

**THE MAIN PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY**

An Advaita Approach
PART TWO

S. K. MAITRA

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THE MAIN PROBLEMS

of

PHILOSOPHY

An Advaita Approach

PART TWO

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
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P R E F A C E

PART two, *Main Problems of Philosophy* deals with the problems of *Truth and Error, Space and Time, Substance, Causality, Universal, Freedom, Immortality, God, Appearance and Reality, Grades of Appearance, Relation and Thought and Reality*. Everyone of these has been approached from the Advaita standpoint and the Advaita position has been maintained throughout, with what success it is for the readers to judge. Mainly intended for undergraduate and postgraduate students, it will also prove of interest to teachers and research scholars. The author considers the present work to be a challenge to current philosophical views and will welcome counter attacks on his own views.

S. K. M.

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THERE are two quite distinct enquiries regarding Truth, viz., the enquiry about the meaning or definition of truth and the enquiry about a suitable criterion or test of truth.

As regards the question of a criterion it is sufficient to remark that the various criteria proposed such as clearness and distinctness, consensus, self-evidence, intuition, practical fruitfulness, authority, etc., are all open to the common charge of being either dogmatic or inconsistent. If any of these criteria is considered sufficient by itself it lays itself open to the charge of being dogmatic. If, however, any reason is offered in support of any of these, then reason, and not the criterion proposed, becomes the true criterion. Further, what is clear and distinct to some is not so to others. And the same is true of intuition and of the so-called self-evidence of beliefs. The appeal to authority is also of little use as authorities are not always found to agree. Nor is consensus an effective test as is proved by many human beliefs, once held without exception, but now discarded in the light of fresh evidence. Practical fruitfulness of ideas is also no sure test. Even dream-ideas bring dream-fruition but such fruition does not make these ideas true.

As there is no agreement amongst philosophers about a suitable criterion, so also there is none about the question of the nature or meaning of truth. There are two principal answers to this latter question—viz., (i) that Truth is some kind of correspondence of belief to facts and (ii) that truth is the agreement or coherence of beliefs. The answers go by the names of the Correspondence and the Coherence Theories of Truth.

THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

According to the Correspondence Theory truth is the agreement of our judgment or belief with a fact or facts in the real

world. Since the judgment as a psychical occurrence is never denied, the question of truth relates to what we judge or believe, not to the judgment or belief as an occurrence in our mental history. Some philosophers thus consider the judgment in its objective reference in abstraction from the subjective act of judging or believing to admit of characterisation as true or false. In other words, according to these philosophers, it is propositions that are true or false—propositions in the sense of *what* we judge considered apart from the act of judging, believing or disbelieving. And propositions are true in so far as there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements constituting the proposition and the elements constituting some fact or facts in the real world.

The most serious difficulty in the 'correspondence theory' is its inability to give a precise definition of 'correspondence'. If correspondence means as in the accounts of its recent exponents a one-to-one correspondence between the elements constituting a proposition and the atomic particulars called the facts in the real world, then the theory is obviously false as a theory of the truth of propositions. Let us suppose a proposition to say that "*X* is to the left of *Y*". Here the elements of the proposition are *X*, 'to the left of', and *Y*. The proposition is true, according to this theory, if there are corresponding facts in the real world, viz., an *X*, a relation 'to the left of' and a *Y*. But these atomic particulars will correspond to the elements of the proposition equally if '*Y* is to the left of *X*' instead of '*X* being to the left of *Y*' as is said in the proposition. If however it is contended that the correspondence must be a correspondence in the order of the elements besides being a one-to-one correspondence of the elements, then the theory must show how the proposition is to be distinguished from the fact which makes it true. If the fact is known as fact as distinguished from the proposition, it cannot be known by simple apprehension or acquaintance as the fact includes both atomic particulars and also their arrangement or order as occurring in the real world. If therefore the fact is to be known at all, it must be through another proposition, the truth whereof will raise the same problem over again, landing us

into an infinite regress. Thus therefore the inevitable dilemma is that correspondence of propositions with facts will either mean prior knowledge of facts through other propositions leading to an infinite regress or correspondence must remain forever an unknown and unknowable correspondence.

Nor can it be said that the knowledge of the fact as fact as a difficulty is valid not against correspondence as the definition of truth but against correspondence as the criterion of truth. A correspondence that can never be known as correspondence is as useless as a definition of truth as it is as a truth-test or truth-criterion. A definition that defines the known by the admitted-ly unknown is no definition worth the name.

In the "Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers" it is pointed out that "we get into difficulties with the correspondence theory "when we try to give a clear meaning to 'correspondence' and 'fact'. No doubt it is true that there are no centaurs and we may say that the statement there are no centaurs corresponds with the facts, but it is hard to see what sort of status the fact of there being no centaurs has and what sort of relation called correspondence it can enter into with such a statement." It seems however that this line of criticism is not quite fair. Once concede negative facts as advocated by Russell, the difficulty vanishes, for then the statement 'there are no centaurs' resolves into 'Horses are not Men', or 'Men are not Horses' and these incompatibilities are as much facts and part and parcel of reality as are the so-called positive facts and compatibilities of experience.

We shall conclude our criticism of the correspondence theory with a brief examination of Russell's view as he states it in his "Human Knowledge and Its Limits". (*Page 167 Second Impression 1951*) "Significance", says Russell, "is a characteristic of all sentences that are not non-sensical, and not only of sentences in the indicative, but also of such as are interrogative, imperative or optative. For present purpose however we shall confine ourselves to sentences in the indicative.....The significance of a sentence may always be understood as in some sense a description. When this description describes a fact, the sentence is true;

otherwise it is 'false'...“Beliefs however are not always expressed in sentences. “Suppose you are expecting to meet some person of whom you are fond....Your expectation may be wordless, even if it is detailed and complex. You may expect that he will be smiling, you may recall his voice, his gait...In this case you are expecting an experience of your own...Your expectation is 'true' if the impression, when it comes, is such that it might have been the prototype of your previous idea if the time-order had been reversed”.

All this seems very plausible, but we can counter it by another case equally plausible. Suppose that receiving a wire from an intimate friend of mine I go to the Railway station and await his arrival. While waiting I imagine my friend coming with his suitcase and his hold-all and I imagine him getting down when the train arrives and greeting me smiling. Suppose that when the train arrives I see my friend getting down exactly as I expected him to. But then I find that I am in my bed and only dreaming a very vivid dream. Here is correspondence of expectation with impression and yet it is rejected as a dream without truth or reality. How will Russell reconcile such phenomena with his theory of truth as correspondence of idea with an impression as its prototype ?

THE COHERENCE THEORY

The Coherence Theory maintains that truth is a relation of harmony or coherence between judgments and is not any relation of correspondence between a judgment and a reality other than the mind that judges. Against the correspondence theory it points out that if truth were to consist in a relation between a judgment and a real other than the mind that judges, then in order to know that the judgment does correspond we must have prior knowledge of the real to which our judgment must correspond in order to be true. But such knowledge will make the judgment superfluous as we already possess the knowledge which the judgment is supposed to make possible. Besides this prior knowledge which is necessarily presupposed in the idea of correspondence as constituting the meaning of truth will again

have to be justified by the test of correspondence involving the same difficulty. This inevitable infinite regress can be avoided only if truth is regarded not as correspondence of a judgment with a fact other than the mind that judges but as the agreement or harmony of the judgment with the judgment or judgments that constitute its objective reference. Truth, in other words, is the consistency or harmony of a judgment with the system of judgments that constitutes its objective reference or meaning.

It follows from the Coherence Theory that if a judgment is true in so far as it coheres with the judgment or judgments which constitute its objective reference, the judgments which constitute the objective reference or meaning must themselves be true as cohering with still other judgments as their objective reference, and these again with other judgments so that the truth of any single judgment will be its coherence or harmony with all judgments, actual and possible. But as this is an ideal which no human being can hope to reach, for practical purposes one has to be satisfied with harmony with as many judgments as are within one's reach. Hence the more numerous the judgments with which a given judgment can be shown to agree, the truer it is, so that while absolute truth as harmony with all judgments, actual and possible, may be only an ideal that no one can reach, one can still have relative truth as progressive approximation to an absolutely coherent whole of experience in different degrees of consistency with an ever-widening system of judgments realised in actual experience.

The objection to this view of truth is that its view of all human truths as only partial truths in different degrees of approximation to the complete, all-inclusive truth is in reality a theory of degrees of falsity rather than of grades of truth, strictly speaking. If no human truth is completely free from inconsistency, if all truths that are within our reach are only approximations to the complete truth, if, in short, they all fall short of truth as such as being, more or less infected with discrepancy, than they are all more or less false appearances wrongly described as partial truths. If our judgments represent only a

progress to the truth and differ only in respect of their greater or lesser distance from the completely coherent truth, then they cannot be even partially true and should be described rather as grades of falsity or error. This will be clear if we consider an analogous case. If of two candidates in an examination, one fails in two subjects, while the other fails in three, we do not say that the first of these is more successful than the second. On the contrary we consider both to be unsuccessful as having fallen short of the pass standard, though the second is more of a failure than the first.

A second objection to the coherence theory is that in so far as, according to this theory, no human truth is absolutely true, the same must hold as regards the truth of the Coherence Theory itself. Hence judged by its own standard the theory that coherence constitutes the meaning or definition of truth cannot be said to be true without qualification.

Another objection to this theory is that like the Correspondence Theory, it is unable to give any precise definition of Coherence. If coherence is to be defined as mere coexistence of experienced facts, then coherence will apply equally to brute conjunctions as well as necessary connexions of facts. But the circumstance of two or more phenomena being observed to be either simultaneous or successive in experience does not necessarily prove that they cohere in a systematic unity or whole.

THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH

While according to the Coherence Theory truth is the logical relation of harmony or consistency of our experiences, according to Pragmatism truth is the felt relation of consistency of our theoretical and practical consciousness as experienced in the successful working of our ideas in life. According to Pragmatism, the intellect is only an instrument in the service of the will, every idea being a plan of action the truth whereof consists in its successful working. A belief is thus true if it works so that successful working is not only the criterion or test of truth, but is also the meaning or definition of truth. As William James says, truth is truth tested and verified in experience so that there

is no sense in speaking of an idea as true independently of the practical test of its verification in experience. Hence the pragmatic theory has been described as the psychological as distinguished from the logical theory of truth.

Since, according to Pragmatism, the true is what is verified in experience and since experience is no unchanging, static reality but an everchanging flux best described by the metaphor of a flowing stream, it follows that the truths established by today's experience may be falsified to-morrow because of changed circumstances. There cannot therefore be any absolute immutable truth nor any eternal varieties which are true irrespective of circumstances. Hence while according to the Coherence Theory there is at least an absolutely coherent experience to which all human truths approximate in different degrees and in this sense are more or less true, according to the Pragmatic Theory no truth is absolutely true, all truth being relative and therefore liable to be falsified under changed conditions.

In defining truth as a belief that works, Pragmatism mistakes what is in reality the effect of truth for truth itself. Beliefs work because they are true and not that they are true because they work. Besides, a belief may work well and yet not be true. A clever lie may work yielding the desired results. Contrarily, the man who sees through the liar's game and is yet unable to get his belief accepted illustrates the case of true beliefs that are true and yet do not work.

True beliefs are no doubt generally useful, but it is not their usefulness that makes them true, rather it is their truth that accounts for their usefulness. Besides, the test of working is not always dependable. What works for some may not work for others and what works for one at one time may not work for one at a different time. The belief that a particular medicine will cure a disease may work for some and effect the cure and may not work for others and yield the expected result. And the same thing may happen to one and the same individual, curing him at one time and failing to do so at another time.

The pragmatic definition of truth as a belief that works identifies truth with its verification in experience. But if no belief

is true unless verified in experience, then no universal proposition can be true. The proposition, All men are mortal, cannot be proved true on pragmatic principles till the mortality of every man, past, present and future, has been verified in experience.

Lastly, the pragmatist denial of absolute, immutable truth on the ground that with change of conditions in an everchanging world the true becomes false and the false true is based on a confusion of the real issue. When the absolutist says that the statement, Napoleon died in St. Helena, in 1821, is true, what he means is that the statement is true not for 1821 only nor again for the island of St. Helena, but is true for all time and for all places. It is true that one who is 30 years old in 1950 is 40 and not 30, in 1960, but that does not affect the truth of the statement in 1960 that he was 30 in 1950. What is true in the situation X may not be true in the situation Y , but that does not take away the immutability of the truth of the belief that related to the situation X .

THE ADVĀITA THEORY OF THE TRUE AS THE AVĀDHITA OR NON-CONTRADICTED

We have considered the three European theories of truth, viz., Correspondence, Coherence and the Pragmatic theory and we have found that none of these can bear strict examination. It remains now to consider the Advaita theory according to which the true is what cannot be contradicted or sublated. This is a negative definition of truth and is connected with the Advaita theory of *adhyāsa* or superimposition as involved in all practical experience. According to the Advaitin the true is what survives criticism, i. e., what cannot be overthrown by any experience. Now what endures in all judgments is not the objective content, the so-called objectivity of the content being always liable to be superseded by discoveries of fresh aspects of experience not capable of being comprised and assimilated in the objective content without rearrangement and recasting thereof. Hence the objectivity of a judgment is only a relative objectivity, i. e., an objectivity relative to a particular level of experience and is always liable to be overthrown when a higher level is

reached. In short, truth cannot belong to the content of a judgment, there being no finality or immutability in the apparent objective truth of the content. In other words, the so-called objectivity of the content may at any time be found to be subjective appearance devoid of strict objectivity. The objective snake of the snake-rope illusion becomes a subjective appearance as soon as the illusory character of the illusion is discovered on closer inspection. The Advaitin, therefore, contends that what survives in all judgments is the consciousness of the content and not the content in which the judgment clothes itself in the act of judging. We cannot get away from the consciousness that judges though the content which is judged is never criticism-proof. What is never sublated, in other words, is not the content that appears as the object of the judgment but the light of consciousness which reveals the content. Thus, according to the Advaitism, all ordinary experience is a case of *adhijāsa* or false identification in which pure consciousness (*śuddha-caitanya*) appears as object-consciousness (*visaya-caitanya*) or consciousness in the garb of objects cognised. Consciousness as it appears in ordinary experience is always the *consciousness* of object and is therefore always other than the objective as such. When therefore consciousness appears as an object cognised as in the judgments of experience it is nothing but a false appearance of consciousness as such which is unobjective by nature. Just as the rope that appears as a snake is only falsely appearing as such so is the unobjective light of consciousness only falsely appearing when it appears as one with the object cognised. Hence all objective experience, according to the Advaitin, is a case of false identification of the unobjective consciousness with the objective. This is why no objective experience is criticism-proof and capable of self-maintenance. What is true therefore in all judgments and what cannot be contradicted or sublated is not the objectivity of experience, i. e., the objective content as which it appears but bare consciousness as such, i. e., consciousness as the unobjective light in which all objective contents are revealed as objects.

It may be objected that this is nothing but rank scepticism

and is no theory of truth strictly speaking. At least it is a theory that has no use for us, ordinary mortals, in so far as it reduces all objective experience to nullify leaving a blank emptiness as truth. But this is a misreading of the Advaita point of view. What the Advaitin denies is the claim to finality for any of our empirical truths, they all alike being condemned as false when judged by the strict standard of non-contradiction. But at the same time the Advaitin recognises different grades of falsity amongst our so-called empirical truths, some surviving longer than others ; and this is all that is necessary for the conduct of life. Thus some truths die very young. They are our ordinary illusions. As soon as their discrepancy with our more enduring experiences, or their discrepancy with the experiences of others, is discovered they are sublated and delegated to the domain of the false. What are called the truths of common sense live a much longer life, some of them reaching a mature age and thereafter passing away. The truths of science are harder propositions. Some of them are octogenarians and some are centenarians and some live even for a thousand years, but then their end comes sometime or other. Geocentricity had several centuries of life while helio-centricity had a much shorter life giving way to Einstein's Relativity of the present day. This is all that is necessary for life. We regulate our lives by choosing the longer-lived truths in preference to the shorter-lived, but this is not to say that even the longest-lived objective truth will ever live an eternal everlasting life.

The objection that consciousness itself is no eternal immutable reality as is shown by complete lapse of consciousness in dreamless sleep, swoon, etc. is also beside the point. What is absent in such states is not consciousness itself but objective consciousness or consciousness of objects. One who awakes from a sound sleep cannot say that he had a good sleep if there was a complete cessation of consciousness in his undisturbed sleep and rest.

ERROR

The Advaita theory of error is a corollary of its theory of

truth. All objectivity is a false appearance of pure consciousness. It is consciousness falsely appearing as the object of consciousness and is therefore error. But falsity is of different grades. A higher falsity cancels a lower falsity but a lower falsity cannot supersede a higher falsity. This is how appearances may be arranged as lower and higher. The rope-appearance cancels the snake-appearance but the snake-appearance cannot supersede the rope-appearance. But this does not mean that the rope-appearance is the truth and the snake-appearance is the false element in the matter. The rope-appearance is also an objective appearance of pure consciousness and as such lacks ultimate truth and reality just as the snake-appearance does. The only difference is that though false in the end the rope-appearance can cancel an ordinary illusion like the snake appearance. In this sense all objectivity (in the language of Indian Philosophy, the *Dr̥śya* as such) lacks ultimate truth and reality, though there are grades of objective falsity, the higher cancelling the lower but the lower incapable of dislodging the higher.

The question is raised what is it that is false in a false experience or illusion. The Indian Naiyāyika says that it is all wrong reference, i. e., a matter of false knowing. When I perceive a rope as a snake I mistake one thing as another and the mistake consists in a subjective wrong reference, i. e., referring an object seen elsewhere (snake) to a wrong locus. This view, however, does not bear strict examination. What is rejected or falsified in the act of correction is not the subjective experience. When I say, 'this is a rope and not a snake', I do not say that I did not see a snake at the time of the illusion. Certainly when the illusion lasted I did not see my seeing but saw a trans-subjective or objective snake in the locus of the rope lying before me. The subsequent act of correction does not say that the illusion never occurred. What it says is that the object seen was no real object, that it was an appearance that never was, never is and never will be in the locus in which it appeared. Therefore what is false in the illusory experience is not the experience itself but the object that was experienced. This is Padmapāda's view in the *Pancapādikā*. The author of the "Vivarana" (*Prakāśāt-*

mayoti), however, contends that every illusion is a case of *viṣayādhyāsa* and *jñānādhyāsa*. It is not merely the object that is false in an illusion but also the experience of such a false object. An appearance that is perceived in the locus in which it stands eternally negated cannot be a case of either true object or of true knowing. Hence, according to Vivaraṇakāra, error is as much a case of false knowing as of false knowing of a false object. In fact, all such knowing is no knowing at all in so far as the object known does not belong to the locus in which it is perceived.

A further point to be noted is that an illusion relates only to appearances. What never appears and cannot appear can never be the content of an illusion. A square-circle nowhere appears and never appears and therefore cannot be the object of an illusion. This is why falsity is defined as that which appears in a locus in which it stands eternally negated (*Pratīpanna upādhanu traikālika niṣedhapratīyogitvam=mithyātvam*).

BOTH space and time, as we perceive them, are (1) limited, (2) sensibly continuous (3) and characterised by quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Thus (1) our perceptual space is not the boundless space of physics, but is bounded, as we see it, by a well-defined outline which we call the horizon. Similarly, both our felt time called the specious present in psychology and the time that we recollect in memory do not reach beyond a limit.

(2) Space and time as we are aware of them in experience, are again internally sensibly continuous, so long as space is functionally or visibly perceived it is found to contain lesser parts which are themselves spaces that repeat the characteristics of the larger space. In other words, our actual experience of space nowhere is an aggregate of mathematical points without extension. Similarly experienced time contains smaller times which are similarly divisible into still smaller spans of time so that we never reach anything in experience like a bare moment without span or duration.

(3) Thirdly, our actual perception of space contains both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Quantitatively, one space is felt as larger or smaller than another, just as one span of time is perceived as shorter or longer than another. Qualitatively, the outline of one space is perceived as square, of another as round, etc., just as one time is qualitatively distinguished as before or after another time.

Out of space and time as actually experienced in perception are constructed the conceptual space and time of physical science. Thus there is first of all a co-ordination of the visual and tactual spaces in the individual percipient. An infant does not know from birth how far a thing seen is from itself till accidental moments bring it in touch with it. The correlation of visual and tactual distance is thus acquired as far as human

beings are concerned, The next in the process of elaboration is an extension of the boundary of the space as seen. Thus the horizon which is the boundary of our visual space recedes as we move towards the horizon. Thus we have emergence of new spaces beyond the boundary seen along with the disappearance of the originally presented spaces. This leads to the mental construction of a wider space including the new spaces that have emerged in view and the old ones that have disappeared from view. This synthesis is then further extended so as to give rise to the idea of one single space comprising all spaces, seen and unseen.

The same process of extension by synthesis occurs as regards time also. As our immediate present becomes past and the future becomes perceived present, the past, the present and the future are brought together in memory and recollection, and the process, further extended, gives rise to the idea of one time, including all past, present and future.

But this conception of an absolute all-inclusive time or space is open to the following objections. If we take this constructed time or space as real, we can never know whether it remains constant and the same. Suppose that this absolute space becomes one-half in size, and suppose that along with it every object in space becomes one-half in size, can we know by any means, that all things are now half of their previous size? Similarly suppose that this absolute time is now one-half of its previous time and suppose that every event occupies also one-half of its previous duration, can we know, by any means, that every event is now happening at half of its previous time?

The conclusion therefore follows that space and time are relative conceptions, or, as Kant would say, a priori forms in which we arrange our sensations, and not anything absolutely real.

FOR the pre-scientific common sense view, the world is composed of a multitude of things, partly inanimate. Each of these things, while in some sense a unit, is thought of as possessing a multiplicity of qualities or properties, and as not only standing in a variety of relations to other things but also as acting on, and being acted upon, by other things.

What this naive pre-scientific view calls a thing, developed thought describes as substance. Thus substance is anything that is capable of maintaining its identity as a unit in spite of many properties or qualities in which it expresses itself and the many relations into which it enters with other things.

The problems to which the idea of substance thus gives rise are the following: (1) What is it that constitutes the unity of a thing? In other words, in what sense we call anything "one thing"? (2) What is the nature of the relation of substance to the qualities in which it expresses itself?

(1) As regards the question of the unity of a substance, it is obvious that one and the same thing may be regarded as an independent individual or only a part or element in an individual whole according to the point of view we take. If, for example; we are interested in a landscape as a painter, the entire landscape is one individual thing to be reproduced on the canvas. If, however, we are interested as a botanist, each particular tree is a separate unit, i. e., an individual to be examined. Thus as regards external nature it is a matter of our subjective choice what we shall call one thing and what we shall call many. That is one which in respect of our immediate interest may be regarded as a single thing; that is many which for our purpose does not admit of being regarded as one individual.

It is otherwise however when we have to deal with a self-conscious individual with a purpose of its own. Here we have to recognise a principle of internal unity as distinguished from

mere relevance to a purpose external to itself. Such an individual is one because of itself and not because we choose to think it as one or otherwise according to our needs. In other words, in case of beings with mind and conscious of themselves as spirit, we have to recognise intrinsic substantiality and individuality, an individuality that is objective and inherent in themselves and not subjective or merely apparent only to beings other than themselves. This is usually expressed by saying that while a thing unconscious of itself has being-for-another, a being conscious of itself has being-for-self. Thus has arisen the Cartesian dualism of material and spiritual substance, of things which are things only to other individuals and beings which have intrinsic individuality, are conscious of themselves, and possess the power of self determination.

(2) More important however is the second of the problems regarding substance, the relation between substance and quality. What we call one thing, is found, in spite of its unity, to possess many qualities. What, then, do we mean by the thing or substance to which these many qualities are ascribed, and how does it possess them?

One solution is to identify the substance with one group of the thing's properties, the properties which we consider more important. The substance is then taken to mean the group of primary qualities of shape, size, etc., and is said to possess the secondary qualities. And usually, the way in which substance, as thus defined, has the secondary qualities is further explained by saying that these are subjective changes in our sensibility caused by the primary qualities. But this latter view is not necessarily involved in the conception of substance as identical with a group of qualities of primary importance.

Now one need not object to the use of such a theory of substance as a working hypothesis in the physical sciences, but as a solution of the metaphysical problem regarding substance it leaves us just where we were. For (1) we ascribe the primary qualities to substance in just the same way as the secondary. We say a thing has such a size, such a shape, just as we say it has a green colour, a bitter taste etc. (2) Secondly, as Berkeley showed,

we never have the primary qualities without the secondary so that if the latter are nothing but subjective sensations, the primary qualities cannot be anything else than subjective states.

These difficulties have led Locke to define substance as the unknown substratum of the various qualities. According to this view, the qualities of the thing "flow" either from the nature of their unknown substratum or from the relations in which the substratum stands to other things.

Such a view is open to grave objections. To say that substance is unknown is to confess that we have really no idea how the many qualities can be called the qualities of a single thing. But a more serious objection is that the substratum considered as the unknown support of the qualities is itself regarded as absolutely indeterminate and devoid of qualities. But a thing without qualities is not this thing, or that thing, i. e., not anything and therefore indistinguishable from nothing.

Locke's theory of substance as the unknown support of qualities thus leads logically to Hume's Phenomenalism and the denial of substance. But Phenomenalism also cannot explain why a group of unrelated sensations should go together and give rise to the idea of a single thing.

It remains therefore to consider now Kant's doctrine of substance as an *a priori* concept of the understanding which the mind itself imposes on the manifold of qualities given in sense. According to Kant, the unity of substance which common sense believes to find in objects has really been put into them by the perceiving mind. In other words, substance is one form of the "synthetic unity of apperception," i. e., the process by which we project the unity of our acts of attention into their objects. It will be noted that Kant's view of substance as a subjective unity imposed by the mind on actually unrelated qualities reduces the idea of substance to a subjective fiction. But can we reasonably hold that a thing is in reality a sum of unrelated qualities which yet submit to our subjective manipulation and thereby appear as one individual thing? It is no doubt true that a group of qualities appear to us to be the qualities of one thing because we attend to them as one. But it may be that we can so attend

to them because they are not an unrelated plurality but are an individual unity or whole in themselves. In other words, instead of saying, as Kant does, that the unity of attention makes the manifold of qualities appear as one thing, we should rather say that because they possess intrinsic unity as the self-differentiation of one single thing that it becomes possible for them to appear to a unitary act of attention as one single object.

Could we, then, give any intelligible account of this intrinsic unity of qualities that makes them appear as one thing? It is obvious that any intelligible account of this unity must be in terms of something of which we are aware in our own experience. Now if we look into our own mental life, we find that it is a manifold of successive states, and yet they are all, as states of our self, different expressions of one and the same individual. We may therefore extend this conception of the unity of our self in spite of its variety of states to every assemblage of qualities that appears to us as the qualities of a single thing. In other words, we may suppose that just as we maintain our individuality amidst different states of ourselves as being the same self in spite of different states and qualities, so each single thing is an individual in spite of the differences of its qualities and states.

But this only pushes the problem one step farther. For in respect of the self the same problem reappears as in the case of substance. If substance as a one-in-many is a puzzle that baffles logical resolution so also is the self as the unity of its different states. If the many is many, how can it be one at the same time without sacrifice of its nature as many? If *a*, *b* and *c* are mutually exclusive reals constituting a manifold, how is it that they become self-differentiations of a single thing *x* at the same time? What is the warrant for our supposing that *a*, *b* and *c* are inseparable except the fact of their being found together in experience so far? Because they have gone together in all observed cases, it does not follow that they will also do so in all future instances. For it is obvious that *a*, *b* and *c*, as different, are reciprocal negations of one another. This means that each is what the other two are not, so that there is nothing in *a* that can be said to imply necessary relation to *b* or *c* and the same will hold of *b* and *c* as well.

In fact, uncontradicted experience is no proof of necessary connexion, and this is corroborated by the fact that even universally held generalisations have been falsified by the evidence of a wider, more inclusive experience. Besides, the so-called personal identity of a self through the differences of its states has been proved in many cases to be illusory as modern psychological investigations into cases of dissociations and split personalities have shown. It follows therefore that the concept of substance regarded either as a one-in-many or as the unity of a self in the differences of its states and qualities is a logical inexplicability that has pragmatic value as necessary for the conduct of life, but lacks truth and reality in the strict sense.


THERE are various senses of the word 'cause'. The medieval scholastics distinguish between *Causa Cognoscendi* and *Causa Existendi*.

(I) The *Causa Cognoscendi* is the logical reason—for the affirmation of a truth. Modern logicians call it the ground.

(II) The *Causa Existendi* is the cause of the existence or the occurrence of an event. In every day use and in scientific treatment of causation, the cause is regarded not as the logical ground of the consequence but as something partly identical with it and partly different. In other words, it is regarded as the source of change or, as medieval philosophers called it, the efficient cause. We may note here that Nyāya Philosophy distinguishes between the *Samavāyī* or inherent, the *asamavāyī* or non-inherent and the *nimitta* or efficient cause, while systems like the Vedānta distinguish between the *upādāna kāraṇa* or material cause and *nimitta kāraṇa* or efficient cause, thus including both the *samavāyī* and the *asamavāyī* of the Indian Nyāya under *upādāna kāraṇa* or material cause. A further point to be noted is that by regarding Brahman as both the material and efficient cause of the world Vedānta reduces causality to the principle of ground and consequence. But, as we have seen, cause means ordinarily the efficient cause. That every event has a cause means in everyday life and in science that the occurrence and character of every event are due to antecedent events. In other words, in its scientific or everyday use causation means the dependence of the present on the past and of the future on the present but not of the past on the present or of the present on the future. It thus means not reciprocal interdependence but one-sided dependence. Thus understood the causal principle cannot be regarded as a logical deduction from the principle of ground and consequence. The principle of ground and consequence implies that all occurrences form a coherent system so

that not only the past determines the present but also the present determines the past and not only the present determines the future but also the future determines the present. Cause as understood in ordinary use is not identical with the true logical ground in its entirety, but only with the ground conceived as a temporal antecedent determining a temporal consequent. In this respect the cause may be described as an incomplete ground, and as such cannot be called an axiomatic principle made self-evident by the very nature of the real. For the principle of ground and consequence an event depends as much on antecedent occurrences as on subsequent events and may be regarded as an action made evident by the very nature of reality as a system. But the causal relation of one-sided dependence is neither evident in the nature of the real nor can be empirically established. Actual experience does not prove that every event must be determined by an antecedent event. At most the success of the sciences proves the assumption of the causal principle practically useful. The causal principle therefore as a universal principle of scientific procedure is neither a self-evident axiom nor an empirically established truth, but a postulate, i. e., an assumption which is not logically justifiable but is made because of its practical value, the practical value depending on the success with which it can be applied. In this sense, viz., that it is a postulate which experience may conform to but cannot prove, it may properly be said to be *a priori*, i. e., prior to its confirmation by experience. It is however not *a priori* in the more familiar Kantian sense of the word, i. e., it is not the necessary and indispensable condition without which knowledge would be impossible.

The inadequacy of the causal principle as a postulate can be illustrated by reference to what is called plurality of causes. Mill, e. g., holds that according to the doctrine of plurality of causes whereas the same cause is always followed by the same effect in the absence of counteracting circumstances, the same effect need not be preceded by the same cause. In criticism of this view Mill points that this conception of a plurality of causes is based on a confusion between a concrete and an abstract



cause and between a concrete and an abstract effect. Death, e. g., may result from murder, suicide, illness, accident etc. but the total effect in each case is not mere death, but death in some special shape and accompanied by special circumstances. If we consider death along with all circumstances attending it a plurality of causes will be precluded. Cause and effect, in other words, must be strictly correlative. To say that cause may vary without being followed by any variation in the effect is to say that there may be conditions which condition nothing. Thus plurality of causes is excluded by the very conception of cause as the totality of conditions. If, however, we extend the causal principle so as to mean by the cause, the totality of all antecedent conditions, positive and negative and by the effect, the totality of all consequent phenomena, we practically mean that the world as a whole in the antecedent stage is the cause of the world as a whole in the immediately succeeding stage. But thus widened the causal principle disappears into the principle of ground and consequence in the form of interconnection between all elements of reality ; in other words, causality becomes the self development of reality as a systematic whole. A distinction has sometimes been drawn between transient and immanent cause. When changes in one thing are regarded as the cause of changes in other things, the relation is called transient causality. Transient causality is expressed in grammar by what are called transitive verbs which express an action of one thing passing over into other things. When however a thing's change of state is caused by its own previous stage we have immanent causality. It corresponds to what are called intransitive verbs which express action which does not pass over from one thing into another but causes internal changes within the agent acting.

Transient causality is inconsistent with strict pluralism. If things are absolutely independent of one another they cannot act or exercise causal influence on one another. Hence pluralism leads to a doctrine of immanent causality as is historically illustrated in (a) Occasionalism, (b) the theory of Pre-established Harmony. Thus starting from the Cartesian conception.

of mind and body as two entirely independent and different kinds of reality Geulincx and Malebranche took refuge in the doctrine that the interaction of mind and body is only apparent and not real and that what really happens is that on the occasion of something happening in the body God produces a sensation or emotion in the mind ; and on the occasion of an idea arising in the mind, God causes a movement of the body. (b) More philosophical however is the attempt of Leibnitz to explain the interaction of things consistently with his pluralistic theory of independent monads. The life of every monad, according to Leibnitz, consists in the development of its own internal nature. Every monad follows its own law of being and there are no windows through which it can receive influence from other monads. How, then, is it that a monad following the law of its own development yet appears to act in agreement with the activities of other monads ? Leibnitz explains it by his theory of Pre-established Harmony between the self-developing activities of the independent monads. He illustrates his view by the simile of two clocks which are so constructed that they keep time with each other without any actual interaction between them. So is it with the different monads : they have been so created by God that the development of one monad corresponds, point for point, with the self-developing activities of every other monad. It may be remarked however that this attribution of the harmony amongst monads to an original creative act of God is giving away the whole case for pluralism and maintaining instead that the harmonious activities of monads are an expression of the eternal nature of God as the Supreme monad of which the other monads are His self-manifestations.

Cause, regarded in the scientific sense, as an antecedent phenomenon determining a consequent phenomenon implies a time-interval between the cause and the effect. Between the premise in an inference and the conclusion which follows from it there is no interval of time. But between a cause and the effect which it produces there is a time-interval that separates the one from the other. Hence the objection is raised that since

the cause produces the effect, it follows that when the cause *is*, the effect *is, not*, and that therefore the cause cannot produce, i. e., determine an effect which is non-existent when the cause is or exists. Between an existent cause and a non-existent effect there cannot be any relation, far less a relation of determining and determined. If an existent cause could determine a non-existent effect, then there being no difference between one non-existent effect and another, every cause would produce every effect. The Sāṃkhya philosophers meet this difficulty by rejecting the Nyāya view of the effect as a new beginning. According to Sāṃkhya, a cause does not bring into being (*utpatti*), but only brings to manifestation (*abhivyakti*). What a cause does is to make a non-manifest effect manifest to our experience. The Advaitin however rightly points out that the difficulty is not really obviated even according to the Sāṃkhya view. Whether effectuation be conceived as *utpatti*, i. e., bringing into being or *abhivyakti*, i. e., bringing into manifest being from a previous state of non-manifest existence, the difficulty remains the same. For the manifestation is itself a new beginning, i. e., something that was not and comes into being through the action of the cause. Hence the Advaitin considers the causal relation to be an ultimate inexplicability, useful for practical purposes, but not bearing logical examination. Causality, regarded as the immanent self-unfolding of the world as the all-inclusive Reality also, according to the Advaitin, does not make sense. How can Reality as the all-inclusive whole outside which there is nothing can yet complete itself through a process of self-unfolding in time? It cannot be both complete as the whole of reality and yet completing itself in a temporal process. If the unfolding is relative to finite beings, then it is only an appearance that does not affect its intrinsic nature as the all-inclusive reality.

UNIVERSALS

A universal, according to the common sense view, is what is identical in a number of particulars. It is thus distinguished from the particulars in which it is identical. The particulars are said to be the instances of the universal and the universal is what is same, or is identical, in all particulars which are its instances. Further a universal is identical in different particulars in some definite character or other. For example, it is either as the manhood in different men, or as cowness in different cows, or as doghood in different dogs that it is the same in its different instances. A universal so understood is either a generic character which is identical in its different species or a specific character which is identical in the different individuals which are its particular instances. Thus colour is the genus of which the species are red, green, blue, etc., and red is as species of which the instances are this, that and every other particular patch of red. It may be noted that when a universal is said to be identical in its instances, it is not meant that it is identical with each of these. For example, according to Aristotle, since the species belong to the genus, the genus is nothing but the species. This would imply that the genus is the aggregate of the species. But this is absurd, for the genus is what is identical in its specific forms, and the genus as the sum of the specific forms cannot be identical in each form. As Cook Wilson observes, "we cannot say that the genus is each of its forms, or any or all of them together, because 'is' in such a statement naturally means 'is identical with'."

A universal understood as what is identical in different instances can belong only to a world in which there are repetitions and recurrences. In a world of pure change in which nothing persists or repeats itself, universals have no place. In the same way universals cannot belong to a world of pure difference. If all things are unique or *svalakṣaṇa* as the Buddhists say, there can not be universals as identical or common characters in things.

For the same reason in a world of blank self-identity in which there is no room for any difference, universals also will have no place. Universals are what are identical or same in different particulars and if there are no particulars that differ but there is only undifferenced self-identity, there can be no universals. It is noteworthy that Buddhists who believe the world to be an ever-changing succession of differences as well as Advaitins who consider reality to be a blank identity reject the reality of universals. Universals, it thus would appear, are possible only in a world of identities amidst differences.

We have distinguished between generic universals which are particularised in more determinate universals called specific characters and universals which as specific and determinate are particularised in individuals. Colour as genus, e. g., is particularised in red, green and other species of colour, while red as a species of colour is particularised in individual reds, i. e., in this, that and other patches of red. Let us consider the latter. What is it that distinguishes one particular instance of universal from other instances. For example, let us consider 'being a book' to be a universal that is identical in all particular books. Now consider two particular books lying on a table. Each is a particular book occupying a particular place on the table which cannot be occupied by the other book at the same time. We may say therefore that each is particularised by its spatio-temporal location, i. e., through its location at a particular place at a particular time. A particular is thus particular only as a spatio-temporal object. Consider now the universal regarded as a character identical in different particulars. 'Being a book' is a character that is the same in the two different books having different spatio-temporal locations. What does *in* stand for in the phrase "same in different books?" Obviously it means some kind of relation, i. e., a relation between the universal "being a book" and "the two particular books" which are its instances. Now since the universal is identical in both the particular books, it is in both the places at the same time and therefore cannot be a spatio-temporal object like the two particular books. This is why universals, according to Plato, are timeless entities which

belong to an intelligible world of Ideas which can be apprehended not by sense but by the reason. The Indian Naiyāyika also speaks of *Jāti* or universal as *nitya* or timeless but not in the Platonic sense as an object that can be grasped only by the reason. But the question arises if universals are timeless entities that are objects both of perception and thought as Naiyāyika says, or are objects of thought only as according to the Platonic view, how is their relation to spatio-temporal particulars which are their instances to be conceived? If the relation were a spatio-temporal object like the particulars, then the relation of this spatio-temporal relation to the eternal reality which is the universal, will be an unexplained mystery. If however the relation be *nitya* or eternal, an eternal intimate relation of inherence of *samavāya* as the Naiyāyika says, then this timeless relation relating the non-temporal universal to the spatio-temporal particulars will remain an equally unexplained mystery. Plato's device of explaining the mystery by the metaphor of imitation does not solve the difficulty. If particulars are spatio-temporal imitations, of the timeless universals in *hyle* or matter, there cannot be any participation of particular in their universal archetypes in the strict sense. Hence particulars would be only approximation, and no true examples of the timeless universals. This is what Plato himself admits as far as the universals of geometry and ethics are concerned. We nowhere have perfect straightness exemplified in any straight line we meet with in experience. Nor do we find goodness completely exemplified in any individual; we find at best a very near approach to perfect goodness but never a perfectly good man. But even thus regarded, the difficulty as regards the relation of universal and particular is not solved. An imitation or copy, even as an imperfect copy or imitation, must have something in common with the original which it is a copy of. If the original is a far away transcendent reality as Plato conceives the universal to be, the copy is cut off from the original by an insuperable barrier. A copy cannot possibly copy an original which it never can get at. Even a shadow must be in some relation to, and also possess something in common with the substance it is a shadow of.

There can be no shadow which is out of relation to some substance. Moreover, transcendent universals cut off from all relations to their particular examples will be universals without instances. A universal without particular instances is, as the Indian Naiyāyika, Udayanāchārya says, no universal. A universal is what is identical in more than one instance. When the universal is itself the instance of the universal, in other words, when the universal is without instance or unique, it is the uncommon without any parallel beyond itself and therefore no universal at all.

Let us now return to the other question we have so far not considered, viz., the relation between the generic and the specific, i. e., between comparatively indeterminate universals and their specifications in more determinate universals called species. Colour, e. g., is the generic character which specifies itself in red, green and other species of colour. How is colour, then, as the genus to be conceived as related to the species, red, blue, green etc. ? Here we are faced with the paradox that each species is different from the rest, yet each is nothing but the genus. Thus though red is a species of colour different from other species of the genus colour, yet it is not anything more than the genus of which it is species. We do not say that red is a colour plus something else such as a smell or a taste, it is just colour and nothing else though a particular kind of it. Further it is as a colour that red differs from green, though again colour is what is identical in both and thus the common ground between them. It cannot be said that the genus colour is the sum of the species red, green, blue, violet etc. in which it specifies itself. Such a view will commit us to the absurdity that the generic universal, viz., colour being what is identical in each and every species of colour, red, blue, violet etc., the aggregate of the colours, red, blue, etc. are in each species of colour. Aristotle's view that the genus is the potentiality which actualises itself in the different species does not also make sense. Apart from the fact that we nowhere have colour as such as an indeterminate potentiality but always colour in specific form as red, blue or green and these latter again as particularised individual red or blue patches,

there is the further objection to the view that it interprets the timeless generic universal as a potentiality that unfolds itself in time. Moreover many of these non-temporal universals have vanished altogether from the earth or are about to do so. It is believed, e. g., that the lion or the gorilla will cease to exist in a few more decades and that there will be no such species on earth in the next century. Timeless universals vanishing with their spatio-temporal examples—this is the absurdity, the theory we have examined leads to.

We have so far considered the theory of universals in particulars in its two forms (i) as specific characters that are identical in spatio-temporal individuals which are its instances and (ii) indeterminate universals whose particularisations are more determinate universals called their species. And we have found that in none of these forms we can give an intelligible account of the relation between the universals and their particularisations. The objection to the first form is that despite its Aristotelian beginning it leads us, on careful examination, to the Platonic theory of non-temporal transcendent universals without any instance. This is practically a denial of universals understood as what is identical in different instances. To the problem in its second aspect there are several objections. In the first place, there is the paradox of the specific universal being constituted by the generic and yet being exclusive of other species of the same genus. Thus red is a species of the genus of colour and as such is exclusive of blue, green and other species of the same genus. And yet red is nothing but a colour, being constituted by this generic character in its entire being. We are thus faced with the paradox of red being a colour and nothing else and at the same time not being blue or green or any other colour. We do not say that red is something more than colour, and we say the same thing also of blue and green. And yet we say that red is not blue or green. It appears then that the things which are equal to the same thing (red=colour + nothing else, blue=colour + nothing else) are yet not equal to one another (blue is not=red). The difficulty is not obviated by regarding the genus as equal to the sum of the

species, for then in so far as the generic is a universal that is identical in all its specifications we are landed into the absurdity of regarding every species as both exclusive of all other species and at the same time having the aggregate of all the species in itself. Thus if colour be a generic universal that is identical in all the species of colour, red, blue, green etc., then in so far as colour as genus is equal to the aggregate of its species (red, blue, etc.), we have in every species (e. g. red) the genus as red+blue+green etc. Thus red will be red as well as blue, green and the other colours. Nor is the contradiction resolved by supposing the generic universal to be an indeterminate potentiality that becomes actual in the species. On the contrary, experience reveals only the spatio-temporal individuals exemplifying both the specific and generic characters. Thus we nowhere find colour as such except as red, green or some other species of colour, nor do we ever have red as such, or blue as such except as a particular red or blue patch. Thus the red as such in an abstraction and the colour in the red colour is an abstraction of the second order. To call the colour a potentiality that actualises itself in red, blue and other colours and through these in particular reds, blues etc., is hypostatizing an abstraction and making it an independent real. Moreover, as above stated, experience does not bear out universals, generic or specific, but reveals only spatio-temporal objects as concrete particulars clothed in generic and specific characters. And just because these particulars are particularised by their spatio-temporal locations, the generic and the specific characters that are identical in different particulars cannot be spatio-temporal objects like the particulars in which they are identical. And yet the evidence of experience shows that universals, both generic and specific as also the spatio-temporal particulars in which they are embodied, may have both a beginning and an end in time. Thus the remains of extinct species show that both the individuals and the specific and generic characters which they embodied have disappeared from the earth in course of time. Consider life as another instance. It is a genus having plant and animal life as its species and particular plants and animals as the spatio-temporal individuals

in which the generic properties of life and the specific properties of plant and animal life are embodied. And yet if the testimony of science is to be accepted there was a time when the earth was unsuitable for life and it is possible that a time may come when the sun would not give enough warmth for life to continue on earth. Hence we are faced with the problem of explaining how universals though not in time or space, could yet appear and disappear in time like spatio-temporal particulars which are their instances.

These and other difficulties inherent in the Aristotelean theory have been sought to be met by Hegelians by their doctrine of the concrete universal. Bosanquet has devoted an entire Lecture (Lecture II) of his "Principle of Individuality and Value" (Gifford Lectures First Series) to the exposition of the concept of the concrete universal. According to Bosanquet, the true universal is not an abstract generality, the same in different particulars, but a concrete individual or a self-maintaining whole that maintains its identity in and through the differences which it unifies. Abstract generality, Bosanquet points out, stresses the identity to the exclusion of the differences. Its method is the method of omission, attending to the common qualities of a number of individuals, disregarding the differences. Such a method, says Bosanquet, may be compared to the attempt to explain the human body by classifying its different parts in terms of their resemblances. By doing so one believes that the differences are immaterial and the resemblances express the truth about the body. But this, Bosanquet points out, is a mistaken view of the universal as a unifying principle. "(Abstract) generality is sameness in spite of the other, but the true universal is sameness because of the other." This is the same as saying that the universal is "the whole" that maintains itself in the differences of the parts. Only as the different parts of the body are not repetitions of each other but perform different functions in the whole does the body maintain itself as a whole. If all the parts were mere hands, or mere legs, or nothing but the mouth that swallows or the stomach that digests, or just protoplasmic cells and nothing else, there would be no body as a self-main-

taining whole. A true universal is like a musical piece in which not a single note is a repetition of any other and yet each is necessary to constitute the harmony which is the musical piece as a single individual whole. Another example is that of human personality that maintains its identity through the varying experiences of boyhood, youth and old age without being disrupted because of varying experiences and environments. A concrete universal, in other words, does not maintain itself by obliterating differences but only by assimilating and absorbing them in the unity of its being. A true universal, says Bosanquet, is indicated by such terms as "a whole of parts," "an organism," "a system" or more generally "a world," and he refers us to Taylor's "Elements of Metaphysics" (p. 96) for an illuminating exposition of these terms. It will conduce to a clearer understanding of the doctrine if we quote here the relevant passages from Taylor's work. "The world for knowledge," says Taylor, "must be an orderly whole or system. To be a system at all it must be the development or expression in detail of a single principle. Therefore it must most certainly be one; it cannot be a medley of independent elements.... But again because it is a system, it cannot be a mere unit; it must be the expression of a single thing in and through a multiplicity of terms or constituents. Not only must it be both one and many, but it must be many precisely because it is one, and one because it is truly many.... A medley of independent things would not even be truly many. For until you can count 'one, two, three...' you have not your many. And nothing but the terms of a coherent connected series can be counted.... Further,...because the world-system is a perfectly systematic whole, not only is multiplicity in general necessary to it, but also each particular element in the multiplicity is necessitated or logically implied by the character of the unity." In other words, "in the all-embracing systematic whole, the unity and the multiplicity must be equally real, and each must be real through the other." Taylor elucidates his meaning by examining several types of unity which fall short of a system or systematic unity in the true sense. (a) An aggregate or collection, e. g., is not a systematic

unity or true universal. Its unitary character consists in the mere fact that we have found it convenient to think of the elements together and not in any intrinsic necessity in the elements to combine into a unity or whole. (b) A whole of parts is also not an example of a true unity. Though the whole has no reality without the parts which make it a whole, yet the parts may continue to be even when the whole which the parts constitute has ceased to be. (c) An organism in this respect is more of a systematic unity than a whole of parts in so far as it has a character of its own which it manifests through the differences of its parts. In an organism the members come into existence along with the whole and in course of the growth of the whole, and though, in a sense, they continue even after severance from the whole, yet it is not with the same kind of existence which they had as members of the organism. Even organic unity, however, does not represent the highest kind of unity. In an organism the unity of the whole is relatively independent of the members so that even when some members are lost the organism may continue to live even after the loss of the members. "In a completely systematic unity, the unity and the multiplicity must be equally real and equally interdependent." This according to Taylor, implies that the complete systematic unity, the all-inclusive whole that comprises all things as mutually necessitating and necessitated, must be an Experience of which every member is also an experience. "Another way of expressing the same thought," says Taylor, "would be to say that Reality is an Individual of which the elements are lesser individuals." This is also substantially the view of Bosanquet. Reality, according to this view, is a self-maintaining Individual and as such the only concrete universal in the strict sense. The elements of Reality are also concrete universals, but not completely and absolutely as is the world as their all-embracing unity.

We may now sum up the doctrine of the concrete universal as follows :—

(I) No universal in the true sense is an abstract identity in

different particulars, i. e., no general rule obtained by omitting the differences.

(II) A true universal is a concrete individual, a unity in multiplicity, in which the unity and the multiplicity are interdependent and equally real.

(III) The Absolute as an all-comprehensive Experience of which each element is also a lesser experience is the only concrete universal.

(IV) The partial unities of our experience are only imperfect expressions of the Absolute as the only concrete universal in the true sense.

It follows from the conception of the concrete universal as above explained that everything implies, and is implied by, everything else and that what we call brute conjunctions are in reality necessary connections of elements in a systematic unity which is the Absolute Reality as a self-maintaining Individual. It may, however, be legitimately asked whether we have any conclusive evidence for our belief in an Absolute Reality as a concrete universal, or whether it is only a pragmatic fiction, an assumption or make-believe necessary for the smooth conduct of life but without evidence, material or formal. "The world for knowledge," says Taylor, "must be an orderly whole or system." One has the right to ask, what evidence is there that justifies the use of *must* in the above statement? Is not the conception of the world as a unity in diversity just an assumption passed on as a demonstrated truth? Kant, as we know, considers the idea of the world as a whole to be a transcendental illusion—a mere ideal without a given basis in sense-intuition, an ideal that is necessary in the interest of the organisation of experience out of the given matter of sense but void of any basis in reality. It is thus a conceptual void, a concept without a foundation in intuition. Objects of experience, phenomena as Kant calls them, have an intuitive basis in the given matter of sense. A colour or a sound, though an appearance as appearing in the character of a sense-experience, has yet a basis in something given. In seeing a colour or hearing a sound we see or hear what is given as a sensation, but we do not create the colour we

see or the sound we hear—it is something caused by an external source, the thing-in-itself as Kant calls it. In the case of the idea of the world, there is no such external basis, the world as a whole is never given in the experience of a finite being ; the given is always a fragment of the totality, never the totality itself. Hence here we have a concept without a basis in sense-intuition—an empty concept or conceptual void. Phenomena are constructions of the given, but the world as a whole is a pure construction, a concept without attachment to reality—a veritable *Gandharva Nagara* or city of fairies floating in mid-air as Indian Philosophers say. And this conceptual void is what the theory of the concrete universal starts from as a demonstrated truth. To be sure, all knowing, as a piecemeal exploration of reality, has to start from the assumption of the orderly nature of the reality it is to explore. Without some such assurance no investigation can proceed, either scientific or philosophical. But this in itself does not prove the assumption to be true in advance of actual confirmation by experience. And so far as the evidence of experience is concerned, by the admission of Taylor himself and other advocates of the doctrine of concrete universal, all empirical unities are only approximations to, and never complete expressions of, the absolute unity which is the concrete universal. Nor is the supposition that brute conjunctions are in reality necessary connections borne out by actual experience. What are called necessary connections, on closer examination, prove to be only cases of regular correlation as far as experience has gone. We start from observed uniformities and extend them to all similar cases, though not observed and in some cases beyond all possibility of observation as in the case of events that have occurred in the remote past.

It follows from what has been said that if reality in all its details is not comprehended in any finite experience, any claim to a knowledge of it as a systematic unity is an unwarranted presumption of omniscience by a being that by its own admission does not know everything. All that finite experience can, in fact, vouchsafe is that Reality must be consistent with itself and must be free from self-contradiction. But this is not the same as

saying that the obvious incompatibilities of experience would become magically transformed into harmonious wholes and that mutually repugnant particulars would shed their repugnance and live together in peace and amity as expressions of a common principle. Consider a less extreme case where we have only difference rather than mutual repugnance. Consider, e. g., *a* and *b* to be two different reals which we observe either as co-existing in space or as succeeding one another in time. Suppose that whenever we observe one of these we find the other co-existing with it in space or succeeding it in time and that this correlation is noticed in all observed cases without exception. Does such observed uniformity prove any necessary connexion between *a* and *b*? It is clear that in so far as *a* and *b* are different, *a* is not *b* and *b* is not *a*, so that there is nothing in *a* as *a* that involves its necessary relation to *b*, and also nothing in *b* as *b* that involves its necessary relation to *a*. And yet, according to the theory of the concrete universal, their co-existence or succession is only an expression of their necessary connexion in an inclusive whole. But what warrant is there for such a conclusion except the repetition of their conjunction in different observed cases? And yet strictly considered the theory of concrete universal cannot concede any repetition or recurrence in experience without giving away its whole case. As we have already said, the systematic unity which is the concrete universal, according to this theory, is a unity of elements in which every detail is different from every other and in which no detail can be omitted without destroying the whole. But even granting that such a unity is compatible with repetitions and recurrences, the theory does not show how repetition of a conjunction in varying circumstances ensuring elimination of all other concomitants is itself a proof of necessary connection. All that repetition in the sense of uncontradicted experience proves is that the conjunction has been found to be true of all past and present observed cases. But to universalise what is true only of the observed cases of the past and the present into a general statement about *all* cases, observed and unobserved, is as unwarranted as it is illogical. In fact, even the observed past and the

observed present constitute only a fragment of the sum-total of all past and present cases, observed and unobserved, and to this sum-total must be added all those unobserved cases which have not yet occurred and which will occur at some time or other in the future. When we say that thunder having followed lightning in all observed cases, past and present, *must* also do so in all cases, observed and unobserved, we are stating a mere conjunction of events covering a portion of the past and the present in terms of a necessary connection covering *all* past, present and future cases, observed and unobserved. And yet there is nothing in the conjunction as such or its repetition that justifies any inference of a necessary connexion. In fact, what Hume has conclusively shown and what, since Hume, has never been successfully refuted is that the so-called necessary connexions of phenomena are only pragmatic fictions necessitated by the requirements of the practical life but incapable of being demonstrated as logically proved truths. And this receives further confirmation from the fact that even some of the highest generalisations of science have been proved false in course of the progress of scientific enquiry. In short, Hegel's view of Reality as a self-maintaining whole that unfolds itself in finite experience through contradiction and resolution of contradiction in a higher synthesis takes away all meaning from contradiction as a criterion of falsity. If contradiction itself be the life-principle of a self-unfolding reality, then there is no sense in saying that it is a criterion of unreality. We have to choose between the two alternatives of (i) a Reality that has no place for any contradiction in itself and in regard to which the contradictions and incompatibilities of experience are as floating appearances, and (ii) a Reality in which contradictions become magically dissolved into a coherent unity in some form which we do not know and can never know from the nature of the case. We subscribe to the first alternative as being more straightforward and more in agreement with the evidence of experience, not requiring us, as in the second alternative, to believe in a unity that must remain for ever an unknown and unknowable X.

Our conclusion therefore is that the universal conceived either

(i) as a one beyond the many (the Platonic view), or (ii) as a one in many (the Aristotelian view), or (iii) as a one of many (the Hegelian view) does not admit of explanation in logical terms. A fourth view that universals are only resemblances of existentially independent particulars may also be disposed of as providing no better solution. Resembling particulars without a common character in which they resemble are as unintelligible as are the *universalia ante res* of the Platonic scholastics, or the *universalia in rebus* of the Aristotelians. Universals, according to our view, are ultimate inexplicabilities, indescribable appearances of a reality that is neither universal nor particular—appearances that are of value for the conduct of life but void of truth and reality in the strict sense.

THE belief is widespread among students of moral philosophy that ethics is not possible without some metaphysical justification of freedom, as a postulate at least, if not as a proved truth. In discussing freedom as a metaphysical issue we, however, shall not go into two enquiries which are not strictly relevant to our purpose. One of these is the psychological question as to the precise elements into which an act of volition may be analysed. The other is the ethical problem as to the limits of moral responsibility. For our special purpose both these questions may be left aside. Our task is the simpler one of deciding, first, what we mean by freedom which we all regard as a necessary condition of the moral life, and, secondly, what general view of reality is implied in the affirmation or denial of freedom as an actuality.

“Free” and “Freedom” are manifestly what logicians call “privative terms” ; they denote the absence of certain restrictions. To be free means to be free from something. What, then, are the typical restrictions which in practical life we resent as making us unfree ? They are as follows :—

(a) We are not free when our limbs are set in motion by an external agent, human or non-human. And the reason why we are unfree in these movements is that they do not express a purpose of our own. Hence so long as a deed is done for us and not by us, so long as it does not correspond to any actual purpose of ours, it is not a free act.

(b) Again, we are not free when we act in ignorance of the special circumstances of the case. If we shoot a friend who came to speak to me from below the window mistaking him for a burglar, we actually act with a purpose, but the result which follows from my acting in ignorance of all the circumstances is quite different from the purpose with which we acted. Hence the result does not express our purpose, i. e., ourselves and therefore we consider ourselves as not having acted with full freedom.

(c) Again, I am not acting freely where the circumstances are such as not to allow the formation of any purpose. Action under sudden impulse comes under this category.

(d) Further, we feel ourselves unfree when we fail to execute our purposes either from sheer inability to attend to a consistent scheme of action or because we attend equally to purposes which are inconsistent with one another. Hence to be free we must have purposes which are coherent so that it is no paradox to say that unfreedom is not knowing one's own mind and following contradictory purposes or aims, while to be free means to know what you want and to aim only at what consists with other aims and with the system of reality as a whole.

If to be free means that one's outward deed will be the complete expression of an inward consistent purpose, then we can see at once that no finite being can be completely free. Complete freedom in a finite being will mean (1) that he is not hampered in any way in the execution of his purpose by the presence of conflicting interests, and (2) that he is not thwarted also by the actions of fellow-beings or by brute nature. But as no finite individual possesses either that internal consistency of purpose or that comprehensiveness of outlook as to make either internal conflict or external resistance impossible, no finite being can be said to be completely free.

A finite being is free thus only in so far as he can translate his purpose into action, and he can translate his purpose into action only as his purpose is free from internal inconsistency and is in harmony with the rest of reality.

WHETHER the self is permanent and imperishable, or only a passing and temporary phase of reality is a much disputed point amongst philosophers. In popular thought this question commonly appears as that of the immortality (sometimes also, as that of the pre-existence) of the soul. A distinction must be made, however, between *Janmāntaravāda* and survival after death on the one side and immortal or eternal life on the other.

To believe in rebirth and a succession of births, deaths and rebirths as even Buddhists do is not necessarily to believe in immortality and an eternity of self-existence. The same is true of survival after death. To continue to be even after death and separation from the physical body does not necessarily mean that this continued existence as a disincarnate spirit will not come to an end at any time.

Immortality thus means an eternity of existence, i. e., existence without cessation at any time, an everlasting and imperishable life. Whether any eternity in this sense can be claimed for the finite self is a doubtful question. A self is one and the same self in virtue of the continuity of its interests and purposes. If this continuity is snapped and a completely different set of purposes and interests takes the place of the old interests and aims, the self evidently is no longer the same old self. Whether the old self in these circumstances should be called dead depends on whether the old interests have vanished altogether and a wholly different set of unrelated interests (i. e., unrelated to the interests that have disappeared) has taken their place; or whether the old interests still function in the new purposes, though in a subordinate and latent manner. In the former case we have what psychology calls a case of multiple personality—the old self having died and a new self having appeared in its place. In the latter case a new self has grown out of the old and is continuous with the latter.

Mr. A. E. Taylor points out (Elements of Metaphysics) that both from Abnormal and Normal psychology examples may be cited of the disappearance of a self and formation of a new one on the basis of new aims and purposes. In the case of multiple or alternating personality we have evidence that a plurality of unrelated selves may either co-exist in the same physical body or alternate in it regularly. The less striking but more familiar examples of dreams and occasions of exceptional excitements, when our normal aims and purposes appear to be overpowered by interests which are quite alien to our normal self also belong to the same category. When we act under great provocation or under sudden strong impulse we say that we are not *ourselves*.

Examples like the above make it quite clear that the essence of the self consists in the interests and purposes it lives for and that the self continues to be so long as the continuity of these interests and ends remains unbroken.

Hence as regards the vexed question of an eternal, immortal life, it follows that philosophy cannot prove the indestructibility of the self unless it can prove that the aims and purposes which constitute a self are also eternal and indestructible. On the other hand, if the self is a function of its inner unity of purpose and aim, there is also no *a priori* ground for holding that, with death and consequent separation from the physical body, the unity of purpose which a self is will be necessarily destroyed.

Hence while philosophy cannot prove that the interests and purposes which a self stands for are eternal or everlasting and that therefore the self must also have an eternity of existence or immortality, it cannot also disprove the possibility of an eternal life by any negative arguments. We *are* what our purposes are and if our purposes are comprehensive enough to last for ever, we ourselves will likewise co-exist with our everlasting aims.

The question, therefore, is : can our purposes be such as to be everlasting and eternal ? The answer to this question depends not merely on our capacity to know the whole of reality so that we may choose a purpose that will not run counter to the intrinsic nature of reality but also on our capacity to control all

external agents, all hostile and alien forces of nature that may destroy and smash all our cherished aims and purposes at any time. It is obvious that, as finite individuals, we are subject to necessary limitations both as regards our capacity to know reality and also to carry through our aims and interests against hostile alien forces. Thus being ignorant of the greater part of reality and knowing only an insignificant fraction of it we cannot possibly hope to choose our purposes in harmony with the nature of the all inclusive whole so that the values and ends we live for may last for ever. Nor is it possible for finite beings like ourselves to carry through all our purposes without hitch or break so that they may not be shattered at any time by unkind hostile forces of which we are ignorant and over which we have no control as a consequence.

Our conclusion, then, is that even if our self be not so tied to the body that it may not survive any separation from it as in death, yet there is no good reason to believe that immortality in the sense of an everlasting eternal life can ever be possible, far less a certainty, for finite beings like ourselves.

It may be conceded, however, that while philosophy cannot prove immortality in the above sense of a life everlasting and eternal, it cannot also categorically reject it as a logically untenable hypothesis.

Is there, then, no other way to ensure immortality even though the logical reason be unable to decide the issue? If no finite purpose can claim to be everlasting, is there, then, no other aim or purpose, no good or value that is infinite and inexhaustible, a value not subject to decay and eventual dissolution incidental to finite existence? And is there no way of our contact with such an imperishable, eternal value, if there be any such, except through the logical reason and discursive thought? In religion, at least in most religions barring perhaps Buddhism, we have positive assurance of some form of eternal existence of the finite self, though hardly any religion can offer any logical ground for such assurance. In *Vaiṣṇavism*, e. g., *amṛtatva* or immortality is assured to the true *bhakta* or devotee who dedicates himself to the service of the Lord as the Fountainhead of

all joy and bliss from Whom all finite purposes derive their value or significance. Whether such absorption in an absolute end with a corresponding indifference to, and withdrawal from, all finite values and purposes, is possible logical reason or discursive thought may not be able to prove, but because it cannot be explained in terms of reason it does not follow that it should be dismissed as a fanciful creation of a disordered mind. We conclude, therefore, that though the logical reason cannot assure immortality, this does not preclude any mystical realisation of *i* in some form of supra-rational experience.

IN tracing the development of the idea of God from early times to the present day we must remark at the outset, that though most of the historical religions centre round some conception or other of a Supreme Person or God to whom finite persons are conceived as owing their existence and Who as such has to be worshipped, prayed to or otherwise propitiated in various ways, yet such conception is neither an invariable feature of every religion as such nor is indispensable to it. For example, Buddhism, one of the great historical religions, in its early phases, was more a religion of escape from the ills of life than worship of any Personal God. The vedāntic religion similarly, even at the present day as professed by large groups of *sannyāsis* in India, is a religion of rediscovery of the true nature of the self rather than worship of any God or Gods. Jainism, another living Indian faith, preaches the religion of *Arhatas*, who, starting as finite beings, become free from the limits of finitude by various methods of meditation and practice, and is not a religion of prayer to any eternally perfect Being regarded as creator, maintainer and moral governor of the world. Besides these historical religions we have also primitive religions some of which worship a cosmic force called *mana* or magical energy while others worship spirits and even demonic beings—none of which has anything in common with the Personal God of modern religions except perhaps their supernatural character. It may not be out of place therefore to remark that what makes a religion what it is, is a sense of recovered unity with reality after one of estrangement, and whatever achieves this end, whether *mana*, magic, spirits, demons, or a personal God or Gods, is religion, and that while the end, viz., the re-attainment of unity after a sense of estrangement, remains the same in all religions, the means of

effecting this unity varies according to the level of culture and the progress of knowledge at that level.

Bearing in mind the above preliminary observations, we may cut out from our survey all primitive religions and their beliefs in *mana*, magic, spirits, etc., as not answering to the God-idea of modern times. We shall begin therefore with Polytheism or the belief in many Gods and Goddesses as was current among the ancient Egyptians, the ancient Greeks and the Romans and also in the Vedic Religion of the Hindus and trace the gradual transformation of early polytheism into monotheism and its different varieties such as pantheism, deism, panentheism and theism.

What is specially notable in polytheism is that it thrives at a stage when man is more impressed by the variety and diversity of the world than by its unity and interrelatedness. Thus arose, e. g., the independent nature deities of the early Vedic religion as also the humanistic Gods of Homer's times. What is noteworthy however is that while in the Vedic religion it was the diversity of Nature that attracted attention so that to every important phenomenon of nature was ascribed a presiding Deity (e. g., a Deity of rain, a Deity of fire, Deities of rivers etc.), in Greek polytheism it was man's diverse nature that was the centre of religious interest so that instead of the Deities of Nature, Greek polytheism deified human attributes and functions. Thus arose the Gods of Peace and War, the Gods of Beauty, of Valour and of Health and Physical Well-being, etc., as the Greek counterpart of the polytheism of the Vedas.

It is obvious however that polytheism can satisfy only as long as man remains engrossed in the diversity and the variety of the world and is bound to give way as soon as attention is attracted to the world's essential unity and harmony. And so it happened that with the growing consciousness of the oneness of the world a way was found to the essential unity of the Gods in the conception of a hierarchy of Gods and the subordination of the lesser to mightier Deities. This was how order and harmony were brought about in the Greek pantheon of Gods and Goddesses, while in the Vedic polytheism the same object was achieved by what Max Mueller calls heno-theism in which each major Deity

was conceived in turn as the One Supreme Deity to which all the rest were subordinate.

The next step in the development of the God-idea was the transformation of the inter-related Gods of the Greek pantheon and of the henotheism of the Vedic religion into full-fledged monotheism either in the form of a conception of one Supreme Person as the creator, maintainer and moral governor of the world, i. e., a God who created the world out of nothing or out of Himself, or in the form of the Upaniṣadic conception of Brahman as one without a second of which the world is either a false appearance (Śāṅkara) or the means of its self-realisation and self-fulfilment (Rāmānuja).

It may be remarked here that pantheism in the sense that *pan* or all is *theos* or God was not an actual intermediate stage of the evolution of the God-idea anywhere either in the West or the East. Pantheism in this strict sense means deification of all things so that even a hill or a river or a stock or stone is God. In this extreme sense pantheism is not an actual stage of the development of the God-idea anywhere. Spinoza's monism is no belief in God as equal to all things and is more a Kind of acosmism and belief in a reality behind the world than an equation of God with the sum-total of things. To be sure, Spinoza distinguishes between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, i. e., between substance as the underlying reality and substance as the sum-total of phenomenal objects, but these latter are what the *understanding* conceives as the attributes and modes of substance and do not represent the intrinsic essence of substance.

Upaniṣadic monism also is very far removed from pantheism in the strict sense. In neither of the two different forms of the Upaniṣadic idea of Brahman as the one reality without a second, i. e., of Brahman as *niṣprapañca*, or negation of the world and Brahman as *saprapañca*, or realising itself in and through the world, is there any question of identity of God and the world as in pantheism strictly interpreted. In the *niṣprapañca* conception of Brahman what is emphasised is Brahman's transcendence of the world, Brahman being regarded as the "wholly other" of which nothing belonging to the world can be strictly predicated.

This is illustrated in the negative description of Brahman as 'not this', 'not this' (*neti, neti*). Thus Brahman is not the *bhutas* or five elements, not the body, not the sense-organs, etc., etc. In the more positive conception of Brahman as *saprapañca*, i. e., as realising itself through the world, the world is conceived as the means or instrument of the Self-manifestation of Brahman as the Supreme Person or God. In neither case, whether in the negative conception on which Śāṅkara's Advaita is based, or the positive view on which Rāmānujist and other theistic Indian schools built their theistic or rather panentheistic conception of the Absolute as the Supreme Person, there is any hint of a complete identity of God and the world as in pantheism. It may be noted that while in the negative conception of Brahman as *niṣprapañca* what is stressed is the Absolute as the 'wholly other' and as transcending the world, in the positive conception both transcendence and immanence are emphasised, the world being regarded as that through which the Absolute realises its nature as an Omnipersonality, i. e., a personality of all personalities who requires the mediation of finite persons to be what He is as God or the Supreme Person. Thus according to the positive view, though God is not the world of finite persons and things, yet He requires it as the means or instrument through which He becomes fully Himself. We may distinguish the two views by what the Vaiṣṇavas call God in his aspect of *aiśvarya*, Lordliness, glory and grandeur and God in His aspect of *mādhurya*, sweetness as the near and the dear one. In the *aiśvarya* aspect, what is stressed is the distance of the absolute from the relative and finite, its transcendence of all worldly things and beings—a view of the Absolute that finds its classical expression in Carlyle's delineation of it as "the absentee God", a far-away being who dwells in the clouds and has nothing in common with, and is utterly unconcerned in worldly phenomena. In the *mādhurya* aspect, however, what is emphasized is God's nearness as the well-beloved or dear one who is as much concerned in finite beings as they are in Him. It may be noted that though none of these aspects is altogether ignored in any of the Indian Theistic Schools, yet in some it is the *aiśvarya* or sublimity and

transcendence that is specially stressed while in some other schools, it is the aspect of immanence, nearness and dearness (*mādhurya*) that is specially emphasised. Thus in Rāmānujist and Mādhva Theism, it is the aspect of *aiśvarya*, distance and sublimity, that receives special prominence, while in the theism of Śri Caitanya, Vallabha and Nimbārka, the aspect of immanence, proximity and close affinity (*mādhurya*) that is specially emphasised. Distinguished from all these is the Śāṅkarite Advaita in which the Absolute is not a Personal God, but the Impersonal Essence of Consciousness behind and beyond the world-appearance. In spite, however, of its denial of a Personal God as the ultimate reality Śāṅkarite Advaita recognises a Personal God as an appearance of the ultimate reality—an appearance which is inherently false just as is the world, but a higher false appearance than the world as it appears in sense-experience in the sense that the worship of God as the material and efficient cause of the world negates the world of sense as an illusion while the world of sense cannot negate the appearance which is God. In other words, God is an appearance no less false than the world, but while the appearance which is God cancels the falsity which is the world, God Himself as appearance is not cancelled by the world but negated only by *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* or intuition of Brahman as the Impersonal Essence of Consciousness.

Turning now to the ideas of God other than Indian we find that the two semitic religions, Judaism and Islamism, emphasize the aspect of transcendence and repudiate all ideas of existential unity of God and the world. Thus Jehova, the God of the Israelites, is as much a Transcendent inaccessible Being as is Allah, the God of Islam. In fact, Islamism categorically denies all idea of contact of man and God, religion being according to Islam, one of Kismet or service, so that though we can serve God in various ways we can never become one with Him. Though in the third semitic religion, viz, Christianity, the separation of God and the world is not emphasized to the same extent as in the other two, some sort of unity with God being provided through love and communion, yet in some forms of Christian Theology the dualism of God and the world is as

sharp as in Judaism or Islamism. For example, in what is called Deism and what was very much in vogue in the Europe of seventeenth century, God was conceived as creating the world out of nothing and thereafter endowing it with absolute independence. Thus, according to Deism, the world including man becomes absolutely separated from God after creation and goes on in accordance with its own laws and as acted on by finite beings.

A detailed examination of Deism, Theism, Panentheism and Pantheism follows in part II below.

II

IN part I we have seen that the idea of God has centred round four different types of thought,—Deistic, Pantheistic, Panentheistic, Theistic. Besides, these four, the Advaitism of Śaṅkara represents a stand-point by itself which cannot be classed under anyone of the previous four types. We shall now consider critically all these different ideas of God.

Deism, as we have seen, stresses the transcendence of God, meaning His remoteness from the world and His inaccessibility to finite creatures. God's function, according to Deism, ends with creating the world, which thereafter pursues its own course according to its inherent laws. Man, however, as an immortal being, is beyond and above nature. Thus there are, according to Deism, three realities : God, Nature, and Man, each independent of the other two.

The principle objections to Deism are the following :—(a) Deism assumes that God created the world at some point of time, and that before creation He had remained all alone without any world. The question may thus be asked, why did God create the world? If He had remained without it from immemorial time, was He imperfect without a world? Then why did He not make good this imperfection before? Why had He allowed

Himself to remain imperfect before He created the world? Further, why did He create just this world and not any other? On the side of the world it may be similarly asked, if the world could go on independently of the creator after creation, might it not as well have gone on without being created by God? Thus the idea of creation becomes a superfluous conception.

(b) Again, Deism supposes that God is the First Cause, and material forces are the Second Causes, which after creation, operate independently of God, the First Cause. But how can the energy of God be divorced from God Himself, and act independently of God as a Second Cause? Why should God whose very essence is ceaseless activity go to sleep as it were after the creation of the world?

(c) Deism believes in occasional Divine interference in the created world. But why should God interfere with His work? Why should this Divine creation tend towards disintegration? Why should there be seeds of decay in a world created by God? Necessity of occasional interference means that God is an imperfect being who could not create a perfect world.

(d) Deism conceives God to be wholly transcendent. But the complete transcendence of God is inconsistent with God's infinitude. The complete transcendence of God means that God falls outside the world, and the world falls outside God. But this means that God is not all-inclusive, but is limited by the world that falls outside His being.

(e) Lastly, Deism supposes that God existed without a world from beginningless time and yet was a Personal God, i. e., a self-conscious and thinking being. But to be conscious requires something to be conscious of. Thinking requires material for thought. But what then was the object of Divine Thought before creation? There was then nothing to think of, no world to serve as the object of Divine thinking.

The difficulties inherent in the Deistic conception of thinking lead naturally to the opposite Pantheistic view, which we should have now to consider critically. While Deism believes in the transcendence of God, i. e., in God creating physical

nature and man and thereafter withdrawing from his created world, pantheism believes in the immanence of God in the world. Hence, according to pantheism, All is God, or rather whatever is, is nothing but the one God. Literally taken, this will mean that whatever is, is God, so that the river, the hill, the tree, etc. are all God. But this is polytheism or belief in many Gods. But pantheism holds that the river, the hill, the tree, etc. are not only God, but all are one and the same God. Thus instead of a river-god, a hill-god, etc., each independent of the rest of Gods as in polytheism, we have in pantheism one unitary God in hill, tree, river, etc. This means that the differences of hill, tree, river, etc., are all illusory, the reality behind them being one Divine Person.

The chief objection to Pantheism is that the one reality behind the differences of things as pantheism conceives it cannot be the Personal God of Religion. A Person must be self-conscious and self-consciousness implies consciousness of something in distinction from which one can be self-conscious. But an abstract one behind the many, a pure unity beyond all differences cannot be self-conscious in this sense.

Secondly, pantheism explains away differences as merely illusory. How can an illusion of difference arise in a reality which is a pure unity bereft of all differences ?

Thirdly, the pantheistic view must necessarily deny freedom of will, moral responsibility and even causal connection as false appearances and thus must be at variance with established facts of experience.

Fourthly, the pantheistic world must be devoid of purpose and teleology as time and its differences of past and present can have no place in the pantheistic one as a blank unity.

Lastly, from the pantheistic standpoint the world of plurality must be an illusion and therefore the so-called creation of the world is only a figure of speech and hence there is no God as *creator* of the world.

Our examination of Deism and Pantheism has shown that none of these gives an intelligible, satisfactory account of the God-idea. We have to consider whether Panentheism is more

satisfactory in this respect. According to Panentheism, God is both transcendent and immanent so that while God is in the world in so far as He evolves it out of Himself and works in, and sustains, the world of finite things and beings as material of His activity and thought, he at the same time as self-conscious agent and subject is not exhausted in the world, but remains above it.

According to this view, therefore God is in the world and yet is more than the world. It was Krause who first gave currency to the word Panentheism. Panentheism is neither abstract monism, nor Pantheism, nor Spinozistic acosmism, nor again pure pluralism. It may be called concrete monism. According to it, the words 'external' or 'internal' have no literal meaning when applied to the relation of God and the world. God is in fact, in things and above things at one and the same time, and it is more correct to say that all things are in God (*Pan*—all, *en*—in, *theos*—God) than that God is outside all things (Deism) or that God is the whole of things (pantheism). If we consider the fallacy underlying abstract monism we find that it leads to concrete monism. Abstract monism must at least admit that there is an appearance of a world of finite beings and minds, but the world is not disposed of by calling it an appearance. If finite minds and things are only appearances, there must nevertheless be some reason for their appearing as such. If the absolute be one, its so-called appearances as finite things and minds must be due to some reason or essence within the absolute and this reason will be reason not only for their appearing out of the absolute, but also for the relations, which, as appearances, they bear to one another and to the absolute, in which or out of which they appear. But this reason being an essence within the one absolute reality must itself be reality and not mere appearance. But this leads to concrete monism or Panentheism, i. e., the view that the finite things and minds are real, (i) because they have their reason within the absolute reality, and also (ii) because they are not unnecessary additions to the absolute, as Deism supposes, but are required by the very nature of the absolute. It may be noted, however, that accor-

ding to Panentheism the reality of the finite which is bound up with the nature or essence of the absolute, is yet relative, dependent and conditioned reality. Its function as reality is determined not by itself but only by the place which it occupies within the plan of the absolute whole relatively to other finite things within the whole.

The central difficulty in Panentheism is that of an intelligible idea of the absolute as being in the world and at the same time being more than the world. If God surpasses the world by an excess of reality, how are we to conceive this excess or *extra* element in the Divine Being? Since it is an excess over all that belongs to, and is comprised in, the world, it cannot be thought of in any of the wordly categories in terms of which we think of the world. Hence space, time, causality, subject, object are all inadequate when applied to the interpretation of this excess aspect of the Divine being. We thus can only say what it is not, but cannot say what it is. In the absence of any positive idea of this excess in the Divine Being, it becomes the unknowable absolute of Spencer and Hamilton. Hence Panentheism critically considered resolves into agnosticism. In fact, any assertion of an excess of being in the absolute, not translatable in any of the categories of experience, becomes an unmeaning nonsensical proposition.

Secondly, the Panentheist contention that finite things and beings, though involved in the nature of the absolute, yet are devoid of anything but relative and conditioned reality is a dogmatic assertion without any reason behind it. That the finite fulfils a limited purpose within the plan of the whole and therefore cannot possess absolute reality is an assertion which presupposes an idea of the plan of the whole which, according to the Panentheistic position, must be beyond all human knowledge, the whole being not construable in terms of any of the categories within the reach of human experience.

Lastly, in asserting the immanence as well the transcendence of God, Panentheism drags the absolute and complete reality to the level of the world-process in time. How can that which is absolutely real be conceived as realising itself in time? It is

only the incomplete or the imperfect that completes or perfects itself in time. Panentheism will have it both ways, i. e., God as an eternally perfect being and yet as evolving and perfecting itself in the history of the world in time.

Whether Panentheism can be regarded as the same as christian theism depends upon the degree to which a personalistic view of God is to be emphasized. The most sustained attempts to maintain that all things have their being in a whole which is a Person are to be found in the views of the Caird brothers, of Royce, and of some of the other Neo-Hegelians.

It is evidently easier to hold that all things are within a whole which is personal, than that all the parts of the whole are personal. Space, time and material objects are obviously not personal, yet they may all be infected by the nature of the personal whole of which they are parts in the same way that a room may be said to betray the personality of its occupant. It is thus possible that personality may be pervasive of the non-personal and the universe may be a personal unity of finite persons and non-personal things. It is this idea which Hegelians have in mind when they describe the whole as a person. Personality or self-conscious spirit, Hegelians say, is the highest category we know, higher than life, and much higher than space, time and matter. It is in personality or self-conscious spirit that reality is most intelligibly revealed, though reality is more than personal. This is why explaining the whole in personalistic terms Panentheists yet confess that personality may not be the last word, or the most adequate account of the world. Hence, Hegelians, like Royce, are never quite clear as to whether the whole is to be called personal or supra-personal. Bradley, in fact, is quite definite that the personal God of theism is only an appearance, the absolute being neither subject nor object and describable at best as *superject* beyond both subject and object.

Hesitation between a personal God, and a supra-personal absolute, which marks the view of most Panentheists and Absolute Idealists is conspicuous by absence in Theism. Theism is out-and-out Personalistic. The God of Theism is distinguished by His pure spiritual nature which excludes matter, space, and

time and, 'as absolute ground, is beyond and above them all. God is spirit, i. e., a person, consisting of self-consciousness and consciousness of other-than-self. This other-than-self is the world as the object of His creation, creation being constant without beginning or end. And creation is for the manifestation of the glory of God, i. e., of God as the perfect being. Descartes was the first real theist of modern times, the first to take personality as the primary philosophical concept, and Berkeley, Leibnitz, and a host of other theists have followed in the wake of Descartes. The main point in theism is that the Universe is not God, but God's. It is His possession, dependent upon Him, and subject to His control. This thought is more in agreement with the evolutionary scheme of modern science than is creation conceived as an accomplished fact as in Deism, or as an endless dialectical movement as in Hegelian Panentheism. God, man and world, according to Theism, are not independent reals as in Deism, but complementary facts of existence. Man's action requires God's sustaining Power just as the world requires God's compresence in its occurrences. God does not act arbitrarily but respects the will of the creatures He has created. God's immutability does not mean apathy, but self-controlled activity directed towards the realisation of the highest values. In this respect God's activity is limited, but the limitation is self-imposed limitation. The Theistic idea of God is both anthropomorphic and theomorphic ; it interprets God in terms of man, and man in his essence in terms of Divine values.

Theism, however, is no more satisfactory than any of the other 'isms' we have considered. While it makes God a co-partner with man in the shaping of the world, it does not say how human initiative is to be conceived in world-making. Is man, e. g., a creator as God is, and as free as God in the task of world-building ? Or, is man free only in the negative sense of being able to withdraw from a world ruled by necessity ? And again, how is man to be conceived as related to God ? Is he co-eternal with God, or is he just a creature who comes into being in time at the will of God ? Further, in what way is God beyond

and above the world which He creates and controls? Is the world existentially separate from God? Or, is it only part and parcel of the Divine Personality? If the world is existentially separate from God and is yet ruled by God, how could God separate Himself from what He created out of Himself? Further, in what sense is God eternal? Is He eternally all that He is? In that case what need is there for God to realise Himself by creating a world and bringing values into being, which are eternally there, involved in the very nature of the eternally perfect being of the Divine Personality.

ADVAITISM

OUR examination of different God-ideas has shown that none of these, Pantheistic, Deistic, Panentheistic, or Theistic, is free from internal contradiction. We have found that the contradiction arises mainly from the endeavour to combine the idea of a complete and perfect reality with that of a reality that completes and perfects itself in time. Each and every one of the above theories thus fails to give an intelligible account of a perfect and eternal reality, which yet must unfold itself in time in the history of the world. In this respect Advaitism is an advance on all the above theories in so far as, without reducing the world to absolute nothingness, it yet recognises it as an appearance rather than as absolute reality in the strict sense.

As an appearance that appears, it is not an absolute void, though, as temporal and imperfect, it is also other than the absolute eternally complete reality. It is thus other than reality as well as unreality, and is, therefore, logically indefinable. This constitutes its falsity in the sense that without being unreal or absolute void, it yet has no attachment to reality. It is thus a floating appearance, a wandering adjective that appears in reality and yet is other than, and stands eternally negated in reality. In this sense the world is a false appearance, and so is the creation of the world, and so also is God as creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world. But, the Advaitin adds, though there are no degrees of reality, reality not admitting of more or

less of reality strictly speaking, there yet are degrees of falsity or appearance in the sense that the higher falsity overcomes and cancels the lower, but the lower appearance has no corresponding power of overcoming the higher appearance.

Thus both the snake, and the rope which appears as the snake in an ordinary illusion, are indescribable appearances both being riddled with contradiction. But while the empirically real rope is actually observed to cancel the illusion of the snake, there is no corresponding power observed in the illusory snake-appearance to cancel the rope of ordinary experience. In this sense we can speak of higher and lower falsities. but not of higher and lower realities. Thus the God-idea is a higher appearance than the world and may be used to overcome our attachment to the world, though it has also to be abandoned when one attains to the intuition of the absolute as the eternally complete reality. Thus the God-idea in this sense may be regarded as a stage, in fact, the penultimate stage of of our progress towards self-discovery as the eternally complete being. Advaitism is thus no denial of religion, but of religion as the ultimate truth of our being.

(A) I M M A N U E L K A N T

KANT uses the term 'appearance' in at least three senses. In the first place, the material given in our sense-intuition is, according to Kant, appearance. Thus colour, taste, smell, etc. are all appearances. They are derived from a foreign source, but they do not reveal the intrinsic nature of the source from which they are derived. We do not create the sensations according to our pleasure, they are forced on us by reals independent of ourselves. And yet in appearing in our consciousness through affections of our sensibilities these reals appear changed into forms which are quite different from their intrinsic nature. Colour, taste, smell, etc., though depending on the actions of things on our sensibilities, yet do not represent the intrinsic properties of their external source. According to the evidence of science, there was a time when conditions were not suitable for the appearance of living beings and there will also be a time when our earth will lack the necessary warmth for living beings to exist in it. Thus it is legitimate to infer that in such a condition of the world, though things, i. e., the external sources of the given material of sense would continue to be yet as there could be neither living beings nor their organs of sense, there could not be any intuitions of sense and therefore no colours, tastes, or smells as the given materials of our sense-intuitions. Hence the materials of sense, the colours, tastes, etc. which constitute the given raw material of our experience are appearances that do not reveal the intrinsic properties of things. These materials, Kant holds, are also appearances in another sense—appearances of the second order one may say. Thus the sensations which are caused in us by the external reals appear spread out in space and as succeeding one another in time, i. e., in the forms of our outer and inner sense.

And thus not merely in their character as sensations but also in their form or ordering they take on the character of the sensibilities in which they appear. Hence they are appearances distinct from things as they are in themselves, both in regard to their material character as sensations and in the character of their forms as co-existing in space or succeeding one another in time. There is yet another sense in which these sense-intuitions are appearances, viz., when they are organised into objects of experience through the application of the categories of the understanding. Kant here uses the term 'phenomena' by which he means the intuited material of sense transformed into a common world of experience through elaboration by concepts. Thus the sense-material as such is no world of objects till it is constructed by the application of the categories of the understanding into substances qualified by qualities and related to other substances in fixed necessary relations as causes, effects, etc. It follows that it is understanding that makes nature as a world of shared common objects standing in fixed objective relations to one another. Since the categories which effect the transformation of the brute material of sense into a world of experience belong to the understanding and not to the things in themselves, the latter in their intrinsic nature cannot be regarded as answering to any of the categories including the categories of relation. Hence things as they are in themselves are neither substances nor qualities, neither causes nor effects, in short, are unrelated to the phenomena or objects which the understanding manufactures out of the given material of sense. Thus strictly regarded, phenomena are floating appearances unrelated to the noumenal background which they neither qualify nor reveal in its intrinsic nature.

Besides the categories with which the understanding constructs a world of objects out of the given material of sense, Kant also mentions another class of concepts which he calls the Ideas of Reason. They differ from the categories in that they are empty concepts that lack a given basis in sense-intuition. While the categories have application to the given material of sense, the Ideas of Reason are mere Ideas without a basis in anything

given in experience. Consider, e. g. the Idea of the world as a completed whole. It is not given in any experience. Only fragments of the totality (if there be any totality) are given, but the totality is not given in any experience. It is thus a concept without an intuitive basis, an empty concept without attachment to any reality as given. It is yet a necessary Idea—an idea necessitated by the very nature of experience as the organisation of the given. Without the idea of a finished reality which we explore piecemeal in experience, there will be no motive for any such exploration. Nobody cares to undertake a task which he knows can never be done. The idea of a world as a completed reality is thus a necessary illusion—an empty idea without a given basis in intuition and yet one that is necessitated by the nature of knowledge as the organisation of experience. The Ideas of the World, Soul and God are empty concepts in this sense, floating ideas without attachment to reality, which yet are necessary illusions which we cannot get rid of.

It would appear however on closer examination that Kant's distinction between the categories of the understanding and the Ideas of Reason is a distinction without any real difference. The categories as the concepts of the understanding no more belong to the things-in-themselves than do the so-called Ideas of Reason. Even if we grant that phenomena have reference to a noumenal background which they claim to represent but fail to reveal, while the Ideas of Reason refer to no such source and claim to be real on their own account, yet phenomena *qua* constructions of the understanding are as much separated from the reality they are supposed to express and as such mere floating ideas as are the so-called Ideas of Reason as empty concepts without a basis in any given reality. In short, appearance in the sense of the given material of sense arranged in the *apriori* forms of space and time and appearance in the sense of a common world of phenomena constructed by the understanding out of the sense-given material are alike false appearances as standing eternally negated in the very substrate which they are supposed to reveal. In this sense they lack attachment to reality and are only wandering adjectives just like the Ideas of Reason as concepts without a real

basis. To be sure, Kant distinguishes between a false appearance in the sense of an illusion and the phenomenal world which the understanding constructs out of the sense-given material. While an illusion is private and is sublated by the empirical reality, the latter belongs to a shared world of phenomena governed by necessary connections and thus revealing a fixed nature of its own. But the distinction thus drawn does not make any substantial difference to the meaning of appearance. If the illusory appearance is illusory or false in the sense that it stands negated in the substrate of empirical reality which it claims to reveal, so is the empirical world of phenomena false in the sense that it stands negated in the noumenal reality of which it claims to be a faithful representation. Thus sense-illusions are false appearances of what are themselves falsifications of things as they are in themselves—appearances of appearances and therefore twice removed from the noumenal reality they are believed to reveal. And yet both the phenomenal and the illusory appearance are equally false as failing to reveal reality in its intrinsic character. It may be noted that this is substantially the Advaita view of appearance and its different grades as we shall see when we deal with the Advaita view, though the Advaita view as far as the nature of reality is concerned has hardly anything in common with that of Kant.

(B) F. H. BRADLEY

If we now turn to F. H. Bradley, the British Neo-Hegelian, it would appear on a first view that his account of Appearance and Reality has hardly anything in common with that of Kant. Bradley rejects Kant's things in themselves as an assumption which is not only incapable of proof but also inconsistent with Kant's fundamental principles. If things are given in the manifold of sense out of which the understanding constructs objects of experience, they could be so given only on the assumption that they are affections of our sensibility caused by the things as they are in themselves—an assumption which involves application of the category of causality on the transcendent things which Kant himself considers to be illegitimate. Thus rejecting the things-in-

themselves as an untenable assumption Bradley also rejects Kant's view of a pluralistic manifold of sense as the starting-point of our construction of objects. A pluralistic manifold is not given either in sense or in any other way—what is given, according to Bradley, being reality as absolute Experience as continuous with our felt experience. In common with Spinoza, his monistic predecessor, Bradley holds that reality is what exists in itself and is conceived in itself. Hence, according to Bradley, nothing is real which lacks self-existence. It follows that whatever is adjectival, whatever is conditional on the existence of something else, is appearance and not reality. According to this criterion, it is the Absolute as the all-inclusive whole that is the only substantive reality; all parts or elements within the whole, being what they are through other elements outside themselves, have only dependent, adjectival reality within the all-inclusive whole and in this sense are appearance of the reality rather than reality itself. To be sure, our point of contact with reality is our felt present. Here we encounter reality, but it is a mistake to suppose, Bradley contends, that the whole of reality is comprised in any given perception. Since what is given in any presentation is not reality in its completeness, and the portion that is so given is not a self-contained whole but presupposes what is outside and in this sense adjectival or dependent, we can only say that reality *appears* in perception and that the given content of a presentation is only an appearance of reality and is not reality itself in its individuality as self-contained, all-inclusive whole. "The real" to quote from the "Principles of Logic" (ch. I p. 71), "cannot be identical with the content that appears in presentation. It forever transcends it and gives us a title to make search elsewhere." "We must get rid of the erroneous notion," says Bradley ("Principles of Logic" ch. II pp. 63-64), "that space and time are 'principles of individuation', in the sense that a temporal or spatial exclusion will confer uniqueness on any content. It is an illusion to suppose that, by speaking of 'events' we get down to real and solid particulars....For the question arises, What space and time do we really mean, and how can we express it so as not to express

what is as much something else? It is true that, in the idea of a series of time or complex of space...the parts exclude one another reciprocally but they do not exclude unless the series is taken as one continuous whole and the relations between its members are thus fixed by the unity of the series." But it is obvious from the nature of the case that the space-time series cannot be a self-contained unity. Apart from the fact that every 'here' of space implies a 'there' and every 'now' is significant only as distinguished from a 'then' there is the further fact that no 'here' is a unique particular of space but is itself made up of 'heres' and no 'now' of time is an atomic moment but made up of 'nows.' "The real which appears within the given," says Bradley, ("Principles of Logic", ch. II p. 98), "cannot possibly be confined to it. Within the limit of the outer edges its character gives rise to the infinite process of space and time....And the outer edges themselves are fluent. They pass over in time and space into what is outside them." In short, "the reference of the content to something other than itself lies deep within its internal nature....Space and time have been held to be principles of individuation. It would be truer to say they are principles of relativity (Ibid)."

What is given in any presentation is thus, according to Bradley, not reality in its self-contained individuality, but only a fragmented portion as it were, which, as incomplete, is necessarily self-transcendent. In this sense every content given in immediate feeling lacks self-existence and is real only in a context which is implied but is not explicit in the given presentation. This is why all given contents of experience have only adjectival reality being real only as dependent or conditional on something else without which it cannot exist. Bradley expresses this by saying that the so-called categorical judgments turn on critical examination to be conditional. This is true even of the so-called analytic judgments of sense where we seem to describe only the immediately presented field of experience. Thus when we exclaim "Wolf" or "Fire" we appear to analyse only the presented environment, but in reality, the presented field extends beyond itself and is not a self-contained whole. Further, the "Wolf" or the "Fire" by which we inter-

pret the presented content is a universal abstracted from its context and is only a sort that will apply to any 'wolf' or 'fire,' without designating any particular 'wolf' or particular 'fire.' Hence our judgment fails to be categorical and to affirm existence, but only moves in the domain of universals which are abstractions without embodiment in some particular being. "We say 'There is a wolf,' or 'The tree is green,' but such poor abstractions," says Bradley, "are much less than the wolf or the tree we see, and they fall even more short of the mass of inward and outward setting, from which we separate the wolf and the tree (*Ibid*—p. 94)."

But it may be objected that Bradley's conclusion rests on the initial assumption that nothing can exist in itself as an individual reality if it has anything outside itself. This assumption itself however does not bear examination. Why should not there be independent particulars that exist in themselves without affecting one another in any way? Certainly co-existence in space or succession in time does not necessarily imply reciprocal determination as Bradley supposes. Things may be in and out of relations without losing their intrinsic self-contained individuality as unique independent reals. In the terminal essay on 'uniqueness' Bradley examines this view in detail and rejects it. Reality, no doubt, implies uniqueness. An abstract universal as such is not real. It is real only in a concrete individual instance which is unique in the sense that there is no other instance that can take its place. But the real regarded as a unique self-contained individual may be taken at least in three different senses. (1) A thing, e. g., may be regarded as unique and individual if it occupies a fixed place within a portion of the universe which we take to be unique for a certain purpose. As an irreplaceable element within this part of the universe, it is unique and exclusive of all else. In this case, the uniqueness is derived, secondary and relative to a condition outside itself. (2) If, however, it could be shown that the thing occupies a fixed place in the universe itself and not a portion of it considered as unique for a certain purpose, the uniqueness of the thing would be not relative, but absolute. In this case it is

unique as an inalienable part of the universe as the all-inclusive Individual Whole which is unique as having nothing outside itself and therefore as having nothing else that can take its place. (3) There is yet a third sense in which one may speak of self-contained individuals, i. e., the sense in which one may speak of a number of self-contained individual beings. In this case, there is a Many, each of which is unique. "But" says Bradley, "when we enquire if beings or qualities, as above defined, are really possible, or whether on the contrary they are no more than self-contradictory abstractions—our reply must be...such beings are not unique, but on the contrary, are impossible.... By definition we are obliged to take our beings as many, and we are ordered to confine the nature of each absolutely within its private self. But these two characters, though both necessary, seem one to exclude the other. Diversity, distinction, plurality, all seem to have a meaning within a whole... The natures of the Many are therefore not each merely self-contained, because, if you extirpate from each every reference beyond itself, you have no maniness left." ("Principles of Logic", p. 651).

Bradley thus concludes that the Real is individual only in one of two senses. It is individual in the sense that it is the whole universe that comprises everything in itself and is thus unique in the sense that there can be no other universe that can take its place. The real also is unique as given in a finite centre of experience in which a portion of the whole appears as uniquely determined by its fixed place in the totality and in this sense having no other that can take its place. In this latter sense, it is relatively unique being determined as such by virtue of its relation to the other elements of the whole and to the whole itself in which it fulfils a purpose that nothing else can fulfil.

Hence the truly individual, the self-existent or real in the strict sense is the universe or the Absolute as the all-comprehensive whole. It is with this that every finite centre of experience is one in the immediacy of feeling. But while the Absolute has existence in itself and in this sense substantial reality, reality only *appears* as the given content of a finite centre as lacking substantial self-contained being and presupposing conditions outside

itself on which it depends. Hence the contents of finite experience have adjectival, dependent being as distinguished from the self-contained, substantial being of the all-inclusive Absolute Reality. "The way of taking the world which I have found most tenable," says Bradley ("Essays on Truth and Reality" pp. 245-46), is to regard it as a single Experience, superior to relations and containing in the fullest sense everything which is. Whether there is any particular matter in this whole which falls outside of any finite centre of feeling, I cannot certainly decide ; ... We have then the Absolute Reality appearing in and to finite centres and uniting them in one experience.... The immanence of the Absolute in finite centres and of finite centres in the Absolute I have set down as inexplicable." "We start...from the immediate union of one and many, of sameness and difference which we have given to us in feeling" (*Ibid* p. 256). But "this immediate union," Bradley continues, is "dissolved in judgment and it never in any judgment is completely made good. The higher form of union which satisfies at once our feeling, sense and intelligence ...lies beyond and on the other side of judgment and intelligence" (*Ibid* p. 256). And the reason for this, according to Bradley, "is that in sense and feeling, the unity of sameness and difference is *not* unconditioned,...but is conditioned for us unintelligibly" so that the 'how' of the union remains an unknown 'how' which does not satisfy our intelligence. An assertion made under unknown conditions does not exclude the opposite assertion, and so judgment aims to replace the felt 'is' by a full statement of the conditions under which the subject and predicate are connected. But a statement of all the conditions under which the predication holds being impossible, judgment is doomed to remain for ever hypothetical. In other words, our starting-point is a felt whole or a given unity of one and many but since as a bare given unity it does not satisfy the intelligence we aim to transform the felt unity into a known whole in which the 'how' of the unity will be obvious to our intelligence. This is why judgment intervenes and attempts to comprehend the unity in idea. But in the very attempt the original unity is dissolved without any possibility of restoration as a logically comprehen-

ded unity of one and many. Judgment is the reference of an ideal content to reality. It attempts to comprehend the given unity in terms of ideas, i. e., not in their psychical existence as images, but as meanings. "If we take up anything considered real," Bradley observes, "we find in it two aspects...a 'what' and a 'that,' an existence and a content, and the two are inseparable. That anything should be, and should yet be nothing in particular, or that a quality should not qualify and give a character to anything, is obviously impossible. If we try to get the 'that' by itself, we do not get it, for either we have it qualified or else we fail utterly. If we try to get the 'what' by itself, we find at once that...it points to something beyond and cannot exist by itself...as a bare adjective. Neither of these aspects if you isolate it can be taken as real" ("Appearance and Reality" p. 162-63). The real thus, according to Bradley, is neither a bare 'that' nor a bare 'what'; on the contrary it is always a 'that'-'what', a unity of existence and content. It is with this unity as given in the immediacy of feeling that we start, but the unity as given in feeling is incomprehensible to our intelligence and that is why thought breaks up this given unity in judgment for a clearer understanding of the 'how' of this unity. "In judgment an idea is predicated of a reality. Now...what is predicated is not a mental image. ...The predicate is a mere 'what'...divorced from its psychical existence in my head.... Judgment adds an adjective to reality, and this adjective is an idea, because it is a quality made loose from its existence and is working free from its implication with that" (*Ibid* pp. 163-64). In other words, while the subject of judgment is reality as the unity of 'that' and 'what,' the predicate is only a 'what' as a feature or aspect of this unity and is predicated of it as a universal or quality. And thus what judgment achieves is not the restoration of reality in its uniqueness as a self-contained individual, but only a *sort* or general character which holds as much of other individuals as of the one it aims to express. In this sense every judgment is inconsistent. It aims to express the real in its self-contained individuality but achieves a universality that is quite other than the self-contained reality. The subject of judgment

is the given unity of 'that' and 'what,' of existence and content and the judgment in expressing it in the 'what' of the predicate falls short of its concrete reality. The subject, in other words, is no single feature or aspect of its concrete existence but unites in its concrete being the entire mass of the innumerable features that constitute its nature as a concrete individual, and yet in the judgment it is equated to a single or a few of the features that are comprised in its concrete being. The predicate thus, though equated to the subject in the judgment, yet falls far short of the inexhaustible richness which the subject as individual reality is. This discrepancy between the predicate and the subject can be made good only if the features not expressed though implied in the judgment be made explicit by being comprised within the predicate. This means that to every predicate of a judgment must be added other predicates to make good its difference from the subject—a difference which makes the judgment inconsistent. This is why, according to Bradley, no judgment can be regarded as unconditionally true, the predication in judgment holding only under conditions not explicitly stated in the judgment. And this also explains why one judgment leads to another, and that again to another, and the process drags on indefinitely in the attempt to resolve the discrepancy between the predicate and the subject.

Since the predicate of a judgment is a universal, it necessarily falls short of the subject which is an individual reality. In other words, the predicate is only an element or aspect of the individual reality which is the subject. It is taken out of its context i. e., out of the complex unity of elements which is the subject as an individual whole. In being affirmed of the subject as a predicate describing it, it falls short of the subject resulting in a discrepancy between the predicate and the subject. The subject is unique and individual, while the predicate as universal fails to express it in its uniqueness. Further, the predicate is an aspect or element of the complex unity which is the subject and has been wrenched from its context to be predicated of the subject. But the predicate thus abstracted from its context is not what it is in the context of the elements with which it constitutes

the subject as an individual reality. The predicate thus is true of the subject only as transformed and transmuted in the full context from which it has been abstracted for being predicated. Hence the predicate in its offered character is not true of the subject but is true of it as transmuted in the context of relations to other elements which are not explicitly stated in the judgment. In this sense the predicate holds only conditionally of the subject i. e., as conditional on the changes it will undergo when the conditions implicit in the judgment, in the context of which it belongs to the subject, are made explicit. This is the same as saying that the character predicated has only adjectival reality being dependent for its truth on other conditions and thus falls short of the subject which is a substantive individual reality possessing self-existence and no mere adjectival character possessing a dependent reality. "Judgments", says Bradley, "are conditional in this sense that what they affirm is incomplete. It cannot be attributed to Reality as such, and before its necessary complement is added. And, in addition, this complement remains unknown," ("Appearance and reality" p. 361). And, Bradley here adds, "while it remains unknown, we obviously cannot tell how, if present, it would act upon and alter our predicate. For to suppose that its presence would make no difference is plainly absurd". In other words, Bradley here brings in his theory of relations as internal and as necessarily making some difference to the terms they relate. It is a mistake to suppose, Bradley contends, that relations make no difference to terms. If terms are not affected by relations, then they would be just the same in relations as they are when not in relation. But this is the same as saying that relations are nothing to the terms they relate and we may as well ignore all relations as unnecessary superfluities which have nothing to do where they appear to occur. If therefore relations external to the terms are an absurdity, a predicate affirmed in abstraction from its context must be different from what it is as qualifying Reality in the context from which it has been abstracted in judgment. From this follows as a corollary what Bradley calls the doctrine of Degrees of Truth and Reality. Since every judgment predicates only an aspect or

feature of the complex unity which is Reality as the subject of judgment and since such isolated aspect has no self-existence but has reality only in the context from which it has been abstracted, and since in the full context it necessarily suffers alteration, every judgment necessarily falls short of Reality and thus involves falsity or error. But since every judgment takes an aspect of reality from its full context and re-affirms it of reality, though abstracted and wrenched from its full context, it is never utterly erroneous. In this sense, the content of every judgment, the predicate by which it seeks to express reality is both true and false. It is true as asserting something which belongs to reality and is false as asserting it in isolation from the full context which necessarily transforms it and apart from which it has no independent existence strictly speaking. And every judgment is thus also more or less true as requiring a lesser or greater supplementation and thus a lesser or greater transmutation in order to qualify reality. "Truths are true", says Bradley, "according as it would take less or more to convert them to reality" (*Appearance and Reality*", p. 363). Bradley adds, "And, throughout our world, whatever is individual is more real and true; for it contains within its own limits a wider region of the Absolute, and it possesses more intensely the type of self-sufficiency. Or, to put it otherwise, the interval between such an element and the Absolute is smaller. We should require less alteration, less destruction of its own special nature in order to make this higher element completely real". (*"Appearance and Reality,"* p. 382)

It is obvious from the above that the term 'appearance' is used by Bradley in two quite distinct senses, viz, 'appearance' in the sense of an aspect or feature predicated, in abstraction from its context, of Reality as the individual unity of all variety of aspects, and 'appearance' in the sense of an aspect qualifying Reality as transmuted and transformed in the context of every kind of aspect that Reality comprehends in its all-inclusive unity. Regarded in the latter sense however 'appearance' is no longer appearance of Reality, but is Reality, or at least, indivisibly one with it. But 'appearance' in the first of the two senses

is obviously not Reality, nor even an inadequate expression of it. A feature of reality abstracted from its context in reality is, according to Bradley's own admission, very different from the same feature as qualifying reality. When we say, 'This is a table,' we seek to express Reality in the character of a 'table' extended in space, though, as a spatio-temporal object, a table lacks the self-existence and self-sufficiency that belong to Reality as the all-inclusive individual whole. Thus the spatio-temporal object, *qua* spatio-temporal, cannot qualify Reality and must be regarded as 'appearance' of Reality rather than Reality itself. But if this be granted, it will also have to be admitted that not only there are floating ideas, but also that every idea just floats on Reality without qualifying it—a consequence which Bradley will not concede. It is obvious from the above example that the table is a spatio-temporal object and that it appears as such in our experience and yet as lacking the character of self-existence it falls short of Reality which it seeks to express. Hence the spatio-temporal appearance, *qua* spatio-temporal, has no home in Reality, though as appearing in our experience, its facthood as appearance cannot be denied. The inference is thus irresistible that there are appearances that simply float, i. e., appearances that appear *in* Reality without being appearances *of* Reality. All ideas as contents loosened from their existence in judgment (as according to Bradley) are thus floating appearances or wandering adjectives without attachment to Reality. But Bradley's contention is that as all ideal contents are derived from Reality and from nowhere else, they cannot be mere appearances but must be appearances of the Reality from which they have been derived. Bradley's argument, however, amounts to saying that an ounce of flesh slashed off from a living body and gummed on to it thereafter will be the living, pulsating ounce of flesh it was before it was slashed off and will not 'melt and thaw' like any dead body because it has been gummed on to a living organism after being severed from it. In fact, consistently with his basic conception of Reality as individual, self-existent substance, Bradley cannot avoid conceding floating appearances that stand eternally negated in the very Being in which they

appear. And even if thinking as loosening of content from existence be regarded as occurring within Reality as the all-inclusive unity, Bradley has to admit an indescribable principle of nescience in Reality that causes all this appearance of what is contrary to its intrinsic nature as indissoluble unity of content and existence.

As regards Bradley's view of degrees of truth and reality, it will suffice to say that it does not consist with what Bradley himself says regarding supplementation and addition for converting appearance into Reality. If every ideal content is true only conditionally as Bradley says, and "if it cannot be attributed to Reality as such, and before its necessary complement is added," and if further, as Bradley adds, "This complement remains unknown," obviously we have no means at our disposal to decide between one appearance and another. Further, if an appearance, *qua* appearance, attributes a partial, finite content to Reality through which it seeks to express it, it is obvious that the supplementation and consequent alteration necessary to convert it into reality will be infinite so that it must be altered beyond all recognition before it can find a home in Reality. But this is the same as to say that the difference between appearances is unsubstantial and negligible as far as their distance from Reality is concerned.

(c) *Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Appearance and Reality.*

While, according to Bradley, no appearance is either absolutely true or absolutely false, according to Śaṅkara, appearance, as appearance, is not reality, and in no way qualifies reality. We can indeed grade appearances into higher and lower, but not as expressing reality more or less adequately, but only as higher and lower falsities, the higher cancelling the lower falsity as a matter of fact and not by virtue of its embodying reality more adequately. According to Śaṅkara, non-contradiction being the criterion of reality, there is no place in Reality for what is self-discrepant or contains contradiction in itself. The real, in short, is the true as what is *avādhita* or never is or can be contradicted, and in this sense *caitanya*, consciousness or the light of in-

telligence alone can be regarded as Reality. While nothing that appears to consciousness is free from the possibility of sublation as false, the consciousness which rejects the false appearance is incapable of being either denied or doubted. Hence, according to Śaṅkara and his followers, it is consciousness or Intelligence alone that answers to the criterion of non-contradiction, the objects of consciousness as other than consciousness being liable all alike to be sublated or falsified. In fact, there is nothing common between *Draṣṭr*, the seer, and *Dṛśya* or the seen, i. e., between consciousness and the object of consciousness. Consciousness is what reveals, illumines objects, while objects are what are revealed, illumined by consciousness. Consciousness and object of consciousness are thus negatives of each other. Consciousness is what objects are not and objects are what consciousness never is. Consciousness reveals objects without being itself an object, while objects are revealed in consciousness as the unobjective light that reveals. Consciousness is self-revealing in the sense that in revealing objects it reveals itself as the negation of the objects it reveals. From this follows the polarity of *Draṣṭr* and *Dṛśya*, of seer and the seen. And from this also follows the unchanging reality of the Intelligence that reveals and the everchanging character of objects that are revealed and their consequent liability to be sublated and negated. Thus *Dṛśyatva* or objectivity is what characterises all objects that are revealed by the *Draṣṭr* or the Intelligence that reveals. And as some of the *dṛśya* objects masquerading as real are found subsequently to be false, no object can claim immunity from falsification and rejection. Sharing as it does the objectivity or *Dṛśyatva* which characterises objects that have first appeared to be true and later been falsified, every object must be regarded as on a par as regards its liability to eventual falsification and rejection. This also will be clear if we consider the matter from another point of view. What survives every process of correction is the consciousness that corrects. While we can deny everything else, what is not, and can never be, denied is the consciousness that denies. Consciousness is thus the only thing that answers to the criterion of reality, viz., non-contradiction. If therefore

consciousness as what never is contradicted is reality, objects of consciousness as other than consciousness must be other the reality. It thus follows that objectivity as such is appearance as lacking strict reality. But this is not the same as saying that objects are simply nothing, such as the void or *śūnya* of the Buddhists. Objects appear, are presented in experience. Not so the void of the Buddhists. We thus have to concede some kind of positivity to all objective appearances, though they all alike lack strict reality. Appearances are thus positivities without reality, presented objective facts which yet as liable to be contradicted do not possess reality strictly speaking.

It may be contended however that the entire position rests on an illegitimate assumption, i. e., the assumption of the possibility of pure consciousness apart from the consciousness of some object or other. As a matter of fact, however, consciousness is always some kind of objective consciousness, i. e., consciousness as a concrete objective experience. Thus we never have pure awareness, but always some concrete awareness such as blue-awareness or green-awareness, etc. In fact, just as there is no object which is also not a form of awareness, so also there is no awareness which is not aware of itself as a definite objective awareness such as a blue-awareness, (awareness of blue), or a green-awareness, etc. The Śāṅkarite points out in reply that any objective awareness that is aware of itself as distinct (as awareness of blue, or of green, etc.) can apprehend itself as a distinct object only in so far as it is aware of itself, aware of its distinction and is aware of all the other awarenesses from which it is aware of itself as distinct. But such an awareness cannot obviously be a particular objective awareness without creating the self-same problem in regard to itself. Hence unless the inclusive awareness is to be regarded as a particular objective awareness distinct from other awarenesses and thus requiring another more inclusive awareness that is aware of it, aware of its distinction and therefore aware of every other awareness from which it is aware of itself as distinct, and this more inclusive awareness similarly requiring a still more inclusive awareness and so on without end, we must regard awareness as self-certify-

ing light that certifies itself in positing objects as other than itself. Hence, according to Śāṅkarities, the apparent objectivity of consciousness is a case of false identification, of consciousness falsely appearing as objective consciousness. The Śāṅkarite technical name for it is *adhyāsa* (superimposition). Through the superimposition of the self and the not-self, of consciousness and object, consciousness falsely appears as objective consciousness, and object appears as a conscious object. There is however no real identity of the two, consciousness being self-certifying and the object borrowing its apparent reality from the consciousness that reveals it. A typical example of such false identification is that of self with one's material possessions so that any loss of material property is felt as a loss of self.

We shall now illustrate the Śāṅkarite view by its stock example of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl. When a person misperceives a mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver, what he sees is an object outside his head lying before him in the place of the mother-of-pearl. He does not see his seeing, but something other than the seeing, i. e., a trans-subjective object which is other than his consciousness of it. And yet when the illusion ceases and he discovers the object to be only a mother-of-pearl, he realises that the object he saw, viz., the silver, was absent even at the time of seeing it in the very locus in which he saw it. Thus though he saw an object other than his seeing it, it is falsified by the experience that corrects it. What is noteworthy in the process of correction is that the correction that follows does not deny the seeing but rejects the *object* that was seen as a false object. In other words, correction only cancels the object of the illusory consciousness but does not deny that there was consciousness of it when the illusion lasted. This is one view. According to the author of the *Pañcapādīkāvivaraṇa* however we have here both *jñānādhyāsa* and *viśayādhyāsa*, both a false object and a false consciousness of an object so that what correction rejects as false is not merely the object of the illusion but also consciousness particularised as the consciousness of a false object. There are however two principal objections to this latter view. In the first place, in correction the

prior consciousness of the object as silver is not denied ; what is denied is the presence of the object in the locus where we were conscious of it. It is thus the falsity of the object that makes the consciousness of it false. Secondly, consciousness or knowing can never be intrinsically false. Consciousness is the self-revealing light that reveals objects. It is thus evidence both of itself and of the object that it reveals as other than itself. To say that consciousness is false is to say that it has failed to reveal the object it does reveal—an evident absurdity. Silver is the object that is revealed in the consciousness of silver. It has thus not failed to reveal what properly is its object. The mother-of-pearl is not its object and therefore it cannot be false for having failed to present the mother-of-pearl. The object of consciousness being thus what is revealed in the consciousness in question, it follows that no consciousness can be false strictly speaking. The falsity of consciousness can thus be spoken of only in reference to the falsity of its object. In so far as an object of consciousness is rejected, i. e., cancelled and superseded by some other object, can we speak of the consciousness as false. It is the falsity of the object that gets transferred by *upacāra*, false attribution to the consciousness of which it is the object, though the consciousness intrinsically is not false as it never fails to reveal its proper object.

We may now sum up the Śankarite position as follows :—

Consciousness is Reality as being what never can be contradicted or falsified. Objects as other than Consciousness are other than reality and in this sense appearance.

It is what appears that can be contradicted or falsified ; what never appears, such as a barren mother, a square circle, or a skyflower, is incapable of being falsified or overthrown.

There is no difference between objects, *qua* objects, as regards liability to falsification and rejection. In this respect the illusory object and the object that passes as real in normal waking experience sail in the same boat. In other words, their liability to correction and eventual rejection as false is the same in both.

It may be argued however that though the illusory object and the object that passes as real in practical experience

share the common character of objectivity or *dṛṣyatva*, there is yet a difference between the two. An illusion is an individual private experience, while a veridical experience is a shared experience, i. e., an experience that is supported by consensus. Further an illusory object does not survive the test even of closer individual inspection, while a real object passes the test of closer scrutiny. The argument however rests on assumptions that do not bear strict examination. A shared experience is not necessarily veridical. All men see the sun rising in the east, coming overhead at noon and setting in the evening in the western horizon. But despite universal agreement of experience in this respect, it is rejected as irreconcilable with astronomical data. Nor is survival at the test of closer scrutiny a proof of the reality of an object. We may have dream-realities cancelling dream-falsities within a dream (a dream-rope superseding a dream-snake and so passing the test of closer scrutiny) but that does not prevent the dream-realities from being rejected as false when the sleeper awakes. Nor can it be said that between dream and waking experience there is this difference that while dream is incoherent and arbitrary, waking experience is coherent, systematic and harmonious. In the first place, waking experience is not always the systematic coherent unity that it is claimed to be. It has its shocks and surprises no less than its concords and harmonies. Nor is dream-experience necessarily an arbitrary incoherent jumble as it is usually described. There are coherent as well as incoherent dreams and in some cases a whole decade of a coherent, eventful life may be lived within an hour's dream. If coherent dreams are not immune from rejection by waking experience as false, why should the latter be immune from cancellation in some other plane of experience? In fact, what we call life may itself be only a longer dream that includes shorter ones within itself as poets have said, there being nothing sacrosanct or invulnerable in the so-called objectivity that we attribute to it.

It may be said however that the Śāṅkarite contradicts the evidence of experience in obliterating the distinction between illusory and veridical experience. We distinguish between the

real and the illusory object only through the evidence of veridical experience. In so far as the veridical experience cancels the illusory, we know that the one reveals the real and the other presents only unreal appearance. If however veridical experience were in no way different from the illusory that it cancels and supersedes, we have no means of distinguishing between the real and the unreal. The Śāṅkarite points out in reply that though no object, *qua* object, can claim immunity from eventual rejection as false, yet there are grades of falsity which, in spite of being alike false, are yet negatively related. Thus we have higher and lower falsities, the higher cancelling the lower, though the lower is incapable of superseding the higher. It is quite conceivable, e. g., that there may be a dream within a dream and a dream-waking from the dream-dreaming that cancels and supersedes the latter, though it is itself cancelled and superseded in its turn when the sleeper awakes. We have in this case a waking within the dream that cancels the dream within the dream, but this does not save it from being falsified when the sleep ends and the dreamer returns to the work-a-day world of his waking experience. Or, consider another hypothetical case equally conceivable. Suppose that there is dream-correction of a dream-illusion, e. g., a dream-perception of a dream-rope cancelling and superseding an illusory dream-snake. When the sleeper awakes, he rejects the entire dream-content as false—the dream-snake, the dream-rope and the dream-correction of the dream-snake by the dream-rope. Here then we have a dream-experience that cancels another dream-experience, and yet is not real being itself cancelled in its turn by waking experience.

That objectivity as such is self-contradictory and therefore false or self-destroying may also be proved by an examination of the nature of an object as such. An object is object to consciousness as distinct from other objects. In other words, no object is conceivable except as different from other objects. Difference, *bheda*, thus enters into the very meaning of every object as object. And yet difference as a category is self-contradictory. For consider any case of difference such as the difference of A from

B. When A is said to differ from B, is the difference between the two things itself different from the things that differ, or is it non-different from them? If the first alternative be accepted, then the difference between the two things being different from the things themselves, we shall have two more differences, one between 'difference' and A, and the other between 'difference' and B. And as the same problem will arise between these two differences which, as two differences, must themselves differ, we shall be landed into an endless series of differences to explain one single difference. If, however, the second alternative be accepted and difference between two things be regarded as non-different from the things that differ, then the question arises, is the difference between the two things, A and B, one single difference so that the difference of A from B is the same as the difference of B from A, or are these two differences, 'A's difference from B' being one difference and 'B's difference from A' being another difference? If the second alternative be accepted, there will be two more differences to account for the difference between the two differences and thus we shall be landed into an endless series of differences. If the first alternative be accepted, then since the difference between A and B (a cow and a horse) is non-different from A and B, we may say 'a cow' simply when we want to say 'A cow is different from a horse', or 'different from a horse' when we want to say 'a cow'. Further, if difference between two things be non-different from the things that differ, and if moreover such difference be one single difference between the two things and not two differences, then in so far as one and the same difference is non-different from the two things that differ, the two things, as non-different from one and the same difference, must be non-different from each other.

It follows therefore that difference is a self-contradictory idea and therefore false appearance. And for the self-same reason objectivity which is unintelligible without the idea of difference must also be a false appearance that cannot qualify reality.

The Śankarite thus concludes that—

1. An object of consciousness is other than consciousness.

- and therefore other than reality, i. e., unreality or false appearance ;
2. Objectivity as involving the idea of difference which is self-contradictory is itself self-contradictory and therefore false appearance ;
 3. Appearance is what appears as object of consciousness and therefore appearance is objectivity as such and therefore all appearance is false appearance.
 4. We can speak indeed of grades of falsity in the sense that while a higher falsity can cancel a lower, the lower cannot supersede the higher.
 5. Appearance being necessarily false appearance and the falsity of the false appearance consisting in its eternal negation in the very locus in which it appears, all appearances are floating appearances, i. e., appearances that appear *in* Reality but are not appearances *of* Reality. They are like the shapes that flit over the canvas in a cinema show but leave no impress thereon.
 6. Lastly, since difference is a false appearance, the difference between consciousness and the object which consciousness reveals as other than itself is also false appearance. Hence it follows that object though appearing as other than the consciousness to which it appears is yet nothing but the consciousness that reveals it. Thus appearance or objectivity is *anirvacanīya*, or an indescribable falsity in the sense that though appearing as other than consciousness it is yet nothing but the light of consciousness that reveals it.
 7. The *Siddhāntaleśa* points out that the problem of Appearance and Reality may be considered from three ascending levels of spiritual experience. At the lowest level, Reality is distinguished from two grades of Appearance the *vyavahārika* and the *prātibhāsika*. According to this point of view, Reality is the unobjective light of consciousness which must be distinguished alike from the objects that pass as the realities of our practical life and objects which are illusory and do not endure beyond the

duration of the illusions. Since however both the illusory object and the objects of practical experience, *qua* objects, alike lack strict reality, at the next higher stage of experience, the triad of *pāramārthika* reality, the empirical realities of practical experience and the apparent realities of illusory experience is discarded in favour of the polarity of the unobjective Reality of consciousness and the unreal objectivity of all that is other than consciousness. This higher point of view thus opposes the objective as Appearance to consciousness as Reality. But since the difference between appearance and reality is itself a false appearance, the duality of appearance and reality is discarded at the highest level in favour of the sole reality of consciousness as the unobjective light, the objective being recognised as nothing but the consciousness that reveals it though appearing indescribably as something other than consciousness. In other words, though we begin with the distinction between ultimate or *pāramārthika* reality, practical or *vyavahārika* reality and apparent or *prātibhāsika* reality, we discover that the distinction between the three kinds of reality is a distinction between consciousness as unobjective reality and appearance as unreal objectivity. Even this polarity is transcended at the highest level when consciousness is realised as the sole reality and objectivity as nothing but consciousness itself though inexplicably appearing as other than the consciousness in which it is revealed.

Hence, according to the Śāṅkarite, Reality is consciousness, and all else being appearance to consciousness is other than consciousness and therefore other than Reality. Hence all appearance is false appearance in the sense that it stands eternally negated in the very substrate in which it appears. In this sense every appearance is a floating appearance, being an appearance *in* Reality but not an appearance *of* Reality. There are however grades of Appearance in the sense of grades of falsity, the higher superseding the lower falsity but the lower incapable of can-

celling the higher. *Qua* appearance however, all appearances, both higher and lower, are false appearances standing eternally negated as they do in the consciousness in which they are revealed.

RELATIONS : EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL

We may consider four different theories of relation :—

- (1) The theory according to which all relations are external ;
- (2) The theory according to which all relations are internal ;
- (3) The theory that recognises both external and internal relations as given facts of experience ;
- (4) The theory according to which relations are appearances of a reality which is either supra-relational (Bradley) or non-relational (Sāṅkara).

The Indian Naiyāyika recognises two kinds of relation, viz., (a) conjunction (*saṃyoga*) or disjunction (*vibhāga*) which holds only between substantive reals and (b) inherence (*samavāya*) which holds between positive adjectives and substantives. *Saṃyoga* and *vibhāga*, conjunction and disjunction of the Indian Naiyāyika, correspond to the external relation of western philosophers. Such relations hold only between substantive reals. A substance is what exists in itself or has self-existence. It is a substrate of adjectives but is not itself an adjective of anything else and in this sense has existence in itself. Hence it is not constituted by its relation to other substances so that relations between substances are external relations which do not make substances what they are.

It is otherwise, however, with the relation of *samavāya* or inherence. It is the relation that holds between adjectives and substantives, i. e., between adjectives which are positive objects of experience and their substrates. The relation between *abhāva*, negativity or absence and its *anuyogī* or substrate where the thing is absent is a special kind of relation called *viśeṣaṇatā* or adjectivity. Adjectivity is a case of *svarūpasambandha* in the sense that the relation is itself both term and relation at the same time. In this sense absence of a thing in a place is itself the relation to the thing which is absent and also to the place where the absence holds. It is no relation of inherence or *sama-*

vāya, signifying as it does not the presence of a positive quality but only an absence that distinguishes (is a distinguishing character or *viśeṣaṇa* of) the location of the absence and also the negatum which is absent. Inherence or *samavāya* thus holds between positive adjectives and the substantives they qualify. Adjectives have no self-existence. They do not go wandering but exist only as qualifying a substantive reality. The relation, e. g., between the colour of brown and the brown table which the colour qualifies is the relation of *samavāya* or inherence. A colour which is not the colour of a coloured substance is a creature of the imagination. It has no existence in itself apart from a substantive, though the substantive may be with or without an adjective that qualifies it. An apple, e. g., which is green while unripe, becomes red in colour when it ripens. The apple thus changes colour when it passes from the unripe stage to ripeness. Neither the green nor the red can exist apart from the apple. But the apple changes colour from green to red. It may be contended that the so-called relation of inherence is no relation at all but just the substance itself exhibiting different attributes at different times. We speak of substance and attributes, but the attributes are the substance itself in its different aspects. To speak of a relation between a substance and the different aspects of a substance is nothing but to speak of the substance itself being related to itself.

Granting the force of the above objection we may limit our consideration of relation to substances or substantive reals. We may point out, however, that substantive reals, having self-existence and also relations which do not affect their internal nature presuppose belief in the pluralistic hypothesis of independent particulars. Granting the truth of this commonsense belief which we shall examine later on, we may point out that the concept of external relations making no difference to the related reals does not bear strict examination. Consider, e. g. the woman that becomes the mother of a child. Motherhood is a relation that holds between the woman who has become a mother and the child she has given birth to. It is a relation between two substantive reals, viz., between the mother and the child. The woman enters into the relation when she gives birth

to the child. It cannot be said that the relation of motherhood [to the child that is born to her makes no difference to the mother of the child. Before the birth of the child she had no experience of what it is to be a mother. She did not know what is motherly love before she became a mother. The same is true of the child. Consider a new-born babe that is abandoned by the mother and brought up in a foundling institution. Will it be like a child brought up in the atmosphere of the tenderness and care of affectionate parents ?

It may be argued, however, that unless external relations be conceded scientific inductions which are all based on the elimination of irrelevant antecedents would be without a valid foundation. How could concomitants be eliminated as not really bearing on the phenomena under investigation if every case of concomitance be a case of internal relation that makes some difference to the concomitant elements ? This objection, however, is based on a misconception of the real character of scientific procedure. When a scientist investigates the cause of a particular phenomenon what he is really interested in is not the phenomenon as a unique particular but only as a representative of phenomena of the same nature. When, e. g., a physician investigates the cause of a particular fever his real object is to consider the fever not in its uniqueness as it manifests itself in a particular case, but only as a special kind or type of fever. It is obvious that when we are investigating the cause of a specific type of phenomena, the cause necessarily will be a specific type of antecedent phenomena. In establishing a causal relation between one type and another we can quite ignore for our special purpose circumstances that are otherwise relevant to the phenomena as unique particulars but not to the phenomena considered merely as representatives or types. Consider, e. g., the following symbolic instance of an induction by the method of agreement. The three instances of observed agreement are :—

	Antecedent	Consequent
(1)	A B C	P Q R
(2)	A C D	P R S
(3)	A D E	P S T

Here the antecedents B and C are eliminated one after another, so that the only antecedent that is constantly present is A. Similarly from the consequents, Q and R are successively eliminated, so that the only consequent that is throughout present is P. It is argued that A is the cause of P because nothing else is always present where P is present. Hence the other factors, even in the absence of which P follows, have no relevance as cause of P. Here it is taken for granted that A is throughout present in all the three instances and so also is P. It is taken for granted that the three A's in the three instances are not three different particulars, each unique without an other corresponding to it in all respects. Similarly, it is also assumed that P in the three instances is not three particular P's but one and the same P. But actual experience shows that they would not be numerically three A's or three P's unless they were three unique particulars. A more precise statement, therefore, of the three instances will be a statement of the three A's as A_1 , A_2 , A_3 respectively and of the three P's likewise as P_1 , P_2 , P_3 . Hence when we come to A_2 though we drop B we have something different from the first instance of A. Similarly when we come to P_2 , we have no longer the old P_1 of our first instance. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the change of concomitants has no effect on A or P in the two instances. As Bradley has shown ("Principles of Logic"—Terminal Essay on *Uniqueness*), it is the Absolute as the all-inclusive Individual Reality that is unique in the true sense, and every element within the absolute is also unique in the sense that its place in the all-inclusive whole is uniquely determined. It follows that when we consider P as a unique particular, i. e., as P_2 , and not as a universal or sort such as when we call it P simply, its place is determined uniquely by its relation to B_2 , C_2 , etc. It is only when we ignore its uniqueness as P_2 and consider it as a bare P that it continues to be despite elimination of the other concomitants. This disposes of Richard Wollheim's refutation of Bradley's doctrine of internal relations in the Pelican Book on F. H. Bradley. "Some of a term's relations are internal: by this is meant that the term in question necessarily stands in these relations, or that, if it did not stand in these

relations, it would not be what it is.....a husband for instance necessarily stands in the relation of being married to some one... Hence the relation of 'being married to some one' is internal to him. Similarly, the relation of being disloyal to one's country is internal to a traitor....A certain traitor has to have been disloyal to his country, but he need not have been executed on Tower Hill...Being executed on the Tower Hill is external to the traitor." Here is an obvious jump from universal to a particular. A particular traitor is considered not in his unique particularity, but only as a being of a sort, and then the conclusion is drawn that his being executed on the Tower Hill because of his disloyalty is something purely accidental. It is obvious that if the traitor be considered not as a bare traitor but as the particular individual traitor that he is, the circumstance of his being executed on the Tower Hill cannot be brushed aside as just an accident that need not have happened to him.

The above is a statement of Bradley's view of external relations. He considers external relations to be an absurdity. Relations must affect the terms they relate or there would be no sense in speaking of relations of terms or of terms as related. If terms could get in and out of relations without any difference to their nature, the relations are nothing to the terms and they may as well not be. Bradley, however, does not refute the concept of external relations only. He first of all shows that relations must be intrinsic to the terms they relate, i. e., only regarded as intrinsic have relations any meaning or sense. But even intrinsic or internal relations Bradley rejects as not logically intelligible. He first of all points out that relations are relations between terms so that there can be no relations unless there are terms which relations are to relate. And what holds of relations, Bradley points out, holds equally of terms. Terms *qua* terms must possess relations; at least the relation of diversity. A term to be a term must answer to some distinct quality or character. And this distinctness itself implies relation to what it is distinct from. A term which is unrelated has no definite or distinct character and therefore is not anything, or what will be saying the same thing, simply no thing. "Is it possi-

ble, asks Bradley, ("Appearance And Reality" p. 29) to think of qualities without distinct character..... Have qualities without relation any meaning for thought?" It may be noted that Bradley here uses substance in the sense of unity of qualities so that the qualities that constitute the substance as their unity, must not only be different from one another but as different must also be in relation to one another. And Bradley points out that to say that a quality which is not a distinct quality involving relation to what it is different from is meaningless verbiage. In confirmation of this Bradley refers to what he calls the most thorough attempt to build a system on this ground, i. e., on the supposition of reals as altogether unrelated to one another. He obviously refers to Leibniz and he rejects it on the ground that the experience of each monad becomes on this view the same thing as an impossible illusion. Hence, Bradley concludes, just as relation without terms are an unmeaning verbiage, so also terms without relations are inconceivable. Bradley, however, does not stop here but points out that just as terms without relations are impossible and likewise relations without terms, so also terms with relations have no intelligible meaning, nor relations taken together with the terms related. In the first place, terms cannot be resolved into the relations. In fact, qualities in relation are not mere relations. They must be something more than the relations into which they enter. In other words, we have here qualities which are nothing unless related and which yet are more than the relations between these qualities. The question thus is: What can the quality be apart from the relation into which it enters? "Qualities", says Bradley, "must be and must also be related...There is hence a diversity which falls inside each quality, each has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation. It may be taken as at once condition and result, and the question is how it can combine this variety.....A is both made and not made, what it is by relation". ("Appearance And Reality" p. 31). Unless A is, there is no relation into which A can enter. And unless there is relation there is no A which is to enter the relation in question. Let us consider, therefore, A in its aspect of a *condition*

of the relation X into which it enters and let us call it P. And let us also consider A in its aspect of a result *conditioned* by the relation X, and let us call it Q. We thus distinguish in A an aspect P which represents A as the pre-condition of the relation X and an aspect Q which is the result of A's relation X. Since both P and Q are aspects within A they must themselves be related so that we shall have now the self-same problem with regard to P and Q, which again will give rise to an exactly same problem over again thus leading to endless regress. Bradley thus concludes that relations must be intrinsic. External relation is unmeaning verbiage. At the same time, he points out that relations without terms or terms without relations are as impossible as relations together with the terms or terms taken together with the relations. Hence, the conception of relations as intrinsic or internal to the terms is as unintelligible as is the conception of external relations. He thus dismisses the concept of relation as an appearance which can qualify reality only as transmuted and transformed in a supra-relational experience that resolves the contradictions and discrepancies of the relational way of thinking into a harmonious unity.

It is obvious, however, that Bradley with his bias against floating ideas is unable to reject relational experience as a mere appearance lacking attachment to reality. As we have already said elsewhere, he will have no relations *qua* relations in the unity of the absolute experience. But since they appear and nothing can appear which is not derived some way or other from absolute experience as its source, they must all have a place within the absolute supra-relational unity though perhaps transmuted and transformed beyond all recognition. It remains true, however, that relations as discrepant and logically unintelligible which they are in respect of their appearance in our experience have no home strictly speaking in the unity of the absolute experience. We are not concerned with the transmutations and transformations of relations as they belong to the absolute as self-maintaining unity. The question really is whether relations in their discrepant and contradictory character as they appear in human experience can belong to the absolute-

or are mere floating appearances that appear in the absolute without qualifying it. In fact, Bradley here has no definite answer to give. He speaks of appearance as it appears in human experience and also of appearance as it qualifies reality and yet the two appearances, even according to Bradley's own showing, are very far removed from one another. If relation qualifies reality it is not as relation but as something quite different, and therefore relations as they appear in our experience have obviously no place in the absolute reality. This is what Śāṅkara means when he describes the relational forms as appearances *in* reality without being appearances *of* reality. Śāṅkara is certainly more consistent in acknowledging the appearance of relation while denying its reality as qualifying the substrate of absolute experience in which it appears. According to Śāṅkara, therefore, while relations cannot be regarded as nothing whatsoever, i. e., as *vikalpas* or conceptual voids as the Buddhists say, they are yet not appearances qualifying reality. Reality thus, according to the Śāṅkarite, is the non-relational-absolute experience which falsely appears in human experience as a complex relational unity.

To begin with, a distinction may be made between experience as awareness in general and objects that are experienced. Russell, e. g., uses the word experience in the sense of awareness and distinguishes between experiencing and experienced. In his wellknown article "Refutation of Idealism" G. E. Moore similarly distinguishes between experience as apprehending and objects of experience as what are apprehended or experienced. Thus, according to Moore, though we distinguish between blue, green, red, etc., as objects, we yet notice no difference in respect of our experiencing thereof which we call sensations. In fact, according to Moore, experiences *qua* awareness as such cannot be distinguished except by reference to the objects that are experienced. The Indian Naiyāyika similarly considers cognition in the generic sense of consciousness as such to be *nirākāra*, without any distinctive form, the difference between one state of consciousness and another being explainable by reference to the objects which they respectively reveal. In fact, if we consider the realist position in general the common view is that experience as such is nothing but bare awareness which becomes distinguished as one experience different from other experiences through the object or objects it reveals. It is to be observed that there is here a curious meeting of opposites in Philosophy. For if we consider the Śāṅkarite Advaita which is the philosophical antipodes of all realism considered as the ultimate truth we find almost the self-same view of consciousness and object of consciousness. While consciousness, according to the Śāṅkarite, is intrinsically indefinable as being *avedya* or unobjective, it yet admits of distinction as this or that particular act of consciousness (*vytticaitanya*) only in so far as it gets falsely identified with objects other than itself. We may note therefore that consciousness considered in any of its modes such as perceiving, remembering, imagining, thinking, etc. is a variety of our consci-

ousness of object—i. e., object-consciousness or *viṣayacaitanya* as the Sāṅkarites say.

We have therefore to consider thought as one amongst other modes of object-consciousness and the question we shall have to discuss is (i) how it is distinguished from other modes of object-consciousness such as perceiving, remembering, etc. and (ii) how as a special kind of object-consciousness is it related to reality.

Amongst Modern Philosophers, Lotze has discussed this question in great detail. We shall begin our enquiry with a detailed examination of Lotze's view. According to Lotze the ultimate material antecedents of thought are impressions of external objects caused by stimuli. Impressions are mere psychological states or events that exist side by side in us or come one after the other, A psychological state, however, is not entirely dependent upon the presence of the external stimulus. Once excited in us a psychological state has a power of awakening other states which have accompanied it or followed it. In this re-awakening the associative mechanism of revival plays a great part. If we knew all about the stimulus and its effects and of the associative mechanism we could, from given states, predict the entire trend or currents of ideas. Impressions as conjoined simultaneously or successively become ideas and currents of ideas. A sensation or impression by itself is a state of our consciousness, a mode of ourselves. A current of ideas is a sequence of existences just as necessary as any trend of material events. "Just because under their respective conditions, every such series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and law as every other, there would be no ground for making...any distinction of value as that between truth and untruth, thus placing one group in opposition to others."

So far there is no question of distinguishing between true and false thinking and therefore also no question of a logical theory. But further investigation reveals certain peculiar properties of the currents of ideas. Some ideas, e. g., are found on examination to be merely coincident while some others to be coherent. In other words, in certain cases the exciting causes of our simultaneous or successive ideas are found really to belong together,

while, in other cases, no real connection between the exciting causes can be discovered. Because of the mechanism of association, however, both coherent and coincident combinations recur. The recurrence of the coherent combinations furnishes the material for Knowledge. Coincident combinations, however, are fruitful sources of error.

The problem of reflective thought arises when we are faced with coincident as well as coherent combinations. Thought confirms the coherent or the really connected and adds to it a justifying notion of a real ground of the connection rejecting the coincident as such as of no logical value. The mere currents of ideas are things that just happen in us. Their classification into the coherent and the merely occurrent, i. e., into the logically significant and the merely coincident without logical value, through a process of selection and rejection, is the work of mind. It is this that distinguishes thought as activity from any psychological event and from the associative mechanism.

It will appear from the above brief account of Lotze's view that according to Lotze thought is not an ontological principle as with Hegel and his followers. The rationality of the real may be a necessary assumption of all intellectual exploration of reality but this is not the same as saying that the real is the rational or that the rational is the real. Lotze rejects outright the Hegelian view that reality is the logic of reality, that it can be completely explained in terms of an eternal system of abstract categories. In fact, according to Lotze, thought does not constitute reality but only reveals it more or less inaccurately. A logical representation of reality we call truth; but the world of truth does not constitute reality, though it may correspond to it. In fact, we have no evidence in our experience of any absolute thought which transcends and overreaches all human intelligence. The only thought we know of is the thought that operates in us as a function of human intelligence. Further, Lotze points out that thought is only one function among other functions of the intellect. There is more in mind than thought. Besides thinking we have feeling and volition which are no less essential than thought, nor are the processes of sensing, perceiv-

ing and imagining to be identified with thinking without confusion. These are also intellectual functions in their own way though they have to do with the individual and the concrete while thought moves only in the domain of the universal and the abstract. To think is to conceive, judge and reason, and conceiving, judging or reasoning establishes relations only between the phenomena of mind.

Moreover, the functions which thought perform are not possible without the aid of the other intelligent powers such as sensing, perceiving and imagining. In fact, in respect of its peculiar functions, thought is entirely dependent on these other powers. Sensation and perception, e. g., supply thought with its material, while other functions such as 'faith' or the feeling of worth and value provide it with its ideals, its impulses and its criteria, and furnish it with a guarantee of the validity of its conclusions. Furnished with the materials on which it works and with the ideal which it seeks to realise thought rearranges given data in accordance with general laws, thus classifying phenomena into groups or classes and connecting them with relations of simultaneity or succession. But in this respect the work of thought remains purely formal. Thought only substitutes a material order for the merely contingent connections of phenomena. Hence the systematic world that thought creates from the data supplied to it is purely ideal—a world of ideas and not of things. Thought classifies but there are no classes in the outer world of reality. (In fact, as Russell has shown, there are more classes than there are actual things in the world.) Nor are there things in the real world called subjects or predicates and relations corresponding to the copula. In reality we have neither premises nor conclusions, though there may be causes or effects. The real, further, is concrete and individual, but thought moves in the domain of abstract universals. We do not find 'cowness' or 'horseness' wandering about in reality but only individual cows and horses. Nor do horses or cows compare themselves in reality so that their common character may stand out against the differences that distinguish them as individual cows or horses. It is the function of thought to compare

individuals and abstract what is identical in them as individual instances of common characters or universals.

Lastly, Lotze points out that the products of thought could not be said even to represent reality unless the mind could exercise some power other than thought. Thought only tells us about the relations *between* things, but tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of the things. In short, thought is essentially discursive, mediate and tells us how we may get from one thing to another, but does not tell us *that* things are. For the knowledge *that* things are we have to depend on other functions of the mind. Furnished with data, thought can operate on them to reveal their ideal significance or meaning. But thought cannot produce the data out of itself. The thing in its individuality and concreteness entirely escapes thought. An intuitive intelligence may give us this inner core of things, but our intelligence is discursive and not intuitive, doomed to move from one fact to another and incapable of seizing the real core of any one of them. Thought, in other words, is an indirect device of which man is obliged to avail himself to make up for his lack of a perceptive intelligence. Thought thus, according to Lotze, is a symbol of man's incompetence, though also his only means of acquiring such knowledge as is possible for him.

It may be noted that in his view of the formal character of thought what Lotze rejects is not an idealistic view of the ideal of knowledge but only that such a view is attainable by thought. In other words, Lotze is not concerned to establish any rival view to that of the idealist, but is concerned to prove that the idealistic view that the real is the rational is incapable of being established by the discursive intelligence which he identifies with thought. No doubt Lotze's view of thought as a formal activity of combining contents externally given is beset with difficulties, but such difficulties do not make Lotze reconsider his fundamental assumption that thought is a formal combining activity. While, according to Lotze, in its function of conceiving thought appears to *find* its laws in its materials, and in the function of judging to *find* the contents to be inwardly combined by a law of sufficient reason, we are told at the end that "the

laws are produced by thought from itself alone." In other words, thought superimposes its own laws upon the contents, though the core, according to Lotze, comes from the materials given to thought. Thus while, according to Lotze, thought does not construct arbitrarily but only in accordance with cues it receives from its materials, yet the products of thought, i.e., the universals and their connections having all their source in thought are all artificial and subjective and do not constitute the objective facts they are supposed to explain. According to Lotze, the fundamental error of Idealism consists in confounding the necessary forms of thought with the objective laws that govern reality. Lotze does not deny that objective laws exist, nor does he deny that it may be possible for us to reach these objective principles of reality. What he denies is that we can know these principles by thought. Thought, according to Lotze, is formal; it delivers only pure forms and cannot yield material knowledge and Hegel is not justified in regarding merely logical principles as objective principles of reality. Thought is necessary for us for arranging the given material of knowledge, but what is necessary for us is no inherent, necessary character of reality.

Before we go into a critical examination of Lotze's conception of Thought and Reality, we shall give a brief resume of the principal points in his theory.

1. The ultimate materials of thought are impressions which arise from external objects as their stimuli.

2. Impressions, conjoined simultaneously or successively through the associative mechanism, are called ideas and currents of ideas.

3. All ideas and currents of ideas, whether simultaneous or successive, are, *quâ* ideas, neither true nor false, but are all equally necessary as *existences*.

4. When thought intervenes and sorts ideas into the coherent and the merely coincident, the logical problem of truth and error arises.

5. Coherent ideas are those that belong together so that it is possible for thought to pass from one idea to another by a

kind of inner logical necessity. This is not so in respect of ideas that are merely coincident. Here the relations are neither necessary nor logical so that in moving from one coincident idea to another there always remains the risk of error.

6. Thought selects the coherent ideas adding to them a new justifying notion of a real ground of the coherence while it eliminates the merely coincident.

7. The action of thought is, in reality, a kind of reaction. Thought takes note of the relations already subsisting between impressions. "Thought can make no difference," says Lotze, "where it finds none in the matter of the impressions."

8. While thought in respect of its functions of conception, judgment or inference, is not the reality it conceives, judges or infers, yet, Lotze contends, thought is 'valid,' i. e., is true of the reality it thinks about in its functions of conceiving, judging or inferring.

The above is an outline of the main points in Lotze's theory and in our examination of Lotze theory we shall first consider point No. 3.

According to Lotze the logical problem arises when thought sorts out ideas into the coherent or really connected and the merely coincident. A careful examination, however, will show that this division of ideas into the coincident and the coherent is only relative and that what is coincident for one purpose is in fact coherent for a different purpose. A concrete example will make this point clear. Let us take the case of a medical man who is investigating the cause of a particular type of fever such as influenza. For his special purpose the relevant facts, i. e., the facts that hang together and bear on the particular purpose are temperature, pulse-beat, condition of the throat, the lungs and the blood of the patients, but certainly not their capacities as actors on the stage, or their being hunch-backed or thick-lipped or their possession of personal charms. All these are mere coincidences which have no bearing on the fever of which the cause is being investigated. But consider a film director. He is concerned to select artists for film-stories he is going to produce. Here the thick lip and the acting power

are quite relevant if he is going to produce 'Othello', and the hunch-back is also just the thing he requires if he is going to produce 'Hunchback of Notre Dame, and also personal charm is what he is looking for if he wants someone to play the part of Portia in the 'Merchant of Venice.' In the case of the film-director the pulse-beat, the blood-circulation, the condition of the throat and the lungs and the temperature are all irrelevant and are mere coincidences that may be simply ignored. Thus data that may appear significant and to hang together from one point of view may be just coincidences and of no consequence from another so that there is no fixed unalterable rule according to which thought can separate the sheep from the goat. And it is further to be noted that in both the above instances the selections of thought are not arbitrary but conditioned throughout by facts in the real world. The fever is an objective occurrence in the world of facts that starts the investigation. And in the second case there are likewise objective facts of interest of large bodies of men in dramatic presentation of fictions and imaginary stories. Thus the so-called distinction between the coherent and the merely coincident proves on examination to be illusory. Thought selects only with reference to a particular purpose and what it finds merely coincident for one purpose it considers quite relevant and significant for another. In fact, if thought is to be regarded as subjective, it is only in so far as it abstracts and selects from a total situation, and this is also what absolute idealists have said and also Lotze virtually concedes even though he rejects the absolute idealist's account of thought and reality. Nor is it quite clear whether the so-called coherent combinations which, according to Lotze, thought discovers in the given material are actually there where they are believed to be discovered or merely taken to be so with reference to a particular purpose. Consider any case of two reals, A and B, which thought takes to be really connected and to form a coherent whole. If thought takes them as belonging together, it must be because it discovers in them some bond of unity which it does not notice in every combination as such. Now what is this bond of unity, and how is it discovered by thought? Certainly it is

not given to thought as an impression received from sense. As far as the deliverances of sense are concerned the two, A and B, are neither given as identical nor as an identity-in-difference. In fact, what is given in sense is not merely a qualitative diversity, e. g., A as a flash of light and B as a peal of thunder, but also a numerical plurality. If, therefore, thought bridges the gulf between the two by introducing a bond of connection it must be on some ground other than the immediate deliverance of sense. Sense only presents the diversity either as simultaneous or successive but does not present any nexus or bond of unity between the different elements. If, then, the connecting link is not sense-given, it must be a superimposition on the basis of uncontradicted experience. In other words, the conjunction, successive or simultaneous, is believed to be a necessary connection because the association has not been seen to fail as far as experience has gone. But when from the mere fact that our experience has not revealed any case of an exception to a conjunction it is concluded that it cannot also be otherwise in any future instance, there is an obvious make-believe which has not proved true in all cases. This point has been discussed thread-bare in our examination of the doctrine of concrete universal (vide. pp. 34-35). There is, therefore, no good reason for holding, as Lotze does, that thought discovers necessary connections within the given facts of experience by distinguishing between conjunctions that are mere coincidences and those that are coherent and logically grounded. The so-called well-grounded beliefs turn, on examination, as we have seen, to be mere make-believes. They have no doubt the support of uncontradicted experience, but uncontradicted experience does not guarantee truth in every case.

The same conclusion may be reached if we approach the problem of thought and reality on a different route. Thought, according to Lotze, works only on the relations it finds in the materials given to it. When, e. g., we have two different sensations, say, a colour and a sound, thought expresses the difference in the form of a negative judgment, such as 'a colour is not a sound'. But in expressing it in the form of a negative

judgment thought only expresses the difference that it *finds* in the given materials of sense. It does not create or manufacture the difference in question, But if this is conceded, it will also follow that the so-called necessary relations which thought is supposed to introduce in the given materials are not a superimposition *ab extra* but only an unfolding or eliciting of what was implicit in the materials themselves. But this is giving away the whole case for a dualism of a thought as a subjective, formal process and reality as a source of the given materials on which thought works. In fact, the idea of a thought, purely subjective and formal, and separated from the real world by an unbridgeable gulf, would make not only knowledge impossible but reduce thought itself to utter unreality or nullity. Thought may fall short of reality, it may be less than the reality it thinks, but a thought that falls outside reality *altogether* is just unreality or nothing. And yet when Lotze refuses to equate reality with thought, it is not without a valid reason. Reality certainly is more than the thought of any finite being. Our thoughts are subject to constant revision, modification and alteration in accordance with the progress of experience. The thought we consider adequate to-day is discarded as inadequate to-morrow. Is it obviously absurd to suppose that reality itself alters and changes its character with the alterations of our thought consequent on the progress of knowledge. E. g., there was a time when the belief that the sun moves round the earth was quite adequate to account for all the known facts at the time, but the belief had to give way to the Copernican hypothesis when more facts came to be known which could not be accommodated within the older view. It is obviously absurd to suppose that the sun was moving round the earth all the time the older view held and that as soon as it was superseded by the Copernican view the sun became stationary and the earth commenced moving round the sun. Yet both the older belief and the later hypothesis were conditioned by the objective facts, i. e., the facts known at the time of each. In other words, they were not random or wild beliefs out of all relation to reality, but were conditioned in each case by reality as far as it was known at the time. It would appear then that,

in either case, it was not man thinking of a reality outside himself but reality thinking itself in him, i. e., unfolding its nature piece-meal in the consciousness of finite beings. Or, to express the same thing in another way, what is called human thinking is nothing outside reality, rather it is the Absolute which is reality as a logical whole that is reproducing itself in finite centres of experience. But this raises a problem of a different nature. We have, according to this view, absolute reality as a logically unified whole on one side, and, on the other, this integral whole of logically interdependent elements recapitulating itself piece-meal in finite centres of experience in more and more adequate forms but never attaining absolute and complete adequacy in any finite thinking. The entire doctrine, it will be noted, rests on two basic assumptions, viz., (i) that the Absolute comprises all that is and in its logical aspect is a coherent whole that includes all elements within itself as its logically interdependent parts or factors, and (ii) that it is the immanent operation of this inclusive whole that drives every finite centre of experience beyond every inadequate view-point to higher and higher degrees of unity or coherence though it cannot be said that an absolutely coherent whole of ideas will ever be reached. Bradley, e. g., considers this to be an ultimate inexplicability. "The immanence of the Absolute in finite centres and of finite centres in the Absolute I have always set down as inexplicable," says he ("Essays on Truth and Reality," p 246). But if we consider the matter closely, we shall find that this reciprocal immanence is not the only inexplicability here. The idea of reality as an all-inclusive coherent whole of logically interdependent parts is another inexplicability in the doctrine for which there is no evidence in experience. We have already discussed this question in pages 34-35 and we shall not go into it here over again. But there is also another inexplicability and perhaps of a more serious nature than the two we have considered, and this is that the coherent all-inclusive whole which is reality as a concrete universal must, of necessity, reproduce itself piece-meal in finite centres of experience as a disrupted series of temporal experiences embodying higher and higher degrees of truth

without, however, any prospect of ever reaching complete coherence and unity. But these are not all the inexplicabilities that one must concede if one is to accept the doctrine as a true account of thought and reality. There is yet a fourth and perhaps the most serious of the inexplicabilities, one which is difficult to swallow and perhaps even more difficult to stomach and digest. It is that the march of finite experience should be construed as an ascent from lower to higher degree of truth and unity in which each superseded level is to be considered neither as altogether true nor as altogether false but both true and false as falling short of, though not falling outside reality altogether. We have shown in our examination of Bosanquet's view of the concrete universal that the idea of an all-inclusive coherent whole cannot be maintained except as a pragmatic fiction and a make-believe necessitated for the smooth conduct of life but incapable of being proved as a demonstrated truth. We need only add here that the immanence of this logical whole in finite centres is not even an inexplicability but a potent contradiction. We cannot have it both ways at the same time—reality as a completely unified whole of all that is and the same as repeating itself in finite experience in an unending series of approximations to the very unity which it is from the beginning. Nor can this temporal progression of experience be represented as an ascent from lower to higher truth in its endeavour to recover the full truth of which it has been dispossessed by an act of original sin. How can a discarded point of view be represented as a less adequate presentation of the full truth when, in fact, it has been superseded as a falsity that got crushed under the load of a larger experience which it was unable to bear? As we have said in our discussion of appearance and reality, truth does not admit of differences of degree. We can speak of lower and higher *mithyā*, of grades of falsity one superseding another but not of degrees of truth and reality.

Kant, it will be noted, draws a clear line of demarcation between thought considered in its intrinsic nature as the pure analytic unity of consciousness and synthetic thought regarded as the organising principle of the given materials of sense. While

to thought as synthetic activity Kant concedes some measure of unity or coherence, he yet denies to it the transparent unity of pure thought except as a necessary illusion with which we must need delude ourselves. Thus the end or goal of objective thinking as an all-inclusive coherent whole of experience remains, according to Kant, only an aspiration never to be actually realised, though the reality of such a whole is the starting-point and also a necessary presupposition of all enquiry. Kant's contention is that the foreign matter of sense can never be completely resolved into the unity of pure thought so that what we achieve is only a partial unity which always falls short of the pure unity which thought in its intrinsic nature is. Kant thus distinguishes between thought as such as the pure self-identity of consciousness and objective thinking or thinking as consciousness of objects. The latter achieves coherence of a sort, but it is partial, incomplete and is quite unlike the self-contained unity which thought in itself is. And the reason for the failure of synthetic thinking lies, according to Kant, in the fact that it has to operate on materials which it derives from a foreign source—the things-in-themselves as he calls them. In other words, with thought working on the differences of materials received from a source which is other than itself, what is achieved is a partial unity which reflects neither the pure unity of thought nor the pure difference of the things from which it derives its given materials. Objective thinking thus results in a world of phenomena which is unlike the reality which lies behind it. Kant does not explain however how, if thought as a synthetic activity be confined within the domain of phenomena, we can speak of an unknown and unknowable source of its materials excepts as an inexplicability that does not admit of characterisation either as real or unreal. In other words, just as the absolute idealist speaks of an all-inclusive coherent whole of experience which yet must recapitulate itself piecemeal in finite experience for no obvious reason, so Kant speaks of pure thought becoming the experience of a world of phenomena because of the action of an unknowable noumenal reality from which by Kant's own admission it is for ever separated. It would have been more straightforward and

consistent for both the absolute idealist and Kant, the phenomenalist, to recognise in the unity of thought as the eternally accomplished reality an inherent nascence that makes it appear as an asymptotic progress to a complete unity which yet it is from the very beginning. This, it need not be said, is the view of the Advaitin who while recognising the pure unity of Intelligence as the reality that reveals both itself and all else, yet distinguishes between Intelligence as such as self-revealing light and phenomenal appearances as what shine by the light of the Intelligence that reveals them. And the Advaitin points out that while Intelligence is self-shining light that reveals both itself and all that is phenomenal and other than itself, and as such can never be denied or contradicted, phenomenal objects which are revealed in the light of Intelligence are never immune from correction and eventual sublation. In other words, while thinking as such is incapable of sublation being necessarily involved in all experience as its inescapable presupposition, it is otherwise with empirical thinking or thinking as the organisation of a world of objects. Such objective thinking, being only the self-alienation of pure thought, is never free from the possibility of sublation and eventual supersession. Thus though on a superficial view, there may appear to be an obvious difference between human thinking and the reality that is thought, human thinking being subject to revision and alteration in the light of fresh evidence while any idea of a corresponding alteration in the reality thought about being an obvious absurdity, yet on a closer examination the absurdity would appear to be a product of insufficient analysis. Consider, e. g., the idea of the sun moving round the earth. When it gives place to the Copernican view under the stress of fresh evidence, we do not believe that with the alteration in our idea there is a corresponding alteration of the relative movements of earth and sun. Evidently on this view, we have a reality on one side from which thought receives its data which it organises into sun, moon, and the other planets and their various relations and thought that thinks reality on the other. But the principal difficulty on this view is that we not only never have pure data without thought

but also that on such a view thought itself, as falling outside reality, becomes an unreality or a shadowy unearthly reality the operations whereof lack all real meaning or significance. The only escape from this consequence is to do away with a realistic dualism of thought and reality that must necessarily reduce all thinking to nullity. If then thought cannot be anything outside reality, the conclusion necessarily follows that thought is reality thinking itself. And this is supported by the fact that there are no objects or any relations of objects except as objects thought or judged. What, e. g., are the sun and the moon, their relations, their apparent and real sizes except experience objectifying itself as contents thought? It thus follows that what is called reality as a system of objects is nothing but thought objectifying itself, pure thinking unfolding itself as the experience of a world of objects. And yet it remains true that objective thinking, i. e., thought unfolding itself as a system of objects never reaches the transparent unity which thought in itself is. And this explains the paradox that while every objective enquiry starts with the belief in a completely intelligible whole of objects which thought must be able to unravel by laborious investigation, what it actually accomplishes is only an approximation to, and never a completely intelligible whole which it proposes to itself as its goal. And this also explains why objective thinking never reaches complete stability but appears as an endless progression from a greater to a lesser unsatisfactory point of view but always falling short of the ideal of complete satisfactoriness and intelligibility. As a recent writer (Arthur Anton Vogel in "Reality, Reason and Religion"—p. 62) has said, "The final establishment of a general law is what cannot be accomplished. In science we move towards the truth rather than have it at any given moment; our progress consists in testing and rejecting false hypotheses rather than establishing true ones." And this, the Advaitin points out, is what follows necessarily from the very nature of the case. While it is true that we have no other access to reality except through thought and while it is also true that the reality of thought is what cannot be denied without contradiction so that the only self-cer-

tifying reality we know of is the reality of thought, it is also no less true that thought as the self-positing reality in positing itself posits objects as the other of itself. Objectivity thus, strictly considered, is other than thought as the self-positing reality and therefore other than reality though not bare emptiness as the void or *Śūnya* of the Buddhist is. It is thus an indescribable appearance of the reality which is thought as such, but is not reality, strictly speaking. It follows from this that any attempt to catch thought in its objective appearances is doomed to failure. Thought reveals objects as other than itself and what we call objective thinking is only a case of false identification of thought as such with what is other than thought. It is a case of *adhyāsa* or superimposition as Advaitins say, a case of self-alienation of thought as a result of which thought appears in the garb of what is other than itself. And this explains why objective thinking never reaches the goal of complete intelligibility it aims at but appears as an endless progression moving from a greater to a lesser unintelligibility but never reaching the transparent unity of pure thought. In other words, what is called *Śuddha-caitanya*, i. e., pure thought is never completely revealed in any *vytticaitanya* or an empirical cognition claiming to express *viśaya-caitanya* or an objective determination of pure thought. This is why no judgment is self-sufficient or self-justifying, every judgment requiring to be substantiated by some other, and that again by another and so on without end.

It would appear from the above that while, according to the Advaitin, thought is the only reality that cannot be denied without contradiction, yet the thinking which is reality is no thinkable in the sense of being an object of thought. And hence according to the Advaitin, the only way to get at the reality which is thought is the *via negative*, the negative way of *neti, neti*, not this, not this, and not as the Hegelian absolutist believes the positive way of ascent from a less inclusive, less satisfactory objectivity to a more comprehensive, more satisfactory objective whole. The fallacy of the objectivist, the Advaitin contends, consists in construing the reality pre-supposed in objectivity as being itself an object like other objects, though more inclusive

and stable than any other. The fallacy, in other words, is that of construing existence as a predicate—the fallacy which vitiates the ontological argument. The same fallacy vitiates the Nyāya conception of being in its two varieties of *sattā* or being as a *parājāti* or the widest universal and *svarūpasatva* or being as the specific content of objects. That being cannot be equated to any objective content as such will be obvious from the fact that an illusory and a real object have the same *svarūpa* or specific content and yet while we accept the latter as real we reject the former as unreal. Nor is being just the universal of widest generality—a *parājāti* that subsumes all particular objects as its instances, for apart from the fact that a universal can only be a predicate and not any substantive reality, there is the further objection, from the Naiyāyika's own point of view, that the relation of universal to its particular instances being *samavāya* or inherence and inherence as a relation being possible only between *vilakṣaṇas* or entities of a contrary nature, the highest universal conceived as *sattā* or being will reduce all its particulars to what is *sattāvilakṣaṇa* i. e., the contrary of *sattā* or being. Hence properly regarded, the Nyāya view of *sattā* will lead to a reality in comparison with which all else will be other than reality, i. e., unreality or mere appearance. But this is exactly what the Advaitin holds about the nature of reality so that the so-called distinction between Nyāya and Vedānta becomes a case of a distinction without difference. The existentialist of the present day, it may be noted, rejects the priority of essence to existence; the Advaitin only goes further than the existentialist reducing all essence to mere appearance of thought as pure being. According to the Advaitin, being, existence—the being of which we have immediate assurance as thinking, is no determinate being, no determination or objective mode of being but is both prior, and irreducible, to any specific objective being, so that what we call the world as an objective whole of experience is only an indescribable appearance of the pure being or reality which thought as such is. Why thought became flesh, i. e., pure unobjective thought clothed itself in objective forms, is, according to the Advaitin, an ultimate

inexplicability of which no logical account can be given, even as the Hegelian account of an absolute all-inclusive whole of experience explicating itself yet in finite experience in a piecemeal temporal process is an inexplicability that does not admit of any explanation in terms of reason. The difference between the Advaitin and the Hegelian is however basic and fundamental in that while the latter reduces existence or being to a coherent whole of essences or concepts for which there is no evidence in experience and which therefore can be believed only as an act of faith, the Advaitin regards existence as the being of thought as such as is incapable of resolution into any essence or objective content, all essences being, according to the Advaitin, indescribable appearances of thought as pure being. The Advaitin points out that if what we call objective thinking were the self-unfolding of thought in its intrinsic nature, it should follow that reality considered as an objective all-inclusive whole of experience should reflect the inherent character of thought in the basic laws illustrated in its operations. Hence it should follow that if the very nature of thought is such that it does not tolerate contradiction so that for thought as such no X can be A and not-A at the same time, the same should hold equally of reality considered as an all-inclusive whole of objects in which thought is believed to unfold itself. But this is just what is not the case if we consider reality as an all-inclusive objective whole that comprises all that is, for obviously such a reality as all-inclusive must comprise not only A but also all that is other than A i. e., must be the home not only both of A and not-A, but of all contradictories, actual and imaginable. Hence, the Advaitin contends, instead of subscribing to a reality which resolves contradictories into its inclusive unity in some inexplicable manner which is beyond comprehension by reason, the more consistent thing is to consider the contradictories as indescribable appearance of a reality which is completely one with itself in the being which is thinking as such.

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THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

An Advaita Approach

PART ONE

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