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China and Tanzania:
A Study in
Cooperative Interaction

GEORGE T. YU



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A Study in
Cooperative Interaction

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
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Foreword

The danger of Gestalt-like thinking affects all aspects of foreign scholarship on the People's Republic of China, but nowhere is this danger greater than in the subject of Chinese foreign policy. Some observers appear to believe that China has only a regional foreign policy, one oriented toward ending the allegedly hostile presence of the United States and the USSR in east Asia. These observers tend to place greatest weight on the evidence of Chinese behavior over the past twenty years, and they discount Chinese ideological pronouncements as being, essentially, propaganda. Some other observers weigh the evidence differently, and conclude that China has a global foreign policy, one with deep ideological roots and one oriented toward enhancing China's ability to influence events around the world. They are impressed by the global sweep of China's ideological positions (e.g., Lin Piao's 1965 statement on "people's wars"), and they discount China's present limited capacity to carry out such a foreign policy.

Professor Yu's study of China's most important foreign policy initiative outside of Asia, its "cooperative interaction" with Tanzania, manages to utilize both the behavioral and the ideological approaches to Chinese foreign policy without being trapped by the Gestalt of either. Equally stimulating, Professor Yu goes beyond both traditional orientations to offer the hypothesis that China and Tanzania have forged a "partial informal alliance" but not one that is based on shared military or ideological interests. In support of his analysis the author also presents a thorough description of the extent, variety, and potential significance of China's numerous programs in Tanzania.

George T. Yu is highly qualified to write this study. Since 1966 he has published some five scholarly articles on the subject of Africa and Chinese foreign policy; and during 1967-68 and 1970, he conducted field research in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. A professor of political science at the University of Illinois, Urbana, he is also the author of *Party Politics in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) and *The Chinese Anarchist Movement* (with Robert Scalapino) (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1961).

John Service worked with the author in editing his manuscript for publication.

CHALMERS JOHNSON, *Chairman*
Center for Chinese Studies

Berkeley, California
June 1970

**To Priscilla, Anthony, and Phillip
for sharing
the excitement and hardships
of field research**

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I

Introduction

Contemporary studies of international politics have devoted far more attention to conflictual patterns of interaction than to instances of cooperation. Yet, the interaction patterns among and between states have been in fact predominantly cooperative. We do not deny the importance of studying conflicts, but we feel strongly that students of international politics should be concerned also with cooperative interaction. Such questions as the causes, development, and effects of cooperation can contribute much—like studies on conflict—to explaining international politics. Indeed, it can be argued that by studying why and how a nation engages in cooperative interaction we can better explain the sources of conflict.

An example of the conflictual approach to the study of international politics can be seen in most studies on the foreign policy and international behavior of the People's Republic of China. Studies abound on China's interaction with the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and other conflict patterns: few have seriously investigated China's cooperative interaction patterns. This emphasis on conflictual interaction has only incompletely revealed China's present and future foreign policy, creating an impression, for instance, that China has been and will be incapable of cooperative interaction. In short, China's international behavior has been perceived as being chiefly conflictual. In suggesting the need for cooperative interaction studies, we are not denying the presence of conflictual attitudes and situations in China's foreign policy and international behavior. Instead, our objective is directed toward a greater comprehension of the totality of China's foreign policy and behavior and its world role.

This study is the examination of one example of China's foreign policy and international behavior in a cooperative role, as a contrast to the conflict role conventionally attributed to China. We adopt this approach with several objectives in mind.

First, our study will depict China in a cooperative international role, recognizing at the same time the direct and indirect impact of China's conflict attitudes and interaction patterns. The conventional image of China's international role has inevitably stressed the non-cooperative dimension. This is, of course, not difficult to understand. The unbroken record of conflict and animosity since 1949 between China and the United States has contributed to this image. Similarly, the Sino-Soviet conflict has strengthened the belief that China is incapable of cooperative interaction. China's relations with India since the early 1960s, and China's promotion of the

concept of "people's war," have further contributed to the unquestioning acceptance of the conflictual nature of China's foreign policy and behavior. These interaction patterns have without doubt been a primary feature of China's international behavior during the last twenty years. However, to accept those interaction patterns as the totality of China's interaction patterns represents a gross distortion and oversimplification of a very complex situation. Like other major states, China has engaged in a variety of interaction patterns. Cooperative interaction has been a dimension as important as conflict in Chinese foreign policy and behavior.

A second objective is to analyze China's cooperative pattern of behavior by using the model of a single-stream interaction. As students of international politics have long been aware, there is a paucity of data on the interaction patterns of most states.¹ The problem becomes especially acute when we move away from North America and Western Europe. We know, in fact, very little about the categories, extent, frequency, and levels of interaction between and among non-Western states. Yet, any meaningful theory of international politics must take data into account. The single-stream interaction model contributes to the international politics field through the systematic examination of the interaction pattern of a pair of states.

The lack of data for theory building has been especially serious in the study of China. Since the late 1950s, China has permitted the release only of selective data pertaining to internal and external policies and behavior. This has been particularly true regarding domestic developments in China. The situation, however, is somewhat different for data on foreign policy and behavior. So far as China's overt international relations are concerned, data has generally been regularly provided. This has been especially the case in regard to those states on which China—whether for positive or negative, internal or external, objectives—has focused its attention. There have been two reasons for this. On one hand, China has used its external relations to support internal policies: for example, a demonstration of external acceptance of the Thought of Mao serves the function of furthering the domestic acceptance of Maoist thought and policies. On the other hand, China's international relations have been used to disprove claims of China's isolationism, and to demonstrate China's friendship with selected areas and states: for example, relations with certain Asian and African states serves the function of validating China's special role in the Third World. A consequence of these and other factors has been a relative abundance of data in the form of news and reports on a wide range of cooperative interactions between China and a select group of states. Despite factors influencing the Chinese data, such as the propagandistic nature and selec-

¹ For a recent statement on this problem, see Peter Berton, "International Subsystems—A Submacro Approach to International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1969), pp. 329–334.

tive character of news dissemination, interaction patterns which reflect reality can nevertheless be reconstructed. For one thing, the data can be checked in the states or state receiving China's attention. When the data from Chinese sources is combined with those from the states or state with which China interacts, Chinese foreign policy and behavior can be studied in much greater depth. Within the context of the single-stream interaction model, utilizing data on the interaction pattern between China and another state, an opportunity exists for a controlled systematic examination of an example of China's cooperative interaction pattern.

A third objective of our study is the examination of a selected group of foreign policy instruments utilized by China in cooperative interaction and, at the same time, the response of the target state. The "revolution" in statecraft manifested in the rapid growth of informal relations between states in the present century has had a profound impact upon international politics. States have become increasingly vulnerable to foreign influence through the widespread use of informal foreign policy instruments which seek to bring "one country's agents or instruments into contact with the people or processes of another country in an effort to achieve certain objectives."² Examples of informal relations, and the foreign policy instruments which are associated with the new form of relationship, include: cultural exchange programs, economic aid, military aid, military training missions, technical assistance, overt information programs, and many others. The nature of the relations, and the instruments employed, are in direct contrast to the formal, government-to-government form of interaction conducted primarily by soldiers and diplomats. A primary difference between formal and informal foreign policy instruments has been the ability of the latter to reach inside the target state, thus giving rise to the initiation of change in that society. Most states seeking to influence others have utilized the two forms of instruments concurrently. Depending, however, upon the particular environmental-situational context, one form of instruments may be more effective to achieve certain objectives and hence given greater use.

China's pursuit of cooperative interaction has utilized all forms of foreign policy instruments, formal and informal. However, relatively heavy reliance has been placed upon informal foreign policy instruments. Today China employs all forms of informal instruments, ranging from cultural exchange programs and economic aid to technical assistance and overt information programs. An examination of these instruments—the techniques through which cooperative interaction has been conducted—can be instructive not only for assessing the competitiveness and effectiveness of the instruments themselves, but also for an understanding of Chinese foreign policy and behavior.

Any study of informal foreign policy instruments must be concerned

² Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft*, New York, 1965, p. 6.

equally with the problems of “technical accessibility” as well as “substantive accessibility.” While it is vital to identify the usage of the instruments, it is equally important to seek to measure the response of the target state to the particular instruments and to the total effort itself. Our study will attempt, by examining selected Chinese informal foreign policy instruments, to analyze both the technical and substantive questions.

A final objective of our study will be to suggest some tentative conclusions regarding the nature and prospects of China’s international role. Our study in itself is a recognition of the importance that China has assigned to cooperative interaction. China’s foreign policy and behavior cannot be understood without considering cooperative interaction patterns. To refuse to accept this cooperative role is to reject reality—just as to deny the presence of the conflictual component in China’s policy and behavior is also a gross distortion of the truth. A balanced account of Chinese foreign policy and behavior requires that the two interaction patterns be placed in juxtaposition.

II

China and Tanzania: “Most Unequal Equals”

Chinese-Tanzanian interaction provides an excellent model of China's cooperative international role. Beginning with Tanganyika's independence in 1961 and Zanzibar's in 1963, China sought and received the friendship of these African states. After the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, there was an increase in the level of China's interaction with the new republic. The relationship was formalized with the conclusion of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship of 1965, signed during President Nyerere's first state visit to China. In the same year, Premier Chou En-lai visited Tanzania. China initiated an extensive economic and technical assistance program to Tanzania. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had neither an overtly adverse political influence upon nor caused a massive reduction in the level of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction. Indeed, relations continued to flourish, marked by President Nyerere's second state visit to China in 1968. In 1970, on the eve of China's formal commitment to finance and construct the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), and the expected expansion of China's economic and military assistance programs, Chinese-Tanzanian interaction had attained a new high level.

THE CHINESE-TANZANIAN PARTIAL INFORMAL ALLIANCE

Based on past and contemporary interaction, the Chinese-Tanzanian relationship can correctly be described as a partial informal alliance. Alliances have been traditionally associated with forms of political cooperation which bear upon common defense. It has been a long-accepted but unexamined assumption that “all important forms of political cooperation necessarily must have implications for common defense.”¹ Thus when speaking of alliances, one usually has in mind such agreements as the Southeast Asia Treaty or the Warsaw Treaty. This traditional concept of alliances has been increasingly questioned; it has become more and more evident that even in overt military agreements joint action for common defense constitutes only one element in cooperation. In short, the dominance of military problems in our thinking about alliances needs re-exam-

¹ George Modelski, “The Study of Alliances: A Review,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VII, No. 4 (December 1963), pp. 769-776.

ination. Certainly the traditional assumptions do not fully explain our concept of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance.

For the purpose of this study, we will define an alliance as a commitment of one or more states to take certain cooperative actions under specified conditions. An alliance thus conceived emphasizes the concept of commitment and the idea of cooperation. That there must be commitment on the part of the actors is self-evident; an alliance will remain viable only so long as the actors have trust in each other. Cooperation follows commitment. But our idea of cooperation is not confined to problems of common defense. Indeed, cooperation may exclude military problems completely. By cooperation, we mean joint action in any of a number of elements: political, economic, or military. Briefly, an alliance represents a commitment to cooperate in any given number of elements by a group of states, but common defense is not a necessary prerequisite for cooperation.

Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction can properly be studied under our definition of an alliance. Cooperation in a number of elements has been conducted over a period of years. The primary elements of cooperation have been economic and political, though military activities have constituted one element of joint action. However, contemporary Chinese-Tanzanian interaction requires qualification. The alliance has been neither formal nor exclusive; and it has been only partial. For example, though economic and political joint action has been an important feature of cooperation, the alliance has been given no formal organizational expression. Indeed, Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction has been conducted largely on an ad hoc basis. Nor has the relationship been exclusive. Consider Tanzania's external pattern of interaction. Tanzania has sought relations with most states and has received assistance from a diversity of foreign sources; it has been also a leading supporter of the principle of non-alignment. These and other factors have led us to propose the concept of partial informal alliance.

Such an alliance is clearly changeable. Given the existing elements of cooperation, the existing partial informal alliance has the potentiality of developing into a full-fledged alliance. This could come about, for instance, if there should be a future escalation of cooperation in all elements, if Tanzania—voluntarily or involuntarily—reduces its relations with other states, and if the joint action is given organizational expression. For the present, however, Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction can be described as a partial informal alliance.

An alliance—partial, informal, or otherwise—denotes some aggregative stance of one state with respect to another. A question of great importance concerns the measurement of the actor's posture: namely, on what basis does one establish the degree of cohesiveness of an alliance. One suggestion has been that the degree of an alliance can be inferred from a set of

acts or indicators, objective and subjective.² A number of indicators can be used to establish and measure alliance cohesiveness. These include: the saliency of one state to another, educational and cultural exchange programs, diplomatic visits by heads of state and of high government officials, economic relations, number of foreign technicians, and military assistance. While it would be ideal to examine all the indicators, an analysis of a selected group of key indicators can be utilized to measure the degree of an alliance.

This study will focus upon the following indicators to measure the degree of cohesiveness of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance: the degree of saliency, economic relations, technical assistance, and military assistance. We emphasize that a primary objective of this study is to examine China in a cooperative role; therefore, our concept of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance, and the use of the select indicators to measure the interaction pattern, should be seen within the larger context of China's cooperative international behavior.

CHINESE OBJECTIVES

Alliances have been perceived as largely political phenomena, manifesting the decisions of the political elites of the allied states. The conditions which influenced the elites are important in explaining the causes which led to the decision to participate in such a commitment. A study of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction must begin, therefore, with a knowledge of the basic goals of the two elite groups. Generally speaking, the importance of Tanzania in relation to the objectives of the Chinese elites has been manifested on three primary levels.

First, the Chinese elites have perceived Tanzania as being a part of the Asian, African, and Latin American world in the unfolding revolutionary struggle, real and symbolic. China's perception of the Third World was summarized in 1965 by Lin Piao.

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people who make up the

² Henry Teune and Sig Synnestevedt, "Measuring International Alignment," *Orbis*, IX: 1 (Spring 1965), pp. 171-189.

overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.³

The vital role of Africa in the world's revolutionary struggle, and the duty of China (and all other true socialist countries) to support the struggle, is a primary component in China's Tanzanian policy. China's call to revolutionary struggle, armed and otherwise, among the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples has long been a familiar policy. In essence, the policy has promoted the idea of a world revolutionary movement, in which the primary enemies are the American imperialists and the Soviet social imperialists—against whom the struggles are “rising like the sweeping wind and the waving cloud.”⁴

Within the specific context of Africa, China has offered advice and support to revolutionary struggles, although China has been careful to differentiate between such struggles in independent and non-independent Africa. On one hand, China has supported a policy of armed struggle in Rhodesia, South Africa, and in those parts of Africa still under colonial rule. On the other, it has called upon the independent African states to be on guard and continue the struggle against “imperialist intervention and subversion.” But, as a whole, China has seen Africa as a major link in the world's revolutionary movement. And China has performed its duty by lending support to that struggle.

The Chinese perceive Tanzania as having a unique role in the world revolutionary struggle. This was succinctly summarized in a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial on the occasion of the second visit of President Nyerere to China in 1968.⁵ Tanzania, under the leadership of President Nyerere, was struggling “against imperialist intervention and subversion” and working “for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty.” Great success had been achieved “in developing their national economy and culture and liquidating the remnants of colonialism.” In addition to initiating reforms internally, Tanzania was a major supporter of African national liberation struggles externally. Tanzania had also demonstrated its opposition to the imperialists and their allies by refusing to accept the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Tanzania's anti-imperialist credentials were unquestionable. As a member of the Asian, African and Latin American world, Tanzania symbolized the revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

In this regard, the importance of Tanzania is the real and symbolic role it has served for Chinese elite objectives. Internationally, Tanzania—as a

³ Lin Piao, “Long Live the Victory of the People's War,” *Jen-min Jih-pao* [hereafter *JMJP*] (Peking), September 3, 1965. For an English translation, see *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965, pp. 9–30.

⁴ “The New Born Power Is Invincible,” *JMJP*, May 17, 1969.

⁵ “A Warm Welcome to President Nyerere,” *JMJP*, June 18, 1968.

component of the Asian-African-Latin American world generally, and as a unit of Africa specifically—has served the vital function of establishing and maintaining China's revolutionary credibility. Cooperation with the "revolutionary" state of Tanzania has given credence to China's revolutionary posture. On the other hand, there has been an undeniable linkage between China's international role and its domestic policies. If it can be demonstrated that China's revolutionary policy has been accepted abroad, then the correctness of the revolutionary policy at home must be verified. Interaction with Tanzania has thus served also a vital domestic function. In this sense, the importance of Tanzania to China has been multi-dimensional: all objectives have converged to serve the function of giving credence to China's revolutionary role at home and abroad.

On the second level, another Chinese objective has been the use of Tanzania, directly and indirectly, as a battleground to combat American "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism" and "social imperialism." Within the context of China's African policy, the policy of anti-imperialism has served the objective of "exposing" the imperialist character of the United States; the anti-revisionist and anti-social imperialist policies have sought to identify the Soviet Union with "United States imperialism" and to discredit the Soviet Union's revolutionary credentials.

The relationship between the perceived roles of the United States and Soviet Union, and China's African policy can be illustrated by an examination of China's call to "revolutionary armed struggle." The summons to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to engage in revolutionary struggles has long been a familiar hallmark of Chinese policy. In essence, China's constant reiteration of this theme has been to demonstrate the viability of the Chinese model to achieve liberation; to claim its universal acceptance and application in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and to insist that the primary forces against the liberation movements have been the United States and the Soviet Union.

Surveying the development of the "revolutionary armed struggle," China sees the fires of revolution everywhere.⁶ In Asia, there are long-standing armed struggles in Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Malaysia. New battlefronts are being opened in Thailand, Indonesia and India. The revolution has also spread to the Middle East and the southern Arabian peninsula. Even the Americas have witnessed the growth of revolutionary movements—China claimed that there were more than ten "armed struggles" taking place in Latin America in 1969. Finally, though Africa has experienced a growth in revolutionary struggles within the last decade—struggles were taking place in the Congo (Kinshasa), Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and other areas. China has perceived two impor-

⁶ "Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of the Gun—The Rapid and Fierce Development of the Revolutionary Armed Struggle of the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America," *JMJP*, May 16, 1969.

tant conclusions from these and other “revolutionary armed struggles”: the revolutionary struggles are interdependent, each lending support to the other; and they all share common enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union.

In Africa, China has not hesitated to offer additional advice and support to the “revolutionary armed struggle.”⁷ Several themes are stressed in the Chinese commentaries. First, “revolutionary armed struggles” can only be learned through engaging in them. One’s fighting ability increases through experience, and armed struggle educates the masses. As the “absolute majority of the population,” the masses must be mobilized to insure the continuance and success of the revolution. Second, self-reliance is essential, and a long-term struggle must be expected. One of the reasons for the mobilization of the masses, aside from the educational factor, is that it accomplishes economic self-reliance, thereby enabling the revolutionary armed struggles to continue until victory has been won. Finally, the struggle for liberation should be conceived not merely as against the Portuguese colonial and white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, but should also include the “more sinister enemies”—the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, the foremost enemies of Africa are the United States and the Soviet Union. This fact has dual significance for the African revolutionary struggle: due to the support of the two powers, the struggle against the white minority regimes and the Portuguese will be bitter; and, for the same reasons, the fight will be protracted and will even suffer reversals. However, the final defeat of the United States and the Soviet Union will witness the true liberation of *all* Africa.

The constant attempts to relate the United States and the Soviet Union as the ultimate sources supporting the forces against change in Africa suggests the importance of the two powers in China’s policy. One Chinese objective, therefore, has been the mobilization of Africa to serve China’s national interest of combating its primary adversaries. The focus upon “revolutionary armed struggle” has sought to maintain Africa’s direct involvement in China’s struggle against the United States and the Soviet Union. The attention to the role of the two powers has been indicative, of course, of China’s recognition of the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in Africa. In sum, China has perceived Africa as one battleground in the struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union. The use of “revolutionary armed struggle” must be seen as one method through which China has sought to combat its adversaries.

The final level of the importance of Tanzania is China’s perception of the importance of securing formal recognition and international support. This question can be examined from two perspectives: the function of

⁷ “Insist on Revolutionary Armed Struggle . . . African Patriotic Armed Forces Strenuously and Energetically March on the Road to Victory,” *JMJP*, January 9, 1969.

Tanzania in China's drive for formal interaction with the African states; and the importance China assigns to securing recognition and international support. A review of Chinese-African formal interaction will demonstrate the significant role of Africa in Chinese foreign policy objectives.

The years between the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the end of the decade were the initial period of China's relations with Africa. During these years, China made a cautious beginning to win African recognition and support. Chinese activities, for the most part, were confined to Africa north of the Sahara, with Cairo as the principal base of operations. By the end of the decade China had been recognized by four African states: Egypt (1956), Morocco (1958), Sudan (1958) and Guinea (1959). Considering the fact that until 1960 there were only nine independent states on the African continent (six of which had become independent only since 1953), China's gaining recognition from four must be taken both as a minor victory, *and* as indicative of the importance assigned to establishing formal interaction.

The major thrust of Chinese-African interaction occurred during the years 1960 through 1965. Between January 1960 and December 1965, no fewer than twenty-nine African colonies won independence, with sixteen African states gaining independence in 1960 alone. Consequently, these years represented also the peak of China's diplomatic offensive in Africa. At the height of this offensive (1964-1965), China initiated a major campaign utilizing a variety of foreign policy instruments to secure African recognition and support, including a grand tour of Africa by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi and aid commitments to Africa totaling \$190 million. One indicator of the overt success of the drive was that by the end of 1965 China had won recognition and support from an additional fifteen African states: Ghana (1960), Mali (1960), Somalia (1960), Tanganyika (1961), Algeria (1962), Uganda (1962), Zanzibar (1963), Kenya (1963), Burundi (1963), Tunisia (1964), Congo-Brazzaville (1964), Central African Republic (1964), Zambia (1964), Dahomey (1964), and Mauritania (1965). Upon the basis of the successful and unsuccessful attempts at securing formal recognition and support through 1964, there is no question that China pursued an almost indiscriminate policy of seeking formal interaction with the African states.

The third period of Chinese-African interaction began in the mid-1960s. This period has been characterized by a reduction in the overt formal presence of China on the African continent, and by the initiation of a Chinese foreign policy toward Africa based upon selectivity. Within China, this period coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In Africa, except for Angola, Mozambique and a few other colonies, this was the post-independence era. Without question, this was a period of Chinese retreat, marked by the breaking of formal interaction by Burundi (1965), Central African Republic (1966), Dahomey (1966), Ghana

(1966) and Tunisia (1967). China's formal recognition and support by the African states was reduced from a high of eighteen in 1964–1965 to a low of thirteen in 1970. Yet, even this number is misleading, since several African states (e.g., Kenya) maintain little more than nominal interaction with China.

This failure of China's African policy was due both to China's own ineptitude and to the high degree of instability of African politics. For example, China's attempt to induce the African states to accept fully its world view and major policy objectives was rejected by the vast majority of the African elites. China's militant posture and alleged subversive activities also did much to antagonize certain African states, e.g., Ivory Coast and Malawi. These and other acts of rejection by the African states were not without their effect upon China. Though neither the states nor the continent were mentioned specifically, a commentary on international developments appearing in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* early in 1966 no doubt was related to China's reversals in Africa.⁸ It admitted the occurrence of setbacks "of the political situation in certain states." But this was allegedly due to the fact that the revolutions were a new force, which had to experience repeated struggles, and to the presence of the imperialists headed by the United States, who were counter-attacking. However, the reversals were merely zig-zag paths along a predetermined course. The world's revolutionary struggle was like the great force of the Yellow River, winding and twisting through high mountains and low valleys but always flowing onwards. This admission of policy reversals undoubtedly represented reassessment by China of its African policy. China's African policy after the mid-1960s was forced to shift from one of indiscriminately seeking to win recognition and support from most of the African states, to a policy of selective interaction with a limited number of African states.

Tanzania was one of a select group of African states with which China sought to maintain formal interaction. Indeed, Chinese-Tanzanian interaction became a model of China's selective pattern of interaction. Within the context of the drive for formal interaction and the securing of recognition and international support, Tanzania undoubtedly served a vital function in China's African policy. China, as we have already suggested, assigned great importance to Africa as a part of the Asian-African-Latin American world. China had also insisted that it was the duty of "the socialist countries" to support the people of the Third World. Continued interaction with Tanzania, symbolizing Africa, became essential to China. This was especially the case after the diplomatic reversals of the late 1960s. On one hand, Tanzania represented the "profound friendship of the Tanzanian and African people for the Chinese people." On the other, China's relations with Tanzania manifested the support of "the seven hundred million

⁸ "Winding and Advancing," *JMJP*, March 7, 1966.

Chinese people . . . for the anti-imperialist(s) in Africa.”⁹ In this sense, the importance of Tanzania’s recognition and international support of China extended beyond the relationship between the two actors. China’s Tanzanian policy served the vital objective of securing and giving substance to China’s international legitimacy in the world of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

TANZANIAN GOALS

Tanzania’s goals in its relations with China have been equally complex. Security has undoubtedly been a foremost consideration. Situated immediately north of Portuguese Mozambique and close to the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, Tanzanian elites have been keenly aware of the military superiority of their adversaries. This feeling of helplessness and frustration has been intensified by Tanzania’s perception of the economic and military supporting roles of the United States, Great Britain, France, and other nations to the Portuguese, and to Rhodesia and South Africa. President Nyerere has repeatedly referred to the “Portuguese colonialist” violation of Tanzanian territory, and to Tanzania’s own economic and military weaknesses.¹⁰

Tanzania’s case against Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa was summarized by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Stephen Mhando in the statement that “the continued presence in Africa of colonialism exploitation and racism is the most pressing international problem.”¹¹ These forces threatened the safety of Tanzania; they had “checked the African march to freedom.” However, these three forces were not alone: they had powerful supporters. How could “a state as poor and decadent as Portugal” fight thousands of miles away from home and supply itself militarily, asked Minister Mhando. And how could the economies of Rhodesia and South Africa continue to prosper without the “connivance of its allies.” Hence it was this “connivance” that maintained their oppressive regimes and contributed to their military might. “It is unnecessary for me,” continued Minister Mhando, “to explain from where Portugal gets the P2V, P2V5, the Lockheed and the North American F84 and the F86 planes.” Nor was it necessary to explain the contribution to the economic development, and hence military strength, of Rhodesia and South Africa by the investments of companies from the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany. These and other investments greatly strengthened the white minority

⁹ See note 5 above.

¹⁰ See for example, *Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs*, Address by the President Julius K. Nyerere at the Tanganyika African National Union National Conference—16th October, 1967, Dar es Salaam, 1967; and *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam), October 7, 1969.

¹¹ *The Standard*, October 16, 1969. These remarks were delivered by Minister Mhando before a session of the UN General Assembly in 1969.

governments. The continued development of these forces posed, therefore, a serious threat to Tanzania.

The expansion of white minority-regime military forces in neighboring South African countries resulted in a steady worsening of Tanzania's relative security position. However, Tanzania for a variety of reasons has been unable to procure the required military supplies. For example, Tanzania's charges against the NATO powers for their military support of Portugal has made acceptance of Western military assistance a highly sensitive political issue. One important goal of Tanzania's interaction with China must be understood within the context of the perceived urgency of obtaining military hardware and other support necessary to deter possible foreign encroachments.

The commitment to total African liberation generally, and the active assistance rendered to the liberation movements specifically, is another area of immediate interest to Tanzania. The commitment to Africa's total liberation from colonialism and white minority rule, and the country's geographical location, have made Tanzania especially conscious of the remaining vestiges of white rule. Thus the issue can be seen as related to national security. Nonetheless, the two questions of security and commitment to Africa's liberation must be differentiated. Tanzania's commitment to the freedom of all Africa has been genuine, in principle and in deed.

Tanzania's policy of supporting total African liberation was appropriately summarized by President Nyerere.

The total liberation of Africa must be a continuing concern of every independent African state. And legal independence is not enough, legally the Union of South Africa is a sovereign state. The freedom we seek must be freedom for the peoples of Africa without distinction of race, colour or religion. Racialist minority governments cannot be acknowledged because they are a negation of the very basis of our existence. Co-existence is impossible; for if the African peoples of South Africa and Rhodesia have no human rights to govern themselves, then what is the basis of Tanzania's existence, of Zambia's, of Kenya's, and so on?¹²

There has been a close relationship between this commitment to Africa's liberation and Tanzania's interaction with China. On one hand, Tanzania saw the independent movements in southern Africa being successfully repressed by white minority regimes with the continued support of the Western powers. On the other, China offered unhesitating support of Africa's liberation by armed struggle. Since the peaceful path to freedom had been "slammed shut, and bolted,"¹³ this armed struggle was perceived by the Tanzanian elite as "the only choice available."

These and other similar thoughts were expressed by President Nyerere

¹² *Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs*, p. 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*

during his second state visit to China in 1968.¹⁴ Africa, said President Nyerere, had to struggle not only against neo-colonialism, but also foreign occupation and racist minority oppression. Tanzania was not truly free because Africa was not free. "My countrymen know that they are insulted because the blackness of our brothers is being insulted in Africa. And my country, with the other independent nations of Africa, is determined that this situation will be changed." "Africa will be free," continued President Nyerere, ". . . For Africans will liberate Africa."

President Nyerere dealt next with the struggle to liberate Africa. The fight for freedom had already begun, but the "struggle before us may be a long one." "The people of Africa have now taken up arms in Mozambique, in Angola, in Portuguese Guinea, and in Rhodesia." The triumph of these struggles will be Africa's triumph, and therefore Tanzania's triumph. Turning to Tanzania's support of Africa's liberation struggles and China's policy of armed revolutionary struggle, President Nyerere summarized the spirit of this dimension of China's role in Tanzania's foreign policy.

I believe that the people of China understand this determination of ours—this determination of Tanzania, and of Africa. I believe that you sympathize with us in our struggle, just as we sympathize with the Chinese people's determination to defend their own country and build it according to their own desires. We do not ask for more . . .¹⁵

Tanzania has supported the total liberation of Africa. This has taken the form, among others, of giving sanction, training, and support to liberation groups, permitting liberation movements to establish offices in Dar es Salaam, and headquartering the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity in Tanzania. Tanzania has contributed, directly and indirectly, to the support of the liberation movements by allowing their presence on Tanzanian territory. Tanzania has also participated in the exile politics of the liberation groups. This undoubtedly has put great strains upon Tanzania. Its resources have been inadequate even for domestic economic development; Tanzania's capacity to assist the liberation movements in their struggles has consequently been moderate. This limited capacity for aid, together with the increasing frustration of many of the liberation groups (due perhaps to the conditions of prolonged exile or the protracted nature of their struggle), drove many of the movements to seek further external aid and inspiration. There is no doubt that the ever-protracted struggle, and the inability of the liberation movements to secure Western aid and sympathy, caused many to look to China, both because of its promise of aid and its militant posture. Difficult though it is to ascer-

¹⁴ Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Tanzania, *Speech by the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere at a Return Banquet in China 21st June 1968*, June 21, 1968, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

tain the exact nature of the relationship, it seems clear that it has also been a determinant of China's role in Tanzania's foreign policy and behavior. Tanzania's commitment to total African liberation dictated that it support those who adhered to the common objective.

A final goal in Tanzania's relations with China has been the attempt to overcome what Tanzania perceived as a position of subordination. Interaction with China served the objective of increasing Tanzania's independence—economically, militarily, and politically—from Western domination. But this must be understood also as a desire to strike a balance between and among the major world forces, namely, Tanzania's wish to correct the imbalance of the past by establishing new linkages.

First, Tanzania sought "to live in friendship with all states and all people." Each problem would be evaluated as it occurred on its own merits, but Tanzania had "no intention of being 'anti-West.'" The need to proclaim Tanzania's friendship for all states and all people, and the desire for continued relations with the West, has to be understood within the context of Tanzania's past. Until 1961 and 1963, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, like the rest of Africa, had been part of the Europe-centered world system of international relations. This had meant that the European states governed Africa in their own interests, and that the African colonies had become increasingly tied to the mother countries—culturally, economically, militarily and politically. Independence for Tanganyika and Zanzibar and all other African colonies provided an opportunity to correct this pattern of relationship. It was natural that the new states should look with reservations on the former exclusive form of interaction. It was also to be expected that the new states would attempt to develop and solicit new relationships. Tanzania proved no exception. After almost eighty years of colonial rule for the Tanzanian mainland and an even longer period for the island of Zanzibar under the Germans and the British, the desire to reassess the exclusive former ties and to broaden relations was not surprising.

Second, the policy of developing and soliciting new relationships included contact with the "Eastern Bloc countries" and the "non-Western nations." Prior to its independence, Tanzania had no direct contact with any of these states. The need to redress the former exclusive dependency, together with a desire to develop relations with other states, led to the establishment of formal interaction with a host of these states.¹⁶ Undoubtedly, this was also a symbol of newly won independence. President Nyerere put it thus: "We shall not allow any of our friendships to be exclusive; we shall not allow anyone to choose any of our friends or enemies for us."¹⁷

¹⁶ As of early 1970, Tanzania had established formal interaction with the following "Eastern Bloc" and "non-Western" states: Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Turkey, USSR, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

¹⁷ *Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs*, p. 4.

A third level of Tanzania's policy of nonalignment has been the perception of its world role in relation to the major powers and the East-West conflict. The Tanzanian elites have admitted that Tanzania is "a poor and small state" which could never be "a big and powerful state." Tanzania could attempt to build up its armed forces; it could even try to overcome its economic underdevelopment "by destroying every non-material quality of life in search for economic strength and wealth." "But small nations can never succeed in being big nations. The more this is realized the more successful they will be in creating good lives, and secure lives for the people."¹⁸ According to President Nyerere, there exist two basic practical alternatives for the small state: it can either ally itself with the major powers, or it can accept the limitations of its position while working for international action in support of justice and national freedom. The problem of the alternatives, and the correct international role for Tanzania and other small states, were clearly set forth by President Nyerere.

A poor nation which is an ally of such a powerful nation is, almost always, in danger of becoming a satellite of that rich and powerful state; its independence often becomes limited by the very action taken to defend it. It cannot hope to make the policy decisions of the alliance, yet it will be bound by them.

It cannot be expected to influence the actions of its big partner; yet every action of its own will be affected by them. *I believe it is by standing aside from such international groupings that a small nation can most easily endeavor to retain some freedom of action.*¹⁹

Finally, Tanzania's policy of nonalignment did not imply an indifference to world events, or that it would remain silent "on the great issues of world peace and justice." Nonalignment was not to be confused with negative neutralism. Tanzania would not hesitate to commit itself to support those principles in which it believed such as: the abolition of racial segregation, support of majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, the eradication of colonialism, the termination of the Vietnam conflict, China's admission to the United Nations, and so on. Tanzania was also a major advocate of support for internationalism represented by the United Nations. In short, Tanzania's perception of nonalignment also included active participation in international politics, both for the attainment of general universal objectives and for specific Tanzanian policy goals.

Tanzania's policy of nonalignment has been embodied in its policy toward China. Certainly the desire to establish new linkages and assert a degree of independence must be accepted as motivations for Tanzania's decision to interact formally with China. Indeed, relations with China provided a balance for Tanzania's interaction with the West. On the other

¹⁸ *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), October 7, 1969.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

hand, President Nyerere has sought to define Tanzania's relations with China, and their respective shared interests and differences. Addressing Prime Minister Chou En-lai during the second state visit to China in 1968, President Nyerere made the following point.

Mr. Prime Minister, your country is a nuclear power, mine is not. For the time being we happen to hold similar views on this particular matter. Of course this does not mean that China and Tanzania will always have the same priorities of action. China is an Asian power; we are a part of Africa. Both of us are interested in international peace, and in human justice, but our immediate preoccupations will be different, and our differences will be of a different kind.²⁰

The role of China in Tanzania's foreign policy goals has had a number of determinants. In the final analysis, however, Tanzania's interaction with China has been determined by one overriding factor, nationalism. Nowhere was this better stated than in President Nyerere's remarks made during his state visit to the Soviet Union in 1969, comments which typified Tanzania's interaction with China and all other states.²¹ Tanzania's first priority was that of guarding the independence of the young state. "This will always be our paramount concern, for to us national independence is the foundation upon which everything else must be built. We are African nationalists first; all other aspects of our policy come after that." President Nyerere recognized that if national independence was to be meaningful to the people, they had to be led to new freedoms in their daily lives. This meant that political independence and democracy had to be combined with economic independence and economic development. "Our main preoccupations are thus domestic ones. *Every other aspect of world affairs has to be considered by us in relation to its impact upon our goal of political, economic and social freedom.*"²² Tanzania's interaction with China must be understood within this frame of reference.

President Nyerere once described Chinese-Tanzanian interaction as a friendship between most unequal equals. There existed great disparities in size, wealth and power between the two states, but these were irrelevant to the equality which governed their relationship. Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction was based upon this spirit of equality. This may be certainly true. However, President Nyerere could have added another basis to Chinese-Tanzanian interaction: shared interest.

It is a truism in international politics that some common interest must be present for an alliance to be formed. But studies on alliances have demonstrated that this does not mean that *all* interests must be shared, that the actors must benefit equally from the alliance, and that roles be similar and

²⁰ See note 14 above.

²¹ *The Standard*, October 10, 1969.

²² *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

contributions equal.²³ Within the context of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance, the objectives and goals of the two actors tend to confirm these views. For example, in measuring the interaction in economic and security terms (as we shall presently do), it becomes evident that the overt benefits have been far greater to Tanzania than to China. On the other hand, the political “capital” derived by China from the relationship, measured in terms of China’s enhanced revolutionary credibility and international legitimacy, have been very great, both for China’s self-image and her international status. The Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance can, therefore, be explained also in terms of a favorable convergence of some common interests of the two actors.

²³ See for example, George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, Baltimore, 1962, pp. 12–41.

III

The Chinese Model: Appeal and Response

One of the great fallacies in the traditional study of international politics was the sharp differentiation between the internal and external environments, namely, that foreign policy began where domestic policy terminated. This approach could perhaps be justified when interactions between states were almost exclusively of a formal, government-to-government nature, and the agents or instruments of one state only rarely had access to the population or internal political processes of another. However, the revolution in statecraft shown by the extensive utilization of informal foreign policy instruments in the present century, has made less meaningful this national-international dichotomy in the study of international politics. A key phenomenon in contemporary international politics has been the increasing use (both by major powers and small states) of informal instruments in combination with formal foreign policy instruments. Indeed, the extensive use of informal instruments—such as economic aid, technical assistance, overt information programs, and so on—by one state to achieve access to the population or processes of another has become accepted as a legitimate technique toward the achievement of policy objectives. These objectives have ranged from the promotion of cooperation, and the maintenance of neutrality, to the increase of conflict. In many instances the national and international components have become increasingly fused, thereby forming a linkage.

The study of national-international linkages has been emphasized by a group of scholars. As Rosenau defines it, a linkage is “any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.”¹ National boundaries in these instances become less meaningful as they can be crossed by direct interaction via informal foreign policy instruments, as well as by processes of perception and emulation. In turn, the behavior that originates at home, the output, leads to a response on the other side, the input.

Three basic forms have been established through which outputs and inputs get linked together.² First, a penetrative process occurs when a state or its representative serve as participants in the political process of another.

¹ James N. Rosenau, “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., *Linkage Politics*, New York, 1969, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 46–49.

This has been considered the most extreme form of linkage, whereby one state shares "with those in the penetrated polity the authority to allocate its values." The reactive process constitutes the second type of linkage. This relationship "is brought into being by recurrent and similar boundary-crossing reactions rather than by the sharing of authority." Though the state which initiated the output does not participate in the allocative activities of the target state, the latter's behavior "is nevertheless a response to behavior undertaken by the former." This constitutes the most frequent form of linkage. Finally, there is the emulative process. This process corresponds to the diffusion effect in which the activities in one state are perceived and emulated in another. However, the linkage is usually indirect, since "the emulated behavior is ordinarily undertaken independently of those who emulate it." Two additional points need be mentioned. The three forms of linkage are concerned with recurrent behavior. In other words, the activities or events must recur with appreciable frequency to form a pattern. And linkages sometimes must be seen as forming a reciprocal relationship: an input may foster an output whereby the state initiating the sequence of behavior becomes itself compelled to react.

Since the early 1960s, the recurrent behavior pattern between China and Tanzania provides an example of national-international linkage in which China was the state which initiated the behavior and Tanzania was the respondent. We shall examine these relationships through selected recurrent patterns of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction, within the context of the partial informal alliance and the use of informal foreign policy instruments by China.

HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP AND SHARED POLITICAL HISTORY

The conditions influencing the elites may at least partially explain their entering into the commitments of an alliance. The development and effects of the relationship, however, reveals how the alliance works. For our purpose, we will measure the workings of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance through selected Chinese informal foreign policy instruments. This will also demonstrate the national-international linkage.

As McClelland has suggested, no transition need be involved in viewing the national-international linkage as a communication network.³ An unending flow of messages are exchanged between and among the participants. The messages range from the verbal and written work to the tacit and nonverbal aspects of communication, including consultations of government officials, the travel of heads of states, and other physical ways of indirectly conveying information. These exchanges reflect the awareness, the importance, and the degree of linkage of the participants to one another.

³ Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System*, New York, 1966, pp. 114-136.

Saliency (or the degree of conspicuousness) is an important measurement of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction. In addition, it has been utilized as a foreign policy instrument for cooperative interaction by China. The degree of saliency has been most evident from the perspectives of the Chinese appeal and Tanzanian response to the themes of historic relationship and shared political history, and to the Chinese model for nation-building.

Since the initiation of its African campaign in the late 1950s, China has appealed to the historic relationship as a basis for contemporary interaction with the African states. The Director of the Institute of Archaeology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, writing in 1962, traced back Chinese-African relations for 1700 years.⁴ Relations with Tanzania began "as early as 900 years ago."⁵ Whether contact was established 900 or 1700 years ago, the objective of the claims has been to establish a sense of historical ties between China and Africa. Contemporary interaction thus became the resumption of a relationship, interrupted by Western colonialism and imperialism, experienced by both China and Africa.⁶

In certain areas, the Chinese message has been substantiated, if only indirectly. For example, the idea of historic contacts cannot entirely be dismissed. Duyvendak has provided us with an interesting account of pre-modern contacts between China and East Africa.⁷ The only known direct contact took place in the 15th century in the course of Cheng Ho's expeditions, which reportedly reached the city of Malindi on the Kenyan coast in the early 1400s. The primary form of contact was indirect trade between China and East Africa conducted by the Arabs, beginning in the Tang period (A.D. 618-907). Chinese gold, silver, silk and porcelain were exchanged for African elephant tusks and rhinoceros horns. In recent years, claims of historic contact, however indirect and remote, have been given a sense of reality by the discovery in East Africa of Chinese porcelain. Excavations at Kilwa on the southern Tanzanian coast carried out during 1965 uncovered Chinese porcelain dating back to the 12th and 13th centuries.⁸ Other findings have occurred along the Kenyan coast.⁹ These and other discoveries have given substance to Chinese claims of historical ties.

Of greater credibility has been the claim of a shared political history.

⁴ New China News Agency, September 19, 1962. See U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press* [hereafter SCMP], No. 2824 (September 24, 1962), pp. 23-24.

⁵ "The United Republic of Tanzania Marches Forward," *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, Dar es Salaam, No. 552 (June 20, 1968), pp. 5-6.

⁶ "The Victorious Progress of the Anti-Imperialist Unity of the Asian-African People," *Shih-cheih chih-shih*, Peking, No. 8 (April 25, 1965), pp. 4-7.

⁷ J. J. L. Duyvendak, *China's Discovery of Africa*, London, 1949.

⁸ National Cultural and Antiquities Division, Ministry of Community Development and National Culture, The United Republic of Tanzania, *Annual Report of the Antiquities Department for the Year 1965*, Dar es Salaam, 1968.

⁹ The Kenyan collection of Chinese ceramics is on public display in the Fort Jesus Museum, Mombasa.

This appeal has emphasized the common subjugation and exploitation of China and Tanzania under colonialism and imperialism. Tanzania's "penetration" first by German and then by British colonialists, the "oppressive" policies under colonial rule, and finally the "heroic struggle" for national independence have been compared to China's experiences with the West, the Western imposition of the "unequal treaties," and China's final liberation.¹⁰ China has pointed also to the contemporary struggles against "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" experienced by the two peoples.

China's messages of historic relationship and shared political history were nowhere more overtly and directly communicated than during Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania in 1965. Speaking before a mass rally in Dar es Salaam, the Premier unabashedly appealed to traditional and contemporary ties as a basis for Chinese-Tanzanian interaction.

Although this is our first visit to the United Republic of Tanzania, my colleagues and I do not find ourselves in a strange land. Inter-course between our two countries date back to 900 years ago. Some 500 years ago, the Chinese navigator Cheng Ho reached East African coasts. The numerous pieces of ancient Chinese porcelain excavated in Tanzania bear eloquent witness to the long-standing traditional friendship between our two peoples. In their protracted struggles for national independence and against imperialism and colonialism, our two peoples have always given each other sympathy and support. The "Maji Maji" Uprising in your country in early 20th century which shook the colonial rule and the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism at that time though separated by great distance inspired each other. We have therefore come to your country as envoys of the Chinese people to renew acquaintance with our old friends and comrades-in-arms.¹¹

China's messages have not gone unheard, though it becomes difficult to measure the exact degree of acceptance. Tanzanian elites have not been unresponsive to the Chinese appeals. President Nyerere has referred to the historic contacts between Tanzania and China in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries—also citing the Chinese pottery discovered along the Tanzanian coast—as one basis for the contemporary interaction. Relations between the two peoples, therefore, were not new, and President Nyerere has stated: "We are merely resuming a connection which had been broken off."¹² On the Chinese appeal of a shared political history, President Nyerere has been equally responsive: "Both of us have only recently won

¹⁰ See note 5 above.

¹¹ New China News Agency, June 5, 1965; *SCMP*, No. 3475 (11 June 1965), pp. 25-29.

¹² Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, The United Republic of Tanzania, *Press Release*, February 18, 1965, Dar es Salaam. President Nyerere made these comments during his state visit to China in February 1965.

freedom from that combination of exploitation and neglect which characterizes feudal and colonial societies. We have therefore much to learn from each other."¹³

The importance of historic contacts and shared political history lies not in their existence or non-existence but in the manner in which the perceived experiences provide a degree of psychological support for the Chinese and Tanzanian elites, namely, a reinforcement of each other's goals and policies. The Chinese messages and the Tanzanian response may represent little more than one way through which the actors rationalize their behavior; yet the participants have referred to the themes often enough to warrant their inclusion as a factor in Chinese-Tanzanian interaction.

THE CHINESE MODEL

In a real sense, the receptivity of both Chinese and Tanzanian elites toward these twin themes of historic ties and shared political experiences has served the function of laying the foundation for the appeal of the Chinese model. China has long sought to present itself as the model for the Asian-African-Latin American world, and one level of interaction with Tanzania must be seen within this context. However, China makes little distinction between substance and means (i.e., between the end product and the techniques of building and sustaining the model). On the other hand, the Tanzanian elites (be they governmental, intellectual or political) have doubts about the substance of the model but find great appeal in its selective technical aspects.

In Tanzania one encounters a number of rationalizations explaining the appeal of the Chinese model. Contemporary Tanzanian elites have been greatly concerned with "success," with making the new society workable. In rejecting the Western model and in the search for a new political system, Tanzanian elites have been increasingly attracted to examples of successful political systems similar to their own in historical and environmental-situational background. Within the Asian-African context, three political systems have been of great interest: China, India, and Japan. Japan, while recognized as a developed and successful society, has been perceived primarily as a Western society in an Asian geographical context and therefore not viable as a model for Tanzania. India since the passing of Nehru has been regarded as being in a state of degeneration and thus of little interest to the success-oriented Tanzanian elites. China, on the other hand, with its shared political experiences, common environmental-situational background, and overall economic, political and social achievements has been perceived as a model which might be pertinent to Tanzania's development. Within this context, the methods of armed struggle to achieve liberation from colonial rule, the injection of a martial spirit and a sense of

¹³ *Ibid.*

discipline among the masses, the use of mass organizations, political and social mobilization and regimentation, the utilization of traditionalism for social change, the concept of self-reliance, and planned economic development have been recognized, individually or collectively, by Tanzanian elites as desirable techniques for nation-building.

On another level, the appeal of the Chinese model has been its perceived success in rapid modernization. An editorial in *The Nationalist*, the organ of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union, put it thus:

New China was liberated only twenty years ago from long years of multi-pronged foreign domination. At the time of its liberation, China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal backward country. But today, New China has all the characteristics of a truly big POWER. It has a powerful independent industrial base interwoven in a self-sustaining socialist economy; it has a united conscious hard working people alive to their responsibilities and ready to sacrifice, build and defend their country, and finally China has the "Bomb"; today's status symbol in the world's real politic.

From all this, it is clearly seen that the socialist system is the surest and quickest way to development; this is particularly so for long oppressed and exploited countries such as those to be found in most of Africa, Asia and Latin America . . .¹⁴

In sum, the primary appeal of the Chinese model to the Tanzanian elites lies in its perceived technical competency and rapidity toward modernity.

An examination of how Tanzanian elites have responded to specific Chinese techniques of nation-building and have related them to their own environmental-situational context, will further demonstrate the appeal of the Chinese model. Though Tanzania achieved independence through non-violence, it has come increasingly to accept the idea of armed struggle to secure liberation from foreign domination. This must be understood within the context of the history of Africa's liberation. Prior to 1964, the vast majority of the liberation movements looked to the colonial powers to give independence gradually to their African colonies. This the powers seemed to do, and by 1964 almost the whole of Africa north of the Zambezi had achieved independence. Only the white regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique remained to be liberated. It soon became clear that neither the redoubts of the south nor the Western nations that still possessed colonial power were going to continue the pattern of giving Africa to the Africans. The remaining national liberation movements, and those states such as Tanzania which actively supported the movement toward the total liberation of Africa, became disillusioned. Indeed, the increasing intransigence of these forces in southern Africa, together with the unwillingness and in-

¹⁴ "New China," *The Nationalist*, October 2, 1969.

ability of the Western powers to intervene, served only to validate Mao's famous dictum: "Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun."¹⁵

The total liberation of Africa, and the freeing of the people under the white regimes of Africa and the Portuguese, have been a continuing concern of the Tanzanian elites. Tanzania has gone on record as equating its freedom with the freedom of Africa; it has also supported "a violent struggle for freedom" when peaceful change has become impossible. Such has been the situation since 1964. Addressing the national conference of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union in 1967, President Nyerere explained Tanzania's position.

The struggle for freedom must go on. Our preference, and that of every African patriot, has always been for peaceful methods of struggle . . . But when the door of peaceful progress to freedom is slammed shut, and bolted, then the struggle must take other forms; we cannot surrender.¹⁶

The acceptance of armed struggle to achieve national liberation was even more explicitly stated by President Nyerere in 1969.

When every avenue of peaceful change is blocked, then the only way forward to positive change is by channeling and directing the people's fury—that is, by organized violence, by a people's war.¹⁷

Traditionalism has served also as a Chinese appeal. In the search for identity, Tanzania's past, real or imaginary, has been subjected to intense scrutiny. President Nyerere's "rediscovery" of Tanzania's indigenous democratic past constitutes an example of this preoccupation.¹⁸ This can be attributed to the consequences of colonialism, which partially arrested the growth of things African, and to the contemporary need to rediscover and develop indigenous symbols for nation-building. China, which requires no credentials to testify to its past, has made wide use of traditional symbols and forms, not for the remembrance of things past, but for introducing new attitudes and values via commonly accepted and recognized stimuli. Modern Chinese theater (of which a fifty-man troupe visited Tanzania during 1967) constitutes an example of the use of traditional symbols and forms to achieve attitudinal change. Tanzanian elites have been attracted greatly by the Chinese use of traditionalism, both as a successful technique for fostering attitudinal and social change and for its implications about

¹⁵ China, of course, never tires of reminding the Africans of this maxim. For an example, see "Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of the Gun," *JMJP* (Peking), May 16, 1969.

¹⁶ *Tanzanian Policy on Foreign Affairs*, p. 9.

¹⁷ *The Nationalist*, October 3, 1969.

¹⁸ Ahamed Mohiddin, "Ujamaa na Kujitegemea," *Mawazo*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 1967), pp. 24–38.

the potential use of traditional Tanzanian symbols and forms for similar objectives.

Still another appeal of the Chinese model can be found in the political, moral, and social imperfections perceived in Tanzanian society but accepted as eradicated in contemporary China. Tanzanian elites deplore what they regard as the lack of spirit, the “conspicuous consumption,” and the absence of discipline and organization in their own society. This attitude can be found among the government officials, the intellectuals, and the locally-based administrators faced with the daily realities of governing. All perceive the need for some forms of martial spirit, political and social mobilization, and regimentation if Tanzania is to complete the task of nation-building. In the Chinese model, the Tanzanian finds the spirit, frugality, and organization he seeks.

Indeed, if anything has impressed the Tanzanian elite, it has been the Chinese martial spirit, the discipline, the sense of frugality and the purpose of organization. These and other themes have been repeatedly singled out for comment by the Tanzanian elite. During his first state visit to China in 1965, President Nyerere commended the changes taking place and the spirit of the people. The mystique of the Chinese spirit made an even greater impression upon President Nyerere during his second visit in 1968. Speaking at the farewell banquet on the eve of his departure from Peking, he was full of praise for the spirit of the Chinese masses.

On my first visit I said in Shanghai, after I had witnessed the revolutionary spirit of your people, that I wished all the people of Tanzania could come to China and witness for themselves what a determined people can do. Today, after the cultural revolution, the spirit of the people of China is even greater than before.¹⁹

President Nyerere felt that there was much that Africa and Tanzania could learn from China.

If we really want to move from national independence to the real independence of the people, and if we really want to make sure that the African revolution will ever move forward, and not degenerate into neo-colonialism, then I say that we should learn from you. Indeed, from what I have seen of China in 1965, I must say that if you found it necessary to begin a cultural revolution, in order to make sure that the new generation would carry forward the banner of your revolution, then certainly we need one.²⁰

The collective spirit of the Chinese elite made an equally deep imprint upon President Nyerere. He perceived the Chinese elite as possessing an

¹⁹ “President Nyerere’s Speech at Farewell Banquet,” *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, Dar es Salaam, No. 555 (June 24, 1968), pp. 4–8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

experience not shared by the elites of other nations: the Chinese were “leaders of a revolution.”

This is the kind of leadership you find; it is a very vigorous kind of leadership; it is not a comfortable leadership nor a traditional leadership . . .

It is very refreshing to meet these revolutionaries. Not young people in their thirties, but elderly people in their sixties and seventies. But as revolutionary in their thinking as the young men we are used to in Africa. You cannot dismiss [the Chinese leaders] as ‘these irresponsible young men.’ This is sober experience.²¹

The sense of frugality made an impression. Speaking before a state banquet during his visit to China in 1965, President Nyerere commented: “The conscious and deliberate frugality with which your people and your Government efficiently and joyfully conduct their affairs was a big lesson for me and through me for my people. I believe we shall begin to apply that lesson.”²² He was struck by two things which offered the greatest overt contrast between China and Tanzania. First, President Nyerere commented that he did not think he was exaggerating if he said that the total number of cars in Nanking, Peking and Shanghai combined did not greatly exceed the number of cars in his own capital, Dar es Salaam.²³ Second, by comparison to the people of the three Chinese cities, the population of Dar es Salaam looked like millionaires because of their gaily colored clothing in comparison to the clothing worn by the Chinese.²⁴ President Nyerere considered these comparisons relevant to the situation in Tanzania.

Finally, the Tanzanian elite has been greatly influenced by the Chinese sense of discipline and organization. The mere size of China and its huge population have never failed to impress most Africans; the Tanzanians have been no exception. In terms of population, Tanzania’s 12.2 million is dwarfed by China’s 700 million. Yet, while an absence of discipline and a feeling of disorganization prevails among the Tanzanian masses, China’s 700 million are perceived as being highly disciplined and organized.

The envy of China’s accomplishment was expressed by President Ny-

²¹ *The Nationalist*, February 25, 1965. These comments were made by President Nyerere during the course of a press conference upon his return from China.

²² Julius K. Nyerere, “Tanzania’s Long March Is Economic,” in *Freedom and Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, 1968, pp. 33–34. This work consists of a selection of writings and speeches of President Nyerere from 1965 to 1967.

²³ The automobile example was subsequently mentioned in the Tanzanian Parliament. A member related the following story. During his state visit to China in 1965, President Nyerere asked Chen Yi, then China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, how many vehicles his ministry had. “Only ten,” Chen Yi replied. The member of parliament urged, therefore, his fellow members to cut down their purchases of Mercedes-Benzes. United Republic of Tanzania, National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), *Official Report*, 16 March–18 March, 1965, Dar es Salaam, 1965, Col. 283.

²⁴ *The Nationalist*, February 25, 1965.

erere following his return from China in 1965.²⁵ He was greatly impressed with the “size of China and the masses of the people,” the immensity of the problems that faced the Chinese leaders, and the great task of organizing a nation of 700 million. “The problem of organizing such a population cannot fail to impress one, and the success with which the Chinese people have met this problem.” He concluded: “Then there is the problem of trying to feed and clothe [the people]; it is immense. We could not fail to be impressed by what the Chinese people are doing.” Together with organization, the Chinese sense of discipline has also drawn favorable comment. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the Friendship Textile Mill (built with Chinese aid), President Nyerere called the workers’ attention to the need for discipline: “Discipline work is essential, and here once again our Chinese technicians have set us a great example.”²⁶

In the final analysis, the appeal of the Chinese model lies in the importance that Tanzanians have assigned to success and to the techniques by which it is achieved. That Tanzanian elites have been success-oriented should not be surprising; neither should Tanzanian perception of China as a successful working political system come as a surprise. To the new Tanzanian state—yet to be freed completely from external domination and dependence, yet to take off economically, and yet to develop a viable political system—China has in various degrees successfully achieved all or most of these objectives. Hence China’s appeal. In turn, the great attraction of techniques must be seen within this context: namely, that China’s perceived successful achievement of certain objectives is through the utilization of specific methods. Whether the Chinese model is fully applicable and will be better suited for achieving social change in Tanzania remains to be answered.

Tanzania’s differentiation between substance and method raises a host of questions. To the student of China, the dichotomy recalls the slogan made famous by Chang Chih-tung in 1898: “Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical application.” The historic fact is that China encountered great difficulties in its attempts at modernization based upon this concept. The question for Tanzania thus becomes one of more than mere academic interest. Can method and substance be successfully differentiated; and if not, what are the short- and long-term consequences for Tanzania?

The response to selected technical aspects of the Chinese model must be understood within the context of Tanzania’s developmental aspirations. Tanzania, like most developing societies, has been impatient with its past developmental pattern. However, the problems of building a new society have been enormous. One basic problem has been the creation of a new

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, *Press Release*, July 6, 1968.

system appropriate to Tanzania's own environmental-situational context. In building such a new system, President Nyerere has made clear that there was no complete model for Tanzania to copy. Indeed, there were some aspects which Tanzania could select from Britain and Sweden, as well as from China and Russia; Tanzania neither automatically rejected nor blindly accepted any model. This eclectic approach to nation-building has been described by President Nyerere in the following terms.

Why should Tanzania not learn from the agricultural communes of China? Their experience could promote thought and ideas about our own rural organization, provided that we go to learn, and proceed to think—not to copy. Why can we not learn from the Korean success in rural transformation in comparison with continuing difficulties in other Communist countries? Do the Cuban experiments in adult education have nothing to teach us? Agricultural organization, rural transformation, adult education, are all problems we have to deal with in Tanzania; why should we not study the techniques used by other men to see if they could usefully be adapted to meet our needs, or if they provide a clue to the solution of a difficulty we are experiencing?

Nor do we have to confine our attention to development in communist countries. The co-operative settlements of Israel, the co-operative organization of Denmark and Sweden, have all accumulated great experience which we could learn from. Even the most avowedly capitalist countries have something to teach us—for example, the techniques by which they encourage workers to increase their output
...²⁷

Whatever Tanzania's approach to nation-building may be, there is no question that, in the search for new techniques, some aspects of the Chinese model have been received with interest by the Tanzanian elites. However, receptivity to the Chinese model should not necessarily be equated with imitation of that model. A decade after its independence, Tanzanian society continues to be in a state of transition, and the elites have perceived no real advantage to formalizing the character of the new society at this early stage of development—thereby excluding future new techniques for Tanzania's nation-building. The response to the Chinese model should be understood, therefore, within Tanzania's contemporary transitional-innovative context. This means that the Chinese techniques of nation-building are but some among many which Tanzania, during a given stage in its developmental process, seeks to examine.

Leaving aside the degree of responsiveness to the Chinese model, this discussion should make it clear that the appeal of the Chinese model and the response to that appeal have formed an important basis of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction. Within the context of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction, the national-international linkage is self-evident: China's

²⁷ Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, "Introduction," pp. 21–22.

foreign policy behavior (the output) has elicited a response (the input) with respect to the problems of Tanzania's political development. However, the linkage has been also of a very special nature. It may best be described as possessing the characteristics of a reactive-emulative process. China has conducted an active campaign to influence Tanzania's behavior, to which Tanzania's response has been both reactive and indirect. A linkage, however tenuous, has nevertheless been formed. The importance of this factor cannot be over-emphasized for Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction. Tanzania's perceptions of China, manifested in positive attitudes toward selected dimensions of the Chinese model, serve the vital functions of reinforcing the decisions of the political elite to participate in the partial informal alliance, and of creating the proper environment and rationale for cooperative interaction in other spheres.

IV

Economic Interaction: Trade and Aid

A state's ability to extend its influence has been said to be a function of its economic resources. In China's instance, this should read that a state's ability to extend its influence is a function of the selective allocation of its economic resources. Economic interaction has been a major indicator for the measurement of China's cooperative international role; it has also served as a vital Chinese foreign policy instrument. The prominence assigned to the economic variable has had two roots. First is the Chinese belief that economic relations with the Asian-African-Latin American world serve an important symbolic function by establishing a Chinese international "presence" suggestive of status and power. Second is the almost universal equating by the developing states of economic development with modernization and nation-building. In the latter instance, President Nyerere has referred to the fight against poverty and economic backwardness (alluding to it as Tanzania's Long March) as being identical with safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of Tanzania.¹ Without question, economic interaction between China and Tanzania has served the objectives and needs of both actors. In turn, this has contributed to the growth of the partial informal alliance.

TRADE

Chinese-Tanzanian economic interaction can be measured from two primary perspectives: trade and aid. We shall first examine trade interactions, and then China's aid program to Tanzania. From the mid 1960s, trade became an increasingly important form of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction. China's "presence" in Tanzania was manifested in a wide variety of manufactured goods, while Tanzania found a new market for its agricultural products. Commercial relations between the two states were based on the Trade Agreement in 1965. The agreement detailed the annual volume of exportation by each side, specified that the volume of trade between the two partners should increase five-fold, and listed the categories of goods to be exchanged. For the most part, Chinese plastic manufactures, plywood, wire rods, textile goods, stationery supplies, and other finished goods were exchanged for Tanzanian cotton, sisal, tobacco, copra, and other raw materials. Through deliberate government efforts, including the

¹ Julius K. Nyerere, "Tanzania's Long March Is Economic," in *Freedom and Socialism*, pp. 33-34.

Trade Agreement of 1965, Chinese-Tanzanian commercial relations have gradually developed. But they have not flourished.

There have been a variety of problems. Tanzania's traditional ties have continued to dominate its trade pattern. This can be seen from a comparison of the percentage of exports and imports for 1962 and 1968 between Tanzania and its three traditional trading partners: the United Kingdom, other sterling areas (including Hong Kong), and the European Economic Community. In 1962 (the year following independence), 75 percent of the exports and 51 percent of the imports were with the three traditional trading partners; in 1968, 64 percent of the exports and 51 percent of the imports of Tanzania continued to be dominated by the traditional destinations and sources.²

Another factor which undoubtedly contributed to the difficult growth of trade interaction was the situation in China. Though complete data is lacking, the conditions resulting from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can be assumed to have had some depressive economic and political effects upon trade. However, it is interesting to note (Table 1) that though

TABLE 1
TANZANIAN TRADE WITH CHINA

Year	Exports to China Value	Percentage of Total Exports	Imports from China Value	Percentage of Total Imports
1961	\$ 1.2 thousand*	\$10.7 thousand*
1962	\$	\$31.7 thousand*
1963	\$10.5 million	5.7%	\$.3 million	.2%
1964	\$ 6.5 million	3.2%	\$.8 million	.6%
1965	\$13.3 million	7.2%	\$ 5.6 million	3.7%
1966	\$ 9.6 million	4.1%	\$11.2 million	5.8%
1967	\$ 8.2 million	3.5%	\$10.0 million	5.3%
1968	\$ 7.7 million	3.5%	\$12.0 million	5.6%

* These figures for the Tanzanian mainland only.

Sources: East African Common Services Organization, *East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade Report of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya*, Mombasa, Kenya, 1962-1967; and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning and the Ministry of Finance, The United Republic of Tanzania, *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Dar es Salaam, 1969, p. 20.

Tanzanian exports to China suffered a decline beginning in 1966, imports from China during the same period remained generally constant. In part, this is explained by the increase of China's aid to Tanzania during these same years (which we shall presently discuss), necessitating both the import of equipment to implement the aid program and the import of

² Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning and the Ministry of Finance, The United Republic of Tanzania, *Background to the Budget, An Economic Survey 1968-1969*, Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. 20b; and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning and the Ministry of Finance, *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Dar es Salaam, 1969, p. 16b.

Chinese goods to help meet local costs. One can only speculate as to the possible level of Chinese-Tanzanian commercial interaction had Chinese domestic conditions been more stable.

A problem of greater importance to the past and future growth of Chinese-Tanzanian trade relates to the basic nature and needs of the two economies. The economic base of both China and Tanzania is fundamentally agricultural. China's industrial sector has progressed significantly since 1949, but the products produced are not necessarily those required by the trading partner. On the Chinese side, there was the problem of which products could be imported from Tanzania. With improved harvests in China, needs for foreign agricultural raw materials have steadily declined. This was reflected partially in China's purchase of cotton, which is Tanzania's second most important export commodity (in terms of both value and volume). One of the provisions of the Trade Agreement of 1965 provided for the annual import by China of 80,000 bales of cotton from Tanzania.³ This agreement became especially important in relation to the general decline of Tanzania's cotton exports. From 1966 to 1967, for example, there was a fall of 28.3 percent in the value and of 29.5 percent in the volume of cotton exports.⁴ Like other raw material-producing developing states, the sale of domestic agricultural products has been a primary source for financing internal development. The need for Tanzania to develop new markets thus became of vital importance. Through 1966-1967, however, the new Chinese market fell short of the original goal agreed to in 1965. This was revealed in the trade statistics on cotton shipments (Table 2).

TABLE 2
LINT SHIPMENTS: TANZANIA TO CHINA

Year	Number of bales to China	Number of bales produced
1964/1965	65,048	293,246 (1964)
1965/1966	76,300	369,460 (1965)
1966/1967	72,472	434,386 (1966)

Sources: United Republic of Tanzania, The Lint and Seed Marketing Board, *Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 20th June 1967*, Dar es Salaam, 1967, Appendix X; and *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 35, p. 45.

From a purely economic viewpoint, Chinese-Tanzanian commercial interaction has been disappointing, and the prospects for its future growth appear limited. However, the role of trade as an indicator of the level of cooperative interaction, present and future, cannot be measured solely by economic considerations. As Eckstein has demonstrated, China's trade

³ *The Nationalist*, February 25, 1965.

⁴ *Background to the Budget, An Economic Survey 1968-1969*, p. 19.

policies have clearly been determined in part by foreign policy.⁵ Thus the Chinese principle of the “inseparability of politics and trade” could lead to still greater trade increases with Tanzania and an increased level of political interaction between the two actors. For Tanzania, trade with China—while economically important—also had a vital non-economic aspect: namely, broadening of Tanzania’s foreign relations, thus reducing its dependence upon traditional relationships. In short, trade must be seen as being economically as well as politically significant in relation to the total pattern of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction.

The political significance of trade can be seen in two related ways: the correlation between the levels of trade and political interaction, and the relationship between trade and aid. Generally speaking, China has utilized trade for three objectives: as a general instrument of foreign policy; as a technique to finance its foreign aid programs; and as a method to secure desired commodities, including foreign exchange.

Unlike economic aid which has been extended primarily upon the basis of selective allocation, China’s commercial relations have been overtly non-discriminatory. This had been the trade pattern with Africa, where China has sought commercial interaction with most of the continent, including South Africa.⁶ In 1967, for example, the International Monetary Fund reported Chinese trade with at least thirty African States.⁷ While China’s commercial relations with Africa have been overtly non-discriminatory, with trade being utilized to secure desired commodities and foster new relations, this has not precluded the use of trade to serve specific political ends and it has served as a barometer of the level of interaction between China and a given state.

The case of Chinese-Ghanaian interaction illustrates this point. Until the coup which deposed Nkrumah in 1966, Chinese-Ghanaian cooperative interaction developed rapidly.⁸ This was reflected in trade. Beginning with no trade in 1962, growing to \$2.6 million in 1963, total trade reached \$20.4 million at the height of Chinese-Ghanaian solidarity in 1965.⁹ After the fall of President Nkrumah and the termination of diplomatic relations

⁵ Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, New York, 1966.

⁶ South Africa was a leading trade partner of China’s through 1963. Since that date, China and South Africa may have continued to trade; but with the substitution of the new Sino-Soviet-South African category in place of the former China-South Africa classification in the trade statistics published by the International Monetary Fund since 1964, trade between China and South Africa has become difficult to identify.

⁷ International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade*, Washington, D.C., 1968.

⁸ For a discussion of Ghana’s foreign policy, including accounts of Chinese-Ghanaian interaction, see Thompson W. Scott, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy : 1957–1966*, Princeton, 1969.

⁹ *Direction of Trade*, 1963–1968.

between China and Ghana, the total trade declined to only \$.5 million in 1967.¹⁰

The Chinese-Tanzanian commercial interaction pattern has followed closely the level of political interaction between the two actors. This was clearly reflected in the development of trade between 1962 and 1968. As Table 1 indicates, commercial interaction was for all practical purposes nonexistent when China established its embassy in Dar es Salaam in April, 1962. The British, who had governed the country, did not encourage relations with countries outside of the British Commonwealth, and in particular Communist states. Trade relations, especially imports from China, continued on a moderate level until the middle 1960s. During this period Tanzania opened its embassy in Peking in the fall of 1964. Chinese-Tanzanian trade showed a marked increase beginning in 1965. Despite an export decline from 1965 to 1968 (probably reflecting the disturbances of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution¹¹), total trade showed an overall increase, reaching a high of \$19.7 million in 1968. During this 1965 to 1968 period, there was also a concurrent development of Chinese-Tanzanian political interaction, as seen by the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship of 1965, Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania in 1965, and President Nyerere's state visits to China in 1965 and 1968. In sum, Chinese-Tanzanian commercial interaction followed a marked upward pattern in direct relationship to the level of political interaction.

The political significance of trade can be demonstrated also from the relationship between trade and aid. It was mentioned earlier that China has utilized trade as a technique to finance its foreign aid programs, e.g., to meet local costs. China's aid to Tanzania was financed in large part by the sale of Chinese goods: hence the increase in imports from China beginning in 1965. This was understandable, in view of China's overall scarcity of foreign exchange and the need to conserve foreign exchange for purchases abroad. The short-range and long-term ramifications of such a practice on an extensive scale did raise serious questions, however, of possible consequences on the domestic economic development and foreign trade relations of Tanzania. This problem was clearly illustrated by the decision of the Tanzanian and Zambian elites to accept China's financing of the proposed Tanzania-Zambia rail link (TAZARA) "by selling Chinese consumer goods through Zambian and Tanzanian trading organizations."¹² The railway has been reported to cost an estimated \$340-400

¹⁰ *Ibid.* The statistic is for the period January to July 1967 only.

¹¹ Tanzania, especially Zanzibar Island, has been a source of sea cucumbers, a Chinese food delicacy. It was reported that during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, especially in 1967, no orders were received from China for sea cucumbers by the merchants of Tanzania. Sea cucumbers, of course, were only a very small fraction of Tanzania's exports to China, but the example was indicative of the general decline of exports to China.

¹² *The Standard*, September 26, 1969.

million; Tanzania and Zambia were expected to contribute about 60 percent of the expenses by purchasing Chinese consumer goods.¹³ A basic issue concerned this massive importation of Chinese consumer goods. For one thing, how would these imports affect the existing Tanzanian trade patterns with Europe and within East Africa? But more importantly, what effects would Chinese consumer goods imports have upon the development of Tanzanian industries?

As part of a plan to achieve economic self-reliance, conserve foreign exchange, and utilize domestic raw materials, Tanzania has sought to develop industries which could reduce dependency upon foreign sources. Most of the industries were consumer-oriented: food manufacturing, beverages, tobacco, textiles, footwear, wood products, paper products and others. Through 1968, the government-supported textile industry had assumed a leading position in the manufacturing sector of the economy; it was second only to food manufacturing in the number of establishments, persons engaged, and value.¹⁴ But textiles were also one of the primary categories of Chinese imports into Tanzania. In 1966, for example, Tanzania imported at least \$1.5 million worth of Chinese textiles.¹⁵ A basic question then came to be: how many more square yards of Chinese textiles could Tanzania import without adversely affecting its textile industry and its own economy. Since aid was tied to trade, Chinese textile imports were tied to aid. To compound the problem, textiles constituted one of the few items offered for export by China. This was discovered by the Zambian trade delegation that went to China in 1969 to discuss the range of goods that Tanzania and Zambia would purchase to pay for their contribution to the costs of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.¹⁶ Tanzanian elites and officials were fully aware of these and other related problems; the Commercial Manager of the State Trading Corporation had declared that only goods not manufactured in Tanzania would be imported from China.¹⁷ However, given the realities of China's capabilities as reported by the Zambian trade delegation, some duplication of imports from China with Tanzanian manufactures could not be totally avoided. The full impact upon Tanzania (and Zambia) of the decision to finance the rail and other aid projects partly through the sale of Chinese textile and other consumer goods may not be immediately clear. The TAZARA case does, however, exemplify the political significance of trade, and the relationship between Chinese aid and trade policies.

¹³ *The Standard*, February 26, 1970; *The New York Times*, March 1, 1970.

¹⁴ *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 43, p. 57.

¹⁵ East African Common Service Organization, *East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade Report of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya*, Mombasa, 1967.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, March 1, 1970.

¹⁷ *The Nationalist*, September 26, 1969.

AID

Aid constitutes the other aspect of Chinese-Tanzanian economic interaction. It actually has a much greater direct impact than trade upon the cooperative relationship between the two actors. This is chiefly due to China's success in "packaging" its aid program in relation to Tanzania's needs, and its ability to provide aid to Tanzania in times of crisis. It is also partly due to Tanzania's inability to secure elsewhere the support required to finance its developmental plans, due to its own political decisions, and general retrenchment by the major aid donors.

In extending aid, China has undoubtedly been influenced by its experiences as an aid recipient and its own economic capabilities and policy goals. These influences were reflected in the "Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Assistance" set forth by Premier Chou En-lai in 1964.¹⁸

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. Through such aid the friendly new emerging countries gradually develop their own national economy, free themselves from colonial control and strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in the world. This is in itself a tremendous support to China.
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions.
3. The Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance step by step.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so the recipient government may increase their income and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government

¹⁸ The "Eight Principles" were first set forth by Premier Chou En-lai during his visit to Africa in an interview with reporters of the Ghana News Agency in Accra, January 15, 1964. See *Ya-fei jen-min fan-ti ta-t'uan-chieh wan-sui* (Long Live the Great Solidarity of the Asian-African People Against Imperialism), Peking, 1964, pp. 131-132. For an English translation, *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism*, Peking, 1964, pp. 149-150.

are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.

7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques.
8. The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

Aside from strict matters of aid, the "Eight Principles" were undoubtedly intended to draw invidious comparisons with other foreign aid programs, especially those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Chinese-Soviet Aid Competition

As previously mentioned, one objective of China's Tanzanian policy was the use of Tanzania, directly and indirectly, as a battleground against the United States and the Soviet Union. One level of this conflict can be seen in the aid competition between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the accusations and counter-accusations each side directed against the other.

The Soviet Union's role in the Asia-African-Latin American world, and its aid programs there, have come under close Chinese scrutiny. The Chinese have charged the Soviet Union with using its economic and military aid for a number of nefarious purposes. In India, it is to establish a "new czarist colonial empire." In countries such as Indonesia and Biafra, it is to suppress "people's revolutionary movements." In Asian, African, and Latin American states in general, it is economic exploitation through the purchase of raw materials at low cost, and the sale of "used and old" machinery at two or three times world market prices.¹⁹ In short, the Chinese have claimed, Soviet aid is nothing but "tricks," "plunder," and "sugar-coated poisonous pills."

China has offered the case of an unnamed African state (Somalia?) as an example of a typical aid program extended by the Soviet Union.²⁰ Beginning by appealing to the goal of national economic development, the Soviet Union agreed to provide a number of industrial and agricultural facilities. These included, report the Chinese, a milk factory, a meat and

¹⁹ "Imitating U.S. Imperialists Schemes and Tricks in Carrying Out Colonial Expansionism—Soviet Revisionists Extend Evil Claws into Asia, Africa and Latin America via 'Aid,'" *JMJP*, June 20, 1969; and "Aid or Plunder," *JMJP*, September 16, 1969.

²⁰ "Extending Aid in Name, Practicing Plunder in Fact," *JMJP* (Peking), November 15, 1967. The conditions described in the unnamed African state resemble greatly those that took place in Somalia. For a brief account of Soviet aid to Somalia, see Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, New York, 1967, p. 180.

fish processing plant, and three large farms, all to be funded by a Soviet loan. After much delay, the projects began. But not before lavish accommodations were provided for the Soviet experts, including “the purchase of refrigerators and cars.” Indeed, continue the Chinese, the comfort of the experts came before even the livelihood of the local workers, who often went without wages. To pay for these and other local costs, the Soviet Union “dumped” untold “valueless commodities” in the country. However, the primary fault of the Soviet aid was its nonconsideration of the true needs of the African state. Consider the milk factory. It was built in the capital city far from the cattle, and its primary products were butter and cheese, products consumed more by the European residents than by the local population. The meat processing plant represented a clear case of Soviet exploitation. Completed after four years, the Soviet Union demanded immediate repayment of the funds used to build the plant. Since the African state lacked the funds, the only alternative was to offer the processed meat in payment to the Soviet Union. Ten years were required to repay the loan under this plan. “In other words,” claim the Chinese, “this meant that the Soviet revisionists had moved their plant to Africa for its own usage, utilizing cheap African material and labour.” Finally, the farms also came to nothing, and had long since reverted to jungle, marked only with rusted tractors. “After all,” ask the Chinese, “is this ‘aid’ or is this ‘plunder’?”

The Soviet Union has hit back at China. The Soviet Union has accused the Chinese in Africa of “a deliberate attempt to split the world into ‘poor,’ ‘oppressed’ and ‘coloured’ nations, on the one hand, and ‘rich white oppressors’ on the other.”²¹ The Chinese are accused of “tearing the newly independent [African] states away from the socialist system”; they are charged also with distortion of facts by claiming that the revolutionary center “had shifted from the industrialized states to the developing countries.” China’s search for markets in Africa is explained in terms of the need to earn foreign exchange to pay for “imports from capitalist countries.” Neither is China’s aid any better. Though the Chinese had committed \$480 million to the African states by January 1968, “Peking promised more,” claims a Soviet writer, “than it intended to give.” In fact, China has no intention of delivering the aid; this was why in most instances the “Maoists were in no hurry to start the construction of the promised industrial and agricultural projects.” The Chinese are also accused of seeking to spread the “cultural revolution.” In the final analysis, what China has to offer is “unpromising and dangerous to Africa.”

A glance at Chinese and Soviet aid commitments to the African states is interesting. Table 3 indicates that total Soviet aid to Africa was more

²¹ Volghin, A., “Africa in Peking’s Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September 1969), pp. 26–32.

TABLE 3
CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS
TO AFRICA THROUGH 1965
(in millions of dollars)

<i>African State</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
Algeria	51.8	228
Central African Republic	4.0	
Congo (Brazzaville)	25.2	9
Ethiopia		102
Ghana	42.0	82
Guinea	26.5	61
Kenya	18.0	44.4
Mali	19.6	61
Senegal		7
Somalia	21.6	52
Sudan		22
Tanzania	44.4	42
Tunisia		29
U.A.R.	84.7	821
Uganda	15.0	16
Zambia	.5	
Total	353.3	1,575.4

Sources: This table has been adapted from the following sources. Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, New York, 1966, p. 307; Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, New York, 1967, p. 206; and Milton Kovner, "Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less-developed Countries," Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 612.

than four times that of China's. Through 1965, China extended aid to twelve, and the Soviet Union to fourteen African states. Chinese and Soviet aid overlapped in ten African states. But Chinese aid commitments exceeded those of the Soviet Union in only two. One of these was Tanzania, where Chinese aid commitments through 1969 continued to exceed those of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, Tanzania is one of the few instances where Soviet aid, measured in known commitments, has a role subordinate to that of China. Soviet aid to mainland Tanzania, for example, consisted only of a \$19.6 million loan. The loan, granted in 1966, carried 2½ percent interest and was repayable in twelve years, to begin one year after completion of the projects. Major projects included fisheries and a mineral survey. However, the Soviet Union was slow to disburse its aid; through 1967, Tanzania had not drawn upon the loan.²² A beginning was made in 1968 with the arrival of Soviet geologists to conduct the mineral survey. Other Soviet projects were largely abortive. The fisheries constituted one such example. The Tanzanian Government included in its development budget for 1967–1968 a fishery complex amounting to \$.5 million, to be funded entirely by the

²² *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 74, pp. 96–97.

Soviet loan.²³ The plan was to establish a national fishery complex, including mobile fishing units, a fish processing station, and refrigeration facilities. The Controller and Auditor-General of Tanzania reported in 1969 that at the end of the 1967–1968 fiscal year no expenditures had been made.²⁴ In the 1968–1969 development budget, the fishery project had been consolidated, with the Soviet Union's aid contribution reduced to \$252 thousand.²⁵ It was uncertain whether the vastly reduced fishery project had been completed during the 1968–1969 fiscal year. At any rate, the project was removed from Tanzania's 1969–1970 development budget.²⁶ The limited role, economic and otherwise, of the Soviet Union was reflected by the fact that mainland Tanzania had drawn only \$163,800 of the \$19.6 million Soviet loan through March 31, 1969.²⁷

No single reason can explain the restrained economic role of the Soviet Union in Tanzania. It may be as Goldman has suggested, that Tanzania did not want to be involved with a European power.²⁸ This explanation seems implausible, given Tanzania's great economic needs and its general policy of accepting aid from all sources. It was known also that Tanzanian elites were disturbed by the fact that their country was among those which received the least aid from the Soviet Union. There was puzzlement, for instance, that Kenya, which "normally showed anti-Communist tendencies," had been extended more aid than Tanzania by the Soviet Union.²⁹

A second explanation may be the Soviet Union's preoccupation with other African states. The Soviet role in such states as Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R. is well known; its concern with these and other operations may have caused neglect with regard to Tanzania. But this also does not seem plausible. As a great power, the Soviet Union had demonstrated an interest and possessed the capabilities to operate concurrently in many theaters. Furthermore, within the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union has sought to challenge China's international role universally.

In the final analysis, an explanation may be the simple fact that the Soviet Union was outmaneuvered by China in Tanzania, consequently in-

²³ *Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure of The United Republic of Tanzania* (for the year from 1st July, 1967 to 30th June, 1968), Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. D35.

²⁴ The United Republic of Tanzania, *The Appropriation Accounts, Revenue Statements, Accounts of the Funds and Other Public Accounts of Tanzania for the Year 1967–1968*, Dar es Salaam, 1969, p. 171.

²⁵ *Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure of The United Republic of Tanzania* (for the year from 1st July, 1968 to 30th June, 1969), Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. D29.

²⁶ *Estimates of Revenue and Recurrent Expenditures, Consolidated Fund Services, Supply Votes and Development Expenditure* (for the year from 1st July 1969 to 30th June, 1970), Dar es Salaam, 1969.

²⁷ *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 74, pp. 96–97.

²⁸ Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, p. 182.

²⁹ A Syndicate Report by Members of the Course for Administrative Officers (Cadets) 1967–1968, *Non-alignment and Tanzanian Foreign Policy*, Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1968. Mimeographed.

hibiting Soviet-Tanzanian relations. Through a unique combination of factors, including China's success in "packaging" its aid program and Tanzania's receptiveness to offers of aid, China at a comparatively early date secured a leading position as an aid donor which it successfully maintained. Indeed, the defense and maintenance of this position against the Soviet Union (and other states) was unquestionably a key element in China's policy toward and behavior in Tanzania. The Soviet Union's "loss" has been China's gain. It is pertinent, then, to examine how China achieved a dominant position in Tanzania through the utilization of economic assistance.

Chinese Aid to Tanzania

China's aid program measured by international standards has not been extensive; aid commitments to all non-Communist nations totaled only \$846 million through 1965 (compared to almost \$2,500 million in Soviet aid for the period 1961-1965). In terms of geographic distribution, China's aid was allocated as follows: Africa (including the United Arab Republic), \$353.3 million; Asia, \$433.2 million; and the Middle East, \$58.4 million. Actual annual expenditures under foreign aid have been estimated at less than one-tenth of one percent of China's GNP.³⁰

Notwithstanding its circumscribed financial scope, China's aid program within a limited context has had considerable impact. Tanzania is one such example. In Tanzania, Chinese aid measured in terms of loans ranked second only to Great Britain. Table 4 shows the major loans received by

TABLE 4
MAJOR LOANS TO MAINLAND TANZANIA
(As of December 31, 1967)

<i>Source</i>	<i>Amount Received</i>	<i>Amount Expended</i>
Great Britain	\$40.9 million	\$ 38.9 million
China	\$36.3 million	\$ 6.1 million
Soviet Union	\$19.6 million	None
United States	\$18.0 million	Not reported
Sweden	\$ 8.5 million	\$ 1.1 million
Japan	\$ 5.6 million	Not reported
Denmark	\$ 5.3 million	\$ 4.0 million
West Germany	\$ 4.1 million	\$ 4.1 million
Canada	\$ 2.3 million	\$164 thousand

Source: *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam), May 11, 1968. These figures were given by Mr. Jamal, Tanzania's Minister of Finance, to the National Assembly, May 10, 1968, in reply to a question how much in loans had Tanzania received since independence. Total received loans from all sources reported came to \$176.6 million of which \$91.4 million had been expended.

³⁰ Kovner, Milton, "Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less-Developed Countries," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, II, Washington, D.C., pp. 611-620.

mainland Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar) up to the end of 1967.

China's loans, granted in 1964 and 1966, were in the form of non-interest-bearing credits repayable within twenty years. In addition to the \$36.3 million loan, China also made grants to mainland Tanzania in 1964 and 1966 totaling \$3.6 million.³¹ Total Chinese aid to mainland Tanzania, therefore, reached \$39.9 million. As Table 3 shows, there was a considerable hiatus between Chinese aid pledges and actual aid disbursements—\$6.1 million out of \$36.3 million as of December 31, 1967. This was due to a variety of factors: Tanzania's inability to marshal domestic resources and finance local costs; China's inexperience and inability to implement its aid pledges; the failure of the two states to agree concerning aid allocation and accounting procedures (credits were not accounted for until after each project had been completed). Since 1967, the gap has been reduced somewhat by Tanzania's new drawings from the loan; this was partially reflected in the increase from \$6.1 million to \$16.9 million of Tanzania's national debt to China as of March 31, 1969.³² The slow rate of disbursement and other related problems no doubt were responsible for the decision by China in 1969 to extend "the terms by five years of both drawing and repayment of the loan agreement concluded in 1964."³³

Though Zanzibar (consisting of the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar) joined with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, Zanzibar has continued to function as a separate administrative entity. Zanzibar, for example, has its own legislative council. This autonomy includes fiscal affairs (Zanzibar has its own treasury), at least to the extent that the Union government differentiates between revenue and expenditure of Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania. This differentiation extends to foreign aid. Zanzibar has received aid from a variety of sources, including China, East Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States. However, between 1964–1965 and 1967–1968 aid to Zanzibar came from two primary sources: China and the German Democratic Republic (Table 5).

TABLE 5
CHINESE AND GERMAN AID TO ZANZIBAR
(1964–1965 to 1967–1968)

Source	Loans	Grants
China	\$4.3 million	\$0.2 million
Germany	\$0.5 million	\$1.9 million

Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning and the Ministry of Finance, The United Republic of Tanzania, *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Dar es Salaam, 1969. Table 72, p. 94.

³¹ *Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure of the United Republic of Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1964–1967.

³² *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 74, pp. 96–97.

³³ "Speech of the Minister for Finance Introducing the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 1969–1970 to the National Assembly on 19th June, 1969," *The Standard*, June 20, 1969.

China's loans were made annually between 1965–1966 and 1967–1968 and carried the same terms as those to mainland Tanzania; the grant was given during 1964–1965. The Zanzibar authorities announced that they were prepared to repay \$2.8 million of China's loan in 1969; China reportedly intimated "that such early repayment is not necessary."³⁴ The funds were to continue to be available to Zanzibar.

The administration of China's aid to Tanzania has necessitated some organizational structure. The Chinese Embassy undoubtedly functioned as overall coordinating agency of the aid program in Tanzania. This has been supplemented by periodic visits by officials from various Chinese ministries. In Tanzania, excluding the office of the New China News Agency, the Chinese "country team" consisted of three primary divisions: the embassy, and an economic and commercial office, in Dar es Salaam; and a consulate in Zanzibar. The "official" membership of the Chinese Embassy has never been large; when it was first established by Ambassador Ho Ying in 1962, it consisted only of six members.³⁵ When the Ambassador was recalled during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1967, this number was further reduced. By May 1968, though Ho Ying was still listed as China's ambassador, the embassy had been reduced to a staff of four.³⁶ Chou Po-ping, who arrived in Dar es Salaam in 1967, served as Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the embassy until the arrival of China's new Ambassador Chung Hsi-tung in 1969. Among Tanzanian government circles, Mr. Chou was regarded as more administrator and "technician" than a diplomat; he remained as counsellor in the embassy following the arrival of Ambassador Chung. On the whole, there has been little staff turnover in the Chinese Embassy. Through May 1968, at least two members were stationed at Dar es Salaam. While the precise role of the Chinese Embassy in the administration of the aid program remains unknown, the symbolic functions of the head-of-mission, such as representing China at the signing and exchange of agreements, participating in the completion ceremonies of Chinese-funded aid projects and other duties, would seem to indicate that the embassy has at least a titular control over China's activities in Tanzania.

China has also maintained an economic and commercial mission in Dar es Salaam. Beginning with a single commercial representative in 1964, a two-man commercial office was established in 1965. This was reorganized into the Chinese Economic and Commercial Mission in 1967. In May 1968, the Mission was staffed by one economic and one commercial rep-

³⁴ *The Nationalist*, July 30, 1960; *The Standard*, July 31, 1969.

³⁵ Ministry of External Affairs, The United Republic of Tanzania, *List of Diplomatic Missions and Other Foreign Representatives*, Dar es Salaam, 1964.

³⁶ Protocol Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *List of Diplomatic Missions, Consular Missions, Trade and International Organizations*, Dar es Salaam, May 1968.

representative, each assisted by a secretary.³⁷ The Chinese commercial representative, Mr. Wang Pu-yun, served in that office from 1964 to 1968; since 1967, two men have served as the economic representative. No doubt the expansion of China's activities required the establishment of a separate economic mission; however, no information was available on its precise functions.

China has maintained formal interaction with Zanzibar since 1963. Following independence, Zanzibar agreed to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors with China. Ambassador Meng Ying was appointed to Zanzibar in April 1964, but returned to China in July 1964. The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964 resulted in the reduction of all foreign missions in Zanzibar from embassy to consulate-general or consulate status. The Chinese embassy thus became the Chinese consulate. In May 1968, the consulate was officially staffed by three members.³⁸ The consul, Mr. Liu Kan, had been with the Chinese mission in Zanzibar since 1964.

As a unit, the Chinese "country team" in Tanzania expanded with the development of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction, especially economic interaction. In relation to the size of the Chinese aid program, however, the total membership of twelve in the official mission would still appear small. Compared to the fifteen-man staff of the Soviet mission and aid program in Tanzania, China's mission was indeed modest. Our count is based on the *List of Diplomatic Missions, Consular Missions, Trade and International Organizations*, published by the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese and other foreign missions presumably also have some individuals not classified as officer members and hence not included in the diplomatic list. Nevertheless, the official list probably is an indicator of the relative size of each mission. Even if allowance is made for some non-officer members, the Chinese mission remained notably moderate in size if related to the totality of activities involved in China's aid program to Tanzania.

In general, China's aid has been allocated primarily to serve Tanzania's developmental needs. It has ranged from assisting in agricultural development, furnishing complete industrial and other plants, to building infrastructural projects. An example of China's aid to increase agricultural productivity is the multi-purpose Ruvu State Farm, funded out of China's 1964 loan and agreed to early in 1965.³⁹ Situated fifty miles west of Dar es Salaam, covering 7,000 acres and representing an investment of between \$1.1 and \$1.4 million, the farm was to be a self-contained agricul-

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ The account of the Ruvu State Farm has been taken from the following sources: "To Serve the World's People With Sincerity," *JMJP*, March 15, 1968; *The Standard*, May 6, 1967; and *East African Trade and Industry* (Nairobi), February 1965.

tural community with a staff of seven hundred. Utilization of the land was planned as follows: 2,000 of the 7,000 acres would be put under cultivation to produce rice, cotton, vegetables, and cereals, with the remaining land allocated to the growing of fruit trees and the raising of dairy and beef cattle. Operation would combine mechanical, semi-mechanical, and hand methods, with China supplying the “hardware”—from tractors to rubber-wheeled animal-drawn carts. A \$14 million irrigation and hydroelectric dam was being also constructed on the adjacent Ruvu River. A similar but smaller agricultural development, funded by a Chinese loan, the Upenja State Farm of 1,300 acres, was reported under operation on Zanzibar in 1969.⁴⁰

In addition to promoting agricultural productivity, China has not neglected large-scale “flagship projects.” A good example is the Chinese designed, financed, and equipped Friendship Textile Mill completed in 1968 at a cost of more than \$7.7 million.⁴¹ Built on a 38-acre site, six miles from downtown Dar es Salaam and on one of the main arteries leading into the city, the mill stands as a shining monument of China’s aid and “presence.” Employing 3,000 workers operating 40,000 spindles and 978 looms, the mill formed one of the largest industrial complexes in East Africa. At full production it is expected to consume about 30,000 bales of cotton annually, producing 2,000,000 pounds of thread and 24,000,000 square yards of Tanzania’s favorite *vitenge* and *khangas* cloth and other materials. A great deal of publicity was given to the mill and its products, including full coverage in the local press, visits by various government and party delegations, and a first prize at the 1968 National Agricultural and Trade Fair in Dar es Salaam. The Friendship Textile Mill, much more than the Ruvu State Farm, focused Tanzanian national attention on China’s aid, thereby lending an atmosphere of substance to all Chinese efforts.

While the Friendship Textile Mill contributed in symbolic and real terms to Tanzanian economic development (and also to China’s “presence”), it has illustrated some of the problems associated with the Chinese aid program, and also with Tanzanian developmental planning. It is not clear whether China or Tanzania requested the construction of the mill as one of the first of China’s aid projects. At any rate, the mill project was agreed to in January 1965, funded out of the 1964 Chinese loan, and construction was initiated shortly thereafter. President Nyerere laid the foundation stone on July 29, 1966, and formally opened the mill on July 6, 1968.

Since completion of the Friendship Textile Mill, some important questions relating to its role in Tanzania’s total economic development have arisen. Tanzania had long been a textile importing nation. As recently as

⁴⁰ *The Standard*, July 12, 1969; “One More Achievement in the Development of Sino-Tanzanian Friendship,” *JMJP* January 13, 1969.

⁴¹ *The Standard*, July 6, 1968.

1964, Tanzania produced less than nine million square yards of cloth. The government, therefore, undertook a planned expansion of the textile industry in the 1960s, both to conserve foreign exchange and to develop national industries which could utilize domestic crops. Four new textile mills were planned, in addition to the some fifty small and medium size textile plants in existence. As a result of this expansion program, textile production in Tanzania reached 35.5 million square yards in 1968 (an increase of almost 90 percent from 1967) and was projected to increase to about 60 million square yards in 1969.⁴² As *The Annual Economic Survey 1968* made plain, "with nearly 50 million square yards of cotton capacity commissioned during the year, severe marketing problems developed. . . ."⁴³ This situation had been anticipated by the textile manufacturers in Tanzania; in 1967 they had urged the government not to grant additional licenses for new textile factories.⁴⁴ The Tanzanian government had sought to alleviate the problem of overproduction by promoting exports and had achieved a limited success through 1969. However, large scale exports of Tanzanian textiles did not offer great prospectives—at least in East Africa and Zambia—because of the concurrent development of the textile industry in that area.

One additional dimension should be mentioned. As we have observed, cotton was Tanzania's second most valuable export commodity. With the growth of an indigenous textile industry, increased internal consumption of cotton was expected. It was estimated that the national textile industry would consume about ten percent of Tanzania's cotton production. This has raised the question of whether the increased local textile output would compensate for the loss in cotton exports. The short-run contribution of the Friendship Textile Mill to Tanzania's economic development thus is difficult to measure.

An immediate problem, related to textile overproduction, focused upon the planning and other aspects of the mill. The mill as equipped by the Chinese was reported to be only partially automated, relying greatly upon labor-intensive techniques. Thus the need for 3,000 workers.⁴⁵ Whether because of this fact or "severe marketing problems" (or both), the mill had been operating at a loss. Mr. Babu, the Minister for Commerce and Industries, reported that the mill was receiving an annual subsidy of \$210,000 from the Tanzanian government.⁴⁶ The Government had, for the time

⁴² *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, p. 58.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *The Standard*, December 16, 1967.

⁴⁵ A comparison between the Friendship Textile Mill and the Mwanza Textile Mill, Mwanza, built with French assistance, clearly demonstrated the different manpower needs between automated and non-automated mills. The Mwanza mill housed 22,400 spindles and 576 high-speed looms, all automated; its annual output was expected to be 24 million square yards, identical to Friendship's. Yet, the Mwanza mill required only 1,100 workers.

⁴⁶ *The Standard*, October 30, 1960.

being, decided against closing the mill because, in Mr. Babu's words: "If we are to follow the colonialist policy of business we have to close it because it makes no profit, but in a socialist policy of business the mill is not losing because the Government is recovering the loss from taxes paid by the workers and in indirect ways."⁴⁷ The government's subsidy perhaps could be justified on grounds that the mill provided employment for a large number of workers who would not otherwise be employed. However, in the long-run the mill must be justified also on economic grounds. The record of China's aid to Tanzania measured in terms of the mill thus becomes difficult to judge, since its success or failure depends upon the economic goals sought.

The much heralded Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) represents another case of a Chinese "flagship project." After the proposal was rejected by the World Bank in 1964 on the ground that development in Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and Zambia would be better served by other projects, China offered in 1965 to build the 1,060-mile railway. Thereafter, there has been a rapid succession of events. A Chinese team arrived in August 1965 to make a feasibility study of the Tanzanian section of the railway; a similar team concluded a three-month survey in Zambia early in 1968. Meanwhile Rhodesia's UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) in November 1965, and Great Britain's refusal to use force to suppress the revolt, added a new sense of urgency to the project. Landlocked and surrounded on three sides by hostile forces, Zambia more than ever sought a link with the outside world, both to reduce its economic dependency on the white southern African states and on security grounds.

On September 5, 1967, a railway agreement between China, Tanzania and Zambia was signed in Peking. The full terms of the agreement have never been released. It is understood that provisions included the stipulation that the survey and design work would be completed within fifteen months and that the technical and professional manpower would be supplied by China.⁴⁸ China offered also to finance the building of the railway, estimated to cost in the region of \$340-400 million, with a twenty-five year interest-free loan.⁴⁹ Three protocols were signed implementing the second stage of the railway survey on April 9, 1968. This was followed by the arrival on April 13 of the first group of Chinese technicians assigned to the project. In November 1969, it was announced that the Chinese had completed the survey and found the project feasible. During the same month, representatives of China, Tanzania and Zambia met in Lusaka and agreed to the final stage of the project. China was represented by the Vice-Minister for Railways, Mr. Kuo Lu, who took the opportunity to visit Tanzania. (Kuo Lu had served as Vice-Minister for Railways since

⁴⁷ *The Standard*, July 24, 1969.

⁴⁸ *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), March 10, 1968.

⁴⁹ *The Standard*, November 7, 1969.

1959.) Construction work on TAZARA was to begin in March 1970 and be completed in five years.⁵⁰ Early in 1970, Tanzanian youths were recruited for construction work on the line; 7,000 youths were reported required for the first year's target.⁵¹

While TAZARA is a Chinese "flagship project," Tanzania will be no poorer because of such aid. Indeed, the project, both in short-term and long-range, contributes to Tanzania's communications and economic development. Large sections of southern Tanzania will, for the first time, be made accessible. However, TAZARA's impact will not be limited to Tanzania; the railway will not only transform Zambia's relations with southern Africa, but also establish new linkages between Zambia and East Africa.

China's cost must also be considered. The estimated cost of \$340-400 million will double China's aid commitments to Africa. In view of China's own development needs, this cost is not negligible. China's own railway development, for example, has been poorly served. It has been estimated that China had added only 10,000 miles of railway since 1949 to the mere 12,500 miles which the regime inherited. It could be said that China will be deprived of the 1,060 miles of railway being contributed to Tanzania's and Zambia's development. Within the context of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance, the TAZARA project thus demonstrates the strong leverage that one member can exercise over the other. It can be seen as a role response to specific Tanzanian expectations which China felt obligated to perform, even at great self-sacrifice.

China's gains from the TAZARA project must also be considered. Undoubtedly, the establishment of a Chinese foothold by means of the project in eastern and southern Africa could have a profound impact upon the future political alignments of the region, as well as upon the struggles against the colonial and white regimes in southern Africa. We cannot dismiss, of course, the perceived positive image TAZARA will project for China in Tanzania, Zambia and Africa, both in terms of China's aid credibility and its international role.

China's aid, however, has not been concentrated solely on a few selected show projects; indeed, it has been highly diffused. During 1967-1968, China contributed, wholly or partially, to twenty-three non-flagship projects (Table 6). The projects give some indication of the range and extent to which Chinese aid has been utilized. Chinese assistance ranged from a high of \$245,000 for a dam construction project (No. 16) to a low of \$1,008 for cattle/coconut schemes (No. 7). In short, Chinese aid has been widely spread, and determined as much by political considerations as by the current basic developmental requisites of Tanzania.

Other Chinese aid projects have included: a short-wave transmitting station (the first completed project, 1966); a tobacco experimental farm;

⁵⁰ *The Standard*, September 30, 1969.

⁵¹ *The Standard*, February 19, 1970.

TABLE 6
TANZANIAN PROJECTS RECEIVING CHINESE AID
1967-1968

1. Survey of feeder roads in rural areas
2. Heavy plant construction
3. Urban water supply
4. Police training school
5. Teachers college (I)
6. Teachers college (II)
7. Cattle/coconut schemes
8. Poultry breeding
9. Tsetse fly control
10. Fisheries office and training center
11. Management of forests
12. Planting of timber resources
13. Ngorongoro scheme
14. Farmers training centers (I)
15. Farmers training center (II)
16. Dam construction
17. Arusha development
18. Antiquities headquarter
19. Stadium construction
20. Art institute
21. Sewerage schemes
22. Drainage and sewerage survey
23. Development loans to urban local authorities

Source: The United Republic of Tanzania, *Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Year from 1 July to 30th June 1968*, Dar es Salaam, 1967.

a farm implements factory; the formation of a joint Chinese-Tanzanian shipping company; a bookshop, bank and post office complex at the University College, Dar es Salaam; and others on mainland Tanzania. On Zanzibar, Chinese aid projects included: a shoe factory; a tractor repair plant; the construction of fresh water tanks; a sports stadium. By any standards, the aid projects have been highly diversified. They also involve a considerable commitment by China to Tanzania.

Whether China's aid has been utilized to focus attention upon itself, or to assist in increasing productivity and economic diversification, Tanzania has derived much benefit. Tanzania's receptiveness toward Chinese economic assistance has not been entirely accidental, however. Two factors deserve special mention. First, Tanzania since independence has been engaged in a major developmental program to increase production by completing specific manufacturing and communication projects and expanding crop acreages. Tanzania, like other developing nations, lacked the necessary capital; it therefore looked to external financing. However, the attempts to secure external funding to finance development expenditures encountered serious difficulties. Tanzania had expected that 78 percent of the development budget for the period 1964-1969 would be externally

financed. However, external financing failed to materialize, and only 34.5 percent of the development budget had foreign support.⁵² The importance of China's aid can thus be appreciated, even though Chinese aid represented less than 3 percent of all aid received by Tanzania through 1967.

Second, Tanzania's pursuit of an independent foreign policy had a direct consequence upon the ability to secure aid. As we mentioned earlier, relations with China had a negative impact on Tanzania's ability to secure aid from the Soviet Union. Tanzania's relations with China, and its stand on Vietnam, had a generally similar effect upon relations with the United States.⁵³ The effect of these and other relationships was clear to the Tanzanian elite. President Nyerere put it thus:⁵⁴

Tanzania's obvious refusal to consider the possibility of getting subventions from foreign governments in return for a commitment to support them either in general or on particular issues of world politics, must have resulted in a failure to obtain certain monies. But the amount, and therefore the cost of non-alignment cannot be even guessed at. A man who does not put himself up for auction cannot tell how much he would have been offered if he had done so. But he would clearly have got something! And this we have foregone.

Tanzania's decision to terminate diplomatic relations with some states over political issues resulted in the withdrawal of already committed and much-needed aid. The most celebrated case involved Tanzania's severing diplomatic relations with Great Britain (since renewed in 1968) over the latter's refusal to suppress Rhodesia's UDI in 1965. Great Britain immediately withdrew a \$21 million loan, causing great disruption to Tanzania's development program. China then offered (in 1966) to finance many of the projects.⁵⁵ Tanzania accepted the offer, thereby rescuing a number of developmental projects. As one group of Tanzanians have since expressed it: "China proved to be a friend in need and hence a friend indeed."⁵⁶

China's aid must be perceived as having also a significant political impact on Tanzania. It has undoubtedly been an important way in which Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction has been given concrete expression. Precisely how aid was transformed into influence is more difficult to determine. It can hardly be disputed, however, that China has used aid as a reward for foreign policy actions of Tanzania. These have included:

⁵² *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, Table 60, p. 83.

⁵³ President Nyerere has said that "A comparison of American aid to Tanzania and to other African countries supports the contention that at any rate our total policies have led to a lower level of assistance than might otherwise have been granted." Nyerere, Julius K., *Principles and Development*, Dar es Salaam, 1966 as quoted in *Non-alignment and Tanzanian Foreign Policy*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ United Republic of Tanzania, National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), *Official Report*, 10-30 June 1966, Dar es Salaam, 1966. Col. 229.

⁵⁶ *Non-alignment and Tanzanian Foreign Policy*.

continued adherence to a policy of non-alignment; recognition and international support of China, including the representation issue at the UN; rejection of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; disapproval of American involvement in Vietnam; strong support of national liberation movements, and so on. We can assume also that aid contributed to increasing still further Tanzania's psychological receptiveness to the Chinese model.

This discussion should make it evident that Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative economic interaction has been an important source of support for the partial informal alliance. This importance can be viewed from two perspectives.

First, although the economic interaction (as a percentage of Tanzania's total trade and total aid received) has not been impressive, its impact has been far-reaching. This has been due to a number of factors: Tanzania's environmental-situational context (southern Africa); the economic needs of Tanzania (funds for development); and China's ability to allocate aid for specific projects (e.g., TAZARA). We are willing to go farther and suggest that, in the long-run, China's aid may make a much more important contribution to Chinese-Tanzanian interaction (economically, politically, and otherwise) than the actual resource commitment would seem to indicate. Assuming continued Tanzanian response, the influence potential of China's aid appears to be considerable.

Second, Chinese-Tanzanian economic interaction is an illustration of the working of the partial informal alliance. China's aid and Tanzania's response had a significant impact upon the development of the alliance. Within a given alliance, two dominant interaction patterns ensue: routine interaction, and responsive interaction that results from a crisis. The latter pattern is especially important, because it is a test of the cohesiveness of the alliance. Chinese-Tanzanian economic interaction experienced both patterns. China's loan of 1964 can be considered under the routine interaction pattern. Such aid projects as the textile mill, the state farms, the water tanks and others were routine aid, at least within the context of the alliance. On the other hand, China's loan of 1966, following Great Britain's loan withdrawal in 1965, represented a clear case of crisis aid. Whereas the 1964 loan was extended in the normal course of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction, the 1966 loan was offered by China to Tanzania in a crisis situation. In short, the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance was founded, among other factors, on China's promise to meet both the routine and crisis economic needs of Tanzania, and Tanzania's responsiveness to such offers. In the final analysis, the ability of an alliance to operate effectively under both routine and crisis situations says something about the cohesive nature of the association. The Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance, measured in terms of the routine and crisis interaction patterns, has demonstrated a high level of cohesiveness.

V

Military Interaction and Technical Assistance

The success of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction has been due in large part to a cumulative process of interaction arising out of China's role response on a variety of levels to Tanzania's needs and expectations. Each level of interaction has contributed to the support and reinforcement of the total pattern of interaction. For example, economic interaction unquestionably gave substance to the appeal of the Chinese model. Within this frame of reference, we turn to a discussion of military interaction and technical assistance between China and Tanzania as a further measure of the degree of cohesiveness of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance.

The "revolution" in statecraft which is manifested in the rapid growth of the use of informal foreign policy instruments has greatly increased the opportunities for direct interaction between the representatives or instruments of one state with the people or processes of another. Access to specific individuals and/or groups, for the objectives of either "support" or "attack," has become readily available. The pattern of access is indicative, therefore, of the attention and non-attention given to specific individuals and/or groups, and also of the level of interaction between the participating actors. One manifestation of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction has been the diverse levels of interaction between individuals and groups from both sides. Within the context of military interaction and technical assistance, we will also examine the levels of access to individuals and groups which have originated from and contributed to the growth and support of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction.

Another aspect which will be examined here is the role which may be played in China's domestic politics by its program of economic aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. Pertinent clues to this question are provided by the content of reports in China's domestic press, and the attention level which the program receives. An examination of China's self-image of this external role indicates that aid to Tanzania serves a vital function by giving credence to China's revolutionary role.

MILITARY INTERACTION

Military interaction is an important indicator for measuring Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction. It should be noted at the outset that no

formal agreement is known to exist between China and Tanzania in which either or both actors commit themselves militarily to the objectives and goals of the other. Any such commitment is, in fact, unlikely. Geographic factors, China's national security priorities, and China's limited military/technical capabilities all contribute to this unlikelihood. As President Nyerere stated in China in 1968, he had not come "to ask China to declare Tanzania to be her nuclear protectorate."¹

The absence of a formal agreement has not, however, obstructed the development of military interaction between China and Tanzania. Indeed, Chinese access to the Tanzanian military has shown a continuous increase. Military interaction is primarily in the form of training and supplies provided by China to Tanzania, extended under existing economic and technical aid and other agreements. One of the first programs provided under the Economic and Technical Aid Agreement of 1964 was the shipment of arms and the dispatch of seven military instructors and four interpreters to Tanzania in 1964.² China extended further assistance by providing military instructors for domestic training of Tanzanian military officers and new recruits, as well as training in China for specialized personnel, e.g., marine police, tank crews, naval personnel, etc. Military supplies were also provided, including small arms, tanks, trucks, and patrol boats. President Nyerere reported in 1969 that most of the "army-ware" of Tanzania (including Zanzibar) was provided by China.³

On the Tanzanian side, there have been visits of officers and other military groups to China, including the Chief of the Tanzania People's Defense Forces, Major-General Marisho Sam Hagi Sarakikya. President Nyerere's trip to China in 1968 included a visit to a Chinese air force unit near Peking, where the President and his party were treated to "a performance of revolutionary songs and dances . . . an exhibition of sculpture depicting the exploitation and oppression suffered by families of P.L.A. soldiers in the old society . . . an exhibition of flight and [a meeting] with the pilots."⁴

Because publicly available data is limited, military interaction is the most difficult to use of our indicators of the cohesiveness of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance. However, the existence though not the extent of military interaction is verifiable, and the commitment of both

¹ Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, United Republic of Tanzania, *Speech by the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere at a Return Banquet in China 21st June, 1968*, Dar es Salaam, June 21, 1968.

² *The Standard*, September 1 and 10, 1964.

³ *Ibid.*, September 2, 1969.

⁴ "Tanzanian President Visits P.L.A. Units in Peking," *Hsinhua News Bulletin* (Dar es Salaam), No. 554, June 24, 1968, p. 1. Whether or not by coincidence, President Nyerere visited a textile mill during his state visit to China in 1965. Subsequently, China provided Tanzania with the Friendship Textile Mill. We do not know the importance, real or symbolic, of President Nyerere's visit to the Chinese air force base in 1968.

countries to such interaction is clear. It is also evident that China has access to the military in Tanzania.

The acceptance of military interaction as one level in the total pattern of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction cannot be understood apart from Tanzania's urgent security needs. We shall limit our discussion of this vital question to two primary factors. First, from the militarily much superior Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African white regimes to its south and southwest, Tanzania perceived a security threat. President Nyerere's reference to 60,000 Portuguese troops in Mozambique, adjacent to Tanzania's southern frontier, was an example of this concern.⁵ The threat of Portuguese militarism to Tanzania's "safety" has also been expressed by other Tanzanian officials. Mr. Stephen Mhando, Tanzania's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, delivered a major address devoted to "Portugal's war against the African people" before the UN General Assembly in 1969.⁶ Portugal's allies, including Rhodesia, South Africa, and the NATO states, were also accused of contributing to Tanzania's national security problem and "the continued presence in Africa of colonialism, exploitation and racism."

Tanzania's security concern has been increased by its extension of shelter and support to African national liberation movements (e.g., the Liberation Front for Mozambique), and its activist role in support of the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and white minority rule. The security and other problems this policy posed were consciously realized. The government newspaper put it thus:

Tanzania and Zambia are on the frontlines of the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa.

This is no mere accident of geography, for there are countries closer to the battlefields, and strategically better placed, who have not chosen to render the maximum assistance to the liberation movements. Tanzania and Zambia have voluntarily chosen to do so.

Both countries are aware of the problems this must inevitably raise for their people. Already Tanzanian territory has been raided, villages attacked and air space violated. The assassination of Dr. Mondlane and the various sabotage attempts are but the warning shots of the salvos to come. Dar es Salaam and Lusaka are today well within range of South African missiles and bombers . . .⁷

President Nyerere has also expressed a similar concern. He has been worried by possible South African and Portuguese retaliatory actions against

⁵ See note 1 above.

⁶ For the text of the address, see *The Standard*, October 16 and 17, 1969.

⁷ *The Standard*, February 16, 1970. On February 6, 1970, *The Standard* became the organ of the Tanzanian Government.

liberation movement bases in Tanzania, much as Israel has attacked Al Fatah guerrilla bases in Arab countries.⁸

These consequences of geography and policy were perceived as requiring the building of a military establishment by Tanzania. Thus the growth of Chinese-Tanzanian military interaction. In fact, however, Chinese military assistance further increased Tanzania's national security needs. This came about because the Portuguese saw Tanzania's military development, and its increased assistance to liberation movements, as a short-term and long-range challenge. We see here, of course, one of the major contradictions of military assistance programs: "Far from increasing security, the military competition between the two groups, and the final bipolarization of the power structure, tends in a cumulative fashion to increase tensions and to make conflict more likely."⁹ At the same time, in its environmental-situational context, Tanzania could not afford to ignore its security needs.

Second, Tanzania found that arms procurement was not always a simple problem. This is illustrated by the following case. In its search for military assistance, Tanzania concluded an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 whereby Germany would provide assistance for the creation of an air force for mainland Tanzania, including both the supply of aircraft and the training of personnel. The Federal Republic agreed also to assist in the formation of a Tanzanian marine police unit complete with patrol boats. The projects were suddenly terminated when Tanzania allowed the German Democratic Republic to establish a Consulate General in Dar es Salaam in 1965.¹⁰ The Federal Republic of Germany, adhering to the "Halstein Doctrine" (which has since been abandoned), withdrew all military aid to Tanzania. As in Great Britain's withdrawal of a \$21 million loan in 1965, Tanzania was faced with a crisis situation. The predicament was partially resolved by a Chinese offer to assume responsibility for the marine police unit training program and to make a gift of four 20-ton patrol boats. Here we see, again, China's role response to Tanzania's needs.

This action by China did not, of course, solve all of Tanzania's security requirements. An agreement was concluded with Canada in 1965 for a five-year military assistance program. This, among other items, assumed the defunct German air training project, and initiated an army training

⁸ *The Standard*, October 6, 1969.

⁹ John W. Burton, *International Relations*, New York, 1965, p. 78.

¹⁰ The immediate cause of the crisis was the reduction of all foreign missions from embassy to consulate-general or consulate status in Zanzibar following the merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964. Since the German Democratic Republic and Zanzibar had developed close ties and a mission was already present, the termination of ties was out of the question. Yet, Tanganyika had established ties with the Federal Republic of Germany. The apparent compromise solution was for the new republic to maintain diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic of Germany, while reducing the German Democratic Republic's mission in Zanzibar to a consulate-general and allowing it to also establish a consulate-general in Dar es Salaam.

program. For a number of reasons, however, the Canadian program did not work out to Tanzania's satisfaction. One factor was that a political liability came to be seen in the fact that Canada was a member of NATO, of which Portugal was also a member. More immediately, Canadian assistance did not provide the military hardware—jet fighters, other combat aircraft, and military armaments—that Tanzania regarded as security essentials. Neighboring Uganda and Somalia, for instance, both possessed Soviet MIG fighters. A peculiarity of Canadian legislation governing military assistance was that Canada could engage in military training, and could provide non-combat aircraft, but could not provide military supplies classed as combat equipment. One interesting consequence of this was that Canadian instructors were training Tanzanians in the use of Chinese military equipment. The Canadian-Tanzanian military assistance program was not, therefore, renewed when it came to an end in early 1970.

The expected termination of the Canadian agreement raised once more the question of Tanzania's military development. Addressing the Tanzanian National Assembly in 1969, Mr. Kawawa, the Second Vice-President and Minister for Defense, announced that the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces would continue to be expanded. He assured the Assembly that work was in full swing to establish a navy and an air force, that it would take some time "to see jet-fighters and warships . . . , but that work on the establishment of these forces had begun."¹¹ The only question was the source of this further major military support. In an interview on the eve of the termination of the Canadian-Tanzanian military assistance program, President Nyerere pointed to the fact that China had already been supplying military aid to Tanzania concurrently with the Canadians. China's military aid would be continued when Canada withdrew. "We will continue to receive arms from China," declared President Nyerere, "and to receive Chinese military instructors."¹² Early in 1970, China began to assist Tanzania in the construction of a naval base. Given Tanzania's perceived national security needs, Chinese-Tanzanian military interaction is likely to continue to develop.

As in the case of economic interaction, Chinese-Tanzanian military interaction also illustrated China's success in "packaging" its aid program in accordance with Tanzania's basic requisites. The cohesiveness of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance certainly depended in part upon China's role response and capabilities in fulfilling Tanzania's security expectations and needs. In turn, increased Chinese-Tanzanian military interaction undoubtedly furthered Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction on other levels, political and economic.

¹¹ *The Standard*, July 11, 1969.

¹² *The Standard*, October 6, 1969.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A study of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction requires also an examination of the role of technical assistance. This involves both the categories of Chinese technical assistance, and the experience of Chinese technicians in Tanzania. Data on China's technical assistance program shows that there is a wide range of the types of assistance. It also shows that it involves important levels of Chinese access to Tanzanian individuals and groups. Chinese technical assistance thus has been yet another source of support for the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance.

Teune and Synnestvedt suggest that the number of foreign technicians stationed in a given state is an indicator of alignment.¹³ This may be valid in the Tanzanian context, where nearly 3,000 Chinese technicians were reported in 1969. Certainly the level of interaction, measured in terms of the numerical presence of Chinese technicians, is indicative of the level of Chinese-Tanzanian relations. However, the presence of this sizable body of Chinese technicians should also be seen against Tanzania's overall manpower needs, and the role of "overseas experts" in Tanzania's economic, political and social development.

Since independence, Tanzania has been forced to rely heavily upon foreign personnel because of the shortage of available indigenous skilled manpower. Indeed, Tanzania's lack of skilled manpower has been declared "the major bottleneck to implementing development projects."¹⁴ There were numerous examples of the reliance upon foreign personnel (which reflects the lack of indigenous talent). In 1968, there were still 1,619 foreign citizens serving as senior and middle-grade civil servants in the Tanzanian national government alone. The government continued actively to recruit overseas experts through 1968 but only 164 out of 469 vacancies had been filled by the end of the year. Also during 1968, the number of countries with which Tanzania had technical assistance agreements increased to 22.¹⁵ In addition to Chinese, the foreign personnel in Tanzania thus included citizens from almost every likely country, Americans and Russians, West and East Germans, Canadians and North Koreans, and a host of others covering the entire political spectrum. In short, the Chinese were far from holding a monopoly position, or of being the sole group of foreign personnel to have exclusive access to Tanzanian individuals and groups. While the presence of Chinese "overseas experts" may have been indicative of the level and extent of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative inter-

¹³ Teune and Synnestvedt, "Measuring International Alignment," *Orbis*. IX: 1 (Spring 1965), pp. 171-189.

¹⁴ *The Nationalist*, January 23, 1970. These remarks were made by Mr. I. M. Kaduma, Deputy Secretary to the Tanzanian treasury, during the course of a seminar on Rural Development and Foreign Aid.

¹⁵ *The Annual Economic Survey 1968*, pp. 30-32.

action, that presence did not in itself, therefore, necessarily indicate alignment.

The presence of foreign personnel in the role of representatives of a foreign state has also been examined in the context of their influence with the populace of the host state. Scott has argued that through such face-to-face interaction, the foreign personnel are brought into direct contact with the people or processes of the host state, thereby allowing the former to gain access to and to influence the latter.¹⁶

In Tanzania, the behavior and impact of the Chinese technicians has followed an interesting pattern. "Professional" contacts were established, and the wide range of projects in which the Chinese were engaged made contacts both frequent and extensive. However, apart from imparting new skills, the principal impact made by the Chinese personnel has come from their collective sense of dedication and hard work. This single-minded devotion to their work had been cited by the Tanzania elite as a behavioral pattern to be emulated. The Tanzanian Minister for Commerce and Industry, for example, praised the Chinese personnel at the Friendship Textile Mill for their work style. Comparing the Chinese to other overseas experts, he commented: "By the way experts from other countries demand high standards of living we get the impression that they are on holiday, not to toil for our development."¹⁷ President Nyerere, at the opening ceremony of the Friendship Textile Mill in 1969, repeated this theme: "These Chinese workers have helped in the establishment of the factory, and are actively training Tanzanians to take over from them. I should add that they have set an example to us all by their hard work and their dedication."¹⁸

The appeal of the Chinese work style must be understood within the general context of Tanzania's goal for social transformation, which depends on an attempt to mobilize the masses. Tanzanian elites, for example, continually call upon the populace to make sacrifices, and to work harder to develop the country. In this sense, the impact of the Chinese technicians upon the populace is less in terms of personal face-to-face interaction, ideological or otherwise, than through the collective exemplary demonstration of the Chinese work style as perceived by the Tanzanian elite.

In part, the lack of personal impact through direct face-to-face interaction is a consequence of the personal behavior of the Chinese technicians. The Chinese usually maintain separate living quarters, as do most foreign experts. Unlike other foreigners, however, the Chinese do not require "lavish accommodations." This was, it will be recalled, one of the points made in the "Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Assistance." And, as mentioned earlier, it has been one basis for Chinese attacks on Soviet aid

¹⁶ Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft*, New York, 1965.

¹⁷ *The Standard*, January 20, 1968.

¹⁸ Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, *Press Release*, July 6, 1968.

programs. The Chinese, instead, attempt to adapt to the native living style, often accepting accommodations at the working site.

Socially, the Chinese also tend to refrain generally from interacting with either the indigenous population or with other foreign experts. This has been due partly to a communication barrier: few Chinese can converse in either English or Swahili.¹⁰

Frugality has been also a distinct Chinese characteristic. The overtly plain style of dress, and other "simple" attributes, served to differentiate the Chinese from other foreign personnel. Indeed, Chinese frugality has been the object of both admiration and surprise by the indigenous population. One behavioral trait which has disturbed some Tanzanians is the inability of the Chinese to "relax," at least in the presence of non-Chinese. Also of interest is the early morning practice of many of the Chinese to engage in strenuous calisthenics followed by small group ideological discussions.

The adherence to a strongly disciplined, puritanical, and personal style of living, and to a pattern of physical and social separatism, has no doubt reduced the Chinese opportunities for direct face-to-face interaction and, consequently, for personal impact. We may assume this to be a result of a differentiation made by the Chinese technicians between their professional and private roles. It seemed, in short, that whereas the Chinese personnel had a sense of a technical mission, they had not—either individually or collectively—perceived their role as also serving a cultural function.

Before discussing the specific categories of Chinese technical assistance, a few additional comments are pertinent regarding the general nature, organization, and experiences of the Chinese personnel. Chinese personnel are almost all assigned to perform skilled or semi-skilled technical assistance in specific aid projects. And, unlike most other overseas experts (who were recruited individually by the Tanzanian government), the selection and recruitment of Chinese technicians has been solely the responsibility of the Chinese government. For the most part, the Chinese personnel are engaged in "demonstrational," as opposed to "instructional," technical assistance. Because of the communication barrier, the Chinese tend to adopt the apprenticeship system rather than the formal classroom instructional technique for imparting skills. However, in most instances of Chinese technical assistance, the training of local talent has not been a part of the project. Another feature of China's assistance is that it is entirely "technical," providing specific technical skills, as opposed to "administrative"—such as the provision of staff members for Tanzanian government ministries and other institutions. As already mentioned, foreign personnel (many were seconded from their respective governments) continue to staff many of the offices in the Tanzanian national government.

¹⁰ To overcome this barrier, select Chinese technicians had been attending English language classes conducted by British personnel in Dar es Salaam.

No Chinese personnel are known to have occupied staff positions in the Tanzanian government.

Very little is certain concerning the organization of the Chinese technical assistance personnel. It is apparent that Chinese personnel are dispatched in groups according to specific project needs. The average length of stay in Tanzania has been two years. Finally, each project team is led by a director, subject to the overall jurisdiction of the Chinese "country-team" in Tanzania.

Generally speaking, except for notices of arrivals and departures, there has been a conspicuous absence of reports on the personal experiences of the Chinese personnel. A few items have appeared in the Tanzanian press. For example, a Chinese dam engineer died from bee stings; and a technician with the Friendship Textile Mill lost an arm due to a mechanical mishap. The foreign press mentions occasionally some personal experiences of the Chinese. One such report dealt with two separate physical confrontations between the Chinese and the Americans and the West Germans in Tanzania.²⁰ These experiences are isolated cases. We actually know very little concerning the trials and tribulations of the Chinese personnel in Tanzania. As a whole, the Chinese seem to find Tanzania a pleasant experience. They are much taken by the beauty of the country, the friendliness of the people, the relatively high standards of living (including the availability of domestic and foreign goods), and the general development of Tanzania.

Chinese technical assistance to Tanzania has included a wide range of projects. A partial listing of the projects (excluding military assistance) includes the following:

- Short wave radio transmission
- Farm implements
- Shoe factory
- Textile mill
- Shipping line
- Dam construction
- Agriculture
- Irrigation control
- Medical assistance
- Printing plant repair workshop
- Water tank construction
- Harbor construction
- Police school construction
- Railway construction

²⁰ *New York Times*, March 26, 1970. These confrontations were not reported in the local Tanzanian press.

The medical project on mainland Tanzania can serve as an example of the organization and operation of Chinese technical assistance.²¹ The project had its beginning in 1967.²² During that year, talks were conducted in Peking for a Chinese medical assistance project to mainland Tanzania. A Chinese medical study team (five doctors, one nurse and one interpreter) arrived in Tanzania in January 1968, led by Dr. Tsao Yueh-chung. It stayed in Tanzania for one month and visited medical facilities throughout the country. In April, Dr. Tsao returned as head of a Chinese medical assistance group, which included thirty-one doctors (surgeons, gynaecologists, ear, nose and throat specialists, pediatricians, and pharmacologists), six nurses, and five interpreters. The group also brought 1,000 cases of equipment and medicines. The group was divided into teams of eight and dispatched to rural areas. The team organization had the advantage of offering various types of treatment, with specialists supplementing and supporting each other. In the "bush," each team was responsible for an assigned area and set up a system of village visits. It was reported that one medical team during one month had attended a total of 2,013 patients in five villages. Although work had already begun, China's medical assistance to Tanzania was formulated with the signing of the Medical Assistance Agreement in Dar es Salaam, May 6, 1968. The agreement was for two years, subject to renewal.

The medical assistance project, like other Chinese technical assistance programs, should be understood within the context of Tanzania's needs. Two factors deserve special attention. First, medical personnel is one of the most acute resource shortages in Tanzania. The Minister for Health and Social Welfare reported in 1969: "At the beginning of this year, there were 502 doctors (in Tanzania), the ratio being 24,275 people to one doctor."²³ Of that number, 120 served with the government.²⁴ Second, there is a serious urban/rural medical imbalance, and the Tanzanian government has started a program to provide health services to the rural areas. In 1970, ten rural health centers were initiated. The shortage of trained medical personnel makes it impossible, however, to staff these centers adequately. China's medical assistance is thus filling an important Tanzanian need.

China's medical assistance is indicative of the general character of Chinese technical assistance to Tanzania. It provides a solution (though temporary and/or partial) to a resource hiatus, thereby making a direct contribution to Tanzania's development. By this contribution to Tanza-

²¹ As distinguished from Zanzibar, which had received medical assistance from China beginning at least from 1964.

²² The following account is based upon a close reading between 1967 and 1970 of the following sources: *The Daily Nation* (Nairobi), *The East African Standard* (Nairobi), *The Nationalist* and *The Standard*.

²³ *The Standard*, August 27, 1969.

²⁴ *The Standard*, February 28, 1970.

nia's developmental needs—economic, political and social—Chinese technical assistance also serves as an important support source for the partial informal alliance. We can accept the reality that all aid and technical assistance are extended by the donor to achieve specific policy objectives. Nonetheless, China cannot be charged with outright opportunism in its behavior in this case. Our examination of Chinese technical assistance and economic aid to Tanzania supports the depiction of China as making a significant short-term and long-run impact upon Tanzania's total development by its technical assistance and economic aid.

CHINA'S SELF-IMAGE OF AID TO TANZANIA

In addition to contributing to Tanzania's national development and forming a support source for the partial informal alliance, China's technical assistance has served an equally important function of demonstrating to China its important world role. This conclusion is based upon a random sample of news reports and articles relating to China's economic aid and technical assistance programs to Tanzania printed in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* in the years 1967 through 1969. Except for the winter of 1969, the attention level to China's activities in Tanzania, as shown especially in reports of technical assistance projects, was very great. On the average, one such report appeared each fortnight. If reports on China's role in Africa generally are included, there is an average of at least one article a week. Given the fact of "news management" in China, this would suggest that China's activities in Tanzania are perceived by the elite as serving some important internal function. At a minimum, these reports reflect China's self-image of its role in Tanzania.

Several themes are clear in the accounts of China's aid and technical assistance to Tanzania. First, Mao's Thought has relevance for both Chinese personnel abroad and the Tanzanians. Every report contained references to Mao's quotations. Indeed, Mao's teachings were the inspiration for the Chinese personnel. A typical quotation attributed to Mao went as follows: "To be determined, to be afraid of no sacrifices, to reject all difficulties and to achieve total victory."²⁵

The Chinese personnel in Tanzania were perceived also as "the fine technicians sent by Chairman Mao." As representatives of the Chairman, and imbued with Mao's Thought, the technicians withstood all hardships. A description of the agricultural workers at the Ruvu State Farm provided an example:

The Chinese technicians working on the farm responded eagerly to Vice President Lin Piao's call to study fully the works of Chairman Mao and to manage one's affairs in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions. [The technicians] have undergone the test of

²⁵ "To Serve the World's People with Sincerity," *JMJP*, March 15, 1968.

tropical hot weather and have conquered the difficulties caused by nature, while always maintaining their strength and spirit.

During the dry season, they laboured daily under the hot tropical sun, their clothes filled with sweat, their arms and faces covered with blisters and their skin peeling layer by layer from sunburn. Nevertheless, they have insisted on working at the farm during the past two years, labouring eight hours daily. [The technicians] said: "Imbued with Mao Tse-tung's thought and working for the people of Africa, we are not afraid of the hot burning sunshine."²⁶

Through the exemplary behavior of the Chinese personnel, the Tanzanians were reported to have come to know Mao. The Tanzanians were forever appreciative of "the good workers sent by Chairman Mao." Mao, symbolized by his thoughts and the good behavior of the technicians, represented the universal truth in Tanzania—and also in China.

Another theme running through the reports was the image of China as the champion of proletarian internationalism.²⁷ This theme had two inter-related parts. First, it is the duty of those who have won revolutionary victory to assist those who are still struggling for liberation. It is China's international duty, therefore, to aid those whose struggle is continuing. China's economic aid and technical assistance is given in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. This includes observing the basic principles of equality and mutual assistance, strict respect for the sovereignty of the recipient state, and unconditional support of the concept of self-reliance. In addition, China is against "big-country chauvinism." Secondly, China is at all times conscious of its competition with the Soviet Union. China's reference to its role as the leader of proletarian internationalism thus should be seen against the background of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Reports of technical assistance to Tanzania, and all other developing states, provide substance for China's claim and are to be compared to the Soviet Union's revisionism and social imperialism. In short, assistance to Tanzania is proof of China's righteous international role.

Finally, the behavior of the Chinese personnel abroad was cited as a model to be followed by those in China. The hardships and sense of responsibility of Chinese technicians in Tanzania are applauded as "service to the people" and "responsibility to the people" which should be emulated by all Chinese. In turn, the good behavior of the Chinese personnel was due to their "studying and practicing the works of Chairman Mao." The relationship between the Chinese technicians abroad and their compatriots at home was summarized in the following manner.

The proletarian international spirit of our personnel, who are rendering assistance to foreign countries and providing us with examples of

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ "Rendering Full-hearted Service to the World's People," *JMJP*, September 26, 1969.

their enthusiastic study and practice of Mao Tse-tung's thought, are worthy of being emulated by those of us [in China].²⁸

China's assistance projects and their personnel had thus come full circle. Intending to serve foreign policy objectives, the personnel of the technical assistance projects had been utilized as an internal support source by Mao and his supporters to achieve hegemony. This was clearly demonstrated in the attention level and the themes manifested in the reports in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* on China's personnel engaged in technical assistance projects. In this sense, China's role in Tanzania served a vital internal function for the Chinese elite.

One factor deserves to be emphasized in our conclusion. Namely, Chinese assistance, military and technical, was of great diversity, both of type and level. This undoubtedly had a cumulative impact upon Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction, with each level of interaction reinforcing the other. To put it differently, a large number of linkages had been built between China and Tanzania which unquestionably contributed toward the cohesiveness of the partial informal alliance.


²⁸ "On Chinese Personnel Rendering Assistance in Foreign Countries," *JMJP*, January 8, 1968.

VI

The Future of Chinese-Tanzanian Cooperative Interaction

The preceding chapters have attempted to explain the causes, development, and effects of Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction. It remains for us to examine the future prospects of the relationship. We shall do so within the context of the existing partial informal alliance, which we have outlined diagrammatically in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF
THE CHINESE-TANZANIAN PARTIAL INFORMAL ALLIANCE



Alliances are dynamic; they have what can be called life cycles. The Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance is no exception to this general rule, but its life cycle has not yet been determined. The formative stages and the pattern of development manifested in the interaction patterns can, however, be delineated. What cannot be known, of course, is the termination of the alliance. We have no method by which to determine the life cycle of an alliance. But specific determinants which influence the future can be identified. These include indicators such as national policy, interaction patterns, and the needs and capabilities of the two parties. To conclude our study of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance, we turn now to these determinants of future prospects.

One method through which alliances terminate is formal or informal expiration. The Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance could expire formally upon the expiration of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship, which has a term of ten years beginning in 1965. A failure by either of the contracting parties to renew the agreement, as provided in the Treaty, would be an overt indicator of the formal termination of the relationship. The formal indicator would be, however, merely a manifestation of the informal conditions which determined the causes and development of the partial informal alliance. To put it differently, the conditions which governed the factors contributing to the formalization and development can also be utilized as determinants to project the future prospects of the relationship.

An important determinant influencing Chinese-Tanzanian interaction has been the objectives and goals of the respective elites. The growth and development of the partial informal alliance can be explained in terms of a favorable convergence of some common interests of the two actors, as perceived by the participating elites. One attribute which both China and Tanzania share in common, at least in relative terms, is that each is governed by first generation post-independence elites. Though their precise objectives and goals differ, each elite group has been faced with the realities of governing, organizing, and dealing with a multitude of problems—against great internal and external obstacles. That these impediments were not always identical is unimportant; what is important is that the elites have perceived each other as being able to contribute toward resolving their problems through joint action. The question applicable to both elite groups is whether their perceptions and policies will be held and pursued by their respective successors.

To suggest that the same problems will influence the perceptions and policies of the succeeding governing elites, or that the problems themselves will remain constant, would be to deny the idea of change. China and Tanzania are both societies experiencing rapid transformation. This is especially true of Tanzania, where the “wind of change” has only recently begun to blow, and where development in all its phases has only just

commenced. Neither can one speak with certainty regarding China. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its aftermath is certain to have a profound impact upon China, with consequences that cannot be foreseen. In the final analysis, the importance of the national political factor upon the future of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance cannot be overemphasized. The Maoist group in China and the Tanzanian leadership under President Nyerere have been important determinants, largely responsible for the growth and development of the relationship. A change in the elite composition of either or both actors could have a serious impact on the future of the partial informal alliance.

The international situational-environmental context has also been an important determinant in Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction. On one hand, China has sought to use Tanzania as a battleground to combat the United States and the Soviet Union; on the other, Tanzania, directly and indirectly, has looked to China for security assistance, principally within the context of southern African developments. This latter factor could have far-reaching consequences. Consider Tanzania's status. Given its geography and its commitment to Africa's liberation from colonialism and white minority rule, Tanzania has perceived its security as being increasingly threatened. Thus the need for military development, which China has contributed. However, these threatening forces are still vastly superior in power and as determined as ever to preserve the status quo. This has only redoubled Tanzania's determination to liberate Africa, and reinforced its urgent desire to establish a military force.

The question here is how far China will be willing to go in granting additional military assistance to Tanzania. Given China's own security priorities and limited military capabilities, can China meet Tanzania's military needs and expectations? There seems little question of China's military capacity to provide assistance to Tanzania in the conventional sense. The key question becomes, therefore, the level of Chinese assistance. It seems unlikely that a major Chinese military program to Tanzania will go unchallenged, by either the West or by the white southern African regimes. At the same time, China will surely seek to maintain its relationship with Tanzania; its role dictates such a reaction. In short, China's response to Tanzania's security need is an important determinant in the future of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction. China's decision whether to maintain, or to increase, the existing level of military interaction will be certain to have an impact upon the future of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance.

Another important determinant which governs Chinese-Tanzanian interaction relates to Tanzania's national developmental needs and China's capabilities. As we have repeatedly stressed, Tanzania has been trying to carry forward major economic and social developmental schemes. However, one basic problem is the lack of capital; another is the scarcity of

human resources. Tanzania not only lacks these, it has also encountered great difficulties in obtaining foreign aid and technical assistance. In large part, the development of the partial informal alliance has been due to China's role as donor of aid, and as provider of technical assistance. Nor should we neglect the categories of aid, and the interaction patterns under which aid has been extended. China has rendered aid both as routine interaction of the alliance, and as responsive interaction resulting from a crisis. The categories of Chinese aid were highly diverse, ranging from the Tanzania-Zambia railway project to a shoe factory. In short, one factor which has contributed to the successful growth of the partial informal alliance is China's role response to Tanzania's developmental requisites.

A vital question for the future development of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction is whether China has the capabilities to meet Tanzania's expectations and needs. Considering China's own developmental needs, China can ill afford—from a critical economic viewpoint—greatly to expand the aid level. Existing commitments such as the rail project will undoubtedly impose considerable strains on China—both economic and political—though none have yet been voiced. On another plane, there is the question of China's aid to Tanzania in relation to China's total foreign policy. Given China's limited capabilities, what priority within a scale of foreign policy priorities will China assign to Tanzania in the future? This question is especially relevant within the context of China's world role: China cannot be expected to focus upon Tanzania to the exclusion of all other states. The cost of such a foreign policy would far outweigh the benefits. The future level of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction, therefore, will be influenced both by China's own developmental requisites, and by China's world role.

The future of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance will result from some combination of these and other factors. That the three determinants discussed are interrelated is self-evident. For example, elite perception has influenced the development of interaction patterns, just as the increased levels of interaction have reinforced the solidarity between the two actors. A change in any one of the determinants will have an impact upon the others, thereby altering the development of the Chinese-Tanzanian partial informal alliance.

Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction has been examined within the context of the partial informal alliance. We want to make clear, however, that the alliance has been neither formal nor exclusive, and only partial. A point needing emphasis is that, with the exception of the colonial and minority white regimes of Africa, Tanzania has sought interaction with all states and has been a leading advocate of nonalignment. Consider, for example, Tanzania's policy with respect to the acceptance of foreign aid. One of the most fascinating phases of Tanzanian affairs has been the concurrent presence of a variety of foreign aid programs from a diversity of sources—Canada, China, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger-

many, France, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, North Korea, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United States and a host of other states. Thus, Tanzania has not limited its relations to one state, or to a particular bloc of states; and China was only one state among many competing in the Tanzanian "open market." That Chinese-Tanzanian interaction has been highly successful has been due to China's ability to compete internationally by the utilization of selected foreign policy instruments.

We began this study with the objective of depicting China's foreign policy and behavior in a cooperative role. We recognize that Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction does not constitute the only pattern of China's international behavior; we are also cognizant of China's conflictual international behavior patterns. Nonetheless, Chinese-Tanzanian cooperative interaction, as we have demonstrated, does represent one significant Chinese interaction pattern. As one interaction pattern along a scale of interaction patterns, China's cooperative interaction behavior deserves inclusion in the study of China's total foreign policy and behavior.

Documents

The documents are intended to give the reader a sampling of the data available and used in the study. They are of three categories: (1) treaties and other formal communications; (2) materials illustrating Chinese elite perceptions of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction; and (3) similar materials indicating the Tanzanian response.

For additional data, the reader is encouraged to consult the sources cited in the footnotes.

1. The Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship (1965)

This treaty was signed in Peking on February 20, 1965, during President Nyerere's first state visit to China.

The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania,

Desiring to consolidate and further develop the profound friendship between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania, and

Being convinced that the strengthening of friendly cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania conforms to the fundamental interests of the peoples of the two countries, helps promote the solidarity between them as well as among Asian and African peoples and the common struggle against imperialism, and conduces to peace in Asia, Africa and the world,

Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty, the articles of which are as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties will maintain and develop the relations of peace and friendship between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Parties pledge to take the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence as the principles guiding the relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE III

The Contracting Parties agree to develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Parties undertake to settle through peaceful consultations any issue that may arise between them.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Dar es Salaam as soon as possible.

The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a period of ten years. Unless either of the Contracting Parties gives to the other notice in writing to terminate the present Treaty one year before the expiration of this period, the present Treaty shall be automatically prolonged for another period of ten years, and shall thereafter be renewable accordingly.

Done in duplicate in Peking on February 20, 1965, in the Chinese, Swahili, and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic.

Chairman of
the people's Republic
of China
LIU SHAO-CHI
(Signed)

President of the
United
Republic of Tanzania
JULIUS K. NYERERE
(Signed)

2. Sino-Tanzanian Joint Communiqué

This joint communiqué was issued at the end of President Nyerere's state visit to China in 1965. The text here used is that published in the Chinese official organ Peking Review, and the emphasis has been retained. The document is reprinted in full except for a first paragraph listing the members of President Nyerere's party.

It is perhaps of interest to note that no communiqué was issued in connection with President Nyerere's second state visit to China in 1968.

During their sojourn in China, President Julius K. Nyerere and the other distinguished guests from Tanzania toured Peking, Nanking and Shanghai, where they visited factories, a people's commune and cultural and educational institutions. They made extensive friendly contacts with the Chinese people and were accorded warm welcome and kind hospitality by the Chinese Government and Chinese people. This fully manifested the profound friendship existing between the peoples of China and Tanzania.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, met and had a cordial and friendly conversation with President Nyerere and the other distinguished guests from Tanzania.

Talks were held between Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, and Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were: Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier of the State Council; Fang Yi, Chairman of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries; General Chang Ai-ping, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; Chiao Kuan-hua, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lu Hsu-chang, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade; Chen Chung-ching, Vice-Chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; Ho Ying, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Tanzania; Ko Hua, Director of the Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also taking part in the talks on the Tanzanian side were: The Hon. O. S. Kambona, Minister for External Affairs; The Hon. A.M. Babu, Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives; The Hon. I. M. Bhoke Munanka, Minister of State, President's Office; The Hon. M. A. Jumbe, Minister of State, First Vice-President's Office; H. E. Alhaj Tewa Said Tewa, Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania to China; Mr. S. K. M. Luangisa, Member of TANU National Executive; Mr. Saidi Washoto, Member of Zanzibar Revolutionary Council; Mr. O. M. Katikaza, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry for External Affairs.

The talks were held in a sincere, frank, cordial and friendly atmosphere. **During the talks, the two parties had a full exchange of views on international questions of common concern and on the further development of the relations of friendly co-operation between the two countries, and an identity of views was reached on the questions discussed.**

The two parties held that the present international situation is most favourable to the peoples of the world and unfavourable to imperialism and colonialism.

The two parties warmly hailed the victories won by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and for the winning and safeguarding of national independence. **The two parties were of the firm conviction that so long as the peoples of the world strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle, they will surely win final victory in completely eradicating imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.**

The two parties were pleased to note that the national-liberation movements in Africa are gaining momentum. The African states which have attained independence are scoring one victory after another in safeguarding their national economies and culture, building up their national armies, etc. The African peoples who still remain under the colonial rule of imperialism are waging heroic struggles for national independence. The two parties expressed the firm belief that a new Africa, politically independent and economically prosperous and strong, will certainly emerge as a result of the unremitting efforts and struggle of the African peoples.

The two parties stressed that imperialism and colonialism would never be reconciled to their defeat and step down from the stage of history of their own accord. They would always try hard to maintain their colonial rule by such means as political, economic and military aggression. The facts have constantly taught the peoples that in order to win and safeguard national independence, the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism must be carried through to the end.

The two parties pledged their support to the people of the Congo (L) in their just and patriotic anti-imperialist struggle, and strongly condemned outside intervention in the Congo (L). They stressed therefore that the foreign mercenaries and imperialist forces must withdraw from the Congo (L) and that the problems of the Congo (L) should be settled by the people of the Congo (L) themselves.

The two parties expressed warm congratulations to the people of Gambia who have just achieved independence. The two parties pledged firm support to the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Southwest Africa, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, French Somaliland and other African countries still under colonial rule in their struggle for national independence.

The two parties condemned the policies of racial discrimination and apartheid which are practised by the South African and Southern Rhodesian colonial authorities and in some other parts of the world; they expressed firm support to the peoples of South Africa and Zimbabwe in their struggle against racial discrimination and for national liberation.

Both parties agreed that all nations, large and small, have the inalienable right to independent existence and full sovereignty. They therefore called upon all nations to exercise mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other. **The two parties were opposed to imperialist aggression and intervention against Viet Nam, Korea and Cuba, and expressed their support to the just struggles of the people of these countries.**

Both parties stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

The two parties held that the success of the Second African-Asian Conference will be of great significance to the Asian and African peoples' cause of unity against imperialism. The two parties expressed the deep conviction that the forthcoming conference will contribute tremendously to the strengthening of the Asian and African countries' cause of unity against imperialism, to the promotion of economic co-operation between these countries and to the defence of world peace. **Both parties expressed their determination to make concerted efforts with the other Asian and African countries for the success of the Second African-Asian Conference.**

The two parties agreed that in order to consolidate their political independence and shake off poverty and backwardness, it is necessary for the new-emerging countries in Asia and Africa to make energetic efforts to develop their national economy on the principle of mainly relying on their own strength. The two parties pointed out that the Asian and African countries, with their industrious and talented people and rich natural resources, are fully capable of developing their respective countries by their own strength. The Asian and African countries should support and assist one another on the basis of equality and mutual benefit so as to bring about common prosperity for their economies. **All countries should base themselves on the principles of equality and mutual benefit in their trade relations and economic co-operation with the Asian and African countries; no privileges or strings should be attached to any aid; and all attempts at interference in others' internal affairs by means of aid should be resolutely opposed.**

The two parties noted with great satisfaction that in recent years rapid development has taken place in the friendly co-operation between the two countries in the political, economic, trade and cultural fields. **Both parties were determined to make joint efforts for the further consolidation and development of the friendship between the two countries.**

The Chinese side pledged firm support to the just struggle waged by the United Republic of Tanzania under the leadership of President Nyerere to strengthen unity, safeguard national independence and state sovereignty, and oppose imperialist subversive schemes; it expressed appreciation of and admiration for the remarkable achievements scored by the Tanzanian Government and people in their efforts to eliminate colonialist influence and develop their country; and it highly appraised the just stand taken by the Tanzanian Government and people in opposing imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, supporting the national-liberation movements in Africa, safeguarding Asian-African solidarity and defending world peace.

The Tanzanian side reaffirmed its support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, its opposition to the imperialist plots for creating "two Chinas," and its support for the Chinese Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese side expressed thanks for this.

During President Julius K. Nyerere's visit in China, the two parties signed a Treaty of Friendship Between the People's Republic of China and the United

Republic of Tanzania. This marks a new phase in the development of the relations of friendship and co-operation between the two countries. The visit by President Nyerere to China was an important contribution to the promotion of friendship and mutual understanding between the two peoples, the strengthening of Asian-African solidarity and the defence of world peace.

The President of the United Republic of Tanzania extended an invitation to the Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China to visit the United Republic of Tanzania at a time convenient to them. Chairman Liu Shao-chi and Premier Chou En-lai gladly accepted the invitation.

February 23, 1965.

3. Premier Chou En-lai's Speech in Tanzania (1965)

Premier Chou's speech was delivered at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam during the course of his visit to Tanzania in 1965.

It is a great pleasure for us to meet here today the people of all circles of the capital of the United Republic of Tanzania. In coming here I have brought to you and the people of all Tanzania the cordial greetings and high tribute of the 650 million Chinese people.

In the last two days we have felt deeply the Tanzanian people's sincere friendship for the Chinese people. We shall never forget the stirring and colorful scenes of welcome. On behalf of my colleague and in my own name, I wish to extend our sincere thanks to His Excellency President Nyerere and the Tanzanian government and people for all that.

Although this is our first visit to the United Republic on Tanzania, my colleagues and I do not find ourselves in a strange land. Intercourse between our two countries dated back to 900 years ago. Some 500 years ago, the Chinese navigator Cheng Ho reached East African coasts. The numerous pieces of ancient Chinese porcelain excavated in Tanzania bear eloquent witness to the long-standing traditional friendship between our two peoples. In their protracted struggles for national independence and against imperialism and colonialism, our two peoples have always given each other sympathy and support. The "Maji Maji" Uprising in your country in early 20th century which shook the colonial rule and the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism at that time though separated by great distance inspired each other. We have therefore come to your country as envoys of the Chinese people to renew acquaintance with our old friends and comrades-in-arms.

Since our two countries shook off imperialist and colonialist domination and achieved independence respectively, the traditional friendship between our two peoples has shone with new splendor. New relations of friendly cooperation have been established and developed between our two countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the ten principles of the Bandung Conference. Economic and cultural exchanges have been growing and the friendly contacts between our two governments and peoples are increasing. His Excellency Second Vice President Kawawa visited China in June last year, and in February this year His Excellency President Nyerere himself paid a State visit to our country. During their visits, our two countries concluded an agreement on economic and technical cooperation and a treaty of friendship, thus bringing our relations of friendly cooperation to a new stage. I hope that our present visit will further strengthen the friendship and solidarity between our two peoples.

The Chinese people note with great admiration that the new-born United Republic of Tanzania is marching forward proudly and confidently on the path of independent development. You have made great efforts and scored remarkable successes in liquidating colonialist influence and developing national economy and culture. You have built up a national army of your own and vigorously carried out the Africanization of your civil service. You have taken over some of the plantations of the colonialists, vigorously developed agricul-

ture, set up farms and tractor stations and constructed dams. Actively taking part in the self-help scheme for national reconstruction, the Tanzanian people have built many farms, dams, schools and clinics. Though we have been here for only two days, we have been deeply impressed by your zeal in construction and the flourishing conditions in your country.

Asian and African countries have won independence mainly by relying on the struggle of their own people, and after independence, it is also necessary for them first to rely on the efforts of their own people in order to develop national economy and carry out national reconstruction. Self-reliance, hard work and thrift in national reconstruction constitute a line of confidence in the masses of the people and reliance on them to attain complete independence through the development of the national economy. His Excellency President Nyerere has aptly said: "We have no money but we have hands, on which we can rely for our own development." What a forceful voice! This is the aspiring and confident voice of the entire people of Tanzania. Tanzania has an industrious and courageous people dedicated to the prosperity and advancement of their country. It is endowed with vast expanses of fertile land and rich underground resources. We have no doubt that, by following the path of self-reliance pointed out by His Excellency President Nyerere, you will certainly be able to build your country into a mighty and prosperous one.

After winning independence, the people of Tanzania have not forgotten their African brothers who are still under the oppression and enslavement of colonial rule. You have been actively and zealously supporting the fighting peoples in the Congo (Leopoldville), Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Tanzania has become a glorious banner in East Africa, a banner against old and new colonialism and for national liberation struggles. In the world arena, the United Republic of Tanzania has taken a clear-cut stand against imperialist policies of aggression and war, upholding Asian-African solidarity and defending world peace, and has made active contributions in these respects. All this has won respect and praise from the people of the world for the United Republic of Tanzania and greatly raised its international standing.

The imperialists and old and new colonialists are unwilling to see an independent Tanzania towering on the East African coast. They have brought political and economic pressure to bear on you and even resorted to frenzied and despicable subversion. But they have met with resolute counter-blows from the people of Tanzania. Recently, you have uncovered one subversive plot after another of the imperialists and expelled the U.S. diplomats involved. These dauntless and resolute acts of yours serve as a forceful warning to the imperialists and old and new colonialists: the people of Tanzania have stood up and are not to be bullied.

Early last year I visited ten friendly countries in Africa, spending 50 days and covering tens of thousands of miles. I saw with my own eyes that Africa was experiencing a great earth-shaking change and that the African which had been hard oppressed and trampled underfoot by colonialism has become an awakened, militant and advanced continent. And this impression has been further accentuated by what we have seen and heard here in your country.

Imperialism and colonialism used to regard Africa as their strategic rear.

But today it has become a front line in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. In the already independent African states, the people are fighting unremittingly against imperialist and colonialist aggression, intervention, subversion and infiltration. They are watchfully guarding their national independence and State sovereignty and are determined to carry forward their national democratic revolution. The African countries which have not yet attained independence are all ablaze with the struggle for national independence. The people of South Africa and Zimbabwe are persistently fighting against racial discrimination and for independence and freedom in defiance of the barbarous suppression by the South African and Southern Rhodesian colonialist authorities. The people of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea are engaged in heroic armed struggles against the brutal Portuguese colonialists. The African people who have been subjected to centuries of enslavement, oppression, plunder and insults of every kind, have now stood up, determined to be masters of their own destiny. Africa will certainly become the African people's Africa. It will certainly become an independent and free Africa. This is a historical trend which no imperialism or reactionary force can resist.

An exceedingly favorable situation for revolution prevails today not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America. The national liberation movement in Africa converging with that in Asia and Latin America has become a mighty torrent pounding with great momentum at the foundation of the rule of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The revolutionary storms in these areas are vividly described in Chairman Mao Tse-tung's famous verses, "The four seas are seething, clouds louring and waters raging; the five continents are rocked by storm and thunder."

As the situation is become more and more unfavorable to imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, they are adopting more ferocious and barbarous means to try to strangle the national liberation movement. U.S. imperialism, in particular, not only supports old colonialism and becomes the main bulwark of colonialism today, but is ambitiously making a bid for world hegemony. It does not tolerate the Asian, African and Latin American peoples standing up on their own feet and becoming masters of their own countries. It is unwilling to see these countries developing independently and attaining prosperity. It wants to ride on the backs of the people of these countries and place them under its colonialist rule. It habitually uses neo-colonialist methods of rule, which are more deceptive. But in the face of the revolutionary storm sweeping Africa, Asia and Latin America, it becomes desperate like a cornered dog and is increasingly revealing its true nature which is even more ruthless than old colonialism and Hitlerite fascism.

In Africa, the United States has colluded with the old colonialist countries in launching armed intervention against the Congo (Leopoldville) and massacring the patriotic soldiers and civilians there. Up till now it is still using mercenaries composed of desperadoes for intensified attacks on the patriotic armed forces there. It has fostered Tshombe, the murderer of Lumumba, as its agent in the Congo (Leopoldville). Moreover, through the Tshombe puppet regime it is constantly carrying out threats, subversion and armed attacks against the country contiguous of the Congo (Leopoldville), in an attempt to

prevent these countries from supporting the Congolese (Leopoldville) people in their patriotic and just struggle against U.S. imperialism.

But barbarous suppression and temporary setbacks, instead of disheartening the Congolese (Leopoldville) people, have heightened their will to fight. They are holding still higher the banner of anti-U.S. patriotism and broadening and deepening their struggle. They pledge their determination to turn the Congo (Leopoldville) into a grave for U.S. imperialism. The Chinese people have consistently supported the Congolese people in their patriotic and just anti-U.S. struggle and, together with the other African peoples, will give every possible aid to the Congolese people.

In Latin America, the United States has dispatched tens of thousands of troops for outright armed aggression against the Dominican Republic with a population of only 3 million. The Dominican people have been forced to take up arms in resistance. The wave of wrath against the United States is spreading fast all over Latin America. The Chinese people firmly stand by the Dominican people and are convinced that no matter how tortuous the path of struggle, the fire of the anti-U.S. struggle of the Dominican people can never be put down, the final victory will certainly belong to the Dominican people.

In Asia, the United States has torn the Geneva Agreement to shreds and launched a war of aggression, the most dirty, shameless and brutal of its kind in the contemporary world, in South Vietnam. It has thrown an increasing number of its armed forces into South Vietnam and employed all kinds of modern weapons short of nuclear ones, not excluding the inhuman use of poison gas. It has razed to the ground many towns and villages in South Vietnam, and slaughtered and mutilated hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese people. As it suffered crushing defeats in South Vietnam, U.S. imperialism has resorted to wanton bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, thereby spreading the war flames to North Vietnam step by step.

The 30 million Vietnamese people, united as one and displaying their national tradition of tenacity and their common hatred of the enemy, are carrying on a heroic struggle against the U.S. aggressor. Full of fighting spirit and growing stronger as they fight, they have scored brilliant victories. Under the leadership of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation and with the support of their fellow countrymen in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnamese people are battering the fully-armed U.S. aggressor out of his senses. The people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are also dealing heavy blows at the U.S. imperialist forces intruding into the North. Today, four-fifths of the territory of South Vietnam and two-thirds of its population, that is to say about ten million people, have been liberated. The U.S. aggressor is bogged down in South Vietnam deeper and deeper, with his forces struggling and being depleted there day by day and month by month.

The present heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against U. S. imperialism not only forms an important part of the struggle of the people of the whole world in defense of world peace against imperialism, but has become the focus of this struggle, with its impact far exceeding the boundaries of Vietnam. By their struggle the Vietnamese people are tightly pinning down forces of U.S. imperialism, seriously depleting them and thus upsetting its global plans for

aggression and war. This constitutes a powerful support to the Asian-African countries in their struggle to win and safeguard national independence, and a great contribution to the cause of defending world peace. It is the bounden duty of all the peace-loving countries and people of Asia, Africa and the whole world to give all out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people who are fighting heroically. The 650 million Chinese people have always regarded it as their sacred international duty to support and assist the Vietnamese people in their just struggle. Together with the people of Africa, Asia and the whole world, we will further help the Vietnamese people carry their struggle to resist U.S. aggression and save the nation through to the end. We firmly hold that the United States must withdraw all her military forces from South Vietnam and that the Vietnam question must be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves.

The 2nd Afro-Asian Conference is due to open in Algeria in about 20 days. The 1st Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in Indonesia ten years ago has exerted far-reaching influence in promoting the Asian-African people's cause of solidarity against imperialism. In the new situation in our struggle today, particularly when U.S. imperialism has embarked on the adventurist road of war provocations in Vietnam, it is imperative for the Asian-African countries to give full play to the Bandung spirit, unite still more closely, strengthen their cooperation and fight together against the imperialist policies of aggression and war, in order to win and safeguard national independence, develop national economy and defend world peace. Therefore, it will be of tremendous importance to make the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference a success. The imperialists and other reactionaries will not relax their efforts to sabotage this conference. But I am convinced that so long as the participating countries made common efforts and live up to the expectations of the 2,000 million Asian-African people, the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference will certainly be able to surmount all obstacles and difficulties and carry the Asian-African people's cause of solidarity against imperialism to a new stage.

Dear friends! Although China and Tanzania are separated by great distances and wide oceans, our common past experiences have long bound our two peoples together. In the protracted common struggle against the common enemy, our ties have stood tests and become closer and firmer than before. In the common cause of opposing imperialism and old and new colonialism, safeguarding national independence, strengthening Asian-African solidarity and defending world peace in the days to come, the Chinese people will unite with the Tanzanian people still further and advance together with them hand in hand.

Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Tanzanian peoples!

Long live the friendship between the Chinese and African peoples!

Long live Asian-African solidarity!

Long live the great unity of the people of the whole world!

Long live world peace!

4. Welcome to President Nyerere (1968)

The following editorial in the Jen-min Jih-pao welcomed President Nyerere to China in 1968.

President Julius K. Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania is arriving in Peking today for a state visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government. Once again President Nyerere is bringing with him profound friendship of the Tanzanian and African people for the Chinese people. With great enthusiasm, the seven hundred million Chinese people most warmly welcome their brothers and comrades-in-arms hailing from the anti-imperialist in Africa.

President Nyerere's visit to our country at a time when China's great proletarian cultural revolution is winning all-round victory is a tremendous support and encouragement for the Chinese people. President Nyerere will see for himself the great fruits of our great proletarian cultural revolution personally initiated and led by our great leader Chairman Mao. Everywhere in China is a scene of vigorous revolution; the seven hundred million people who are armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought are all the more inspired with a revolutionary spirit and production is prospering in the fields of industry and agriculture. Socialist China has never been so powerful as it is today.

There exists long-standing traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Tanzania. In our prolonged struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, we have always supported and encouraged each other. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, friendly cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres has witnessed tremendous development. In 1964, Second Vice-President Rashidi M. Kawawa visited our country and signed with China an agreement on economic and technical cooperation; in February 1965, President Nyerere visited China and signed a treaty of friendship between two countries and in June of the same year, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai visited Tanzania. The mutual visits between leaders of the two countries have made important contribution to promoting the friendship between the two peoples. The relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Tanzania have set a fine example for the unity and cooperation among Asian and African countries.

Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people, has taught us: "The Asian, African and Latin American people, who love freedom and independence, are all fighting colonialism . . . the colonialists want us to have no unity, cooperation or friendship. We must answer them by strengthening our unity and friendly cooperation and we must bring their schemes to nought."

The constant strengthening of the militant unity and friendly cooperation between China and Tanzania is a powerful blow to U.S.-led imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

The Chinese people always admired and firmly support the Tanzanian people in their resolute and just struggle under the leadership of president Nyerere against imperialist intervention and subversion and for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty. The Tanzanian people have made unremitting efforts and achieved one new success after another in developing their

national economy and culture and liquidating the remnants of colonialism. Under the inspiration of the spirit of self-reliance of the "Arusha Declaration," the Tanzanian people are now diligently and industriously working to build their own country. The Tanzanian Government and people have made active contributions to supporting the national-liberation movement in Africa. The international prestige of the United Republic of Tanzania is rising with each passing day. The Chinese people are greatly elated at this. Recently, Tanzania has resolutely opposed the political swindle of the "Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty" jointly concocted by the United States and the Soviet Union. This just action of defying brute force has won the praise of people the world over.

We live today in a great new era of world revolution. The world people's anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle is on a new upsurge. The national-liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America are surging forward vigorously. The Vietnamese people's war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is dealing ever heavier blows to U.S. imperialism. The masses of the people in Europe and North America have also experienced a new awakening and staged raging storms of struggle against the rule of monopoly capitalist class. Imperialism headed by the United States is facing grave political and economic crises; its going is becoming tougher and tougher. Imperialism and all colonialism, old and new, will definitely not last long.

Let the Chinese people and the Tanzanian people further unite, let the people in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America further unite, and let the people of the whole world further unite and fight shoulder to shoulder for complete burial of the imperialist-colonialist system.

Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), June 18, 1968. This translation is taken from the *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, Dar es Salaam, No. 552 (June 20, 1968), pp. 1-3.

5. “Everlasting Friendship” (1968)

This document is an example of China's self-image of its role as expressed in the work of Chinese technicians in Africa.

Though China and Tanzania are separated by mountains and oceans, the peoples of the two countries always cooperate and support each other in their struggle against imperialism and for building their countries. The Chinese people regard the Tanzanian people as their friends and they in turn often say: “The Chinese people are our brothers!”

A group of the Chinese technical personnel who helped the Tanzanian people in construction returned home not long ago. They brought back from Africa the Tanzanian people's friendship for the Chinese people and their high esteem for our great leader Chairman Mao.

During their stay in Tanzania, the Chinese personnel lived in a friendly atmosphere whether in the cities or villages, at work-sites or in apartments. In particular, they were deeply moved by the love expressed by the Tanzanian people for Chairman Mao. On the national day, October 1, of the Chinese People's Republic last year, Chinese technical personnel at the building site for a school in Tanzania, held a reception at which a good number of Tanzanian friends hailed the great achievements made by the Chinese people under the leadership of Chairman Mao and rejoiced at the assistance of the technicians sent by Chairman Mao in developing their national economy. A leading member of the school said that China not only had given them economic aid but had brought them Chairman Mao Tse-tung's ideas on self-reliance in construction. The spirit of diligence, courage and selfless labour displayed by the Chinese experts had set an example for them to learn from, he said. During the cordial conversation between the hosts and guests, a Tanzanian worker shook hands with a Chinese technician and said: “We are very grateful to Chairman Mao!” and some workers shouted: “Long live Chairman Mao! Long live Chairman Mao!”

An old worker in the school, whose son had studied in China and seen the tremendous advances made by the Chinese people led by Chairman Mao, said to a Chinese technician that Chairman Mao was very great indeed. “The Chinese people have built their country very well under his leadership. I will surely ask my son to study Chairman Mao's works well and serve the Tanzanian people.”

When the Chinese arts crafts exhibition was showing in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania, thousands upon thousands of the Tanzanian friends attended and many of them came from distant places. Many visitors saluted to the portrait of Chairman Mao in the exhibition hall and some brought their families to the exhibition and had a photo taken in front of Chairman Mao's portrait. They said that they were honoured to take a photo before the portrait of Chairman Mao.

Some Chinese technicians said that during their stay of more than two years in Tanzania they had kept in mind the teachings of Chairman Mao, taking the internationalist fighter Norman Bethune as their example, lived and worked

with the Tanzanian people and established close friendly relations with them. They had received great kindness from the Tanzanian people. On the construction sites and farms where the Chinese technicians worked, the Tanzanian Government and people had provided good facilities and they were able to fulfill their tasks smoothly. The Tanzanian people commended the work done by the Chinese technical personnel. This encouraged them, as did the warm praise that they were “good workers sent by Chairman Mao” and “our Chinese brothers.” The Tanzanian people paid attention to the daily life of the Chinese workers. When a Chinese technician was injured on his job, skilled doctors were immediately sent by the Tanzanian Government. During his hospitalization he received every attention from doctors, nurses and local friends, who praised his utter devotion to the work and wished him a speedy recovery.

Chinese technicians saw the courageous actions of the Tanzanian people led by President Julius K. Nyerere in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism and in defending national independence, as well as the achievements they made through self-reliance in developing their economy. The Chinese technicians rejoiced at this and were inspired to contribute their share wholeheartedly.

When the day scheduled for the departure of Chinese technicians from Dar es Salaam came, many people came to see them off. Some Tanzanian friends warmly shook hands with the Chinese workers and repeatedly expressed their love for Chairman Mao, wishing that the friendship between the peoples of the two countries be ever green. One worker said to a Chinese technician: “When you get home be sure to give Chairman Mao our best wishes!” The worker asked the Chinese to deliver a letter to Chairman Mao, in which he wrote:

“Respected Chairman and great helmsman:

“We young people and children of Tanzania hail and thank you who have sent us industrious and brave men. We are determined, alongside the Chinese people, to fight resolutely against imperialism.

“Long live Chairman Mao! A long, long life to you!”

Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), June 19, 1968. This translation is taken from the *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, Dar es Salaam, No. 553 (June 21, 1968), pp. 5–7.

6. "Aid from China" (1966)

This editorial was published in The Nationalist, the official organ of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union.

Speaking about external assistance for development projects in his Budget Speech, the Minister for Finance, Mr. Jamal, expressed the anticipation that additional funds would be obtained.

Two days ago his colleague, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Mr. Bomani, announced that the People's Republic of China is to give us a loan of 40 million shillings and a grant of 20 million shillings. The loan is to be interest free and repayable over ten years from 1971. This is assistance on a generous and spectacular scale, for which we are very grateful.

The latest Chinese capital assistance brings China's commitment to our development plans up to the tune of 180 million shillings. By any standards this is an impressive degree of participation in our development efforts about which the People's Republic of China should be justifiably proud. Help from China has gone into a range of development projects including the Mao Tse-tung Textile Mill, the radio transmitter, land productivity studies, and the Tanzania-Zambia rail link survey. This testifies to the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people of our development aspirations and economic objectives.

The Chinese aid is especially noteworthy, since in these days of external assistance on a commercial basis this is interest free, with a reasonable period of grace. This latest one acquires added significance because it comes to replace British aid pledged to our development programme but "frozen" when we decided in December to uphold the honour of our country and of the O.A.U. by breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. The freezing of the British loan put in jeopardy the execution of several schemes already embarked upon. These will now be reprieved by the Chinese offer.

The friendship and co-operation between China and Tanzania has grown phenomenally since our independence. This is a remarkable achievement on the part of both countries, particularly when it is remembered that in pre-independence days contacts both on a people-to-people and government-to-government basis between us were barred because of the prejudices and restrictions of the colonial government. It is therefore gratifying that in five years we should have attained such a high degree of co-operation and understanding.

If precedent is any guide we may expect that this latest Chinese aid will set wagging the tongues of the rumour-mongers and Communist augurers of the Western countries. As often in the past they will take acceptance of this aid as so-called evidence of our subjection to Chinese domination. As in the past we should ignore these rantings. We have by now amply demonstrated that as far as we are concerned the important factor in our consideration of foreign assistance is not that it is British or Chinese, American or Communist, but whether it will tie down or advance our development.

We hope that the friendly relations and economic co-operation of which the loan and grant are a practical demonstration will be further strengthened.

7. "New China" (1969)

This comment from The Nationalist is representative of the official Tanzanian view of China.

The People's Republic of China yesterday celebrated its twentieth anniversary with deserved grand manifestations marked by military parades, mass processions and rallies symbolising the unity of the Chinese people under the Communist Party of China which led them during the liberation struggle and is now leading them in the construction and consolidation of socialism in the New China.

Over the past twenty years, New China has, every passing year, demonstrated more than ever before, that it is here not only to live as a free, independent, democratic country but also to flourish as a powerful, self-reliant socialist country; free from exploitation from any quarters, vigilant, revolutionary and uncompromisingly anti-imperialist.

But perhaps more than anything else, People's China has demonstrated to the world one thing which is unique and peculiar only to those countries that have followed a similar path of development. New China, has, over the past twenty years, once again, demonstrated the **POWER OF SOCIALISM**.

New China was liberated only twenty years ago from long years of multi-pronged foreign domination. At the time of its liberation, China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal backward country. But today, New China has all the characteristics of a truly big **POWER**. It has a powerful independent industrial base interwoven in a self-sustaining socialist economy; it had a united conscientious hard working people alive to their responsibilities and ready to sacrifice, build and defend their country, and finally China has the "Bomb"; today's status quo symbol in the world's real politic.

From all this, it is clearly seen that the socialist system is the surest and quickest way to development; this is particularly so for long oppressed and exploited countries such as those to be found in most of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Indeed, in all these countries an option for capitalism, which takes centuries to develop (and even then only towards decadence and final extinction) cannot be justified in any manner.

But when all this has been said and New China has been put in its proper perspective, we would like, to ask the people of the entire world to do a little more serious soul searching about the People's Republic of China. This soul searching should begin from the basic question that: when the oppressed and exploited peoples of the world can find such an inspiring example in New China; when the national liberation movement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America can find such a reliable ally in New China; when the peoples of these countries can find such a friend in China, why should they accept the so-called "isolation of China" policies to be imposed on them by imperialist countries that fear and hate China for nothing but sheer greed and other imperialistic ends? Indeed why should a third of humanity be isolated for nothing?

The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), October 2, 1969.

8. President Nyerere's Speech in China (1968)

President Nyerere gave the following speech at the farewell banquet upon the conclusion of his visit to China in 1968. The text of the speech was released both by the Tanzanian government and by the Hsinhua News Agency. In the Tanzanian government press release, the two paragraphs in italics were not part of the text; these were added by President Nyerere in China.

The friendship between Tanzania and the People's Republic of China is a friendship between most unequal equals. Perhaps for that reason some other nations of the world find it hard to understand: they are always trying to suggest that Tanzania is a satellite of China, or—alternatively—that our friendship is about to break up. This is probably an expression of wishful thinking, or else it is a misunderstanding of the nature of friendship and an assumption that friendship is exclusive—that you cannot be friends with many nations if these are not themselves close friends.

I admit that in the modern world real friendship between very big nations and very small nations is a comparatively rare thing. For friendship in these circumstances means a recognition on both sides that the differences in size, wealth, and power, are irrelevant to the equality which exists between sovereign nations. It means that both sides recognise the differences, but treat them as facts which have relevance only when the friendship itself needs them, or can benefit from them.

Mr. Premier, the friendship between China and Tanzania is based on these principles of respect and equality. It is not an exclusive thing, and we do not interfere in each other's affairs. When we feel able to cooperate we do so; if either of us feels reluctant, then we move on to some other matter. I can state quite categorically that Tanzania is enriched by this friendship, and we value it. No outside nation will be able to interfere with; only we ourselves, by our own actions to one another, could destroy it. I have therefore no reason to believe that friendship between Tanzania and China will not continue indefinitely, and grow stronger as time passes.

Having said that I would like to say further, Mr. Prime Minister, that my colleagues and I have not come to China to ask China to place a protective nuclear umbrella over Tanzania. Colonialism in Africa passed under many labels. Some of our countries were called colonies; others, protectorates; some provinces; and yet others, trust territories. In fact they were all colonies, and all of them rightly rejected their colonial status. If therefore I had come to ask China to declare Tanzania to be her nuclear protectorate, the people of Tanzania would have every right to denounce me as a lackey of nuclear neo-colonialism.

The relation we seek between ourselves and the rest of the world is a relation of equality. It is mainly for that reason that Tanzania has opposed the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons. We regard it as a most unequal treaty. It asks non-nuclear nations, including potential nuclear states, to renounce the right to make, or possess, nuclear weapons. But it does not ask the

nuclear powers themselves to stop making any more nuclear weapons; it does not ask the nuclear powers to destroy the weapons they already possess. And worst of all, it does not ask the nuclear powers to pledge that they will neither use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons against states which agree to sign the treaty. Instead, the nuclear powers, on their own, simply declare that they will protect non-nuclear signatories against nuclear attack. Under this treaty, if a nation could swear on the Bible, or the Holy Quoran, that it wanted to develop nuclear explosives purely for peaceful purposes, it would not be allowed to do so. It must buy such explosives from the nuclear powers. This is the first time in history that a tremendous and far-reaching human discovery is made the monopoly of a few.

We have opposed this treaty not because we want to reserve our right to make, or receive, nuclear weapons. We have neither the ability nor the wish to do so. We have opposed it because it is an unequal treaty, which cannot even contribute to the cause of peace. A monopoly of weapons cannot produce real peace; it could only produce so-called peace, like *pax romana* or *pax britanica*.

Mr. Prime Minister, your country is a nuclear power, mine is not. For the time being we happen to hold similar views on this particular matter. Of course this does not mean that China and Tanzania will always adopt the same policies, and will always have the same priorities of action. China is an Asian power; we are a part of Africa. Both of us are interested in international peace, and in human justice, but our immediate preoccupations will be different, and our difficulties will be of a different kind.

Thus, for example, colonialism of the traditional kind has now been virtually defeated in Asia. Political independence has been won everywhere. The struggle which remains is a struggle to make that independence meaningful—to make it the independence of the people and not a mere matter of flags, and presidents, and protocol, while the masses continue to be exploited either by their old masters or by new ones.

In Africa we do have this struggle against neo-colonialism. But we also still have a struggle against foreign occupation, and racist minority oppression. We still have to face the fact that Tanzania's southern neighbour is governed by Portugal, and that 60,000 Portuguese troops are trying to maintain that European rule against the wishes of the people of Mozambique.

Nor is that an isolated case. Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and South West Africa, are all still occupied territories held in thrall by colonialists who are determined to continue their direct exploitation of African people. And on top of that, there are in South Africa, and in Rhodesia, racist minority governments engaged on a systematic attempt to maintain their power and economic privilege by denying the humanity of those who are non-white.

Mr. Premier, ladies and gentlemen, my country is free. It is because of that freedom that I am able to come here on behalf of my countrymen to cement the friendship which exists between our two peoples. Yet at the same time my country feels that it is not free, because Africa is not free. My countrymen know that they are insulted because the blackness of our brothers is being insulted in Africa. And my country with the other independent nations of Africa, is determined that this situation will be changed. Africa will be free. Africans will be respected in Africa. For Africans will liberate Africa. The struggle be-

fore us may be a long one; the machinations of neo-colonialism may sometimes cause us to stumble in our progress to liberation. But the Organisation of African Unity will succeed in both its objectives. It will lead Africa to freedom and human dignity, and it will lead Africa to unity.

For the unity of free Africa is our ultimate objective. I look forward to the day when I cannot come to China as President of the United Republic of Tanzania, because to the outside world there is no Tanzania—only Africa. My ambition is that the President of a United States of Africa goes on state visits—to China and to other countries. (Let me hasten to add that this does not mean a reluctance on my part ever to come to China again! It only means that I want to be in a position where I come as a citizen of Africa who is renewing old friendships!)

This ambition of ours is a very large one, and we do not expect it soon to be fulfilled. But we shall not surrender the goal because we cannot see it clearly, any more than you surrendered because you could not see China of today from the caves of Yenan. Most of all, we shall never compromise on our determination to rid Africa of imperialism. The people of Africa have now taken up arms in Mozambique, in Angola, in Portuguese Guinea, and in Rhodesia. Sooner or later these fighters will triumph; which means that Africa will triumph, and therefore Tanzania will triumph. We shall succeed, because we are fighting for our own freedom, our own homes, and the future of our children. To no one will we surrender our birthright. Africa will be governed by Africans, and Africans of all colours, races, and languages, will one day be equal citizens in their homeland.

I believe that the people of China understand this determination of ours—this determination of Tanzania, and of Africa. I believe that you sympathise with us in our struggle, just as we sympathise with the Chinese people's determination to defend their own country and build it according to their own desires. We do not ask for more. For we know that no one else can make a people free; freedom must be won and maintained by the people who expect to enjoy it.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to repeat that I have come to China to learn. In particular, I wanted to see something of your country after the cultural revolution. The last three days have confirmed my conviction once again that we have a lot to learn from China. First, we should reject the proposition that peace will be served by isolating China. This is very silly. You cannot isolate 700 million human beings, unless they go to sleep. Secondly, there is a danger in Africa for some of us to believe that independence is enough. If we really want to move from national independence to the real independence of the people, and if we really want to make sure that the African revolution will ever move forward, and not degenerate into neo-colonialism, then I say that we should learn from you. Indeed, from what I had seen of China in 1965, I must say that if you found it necessary to begin a cultural revolution, in order to make sure that the new generation would carry forward the banner of your revolution, then certainly we need one. We have seen in Tanzania how easy it is to pay lip service to the importance of socialism and the people, while in fact we behave like capitalists and petty dictators!


On my first visit I said in Shanghai, after I had witnessed the revolutionary

spirit of your people, that I wished all the people of Tanzania could come to China, and witness for themselves what a determined people can do. Today, after the cultural revolution, the spirit of the people of China is even greater than before. One of the sayings of Christianity is that faith can move mountains. You Chinese people have great faith; nor is it blind faith. You believe in the creative power of the people; you believe in your great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung; you believe in the spirit of self reliance and self criticism; and you believe in the oneness of the oppressed peoples of the world. But you do more than believe. You are showing us that it is not enough to believe: one must practise what one believes.

With this immense spiritual strength, always very great in China, but now renewed and deepened by the cultural revolution, and under the guidance of the great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, I am sure you will move from victory to victory, and I do wish you well.

Mr. Prime Minister, it has been a great pleasure for me and my colleagues to revisit the People's Republic of China. You have received us with great warmth, and great hospitality. Our stay has been both enjoyable and useful.

I now ask you to join me in a toast: to the friendship between the People's Republic of China, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
to the prosperity of the People's Republic of China,
to the militant friendship of the people of Tanzania and of China,
to the health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people,
to the health of Premier Chou En-lai,
to the health of distinguished ambassadors, guests and all friends present.



Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, the United Republic of Tanzania, *Speech By the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere at a Return Banquet in China 21st June 1968*, Dar es Salaam, June 21, 1968; "President Nyerere's Speech at Farewell Banquet," *Hsinhua News Bulletin*, Dar es Salaam, No. 555 (June 24, 1968), pp. 4-8.

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