A SURVEY OF

Wittgenstein's
THEORY OF MEANING

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

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This is an addition to the glut that has accumulated on an aspect of philosophical palaeontology. It was scribbled in 1961, when I was a research scholar at the University of Saugor. No attempt has been made to prune it properly as I am not a necrophilist ; a shift in interest contributed to this. But few withered leaves are plucked (still there are many) and new stakes are given (but it needs more). I had to bring it under hard covers for the only alternative left to me was to perish.

Due to typographical difficulties I used '$\neq$' to mean 'not $\equiv$'. And as a book is seldom complete without an appendix and an erratum, I made a provision for them. Appendix *A* appeared in the *Journal of Philosophical Association* and is incorporated with permission.

Santiniketan
January, 1965

A. P. RAO

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2	9	Dummet	Dummett
3	20	Confusionsi nvolved	Confusions involved
6	6	$(\exists x)(Cx)\equiv fx)$	$(\exists x)(((Cx)\equiv(fx))$
13	13	$\left(V^{2n-1}\right)$	$\left(V^{2^{(n-1)}}\right)$
16	15	and here we.....	"and here we.....
17	1	C	$\subset$
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—	11-13	$(\exists\phi)(x)(y)((x\phi y)\supset$ ..... $(x\psi z))))$	$(\exists\phi)((x)(y)((x\phi y)\supset\sim(y\phi x)).(x)\sim(x\phi x).(x)(y)(z)(((x\phi y).(y\phi z))\supset(x\phi z))).(\exists\psi)((x)(y)((x\psi y)\supset\sim(y\psi x)).(x)\sim(x\psi x).(x)(y)(z)(((x\psi y).(y\psi z))\supset(x\psi z)))$
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"...We cannot make our philosophy into an ordered progress to a goal, but have to take our problems as a whole and jump to a simultaneous solution ; which will have something of the nature of hypothesis..."

—F. P. RAMSEY

INTRODUCTION

'Meaning' is the most important concept which has impressed the philosophical mind of this century and is a dominant theme of contemporary philosophical thought. But, why and how are the twentieth century philosophers so much preoccupied with the problem of meaning? As the *how* and the *why* of a problem will lead to an historical study, historical data of the chief trends of contemporary thought will provide an answer to this question. What is aimed at, in this essay, is far from tracing the roots and giving a complete history of the problem. It does not offer even a new definition of the concept. Its aim is a more limited one, namely to show how Wittgenstein reflected on the problem, clarify some concepts and eliminate some conceptual confusions involved in understanding his thought. It also offers a new interpretation of it. After all, logical clarification being the object of philosophical activity, "a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations". So, this essay does not make any philosophical assertion but limits itself to making such assertions clear.

Wittgenstein's work has been, for a number of years, a favourite quarry for interpreters and analysts. Russell's introduction to the *Tractatus* (1922) can be considered as the beginning of the extensive research work that has been done in this field. But, the first important study of it was that of Ramsey (1923). This was followed by Weinberg's thirteen years later. During this period the *Tractatus* exercised a great influence practically on almost all the writers on this subject, in one way or another. Unfortunately, the post-war period saw adverse attacks on this classic, and still more unfortunately, Wittgenstein's own later thought has been supposed to be one of them. This tendency continued until, very recently, a new generation of Wittgensteinians drew attention to the enormous number of errors such attacks contained. Anscombe's analysis of the *Tractatus* came in 1959 and this was followed by Stenius's exposition of its main lines of thought in 1960. In the following year, Maslow published his study of the *Tractatus*, twenty eight years after the

draft was made ready for publication. And since 1953, Wittgenstein's works, relating to the second phase of his thought, are being published. In 1958, an attempt at a systematic interpretation of these was made by Pole. But, he neither conceived nor clarified anything. Meanwhile, almost all the leading philosophical journals, issue after issue, carried articles and discussion notes on Wittgenstein's work, by distinguished academicians—to name some, Wisdom, Bergmann, Evans, Black, Copi, Feyrabend, Strawson, Hintikka and Dummet.

Such is, in outline, the research work that has been done till now, in this field. In spite of these studies nearly everything is still to be done in this domain. Some of the interpretations offered previously are confined to the first phase of Wittgenstein's thought and some others show that even the texts are not studied properly. So everything which has been interpreted and clarified till now, will have to be re-interpreted and re-stated. It is not claimed that this interpretation is invulnerable to criticism or exhaustive in the sense that it cannot be further clarified or analysed. But, it perhaps could claim to be consistent and coherent. Nodoubt, the fate of Wittgenstein is the fate of all great thinkers and their fate is to be misunderstood. Wittgenstein was misunderstood during his own life time. Having seen his ideas being 'more or less mangled' he gave some directions according to which he wanted the understanding of his thought should proceed. The present essay is based on these directions. The limitations of space precluded the discussion of anything which has no direct bearing on the main theme, and many important concepts are left untouched, as deliberations about them are beyond its scope. Some (important) points are just hinted at either due to obviousness or due to the fear that the essay would be unduly lengthy.

SECTION 1

I. THE PICTURE THEORY

The picture theory of sentential meaning maintains that the world and language are totalities of the pictured and the picturing facts respectively. Facts in logical space are the world, and language presents facts in logical space. So there must be something common between the world and language ; and that which is common to them is the logical form. Form is the possibility of structure, that is, the possibility of the definite ways in which the components of facts are combined in logical space. By virtue of this identical form, language represents the world. It stands in a projective relation to the world and hence is a picture of it.

In his exposition of this theory Wittgenstein uses a number of concepts, for example, fact, logical space, logical form, structure and representation. He does not offer any explanation of these concepts as he believes that they will be understood only by those "who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed" in the *Tractatus*. As a result, the basic concepts of his thought remain unclear and are confused by most of his interpreters. In this section an attempt is made to clarify some of these concepts and to eliminate the confusionsi nvolved in understanding them.

II. THE CONCEPT OF FACT

According to the first proposition of the *Tractatus* the world is *everything* that is the case. That is, it is everything that is the situation. Let us suppose that in a given world there are three entities A, B and C ; and these are *all* the entities of that world and that they occur in the following combinations

[AB], [BC]

(Throughout the monograph capital letters will be used to refer to constituent entities of facts which are components of the world

and small letters will be used to refer to linguistic entities. So, this discussion may be considered as meta-linguistic, as the vocabulary here, is of the $(n+1)$th order if n is taken to be the order of linguistic symbols—in the ordinary sense).

[AB] and [BC] are all the combinations of the given world ; and if there is any other combination it is identical either with [AB] or with [BC] or not a combination in the given world.

Proposition 1.1 of the *Tractatus* equates the world with the totality of facts. Facts are either simple or complex. Complex facts can be analysed or split into atomic facts or simple facts. Atomic facts are combinations of things which cannot be further divided. If in the given world a diadic relation holds between the different entities or objects, namely, between A, B and C, that is, if they are combined in such a way that each combination gives an ordered pair, then we have the following combinations :

[AA] [BA] [CA]
[AB] [BB] [CB]
[AC] [BC] [CC]

As any combination of entities is a fact, [AA], [BA] etc, are facts. They are simple facts as they cannot be further divided, and [[AA] [CB]], [[AC] [BA]] are complex facts. According to the proposition 1.1 of the *Tractatus* this given world is totality of the nine combinations mentioned earlier, but not of three entities. The world is the totality of simple combinations or facts, as the diadic relation here is supposed to hold between the objects and not between their combinations. If the latter were to be the case, instead of nine combinations, there would be a denumerably infinite number of combinations. It might be argued that this world is the totality of such denumerably infinite number of combinations. But, this is untenable as the axiom of infinity contradicts it and does not permit any such assertion. In a world containing only a finite number of atomic facts, that finite number would be the greatest possible number for a collection of facts, as according to the axiom of infinity, the universal class of individuals is similar to the proper sub-class of itself. (How Wittgenstein came to the conclusion that the world is the totality of facts and not of things is not relevant to the main theme. So in the present discussion it should be left out. But

it is a very important issue. Perhaps it can be related to a similar radical change in the outlook of the physicists of the twentieth century. The shift from property physics to field physics corresponds to the shift from the view of the world as the totality of things to the view that it is the totality of facts. It might be even related to the development of logic during the last hundred years. The type of logic we use in our discourse determines the structure of the world. When logic of terms is accepted one has to maintain that the world is made of things and when logic of judgments is accepted one has to maintain that the world is a cobweb of complex and mentally constructed relations. These two types of logic have been discorded by the twentieth century logicians, to accept the logic of propositions (or sentences). The inevitable corrolary is the view that the world is the totality of facts and not either of things or of relations).

What then, is the import of the Wittgensteinian assertion : 'the world is everything that is the case'? A *case* is the existence of an atomic fact. To say that [AB] is a case is to say that A and B are combined in a definite way and that this combination actually exists or [AB] holds in this world. But, it is the way in which A and B are combined so as to result in [AB] that makes it a fact. In the example we have taken, it is possible to combine the given entities in nine ways. That means nine combinations are logically possible. But, in the empirical world or the actual world certain combinations occur and certain others do not. For instance, in the world which has been taken as an example [AB] and [BC] hold and [BA], [CA] do not hold. The facts which actually hold in a given world are the cases of that world. But, the totality of the given world being the totality of all the nine possible combinations, the totality of these combinations determines facts which are cases as well as facts which are not cases, because both of them are constituents of that totality. That means the inference form

$$(aa) . (ab) . (ac) . (ba) . (bb) . (bc) . (ca) . (cb) . (cc)$$
$$\therefore \quad (ab) . (bc)$$

is valid.

Facts being combinations of objects, the way in which objects are combined determines what are facts, as well as what are

not facts. Every case is a fact, but every fact need not necessarily be a case. That is, if 'fx' is taken to mean 'x is a fact' and 'cx' is taken to mean 'x is a case' the two following principles can be asserted :

$$(1) \quad (x)\ (cx \supset fx)$$

$$(2) \quad [(\exists x)\ (fx) \neq (\exists x)\ (cx) \equiv fx)]$$

That the totality of facts, though every fact is not a case, determines what are not cases follows from the rules of combination itself. But, this is possible only when an interpretation is given to the rules of combination. For example, if the diadic relation, supposed to be held between the entities of the given world is interpreted in such a way that [AB] means 'A' is to the left of 'B' and so on ; and if A, B and C are different points on a straight line it can be stated that the combinations [AB] and [BC] are possible while the combinations [CA] and [AC] are not possible. Or, supposing 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all the facts of a world, ϕ the class of all those facts, 1 the case of that world, ψ the class of the cases of that world, it can be stated that

$(1, 2, 3, 4 \subset \phi)$. $(1 \subset \psi)$. $(\psi \subset \phi)$ and $(\exists n)\ (n \subset \psi) \equiv ((n=1)\ v\ (n \subseteq \psi))$. Here 'v' is used in the exclusive sense. That means, $(x)\ (((x=n) \supset (n \subset \psi)) \supset (x \subset \phi))$. $(x \subset \phi) \supset ((x \subset \psi)\ v\ (x \subseteq \psi))$

Thus fact and case are different, though prima facie they seem to be identical. Propositions 1 and 1.1 of the *Tractatus* presuppose such a distinction ; therefore in these propositions 'fact and 'case' should not be taken as synonymous terms and substituted one for the other.

Facts are spatial sequences and it is in this sense the term 'fact' is used in the *Tractatus*. The notion of space to which a reference is made in the preceeding sentence is physical space and not logical space. Palmieri's interpretation that a fact is *whatever is the case* is erroneous, because in that case sentential sequences cannot be facts ; and Wittgenstien says that they are facts. Confusing the concept of 'fact' with the concept of 'case' Palmieri comes to the conclusion : "By facts Wittgenstein means the *non-linguistic complex* because of which one proposition is true and another false." (*Synthese*. p. 72 Vol. XII. No. 1). This statement contradicts the proposition 2.141 of the *Tractatus*.

The picture is a fact. Wittgenstein is using the term 'fact' to refer not only to the non-linguistic complexes, but linguistic complexes as well. [AB] as well as (ab) are facts as they are spatial sequences. The definition of 'fact' should then be restated so that it may comprehend the spoken language too. A fact, then, is a spatio-temporal sequence. This shows that it is possible to define 'fact' without any circularity and disposes off the doubts of Weinberg and Russell about the possibility of a definition of the term without circularity.

It might be pointed out that this definition of 'fact,' as it is confined to physical space, is not in consonance with the Wittgensteinian assertion that facts in logical space are the world. Prima facie, it is so. But, this definition is consistent with the notion of the world as facts in logical space, as what Wittgenstein means by 'world' here, is 'the possible world'. Spatio-temporal sequences arranged in physical space constitute the actual world or the physical world, which is a part of the possible world. This point will be discussed in a separate section below.

Facts are mutually independent and this distinguishes them from cases. They are independent in the sense that a fact can either be or not be a case, without reference to any other fact. Correspondingly, sentential facts are independent as the truth-value of a given sentence does not depend upon any other sentence, if that sentence is atomic. That means the following schema is valid :

$$((ab)) \supset (ab)). \quad ((((ac) \vee \sim ((ac)) \supset (ab)).$$
$$(((bc) \vee \sim (bc) \supset (ab).$$

Wittgenstein uses 'the world' in two senses. This is evident from his equating this term with 'the totality of facts' as well as 'the totality of cases'. He accepts that the class of all cases and the class of all facts are not identical or equinumeral, because the one-one correlation cannot be established between them. If 'the world' in proposition 1 and 'the world' in proposition 1.3 of the *Tractatus* are synonyms, then it can be proved that, identity being a transitive relation, these two classes are identical. So 'the world' in 1.13 means the possible world, (that is, facts arranged in logical space) and in 1 it means the actual world (that is, facts arranged in physical space). The actual world is a part of the possible world. The universal class of cases of

a finite world is a sub-set of the universal class of facts of that finite world. It is not only a sub-set, but a proper sub-set as the actual cannot be actual unless it is possible.

III. TWO SENSES OF 'THE WORLD'

A sentence pictures a fact when the constituent elements of that sentence correspond to the elements of the pictured fact and when it shows the structure of the fact. Stuctural identity between the sentence and the fact is necessary for the sentence to be a picture of the fact. The elements of the sentence, which is the picturing fact, can be coordinated with the elements of the pictured fact. The sentence is a picture due to this coordination. Coordination is the representing relation which is an essential feature of a picture. The elements of a sentence correspond to the elements of the fact which it pictures and the elements of a sentence are "combined in a definite way". This combination-in-a-definite-way is the structure of a fact and the possibility of the elements of fact to be combined in a definite way is the form of that fact. A simple illustration can make this clear. Suppose that the figure given below in the picture of the sky on a certain night.

(1)



In this there are four pentagraphs and a black circle. The four pentagraphs stand for (that is, function as names of) the four stars of the sky, and the black circle stands for the moon (that is, stands as a name for the moon). In this figure the four pentagraphs and the black circle stand in a definite relation to each other, just as the four stars and the moon which are the *nominata* or the *denotata* of these names, stand in a definite relation to each other in the sky. The ways in which the entities in the figure and the entities of their *nominata* stand together is identical

(or the same). That is to say, the moon and (its name) the black circle stand right to the group of stars, and the group of pentagraphs, and the four stars are arranged in such a way that by joining them we get something like a square. In the picturing fact, the way in which the elements of the pictured fact are combined is represented. That means, the picturing fact stands in a representing relation to the pictured fact.

Linguistic facts (or sentences) stand in a representing relation to the facts they picture; and by virtue of this relation sentences express their meaning. A sentence must have the form of representation in common with the fact it represents and then only it will be able to "represent after its manner—rightly or falsely". Here, the word 'falsely' is misleading, because it may raise the issue, whether a false picture is a picture at all. The notion of false proposition is closely connected with the notion of the negative fact. Wittgenstein, perhaps under the impact of Platonism, holds that a negative fact is an unrealised fact—in contrast with the realised or the actual fact. A negative fact is not an impossible combination of entities, but is an unrealised combination, or to be more clear that which does not hold in a given world. (But he does not maintain degrees of realisation or degrees of picturing). If it were to be an impossible combination, we cannot, even think about it. By 'possibility' and 'impossibility' Wittgenstein means 'logical possibility' and 'logical impossibility' and this should be distinguished from 'psychological possibility' and 'psychological impossibility' on the one hand and 'physical possibility' and 'physical impossibility' on the other. This distinction is presupposed in the assertion that the actual (physical) world is the totality of cases only.

Further, it should be pointed out that negative facts do not present or picture what are *not-facts*. This statement cannot be denied without commiting an explicit contradiction, for such a denial amounts to saying that what is non-existent is existent. Negative facts show the combinations that do not hold in the actual world. Negative facts do not cease to be facts, but remain just unrealised facts. Suppose that a sketch of a beautiful girl is drawn and then an attempt is made to see to whom it corresponds, and also suppose that no girl is found in this world to whom the sketch corresponds. Then does the sketch cease to be a picture? Or, suppose that a picture of a

unicorn is drawn and the attempt to find an object with which it can correspond resulted in vain. Even then it remains a picture. May be unicorns, as a species , have become extinct in the course of evolution, and natural history as yet has not explained this extinction. Or, they may come into existence a million years later.

Moreover, pictures can be classified as either realised pictures or unrealised pictures, only with reference to the actual world. When the realm of discourse is confined to the possible world such a distinction cannot be drawn. Wittgenstein, when he says that 'facts in logical space are the world', is referring to the possible world ; and it is to this that language stands in a representing relation. The possible world together with linguistic facts constitutes reality. This view is held not only in the *Tractatus* but in the *Remarks* too (part 1. 125).

As the world is the totality of facts and objects and properties enter into the world as components of those facts, the structure of the world is the way in which various objects and properties are combined (in the case of the actual world) and are combinable (in the case of the possible world). How the objects *do* stand, that is, the actual state of affairs, is something that is really the case. But, the structure of the possible world is the way in which objects and properties *can* be arranged and not the way in which they are found arranged. It is not necessary for them to be arranged in that particular way. That they are found arranged in such and such way is indisputable. But their arrangement is contingent or purely accidental. "What is can as well be otherwise." But, nothing is accidental in logic, as it treats every possibility and "all possibilities are facts". Thus, given two objects, and two properties the world of these objects and properties will be the totality of all the possible combinations of these four entities. Let p and q be the names of these objects and r and s the names of these properties. Then a description of that world can be given as follows :

1. ((pr) . (ps) . (qr) . ~(qs))
2. ((pr) . (ps) . (qr) . (qs))
3. ((pr) . (ps) . ~(qr) . (qs))
4. ((pr) . (ps) . ~(qr) . ~(qs))
5. ((pr) . ~(ps) . (qr) . (qs))

6. ((pr) . ∼(ps) . (qr) . ∼(qs))
7. ((pr) . ∼(ps) . ∼(qr) . (qs))
8. ((pr) . ∼(ps) . ∼(qr) . ∼(qs)
9. (∼(pr) . (ps) . (qr) . (qs))
10. (∼(pr) . (ps) . (qr) . ∼(qs))
11. (∼(pr) . (ps) . ∼(qr) . (qs))
12. (∼(pr) . (ps) . ∼(qr) . ∼(qs))
13. (∼(pr) . ∼(ps) . (qr) . (qs))
14. (∼(ps) . ∼(ps) . (qr) . ∼(qs)
15. (∼(pr) . ∼(ps) . ∼(qr) . (qs))
16. (∼(pr) . ∼(ps) . ∼(qr) . ∼(qs))

(In this description, dots are used between atomic combinations. But they do not have denotata, that is, there can be no entities in the given world to which these dots refer. The same is the case with the sign '∼'. The signs of conjunction and negation, are linguistic devices and are relevent to the notation used, that is, accidental features of the symbolic-structure by which the given world is presented here).

What is given in the sequences 1 to 16 is a complete description of the world of the two objects and two properties mentioned earlier. That means, the combinations of these objects and properties are shown as arranged in logical space. There are sixteen ways of combining them and all the sixteen combinations are pictures of the constituent facts of the world. When all of them, as a unit, are taken into consideration, any one combination cannot be distinguished from the others. That is, when the realm of discourse is confined to the possible world, all of them stand on the same level. But, when the description of the possible world is seen in relation to a given (actual) world, when an interpretation is provided to the symbols occuring in the desdescription (1-16), it will be evident that some combinations do and some do not have counterparts in the actual world. What the sequences 1 to 16 together give is "a complete description of a possible state of universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by predicates of the system" (Carnap : *Meaning and Necessity*. p. 9) ; and this is what Wittgenstein means by possible state of affairs. For example, if the *actual world* consists of two objects of which p and q are names and that these objects are triangular and circular respectively

in shape, this world can be described as ((ps) . (qr)). But, this is not a complete picture of it, because it does not show what other combinations are excluded from this world. That is why the notion of negation has to be brought into discussion. '((ps) . (qr))' shows the combinations which actually hold in this world, that is the cases in this world. It does not show the combinations which are not the cases in this world. In order to make provision for these too, the sequence describing this world should be reformulated with the help of negation.

Weinberg relates the use of the sign of negation to the incompleteness of human knowledge. "If knowledge were complete", he writes, "there would be no false proposition and hence no use for the negation sign" (*An Examination of Logical Positivism* p. 58). This is exactly the opposite of what Wittgenstein holds. Weinberg's assumption that Wittgenstein holds the view which he himself holds is baseless. Moreover, he never makes it clear as to what he means by the term 'false proposition'.

As this world is everything that are the cases in it our knowledge of the cases that are constituents of it, determines the cases that are not constituents of it. Every picture is an expression of knowledge. "The logical picture of facts is the thought." So a complete picture should show both, those which are cases and those which are not cases. Hence, a supplementary or complimentary picture showing that pr and qs do not have any corresponding cases in the world should be added to ((ps). (qr)) so that the given world might be completely pictured. Such a picture will be (((ps). (qr)). (~(pr). ~(qs))).

This is one of the sixteen possible combinations of these entities ; and all the other fifteen combinations are unrealised. But they stand to the possible world in the same relation as this combination does. It should also be noted that it is not logically necessary for those objects and properties to be related in this particular way. It is empirically so in the actual world. In this connection Keyt raises an interesting issue. He writes "suppose that I draw up a list of all possible atomic facts. That is, I write down all the elementary propositions.....suppose also that I draw up a second list of all existent atomic facts. This time I write down all the elementary propositions. Now the question I want to ask is this : can a name appear on the first list that does not appear on the second?" (p. 19). His

answer is that it cannot, as he thinks that "if there were no existent atomic facts, there could be no possible atomic facts either." (*ibid*).

If there were to be n number of objects and a diadic relation holding between them, it is possible to anticipate 2^n number of facts. So far n objects with a diadic relation, there will be 2^n possible facts. The possible combinations of these facts will be $K2^n = \sum_{\nu=0}^{2^n} (\nu^{2^n})$. This presents the possible world of n number of objects. Now think that there *are* only $(n-1)$ objects in the world of experience and that a diadic relation is found to be holding between them. Then the constituent facts of this world will be $(n-1)^2$. The total possible combinations of these facts will be $K(n-1)^2 = \sum_{\nu=0}^{2^{(n-1)}} (\nu^{2^{n-1}})$. This presents the world of $(n-1)$ number of objects. Keyt's argument holds good in the case of this world. But he is on the wrong when he thinks that it holds in the case of the world of n objects. His argument is based on the assumption that *objects are existent*. This is what a strict nominalist maintains. But neither Wittgenstein is a strict nominalist nor he is using *object* in the usual sense. As, according to him, *objects* are transcendental it makes no sense to say either that they are existent or that they are not existent (see section 2). As a logician he is interested only in what logic can anticipate and it does not anticipate existence of objects. That is why, it is possible to think of the possible world without knowing the actual world. Keyt's argument cannot affect our distinction between the possible world and the actual world.

IV. THE STRUCTURE SHOWS ITSELF

If a sentence is a picture of a fact, then the elements of that sentence should represent the elements of the fact of which it is a picture, and the arrangement of the elements in the sentence should show the arrangement of the elements of the pictured fact. This has great import as neither the world is just a concatenation of things, nor language mere collection of words.

1.1 The world is the totality of facts.

3.141 The proposition is not a mixture of words (just as the musical theme is not a mixture of tones). The proposition is articulate.

3.142 Only facts can express sense, a class of names cannot.

Syntax corresponds to the relations which holds between the objects of the world. So it *shows* them. But, *show* in what sense? The concept of *showing* is connected with the concept of *understanding*. Sentential facts are understood without any explanation. This is because a "sentence *shows* how things stand if it is true. And it *says* they do stand" as if it is a picture of a fact. This can be explained as follows :

(2) 

This figure will serve the purpose of a sentential fact. What does any person see when he looks at (2)? He sees a dotted patch of triangular shape in the centre and three black patches of similar shape attached to the different sides of this triangle looking as if the dotted patch is fitted in a black patch of triangular shape. But this is not all what he understands when he looks at (2). "This is how", he says, a moment after looking at it, "the mosaic floor in the university library books like. Yes, this is how, exactly, the slabs are arranged in it" (assuming, of course, that he had seen the floor in Saugor University library). Now, instead of looking at (2), suppose that he looks at the marks, and their order, in the rectangle (3).

(3)

A DOTTED PATCH OF TRIANGULAR SHAPE IN THE CENTRE AND THREE BLACK PATCHES OF TRIANGULAR SHAPE AND OF THE SAME SIZE ATTACHED TO THE THREE DIFFERENT SIDES OF THIS TRIANGLE LOOKING AS IF THE DOTTED PATCH IS FITTED IN A BIG BLACK PATCH.

What strikes him when he looks at (3) is (2) and vice versa. Then what he understands from what he has seen is the structural

identity of (2) and (3). This is possible because (2) and (3) *show* the way in which the components of these facts and the bits of mosaic flooring are spatially arranged. Understanding, then, according to Wittgenstein is the recognition of the structural identity between the picturing fact and the pictured fact.

4.022 the proposition *shows* its sense. The proposition *shows* how things stand, if it is true. And it *says* that they do stand.

It might be argued that this proposition contradicts proposition 4.12 which states that "what *can* be shown *cannot* be said." This apparant contradiction has been explained by Stenius (Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* p. 178-183). He shows how Wittgenstein uses the word 'show' with two different meanings in these two propositions. According to 4.12 and 4.121, sentences represent reality but they do not represent the logical form which they have in common with reality. Sentences show their logical form. They, rather, exhibit it. The representation of the logical form cannot be represented in or shown by sentences, because "that which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent and that which expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by language". A sentence, if true, shows how things should hang together in the pictured fact and says that they do stand like that. But, that is what the structure of the sentence exhibits. The sentence does not say that it exhibits such and such structure. Ontological statements have been considered by Wittgenstein meaningless, because ontological structures can only be shown in language ; they cannot be said or described. Thus it is clear that what a picture shows is the structure, which it holds in common with reality and that the entities do stand exactly in the same way in which they are exhibited as standing in the picture. Moreover, in the type of language about which Wittgenstein is speaking in the *Tractatus* the function of words is to and only to name objects, and the arrangement of these words show the arrangement of the objects. Therefore the arrangement of entities in the pictured fact is not an entity in the picturing fact and there cannot be any corresponding entity. This means that the arrangement of words in a sentence itself is not a name. Therefore, arrangement cannot be talked about meaningfully. (It is interesting to note that the most original medieval thinker, Roscelin of Compiegne came to the same conclusion, though the arguments adduced by him are different from these. He main-

tains that what propositions express are forms of assertion determined by arbitrary grammatical rules. Vide : Carre : *Realists and Nominalists*).

Another argument can be extended to show that ontological assertions are meaningless. As a sentential fact shows the structure of the corresponding fact, to state that it shows is unnecessary ; as unnecessary elements in a symbolic system are meaningless, by application of Occam's razor, such assertions become meaningless. (But they have some transitory importance. Vide *Tractatus* 6.54 and *Investigations* : Part I. 134 and Part 2.17). Moreover, such sentences are tautologous and as such are vacuous or deviod of any thought content. For example, take *p* as a propositional sign which shows that such and such is the case. Then to state that '*p*' shows that such and such is the case is to say : *p* shows *p*, and here we have no coordination of a fact and an object, but a coordination of facts by means of a coordination of their objects." (*Tractatus* 5.542). That sentence is a picture of a fact cannot be shown in another sentence. That it is a picture of a corresponding fact is evident from that sentence itself. The reason which led Wittgenstein to this conclusion is purely logical and not either metaphysical or mystical, as has been supposed by almost all of his interpreters. It is evident from the argument given above that there is at least one relation which holds between facts, that is, between the world and language, and which cannot be represented in language. It cannot be projected into linguistic facts. This, on the analogy of Godel's theory of logical incompleteness, can be called *projective incompleteness*. Wittegnstein's theory of projective incompleteness shows the inherent limitations of linguistic structure. It further throws light on the conceptions of *infinite regress* and *meaninglessness*. As Godel's theorm proves that there is a class of logically true schema which cannot be proved within the system, Wittgenstein's theory shows that there is an area of structures which cannot be projected into linguistic structures. Language, being spatio-temporal, is itself a part of reality. This means that there is at least one fact which is not a member of the class of linguistic facts (L) but a member of the class of facts which constititute the world (W). That is ;

(1) $L \subset W$

(2) $(\{1, 2, 3, \ldots\ldots n\} \subset W)$

(3) ({1, 2, 3.....n-m} CL) therefore
(4) $(\exists f)$ (($f \subset W$). ($f \subseteq L$)
(Where 'n' is a finite number and 'f' is any fact.

That is why, Wittgenstein maintains, that we cannot assert a statement about reality in general. Our statements refer to a finite number of particulars only. Hence, statements quantified by the universal quantifier are meaningless unless the universal quantifier is taken as having a finite number of values.

Any attempt to show the structural identity which holds between two facts will result in *infinite regress.* To come out of this impasse the theory of types may be accepted, and a heirarchy of languages may be constructed. This theory works out all right for a given number of languages. But, as for any number of languages, the (n+1) th can be constructed, it cannot give an answer to the issue raised by the theory of projective incompleteness. This is one of the reasons for Wittgenstein's not accepting Russell's theory of types, either in its original or ramified form (He gave some other reasons for this in the *Tractatus.* See 3.33, 3.332 and 6.123). From this it becomes evident how erroneous is the contention of Feigl, namely, that the "dogmatic opinion of Wittgenstein's according to which the relation of language to fact can only be 'shown' but not linguistically represented was repudiated and the error corrected by the introduction of a well-defined heirarchy of languages" (*Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, p. 19).

It might be interesting to note that such a limitation has been accepted by almost all logicians and mathematicians. For example, in the case of Skolem paradox it has been admitted that even if one avoids the Skolem paradox "one has to admit the existence of propositions which cannot be expressed by any statement" (Rosser : *Logic for Mathematicians*, p. 200).

V. STRUCTURAL IDENTITY

When can two facts F and F_1 be said to be structurally identical? Do the elements of the facts which are structurally identical hang together exactly in the same way? There are some of the issues concerning the notion of structural identity. Before answering these questions, a confusion, which is due to Ramsey, has to be clarified.

Ramsey had some doubts as to whether two facts could ever have the same structure or the same form, "It looks", he wrote "as if two atomic facts might well have the same structure because objects hang together in the same way in each of them. But that the structure of the fact is not merely the way in which the objects hang together, but depends on what objects they are, so that two different facts may have the same structure". (*Mind.* 1923). This means that quite contrary to the intentions of Wittgenstein, he thought that 'structural identity' as used in the *Tractatus* was a semantic concept. But Wittgenstein used it as a syntactical concept, and what Wittgenstein presumably meant by that term will be shown in the following paragraphs. It can be seen that two facts are structurally identical by comparing the definite ways in which the elements of these facts are combined, irrespective of whether they are of the same category or not. Suppose that in the two sentential facts given below 'Tom' and 'John' are not names of the same person and 'Dick' and 'Peter' are not names of the same person.

(1) Tom is younger than Dick.

(2) John is shorter than Peter.

Now, if it can be shown that (1) is structurally identical with (2), it becomes evident that Ramsey's interpretation is erroneous. Let us symbolise (1) and (2) by using relational variables as well as variables for components.

(1a) $t \phi d$

(2a) $J \psi p$

(In what follows s should be read as 'structurally identical', a, b, c etc. are used as sentential variables, I, II, III etc. are variables for the component parts of sentences ; r, r_1, r_2 are relational variables ; f, f_1, f_2 are variables for the set of rules which r, r_1, r_2 etc. follow, that is, variables for the set of relations by which the component parts of the sentences are combined, and 'comp' should be read as 'component part of'. 'Component' here means an independent part of the spatial sequence which is a sentence.)

(3) $(t \phi d)\ s\ (j \psi p)$

Two facts are said to be structurally identical if and only if they have the same structure, that is, if the elements of those facts are

combined in ways which are identical. The definite way in which the elements of a fact are combined is the relation which holds the different component elements of that fact together. So, if two facts are identical the relation which holds the constituents of those facts together must be the same. Now, by using sentential variables (3) can be transformed into

(4) a s b

a and b are facts and, hence, there must be some elements which are the component parts of these facts. Suppose, that I and II are components of a and III and IV are components of b. Then,

(5) (I, II) comp a

(6) (III, IV) comp b

I and II are all the components of a and III and IV are all the components of b. Then,

(7) (((I, II) comp a). (x) ((x comp a)≡((x=I)v(x=II))))

(8) (((III, IV) comp b). (x) ((x comp b)≡(x=III)v(x=IV)))

As a and b are facts, there must be a relation which relates the various components of a and some other relations which relates the various components of b. If these two relations are supposed to be r and r_1 respectively, it follows that,

(9) (∃r) (r_1 I, II)

(10) (∃r_1) (r_1 III, IV)

Every relation follows some syntactical rules, that is, rules of formation and transformation. If it is assumed that f is the set of such rules which r follows and f_1 is the set of rules which r_1 follows, then it can be said that,

(11) r ⊃ f

(12) r_1 ⊃ f_1

So, if a relation occurs in a sentential fact the implication is that a set of rules has been followed. This means that it is not the case that a relation occurs in a fact and the set of rules which that relation follows are violated or rejected. So the occurance of a relation in a fact implies the set of rules which it follows. It can easily be shown that there are relations which occur in facts which are structurally identical and are of this type. r

and r_1 are relations occuring in facts which are supposed to be structurally identical. So they follow the same set of rules. That means,

(13) $f=f_1$ from this it follows that,

(14) (a s b) $\equiv$ ((I, II comp a). (x) ((x comp a) $\equiv$ (x=I) v(x = II)). (III, IV comp b). (x) ((x comp b) $\equiv$ (x=III) v (x=VI)). ($\exists$r) (r I, II). ($\exists r_1$) (r_1 III, IV). (r $\supset$ f). ($r_1 \supset f_1$). ($f=f_1$)).

Hence ((tϕd) s (j ψ p)=((t, d comp (t ϕ d)). (x) ((x comp (t ϕ d))$\equiv$ (x=t) v (x=d). (j, p comp (j ψ p)). (x) ((x comp (j ψ p))$\equiv$(x=j) v (x=p). ($\exists\phi$) (x) (y) ((x ϕ y) $\supset \sim$(y ϕ x)). (x) $\sim$ (x ϕ x). (x) (y) (z) (((x ϕ y). (y ϕ z)) $\supset$(x ψ z)). (x) (y) ((x ψ y) $\supset \sim$ (y ψ x)). (x) $\sim$(x ψ x. (x) (y) (z) (((x ψ y). (y ψ z) $\supset$(x ψ z)))).

So, structural identity is purely a syntactical concept ; and Wittgenstein seems to be using it in this sense, though it is not explicitly stated in the *Tractatus*. "Take any sentence" writes Bergmann "containing non-logical primitives, say Hume's paradigm of a law "(x) [$f_1(x) \supset f_2(x)$]" replace all its non-logical primitives [f_1, f_2] by variables of the proper types ('f', 'g') ; define 'r' (f, g) as (x) (f(x) $\supset$ g(x)). r_1 refers to a logical relation of the second type. What has been done in this case can be done in all cases. It follows that constituents of two states of affairs exemplify the same logical relation if and only if the sentences referring to them exemplify the same logical structure." (*Meaning and Existence* p. 55).

But, in addition to these requirements Wittgenstein's notion of structural identity has another feature. According to him any two facts to be structurally identical should be equinumeral.

4.04 In the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the states of affairs, which it represents. They must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity.

In the light of this additional criterion, what (3) means is (j ψ p). (j ψ p) can be obtained from (t ϕ d) by replacing t by j, d by p and ϕ by ψ. By 'replacement' it is meant replacement of each element by one and only one element and different elements by different elements and for n occurances of an element e, by n occurances of an element e_1. This leads to the notion of

one-one relation. (But as this condition does not hold in ordinary language, Wittgenstein seems to have dropped this idea.) Thus the nature of the relation of structural identity can be shown as follows :

(1) (f) (f s f)

(2) (f) (f_1) ((f s f_1) $\supset$ (f_1 s f)

(3) (f) (f_1) (f_2) ((((f s f_1). (f_1 s f_2) $\supset$ (f s f_2)).

So, Wittgenstein's notion of structural identity, like his view of projection, closely resembles that of *mapping*, as used in projective Geometry. Mathematicians hold that "the basic feature of mapping is that an abstract structure of relations embodied in one domain of objects can be shown to hold between objects (usually of a sort different from the first set) in another domain" (Nagel & Newman : *Godel's proof.* p. 64).

Wittgenstein maintains that the structure or the form of a sequence is constituted by the way in which its parts are put together in a configuration. But, Ramsey thinks that form and structure are such that the same fact may have different form and structure, and attributes this to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's definitions of the term 'form' as the possibility of structure, prima facie, is unclear. But, from the way in which he is using it in the *Tractatus*, it becomes evident that he is using it in a platonic sense. Hence, a distinction can be made between form and structure. But, they can be understood only in their mutual relation. Form is something ideal concerning the possible world and possibility-space, whereas structure is concerned with the actual world or physical space. This can be explained as follows.

Neither tautologies nor contradictories represent any state of affairs. Only sentences which are neither of these represent facts—either possible or actual. Thus if there are two objects A and B, as objects cannot have independent existence, without being constituents of a configuration and as the capacity to be a constituent of a configuration makes anything an object, there is no necessity for a combinator in the formation of an atomic fact. ('Combinator' means that which combines, that is, a relation. This vitiates all the theories which give relations some ontological status.) In the atomic fact things are like links of a chain, connected together. There is nothing else



except the links themselves to connect and yet these links retain their independence as links. So, with two objects A and B two atomic facts can be constructed.

(1) [AB]

(2) [BA]

"The ultimate connection of terms", writes Wittgenstein, "is the immediate connection which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional function." (Aristotlian Society: *Proceedings* 1929)



Now, there is structural identity between (AB) and (BA). They have the same form because the state of elements in one fact corresponds to the possible state of elements of the other fact ; that is to say the possibility of the elements of the one fact which are combined with one another in a certain way, is similar to the way in which the elements of the other fact are combined. This possibility shows their form. If (AB) is projected into language that is, if a description of this fact is given, it results in (ab). (ab) shows the form as well as structure of (AB). The form of (AB), (BA) and (ab) can be seen by dropping the constants and replacing variables of a higher order. Such an abstraction will result in (— ...). That the entities A, B, a and b, could be fitted in this frame work so as to yield (AB) or (BA) or (ab) shows that it is possible to arrange them in *that* way. This frame refers to the logical space in which these objects are constituents. Thus, the relationship between the pictured fact, the picturing fact, their structural identity and their form can be shown in the above diagram.

The structures of the pictured and picturing facts are instances of the logical form. To say that a fact has a structure is to say

that the constituent entities of that fact are combined in a form of which that structure is an instance and to say that a fact has a form is to say that the entities of that fact *can* be combined in a way which will be an instance of that form. So, the implication is that to say that a fact F has a structure is to say that F has *that* form and to say that F has a certain form is to say that it can have *that* structure. This means that two facts have the same structure if and only if they have the same form. This disproves Ramsey's contention.

VI. REACHING UPTO REALITY

Sentences 'reach upto reality'. Sentences with their modes of projection by which reality is projected into them, determine the logical form of the entities and the form of the entities combined is the form of reality. The mode of projection by which sentences reach upto reality is the structural identity between sentences and facts which are projected into them, together with the correlations between the constituent entities of sentences and those of facts. Such a correlation is possible because, the entities of a sentential fact are names of the entities of the pictured fact.

Sentential facts are constructed as models of reality, as pictures of its constituents. The created (or the creatable) spatio-temporal entities are used as representatives of the actual (or the possible) entities. That is why the way in which the entities stand in a sentential fact shows what the possible state of affairs is. The way in which the sentential facts are made to correspond, that is, the way in which the constituent facts of the world are projected into them, is inherent in the sentential facts themselves. It belongs to them. But, the non-linguistic facts which are projected do not belong to them. To know what belongs to a sentential fact is to know the mode of projection that is used, and hence, to know the sense of that sentential fact.

4.0141. In the fact that there is a general rule by which the musician is able to read the symphony out of the score and that, there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again—by means of the first rule—construct the score, herein lies the internal similarity between these things which at first sight seem to be

entirely different. And the rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical score. It is the rule of translation of this language into the language of gramophone record.

Sentential signs are understood or can be understood without any explanations, because they are *used* in such a way. They are used in accordance with some rules as models of reality. For instance, consider a group of five men, one standing to the right of another in a line as a fact which is a constituent of the world. In making a picture of this it will be seen that each of these five men has a corresponding entity in the picture and the order in which they stand will correspond to the order in which the entities in the picture stand. If the following is considered as such a picture the nature of the projection becomes clear.



Such a picture of that fact can be drawn only by following certain rules. The rules in accordance with which the construction of the picture will proceed in this case, can be stated as follows :

(A) 1.  designates the first man

2.  designates the second man

3.  designates the third man

4.  designates the fourth man

5.  designates the fifth man

(B) The way in which the five entities of the picture are arranged in the picture is structurally identical with the way in which the five men stand.

These rules are called rules of projection. Without knowing these rules, one cannot know anything about the fact pictured from the picture alone. But in our daily life we proceed from pictures to the facts pictured. This throws light on the structure and function of language. Wittgenstein points out that they correspond to "the norms of our particular language into which we project in ever so many different ways, ever so many different logical forms. And for this very reason we can draw no conclusions—except very vague ones—from the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described." (Aristotlian Society: *Proceedings*. 1929). The rules of projection used in ordinary language are not clear ; in language systems of ordinary use these rules are not given explicit formulation ; and unless such a formulation is given it is impossible to know the form of reality. That is why, Wittgenstein assumes much importance to a consideration of the 'rules of using language' in *Investigations*.

It is the rules of projection which relate language to the world and bring an element of aboutness into it, and thereby enable sentential facts to 'reach upto reality' by being models of it.

VII. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL FEATURES

Language (that is, a set of denumerably infinite number of symbols having a syntactical and semantic structures) has perceptible difference from the *primitive languages* like maps, sketches and cartoons. So, it may be asked whether this difference is due to the equinumerality of the pictured and picturing facts. To state it more clearly, the issue is : Do the linguistic facts stand in one-one relation with the facts which they picture? Wittgenstein asserts that one-one relation holds between them, and that

4.04 in the proposition there must be as many things distinguishable as there are in the states of affairs which it represents. They must have the same logical multiplicity.

Pictures or sentences in their external forms do not resemble the facts for which they stand, except in the case of maps,

Hence Wittgenstein distinguishes between the essential and the accidental feature of pictures or sentences.

3.34 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental are the features which are due to a particular way of producing the propositional sign. Essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense.

3.341 The essential in a proposition is therefore that which is common to all propositions which can express the same sense. And in the same way in general the essential in a symbol is that which all symbols which can fulfil the same purpose have in common.

For example, suppose that in a map the sea is shown in blue and the land in various other colours. But, a map in which the sea is shown in black and the land in blue can be prepared ; and this does not change the sense of these maps. They present the same state of affairs, and hence express the same sense. They are structurally identical with the fact of which they are maps of, and as structural identity is a transitive relation, they are structurally identical. The colours in which the various parts of these facts are marked are purely accidental features, or as Wittgenstein calls them 'the particular ways of producing the signs'. But, the way in which the elements of a map stand is essential in it and it is only this that expresses its sense. This is common to both the maps. Structrual identity is stated to exist between the essential features of a sentence and the fact it represents. The essential feature of a sentence is its logical form and only logical pictures depict the world.

Hence, Wisdom's interpretation of propositions 3.34 and 3.341 of the *Tractatus* seems to be erroneous, as it involves the notion of degrees of picturing or a heirarchy of pictures. He thinks that Wittgenstein "is trying to point out an ideal to which some sentences try to attain", and suggests that "he should .....have drawn our attention to the fact that some sentences do not attain this ideal." (*Mind.* 1931, p. 202). Perhaps, Wisdom had in his mind the Platonic doctrine of imitation and participation when he thought that we could understand Wittgenstein better if we consider in what respect those sentences which do try to attain this ideal fall short of it, and secondly in what respect those sentences which do not try to attain this ideal differ from those which do. The theory which maintains degrees

of picturing may be valid. But, Widom is in the wrong when he tries to read such a theory in the *Tractatus*, as the notion of heirarchy is totally absent in it. A fact either is or is not a picture.

5.556 There cannot be a heirarchy of the forms of the elementary propositions.

Wisdom's error is, perhaps, due to his misunderstanding of the term 'logical picture'. Moreover, the examples which he gives to substantiate his arguments in the article from which he has been quoted, cannot be pictures as they are truth-functional sentences. Only atomic sentences can picture. The sentences which he gives as examples are not pictures—let alone the nearness or farness of them to the fact which they represent.

It is, of course, true that sentences picture facts in a quite different way from that of maps and portraits. (Portraits too picture facts in various ways. For instance, a two-dimensional portrait differs from a three-dimensional one ; and maps drawn using zenithal projective rules differ with those drawn according to cylindrical, conical and conventional projective methods. There will be variations in different types of maps drawn even according to zenithal projective rules, for example, onomonic, steriographic and orthographic. But, the difference is not an internal difference ; it is purely accidental belonging to the external features of the maps of various kinds.)

This difference has been explained by Wisdom (*Mind.* 1932) through the distinction he draws between the equitermed, equilevel and equiordinal relationships between the picturing and the pictured facts. But, an untenable distinction has been drawn by Mrs. Daitz, between language and pictures. According to her, they belong to mutually exclusive realms. Words have meaning and are used to refer to things, whereas lines and tunes are not. She classifies pictures as *icons*, that is, they are signs which have at least one of the properties for which they are signs whereas sentences are not icons. She holds that icons only show, whereas sentences state. But, Wittgenstein holds the opposite view about linguistic facts. So, if Mrs. Daitz thinks, as she appears to (*Mind.* 1953), that what she holds about sentences holds good in the case of the picture theory of meaning, as developed in the *Tractatus*, she is definitely mistaken. "The proposition", it is stated in the *Tractatus*, "shows its sense". The dichotomy, shown by Mrs. Daitz, between language and

pictures is untenable for another reason. As Storer has shown (*British Journal of Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 19, No. I) there is structural identity between pictures and sentences. For instance a picture which can be seen on a T. V. screen can be univocally translated into a sentence of ordinary language. He suggests that when such a univocal translation is possible it cannot be consistently maintained that the elements of a picture are meaningless. (A univocal translation in this case is possible because it is based on the principle that an area can be decomposed into a set of spots and that these spots can be re-arranged, that is projected into, in a simply ordered temporal sequence according to a fixed rule, that is a rule of projection.)

VIII. ELEMENTARY SENTENCES

The picture theory of meaning deals only with the structural aspect of a sentential fact. That is to say, it is intended to establish a relation between linguistic structures and the structures of the constituent facts of the world ; or to be more exact, to establish a relationship between two experienced (or experiencible) structures. Hence, as Copi points out, Mrs. Daitz's suggestion that the *Tractatus* presents a picture theory of meaning for words is misleading. She writes : "How can words have meaning? You may answer that a word is, in a way, a picture, and that its meaning is what it pictures ; and if words are put together to make a sentence, they can picture a more complex unit, a fact. Let us call this the picture theory of meaning." (*Mind*. 1953). But, nowhere does Wittgenstein suggest that the picture theory comprehends words too. Moreover, the idea that pictures are facts (or atomic facts) implies that words are not pictures (or facts) and, therefore, the picture theory cannot explain how words are meaningful. This is implicit in the *Tractatus*.

2.14 The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way.

4.02.....We see from the fact that we understand the sense of the propositional sign, without having it explained to us.

4.026 The meaning of the simple signs (the words) must be explained to us, if we are to understand them.

Sentences have both form and content. The picture theory of meaning is concerned only with their form. As to their content, Wittgenstein, under the impact of Frege and Russell, maintains the denotative theory of word-meaning.

Wittgenstein maintains that the picture theory holds in the case of elementary or atomic sentences only. The world is the totality of atomic facts and language pictures the world. So, it follows that sentences must be atomic pictures. "What the picture theory of sentence meaning is primarily intended to explain", writes Stenius, "is how (semantical) elementary sentences are understood. How often sentences are understood is explained by this theory so far as they are logically dependent on elementary sentences." (Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. p. 126).

Then, what is an elementary sentence? Various answers have been given to this question, for example, those of Ramsey, Popper, Anscombe, Stenius and Palmieri. Most of the answers at least prima facie, are confusing as well as inconsistent with the general body of the *Tractatus*. Here, an attempt will be made to clear some confusions and explain what an elementary sentence is.

According to Ramsey, an elementary sentence "is one which asserts the existence of an atomic fact, and.....a propositional token is completely analysed if there is an element in the corresponding to each occuring in its sense". ; and, further, elementary sentences "consist of names alone without logical contents..... Thus if we neglect the fact that 'Socrates' and 'wise' are incomplete symbols and regarded them as names 'Socrates is wise' is an atomic proposition but 'All men are wise', 'Socrates is not wise, are not atomic." (*Foundations of Mathematics*. p. 56). Ramsey thinks that according to Wittgenstein 'This is red' is an atomic fact. It is apparent from this, that Ramsey is of the opinion that what Wittgenstein meant by 'elementary sentence' was logically elementary sentence holding one-one relation with the fact for which it stood. This interpretation will be plausible if Wittgenstein is not a strict nominalist and is using language extentionally only, because, words, according to him, are names of individuals, and nominalists usually consider only entities as individuals and not properties. Wittgenstein's nominalism is of a different sort. So, Ramsey is either not aware of this or has ignored it. Nominalist's language contains no

names for entities other than individuals. They dispense with class names. But Wittgenstein, at least in the *Tractatus*, is thinking of language in its extentional and nominalistic use. It is obvious that an extentional language need not be necessarily nominalistic. And Wittgenstein's nominalism is peculiar in the sense that it eliminates the distinction between properties and individuals by considering both of them as *entities*. This means that Ramsey's interpretation does not make the full import of the *Tractatus* explicit.

Popper thinks (*British Philosophy in the Mid-century :* Mace (ed.) p. 163) that elementary sentences are observation-sentences or sense-datum statements. But, when Wittgenstein talks about atomic statements he is not referring to either observation or sense-datum. The *Tractatus* is free from any psychological, epistemological or phenomenalistic affiliation. If, as Popper thinks, atomic sentences are statements of observation, the minute the observation the more elementary the sentences will be. That is, if it is admitted that they are either observation or sense-datum statements, degrees of elementariness and a heirarchy of elementary statements will have to be admitted. In the *Tractatus* such an idea is not found either explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, Wittgenstein's rejection of degrees of picturing implies the rejection of degrees of elementariness. It is upto Popper either to disown his views or not to attribute them to the *Tractatus*.

5.556 There cannot be a heirarchy of form of the elementary propositions.

Anscombe's list of the essential features of elementary sentences comprises of five requirements, namely, (1) mutual independence (2) positivity, (3) being concatenations of absolutely simple signs, (4) remaining the same when negated either internally or externally, and (5) the impossibility of the existence of two ways of being true or false. It will be shown here that these features give only a partial view of the nature of elementary sentences and that some of these features are excluded from the properties of the elementary sentences in the sense in which the term 'elementary sentence' is used in the *Tractatus*.

Language being a model of reality—that is, the possible world—and as reality splits into atomic facts it follows by implication that language splits into atomic sentences which correspond to or are models or pictures of atomic facts. So, whatever

can be said about atomic facts can be said about atomic sentences also. Here, it should be recalled that the elements of every picture stand for the elements of the pictured fact ; and hence, the elements of every elementary sentence, stand for the objects which are constituents of the fact which it pictures. This means that the constituents of elementary sentences are names and names only. The elementary sentences are atomic combinations of names. Non-elementary sentences are *Truth-functions* of elementary sentences. The *Truth-operators* which form a part of the truth-functional sentences do not stand for objects ; that is, they are not names.

An elementary sentence is not a mere combination of names, but, is an articulated combination. Its articulatedness is due to the reason that it is a picture and in being so, represents the structure of the corresponding fact. Carnap thinks that a sequence consisting of predicate of degree n followed by n individual constants is an elementary sentence (*Meaning and Necessity*). So, according to him p a b is an elementary proposition, if 'a' and 'b' are taken as individual constants and 'p' as a predicate constant. But, this is, prima facie at least, misleading, for from its external appearance 'p' also seems to be a constituent entity of that elementary sentence. This, in trun, will lead to the conclusion that the constituent entities of a sentence and the constituent entities of the corresponding fact are not equinumeral. As Wittgenstein remarks.

3.41431 The existential nature of the propositional sign becomes clear when we imagine it as made up of spatial objects (such as tables. chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these signs then express the sense of the proposition.

4.5 The general form of proposition is : such and such is the case.

For instance, suppose that Smith was standing to the right of Jones. That is, one individual is to the right of the other and there are two individuals only. A sentential picture of this fact can be constructed in English language. That sentence will be 'Smith is to right of Jones'. Here 'Smith' and 'Jones' are names of the two individuals and this sentence shows the relation in which they stand to each other in physical space. So, 'is to the right of,' is used to show this relation or to represent

this relation and not to express it. It is not a name. The same fact can, as well, without being a ground of any possible misunderstanding, be represented in '(Jones) (Smith)'. [To give an illustration containing so-called predicates : (PEN) (RED)]

There is structural identity between this picture and the fact of Smith being to the right of Jones. One-one relation holds between the constituent entities of these two facts. Wittgenstein is using the term 'elementary' to refer to such sentences which are pictures. If Carnap's symbolism is used and his definition of elementary sentence is stipulated, 'Smith is to the right of Jones' will be an elementary sentence as it can be symbolised as 'R a b'.

Further, elementary sentences are understood directly and they are units of sense. Their sense is the occurence of an atomic fact in the possible world. The totality of elementary sentences determines the totality of all the possible sentences and there by language itself. As language is a picture into which reality is projected, the totality of all elementary sentences determines the world.

5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.

From an elementary sentence nothing follows. To infer one elementary sentence from another, it should be combined with a third one, and the rules of formation and transformation of such a combination should be given. Wittgenstein explicitly states that the components of elementary sentences are simple signs or names, and therefore not further analysable. There cannot be any heirarchy of elementary sentences. The truth-value of any elementary sentence depends on that sentence only and not on any other sentence. It will be true if it agrees with reality and false if it does not. Elementary sentences are not, turth-functions of any other sentences but of themselves. Thus, the following will be the truth-table of any elementary sentence, if 'E' is taken as an elementary sentential variable.

e	e.e	e v e	e ⊃ e	e ≡ e	~e
T	T	T	T	T	F
F	F	F	T	T	T

Elementary sentences are independent. It is not logically necessary for them to be constituents of particular combinations, but it is necessary for them to be constituents of any complex fact. That means,

(1) $(\exists x)\ (Ex) \neq \{(\exists x)\,[Ex.\ ((\exists y)\,(E_1y).\ (\exists f)\ f(E,\ E_1))]\ .\ Ey\ comp\ f\ (E,\ E_1)\}$

(2) $(x)\ (Ex) \equiv \{(\exists y)\ [Ey\ (Ex)\ (\exists f)\ f\ (E,\ E_1))]\ .\ E\ comp\ f\ (E,\ E_1)\}$

(Where 'E', 'E_1' are elementary sentential variables, 'f' is variable for truth operators or combinators, and 'E'_1 is complex sentential variable or variable for truth-functions. Here universal and existential quantifiers are used, instead of alethic symbols N and M because, as von Wright points out, "there are essential similarities between alethic, epistemic and deontic modalities on the one hand and quantifiers on the other hand.....though model concepts are different from truth-concepts, the two realms are not totally disconnected. If a position is true then it is possible". *An Essay in Modal Logic.* p. 2).

This view of elementary or atomic propositions differs from that of Russell. In *Principia Mathematica* he writes, "atomic and molecular propositions together are 'elementary propositions". (Introduction, xvii). What he means by an atomic proposition is a proposition whose truth or falsity can be empirically determined—for there is no other way. Molecular propositions are propositions constructed by substituting atomic propositions for p or q or both in the primitive idea (function) p/q. But such propositions are not elementary in the sense in which Wittgenstein is using the term. Russell, however, states that atomic propositions are propositions which contain neither parts nor the notions of 'all' and 'some'. But elementary propositions in the sense in which he is using the term do contain parts, so that, it is not clear how atomic propositions can be elementary propositions. Nevertheless Russell seems to have been influenced by the *Tractatus* when he admits that the acceptance of the notion of atomic proposition is rather philosophical and not logical, and that logic does not know whether there are atomic propositions, for that is an empirical issue and not logical. According to him logic "is concerned solely with the hypothesis of there being propositions of such-and-such a form."

(*ibid.* XV). He goes on to say that "In certain cases, this hypothesis is itself of the form in question, or contains a part which is of the form in question, in these cases, the fact that 'the hypothesis can be framed', proves that it is true. But even when a hypothesis occurs in logic, the fact it can be framed does not itself belong to logic." What according to Russell is philosophical is according to Wittgenstein's later opinion, the rule of language-game. What Russell is doing in *Principia Mathematica* is framing the rules of a language-game and he states a rule of this language-game as follows : "*Our system* begins with 'atomic propositions'. *We accept* these *as a datum*" (*ibid.* xv. Italics mine).

IX. POSITIVITY AND NUMERALITY OF ELEMENTARY SENTENCES

Are elementary sentences essentially positive? Every elementary sentence shows how the entities in the corresponding fact do stand. It has already been shown how the notion of negation is involved in giving a complete picture of a given world; here it can be said that negative sentences which show an atomic combination of two individuals show that those entities do not stand, in a given world, in the way in which their names do stand in that negative sentence. In other words negative elementary sentences show that the facts to which they correspond are not the cases of the actual world. For example, if (ab) shows that (AB) is a case in the actual world, (~(ba)) shows that (BA) is not a case in the actual world. But, in relation to the possible world both (ab) and (~(ab)) stand on the same footing. Hence the issue of positivity and negativity of a given elementary sentence can be raised in relation to the actual world and not in relation to the possible world. "Of negative semantical elementary sentences" Stenius remarks, "we ought to say : The sentence shows how things stand if it is false. And it says that they do not stand." (*Wittgenstein's Tractatus—a critical exposition of its main lines of thought*, p. 148).

5.5152 Must the sign of the negative proposition be constructed by the sign of the positive? Why should one not be able to express the negative proposition by means of a negative fact?

(Like : if 'a' does not stand in a certain relation to 'b' it could express that aRb is not the case). But, here also the negative proposition is indirectly constructed with the positive. The positive proposition must presuppose the existence of the negative proposition and conversely.

That the notion of negation is an intuitive and indispensable idea is evident from the above passage. Hence, it would be erroneous to categorise elementary sentences either as positive or as negative—in the usual sense of these terms. All elementary sentences are positive in the sense that they assert their content. As even a negative sentence like (∼(ba)) asserts its content ; it is elementary. Therefore Anscombe's contention that elementary sentences are essentially positive, seems to be wrong. Moreover the word 'not' in ordinary language and the sign '∼' and '—' in symbolic languages are the accidental features involved in producing the propositional signs. Besides this, the elementary sentence and its negation present the same state of affairs.

4.1 A proposition presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.

4.0621 That, however, the signs "∼P" and "p" *can* say the same thing is important, for it shows that the sign '∼' corresponds to nothing in reality.
That negation occurs in a proposition is no characteristic of its sense (∼∼p=p).

The propositions "P" and "∼p" have opposite senses, but to them correspond one and the same reality.

4.01 The proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.

4.064 Every proposition must *already* have a sense ; assertion cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is the sense itself. And the same holds of denial, etc.

This means that Wittgenstein is treating elementary sentences, having a negation sign, on par with other elementary sentences. He seems to be using a sentence and its negation as coordinate sentences, that is, having same structure and standing in representing relation with some other structure of the same form.

There is another important issue—concerning the nature of elementary sentences, namely, whether an elementary sentence in which a relation is asserted, (for example, 'a R b'), and the fact which it pictures are equitermed. Whether 'a R b' can

be considered as an elementary sentence is itself an issue. Wittgenstein nowhere gives an example of an elementary sentence. The obvious reason for this is that Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* is essentially a logician, and as such he is not concerned with providing examples or deciding whether this or that is an elementary sentence, as that would be an empirical affair.

How many entities does 'a R b' contain? If for Copi there are two, for Evans there are four. "The four elements", he writes, "into which Wittgenstein converts 'a R b' are evidently the three signs and their order. That is to say, the fact that the sign is what it is, is the fact, that it contains 'a' that it contains 'b', that it contains 'R' and that it contains them in the order 'aRb' " (*Mind.* 1955). He further, remarks that "to the individual elements of the sign correspond the elements of the fact, but it is the order of the elements of the sign that corresponds to the structure of the elements of the fact." (*ibid.* p. 260). Anscombe differs from both these when she says that it has not been explicitly stated in the *Tractatus* that the fact 'a R b' contains exactly two elements, namely, 'a' and 'b'. According to her, 'a R b' just shows that 'a' and 'b' occur in it. She supports her contention with proposition 4.211 of the *Tractatus* (*An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*).

According to the *Tractatus*, facts are combinations of objects. The *objects* of sentential facts are names. Objects combine to form an elementary fact and such a possibility is inherent in them.

In logic nothing is accidental. If a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing. An internal property of a fact we also call a feature of this fact (in the sense in which we speak of facial features). The feature of a fact is its form as distinguished from its content. The content of a fact is the totality of the entities that go into the formation of that fact. Form does not go into the formation of a combination, and hence it should not be counted as an entity of the fact. Therefore, any sign in a sentential fact showing the form of that sentence should not be counted as an entity which is a constituent of its context. 'R' is not an entity in the elementary fact 'Rab'. This goes against Evan's interpretation. Signs such as 'R' are due to the particular way in which the given fact is projected into this sentential

fact and its presence in it is purely accidental, and hence can be eliminated by using another and perhaps a better way of projection. The symbolism which, perhaps, Wittgenstein had in his mind, when he said that an elementary fact and the corresponding fact are equinumeral, is a symbolism, in which there are no relational signs. From the point of view of such symbolic structure or language 'Rab' is not an elementary sentence. Evans and Stenius have ignored this point and Stenius erroneously remarks that "elementary sentences may symbolically be written in the form Fx or ϕ(xy) or xRy etc. (cf. 4.24 and 3.1432) when Wittgenstein says that sentences of this form consist of names he obviously means not only that letters like 'x' or 'y' are names of individual objects, but also that letters 'f', 'ϕ' or 'R' are names of predicates." (*Wittgenstein's Tractatus—a critical exposition of its main lines of thought*, p. 126).

Wittgenstein seems to be quite aware of the fact that his notion of elementary sentence is prone to be misunderstood (See *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Part IV. p. 48). The misunderstanding in this case is due to confusing particular symbolic structures with the logical structure of facts. What Wittgenstein means by 'elementary sentence' is logically elementary sentence, in which there is nothing besides the names of the entities which constitute the fact which it represents. As Copi remarks, "Once it is understood that the picturing relation is not the same as the relation pictured, it is easy to see how the picture theory of meaning can apply to relational propositions in general. Any relation of objects spatial or non-spatial, can be represented by a spatial relation of the names of objects. That 'a' has a relation to 'b' can be represented by writing 'a' at some specified distance and direction from 'b' and that 'a' has some different relation to 'R' can be represented by writing 'a' at some different distance and direction from 'b'" (*Mind.* 1958. p. 58). This is, perhaps, what Wittgenstein means in 3.1431 of the *Tractatus*.

X. ARE PERSUASIVE SENTENCES PICTURES

Do elementary sentences which are not descriptive in the sense of the term in which it is used by most of the analysts picture facts? It can, however, be pointed out that such sentences are

not elementary sentences and therefore, do not picture. But, this is not as valid as it seems to be. In fact, according to Wittgenstein elementary sentences are not necessarily descriptive in character as they are neither observation statements nor sense-datum statements. Any sentence is elementary if it is logically indivisible. Like atoms, elementary sentences are non-phenomenological (Hence, it can be said that Wittgensteinian atomism corresponds to that of Democritus). But, there is an element of aboutness in them. According to Wittgenstein there is no categorical difference between elementary sentences and statement sentences, "It is easy", he writes in *Remarks*, "to think of a language in which there is not a form for questions or commands, but question and command are expressed in the form of statements.....The great majority of sentences that we speak, write and read are statement sentences. And you say—these sentences are true or false. Or, as I might say, the game of of truth-functions is played with them." (Part, I.I).

Now, imagine of a language in which the simple signs name objects occupying various points and events of the physical world. Then does not the spatial sequence or the sentence "He is going" picture a state of affairs or does not this sentence represent the fact of that individual's being at differenet points at different moments of time? Is not this sentence picturing the motion of that body? It, of course, represents and hence is a picture, though prima facie, it does not look so. The reason for this is that ordinary language is often ambiguous and scientifically inept. Wittgenstein remarks on the nature of ordinary languages thus :

4.002 From it, it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the Logic of language. Language distinguishes the thought. So that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe ; because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognised. The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated.

This complicatedness is due to the accidental features that have gone in the way of projecting reality into linguistic facts. The perceptible signs, for example "He," "is" and "going" are used as a projection of the possible state of affairs, namely that

the person to whom the personal pronoun "He" refers is at point P at time t, at point P_1 at time t_1, at point p_2 at time t_2 and so on. A sentential sign is a sign in which we express our thoughts. What then is the thought content of the sentential sign 'He is going'? It is : that man is point P at time t and so on. It may be a bit difficult to establish the correlation here. It may be a complicated affair to trace the rules of projection in this case. But, it is not *logically impossible*. Hence, it is a picture.

The same is the case with persuasive propositions. Suppose that a teacher asks a boy to go out, that is, uses the sentence 'go out', and the boy obeys, that is, goes out. Then, does this spatial sequence, and hence the fact, 'go out' picture the fact of the boy's going out? It is a picture by virtue of being a fact in projective relation to a possible state of affairs. G. E. Moore, in the notes which he took when he attended Wittgenstein's lectures at Cambridge in 1940, points out that Wittgenstein admitted that such sentences are not pictures *in any ordinary sense* (and that he is not using the picture notion in the ordinary sense of the term is clearly evident in the *Tractatus*), but "went on to say that it is as much a picture of the boy's action as '2+3' is of '5' and '2+3' is really a picture of '5' with reference to a particular system of projection and that this system is in no way inferior to the system in which II+III is projected into IIIII ; only that the projection is rather queer". (Perhaps, Wittgenstein, here, is referring to the non-canonical arithmetical systems and thereby hinting at how the Cartesian conception of infallibility collapses. Infallibility being the foundation of Kantian intuition which makes synthetic apriori judgments possible, the Kantian view of apriori form of knowledge too collapses. This seems to be the reason for Wittgenstein's saying that "there is no order of things apriori" (*Tractatus* 5.634). After all, the selection of the rules of projection is arbitrary. Like alternative systems of logic having different logical primitives, alternative systems of projection are equally valid. To say, this is not to reject the picture theory (see Sections IV and V). It is true that the Wittgenstein in the second phase of his thought maintains that the views maintained in the *Tractatus* are not absolutely true. But this remark is not, perhaps, concerned with the major tenets of the picture theory. Neither in the *Blue and Brown*

Books nor in the *Investigations* does he say that it is wrong to think that a sentence shows, by sharing it, the logical structure of the possible state of affairs. In the *Remarks* the picture theory is not only maintained, but further elaborated and applied to the notion of proof as used in mathematics (see part I, 25, 26, 31, 41, 125, 129 and 158, part II, 9, 22, 28, and 63, part III, 2, 12, 21, 48 and 49, Part V, 6, 15, and 51). It might, however, be argued that parts I and II of the *Remarks* belong to the transitory period of Wittgenstein's thought and to a large extent are more related to the *Tractatus* than to the *Investigations*, and hence the impact of the picture theory can be found in them. But, what about the fifty first section of the fifth part of the *Remarks* which maintains the picture theory, though it was written sometime between 1941 and 1944? He shows there that proof is a picture.

XI. SCHEMATIC PICTURES

The notion of the *schematic picture* of the *Remarks* is a modification of the notion of the picture theory of the *Tractatus*. Pole thinks that Wittgenstein is not using 'picture' in the *Remarks* in the sense in which he uses it in the *Tractatus*. This is true. But he is mistaken when he says that "in the *Tractatus* propositions are said to be pictures of facts : thus the statement 'St. Peter's is a cruciform church' would stand in much the same relation to St. Peter's itself as the ground plan of the building. It is not in this sense that a mathematical proof is called a picture ; a proof is sort of replica of an independently existing state of affairs rather it is a pardigm or a model." (*Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. p. 40). But, what is it a model of? a paradigm to? Pole still has to answer these questions. Obviously, they are models or paradigms to sequences in the logical space. Moreover 'picture' in the *Tractatus* is used in the sense that it is picture of a possible sequence of the logical space, and it is to the totality of such sequences language stands in projective relation. In the *Remarks* Wittgenstein tries to apply the picture theory of meaning to sentences which are about even changing combinations. There he maintains the fundamental features of this theory, namely, structural identity, projective relation,

co-ordination etc. and discards the notion of one-one relation. In part I-30 he shows how a schematic picture of proving the equinumerality of two sets can be constructed. In part V-51 he shows how propositions of Kinematics correspond to a picture of mechanism. "Thus", he writes, "it is in a certain respect a picture of that movement.....with this is connected the fact that we can say that proof must show the existence of an internal relation, for the internal relation is the operation producing one structure from another, seen as equivalent to picture of the transition itself—so that now the transition according to this series of configurations is *eo ipso* a transition according to those rules of operating".

This means that Wittgenstein is not discarding the picture theory in toto. But, he becomes aware of its limitation, namely that it cannot give an explanation as to the function of language as a medium of communication. That is why he relates it to the usage theory. This is one of the main themes of the *Remarks* (see part 1, 2, 13, 14, 129 and 152. Appendix part I, 2. Part II, 26, 28, 70 and 80 part III, 2 and 3, Part IV, 25, part V, 7). As Moore observes, Wittgenstein seems to have conceived this even before his *Remarks*. According to Moore, Wittgenstein, in course of his lectures, remarked ; "There is no use in correlating noise in a particular way again—unless the correlation has consequences" (*Philosophical Papers*, p. 129.).

Language being a picture of reality, and as we cannot escape from the linguistic medium of thinking, picture "forces itself on us". This may also be due to the reason that we ourselves make pictures of facts and as a social group commit ourselves to use them. How can we know that a given linguistic fact is a picture of some non-linguistic fact? It can be known as we use it as a picture of a certain fact. We use a sentence 'as we find it acceptable to indicate our rough knowledge' of the fact pictured by it. We *accept* it as a picture. A sentence does not become a picture if it is not used 'precisely for that purpose'. That means, pictures "are linked with a constantly practiced use." *The way we always use it* and *the way we are taught to use it* are closely related to a *picture*. Hence, Wittgenstein, reflects on the foundations of the picture theory and links it up with *usage*. This point has been more or less ignored by almost all the interpreters of the *Tractatus* as well as the *Investigations*.

XII. CONCLUSION

Thus the main thesis of the *Tractatus*, namely, that linguistic facts are structurally identical with non-linguistic facts and that language stands in a projective relation to the world, remains uncontradicted by the later thought of Wittgenstein.

The structure of language shows the structure of the world.

SECTION 2

I. DENOTATIVE THEORY

In the previous section it has been suggested that Wittgenstein maintains in the *Tractatus* the denotative theory of word-meaning. This will be devoted to explain this. Strangely enough, this aspect of his thought was attacked by his followers as well as those who disagree with him, like Ryle. It is erroneously reasoned that this theory has been refuted and disowned by Wittgenstein himself in the *Investigations*. It will be shown that such a view is due to a misunderstanding of his approach to the problem. He retains the essential feature of this theory, namely, that there is an element of *aboutness* in linguistic entities. In his later work, he does not say that this theory is false. He just holds that it is not all comprehending, that it cannot be applied to explain the meaning of each and all words. (*Investigations*, Part I. p. 41). He, therefore, cautiously advises the readers of the *Investigations* that the notion of meaning-as-use "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of (his) old ways thinking" (*Investigations*. Preface).

II. NAMES AND OBJECTS

Linguistic facts are combinations of entities which stand for objects. They are names of, or stand for, the objects. Language is about the various relationships that hold between the objects. But, it cannot show or assert or exhibit the objects themselves. A sentence shows how a thing is and not *what*. It is words, as they are used as marks of symbols or names, that give the clue to the knowledge of *what* they are. Names refer to or deputize the objects of which they are names in a sentence. Names *qua* names have no sense. But they will have sense in a sentence, that is, when they occur in a combination or by being constituents of a sentential fact. Names cannot be understood at the first

sight, as sentences can be. An explanation is necessary to understand the meaning of names. This is, roughly, what Wittgenstein maintains regarding the constituents of linguistic facts, and this can be called his denotative theory of words.

III. OBJECTS

Frege, by distinguishing *sense* from what he called *reference*, long ago paved the way for Wittgenstein's theory. The distinction which Frege formulates may be said to have been implicitly recognised by Wittgenstein. But, he differs with Frege (and Russell too) in holding that logical proper names and singular descriptions are not distinct as their meaningfulness is constituted in the same thing, namely in their reference. According to him they are *senseless* (in the Fregean sense), but are meaningful, as they have reference. Frege's paper was aimed at finding out a solution of what Carnap calls the antinomy of naming relation or the puzzle involved in the identity and interchangeability of linguistic expressions. But it makes the antinomy more complicated. (*Meaning and Necessity*, p. 139). Perhaps, Wittgenstein is aware of this when he writes :

3.25 In order to avoid these errors we must employ a symbolism which excludes these, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by not employing the same way which signify in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar—of logical syntax (logical symbolism of Frege and Russell in such a language, which however does still not exclude all errors).

Whatever differences there may be between Frege and Russell, they agree on one point, namely, that if a word having no reference enters into a combination, then it is vacuous. An expression will be considered vacuous if and only if it fails to fulfil the function for which it is used. Such expressions are unnecessary as they have no function in the linguistic system in which they occur. They can be eliminated. Wittgenstein goes a step farther and declares,

3.328 If a sign is not necessary then it is meaningless.

Names are meaningful and their meaning is in their denotation. But they do not connote. So, it is obvious that Wittgenstein is equating language with extentional language. According to Frege a well-constructed language has the same extention and intention, though in some contexts it will have ordinary reference and ordinary sense and in other contexts oblique reference and oblique sense. Under the impact of Frege, Wittgenstein states that sentences alone have sense, and names which are merely its constituents have only reference. This is, no doubt, a corollary drawn from his ontological theory. These views on names correspond to his views on objects.

IV. WHAT ARE OBJECTS?

So what are objects? Objects are intrinsically capable of being components of atomic facts. It is logically impossible to think of any object apart from its possible occurrence in an atomic fact. Objects are spatio-temporal, not in the sense of physical space or empirical time, but in the sense of logical or possible spatio-temporal structure.

2.0131 A spatial object must lie in infinite space. (A point in space is an argument place).

A speck in a visual field need not be red, but must have a colour, it has, so to speak, a coloured space round it. A tone must have *a* hardness etc.

They are, in the Wittgensteinian sense, non-phenomenological. So they form the substance of reality. Then it can be asked : How can the change which we find in the experiential world can be explained? Wittgenstein's answer seems to be that change is not due to any change in the objects, but due to change in their configurations. Objects form the substance of the world. Substance, he assumes, is eternal in the sense changeless. If there is no substance how can language have any aboutness? If it cannot be linked with the real, the meaning of a linguistic entity becomes either intrinsic or relational. But meaning is extrinsic. Hence there must be substance.

2.0211 If there is no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

Such a coherence theory of meaning and truth has been disproved by the fact that atomic facts and elementary sentences are independent.

It will not be erroneous to maintain that Wittgenstein's assumption about substance corresponds to the basic principles of various speculative schools of thought which have been postulated. That the human mind has a natural disposition towards such assumptions has been shown by Kant. (cf. Beth : *Foundations of Mathematics*. chapter I). Whether Wittgenstein has been influenced by Kant in this connection is yet to be determined.

Objects and properties enter into the world as constituents. But are they distinct? Wittgenstein thinks that they are of the same category. In this aspect he differs with Russell. Objects as well properties enter into facts as they are capable of being so. The ghost of Plato still haunts Wittgenstein's nominalism. Nominalists, usually, distinguish objects and properties by bestowing on objects existence and denying it properties, whereas Wittgenstein does not segregate properties from objects. Further,

2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit. If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility already lie in them. (A logical entity cannot be merely possible, logic treats every possibility, all possibilities are facts.) Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connection with other things. If I can think of an object in context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context.

Like Kant, Wittgenstein holds that experience or empirical perception of objects involves the notions of space and time which form the background of all objects. The world being the totality of spatio-temporal configurations, there cannot be anything existent outside this totality. So it is necessary for objects to be components of one or many of these configurations. Objects have extention and hence they cannot be thought of without referring to their spatio-temporal background. To think of a point-event in spatio-temporal structure is to think of it in relation to other point-events, that is, in relation to or in the background of the configuration in which this point-event

is a constituent entity. Space and time are forms of objects. According to Wittgenstein to think otherwise is logically impossible whereas Kant seems to hold that it is impossible due to the fact that the thinking faculty of man is constituted like that. But Wittgenstein's view differs with the Kantian approach. Kant maintains that intuition which gives the principles of apriori knowledge, is not only a mode of knowing the first principles of knowledge but also the possibility of all experience.

2.0251 Time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.

This does not mean that Wittgenstein is making a distinction between objects and properties. Russell does make such a distinction only on the epistemological level. Wittgenstein must have thought that if logical and ontological distinctions could not be drawn between them, an epistemological distinction too could not be drawn.

2.0231. The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by propositions—first formed by configuration of the objects.

This shows that Wittgenstein's atomism is Democritian and that his linguistic atomism is a consequence of it. And as such it differs from Russell's logical atomism. Russell, in his *logical atomism* (*Logic and Knowledge*) does not seem to be aware of this. Wittgenstein's nominalism is deduced from his atomism. Objects enter into combinations and hence from the substance of the world. Therefore they determine the form and the content of the world.

Objects are distinguishable, in the sense that in any fact the constituents can be enumerated and deciphered. They are independent because for any given object it is not logically necessary to be constituent of some fact. If all the objects are given, then all the atomic facts are given and thereby the world itself.

2.0132. If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts.....A new possibility cannot subsequently be found.

Objects are simple. Wittgenstein, perhaps, means by 'simple' logically simple. From the very spirit of the '*Tractatus*' it is apparent that he is not using the term in the phenomenological sense, as Russell seems to. Russell admits that simple objects are those which are referred to or designated in language by

demonstrative pronouns which alone, according to him, are logical proper names. He also admits that the demonstrative pronouns, 'this' and 'that,' are used with reference to sense-data. That means, simplicity according to Russell is phenomenological or epistemological simplicity. But, Wittgenstein maintains that the simplicity of objects is not either in their non-perceptibility or perceptibility as single units. It is due to their individuality. A simple object, in this sense, need not necessarily be imperceptible but it cannot be analysed into parts. As he is defining the term 'simple' and not giving an explanation by ostensive methods, Wittgenstein does not state that such and such or of that sort is a simple object. The inadequacy of any ostensive definition of 'simple object' is admitted in the *Investigations*. Believing in the Socratic assertion that there cannot be any definition of the 'simple object' Wittgenstein points out that it makes no sense at all to speak of absolutely simple object of which the world is constituted. Being a logical entity, 'simple object' and its nature is intuitively grasped and cannot be ratiocinatively explained. But to admit the inability to give an exhaustive definition of 'simple object' is not to discard the notion of simplicity, as the inability is logical and not psychological. Moreover, it shows the limitations of language in which any definition has to be formulated.

Now it should be obvious that Wittgenstein uses the term 'objects' in a technical sense. He does not use it confining its sense to tables and chairs only, though it comprehends all these things. Objects are logical entities and atomic facts are logically possible combinations of these entities. If there are two objects then there is at least one atomic fact because objects cannot be conceived of apart from the possible combination in which they can occur. This occuring-in-an-atomic fact is an internal property (logical property) of objects. Objects like things-in-themselves are logical. The distinction between atomic facts and objects corresponds to the distinction between the things-as-they appear and the things-in-themselves. The latter form the substance of the world. But that they are so can only be known through things-as-they appear. Similarly objects form the substance of the world. But we can know objects only through facts in which they occur. The place of objects in the conceptual framework of the *Tractatus* is analogous to the place

of things-in-themselves in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Objects being logical entities they can have only logical properties. It is in this sense they have qualities, they do not possess any phenomenological properties. Not even temporal predicates can be predicated to them. The expression 'Objects exist' is not a sentential fact as first 'object' is not a proper concept and secondly 'exist' is not a name. 'Object' is a formal concept and "the question about the existence of a formal concept is senseless" (4.1274)

In ordinary language simple names are used to designate simple objects. That means, simple names as they occur in ordinary language are not names of absolutely simple objects having an unique designation, but only relative designation. In ordinary language, whenever a name is used to designate an object and whether that name is designating a simple object or a complex object depends upon the context or the way in which it is used. So, as far as ordinary language is concerned simplicity is related to use. Objects have not "got a name except in the language-game. This is what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning only as a part of a sentence" (*Investigations*, Part I. pp. 49). This point will be taken up again in the next section. If words are used as names or to designate objects what are the objects of which the words like 'Unicorn,' 'Pegasus' are names? Or can their supposed designata be objects? Wittgenstein's answer seems to be positive. There is no inconsistency in thinking of a possible combination of entities of which the unicorn is one. It is not logically impossible. (This is implicit in the *Invastigations*, Part I. p. 183. vide the last part of this Section). Moreover, as Prior points out "where X stands for a proper name, it seems to me that the form 'X exists' must logically be equivalent to and definable as 'there is a fact about X' $\Sigma\phi X$." (*Time and Modality*, p. 31). And if an object "although it does not exist can already be talked about, or can be a value for our bound variables, presumably it is in this position at all times—it is at all times an object, even if it is not at all times an existent object" (*ibid*, p. 30). Unicorns may be non-existent now, but, their future existence is not inconceivable. Wittgenstein seems to consider every X as an object if there can be no logical impossibility in thinking of a possible combination in which X will be a component. Thus chairs, tables and

unicorns are all objects. Copi seems to be not aware of this when he interprets 3.203 of the *Tractatus* as an assertion that there must be an object which is existent, to which its name refers for the name to be meaningful. Obviously that a name does not denote does not imply that it cannot denote.

V. NAMES

What are names? Names are just like labels. They differentiate the entities of which they are names from others. Then it might be argued that names do not say anything about their nominata. This is true. But this does not disprove the basic tenet of the *Tractatus* that there is an element of aboutness which is dependent upon the relationship that is held between names and their nominata. Bergmann seems to hold that if names are just labels, there cannot be any aboutness in them as they will not say anything about their nominata ; and as he himself remarks, Wittgenstein's distinction between *saying* and *showing* is consistent with his notion of naming. Names just *show* what they are. As names uniquely designate objects, the class of names and the class of objects are equipollent and equinumeral. Names are simple and independent as objects are. Names cannot be understood without any explanation. Given any name one cannot know that name designates a certain nominata unless one is told that name is used to name that nominata, in a certain language. In other words correlating a word with the object of which it is a name is the precondition for its being understood. To establish correlation is to trace the rules of its use, that is, the way in which it is used in the language in which it occurs.

3.326. In order to recognise the symbol in the sign we must consider the significant use.

VI. REFERENCE AND MEANING

3.203. A name means an object. The object is its meaning. Here what Wittgenstein means by 'meaning' is 'reference.' If it is taken in the literal sense the proposition above will amount

to asserting that meaning is an *entity*. This is what Wittgenstein tries to refute. That Wittgenstein is using the terms 'meaning' and 'reference' as synonymous terms is clearly evident from,

6.232. Frege says that these expressions have same meaning but different senses.

Frege distinguishes between *reference* and *sense* and uses *reference* both for the process of reference and the referent. Wittgenstein, too, uses the term 'meaning' in these two senses. A comparative study of the propositions 6.2322, 6.232 and 3.203 reveals this. Wittgenstein in 6.2322 is talking about the referents or the nominata of names and not their meaning in the usual sense of the term. It should be read as : the identity of the referent of two expressions cannot be asserted. For in order to be able to assert anything about their referent, I must know their referent, and if I know their referent, I know whether their referent is the same or different. Then 3.203 should be reformulated as : a name refers to the object and the object is its referent.

Stenius, however, differs with this view and holds that 3.203 says that "a name means its denominatum and that the *denominatum is its meaning*" (*Wittgenstein's Tractatus—a critical exposition of its main lines of thought*. p. 121). According to him if the term 'bedeutet' used by Wittgenstein means in English 'mean' then the import of the sentence will be lost. So, its import is that "there are many different kinds of symbols and many different ways in which they can have meaning." But his objections are untenable as the notion that meaning *is* an entity is not found anywhere in the *Tractatus*. On the other hand there are some passages (for example, the propositions referred to in the previous paragaph) which refute such a notion. Moreover, it cannot be maintained that Wittgenstein was aware of the notion of multiplicity of meaning in the *Tractatus* period, for in that period he was under the illusion that all language was extentional-nominalistic.

Names are meaningful by virtue of their denoting capacity. A word becomes meaningful if it refers to some entity other than itself. To what a given word refers will have to be known before the meaning of that word is grasped. Thus *naming* and *knowing* are related together ; and it is with a reflection on this relation that the *Investigations* begins.

VII. TRANSITION

There are some very important reasons which seem to have led Wittgenstein to the conclusion that this theory is inadequate to explain how words are meaningful. The causes for this inadequacy, of course, can be traced back to earlier thought. For instance, it can be traced to Meinongian platonism and Russell's trenchant attack on it. The difficulties which the Meinongian postulation of entities, in order to lay a firm foundation for the denotative theory, and the paradoxes and contradictions which can be derived in the calculus of classes on the basis of Meinongian contentions, led Russell to propound his theory of descriptions. The basic aim of the theory of descriptions is to eliminate all proper names which look like denoting phrases, as they are irregularities of ordinary language. But, its weakness lies in the fact that it gives a special status to some proper names, which Russell calls logical proper names, and which name the sense qualities known by acquaintance. It can, however, be legitimately maintained that no categorical distinction can be drawn between *names* and *descriptions*, as there is no categorical difference between the elements of *aboutness* implicit in *names* and *descriptions*. For example, 'Daya' is the name of an individual and let 'the man with a beard' be a description of that individual. 'The man with a beard' differs from 'Daya' in the sense that the former identifies that particular individual completely even to those who have no previous acquintance with him. 'Daya' is a name of this particular only by agreement or usage ; and if a newcomer is unaware of the agreement or usage of this name he would have no way of identifying the person from the name 'Daya'. But is not the description here used *as* a name? It is only for convenience that the word 'description' is used to indicate a name which by its own structure unequivocally identifies the object of which it is the name. So it is almost impossible to imagine that logical proper names in the sense in which Russell uses the term, that is demonstrative pronouns like 'this' and 'that', are exceptions. They function as logical proper names when they are used in particular situations or contexts. In this sense they are denoting expressions and not connoting expressions. Our concern is not with the merits and demerits of Russell's theory, but only with its influence on Wittgenstein's thought.

Russell's arguments, no doubt, are confined to what are called denoting phrases. But, some general conclusions can be drawn from this specific discussion. He does not question the basic tenet of the denotative theory. His objections are confined only to a certain type of symbols, which appear to denote something but actually do not. These, he calls 'incomplete symbols.' These expressions are not meaningful in themselves but become meaningful as component parts of sentences which are meaningful, that is, due to the context in which they occur. This occuring-in-a-context in its turn is related to the whole structure of the language in which they occur even though this inference is not quite recognised by Russell. This implies that, meaning of any expression depends upon the system of language as a whole in which that expression is permitted to occur in certain contexts and prohibited from occuring in certain other contexts. That means, meaning is related to the rules of the language-game or use.

From the arguments of Frege and Russell it is clear that the meaning of names does not consist in their denotation only. This can be seen by a consideration of names which have the same denotation though their meanings are different (Frege : *Sense and Nominatum*, included in Feigl (ed) : *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 85-102). Besides its denotation, a name has another kind of meaning and this is what is grasped when that name is understood.

Russell's views about formalised languages, in which confusions, ambiguities and paradoxes are completely eliminated, are sound and consistent. But, they cannot be applied to ordinary language. He, himself, admits that any formally constructed language cannot be tendered as a medium of communication in daily life (*Principia Mathematica* : Introduction). Wittgenstein takes up this issue in the *Investigations*. This does not mean that Russell's views are wrong and Wittgenstein's right. They are giving different proposals. So there is no theoretical issue of rightness and wrongness between various proposals, but, only a practical issue of convenience and adequacy of these proposals to solve the riddles of language and especially of ordinary language used as a medium of communication.

The difficulties involved in the denotative theory are now clear. As Ryle remarks "the equation of 'words' and 'descrip-

tive phrases' with names is from the outset a monstrous howler. .....It was a fetter round the ankles of Meinong, from which he never freed himself. It was fetter round the ankles of Frege, Moore and Russell who sooner or later saw without big emendations, the assumption led to total impasse. It was, as he himself says in his new book (the *Investigations*) a fetter round the ankles of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* though in that same book he had found not only the need but the way to cut himself praticularly loose from it." Mace (ed) : *British Philosophy in the Mid Century*. p. 243).

Wittgenstein's attack on Meinong's postulation is an application of Occam's razor. Does the postulation of some sort of mysterious entities in any way help us in understanding the constituents of the world of experience? The postulated entities do not have any function in our attempt to understand the nature of the experiential world. Hence postulation is useless and unnecessary. So, any linguistic entity which is supposed to correspond to or denote one such postulated entity will be meaningless and as it is useless it can be eliminated. Obviously such a postulation is the inevitable destiny to which dogmatic nominalism leads. Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* is a nominalist no doubt. But he started drifting from dogmatic nominalism. In the *Investigations* he points out how "nominalists make the mistake of interpreting *all* words as names." (Part I.).

According to the *Tractatus*, any word that cannot denote is meaningless. Wittgenstein in the spirit of a strict nominalist tries to bracket names and the knowledge of the world.

5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.

Perhaps what he meant by this, and at least it can be interpreted like that keeping his mominalism in mind, is that one cannot think of any entity the name of which does not occur in his language and that there is a name in his language implies that there is an entity either in this world or in the possible world and which is its nominatum. But, as he maintains that, "What is thinkable is possible," (3.6). This leads to another issue. Here it is not clear in what sense he is using the term 'possible' that is, whether he is using it to mean 'logically possible' or 'psychologically possible." It might be argued that he meant by it both. In the latter sense 3.6 will be a tautology as it will amount to this what is thinkable is psychologically possible to think. But

this is not plausible as in the *Investigations* he writes : "Here is a possibility. I hear that some one is painting a picture 'Bethoven writing the ninth symphony.' I *could* easily *imagine* the kind of thing such a picture would show us. But suppose some one wanted to represent that Goethe would have looked like writing the ninth symphony? Here *I could imagine nothing.*" (part II. p.183. Italics mine). Wittgenstein is using the term 'imagine' in the Humean-Kantian sense. In other words for Wittgenstein, just as for Hume and Kant (Pap : *Semantics and Necessary Truth*, pp. 69-80), 'imaginable' and 'logically possible' are synonymous terms.

Not only is everything that is logically possible imaginable, but everything that is imaginable is namable. And if it is logically possible to give a name to an imaginable entity then that name is meaningful, for example 'unicorn'. But expressions like 'round square' are meaningless as they are unimaginable, and unimaginable because they are logically impossible. In the later period of his thought Wittgenstein says that it is logically impossible because the rules of language, that is the logic of language do not permit such expressions to be used in sentential facts. The rules of language fix the use of the word 'round' and the word 'square' in such a way that a combination of these two words is prohibited from being used in meaningful language or meaningfully.

Russell does not make any distinction between the unimaginable and the imaginable. He does not differentiate the so-called names of the unimaginable ('round square') from names of the imaginable ('unicorn'). According to him both the expressions are meaningless as any sentence in which these expressions are constituents, if fully expressed does not contain them, that is, they can be eliminated. He explicates the sentence 'the round square is round' as 'there is one and only one entity x which is round and square and that entity is round'. He shows that this sentence is false, whereas Meinong considers it to be true. That means the difference between Russell and Meinong is about the truth-value of the sentence and not about its meaning. But the truth-value of a sentence depends upon its meaningfulness. Unless a sentence is meaningful it cannot be either true or false. The The truth-value of a sentence can be determined only after being sure that it is meaningful. Hume too, as Pap shows, seems to be

similarly confused (*Semantics and Necessary Truth.* p. 81). Moreover, only a meaningful sentence can be understood.

Now to say that the sentence 'the round square is round' is false is to admit that the sentence has been understood. It further implies that the sentence is meaningful. But, according to Russell, it contains a meaningless expression, namely 'round square'. That this expression does not denote or there is no denotation corresponding to it, is admitted by him. Then, how does that expression, though devoid of any denotation, *get* meaning in the complex structure in which it is a component? This can be called the antinomy of meaning. Russell's answer is that it gets its meaning by playing a certain role or discharging a function in that complex structure. Its function, as he says, is to *say something.* Thus, Russell seems to admit that meaning, at least in some cases, is not *denoting* but *saying.* To ask what the expression 'round square' means, is to ask what role it plays in the sentences in which it occurs or to ask how the expression is *used.* This is the import of Wittgenstein's oft quoted dictum 'don't ask for meaning ask for the use'. Thus, a gradual development in his thought can be seen. "In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein still had one foot in denotationist camp, but his other foot was already free. He saw.....that all the words and phrases that can enter into sentences are governed by the rules of what he called 'logical syntax' or 'logical grammar." These rules are what are broken by such concatenations of words and phrases as a result is nonsense.....when he said 'Don't ask for the meaning ask for the use' he was imparting a lesson which he said to teach to himself after he had finished with the *Tractatus.*" (Ryle *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, Mace (ed). pp. 254-55). Whether Ryle's statement is totally valid will be seen in the next section.

Wittgenstein might have been led to the conclusion that meaning is usage by a consideration of the antinomy of meaning. For example, even though the expression 'round square' is meaningless the sentence 'the round square is round' is understood. What is understood from the very first sight of this perceptible propositional sign is not that the round square is round or as Russell puts it, that 'there is an entity x and x is round and square and that entity is round', but that "the sentence 'the round square is round' is meaningless." This amounts to saying that

this sentence is not a meaningful sentence as the expression 'round square' violates the rules of the English language or as it is not in accordance with the accepted *usage*. So in understanding we are reflecting on *usage*.

Besides this, the development of three-valued logic has shown that the contradictions that have been derived in the calculus of classes, namely the Russell paradox can be eliminated by constructing a three-valued calculus. As early as 1939 an attempt in this direction was made by a Russian logician Bocvar (*Journal of Symbolic Logic*. Vol. 4, 1939. pp. 98-99 and Vol. 5. 1940. p. 119). This made it evident that paradoxes are relevant to particular systems ; and, therefore, dependent on the *acceptance* or the *non-acceptance* of a given system.

SECTION 3

I. USAGE THEORY

"For a large class of cases—though not for all" writes Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* "in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus : the meaning of a word is the use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." (Part I, 1.43).

This, in a nutshell, is the usage theory; and its roots, together with the notion of language-game, are implicitly found in the *Tractatus*.

3.326. In order to recognise the symbol in the sign we must consider the *significant use*.

6.211. In philosophy the question 'why do we really use that word, that proposition?' constantly leads to valuable results.

5.4733 'Socrates is identical' says nothing because we have not given any meaning to the word 'identical' as adjective. For when it occurs as the sign of equality it symbolises in an entirely different way, the symbolising relation is another—therefore the symbol in two cases entirely different ; the two symbols have the same sign in common with one another only by accident.

That is why, Wittgenstein wants that the usage-theory should be understood in relation to or in the background of the *Tractatus*. The *Investigations* begins with a summing up of his old thoughts which correspond to those of Augustine. Quoting Augustine from his *Confessions*, Wittgenstein presents his thoughts "It is this : the individual words in language have objects—sentences are combinations of such names—in this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea : Every word has a meaning. This meaning is corrected with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."

Wittgenstein states that it is *we* who make propositional signs. We make them for a definite purpose, that is, we *use*

them to perform a certain function. Thus he is relating the picture notion to usage. This is explicit in the *Investigations*. "Imagine a picture", he writes, "representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself ; or how he should not hold himself, or how a particular man stands in such-and-such a place and so on." (Foot note on p. 11, also see *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. part III. I). In the *Tractatus* it is maintained that such a picture is used to tell 'how a particular man did stand in such-and-such a place.' There one of the many functions that this picture can discharge is considered. Wittgenstein was unaware of them when he wrote the *Tractatus*. This picture can meaningfully be used in any one of these possible ways. The same thing is true in the case of linguistic facts. Hence it can be said that in the *Investigations* language is looked at in a wider perspective. In the '*Investigations* the validity of the picture theory is not questioned. What is maintained in the *Tractatus* is true as far as that particular use or function of the picture is concerned. But representing facts, according to later Wittgenstein, is not *the only* function of language. It is one of its functions. According to the *Tractatus*, the form of a language depends upon the mode of projection with which reality is projected into that language. In *Some Remarks on Logical Form* it is maintained that innumerable modes of projection are possible. Hence there can be innumerable forms of language representing the form of reality or standing in a projective relation to it. What is maintained in the *Investigations* is a logical corollary to this. If the form of reality can be projected into language in many ways, it is not absolutely necessary to follow a particular way, for any other way can be followed. The selection of a mode of projection is arbitrary. The selection is a game. So, it follows, that there can be many language-games. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein shows how the idea that there is a *necessary form* of language leads to many philosophical perplexities. He aims at a dissolution of this idea of language, which "holds us captive." The method which he follows to show this is that of *observation* of, rather than reflection on, language-forms. He looks at, and not thinks of, language-forms as used as instruments or tools to function variously and to meet various needs.

II. 'USE'

Wittgensteinian notion of 'usage' and 'use' should not be confused with 'ordinary usage' and 'ordinary use.' A confusion between these two has led to some devastating results in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy. The so-called philosophy of ordinary language, as Russell calls it, is a "philosophy without tears." But to brand Wittgenstein's work, as such a philosophy is unjustifiable. It is strange how a thinker of Russell's stature could commit such a blunder. (Vide, *My Philosophical Development.*) Russell's failure to find any wisdom in Wittgenstein's later thought is due to his prejudice and impertinence, rather than due, as he tries to show, to the reason that it is an outcome of Wittgenstein's feeble mind which lost its ability to think. Russell, erroneously, goes to the extent of saying that it is 'trivial'. Russell misunderstands Wittgenstein on another point also. Surprisingly he attacks him for not saying things which Wittgenstein says clearly. That language has relation to something other than itself has been maintained by Wittgenstein throughout—from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations.* He also admits that language itself is physical and therefore a part of reality. If in the *Tractatus* he talks about the syntactical and semantical structures of the 'sensibly perceptible signs,' in the *Investigations* he refers to the 'spatial and temporal phenomena of language and not *to* non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm" (Part I. 109). He does state that "a description is a representation of a distribution in space (in that of time for instance)". (*Investigations* Part II, 187). Russell's two contentions, namely that Wittgenstein's later thought has no regard for understanding the world and that it ignores the non-linguistic aspects involved in communication, are erroneous. According to Wittgenstein, to invent a language, that is to create a set of 'sensibly perceptible signs having semantical and syntactical structures is "to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the law of nature (or consistently with them)" (*Investigations* Part I, 492).

Linguistic facts have sense because they have thought-content and they have thought-content due to their relation to the world. They are vehicles of thought. (*Tractatus* 3 and 3.01, and *Investigations*, Part I. 102 and 329).

III. 'GRAMMAR' AND 'GAME'

Words are used to stand for something. So meaning is *given* to them or they get it when they are put to certain *functions* in linguistic activity. Meaning, then, emerges from the *functioning* of language. Language is a social institution. Hence, "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life." The main burden of the *Blue and Brown Books* and the *Investigations* is to establish this contention. Language is intrinsically related to human life ; and a slight reflection on this relationship shows that language is used in various ways. For example, indicative, interrogative and imperative.

Words function within a language. As language is a system, words belong to a system. A word or a sentence gets its meaning from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly, understanding a sentence means understanding a language. As a part of the system.....the sentence has life" (*Brown Book*. 5). Meaning of any word is fixed or determined by the rules of the system of which it is a constituent. The rules of a system are its *grammar*. Grammar in the sense in which it is being used here, includes syntactical as well as semantical rules. The grammar of a language is its structure. That is why it expresses its essence. It constitutes the mode of representation with which reality is projected into that language. It is the form of language corresponding to the form of reality. As there can be many modes of projection and many ways of representation there can be many grammatical systems and, therefore, many languages. Every language is complete in 'itself—complete as a system of human communication.' There are *countless kinds* of grammatical systems. And as language is a dynamic social institution, the multiplicity of grammatical systems cannot be fixed. New systems can come into existence and existing systems may get obsolete. There is nothing like *the necessary structure* of language. That is why "it is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the way they are used.....with what logicians have said about the structure of language (including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*)." (*Investigations*, Part I. 23).

In the extentional language of the *Tractatus* every word will be used as a *name*. It is conventional to use a particular word

to name a certain *nominata.* It is arbitrarily decided to use a name to name a certain nominata and then accept—to use it or name it and it only. Conventions are set and accepted arbitrarily by any community using a language. Hence there cannot be any *real meaning* of linguistic signs. Then the meanings of linguistic signs are relevant to the accepted use. "Philosophers" writes Wittgenstein "very often talk about investigating, analysing the meaning of words. But let us not forget that a word has not got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what word *really* means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it." (*Blue Book*, pp. 27-28)

The entire use of a linguistic sign is revealed only through the working of the linguistic system in which it occurs. If, how the community which accepts that linguistic system as a medium of communication, is using that sign is known the *use* of it is known. So to know the *use* of a sign we have to look at the working of the system. That linguistic signs have no real meaning, but only those which are provided for them is implicit in the *Tractatus* itself.

5.4733 Frege says : Every legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense, and I say : every possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and *if it has no sense this can only be because we have given no meaning to some of its contituent parts.* (Even if we believe that have done so)."

Thus "Socrates is identical" is meaningless because the English speaking community has not given any meaning to the word 'identical' as an adjective. Besides this, words sometimes are used as sentences. For example the word 'Book' is and can be used in diverse ways. It is used as the name of an object. We reply : 'Book' when we are asked as to what we want. That is, the same word is used to mean 'I want a book.' It can also be used to mean 'that is a book.' 'bring me a book', 'What a fine book' etc. These sentences are, no doubt, elliptical, or to use Wittgenstein's term, degenerate. The meaning of the term 'Book' depends, in each case, on the function it has in that particular occurrence. Here what is elliptical is the external feature of the sign and not its meaning, "The sentence is elliptical not because it leaves out something that we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened—in comparison with a particular

paradigm of our grammar—of course one might object here : 'you grant that the shortened and unshortened sentence have the same sense? What is this sence then? consist in their having the same use? (In Russian one says 'stone red' instead of 'the stone is red' ; do they feel the copula missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?)" (*Invcstigations*, Part I. 20). But does not the fact that sentences have the same sense? Is not there a verbal expression for this sense?

The idea that linguistic signs have a variety of functions is inherent in Frege's *Sense and Nominatum.* He shows there, that natural languages customarily allow, besides the ordinary use of a name, an oblique use. A name will express its ordinary use by becoming the nominatum when it is used obliquely. This implies that the meaning of a name depends upon whether it is used in the ordinary way or in the oblique way—any how *on the way* in which it is used. But, how far Wittgenstein's usage-theory owes to this point of Frege cannot be ascertained in the absence of any explicit reference to it in Wittgensteins' works, except in *Investigations.* Part I. p. 49.

Wittgenstein shows that an observation of language-games throws light on particular problems. The relationship between words and objects is one such problem. A study of the language-games leads Wittgenstein to the following conclusion, concerning this problem.

(1) "Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names." Here it may appear that Wittgenstein is indirectly asking : How can there be a language without universals? According to the *Tractatus,* as names are names of bare particulars, common names are not *names* (they are logical constructions out of names of bare particulars). This view inevitably leads to atomism. As simple objects and atomic facts, in the sense in which these terms are used in the *Tractatus,* are non-phenomenological, a clear empirical knowledge of them is impossible. Wittgenstein's firm belief in empiricism and the extreme nominalism of the *Tractatus,* led him to the position he holds in the *Investigations.*

But this is erroneous, because he clearly shows that questions like 'How can there be a language without universals?' are pseudo-questions This question is a typical example of philo-

sophical issues. What he says in the line quoted, in the previous paragraph, is that the nominalist's contention is wrong because there are in our language words which are not names. There can be a language-game in which every word is used as a name. But such a language should not be confused with ordinary language, as the nominalists usually do. In fact a language where not only words but sentences too are names can be constructed. Frege, for instance, talks about sentences which are, in a sense, names. As Church points out "this seems unnatural at first sight, because the most conspicuous use of sentences.....is not barely to name something but to make an assertion. Nevertheless it is possible to regard sentences as names by distinguishing between the assertive use of a sentence on the one hand and its non-assertive use, on the other hand, as a name of a constituent of a longer sentence (just as names are used). Even when a sentence is simply asserted, we shall hold it still a name, though used in a way not possible for other names." (*Introduction to Mathematical Logic*. Vol I. pp. 23-24).

Wittgenstein shows that in ordinary language there are words which are names and there are words which are not. This is the import of passage 43. of the *Investigations*, Part I.

(2) The theory of logical proper names attempts to 'sublime the logic of language.' In saying it he is perhaps admitting that he and Russell were wrong. The notion of logical proper names is related to the logical form of language. That form is relevant to the language-game, implies that there is no single and necessary form of language. In the same way when once it is seen that the function of a word is relevent to the language-game in which it occurs the myth of logical proper names is exploded. That demonstrative pronouns are logical proper names or real names is, according to Wittgenstein, a queer conception. "This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the logic of language—as one might put it. The proper answer to it is : we call very different things 'names' ; word 'name' is used to characterise many different kinds of a word, related to one another in many ways ;—but the kind of use that 'this' is not among them." (*Investigations*, Part I. p. 39). In Section 2 it has been shown that demonstrative pronouns become proper-names when they are used in specific situations. In other words, their status *as* logical proper names depends upon the use to

which they are put, and, thereby relative to the language-game. Russell does not seem to be aware of this.

Closely connected to this, is the problem of the simplicity of names and the simplicity of objects. The usual atomist assumption is : '*A name ought really to signify a simple*' In the *Tractatus* it is maintained that words are names of simple objects. But simplicity is a vague concept. For instance the proper name 'Excalibur', is usually taken as a simple name. While the object Excalibur consists of many parts, in ordinary language the implicit complexity is ignored. It is possible to construct two linguistic systems in one of which 'Excalibur' is taken as a logically simple proper name and in another as a complex name. Hence 'simplicity' is relative to language-games.

(3) Wittgenstein thinks that the view that words are names of existent objects is erroneous. Most of the interpreters erroneously think that he maintains that names are names of existing objects. Even Copi errs on this point. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein makes it clear that the word 'meaning' is wrongly used when one says that a word has no meaning in the absence of an object corresponding to it. This is due to the confusion of the name with its bearer. For instance, when Excalibur is broken, it is the object that is broken and not the meaning of the word 'Excalibur.' This word is meaningful even after that. It will be meaningless if it is not used in a language-game any longer.

Moreover, names are like labels. "Naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But *what* is it a *preparation* for?" (*Investigations*, Part I. 26). A label is a mark. Take for example, the word 'book'; this mark, constituting four letters of the English alphabet, is a label for an object, having a role in the English language. "Naming is a preparation for description ; and *nothing* has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except in a language-game. This is what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning as a part of a sentence." *Investigations*, Part 1. 49).

In connection with this, Wittgenstein attacks another queer conception, namely that of attributing existence and non-existence to elements and thereby Russell's theory of descriptions. Russell maintains that proper names like 'Apollo' and 'Moses' are not logically proper names as they do not have any correspond-

ing existent entities, and that any sentence containing anyone of these expressions could be analysed into sentences which do not contain them. He also holds that such sentences are plainly false. Wittgenstein thinks that Russell is mistaken in assuming that there is one and one way of analysing sentences and also in assuming that we could substitute the description for the expressions in question whenever they occur. "If one says 'Moses does not exist' this may mean various things.....We may say, following Russell : the name 'Moses' can be defined by means of various descriptions.....But when I make a statement about Moses,—am I always ready to substitute some *one* description of these descriptions for Moses'? Has the name Moses got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?" (*Investigations*, Part I. 29). Philosophers are prone to comit such mistakes because they are misled by the method of science. But there are fluctuations even in scientific definitions or analysis. "What today counts as an observed concommitant of a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to define it" (*ibid.* p, 29). So categorising an expression either as a *difiniendum* or as a *definiens* is purely conventional, and hence, relevent to a given system or language-game. Moreover Wittgenstein holds that Russell fails to notice that truth and falsity of a sentence or its agreement or disagreement is related to its role in a language-game.

IV. RULES

Thus, explanation of the meaning of a word is to show its *meaning location* (Sommers used the expression *sense-location*. The notion of meaning location is borrowed from him.



See. Sommers : Ordinary Language Tree. *Mind*, 1959). Meaningfulness and meaninglessness or use and misuse emerge

from the functioning of language-games. A game consists of constructing a set of rules and obeying them. Let a, b and c be the words of a language-game; and let the above diagram present all the rules of their combination.

Here, any line connecting any two word-variables and passing through point p is a rule of that language-game. In other words it is a grammatical or syntactical rule. In using this linguistic system a community accepts these rules. That is why *use* is the *accepted use*. If a member of that linguistic community gives the following rules,



then by the very hypothesis, these are meaningless or misuses. In these combinations a, b and c are meaningless with reference to this language or in this language. Hence, to explain the meaning of a word which is not a name, is to show how it is used in a language-game following some rules. But what is a rule and what is it to follow a rule?

These are the two important issues which dominate the discussion in *Remarks*. Like meaning and explanation of meaning, rule and following a rule are seen by Wittgenstein in relation to each other. A rule says that such and such a sign stands for such and such a thing and that sign can be combined with such and such other sign. Following a rule is to apply it, to play the game according to it. Following is stipulating. But a combination of signs which is made in accordance with a rule is not itself a rule. To learn to play a language-game, that is, to understand a language, is to know the rules and all their possible applications or stipulations. Meanings of words and sentences are governed by these rules. But meaning is not the set of rules.

V. 'USAGE' AND 'PICTURE'

What Wittgenstein wants us to notice is that he is not refuting the denotative and the picture theories. He is just restricting their scope. He is not denying that words are names and that sentences are pictures. These are so because they are used so in a language-game. So the use of language should not be confused with the use of names and sentential-pictures. The use of language comprises or comprehends many other uses of words and sentences. Language does not have the extentional use only. Language does not have only one kind of relation with reality. It has infinitely many relations with it, of which representing relation as held in the *Tractatus* is one.

VI. MOLECULAR SENTENCES

Till now meaning of words and sentences which are combinations of words has been discussed. Now combinations of sentences will be taken up. Such combinations are called compound sentences. A compound sentence is constructed out of sentences by an operator. Meaning of a compound sentence is determined by the combination or is a function of this operator. The occurrence of operators in compound sentences is related to particular language-games. The selection of operators is arbitrary. However the selection is aimed at simplicity, elegance and convenience.

5.474. The number of necessary fundamental operations depend *only* on our notation.

The development of alternative notation shows this clearly. These operators have no meaning in themselves. As marks on paper or as sounds, 'they are dead'. But they get their life in a language-game. They are used in language-games as expressions of rules with which these games are played. A game which is played with one kind of operators, namely, *Truth-operators* is presented in the *Tractatus*. But, this is not the only game. There can be a game with other kinds of operators, for example, modal operators.

In the language-game of the *Tractatus* type, every simple sentence presents a state-of-affairs. The general nature of a simple sentence in this language is : such and such is the case. A sentence of this language represents a state-of-affairs either rightly or falsely, and thereby, either agrees or disagrees with the state of affairs represented. In other words, sentences are either true or false, and as such they are meaningful. In this game only two values of a sentence are accepted. But another game where many more values of a sentence are acceptable can be constructed. There are many-valued logical systems constructed by Rosser and Turquette, Hoo and others. What does this mean? Obviously, the fact that a sentence can be either true or false is a rule of a particular language-game ; or a two-valued game is played. Wittgenstein clearly states this in the *Remarks*. "You say these sentences are ture or false. Or as I might also say, the game of truth-functions is played with them—for assertion is not something that gets added to proposition, but an essential feature of the game we play with it, comparable, say, to that characteristic of chess by which there is winning and losing in it, the winner being the one who takes to other's king. Of course, there could be in a cetain sense very near akin chess, consisting in making the chess moves, but without there being any winning and losing in it, or with different conditions for winning" (Part I, Appendix 2).

In the two-valued games of the *Tractatus*, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its Truth-possibilities. Truth-possibilities are possibilities or the existence or the non-existence of atomic facts. Now compounds of atomic facts or molecular sentences are not pictures, because operators which occur as constituents of molecular sentences are not names. Operators neither represent nor name. The logic of the facts cannot be represented. Operators do not function in that language as words do and that is they do not denote. Thus they are empty. They are not, strictly speaking, *words* of the language-game in question. Their meaning is the way in which they are used in that language-game. Hence, their meanings can be shown by *truth-tables*. For example the meaning of the operator 'and', 'or' and 'if' can be illustrated as follows. Let T and F are abbreviations for 'true' and 'false' respectively. If p and q are propositions and o is a truth operator o p q will be the turth function of p and q as the

truth-value of o p q is dependent upon the truth of p and the truth-value of q. That means, the truth possibilities of p and q determine the turth possibilities of o p q.

p	q	p and q	p or q	if p then q
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	F
F	T	F	T	T
F	F	F	F	T

4.466 To a definite logical combination of signs corresponds a definite logical combination of their meaning.

Operators occuring in molecular sentences show the way in which they can be transformed into individual atomic sentences. A molecular sentence is meaningful if and only if all its arguments are meaningful. This follows from the fact that Wittgenstein equates language, in the *Tractatus*, with extentional language. Then the truth-value, and thereby meaning, of a molecular sentence in the two valued language-game depends only upon the extention of that molecular, that is upon the range of values for which that molecular sentence is either true or false. (Truth-operations of this game are, then, extentional operations).

VII. CONCLUSION

This means that not only meaning of words and atomic sentences but meaning of molecular sentences too is relative to the language-game of which they are constituents.

SECTION 4

I. UNITY IN WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT

Despite the fact that two phases of Wittgenstein's thought look disconnected, there is an implicit unity in them. A careful study of the two phases removes the popular misconception that they are mutually contradictory, which itself is the result of an uncritical acceptance of the prepheral difference between the two phases. He himself suggests a comparative study of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* to avoid any misunderstanding ; and suggests that such a study is necessary to understand that the two phases of his thought are interlinked and each of them is supplementary to the other. He makes this suggestion as he was aware of the real unity which lies concealed behind the apparent disconnectedness.

A close study of his works in chronological order reveals that he is constantly trying to make his theory of meaning more and more precise, wide and rigorous so that it may comprehend all possible languages in their applicative ranges.

Wittgenstein throughout his work maintains that language is a totality of a finite number of symbols with syntactical and semantical structure. Language has both form and content. In the *Tractatus*, he shows that the form of language corresponds to the form of reality. As to the content he maintains the denotative theory. Further probing into the nature and functioning of language led Wittgenstein to the usage-theory. So he supplements the first two theories with this theory. He seems to have thought that any theory of meaning incorporating only the picture theory and the denotative theory is bound to be incomplete. Language is not a static structure. It is a social and a dynamic institution. "To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life." It is always *used* by a social group. It is *use* that relates the problem of meaning to the dynamics of language. This point has been ignored in the *Tractatus.*

Wittgenstein uses the concepts 'grammar' and 'syntax' in the same sense though they are used in two different phases of his thought. In *Some Remarks on Logical Form* which belongs to the (so-called) transitory period (1929), by 'syntax' he means "the rules which tell us in which connections only a word gives sense thus excluding non-sensical structures." In the *Blue and Brown Books* as well as in the *Investigations* he uses 'grammar' in the sense that it is a name for rules of language. That 'logical syntax' and 'logical grammar' are synonymous terms is implicit in the *Tractatus* 3.325. The idea, that syntax is the logical form of language and therefore is the essential feature of it, which is found in the *Tractatus* and *Remarks on Logical Form*, can be found in the *Investigations*, where he maintains that grammar expresses the *essence*. Therefore grammar is the form which represents the form of reality. Wittgenstein throughout the course of his thought maintains that syntax or grammar stands in a projective relation to the world (vide. Moore : *Philosophical Papers*) Hence it is erroneous to think, as von Wright does, that "Wittgenstein's *new* philosophy *entails* the rejection of some of the fundamental thoughts of the *Tractatus*. He abandoned the picture theory of language, the doctrine that all significant propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions and the doctrine of the unspeakable" (Malcolm : *Wittgenstein—A Memoir* : Introduction). All that Wittgenstein says about the picture theory in the *Investigations* is that a picture does not give its own use. "What is to be done with the picture? How it is to be used still observe" (*Investigations*, Part I) What he means is, whether a picture is used to represent a possible state-in-affairs or an actual state-of-affairs or whether it is used positively or negatively will have to be made clear before the picture is actually used. (*Ibid*, Foot note on p. 11).

II. TRACTATUS AND INVESTIGATIONS

The *Tractatus* begins with an assertion which is an answer to the tacit question : What is the world? Whatever answer may be offered to this question—Wittgenstein suggested that it is a totality of facts—it will have to be stated in language. Then, a consideration of language, its scope and nature, is essential for the

deliberations on that issue. Perhaps his investigations started with an awareness of this, though it is expressed in the middle of the *Investigations*. Thus the *Investigations* gives a study of the foundations of the *Tractatus*.

III. THE IMPORT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S WORK

Wittgenstein shows how philosophical thought can be purged of meaningless assertions by applying Occam's razor to language as a whole. The limits of language being the limits of the world, any assertion about something that is not a part of the world is meaningless. Thus in drawing a distinction between what can be said meaningfully and what cannot be, Wittgenstein gives a criterion for judging what is spurious and what is not spurious in the accumulated store of human thought and thereby a general indication as to the way in which further advancement in sound thinking should proceed.

APPENDICES

A. THE MEANING OF MEANING

We often hear claims which assume the form 'meaning is . . .' These claims are called, or at least supposed to be, meaning formulae or meaning criteria. As regards these it can be asked whether the semi-skeletons 'Meaning is . . . .' and 'Inflation is . . . . .' are of the same form. This seems to be an issue of fundamental importance, not that we shall probe into it here, for our aim is just to show the presuppositions involved in posing that problem itself, in other words to see what the formulation of meaning criteria is, rather than either to formulate a meaning criterion or justify this or that criterion.

The claim that meaning was such and such has some delphic ambiguity as it does not make it clear how it was conceived that meaning was such and such. Perhaps, there is a presupposition underlying every such claim or formula, namely that for any linguistic entity, it is possible to decide, by an application or stipulation of this formula, whether or not that entity was meaningful. But, deciding the meaningfulness or the meaninglessness of a linguistic entity makes no point, because by virtue of being linguistic an entity will be meaningful. Language, obviously, is an aggregate of meaningful entities. Neither any entity is a linguistic one nor any aggregate of entities a language. Though all of them are physical (i.e. spatio-temporal), the entities which you are perceiving while reading this line and the chair on which you are sitting now or the linear spatial sequence 'CAX BAX' differ radically. What makes our talk about deciding the meaningfulness of entities meaningful, is the possibility which implies dicidability. In the absence of such possibility decisions as to meaningfulness make no point. We will not be saying anything about '. . . . . .' in saying that . . . . . was meaningful, if we fill in that blank with a linguistic expression, for "..... which is meaningful, is meaningful" says nothing about.....'s being meaningful. Had it not been meaningful, it would not have been a linguistic expression at all.

That is how we use 'word', 'sentence', 'linguistic expression' etc. In what sense can we decide whether a meaningful entity is meaningful ? (This sounds like proving the validity of a tautology, and proving here, makes no sense for we constructed it in such a way that it cannot possibly be false). This shows that we have misconstrued the notion of decision. The same thing is true in the case of non-linguistic entities. Such an act presupposes that we can decide whether an entity which is meaningless, is meaningful or not. Certainly this is not the way we take decisions.

It can be asked as to how a meaningless entity occuring in the context of a sentence (i.e. a meaningful entity) can be explained, for example, the sentence in the preceding paragraph in which CAX BAX has occurred. When we said that CAX BAX differs from linguistic entities, what we meant was that their difference was not constituted in bare physical aspects, that is concerning shape and size. The difference is in the realm of symbolic aspect. Now, if someone asks whether CAX BAX is identical with ABRACADABRA, he will be, of course, asking a genuine question provided he is refering to the physical aspects of these two sequences, i.e. if he means by his question whether they have the same shape or size. And if he meant by his question whether these two entities convey the same thing then he seems to make a deliberate attempt to talk nonsense for what he then asks amounts to : is the meaning of these two meaningless entities the same ? This, perhaps, is the result of a confusion between the physical and non-physical aspects of linguistic entities on the one hand and linguistic and non-linguistic entities on the other. Whatever it may be, it makes no sense to talk about deciding the meaningfulness of either linguistic entities or non-linguistic entities. (We will consider the issue of sequences of linguistic entities which miss to say anything, a little later).

An analogous argument. perhaps, reveals another point. Let us take a scale, of one foot for instance. We can lay down a criterion, namely that whatever is equal in length to this scale is one foot in length. We will be now in a position to decide whether a given object has or has not this specified length. For example, we can say, after stipulating our criterion 'that book is one foot in length'. But, as yet, we have not touched the issues : What is it to say that an object has a length ? What is length ?

What is it to say that two objects are equal in length ? Nor have we said anything as to how it is conceived that the length of an object is specifiable. Now, 'Meaning is use', 'Meaning is verifiability' etc. might be considered as criteria to be applied in specifying the use or the verifiability of linguistic expressions (or to explain the meaning of linguistic entities). But they do not state anything as to how a linguistic entity is conceived to be capable of verification or how it is conceived to be having a specifiable use. Nor do they make it clear how it is conceived that these criteria are applicable in specifying the use or the verifiability of linguistic entities.

Moreover specification creeps in when understanding lurks out. As long as we know how to play the language-game the question 'what is the meaning of . . . . .' (or 'how do you decide whether..... is meaningful or not') does not arise. That is to say, expressions like these and the formulae for which these are supposed to be possible grounds of stipulation (i.e. claims of the form 'meaning is.....'), remain without any application. We ask : what is the meaning of..... ? (This is comparable to : what is L.B.W. ? and we ask this question when we do not know how to play cricket or how cricket is played). We can as well ask : what do you want to communicate by constructing the expression'.....'.) We ask these questions expecting the answer : I mean by ..... that ..... or I want to say ..... This means that to ask for the meaning of an expression is to ask what was said in it. The presupposition here is that there is a way of knowing that..... . Only after assuming this we ask for a specification of the way to know that..... . This implies that 'what do you mean' and 'how do you know' are synonymous. 'I mean that.....' 'I say that .....' and 'I know that .....' mean the same thing.

We have been using some terms which are prone to be misunderstood. So we shall state what we mean by them. *Imply* is used in the ordinary sense of the term. The term 'expressions' is used in a broad or loose sense. It denotes any linguistic entity or a combination of them. The term 'language' too needs a clarification. We are using it in the sense that it is an aggregate of the resultant patterns which are results of organising our actual and possible experience of the world. This means the same as the conceptual structures of experience. Constructing

patterns of conceptual structures has been called linguistic activity. Each pattern is a meaning-situation.

Now, there are different ways of knowing and (hence) there are different ways of saying. We use many kinds of language, phenomenological language, sense-data language etc. We apply many types of logic, logic of propositions, of judgments, logic of terms and also different modes of expression, assertoric, alethic etc. Constructing a language is projecting our experience into spatio-temporal entities which we call phonems, syllables etc. The method of projection determines the form of the world and is determined by the grammatical structure we give to our own language. (That is why there is no apriori form of the world, it varies according to the grammatical structure of language ; grammar does not represent the form of the world, it just gives one to the world.) If we philosophers have some humility and care to know what the linguist Worf (see his *Language, Thought and Reality*) has shown, we can have a clear picture of the relationship between language, thought, logic and reality. Worf has shown how the grammatical segmentation of sentences, which are units of thought, into substantives and verbs, which can be seen in Indo-European languages, made dichotomies of subject-predicate, object-attribute, and things-relations among things inevitable. This resulted in the notion that the world is a collection of things and the logic of terms. Classical physics is based on these presuppositions. The description of the universe based upon sentence-logic gave an altogether different picture, which can be seen in field physics. To teach classical physics or field physics is to teach or to explain some grammatical forms, to teach some type of logic, to teach how those conceptual frameworks are constructed. Thus to teach someone to use a language is to teach him a technique of knowing, a technique of organising experience, a method to conceptualise the world. We cannot think of, or know, something without projecting it into language. This means that without language we cannot know. The hippopotamus might express its pain by snorting — express what it felt. It cannot know that it had pain or that it can have pain or that it felt pain. Had not there been language we would not have been in a position to know that we can have pain, or that we had pain. Further, if there were to be nothing to know and no way of knowing it either there will not be any

language at all. Thus, an inquiry into meaning converges into an inquiry into knowing which coincides with an inquiry into linguistic activity as such.

Now one might argue, as Daya does (I am quoting from a personal communication) : "using language and knowing are the same,' but only in the sense of knowing to use the language. Surely, one can spin meaningful sentence without knowing anything about a subject and there were such things as questionings, doubtings etc. in a language." But this argument does not disprove our contention as to the relationship between language and knowing. Knowing to use a language is mastering a technique of conceptualising, that is knowing how to create meaning-situations. This is the same as knowing a way of knowing. Secondly, one can, of course, spin meaningful sentences without knowing anything, but certainly not without the assumption that he can know. We can say 'We can have pain' without ever having pain. Now, knowing that we can have pain is different from knowing that we do have pain. This implies that to say that a sequence of sensibly perceptible entites is meaningful is to say that such and such is knowable. Let the blank.....stand for such a sequence, then,.....is meaningful≡that.....is knowable. Obviously we cannot fill in the blanks in the following semi-skeleton—for it is inconceivable. ".....is meaningful ≡ that .....is unknowable." We cannot conceive that anyone of the sentences that "one can spin without knowing anything" will be a value of the variable '.....'. Thirdly, we are not denying the fact that there are questionings and doubtings in a language (This is one of the ambiguities of our language). After all, we use expressions like, 'Can we have pain?', 'Can we improve the standard of living?'. Now, when we ask whether we can have pain our question can be interpreted to mean two things. First we might be asking whether it is possible for us to have pain or whether it is possible for us to know that we do have pain or can have pain. Now this is the same as to ask whether we are constructing a meaning-situation in spinning the sequences 'We have pain', 'We can have pain' etc. This means that we are asking whether the sequences 'we have pain' and 'we can have pain' have any applications in our linguistic activity. It also implies that we can spin, a conceptual framework into which our experience of pain can

be projected. Here we are not constructing meaning-situations but reflecting on such construction itself, rather reflecting on the borders of our constructive activity. That is why such questions should not be considered as occuring in a language. They are the limiting points of a language. The border of a field is not within the field, but certainly is in relation to it, for there will be nothing to be called a field without a border. We shall return to issue of little later.

Secondly, we may be taken to mean, when we say "can we have pain", that we are asking whether it was possible for us to conceive the possibility of having pain. This is the same as to ask whether we can construct a meaning-situation by using the sequences 'we have pain', 'we can have pain' etc, that is whether we can conceive the possibility of constructing a conceptual framework for pain. This, again, is a border-problem rather than one that occur within a conceptual framework.

Now we are in a position to recognise how "the philosophical concept of meaning has the place in the primitive idea of the way language functions." (*Investigations*. P. I. 2) If we once recognise the difference between the philosophical concept of meaning and the notion of meaning implicit in empirical investigations into the semantic structures of various languages, we will be able to differentiate philosophical approach to language from the science of language. This philosophical concept is a formal concept — a transcendental concept, as the notion of meaning (the idea of meaningfulness) with which philosophers are concerned, is not the result of our investigation into the functioning of language. It is rather a requirement, a pre-condition of all linguistic activity, and the possibility of knowing activity (this expression should not be taken as synonymous with congnitive activity) is based upon this formal idea of meaning. That is why we said that it was transcendental. (We are using the terms 'transcendental' and 'formal' strictly in the Kantian and the Wittgensteinian senses respectively, and they mean the same thing. If for Kant the transcendental is something that signifies the very possibility of knowledge, for Wittgenstein a formal concept is one without which the object which belongs to it is unthinkable apart from this relation. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 96 and *Tractatus* 4.123 to 4.12721). We cannot conceive any language (for that matter linguistic activity as a

whole itself) apart from the idea of its being meaningful. Philosophical approach to language does not distinguish, for we cannot conceive the possibility of such a distinction, between the idea of meaning and the idea that linguistic entities are meaningful. Now, one might argue, (I am quoting again from a personal communication of Daya) "The question what is meaning is different from how does something come to have that meaning : There is such a thing as a history of words—the change of meaning over periods of time." Such an argument, it is not difficult to show that, is the result of the distinction between object and attribute, which is presupposed. That is based upon the idea that objects are simple and they "come to have" an attribute somehow. The argument which we are considering now presupposes that linguistic entities are such entities and somehow "come to have" meaning, acquire this quality. This assumption further implies that there can be linguistic entities without acquiring this quality. In what sense, now we are led to ask ourselves, meaning is a quality? Before answering this issue we shall point out another confusion involved in almost all the recent discourses on meaning.

We have said that there are different ways of knowing and saying. This implies that there can be many ways in which linguistic entities are, or can be, said to be meaningful. Now, one can think that we are accepting that there are multiple modes of meaning requirements, requirements for the very possibility of linguistic activity. But, our acceptance of the transcendentality of meaning does not lead to such a conclusion unless the *formal aspect* of meaning is confused with its *proper aspect.* By proper aspect we mean a feature which is not indispensable or the aspect without presupposing which we can conceive of a thing which presumably falls under it. Meaning in its proper aspect emerges within the linguistic activity. That is why we find various notions of meaning in various language-games. As linguistic activity is multifarious there will be many ways or modes in which linguistic entities can be said to be meaningful —cognitively meaningful, emotively meaningful, meaningful by being a well-formed formula, meaningful by virtue of being a product of an admissible operation etc. Here we have various proper concepts of meaning. (*Use* is such a proper concept. That is why the oracle 'meaning is use' is delphic).

The various formulae (criteria, proposals?) offered as to the way of deciding whether a given linguistic entity has been used in this or that way do not have any application whatsoever is *deciding* whether a sequence of sensibly perceptible entities is or is not a meaningful sequence, for this the sequence itself shows. "We grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the *use*." (*Investigations* I. 138. Italics mine) what we grasp in a flash is that it is meaningful, that is, that it is a linguistic expression and that we can say such and such, and that such and such is knowable. Specification of the use of linguistic entities follows this grasp. Specifying the mode of meaning is not the same as recognising a linguistic expression. (There cannot be a logic of meaningless entities, that is of bare physical entities. Thef undamental reason for this is, the logic we use is closely related to the form of our language. We cannot elaborate this point here. Even the symbols like p, q, r, s, in formal logic, are *accepted* as propositional variables. Even if one denies this, and most of the modern logicians do deny for them they are nothing but black marks on white background *i.e.*, bare physical entities, it cannot be denied that only *admissible* operations on these variables are *accepted* as propositional functions. The propositional variables and the propositional functions are not meaningless entities, like the scattered shells on the banks of the Brahmaputra, but are entities whose meaning is not specified or rather kept unspecified. (Hegelian dialectic is based on the assumption that there can be a logic of bare physical entities. To go into the details of this point is out of place here.)

The various formulae or criteria of specification (of the modes of meaning) can be given a functional form of expression as meaning occurs in them as a proper concept. Instead of saying either this sensibly perceptible sequence of entities is meaningful or this sequence is having such and such property, we can say that this sequence satisfies the function f. For example, instead of saying " 'rose is red' is meaningful because it is verifiable" (of course, when it is assumed that meaning is verifiability and also accepting that 'rose is red' is a case where we can stipulate the formula 'meaning is verifiability') we can say "(rose is red) $f \equiv$ (rose is red) g". A transformation of these formulae will result in the form "$f(x) \equiv g(x)$." Such a formulation

eliminates the possible confusion between the proper concept of meaning and the formal concept of meaning. Besides this, such a formulation will result in a meaningful expression, when the variables are replaced by constants, unlike the formulations which assume the form 'meaning is.....' (See *Tractatus* 4.1272).

Now, we cannot give such a functional formulation of the formal concept of meaning as "formal concepts cannot, like proper concepts, be presented by a function. For their characteristics, the formal properties are not expressed by the functions." (*ibid.*, 4.126). But, while philosophising we often say that there cannot be a logic of nonsense, comunication through meaningless symbols is impossible, meaningless sentences do not exist, understanding meaningless symbols is impossible, meaningless sentences do not exist, understanding meaningless sentences makes no point. etc. This is how we talk while we crack jokes. This will be clear if we compare the above assertions with Chesterton's jokes : "I did not give you green pain.", "when I have pain I never notice the colour." In saying these things we have not said anything, in the sense of *saying* when we say that the rose was red or that our pains were intense. In cracking a joke we are not constructing a meaning-situation which could possibly satisfy a meaning-function by being an argument-place of it. None of the philosophical assertions can possibly be an argument-place for a meaning-function. That is why philosophical propositions miss to say something. But they point out the presuppositions of thinking activity itself by drawing our attention to the internal properties of thinking (or knowing or language) itself. When we say that we cannot conceive the meaninglessness of sentences, and colours of pains, we are pointing out the internal properties of sentences and pain, just as we say that we cannot conceive of gravitation apart from gravitational field (outside this field we conceive gravitationlessness, as we conceive of meaninglessness outside the field of language. Language is the field of meaning-situations.) We are just showing that the internal properties of pain exclude the possibility of having a colour and that the internal properties of a sentence exclude the possibility of its being meaningless. It is these internal properties we call formal properties or transcendental properties, for we cannot think of anything that conceivably falls within the domain of these properties without them being so.

This means that when we say 'pain cannot have colour' or 'colour predicates cannot be conjoined with pain,' we mean that the combinations pain-colour, sentence-meaningless etc. do not have any application in our linguistic activity, just as the expression "200 runs for the loss of 7 wickets" has no application when we play Base Ball. They cannot be applied to construct meaning-situations. Here, *cannot* is not being used in the sense that we cannot imagine of pain having a colour or imagine the remote possibility of a sentence being meaningless (we may imagine them having these properties when we are under some hallucination.) There is no psychological impossibility implicit in the sense of *cannot.*

This will be clear when we consider expressions like : A moving body cannot have two velocities. The same body cannot be at two places at the same time, both position and momentum of a physical system can never be predicted with certainty. In saying these things we presume that we are saying something about the external reality which is supposedly to be there having these properties. These, in fact, belong to our thinking. In these we are saying something about our own thinking, or the way in which we think about the external world, the way we conceptualise the world. They are about the forms of our own conceptualisation. The sentences 'the body B has the velocity V' 'and a moving body cannot have two velocities' have different forms. (One can say that the former presuppose the latter. The latter exhibits the limiting cases of the construction of the meaning-situations of the former type.) To think, or to know, is to conceptualise, and we have also said that to know is to play a language-game. Various sciences show how our conceptual activity is multifarious, that is, how we play various language-games. Philosophising is another game where the various language-games themselves become pawns. That is why, philosophy is conceptual analysis of thinking, of knowing, of language-games. Now to think is to construct meaning-situations. In philosophy we specify the modes of these situations. So philosophical activity constitutes specifications of modes of meaning and does not aim at constructing meaning-situations. The concept of meaning is not a meaning-situation. Therefore there cannot be any philosophical activity concerning this concept itself. We cannot specify any mode, for there is

no situation at all. 'What is the possible mode of meaning?' and 'what is the meaning of meaning?' are not philosophical questions and 'the meaning of meaning,' as Wittgenstein would like to call, is a super-concept or a pseudo-concept. These questions and this concept do not occur in any individual language-game either.

The same body cannot be at two place because we cannot *see* (not in the psychological sense) it at two places, that is, we cannot think of it as being at two places. This is the same as to say that a body occupies one and only one place in my visual field. (If someone were to have hallucinations or delusions of seeing a body occupying two places at the same time then? Such an use of *see* can be found in. I see God as omnipresent. But, where is the visual field here? Certainly this is not the way in which we play with '*see*' in our language-game. The illusory nature of this will be evident if we compare with it. In yesterday's Base Ball match we scored 220 runs for the loss of 6 wickets. How can this be explained to those who do not understand it, that is, how can this sequence be applied in our language-game. This is not the way we record our score when we play that game.) We say that we do see or that we can see that the rose is red. We also say 'I see' when we encounter expressions of the form *this* follows from *that*. Certainly we do not see this *following* that, say when we are talking about an inference, in the sense of seeing when we say that we see a beautiful girl. It is in this sense, *saying*, *seeing* and *knowing* coincide. 'I do not *see* this body having two velocities' means the same as 'I cannot *say* that it has velocities' or 'I cannot *know* that it has two velocities.'

It can, then, be asked what we were doing in constructing these expressions. Obviously, we are showing the form (grammar) of the expressions 'having a velocity' and 'to be in motion.' That is to say, we are pointing out the internal properties of velocity and motion. This implies that we are investigating into the way in which meaning-situations are created with the concepts of motion and velocity. Then, we are investigating into our own conceptual activity, and not creating a meaning-situation as we do when we say that such and such a body has the velocity V. It makes no sense to talk about specifi-

cation of the modes of specification of meaning-situations, for such a (second-order) specification will not be about any meaning-situation. To say that there was no body called B and that it was not in motion but its velocity was 200 meters a second is to deliberately speak some nonsense. There cannot be any philosophy of meaning (we are refering to the formal aspect of this concept) and a question about the meaning of meaning is like a shot fired aiming at nothing. One can, of course, distinguish shooting from knowing how to shoot and identify shooting without aim with learning to shoot, that is how to operate the gun. This is a sound argument. We create meaning-situations, as we shoot, and just as we learn how to operate with the gun we explore the various possible modes of constructing meaning-situations. Now think of someone talking about how to know to shoot. Our talk about the meaning of meaning is just like this. (The implication is : it makes no sense to talk about the truth or falsity of say, Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. It has, of course, consequences. But neither the truth of consequences establishes its truth nor their falsity its falsity. This has far reaching consequences in philosophy of physics.)

We said that there were various modes in which linguistic entities were said to be meaningful, and that there were various ways of knowing. Now, think of all possible modes of meaning (that is all possible uses of language) and all possible ways of knowing. Whatever falls outside these aggregates is the meaningless, the unknowable and the unsayable. Not that we exhaust in thinking about anything that is beyond the boundaries of these, but any such thing is inconceivable for us. Herein lies the transcendental nature of meaningfulness and knowability and sayability. The distinctions between the meaningful and the meaningless, the knowable and the unknowable, like the distinctions between phenomenon and noumenon, the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it appears, are transcendental distinctions. We might be asked whether, then, the boundaries of meaningful discourse, which is determined by this transcendental distinction, was fixed and if it not what makes it shift. Our answer for this would be that it would not make any sense to raise these issues, for we cannot conceive the possibility of the boundaries being independent of the field of which they are boundaries. How can we say : here is gravitation and there the gravitational field,

Linguistic activity has a form and a mode of meaning. The activity itself reveals this. That is why the form a linguistic activity makes us powerless to go beyond the conditions of saying and thereby to penetrate beyond the limits drawn by conditions of knowing, just as the form of the game of chess makes it impossible to move pawns beyond the totality of the given squares on the board and yet continue to play the game. Now, the possible conditions of knowing and the possible conditions of saying are not subjective limits. They are objective conditions of the very possibility of knowledge and language. That we can know, or that we know that there is something which is not comprehended by the very conditions of the possibility of knowledge is the transcendental illusion. This is the same as the formal or the grammatical illusion, that is, the view that we can say that there is something that is not sayable. Philosophers attempt at saying such thing. (This might be a natural tendency, as Kant would like to put it. It might be even a natural temptation to touch the fruit of the forbidden tree, which they inherited from their ancestor.) Such attempts assume the form : I can know that which I cannot know and I can say that which I cannot say.

Beyond the totality of all the possible ways of saying, that is beyond the realms of linguistic activity, we cannot raise the issue of meaning at all, and we have already seen how we cannot ask about the meaning of meaning within the realm of our linguistic activity. The boundaries of knowledge and language allow us to go so far and no further.

Meaning-situations arise as soon as we begin conceptualising the world or as soon as we begin to play language-games. Why do we conceptualise? Why do we play language-games? These questions cannot be answered, for to answer them we have to go beyond the boundaries of the sayable and the knowable. That we conceptualise, that we do play language-games are the real wonders. We cannot *know* and we cannot *say* why we do what we do, we can know and say how do we do what we do. (This implies that there cannot be any Historiography.)

There is another important point which we should not fail to note, namely as meaning is an internal property of language it makes no sense to attribute it linguistic entities. We cannot say 'the sentence S is meaningful' as we say 'the rose is red,' for the

sentence 'the sentence S is meaningful' misses to have any application in our language. Nor can we say 'language is meaningful,' for the concept of 'meaningful language' is neither a proper concept nor a formal concept. It is a super-concept.

This leads us to the conclusion that the idea that there can be a philosophy of meaning is 'a bump of understanding.' Perhaps Wittgenstein was refering to this, or something of that type, when he said that "the real discovery is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to—the one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question." (*Investigations.* P.I. 133).

B. THOUGHT AND REALITY, AND SUBJECT AND OBJECT

It is a popular confusion and misunderstanding that objects for Wittgenstein are *the ultimate constituents of the world* (in the sense in which Russell uses this expression). But whether objects are the ultimate constituents of the world, according to Wittgensteinian mode of thinking, is a pseudo-question and such a problem is the result of a confusion between the two senses of 'objects'—the proper sense and the formal sense, that is to say the sense in which we use 'objects' when we say that tables, chairs etc. are objects, and the sense of 'objects' in which we use 'objects' when we say that objects occur in atomic facts. In connection with this a Wittgensteinian can argue:

"Objects (in the formal sense of the term) form the substance of the world. They logically determine the world. Now "the world is my world." But how? It is easy to answer the question if we try to understand it in the light of and in relation to the following passages from the *Note Books*.

"My idea is my world." (17. 10. 16)

"I want to report how I find the world." (2. 9. 16)

Corresponding passages can be found in the *Tractatus*, (for instance, 5. 631). Indeed to say that I found the world like this and this is to say that my logic anticipates this. That is why the limits of my logical anticipation coincide with the limits of my language. So the limits of my language are the limits of my world. (It is interesting to compare this argument with kant's, which can be presented as follows (of course stripping it off its obscurantist cloak) : The limits of my reason are the limits of my world of experience—or the world of my experience. The world of which I can think is my world. The world is my world. The limits of my thought coincide with the limits of my world.) My logical anticipation comprehends the world of my experience. (Keyt's interpretation is misleading and false.)

My world, which my logic anticipates, is wider than the world of my acquaintance. (Anscombe erroneously equates 'my world' with 'the world of my acquaintance,' and concludes that ".....the limits of my world and of the acquaintance are one and the same ; therefore the world is my world." p. 167). The world of my acquaintance is not all that is my world. That I can know whether something falls within my world or not is independent of the issue whether I do have an experience of it or not. ".....every question which can be decided at all by logic can be decided off-hand. And if we get into a situation where we need to answer such a problem by looking at the world, this shows that we are on fundamentally wrong tract." (5. 551)

Now consider the following propositions :

"I am my world (The microcosm)." (5. 631)

"The world and life are one." (5. 621)

".....mine is the first and only world." (*Note Books*, 2. 9. 16)

".....my idea is the world." (*ibid* 17. 10. 16)

"The I is not an object." (*ibid* 7. 8. 16)

"The thinking, presenting subject :
There is no such thing." (*ibid* 5. 6. 13)

"To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (p. 9. 1. 1).

Language represents my world and whatever language I imagine it is my idea *i.e.*, my formation. So my idea and my world are one and the same. 'I' is not an object in either sense of the term. Then what is it?—a figment of my fantastic imagination? No. First it is not the thinking self or the subject. It is thought (or idea or formation, or logical anticipation, or language) itself. Then I am my world. As nothing falls beyond the boundaries of my logical anticipation, beyond my linguistic perview, my world is the only world— rather the only possible world. I can think or talk about the possible world only, and not the impossible. This is due to the reason : my logic fills my world. So to think of anything beyond my world I have to get outside my world. But I cannot take this leap as "I am placed in it like my eye in my visual field." (*Note books*. 11. 6. 16) 'I' does not belong to the world. "The subject does not belong to the world, but it is a limit." (*Tractatus*. 5. 633). The relationship between the 'I' and the world is exactly same as the

relationship between my eye and its visual field. I do not find my own eye in my visual field, nor 'I' in my world. (Now you might suggest : Well ! look into a mirror, you will find your eye as well as your visual field—rather your eye in your visual field. But I do not find your argument sound. Do you suggest that when I look at my own language I will find my world as well as me—rather me in my world? But is it the world that I see in my language? No, its representation only. Is it the eye that I locate in the mirror? No, its reflection only. Then, "where *in* the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?" (*Tractatus*. 5. 633)

Now what I can see, I can see and what I cannot see I cannot. My eye then demarcates between what I can see and and what I cannot see. Thus it is that which exhibits the limits of all that I can see, the limits themselves. Analogously 'I' demarcates between what I can think and I cannot think—and thereby what belongs to my world and what does not belong to my world. It shows how far my world is extended. (Once again an interesting point of comparison. Kant tries to show that *pure reason* demarcates between what can be *known* and what cannot be *known*.) That is why what solipsicism intends "is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but shows itself." (*Tractatus*, 5. 62)

Now I am my life. I am my language too. Then my life, my language and my world are one and the same. The limits of life and language are one and the same. Hence "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life." Further "solipsicism strictly thought coincides with pure realism." (*Tractatus*, 5. 64)

You might point out that I am contradicting myself for, in saying that 'I' cannot be talked about as it shows itself, I am saying something about the unsayable. This argument against my solipsicism is muddle headed, because your argument is based on a confusion and misunderstanding of my uses of the two words 'say' and 'show.' Let me make the meanings of these terms clear. When I say that P is sayable I mean *that* P is an empirical fact, and when that P is unsayable I mean *that* P is not an empirical fact. When I say *that* P is not an empirical fact I am not denying that 'P' is a meaningful proposition. In that case 'P' is devoid of any factual content, and this does not entail that 'P' is devoid of any thought-content."

Now it is very easy to impute all sorts of false implications to Mr. Wittgensteinian's soliloquy, just as Keyt does in saying that his world "floats between qualityless and eternal objects on the one hand and the metaphysical subject, which is an extentionless point, on the other." (p. 25)

But Mr. Wittgensteinian is trying to say just the opposite—in letting loose the absolute distinction between subject and object, thought and reality etc. "There is no philosophical monism or dualism" (*Tractatus*, 4. 128).

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