Tulane Studies in Political Science
VOLUME X

Mass Demonstrations against Foreign Regimes

A STUDY OF FIVE CRISES

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NEW ORLEANS
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THE HAGUE
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

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



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PREFACE

Foreign regimes are not always able to stave off expressions of mass discontent directed against them. Under the right combination of circumstances, demonstrations of varying intensity can take place. Although it is unlikely that regimes will be brought to fall by such actions, their effect can be far-reaching. Once a mass demonstration has taken place, a regime's hold on the population will never be the same again. This is particularly true if the regime has totalitarian aspects. Totalitarianism is imperfectly totalitarian where the masses cannot be prevented from communicating their discontent to each other and the world at large by conspicuous actions.

The present study analyzes five mass demonstrations against foreign regimes. Three of these demonstrations took place in the time of the German occupation of the Netherlands during World War II; one, in 1956, was directed against the "Muscovites'" rule in Hungary and one, in 1964, against the "Zonians'" presence in Panama. The Dutch episodes consisted of strike actions, each taking place under different sets of circumstances. The so-called February Strike of 1941 in Amsterdam was primarily in protest against the first anti-semitic outbursts. The strikes of April-May 1943 developed in many parts of the Netherlands to express dissatisfaction with German forced labor drafts, at a time that German victory began to appear doubtful. The railroad strike of 1944–45 was originally intended as a tactical measure to support the Allied airborne landings near Arnhem, but soon developed into a grandiose national act of defiance against the occupier by the largest Dutch enterprise. The Hungarian uprising, of course, took place in a somewhat different time span and under considerably different conditions of regime and population. Nevertheless, this unique event – which "illuminated the immense landscape of post-war totalitarianism for twelve long days [and] ... contained more history than the twelve years since the Red Army had 'liberated' the country"[1]

[1] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 480.

– contributes valuable parallels to the Dutch strikes and permits additional insights into the phenomena under study. The Panamanian demonstrations of January 1964 featured some of the patterns of the Dutch and Hungarian events. There existed an imposing array of Panamanian grievances against the United States, many of such a nature that the United States could not readily correct them. More immediately preceding the outburst came errors on the part of the foreign power in terms of policy, communications, and insufficient control over lower functionaries and their dependents.

The demonstrations are covered "functionally" in this study. They are chopped up and discussed in terms of sub-categories which are established for purposes of the present analysis: underlying factors, immediate factors, leadership groups, the outbreak of the demonstrations, the spreading of the demonstrations, and the regime's reaction and repression. Each sub-category is presented with respect to its effect on the five demonstrations under consideration. Admittedly, this arrangement has artificial aspects since the six sub-categories obviously do not divide the material into neat sectors. Particularly the distinction between the first two factors may seem doubtful not only in view of the greatly varying time spans presented as constituting the underlying "tinder" or the more immediate "sparks"; because of the immense complexity of all cause and effect relationships, the duality of underlying and immediate factors may be simplistic. Moreover, chopping-up the demonstrations will hardly facilitate the task of the reader who in any case is not likely to be familiar with the sequence of events of the Dutch strikes. Nevertheless, the "functional" coverage seemed preferable for the achievement of at least a minimum of comparative insights. Furthermore, each chapter features introductions and summaries to help recall the thread of each of the demonstrations.

I like to express my gratitude to my colleague, Professor David R. Deener of Tulane University, for his valuable comments and advice in connection with this study. I would also like to take this opportunity to point to the admirable work of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, in Amsterdam, whose numerous excellent monographs provided the material for a considerable part of this study.[2]

[2] Translations from Dutch and German into English are my own.

CONTENTS

MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN REGIMES

CHAPTER I

UNDERLYING FACTORS

The five demonstrations took place against various types of foreign regimes. The German rulers of the Netherlands were civilians, as it happened mostly of Austrian extraction, headed by A. Seyss-Inquart, reportedly a fairly intelligent administrator. However, all the internal power struggles of the Nazi elites were reflected, often exaggeratedly, in the occupation capitals and as a result efficiency suffered. The German rule in the Netherlands was never imaginative, often sloppy and psychologically inept. Because of the unpopularity and utter lack of respectability of the Dutch Nazis, these Quislings were often a burden to occupation officials. Above all, the unbelievably cruel policy of segregation and extermination of the Jews doomed all German attempts at tolerable public relations with the Dutch population.[1] In Budapest, the regime under M. Rákosi was Hungarian in name only. The ruling clique, known as the "Muscovites," had spent long years in Russian exile and had been put into office by the Russians against the wishes of the bulk of the population. By 1956, the "Muscovites" had become unpopular even among their own Hungarian Communist comrades and were probably inconvenient to the Russians for affecting the prestige of the Soviet troops in Hungary and the Soviet Union as a whole. To numerous Panamanians, the Canal Zone has always been a segregationist-minded Gringo colony, bisecting the revered national soil and established in 1903 under doubtful conditions and confusing arrangements pertaining to sovereignty. Explosions were likely regardless of the skill of United States administrators; in 1964, these skills were evidently at a low level, while on the Panamanian side emotions were stirred by various events, internal and external.

In the following discussion of underlying factors, those background conditions are emphasized which provide an explanation for the possibility of the bursting-out of demon-

[1] The unfathomable drama of the Jews in the Netherlands has been recounted by J. Presser, *Ondergang* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, 2 vols.).

strations at a later time. In early 1941, rioting against Dutch Nazis broke loose in Amsterdam streets, followed by a general work stoppage; in spring of 1943, a wave of strikes hit widespread sectors of the Dutch economy at a most critical moment for the German war effort; in September 1944, the largest Dutch enterprise, the railroads, began a strike which was to outlast the war in spite of the ensuing near-starvation of the population of Holland's major urban centers. It will be maintained that three inherent features of the German occupation were, respectively, responsible: the apparent inevitability of anti-semitic acts, the difficulties in securing Dutch manpower for the German war economy, and the dilemmas resulting from cooperation with a foreign invader. In Hungary, a major uprising against a quasi-foreign regime can only be understood in terms of certain internal and external factors undermining that regime's authority. Similarly, the relatively minor Panamanian challenge of a quasi-colonial regime necessitates analysis of the nature of the United States presence in the Canal Zone.

February 1941; Conquering the Streets of Amsterdam

During the winter of 1940–41 the Germans were still to some extent in the "honeymoon" period of the occupation. This period was characterized by their apparent inclination to leave Holland to the Dutch except for strictly military requirements, which at this time seemed hardly imposing. This "soft" policy was repugnant to various factions of Dutch Nazis, who had anticipations of political power as their ideological brethren from the East took over in the Netherlands. The most obvious symbol of National Socialism was anti-semitism. The most Jewish of all Dutch cities was Amsterdam, unique in continental Western Europe because of the large Jewish proletariat which was concentrated in the "Jodenhoek" of this ancient metropolis. In traditionally tolerant Amsterdam Dutch Nazis made their first, crude attempts to acquire power, employing Hitler's own tactics of "conquering the streets" which had caused such havoc in the latter years of the Weimar Republic.

As early as June 1940, a few weeks after the Dutch capitulation, clashes between Dutch Nazis and the population had occurred in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Delft. On Prince Bernhard's birthday, June 29, German police had

to intervene to quell pro-Orange demonstrations, and these had also led to attacks on Dutch Nazis. During all of 1940, minor street riots took place frequently in Amsterdam and The Hague as the *Weer Afdeeling* (WA) – the Dutch Nazi equivalent of the German SA – began its policy of "conquering the streets." When WA-man Peter Ton was killed by Dutch police in the streets of The Hague, the Dutch Nazis acquired their first martyr. The "honeymooning" Germans were probably far from delighted when in November 1940 five thousand WA-men marched through the streets of Amsterdam to demonstrate to friend and foe that "a new wind was blowing from the East." [2]

It is not clear whether the street riots played into the hands of the more "ideologically" inclined Germans or whether the more realistically minded Germans were trying to mollify the Dutch Nazis, but in any case the first German measures against the Jews coincided with these riots and marches. During the summer of 1940, Jews were removed from civilian antiaircraft units, and ritual slaughter was prohibited. In late 1940, Jewish civil servants and Jewish elected officials were suspended from their functions. By January 1941, Jews were barred from motion picture theaters, and "Aryans" were no longer permitted as servants in Jewish households. The segregation process was beginning which was intended ultimately to eject the Jews from the Dutch community.[3]

The anti-semitic measures immediately became the target of protests – from the Netherlands Union,[4] from university students and professors, and particularly from the Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy. It was at this time, according to the German security chief, H. Rauter, that the Dutch churches began their all-out fight against the Dutch Nazis. In fact, from January 1941 on the Roman Catholic church refused all sacraments to members of the various Dutch Nazi organizations.[5]

Duly inspired by the official German decrees, the Dutch

[2] B. A. Sijes, *De Februari-Staking* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), pp. 4, 5, 12, 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 14, 17.

[4] The Netherlands Union was an organization set up at the beginning of the occupation. Its leaders, including prominent members from all the non-totalitarian parties, tried to present a united Dutch front and hoped to be able to get along with the more moderate German elements.

[5] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 16, 20, 201.

Nazi street campaigns soon began to feature attacks on Jewish homes and on cafés and restaurants where Jews were customers. For example, in mid-December 1940 WA-men entered a large popular restaurant in Amsterdam and attempted to force the Jewish customers from the premises. Only after considerable fighting and bloodshed did Amsterdam police succeed in restoring order. In this period Dutch Nazis also began to urge hotels and restaurants to post "Jews not welcome" signs, and sometimes official German support could be obtained for these utterly un-Dutch displays. Among other incidents were attemps to drag Jews from streetcars, and attacks on Amsterdam police who tried to protect Jews. Even more serious was the involvement of individual German soldiers in the riots. In one anti-semitic incident, according to an official German report, "hundreds" of German soldiers participated. German military police was frequently needed to assist Amsterdam police, and many of the latter were injured in the street fights.

There is considerable evidence that higher German officials, and even the Dutch Nazi leadership, were far from happy about the anti-Jewish riots at this period of the occupation. On the other hand, some lower German officials in Amsterdam undoubtedly encouraged the WA-men, and the occupier accompanied the riots with the first series of anti-Jewish decrees. In any case, the rank and file of Dutch Nazis remained frustrated since the pre-war Dutch civil service and other officialdom were generally kept in office by the Germans, who had little faith in the administrative qualities of their Dutch comrades.[6]

Major trouble was obviously ahead as the population of Amsterdam's old Jewish quarter, aided by non-Jews from neighboring districts, organized self-defense units against the WA inroads. Street battles began in the Jewish quarter and on several occasions the Dutch Nazi invaders were defeated. On February 11, 1941, an entire WA detachment was forced to flee, several of its members were thrown into canals, and one – WA-man Koot – died after a severe beating administered by the Jewish defenders of the neighborhood.[7] From the

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 53–58, 61–66, 70–74, 202.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–86, 219. "Rauter reported to Himmler that a Jew had bitten through Koot's jugular vein and sucked out his blood, an obvious allusion to ritual murder." (W. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940–1945* [Stanford University Press, 1963], p. 107.)

perspective of the German security chief in the Netherlands, H. Rauter, "the behavior of the Jews" was the ultimate cause of the February Strike which was to follow soon. "As Jews to involve themselves with the WA in such street battles was certainly crazy." [8] Or, put somewhat more honestly, the underlying factor in the February Strike was the doctrine of anti-semitism which the occupier could not help but carry in his baggage, even though at that particular moment he would probably have been quite eager to hide it from his Dutch friends, the WA rabble.

April–May 1943; Procuring Slave Labor after Stalingrad

An analysis of underlying factors in the second large strike, occurring in late April and early May of 1943, reveals stringencies related to the total war effort which Germany was forced to adopt in that period. As a result of the defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa, labor was looming as one of the crucial bottlenecks of the tottering German war machine. Occupation authorities everywhere were ordered to "comb out" their domains by whatever means available. For example, large-scale "razzias" (round-ups) took place in the Netherlands in February 1943, during which able-bodied men were grabbed in the streets, in sports arenas, and in other public places, and shipped to German labor camps. The men often were not even permitted to contact their families before their departure. As of March 1, 1943, all hirings and dismissals in private industry were controlled by the Government employment offices. After March 11, 1943, all Dutch university students were supposed to undergo at least one year of labor service in Germany.

Particularly the "razzias" and the student labor service affected Dutch families which until that period had managed to escape most of the consequences of war. As the Germans appeared determined to enforce their new policies, increasing tension spread through the country. According to a widely distributed underground newspaper – *Het Parool*, of April 5, 1943 – the atmosphere all over the Netherlands was beginning to resemble Amsterdam of February 1941. One slip on the part of the occupier, one clumsy action or decree which would hit a great number of Dutchmen simultaneously, might be the

[8] "*Als Judentum sich mit der WA in solche Straßenschlachten einzulassen war gewiß unsinnig.*" (*Het Proces Rauter* [The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1952], p. 499.)

cause of a nation-wide protest strike. However, *Het Parool* cautioned, the Germans were quite aware of the danger and would be clever enough to avoid the kind of action which would spark Dutch tempers in the direction of a unified resistance demonstration. *Het Parool's* estimate of public opinion turned out to be quite accurate, only the Germans were not sufficiently aware of the explosiveness in the air.[9]

The Germans' dilemma was considerable. While the war was going well for them, occupation decrees had been enforced with a certain amount of flexibility and even laxity. Curfew hours were not always respected by Dutch civilians. The medical association had been amazingly successful in resisting German nazification decrees. Only 20 per cent of students had registered for the labor draft and to catch the remaining 80 per cent was beyond the capacity of the German police. Even non-cooperative students – the so-called "non-signers" of a loyalty statement to the occupier – had been left alone as a whole. By early 1943, many German circles were complaining about the ineffectual "softness" which presumably characterized occupation policies and called for appropriately stern measures without pity for the population.[10] Of course, the "soft" policies had by no means lessened the unpopularity of the occupier. In 1943, after Stalingrad and El Alamein, control of the Dutch population would be even more difficult as a German defeat in the war for the first time seemed possible. Yet, at this very moment of revealed weakness on the battlefields, the Germans had to attempt to tighten their hold in the occupied regions, demanding services which in more favorable, victorious periods would have been hard enough to obtain. Thus, the desperate need for labor made drastic measures necessary; the very occasion which demanded the labor –

[9] P. J. Bouman, *De April–Mei-Stakingen van 1943* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 13–14. It should be noted that Professor Bouman's book includes a contribution by B. A. Sijes – the section on the origin of the strike in the Twente region (pp. 191–296).

[10] According to a German official in the province of Groningen, one of the main causes of the 1943 strike was the laxity of occupation authorities; the population had never discovered the point beyond which it would not dare to go in its disregard of decrees. Often, mere reprimands were the only German answer to violations. (*Ibid.*, p. 393.) A Dutch Nazi district leader in Noord-Brabant province thought that the "soft" attitude towards the physicians' resistance had given the population the idea that mass actions could have favorable results. (*Ibid.*, p. 373.) Note other German and Dutch Nazi complaints with respect to "softness," *ibid.*, pp. 361–362, 384, 427.

military defeat – made proper enforcement of these measures more unlikely than ever.

When the "get tough" measures of April–May 1943 – consisting mainly of the call-up of the former members of the Dutch army – were finally announced, it surprised no one, least of all many Germans, that they were doomed to failure from the outset. Moreover, the Germans handled this call-up with incredible lack of skill. According to German surveys, 75 per cent of the former Dutch soldiers did not show up to register for the call-up, and the problem of catching the delinquents was considered hopeless from the beginning. The surveys noted a radical shift in Dutch morale as a result of the call-up; a point would soon be reached when even terror and "assembly line" executions would no longer suffice to keep the population in line.[11] The Dutch public immediately felt the weakness of the German position. Not only was the call-up disobeyed, but the situation produced nation-wide protest strikes on a level altogether unimaginable after the failure of the February 1941 strike outside Amsterdam. Underlying these strikes was the German dilemma of having to introduce unpopular measures affecting the entire population at a time when the image of Germany's invincible military prowess was for the first time seriously in decline.

The Railroad Strike; the Dilemma of "Loyal Cooperation"

The first protest strike arose when the Germans could not, or would not, contain violent anti-semitic outbursts provoked by some of their Dutch supporters. The second protest strike was related to the increasing German need for manpower as the German hold on the Dutch population was slipping away rapidly. The third mass protest, the railroad strike of 1944–45, was based on yet another set of underlying factors. "Loyal cooperation" was the slogan which characterized the Netherlands (State) Railroads' attitude during the first years of the occupation; they provided useful services for the Germans, in return for nearly complete Dutch control of the railroad system, the largest enterprise in the Netherlands.[12] This arrangement was not in accordance with the Regulations

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 427–430.

[12] In Belgium and France, on the other hand, the Germans had immediately taken over direct controls with respect to the railroads. (*Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940–1945* [The Hague, 1949–1956], 7c, p. 707.)

(*Aanwijzingen*) issued by the Dutch government in 1937 for the case of war and occupation. In these instructions, intended for all government agencies, the railroads were specifically ordered not to transport enemy troops, munitions, or military supplies – services actually rendered the Germans under the "loyal cooperation" policy.

Immediately after the Dutch capitulation the Dutch supreme commander had told the railroads to resume operations. On May 20, 1940, the board of directors of the railroads had announced that operations would be restored "in loyal cooperation with the German authorities." Perhaps the board of directors was not aware of the Regulations of 1937, which had not been circularized widely. In any case, nobody reminded railroad employees that, according to the Regulations, they were to go on strike if demands contrary to the Regulations were made by the occupier.[13] The first such demand was approved by the board of directors in May 1940, when Dutch trains, with Dutch engineers, were dispatched to carry German ammunition deep into Belgium. A year later the Netherlands Railroads agreed to repair German locomotives in Dutch repair shops, and Dutch locomotives and personnel were put into service on German lines near the Dutch border, as far as fifty miles inside Germany.[14] After a while, "loyal cooperation" meant that the Netherlands Railroads were not only transporting German troops, artillery, and tanks, as well as Dutch slave laborers and political prisoners, but were even sending Jewish deportees to their cruel destiny.[15] Finally, Dutch trains

[13] A. J. C. Rüter, *Rijden en staken* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 19–20.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 33, 36.

[15] After the war, a parliamentary inquiry commission was struck by the "laconic" manner in which the railroad personnel had accepted the transports of Jews. Dr. Willem Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, replied that the city of Amsterdam had also been criticized for providing streetcars to transport Jewish deportees, but that Jewish officials had actually requested the city to provide this service. Another railroad official suggested that the board of directors would have been dismissed if the Jewish transports had been refused. (*Enquête-commissie*, 7a, pp. 390, 707; 7c. p. 684.) It is doubtful whether the Germans would have dared to present the public spectacle of hundred thousand Jews of all ages walking through the Netherlands to the East. Most likely, if the Dutch had refused, the Germans would have had to provide German-manned trains for these transports. This would have been the more honorable solution for the Netherlands Railroads, and – in retrospect – it seems most doubtful whether the Germans would have penalized them for it. Rüter also noted how "this most revolting transport of all" was virtually not opposed by railroad personnel at any level. (Rüter, *op. cit.*, p. 117.)

were used to carry out the systematic spoliation of the Netherlands.[16]

Of course, the "loyal cooperation" policy had certain advantages for the Dutch. For its very survival the country needed the railroads. If the railroads had stopped operations, the Germans would have sent German personnel, and perhaps trains, to serve their own needs, but they would hardly have been willing to provide for Dutch needs beyond the barest subsistence level. Moreover, Dutch railroad workers under "loyal cooperation" were exempted from labor draft in Germany, and Nazi propaganda and influence were barred successfully in Holland's largest enterprise. On the other hand, the Germans benefitted from an excellently operating transport system without having to involve scarce German labor or managerial personnel. It so happened that German policy vis-à-vis the Dutch railroads was, as a whole, efficiently handled. As a Dutch official put it, the few German supervisors and liaison officials "were, after all, railroad men with whom one could talk ...." Besides, one of the highest of the German railroad officials in Holland was anti-Nazi and even sabotaged certain German efforts; another highly placed German, the railroad *Referent*, was said to be deeply ashamed of Nazi behavior.[17]

"Loyal cooperation" continued as the battle lines remained far from the Netherlands. The Amsterdam strike of February 1941 did not spread to the railroads, except for a very brief work stoppage in railroad yards on the outskirts of Amsterdam – one of the few locales of Communist influence in the railroad unions.[18] The strikes of 1943 did involve a few more railroad employees. Some 900 office workers at the central office in Utrecht, 30 per cent of the office personnel there, walked out briefly, and so did some engineers and workshop workers. But, as a whole, the railroads continued to operate in April–May 1943, and this was perhaps the most important reason why that strike did not last longer and spread more completely.[19]

The railroad strike was, however, foreshadowed by one significant German blunder. Dutch Nazis and "ideologists" among the occupation hierarchy had been eagerly pushing

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 24–25, 46, 48–51.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118, 122.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 136–140.

efforts to take over the Dutch labor movement. Disregarding the warnings of German railroad officials, they also attempted nazification of the various railroad unions – Catholic, Protestant, socialist, and "neutral," in the typical Dutch stratification. The railroad unions acted through a joint top organ, the Personnel Council (*Personeelsraad*), in close and harmonious cooperation with the railroads' board of directors. Under the "loyal cooperation" policy, Nazi influence had been generally kept out of this top organ, while other segments of Dutch labor had to accept unpleasant compromises. Although the Dutch Nazis and their German allies tried hard, and almost broke up the railroad unions, the effort failed in the end. Transport needs were more real than the ideological needs of Nazi "labor front" doctrines, and the German railroad officials ultimately helped to prevent nazification of railroad labor and to keep at bay the "*Scheißarbeitsfront*," as they called it untranslatably. For once, the board of directors went as far as to threaten resignation to protect their union counterpart, the Personnel Council.[20]

After this scare, other factors contributed to effectuate a radical change in railroad policy. As the Allied invasion of Western Europe was finally approaching, and after the strikes of 1941 and 1943 had shown the possibilities of mass action, the Dutch public was becoming more and more critical of "loyal cooperation." Partly, perhaps, to avoid identification with the side of treachery and cowardice, the board of directors began to consider plans for a large-scale action, a general railroad strike, which would put the railroads undisputedly on the right side of the occupation. The board always assumed that such a strike could be staged only once, and therefore would have to take place at a moment most inopportune to the Germans.[21] Gradually, but soon more and more intensively, the board of directors and the Personnel Council prepared for the big day, under the safe screen of all-Dutch control, the price obtained for "loyal cooperation." As soon as the Allies would reach Dutch soil, the Germans would be most desperately in need of the Dutch railroads. At this very moment a total railroad strike would be called to hamstring the German effort. "Loyal cooperation" would finally cease, but the strike would be the more successful because the signals would be called by an

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–81, 84–85, 98–104, 111.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 115–116, 138–142.

organization which had remained efficient, loyally Dutch, and anti-Nazi.

In the end, German railroad policies, farsighted as they appeared, were also doomed to failure. The longer "loyal cooperation" lasted, the more it became intolerable to the Dutch. The railroad strike was successful beyond expectation because the dishonorable period of "loyal cooperation" increased eagerness to rebel and preserved effective leadership and facilities.

The Hungarian Uprising; the "Muscovites" and the Challenge of Anti-Stalinism

The Hungarians too were living under foreign occupation in 1956. The Hungarian Communist Party's regime was Hungarian in name only; in fact, it was the agent of the Soviet Union. This had been reflected in the elections which were held, for the first and last time after World War II, in 1945. At a moment of unprecedented prestige for the Soviet Union, the Communists managed to obtain only 70 seats in the Hungarian parliament against 245 seats of the Independent Smallholders and 94 seats of three smaller parties. Communist strength amounted to a mere 17 per cent of the total seats.[22] Moreover, this minority was ridden by internal dissensions.

Hungarian Communism in the interwar period had been haunted by the memory of the Béla Kún episode, "a memory hateful to the peasantry and the middle strata and far from endearing even to the industrial workers." After the debacle of 1919, the Hungarian Communist Party was "a head without a body," whose few surviving leaders attempted in vain to reorganize from their Soviet exile.[23] When the end of World War II found the Red Army in complete occupation of the exhausted and dispirited country, three groups of Hungarian Communists competed for the new places in the sun. The so-called "Muscovites," the exiles who had lingered in Russia for a generation, were in control, under Mátyás Rákosi. Their bitter rivals were the resistance-hero Communists, the underground leaders who had acquired popular prestige in the period of German predominance. A third group was particu-

[22] General Assembly, United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (1957), p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as United Nations Report.)

[23] P. Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 11.

larly trusted by the Russians, selected by them from the ranks of their many Hungarian prisoners of war and indoctrinated in special training courses during Russian captivity. Since there were many jobs to be filled in 1945, all three groups were to some extent satisfied.[24]

Yet, inevitably, the impact of the later years of the Stalin era was felt in Hungary. In a succession of massive purges, with the number of victims estimated by some as high as 200,000, "virtually the entire indigenous [i.e., non-'Muscovite'] element in the Party was liquidiated." The popular leader and potential "Tito," László Rajk, was executed in 1946. After these great purges Rákosi could enforce a policy of total subservience to Russia, with the assistance of a coterie of "Muscovites" who were further handicapped by being considered "ethnically" alien by many Hungarians.[25] This enforced unity in the Communist camp was drastically disturbed by the "anti-purge purges" of the post-Stalin years. Overnight the surviving purge victims returned from prisons, forced residences, and concentration camps to reenter the inner circles of the Party. Clashes became inevitable, and Rákosi's authority was weakened to a most serious extent. One exceptionally popular purge victim, Imre Nagy, had "miraculously" survived the Stalinese elimination of all who were not "a mere agent," and his return in particular made the inner Party split critical. Thus, the purges and the subsequent return of the purge victims were underlying factors in the uprising, upsetting the unity of a regime which, even if it had preserved unity, would have been regarded as an alien instrument on Hungarian soil.[26]

The division within the top leadership had a demoralizing effect on an important group in its entourage, the writers and other intellectuals. A discussion club, the Petöfi Circle, had been established as a branch of the Communist Youth League. An "unprecedented phenomenon" occurred when this subordinate Party organ emancipated itself from the top leadership's control and began to defy it in public.[27] The Communist intellectuals, by attacking the regime, "hoped to gain a point

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19, 29. Rákosi and his chief lieutenants – Ernö Gerö, József Révai, Mihály Farkas – were of Jewish origin.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 31. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–494.

[27] Kecskement, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

of contact with the masses." [28] Thus, that nightmare of the totalitarian state, the splitting-up of the elite, had come about in Hungary, and to make the situation even more serious, contacts with the supposedly voiceless masses were being sought by part of the elite. After several writers of the Petöfi Circle had vehemently criticized the top leaders before a large crowd in June 1956, opposition came forth everywhere in Party circles. "An obscure functionary" at another meeting in Budapest had even called for Rákosi's resignation, and as a result he became a minor celebrity overnight. As the regime, to everyone's surprise and delight, no longer dared to employ its instruments of terror against these kinds of defiance, the intra-Party opposition continued on the offensive. "Within a few months, the whole authority structure of the Party was corroded." [29]

The discontents within the elite made their contacts with the masses and discovered to their own – and the masses' – surprise the depth of the hatred uniting them. As Kecskemeti observes, "perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the Hungarian revolution was the rapidity with wich a national consensus crystallized after the outbreak." [30] The existing mass discontent could make itself felt because the elite had become divided; at the same time, elite divisions would not have upset the regime "if the masses had not entered upon the scene." In this sense, the "elite process" and the "mass process," as Kecskemeti calls them, were both essential underlying factors in the uprising. In the face of the dual challenge of intra-elite divisions and mass discontent with "foreign" rule, the regime was ill-prepared to withstand the onslaught of that "fantastic *coup de théâtre*" which presented itself during the hectic days of October 1956.[31]

The Panamanian Riots; the Zonians' Colonial System

The underlying factors in the friction between the United States and Panama related to a "deepest grievance": that a "foreign colony," the Canal Zone, had been established in the heart of the Republic of Panama. Many of the traditional characteristics of colonials were displayed by the so-called

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–75. The Polish Communist writers also played a decisive role in bringing liberalization ideas before the public and discrediting the "Stalinist Old Guard." (*Ibid.*, p. 143.)

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2, 70.

Zonians, who did not care to participate in Panamanian life and did not allow Panamanians to penetrate their "closed pattern of inward turned living." Until 1946 this colonial system of the Zone had included segregated drinking fountains, toilets, and even post-office windows.[32] In the words of some United States Army dependents, evacuated after the riots, many long-time Zonians behaved "like colonials," never learned Spanish, and treated Panamanians "like scum." [33] According to American residents of the Republic of Panama, who in general were reported to have sympathized with the Panamanians during the riots, the Zonians "have created a community that is both ostentatiously offensive to Panamanians and at the same time dangerously indifferent to their feelings." [34]

The report of the International Commission of Jurists points emphatically to the two separate communities who live in Panama. On the one hand the Panamanians in the Republic, on the other hand the 16,000 American citizens employed in the Canal Zone by the Canal Zone administration and the Canal Company, further augmented by some 20,000 United States military forces and their dependents. The International Jurists noted the divergency in the way of life, in the economy, and in the outlook of the two groups living in close proximity and yet "virtual isolation" from each other.

It is unfortunate that the United States citizens who have lived all their lives in the Canal Zone, and, perhaps more particularly, the second and third generation United States citizens who were born and raised in the Canal Zone, have developed a particular state of mind not conducive to the promotion of happier relations between them and the people of Panama. Indeed, on the contrary, this particular state of mind has resulted in building up resentment over the decades which has found expression in the type of unbalanced attitudes on both sides such as on the subject of flying their respective flags, as was demonstrated during the unfortunate days covered by this report, and also for some considerable time previously. The passage of time, instead of assuaging these conflicting tendencies, appears to have aggravated them.[35]

[32] *New York Times*, January 18, 1964.

[33] *Ibid.*, February 1, 1964.

[34] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1964.

[35] International Commission of Jurists, *Report on the Events in Panama* (Geneva, 1964), p. 42. (Hereafter cited as *International Jurists*.) The International Commission of Jurists was requested by the National Bar Association of Panama to investigate a number of complaints of infringements of Articles 3, 5, and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United States during the Panamanian riots of January 9 – January 12, 1964. The Commission dispatched an investigating committee of three legal experts: Professor A. D. Belinfante of

In fact, the International Jurists' chief conclusion consisted of advice to the United States to abolish the Zonians' system of isolation from the Panamanians.

We cannot help feeling that the United States, having regard to the special situation it occupies in the world, and with its resources and ideals, should reflect upon these sad facts and take effective steps to make possible a reorientation and change in the outlook and thinking of the people living in the Canal Zone. Undoubtedly this is a difficult and uphill task but it would yield rich dividends in healthier relations with the people of Panama.[36]

In addition to the charges of Zonian colonialism, the underlying factors of grievance on the part of the Panamanians related to aspects of the treaty of 1903 between the United States and the then newly established Republic of Panama. Panamanians have traditionally insisted that the Republic was "shotgunned" into this treaty after the United States had backed and protected the anti-Columbian coup. United States blackmail, supposedly, made Panama accept illegal restrictions on its sovereignty and an "abnormally" low share of the Canal's earnings.[37]

According to Article 2 of the treaty of 1903,

the Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed .... [38]

Article 3 contains the crucial provisions which later produced the disputes on the nature of United States "sovereignty" in the Zone.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in the said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.[39]

Amsterdam University, Judge Gustaf Petrén of Sweden, and Mr. Navroz Vakil, a Bombay attorney. This committee spent fourteen days in Panama, from March 1–March 14, 1964. Its findings, as presented in the above cited report, were adopted unanimously.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Cf., for example, *New York Times*, January 18, 1964.

[38] *International Jurists*, p. 10.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

Panamanians have tended to insist that United States jurisdiction over the 650 square miles of the Zone be interpreted in a strictly functional sense. It was argued that the clauses in the 1903 treaty should be limited by requiring purposes relating to the operation and maintenance of the Canal. For example, as early as 1904 the Panamanian government claimed the right to control ports in the Zone and attempted to deny the right of the United States to establish customs offices and a postal service there. The United States government, on the other hand, maintained – successfully – that its jurisdiction was as exclusive as the Republic of Panama's jurisdiction was totally non-existent in the Zone.[40]

Different underlying factors are revealed in each of the demonstrations under investigation. Although the "honeymooning" Germans aspired to be concialiatory in the winter of 1940–41, rowdy anti-semitism and street-conquering tactics on the part of "ideologists" and their Dutch sympathizers provoked the citizens of Amsterdam to violent counteractions. However thoroughly the German army had done its job for the purposes of the German war effort, the streets had to be conquered again. In 1943 and 1944, the workers in general and the railroad people in particular, who had not come to consider themselves partners of a victorious Germany in spite of full employment, good wages, and special treatment, were hardly likely to follow a Germany in defeat. Therefore, the Germans were bound to fumble with a more inclusive labor draft, and would not be able to convince the railroad men that "loyal cooperation" was ultimately not treasonable. In Hungary, an "alien" regime could not contain its intellectual entourage nor the masses as it was forced to absorb the severe internal strains of Stalin's purge and Khrushchev's anti-purge. The Panamanian situation was made difficult by the Zonians' Little America placed in the middle of a highly nationalistic Latin American republic; this difficulty was further aggravated by the uncertainties, legal and ideological, flowing from the various interpretations of the content and status of the treaty of 1903.

The underlying factors, then, produced explosive situations which overtaxed the intelligence and imagination of Germans, "Muscovites," and Zonians as more immediate and, in a sense, accidental factors provided the necessary spark.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

CHAPTER II

IMMEDIATE FACTORS

Different kinds of sparks affected the crises whose underlying influences have just been discussed. The riotous Amsterdam atmosphere of early 1941 reached a climax as violent clashes between Dutch Nazis and aroused citizens – and even between German police and Jews – led to the indiscriminate arrests of hundreds of Jewish "hostages" in the streets of the city. The ruthless manner of these arrests so excited Amsterdam tempers that the most efficient underground organization of the period, the Communist Party, saw a "natural" opportunity to promote large-scale demonstrations and a general strike. The situation was quite different in April–May 1943, when the post-Stalingrad requirements for manpower led the Germans to consider steps toward the total mobilization of the resources under their control. It so happened that in the Netherlands these steps were undertaken with such an amazing array of blunders that but relatively few Dutchmen were caught and the population was shocked into a series of spontaneous strikes which developed simultaneously in many sections of the country. As to the railroad strike of September 1944, the arrival of the Allied armies on Dutch soil provided the final impetus to Dutch railroad men, who during many months had become more and more impatient with the policy of cooperation with the occupier. The Hungarian uprising was sparked by an external factor, the filtering-through of news about sensational Polish moves toward liberalization, and a related internal factor, the eruption of demonstrations on the streets of Budapest. In the Canal Zone, concessions to the Panamanian point of view on the touchy subject of display of the United States flag, as imposed by Washington, were defied by angry Zonians. These acts of defiance led to painful incidents and provoked Panamanian nationalists to violent actions.

February 1941; the Illegal CPN and the Arrest of the Jewish "Hostages"

The atmosphere of the February 1941 strike was decisively affected by the Amsterdam Communists. The Communist Party Netherlands (CPN) had been under close Soviet control since 1919. A Popular Front policy was followed during the Thirties, and after the Nazi-Soviet pact a "neutralist" line came to the fore. The war was described as an imperialist struggle for world domination between the ruling classes of England, France, and Germany. According to a November 1939 statement by a CPN leader, the Anglo-French were the chief warmongers, and the workers should least of all prefer an Allied victory. After the German occupation began, the Communist press blamed the Dutch government for the invasion and called for friendship with Germany.[1] Nevertheless, the Germans almost immediately banned the Communist papers, and on July 20, 1940, the CPN itself was prohibited.[2] The CPN had always found its main voting strength in Amsterdam, where in the June 1939 elections it had obtained 55,755 votes, constituting 13.8 per cent of the total votec ast in Holland's largest city. In some Amsterdam districts the party was actually larger than its chief rival, the Social Democrats – but not in the neighborhoods of the Jewish proletariat, which had always preferred the Social Democrats.[3]

When the CPN was banned, it immediately moved into carefully prepared underground positions. Previously prominent leaders remained visible as "fronts," but most leadership posts were given to relatively unknown Communists. An exemplary underground set-up was organized, with intricate security precautions. By February 1941, the CPN had become the strongest resistance group in Amsterdam, and its newspaper, *De Waarheid*, then already had an underground circulation of 7000.[4] It is characteristic of the period before

[1] According to *Het Volksdagblad* of June 26, 1940, the Dutch government had been responsible for the five days of "butchery for capitalistic interests." The new English alliance was as deceitful as the previous policy of neutrality. The monthly *Politiek en Cultuur*, of June 1940, called for "peace and friendship"with Germany and a "correct" attitude toward the occupier. Due praise was given to the Soviet Union, the only really neutral nation in the war. (Cited in Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 42.)

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 40–43.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[4] Of course, other underground organizations and papers also made their appearance in Amsterdam in this early period, most of them with Social-Democrat,

the German invasion of the Soviet Union that *De Waarheid*, in its first underground issue on November 23, 1940, warned against the dangers of a British as well as a German victory, but concluded that promising revolutionary situations might be forthcoming from all kinds of directions as a result of the war.[5]

The potent underground organization of the Amsterdam CPN was first employed on a larger scale in November 1940. Sit-down actions were provoked with some success at a German-supported Dutch public works project for unemployed workers. Strong Communist leadership managed to inspire some two thousand men to protest the miserable wages and long hours on the project. Although a German anti-strike decree was violated, neither the occupier nor Amsterdam police seriously attempted to beat down these first demonstrations of the occupation. Instead, the workers' conditions were actually somewhat ameliorated.[6] Another minor strike occurred on February 17–18, 1941, in protest against rather half-hearted German efforts to obtain volunteers for naval yards in Germany. Some 2200 metal workers in several large Amsterdam enterprises were involved, and the Communists were again very active among the strikers. The Germans gave in once more. No penalties were inflicted upon the strikers, and the call for volunteers was withdrawn. The workers – and the CPN – noted with great interest that even during a Nazi occupation mass actions could be effective.[7]

After these successful affairs the CPN eagerly searched for other occasions and "causes" which might be turned into protest demonstrations. Low wages, inflation, hatred against the Dutch Nazis, and indignation about the anti-semitic measures were found to be likely themes. The CPN would have liked best of all a strike based on economic and political motives, which could be directed against Dutch "capitalists" as well as Dutch and German Nazis.[8] But, it so happened that at this time the anti-Jewish riots in Amsterdam were ap-

pro-Allied leanings. A German opinion survey of October 19, 1940, expressed surprise at the efficiency of these first Dutch resistance efforts, accomplished in a country which for a century and a quarter had been without war or enemy occupation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.)

[5] Concerning the Amsterdam CPN during this period, *ibid.*, pp. 43–48.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–34.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–39.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.

proaching a boiling point. On February 12, 1941, the Germans had sealed off the old Jewish quarter for twenty-four hours, as a punitive measure for attacks on uniformed Dutch Nazis in the quarter. This forced isolation of the Jews and renewed Nazi provocations caused even bloodier riots. On February 19, a German police patrol was fought off with gun fire and acid as it attempted to search a Jewish-owned ice cream parlor. This was the first time that Germans, rather than Dutch Nazis, had been openly resisted.[9] The German reaction came quickly, decided upon at the highest level – by Himmler himself, and the two most powerful Germans in the Netherlands, Reichskommissar A. Seyss-Inquart and Security Chief H. Rauter. On February 22 and 23, 425 Jewish "hostages" between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five were picked up at random by German police in the streets of the Jewish quarter, as Dutch police looked on helplessly and, as is reported, "completely flabbergasted [*volslagen overstuur*]." [10]

The arbitrary arrest of hundreds of Jews in plain view of the public provided the occasion many Communists had been waiting for impatiently. The riots had already excited the citizens of Amsterdam, but the grabbing from the streets, and even from streetcars and motion picture theaters, of so many of "their" Jews brought the Amsterdam temper close to explosion. At last the Party's organizing talents could be directed in behalf of a "cause" which would be supported by the entire population.[11] Thus, the immediate factor behind the February strike can be found in the public arrests of the Jews. These brutal acts brought the population to a state of emotion which would permit the successful promotion of a general strike by an organization eager to test its underground strength.

April–May 1943; German Fumbling

A series of German blunders constituted the most noteworthy factors immediately preceding the outbreak of the strike of April–May 1943. On January 13, 1943, Hitler had issued a special decree, a "*Führererlaß*," on the necessities of a truly total war effort. He was particularly concerned with the

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–91, 97–98, 104.

[10] Almost all of the "hostages" were sent to Mauthausen concentration camp in Germany. By autumn of 1941 none had survived after they had been ordered to the notorious stone quarries at Mauthausen. (*Ibid.*, pp. 105–109, 188.)

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

mobilization of all possible labor resources in the German domain. The real problem, of course, was left unanswered by Hitler: how to effectuate mass deportations of workers from the occupied countries to Germany without thereby provoking mass desertions to the underground resistance movements. Himmler suggested to Hitler that the procurement of Dutch laborers could readily be accomplished by recalling the 300,000 demobilized members of the former Dutch army for labor duty (*Arbeitseinsatz*) in Germany. This would bring in an ample supply of able-bodied men, and would also, Himmler thought, eliminate potential resistance fighters in the back of the German army if an Allied invasion were to hit the Dutch coast. Hitler approved this plan and ordered his lieutenant in the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart, to prepare its execution.

Seyss-Inquart was intelligent enough to realize the dangers of Himmler's proposal. In an immediate, personal reply to Himmler he stated that the German forces at his disposal would not suffice to round up the ex-soldiers, particularly since the Dutch police could certainly not be relied upon for these kinds of purposes. Therefore, as he predicted quite accurately, the inability to enforce this measure would result in "severe damage" to the image of German authority in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Seyss-Inquart promised to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.[12]

Partly to allay the fears of Seyss-Inquart and other German civilian officials, it was decided that military security reasons were to be stressed to the Dutch public in press releases concerning the round-up, on the assumption that security arguments would be more readily accepted than references to German needs for slave labor. In fact, the German military had felt for some time that there were legitimate and urgent reasons for the internment of the former members of the Dutch army, from a military security point of view.[13] Yet, as the call-up was in fact explained to lower German and Dutch officials and the public, forced labor arguments were constantly mixed in with security arguments.[14] Moreover, interspersed

[12] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 306.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 16. Note, for example, Himmler's letter of February 10, 1943, pointing to the increasing effectiveness of military sabotage efforts by the Dutch resistance. (*Ibid.*, p. 305.)

[14] Note, for example, Security Chief Rauter's letter of January 1, 1943, describing the difficulties of getting Dutch laborers to Germany and the failures of previous German measures in this sphere. (*Ibid.*, p. 394.)

with the security and labor arguments were snide remarks about Dutch "plutocrats' sons" who were allegedly loitering in the "ornate" but idle offices of banks, shipping companies, and insurance firms in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, while German soldiers were dying at Stalingrad. Strong emotional overtones thus entered the labor draft. As the glorious victories of the early years were followed by the drabness and gloom of the first defeats, the Germans became jealous of those who seemed to be spared the deprivations of the Eastern front, particularly if they also happened to reflect the traditional comforts and "conceit" of the Dutch middle and upper classes.[15]

The German army was reluctant to associate itself with the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, particularly in view of the confusing spectrum of justifying arguments presented by the proponents. Yet, in order to avoid the appearance of just another forced labor draft, the army could not get itself excused from this distasteful job. Also the German Foreign Office expressed grave doubts. It was entirely in accordance with international law to put the 300,000 members of the former Dutch army into prisoner-of-war camps, but – according to the Foreign Office – international law did not necessarily permit ["*völkerrechtlich ... nicht ohne weiteres vertretbar*"] bringing these prisoners of war to Germany for purposes of labor duty ["*Arbeitseinsatz*"]. Moreover, the measure was doubtful ["*nicht unbedenklich*"] from a foreign policy point of view and would be exploited by Allied propaganda. Besides, Sweden, the neutral power representing Dutch interests in Germany, might make difficulties, the Foreign Office feared.[16]

After much hesitation, Hitler finally issued an order which in effect settled very little. He directed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to "recapture" the former Dutch soldiers and to effectuate their "return into captivity as prisoners of war [*Rückführung in die Kriegsgefangenschaft*]." However, labor service was specifically mentioned only in connection with a possible future call-up of those age groups which would

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 305, 312–331.

[16] Concerning the doubts of the German army, note two communications from Seyss-Inquart's assistant, F. Schmidt, to the German labor draft chief, F. Sauckel, dated April 12 and April 16, 1943. The Foreign Office attitude is reflected in a lengthy memorandum, dated April 17, 1943. (These documents are cited in full by Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–319.)

have had to serve in the Dutch army if the Germans had not come. These as yet not drafted age groups [*"ungediente Jahrgänge"*] would face labor service in Germany – if they were called up. Hitler's order, therefore, seemingly provided no laborers except the "non-draftees" to be called in the undetermined future.[17]

The Supreme Command contributed to the confusion by promptly instructing General F. Christiansen, the German military commander in the Netherlands, "to catch, detain, and deport [*erfassen, festnehmen, und abschieben*]" the members of the former Dutch army, without providing detailed instructions concerning the method of recapture of the ex-soldiers, their further destination, or the exact categories of men affected. On April 29, 1943, some five weeks after receiving this order, General Christiansen finally proclaimed the general call-up of the former Dutch army as prisoners of war. On the next day, April 30 – after the protest strike against the general call-up had begun – he suddenly and surprisingly announced that only the "regular soldiers [*Berufspersonal*]" who had been on active service in May 1940 would have to turn themselves in. This meant that at most 10 per cent of the former Dutch army, about 30,000 men, were actually affected by the German measure.[18] On April 30, no public mention was made of the intended exempted categories even in the reduced call-up – farmers, miners, and certain other groups.

Other blunders were committed by the Germans at this point. The announcement of the call-up virtually coincided with Crown Princess Juliana's birthday (April 30) and the Socialists' May Day, dramatic dates for the Dutch under German occupation. Also, the Germans had previously decided that the first day of May would not be a holiday but a regular working day, yet had failed to announce this properly. When the strike broke out, some assumed "strikers" were actually taking the day off, unaware of the fact that the customary holiday had been cancelled.[19]

The general call-up of April 29 hit millions of Dutchmen: the 300,000 ex-soldiers apparently affected, their relatives and

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–19, 24, 333. Regular officers of the Dutch army had been sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Poland in May 1942; at first, they too had been demobilized and permitted to go home after the Dutch defeat in 1940.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 355, 359.

friends. Moreover, the "return into captivity as prisoners of war" was immediately seen as a trick for obtaining slave laborers. The security argument found no acceptance among the Dutch.[20] As one German official stated quite correctly, the great mass of the population would not have been so shocked if it had been known on April 29 how few ex-soldiers were actually being called.[21] However, since the call-up was taken to include all former soldiers, the impact on the public was terrific, and the strike burst loose immediately and spontaneously. When the Germans announced on the next day that they intended only to call the "regulars" among the ex-soldiers, this was considered by many as a German retreat, ex-post facto and as such the best possible evidence for the strike's success. On April 30, the apparent softening of the German attitude fanned rather than restrained the spirit of the strike.[22]

The many German blunders, committed at the highest civilian and military levels in Holland and Germany, reflected – in the view of the official Dutch historian of the strike – a combination of bureaucratic sloppiness, indifference, and lack of insight into mass attitudes and reactions.[23] Since military channels were chosen for the effectuation of the call-up in a country where the occupation had been a German civilian show, the lack of political and psychological empathy was particularly noticeable. Airforce General Christiansen – a Goering protégé – was a man of very modest talents, who was quite content to carry out orders, as he understood them, without worrying about the consequences.[24] It is altogether

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 294. Several German police reports confirmed the immediate recognition by the Dutch of the "real" German purposes in the call-up. (*Ibid.*, pp. 335, 354.)

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17. While the Dutch were spared the utter chaos depicted in Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia*, the German set-up in the Netherlands certainly was no model of efficiency. General H. von Wühlich, the chief of staff of the German military command in the Netherlands, after the war referred to the occupation regime as an "organizational miscarriage," typical for Hitler's style of government. As a result of "confused organization" and "inadequately arranged command relationships," no clear-cut policies or decrees were possible. "A large part of the orders issued required delicate weighing of competences and resulted in disputes about competences; often complicated diplomatic negotiations had to be undertaken to reach intended goals." (*Het Proces Christiansen* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950], p. 233.)

Around Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart all kinds of factions and personalities, reflecting the internal German scene, were struggling for influence.

possible that the underlying German need for manpower would have produced a violent Dutch response in any case. Yet, the immediate circumstances of the announcement of April 29, 1943, reflected so many German blunders that the protest strike became virtually inevitable then.

The Railroad Strike; the Battle Returns to the Netherlands

The strike of April–May 1943 might have been avoided by the Germans if they had behaved more tactfully and intelligently. On the other hand, they could hardly have controlled the immediate circumstances leading to the railroad strike, even if they had been in a more resourceful mood. "Loyal cooperation" grew less and less tolerable to railroad men as Allied victory became more certain; it could not possibly continue when the Allied armies approached the frontiers of the Netherlands.

The first Dutch village was liberated by elements from the Thirtieth Division of the United States Army on September 12, 1944; on September 17, the attack on the Arnhem–Nijmegen area was staged by British, American, and Polish airborne troops. Just before these operations were undertaken, the Dutch railroads had been providing the usual logistics support to the Germans, under the "loyal cooperation" policy. For example, a German armored division was transported from Twente to Tilburg during the night of September 4–5, 1944, in order to bolster the southern front in the path of the Allied advance.[25] The moment had arrived, obviously, to abandon "loyal cooperation."

Another factor pertaining to railroading morale came to

Actually, Security Chief Rauter at times managed to outshine his boss. Rauter frequently enjoyed better contacts with Hitler than Seyss-Inquart because Rauter's superior in Germany, Himmler, tended to be closer to the Führer than anyone else. (Cf. J. Schreieder's testimony in *Proces Rauter*, p. 14.) In the words of that astute observer, Secretary-General Hirschfeld, the upper elite of occupation officials pursued "their own, largely impenetrable aims," and each had his own supporters and connections in Berlin. As intrigues more and more preoccupied this elite, various factions of Dutch Nazis and variously motivated Dutch officials could not help but participate. (H. M. Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen uit de bezettingstijd* [Amsterdam, 1960], p. 44.) For interesting observations on the German occupation regime, cf. also A. E. Cohen, "De positie van de secretarissen-generaal tijdens de bezetting," *Notities voor het Geschiedwerk*, nr. 78, and A. E. Cohen, "Het ontstaan van het Duitse Rijkscommissariaat voor Nederland," *Notities voor het Geschiedwerk*, nr. 91 (both mimeo., Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1955 and 1958).

[25] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–211.

a head at this time. Allied air bombardments and sabotaging of tracks and trains by the resistance made the operation of trains increasingly dangerous and distasteful. Air attacks on trains were stepped up after the Normandy invasion and became particularly frequent and effective in early September 1944. As a result, the traditionally independent railroad engineers reported "sick" more and more frequently – the so-called "shooting disease [*schietziekte*]" – and favored a radical change of policy also for this reason.[26]

This radical change of policy had been prepared during many months by the board of directors of the railroads, the railroad unions, the resistance, the Dutch government in exile, and the Allied supreme command, acting jointly with relative effectiveness. A general railroad strike was to terminate once and for all the shame of "loyal cooperation," at a time most inconvenient to the Germans. On September 10, 1944, Dr. Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, sent an urgent radio message to London, reminding the Dutch government that the signal for the strike would have to come from there. The signal finally came on September 17, to coincide with the Arnhem operations. Although it was known that food reserves in the large Dutch cities were completely exhausted and the vital supplies from the new harvest would have to be brought in from the eastern Netherlands by railroad, the strike was greeted in most places with tremendous enthusiasm. In September 1944 the possible dangers of a "hunger winter" failed to persuade the great majority of railroad men that the policy of "loyal cooperation" should not be concluded with a bang. Anything less than the general strike would have been considered treason – and besides, most Dutchmen believed that the Arnhem landings signified the end of the war for the Netherlands.[27]

The policy of "loyal cooperation" may have been inevitable for the railroads after the seemingly final German victories of 1940. Equally inevitable, however, was the termination of this policy in September 1944, as the Allies pushed the front line back to the Netherlands once more. During the more than four years of its duration, "loyal cooperation" had meant utterly despicable acts, such as the deportation of almost one hundred thousand Jews, and near-treasonable acts, such as

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 202, 206.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.

the efficient logistics support for the German forces in their battles with the Allies. Considering the extent of the shame and frustration which Dutch railroad men must have felt, it is not at all surprising that the "loyal cooperation" policy had to end with that ultimate symbol of independence and strength – the general, political strike. As to the precise timing, what could be more fitting for the outbreak of the great strike than its association with that daring and largest airborne effort of World War II, the Battle of Arnhem.

The Hungarian Uprising; Poznan and Student Demonstrations

Intra-elite divisions and popular discontent with a "foreign" regime were underlying factors in the Hungarian uprising. On the threshold toward immediacy one outside stimulant was added to the interaction between the "elite process" and the "mass process." This stimulant was provided by the Poznan revolt of June 1956 and the ensuing events in Poland. These Polish events "exercized a greater influence upon the Hungarian people than any other external event since the death of Stalin." When, in October 1956, the news filtered through of Poland's moves toward liberalization and greater independence, "this, more than any other single event, was the catalyst for which Hungarians had been, half consciously, waiting." [28]

A group which was on the fringe of the elite, but also belonged to the masses in the sense that it did not share in the exercise of ruling power, was destined to be the most active in the period just preceding the uprising – the students. On an even larger scale than the writers, the students were prepared to rebel against the Party. In autumn of 1956 Budapest students "simply seceded" from the Communist Youth League, "which let them go without much ado." At about the same time, students in universities all over Hungary proceeded to set up independent student organizations, outside Party controls.[29]

The final link in the events immediately before the uprising came on October 6, 1956. On that day two hundred thousand persons, as Kecskemeti states, attended reburial ceremonies for László Rajk, the Hungarian "Tito," who had been executed by the "Muscovites" during the Stalin era. Permission

[28] United Nations Report, pp. 66–67.
[29] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

for these ceremonies had been specifically granted by Party boss Gerö, and, inspite of a tense atmosphere, no disturbances developed during the reburial.[30] Nevertheless, the honoring of the leading purge victim by two hundred thousand persons constituted an extremely hostile public act against the regime which had been responsible for the victim's execution. Thus, as the United Nations report points out, "the practice of mass demonstrations had ... been effectively started in Budapest."[31]

The already "seceded" students adopted the demonstration practice quickly. Two weeks after Rajk's reburial, on October 23, they staged a large demonstration for which – after much hesitation – official permission had again been granted. And again, the demonstration as such, a street parade, proceeded peacefully. Yet, this time, by coincidence or because the bucket was finally flowing over, the "mass process" introduced violence to what had been a peaceful phenomenon on the fringes, but within, the "elite process." Street crowds attracted by the student parade "became more and more agitated." Demands were voiced that the slogans and petitions featured by the students be broadcasted. When the government's radio officials refused this, "an unplanned and unforeseeable chain reaction" was triggered which led to clashes with the police and large-scale violence. Thus, the demonstrations led to "a new pattern of revolutionary behavior" involving all sectors of the Hungarian population.[32]

Intra-Party divisions and popular dislike of a "foreign" regime provided the underlying factors which ultimately provoked the uprising. The immediate factors, which sparked the explosion, were threefold. The Poles had shown how much could be accomplished within the limits of the Soviet orbit; the Rajk reburial and the student parade, however peaceful, were public and defiant demonstrations which had a most dramatic effect on the street crowds; finally, the students, by being both of the elite and of the masses, were precisely the right catalyst for the "elite process" and the "mass process." The Hungarian uprising could take its course.[33]

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[31] United Nations Report, p. 67.

[32] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–82.

[33] The immediate factors behind the East German revolt of 1953 were more comparable to the April–May 1943 situation in the Netherlands – blundering by

The Panamanian Riots; Flag Display under "Titular" Sovereignty

The more immediate factors behind the Panamanian riots involved problems of flag display – a foreseeable consequence of the rival claims to sovereignty in the Zone. Riots about flags had occurred already in November 1959. As of November 7, 1960, President Eisenhower had permitted the joint display of the United States and Panamanian flags in one location inside the Zone, at Shaler Triangle in Panama City. On June 13, 1962, Presidents Kennedy and Chiari agreed that "their representatives would arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an appropriate way in the Canal Zone." As a result, both flags were flown at three additional Zonal locations, including two official buildings of the Canal Zone administration. Finally, on January 10, 1963, a joint Commission reached agreement to fly both flags "on land in the Canal Zone wherever the flag of the United States was flown by civilian authorities." [34]

These concessions were bitterly resented by many Zonians, particularly since they seemed to confirm Secretary Dulles' 1959 affirmation of Panama's "titular sovereignty" in the Zone. Zonal sympathies were backing Gerald A. Doyle, an architect employed by Zonal authorities, who in October 1962 sued in the local federal District Court for an injunction to prevent the United States government from allowing the Panamanian flag inside the Zone. The suit was denied on July

the regime played an important role. Walter Ulbricht's post-Stalinist confession of "Stalinist" errors, published in a resolution of June 11, 1953, constituted a "stern judgment" on his own government and the East German Party. Thus, a "mortal blow" was struck at the regime's authority. Yet, as the regime lost face, it also committed the incredible error of not revoking the most unpopular of all recent decrees, involving a 10 per cent increase in "work norms." The confession of errors in combination with the recalcitrance concerning the work norms had "immediate and drastic" effects. Within a few hours after the public discovered that the increase in work norms had not been annulled, thousands of workers were demonstrating on Berlin streets. On the following day, June 17, 1953, the insurrection became general – although the work norms decree had been rescinded after the first demonstrations on June 16. (*Ibid.*, pp. 128–129.)

A similar error of judgement touched off riots in Czechoslovakia during June 1953. A currency reform decree constituted in effect "tampering with the people's purchasing power." This infuriated workers, and their wives, in several Czech factory towns. At the same time, the currency reform was a "manifestation of weakness" on the part of the regime and demonstrated that it had to renege on its financial promises. (*Ibid.*, pp. 124–125.) Again, a show of weakness combined with recalcitrance led to violence.

[34] *International Jurists*, pp. 12–13.

8, 1963, but Judge Guthrie F. Crowe observed in a revealing aside that the Zonal authorities' actions in permitting the Panamanian flag might indeed not have been "to the plaintiff's best interests." The judge further opined that "the flying of two national flags side by side in a disputed territory for an undeclared purpose is a position of weakness that can lead but to further misunderstanding and discord." As a result of this suit, "meetings were held throughout the Zone and enthusiasm was whipped up among youths." Claimant Doyle spoke at social events, action groups were organized, and funds collected to finance legal actions.[35]

It was only after the suit, and after the time for appealing it had expired, that the governor of the Canal Zone, Major General Robert J. Fleming, undertook to implement the agreement of January 1963. And even then he did not fly the Panamanian flag at every place where the United States flag had flown before January 1963. Instead,

> the Governor selected seventeen spots where both flags were to be displayed. In other places, where the United States flag hitherto used to be flown, it was taken down by the Governor's orders on December 30, 1963. Especially with regard to schools, the Governor ordered that, though in front of the building no United States flag was to be flown, it was "in accordance with law and customs requiring the United States flag to be displayed in or near schools," for the United States flag to continue to be displayed in classrooms or elsewhere within the schools as at present.[36]

Accordingly, when Zonal schools reopened on January 2, 1964, after the Christmas holidays, the United States flag was no longer displayed outside school buildings. This compromise angered numerous Zonians of school age and above. Undoubtedly prompted by their elders, students at one school, Balboa High School, proceeded to organize flag-raising parties in defiance of the new regulation. These acts became the immediate cause of the riots.[37]

Another factor of more immediate importance was a temporary vacancy at the United States Embassy in the Republic of Panama during the period just preceding the riots. The last ambassador had departed in the summer of 1963, reportedly leaving Panamanian relations more than ever under control of Zonal officials – the governor, Major General Robert J.

[35] *New York Times*, January 14, and January 16, 1964.
[36] *International Jurists*, p. 13.
[37] *Ibid.*

Fleming, and the commanding general, General Andrew P. O'Meara. Both of these officers were said to be particularly submissive to Zonal pressure groups and insensitive to Panamanian feelings.[38] Moreover, it so happened that Governor Fleming departed for the United States on the very afternoon of January 9, 1964 – a few hours before the outbreak of the riots.[39]

The factors determining the development of events immediately before each of the five mass actions were divergent in character, as were the more underlying factors mentioned previously. In one case, April–May 1943, German blunders were probably decisive; in another, the railroad strike, the Allied armies' arrival on Dutch soil made all the difference. The strike of February 1941 was sparked by the arrest of the Jewish "hostages," as exploited by the underground Communist Party in its eagerness to enjoy the fruits of a general political strike. The Hungarian uprising burst out after the university students, encouraged by the Poznan revolt, seceded from the Party and began minor demonstrations which in turn inspired crowds in the streets to engage the regime in potentially violent fashion. The Panamanian riots were preceded by a compromise on joint flag display in the Zone which deeply affected Zonians' emotions, who saw in it the beginning of the end for American sovereignty in the Zone. The Zonians' defiance of the new flag regulations, tolerated by weak Zonal authorities, in turn provoked the Panamanians who were equally emotional about the flag issue.

The course of the demonstrations was also influenced by the kind of leadership which was willing and able to risk its neck in the often uneven battle against the ruling regime. Various types of leadership groups came to the fore, often representing well-defined political, economic, or student organizations. At times, however, leaders seemed to rise spontaneously from among ordinary "men in the street." Moreover, shifting leadership patterns at earlier and later stages of a demonstration were a feature in several of the demonstrations.

[38] *New York Times*, January 16, 1964.
[39] *International Jurists*, p. 14.

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP GROUPS

It seems fairly certain that Amsterdam Communists were the principal leaders during the strike of February 1941. The Communist underground bosses recognized the possibilities of the crisis after the arrest of the Jewish "hostages," and rank and file Communists contributed greatly by spreading the news about the arrests and by urging strategically placed groups to begin the strike. Some two years later, however, the strike actions of April–May 1943 were inspired by spontaneous leaders, not as such classifiable by party or otherwise, in the various machine shops or enterprises where the ill-fated German announcement on the recall of the Dutch army had a terrific impact. Certain plants may have acted as strike leaders, but this was probably a consequence of their local or regional prominence. The railroad strike of September 1944 involved yet another leadership situation, with competing sets of leaders. Various resistance organizations caused considerable worry to the railroad management as they attempted to induce a change in the railroad men's attitude toward the policy of cooperation with the Germans; besides, the Dutch government in London developed ideas about a strike in behalf of its own and the Allied cause. All three groups – the resistance, the government in exile, and the railroad management – finally did get together on the timing of the strike, which was started by signal from London and carried to the bitter end through the delicately balanced coordination of management and resistance, with intermittent and rather passive advice from London. Elements from among the Communist elite, liberalizing intellectuals and demonstrating students, put the final touches on the corrosion of the Rákosi regime in post-Stalinist Budapest; the ensuing street riots were apparently promoted by younger workers, high school students, and adventurer types. Finally, to complete the pattern of shifting leadership groups typical for the Hungarian uprising, organized labor dominated the rebellion in the last stages. The Panamanian riots of 1964 were induced by high school students, both

Zonian and Panamanian; however, the real exploiters of the students' embarrassing flag encounters have not been reliably identified, and may, of course, not have belonged to any particular group.

February 1941; the Grass Roots of the CPN

On February 22, 1941, the day of the arrests of the first Jewish "hostages," the leader of the Communist underground in Amsterdam instructed his apparatus to spread the news of the arrests. The citizens of Amsterdam were profoundly impressed by the shocking scenes which many of them witnessed personally or heard about through the grapevine. "What the WA had started, the Germans were completing." [1]

The next day, on February 23, two rank and file members of the Party – both municipal employees, one in road maintenance and the other in garbage collection – decided, apparently on their own, that a general strike would have to be organized immediately. They scurried about the city and instructed friends to prepare for a strike on the following day, February 24. Only after this entirely unofficial issuance of the strike call did they consult one of the leaders of the CPN, and obtained full support from the side of the Party. However, this first strike call was too hastily improvised to be effective. Many more workers had to be talked to and convinced. During the evening of February 24, some two hundred and fifty municipal workers, the great majority of whom were Communists, assembled to hear passionate condemnations of the arrests of the Jews. A strike was once more proclaimed for the following day, February 25.

That night an inner group, including again several grass roots members of the Party, worked out strategy. Streetcar personnel, garbage collectors, and other employees of municipal services whose absence in the early morning hours would be most striking to the public, were to begin the strike. Others were to follow at the very time that the general public would note the absence from the streets of the first groups. Hesitant groups of workers were to be persuaded by exaggerated claims about the success of the strike elsewhere. Party machinery was fully mobilized to spread the news about the strike, whose purpose was proclaimed to be not only the release of the Jewish

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

"hostages" but also a general increase in wages and unemployment benefits. The latter reflected the Communist predilection for the "mixed" strike, featuring political as well as economic slogans. Finally, it was decided that non-Communists should be attracted to the strike as much as possible.[2]

The strike of February 1941 was prepared, proclaimed, and carried through its initial stages by the concerted efforts of the Communists. Lowly Party members, particularly among the municipal workers, displayed considerable initiative after the leaders had alerted them for the possibilities of the explosive situation which prevailed in Amsterdam as a result of the anti-semitic excesses.[3]

April–May 1943; the Grass Roots on Their Own

The strike of April–May 1943 was a composite of a series of local strikes starting spontaneously in various localities all over the Netherlands which were not necessarily in communication with one another. As a German report noted quite correctly, neither the resistance nor the Communist Party was involved in the proclamation and organization of this strike.[4] As another German official observed, this strike did not have centralized leadership nor, for that matter, specific aims. The strike began in the eastern part of the Netherlands, in industrial Twente, perhaps because that region had been relatively immune from the hardships of war. Consequently, the population there was said to be more profoundly shocked by the recall of the former soldiers, many of whom were bound to come from households in Twente.[5]

As the strike broke out, leaders came forward spontaneously, often without any formal organizational backing. Political parties and independent labor unions or agricultural associ-

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–114.

[3] Dr. B. A. Sijes, the skillful historian of this strike, admitted that the complete picture of the CPN's involvement in the strike could not be reconstructed after the war. The Communists decided in May 1950 that they would no longer cooperate with Sijes' sponsor, the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, on the grounds that both the Institute and Sijes "lacked objectivity." (*Ibid.*, pp. 192, 194.) Sijes, a sociologist and expert on the Amsterdam labor scene, was a participant in the strike. (Cf. also, Warmbrunn, *op. cit.*, p. 111.)

[4] Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

[5] In the western part of the Netherlands, according to the same German official, the tragedies of war had already penetrated the "subconsciousness" of the population. Therefore, the fate of the ex-soldiers may have been of lesser concern to some of the inhabitants of the West. (Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 420.)

ations had been dissolved by that time; only the churches and some of the cooperatives and social clubs were still available as traditional sources of leadership. Of course, many former union leaders were working and did manage to play an active role in the strike.[6]

This spontaneous leadership pattern was well adapted to the medium-sized enterprises (1000–4000 workers) prevailing in Twente and other key areas of the strike, particularly among the metallurgic industry. Large enough to make possible mass action, yet not too large to prevent face-to-face contacts among workers, the medium-sized enterprise presented a suitable background for the sudden emergence of the strike. Stork Brothers Machine Works of Hengelo, Twente, where the strike started, had some 3000 employees in 1943. The crucial strike decisions at Stork were reached among smallish groups, the "workshop groups," which were in constant communication with each other by means of trusted workers known in all the workshops of Stork.[7]

Another factor favoring the "leaderless" strike in Twente was related to the lag in urbanization in this rather recently developed industrial region. Many of the workers commuted from rural surroundings, and, therefore, "the opinions of family, neighborhood, and peer group still weighed heavily." As a result, according to Bouman, once the strike had broken out, the pressure in the "bedroom-villages" toward conforming were substantial even without the presence of strong, central leadership from union or party.[8] Yet, outside the metallurgical industry, in the textile mills of Twente, participation in the strike was less impressive, apparently because the largely unskilled textile workers had been less effectively unionized and had less *esprit de corps*.

In conclusion, as a German police report put it, the strike of April–May 1943 was "an outburst above party lines [*eine überparteiliche Entladung*]" of popular animosity against the occupier.[9] As an outburst it resembled the Amsterdam strike of February 1941, but its non-partisan nature reflected the fact that neither the Communists nor any other organized group played a dominant role. This strike by the "grass roots"

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 47.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[9] Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

occurred chiefly where medium-sized enterprises employing skilled workers were located in non-urban surroundings similar to Twente, such as in South Limburg and the region around Dordrecht. The strike did not spread to the big cities, particularly not to Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

The Railroad Strike; Limits of Centralized Planning

The railroad strike of September 1944 involved several high levels of bureaucracy. By autumn of 1943, major resistance organizations, particularly the Nationaal Comité, had established contacts with the railroads. However, Dr. Hupkes, the managing director, did not intend to surrender to the resistance any jurisdiction over his "precious" organization, especially not the decision-making on the strike. He tried to keep resistance contacts at a minimum, but had to rely on resistance channels for his communications with the Dutch government in London. Hupkes had always believed that the London government itself would have to issue the final strike order. For the rest, the railroads took care of all preparations. In early 1944, railroad paymasters all over the Netherlands were ordered to keep in reserve the equivalent of one month salary for each employee, to be paid out in advance in case of "emergency." This reserve cash was soon known as the "invasion money" to virtually every railroad man. In June 1944, the Personnel Council, the top railroad union organ, was drawn into the strike preparations, and "confidence men [*vertrouwensmannen*]" were appointed in railroad stations all over the country as further communications links. These "confidence men" were also to keep liaison with the local resistance.[10]

Already in May 1943, a resistance coordinating council, the Raad van Verzet, had suggested to Premier Gerbrandy the possibilities of a railroad strike. Gerbrandy, in turn, approached Allied circles on the matter without formally discussing the strike with his cabinet.[11] Much later, in September 1944, Dutch intelligence officials were suddenly informed by SHAEF that the Allies were in favor of a railroad

[10] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–164, 167, 173.

[11] A controversy has developed on the subject of the cabinet's non-involvement with the strike decision. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 219; also, C. L. W. Fock, "De Nederlandse regering in Londen en de spoorwegstaking," *De Gids*, December 1955; P. S. Gerbrandy, "Nogmaals: de Nederlandse regering en de spoorwegstaking," *De Gids*, January 1956.

strike in the Netherlands, to support the immediately pending airborne operations in the Arnhem region. Only the Premier and the Minister of War were at first supplied with this top-secret information. As the Arnhem droppings were taking place, the Dutch government itself made the final decision on the strike, thus taking full responsibility for its consequences, even though the abruptness of the proclamation was due to Allied intelligence precautions.

The Dutch government, for the purposes of this decision, consisted only of Premier Gerbrandy, his Minister of War, and perhaps Queen Wilhelmina. Gerbrandy very much favored the strike, partly because he came to see it as the public show piece of the Dutch resistance spirit, unmatched in any other occupied country. Yet, he doubted whether the strike would be supported by the rest of the cabinet. Even the Minister of War, who was consulted by the Premier, was hesitant until the last moment. He only approved after the Dutch intelligence chief informed him – without any basis of fact – that the Allies themselves would proclaim the strike if the Dutch government were to refuse. At the first cabinet meeting after the strike there was general criticism of the Premier's failure to inform his colleagues, particularly on the part of the minister who was responsible for the railroads.[12]

On the other side of the Channel, Managing Director Hupkes had become convinced of the necessity of the strike and energetically devoted his considerable organizational skills to its preparation. Yet, even Hupkes had his moments of doubt and hesitation, mainly because of loyalty to his "apparatus."

> The leap in the dark was not tempting, and neither was the prospect of committing to the battle his own, precious, and for Holland so important enterprise, thereby exposing it to grave risks. During the strike a station master in a small town refused to obey the strike order of the government simply because he could not bring himself to desert his station. That kind of spirit characterized many [railroad men] . . . .[13]

All the careful planning for the strike was defective, however, with respect to questions concerning its intended duration. Hupkes did not think that a lengthy strike could be endured by the Dutch people. He anticipated a strike of about two weeks or at most one month. He felt, somewhat vaguely,

[12] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 220, 223–225.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

that the railroad strike would constitute a kind of transition between occupation and liberation.[14] It is doubtful whether any of the groups providing leadership in the strike – the railroad officials, the government in exile, the Allies, and the resistance – would have dared to support it if its incredible length, from September 1944 until May 1945, could have been foreseen. The leadership broke down when the extremely delicate decision had to be faced on the possible calling off a strike which by its length was bringing millions of Dutchmen to the very threshold of starvation. At this moment, the Allies could only give evasive answers to the Dutch government; Premier Gerbrandy, in turn, had no real reply to the railroad officials' urgent queries; finally, even the communications channels provided by the resistance worked less efficiently than ever. As a result, the strike lingered on virtually without leadership. Ten-thousands literally starved, and other millions of Dutchmen survived starvation only by sheer luck, altogether unusual German concessions, and amazing improvisations by a handful of Dutch officials at The Hague.

The Hungarian Uprising; Shifting Leadership Groups

The UN report quotes a Budapest professor of philosophy who maintained that the revolution "had no leaders; it was not centrally directed." [15] Although there was indeed no tightly led revolutionary elite, certain groups did play outstanding roles at various stages of the uprising.

In the beginning, as Hannah Arendt remarked with much justification, the crucial initiatives were taken not by the underprivileged "but the overprivileged of communist society," the intellectuals and students. The most striking example of this was presented by the eight hundred cadets of the Petöfi Military Academy who joined the uprising immediately. These cadets were the sons of the "power elite" of Communist Hungary. As for their motives, Hannah Arendt speculates that these were related to "neither their own nor their fellow-citizens' material misery, but exclusively [to] Freedom and Truth." [16]

These first groups of rebels were, however, frightened by the violent course of the uprising and foresaw Soviet inter-

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 177–178.
[15] United Nations Report, p. 68.
[16] Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 494, 497.

vention if things were carried too far. The Communist intellectuals, who had been the most radical critics, soon "did everything in their power to steer events into a peaceful course." [17] Similarly, the university students early abandoned the fighting.[18] The leaders among those who continued to fight even against the Soviet army came mostly from three groups: young workers ("apprentices"), teen-age high school pupils, and *Lumpenproletariat* elements. According to Zinner, the motives of these groups were at times not particularly "noble." [19]

Finally, after most of the active fighting was over, the leadership shifted once more, to the industrial workers. Their rebel activities "lasted longest and were the best organized." Although the workers had been active in the street battles, "their weightiest contribution to the revolutionary struggle was the organization of workers' councils and, its principal outcome, the revolutionary general strike." The strike provided the workers with a bargaining instrument which the Soviets could not wipe out immediately by military might. According to Kecskemeti, the workers' motives were "national" rather than socio-economic; their main aim was the termination of the Soviet controls over the Hungarian economy and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops.[20]

It should be noted that the Hungarian uprising seemed directed not so much against Communism as against the "Muscovites" and Soviet interventionism. In the beginning, at least, all the leaders of the rebellion pretended to be good Communists. As the uprising proceeded, party affiliation – i.e., Communist affiliation – or lack of it, was not considered the important question among the rebels.[21] In the workers' councils, as Hannah Arendt wrote, "the men elected were communists and non-communists; party lines seem to have

[17] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Paul E. Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York, 1962), p. 283.

[18] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115. A Radio Free Europe survey, cited by Kecskemeti, gives an estimate of the percentage of "active fighters" within various occupational groups: professionals, 14 per cent; white collar, 2 per cent; industrial workers, 13 per cent; farmers and farm hands, 6 per cent; others (including students), 20 per cent. "Extreme combativeness" was shown by three categories: "street crowds who assembled in spontaneous fashion"; "the youngest age group"; industrial workers. (*Ibid.*, p. 109–111.)

[21] United Nations Report, p. 68.

played no role whatever . . . ." [22] After October 24, the Communist Central Committee was isolated and "remained sealed off at headquarters day and night." Yet, rebels from the Writers' Association "drifted in and out of the building, serving as a channel of communications between the two worlds." [23] Moreover, even after the uppermost Party elite had been eliminated from power, various types of Communists continued to occupy most governmental positions in Budapest. Only in the countryside did a purge of orthodox Communists in higher jobs take place. One reason why such a purge failed to materialize in Budapest was the absence of non-Communist replacements. Non-Communist political leaders did not, as a whole, come forward during the uprising, having had their share of troubles in the not too distant past and fearing all along that the Soviet Union would intervene. Several non-Communists specifically declined offices offered them by the rebels, although this trend seems to have been less marked in the countryside.[24]

If any individual must be credited with leadership of the uprising, Imre Nagy would, of course, be most qualified for the honor. Among all the "Muscovites" in top positions after World War II, Nagy was the only one "who did not live apart from the people but kept up relations with a wide circle of acquaintances in ordinary walks of life; he also was a familiar figure in the Budapest cafés." [25] He was non-Jewish, of Hungarian peasant stock. Nagy, like the rest of the Communist elite whom he had rejoined as an "ex-purgee," was isolated from the early events of the uprising. Like the other Moscow-trained "war horses," he at first "reverted to . . . orthodoxy," to the great disappointment of many rebels. When Nagy, nevertheless, was put in charge by the rebels, the Soviets probably considered him "the last best hope" of Hungarian Communism; they certainly did not expect him to destroy the system. At first, "there was no sense of incipient betrayal of the Communist cause about him." Nobody could forsee "the enormous transformation he was to undergo." [26]

This transformation may have been forced upon him "by

[22] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[23] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 279–280.
[25] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[26] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–266.

the uncontrollable, overwhelming upsurge of the masses' revolutionary *élan*." [27] After he moved from the isolated Party headquarters to the Parliament building, he met for days with endless streams of delegations of revolutionary councils from all over Hungary. Thus, he is reported to have discovered the mood of the masses and "caught something of the fire" of the uprising. Besides, at the Parliament his close assistants were no longer old "Muscovites"; some of these new assistants even came from non-Communist circles.[28]

In any case, Nagy did not lead "a purposeful group acting in unison." When he finally decided to move with the uprising, he and his lieutenants disagreed among one another on most questions of tactics and strategy. The writers of the Petöfi Circle and the university students had been rather well organized in the beginning; but, as the uprising proceeded they too did not know where they were going. Thus, as Zinner concluded, the early rebels and Nagy simply saw no alternative but to follow the crowds.[29] The crowds had selected Nagy because they needed a symbol of leadership. It was the crowd who produced the one Communist leader who managed to enshrine himself as a Hungarian national hero and martyr.[30]

The Panamanian Riots; Students, Politicians (and Castro Agents?)

Concerning leadership groups in the Panamanian riots, United States officials and above all the Zonians have suspected Castro's influence. According to Secretary of State Rusk, Castro elements "moved in quickly to aggravate the disturbances." In the words of Army Secretary Vance, "if Castro agents had not been present, the violence would not have reached the peak that it did." [31] Another source of leadership was seen in certain Panamanian politicians, whose appeal to the population was said to include demagogic exploitation of anti-Americanism. The worst anti-American

[27] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[28] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 248–250.

[30] Leadership in the East German uprising was also "entirely spontaneous and unorganized." This uprising too was the outgrowth of a street demonstration which had attracted large crowds. Similarly, the incidents at Plzen and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, during June 1953, were called "purely a mass movement, unrehearsed and spontaneous." (Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–125, 130–131.)

[31] *New York Times*, January 15, 1964.

riots have occurred in election years, 1959 and 1963. Political vituperation in 1963 had reached unprecedented depths: "Such phrases as 'bastards of the earth,' 'monsters,' and 'deformities' and some even more intemperate have been used in denouncing Zonians." [32]

The crucial acts leading to the riots were performed by the students who entered the Zone to challenge the United States flag outside Balboa High School. The group of approximately two hundred came from one school, the Instituto Nacional. A student leader, Guillermo Guevara Pas, had conferred with the principal of Balboa High School on the day before the riot, but did not announce the planned demonstration. It should be noted that the Headmaster of the Instituto Nacional personally gave the demonstrators the flag which they were intending to display in the Zone. Moreover, the students were received by the President of the Republic immediately after their return from Balboa High School, leading the International Jurists to suggest "that the Panamanian authorities may have had prior knowledge" of the demonstration. "In any case, the Ministry of External Affairs was informed by the students of their proposed demonstration before they took off." [33]

On their return into the Republic's territory the students were greeted by a suddenly appearing crowd of rank-and-file citizens who immediately began to riot. At this earliest moment the crowd already included skilled snipers and employed incendiary bombs or Molotov cocktails. In the words of the International Jurists, these bombs

> must have been made for this purpose. When, where and by whom they were made was not disclosed to the Investigating Committee. The fact that these were made and used would indicate some degree of premeditation and planning.[34]

The suspicions concerning Castro agents are related to the degree of premeditation which has been deduced from the ready availability of Molotov cocktails and the immediate appearance of snipers.

Leadership groups in the crises under investigation reveal varied patterns of involvement and deliberateness. The

[32] *Ibid.*, January 18, 1964.
[33] *International Jurists*, p. 15.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Amsterdam strike of February 1941 was provoked by the best organized underground group of the day, exploiting a "natural" crisis and operating through initiatives of activists at a grass roots level. The strike of April–May 1943 broke out without prior planning or deliberate initiative on the part of any particular group of leaders. It developed spontaneously in many parts of the Netherlands as a result of blatant German public relations blunders, and was aided in each locality by favorable conditions pertaining to plant size and urban-rural mix. The railroad strike, by contrast, was prepared and led from the top by a highly centralized railroad administration, assisted by other bureaucratic elites – the London government, the Allies, and the coordinators of the resistance movements. However, this system broke down when unforeseen circumstances prolonged the strike beyond expectation and produced dilemmas which were too complex and delicate to handle for the various layers of "planners," operating under occupation and through the front lines of opposing armies. Several shifts of leadership groups occurred in Hungary. The intellectuals and university students prepared the ground for the uprising, but were replaced by spontaneous "mob" elements when the real violence began. Imre Nagy was the instrument, rather than the leader, of these elements. Organized labor determined the course in the post-mortem stage, as the Soviets mopped up the remainders of the rebellion. Students of the Instituto Nacional started the anti-Zonian actions which led to the Panamanian riots, in an election atmosphere poisoned by anti-American slogans. The leaders of the mob which participated in the rioting have apparently not been identified, but may have included pro-Castro elements.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the various leadership groups and the urgency of the underlying and more immediate factors, the further success of the mass demonstrations also depended upon the prevalence of the "right" conditions at the time and place of the outbreak of each of them.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTBREAK

As the demonstrations broke out, certain exceptional circumstances prevailed which were either accidental or engineered by more or less astute leadership. The organizers of the strike of February 1941 apparently knew their business quite well; they concentrated in their early efforts on features of Amsterdam life where disruption of regular routines would provide immediate and forceful signals to the population about an impending crisis. These signals were the failure of the streetcars to appear during the early morning rush hour and the conspicuous return into the city of workers who had gone on strike while other workers were still going to their jobs. The exceptional circumstance during the strike of 1943 was of an entirely different nature. The above-described German fumbling with the call-up of the former Dutch army happened to be communicated to many Dutch workers at a time and in a manner which could not have been more damaging to the German cause. The outbreak of the strike actions of 1943 can not be visualized without various, largely accidental happenings in the sphere of communications. The big railroad strike of 1944 broke out because the London government so commanded in a broadcast which came almost too late and was poorly coordinated with the various affected groups in occupied Holland. The railroad strike did break out successfully since the railroad management and most of the railroad personnel were singularly united and prepared for this strike, and not just due to the pressures of various resistance organizations. As to Hungary, it can be assumed that the dissatisfied intellectuals and the students originally had no desire no conquer the streets of Budapest or to excite the population to acts of violence. On the other hand, several dissenting elements among the elite were probably not averse to use "the masses" as an instrument of pressure through such devices as street marches and reburials of ex-purgees. They did not realize, perhaps, how easily escalation to the level of widespread bloodshed can take place once mass emotions take hold of an

issue, as did happen outside the radio headquarters. The Panamanian outbreak, finally, was provoked by, what can be termed, a display of negative leadership on the part of the agents of the United States government. Zonal police forces, for example, were unable to cope with fervent teenage nationalists of the Panamanian or the Zonal type.

February 1941; Streetcar Barns and IJ Ferries

The strike of February 1941 was arranged to break out where it was bound to be immediately conspicuous to most working inhabitants of Amsterdam. At 5 a.m., on February 25, 1941, members of the Communist Party first concentrated their efforts on the streetcar barns. They attempted to prevent the streetcars from leaving the barns. The strike would be an obvious success, they reasoned, if the familiar blue "trams" – there were hardly any busses – would be absent during the early morning rush hour. This would convince everyone that a strike had broken out and that it was effective.

The streetcar personnel was not persuaded easily. Many were reluctant to risk their secure civil service status as municipal employees; others mistrusted the Communists' motives. Yet, at the crucial barns the strike call was obeyed, sometimes only after application of such tricks as forcefully keeping the doors of the barns closed or even laying down on the rails leading out of the barns. Everywhere the strike leaders misrepresented the situation in "the other barns," where, they boasted, the strike was already a success.[1]

Another strategically important point developed near the ferries which connect Amsterdam with important industrial enterprises on the north side of the IJ river. Communist activists succeeded in convincing the workers in some enterprises there to drop their work immediately upon arrival at the plant and to surge back into the city. Thus, as other workers prepared to go to work by ferry, they noticed returning ferries crowded with workers who were obviously quitting their jobs. The crowded ferries going the other way were another symbol for the success of the strike. Highly emotional scenes developed that morning on the IJ river, with Communist and Socialist songs filling the air amidst considerable enthusiasm.

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–118.

With the help of these conspicuous rush hour victories, resulting in the absence of streetcars and ferries demonstratively occupied by strikers, the outbreak of the strike was managed successfully. Within one or two hours the inner city of Amsterdam was so completely and suddenly filled with throngs of idle workers that even the Germans were stunned and at first altogether helpless. The strikers had, in effect, conquered the street.[2]

April–May 1943; Bulletins during the Lunch Break

One circumstance crucial to the outbreak of the April–May 1943 strike was certainly not planned by professional strategists. At 1:23 p.m. on Thursday, April 29, 1943, a printing shop in the center of Hengelo – an important industrial town of Twente, in the eastern part of the Netherlands – began to display several copies of a German bulletin. This was the bulletin announcing the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, and at that time it was still in its original, apparently all-inclusive form. Workers were just returning to their plants from their lunch break, and many of them saw the bulletins in the shop window in front of which large and noisy crowds began to assemble immediately. The crucial point was that the call-up news thus spread to factories in Hengelo that same afternoon, before the workers had returned to their homes and before the call-up was watered down by restricting it to the "regulars" among the ex-soldiers. Some workers actually went on strike that very moment, perhaps to spend a few "final" hours with their family.

Rumors spread like wildfire through Hengelo factories that afternoon, and strike leaders cropped up everywhere, seemingly on the spur of the moment. Due to another lucky coincidence, the strike succeeded first in one of the most respected plants, the Stork machine works, which also happened to be situated in a conspicuous and central location with respect to other enterprises in Hengelo. At about 2:30 p.m. the striking Stork workers surged out into the streets, thus demonstrating to all the surrounding plants how they were reacting. It is characteristic for the April–May 1943 strike that no large-scale meetings of workers apparently took place in any Hengelo factory; also, there was no concerted action by any groups outside the factories to encourage the strike.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 129–125.

There were no mimeographed sheets, no party or union bosses pulling strings behind the scene. Workers went on strike spontaneously after hearing about the call-up bulletins and after seeing the strike evidence at Stork. In some plants, workers from different workshops actually went on strike simultaneously without prior contacts among the workshops.

The German blunders really paid off. If the workers had heard the call-up news at night, in their homes, the strike decisions would in fact have been taken the next morning, after the Germans had announced their intention just to call the ex-"regulars." This, in turn, would have made the outbreak of the strike unlikely. Thus, it could be argued that the timing of the bulletin's appearance in the shop window was a crucial fact in the outbreak of the strike of April–May 1943.[3]

The Railroad Strike; Last-Minute Proclamation from London

Careful attention had been paid by the board of directors to the proper proclamation of a strike which, after all, was to be decidedly non-spontaneous. The directors hoped to get advance notice from London, at least a few days, to be able to give appropriate warning to their organization. This was to be accomplished through the "confidence men" and through resistance channels. On September 11, 1944, a week before the strike, two telegrams were dispatched from London to Dr. Hupkes, the managing director, in which the imminent possibility of a railroad strike was implied, without, however, giving any clues about the exact date. Hupkes was further advised to listen constantly to the Dutch radio in London. These telegrams somewhat puzzled Hupkes since they came through resistance channels not previously known to him. Actually, they were sent by Dutch intelligence in London, not by the Dutch government – the latter being kept in the dark because of security precautions relating to the Arnhem operations.

The Dutch government did proclaim the railroad strike, but it was not able to give advance details to the board of directors because of its own ignorance of Allied plans. Late at night on September 16, 1944, the Allies finally informed the Dutch

[3] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 221–229. The strike was aided by the support of many of the employers. The manager of the Hengelo printing shop stated after the war that he had hurriedly displayed the German bulletin so that the workers would see it before returning to their jobs that afternoon. (*Ibid.*, p. 221.)

intelligence chief that the Arnhem landings would be staged the next day, at noon, and authorized him to notify the Dutch government that the strike call could be issued at that same hour. The intelligence chief had considerable trouble in locating the Premier, who was somewhere in the English countryside for the weekend. Premier Gerbrandy was reached only after the Arnhem landings had begun, and even then he did not want to proclaim the strike without the Minister of War's approval. It took a few more hours to find the latter, and his approval was obtained only after considerable hesitation.[4] Six hours after the Arnhem operations had started – at 6 p.m. on Sunday, September 17, 1944 – the government at last proclaimed the railroad strike via the London radio. Over the heads of the board of directors, who themselves heard the strike news only on the 6 p.m. broadcast, the strike order was given directly to all railroad employees. Thus, the board of directors' elaborate preparatory plans for the promulgation of the strike order had come to naught.[5]

Most railroad employees were not prepared for the sudden strike call, even though their service had become most distasteful and dangerous. The strike was proclaimed on a Sunday while many office and workshop employees were at their homes. This, in any case, made impossible the sudden surge of striking workers into the streets. The crucial decisions on carrying out the strike order had to be reached during the night of September 17–18, 1944. Much depended on the courage and efficiency of local leaders, many of whom came forward from the ranks of workers and lower officials. The station masters often were not sufficiently dynamic and imaginative to lead the strike in their respective sectors, partly because they usually resided with their families in the upper stories of station buildings and therefore were most vulnerable to German sanctions.

The strike, as a whole, proceeded successfully. In some localities it was effective within two hours of the London broadcast, in others by morning or soon thereafter. Only in relatively few areas did it fail to develop properly. For example, in the city of Groningen 80 per cent of the conductors and engineers, but only about 50 per cent of the other employees

[4] Apparently Premier Gerbrandy also desired royal approval for the strike, but it is not clear whether he actually reached Queen Wilhelmina.

[5] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 176, 214–218, 221–222.

responded to the strike. Many of the strikers immediately went "underground" with their families, although a high proportion of the lower ranking employees did not bother to take this precaution. The population everywhere greeted the strike with enthusiasm and provided shelter, food, and money to the railroad men.[6]

Thus, the railroad strike broke out by proclamation over the London radio. Local leadership could act with sufficient speed to offset the sudden, last-minute issuance of the strike order. It was fortunate that the Dutch were in the habit of listening to the London radio – in spite of the death penalty imposed on it by the Germans – and that the strike could be announced at the prime hour for news in the Netherlands, the 6 p.m. broadcast.

The Hungarian Uprising; Sixteen Points Conquer the Street

On October 22, 1956, university students and faculties in Budapest began a series of lengthy meetings which were intended, chiefly, to express solidarity with the Poles. In the great hall of Budapest university four to five thousand students and professors met for eleven hours, into the early hours of October 23, to praise the Poles, Imre Nagy, and democracy. Radio Budapest refused to broadcast the so-called sixteen points which were the product of this marathon session. Nevertheless, by the morning of October 23 the sixteen points were mimeographed and circularized all over the city. The results, according to the UN report, were incredible.

> Early on Tuesday, 23 October, the students' sixteen points appeared all over the city. "Work in Budapest stopped," a participant told the Committee. "Everyone went out on the streets weeping. People read the points and then rushed home or to their factories. Every stenographer and every typist did nothing but copy these things in all the offices. The Communist Party forbade this in vain. Everyone was talking about it; in conversation, over the telephone, the news spread in a few hours and within a short time all Budapest became an ant-hill. People pinned the Hungarian national cockade to their clothes, and a really fantastic miracle occurred, for I regard it as a miracle that the whole people became unified." [7]

Tension built up rapidly during the afternoon and evening among the crowds populating the streets. What attracted

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 226–234, 241–244, 249.
[7] United Nations Report, pp. 78–79.

them above all was the sight of demonstrating students parading through the city.

This was something entirely new and exhilarating .... At first the street crowds were mere onlookers, curious to see what would happen. As time went by, however, the people's mood gradually changed. When the crowds grew denser and showed no inclination to disperse, it dawned upon those in them that a historic moment was at hand. We find in the interviews such statements as: "We simply felt that it was impossible to leave without having done something decisive"; and "Something big was bound to happen." [8]

After the students had marched back to their universities, the crowds showed no desire to go home. Many persons, perhaps as many as 300,000, began to assemble near the Parliament building and adjoining streets, at about 6 p.m. Nothing particularly exciting happened there:

... the proceedings were dull; few could hear what was going on and not much seemed to happen. The crowd demanded that the light on a large red star on the top of the Parliament Building be switched off. There were cheers when this was done ....[9]

The crowds persisted in calling for Imre Nagy, who at that time had no official governmental position. After a while some writer friends of his persuaded him to come to the Parliament. From a balcony, without microphones, he delivered an unprepared, very brief address which few where able to hear. Apparently he merely asked the crowd to go home quietly – without success, however.

Whether the people could hear him or not, his words had no marked effect – possibly because the crowd had been waiting for so many hours, possibly because they had become exhilarated by a feeling of freedom and had expected some dramatic statement.[10]

Although the situation at the Parliament was by no means critical, the crowds did gradually fill streets and squares "with an ocean of humanity." [11] After 8 p.m., the atmosphere became markedly more ominous due to a radio address delivered at that time by First Party Secretary Gerö.

It was apparently the truculent tenor of Mr. Gerö's address, rather than specific phrases, that infuriated people all over Budapest. A witness has described how he rushed out into the streets and felt that something

[8] Kecskimeti, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[9] United Nations Report, p. 80.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[11] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

had to be done. The slogans: "Down with Gerö," and even "Death to Gerö" were heard everywhere.[12]

It was at one of the points of concentration of the crowds, near the headquarters of the Hungarian broadcasting system, that the first violence broke out. Originally the crowds at radio headquarters seemed no more bent on violence than those at the Parliament. They wanted the sixteen points broadcasted, and they apparently also demanded microphones on the street for sampling of public opinion, but they had no intention of storming the building.[13] Somehow, after the authorities denied the two requests, the situation went out of control. As the crowd in front of the radio building grew thicker, its mood became menacing.

Rumor spread that members of a delegation sent into the building to present the claims of the demonstrators had been detained and even shot. No one could verify the rumor. Tempers grew shorter. Shouted exchanges between the milling mass – confined as it was in a narrow street – and various officials who ventured out on a second-floor balcony in an effort to appease it further aggravated matters. The chanted slogans grew more radical, the language and catcalls grew fouler. Individual persons, protected by darkness and by the anonymity of the mob, also grew bolder. The lighted red star atop the building made a particularly tantalizing target of abuse. A young man shinnied up the facade of the building to the second floor to plant a Hungarian flag on the balcony's parapet. Very likely he acted as much from exhibitionism as from patriotic fervor, but it did not matter.[14]

At about 9 p.m. the violence began. The UN report describes the scene.

Some of the demonstrators set off fireworks from a truck standing in one of the streets. Water was sprayed on the crowd from a house .... Then, it is alleged, several demonstrators attempted to force their way into the building .... Shortly after 9 p.m. tear gas bombs were thrown from the upper floors. One or two minutes later, AVH [secret police] men rushed from the entrance and began shooting in all directions. At least three people were killed – some say eight – and many wounded. For about twenty minutes the shooting continued from the windows of the building, resulting in more casualties among the demonstrators.[15]

After this incident, violence began to spread. The cry, "they are massacring the Hungarians," was heard everywhere.[16]

[12] United Nations Report, p. 81.
[13] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] United Nations Report, p. 81.
[16] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

Numerous other clashes developed between the crowd and government forces. The radio building and other public buildings were surrounded, the central publishing house of the Party was invaded and ransacked. By morning, the uprising was in full progress amidst general confusion.

> Decisions had to be made on the spot. Skirmishes or truces ensued, depending on the moment and the place. Guns changed hands and persons switched sides from the government to the insurgents ....[17]

Mass emotions, and the response they provoked at the lower levels of the regime's functionaries, determined the outbreak of the uprising. There is no particular explanation why the crowd before the Parliament building remained peaceful and the crowd before the radio building became violent. Zinner merely concludes that the radio building crowd "acted spontaneously" and "had no clear ideas of the consequences of its actions"; similarly, the defenders of the radio building, including secret police and army detachments, behaved "spontaneously."

> They responded to an acute situation of anxiety in a confused manner. There is no telling precisely what orders the secret policemen had about dispersing the crowd, or whether anyone authorized them to fix bayonets and fire into the throng with live ammunition.[18]

In view of the regime's lack of effectiveness at the time and the sudden development of the crisis situation, it appears altogether likely that the use of firearms against the crowd was as unscheduled and unauthorized as the crowd's "siege" of the building. Thus, the violence which determined the outbreak of the uprising might have been avoided if the regime had happened to react differently.

The Panamanian Riots; Illegal Flag-Raisings

On Thursday, January 9, 1964, students at Balboa High School had raised the United States flag for the third time in as many days in violation of official orders. Governor Fleming at first had ordered the flag taken down again, and the school's principal had complied. This raised a storm of protest among students and parents, and "within an hour the students ran up a smaller United States flag and recited the Pledge of Allegiance." School officials talked to the students, but the flag

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 243–244.
[18] *Ibid.*

was not taken down again. Reportedly, "the Governor relented temporarily to avoid trouble." [19] As the International Jurists concluded, "we find it difficult to understand why the Canal Zone authorities, including the Balboa School authorities, did not take firmer and stronger action to implement the flag agreement with regard to their own students." [20]

The consequences of this lack of firmness soon became obvious. At about 4:45 p.m. on January 9, a group of some two hundred Panamanian students left their school, the Instituto Nacional, after classes and marched into the Zone. They carried a Panamanian flag and placards. As was mentioned before, this flag was the Institute's flag, given to them by the headmaster. Photographers and other newsmen accompanied the students, whose march – in the opinion of the International Jurists – seemed to have been "very carefully prepared" and hardly "spontaneous." [21] Although the students, dressed in their school uniforms, appeared to have peaceful and orderly methods of demonstration in mind, their placards advised Governor Fleming to go home and claimed exclusive Panamanian sovereignty in the Zone.[22]

The students' march was stopped well inside the Zone and quite near to their objective, Balboa High School. Captain Gaddis Wall, head of the Balboa district of the Zonal police, refused access to the flagpole in front of the school on which the marchers wanted to display their Panamanian flag. Addressing the students in English, and through an interpreter, Captain Wall proposed that a delegation of five students "should display the Panamanian flag at the foot of the flagpole by holding it in their hands and sing the national anthem; they would not be allowed to hoist the flag on the flagpole." [23] The rest of the Panamanian students were required to remain at some distance, separated by Zonal police from a large number of Zonal students who had gathered around the flagpole with its illegally displayed United States flag.[24]

The student marchers accepted these terms, although it is not certain that they understood them completely in view of "the general state of agitation" at the scene and the additional

[19] *New York Times*, January 13 and January 15, 1964; February 2, 1964.
[20] *International Jurists*, p. 40.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[24] *Ibid.*

confusion resulting from the use of an interpreter. Five students with the Panamanian flag approached the flagpole, followed by a sixth who carried a placard proclaiming Panama's sole sovereignty in the Zone. In the meantime some four hundred to five hundred Zonal students and adults had gathered in front of Balboa High and the flagpole. These Americans did not, in Captain Wall's admission, "behave entirely as I had hoped they would." As the Panamanian delegation approached, the Zonians began to sing the United States national anthem and loudly displayed displeasure with the Panamanian students. At this point Captain Wall decided to cancel the originally permitted flag demonstration by the Panamanian delegation. He ordered his policemen to force the six students back to the main group of marchers. Surrounded by police and Zonians,

> the Panamanian students, who were bearing the Panamian flag, were exposed to considerable stress, especially when two of them stumbled over the hedge and when, some 25 feet further, some fell a second time. At a certain stage in the general melee the Panamian flag was torn. It was not proved that the flag was torn on purpose by American adults or students, nor was it proved that the flag was slightly torn before the six students proceeded to the flagpole with Captain Wall. It is quite likely that the flag, made of silk, was not able to resist the stress and strain of the occasion.
>
> The delegation of Panamian students was forced back by the police equipped with special riot-control batons until they were with the main body of the Panamian students behind the police line on the other side of Gorgona Road. It is doubtful that the police used their batons only by holding the batons in both hands in front of them to push the Panamian delegation back. Some of the policemen seem to have used their batons in a more aggressive manner against the retreating Panamian students.[25]

When the main force of Panamanian students saw what was happening they started shouting and otherwise expressed their dissatisfaction. Some stones were thrown at Zonal policemen and one was slightly injured. As the students began their march out of the Zone, their resentment was profound due to the

> cancelling of the demonstration, the retreat with a torn flag, the hostile behavior of the Americans in front of the Balboa High School, as well as during the retreat of the students, and the lack of any effective attempt by the police to quieten the American students and adults....[26]

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[26] *Ibid.*

On the way back to Panama City the angry students caused some damage in the Zone. Garbage cans were toppled; windows, street lights, and traffic lights were smashed. The students left the Zone shortly before 7 p.m., some two hours after their futile march had begun.[27] Even before they re-entered the Republic of Panama, the news of the flag incident and of the torn flag "spread like wildfire." At about 6:30 p.m., a crowd of several hundred Panamanians had gathered to await the students. Before their return a series of acts of violence had already been committed on the Panamanian side of the border, particularly the turning over and burning of several United States cars.[28]

The outbreak of the riots was apparently facilitated by a communications failure on the part of the United States government. The high school students had been violating the flag rule for three days before the Panamanian students appeared. Washington seems not to have been informed of these acts of defiance until the third day; by that time it was much more difficult to control the students, and the Panamanians had organized their counter-measures. The *New York Times* reported that "intelligence specialists" were disturbed by a forty-eight hour lag in the reporting of the first defiance of the no-flag rule at the school, which had occurred on January 7. Thus, the agitators were given two days "to set their plans in motion while the United States Government was in no position to order measures that might have averted the trouble." The Embassy in Panama apparently cabled no reports to the State Department on January 7 and January 8, although the Panamanian television, radio, and press had prominently featured the news of these early incidents.[29]

This communications failure may provide a partial explanation for the unwise handling of the student march by Zonal police. The International Jurists concluded as follows:

> We cannot ... help feeling that the Canal Zone authorities, and in particular the Canal Zone police, could have handled the situation with greater foresight. The Panamanian students having been permitted to stage their demonstration and march into the compound of the Balbao School, and the police captain having assured the safe conduct of the small group of Panamanian students who were to carry out their flag demonstration and sing the Panamanian national anthem, we think

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[29] *New York Times*, January 14, 1964.

that the Panamanian students should have been better protected, and that the provocative acts of the United States students and citizens should have been more firmly handled. It was particularly unfortunate that physical force, by the use of batons on the Panamanian students who had been previously assured safe conduct, was not avoided.[30]

What are the right conditions for the successful outbreak of mass demonstrations? In Amsterdam, in 1941, the streetcars were not available during the early morning rush hours and the IJ ferries were filled with workers going the wrong way. These phenomena, provoked largely by the CPN, produced the milling crowds in the inner city which signalled the outbreak of the strike. In Hengelo, in 1943, bulletins displayed during the lunch hour announced the German call-up in its most tactless and shocking version. These bulletins were directly related to the strike decisions taken that afternoon in various workshops of the Stork plant. Partly because of the example of Stork, partly spontaneously, the 1943 strike spread rapidly thereafter. Since the outbreak of the railroad strike was not spontaneous, it required proclamation by legitimate authority. This was provided by the Dutch government over the London radio under rather haphazard circumstances. The strike succeeded nevertheless, partly because of the preparations undertaken by the railroad management. The Hungarian uprising broke out after crowds in the streets, excited by student demonstrations, attempted to pressure the radio authorities to announce the students' sixteen points on the air. The tense atmosphere outside the radio headquarters exploded into violence more or less accidentally; this, in turn, produced series of violent incidents all over the city. In Panama, proud student demonstrators were slighted in front of a crowd of Zonians in an atmosphere of supreme nationalistic tension, as the opposing groups were engaged in a battle

[30] *International Jurists*, p. 40. The following citation from a Panamanian author reveals the intensity of Panamanian emotions regarding the flag issue. "The 'flag issue' has become . . . the ultimate symbolization of Panama's position and demands vis-à-vis the United States. *Everything* is symbolized in the flag. It is quite impossible to depict or convey how very sacred and dear to Panamanian hearts the flag is. One could almost go as far as to say that Panamanians are flag-worshippers for somehow this is one issue every Panamanian takes seriously. By law, every Monday morning, all Panamanian schoolchildren formally line up in the assembly ground and salute the flag. Just as one believes in the Child Jesus and Santa Claus, one also believes that no harm can come to the person shielded by the flag." ("Crisis in Panama," unpublished manuscript, Tulane University, 1964, pp. 39–40.)

for the display of their respective national flags. As Zonal police authorities appeared to disregard their own, minor concessions to the Panamanians, the humiliated students of the Instituto Nacional marched back to the Republic where they were received by a bitter crowd which was easily persuaded to start rioting against the United States.

The course of the demonstrations required one further step after the outbreak. They had to be spread with respect to time and place, to endure as long as possible in as many areas as possible.

CHAPTER V

THE SPREADING

The extent of the spreading of the demonstrations varied, but did generally reflect their limited scope. On February 25, 1941, the Germans did for a few hours lose control of the streets of Amsterdam, but they recovered within the next one or two days. The 1943 strike was less intensive, yet it spread throughout the country and lasted a few days, in some places even a week. The railroad strike of 1944 lasted eight months, until the end of the war; it completely shut down Holland's largest enterprise at a time that the Germans – and also the Dutch population – needed it most. The Hungarian rebels controlled much of the country, including Budapest, for thirteen days, and maintained themselves even longer in some industrial plants; the uprising successfully toppled one Communist regime and seized its most sensitive power positions in the capital, in the provincial centers, and in the villages. The Panamanian riots involved United States troops and Panamanian civilians for several days in explosive encounters along the Canal Zone borders, with brief penetrations of Zonal territory, continuous sniping at Zonal targets, and anti-American acts inside the Republic of Panama.

February 1941; One Day's Vacation from German Rule

By 11 a.m., on February 25, 1941 – just six hours after the crucial organizing efforts at the streetcar barns – all kinds of people had joined the strike which had started with municipal transport workers and metal workers across the IJ river. Some 1300 employees of Amsterdam's largest department store (De Bijenkorf), about 1000 workers and engineers at the Royal Dutch Shell plant, hundreds of workers in tobacco factories and sugar refineries, to cite a few examples. Feverish excitement prevailed throughout the city during the late morning hours. The few streetcars which somehow made an appearance were stoned, toppled over, stopped, or literally pushed back into the barns by the crowds in the streets. At

the height of the strike, at noon, the German Commissioner for Amsterdam, H. Böhmcker, observed waves after waves of Amsterdamers who "surged through the streets of the inner city, organized large-scale disturbances, and sang . . . patriotic songs."

The German police and military were conspicuously absent during most of the day, and Amsterdam police obviously sympathized with the demonstrators. Only by 10 a.m. did Dutch police authorities bother to take official notice of the disorders. At 12:45 p.m. the first action by Amsterdam police against demonstrators finally took place, as sabres and horses were used to disperse a crowd massed near the royal palace.[1]

In the early afternoon many thousands attended a Communist-organized rally on a square in the Jordaan, the quarter of Amsterdam inhabited mostly by the non-Jewish proletariat. When a suddenly appearing German police detachment began firing at the crowd, Amsterdam police intervened *en masse* to clear the square. The demonstrators reassembled soon and spent the rest of the afternoon trekking through the streets, singing socialist songs, shouting slogans such as "down with the Jewish pogroms," and molesting uniformed Dutch Nazis.[2]

The strike spread on February 25 because those connected with its outbreak managed to conquer the street. For a few hours, at least, the demonstrators were dominant, and large numbers of new strikers continued to join because the success of the conquest of the street was obvious to all. The strike hardly spread outside Amsterdam, however. After all, the strike leaders were Communists, and Amsterdam was the center of the CPN; the cause of the strike related to the acts against the Jews, and Amsterdam was the center of Dutch Jewry. Nevertheless, fairly impressive strikes did spread from Amsterdam to the adjacent industrial region of the Zaan, but only in a few other areas, such as nearby Haarlem, did some small-scale demonstrations develop. As will be seen below, the February strike did not endure much beyond that first day, partly as a result of the German reaction, partly for reasons inherent in the nature of this particular strike.[3]

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–133.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–138.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–142, 156–158. The news of the February strike reached London late during the second day, February 26. The Associated Press still had a correspondent in Amsterdam at the time, who managed to send details about the strike

April–May 1943; Commuters, Telephone Operators, and Dairy Distributors

The strike of April–May 1943 did spread all over the Netherlands, to towns as well as the countryside, even though it did not bring about as intensive a conquest of the street as the Amsterdam strike.

The first workers walking off a job in a locality were the most effective agents for the further spreading of the strike there. For example, in the key city of Hengelo the strike leader, Stork, happened to be located in the middle of several other factories. The walk-out of the Stork workers could be seen at these other enterprises and duly inspired them. Another factor in the successful spreading of this strike related to the rural place of residence of many of the workers. In Twente, and in other key regions of the 1943 strike, workers commute daily from their villages to the factory. These commuters were most effective in communicating the news and the spirit of the strike to neighboring localities. The spreading of the strike was further enhanced by the unprecedented activity of telephone operators on factory switchboards and in telephone company exchanges. For example, whoever tried to call Stork during the first afternoon of the strike was told by the operators of the state-owned telephone company that Stork was on strike. In this way, customers and suppliers of Stork all over the Netherlands found out that very afternoon about the strike in Twente, and this awareness contributed to the success of the strike elsewhere.

Within ninety minutes the strike in Hengelo succeeded even though there was no centralized leadership at a level higher than the individual enterprises. Workers left their jobs quietly in 1943, and virtually no street demonstrations developed. Also, in further contrast to 1941, workers in private enterprises quit first, but many municipal employees, in Hengelo and elsewhere, followed very soon. Of forty-one large enterprises in Twente, with a total of 25,591 employees, twenty-eight enterprises with 20,947 employees went out on strike during the first afternoon.[4]

In another important locale of the 1943 strike, the coal-mining region of Limburg in the southern part of the Nether-

to the AP office in Berlin. From there the news came to the United States and the Allied world. (*Ibid.*, p. 181.)

[4] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 51, 67, 229–230, 233.

lands, the spreading was helped by the particularly lengthy commuting trips of many miners who preferred to live in their native villages. The commuters travelled by public transportation, frequently by bus, and "quite a few strikes were born on the bus." Apparently, "increased community feelings" came to the fore on the bus; "while travelling the mood became more and more courageous." Moreover, the unusual early morning return to the villages of the busses with strikers announced the strike news throughout rural Limburg.[5]

In the countryside itself, the "dairy plant [*zuivelfabriek*]" usually was the center of the strike. The dairy plant is the one place where the farmers of the surrounding villages have daily contact with one another. If the personnel of the dairy plant goes on strike, the farmer will be affected immediately as his daily shipment of milk is no longer accepted. Also, during a dairy strike milk is not delivered to the nearby towns. As a result, town dwellers are forced to trek directly to the farms in an effort to secure milk. Thus, urban and rural strikers could make contacts. Wherever the dairy plant of a region went on strike, a united front between town and countryside could usually be established. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Germans directed their main anti-strike efforts in the countryside against the personnel of the dairy plants.[6]

While the strike initiative in rural areas was frequently taken in the dairy plants, also the so-called "milk-riders" were often among the activists. "Milk-riding" is a rotating chore for Dutch farmers, involving the pick-up of milk cans in a neighborhood and their delivery to the dairy plant. If the "milk-rider" goes on strike, the effect is similar to a strike in the dairy plant. Of course, by his very duties the "milk-rider" gets around, and his absence is immediately noted. In a few other farm communities, the village doctor or retired officers were most active in 1943. Farmers, as a whole, were willing to cooperate with the strike. They did it by not shipping their products and by urging the closing of village shops and even schools. In the close and conformist village community such actions could be amazingly unanimous.

The rural strike was most intensive in the traditionally independent province of Friesland. The spreading there was facilitated by a lucky coincidence. April 30, 1943, the day after

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 119–121.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

the strike broke out in Twente, happened to be market day in the provincial capital of Leeuwarden, and farmers from all over the province congregated to discuss the strike news. In Friesland the strike lasted longer than anywhere else, until May 7, and brought the most total disobedience of German decrees. The great majority of Friesland farmers are either orthodox Calvinists or Social Democrats, and both kinds participated fully, not to speak of the enthusiastic support in those rural areas of the province where the old Syndicalist-Anarchist traditions of Domela Nieuwenhuis were still alive.

Violence in the 1943 strike was directed against farmers who had sided with the Dutch Nazis, and some of their farms were burnt to the ground. In some areas the strike tended to be used by farm laborers to harass wealthy farmers and it also at times served as an excuse for farmers to evade rationing and anti-black market regulations.[7]

The spreading to the governmental sector must still be mentioned. In many towns the post office, which also provides telegraph and telephone services in the Netherlands, joined the strike immediately. Municipal services, and in some cases teachers, participated too. In Twente even policemen wanted to leave their posts, but changed their mind in the last minute.[8]

The spreading of the 1943 strike was considerably facilitated by the fact that virtually all employers backed their striking workers, often at grave risk to their personal safety. Employers, after all, were usually personally known to the authorities and could not "retreat into the anonymity of their group." Most employers sabotaged German demands to hand over lists with names of striking workers. It comes as no surprise to read German complaints about the many "unreliable" leaders of enterprises who should have been eliminated before the strike broke out.[9] Numerous Catholic and Protestant clergymen backed the strike to the utmost, particularly in the many Dutch villages where they have continued to play a dominant role in all phases of daily life.[10]

Thus, the 1943 strike spread from Twente across the nation – to the coal mines of Limburg, the huge Philips plant at Eindhoven, the smallish enterprises of the Delft and the

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–54, 67, 81, 92–98, 116, 133, 145.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 71, 99, 105, 127, 246, 282–284.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 165, 293, 381.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.

Noord river region, the paper mills at Velzen, and the farms of Friesland, to give but an incomplete listing. However, it could not take hold in the three largest cities. Amsterdam had "shot its bolt" in February 1941; moreover, the underground Communist Party had been hit by a series of arrests just before the outbreak of the strike. Rotterdam was still in ruins from the air bombardment of May 1940, and its economic heart, the port, was dead. The Hague was the center of the occupation regime, whose controls weighed most heavily there.[11] Equally immune to the 1943 strike were the Netherlands Railroads. The anti-strike decision was not an easy one for the management, and certainly not a popular one; it was argued that the railroads could only strike once and that this would have to be done at the strategically most important moment, after thorough preparation. The non-participation of the railroads in the 1943 strike, according to its official historian, "probably contributed most to the giving-up of the illusion that the strike could develop into a truly national strike." Particularly in rural areas, where the railroad is the one link with the country as a whole, the punctually appearing trains were the symbol of "business as usual" and augured the limited duration of the strike action.[12]

The Railroad Strike; "Federation" of Local Actions

While the 1943 strike developed in regional clusters, spreading through such agents as the commuters, the "milk-riders," or the telephone operators, the railroad strike was

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26, 138, 178.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 54, 84. The post-war parliamentary commission of inquiry showed concern about the railroads' attitude in 1943. The railroads' managing director, Dr. Hupkes, mentioned in his defense that the character of the 1943 strike was particularly decentralized and spontaneous. Management did not organize the walk-outs, but "the employees simply ran away" and management did not object. However, the thoroughly centralized railroad system could not be expected to engage in this kind of strike. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 685–686.)

The late arrival of news about this strike in London illustrates the difficulties of communicating with an occupied country. On the second day, on April 30, a German radio message in English, directed to Japan, was picked up in London. This message mentioned the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, and a Swiss correspondent in Berlin soon confirmed this. However, only on May 2 did a resistance telegram provide some vague and inaccurate news about strikes. On May 9 a lengthy but also inaccurate report about the strike finally reached London. The lack of current and accurate information played havoc with the Dutch government's psychological warfare efforts from London on the subject of the strike, which as such should have been a "natural" topic. (Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–43.)

carried out by the hierarchically organized network of the railroads, extending from the central offices in Utrecht to the smallest depot in the provinces. Although the strike call ultimately came via the London radio, and not from Utrecht, the preparations had been sufficient to make the spreading of the strike fairly even and reasonably instantaneous. Yet, in the beginning the railroad strike too consisted merely of "a series of improvised and isolated local actions"; only gradually these transformed themselves into, what Rüter called, "a federation" of local actions. As the weeks and months of the long railroad strike passed, it did more and more show the effects of the "perfectly hierarchical system" which is the Netherlands Railroads.[13]

While the management could be content with the spreading of the strike, there were stations where far too many employees stayed on the job, such as in Groningen and Alkmaar. In some places a struggle developed between strikers and non-strikers, abetted by the forces backing each group. For example, at the key junction of Amersfoort the Germans tried all sorts of tricks to prevent the strike. They promised double wages and extra rations to strike breakers, and threatened strikers with concentration camp and confiscation of personal properties. The management and the railroad unions' Personnel Council replied in kind. They reconfirmed the strike order both in writing and orally, used direct pressure through resistance channels, and finally asked the Allies to bomb the Amersfoort station. This took place, and Amersfoort was saved for the strike. In the important city of Apeldoorn the resistance enforced the continued spreading of the strike by threatening violence, and at least one non-striker was shot through the hip, as a warning. Of course, as in all other strikes, the quality of local leadership had much to do with the successful spreading.[14]

Because of the centralized nature of the strike and its unprecedented length, continued success depended on the availability of communications. The management and the Personnel Council had to keep themselves informed on the progress and problems of the strike in the various parts of the country. Yet, the very stoppage of the trains, the virtual non-existence of other means of transportation, and the German tapping of telephones made communications ex-

[13] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. VIII, 3–4.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 323, 325, 330.

tremely difficult and hazardous. Fortunately, a resistance organization, the efficient "T.D.," was willing to put a communications system at the management's disposal. The system, as was usual during the occupation, featured young females on bicycles who in relays kept up a message service between the various cities. In addition, Secretary-General M. Hirschfeld and other Dutch officials still in office lent a helping hand by "disguising" management and Personnel Council members as "food-rationing officials"; they even provided the incredible luxury of a car and gasoline. This made the trips to outlying stations somewhat less arduous for the strike leadership.[15]

The Hungarian Uprising; the "Muscovites" Melt Away

After the peak of mass involvement and mass excitement during the night of October 23, 1956, "excitement abated and fatigue set in." As the new day broke in Budapest, sobering thoughts came. As a result, the insurgents hesitated about consolidating their hold on public buildings which had been seized or surrounded during the night. Never again, after the night of October 23, "did the insurrection regain the character of a massed, armed rising." From October 24 on, the fighting was limited to certain blocks and intersections, and was generally of a sporadic character. After all, a unified rebel command never developed, nor were there organized troops available. Yet, the isolated fighting was sufficient to keep the uprising alive and the rebels dominant; moreover, it created the conditions under which the rebellion could spread to the entire country, to the provincial towns as well as the countryside.[16]

The leaders of the uprising in the capital, the lieutenants around Imre Nagy, were at first not in communication with the country outside Budapest. But, by some kind of "instinctive affinity," as Zinner called it, the uprising did spread. In the villages and towns there were no dissenting factions of the elite, such as the Communist writers and students in Budapest, to engineer mass demonstrations. The countryside rebellion had a more specifically anti-Communist character. As a result,

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 294–295. Concerning the complicated and amazingly successful financial arrangements for the continuation of the strike, see the following chapter, fn. 25.

[16] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–260.

the thinly scattered local Communists in most areas simply surrendered their offices and "evaporated"; where they failed to do so, violence occurred with casualties on both sides. As a whole, country Communists were "spineless," particularly since local Soviet army units usually stood aside and were content merely to protect their own barracks and dependents. In fact, "ad hoc arrangements" between Soviet garrison commanders and local rebels served very well to maintain the peace. Thus, isolated and demoralized, "the Communist Party in the countryside simply melted away." [17]

The initiative for spreading the uprising in the countryside came from individual students, skilled workers, or any other kind of more prominent person available. Usually, revolutionary councils were established immediately, consisting of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. In the city of Győr, the key rebel center in the provinces, a "parliament of revolutionary councils" apparently was organized effectively. The radio station at Győr had been captured at a time that the Budapest station was still in "Muscovite" hands.[18]

Communications between Budapest and the rest of the country remained singularly difficult during the entire course of the uprising. Road, rail, and air transport facilities were at first entirely disorganized; later, the Soviet army controlled them tightly. Although some local radio stations were captured, the strongest station, Radio Budapest, remained relatively long in the hands of the old government. Only the telephone was at the rebels' disposal, particularly so since the secret police was too busy to keep up its previous monitoring services.

> The telephone became the principal medium of communication. Never before in the history of the capital were the capacities of the telephone exchange so heavily taxed .... Some refugees claim to have made several hundred telephone calls during the thirteen-day period of the revolution.[19]

By October 30, a week after its eruption, the rebellion seemed to succeed everywhere with relative ease. A general strike had engulfed the country. The most guarded political prisons had fallen and their inmates liberated. The most sensitive governmental offices had been taken over, including defense and the regular police. Universities had been purged and Cardinal

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 260–261.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 262.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

Mindszenty had been released from the house arrest imposed on him by the old regime. Excesses – such as anti-semitism, looting, and needless violence – could generally be avoided and order was maintained to some extent. Even the middle classes, who tended to remain "on the sidelines," were venturing out in the streets again. According to Zinner, they developed a passive yet complete identification with the uprising. "People who had never felt any particular kinship with the masses now were seized with indescribable excitement." [20]

The uprising spread successfully even though the most dramatic night, October 23–24, was not followed by equally intensive mass outbursts. Of course, the rebels had only beaten the "front" of the real power in Hungary. When this power finally decided to intervene on a large scale, the uprising in turn melted away almost overnight, like the "Muscovites" before it.

The Panamanian Riots; Snipers and Looters

Upon return of the Panamanian students from their unsuccessful attempt to hoist their flag on the flagpole of Balboa High School in the Zone, the Panamanian crowd which was awaiting them became unruly. Rioting developed rapidly and soon casualties occurred on both sides. When the riots finally subsided after three days and four nights, twenty-four persons, including four Americans, had been killed and more than two hundred wounded. American business establishments in Panama had been looted and ransacked, and several deep penetrations of the Zone had taken place.[21] The report of the International Jurists somewhat scantly describes the various incidents.

For example, shortly after 7:00 p.m. on the first night, the crowds near the Instituto Nacional turned over and burned United States cars, threw rocks into the Zone, and attacked an iron fence wich formed the Zonal border. They succeeded in tearing down the fence and surged into the Zone near the residence of Federal District Judge Crowe. The Judge's house was attacked with rocks and Molotov cocktails and was set on fire in several places.[22] The area of greatest violence and damage was near Shaler Triangle and the neighboring Legis-

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 288–290, 293.
[21] *New York Times*, January 13 and January 18, 1964.
[22] *International Jurists*, p. 22.

lative Palace, the Pan American Building, and the Tivoli Hotel, the latter building being situated inside the Zone. "Shortly after 7 p.m. [on the first night] the normal stream of traffic appeared to have ceased and the streets were filled by a milling, agitated crowd." Soon the crowd in the area numbered several thousand people. Cars were turned over and set afire, street lights were broken, and shops and other properties on the Panamanian side were looted and damaged. Late during the night, the Pan American Building was invaded and burned out entirely. "Six persons – possibly looters – seem to have been trapped in the building, where their dead bodies were found the next morning." The Tivoli Hotel was attacked during several days, with Molotov coctails and firearms. Afterwards, "the marks of no less than 465 bullets were found." [23] The news of the disturbances in Panama City spread rapidly to other parts of Panama, particularly the Cristobal-Colon area. Crowds of more than one thousand persons entered the Zone there on the first night of rioting. Windows were broken in the Y.M.C.A. building and the Masonic Temple, and serious fighting between United States troops and Panamanians developed there too, killing three soldiers.[24]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the spreading of the Panamanian riots hardly assumed what might be called major proportions. United States troops at all times seemed to manage to contain the attacks where they chose to make a determined stand. Where the rioters succeeded in penetrating to Zonal targets, it appeared to be a consequence of the reluctance on the part of the defenders to cause a bloodbath among the demonstrators. The riots everywhere ended quite suddenly when the Panamanian Guardia Nacional was finally ordered onto the scene, during the early morning of January 13. If United States and Panamanian troops had cooperated from the beginning, particularly on January 9, it might have been possible to control the angry crowds sufficiently so that the demonstrations would have collapsed during that first night.

With the exception of the eight months long railroad strike, the demonstrations did not endure. Their time span was limited to one or two days in February 1941, one day to one week in April–May 1943, thirteen days in Hungary, and three

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–25.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–31.

days in Panama. On the other hand, the spreading was impressive in other respects. All the population of Amsterdam could enjoy, in a sense, a day's vacation from Nazi rule; the conquest of the Amsterdam streets was as complete on February 25 as the demonstrators cared to make it. The 1943 strike spread to the entire country and to all kinds of sectors of the economy, such as industrial workers, miners, farmers, shopkeepers, garbage collectors, and postal employees. While the street was not conquered in 1943, the strike imposed itself on an impressive number of enterprises. The railroad strike did last and spread all the way down the line, with tremendous consequences for all Dutchmen. The Hungarian uprising toppled a puppet government in its central positions in Budapest as well as in the countryside. Eventually, the power behind the puppets repressed the uprising, but for almost two weeks the Soviet Union was forced to temporize and react passively. The Panamanian riots involved thousands of Panamanians and Americans during several days and nights; they flared up all along the border and caused casualties and destruction of property on Panamanian as well as Canal Zone soil.

All the demonstrations were repressed except the railroad strike, which outlasted the war. Yet, all the demonstrations presented novel and unpleasant challenges to the regimes involved. Immediate, on-the-spot repression seemed out of the question in each case, particularly because the demonstrations invariably featured surprise elements. Moreover, the masses of demonstrators, like guerrilla fighters, were not too readily affected by the frontal assaults of a superior military establishment, although United States – Panamanian military cooperation might have made all the difference during the Panamanian riots.

CHAPTER VI

THE REPRESSION

The Amsterdam strike of 1941 surprised the Germans, who were unable to take any effective repressive measures on the first day. Stern measures easily brought the steets under control on the second day, even though many workers continued to stay away from their jobs. It should be noted that the strikers made no serious effort to stage demonstrations on the second day, and had probably never intended to do so. During the strike actions of 1943 the Germans were again taken by surprise and again undertook their repressive measures after the strikers had had their day and were probably not too interested in pushing matters much further. As a result, since strikers and Germans did not clash directly very often, there was relatively little bloodshed in 1941 and 1943. The 1944 railroad strike was not repressed at all. The Germans, once more, did not react immediately, and later, indirect measures – involving the threat of starvation of the population of the three large cities – could not be maintained. The Hungarian rebels successfully fought off not only the regime's feeble attempts at repression but also the first wave of Russians, although the latter were initially too weak and undetermined to make a real effort. The second wave of Russians, on the other hand, met no major resistance. Thus, also in Hungary bloodshed was relatively minor during the actual repression. During the Panamanian riots the United States forces seem to have acted, as a whole, with some restraint. The rioting ceased when Panamanian troops appeared on the scene and made unnecessary a final repression by United States troops.

February 1941; German Surprise and Indiscriminate Punishment

The rapidly spreading strike of February 25, 1941, which burst out at 5 a.m. and took control of the street by 10 a.m., placed the Germans before an accomplished fact. The occupier

certainly had not expected an eruption; in fact, during the evening preceding it German police authorities in Amsterdam had dismissed rumors about a strike as "bluff." By coincidence, not only the German boss of the Netherlands but also the head of the security forces were out of the country. Seyss-Inquart was on leave in Germany, and the chief of the Sicherheitsdienst, Dr. W. Harster, was organizing ski championships in Austria.[1]

The German commissioner for Amsterdam, Dr. H. Böhmcker, heard about the strike only at 9:05 a.m., four hours after the scenes at the streetcar barns. At this late hour he dispatched an aide with a detachment of German police to one of the barns, but nothing could be accomplished there. Two SS regiments barracked in neighboring towns were ordered into a state of combat readiness, and the five hundred men of the German police battalion in Amsterdam were issued special orders to break up rallies of strikers and to shoot to kill without warning wherever necessary. Yet, significantly enough, the SS regiments did not enter the city that first day of the strike and the police battalion remained in barracks virtually all day. In one documented case, a truck full of German police waited patiently and passively at an intersection until a noisy group of demonstrators had passed. At 4:15 p.m. the Amsterdam police was finally told that German forces would intervene if order were not restored "soon."

Thus, on the first day the strikers were hardly challenged and suffered virtually no casualties. German army authorities were duly impressed and upset by their own security forces' reluctance to intervene. It became very obvious that Amsterdam police and Dutch national police troops (Marechaussee) "were not willing to do anything." [2]

The German commissioner did initiate certain other measures on the first day of the strike after he had discovered that the strike was intended as a protest against the anti-Jewish measures, particularly the grabbing of the "hostages." He informed the leaders of the *Judenrat* (Jewish Council) that three hundred more Jews would be arrested at random if the strike would not be terminated by noon the next day. This threat was publicized by posters displayed throughout the city

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 143–145.

after 6:30 p.m.[3] Moreover, a 7:30 p.m. curfew was ordered for the entire population. The German police did manage to arrest some of the Communist activists in the strike that first night, but the Germans themselves admitted that the "top leaders" of the strike among the Communists and Jews had not yet been discovered. It should be noted that the press and the radio were prohibited from making any mention of the demonstrations.[4]

Early the next day the two SS regiments moved into Amsterdam and a modified form of martial law was proclaimed. The German police appeared on the streets and made use of its firearms. Between thirty and forty casualties occured, mostly non-fatal, particularly among those attending a large rally of striking garbage collectors. Also Amsterdam police used force on the second day, sabres as well as firearms.[5] Moreover, the mayor of Amsterdam, decidedly not a Nazi or Quisling, was persuaded to announce that all municipal employees who continued the strike would be dismissed.

As a result of these pressures, including the earlier threats against the Jews, many workers did go back to their jobs during the second day. For example, of the 3336 municipal employees on strike on February 25, 1845 had resumed work by the evening of February 26. Even the streetcars were appearing again. The Germans had soon realized the significance of "the regularity of public transportation" as a decisive factor in the restoration of order. By ordering German or Dutch policemen to ride on each streetcar, they were able to prevent further attempts by strikers to overturn operating streetcars. As the streetcars reappeared, the main symbol of the success of the strike disappeared. However, most strikers in the private industrial enterprises across the IJ river stayed out also during the second day.

The strike collapsed in both private and public enterprises on the third day, February 27. German police occupied many of the factories across the river, and heavily armed German patrols dominated the streets, with machine gun positions at strategic points.[6]

[3] The *Judenrat* had been ordered into existence by the Germans to facilitate their dealings with the Jewish inhabitants of Amsterdam.

[4] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147, 160–161, 168.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 152–154, 162, 165. Apparently, seven persons were killed in Amsterdam on the second day of the strike. (Warmbrunn, *op. cit.*, p. 110.)

[6] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–152, 156, 170.

After it was all over, the Germans remained in a state of shock. At the height of Hitler's victories, mere Dutch civilians, even Jews, had been willing and able to challenge German rule. It is reported that when Himmler told Hitler about the strike, the Führer burst out in a terrible rage, threw his glass of lemonade against the floor, and proclaimed that all the Dutch would have to be deported "to the East." The predominantly Austrian top officialdom in the Netherlands had been criticized earlier in Berlin because of allegedly soft occupation policies. The successful demonstrations seemed to confirm this charge.[7]

As a result, perhaps, of both the shock and the charges of "Austrian softness," the ultimate punishment was more severe, and indiscriminate, than the relatively restrained repressive measures of the German authorities would have indicated. The mayor of Amsterdam, a majority of the city council, and the police chief were fired and replaced mostly with Dutch Nazis. The Amsterdam "plutocracy" – those earning more than 10,000 guilders per year – was supposed to contribute to an "atonement levy" of fifteen million guilders. Since the Germans had understood the pro-Jewish character of the demonstrations, they replied with further steps in the segregation of Dutch Jews from the rest of the nation. The Dutch would have to realize that Jews could no longer be considered part of Dutch life. On March 12, 1941, Seyss-Inquart announced measures which in effect removed the Jews from the economy and made it virtually impossible for them to earn a living. The first of the final steps in the drama of internment, deportation, and extermination had thus been taken. The death penalty or long prison terms were given to all those Jews who had participated in the riots preceding the strike. However, the additional three hundred Jewish "hostages" were not taken–yet.

Surprisingly enough, the strikers themselves were let off rather easily, partly because many of them could not be identified. Apparently only one strike leader in private industry and perhaps seventy of the activists among the municipal workers were fired. All strikers were supposed to be punished by a fine amounting to approximately 10 per cent of their monthly wage. The real organizer of the strike, the underground Communist Party in Amsterdam, was successfully

[7] H. M. Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen*, p. 65.

penetrated by an agent shortly after the strike. Twenty-two of its top leaders and ninety lower functionaries were arrested. Three of these were executed, and twenty-two received prison terms. All but three of the latter returned alive – a truly remarkable record for Nazi Germany.[8]

The strike of February 1941 was a success on the first day during which the surprised Germans acted with restraint, or not at all, against the demonstrators. Blackmail against the Jews and the display of armed forces ended the strike on the second or third day, again with relatively little violence. Many of the demonstrators probably had not intended to strike for more than one or two days and felt that they had made their point on February 25. The measures of German revenge hardly hit the strikers, but were directed against Amsterdamers in general and, of course, the Jews.

April–May 1943; German Surprise and Ineffectual Punishment

There were similarities between the German reactions in February 1941 and April–May 1943. The occupation regime was again taken by surprise, and its boss, Seyss-Inquart, happened to be out of the country once more. In fact, he could not even be located during the first day. The German police chief, H. A. Rauter, had not been told about the all-inclusive call-up announcement which General Christiansen was to issue on April 29. Again, the Germans were shocked by the outbreak of the strike and feared that it might spread to other countries in the West, particularly Belgium and France.

Also in this strike German measures were not effective on the first day. A modified form of martial law was proclaimed in the various strike regions. It imposed a curfew, the immediate use of firearms against strikers, the occupation of struck plants, as well as other measures. However, the issuance of the proclamation was delayed for many hours because printers were on strike and the posters could not be distributed properly. Moreover, since newspapers in some localities were on strike, publicizing of the proclamation was difficult there.

Only on the second day did the Germans attempt to enforce the martial law provisions. They were at an advantage in doing this because the strike tended to break out at different times in different localities, making it possible for one German police

[8] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–179.

unit to intervene in several towns and villages. Again, the Germans showed some restraint. To be sure, there were widely publicized on-the-spot executions and violent street battles – including a bloody affair at Marum in Groningen province which brought death to eighteen Dutchmen. On the whole, however, strikers arrested for continuing the strike after the proclamation had been posted were released quickly without further penalties. In any case, with more than 100,000 strikers, arrests were hardly feasible in most cases.

Like in Amsterdam in 1941, most strikers were not interested in a lengthy strike, particularly not after the Germans drastically softened their call-up order on the second day – reducing its effect to the 10 per cent of regulars among the former soldiers. The first two days, April 29–30, were the most successful. The return to work began already on May 1, and by Monday, May 3, the strike continued only in a few areas, such as Friesland.

The German punitive measures, announced after a brief delay, sounded severe. Again, they were not so much directed at the strikers, who could hardly be identified in most cases, but at the Dutch public in general. All radio receivers had to be turned in, to make impossible further listening to the London radio; the labor duties of students in Germany were stepped up; a general labor draft of all men between 18 and 35 years was announced. However, these measures remained rather ineffective. By 1943 the Germans lacked the manpower to enforce their revenge. Many radio receivers were not turned in. An overwhelming number of students and others managed to escape forced labor by going underground, often not very deep – for example, right in their own homes.[9]

The Railroad Strike; the Unenforceability of Mass Starvation Measures

The German reaction to the railroad strike was, of course, determined by the long duration of the strike. Yet, again, the strikers themselves were not bothered too much. Also, the planned repressive measures were so severe, involving in fact

[9] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–24, 31, 36–37, 109, 142, 387, 389, 442. The exact number of Dutch fatalities in the April-May 1943 strike has apparently not been determined. Bouman's estimate – about sixty persons killed by on-the-spot executions and more than eighty death sentences actually carried out – seems high in the light of his other evidence. (*Ibid.*, p. 448.)

the starvation of the population of the Western part of the country, that they could not be kept up.

The Germans should not have been, and probably were not, surprised by this strike. A German opinion survey of May 10, 1943, had noted quite correctly that a good number of railroad workers were eager to go on strike in the 1943 crisis, but that the railroad management had not considered it the proper time yet. According to this German report, railroad leaders had agreed that their forces had to be kept intact for the decisive moment, i.e. some time after the Allied invasion. A similar prediction concerning a railroad strike "at the right moment" appeared in the report of the German Commissioner for the Province of Gelderland, dated May 15, 1943.[10] Nevertheless, when the strike was finally proclaimed on September 17, 1944, the Germans once again acted as if they were caught by surprise; they seemed to ignore or be unaware of the not so secretive strike preparations which had preceded the proclamation. Of course, the Germans had their hands full during the hectic days after the Arnhem attack and knew that almost anything could happen on the Dutch resistance front.[11]

Either due to preoccupation or surprise, the Germans failed to undertake immediate, large-scale reprisals against the strikers. They did catch a few of the higher officials in the railroads' central offices in Utrecht – some of whom died in concentration camps – but the rank-and-file of striking railroad employees "got off relatively lightly, excepting a very small number ... of casualties." Many of the strikers did not bother to go "underground," and even in front line areas the Germans did not persecute strikers.[12]

The German failure to react immediately and authoritatively against the strikers was of considerable assistance to the crucial first days of the strike. In some localities the strike began hesitatingly, and it was the very absence of German counter-measures which sometimes produced the sentiment to participate fully in the strike.[13] The German security chief, Rauter, claimed after the war that the German army had asked for authority to shoot all railroad strikers on sight, but that he had stopped this "crazy" plan.[14] The Germans pre-

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 408, 426.
[11] Rüter, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 262, 266, 269, 276–277.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 263.
[14] *Het proces Rauter*, p. 430.

ferred to hit at the strike indirectly, by linking it with the shortage of food and fuel which was threatening the Dutch population. Already on the second day of the strike the Germans instructed the controlled Dutch press to play up the starvation theme; because of the railroad strike, an unprecedented catastrophe was said to be in store for the Netherlands. The Germans decided that direct force could not be used effectively against the strikers, but that the absence of the products normally transported by the railroads could provide the means to hit back.[15]

A first German "starvation plan" was more than drastic. All Germans were to be evacuated from Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, and all means of transportation to these cities, except the railroads, were to be interrupted. Then, the strikers themselves could choose between returning to work or starving the three large cities of the Netherlands, all three of which had no reserve stocks whatever. However, the Germans realized that this plan was too crass. Another plan, thought out by either Seyss-Inquart or Rauter, was in fact adopted, and it was almost equally severe. A complete embargo on all water transport, barges as well as ships, was decreed until the end of the railroad strike. This also meant starvation for the western part of the Netherlands, which was dependent on food and coal shipments from the eastern and southern parts of the country. It should be noted that the third means of transport, trucking, had come to a virtual standstill by that time because of lack of fuel.[16]

By the end of September it had become obvious that the greater part of the Netherlands would not be liberated soon. After the Allied defeat at Arnhem the frontlines were stabilizing once more. Yet, the railroad strike continued. Since the Germans had never permitted the building-up of food reserves and since the new harvest had not yet been shipped to the western provinces, Dutch food authorities estimated that supplies in the areas of the three large cities, where most Dutchmen live, would not last beyond October 15, 1944. The coal shortage was equally critical; the supply for gas and electricity production was about to be exhausted, and in consequence the water system, sewerage, and even the pumping

[15] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–265, 270.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

stations of the low-lying polders would no longer be able to function.[17]

Whether to continue the railroad strike – and with it, the shipping embargo – became the crucial question for the survival of the Dutch population. The leading Dutch food officials in The Hague, Secretary-General Hirschfeld and S. L. Louwes, fully realized the seriousness of the crisis, and so did the railroad management and the railroad unions. Yet, both the officials in The Hague and the railroad leaders maintained – quite correctly, according to Professor Rüter – that the decision to call off the strike could only be made by the Dutch government in London. Fortunately, communications were in better shape than before, and as a result the London government was quite aware of the situation and its responsibility therein. The partial or total termination of the strike was discussed by the cabinet on several occasions and already on September 28, the minister responsible for the railroads, J. W. Albarda, suggested abandoning the strike. However, the minister of war opposed this and suggested that the Allied high command would have to be consulted first. SHAEF gave a rather ambiguous answer: the strike in the western part of the Netherlands could be abandoned, but it would have to be continued in the eastern part.

The London government concluded immediately that a *partial* resumption of railroad work was "in effect impracticable" and would result in "severe reprisals" by the Germans. On the basis of this not necessarily self-evident argument, the London government announced on October 2 that the strike would have to be continued until the enemy was ejected from the country.[18] Forty-eight hours later the government seemed to regret this decision. On October 4, it sent a telegram to the railroad management to inquire about the possibilities of a partial termination of the strike, and mentioned that SHAEF was only interested in continuing the strike in the eastern part of the country. It cannot be determined from the sources what the railroad management's reply was, if any. According to Rüter, if there was an answer, it was undoubtedly negative. Also in Holland, says Rüter, a partial resumption was considered "impracticable." [19] In any case, on October 5, Premier

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 277.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 278–279.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

Gerbrandy took to the air and explained why the strike had to continue. The Allies had to be assisted at this decisive stage of the war, and besides, according to Gerbrandy, the Germans would penalize returning strikers and would grab the food and coal from the Dutch even if the trains were operating. The Germans could not be trusted in their promises and the Allies would have to bomb the Dutch railroads to a standstill regardless of the consequences. Professor Rüter does not think that Gerbrandy's points were necessarily valid, but he grants that in that period there were considerable limits to anybody's ability to evaluate the situation, from Holland and particularly from England.[20]

The strike continued, as did the German-decreed shipping embargo. As the threat of "total starvation" came closer and closer, Hirschfeld and Louwes – and even the Dutch Nazi leader, Anton Mussert – tried desperately to get concessions from the Germans. Finally the Germans were forced to give in. On October 16, Seyss-Inquart announced the lifting of the shipping embargo, in spite of the continuing railroad strike. In Rüter's view, this major victory for the strikers was not so much a consequence of Seyss-Inquart's fear of German defeat and Allied retribution. Rather, it was the result of pressure from the German military who did not want starving urban masses in the rear of their troops during the crucial battles ahead. Military necessity made it possible for the railroad strikers to have their strike and food for the population as well. Moreover, Hirschfeld was able to get German approval for the immediate procurement of a fleet of ships and barges, and by mid-November regular food transports were again operating across the IJsselmeer and on the canals. Even some coal for bakeries and public services was successfully "organized" by Hirschfeld from supplies actually earmarked for the occupier.[21]

The drama of the railroad strike was by no means over,

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–282.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 391–398, 406. For a fascinating account of the organization of Hirschfeld's emergency fleet, which undoubtedly saved the western part of the Netherlands, see his own account, written after the war. (H. M. Hirschfeld, "De Centrale Reederij voor de voedselvoorziening," *Economie*, 1945/1946.) It is amazing how Hirschfeld managed to play his role in the top position of the Dutch administration during this entire period. His Jewish ancestry was ignored by the Germans – except some of the more radical SS elements, who frequently complained about him. Note also Hirschfeld's interrogation by the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission, particularly on his relations and negotiations with the Germans during the railroad strike. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 802–803.)

however. A new enemy, the weather, began to interfere. An unusually severe and lengthy freeze began on December 23, which was to last until January 31. Almost immediately the shipping operations had to be suspended and within a few weeks, by mid-January, the food supplies in western Holland were literally exhausted. Again the railroad management felt that it had no authority to stop the strike as the London radio reconfirmed the strike policy, "until the bitter end." Hirschfeld and Louwes once more appealed to the Germans, and again the Germans were forced to give in. On January 16, 1945, Seyss-Inquart made an incredible concession; he permitted three trains, operated entirely by German crews, to carry potatoes from Friesland to the starvation areas. They arrived just in time to keep the public soup kitchens going.[22] Moreover, the Germans offered to supply ten food trains per week if Dutch railroad men would be willing to operate them. The railroad management relayed this offer to London on January 27, but a reply reached Holland only on February 6. London was willing to permit this specific rupture of the strike, but only if the railroad management, Hirschfeld, and several sets of resistance leaders would also approve. Since in the meantime the ice had melted and Hirschfeld's fleet had started to operate again, the strike was permitted to continue as before. Ten thousands of Dutchmen in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam did in fact die of starvation, but the great majority survived because of the end of the freeze and the several German concessions.[23]

The German repressive measures against the railroad strike were ineffective. The strikers themselves could not be caught, the shipping embargo had to be lifted, and German-staffed trains had to operate for Dutch civilians at the height of the crisis in the German war effort. On the very edge of starvation, the Dutch for once were able to blackmail successfully. Of course, the costly strike effort did not really affect the German military position. Even during the Arnhem battle German military transport needs were apparently taken care of satisfactorily, but the Germans were forced to assign some five

[22] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 399–402.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 403–405. At a time that the Germans themselves were extremely short of coal and transport, the Dutch were still able to get some coal from them – 82,000 tons in January and 40,000 tons in February of 1945. (Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen*, p. 159.)

thousand German railroad men to operate the Dutch railroads for their military necessities.[24] The involvement of these five thousand Germans has to be balanced against the very real threat of mass starvation, and thus stated, the railroad strike could be dismissed as a Dutch blunder. However, the symbolic significance of this heroic strike effort cannot be so simply assessed. Moreover, could "loyal cooperation" possibly have been in effect after Arnhem? [25]

The Hungarian Uprising; "Muscovite" Panic and Two Soviet Interventions

The leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party and their instruments of physical power – army, secret police troops, regular police – were not able to control mass rioting. The result was the previously mentioned "evaporation' of the Party. In Zinner's opinion, "the astonishing rapidity of the collapse of the Party machinery and affiliated organizations was the most remarkable aspect of the first phase of the revolution." The Hungarian army turned out to be a complete fiasco for the regime. Many soldiers ,either deserted to the rebels or handed over their weapons to them. Entire units fought on the side of the uprising, and apparently not a single Hungarian detachment collaborated with Soviet troops in their two repressive efforts.[26]

From October 22–24, 1956, the scene at Party headquarters was one of complete confusion, as "hysteria and near panic

[24] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 257, 260–261. The German security chief, Rauter, claimed after the war that the strike had one obvious military advantage for the Germans – it played havoc with the communications of the resistance.

[25] Minister Albarda told the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission that Premier Gerbrandy, as be proclaimed the strike, should have provided for a way out – "a return-ticket" – in view of the possibility of an Allied defeat at Arnhem. Dr. L. de Jong mentioned that he had questioned Premier Gerbrandy about this on the day the strike was proclaimed; Gerbrandy had replied merely that the Allies would be in Amsterdam within a week. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 15, 721.)

The story of this unique and dramatic strike has been brilliantly told by Professor Rüter. The mere physical feat of supporting some 30,000 strikers – many of them decidedly not resistance heroes – for almost eight months staggers the imagination. All the railroad strikers were paid their regular salaries, including their usual overtime, through resistance channels. During the time of starvation they were even provided with extra food rations, to counteract German attempts at bribery. The intricate and ingenious system of financing the Dutch resistance, including the procurement of the 63 million guilders required for the railroad strikers, is described in P. Sanders, *Het Nationaal Steun Fonds* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

[26] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 250–251; United Nations Report, p. 28.

prevailed." Decisions were made and rescinded immediately. This state of irresolution was evident to the entire capital and undoubtedly contributed to the rebels' determination. For example, with regard to the decision on the permit for the October 23 demonstration of the students, Zinner argues that "it is open to question whether the Party's cause would have been damaged more by steadfastly clinging to a ban that was defied than it was by public vacillation." [27] Party boss Gerö's radio speech of October 23 revealed obvious symptoms of panic. "So maladroit was Gerö's address that it has prompted speculation whether it could have been meant as deliberate provocation." [28] Gerö evidently misjudged the nature of the opposition, and he compounded his error by committing the "crowning" blunder – the hasty call for Soviet military assistance during the evening of October 23, without regard to Soviet intentions and immediate capabilities.[29]

The initial reaction of the Russians was as helpless and headless as Gerö's, at least in retrospect. However, not all the facts pertaining to the first Soviet intervention can be determined. It is known that the Soviet troops were called some time after 10:30 p.m. on October 23. But, it is not known whether Moscow was consulted or whether the local Soviet commander had sufficient discretionary powers to assent to Gerö's request on his own. Soviet motorized units appeared in Budapest between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. on October 24, coming from bases located some 35–40 miles outside the city. The crucial point is that their intervention at this time could not be decisive. Because of the limited number of Soviet troops committed during October 23–24, a massive assault on the insurgents was out of the question and could not have been intended.

The Soviet government evidently was taken by surprise and must not have been in possession of accurate information on the Hungarian scene. Clarification came only after special emissaries Mikoyan and Suslov – "representing perhaps opposing viewpoints in the Soviet Communist Presidium" [30] – arrived in Budapest on October 24. For the next few days the nature of the Soviet military intervention remained quite

[27] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 254.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

ambiguous. No real assaults were mounted against the insurgents, although some casualties were sustained and inflicted. Zinner suspects that the primary Soviet aim at this time was to guard all Soviet and some Hungarian strategic installations and public buildings. The Soviets were obviously trying to minimize their intervention, perhaps because not enough of their troops were available or because the troops were not entirely reliable. However, the persistent rumors of Soviet army defections could not be confirmed.

In any case, the minimizing of the intervention did not succeed. On October 25, at Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament, a column of Soviet tanks "inadvertently became involved in the bloodiest single encounter of the revolution . . . ." A mass demonstration was taking place at the time, but the tanks seemed to ignore it in a manner characteristic of the first Soviet intervention. Yet, somehow, firing began from neighboring houses, possibly provoked by Hungarian secret policemen. After a few Soviet soldiers were wounded or killed, the tanks began to fire into the crowd, causing many casualties.

The first Soviet military intervention certainly was a blunder. Generally defensive and indecisive actions of the Russian troops had "the effect of creating a myth among the insurgents that they had actually defeated the troops of the occupying power." If the Soviets had hoped to muddle through the uprising without a real military effort on their part, the half-hearted commitment of these first troops was foolish. If the Soviets were already planning a massive intervention, the involvement of weak troops before the final, decisive action was equally senseless. Since these first troops had to be pulled out of the capital while the uprising was still continuing, the withdrawal was "tantamount to a serious if not intolerable loss of face." Of course, the Soviets suffered very few casualties and continued to enjoy complete freedom of movement in the countryside. "Yet, the cocky mood engendered by the illusion of having defeated the Soviet military grew as the revolution wore on." [31]

One hour after the massacre at Kossuth square, Party boss Gerö, who had called in the Soviet troops, was replaced by "moderate" János Kádár. The incredible revolution seemed to be succeeding "in the presence but without the defeat of the forces of a foreign great power." By October 30, Nagy and his

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 256–258.

advisors mentioned truly harsh terms to the Soviets: Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw treaty and Soviet troops would have to leave Hungary within two or three months. On November 3, a Hungarian military delegation appeared at the Soviet headquarters "to discuss terms of Soviet withdrawal."

> In the face of clear evidence to the contrary they [the Hungarians] believed that they could flout their giant neighbor with impunity, insulting and humiliating him to boot. What was worse, they once again were gullible in assessing Soviet statements, promises, and proffers of peace, amity, and negotiation – as they had been a decade before.[32]

The Soviets, in the meantime, were preparing another military intervention. There undoubtedly was serious dissension within the Presidium on the merits and timing of this second intervention. The Suez affair apparently made the decision for massive intervention an easier one.[33] On November 4 – the day the General Assembly voted to establish the United Nations Emergency Force – a massive attack was launched by the Soviet army which encountered no organized defense in Budapest. Only "improvised resistance on the part of mixed groups of students, workers, and some military personnel" developed, and the few centers of continued rebellion were soon reduced to isolated strongholds – some of which held for a week of more. Within a few hours Nagy's government had ceased to exist. A "revolutionary worker-peasant government" under János Kádár suddenly emerged "somewhere" in eastern Hungary.[34]

Strongholds located within industrial plants held out longest:

> It was one thing for the Soviet forces summarily to reoccupy a town hall and to sweep away the local revolutionary council; it was quite another thing for them to dislodge by force a workers' council whose

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 316–317.

[33] Zinner believes that the Soviets would have intervened even without the Anglo-French attack on Egypt occurring simultaneously; however, because of this attack, the Hungarian intervention involved fewer risks for them. By the same token, according to Zinner, the Soviets might have intervened more forcefully in the Middle East if they had not been involved in Hungary. Thus, one could argue that the Hungarian uprising prevented a general war in the Middel East. (*Ibid.*, pp. 320, 323, 363.)

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 336–337, 339. The Hungarian "negotiators" were arrested at Soviet headquarters by Soviet security police while discussing "terms" with the Soviet army commander, apparently to the latter's surprise. (United Nations Report, p. 45.)

base of operation was in the middle of an industrial complex employing thousands of workers.[35]

The workers' councils became the final agents of the uprising. As late as November 14, a "Workers' Council of Greater Budapest" was set up to serve as the top organ of the remaining workers' councils, but lack of communications prevented similarly planned institutions for the rest of the country. The workers' councils' key weapon was the general strike, wich was continued with sporadic effectiveness even after the second Soviet intervention had succeeded. Yet, as winter approached, the strikes could hardly be maintained, and, therefore, negotiations with the Kádár government and the Soviets had to be attempted.[36] On November 6, the Soviet military had called on the workers to resume work; weeks of bargaining were often required before striking workers consented to give in. During this period clashes between the Soviet army and workers were reported; usually, however, Soviet troops consented to withdraw from a factory if at least a partial resumption of work could be arranged.[37]

The final matter in the repression of the uprising related to the punishment of the rebels. Imre Nagy was duly executed, and became a real national hero and martyr as no Hungarian Communist before him. A good number of his associates were either executed or received prison terms; only a handful fled to the West. Kádár rebuilt the Party with persons who had somehow managed to ply their course without openly identifying themselves with either Rákosi of Nagy. Rákosi and Gerö became real "Muscovites" once more, settling down for their final period of exile somewhere in the Soviet Union.[38]

The Panamanian Riots; Waiting for the Guardia Nacional

United States efforts to contain and subdue the Panamanian crowds faced several handicaps. Above all, Panamanian authorities were most uncooperative. The International Jurists described the situation in Panama City during the first evening.

Repeated attempts were made by the Canal Zone authorities to call to their aid the Guardia Nacional of Panama to take effective measures to control the violent crowd. Between 6:30 and 8:30 p.m., 7 or 8 telephone

[35] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 342–344.
[37] United Nations Report, pp. 104–105.
[38] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–353.

calls were made by the American authorities but no effective action was taken by the Guardia Nacional. On the contrary, the Guardia Nacional was purposely kept away from the trouble-spots in the City of Panama until early on January 13.[39]

In the Colon area too the International Jurists discovered that the Guardia Nacional was insufficiently deployed.

Curiously, it was also proved that the Guardia were totally disarmed during these difficult days; the Guardia are usually equipped with pistols and batons. No explanation was given as to why the Guardia were not to carry their usual arms during these days.[40]

The Canal Zone police forces were inadequate for the tasks presented by the riots. For example, in the Balboa district a total of eighty men were available to cover the Zonal border extending over considerably more than one mile. Zonal authorities, of course, had no jurisdiction inside Panamanian territory where many of the attacks on American property occurred.[41]

At about 8:00 p.m., approximately one hour after the rioting burst out, the acting governor of the Zone, Lieutenant Governor Parker, called on the commanding officer of the United States military forces, General O'Meara, to provide military assistance for the outnumbered Zonal police forces. This military assistance came forth immediately.[42]

Both police and troops began by using tear gas against the crowds. But, invariably, firearms were employed after a while to supplement the tear gas. In the words of the International Jurists,

It would appear that the use of firearms was the only method by which, at this stage, the limited number of policemen present could prevent the crowd from forcing its way into the Canal Zone. It would also appear to the Investigating Committee that the revolver fire was not entirely directed over the heads of the crowd or into the ground in front of the crowd, but that some of it was directed into the crowd causing casualties.[43]

Unfortunately, even the revolver fire directed at the crowds did not suffice. Further escalation became inevitable when rifle fire, and even bursts from automatic or semi-automatic

[39] *International Jurists*, p. 20.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

weapons, began to hit the Tivoli Hotel from Panamanian territory. Consequently,

> a select team of United States Army marksmen under a sergeant was ordered to take up position in the Hotel Tivoli late in the evening of January 9. General O'Meara made at least two requests, through the appropriate Panamanian Authorities, for action by the Panamanian Authorities to stop the firing which was being directed against the Canal Zone from the Republic of Panama. No action having been taken by the Panamanian Authorities, through the Guardia Nacional or otherwise, General O'Meara issued orders after midnight on January 10, that the team of U.S. Army marksmen could use .30 calibre rifle fire to stop the snipers. At this stage four U.S. soldiers had been wounded, making a total of six casualties on the U.S. side. One soldier and one civilian had been wounded earlier.
>
> The rifle firing by the U.S. Army marksmen from the Hotel Tivoli commenced on the morning of the 10th at about 12:30 a.m., and continued until 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. the same day. It started again about 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 10th, and continued until about 2:00 p.m. It was resumed again from 7:10 to 7:15 p.m. on the same evening. It is estimated that some 400 and 500 bullets were fired by the United States forces. An examination of the Legislative Building showed that bullets had penetrated through the walls. Throughout this period U.S. troops also used shotguns intermittently.[44]

Although rumors about the employment of tanks by United States troops were false, armored personnel carriers were used to deploy the soldiers more effectively.[45]

The first fatal casualty occurred within the first hour of the outbreak of the riots. At 7:45 p.m. a Panamanian student from the Instituto Nacional, aged 20, was killed by a bullet from a Zonal police revolver.[46] After it was all over, ninety-five Panamanian civilians from the Panama City area had been brought to St. Thomas Hospital; among these were eighteen dead. However, the International Jurists point out that not all of the casualties were due necessarily to United States action. "Panamanians fired on each other, on different occasions, for different reasons. It seems also probable that shopkeepers and others used weapons in order to stop looting and to protect their property." [47]

The International Jurists' report seems to indicate that the riots in the Colon-Cristobal area were handled more tactfully than in Panama City, even though three of the four American

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

military fatalities occurred there. For example, on one occasion a crowd was dissuaded from entering the Zone when the local chief of police pleaded with them in Spanish, without an interpreter.[48]

The opinion of the International Jurists concerning the character of the United States repressive effort is mixed.

> The tempo and violence of the disturbances were such that there is little doubt that they held out a real threat to life and security, which could only be met by strong measures. In these circumstances the Canal Zone Authorities and the United States military forces were entitled to use force. Nevertheless, we entertained some doubts as to whether the force used, at some stages, was not in excess of the minimum absolutely necessary. In particular the following caused us concern:
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 1. (a) While the Canal Zone Police had exhausted the greater part of the tear-gas available to them, it was established that they did not try to obtain additional supplies.
>
> (b) No attempt appears to have been made to use water jets to calm down and control the crowd.
>
> (c) It also appears that, while orders were given to shoot over the heads of people or into the ground in front of the crowd, people in the crowd were struck by bullets which did not appear to be "ricochet" bullets.
>
> 2. A large number of bullets (approximately 400–500) were fired by United States Army trained marksmen using high velocity rifles. In a residential and densely populated area such extensive use of high fire-power is a disturbing feature.[49]

On the other hand, the International Jurists emphasized certain factors which excuse at least some of these "excesses": the large and violently tempered crowds; the extensive use of Molotov cocktails; the heavy firing and sniping from the Panamanian side before the United States Army employed its marksmen. Above all, the International Jurists condemned the failure of Panamanian authorities to take steps to control the crowds and to remove the snipers and arsonists.[50] The most serious charge concerns the inactivity in the Panama City area of the Panamanian Guardia Nacional. The International Jurists felt certain that,

> if the Guardia Nacional had taken charge of the situation early on the evening of the 9th or soon thereafter, the violence and the damage to property and the tragic casualties would not, in all probability, have taken place.[51]

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

In fact, when the Guardia Nacional finally appeared in full force during the early morning of January 13, order was immediately restored and maintained.[52] Similarly, in the Colon area the Guardia Nacional, as was mentioned previously, chose to operate "totally disarmed" during the days of riots. In Colon too the Guardia "brought the situation completely under control on the morning of the 13th." [53]

In the following conclusions the International Jurists appear more critical of Panama than the United States.

> Considering all the above surrounding circumstances, and in particular the grave acts of violence and the threat to life and security involved, we have come to the conclusion that, even if the force used by the Canal Zone authorities and the United States Army may have been at certain stages somewhat in excess of what was absolutely necessary at the time, the force used seems to have been justified; taking into account such rapidly moving, critical, and violent conditions, it is impossible to lay down a fine distinguishing line of what should have been the absolute minimum necessary.
>
> We regret deeply that the Panamanian authorities made no attempt during the critical early hours, as well as for almost three days thereafter, to curb and control the violent activities of the milling crowds. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence to indicate that broadcasts over radio, television and loud-speakers, newspapers, and other means were adopted to incite and misinform the Panamanian public without any action by the Panamanian authorities to curtail or moderate such activities.[54]

The Germans and their Russo-Hungarian counterparts were taken by surprise by the events depicted here. As a result, repressive efforts were slow, initially clumsy, and not always effectively directed against those responsible for the troubles. The strikes of February 1941 and April–May 1943 were short-lived, but it would be an exaggeration to claim that only the repressive measures made them so. The railroad strike could not be checked at all by an occupier in the last stages of his rule, while the Hungarian uprising required full-scale military intervention of a type which was bound to be most damaging to the Soviet Union's image. As to the United States, its image too could hardly afford the kind of military effort which was required to keep at bay the angry Panamanian crowds, especially since the Panamanians' own government was not inclined to share the burdens of the repressive effort.

[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

CHAPTER VII

EPILOGUE

The Demonstrations as Catalysts of Mass Resistance

The strikes in Holland and the uprising in Hungary were important as enduring symbols of the possibilities of resistance to an occupier; moreover, they provided a crucial link between the activists of the resistance and the largely passive majority of the population. For example, the strike of February 1941 was provoked by the Communists for rather special purposes of their own; yet, very soon it engulfed the entire population of Amsterdam.

> The strike developed the characteristics of an all-inclusive protest against the occupier. The Jewish persecutions were the occasion which brought all together. It was not known who had provoked the action. Nobody inquired about it and nobody really cared, as long as the desired strike could take place.... The absence of the streetcars and the return of the striking workers from the factories changed the familiar pattern of the city. This in turn had a tremendous effect on the public .... Strikers as well as non-strikers became demonstrators in this kind of city atmosphere .... In unison they marched – the strike had found its own track.[1]

The strike found "its own track" as the strikers and the general public coalesced into one large group of demonstrators. All parties concerned, the Germans, the Communists, and the general public were surprised how suddenly and universally the strike could develop – "everyone was flabbergasted." The Communists noticed to what extent the strike had slipped out of their hands when they tried to add wage demands to the protests about the Jews. These demands were entirely ignored, as was a later attempt by the Communists, on March 6, 1941, again to provoke a mass strike. The strike was a genuine mass demonstration, provoked by a genuine "revolutionary" situation – the grabbing of the Jewish "hostages" – and it could not be reproduced at will, not even by the Communists. This genuineness effectuated the successful linking of the resistance and the general public, and the linking endured. Henceforth, a

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

person's attitude toward the Jewish persecutions became the criterion for being a "good Dutchman." [2]

What the strike of February 1941 did for Amsterdam, the strike of 1943 did for the rest of the nation, to some extent at least. According to Professor Bouman's conclusion, the strike constituted "the first mass protest of the Dutch people," even though in many localities it lacked the fervor and unity of the Amsterdam scene of February 1941.[3] A German opinion survey of May 10, 1943, attached great significance to this demonstration by some 500,000 persons. The survey admits that the strike was not ended by German counter-measures but by the strikers themselves: "They wanted to express their indignation, and when they felt that this had been done with sufficient bluntness, they went back to work." [4] Bouman considers the strike a turning point in the history of the Dutch resistance. It proved to the activists that the population was behind them and could be trusted as a protective screen during their hazardous tasks against the Germans. This function of the 1943 strike is remarkable since its immediate cause lay in a German blunder, soon repaired, which lacked the deeply emotional issues behind the Amsterdam strike.[5]

In spite of more doubtful aspects, pertaining to lack of military significance and "brinkmanship" with regard to starvation of the population, the railroad strike was an incredible feat. In Rüter's words, that 30,000 persons went on strike for eight months under German occupation and ignored severe distress, represents a "noble," historic deed, a "grandiose demonstration of the will to resist." The strike, with its aftermath of severe famine, brought the entire nation together just before the liberation "through ties of need and sacrifice." Rüter emphasizes the element of continuity which the railroad strike provided between war and peace. Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, was said to be the typical Dutch entrepreneur of the pre-war era, "level-headed and sober, eager to keep tight controls over his enterprise."

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 151–152, 186–187.

[3] Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188. Some resistance men, according to Bouman, were quite unhappy about the 1943 strike. It was considered too undisciplined and supposedly involved persons who had not been particularly anti-German but were forced into the strike in compliance with dominant feelings of the village or plant community. (*Ibid.*, pp. 82, 137–138.)

Hupkes preserved his controls in spite of the Germans, in spite of resistance efforts during the strike, and in spite of the purge boards after the liberation. To Rüter, Hupkes and his railroad symbolized the link between the pre-war and the post-war era, the continuity of Dutch traditions notwithstanding the revolutionary potentialities of war, occupation, starvation, liberation, and purge.[6] In the words of the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission, the railroad strike, which had been intended as a strategic device to serve the battle of Arnhem, became instead "a spectacular resistance act of the Netherlands people." [7] It provided links not only between the resistance and the rest of the population, but also between the world of 1940 and the world of 1945. The railroads' willingness to fight for survival symbolized similar feelings in the nation as a whole, and the fight was led by the traditional leaders, the management and the unions' Personnel Council. The men of 1940 were also the men of 1945.

During the Hungarian uprising, in the graphic description of a participant interrogated by the UN committee, "a really fantastic miracle occurred," the miracle "that the whole people became unified." [8] The rebellious intellectuals, the middle classes, and the rest of the population developed complete identification with the uprising. "People who had never felt any particular kinship with the masses now were seized with indescribable excitement." [9] The real Hungarian miracle, in Hannah Arendt's view, was the outburst of the "spontaneous revolution," previously not considered possible by either Communists or anti-Communists.

> If there was ever such a thing as Rosa Luxemburg's "spontaneous revolution" – this sudden uprising of an oppressed people for the sake of freedom and hardly anything else, without the demoralizing chaos of military defeat preceding it, without *coup d'état* techniques, without a closely knit apparatus of organizers and conspirators, without the undermining propaganda of a revolutionary party, something, that is, which everybody, conservatives and liberals, radicals and revolutionists, had discarded as a noble dream – then we had the privilege to witness it.[10]

[6] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24, 417–419, 469. After the liberation Hupkes succeeded in preventing outsiders from judging acts of collaboration among railroad personnel. The railroad purge boards were staffed by Hupkes' own men. (*Ibid.*, pp. 433, 450.)

[7] *Enquêtecommissie*, 7a, p. 391.

[8] United Nations Report, p. 79.

[9] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[10] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

At least one Panamanian observer has seen the riots of January 1964 in a quasi-Hungarian light – as the catalyst which united the general public with its "natural" leaders, the students.

> Tired of bringing its demands before the conference table and tired of hearing the Panamanian Government announce grandiose concessions received from the United States, the people of Panama are again being led by their traditional leaders – the Panamanian youth. Once again the Panamanian students have had to pick up the flag of reform. Once again have they, through their unrelenting insistence and incorruptability, forced the general public to act ....
>
> According to the reports on the January riots one cannot help but wonder if the general public has not finally joined the student movement. This had been the case on very few occasions in Panama's history – but these few alliances have led to fruitful and very beneficial results for the Panamanian nation.[11]

Mass Demonstrations and Governmental Policy

Zinner observed that the beginning of a mass demonstration "is traceable to a physical act of violence that has both actual significance as a test of strength between the forces opposing each other and symbolic meaning as a point of no return in resolving the differences between them." [12] Actually, this act of violence does not have to include shootings such as occurred in front of the Budapest radio headquarters. To serve as "test of strength" and "point of no return" the act of violence has to be dramatic and conspicuous, even if it does not involve casualties. For example, the successful mass distribution of the Budapest students' sixteen points constituted a sort of conquest of the street, without any physical violence, and as such could be interpreted to have served as a test of strength and point of no return. In Amsterdam, too, the streets were conquered without physical violence. The absence of the streetcars and the scenes at the ferries were instrumental in getting the crowds into the heart of the city, and this mass presence came to constitute the test and point of no return for the strike of February 1941. In April–May 1943, and in September 1944, the act of violence consisted of the illegal act of leaving the workshop or the railroad post; the immediate success of these strikes decided the test of strength and led to a point of no return in the relations with the occupier. In the Panamanian crisis the demonstrators actually failed in the first test, as the students

[11] "Crisis in Panama," pp. 44–45.
[12] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

were unable to raise the Panamanian flag. Perhaps, in view of the self-conscious nature of the United States presence in Panama, the mere fact that a test of strength was attempted sufficed to provoke a point of no return situation.

Through the symbolic act of violence the general public becomes aware that a "test" has been passed and a "point of no return" reached. At this point, according to Zinner, the regime is bound to discover that "the behavior of an aroused mass is generally characterized by its unpredictability . . . [and] that its mood is more susceptible to the influence of the loudest and most rancous participants . . . ." [13] The approval by the "aroused" masses makes the demonstrations find their track, as illustrated by the events in Amsterdam, Budapest, and Panama. The railroad strike's incredible duration in spite of starvation may well be explained in terms of the "aroused" population which was willing to submit to extreme deprivation to support it. The strikes of April–May 1943 were unique in featuring "aroused" rural publics, demonstrating the effectiveness of rural communications and consensus.

The crucial policy decisions of the regime must be taken before the symbolic act of violence has driven the public to a state of fervor which makes control measures unfeasible. In the crises under investigation, an imposing number of factors became evident which could not have been controlled sufficiently by governmental counter-measures to prevent the symbolic act of violence. On the other hand, there also occurred a considerable number of blunders, oversights, and failures of empathy whose avoidance might have stifled the potentialities of the demonstrations concerned.

All the factors described as "underlying" were beyond governmental manipulation, considering the quality of the governments involved. As to "immediate" factors, the Germans in Holland could hardly have had an answer for the psychological and other consequences of the battle line's return to Netherlands territory, which in turn made a continuation of "loyal cooperation" impossible to the railroad personnel. Similarly, the Hungarian regime could hardly have been prepared for the post-Stalin upheavals within the Party nor for the contagious effects of events in Poland. Equally beyond governmental control were some of the skillful or lucky feats of rebel leadership, such as the early morning actions at

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

the streetcar barns, the immediate posting of the lunch hour bulletin, or the mass reproduction of the Budapest students' sixteen points.

However, a number of situations could have been managed more advantageously by the regimes if they had reacted astutely. In February 1941 the Jewish "hostages" should not have been picked up at random from the streets. At that time the Germans were still attempting a moderate game, exploiting the last vestiges of the honeymoon, and it was foolish for them to adopt suddenly and publicly the methods of the lowest Dutch Nazi rabble. Even more inept, of course, were the series of mistakes relating to the call-up of the former Dutch army. Of all the demonstrations, the strike of April–May 1943 was most clearly the consequence of inadequately and tactlessly contrived governmental policy. Several mistakes of judgement are evident in the Panama crisis. Zonians should have been more carefully, and sternly, prepared for the emotional problems flowing from joint flag display; governmental authorities at all levels should have been forewarned about the troubles as a result of more properly working communications between Washington and the Canal Zone; finally, the outburst might have been averted in the last minute if the Panamanian students near Balboa High School had been handled more tactfully.

The crucial counter-policies must be effectuated before the symbolic act of violence has occurred. The evidence from the five demonstrations points to the inadequacy of repressive efforts after the outbreak. That is, the repression usually manages to curtail the demonstration, but not before the irreparable harm to the regime has taken place. Even where repressive measures did not involve errors such as the first Soviet intervention in Hungary or the failure to arrange for the presence of the Guardia Nacional, these measures were bound to affect the regime's authority and image in a most adverse manner. Also the factors pertaining to the spreading of a demonstration may very well be beyond governmental manipulation. In the case of the five demonstrations, the outbreak momentum was sufficient to ensure a certain amount of spreading against which counter-measures were of no avail.

The conclusion may well be that there is no certain way for a regime to avoid mass demonstrations. Curzio Malaparte once

thought that he had discovered a "science" of the *coup d'état* which would enable either the plotters to capture the state or the government to defend the state against the plotters. Malaparte tried to show

> that the problem of the conquest and defense of the State is not a political one, that it is a technical problem, that the art of State-defense is guided by the same principles that guide the art of its conquest, and that circumstances favorable to a *coup d'état* are not necessarily of a political and social order and do not depend on the general condition of the country.[14]

Franz Neumann, on the other hand, maintained that Malaparte's "science" was full of errors and that his examples and predictions were largely fallacious.[15] Certainly, political, social, and merely accidental conditions inevitably interfere with the "technology" of the *coup d'état* as well as with the "technology" of the kind of demonstrations described in this study. Purely "technological" tactics, to be sure, did pay off at times – for example, at the streetcar barns in Amsterdam and as a result of the activities of the dairy distributors and telephone operators in the 1943 strike. Yet, most of the time the particular demonstration seemed to develop by some kind of internal "magic" of its own, and both demonstration leaders and governmental authorities had to try to keep abreast by means of not particularly scientific improvisations. Malaparte's scientific planning would not, and probably could not, be applied to any large extent by the various actors in the demonstrations here described.

This is not to say that officials must not try to understand the underlying factors even where they cannot affect them. And, of course, an intelligent and mature regime will more positively influence the chain of events by not committing errors at the points where manipulation is possible, especially during the period immediately preceding the outbreak and during the outbreak itself. Yet, even the most empathic regime may sooner or later have to endure demonstrations which are likely to be harmful to its authority and image.

[14] Curzio Malaparte, *Coup d'État, the Technique of Revolution* (New York, 1932), p. 250.

[15] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1944), p. 458.

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A STUDY OF FIVE CRISES

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

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



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PREFACE

Foreign regimes are not always able to stave off expressions of mass discontent directed against them. Under the right combination of circumstances, demonstrations of varying intensity can take place. Although it is unlikely that regimes will be brought to fall by such actions, their effect can be far-reaching. Once a mass demonstration has taken place, a regime's hold on the population will never be the same again. This is particularly true if the regime has totalitarian aspects. Totalitarianism is imperfectly totalitarian where the masses cannot be prevented from communicating their discontent to each other and the world at large by conspicuous actions.

The present study analyzes five mass demonstrations against foreign regimes. Three of these demonstrations took place in the time of the German occupation of the Netherlands during World War II; one, in 1956, was directed against the "Muscovites'" rule in Hungary and one, in 1964, against the "Zonians'" presence in Panama. The Dutch episodes consisted of strike actions, each taking place under different sets of circumstances. The so-called February Strike of 1941 in Amsterdam was primarily in protest against the first anti-semitic outbursts. The strikes of April-May 1943 developed in many parts of the Netherlands to express dissatisfaction with German forced labor drafts, at a time that German victory began to appear doubtful. The railroad strike of 1944–45 was originally intended as a tactical measure to support the Allied airborne landings near Arnhem, but soon developed into a grandiose national act of defiance against the occupier by the largest Dutch enterprise. The Hungarian uprising, of course, took place in a somewhat different time span and under considerably different conditions of regime and population. Nevertheless, this unique event – which "illuminated the immense landscape of post-war totalitarianism for twelve long days [and] ... contained more history than the twelve years since the Red Army had 'liberated' the country"[1]

[1] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 480.

– contributes valuable parallels to the Dutch strikes and permits additional insights into the phenomena under study. The Panamanian demonstrations of January 1964 featured some of the patterns of the Dutch and Hungarian events. There existed an imposing array of Panamanian grievances against the United States, many of such a nature that the United States could not readily correct them. More immediately preceding the outburst came errors on the part of the foreign power in terms of policy, communications, and insufficient control over lower functionaries and their dependents.

The demonstrations are covered "functionally" in this study. They are chopped up and discussed in terms of sub-categories which are established for purposes of the present analysis: underlying factors, immediate factors, leadership groups, the outbreak of the demonstrations, the spreading of the demonstrations, and the regime's reaction and repression. Each sub-category is presented with respect to its effect on the five demonstrations under consideration. Admittedly, this arrangement has artificial aspects since the six sub-categories obviously do not divide the material into neat sectors. Particularly the distinction between the first two factors may seem doubtful not only in view of the greatly varying time spans presented as constituting the underlying "tinder" or the more immediate "sparks"; because of the immense complexity of all cause and effect relationships, the duality of underlying and immediate factors may be simplistic. Moreover, chopping-up the demonstrations will hardly facilitate the task of the reader who in any case is not likely to be familiar with the sequence of events of the Dutch strikes. Nevertheless, the "functional" coverage seemed preferable for the achievement of at least a minimum of comparative insights. Furthermore, each chapter features introductions and summaries to help recall the thread of each of the demonstrations.

I like to express my gratitude to my colleague, Professor David R. Deener of Tulane University, for his valuable comments and advice in connection with this study. I would also like to take this opportunity to point to the admirable work of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, in Amsterdam, whose numerous excellent monographs provided the material for a considerable part of this study.[2]

[2] Translations from Dutch and German into English are my own.

CONTENTS

MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN REGIMES

CHAPTER I

UNDERLYING FACTORS

The five demonstrations took place against various types of foreign regimes. The German rulers of the Netherlands were civilians, as it happened mostly of Austrian extraction, headed by A. Seyss-Inquart, reportedly a fairly intelligent administrator. However, all the internal power struggles of the Nazi elites were reflected, often exaggeratedly, in the occupation capitals and as a result efficiency suffered. The German rule in the Netherlands was never imaginative, often sloppy and psychologically inept. Because of the unpopularity and utter lack of respectability of the Dutch Nazis, these Quislings were often a burden to occupation officials. Above all, the unbelievably cruel policy of segregation and extermination of the Jews doomed all German attempts at tolerable public relations with the Dutch population.[1] In Budapest, the regime under M. Rákosi was Hungarian in name only. The ruling clique, known as the "Muscovites," had spent long years in Russian exile and had been put into office by the Russians against the wishes of the bulk of the population. By 1956, the "Muscovites" had become unpopular even among their own Hungarian Communist comrades and were probably inconvenient to the Russians for affecting the prestige of the Soviet troops in Hungary and the Soviet Union as a whole. To numerous Panamanians, the Canal Zone has always been a segregationist-minded Gringo colony, bisecting the revered national soil and established in 1903 under doubtful conditions and confusing arrangements pertaining to sovereignty. Explosions were likely regardless of the skill of United States administrators; in 1964, these skills were evidently at a low level, while on the Panamanian side emotions were stirred by various events, internal and external.

In the following discussion of underlying factors, those background conditions are emphasized which provide an explanation for the possibility of the bursting-out of demon-

[1] The unfathomable drama of the Jews in the Netherlands has been recounted by J. Presser, *Ondergang* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, 2 vols.).

strations at a later time. In early 1941, rioting against Dutch Nazis broke loose in Amsterdam streets, followed by a general work stoppage; in spring of 1943, a wave of strikes hit widespread sectors of the Dutch economy at a most critical moment for the German war effort; in September 1944, the largest Dutch enterprise, the railroads, began a strike which was to outlast the war in spite of the ensuing near-starvation of the population of Holland's major urban centers. It will be maintained that three inherent features of the German occupation were, respectively, responsible: the apparent inevitability of anti-semitic acts, the difficulties in securing Dutch manpower for the German war economy, and the dilemmas resulting from cooperation with a foreign invader. In Hungary, a major uprising against a quasi-foreign regime can only be understood in terms of certain internal and external factors undermining that regime's authority. Similarly, the relatively minor Panamanian challenge of a quasi-colonial regime necessitates analysis of the nature of the United States presence in the Canal Zone.

February 1941; Conquering the Streets of Amsterdam

During the winter of 1940–41 the Germans were still to some extent in the "honeymoon" period of the occupation. This period was characterized by their apparent inclination to leave Holland to the Dutch except for strictly military requirements, which at this time seemed hardly imposing. This "soft" policy was repugnant to various factions of Dutch Nazis, who had anticipations of political power as their ideological brethren from the East took over in the Netherlands. The most obvious symbol of National Socialism was anti-semitism. The most Jewish of all Dutch cities was Amsterdam, unique in continental Western Europe because of the large Jewish proletariat which was concentrated in the "Jodenhoek" of this ancient metropolis. In traditionally tolerant Amsterdam Dutch Nazis made their first, crude attempts to acquire power, employing Hitler's own tactics of "conquering the streets" which had caused such havoc in the latter years of the Weimar Republic.

As early as June 1940, a few weeks after the Dutch capitulation, clashes between Dutch Nazis and the population had occurred in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Delft. On Prince Bernhard's birthday, June 29, German police had

to intervene to quell pro-Orange demonstrations, and these had also led to attacks on Dutch Nazis. During all of 1940, minor street riots took place frequently in Amsterdam and The Hague as the *Weer Afdeeling* (WA) – the Dutch Nazi equivalent of the German SA – began its policy of "conquering the streets." When WA-man Peter Ton was killed by Dutch police in the streets of The Hague, the Dutch Nazis acquired their first martyr. The "honeymooning" Germans were probably far from delighted when in November 1940 five thousand WA-men marched through the streets of Amsterdam to demonstrate to friend and foe that "a new wind was blowing from the East." [2]

It is not clear whether the street riots played into the hands of the more "ideologically" inclined Germans or whether the more realistically minded Germans were trying to mollify the Dutch Nazis, but in any case the first German measures against the Jews coincided with these riots and marches. During the summer of 1940, Jews were removed from civilian antiaircraft units, and ritual slaughter was prohibited. In late 1940, Jewish civil servants and Jewish elected officials were suspended from their functions. By January 1941, Jews were barred from motion picture theaters, and "Aryans" were no longer permitted as servants in Jewish households. The segregation process was beginning which was intended ultimately to eject the Jews from the Dutch community.[3]

The anti-semitic measures immediately became the target of protests – from the Netherlands Union,[4] from university students and professors, and particularly from the Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy. It was at this time, according to the German security chief, H. Rauter, that the Dutch churches began their all-out fight against the Dutch Nazis. In fact, from January 1941 on the Roman Catholic church refused all sacraments to members of the various Dutch Nazi organizations.[5]

Duly inspired by the official German decrees, the Dutch

[2] B. A. Sijes, *De Februari-Staking* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), pp. 4, 5, 12, 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 14, 17.

[4] The Netherlands Union was an organization set up at the beginning of the occupation. Its leaders, including prominent members from all the non-totalitarian parties, tried to present a united Dutch front and hoped to be able to get along with the more moderate German elements.

[5] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 16, 20, 201.

Nazi street campaigns soon began to feature attacks on Jewish homes and on cafés and restaurants where Jews were customers. For example, in mid-December 1940 WA-men entered a large popular restaurant in Amsterdam and attempted to force the Jewish customers from the premises. Only after considerable fighting and bloodshed did Amsterdam police succeed in restoring order. In this period Dutch Nazis also began to urge hotels and restaurants to post "Jews not welcome" signs, and sometimes official German support could be obtained for these utterly un-Dutch displays. Among other incidents were attemps to drag Jews from streetcars, and attacks on Amsterdam police who tried to protect Jews. Even more serious was the involvement of individual German soldiers in the riots. In one anti-semitic incident, according to an official German report, "hundreds" of German soldiers participated. German military police was frequently needed to assist Amsterdam police, and many of the latter were injured in the street fights.

There is considerable evidence that higher German officials, and even the Dutch Nazi leadership, were far from happy about the anti-Jewish riots at this period of the occupation. On the other hand, some lower German officials in Amsterdam undoubtedly encouraged the WA-men, and the occupier accompanied the riots with the first series of anti-Jewish decrees. In any case, the rank and file of Dutch Nazis remained frustrated since the pre-war Dutch civil service and other officialdom were generally kept in office by the Germans, who had little faith in the administrative qualities of their Dutch comrades.[6]

Major trouble was obviously ahead as the population of Amsterdam's old Jewish quarter, aided by non-Jews from neighboring districts, organized self-defense units against the WA inroads. Street battles began in the Jewish quarter and on several occasions the Dutch Nazi invaders were defeated. On February 11, 1941, an entire WA detachment was forced to flee, several of its members were thrown into canals, and one – WA-man Koot – died after a severe beating administered by the Jewish defenders of the neighborhood.[7] From the

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 53–58, 61–66, 70–74, 202.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–86, 219. "Rauter reported to Himmler that a Jew had bitten through Koot's jugular vein and sucked out his blood, an obvious allusion to ritual murder." (W. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940–1945* [Stanford University Press, 1963], p. 107.)

perspective of the German security chief in the Netherlands, H. Rauter, "the behavior of the Jews" was the ultimate cause of the February Strike which was to follow soon. "As Jews to involve themselves with the WA in such street battles was certainly crazy." [8] Or, put somewhat more honestly, the underlying factor in the February Strike was the doctrine of anti-semitism which the occupier could not help but carry in his baggage, even though at that particular moment he would probably have been quite eager to hide it from his Dutch friends, the WA rabble.

April–May 1943; Procuring Slave Labor after Stalingrad

An analysis of underlying factors in the second large strike, occurring in late April and early May of 1943, reveals stringencies related to the total war effort which Germany was forced to adopt in that period. As a result of the defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa, labor was looming as one of the crucial bottlenecks of the tottering German war machine. Occupation authorities everywhere were ordered to "comb out" their domains by whatever means available. For example, large-scale "razzias" (round-ups) took place in the Netherlands in February 1943, during which able-bodied men were grabbed in the streets, in sports arenas, and in other public places, and shipped to German labor camps. The men often were not even permitted to contact their families before their departure. As of March 1, 1943, all hirings and dismissals in private industry were controlled by the Government employment offices. After March 11, 1943, all Dutch university students were supposed to undergo at least one year of labor service in Germany.

Particularly the "razzias" and the student labor service affected Dutch families which until that period had managed to escape most of the consequences of war. As the Germans appeared determined to enforce their new policies, increasing tension spread through the country. According to a widely distributed underground newspaper – *Het Parool*, of April 5, 1943 – the atmosphere all over the Netherlands was beginning to resemble Amsterdam of February 1941. One slip on the part of the occupier, one clumsy action or decree which would hit a great number of Dutchmen simultaneously, might be the

[8] "*Als Judentum sich mit der WA in solche Straßenschlachten einzulassen war gewiß unsinnig.*" (*Het Proces Rauter* [The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1952], p. 499.)

cause of a nation-wide protest strike. However, *Het Parool* cautioned, the Germans were quite aware of the danger and would be clever enough to avoid the kind of action which would spark Dutch tempers in the direction of a unified resistance demonstration. *Het Parool's* estimate of public opinion turned out to be quite accurate, only the Germans were not sufficiently aware of the explosiveness in the air.[9]

The Germans' dilemma was considerable. While the war was going well for them, occupation decrees had been enforced with a certain amount of flexibility and even laxity. Curfew hours were not always respected by Dutch civilians. The medical association had been amazingly successful in resisting German nazification decrees. Only 20 per cent of students had registered for the labor draft and to catch the remaining 80 per cent was beyond the capacity of the German police. Even non-cooperative students – the so-called "non-signers" of a loyalty statement to the occupier – had been left alone as a whole. By early 1943, many German circles were complaining about the ineffectual "softness" which presumably characterized occupation policies and called for appropriately stern measures without pity for the population.[10] Of course, the "soft" policies had by no means lessened the unpopularity of the occupier. In 1943, after Stalingrad and El Alamein, control of the Dutch population would be even more difficult as a German defeat in the war for the first time seemed possible. Yet, at this very moment of revealed weakness on the battlefields, the Germans had to attempt to tighten their hold in the occupied regions, demanding services which in more favorable, victorious periods would have been hard enough to obtain. Thus, the desperate need for labor made drastic measures necessary; the very occasion which demanded the labor –

[9] P. J. Bouman, *De April–Mei-Stakingen van 1943* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 13–14. It should be noted that Professor Bouman's book includes a contribution by B. A. Sijes – the section on the origin of the strike in the Twente region (pp. 191–296).

[10] According to a German official in the province of Groningen, one of the main causes of the 1943 strike was the laxity of occupation authorities; the population had never discovered the point beyond which it would not dare to go in its disregard of decrees. Often, mere reprimands were the only German answer to violations. (*Ibid.*, p. 393.) A Dutch Nazi district leader in Noord-Brabant province thought that the "soft" attitude towards the physicians' resistance had given the population the idea that mass actions could have favorable results. (*Ibid.*, p. 373.) Note other German and Dutch Nazi complaints with respect to "softness," *ibid.*, pp. 361–362, 384, 427.

military defeat – made proper enforcement of these measures more unlikely than ever.

When the "get tough" measures of April–May 1943 – consisting mainly of the call-up of the former members of the Dutch army – were finally announced, it surprised no one, least of all many Germans, that they were doomed to failure from the outset. Moreover, the Germans handled this call-up with incredible lack of skill. According to German surveys, 75 per cent of the former Dutch soldiers did not show up to register for the call-up, and the problem of catching the delinquents was considered hopeless from the beginning. The surveys noted a radical shift in Dutch morale as a result of the call-up; a point would soon be reached when even terror and "assembly line" executions would no longer suffice to keep the population in line.[11] The Dutch public immediately felt the weakness of the German position. Not only was the call-up disobeyed, but the situation produced nation-wide protest strikes on a level altogether unimaginable after the failure of the February 1941 strike outside Amsterdam. Underlying these strikes was the German dilemma of having to introduce unpopular measures affecting the entire population at a time when the image of Germany's invincible military prowess was for the first time seriously in decline.

The Railroad Strike; the Dilemma of "Loyal Cooperation"

The first protest strike arose when the Germans could not, or would not, contain violent anti-semitic outbursts provoked by some of their Dutch supporters. The second protest strike was related to the increasing German need for manpower as the German hold on the Dutch population was slipping away rapidly. The third mass protest, the railroad strike of 1944–45, was based on yet another set of underlying factors. "Loyal cooperation" was the slogan which characterized the Netherlands (State) Railroads' attitude during the first years of the occupation; they provided useful services for the Germans, in return for nearly complete Dutch control of the railroad system, the largest enterprise in the Netherlands.[12] This arrangement was not in accordance with the Regulations

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 427–430.

[12] In Belgium and France, on the other hand, the Germans had immediately taken over direct controls with respect to the railroads. (*Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940–1945* [The Hague, 1949–1956], 7c, p. 707.)

(*Aanwijzingen*) issued by the Dutch government in 1937 for the case of war and occupation. In these instructions, intended for all government agencies, the railroads were specifically ordered not to transport enemy troops, munitions, or military supplies – services actually rendered the Germans under the "loyal cooperation" policy.

Immediately after the Dutch capitulation the Dutch supreme commander had told the railroads to resume operations. On May 20, 1940, the board of directors of the railroads had announced that operations would be restored "in loyal cooperation with the German authorities." Perhaps the board of directors was not aware of the Regulations of 1937, which had not been circularized widely. In any case, nobody reminded railroad employees that, according to the Regulations, they were to go on strike if demands contrary to the Regulations were made by the occupier.[13] The first such demand was approved by the board of directors in May 1940, when Dutch trains, with Dutch engineers, were dispatched to carry German ammunition deep into Belgium. A year later the Netherlands Railroads agreed to repair German locomotives in Dutch repair shops, and Dutch locomotives and personnel were put into service on German lines near the Dutch border, as far as fifty miles inside Germany.[14] After a while, "loyal cooperation" meant that the Netherlands Railroads were not only transporting German troops, artillery, and tanks, as well as Dutch slave laborers and political prisoners, but were even sending Jewish deportees to their cruel destiny.[15] Finally, Dutch trains

[13] A. J. C. Rüter, *Rijden en staken* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 19–20.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 33, 36.

[15] After the war, a parliamentary inquiry commission was struck by the "laconic" manner in which the railroad personnel had accepted the transports of Jews. Dr. Willem Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, replied that the city of Amsterdam had also been criticized for providing streetcars to transport Jewish deportees, but that Jewish officials had actually requested the city to provide this service. Another railroad official suggested that the board of directors would have been dismissed if the Jewish transports had been refused. (*Enquête-commissie*, 7a, pp. 390, 707; 7c. p. 684.) It is doubtful whether the Germans would have dared to present the public spectacle of hundred thousand Jews of all ages walking through the Netherlands to the East. Most likely, if the Dutch had refused, the Germans would have had to provide German-manned trains for these transports. This would have been the more honorable solution for the Netherlands Railroads, and – in retrospect – it seems most doubtful whether the Germans would have penalized them for it. Rüter also noted how "this most revolting transport of all" was virtually not opposed by railroad personnel at any level. (Rüter, *op. cit.*, p. 117.)

were used to carry out the systematic spoliation of the Netherlands.[16]

Of course, the "loyal cooperation" policy had certain advantages for the Dutch. For its very survival the country needed the railroads. If the railroads had stopped operations, the Germans would have sent German personnel, and perhaps trains, to serve their own needs, but they would hardly have been willing to provide for Dutch needs beyond the barest subsistence level. Moreover, Dutch railroad workers under "loyal cooperation" were exempted from labor draft in Germany, and Nazi propaganda and influence were barred successfully in Holland's largest enterprise. On the other hand, the Germans benefitted from an excellently operating transport system without having to involve scarce German labor or managerial personnel. It so happened that German policy vis-à-vis the Dutch railroads was, as a whole, efficiently handled. As a Dutch official put it, the few German supervisors and liaison officials "were, after all, railroad men with whom one could talk ...." Besides, one of the highest of the German railroad officials in Holland was anti-Nazi and even sabotaged certain German efforts; another highly placed German, the railroad *Referent*, was said to be deeply ashamed of Nazi behavior.[17]

"Loyal cooperation" continued as the battle lines remained far from the Netherlands. The Amsterdam strike of February 1941 did not spread to the railroads, except for a very brief work stoppage in railroad yards on the outskirts of Amsterdam – one of the few locales of Communist influence in the railroad unions.[18] The strikes of 1943 did involve a few more railroad employees. Some 900 office workers at the central office in Utrecht, 30 per cent of the office personnel there, walked out briefly, and so did some engineers and workshop workers. But, as a whole, the railroads continued to operate in April–May 1943, and this was perhaps the most important reason why that strike did not last longer and spread more completely.[19]

The railroad strike was, however, foreshadowed by one significant German blunder. Dutch Nazis and "ideologists" among the occupation hierarchy had been eagerly pushing

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 24–25, 46, 48–51.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118, 122.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 136–140.

efforts to take over the Dutch labor movement. Disregarding the warnings of German railroad officials, they also attempted nazification of the various railroad unions – Catholic, Protestant, socialist, and "neutral," in the typical Dutch stratification. The railroad unions acted through a joint top organ, the Personnel Council (*Personeelsraad*), in close and harmonious cooperation with the railroads' board of directors. Under the "loyal cooperation" policy, Nazi influence had been generally kept out of this top organ, while other segments of Dutch labor had to accept unpleasant compromises. Although the Dutch Nazis and their German allies tried hard, and almost broke up the railroad unions, the effort failed in the end. Transport needs were more real than the ideological needs of Nazi "labor front" doctrines, and the German railroad officials ultimately helped to prevent nazification of railroad labor and to keep at bay the "*Scheißarbeitsfront*," as they called it untranslatably. For once, the board of directors went as far as to threaten resignation to protect their union counterpart, the Personnel Council.[20]

After this scare, other factors contributed to effectuate a radical change in railroad policy. As the Allied invasion of Western Europe was finally approaching, and after the strikes of 1941 and 1943 had shown the possibilities of mass action, the Dutch public was becoming more and more critical of "loyal cooperation." Partly, perhaps, to avoid identification with the side of treachery and cowardice, the board of directors began to consider plans for a large-scale action, a general railroad strike, which would put the railroads undisputedly on the right side of the occupation. The board always assumed that such a strike could be staged only once, and therefore would have to take place at a moment most inopportune to the Germans.[21] Gradually, but soon more and more intensively, the board of directors and the Personnel Council prepared for the big day, under the safe screen of all-Dutch control, the price obtained for "loyal cooperation." As soon as the Allies would reach Dutch soil, the Germans would be most desperately in need of the Dutch railroads. At this very moment a total railroad strike would be called to hamstring the German effort. "Loyal cooperation" would finally cease, but the strike would be the more successful because the signals would be called by an

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–81, 84–85, 98–104, 111.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 115–116, 138–142.

organization which had remained efficient, loyally Dutch, and anti-Nazi.

In the end, German railroad policies, farsighted as they appeared, were also doomed to failure. The longer "loyal cooperation" lasted, the more it became intolerable to the Dutch. The railroad strike was successful beyond expectation because the dishonorable period of "loyal cooperation" increased eagerness to rebel and preserved effective leadership and facilities.

The Hungarian Uprising; the "Muscovites" and the Challenge of Anti-Stalinism

The Hungarians too were living under foreign occupation in 1956. The Hungarian Communist Party's regime was Hungarian in name only; in fact, it was the agent of the Soviet Union. This had been reflected in the elections which were held, for the first and last time after World War II, in 1945. At a moment of unprecedented prestige for the Soviet Union, the Communists managed to obtain only 70 seats in the Hungarian parliament against 245 seats of the Independent Smallholders and 94 seats of three smaller parties. Communist strength amounted to a mere 17 per cent of the total seats.[22] Moreover, this minority was ridden by internal dissensions.

Hungarian Communism in the interwar period had been haunted by the memory of the Béla Kún episode, "a memory hateful to the peasantry and the middle strata and far from endearing even to the industrial workers." After the debacle of 1919, the Hungarian Communist Party was "a head without a body," whose few surviving leaders attempted in vain to reorganize from their Soviet exile.[23] When the end of World War II found the Red Army in complete occupation of the exhausted and dispirited country, three groups of Hungarian Communists competed for the new places in the sun. The so-called "Muscovites," the exiles who had lingered in Russia for a generation, were in control, under Mátyás Rákosi. Their bitter rivals were the resistance-hero Communists, the underground leaders who had acquired popular prestige in the period of German predominance. A third group was particu-

[22] General Assembly, United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (1957), p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as United Nations Report.)

[23] P. Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 11.

larly trusted by the Russians, selected by them from the ranks of their many Hungarian prisoners of war and indoctrinated in special training courses during Russian captivity. Since there were many jobs to be filled in 1945, all three groups were to some extent satisfied.[24]

Yet, inevitably, the impact of the later years of the Stalin era was felt in Hungary. In a succession of massive purges, with the number of victims estimated by some as high as 200,000, "virtually the entire indigenous [i.e., non-'Muscovite'] element in the Party was liquidiated." The popular leader and potential "Tito," László Rajk, was executed in 1946. After these great purges Rákosi could enforce a policy of total subservience to Russia, with the assistance of a coterie of "Muscovites" who were further handicapped by being considered "ethnically" alien by many Hungarians.[25] This enforced unity in the Communist camp was drastically disturbed by the "anti-purge purges" of the post-Stalin years. Overnight the surviving purge victims returned from prisons, forced residences, and concentration camps to reenter the inner circles of the Party. Clashes became inevitable, and Rákosi's authority was weakened to a most serious extent. One exceptionally popular purge victim, Imre Nagy, had "miraculously" survived the Stalinese elimination of all who were not "a mere agent," and his return in particular made the inner Party split critical. Thus, the purges and the subsequent return of the purge victims were underlying factors in the uprising, upsetting the unity of a regime which, even if it had preserved unity, would have been regarded as an alien instrument on Hungarian soil.[26]

The division within the top leadership had a demoralizing effect on an important group in its entourage, the writers and other intellectuals. A discussion club, the Petöfi Circle, had been established as a branch of the Communist Youth League. An "unprecedented phenomenon" occurred when this subordinate Party organ emancipated itself from the top leadership's control and began to defy it in public.[27] The Communist intellectuals, by attacking the regime, "hoped to gain a point

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19, 29. Rákosi and his chief lieutenants – Ernö Gerö, József Révai, Mihály Farkas – were of Jewish origin.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 31. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–494.

[27] Kecskement, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

of contact with the masses." [28] Thus, that nightmare of the totalitarian state, the splitting-up of the elite, had come about in Hungary, and to make the situation even more serious, contacts with the supposedly voiceless masses were being sought by part of the elite. After several writers of the Petöfi Circle had vehemently criticized the top leaders before a large crowd in June 1956, opposition came forth everywhere in Party circles. "An obscure functionary" at another meeting in Budapest had even called for Rákosi's resignation, and as a result he became a minor celebrity overnight. As the regime, to everyone's surprise and delight, no longer dared to employ its instruments of terror against these kinds of defiance, the intra-Party opposition continued on the offensive. "Within a few months, the whole authority structure of the Party was corroded." [29]

The discontents within the elite made their contacts with the masses and discovered to their own – and the masses' – surprise the depth of the hatred uniting them. As Kecskemeti observes, "perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the Hungarian revolution was the rapidity with wich a national consensus crystallized after the outbreak." [30] The existing mass discontent could make itself felt because the elite had become divided; at the same time, elite divisions would not have upset the regime "if the masses had not entered upon the scene." In this sense, the "elite process" and the "mass process," as Kecskemeti calls them, were both essential underlying factors in the uprising. In the face of the dual challenge of intra-elite divisions and mass discontent with "foreign" rule, the regime was ill-prepared to withstand the onslaught of that "fantastic *coup de théâtre*" which presented itself during the hectic days of October 1956.[31]

The Panamanian Riots; the Zonians' Colonial System

The underlying factors in the friction between the United States and Panama related to a "deepest grievance": that a "foreign colony," the Canal Zone, had been established in the heart of the Republic of Panama. Many of the traditional characteristics of colonials were displayed by the so-called

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–75. The Polish Communist writers also played a decisive role in bringing liberalization ideas before the public and discrediting the "Stalinist Old Guard." (*Ibid.*, p. 143.)

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2, 70.

Zonians, who did not care to participate in Panamanian life and did not allow Panamanians to penetrate their "closed pattern of inward turned living." Until 1946 this colonial system of the Zone had included segregated drinking fountains, toilets, and even post-office windows.[32] In the words of some United States Army dependents, evacuated after the riots, many long-time Zonians behaved "like colonials," never learned Spanish, and treated Panamanians "like scum." [33] According to American residents of the Republic of Panama, who in general were reported to have sympathized with the Panamanians during the riots, the Zonians "have created a community that is both ostentatiously offensive to Panamanians and at the same time dangerously indifferent to their feelings." [34]

The report of the International Commission of Jurists points emphatically to the two separate communities who live in Panama. On the one hand the Panamanians in the Republic, on the other hand the 16,000 American citizens employed in the Canal Zone by the Canal Zone administration and the Canal Company, further augmented by some 20,000 United States military forces and their dependents. The International Jurists noted the divergency in the way of life, in the economy, and in the outlook of the two groups living in close proximity and yet "virtual isolation" from each other.

It is unfortunate that the United States citizens who have lived all their lives in the Canal Zone, and, perhaps more particularly, the second and third generation United States citizens who were born and raised in the Canal Zone, have developed a particular state of mind not conducive to the promotion of happier relations between them and the people of Panama. Indeed, on the contrary, this particular state of mind has resulted in building up resentment over the decades which has found expression in the type of unbalanced attitudes on both sides such as on the subject of flying their respective flags, as was demonstrated during the unfortunate days covered by this report, and also for some considerable time previously. The passage of time, instead of assuaging these conflicting tendencies, appears to have aggravated them.[35]

[32] *New York Times*, January 18, 1964.

[33] *Ibid.*, February 1, 1964.

[34] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1964.

[35] International Commission of Jurists, *Report on the Events in Panama* (Geneva, 1964), p. 42. (Hereafter cited as *International Jurists*.) The International Commission of Jurists was requested by the National Bar Association of Panama to investigate a number of complaints of infringements of Articles 3, 5, and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United States during the Panamanian riots of January 9 – January 12, 1964. The Commission dispatched an investigating committee of three legal experts: Professor A. D. Belinfante of

In fact, the International Jurists' chief conclusion consisted of advice to the United States to abolish the Zonians' system of isolation from the Panamanians.

We cannot help feeling that the United States, having regard to the special situation it occupies in the world, and with its resources and ideals, should reflect upon these sad facts and take effective steps to make possible a reorientation and change in the outlook and thinking of the people living in the Canal Zone. Undoubtedly this is a difficult and uphill task but it would yield rich dividends in healthier relations with the people of Panama.[36]

In addition to the charges of Zonian colonialism, the underlying factors of grievance on the part of the Panamanians related to aspects of the treaty of 1903 between the United States and the then newly established Republic of Panama. Panamanians have traditionally insisted that the Republic was "shotgunned" into this treaty after the United States had backed and protected the anti-Columbian coup. United States blackmail, supposedly, made Panama accept illegal restrictions on its sovereignty and an "abnormally" low share of the Canal's earnings.[37]

According to Article 2 of the treaty of 1903,

the Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed .... [38]

Article 3 contains the crucial provisions which later produced the disputes on the nature of United States "sovereignty" in the Zone.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in the said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.[39]

Amsterdam University, Judge Gustaf Petrén of Sweden, and Mr. Navroz Vakil, a Bombay attorney. This committee spent fourteen days in Panama, from March 1–March 14, 1964. Its findings, as presented in the above cited report, were adopted unanimously.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Cf., for example, *New York Times*, January 18, 1964.

[38] *International Jurists*, p. 10.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

Panamanians have tended to insist that United States jurisdiction over the 650 square miles of the Zone be interpreted in a strictly functional sense. It was argued that the clauses in the 1903 treaty should be limited by requiring purposes relating to the operation and maintenance of the Canal. For example, as early as 1904 the Panamanian government claimed the right to control ports in the Zone and attempted to deny the right of the United States to establish customs offices and a postal service there. The United States government, on the other hand, maintained – successfully – that its jurisdiction was as exclusive as the Republic of Panama's jurisdiction was totally non-existent in the Zone.[40]

Different underlying factors are revealed in each of the demonstrations under investigation. Although the "honeymooning" Germans aspired to be concialiatory in the winter of 1940–41, rowdy anti-semitism and street-conquering tactics on the part of "ideologists" and their Dutch sympathizers provoked the citizens of Amsterdam to violent counteractions. However thoroughly the German army had done its job for the purposes of the German war effort, the streets had to be conquered again. In 1943 and 1944, the workers in general and the railroad people in particular, who had not come to consider themselves partners of a victorious Germany in spite of full employment, good wages, and special treatment, were hardly likely to follow a Germany in defeat. Therefore, the Germans were bound to fumble with a more inclusive labor draft, and would not be able to convince the railroad men that "loyal cooperation" was ultimately not treasonable. In Hungary, an "alien" regime could not contain its intellectual entourage nor the masses as it was forced to absorb the severe internal strains of Stalin's purge and Khrushchev's anti-purge. The Panamanian situation was made difficult by the Zonians' Little America placed in the middle of a highly nationalistic Latin American republic; this difficulty was further aggravated by the uncertainties, legal and ideological, flowing from the various interpretations of the content and status of the treaty of 1903.

The underlying factors, then, produced explosive situations which overtaxed the intelligence and imagination of Germans, "Muscovites," and Zonians as more immediate and, in a sense, accidental factors provided the necessary spark.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

CHAPTER II

IMMEDIATE FACTORS

Different kinds of sparks affected the crises whose underlying influences have just been discussed. The riotous Amsterdam atmosphere of early 1941 reached a climax as violent clashes between Dutch Nazis and aroused citizens – and even between German police and Jews – led to the indiscriminate arrests of hundreds of Jewish "hostages" in the streets of the city. The ruthless manner of these arrests so excited Amsterdam tempers that the most efficient underground organization of the period, the Communist Party, saw a "natural" opportunity to promote large-scale demonstrations and a general strike. The situation was quite different in April–May 1943, when the post-Stalingrad requirements for manpower led the Germans to consider steps toward the total mobilization of the resources under their control. It so happened that in the Netherlands these steps were undertaken with such an amazing array of blunders that but relatively few Dutchmen were caught and the population was shocked into a series of spontaneous strikes which developed simultaneously in many sections of the country. As to the railroad strike of September 1944, the arrival of the Allied armies on Dutch soil provided the final impetus to Dutch railroad men, who during many months had become more and more impatient with the policy of cooperation with the occupier. The Hungarian uprising was sparked by an external factor, the filtering-through of news about sensational Polish moves toward liberalization, and a related internal factor, the eruption of demonstrations on the streets of Budapest. In the Canal Zone, concessions to the Panamanian point of view on the touchy subject of display of the United States flag, as imposed by Washington, were defied by angry Zonians. These acts of defiance led to painful incidents and provoked Panamanian nationalists to violent actions.

February 1941; the Illegal CPN and the Arrest of the Jewish "Hostages"

The atmosphere of the February 1941 strike was decisively affected by the Amsterdam Communists. The Communist Party Netherlands (CPN) had been under close Soviet control since 1919. A Popular Front policy was followed during the Thirties, and after the Nazi-Soviet pact a "neutralist" line came to the fore. The war was described as an imperialist struggle for world domination between the ruling classes of England, France, and Germany. According to a November 1939 statement by a CPN leader, the Anglo-French were the chief warmongers, and the workers should least of all prefer an Allied victory. After the German occupation began, the Communist press blamed the Dutch government for the invasion and called for friendship with Germany.[1] Nevertheless, the Germans almost immediately banned the Communist papers, and on July 20, 1940, the CPN itself was prohibited.[2] The CPN had always found its main voting strength in Amsterdam, where in the June 1939 elections it had obtained 55,755 votes, constituting 13.8 per cent of the total votec ast in Holland's largest city. In some Amsterdam districts the party was actually larger than its chief rival, the Social Democrats – but not in the neighborhoods of the Jewish proletariat, which had always preferred the Social Democrats.[3]

When the CPN was banned, it immediately moved into carefully prepared underground positions. Previously prominent leaders remained visible as "fronts," but most leadership posts were given to relatively unknown Communists. An exemplary underground set-up was organized, with intricate security precautions. By February 1941, the CPN had become the strongest resistance group in Amsterdam, and its newspaper, *De Waarheid*, then already had an underground circulation of 7000.[4] It is characteristic of the period before

[1] According to *Het Volksdagblad* of June 26, 1940, the Dutch government had been responsible for the five days of "butchery for capitalistic interests." The new English alliance was as deceitful as the previous policy of neutrality. The monthly *Politiek en Cultuur*, of June 1940, called for "peace and friendship"with Germany and a "correct" attitude toward the occupier. Due praise was given to the Soviet Union, the only really neutral nation in the war. (Cited in Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 42.)

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 40–43.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[4] Of course, other underground organizations and papers also made their appearance in Amsterdam in this early period, most of them with Social-Democrat,

the German invasion of the Soviet Union that *De Waarheid*, in its first underground issue on November 23, 1940, warned against the dangers of a British as well as a German victory, but concluded that promising revolutionary situations might be forthcoming from all kinds of directions as a result of the war.[5]

The potent underground organization of the Amsterdam CPN was first employed on a larger scale in November 1940. Sit-down actions were provoked with some success at a German-supported Dutch public works project for unemployed workers. Strong Communist leadership managed to inspire some two thousand men to protest the miserable wages and long hours on the project. Although a German anti-strike decree was violated, neither the occupier nor Amsterdam police seriously attempted to beat down these first demonstrations of the occupation. Instead, the workers' conditions were actually somewhat ameliorated.[6] Another minor strike occurred on February 17–18, 1941, in protest against rather half-hearted German efforts to obtain volunteers for naval yards in Germany. Some 2200 metal workers in several large Amsterdam enterprises were involved, and the Communists were again very active among the strikers. The Germans gave in once more. No penalties were inflicted upon the strikers, and the call for volunteers was withdrawn. The workers – and the CPN – noted with great interest that even during a Nazi occupation mass actions could be effective.[7]

After these successful affairs the CPN eagerly searched for other occasions and "causes" which might be turned into protest demonstrations. Low wages, inflation, hatred against the Dutch Nazis, and indignation about the anti-semitic measures were found to be likely themes. The CPN would have liked best of all a strike based on economic and political motives, which could be directed against Dutch "capitalists" as well as Dutch and German Nazis.[8] But, it so happened that at this time the anti-Jewish riots in Amsterdam were ap-

pro-Allied leanings. A German opinion survey of October 19, 1940, expressed surprise at the efficiency of these first Dutch resistance efforts, accomplished in a country which for a century and a quarter had been without war or enemy occupation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.)

[5] Concerning the Amsterdam CPN during this period, *ibid.*, pp. 43–48.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–34.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–39.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.

proaching a boiling point. On February 12, 1941, the Germans had sealed off the old Jewish quarter for twenty-four hours, as a punitive measure for attacks on uniformed Dutch Nazis in the quarter. This forced isolation of the Jews and renewed Nazi provocations caused even bloodier riots. On February 19, a German police patrol was fought off with gun fire and acid as it attempted to search a Jewish-owned ice cream parlor. This was the first time that Germans, rather than Dutch Nazis, had been openly resisted.[9] The German reaction came quickly, decided upon at the highest level – by Himmler himself, and the two most powerful Germans in the Netherlands, Reichskommissar A. Seyss-Inquart and Security Chief H. Rauter. On February 22 and 23, 425 Jewish "hostages" between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five were picked up at random by German police in the streets of the Jewish quarter, as Dutch police looked on helplessly and, as is reported, "completely flabbergasted [*volslagen overstuur*]." [10]

The arbitrary arrest of hundreds of Jews in plain view of the public provided the occasion many Communists had been waiting for impatiently. The riots had already excited the citizens of Amsterdam, but the grabbing from the streets, and even from streetcars and motion picture theaters, of so many of "their" Jews brought the Amsterdam temper close to explosion. At last the Party's organizing talents could be directed in behalf of a "cause" which would be supported by the entire population.[11] Thus, the immediate factor behind the February strike can be found in the public arrests of the Jews. These brutal acts brought the population to a state of emotion which would permit the successful promotion of a general strike by an organization eager to test its underground strength.

April–May 1943; German Fumbling

A series of German blunders constituted the most noteworthy factors immediately preceding the outbreak of the strike of April–May 1943. On January 13, 1943, Hitler had issued a special decree, a "*Führererlaß*," on the necessities of a truly total war effort. He was particularly concerned with the

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–91, 97–98, 104.

[10] Almost all of the "hostages" were sent to Mauthausen concentration camp in Germany. By autumn of 1941 none had survived after they had been ordered to the notorious stone quarries at Mauthausen. (*Ibid.*, pp. 105–109, 188.)

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

mobilization of all possible labor resources in the German domain. The real problem, of course, was left unanswered by Hitler: how to effectuate mass deportations of workers from the occupied countries to Germany without thereby provoking mass desertions to the underground resistance movements. Himmler suggested to Hitler that the procurement of Dutch laborers could readily be accomplished by recalling the 300,000 demobilized members of the former Dutch army for labor duty (*Arbeitseinsatz*) in Germany. This would bring in an ample supply of able-bodied men, and would also, Himmler thought, eliminate potential resistance fighters in the back of the German army if an Allied invasion were to hit the Dutch coast. Hitler approved this plan and ordered his lieutenant in the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart, to prepare its execution.

Seyss-Inquart was intelligent enough to realize the dangers of Himmler's proposal. In an immediate, personal reply to Himmler he stated that the German forces at his disposal would not suffice to round up the ex-soldiers, particularly since the Dutch police could certainly not be relied upon for these kinds of purposes. Therefore, as he predicted quite accurately, the inability to enforce this measure would result in "severe damage" to the image of German authority in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Seyss-Inquart promised to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.[12]

Partly to allay the fears of Seyss-Inquart and other German civilian officials, it was decided that military security reasons were to be stressed to the Dutch public in press releases concerning the round-up, on the assumption that security arguments would be more readily accepted than references to German needs for slave labor. In fact, the German military had felt for some time that there were legitimate and urgent reasons for the internment of the former members of the Dutch army, from a military security point of view.[13] Yet, as the call-up was in fact explained to lower German and Dutch officials and the public, forced labor arguments were constantly mixed in with security arguments.[14] Moreover, interspersed

[12] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 306.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 16. Note, for example, Himmler's letter of February 10, 1943, pointing to the increasing effectiveness of military sabotage efforts by the Dutch resistance. (*Ibid.*, p. 305.)

[14] Note, for example, Security Chief Rauter's letter of January 1, 1943, describing the difficulties of getting Dutch laborers to Germany and the failures of previous German measures in this sphere. (*Ibid.*, p. 394.)

with the security and labor arguments were snide remarks about Dutch "plutocrats' sons" who were allegedly loitering in the "ornate" but idle offices of banks, shipping companies, and insurance firms in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, while German soldiers were dying at Stalingrad. Strong emotional overtones thus entered the labor draft. As the glorious victories of the early years were followed by the drabness and gloom of the first defeats, the Germans became jealous of those who seemed to be spared the deprivations of the Eastern front, particularly if they also happened to reflect the traditional comforts and "conceit" of the Dutch middle and upper classes.[15]

The German army was reluctant to associate itself with the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, particularly in view of the confusing spectrum of justifying arguments presented by the proponents. Yet, in order to avoid the appearance of just another forced labor draft, the army could not get itself excused from this distasteful job. Also the German Foreign Office expressed grave doubts. It was entirely in accordance with international law to put the 300,000 members of the former Dutch army into prisoner-of-war camps, but – according to the Foreign Office – international law did not necessarily permit ["*völkerrechtlich ... nicht ohne weiteres vertretbar*"] bringing these prisoners of war to Germany for purposes of labor duty ["*Arbeitseinsatz*"]. Moreover, the measure was doubtful ["*nicht unbedenklich*"] from a foreign policy point of view and would be exploited by Allied propaganda. Besides, Sweden, the neutral power representing Dutch interests in Germany, might make difficulties, the Foreign Office feared.[16]

After much hesitation, Hitler finally issued an order which in effect settled very little. He directed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to "recapture" the former Dutch soldiers and to effectuate their "return into captivity as prisoners of war [*Rückführung in die Kriegsgefangenschaft*]." However, labor service was specifically mentioned only in connection with a possible future call-up of those age groups which would

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 305, 312–331.

[16] Concerning the doubts of the German army, note two communications from Seyss-Inquart's assistant, F. Schmidt, to the German labor draft chief, F. Sauckel, dated April 12 and April 16, 1943. The Foreign Office attitude is reflected in a lengthy memorandum, dated April 17, 1943. (These documents are cited in full by Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–319.)

have had to serve in the Dutch army if the Germans had not come. These as yet not drafted age groups [*"ungediente Jahrgänge"*] would face labor service in Germany – if they were called up. Hitler's order, therefore, seemingly provided no laborers except the "non-draftees" to be called in the undetermined future.[17]

The Supreme Command contributed to the confusion by promptly instructing General F. Christiansen, the German military commander in the Netherlands, "to catch, detain, and deport [*erfassen, festnehmen, und abschieben*]" the members of the former Dutch army, without providing detailed instructions concerning the method of recapture of the ex-soldiers, their further destination, or the exact categories of men affected. On April 29, 1943, some five weeks after receiving this order, General Christiansen finally proclaimed the general call-up of the former Dutch army as prisoners of war. On the next day, April 30 – after the protest strike against the general call-up had begun – he suddenly and surprisingly announced that only the "regular soldiers [*Berufspersonal*]" who had been on active service in May 1940 would have to turn themselves in. This meant that at most 10 per cent of the former Dutch army, about 30,000 men, were actually affected by the German measure.[18] On April 30, no public mention was made of the intended exempted categories even in the reduced call-up – farmers, miners, and certain other groups.

Other blunders were committed by the Germans at this point. The announcement of the call-up virtually coincided with Crown Princess Juliana's birthday (April 30) and the Socialists' May Day, dramatic dates for the Dutch under German occupation. Also, the Germans had previously decided that the first day of May would not be a holiday but a regular working day, yet had failed to announce this properly. When the strike broke out, some assumed "strikers" were actually taking the day off, unaware of the fact that the customary holiday had been cancelled.[19]

The general call-up of April 29 hit millions of Dutchmen: the 300,000 ex-soldiers apparently affected, their relatives and

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–19, 24, 333. Regular officers of the Dutch army had been sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Poland in May 1942; at first, they too had been demobilized and permitted to go home after the Dutch defeat in 1940.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 355, 359.

friends. Moreover, the "return into captivity as prisoners of war" was immediately seen as a trick for obtaining slave laborers. The security argument found no acceptance among the Dutch.[20] As one German official stated quite correctly, the great mass of the population would not have been so shocked if it had been known on April 29 how few ex-soldiers were actually being called.[21] However, since the call-up was taken to include all former soldiers, the impact on the public was terrific, and the strike burst loose immediately and spontaneously. When the Germans announced on the next day that they intended only to call the "regulars" among the ex-soldiers, this was considered by many as a German retreat, ex-post facto and as such the best possible evidence for the strike's success. On April 30, the apparent softening of the German attitude fanned rather than restrained the spirit of the strike.[22]

The many German blunders, committed at the highest civilian and military levels in Holland and Germany, reflected – in the view of the official Dutch historian of the strike – a combination of bureaucratic sloppiness, indifference, and lack of insight into mass attitudes and reactions.[23] Since military channels were chosen for the effectuation of the call-up in a country where the occupation had been a German civilian show, the lack of political and psychological empathy was particularly noticeable. Airforce General Christiansen – a Goering protégé – was a man of very modest talents, who was quite content to carry out orders, as he understood them, without worrying about the consequences.[24] It is altogether

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 294. Several German police reports confirmed the immediate recognition by the Dutch of the "real" German purposes in the call-up. (*Ibid.*, pp. 335, 354.)

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17. While the Dutch were spared the utter chaos depicted in Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia*, the German set-up in the Netherlands certainly was no model of efficiency. General H. von Wühlich, the chief of staff of the German military command in the Netherlands, after the war referred to the occupation regime as an "organizational miscarriage," typical for Hitler's style of government. As a result of "confused organization" and "inadequately arranged command relationships," no clear-cut policies or decrees were possible. "A large part of the orders issued required delicate weighing of competences and resulted in disputes about competences; often complicated diplomatic negotiations had to be undertaken to reach intended goals." (*Het Proces Christiansen* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950], p. 233.)

Around Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart all kinds of factions and personalities, reflecting the internal German scene, were struggling for influence.

possible that the underlying German need for manpower would have produced a violent Dutch response in any case. Yet, the immediate circumstances of the announcement of April 29, 1943, reflected so many German blunders that the protest strike became virtually inevitable then.

The Railroad Strike; the Battle Returns to the Netherlands

The strike of April–May 1943 might have been avoided by the Germans if they had behaved more tactfully and intelligently. On the other hand, they could hardly have controlled the immediate circumstances leading to the railroad strike, even if they had been in a more resourceful mood. "Loyal cooperation" grew less and less tolerable to railroad men as Allied victory became more certain; it could not possibly continue when the Allied armies approached the frontiers of the Netherlands.

The first Dutch village was liberated by elements from the Thirtieth Division of the United States Army on September 12, 1944; on September 17, the attack on the Arnhem–Nijmegen area was staged by British, American, and Polish airborne troops. Just before these operations were undertaken, the Dutch railroads had been providing the usual logistics support to the Germans, under the "loyal cooperation" policy. For example, a German armored division was transported from Twente to Tilburg during the night of September 4–5, 1944, in order to bolster the southern front in the path of the Allied advance.[25] The moment had arrived, obviously, to abandon "loyal cooperation."

Another factor pertaining to railroading morale came to

Actually, Security Chief Rauter at times managed to outshine his boss. Rauter frequently enjoyed better contacts with Hitler than Seyss-Inquart because Rauter's superior in Germany, Himmler, tended to be closer to the Führer than anyone else. (Cf. J. Schreieder's testimony in *Proces Rauter*, p. 14.) In the words of that astute observer, Secretary-General Hirschfeld, the upper elite of occupation officials pursued "their own, largely impenetrable aims," and each had his own supporters and connections in Berlin. As intrigues more and more preoccupied this elite, various factions of Dutch Nazis and variously motivated Dutch officials could not help but participate. (H. M. Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen uit de bezettingstijd* [Amsterdam, 1960], p. 44.) For interesting observations on the German occupation regime, cf. also A. E. Cohen, "De positie van de secretarissen-generaal tijdens de bezetting," *Notities voor het Geschiedwerk*, nr. 78, and A. E. Cohen, "Het ontstaan van het Duitse Rijkscommissariaat voor Nederland," *Notities voor het Geschiedwerk*, nr. 91 (both mimeo., Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1955 and 1958).

[25] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–211.

a head at this time. Allied air bombardments and sabotaging of tracks and trains by the resistance made the operation of trains increasingly dangerous and distasteful. Air attacks on trains were stepped up after the Normandy invasion and became particularly frequent and effective in early September 1944. As a result, the traditionally independent railroad engineers reported "sick" more and more frequently – the so-called "shooting disease [*schietziekte*]" – and favored a radical change of policy also for this reason.[26]

This radical change of policy had been prepared during many months by the board of directors of the railroads, the railroad unions, the resistance, the Dutch government in exile, and the Allied supreme command, acting jointly with relative effectiveness. A general railroad strike was to terminate once and for all the shame of "loyal cooperation," at a time most inconvenient to the Germans. On September 10, 1944, Dr. Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, sent an urgent radio message to London, reminding the Dutch government that the signal for the strike would have to come from there. The signal finally came on September 17, to coincide with the Arnhem operations. Although it was known that food reserves in the large Dutch cities were completely exhausted and the vital supplies from the new harvest would have to be brought in from the eastern Netherlands by railroad, the strike was greeted in most places with tremendous enthusiasm. In September 1944 the possible dangers of a "hunger winter" failed to persuade the great majority of railroad men that the policy of "loyal cooperation" should not be concluded with a bang. Anything less than the general strike would have been considered treason – and besides, most Dutchmen believed that the Arnhem landings signified the end of the war for the Netherlands.[27]

The policy of "loyal cooperation" may have been inevitable for the railroads after the seemingly final German victories of 1940. Equally inevitable, however, was the termination of this policy in September 1944, as the Allies pushed the front line back to the Netherlands once more. During the more than four years of its duration, "loyal cooperation" had meant utterly despicable acts, such as the deportation of almost one hundred thousand Jews, and near-treasonable acts, such as

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 202, 206.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.

the efficient logistics support for the German forces in their battles with the Allies. Considering the extent of the shame and frustration which Dutch railroad men must have felt, it is not at all surprising that the "loyal cooperation" policy had to end with that ultimate symbol of independence and strength – the general, political strike. As to the precise timing, what could be more fitting for the outbreak of the great strike than its association with that daring and largest airborne effort of World War II, the Battle of Arnhem.

The Hungarian Uprising; Poznan and Student Demonstrations

Intra-elite divisions and popular discontent with a "foreign" regime were underlying factors in the Hungarian uprising. On the threshold toward immediacy one outside stimulant was added to the interaction between the "elite process" and the "mass process." This stimulant was provided by the Poznan revolt of June 1956 and the ensuing events in Poland. These Polish events "exercized a greater influence upon the Hungarian people than any other external event since the death of Stalin." When, in October 1956, the news filtered through of Poland's moves toward liberalization and greater independence, "this, more than any other single event, was the catalyst for which Hungarians had been, half consciously, waiting." [28]

A group which was on the fringe of the elite, but also belonged to the masses in the sense that it did not share in the exercise of ruling power, was destined to be the most active in the period just preceding the uprising – the students. On an even larger scale than the writers, the students were prepared to rebel against the Party. In autumn of 1956 Budapest students "simply seceded" from the Communist Youth League, "which let them go without much ado." At about the same time, students in universities all over Hungary proceeded to set up independent student organizations, outside Party controls.[29]

The final link in the events immediately before the uprising came on October 6, 1956. On that day two hundred thousand persons, as Kecskemeti states, attended reburial ceremonies for László Rajk, the Hungarian "Tito," who had been executed by the "Muscovites" during the Stalin era. Permission

[28] United Nations Report, pp. 66–67.
[29] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

for these ceremonies had been specifically granted by Party boss Gerö, and, inspite of a tense atmosphere, no disturbances developed during the reburial.[30] Nevertheless, the honoring of the leading purge victim by two hundred thousand persons constituted an extremely hostile public act against the regime which had been responsible for the victim's execution. Thus, as the United Nations report points out, "the practice of mass demonstrations had ... been effectively started in Budapest."[31]

The already "seceded" students adopted the demonstration practice quickly. Two weeks after Rajk's reburial, on October 23, they staged a large demonstration for which – after much hesitation – official permission had again been granted. And again, the demonstration as such, a street parade, proceeded peacefully. Yet, this time, by coincidence or because the bucket was finally flowing over, the "mass process" introduced violence to what had been a peaceful phenomenon on the fringes, but within, the "elite process." Street crowds attracted by the student parade "became more and more agitated." Demands were voiced that the slogans and petitions featured by the students be broadcasted. When the government's radio officials refused this, "an unplanned and unforeseeable chain reaction" was triggered which led to clashes with the police and large-scale violence. Thus, the demonstrations led to "a new pattern of revolutionary behavior" involving all sectors of the Hungarian population.[32]

Intra-Party divisions and popular dislike of a "foreign" regime provided the underlying factors which ultimately provoked the uprising. The immediate factors, which sparked the explosion, were threefold. The Poles had shown how much could be accomplished within the limits of the Soviet orbit; the Rajk reburial and the student parade, however peaceful, were public and defiant demonstrations which had a most dramatic effect on the street crowds; finally, the students, by being both of the elite and of the masses, were precisely the right catalyst for the "elite process" and the "mass process." The Hungarian uprising could take its course.[33]

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[31] United Nations Report, p. 67.

[32] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–82.

[33] The immediate factors behind the East German revolt of 1953 were more comparable to the April–May 1943 situation in the Netherlands – blundering by

The Panamanian Riots; Flag Display under "Titular" Sovereignty

The more immediate factors behind the Panamanian riots involved problems of flag display – a foreseeable consequence of the rival claims to sovereignty in the Zone. Riots about flags had occurred already in November 1959. As of November 7, 1960, President Eisenhower had permitted the joint display of the United States and Panamanian flags in one location inside the Zone, at Shaler Triangle in Panama City. On June 13, 1962, Presidents Kennedy and Chiari agreed that "their representatives would arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an appropriate way in the Canal Zone." As a result, both flags were flown at three additional Zonal locations, including two official buildings of the Canal Zone administration. Finally, on January 10, 1963, a joint Commission reached agreement to fly both flags "on land in the Canal Zone wherever the flag of the United States was flown by civilian authorities." [34]

These concessions were bitterly resented by many Zonians, particularly since they seemed to confirm Secretary Dulles' 1959 affirmation of Panama's "titular sovereignty" in the Zone. Zonal sympathies were backing Gerald A. Doyle, an architect employed by Zonal authorities, who in October 1962 sued in the local federal District Court for an injunction to prevent the United States government from allowing the Panamanian flag inside the Zone. The suit was denied on July

the regime played an important role. Walter Ulbricht's post-Stalinist confession of "Stalinist" errors, published in a resolution of June 11, 1953, constituted a "stern judgment" on his own government and the East German Party. Thus, a "mortal blow" was struck at the regime's authority. Yet, as the regime lost face, it also committed the incredible error of not revoking the most unpopular of all recent decrees, involving a 10 per cent increase in "work norms." The confession of errors in combination with the recalcitrance concerning the work norms had "immediate and drastic" effects. Within a few hours after the public discovered that the increase in work norms had not been annulled, thousands of workers were demonstrating on Berlin streets. On the following day, June 17, 1953, the insurrection became general – although the work norms decree had been rescinded after the first demonstrations on June 16. (*Ibid.*, pp. 128–129.)

A similar error of judgement touched off riots in Czechoslovakia during June 1953. A currency reform decree constituted in effect "tampering with the people's purchasing power." This infuriated workers, and their wives, in several Czech factory towns. At the same time, the currency reform was a "manifestation of weakness" on the part of the regime and demonstrated that it had to renege on its financial promises. (*Ibid.*, pp. 124–125.) Again, a show of weakness combined with recalcitrance led to violence.

[34] *International Jurists*, pp. 12–13.

8, 1963, but Judge Guthrie F. Crowe observed in a revealing aside that the Zonal authorities' actions in permitting the Panamanian flag might indeed not have been "to the plaintiff's best interests." The judge further opined that "the flying of two national flags side by side in a disputed territory for an undeclared purpose is a position of weakness that can lead but to further misunderstanding and discord." As a result of this suit, "meetings were held throughout the Zone and enthusiasm was whipped up among youths." Claimant Doyle spoke at social events, action groups were organized, and funds collected to finance legal actions.[35]

It was only after the suit, and after the time for appealing it had expired, that the governor of the Canal Zone, Major General Robert J. Fleming, undertook to implement the agreement of January 1963. And even then he did not fly the Panamanian flag at every place where the United States flag had flown before January 1963. Instead,

> the Governor selected seventeen spots where both flags were to be displayed. In other places, where the United States flag hitherto used to be flown, it was taken down by the Governor's orders on December 30, 1963. Especially with regard to schools, the Governor ordered that, though in front of the building no United States flag was to be flown, it was "in accordance with law and customs requiring the United States flag to be displayed in or near schools," for the United States flag to continue to be displayed in classrooms or elsewhere within the schools as at present.[36]

Accordingly, when Zonal schools reopened on January 2, 1964, after the Christmas holidays, the United States flag was no longer displayed outside school buildings. This compromise angered numerous Zonians of school age and above. Undoubtedly prompted by their elders, students at one school, Balboa High School, proceeded to organize flag-raising parties in defiance of the new regulation. These acts became the immediate cause of the riots.[37]

Another factor of more immediate importance was a temporary vacancy at the United States Embassy in the Republic of Panama during the period just preceding the riots. The last ambassador had departed in the summer of 1963, reportedly leaving Panamanian relations more than ever under control of Zonal officials – the governor, Major General Robert J.

[35] *New York Times*, January 14, and January 16, 1964.
[36] *International Jurists*, p. 13.
[37] *Ibid.*

Fleming, and the commanding general, General Andrew P. O'Meara. Both of these officers were said to be particularly submissive to Zonal pressure groups and insensitive to Panamanian feelings.[38] Moreover, it so happened that Governor Fleming departed for the United States on the very afternoon of January 9, 1964 – a few hours before the outbreak of the riots.[39]

The factors determining the development of events immediately before each of the five mass actions were divergent in character, as were the more underlying factors mentioned previously. In one case, April–May 1943, German blunders were probably decisive; in another, the railroad strike, the Allied armies' arrival on Dutch soil made all the difference. The strike of February 1941 was sparked by the arrest of the Jewish "hostages," as exploited by the underground Communist Party in its eagerness to enjoy the fruits of a general political strike. The Hungarian uprising burst out after the university students, encouraged by the Poznan revolt, seceded from the Party and began minor demonstrations which in turn inspired crowds in the streets to engage the regime in potentially violent fashion. The Panamanian riots were preceded by a compromise on joint flag display in the Zone which deeply affected Zonians' emotions, who saw in it the beginning of the end for American sovereignty in the Zone. The Zonians' defiance of the new flag regulations, tolerated by weak Zonal authorities, in turn provoked the Panamanians who were equally emotional about the flag issue.

The course of the demonstrations was also influenced by the kind of leadership which was willing and able to risk its neck in the often uneven battle against the ruling regime. Various types of leadership groups came to the fore, often representing well-defined political, economic, or student organizations. At times, however, leaders seemed to rise spontaneously from among ordinary "men in the street." Moreover, shifting leadership patterns at earlier and later stages of a demonstration were a feature in several of the demonstrations.

[38] *New York Times*, January 16, 1964.
[39] *International Jurists*, p. 14.

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP GROUPS

It seems fairly certain that Amsterdam Communists were the principal leaders during the strike of February 1941. The Communist underground bosses recognized the possibilities of the crisis after the arrest of the Jewish "hostages," and rank and file Communists contributed greatly by spreading the news about the arrests and by urging strategically placed groups to begin the strike. Some two years later, however, the strike actions of April–May 1943 were inspired by spontaneous leaders, not as such classifiable by party or otherwise, in the various machine shops or enterprises where the ill-fated German announcement on the recall of the Dutch army had a terrific impact. Certain plants may have acted as strike leaders, but this was probably a consequence of their local or regional prominence. The railroad strike of September 1944 involved yet another leadership situation, with competing sets of leaders. Various resistance organizations caused considerable worry to the railroad management as they attempted to induce a change in the railroad men's attitude toward the policy of cooperation with the Germans; besides, the Dutch government in London developed ideas about a strike in behalf of its own and the Allied cause. All three groups – the resistance, the government in exile, and the railroad management – finally did get together on the timing of the strike, which was started by signal from London and carried to the bitter end through the delicately balanced coordination of management and resistance, with intermittent and rather passive advice from London. Elements from among the Communist elite, liberalizing intellectuals and demonstrating students, put the final touches on the corrosion of the Rákosi regime in post-Stalinist Budapest; the ensuing street riots were apparently promoted by younger workers, high school students, and adventurer types. Finally, to complete the pattern of shifting leadership groups typical for the Hungarian uprising, organized labor dominated the rebellion in the last stages. The Panamanian riots of 1964 were induced by high school students, both

Zonian and Panamanian; however, the real exploiters of the students' embarrassing flag encounters have not been reliably identified, and may, of course, not have belonged to any particular group.

February 1941; the Grass Roots of the CPN

On February 22, 1941, the day of the arrests of the first Jewish "hostages," the leader of the Communist underground in Amsterdam instructed his apparatus to spread the news of the arrests. The citizens of Amsterdam were profoundly impressed by the shocking scenes which many of them witnessed personally or heard about through the grapevine. "What the WA had started, the Germans were completing." [1]

The next day, on February 23, two rank and file members of the Party – both municipal employees, one in road maintenance and the other in garbage collection – decided, apparently on their own, that a general strike would have to be organized immediately. They scurried about the city and instructed friends to prepare for a strike on the following day, February 24. Only after this entirely unofficial issuance of the strike call did they consult one of the leaders of the CPN, and obtained full support from the side of the Party. However, this first strike call was too hastily improvised to be effective. Many more workers had to be talked to and convinced. During the evening of February 24, some two hundred and fifty municipal workers, the great majority of whom were Communists, assembled to hear passionate condemnations of the arrests of the Jews. A strike was once more proclaimed for the following day, February 25.

That night an inner group, including again several grass roots members of the Party, worked out strategy. Streetcar personnel, garbage collectors, and other employees of municipal services whose absence in the early morning hours would be most striking to the public, were to begin the strike. Others were to follow at the very time that the general public would note the absence from the streets of the first groups. Hesitant groups of workers were to be persuaded by exaggerated claims about the success of the strike elsewhere. Party machinery was fully mobilized to spread the news about the strike, whose purpose was proclaimed to be not only the release of the Jewish

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

"hostages" but also a general increase in wages and unemployment benefits. The latter reflected the Communist predilection for the "mixed" strike, featuring political as well as economic slogans. Finally, it was decided that non-Communists should be attracted to the strike as much as possible.[2]

The strike of February 1941 was prepared, proclaimed, and carried through its initial stages by the concerted efforts of the Communists. Lowly Party members, particularly among the municipal workers, displayed considerable initiative after the leaders had alerted them for the possibilities of the explosive situation which prevailed in Amsterdam as a result of the anti-semitic excesses.[3]

April–May 1943; the Grass Roots on Their Own

The strike of April–May 1943 was a composite of a series of local strikes starting spontaneously in various localities all over the Netherlands which were not necessarily in communication with one another. As a German report noted quite correctly, neither the resistance nor the Communist Party was involved in the proclamation and organization of this strike.[4] As another German official observed, this strike did not have centralized leadership nor, for that matter, specific aims. The strike began in the eastern part of the Netherlands, in industrial Twente, perhaps because that region had been relatively immune from the hardships of war. Consequently, the population there was said to be more profoundly shocked by the recall of the former soldiers, many of whom were bound to come from households in Twente.[5]

As the strike broke out, leaders came forward spontaneously, often without any formal organizational backing. Political parties and independent labor unions or agricultural associ-

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–114.

[3] Dr. B. A. Sijes, the skillful historian of this strike, admitted that the complete picture of the CPN's involvement in the strike could not be reconstructed after the war. The Communists decided in May 1950 that they would no longer cooperate with Sijes' sponsor, the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, on the grounds that both the Institute and Sijes "lacked objectivity." (*Ibid.*, pp. 192, 194.) Sijes, a sociologist and expert on the Amsterdam labor scene, was a participant in the strike. (Cf. also, Warmbrunn, *op. cit.*, p. 111.)

[4] Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

[5] In the western part of the Netherlands, according to the same German official, the tragedies of war had already penetrated the "subconsciousness" of the population. Therefore, the fate of the ex-soldiers may have been of lesser concern to some of the inhabitants of the West. (Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 420.)

ations had been dissolved by that time; only the churches and some of the cooperatives and social clubs were still available as traditional sources of leadership. Of course, many former union leaders were working and did manage to play an active role in the strike.[6]

This spontaneous leadership pattern was well adapted to the medium-sized enterprises (1000–4000 workers) prevailing in Twente and other key areas of the strike, particularly among the metallurgic industry. Large enough to make possible mass action, yet not too large to prevent face-to-face contacts among workers, the medium-sized enterprise presented a suitable background for the sudden emergence of the strike. Stork Brothers Machine Works of Hengelo, Twente, where the strike started, had some 3000 employees in 1943. The crucial strike decisions at Stork were reached among smallish groups, the "workshop groups," which were in constant communication with each other by means of trusted workers known in all the workshops of Stork.[7]

Another factor favoring the "leaderless" strike in Twente was related to the lag in urbanization in this rather recently developed industrial region. Many of the workers commuted from rural surroundings, and, therefore, "the opinions of family, neighborhood, and peer group still weighed heavily." As a result, according to Bouman, once the strike had broken out, the pressure in the "bedroom-villages" toward conforming were substantial even without the presence of strong, central leadership from union or party.[8] Yet, outside the metallurgical industry, in the textile mills of Twente, participation in the strike was less impressive, apparently because the largely unskilled textile workers had been less effectively unionized and had less *esprit de corps*.

In conclusion, as a German police report put it, the strike of April–May 1943 was "an outburst above party lines [*eine überparteiliche Entladung*]" of popular animosity against the occupier.[9] As an outburst it resembled the Amsterdam strike of February 1941, but its non-partisan nature reflected the fact that neither the Communists nor any other organized group played a dominant role. This strike by the "grass roots"

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 47.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[9] Cited by Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

occurred chiefly where medium-sized enterprises employing skilled workers were located in non-urban surroundings similar to Twente, such as in South Limburg and the region around Dordrecht. The strike did not spread to the big cities, particularly not to Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

The Railroad Strike; Limits of Centralized Planning

The railroad strike of September 1944 involved several high levels of bureaucracy. By autumn of 1943, major resistance organizations, particularly the Nationaal Comité, had established contacts with the railroads. However, Dr. Hupkes, the managing director, did not intend to surrender to the resistance any jurisdiction over his "precious" organization, especially not the decision-making on the strike. He tried to keep resistance contacts at a minimum, but had to rely on resistance channels for his communications with the Dutch government in London. Hupkes had always believed that the London government itself would have to issue the final strike order. For the rest, the railroads took care of all preparations. In early 1944, railroad paymasters all over the Netherlands were ordered to keep in reserve the equivalent of one month salary for each employee, to be paid out in advance in case of "emergency." This reserve cash was soon known as the "invasion money" to virtually every railroad man. In June 1944, the Personnel Council, the top railroad union organ, was drawn into the strike preparations, and "confidence men [*vertrouwensmannen*]" were appointed in railroad stations all over the country as further communications links. These "confidence men" were also to keep liaison with the local resistance.[10]

Already in May 1943, a resistance coordinating council, the Raad van Verzet, had suggested to Premier Gerbrandy the possibilities of a railroad strike. Gerbrandy, in turn, approached Allied circles on the matter without formally discussing the strike with his cabinet.[11] Much later, in September 1944, Dutch intelligence officials were suddenly informed by SHAEF that the Allies were in favor of a railroad

[10] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–164, 167, 173.

[11] A controversy has developed on the subject of the cabinet's non-involvement with the strike decision. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 219; also, C. L. W. Fock, "De Nederlandse regering in Londen en de spoorwegstaking," *De Gids*, December 1955; P. S. Gerbrandy, "Nogmaals: de Nederlandse regering en de spoorwegstaking," *De Gids*, January 1956.

strike in the Netherlands, to support the immediately pending airborne operations in the Arnhem region. Only the Premier and the Minister of War were at first supplied with this top-secret information. As the Arnhem droppings were taking place, the Dutch government itself made the final decision on the strike, thus taking full responsibility for its consequences, even though the abruptness of the proclamation was due to Allied intelligence precautions.

The Dutch government, for the purposes of this decision, consisted only of Premier Gerbrandy, his Minister of War, and perhaps Queen Wilhelmina. Gerbrandy very much favored the strike, partly because he came to see it as the public show piece of the Dutch resistance spirit, unmatched in any other occupied country. Yet, he doubted whether the strike would be supported by the rest of the cabinet. Even the Minister of War, who was consulted by the Premier, was hesitant until the last moment. He only approved after the Dutch intelligence chief informed him – without any basis of fact – that the Allies themselves would proclaim the strike if the Dutch government were to refuse. At the first cabinet meeting after the strike there was general criticism of the Premier's failure to inform his colleagues, particularly on the part of the minister who was responsible for the railroads.[12]

On the other side of the Channel, Managing Director Hupkes had become convinced of the necessity of the strike and energetically devoted his considerable organizational skills to its preparation. Yet, even Hupkes had his moments of doubt and hesitation, mainly because of loyalty to his "apparatus."

> The leap in the dark was not tempting, and neither was the prospect of committing to the battle his own, precious, and for Holland so important enterprise, thereby exposing it to grave risks. During the strike a station master in a small town refused to obey the strike order of the government simply because he could not bring himself to desert his station. That kind of spirit characterized many [railroad men] . . . .[13]

All the careful planning for the strike was defective, however, with respect to questions concerning its intended duration. Hupkes did not think that a lengthy strike could be endured by the Dutch people. He anticipated a strike of about two weeks or at most one month. He felt, somewhat vaguely,

[12] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 220, 223–225.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

that the railroad strike would constitute a kind of transition between occupation and liberation.[14] It is doubtful whether any of the groups providing leadership in the strike – the railroad officials, the government in exile, the Allies, and the resistance – would have dared to support it if its incredible length, from September 1944 until May 1945, could have been foreseen. The leadership broke down when the extremely delicate decision had to be faced on the possible calling off a strike which by its length was bringing millions of Dutchmen to the very threshold of starvation. At this moment, the Allies could only give evasive answers to the Dutch government; Premier Gerbrandy, in turn, had no real reply to the railroad officials' urgent queries; finally, even the communications channels provided by the resistance worked less efficiently than ever. As a result, the strike lingered on virtually without leadership. Ten-thousands literally starved, and other millions of Dutchmen survived starvation only by sheer luck, altogether unusual German concessions, and amazing improvisations by a handful of Dutch officials at The Hague.

The Hungarian Uprising; Shifting Leadership Groups

The UN report quotes a Budapest professor of philosophy who maintained that the revolution "had no leaders; it was not centrally directed." [15] Although there was indeed no tightly led revolutionary elite, certain groups did play outstanding roles at various stages of the uprising.

In the beginning, as Hannah Arendt remarked with much justification, the crucial initiatives were taken not by the underprivileged "but the overprivileged of communist society," the intellectuals and students. The most striking example of this was presented by the eight hundred cadets of the Petöfi Military Academy who joined the uprising immediately. These cadets were the sons of the "power elite" of Communist Hungary. As for their motives, Hannah Arendt speculates that these were related to "neither their own nor their fellow-citizens' material misery, but exclusively [to] Freedom and Truth." [16]

These first groups of rebels were, however, frightened by the violent course of the uprising and foresaw Soviet inter-

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 177–178.
[15] United Nations Report, p. 68.
[16] Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 494, 497.

vention if things were carried too far. The Communist intellectuals, who had been the most radical critics, soon "did everything in their power to steer events into a peaceful course." [17] Similarly, the university students early abandoned the fighting.[18] The leaders among those who continued to fight even against the Soviet army came mostly from three groups: young workers ("apprentices"), teen-age high school pupils, and *Lumpenproletariat* elements. According to Zinner, the motives of these groups were at times not particularly "noble." [19]

Finally, after most of the active fighting was over, the leadership shifted once more, to the industrial workers. Their rebel activities "lasted longest and were the best organized." Although the workers had been active in the street battles, "their weightiest contribution to the revolutionary struggle was the organization of workers' councils and, its principal outcome, the revolutionary general strike." The strike provided the workers with a bargaining instrument which the Soviets could not wipe out immediately by military might. According to Kecskemeti, the workers' motives were "national" rather than socio-economic; their main aim was the termination of the Soviet controls over the Hungarian economy and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops.[20]

It should be noted that the Hungarian uprising seemed directed not so much against Communism as against the "Muscovites" and Soviet interventionism. In the beginning, at least, all the leaders of the rebellion pretended to be good Communists. As the uprising proceeded, party affiliation – i.e., Communist affiliation – or lack of it, was not considered the important question among the rebels.[21] In the workers' councils, as Hannah Arendt wrote, "the men elected were communists and non-communists; party lines seem to have

[17] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Paul E. Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York, 1962), p. 283.

[18] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115. A Radio Free Europe survey, cited by Kecskemeti, gives an estimate of the percentage of "active fighters" within various occupational groups: professionals, 14 per cent; white collar, 2 per cent; industrial workers, 13 per cent; farmers and farm hands, 6 per cent; others (including students), 20 per cent. "Extreme combativeness" was shown by three categories: "street crowds who assembled in spontaneous fashion"; "the youngest age group"; industrial workers. (*Ibid.*, p. 109–111.)

[21] United Nations Report, p. 68.

played no role whatever . . . ." [22] After October 24, the Communist Central Committee was isolated and "remained sealed off at headquarters day and night." Yet, rebels from the Writers' Association "drifted in and out of the building, serving as a channel of communications between the two worlds." [23] Moreover, even after the uppermost Party elite had been eliminated from power, various types of Communists continued to occupy most governmental positions in Budapest. Only in the countryside did a purge of orthodox Communists in higher jobs take place. One reason why such a purge failed to materialize in Budapest was the absence of non-Communist replacements. Non-Communist political leaders did not, as a whole, come forward during the uprising, having had their share of troubles in the not too distant past and fearing all along that the Soviet Union would intervene. Several non-Communists specifically declined offices offered them by the rebels, although this trend seems to have been less marked in the countryside.[24]

If any individual must be credited with leadership of the uprising, Imre Nagy would, of course, be most qualified for the honor. Among all the "Muscovites" in top positions after World War II, Nagy was the only one "who did not live apart from the people but kept up relations with a wide circle of acquaintances in ordinary walks of life; he also was a familiar figure in the Budapest cafés." [25] He was non-Jewish, of Hungarian peasant stock. Nagy, like the rest of the Communist elite whom he had rejoined as an "ex-purgee," was isolated from the early events of the uprising. Like the other Moscow-trained "war horses," he at first "reverted to . . . orthodoxy," to the great disappointment of many rebels. When Nagy, nevertheless, was put in charge by the rebels, the Soviets probably considered him "the last best hope" of Hungarian Communism; they certainly did not expect him to destroy the system. At first, "there was no sense of incipient betrayal of the Communist cause about him." Nobody could forsee "the enormous transformation he was to undergo." [26]

This transformation may have been forced upon him "by

[22] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[23] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 279–280.
[25] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[26] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–266.

the uncontrollable, overwhelming upsurge of the masses' revolutionary *élan*." [27] After he moved from the isolated Party headquarters to the Parliament building, he met for days with endless streams of delegations of revolutionary councils from all over Hungary. Thus, he is reported to have discovered the mood of the masses and "caught something of the fire" of the uprising. Besides, at the Parliament his close assistants were no longer old "Muscovites"; some of these new assistants even came from non-Communist circles.[28]

In any case, Nagy did not lead "a purposeful group acting in unison." When he finally decided to move with the uprising, he and his lieutenants disagreed among one another on most questions of tactics and strategy. The writers of the Petöfi Circle and the university students had been rather well organized in the beginning; but, as the uprising proceeded they too did not know where they were going. Thus, as Zinner concluded, the early rebels and Nagy simply saw no alternative but to follow the crowds.[29] The crowds had selected Nagy because they needed a symbol of leadership. It was the crowd who produced the one Communist leader who managed to enshrine himself as a Hungarian national hero and martyr.[30]

The Panamanian Riots; Students, Politicians (and Castro Agents?)

Concerning leadership groups in the Panamanian riots, United States officials and above all the Zonians have suspected Castro's influence. According to Secretary of State Rusk, Castro elements "moved in quickly to aggravate the disturbances." In the words of Army Secretary Vance, "if Castro agents had not been present, the violence would not have reached the peak that it did." [31] Another source of leadership was seen in certain Panamanian politicians, whose appeal to the population was said to include demagogic exploitation of anti-Americanism. The worst anti-American

[27] Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[28] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 248–250.

[30] Leadership in the East German uprising was also "entirely spontaneous and unorganized." This uprising too was the outgrowth of a street demonstration which had attracted large crowds. Similarly, the incidents at Plzen and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, during June 1953, were called "purely a mass movement, unrehearsed and spontaneous." (Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–125, 130–131.)

[31] *New York Times*, January 15, 1964.

riots have occurred in election years, 1959 and 1963. Political vituperation in 1963 had reached unprecedented depths: "Such phrases as 'bastards of the earth,' 'monsters,' and 'deformities' and some even more intemperate have been used in denouncing Zonians." [32]

The crucial acts leading to the riots were performed by the students who entered the Zone to challenge the United States flag outside Balboa High School. The group of approximately two hundred came from one school, the Instituto Nacional. A student leader, Guillermo Guevara Pas, had conferred with the principal of Balboa High School on the day before the riot, but did not announce the planned demonstration. It should be noted that the Headmaster of the Instituto Nacional personally gave the demonstrators the flag which they were intending to display in the Zone. Moreover, the students were received by the President of the Republic immediately after their return from Balboa High School, leading the International Jurists to suggest "that the Panamanian authorities may have had prior knowledge" of the demonstration. "In any case, the Ministry of External Affairs was informed by the students of their proposed demonstration before they took off." [33]

On their return into the Republic's territory the students were greeted by a suddenly appearing crowd of rank-and-file citizens who immediately began to riot. At this earliest moment the crowd already included skilled snipers and employed incendiary bombs or Molotov cocktails. In the words of the International Jurists, these bombs

> must have been made for this purpose. When, where and by whom they were made was not disclosed to the Investigating Committee. The fact that these were made and used would indicate some degree of premeditation and planning.[34]

The suspicions concerning Castro agents are related to the degree of premeditation which has been deduced from the ready availability of Molotov cocktails and the immediate appearance of snipers.

Leadership groups in the crises under investigation reveal varied patterns of involvement and deliberateness. The

[32] *Ibid.*, January 18, 1964.
[33] *International Jurists*, p. 15.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Amsterdam strike of February 1941 was provoked by the best organized underground group of the day, exploiting a "natural" crisis and operating through initiatives of activists at a grass roots level. The strike of April–May 1943 broke out without prior planning or deliberate initiative on the part of any particular group of leaders. It developed spontaneously in many parts of the Netherlands as a result of blatant German public relations blunders, and was aided in each locality by favorable conditions pertaining to plant size and urban-rural mix. The railroad strike, by contrast, was prepared and led from the top by a highly centralized railroad administration, assisted by other bureaucratic elites – the London government, the Allies, and the coordinators of the resistance movements. However, this system broke down when unforeseen circumstances prolonged the strike beyond expectation and produced dilemmas which were too complex and delicate to handle for the various layers of "planners," operating under occupation and through the front lines of opposing armies. Several shifts of leadership groups occurred in Hungary. The intellectuals and university students prepared the ground for the uprising, but were replaced by spontaneous "mob" elements when the real violence began. Imre Nagy was the instrument, rather than the leader, of these elements. Organized labor determined the course in the post-mortem stage, as the Soviets mopped up the remainders of the rebellion. Students of the Instituto Nacional started the anti-Zonian actions which led to the Panamanian riots, in an election atmosphere poisoned by anti-American slogans. The leaders of the mob which participated in the rioting have apparently not been identified, but may have included pro-Castro elements.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the various leadership groups and the urgency of the underlying and more immediate factors, the further success of the mass demonstrations also depended upon the prevalence of the "right" conditions at the time and place of the outbreak of each of them.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTBREAK

As the demonstrations broke out, certain exceptional circumstances prevailed which were either accidental or engineered by more or less astute leadership. The organizers of the strike of February 1941 apparently knew their business quite well; they concentrated in their early efforts on features of Amsterdam life where disruption of regular routines would provide immediate and forceful signals to the population about an impending crisis. These signals were the failure of the streetcars to appear during the early morning rush hour and the conspicuous return into the city of workers who had gone on strike while other workers were still going to their jobs. The exceptional circumstance during the strike of 1943 was of an entirely different nature. The above-described German fumbling with the call-up of the former Dutch army happened to be communicated to many Dutch workers at a time and in a manner which could not have been more damaging to the German cause. The outbreak of the strike actions of 1943 can not be visualized without various, largely accidental happenings in the sphere of communications. The big railroad strike of 1944 broke out because the London government so commanded in a broadcast which came almost too late and was poorly coordinated with the various affected groups in occupied Holland. The railroad strike did break out successfully since the railroad management and most of the railroad personnel were singularly united and prepared for this strike, and not just due to the pressures of various resistance organizations. As to Hungary, it can be assumed that the dissatisfied intellectuals and the students originally had no desire no conquer the streets of Budapest or to excite the population to acts of violence. On the other hand, several dissenting elements among the elite were probably not averse to use "the masses" as an instrument of pressure through such devices as street marches and reburials of ex-purgees. They did not realize, perhaps, how easily escalation to the level of widespread bloodshed can take place once mass emotions take hold of an

issue, as did happen outside the radio headquarters. The Panamanian outbreak, finally, was provoked by, what can be termed, a display of negative leadership on the part of the agents of the United States government. Zonal police forces, for example, were unable to cope with fervent teenage nationalists of the Panamanian or the Zonal type.

February 1941; Streetcar Barns and IJ Ferries

The strike of February 1941 was arranged to break out where it was bound to be immediately conspicuous to most working inhabitants of Amsterdam. At 5 a.m., on February 25, 1941, members of the Communist Party first concentrated their efforts on the streetcar barns. They attempted to prevent the streetcars from leaving the barns. The strike would be an obvious success, they reasoned, if the familiar blue "trams" – there were hardly any busses – would be absent during the early morning rush hour. This would convince everyone that a strike had broken out and that it was effective.

The streetcar personnel was not persuaded easily. Many were reluctant to risk their secure civil service status as municipal employees; others mistrusted the Communists' motives. Yet, at the crucial barns the strike call was obeyed, sometimes only after application of such tricks as forcefully keeping the doors of the barns closed or even laying down on the rails leading out of the barns. Everywhere the strike leaders misrepresented the situation in "the other barns," where, they boasted, the strike was already a success.[1]

Another strategically important point developed near the ferries which connect Amsterdam with important industrial enterprises on the north side of the IJ river. Communist activists succeeded in convincing the workers in some enterprises there to drop their work immediately upon arrival at the plant and to surge back into the city. Thus, as other workers prepared to go to work by ferry, they noticed returning ferries crowded with workers who were obviously quitting their jobs. The crowded ferries going the other way were another symbol for the success of the strike. Highly emotional scenes developed that morning on the IJ river, with Communist and Socialist songs filling the air amidst considerable enthusiasm.

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–118.

With the help of these conspicuous rush hour victories, resulting in the absence of streetcars and ferries demonstratively occupied by strikers, the outbreak of the strike was managed successfully. Within one or two hours the inner city of Amsterdam was so completely and suddenly filled with throngs of idle workers that even the Germans were stunned and at first altogether helpless. The strikers had, in effect, conquered the street.[2]

April–May 1943; Bulletins during the Lunch Break

One circumstance crucial to the outbreak of the April–May 1943 strike was certainly not planned by professional strategists. At 1:23 p.m. on Thursday, April 29, 1943, a printing shop in the center of Hengelo – an important industrial town of Twente, in the eastern part of the Netherlands – began to display several copies of a German bulletin. This was the bulletin announcing the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, and at that time it was still in its original, apparently all-inclusive form. Workers were just returning to their plants from their lunch break, and many of them saw the bulletins in the shop window in front of which large and noisy crowds began to assemble immediately. The crucial point was that the call-up news thus spread to factories in Hengelo that same afternoon, before the workers had returned to their homes and before the call-up was watered down by restricting it to the "regulars" among the ex-soldiers. Some workers actually went on strike that very moment, perhaps to spend a few "final" hours with their family.

Rumors spread like wildfire through Hengelo factories that afternoon, and strike leaders cropped up everywhere, seemingly on the spur of the moment. Due to another lucky coincidence, the strike succeeded first in one of the most respected plants, the Stork machine works, which also happened to be situated in a conspicuous and central location with respect to other enterprises in Hengelo. At about 2:30 p.m. the striking Stork workers surged out into the streets, thus demonstrating to all the surrounding plants how they were reacting. It is characteristic for the April–May 1943 strike that no large-scale meetings of workers apparently took place in any Hengelo factory; also, there was no concerted action by any groups outside the factories to encourage the strike.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 129–125.

There were no mimeographed sheets, no party or union bosses pulling strings behind the scene. Workers went on strike spontaneously after hearing about the call-up bulletins and after seeing the strike evidence at Stork. In some plants, workers from different workshops actually went on strike simultaneously without prior contacts among the workshops.

The German blunders really paid off. If the workers had heard the call-up news at night, in their homes, the strike decisions would in fact have been taken the next morning, after the Germans had announced their intention just to call the ex-"regulars." This, in turn, would have made the outbreak of the strike unlikely. Thus, it could be argued that the timing of the bulletin's appearance in the shop window was a crucial fact in the outbreak of the strike of April–May 1943.[3]

The Railroad Strike; Last-Minute Proclamation from London

Careful attention had been paid by the board of directors to the proper proclamation of a strike which, after all, was to be decidedly non-spontaneous. The directors hoped to get advance notice from London, at least a few days, to be able to give appropriate warning to their organization. This was to be accomplished through the "confidence men" and through resistance channels. On September 11, 1944, a week before the strike, two telegrams were dispatched from London to Dr. Hupkes, the managing director, in which the imminent possibility of a railroad strike was implied, without, however, giving any clues about the exact date. Hupkes was further advised to listen constantly to the Dutch radio in London. These telegrams somewhat puzzled Hupkes since they came through resistance channels not previously known to him. Actually, they were sent by Dutch intelligence in London, not by the Dutch government – the latter being kept in the dark because of security precautions relating to the Arnhem operations.

The Dutch government did proclaim the railroad strike, but it was not able to give advance details to the board of directors because of its own ignorance of Allied plans. Late at night on September 16, 1944, the Allies finally informed the Dutch

[3] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 221–229. The strike was aided by the support of many of the employers. The manager of the Hengelo printing shop stated after the war that he had hurriedly displayed the German bulletin so that the workers would see it before returning to their jobs that afternoon. (*Ibid.*, p. 221.)

intelligence chief that the Arnhem landings would be staged the next day, at noon, and authorized him to notify the Dutch government that the strike call could be issued at that same hour. The intelligence chief had considerable trouble in locating the Premier, who was somewhere in the English countryside for the weekend. Premier Gerbrandy was reached only after the Arnhem landings had begun, and even then he did not want to proclaim the strike without the Minister of War's approval. It took a few more hours to find the latter, and his approval was obtained only after considerable hesitation.[4] Six hours after the Arnhem operations had started – at 6 p.m. on Sunday, September 17, 1944 – the government at last proclaimed the railroad strike via the London radio. Over the heads of the board of directors, who themselves heard the strike news only on the 6 p.m. broadcast, the strike order was given directly to all railroad employees. Thus, the board of directors' elaborate preparatory plans for the promulgation of the strike order had come to naught.[5]

Most railroad employees were not prepared for the sudden strike call, even though their service had become most distasteful and dangerous. The strike was proclaimed on a Sunday while many office and workshop employees were at their homes. This, in any case, made impossible the sudden surge of striking workers into the streets. The crucial decisions on carrying out the strike order had to be reached during the night of September 17–18, 1944. Much depended on the courage and efficiency of local leaders, many of whom came forward from the ranks of workers and lower officials. The station masters often were not sufficiently dynamic and imaginative to lead the strike in their respective sectors, partly because they usually resided with their families in the upper stories of station buildings and therefore were most vulnerable to German sanctions.

The strike, as a whole, proceeded successfully. In some localities it was effective within two hours of the London broadcast, in others by morning or soon thereafter. Only in relatively few areas did it fail to develop properly. For example, in the city of Groningen 80 per cent of the conductors and engineers, but only about 50 per cent of the other employees

[4] Apparently Premier Gerbrandy also desired royal approval for the strike, but it is not clear whether he actually reached Queen Wilhelmina.

[5] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 176, 214–218, 221–222.

responded to the strike. Many of the strikers immediately went "underground" with their families, although a high proportion of the lower ranking employees did not bother to take this precaution. The population everywhere greeted the strike with enthusiasm and provided shelter, food, and money to the railroad men.[6]

Thus, the railroad strike broke out by proclamation over the London radio. Local leadership could act with sufficient speed to offset the sudden, last-minute issuance of the strike order. It was fortunate that the Dutch were in the habit of listening to the London radio – in spite of the death penalty imposed on it by the Germans – and that the strike could be announced at the prime hour for news in the Netherlands, the 6 p.m. broadcast.

The Hungarian Uprising; Sixteen Points Conquer the Street

On October 22, 1956, university students and faculties in Budapest began a series of lengthy meetings which were intended, chiefly, to express solidarity with the Poles. In the great hall of Budapest university four to five thousand students and professors met for eleven hours, into the early hours of October 23, to praise the Poles, Imre Nagy, and democracy. Radio Budapest refused to broadcast the so-called sixteen points which were the product of this marathon session. Nevertheless, by the morning of October 23 the sixteen points were mimeographed and circularized all over the city. The results, according to the UN report, were incredible.

> Early on Tuesday, 23 October, the students' sixteen points appeared all over the city. "Work in Budapest stopped," a participant told the Committee. "Everyone went out on the streets weeping. People read the points and then rushed home or to their factories. Every stenographer and every typist did nothing but copy these things in all the offices. The Communist Party forbade this in vain. Everyone was talking about it; in conversation, over the telephone, the news spread in a few hours and within a short time all Budapest became an ant-hill. People pinned the Hungarian national cockade to their clothes, and a really fantastic miracle occurred, for I regard it as a miracle that the whole people became unified." [7]

Tension built up rapidly during the afternoon and evening among the crowds populating the streets. What attracted

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 226–234, 241–244, 249.
[7] United Nations Report, pp. 78–79.

them above all was the sight of demonstrating students parading through the city.

This was something entirely new and exhilarating .... At first the street crowds were mere onlookers, curious to see what would happen. As time went by, however, the people's mood gradually changed. When the crowds grew denser and showed no inclination to disperse, it dawned upon those in them that a historic moment was at hand. We find in the interviews such statements as: "We simply felt that it was impossible to leave without having done something decisive"; and "Something big was bound to happen." [8]

After the students had marched back to their universities, the crowds showed no desire to go home. Many persons, perhaps as many as 300,000, began to assemble near the Parliament building and adjoining streets, at about 6 p.m. Nothing particularly exciting happened there:

... the proceedings were dull; few could hear what was going on and not much seemed to happen. The crowd demanded that the light on a large red star on the top of the Parliament Building be switched off. There were cheers when this was done ....[9]

The crowds persisted in calling for Imre Nagy, who at that time had no official governmental position. After a while some writer friends of his persuaded him to come to the Parliament. From a balcony, without microphones, he delivered an unprepared, very brief address which few where able to hear. Apparently he merely asked the crowd to go home quietly – without success, however.

Whether the people could hear him or not, his words had no marked effect – possibly because the crowd had been waiting for so many hours, possibly because they had become exhilarated by a feeling of freedom and had expected some dramatic statement.[10]

Although the situation at the Parliament was by no means critical, the crowds did gradually fill streets and squares "with an ocean of humanity." [11] After 8 p.m., the atmosphere became markedly more ominous due to a radio address delivered at that time by First Party Secretary Gerö.

It was apparently the truculent tenor of Mr. Gerö's address, rather than specific phrases, that infuriated people all over Budapest. A witness has described how he rushed out into the streets and felt that something

[8] Kecskimeti, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[9] United Nations Report, p. 80.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[11] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

had to be done. The slogans: "Down with Gerö," and even "Death to Gerö" were heard everywhere.[12]

It was at one of the points of concentration of the crowds, near the headquarters of the Hungarian broadcasting system, that the first violence broke out. Originally the crowds at radio headquarters seemed no more bent on violence than those at the Parliament. They wanted the sixteen points broadcasted, and they apparently also demanded microphones on the street for sampling of public opinion, but they had no intention of storming the building.[13] Somehow, after the authorities denied the two requests, the situation went out of control. As the crowd in front of the radio building grew thicker, its mood became menacing.

Rumor spread that members of a delegation sent into the building to present the claims of the demonstrators had been detained and even shot. No one could verify the rumor. Tempers grew shorter. Shouted exchanges between the milling mass – confined as it was in a narrow street – and various officials who ventured out on a second-floor balcony in an effort to appease it further aggravated matters. The chanted slogans grew more radical, the language and catcalls grew fouler. Individual persons, protected by darkness and by the anonymity of the mob, also grew bolder. The lighted red star atop the building made a particularly tantalizing target of abuse. A young man shinnied up the facade of the building to the second floor to plant a Hungarian flag on the balcony's parapet. Very likely he acted as much from exhibitionism as from patriotic fervor, but it did not matter.[14]

At about 9 p.m. the violence began. The UN report describes the scene.

Some of the demonstrators set off fireworks from a truck standing in one of the streets. Water was sprayed on the crowd from a house .... Then, it is alleged, several demonstrators attempted to force their way into the building .... Shortly after 9 p.m. tear gas bombs were thrown from the upper floors. One or two minutes later, AVH [secret police] men rushed from the entrance and began shooting in all directions. At least three people were killed – some say eight – and many wounded. For about twenty minutes the shooting continued from the windows of the building, resulting in more casualties among the demonstrators.[15]

After this incident, violence began to spread. The cry, "they are massacring the Hungarians," was heard everywhere.[16]

[12] United Nations Report, p. 81.
[13] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] United Nations Report, p. 81.
[16] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

Numerous other clashes developed between the crowd and government forces. The radio building and other public buildings were surrounded, the central publishing house of the Party was invaded and ransacked. By morning, the uprising was in full progress amidst general confusion.

> Decisions had to be made on the spot. Skirmishes or truces ensued, depending on the moment and the place. Guns changed hands and persons switched sides from the government to the insurgents ....[17]

Mass emotions, and the response they provoked at the lower levels of the regime's functionaries, determined the outbreak of the uprising. There is no particular explanation why the crowd before the Parliament building remained peaceful and the crowd before the radio building became violent. Zinner merely concludes that the radio building crowd "acted spontaneously" and "had no clear ideas of the consequences of its actions"; similarly, the defenders of the radio building, including secret police and army detachments, behaved "spontaneously."

> They responded to an acute situation of anxiety in a confused manner. There is no telling precisely what orders the secret policemen had about dispersing the crowd, or whether anyone authorized them to fix bayonets and fire into the throng with live ammunition.[18]

In view of the regime's lack of effectiveness at the time and the sudden development of the crisis situation, it appears altogether likely that the use of firearms against the crowd was as unscheduled and unauthorized as the crowd's "siege" of the building. Thus, the violence which determined the outbreak of the uprising might have been avoided if the regime had happened to react differently.

The Panamanian Riots; Illegal Flag-Raisings

On Thursday, January 9, 1964, students at Balboa High School had raised the United States flag for the third time in as many days in violation of official orders. Governor Fleming at first had ordered the flag taken down again, and the school's principal had complied. This raised a storm of protest among students and parents, and "within an hour the students ran up a smaller United States flag and recited the Pledge of Allegiance." School officials talked to the students, but the flag

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 243–244.
[18] *Ibid.*

was not taken down again. Reportedly, "the Governor relented temporarily to avoid trouble." [19] As the International Jurists concluded, "we find it difficult to understand why the Canal Zone authorities, including the Balboa School authorities, did not take firmer and stronger action to implement the flag agreement with regard to their own students." [20]

The consequences of this lack of firmness soon became obvious. At about 4:45 p.m. on January 9, a group of some two hundred Panamanian students left their school, the Instituto Nacional, after classes and marched into the Zone. They carried a Panamanian flag and placards. As was mentioned before, this flag was the Institute's flag, given to them by the headmaster. Photographers and other newsmen accompanied the students, whose march – in the opinion of the International Jurists – seemed to have been "very carefully prepared" and hardly "spontaneous." [21] Although the students, dressed in their school uniforms, appeared to have peaceful and orderly methods of demonstration in mind, their placards advised Governor Fleming to go home and claimed exclusive Panamanian sovereignty in the Zone.[22]

The students' march was stopped well inside the Zone and quite near to their objective, Balboa High School. Captain Gaddis Wall, head of the Balboa district of the Zonal police, refused access to the flagpole in front of the school on which the marchers wanted to display their Panamanian flag. Addressing the students in English, and through an interpreter, Captain Wall proposed that a delegation of five students "should display the Panamanian flag at the foot of the flagpole by holding it in their hands and sing the national anthem; they would not be allowed to hoist the flag on the flagpole." [23] The rest of the Panamanian students were required to remain at some distance, separated by Zonal police from a large number of Zonal students who had gathered around the flagpole with its illegally displayed United States flag.[24]

The student marchers accepted these terms, although it is not certain that they understood them completely in view of "the general state of agitation" at the scene and the additional

[19] *New York Times*, January 13 and January 15, 1964; February 2, 1964.
[20] *International Jurists*, p. 40.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[24] *Ibid.*

confusion resulting from the use of an interpreter. Five students with the Panamanian flag approached the flagpole, followed by a sixth who carried a placard proclaiming Panama's sole sovereignty in the Zone. In the meantime some four hundred to five hundred Zonal students and adults had gathered in front of Balboa High and the flagpole. These Americans did not, in Captain Wall's admission, "behave entirely as I had hoped they would." As the Panamanian delegation approached, the Zonians began to sing the United States national anthem and loudly displayed displeasure with the Panamanian students. At this point Captain Wall decided to cancel the originally permitted flag demonstration by the Panamanian delegation. He ordered his policemen to force the six students back to the main group of marchers. Surrounded by police and Zonians,

> the Panamanian students, who were bearing the Panamian flag, were exposed to considerable stress, especially when two of them stumbled over the hedge and when, some 25 feet further, some fell a second time. At a certain stage in the general melee the Panamian flag was torn. It was not proved that the flag was torn on purpose by American adults or students, nor was it proved that the flag was slightly torn before the six students proceeded to the flagpole with Captain Wall. It is quite likely that the flag, made of silk, was not able to resist the stress and strain of the occasion.
>
> The delegation of Panamian students was forced back by the police equipped with special riot-control batons until they were with the main body of the Panamian students behind the police line on the other side of Gorgona Road. It is doubtful that the police used their batons only by holding the batons in both hands in front of them to push the Panamian delegation back. Some of the policemen seem to have used their batons in a more aggressive manner against the retreating Panamian students.[25]

When the main force of Panamanian students saw what was happening they started shouting and otherwise expressed their dissatisfaction. Some stones were thrown at Zonal policemen and one was slightly injured. As the students began their march out of the Zone, their resentment was profound due to the

> cancelling of the demonstration, the retreat with a torn flag, the hostile behavior of the Americans in front of the Balboa High School, as well as during the retreat of the students, and the lack of any effective attempt by the police to quieten the American students and adults....[26]

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[26] *Ibid.*

On the way back to Panama City the angry students caused some damage in the Zone. Garbage cans were toppled; windows, street lights, and traffic lights were smashed. The students left the Zone shortly before 7 p.m., some two hours after their futile march had begun.[27] Even before they re-entered the Republic of Panama, the news of the flag incident and of the torn flag "spread like wildfire." At about 6:30 p.m., a crowd of several hundred Panamanians had gathered to await the students. Before their return a series of acts of violence had already been committed on the Panamanian side of the border, particularly the turning over and burning of several United States cars.[28]

The outbreak of the riots was apparently facilitated by a communications failure on the part of the United States government. The high school students had been violating the flag rule for three days before the Panamanian students appeared. Washington seems not to have been informed of these acts of defiance until the third day; by that time it was much more difficult to control the students, and the Panamanians had organized their counter-measures. The *New York Times* reported that "intelligence specialists" were disturbed by a forty-eight hour lag in the reporting of the first defiance of the no-flag rule at the school, which had occurred on January 7. Thus, the agitators were given two days "to set their plans in motion while the United States Government was in no position to order measures that might have averted the trouble." The Embassy in Panama apparently cabled no reports to the State Department on January 7 and January 8, although the Panamanian television, radio, and press had prominently featured the news of these early incidents.[29]

This communications failure may provide a partial explanation for the unwise handling of the student march by Zonal police. The International Jurists concluded as follows:

> We cannot ... help feeling that the Canal Zone authorities, and in particular the Canal Zone police, could have handled the situation with greater foresight. The Panamanian students having been permitted to stage their demonstration and march into the compound of the Balbao School, and the police captain having assured the safe conduct of the small group of Panamanian students who were to carry out their flag demonstration and sing the Panamanian national anthem, we think

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[29] *New York Times*, January 14, 1964.

that the Panamanian students should have been better protected, and that the provocative acts of the United States students and citizens should have been more firmly handled. It was particularly unfortunate that physical force, by the use of batons on the Panamanian students who had been previously assured safe conduct, was not avoided.[30]

What are the right conditions for the successful outbreak of mass demonstrations? In Amsterdam, in 1941, the streetcars were not available during the early morning rush hours and the IJ ferries were filled with workers going the wrong way. These phenomena, provoked largely by the CPN, produced the milling crowds in the inner city which signalled the outbreak of the strike. In Hengelo, in 1943, bulletins displayed during the lunch hour announced the German call-up in its most tactless and shocking version. These bulletins were directly related to the strike decisions taken that afternoon in various workshops of the Stork plant. Partly because of the example of Stork, partly spontaneously, the 1943 strike spread rapidly thereafter. Since the outbreak of the railroad strike was not spontaneous, it required proclamation by legitimate authority. This was provided by the Dutch government over the London radio under rather haphazard circumstances. The strike succeeded nevertheless, partly because of the preparations undertaken by the railroad management. The Hungarian uprising broke out after crowds in the streets, excited by student demonstrations, attempted to pressure the radio authorities to announce the students' sixteen points on the air. The tense atmosphere outside the radio headquarters exploded into violence more or less accidentally; this, in turn, produced series of violent incidents all over the city. In Panama, proud student demonstrators were slighted in front of a crowd of Zonians in an atmosphere of supreme nationalistic tension, as the opposing groups were engaged in a battle

[30] *International Jurists*, p. 40. The following citation from a Panamanian author reveals the intensity of Panamanian emotions regarding the flag issue. "The 'flag issue' has become . . . the ultimate symbolization of Panama's position and demands vis-à-vis the United States. *Everything* is symbolized in the flag. It is quite impossible to depict or convey how very sacred and dear to Panamanian hearts the flag is. One could almost go as far as to say that Panamanians are flag-worshippers for somehow this is one issue every Panamanian takes seriously. By law, every Monday morning, all Panamanian schoolchildren formally line up in the assembly ground and salute the flag. Just as one believes in the Child Jesus and Santa Claus, one also believes that no harm can come to the person shielded by the flag." ("Crisis in Panama," unpublished manuscript, Tulane University, 1964, pp. 39–40.)

for the display of their respective national flags. As Zonal police authorities appeared to disregard their own, minor concessions to the Panamanians, the humiliated students of the Instituto Nacional marched back to the Republic where they were received by a bitter crowd which was easily persuaded to start rioting against the United States.

The course of the demonstrations required one further step after the outbreak. They had to be spread with respect to time and place, to endure as long as possible in as many areas as possible.

CHAPTER V

THE SPREADING

The extent of the spreading of the demonstrations varied, but did generally reflect their limited scope. On February 25, 1941, the Germans did for a few hours lose control of the streets of Amsterdam, but they recovered within the next one or two days. The 1943 strike was less intensive, yet it spread throughout the country and lasted a few days, in some places even a week. The railroad strike of 1944 lasted eight months, until the end of the war; it completely shut down Holland's largest enterprise at a time that the Germans – and also the Dutch population – needed it most. The Hungarian rebels controlled much of the country, including Budapest, for thirteen days, and maintained themselves even longer in some industrial plants; the uprising successfully toppled one Communist regime and seized its most sensitive power positions in the capital, in the provincial centers, and in the villages. The Panamanian riots involved United States troops and Panamanian civilians for several days in explosive encounters along the Canal Zone borders, with brief penetrations of Zonal territory, continuous sniping at Zonal targets, and anti-American acts inside the Republic of Panama.

February 1941; One Day's Vacation from German Rule

By 11 a.m., on February 25, 1941 – just six hours after the crucial organizing efforts at the streetcar barns – all kinds of people had joined the strike which had started with municipal transport workers and metal workers across the IJ river. Some 1300 employees of Amsterdam's largest department store (De Bijenkorf), about 1000 workers and engineers at the Royal Dutch Shell plant, hundreds of workers in tobacco factories and sugar refineries, to cite a few examples. Feverish excitement prevailed throughout the city during the late morning hours. The few streetcars which somehow made an appearance were stoned, toppled over, stopped, or literally pushed back into the barns by the crowds in the streets. At

the height of the strike, at noon, the German Commissioner for Amsterdam, H. Böhmcker, observed waves after waves of Amsterdamers who "surged through the streets of the inner city, organized large-scale disturbances, and sang . . . patriotic songs."

The German police and military were conspicuously absent during most of the day, and Amsterdam police obviously sympathized with the demonstrators. Only by 10 a.m. did Dutch police authorities bother to take official notice of the disorders. At 12:45 p.m. the first action by Amsterdam police against demonstrators finally took place, as sabres and horses were used to disperse a crowd massed near the royal palace.[1]

In the early afternoon many thousands attended a Communist-organized rally on a square in the Jordaan, the quarter of Amsterdam inhabited mostly by the non-Jewish proletariat. When a suddenly appearing German police detachment began firing at the crowd, Amsterdam police intervened *en masse* to clear the square. The demonstrators reassembled soon and spent the rest of the afternoon trekking through the streets, singing socialist songs, shouting slogans such as "down with the Jewish pogroms," and molesting uniformed Dutch Nazis.[2]

The strike spread on February 25 because those connected with its outbreak managed to conquer the street. For a few hours, at least, the demonstrators were dominant, and large numbers of new strikers continued to join because the success of the conquest of the street was obvious to all. The strike hardly spread outside Amsterdam, however. After all, the strike leaders were Communists, and Amsterdam was the center of the CPN; the cause of the strike related to the acts against the Jews, and Amsterdam was the center of Dutch Jewry. Nevertheless, fairly impressive strikes did spread from Amsterdam to the adjacent industrial region of the Zaan, but only in a few other areas, such as nearby Haarlem, did some small-scale demonstrations develop. As will be seen below, the February strike did not endure much beyond that first day, partly as a result of the German reaction, partly for reasons inherent in the nature of this particular strike.[3]

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–133.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–138.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–142, 156–158. The news of the February strike reached London late during the second day, February 26. The Associated Press still had a correspondent in Amsterdam at the time, who managed to send details about the strike

April–May 1943; Commuters, Telephone Operators, and Dairy Distributors

The strike of April–May 1943 did spread all over the Netherlands, to towns as well as the countryside, even though it did not bring about as intensive a conquest of the street as the Amsterdam strike.

The first workers walking off a job in a locality were the most effective agents for the further spreading of the strike there. For example, in the key city of Hengelo the strike leader, Stork, happened to be located in the middle of several other factories. The walk-out of the Stork workers could be seen at these other enterprises and duly inspired them. Another factor in the successful spreading of this strike related to the rural place of residence of many of the workers. In Twente, and in other key regions of the 1943 strike, workers commute daily from their villages to the factory. These commuters were most effective in communicating the news and the spirit of the strike to neighboring localities. The spreading of the strike was further enhanced by the unprecedented activity of telephone operators on factory switchboards and in telephone company exchanges. For example, whoever tried to call Stork during the first afternoon of the strike was told by the operators of the state-owned telephone company that Stork was on strike. In this way, customers and suppliers of Stork all over the Netherlands found out that very afternoon about the strike in Twente, and this awareness contributed to the success of the strike elsewhere.

Within ninety minutes the strike in Hengelo succeeded even though there was no centralized leadership at a level higher than the individual enterprises. Workers left their jobs quietly in 1943, and virtually no street demonstrations developed. Also, in further contrast to 1941, workers in private enterprises quit first, but many municipal employees, in Hengelo and elsewhere, followed very soon. Of forty-one large enterprises in Twente, with a total of 25,591 employees, twenty-eight enterprises with 20,947 employees went out on strike during the first afternoon.[4]

In another important locale of the 1943 strike, the coal-mining region of Limburg in the southern part of the Nether-

to the AP office in Berlin. From there the news came to the United States and the Allied world. (*Ibid.*, p. 181.)

[4] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 51, 67, 229–230, 233.

lands, the spreading was helped by the particularly lengthy commuting trips of many miners who preferred to live in their native villages. The commuters travelled by public transportation, frequently by bus, and "quite a few strikes were born on the bus." Apparently, "increased community feelings" came to the fore on the bus; "while travelling the mood became more and more courageous." Moreover, the unusual early morning return to the villages of the busses with strikers announced the strike news throughout rural Limburg.[5]

In the countryside itself, the "dairy plant [*zuivelfabriek*]" usually was the center of the strike. The dairy plant is the one place where the farmers of the surrounding villages have daily contact with one another. If the personnel of the dairy plant goes on strike, the farmer will be affected immediately as his daily shipment of milk is no longer accepted. Also, during a dairy strike milk is not delivered to the nearby towns. As a result, town dwellers are forced to trek directly to the farms in an effort to secure milk. Thus, urban and rural strikers could make contacts. Wherever the dairy plant of a region went on strike, a united front between town and countryside could usually be established. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Germans directed their main anti-strike efforts in the countryside against the personnel of the dairy plants.[6]

While the strike initiative in rural areas was frequently taken in the dairy plants, also the so-called "milk-riders" were often among the activists. "Milk-riding" is a rotating chore for Dutch farmers, involving the pick-up of milk cans in a neighborhood and their delivery to the dairy plant. If the "milk-rider" goes on strike, the effect is similar to a strike in the dairy plant. Of course, by his very duties the "milk-rider" gets around, and his absence is immediately noted. In a few other farm communities, the village doctor or retired officers were most active in 1943. Farmers, as a whole, were willing to cooperate with the strike. They did it by not shipping their products and by urging the closing of village shops and even schools. In the close and conformist village community such actions could be amazingly unanimous.

The rural strike was most intensive in the traditionally independent province of Friesland. The spreading there was facilitated by a lucky coincidence. April 30, 1943, the day after

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 119–121.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

the strike broke out in Twente, happened to be market day in the provincial capital of Leeuwarden, and farmers from all over the province congregated to discuss the strike news. In Friesland the strike lasted longer than anywhere else, until May 7, and brought the most total disobedience of German decrees. The great majority of Friesland farmers are either orthodox Calvinists or Social Democrats, and both kinds participated fully, not to speak of the enthusiastic support in those rural areas of the province where the old Syndicalist-Anarchist traditions of Domela Nieuwenhuis were still alive.

Violence in the 1943 strike was directed against farmers who had sided with the Dutch Nazis, and some of their farms were burnt to the ground. In some areas the strike tended to be used by farm laborers to harass wealthy farmers and it also at times served as an excuse for farmers to evade rationing and anti-black market regulations.[7]

The spreading to the governmental sector must still be mentioned. In many towns the post office, which also provides telegraph and telephone services in the Netherlands, joined the strike immediately. Municipal services, and in some cases teachers, participated too. In Twente even policemen wanted to leave their posts, but changed their mind in the last minute.[8]

The spreading of the 1943 strike was considerably facilitated by the fact that virtually all employers backed their striking workers, often at grave risk to their personal safety. Employers, after all, were usually personally known to the authorities and could not "retreat into the anonymity of their group." Most employers sabotaged German demands to hand over lists with names of striking workers. It comes as no surprise to read German complaints about the many "unreliable" leaders of enterprises who should have been eliminated before the strike broke out.[9] Numerous Catholic and Protestant clergymen backed the strike to the utmost, particularly in the many Dutch villages where they have continued to play a dominant role in all phases of daily life.[10]

Thus, the 1943 strike spread from Twente across the nation – to the coal mines of Limburg, the huge Philips plant at Eindhoven, the smallish enterprises of the Delft and the

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–54, 67, 81, 92–98, 116, 133, 145.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 71, 99, 105, 127, 246, 282–284.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 165, 293, 381.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.

Noord river region, the paper mills at Velzen, and the farms of Friesland, to give but an incomplete listing. However, it could not take hold in the three largest cities. Amsterdam had "shot its bolt" in February 1941; moreover, the underground Communist Party had been hit by a series of arrests just before the outbreak of the strike. Rotterdam was still in ruins from the air bombardment of May 1940, and its economic heart, the port, was dead. The Hague was the center of the occupation regime, whose controls weighed most heavily there.[11] Equally immune to the 1943 strike were the Netherlands Railroads. The anti-strike decision was not an easy one for the management, and certainly not a popular one; it was argued that the railroads could only strike once and that this would have to be done at the strategically most important moment, after thorough preparation. The non-participation of the railroads in the 1943 strike, according to its official historian, "probably contributed most to the giving-up of the illusion that the strike could develop into a truly national strike." Particularly in rural areas, where the railroad is the one link with the country as a whole, the punctually appearing trains were the symbol of "business as usual" and augured the limited duration of the strike action.[12]

The Railroad Strike; "Federation" of Local Actions

While the 1943 strike developed in regional clusters, spreading through such agents as the commuters, the "milk-riders," or the telephone operators, the railroad strike was

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26, 138, 178.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 54, 84. The post-war parliamentary commission of inquiry showed concern about the railroads' attitude in 1943. The railroads' managing director, Dr. Hupkes, mentioned in his defense that the character of the 1943 strike was particularly decentralized and spontaneous. Management did not organize the walk-outs, but "the employees simply ran away" and management did not object. However, the thoroughly centralized railroad system could not be expected to engage in this kind of strike. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 685–686.)

The late arrival of news about this strike in London illustrates the difficulties of communicating with an occupied country. On the second day, on April 30, a German radio message in English, directed to Japan, was picked up in London. This message mentioned the call-up of the former Dutch soldiers, and a Swiss correspondent in Berlin soon confirmed this. However, only on May 2 did a resistance telegram provide some vague and inaccurate news about strikes. On May 9 a lengthy but also inaccurate report about the strike finally reached London. The lack of current and accurate information played havoc with the Dutch government's psychological warfare efforts from London on the subject of the strike, which as such should have been a "natural" topic. (Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–43.)

carried out by the hierarchically organized network of the railroads, extending from the central offices in Utrecht to the smallest depot in the provinces. Although the strike call ultimately came via the London radio, and not from Utrecht, the preparations had been sufficient to make the spreading of the strike fairly even and reasonably instantaneous. Yet, in the beginning the railroad strike too consisted merely of "a series of improvised and isolated local actions"; only gradually these transformed themselves into, what Rüter called, "a federation" of local actions. As the weeks and months of the long railroad strike passed, it did more and more show the effects of the "perfectly hierarchical system" which is the Netherlands Railroads.[13]

While the management could be content with the spreading of the strike, there were stations where far too many employees stayed on the job, such as in Groningen and Alkmaar. In some places a struggle developed between strikers and non-strikers, abetted by the forces backing each group. For example, at the key junction of Amersfoort the Germans tried all sorts of tricks to prevent the strike. They promised double wages and extra rations to strike breakers, and threatened strikers with concentration camp and confiscation of personal properties. The management and the railroad unions' Personnel Council replied in kind. They reconfirmed the strike order both in writing and orally, used direct pressure through resistance channels, and finally asked the Allies to bomb the Amersfoort station. This took place, and Amersfoort was saved for the strike. In the important city of Apeldoorn the resistance enforced the continued spreading of the strike by threatening violence, and at least one non-striker was shot through the hip, as a warning. Of course, as in all other strikes, the quality of local leadership had much to do with the successful spreading.[14]

Because of the centralized nature of the strike and its unprecedented length, continued success depended on the availability of communications. The management and the Personnel Council had to keep themselves informed on the progress and problems of the strike in the various parts of the country. Yet, the very stoppage of the trains, the virtual non-existence of other means of transportation, and the German tapping of telephones made communications ex-

[13] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. VIII, 3–4.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 323, 325, 330.

tremely difficult and hazardous. Fortunately, a resistance organization, the efficient "T.D.," was willing to put a communications system at the management's disposal. The system, as was usual during the occupation, featured young females on bicycles who in relays kept up a message service between the various cities. In addition, Secretary-General M. Hirschfeld and other Dutch officials still in office lent a helping hand by "disguising" management and Personnel Council members as "food-rationing officials"; they even provided the incredible luxury of a car and gasoline. This made the trips to outlying stations somewhat less arduous for the strike leadership.[15]

The Hungarian Uprising; the "Muscovites" Melt Away

After the peak of mass involvement and mass excitement during the night of October 23, 1956, "excitement abated and fatigue set in." As the new day broke in Budapest, sobering thoughts came. As a result, the insurgents hesitated about consolidating their hold on public buildings which had been seized or surrounded during the night. Never again, after the night of October 23, "did the insurrection regain the character of a massed, armed rising." From October 24 on, the fighting was limited to certain blocks and intersections, and was generally of a sporadic character. After all, a unified rebel command never developed, nor were there organized troops available. Yet, the isolated fighting was sufficient to keep the uprising alive and the rebels dominant; moreover, it created the conditions under which the rebellion could spread to the entire country, to the provincial towns as well as the countryside.[16]

The leaders of the uprising in the capital, the lieutenants around Imre Nagy, were at first not in communication with the country outside Budapest. But, by some kind of "instinctive affinity," as Zinner called it, the uprising did spread. In the villages and towns there were no dissenting factions of the elite, such as the Communist writers and students in Budapest, to engineer mass demonstrations. The countryside rebellion had a more specifically anti-Communist character. As a result,

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 294–295. Concerning the complicated and amazingly successful financial arrangements for the continuation of the strike, see the following chapter, fn. 25.

[16] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–260.

the thinly scattered local Communists in most areas simply surrendered their offices and "evaporated"; where they failed to do so, violence occurred with casualties on both sides. As a whole, country Communists were "spineless," particularly since local Soviet army units usually stood aside and were content merely to protect their own barracks and dependents. In fact, "ad hoc arrangements" between Soviet garrison commanders and local rebels served very well to maintain the peace. Thus, isolated and demoralized, "the Communist Party in the countryside simply melted away." [17]

The initiative for spreading the uprising in the countryside came from individual students, skilled workers, or any other kind of more prominent person available. Usually, revolutionary councils were established immediately, consisting of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. In the city of Győr, the key rebel center in the provinces, a "parliament of revolutionary councils" apparently was organized effectively. The radio station at Győr had been captured at a time that the Budapest station was still in "Muscovite" hands.[18]

Communications between Budapest and the rest of the country remained singularly difficult during the entire course of the uprising. Road, rail, and air transport facilities were at first entirely disorganized; later, the Soviet army controlled them tightly. Although some local radio stations were captured, the strongest station, Radio Budapest, remained relatively long in the hands of the old government. Only the telephone was at the rebels' disposal, particularly so since the secret police was too busy to keep up its previous monitoring services.

> The telephone became the principal medium of communication. Never before in the history of the capital were the capacities of the telephone exchange so heavily taxed .... Some refugees claim to have made several hundred telephone calls during the thirteen-day period of the revolution.[19]

By October 30, a week after its eruption, the rebellion seemed to succeed everywhere with relative ease. A general strike had engulfed the country. The most guarded political prisons had fallen and their inmates liberated. The most sensitive governmental offices had been taken over, including defense and the regular police. Universities had been purged and Cardinal

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 260–261.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 262.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

Mindszenty had been released from the house arrest imposed on him by the old regime. Excesses – such as anti-semitism, looting, and needless violence – could generally be avoided and order was maintained to some extent. Even the middle classes, who tended to remain "on the sidelines," were venturing out in the streets again. According to Zinner, they developed a passive yet complete identification with the uprising. "People who had never felt any particular kinship with the masses now were seized with indescribable excitement." [20]

The uprising spread successfully even though the most dramatic night, October 23–24, was not followed by equally intensive mass outbursts. Of course, the rebels had only beaten the "front" of the real power in Hungary. When this power finally decided to intervene on a large scale, the uprising in turn melted away almost overnight, like the "Muscovites" before it.

The Panamanian Riots; Snipers and Looters

Upon return of the Panamanian students from their unsuccessful attempt to hoist their flag on the flagpole of Balboa High School in the Zone, the Panamanian crowd which was awaiting them became unruly. Rioting developed rapidly and soon casualties occurred on both sides. When the riots finally subsided after three days and four nights, twenty-four persons, including four Americans, had been killed and more than two hundred wounded. American business establishments in Panama had been looted and ransacked, and several deep penetrations of the Zone had taken place.[21] The report of the International Jurists somewhat scantly describes the various incidents.

For example, shortly after 7:00 p.m. on the first night, the crowds near the Instituto Nacional turned over and burned United States cars, threw rocks into the Zone, and attacked an iron fence wich formed the Zonal border. They succeeded in tearing down the fence and surged into the Zone near the residence of Federal District Judge Crowe. The Judge's house was attacked with rocks and Molotov cocktails and was set on fire in several places.[22] The area of greatest violence and damage was near Shaler Triangle and the neighboring Legis-

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 288–290, 293.
[21] *New York Times*, January 13 and January 18, 1964.
[22] *International Jurists*, p. 22.

lative Palace, the Pan American Building, and the Tivoli Hotel, the latter building being situated inside the Zone. "Shortly after 7 p.m. [on the first night] the normal stream of traffic appeared to have ceased and the streets were filled by a milling, agitated crowd." Soon the crowd in the area numbered several thousand people. Cars were turned over and set afire, street lights were broken, and shops and other properties on the Panamanian side were looted and damaged. Late during the night, the Pan American Building was invaded and burned out entirely. "Six persons – possibly looters – seem to have been trapped in the building, where their dead bodies were found the next morning." The Tivoli Hotel was attacked during several days, with Molotov coctails and firearms. Afterwards, "the marks of no less than 465 bullets were found." [23] The news of the disturbances in Panama City spread rapidly to other parts of Panama, particularly the Cristobal-Colon area. Crowds of more than one thousand persons entered the Zone there on the first night of rioting. Windows were broken in the Y.M.C.A. building and the Masonic Temple, and serious fighting between United States troops and Panamanians developed there too, killing three soldiers.[24]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the spreading of the Panamanian riots hardly assumed what might be called major proportions. United States troops at all times seemed to manage to contain the attacks where they chose to make a determined stand. Where the rioters succeeded in penetrating to Zonal targets, it appeared to be a consequence of the reluctance on the part of the defenders to cause a bloodbath among the demonstrators. The riots everywhere ended quite suddenly when the Panamanian Guardia Nacional was finally ordered onto the scene, during the early morning of January 13. If United States and Panamanian troops had cooperated from the beginning, particularly on January 9, it might have been possible to control the angry crowds sufficiently so that the demonstrations would have collapsed during that first night.

With the exception of the eight months long railroad strike, the demonstrations did not endure. Their time span was limited to one or two days in February 1941, one day to one week in April–May 1943, thirteen days in Hungary, and three

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–25.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–31.

days in Panama. On the other hand, the spreading was impressive in other respects. All the population of Amsterdam could enjoy, in a sense, a day's vacation from Nazi rule; the conquest of the Amsterdam streets was as complete on February 25 as the demonstrators cared to make it. The 1943 strike spread to the entire country and to all kinds of sectors of the economy, such as industrial workers, miners, farmers, shopkeepers, garbage collectors, and postal employees. While the street was not conquered in 1943, the strike imposed itself on an impressive number of enterprises. The railroad strike did last and spread all the way down the line, with tremendous consequences for all Dutchmen. The Hungarian uprising toppled a puppet government in its central positions in Budapest as well as in the countryside. Eventually, the power behind the puppets repressed the uprising, but for almost two weeks the Soviet Union was forced to temporize and react passively. The Panamanian riots involved thousands of Panamanians and Americans during several days and nights; they flared up all along the border and caused casualties and destruction of property on Panamanian as well as Canal Zone soil.

All the demonstrations were repressed except the railroad strike, which outlasted the war. Yet, all the demonstrations presented novel and unpleasant challenges to the regimes involved. Immediate, on-the-spot repression seemed out of the question in each case, particularly because the demonstrations invariably featured surprise elements. Moreover, the masses of demonstrators, like guerrilla fighters, were not too readily affected by the frontal assaults of a superior military establishment, although United States – Panamanian military cooperation might have made all the difference during the Panamanian riots.

CHAPTER VI

THE REPRESSION

The Amsterdam strike of 1941 surprised the Germans, who were unable to take any effective repressive measures on the first day. Stern measures easily brought the steets under control on the second day, even though many workers continued to stay away from their jobs. It should be noted that the strikers made no serious effort to stage demonstrations on the second day, and had probably never intended to do so. During the strike actions of 1943 the Germans were again taken by surprise and again undertook their repressive measures after the strikers had had their day and were probably not too interested in pushing matters much further. As a result, since strikers and Germans did not clash directly very often, there was relatively little bloodshed in 1941 and 1943. The 1944 railroad strike was not repressed at all. The Germans, once more, did not react immediately, and later, indirect measures – involving the threat of starvation of the population of the three large cities – could not be maintained. The Hungarian rebels successfully fought off not only the regime's feeble attempts at repression but also the first wave of Russians, although the latter were initially too weak and undetermined to make a real effort. The second wave of Russians, on the other hand, met no major resistance. Thus, also in Hungary bloodshed was relatively minor during the actual repression. During the Panamanian riots the United States forces seem to have acted, as a whole, with some restraint. The rioting ceased when Panamanian troops appeared on the scene and made unnecessary a final repression by United States troops.

February 1941; German Surprise and Indiscriminate Punishment

The rapidly spreading strike of February 25, 1941, which burst out at 5 a.m. and took control of the street by 10 a.m., placed the Germans before an accomplished fact. The occupier

certainly had not expected an eruption; in fact, during the evening preceding it German police authorities in Amsterdam had dismissed rumors about a strike as "bluff." By coincidence, not only the German boss of the Netherlands but also the head of the security forces were out of the country. Seyss-Inquart was on leave in Germany, and the chief of the Sicherheitsdienst, Dr. W. Harster, was organizing ski championships in Austria.[1]

The German commissioner for Amsterdam, Dr. H. Böhmcker, heard about the strike only at 9:05 a.m., four hours after the scenes at the streetcar barns. At this late hour he dispatched an aide with a detachment of German police to one of the barns, but nothing could be accomplished there. Two SS regiments barracked in neighboring towns were ordered into a state of combat readiness, and the five hundred men of the German police battalion in Amsterdam were issued special orders to break up rallies of strikers and to shoot to kill without warning wherever necessary. Yet, significantly enough, the SS regiments did not enter the city that first day of the strike and the police battalion remained in barracks virtually all day. In one documented case, a truck full of German police waited patiently and passively at an intersection until a noisy group of demonstrators had passed. At 4:15 p.m. the Amsterdam police was finally told that German forces would intervene if order were not restored "soon."

Thus, on the first day the strikers were hardly challenged and suffered virtually no casualties. German army authorities were duly impressed and upset by their own security forces' reluctance to intervene. It became very obvious that Amsterdam police and Dutch national police troops (Marechaussee) "were not willing to do anything." [2]

The German commissioner did initiate certain other measures on the first day of the strike after he had discovered that the strike was intended as a protest against the anti-Jewish measures, particularly the grabbing of the "hostages." He informed the leaders of the *Judenrat* (Jewish Council) that three hundred more Jews would be arrested at random if the strike would not be terminated by noon the next day. This threat was publicized by posters displayed throughout the city

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 143–145.

after 6:30 p.m.[3] Moreover, a 7:30 p.m. curfew was ordered for the entire population. The German police did manage to arrest some of the Communist activists in the strike that first night, but the Germans themselves admitted that the "top leaders" of the strike among the Communists and Jews had not yet been discovered. It should be noted that the press and the radio were prohibited from making any mention of the demonstrations.[4]

Early the next day the two SS regiments moved into Amsterdam and a modified form of martial law was proclaimed. The German police appeared on the streets and made use of its firearms. Between thirty and forty casualties occured, mostly non-fatal, particularly among those attending a large rally of striking garbage collectors. Also Amsterdam police used force on the second day, sabres as well as firearms.[5] Moreover, the mayor of Amsterdam, decidedly not a Nazi or Quisling, was persuaded to announce that all municipal employees who continued the strike would be dismissed.

As a result of these pressures, including the earlier threats against the Jews, many workers did go back to their jobs during the second day. For example, of the 3336 municipal employees on strike on February 25, 1845 had resumed work by the evening of February 26. Even the streetcars were appearing again. The Germans had soon realized the significance of "the regularity of public transportation" as a decisive factor in the restoration of order. By ordering German or Dutch policemen to ride on each streetcar, they were able to prevent further attempts by strikers to overturn operating streetcars. As the streetcars reappeared, the main symbol of the success of the strike disappeared. However, most strikers in the private industrial enterprises across the IJ river stayed out also during the second day.

The strike collapsed in both private and public enterprises on the third day, February 27. German police occupied many of the factories across the river, and heavily armed German patrols dominated the streets, with machine gun positions at strategic points.[6]

[3] The *Judenrat* had been ordered into existence by the Germans to facilitate their dealings with the Jewish inhabitants of Amsterdam.

[4] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147, 160–161, 168.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 152–154, 162, 165. Apparently, seven persons were killed in Amsterdam on the second day of the strike. (Warmbrunn, *op. cit.*, p. 110.)

[6] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–152, 156, 170.

After it was all over, the Germans remained in a state of shock. At the height of Hitler's victories, mere Dutch civilians, even Jews, had been willing and able to challenge German rule. It is reported that when Himmler told Hitler about the strike, the Führer burst out in a terrible rage, threw his glass of lemonade against the floor, and proclaimed that all the Dutch would have to be deported "to the East." The predominantly Austrian top officialdom in the Netherlands had been criticized earlier in Berlin because of allegedly soft occupation policies. The successful demonstrations seemed to confirm this charge.[7]

As a result, perhaps, of both the shock and the charges of "Austrian softness," the ultimate punishment was more severe, and indiscriminate, than the relatively restrained repressive measures of the German authorities would have indicated. The mayor of Amsterdam, a majority of the city council, and the police chief were fired and replaced mostly with Dutch Nazis. The Amsterdam "plutocracy" – those earning more than 10,000 guilders per year – was supposed to contribute to an "atonement levy" of fifteen million guilders. Since the Germans had understood the pro-Jewish character of the demonstrations, they replied with further steps in the segregation of Dutch Jews from the rest of the nation. The Dutch would have to realize that Jews could no longer be considered part of Dutch life. On March 12, 1941, Seyss-Inquart announced measures which in effect removed the Jews from the economy and made it virtually impossible for them to earn a living. The first of the final steps in the drama of internment, deportation, and extermination had thus been taken. The death penalty or long prison terms were given to all those Jews who had participated in the riots preceding the strike. However, the additional three hundred Jewish "hostages" were not taken–yet.

Surprisingly enough, the strikers themselves were let off rather easily, partly because many of them could not be identified. Apparently only one strike leader in private industry and perhaps seventy of the activists among the municipal workers were fired. All strikers were supposed to be punished by a fine amounting to approximately 10 per cent of their monthly wage. The real organizer of the strike, the underground Communist Party in Amsterdam, was successfully

[7] H. M. Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen*, p. 65.

penetrated by an agent shortly after the strike. Twenty-two of its top leaders and ninety lower functionaries were arrested. Three of these were executed, and twenty-two received prison terms. All but three of the latter returned alive – a truly remarkable record for Nazi Germany.[8]

The strike of February 1941 was a success on the first day during which the surprised Germans acted with restraint, or not at all, against the demonstrators. Blackmail against the Jews and the display of armed forces ended the strike on the second or third day, again with relatively little violence. Many of the demonstrators probably had not intended to strike for more than one or two days and felt that they had made their point on February 25. The measures of German revenge hardly hit the strikers, but were directed against Amsterdamers in general and, of course, the Jews.

April–May 1943; German Surprise and Ineffectual Punishment

There were similarities between the German reactions in February 1941 and April–May 1943. The occupation regime was again taken by surprise, and its boss, Seyss-Inquart, happened to be out of the country once more. In fact, he could not even be located during the first day. The German police chief, H. A. Rauter, had not been told about the all-inclusive call-up announcement which General Christiansen was to issue on April 29. Again, the Germans were shocked by the outbreak of the strike and feared that it might spread to other countries in the West, particularly Belgium and France.

Also in this strike German measures were not effective on the first day. A modified form of martial law was proclaimed in the various strike regions. It imposed a curfew, the immediate use of firearms against strikers, the occupation of struck plants, as well as other measures. However, the issuance of the proclamation was delayed for many hours because printers were on strike and the posters could not be distributed properly. Moreover, since newspapers in some localities were on strike, publicizing of the proclamation was difficult there.

Only on the second day did the Germans attempt to enforce the martial law provisions. They were at an advantage in doing this because the strike tended to break out at different times in different localities, making it possible for one German police

[8] Sijes, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–179.

unit to intervene in several towns and villages. Again, the Germans showed some restraint. To be sure, there were widely publicized on-the-spot executions and violent street battles – including a bloody affair at Marum in Groningen province which brought death to eighteen Dutchmen. On the whole, however, strikers arrested for continuing the strike after the proclamation had been posted were released quickly without further penalties. In any case, with more than 100,000 strikers, arrests were hardly feasible in most cases.

Like in Amsterdam in 1941, most strikers were not interested in a lengthy strike, particularly not after the Germans drastically softened their call-up order on the second day – reducing its effect to the 10 per cent of regulars among the former soldiers. The first two days, April 29–30, were the most successful. The return to work began already on May 1, and by Monday, May 3, the strike continued only in a few areas, such as Friesland.

The German punitive measures, announced after a brief delay, sounded severe. Again, they were not so much directed at the strikers, who could hardly be identified in most cases, but at the Dutch public in general. All radio receivers had to be turned in, to make impossible further listening to the London radio; the labor duties of students in Germany were stepped up; a general labor draft of all men between 18 and 35 years was announced. However, these measures remained rather ineffective. By 1943 the Germans lacked the manpower to enforce their revenge. Many radio receivers were not turned in. An overwhelming number of students and others managed to escape forced labor by going underground, often not very deep – for example, right in their own homes.[9]

The Railroad Strike; the Unenforceability of Mass Starvation Measures

The German reaction to the railroad strike was, of course, determined by the long duration of the strike. Yet, again, the strikers themselves were not bothered too much. Also, the planned repressive measures were so severe, involving in fact

[9] Bouman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–24, 31, 36–37, 109, 142, 387, 389, 442. The exact number of Dutch fatalities in the April-May 1943 strike has apparently not been determined. Bouman's estimate – about sixty persons killed by on-the-spot executions and more than eighty death sentences actually carried out – seems high in the light of his other evidence. (*Ibid.*, p. 448.)

the starvation of the population of the Western part of the country, that they could not be kept up.

The Germans should not have been, and probably were not, surprised by this strike. A German opinion survey of May 10, 1943, had noted quite correctly that a good number of railroad workers were eager to go on strike in the 1943 crisis, but that the railroad management had not considered it the proper time yet. According to this German report, railroad leaders had agreed that their forces had to be kept intact for the decisive moment, i.e. some time after the Allied invasion. A similar prediction concerning a railroad strike "at the right moment" appeared in the report of the German Commissioner for the Province of Gelderland, dated May 15, 1943.[10] Nevertheless, when the strike was finally proclaimed on September 17, 1944, the Germans once again acted as if they were caught by surprise; they seemed to ignore or be unaware of the not so secretive strike preparations which had preceded the proclamation. Of course, the Germans had their hands full during the hectic days after the Arnhem attack and knew that almost anything could happen on the Dutch resistance front.[11]

Either due to preoccupation or surprise, the Germans failed to undertake immediate, large-scale reprisals against the strikers. They did catch a few of the higher officials in the railroads' central offices in Utrecht – some of whom died in concentration camps – but the rank-and-file of striking railroad employees "got off relatively lightly, excepting a very small number ... of casualties." Many of the strikers did not bother to go "underground," and even in front line areas the Germans did not persecute strikers.[12]

The German failure to react immediately and authoritatively against the strikers was of considerable assistance to the crucial first days of the strike. In some localities the strike began hesitatingly, and it was the very absence of German counter-measures which sometimes produced the sentiment to participate fully in the strike.[13] The German security chief, Rauter, claimed after the war that the German army had asked for authority to shoot all railroad strikers on sight, but that he had stopped this "crazy" plan.[14] The Germans pre-

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 408, 426.
[11] Rüter, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 262, 266, 269, 276–277.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 263.
[14] *Het proces Rauter*, p. 430.

ferred to hit at the strike indirectly, by linking it with the shortage of food and fuel which was threatening the Dutch population. Already on the second day of the strike the Germans instructed the controlled Dutch press to play up the starvation theme; because of the railroad strike, an unprecedented catastrophe was said to be in store for the Netherlands. The Germans decided that direct force could not be used effectively against the strikers, but that the absence of the products normally transported by the railroads could provide the means to hit back.[15]

A first German "starvation plan" was more than drastic. All Germans were to be evacuated from Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, and all means of transportation to these cities, except the railroads, were to be interrupted. Then, the strikers themselves could choose between returning to work or starving the three large cities of the Netherlands, all three of which had no reserve stocks whatever. However, the Germans realized that this plan was too crass. Another plan, thought out by either Seyss-Inquart or Rauter, was in fact adopted, and it was almost equally severe. A complete embargo on all water transport, barges as well as ships, was decreed until the end of the railroad strike. This also meant starvation for the western part of the Netherlands, which was dependent on food and coal shipments from the eastern and southern parts of the country. It should be noted that the third means of transport, trucking, had come to a virtual standstill by that time because of lack of fuel.[16]

By the end of September it had become obvious that the greater part of the Netherlands would not be liberated soon. After the Allied defeat at Arnhem the frontlines were stabilizing once more. Yet, the railroad strike continued. Since the Germans had never permitted the building-up of food reserves and since the new harvest had not yet been shipped to the western provinces, Dutch food authorities estimated that supplies in the areas of the three large cities, where most Dutchmen live, would not last beyond October 15, 1944. The coal shortage was equally critical; the supply for gas and electricity production was about to be exhausted, and in consequence the water system, sewerage, and even the pumping

[15] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–265, 270.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

stations of the low-lying polders would no longer be able to function.[17]

Whether to continue the railroad strike – and with it, the shipping embargo – became the crucial question for the survival of the Dutch population. The leading Dutch food officials in The Hague, Secretary-General Hirschfeld and S. L. Louwes, fully realized the seriousness of the crisis, and so did the railroad management and the railroad unions. Yet, both the officials in The Hague and the railroad leaders maintained – quite correctly, according to Professor Rüter – that the decision to call off the strike could only be made by the Dutch government in London. Fortunately, communications were in better shape than before, and as a result the London government was quite aware of the situation and its responsibility therein. The partial or total termination of the strike was discussed by the cabinet on several occasions and already on September 28, the minister responsible for the railroads, J. W. Albarda, suggested abandoning the strike. However, the minister of war opposed this and suggested that the Allied high command would have to be consulted first. SHAEF gave a rather ambiguous answer: the strike in the western part of the Netherlands could be abandoned, but it would have to be continued in the eastern part.

The London government concluded immediately that a *partial* resumption of railroad work was "in effect impracticable" and would result in "severe reprisals" by the Germans. On the basis of this not necessarily self-evident argument, the London government announced on October 2 that the strike would have to be continued until the enemy was ejected from the country.[18] Forty-eight hours later the government seemed to regret this decision. On October 4, it sent a telegram to the railroad management to inquire about the possibilities of a partial termination of the strike, and mentioned that SHAEF was only interested in continuing the strike in the eastern part of the country. It cannot be determined from the sources what the railroad management's reply was, if any. According to Rüter, if there was an answer, it was undoubtedly negative. Also in Holland, says Rüter, a partial resumption was considered "impracticable." [19] In any case, on October 5, Premier

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 277.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 278–279.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

Gerbrandy took to the air and explained why the strike had to continue. The Allies had to be assisted at this decisive stage of the war, and besides, according to Gerbrandy, the Germans would penalize returning strikers and would grab the food and coal from the Dutch even if the trains were operating. The Germans could not be trusted in their promises and the Allies would have to bomb the Dutch railroads to a standstill regardless of the consequences. Professor Rüter does not think that Gerbrandy's points were necessarily valid, but he grants that in that period there were considerable limits to anybody's ability to evaluate the situation, from Holland and particularly from England.[20]

The strike continued, as did the German-decreed shipping embargo. As the threat of "total starvation" came closer and closer, Hirschfeld and Louwes – and even the Dutch Nazi leader, Anton Mussert – tried desperately to get concessions from the Germans. Finally the Germans were forced to give in. On October 16, Seyss-Inquart announced the lifting of the shipping embargo, in spite of the continuing railroad strike. In Rüter's view, this major victory for the strikers was not so much a consequence of Seyss-Inquart's fear of German defeat and Allied retribution. Rather, it was the result of pressure from the German military who did not want starving urban masses in the rear of their troops during the crucial battles ahead. Military necessity made it possible for the railroad strikers to have their strike and food for the population as well. Moreover, Hirschfeld was able to get German approval for the immediate procurement of a fleet of ships and barges, and by mid-November regular food transports were again operating across the IJsselmeer and on the canals. Even some coal for bakeries and public services was successfully "organized" by Hirschfeld from supplies actually earmarked for the occupier.[21]

The drama of the railroad strike was by no means over,

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–282.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 391–398, 406. For a fascinating account of the organization of Hirschfeld's emergency fleet, which undoubtedly saved the western part of the Netherlands, see his own account, written after the war. (H. M. Hirschfeld, "De Centrale Reederij voor de voedselvoorziening," *Economie*, 1945/1946.) It is amazing how Hirschfeld managed to play his role in the top position of the Dutch administration during this entire period. His Jewish ancestry was ignored by the Germans – except some of the more radical SS elements, who frequently complained about him. Note also Hirschfeld's interrogation by the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission, particularly on his relations and negotiations with the Germans during the railroad strike. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 802–803.)

however. A new enemy, the weather, began to interfere. An unusually severe and lengthy freeze began on December 23, which was to last until January 31. Almost immediately the shipping operations had to be suspended and within a few weeks, by mid-January, the food supplies in western Holland were literally exhausted. Again the railroad management felt that it had no authority to stop the strike as the London radio reconfirmed the strike policy, "until the bitter end." Hirschfeld and Louwes once more appealed to the Germans, and again the Germans were forced to give in. On January 16, 1945, Seyss-Inquart made an incredible concession; he permitted three trains, operated entirely by German crews, to carry potatoes from Friesland to the starvation areas. They arrived just in time to keep the public soup kitchens going.[22] Moreover, the Germans offered to supply ten food trains per week if Dutch railroad men would be willing to operate them. The railroad management relayed this offer to London on January 27, but a reply reached Holland only on February 6. London was willing to permit this specific rupture of the strike, but only if the railroad management, Hirschfeld, and several sets of resistance leaders would also approve. Since in the meantime the ice had melted and Hirschfeld's fleet had started to operate again, the strike was permitted to continue as before. Ten thousands of Dutchmen in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam did in fact die of starvation, but the great majority survived because of the end of the freeze and the several German concessions.[23]

The German repressive measures against the railroad strike were ineffective. The strikers themselves could not be caught, the shipping embargo had to be lifted, and German-staffed trains had to operate for Dutch civilians at the height of the crisis in the German war effort. On the very edge of starvation, the Dutch for once were able to blackmail successfully. Of course, the costly strike effort did not really affect the German military position. Even during the Arnhem battle German military transport needs were apparently taken care of satisfactorily, but the Germans were forced to assign some five

[22] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 399–402.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 403–405. At a time that the Germans themselves were extremely short of coal and transport, the Dutch were still able to get some coal from them – 82,000 tons in January and 40,000 tons in February of 1945. (Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen*, p. 159.)

thousand German railroad men to operate the Dutch railroads for their military necessities.[24] The involvement of these five thousand Germans has to be balanced against the very real threat of mass starvation, and thus stated, the railroad strike could be dismissed as a Dutch blunder. However, the symbolic significance of this heroic strike effort cannot be so simply assessed. Moreover, could "loyal cooperation" possibly have been in effect after Arnhem? [25]

The Hungarian Uprising; "Muscovite" Panic and Two Soviet Interventions

The leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party and their instruments of physical power – army, secret police troops, regular police – were not able to control mass rioting. The result was the previously mentioned "evaporation' of the Party. In Zinner's opinion, "the astonishing rapidity of the collapse of the Party machinery and affiliated organizations was the most remarkable aspect of the first phase of the revolution." The Hungarian army turned out to be a complete fiasco for the regime. Many soldiers ,either deserted to the rebels or handed over their weapons to them. Entire units fought on the side of the uprising, and apparently not a single Hungarian detachment collaborated with Soviet troops in their two repressive efforts.[26]

From October 22–24, 1956, the scene at Party headquarters was one of complete confusion, as "hysteria and near panic

[24] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 257, 260–261. The German security chief, Rauter, claimed after the war that the strike had one obvious military advantage for the Germans – it played havoc with the communications of the resistance.

[25] Minister Albarda told the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission that Premier Gerbrandy, as be proclaimed the strike, should have provided for a way out – "a return-ticket" – in view of the possibility of an Allied defeat at Arnhem. Dr. L. de Jong mentioned that he had questioned Premier Gerbrandy about this on the day the strike was proclaimed; Gerbrandy had replied merely that the Allies would be in Amsterdam within a week. (*Enquêtecommissie*, 7c, pp. 15, 721.)

The story of this unique and dramatic strike has been brilliantly told by Professor Rüter. The mere physical feat of supporting some 30,000 strikers – many of them decidedly not resistance heroes – for almost eight months staggers the imagination. All the railroad strikers were paid their regular salaries, including their usual overtime, through resistance channels. During the time of starvation they were even provided with extra food rations, to counteract German attempts at bribery. The intricate and ingenious system of financing the Dutch resistance, including the procurement of the 63 million guilders required for the railroad strikers, is described in P. Sanders, *Het Nationaal Steun Fonds* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

[26] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 250–251; United Nations Report, p. 28.

prevailed." Decisions were made and rescinded immediately. This state of irresolution was evident to the entire capital and undoubtedly contributed to the rebels' determination. For example, with regard to the decision on the permit for the October 23 demonstration of the students, Zinner argues that "it is open to question whether the Party's cause would have been damaged more by steadfastly clinging to a ban that was defied than it was by public vacillation." [27] Party boss Gerö's radio speech of October 23 revealed obvious symptoms of panic. "So maladroit was Gerö's address that it has prompted speculation whether it could have been meant as deliberate provocation." [28] Gerö evidently misjudged the nature of the opposition, and he compounded his error by committing the "crowning" blunder – the hasty call for Soviet military assistance during the evening of October 23, without regard to Soviet intentions and immediate capabilities.[29]

The initial reaction of the Russians was as helpless and headless as Gerö's, at least in retrospect. However, not all the facts pertaining to the first Soviet intervention can be determined. It is known that the Soviet troops were called some time after 10:30 p.m. on October 23. But, it is not known whether Moscow was consulted or whether the local Soviet commander had sufficient discretionary powers to assent to Gerö's request on his own. Soviet motorized units appeared in Budapest between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. on October 24, coming from bases located some 35–40 miles outside the city. The crucial point is that their intervention at this time could not be decisive. Because of the limited number of Soviet troops committed during October 23–24, a massive assault on the insurgents was out of the question and could not have been intended.

The Soviet government evidently was taken by surprise and must not have been in possession of accurate information on the Hungarian scene. Clarification came only after special emissaries Mikoyan and Suslov – "representing perhaps opposing viewpoints in the Soviet Communist Presidium" [30] – arrived in Budapest on October 24. For the next few days the nature of the Soviet military intervention remained quite

[27] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 254.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

ambiguous. No real assaults were mounted against the insurgents, although some casualties were sustained and inflicted. Zinner suspects that the primary Soviet aim at this time was to guard all Soviet and some Hungarian strategic installations and public buildings. The Soviets were obviously trying to minimize their intervention, perhaps because not enough of their troops were available or because the troops were not entirely reliable. However, the persistent rumors of Soviet army defections could not be confirmed.

In any case, the minimizing of the intervention did not succeed. On October 25, at Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament, a column of Soviet tanks "inadvertently became involved in the bloodiest single encounter of the revolution . . . ." A mass demonstration was taking place at the time, but the tanks seemed to ignore it in a manner characteristic of the first Soviet intervention. Yet, somehow, firing began from neighboring houses, possibly provoked by Hungarian secret policemen. After a few Soviet soldiers were wounded or killed, the tanks began to fire into the crowd, causing many casualties.

The first Soviet military intervention certainly was a blunder. Generally defensive and indecisive actions of the Russian troops had "the effect of creating a myth among the insurgents that they had actually defeated the troops of the occupying power." If the Soviets had hoped to muddle through the uprising without a real military effort on their part, the half-hearted commitment of these first troops was foolish. If the Soviets were already planning a massive intervention, the involvement of weak troops before the final, decisive action was equally senseless. Since these first troops had to be pulled out of the capital while the uprising was still continuing, the withdrawal was "tantamount to a serious if not intolerable loss of face." Of course, the Soviets suffered very few casualties and continued to enjoy complete freedom of movement in the countryside. "Yet, the cocky mood engendered by the illusion of having defeated the Soviet military grew as the revolution wore on." [31]

One hour after the massacre at Kossuth square, Party boss Gerö, who had called in the Soviet troops, was replaced by "moderate" János Kádár. The incredible revolution seemed to be succeeding "in the presence but without the defeat of the forces of a foreign great power." By October 30, Nagy and his

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 256–258.

advisors mentioned truly harsh terms to the Soviets: Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw treaty and Soviet troops would have to leave Hungary within two or three months. On November 3, a Hungarian military delegation appeared at the Soviet headquarters "to discuss terms of Soviet withdrawal."

> In the face of clear evidence to the contrary they [the Hungarians] believed that they could flout their giant neighbor with impunity, insulting and humiliating him to boot. What was worse, they once again were gullible in assessing Soviet statements, promises, and proffers of peace, amity, and negotiation – as they had been a decade before.[32]

The Soviets, in the meantime, were preparing another military intervention. There undoubtedly was serious dissension within the Presidium on the merits and timing of this second intervention. The Suez affair apparently made the decision for massive intervention an easier one.[33] On November 4 – the day the General Assembly voted to establish the United Nations Emergency Force – a massive attack was launched by the Soviet army which encountered no organized defense in Budapest. Only "improvised resistance on the part of mixed groups of students, workers, and some military personnel" developed, and the few centers of continued rebellion were soon reduced to isolated strongholds – some of which held for a week of more. Within a few hours Nagy's government had ceased to exist. A "revolutionary worker-peasant government" under János Kádár suddenly emerged "somewhere" in eastern Hungary.[34]

Strongholds located within industrial plants held out longest:

> It was one thing for the Soviet forces summarily to reoccupy a town hall and to sweep away the local revolutionary council; it was quite another thing for them to dislodge by force a workers' council whose

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 316–317.

[33] Zinner believes that the Soviets would have intervened even without the Anglo-French attack on Egypt occurring simultaneously; however, because of this attack, the Hungarian intervention involved fewer risks for them. By the same token, according to Zinner, the Soviets might have intervened more forcefully in the Middle East if they had not been involved in Hungary. Thus, one could argue that the Hungarian uprising prevented a general war in the Middel East. (*Ibid.*, pp. 320, 323, 363.)

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 336–337, 339. The Hungarian "negotiators" were arrested at Soviet headquarters by Soviet security police while discussing "terms" with the Soviet army commander, apparently to the latter's surprise. (United Nations Report, p. 45.)

base of operation was in the middle of an industrial complex employing thousands of workers.[35]

The workers' councils became the final agents of the uprising. As late as November 14, a "Workers' Council of Greater Budapest" was set up to serve as the top organ of the remaining workers' councils, but lack of communications prevented similarly planned institutions for the rest of the country. The workers' councils' key weapon was the general strike, wich was continued with sporadic effectiveness even after the second Soviet intervention had succeeded. Yet, as winter approached, the strikes could hardly be maintained, and, therefore, negotiations with the Kádár government and the Soviets had to be attempted.[36] On November 6, the Soviet military had called on the workers to resume work; weeks of bargaining were often required before striking workers consented to give in. During this period clashes between the Soviet army and workers were reported; usually, however, Soviet troops consented to withdraw from a factory if at least a partial resumption of work could be arranged.[37]

The final matter in the repression of the uprising related to the punishment of the rebels. Imre Nagy was duly executed, and became a real national hero and martyr as no Hungarian Communist before him. A good number of his associates were either executed or received prison terms; only a handful fled to the West. Kádár rebuilt the Party with persons who had somehow managed to ply their course without openly identifying themselves with either Rákosi of Nagy. Rákosi and Gerö became real "Muscovites" once more, settling down for their final period of exile somewhere in the Soviet Union.[38]

The Panamanian Riots; Waiting for the Guardia Nacional

United States efforts to contain and subdue the Panamanian crowds faced several handicaps. Above all, Panamanian authorities were most uncooperative. The International Jurists described the situation in Panama City during the first evening.

Repeated attempts were made by the Canal Zone authorities to call to their aid the Guardia Nacional of Panama to take effective measures to control the violent crowd. Between 6:30 and 8:30 p.m., 7 or 8 telephone

[35] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 342–344.
[37] United Nations Report, pp. 104–105.
[38] Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–353.

calls were made by the American authorities but no effective action was taken by the Guardia Nacional. On the contrary, the Guardia Nacional was purposely kept away from the trouble-spots in the City of Panama until early on January 13.[39]

In the Colon area too the International Jurists discovered that the Guardia Nacional was insufficiently deployed.

Curiously, it was also proved that the Guardia were totally disarmed during these difficult days; the Guardia are usually equipped with pistols and batons. No explanation was given as to why the Guardia were not to carry their usual arms during these days.[40]

The Canal Zone police forces were inadequate for the tasks presented by the riots. For example, in the Balboa district a total of eighty men were available to cover the Zonal border extending over considerably more than one mile. Zonal authorities, of course, had no jurisdiction inside Panamanian territory where many of the attacks on American property occurred.[41]

At about 8:00 p.m., approximately one hour after the rioting burst out, the acting governor of the Zone, Lieutenant Governor Parker, called on the commanding officer of the United States military forces, General O'Meara, to provide military assistance for the outnumbered Zonal police forces. This military assistance came forth immediately.[42]

Both police and troops began by using tear gas against the crowds. But, invariably, firearms were employed after a while to supplement the tear gas. In the words of the International Jurists,

It would appear that the use of firearms was the only method by which, at this stage, the limited number of policemen present could prevent the crowd from forcing its way into the Canal Zone. It would also appear to the Investigating Committee that the revolver fire was not entirely directed over the heads of the crowd or into the ground in front of the crowd, but that some of it was directed into the crowd causing casualties.[43]

Unfortunately, even the revolver fire directed at the crowds did not suffice. Further escalation became inevitable when rifle fire, and even bursts from automatic or semi-automatic

[39] *International Jurists*, p. 20.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

weapons, began to hit the Tivoli Hotel from Panamanian territory. Consequently,

> a select team of United States Army marksmen under a sergeant was ordered to take up position in the Hotel Tivoli late in the evening of January 9. General O'Meara made at least two requests, through the appropriate Panamanian Authorities, for action by the Panamanian Authorities to stop the firing which was being directed against the Canal Zone from the Republic of Panama. No action having been taken by the Panamanian Authorities, through the Guardia Nacional or otherwise, General O'Meara issued orders after midnight on January 10, that the team of U.S. Army marksmen could use .30 calibre rifle fire to stop the snipers. At this stage four U.S. soldiers had been wounded, making a total of six casualties on the U.S. side. One soldier and one civilian had been wounded earlier.
>
> The rifle firing by the U.S. Army marksmen from the Hotel Tivoli commenced on the morning of the 10th at about 12:30 a.m., and continued until 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. the same day. It started again about 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 10th, and continued until about 2:00 p.m. It was resumed again from 7:10 to 7:15 p.m. on the same evening. It is estimated that some 400 and 500 bullets were fired by the United States forces. An examination of the Legislative Building showed that bullets had penetrated through the walls. Throughout this period U.S. troops also used shotguns intermittently.[44]

Although rumors about the employment of tanks by United States troops were false, armored personnel carriers were used to deploy the soldiers more effectively.[45]

The first fatal casualty occurred within the first hour of the outbreak of the riots. At 7:45 p.m. a Panamanian student from the Instituto Nacional, aged 20, was killed by a bullet from a Zonal police revolver.[46] After it was all over, ninety-five Panamanian civilians from the Panama City area had been brought to St. Thomas Hospital; among these were eighteen dead. However, the International Jurists point out that not all of the casualties were due necessarily to United States action. "Panamanians fired on each other, on different occasions, for different reasons. It seems also probable that shopkeepers and others used weapons in order to stop looting and to protect their property." [47]

The International Jurists' report seems to indicate that the riots in the Colon-Cristobal area were handled more tactfully than in Panama City, even though three of the four American

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

military fatalities occurred there. For example, on one occasion a crowd was dissuaded from entering the Zone when the local chief of police pleaded with them in Spanish, without an interpreter.[48]

The opinion of the International Jurists concerning the character of the United States repressive effort is mixed.

> The tempo and violence of the disturbances were such that there is little doubt that they held out a real threat to life and security, which could only be met by strong measures. In these circumstances the Canal Zone Authorities and the United States military forces were entitled to use force. Nevertheless, we entertained some doubts as to whether the force used, at some stages, was not in excess of the minimum absolutely necessary. In particular the following caused us concern:
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 1. (a) While the Canal Zone Police had exhausted the greater part of the tear-gas available to them, it was established that they did not try to obtain additional supplies.
>
> (b) No attempt appears to have been made to use water jets to calm down and control the crowd.
>
> (c) It also appears that, while orders were given to shoot over the heads of people or into the ground in front of the crowd, people in the crowd were struck by bullets which did not appear to be "ricochet" bullets.
>
> 2. A large number of bullets (approximately 400–500) were fired by United States Army trained marksmen using high velocity rifles. In a residential and densely populated area such extensive use of high fire-power is a disturbing feature.[49]

On the other hand, the International Jurists emphasized certain factors which excuse at least some of these "excesses": the large and violently tempered crowds; the extensive use of Molotov cocktails; the heavy firing and sniping from the Panamanian side before the United States Army employed its marksmen. Above all, the International Jurists condemned the failure of Panamanian authorities to take steps to control the crowds and to remove the snipers and arsonists.[50] The most serious charge concerns the inactivity in the Panama City area of the Panamanian Guardia Nacional. The International Jurists felt certain that,

> if the Guardia Nacional had taken charge of the situation early on the evening of the 9th or soon thereafter, the violence and the damage to property and the tragic casualties would not, in all probability, have taken place.[51]

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

In fact, when the Guardia Nacional finally appeared in full force during the early morning of January 13, order was immediately restored and maintained.[52] Similarly, in the Colon area the Guardia Nacional, as was mentioned previously, chose to operate "totally disarmed" during the days of riots. In Colon too the Guardia "brought the situation completely under control on the morning of the 13th." [53]

In the following conclusions the International Jurists appear more critical of Panama than the United States.

> Considering all the above surrounding circumstances, and in particular the grave acts of violence and the threat to life and security involved, we have come to the conclusion that, even if the force used by the Canal Zone authorities and the United States Army may have been at certain stages somewhat in excess of what was absolutely necessary at the time, the force used seems to have been justified; taking into account such rapidly moving, critical, and violent conditions, it is impossible to lay down a fine distinguishing line of what should have been the absolute minimum necessary.
>
> We regret deeply that the Panamanian authorities made no attempt during the critical early hours, as well as for almost three days thereafter, to curb and control the violent activities of the milling crowds. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence to indicate that broadcasts over radio, television and loud-speakers, newspapers, and other means were adopted to incite and misinform the Panamanian public without any action by the Panamanian authorities to curtail or moderate such activities.[54]

The Germans and their Russo-Hungarian counterparts were taken by surprise by the events depicted here. As a result, repressive efforts were slow, initially clumsy, and not always effectively directed against those responsible for the troubles. The strikes of February 1941 and April–May 1943 were short-lived, but it would be an exaggeration to claim that only the repressive measures made them so. The railroad strike could not be checked at all by an occupier in the last stages of his rule, while the Hungarian uprising required full-scale military intervention of a type which was bound to be most damaging to the Soviet Union's image. As to the United States, its image too could hardly afford the kind of military effort which was required to keep at bay the angry Panamanian crowds, especially since the Panamanians' own government was not inclined to share the burdens of the repressive effort.

[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

CHAPTER VII

EPILOGUE

The Demonstrations as Catalysts of Mass Resistance

The strikes in Holland and the uprising in Hungary were important as enduring symbols of the possibilities of resistance to an occupier; moreover, they provided a crucial link between the activists of the resistance and the largely passive majority of the population. For example, the strike of February 1941 was provoked by the Communists for rather special purposes of their own; yet, very soon it engulfed the entire population of Amsterdam.

> The strike developed the characteristics of an all-inclusive protest against the occupier. The Jewish persecutions were the occasion which brought all together. It was not known who had provoked the action. Nobody inquired about it and nobody really cared, as long as the desired strike could take place.... The absence of the streetcars and the return of the striking workers from the factories changed the familiar pattern of the city. This in turn had a tremendous effect on the public .... Strikers as well as non-strikers became demonstrators in this kind of city atmosphere .... In unison they marched – the strike had found its own track.[1]

The strike found "its own track" as the strikers and the general public coalesced into one large group of demonstrators. All parties concerned, the Germans, the Communists, and the general public were surprised how suddenly and universally the strike could develop – "everyone was flabbergasted." The Communists noticed to what extent the strike had slipped out of their hands when they tried to add wage demands to the protests about the Jews. These demands were entirely ignored, as was a later attempt by the Communists, on March 6, 1941, again to provoke a mass strike. The strike was a genuine mass demonstration, provoked by a genuine "revolutionary" situation – the grabbing of the Jewish "hostages" – and it could not be reproduced at will, not even by the Communists. This genuineness effectuated the successful linking of the resistance and the general public, and the linking endured. Henceforth, a

[1] Sijes, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

person's attitude toward the Jewish persecutions became the criterion for being a "good Dutchman." [2]

What the strike of February 1941 did for Amsterdam, the strike of 1943 did for the rest of the nation, to some extent at least. According to Professor Bouman's conclusion, the strike constituted "the first mass protest of the Dutch people," even though in many localities it lacked the fervor and unity of the Amsterdam scene of February 1941.[3] A German opinion survey of May 10, 1943, attached great significance to this demonstration by some 500,000 persons. The survey admits that the strike was not ended by German counter-measures but by the strikers themselves: "They wanted to express their indignation, and when they felt that this had been done with sufficient bluntness, they went back to work." [4] Bouman considers the strike a turning point in the history of the Dutch resistance. It proved to the activists that the population was behind them and could be trusted as a protective screen during their hazardous tasks against the Germans. This function of the 1943 strike is remarkable since its immediate cause lay in a German blunder, soon repaired, which lacked the deeply emotional issues behind the Amsterdam strike.[5]

In spite of more doubtful aspects, pertaining to lack of military significance and "brinkmanship" with regard to starvation of the population, the railroad strike was an incredible feat. In Rüter's words, that 30,000 persons went on strike for eight months under German occupation and ignored severe distress, represents a "noble," historic deed, a "grandiose demonstration of the will to resist." The strike, with its aftermath of severe famine, brought the entire nation together just before the liberation "through ties of need and sacrifice." Rüter emphasizes the element of continuity which the railroad strike provided between war and peace. Hupkes, the managing director of the railroads, was said to be the typical Dutch entrepreneur of the pre-war era, "level-headed and sober, eager to keep tight controls over his enterprise."

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 151–152, 186–187.

[3] Bouman, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188. Some resistance men, according to Bouman, were quite unhappy about the 1943 strike. It was considered too undisciplined and supposedly involved persons who had not been particularly anti-German but were forced into the strike in compliance with dominant feelings of the village or plant community. (*Ibid.*, pp. 82, 137–138.)

Hupkes preserved his controls in spite of the Germans, in spite of resistance efforts during the strike, and in spite of the purge boards after the liberation. To Rüter, Hupkes and his railroad symbolized the link between the pre-war and the post-war era, the continuity of Dutch traditions notwithstanding the revolutionary potentialities of war, occupation, starvation, liberation, and purge.[6] In the words of the post-war parliamentary inquiry commission, the railroad strike, which had been intended as a strategic device to serve the battle of Arnhem, became instead "a spectacular resistance act of the Netherlands people." [7] It provided links not only between the resistance and the rest of the population, but also between the world of 1940 and the world of 1945. The railroads' willingness to fight for survival symbolized similar feelings in the nation as a whole, and the fight was led by the traditional leaders, the management and the unions' Personnel Council. The men of 1940 were also the men of 1945.

During the Hungarian uprising, in the graphic description of a participant interrogated by the UN committee, "a really fantastic miracle occurred," the miracle "that the whole people became unified." [8] The rebellious intellectuals, the middle classes, and the rest of the population developed complete identification with the uprising. "People who had never felt any particular kinship with the masses now were seized with indescribable excitement." [9] The real Hungarian miracle, in Hannah Arendt's view, was the outburst of the "spontaneous revolution," previously not considered possible by either Communists or anti-Communists.

> If there was ever such a thing as Rosa Luxemburg's "spontaneous revolution" – this sudden uprising of an oppressed people for the sake of freedom and hardly anything else, without the demoralizing chaos of military defeat preceding it, without *coup d'état* techniques, without a closely knit apparatus of organizers and conspirators, without the undermining propaganda of a revolutionary party, something, that is, which everybody, conservatives and liberals, radicals and revolutionists, had discarded as a noble dream – then we had the privilege to witness it.[10]

[6] Rüter, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24, 417–419, 469. After the liberation Hupkes succeeded in preventing outsiders from judging acts of collaboration among railroad personnel. The railroad purge boards were staffed by Hupkes' own men. (*Ibid.*, pp. 433, 450.)

[7] *Enquêtecommissie*, 7a, p. 391.

[8] United Nations Report, p. 79.

[9] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[10] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

At least one Panamanian observer has seen the riots of January 1964 in a quasi-Hungarian light – as the catalyst which united the general public with its "natural" leaders, the students.

> Tired of bringing its demands before the conference table and tired of hearing the Panamanian Government announce grandiose concessions received from the United States, the people of Panama are again being led by their traditional leaders – the Panamanian youth. Once again the Panamanian students have had to pick up the flag of reform. Once again have they, through their unrelenting insistence and incorruptability, forced the general public to act ....
>
> According to the reports on the January riots one cannot help but wonder if the general public has not finally joined the student movement. This had been the case on very few occasions in Panama's history – but these few alliances have led to fruitful and very beneficial results for the Panamanian nation.[11]

Mass Demonstrations and Governmental Policy

Zinner observed that the beginning of a mass demonstration "is traceable to a physical act of violence that has both actual significance as a test of strength between the forces opposing each other and symbolic meaning as a point of no return in resolving the differences between them." [12] Actually, this act of violence does not have to include shootings such as occurred in front of the Budapest radio headquarters. To serve as "test of strength" and "point of no return" the act of violence has to be dramatic and conspicuous, even if it does not involve casualties. For example, the successful mass distribution of the Budapest students' sixteen points constituted a sort of conquest of the street, without any physical violence, and as such could be interpreted to have served as a test of strength and point of no return. In Amsterdam, too, the streets were conquered without physical violence. The absence of the streetcars and the scenes at the ferries were instrumental in getting the crowds into the heart of the city, and this mass presence came to constitute the test and point of no return for the strike of February 1941. In April–May 1943, and in September 1944, the act of violence consisted of the illegal act of leaving the workshop or the railroad post; the immediate success of these strikes decided the test of strength and led to a point of no return in the relations with the occupier. In the Panamanian crisis the demonstrators actually failed in the first test, as the students

[11] "Crisis in Panama," pp. 44–45.
[12] Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

were unable to raise the Panamanian flag. Perhaps, in view of the self-conscious nature of the United States presence in Panama, the mere fact that a test of strength was attempted sufficed to provoke a point of no return situation.

Through the symbolic act of violence the general public becomes aware that a "test" has been passed and a "point of no return" reached. At this point, according to Zinner, the regime is bound to discover that "the behavior of an aroused mass is generally characterized by its unpredictability . . . [and] that its mood is more susceptible to the influence of the loudest and most rancous participants . . . ." [13] The approval by the "aroused" masses makes the demonstrations find their track, as illustrated by the events in Amsterdam, Budapest, and Panama. The railroad strike's incredible duration in spite of starvation may well be explained in terms of the "aroused" population which was willing to submit to extreme deprivation to support it. The strikes of April–May 1943 were unique in featuring "aroused" rural publics, demonstrating the effectiveness of rural communications and consensus.

The crucial policy decisions of the regime must be taken before the symbolic act of violence has driven the public to a state of fervor which makes control measures unfeasible. In the crises under investigation, an imposing number of factors became evident which could not have been controlled sufficiently by governmental counter-measures to prevent the symbolic act of violence. On the other hand, there also occurred a considerable number of blunders, oversights, and failures of empathy whose avoidance might have stifled the potentialities of the demonstrations concerned.

All the factors described as "underlying" were beyond governmental manipulation, considering the quality of the governments involved. As to "immediate" factors, the Germans in Holland could hardly have had an answer for the psychological and other consequences of the battle line's return to Netherlands territory, which in turn made a continuation of "loyal cooperation" impossible to the railroad personnel. Similarly, the Hungarian regime could hardly have been prepared for the post-Stalin upheavals within the Party nor for the contagious effects of events in Poland. Equally beyond governmental control were some of the skillful or lucky feats of rebel leadership, such as the early morning actions at

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

the streetcar barns, the immediate posting of the lunch hour bulletin, or the mass reproduction of the Budapest students' sixteen points.

However, a number of situations could have been managed more advantageously by the regimes if they had reacted astutely. In February 1941 the Jewish "hostages" should not have been picked up at random from the streets. At that time the Germans were still attempting a moderate game, exploiting the last vestiges of the honeymoon, and it was foolish for them to adopt suddenly and publicly the methods of the lowest Dutch Nazi rabble. Even more inept, of course, were the series of mistakes relating to the call-up of the former Dutch army. Of all the demonstrations, the strike of April–May 1943 was most clearly the consequence of inadequately and tactlessly contrived governmental policy. Several mistakes of judgement are evident in the Panama crisis. Zonians should have been more carefully, and sternly, prepared for the emotional problems flowing from joint flag display; governmental authorities at all levels should have been forewarned about the troubles as a result of more properly working communications between Washington and the Canal Zone; finally, the outburst might have been averted in the last minute if the Panamanian students near Balboa High School had been handled more tactfully.

The crucial counter-policies must be effectuated before the symbolic act of violence has occurred. The evidence from the five demonstrations points to the inadequacy of repressive efforts after the outbreak. That is, the repression usually manages to curtail the demonstration, but not before the irreparable harm to the regime has taken place. Even where repressive measures did not involve errors such as the first Soviet intervention in Hungary or the failure to arrange for the presence of the Guardia Nacional, these measures were bound to affect the regime's authority and image in a most adverse manner. Also the factors pertaining to the spreading of a demonstration may very well be beyond governmental manipulation. In the case of the five demonstrations, the outbreak momentum was sufficient to ensure a certain amount of spreading against which counter-measures were of no avail.

The conclusion may well be that there is no certain way for a regime to avoid mass demonstrations. Curzio Malaparte once

thought that he had discovered a "science" of the *coup d'état* which would enable either the plotters to capture the state or the government to defend the state against the plotters. Malaparte tried to show

> that the problem of the conquest and defense of the State is not a political one, that it is a technical problem, that the art of State-defense is guided by the same principles that guide the art of its conquest, and that circumstances favorable to a *coup d'état* are not necessarily of a political and social order and do not depend on the general condition of the country.[14]

Franz Neumann, on the other hand, maintained that Malaparte's "science" was full of errors and that his examples and predictions were largely fallacious.[15] Certainly, political, social, and merely accidental conditions inevitably interfere with the "technology" of the *coup d'état* as well as with the "technology" of the kind of demonstrations described in this study. Purely "technological" tactics, to be sure, did pay off at times – for example, at the streetcar barns in Amsterdam and as a result of the activities of the dairy distributors and telephone operators in the 1943 strike. Yet, most of the time the particular demonstration seemed to develop by some kind of internal "magic" of its own, and both demonstration leaders and governmental authorities had to try to keep abreast by means of not particularly scientific improvisations. Malaparte's scientific planning would not, and probably could not, be applied to any large extent by the various actors in the demonstrations here described.

This is not to say that officials must not try to understand the underlying factors even where they cannot affect them. And, of course, an intelligent and mature regime will more positively influence the chain of events by not committing errors at the points where manipulation is possible, especially during the period immediately preceding the outbreak and during the outbreak itself. Yet, even the most empathic regime may sooner or later have to endure demonstrations which are likely to be harmful to its authority and image.

[14] Curzio Malaparte, *Coup d'État, the Technique of Revolution* (New York, 1932), p. 250.

[15] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1944), p. 458.

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