very little about the science of psychology. This omission will have appeared particularly perverse, since the entire book could properly be described as an essay, not indeed in scientific but in philosophical psychology."<sup>24</sup> Again Buddhism as religion or as science in the importance attached to philosophy and metaphysical inquiry. As such it is often regarded as the most advanced of the philosophic systems of India. It is, however so fundamentally opposed in so many important particulars that it would be more proper to regard it as a distinct body, which alone can satisfy the scientific mind. Ethics, science, psychology and philosophy are delicately interwoven and intermingled into this system, which is godless and soulless, and which attempts to unravel the many philosophical problem.

Buddha was not ready to accept his cotemporary religious view. At that time all religious views which uphold to an eternal, self-subsisting spiritual entity were termed as *s@svata@v@da* or *@tmav@da*. However there was a vibrant materialist tradition which arose in direct opposition to the religious view of an eternal soul. The

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<sup>23</sup> *Kath @-vatthu*, I:2

<sup>24</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 305

materialist tradition rejected the belief in an eternal soul/self and subscribed to the view that soul/self was identical with body. According to this view, the self/soul gets annihilated at death without any prospect of after-death survival. This view is termed as *ucchedav Dda* in Buddhist literature. Thus, it was against this intellectual polarization of *s Dsvatav Dda* and *ucchedav Dda*, Buddha set into his newly discovered path to deliverance. This newly enunciated path was called the *majjhim D patipad D* (via media), because it is said to avoid the two extremes of *s Dsvatav Dda* and *ucchedav Dda* (eternalism and annihilationism), the metaphysical and the physical views on the soul/self.<sup>25</sup> So Buddha does not talk about the eternal soul. In the same way Ryle has rejected the dualism in his book '*The Concept of Mind*'. He says that it is assumed that there are two different kinds of existence or status. So it is supposed, some existing is physical and other, existing is mental existing which is eternal or exist after death. So both philosophers are not ready to accept the existence of eternal soul. But Buddha rejection of eternal soul does not terminate the *karma* theory which is one step ahead than Ryle's philosophy.

According to Ryle Descartes has committed special kind of mistake, which is category mistake. 'It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another'<sup>26</sup>. It is assumed that there are two different kinds of existence or status. What exists or happens may have the status of physical existence, or it may have the status of mental existence. Somewhat as the faces of coins are either heads or tails, or somewhat as loving creatures are either male or female, so it is supposed, some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing. Ryle presents the dualism as the dogma of the *Ghost in the Machine* because in dualism, one is material and the latter immaterial. For example 'A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific department and administrative office. He then asks but where is the university?'<sup>27</sup> It has then to be explained to him that university is just way in which all that he has

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<sup>25</sup> Gyan prakash, "Doctrine of Non-Soul in Buddhism", *Journal of Sacred Scriptures*, Vol. 2 (2008) p215-216

<sup>26</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.17

<sup>27</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 18

already seen is organized. Likewise, we can not figure out the mind like sense organ or matter because mind is just way to express all the activity of body. Mind represents the entire function of the body. Similarly in early Buddhism the word '*Nāma*' has been used in same meaning. One should not understand *Nāma* or *viññāna* as a 'formless' like soul and it is enter in the body. Buddha refused to accept formless and eternal self. Buddha's explanation is the abolition of ambiguity. It is not to shift the soul to the mind. However, Buddha does not reject the existence of soul. He maintains the middle path with silence.<sup>28</sup> So in early Buddhism *viññāna* represent the all activity of body.

The notion of 'I' is very important question for non-self theory because in *Upaniṣadic* tradition, the essence of a person is his self or soul, which enters the body at birth and quits it at death. The soul, it is said, forms the invisible, immaterial ego, which, knowing itself as 'I' remains the same amidst all that is changeable. It is the recipient of knowledge through the five gate-ways of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. It is the agent that is active in the movements of the various motor organs. It is the lord not only of the body but also of the mind. But when we say that there is no self then what am I? Some time the word 'I' represent our experience. For instance I am hungry; I am not feeling well etc. But this explanation is not acceptable and this enigma has continued to perplex theorist. 'Even Hume confesses that, when he has tried to sketch all the items of his experience, he has found nothing there to answer to the word 'I', and yet he is not satisfied that there does not remain something more and something important, without which his sketch fails to describe his experience'.<sup>29</sup> In early Buddhism 'I' stand for five *khandhā*. As I have explained that *Nāma* or mind<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> "Should anyone say that he does not wish to lead the holy life under the Blessed one, unless the Blessed one first tells him, whether the world is eternal or temporal, finite or infinite; whether the life principle is identical with the body, or something different; whether the perfect one continues after death, etc.-such an one would die, ere the perfect one could tell him all this." *Majjhima-Nikaya*: 63

<sup>29</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 178

<sup>30</sup> "*Citta*, *Ceta*, *Cittuppada*, *Nama*, *Mano*, *Vinnana* are all used as synonymous terms in Abhidhamma. Hence from the Abhidhamma standpoint no distinction is made between mind and consciousness. When the so-called being is divided into its two constituent parts, *Nama* (mind) is used. When it is divided into five aggregates (*Pancakkhandha*), *Viññāna* is used. The term *citta* is invariably employed while referring to different classes of consciousness. In isolated cases, in the ordinary sense of mind, both terms *citta* and *mano* are frequently used." Narada Maha Thera, *A Manual of Abhidhamma*, p.9

represents all activity of body. So when we use ‘I’ then it indicates our activity. In same way Ryle says that ‘when a person utters an ‘I’ sentence, his utterance of it may be part of a higher order performance, namely one, perhaps, of self-reporting, self-exhortation, or self-commiseration and this performance itself is not dealt with in the operation which it itself is’.<sup>31</sup>

Ryle has made clear distinction between sensation and observation. He presented that one very often uses the word sensation in meaning of observation. So through logical analysis he makes a clear distinction. For example “Football matches are just the sorts of things of which we do catch glimpses; and sensations are the sorts of things of which it would be absurd to say that any one caught glimpses.”<sup>32</sup> Early Buddhism is one step ahead. In early Buddhism sensation may be bodily as well mentally. Ryle has elucidated grief as a name of mood he refused to accept as sensation because we cannot locate it as he says “words like ‘distress’, ‘distaste’, ‘grief’ and ‘annoyance’ are names of moods. But ‘hurt’, ‘itch’, and ‘qualm’, when used literally, is not the names of moods. We locate hurts and itches where we locate the grit, or the straw, that we feel, or fancy we feel”.<sup>33</sup> But it comes in early Buddhism in sensation or *vedanā*. Because one feels it due to his past experience for example when one remembers his past experience related to bodily pain then he feels mentally pain and it is the kind of *vedanā*. However, sensation is fivefold according to analysis of its individual essence into (bodily) pleasure,<sup>34</sup> (bodily) pain,<sup>35</sup> (mental) joy,<sup>36</sup> (mental) grief<sup>37</sup> and equanimity.<sup>38</sup> According to early Buddhism there cannot be

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<sup>31</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.188

<sup>32</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.213

<sup>33</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.231

<sup>34</sup> “Pleasure is has the characteristic of expiring a desirable tangible datum. Its function is to intensify associated states. It is manifested as bodily enjoyment. Its proximate cause is the body faculty” *Visuddhimagga*, XIV:128

<sup>35</sup> “Pain has the characteristic of experiencing an undesirable tangible datum. Its function is to wither associated states.” *Visuddhimagga*, XIV:128

<sup>36</sup> “Joy has the characteristic of experiencing a desirable object. Its function is to exploit in one way or the other aspect. It is manifested as mental affliction” *Visuddhimagga*, XIV:128

<sup>37</sup> “Grief has characteristic of experiencing an undesirable object. Its function is to exploit in one way or another undesirable aspect. It is manifested as mental affliction.” *Visuddhimagga*, XIV:128

<sup>38</sup> “Equanimity has the characteristic of being felt as neutral. Its function is not to intensify or wither associated states much. Its proximate cause is consciousness without happiness” *Visuddhimagga*, XIV:128

any unsensed pain or pleasure. It means one can not say that he was not aware of particular sensation. This is similar to Ryle's concept of sensation.

In early Buddhism the word '*Nāma*' has been used in same meaning. One should not understand *Nāma* or *viññāna* as a 'formless' like soul and it is entered in the body. Buddha refused to accept formless and eternal self. Buddha's explanation is the abolition of ambiguity. It is not to shift the soul to the mind. However, Buddha does not reject the existence of soul. He maintains the middle path with silence. So in early Buddhism *viññāna* or mind represent the all activity of body. In early Buddhism mind has made by elements and that is not eternal. It changes every moment. Let us draw attention here that if we use word 'change' in Buddhist context then it does not mean that one thing is replaced by another thing. According to Buddhism the word 'change' means, the thing remains the same, but its condition or quality changes. So in Buddhist context movement is like a row of lamps sending flashes the one after the other and thus producing the illusion of a moving light. Motion consists of a series of immobilities. The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved, but in reality other flames have appeared in other contiguous places. Thus the Buddhist by purely speculative methods came to envisage motion in a way which bears some analogy with modern analytical tradition.

*Viññāna* has been explained in many ways but it is much more a pregnant concept with a deep philosophical significance. In early Buddhism *Viññāna* or mind is neither a sense organ nor like a 'lord of the town'. One should not take it different from matter. So there is some level of vagueness in early Buddhism specially related to terms because many words use in same meaning. It becomes very confusing when one understands word 'mind' and 'self' in same meaning. Buddha does not vouch eternal entity. But it does not mean that he replaces the self by word mind. Here one point should be noted that both of the philosophers have reacted on same problem that is dualism.

However, we have raised the cardinal point in this paper that, mind is not like self in early Buddhism because word *N@ma* or mind represent last four *khandh @* and by last four *khandh @* Buddha has elucidate entire function of body. Similarly, Ryle has denied the existence of eternal entity that lives as a ghost in the body and elucidated philosophical problem related to the self. Ryle has mainly examined the contemporary concept of dualism through the logical analysis. So the method of early Buddhism and Ryle is not same but philosophical conclusion is same. But Buddhist philosophy is one step ahead then Ryle's philosophy. That is why when we read the Ryle's philosophy of mind a series of question arises in our mind and that kind of question is unanswerable in Ryle's point of view but Buddha has successfully answered the those question.

Conclusively, one might beg to differ from the Rylean repudiation of dualism purely by logical analysis, as the early Buddhist denial of dualism is different from that of Ryle's. But the conception of mind in both early Buddhist philosophy and Ryle, do share some common traits. For early Buddhism *n @ma* and *r @pa* constitutes the complete personality (or person), and self is nothing but a bundle of *khandh @* or aggregates. The conception of mind in early Buddhist philosophy is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*. In the early Buddhist thought, mind is not different from five aggregates which are *dhamm @*. Similarly, Rylean notion of mind also shows that the substance of mind is not different form substance of body. The Buddha and Ryle did not commit themselves to the existence of metaphysical self (soul), but explained everything in terms of the mind mechanism.