



THE IMPACT OF
U.S. POLICY ON
THE KASHMIR CONFLICT


Louis D. Hayes

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Louis D. Hayes

THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH

International Studies

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


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
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Foreword

The emphasis in much of the post-World War II literature on foreign policy has been on major power conflicts. The shifting patterns of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China remain of central concern to students of international relations. However, policies of the major powers are intertwined with continuing regional conflicts in various parts of the world. These arenas of action, such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia, are often the focus of developments which are independent of the policies and goals of the great powers. However, these regional crises command the attention of the major powers as well as of the nations more directly concerned.

Mr. Hayes is concerned with one such regional involvement, that between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which has not received the wide attention given other disputes such as the one in the Middle East. This study serves two purposes. First, it details and evaluates the developments in the Kashmir dispute itself. Second, it relates directly to American foreign policy *vis-à-vis* India and Kashmir. Professor Hayes develops a central thesis that in many ways American foreign policy has tended to contribute to developments which are contrary to American interests. Thus, the work is of value in facilitating our understanding of American policy in general as well as shedding light on the Kashmir dispute itself.

Professor Hayes received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Arizona in 1966. He taught two years at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee before going to the University of Montana in Missoula where he now is an assistant professor in the Department of Government.

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Introduction

It is no exaggeration to say that the patterns of international politics have changed more rapidly during the twentieth century than during the entire previous history of the world. World War I marked the end of a European-centered international system which had existed for 400 years. New centers of international power and new dimensions of international conflict emerged during the 20 years between the First and Second World Wars. After World War II an intense and extremely dangerous confrontation between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellites developed into a pattern of relationships known as the Cold War. But even as the patterns of Cold War international politics were being shaped, new conditions and relationships were appearing on the margins of the international political arena. In just over 20 years the international system has changed from a fairly simplified bipolar power relationship into a highly pluralistic and extremely complex set of relationships involving, for the first time, the entire world. The nuclear power Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is becoming, if it has not already become, irrelevant to the international political relations of the world as a whole.

These rapidly changing patterns of international politics make the conduct of foreign policy hazardous and frustrating. This is particularly true for a country like the United States which is so extensively involved in international affairs. Since the circumstances and conditions of international politics change so rapidly, foreign policy must be highly flexible and adaptive, qualities which, unfortunately, have not always characterized American policy since World War II.

The international problems which continue to vex the United States are nowhere better illustrated than by regional conflicts. These regional conflicts occur, to a large extent, independent of and in spite

of the policies and goals of the United States and most other great powers. The Middle East, which has been a continuing crisis area since 1947, has already produced three wars and at this writing threatens to degenerate once again into conflagration. While the United States desires the pacific settlement of differences among the countries of the Middle East, American policy has been singularly ineffective in achieving this goal. In fact, a strong case can be made that American policies have contributed to achieving the precise opposite effect.

An even more serious regional crisis is that of Southeast Asia. In this area, as with the Middle East, United States policy has met with limited success in achieving its stated goals. The situation has deteriorated so rapidly that in order to avoid a complete policy failure, the United States has been forced to make very sizeable commitments of its own resources. The frustrations experienced by the United States in Vietnam have occasioned much criticism of the whole fabric of American foreign policy. Some critics contend that we have overcommitted ourselves in an effort to achieve goals which in reality may be unattainable. Other critics say we have become intoxicated by our own power and strength. American success in meeting the threats posed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union has produced an arrogance of power. Still others suggest that we may not be as powerful as we think we are. Simply because the United States possesses the greatest economic and military capabilities in the world does not mean we can build the Great Society in the swamps of Vietnam.

These criticisms reflect a growing frustration with the inability of American foreign policy to achieve desired goals. Yet, all areas of public policy — whether domestic or foreign — experience occasional difficulties and frustrations. Criticism of foreign policy is part of a much more general “crisis of confidence” in the United States. Were it not for the growing domestic crisis with the rapid deterioration of urban areas, the riots and demonstrations associated with civil rights, and other domestic problems, the failures of American foreign policy might not have produced such widespread dissatisfaction.

The relative success or failure of American foreign policy since World War II depends on one’s point of view. A fairly objective evaluation might be possible if the achievement or nonachievement of policy goals is the criterion. In this regard, the record of American foreign policy is mixed; there have been both successes and failures. In the long run there have probably been far more successes than

failures. The problem is that Americans are not accustomed to recognizing the possibility of failure; we have acquired the habit of always winning. Americans possess a pragmatic philosophy which holds that nothing is impossible. Simply find the proper combination of ingredients and success will follow. While this philosophy has generally proved sound and rewarding in the peculiarly favorable historical and material circumstances of the United States, it appears to be increasingly less workable both at home and abroad in the second half of the twentieth century. Domestically, there are no longer any frontiers to master. Rather, the country is getting somewhat flabby with middle age. In foreign policy, the enthusiasm and vigor of the United States helped rescue the rest of the world from the disasters of the two World Wars. But conditions have changed. Europe is now able to stand alone and is often inclined to forget its debts to the United States.

Old problems, therefore, have ceased to exist, and policies relevant to them are anachronistic. The make-up of many existing problems has changed, necessitating corresponding changes in policy. Finally, altogether new problems have emerged, requiring novel policy approaches. These are realities which confront American foreign policy. Efforts to meet each one simultaneously produce a variety of dilemmas.

This study examines one problem area of American foreign policy. As a general proposition regarding international politics, it is assumed that regional crises such as those in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia are focal points of contemporary international politics. These regional crises absorb the attention and resources of not only the immediate participants, but other nations as well. Moreover, the pattern of regional crises can be expected to increase both in frequency and in intensity in the foreseeable future. The political stability of Africa shows increasing signs of disintegration, and regional conflicts between black and white African countries can be expected in the future. The Middle Eastern situation is far from resolved; Arab and Israeli forces are rearming for a return engagement. No one suggests anymore that the Vietnamese problem will be resolved to anyone's satisfaction in the next few years.

The subject of this study is a third regional conflict which to this date has not reached the levels of intensity nor received the wide publicity accorded the other two. This is the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As in the case with other regional conflicts, American foreign policy has directly and indirectly influenced

the course of events in Kashmir. While it is not possible to measure precisely the degree of influence, it is possible to demonstrate the impact of certain United States policies upon developments in South Asia. It is also possible to demonstrate that the nature of this influence has, in certain instances, contributed to the frustration of American foreign policy goals.

Herein lies the central thesis of this paper. Some aspects of American foreign policy in South Asia have produced consequences, *other than those intended by policy makers*, which have tended to exacerbate local problems and, accordingly, to contribute to developments which are contrary to American interests.

The following discussion will be organized into three parts. The first part consists of a brief examination of the dimensions of the Indo-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir. Any effort by the United States to develop policies which encompass all of South Asia must provide for the realities of this confrontation. It will become apparent that the United States has, to a large extent, failed to appreciate the depth and extent of this problem when formulating policy for this area.

The second part consists of a survey of American policies *vis-à-vis* both India and Pakistan since 1947. The purpose of this section is to illustrate how various American policies (but not all) have contributed to a worsening of the Kashmir situation. There has also been a tendency for some policies to negate one another.

The final section consists of conclusions regarding American foreign policy. These conclusions apply specifically to South Asia and Kashmir, but it is assumed that they have more general implications not only for the United States, but for other countries as well.

I. THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

Background

The state of Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the Indian states, covers territory totaling more than 84,400 square miles. The state is composed of three provinces — Kashmir, Jammu, and the frontier districts — but is generally referred to collectively as Kashmir. It is located in a strategic position which makes it the center of several intense international rivalries. To the northeast is Tibet, which since 1957 has been part of China. To the north is the Chinese province of Sinkiang. In the northwest are Afghanistan and the Soviet Republic of Turkestan. Kashmir borders on both India and Pakistan in the south. Kashmir is an area of geographical transition from the Himalayan Mountains, which separate the Indian subcontinent from regions to the north, to the plains in the south.

The roots of the contemporary Indo-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir can be traced far back into history.¹ The state was dominated by Muslims from 1330-1819. During this period of nearly 500 years, the population of Kashmir, which prior to 1339 was Hindu, was converted almost entirely to Islam. Even though Muslim rule ended in Kashmir in 1819, the predominance of Islam in the area continues up to contemporary times. The 1941 census, for instance, showed 77 per cent of the population of Kashmir as Muslims.

The Moguls ruled Kashmir from 1339 until 1752, when Afghanistan gained control over the area. In 1819 Kashmir was invaded and conquered by Sikhs. The people of Kashmir welcomed the Sikhs,

¹On the history of Kashmir see: P. N. K. Bamzai, *A History of Kashmir* (Delhi: Metropolitan Books, 1962), and J. P. Ferguson, *Kashmir: An Historical Introduction* (London: Centaur Press, 1961).

believing they would be a relief from two centuries of oppression at the hands of the Afghans. Unfortunately for the Kashmiris, the Sikhs were if anything even more oppressive than had been the Afghan rulers.

In 1846 Sikh rule was ended by the British. In the Treaty of Amritsar of March 16, 1846, the British agreed to turn over rule of Kashmir to one Gulab Singh of the Hindu Dogra tribe in return for a sizeable monetary consideration. The Dogra rule remained intact until the British left India in 1947.

Throughout this 100-year period, a Hindu elite dominated the Islamic majority of Kashmir. Muslims were effectively excluded from significant administrative and military service in the state. But during the 1930's, in the wake of Ghandi's successful efforts at nonviolent resistance in India, Kashmiri Muslims began agitating for relief from the oppressive rule of the Dogras. This agitation reached major proportions at the time of the transfer of power.

The international problem of Kashmir arose when the British transferred their ruling power to native Indian governments. The empire over which Britain ruled in India was a loose collection of culturally and politically diversified areas. Many of these areas enjoyed considerable autonomy. Although originally intending to keep India intact, the British soon realized that upon their departure the subcontinent would be partitioned into two separate countries. This partition would follow communal lines, with one country made up of Muslims and the other of Hindus. Partition was actually made inevitable by a series of historical developments.

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded, ironically by an Englishman. Up until 1900, Congress' activities consisted of relatively moderate efforts to get the British to allow more Indians into governmental service. At the turn of the century, however, Congress was a much more vigorous organization. It became militantly nationalistic and, perhaps more importantly, led a revival of Hindu orthodoxy. This emphasis upon religious fundamentalism spelled trouble, as is generally the case, for members of other religions. Hindu persecution of Muslims increased considerably. Somewhat belatedly, the Muslims initiated their own religious revival by founding the Muslim League in 1906. While Congress claimed consistently to represent both Hindus and Muslims, the League was avowedly Muslim, having no place for Hindus. Although Congress attempted to maintain the fiction of bridging the gap between Islam and Hinduism, in reality Congress was a Hindu organization early in the

20th century. The development of these two organizations thus contributed to the polarization of the two religious communities.

The British themselves added to communal antagonisms through the practice of "divide and rule." This is the policy where British colonial administrators exploited existing cultural divisions within the native population in order to prevent unified resistance. An illustration of this was the British willingness to allow a Hindu ruler to take over the largely Muslim state of Kashmir in 1846. While it seems rather pointless to criticize policies which amounted to efficient administration of an empire, the fact remains that these policies did contribute to later difficulties. In addition, in 1909 the British adopted the practice of providing for separate communal representations in the native legislature. By so doing, the British provided legal recognition for the two religious communities and thus widened the cleavage between them.

The Muslims were intent upon partition long before such a course of action was finally adopted as the official policy of the British government. Partition was central in the thinking of the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had no intention of accepting any transfer of power agreement other than one including partition. His insistence upon this provision and the amount of territory that he demanded for the Muslim portion frequently threatened to break up the negotiations for transfer of power.

The new British Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, had arrived in India for the express purpose of engineering the transfer. Mountbatten's personal abilities and considerable good fortune kept the feuding parties together at the conference table long enough to reach agreement on a plan for transfer of power. Perhaps operating in Mountbatten's favor was a rapidly deteriorating political situation throughout British India. Communal rioting was spreading rapidly, and there was a general breakdown of law and order in important areas of the country. All parties were thus encouraged to reach agreement as soon as possible before the situation got completely out of hand. On June 3, 1947, both Hindu and Muslim leaders tentatively agreed to a partition plan.

On August 14, 1947, British rule in India ended. On August 15, India and Pakistan were sovereign independent nations. But the transfer of power and partition did not end all the problems. In fact, many problems were just beginning. First, there was the problem of dividing up the resources of the government of undivided India. Somehow the military and financial resources had to be partitioned

equitably between the two countries.² Moreover, the boundaries between the two countries (there are two, in fact, since Pakistan is divided into two parts—one on either side of India) had to be defined. The states of Punjab and Bengal were partitioned and new boundaries had to be drawn. There was the overwhelming problem of refugees streaming by the thousands into both countries—Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan. The communal rioting and mutual slaughter did not abate with partition and independence, but if anything grew in intensity. Both governments were faced with the problem of trying to establish law and order. To add to their difficulties, the two governments began to quibble with one another. Pakistan charged India with negligence in failing to live up to agreements concerning the partition of resources. India charged that Pakistan was making excessive demands which went far beyond equity.

Another problem resulting from the transfer of power and partition was Kashmir. When the British left India, it was not simply a matter of transferring political control from one government to another. Transferring power involved the very complicated business of changing the patchwork quilt of British India to more simplified political structures in independent India and Pakistan.

British India was composed of two basic legal categories. In one category were those areas directly administered by the British government, i.e. the British Parliament, the Secretary of State for India, and the Viceroy. The British directly administered slightly more than half of the total surface area of India. The remaining portions of the country were divided up into more than 550 separate

²Being the larger of the two countries, India received the larger share of the resources. The military, for instance, was divided in the following way:

	INDIA	PAKISTAN
ARMY		
Armored regiments	12	6
Artillery regiments	15	8
Transport units	34	17
Hospitals	82	34
NAVY		
Sloops	4	2
Frigates	2	2
Minesweepers	12	4
Trawlers	4	2
AIR FORCE		
Fighter Squadrons	7	2
Transport squadrons	1	1
MILITARY STORES*	3	2

*India gave Pakistan 60 million rupees in lieu of ordnance factories which could not be moved.

Source: D. Som Dutt, "Foreign Military Aid and the Defense Strength of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study," *International Studies*, 8 (July, 1966-April, 1967), pp. 67-68.

princely states.³ Most of these states were exceedingly small and relatively insignificant, but some were large and tremendously important. The internal affairs of the states were administered by an hereditary prince with a government subordinate to him. Over the prince was the British government, which exercised what was called paramountcy. Through paramountcy, the British crown retained control of the diplomatic and military affairs of the various Indian states. The Indian states could not conduct international relations, nor were they completely free to conduct relations with other states in British India. The bridge between British-administered India and princely India was the Viceroy, who functioned as Governor General and crown representative.

The transfer of power of British-administered India was simply a matter of Britain transferring power to either India or Pakistan. But for the Indian states to be transferred from the system of paramountcy to the new political systems was a more complicated matter. The transfer of power involving the states was governed by the principle of accession.

The basic principle of Accession was that it was vested in the personal discretion of the Ruler, since he was an autocrat. But it was recognized that this discretion should be qualified by the geographical contiguity of the State to the successor Dominion, the communal composition of the State, and a plebiscite if necessary to ascertain the will of the people. . . . All but three of the five hundred sixty-five States had acceded by 14th August.⁴

For the most part, the accession of the princely states went smoothly. This was largely due to the fact that most of these states were ruled by Hindu princes; only about six were ruled by Muslims. A principality ruled by a Hindu which was located within India naturally acceded to India. In only three cases did problems of accession occur. One was Hyderabad, a state about the size of Germany with a population of roughly 17 million. The Nizam of Hyderabad, who was a Muslim, delayed the accession decision and

³There is no agreement on the exact number of these princely states. For instance, Alan Campbell-Johnson says there were 565, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1952), p. 357; Josef Korbel says there were 584, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 46; and Alistair Lamb says there were 562, *The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 3.

⁴Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-8. The instrument of accession itself recognizes the *Sovereignty* of the prince. This legal concept is an important aspect of the Indo-Pakistan controversy. See A. G. Noorani, *The Kashmir Question* (Bombay: P. C. Manaktala and Sons, Ltd., 1964), pp. 89-91.

eventually chose Pakistan. The issue was resolved in September, 1948, when the Indian army forcibly incorporated the state into India. A second holdout was Junagadh which acceded in September, 1947, to Pakistan. But the Indian army entered the state and forced a plebiscite, whereupon the people, a majority of whom were Hindus, decided to join India. The third case was Kashmir, which was not so easily resolved.

The First Kashmir Crisis

Kashmir borders on both India and Pakistan, so the contiguity principle does not immediately resolve the problem. Secondly, the majority of the population of Kashmir is Muslim, but the Maharaja was a Hindu. In terms then of population, Kashmir might have been expected to accede to Pakistan. But the inclinations of the Maharaja, being a Hindu, were toward India.

Foreseeing the likelihood of difficulties arising over the Kashmir question, Mountbatten encouraged the signing of standstill agreements between Kashmir and India and Pakistan. Standstill agreements would have provided that neither India nor Pakistan would force the issue. Pakistan signed such an agreement, but India delayed and never signed. As the Maharaja procrastinated, the situation in Kashmir deteriorated rapidly. In July, 1947, an uprising occurred in the Poonch area of West Kashmir. This uprising was apparently an effort to throw off the oppressive rule of the Maharaja.⁵ By October, the rebels were joined by Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan. While Pakistan did nothing to discourage the intervention, it is doubtful that the tribal rebellion was a Pakistani plot, as some Indians charged.

The tribal raid into Kashmir had far-reaching consequences. First, it forced the Maharaja's hand in that he could no longer delay a decision on accession. Secondly, it compelled India to react in the only feasible way—favorably toward Kashmir's accession to India. Third, it undermined Pakistan's position. Subsequent events placed Pakistan at a disadvantage. Since India held the initiative, it remained for Pakistan to regain some influence over the future of Kashmir.

The objectives of the four parties to the dispute varied. Mount-

⁵Lamb, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-8. The uprising does not appear to have been directed exclusively at Hindus, as killing was indiscriminate including Hindus, Muslims, Catholic nuns, and British military personnel and their families. Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 110-112.

batten was in a ticklish spot. He refused to send troops into Kashmir because this would violate the whole fabric of partition and accession. Nothing could be done, he argued, until Kashmir had acceded to India or Pakistan. Mountbatten noted further that Pakistan might interpret a sudden accession of Kashmir to India as a seizure of power. The result might be an even more dangerous and explosive situation. Therefore, Mountbatten encouraged the Indians to make it clear that should the Maharaja accede to India, the issue of accession would subsequently be put to a plebiscite. In this way, the final disposition of Kashmir would be resolved. The Indians agreed to Mountbatten's suggestion.⁶

The Indians could hardly contemplate any resolution of the Kashmir problem other than accession to India. The strategic importance of Kashmir to India and an unwillingness to give Pakistan anything beyond what was absolutely necessary kept India from taking a completely flexible position. The Indians assumed that the Hindu Maharaja would eventually accede to India and accordingly pursued a fairly cautious course. The tribal invasion thus played into Indian hands by forcing the Maharaja into making a decision in India's favor.

The Maharaja, by his delaying tactics, could hardly have had any objective in mind other than independence. Since he had little latitude for maneuver other than simply to delay the matter, he perhaps hoped that India and Pakistan would move into positions of stalemate, so that neither could force the issue on its own behalf. This would then allow the Kashmir government to become independent by force of circumstances. The tribal invasion, however, ruled such a goal out of the question.

It is rather difficult to determine the precise Muslim goals. Probably the tribal actions reflected long-standing grievances against the Dogra rule. The suggestion that the whole affair was a Pakistani plot is simply not credible. Even if they could have planned and engineered such an effort, which is doubtful, the likelihood of it ever producing results in their favor seems remote.⁷ Whatever the explanation, the first Kashmir crisis had begun.

Once the instrument of accession was signed, the Indians lost

⁶Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

⁷Many Indians were convinced that events in Kashmir and elsewhere were manifestations of a campaign against non-Muslims which the Muslim League had been planning for years. See, for example, *Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947* (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 1950), which "documents" in almost 500 pages the atrocities committed.

no time in providing military support for the defense of the territory. In addition, the Indians threatened to disrupt the transfer of resources to Pakistan unless Pakistan agreed to cease supporting the raiders.

On November 2, Nehru, who had become the first Prime Minister of independent India, announced that the Indian government favored a plebiscite as the way of permanently resolving the Kashmir problem. But India would agree to a plebiscite only under certain conditions.

We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer.

Meanwhile we have given our word to the people of Kashmir to protect them against the invader and we shall keep our pledge.⁸

Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, reacted negatively on the grounds that an impartial plebiscite could not be held because of the presence of Indian troops and an Indian controlled government in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir would be unable to express freely their feelings under such conditions.⁹

The Indian government was concerned lest the Kashmir problem produce repercussions with the Sikh population. As tensions and fighting continued in Kashmir, the likelihood of the Indian government keeping the Sikhs in check declined. The Sikhs and other communal minorities have always been a problem in India. Britain took advantage of India's cultural heterogeneity through the policy of "divide and rule." The same cultural differences have confronted independent India with major problems of maintaining unity. By obtaining Kashmir, the Indians were faced with still another divisive pressure. If Kashmir succeeded in separating itself from India, other groups — the Sikhs, for example — might be encouraged to attempt the same strategy.

Pakistan consistently denied any direct responsibility for or

⁸"Broadcast by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 November, 1947," in K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 75.

⁹"Statement by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, 16 November, 1947," in *Ibid.*, pp. 67-72.

involvement in the tribal disturbances. Pakistan officially regarded the activities of the Muslims in Kashmir as a native uprising against the regime of the Maharaja. The movement to overthrow Hindu rule in Kashmir is called "Azad Kashmir" (Free Kashmir) and included some former members of the Pakistani army. India charged that Pakistani officers, including a brigadier and many Pakistani army deserters, were involved in the revolt. According to Pakistan, the tribal uprising occurred when Muslims were massacred by Hindus. The tribesmen of Pakistan invaded Kashmir because of sympathy for their co-religionists and the desire to render assistance. India dismissed the charges of massacres and countercharged that Pakistan was guilty of simple aggression.¹⁰

At any rate, the activities of the Muslims forced the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to India. The way was thus opened for direct intervention by India in Kashmiri affairs. Events then moved rapidly to the point where military units of both India and Pakistan were involved. The fighting followed a line which bisected the state.

Both sides undoubtedly feared a full scale war which would have served the interests of neither. It seemed unlikely that either India or Pakistan could force the issue in its own favor by military means alone. The conditions were thus favorable for a cease fire. Acting on a petition from India, the United Nations was able to arrange a cease fire effective January 17, 1948.

The first Kashmir crisis thus opened a virtually unbridgeable gulf between Pakistan and India immediately upon achieving independence. Neither side was able to achieve its objectives in the initial confrontation over Kashmir. Particularly in the case of Pakistan, its principal desires remained unfulfilled. Given the likelihood that time was on the side of India, a resumption of hostilities in the future was to be expected.

The military confrontation over Kashmir heavily burdened the budgetary resources of both countries. In order to insure that the other side would not gain a rapid military victory, both countries maintained armies of considerable size in the disputed area. In the case of Pakistan, the Kashmir situation undoubtedly was a strong stimulus influencing the direction of its foreign policy for a number of years following the first crisis.

As far as Kashmir itself is concerned, the presence of both India

¹⁰See exchange of telegrams among India, Pakistan, and Great Britain in P. L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute* (Delhi: International Books, 1965), pp. 67-72. Also see Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955* (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958), p. 95.

and Pakistan effectively broke up all existing unity. The Pakistani portion governed by the Azad Kashmir government remains subordinated to Pakistan. The Azad government is in nominal charge of local political affairs, while defense and international affairs are in the hands of the government of Pakistan through a special ministry of Kashmir affairs established in 1949. Armed forces in the area are under the command of the Pakistani general staff and are composed of units of the Pakistani army and local Azad troops. The tribesmen who played such an important role in the initial crisis withdrew from Kashmir in 1949.

In the Indian portion, the Maharaja's government continued in an interim capacity pending elections for a new National Assembly. The strongest force in Kashmir politics was the National Conference headed by Sheik Abdullah, which eventually won all seats in the new National Assembly. The strength of the National Conference has been a source of some difficulties for the central government in New Delhi.

From the beginning, the Indian portion of Kashmir enjoyed considerable autonomy within the Indian union. In late 1951 the Kashmir government announced that except for defense, foreign affairs, and communications activities, the government of Kashmir would be entirely in the hands of the Kashmiris. The fact that the Indian government tolerated such a declaration of independence was a source of some irritation. Some people demanded that the Kashmir government be subordinated to the Indian constitution as all other Indian states were. Separatist groups looked upon the Kashmiri activity as perhaps signalling an opportunity for other states to win autonomy from the central government.¹¹

All this did not escape the attention of Prime Minister Nehru, although as late as July, 1952, he openly recognized the autonomous claims of Kashmir. But on August 9, Sheik Abdullah was arrested by the Indians and put into prison on charges of corruption, malpractices, disruptionism, and dangerous foreign contacts.¹² He remained there until his release in January, 1958. Taking his place as Prime Minister of Kashmir was Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who was more receptive to the wishes of India.

Initially, India enjoyed a stronger international position in the Kashmir crisis than did Pakistan. The Indians have always regarded

¹¹K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1960), p. 147.

¹²Sisir Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 264.


the accession of Kashmir to India as perfectly legal and the Pakistani involvement thus clearly illegal. The Indians regard their willingness to hold an internationally supervised plebiscite as being more than generous to Pakistan. But the two countries could never agree on the precise conditions under which the plebiscite should be held.

However, in the United Nations, the Indian position steadily deteriorated. It was the Indians who requested United Nations intervention in the first place, and many nations at first reacted favorably toward the Indian position. The United States, for instance, took a position at the beginning of the Kashmir problem that India was legally within its rights in Kashmir and that any activities on the part of Pakistan or other parties were in violation of this legality.¹³ The Indians were convinced that Pakistan was at fault and by placing the dispute before the United Nations, they were going out of their way to try to solve the problem equitably. While the international community initially sympathized with India and regarded Pakistan as the aggressor, India eventually received an equal share of the blame for the crisis. India's position degenerated from that of a country victimized by aggression to a mere participant in a case of conflicting interests. The Indians have always resented the fact that Pakistan came eventually to enjoy a position of equality with India over Kashmir.

The Indians have been particularly disillusioned by the development of American policy. The United States was initially sympathetic toward India and paid relatively little attention to Pakistan, but by the mid 1950's the emphasis had been reversed. As Pakistan proved more adaptable to American foreign policy than did India, the United States became increasingly sympathetic toward Pakistan's position *vis-à-vis* Kashmir. This is reflected in the growing insistence by the United States in the United Nations that the Kashmir problem be resolved by plebiscite. Thus, the United States, much to the displeasure of the Indians, minimized the legality of India's position.

India's desire to press for the legal and political integration of Kashmir into India in part reflects its fear of the political instability of Pakistan. It was feared that Pakistani leaders might exacerbate the Kashmir crisis in order to enhance their own insecure political

¹³The American United Nations representative endorsed the Indian position. "External sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is no longer under the control of the Maharajah. . . . With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner," quoted in Patwant Singh, *India and the Future of Asia* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 152.



positions. Accordingly, a political deterioration in Pakistan might result in renewed hostilities over Kashmir.¹⁴

Given the unsettled situation in the United Nations and the inclination of other countries, particularly the United States, to sympathize with Pakistan, India moved unilaterally to consolidate its position in Kashmir. Specific actions included, among others, the states reorganization bill passed in August, 1956, by the Indian parliament which listed Kashmir as one of the 14 Indian states. In November of the same year, the Kashmir constituent assembly adopted a constitution declaring Kashmir an integral part of India. In January, 1957, the United Nations declared these actions contrary to the commitment to hold a plebiscite. This action by the Security Council was ignored by India.

Despite the hardening of the Indian position, some authorities suggest that India remained willing to reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of the status quo in 1955. Norman Palmer suggests that Nehru made an offer for a status quo settlement, subject only to minor boundary adjustments, in 1955. However, Pakistan consistently refused such an offer.¹⁵

Conflicting Claims

The primary justification for India's claim to Kashmir is the legality of the Maharaja's accession to India. There can be little doubt that from a strictly legal point of view, India's claim is sound. However, taking into consideration the accession crises in Junagadh and Hyderabad as well as Kashmir, India's position is far from consistent. In Junagadh, an accession by a Muslim ruler to Pakistan was rejected by a plebiscite. In this case a majority of the population was Hindu. In Hyderabad, an accession decision by a Muslim Nizam was challenged by the Indians through an economic blockade. Eventually Hyderabad was taken over by Indian military occupation. The legality of these two accessions seems to be no more disputable than that of Kashmir, but the Indians challenged them nevertheless. In Kashmir, India refuses to hold a plebiscite, which would benefit the Muslim population as it benefited the Hindus in Junagadh, and deplores the

¹⁴Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai, *India and America: A Study in Their Relations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 90-91.

¹⁵Norman D. Palmer, *South Asia and the United States Policy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 239, and *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9.

use of Pakistani armed forces on moral grounds, which somehow did not apply to the use of Indian armed forces in Hyderabad.

While India's position in these three separate instances is inconsistent, an underlying ideological factor does help explain the Indian actions. India is committed to the "one nation theory" which holds that all British India should be included in a single national unit. The one nation theory emerged as a counter to the demand for two nations characteristic of Muslim separatist thinking prior to partition. The attempt to establish a separate Muslim state was based upon the claim that the Muslims could not survive in a state the majority of which were Hindus. Accordingly, Muslims should have their own state. The Hindu reply is that the Muslim two nation idea reflects the medieval theocratic nature of Islamic philosophy. Indian theorists consider themselves secularists, representing the best interests of both Hindus and Muslims. The Muslim demand for two states, on the other hand, is based upon reactionary and obscurantist philosophy.¹⁶

Given the Indian one nation theory, Pakistan's claim to existence is unsound at best. Since the one nation advocates had morality, progress, and goodness on their side, any attempts by the Indian government to thwart the ambitions of Pakistan are, therefore, justified. Accordingly, actions taken by India in the three accession crises merely reflect an attempt to implement the one nation theory.

The general acceptance of the one nation theory among Indians reinforces Pakistani feelings of insecurity *vis-à-vis* India. Both independence leaders, Nehru and Gandhi, were strongly opposed to the division of British India. Gandhi, for instance, never accepted partition and at one point considered fasting in an effort to prevent the partition decision from being implemented. However, he was convinced that such an effort would be fruitless, and he abandoned the fast. The one nation theory and Indian unwillingness to accept partition led

¹⁶The Muslims were adamant on the two nations idea and were disturbed that many Indians refused to accept it. "It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions." Jamilud-Dinahman (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore: Dashmiri Bazar, 1942), p. 153. Also see Arif Hussain, *Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy* (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 55-85.

Pakistan to suspect the Indians of intending to reunite the subcontinent by force if necessary.¹⁷

Another important consideration for India's point of view is the matter of security. Kashmir is located in a strategic position for both India and Pakistan, but particularly for India in the light of subsequent hostilities with China. But even as early as 1947, India was concerned about the security of the area.

We have received urgent appeal for assistance from the Kashmir Government. We would be disposed to give favorable consideration to such request from any friendly state. Kashmir's northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon its internal tranquility and existence of stable government, is vital to security of India, especially since part of southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir therefore, is an obligation of national interest in India.¹⁸

Should India lose control over the Kashmiri approaches to the Indian plains to either Pakistan or China, its strategic position would be considerably weakened. Moreover, since Pakistan has grown increasingly friendly with China, the Indians are more than ever concerned about this strategic area.

Pakistan offers many more justifications for its claims to Kashmir which in many cases are more compelling than those offered by India. Pakistan claims that the accession of Kashmir to India was not legal. The circumstances under which the Maharaja signed the accession agreement negated the legality of this agreement. Pakistan signed a standstill agreement with Kashmir, although India did not. This standstill agreement, argues Pakistan, prevented Kashmir from concluding any agreement with India. Second, Pakistan contends that the Maharaja was not legally competent to sign the instrument of accession, since his authority had been ended by the popular revolt. Third, the Indian government had maneuvered the Maharaja into a

¹⁷There can be little doubt that Pakistan is earnestly concerned about Indian intentions. "Therefore, India's occupation of Jammu and Kashmir is only a stage, only a part of India's intentions, to subjugate and destroy Pakistan itself," Z. A. Bhutto, *Indian Aggression and the Kashmir Dispute* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1965), p. 12.

¹⁸"Telegram from Prime Minister of India to Prime Minister of Great Britain," in Hasan, *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, op. cit.*, p. 62.

position where he was forced to accede. Therefore, the accession agreement was obtained under duress.¹⁹

Pakistan defends its intervention in Kashmir on the grounds that the Azad Kashmir movement was spontaneous and indigenous. The initial violence was not a matter of aggression, but rather one of civil war. Pakistani troops intervened in Kashmir only after the intervention of India threatened not only Kashmir, but the security of Pakistan as well. The Indian charge that Pakistan is guilty of aggression is meaningless, since the government of Kashmir had lost political control of its jurisdiction. Since there was no effective system of law in Kashmir at the time of accession, the claims of India are without foundation.²⁰

India agreed to a plebiscite on two conditions. First, Pakistani forces must be withdrawn, and second, Azad forces must be disbanded. Pakistan, on the other hand, charged that it would be impossible to hold a free plebiscite if India remained in control of Kashmir while Pakistani forces withdrew. On the contrary, Pakistan demanded full and equal rights in the dispute, the same as those claimed by India.

Pakistan charged India with never really intending to hold a plebiscite. Indian efforts to consolidate their position both legally and militarily in Kashmir and their unwillingness to agree to a plebiscite on grounds other than Indian control are cited as proof of this. Pakistan eventually concluded that the only way the matter could be resolved with satisfaction was by force of arms.

In May, 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with the United States. By entering into this agreement, Pakistan joined the American defense system. Since it had carefully remained aloof from not only the American defense system but from close association with the Soviet Bloc, India was disturbed by this Pakistani move.

The arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in August, 1952, and the Pakistan-United States Alliance disrupted negotiations between India and Pakistan over the settlement of the Kashmir question. Pakistan viewed the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah as indicating a hardening of India's position. India charged that Pakistan's military alliance with the United States upset the balance of power in South Asia. Accordingly,

¹⁹"Pakistan's Complaint Against India Submitted to United Nations Security Council," in Lakhanpal, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-118; Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

²⁰*Ibid.* The same claim is made by China with respect to areas along the Himalayan frontier. Since India does not have administrative control over disputed territory, a charge of aggression against China is groundless.

India could no longer honor its commitment to seek a negotiated settlement. In effect, India took the position that the only acceptable resolution of the Kashmir problem would be partition of Kashmir itself.

It is impossible to determine the significance of Pakistani irredentism in the Kashmir crisis. It is undoubtedly important, but the likelihood that Pakistan would be willing to go to great lengths on behalf of brother Muslims is questionable. There are, however, practical considerations which undoubtedly encouraged Pakistan to attempt a favorable resolution of the Kashmir problem. One of the most important of these practical considerations is water. There are two aspects to this matter: headwaters of major rivers and canal systems. All of Pakistan's major rivers have their headwaters in Kashmir. Before Pakistan achieved a division of Kashmir by military means, the headwaters were in the hands of the Indians. The Indians could have interrupted or diverted much of Pakistan's water supply. The desire to obtain control of the sources of their water is no doubt an important consideration for Pakistan.

The other aspect of the water controversy involves the system of canals built in the Punjab by the British during the 1860's and 1870's. Irrigation water carried by these canals spurred agricultural development. The network of canals was not built with the idea that the area would be eventually partitioned into two countries. But as a result of partition, Punjab was divided into an eastern portion which became part of India and a western portion which became part of Pakistan. The boundary between the two countries cuts the canal system in a most inappropriate way. Pakistan is the most affected in that it has more than three times the amount of acreage dependent for irrigation upon the canals than does India.

Temporary agreements between India and Pakistan over canal water expired in April, 1948, and as a result of Pakistan's failure to renew these agreements, water was cut off from the canals into Pakistan. This caused panic among Pakistani peasants and a hardening of Pakistan's attitude toward India.²¹

Probably the biggest obstacle to the settlement of conflicting claims to Indus Basin water by India and Pakistan is the fact that there is simply not enough water to accommodate the total needs of both countries. Both countries have plans for the utilization of Indus Basin water which involve more than their fair share of the maximum available. It seems clear that the only workable solution to this water

²¹Kotta P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs: A Review of India's Foreign Relations* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 185-6.

problem is one based upon some kind of cooperative agreement. The World Bank has played a key role in trying to work out a solution to this problem, but negotiations have been extremely slow and frustrating. An attempt to take the matter to the International Court of Justice for arbitration was defeated by the Indian claim that permanent resolution should be made by the states whose sovereign rights were in question. The Indians offered a counter proposal that the matter should be handled by a tribunal made up of judges from both of the disputing countries. Since 1952, negotiations have been conducted through the good offices of the President of the International Bank.²²

Developments in other parts of the world have occasionally influenced the Kashmir problem. This has been especially true for Pakistan. In 1949, Britain devalued the pound, and most other countries in the sterling area, including India, followed suit. However, Pakistan refused, and, when the Korean War broke out in 1950, was able to achieve considerable economic gain as a result of the high prices received for Pakistani raw materials. However, the balloon eventually burst; with its monetary system producing an artificial exchange rate, Pakistan's trade position rapidly deteriorated. The ensuing economic crisis may have encouraged Pakistan to accept American assistance.

Throughout the 1950's a steady stream of United Nations commissions and mediators went to Kashmir in an effort to achieve a permanent resolution of the problem. However, there was always some point or other which prevented agreement. A plebiscite was never held because India insisted that the Pakistani forces withdraw and Azad forces be disbanded first. Pakistan always refused such a precondition. When it appeared that partition would be the only feasible solution, disagreement over the location of the partition line prevented a formal decision to that effect. Both sides insisted that the Vale of Kashmir be allocated to them.

The United States and Britain, realizing that a permanent settlement by plebiscite was probably out of the question and that fighting might again break out, argued that the dispute should be settled by arbitration. This is unacceptable to India on the grounds that arbitration implies that Pakistan's claim is as legitimate as India's, which India has always denied on the grounds that Pakistan is the aggressor.

A final international influence is the attitude of the Soviet Union.

²²Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-181.

Since the mid-1950's the Soviets have been firmly on the side of India. Soviet spokesmen took the position that the Kashmir question has already been decided. Kashmir is a part of India and, accordingly, Pakistan is guilty of simple aggression. The problem will resolve itself if the aggressors leave the area. The Soviet Union became increasingly pro-Indian as Pakistan moved firmly into the American camp.²³

The Second Kashmir Crisis

By 1965, the situation from the point of view of Pakistan had changed in several ways. In the first place, Jawaharlal Nehru was no longer the leader of India. Nehru had been the guiding force behind the Indian foreign policy since independence. The unity that Nehru had maintained began to disintegrate after his death. Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a far less commanding figure. Second, for a number of years India had been consolidating its position in its portion of Kashmir. On several occasions the Indians made it clear that Indian-held Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian union. This diminished any hopes for a negotiated settlement, at least in terms of a unified Kashmir. Third, Pakistani President Ayub Khan had just decisively defeated his opponents in an election test. Ayub's electoral victory consolidated and strengthened his position. Fourth, since 1962 Pakistan and China had become increasingly accommodating toward each other's border claims. Their cooperation constituted a vise with Indian-held Kashmir in the middle. Fifth, India experienced increasing domestic difficulties during 1964 and 1965. On January 26, 1965, Indian Republic Day, Hindi became the official language of the union, thus arousing all of the countless linguistic conflicts that seethe below the surface of Indian politics. Finally, Indian harvests had been poor for several years in a row, and India faced serious food shortages. Linguistic problems and food shortages produced not a few riots. These internal problems combined to occupy the attention of the Indian leadership.

During the early part of 1965, a series of incidents involved Indian and Pakistani troops along the Kashmir cease fire line. These incidents mounted in intensity until in April major engagements occurred in the region of the Rann of Kutch.

²³Harish Kapur, "The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations," *International Studies*, 8 (July, 1966-April, 1967), pp. 150-157.

The Rann of Kutch is a relatively inconsequential piece of ground along the southwest border of India and Pakistan. For most of the year it consists of dry mud flats with some isolated scrub growth. During the monsoon season it is completely flooded and impassable. The Rann is a part of the boundary between India and Pakistan, and the two countries disagree over precisely where the boundary should be drawn. The Indians, relying upon some British decisions, claim that the whole of the Rann is part of India. Pakistan claims that the boundary should run through the middle of the Rann on the grounds that it is either a boundary lake or an inland sea. According to international law, when a body of water of this type constitutes a part of an international boundary, then the boundary line is considered to run through the middle of the body of water.²⁴

The dispute over the Rann of Kutch probably occurred as a result of these conflicting boundary interpretations. The Indians, figuring the boundary gives them the entire Rann of Kutch, moved military and border personnel into the area to enforce their claim. Pakistan would thus have had military personnel in areas claimed by India, and vice versa. Given the presence of military units of both countries in the same area, confrontation was inevitable. By whatever means the fighting started, the fact remains that it soon escalated into a major military engagement.

Neither side appeared willing to increase its military involvement, recognizing that fighting could easily escalate out of control. The impending monsoon season may also have moderated desires to press forward militarily. Accordingly, both sides agreed to a British mediated cease fire effective June 30, 1965. The status quo as of January 1, 1965, was to be restored and the border decided by arbitration.²⁵

The situation in Indian-held Kashmir began to deteriorate fairly rapidly during the middle of 1965. Sheik Abdullah was becoming less responsive to the wishes of Delhi. On May 8 he was arrested and removed by the Indian government to internment in South India. Supporters of Abdullah and groups advocating the league of Kashmir with Pakistan protested violently against the arrest. Resistance spread

²⁴"The Rann of Kutch Dispute," *Pakistan Horizon*, 18 (Fourth Quarter, 1965), p. 377.

²⁵The three man arbitral tribunal was composed of judges from Yugoslavia, Iran and Sweden. In February, 1968, after two years of fact gathering and deliberations, the tribunal awarded 90 per cent of the Rann to India and ten per cent to Pakistan. Although receiving the smaller portion, Pakistan accepted the decision. India, however, experienced major dissention over the award. A motion of no confidence was introduced in the Lok Sabha against Prime Minister Gandhi's government.

rapidly, and anti-Indian guerrilla activities soon occurred with much encouragement from the Pakistani side of the Kashmir cease fire line. In addition, clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops occurred with increasing frequency from May to July.²⁶

Confronted with the growing Kashmir crisis and the deteriorating Indian position, Prime Minister Shastri was persuaded by his military advisers to take strong action to stop the infiltration from Pakistani territories into Kashmir. Accordingly, in mid-August Indians attacked various Pakistani positions in the north. Pakistan reacted in September by sending armored units into the southern areas of Indian-held Kashmir with the obvious intention of cutting off the Indian main line of communications.

The Pakistani movement met with such success that the Indians were faced with a major setback in Kashmir and were prompted to escalate their military efforts. On September 6, three Indian columns invaded Pakistan. The Kashmir problem had finally given rise to a general war between India and Pakistan. In addition to armor and infantry engagements, both sides launched air attacks against population centers.

In spite of some initial success on both sides, it was soon clear that neither could hope to attain a complete victory. It does not seem likely that either country was expecting to resolve mutual differences by total war. Both had more limited objectives. But the means they chose to attain these objectives involved military operations resulting in the problem of escalation. The situation had gone beyond the point where either side wished to pursue the matter further. Accordingly, a cease fire was in order.

Western reaction to the Indo-Pakistani fighting was to suspend immediately military assistance to both countries. This suspension came eventually to include other forms of assistance in the hope of pressuring both sides to agree to a cease fire. The suspension of military aid fell most heavily upon Pakistan, which relied almost exclusively on the United States for military equipment. India was slightly better off, having received aircraft and armor from Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Pakistan was particularly distressed by the reaction of her western allies. She seems to have entertained the idea that participation in the American alliance system meant that should Pakistan get into a major military confrontation with India, her CENTO and SEATO allies would offer support. Not only was

²⁶For further discussion of these developments, see Lamb, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-134. India removed all restrictions on Abdullah in April, 1968.

this support not forthcoming, but her allies were exerting considerable pressure on Pakistan to stop fighting.²⁷

Arranging for an effective cease fire was not easy. The United States and Britain could not play active roles because their stock was discredited, particularly in the eyes of Pakistan. Other countries with an interest in the area, such as China, were for one reason or another unacceptable. The United Nations, through its Secretary General U Thant, met with only limited success in arranging a cease fire. However, a Security Council resolution, supported by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., demanded a cease fire to which both India and Pakistan agreed on September 23. Although the major hostilities had stopped, incidents continued along the cease fire line for several months to come.

The only country with the potential for mediating a more permanent settlement was the Soviet Union. On September 4, Premier Kosygin offered his good offices for negotiations. Although Pakistan was not wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the Russian intervention, both sides did agree to direct negotiations. The parties met in Tashkent on January 3, 1966. After an initial period of failure when the conference reached a point of imminent collapse, a sudden and dramatic announcement on January 10 revealed that agreement had been reached. On the following day, Prime Minister Shastri died.

The Declaration of Tashkent oddly enough had little to say about Kashmir itself.²⁸ Most attention was devoted to promises by both sides to attempt permanent resolution of their mutual difficulties. They agreed to conduct continuing discussions at high ministerial levels on a variety of matters of direct concern to both countries. A stipulation that both sides should withdraw to the established international boundaries of the 1949 Kashmir cease fire line was implemented in late February. Although discussions between the two countries did occur in the months to follow, they produced little of any consequence. Soon each side accused the other of violating the principle and spirit of the Declaration of Tashkent, and the situation by late 1966 had returned virtually to the status quo ante.

²⁷Cf. Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy," *Orbis*, 9 (Fall, 1965), pp. 613-629. Trager argues that the failure of the United States to support Pakistan in the interest of courting favor with India has undermined the American position in relation to both countries. Trager's argument is that the main issue concerning the United States in South Asia is the strategic threat from the north.

²⁸M. S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Studies*, 8 (July, 1966-April, 1967), pp. 1-28, and Der Sharma, *Tashkent: A Study in Foreign Relations with Documents* (Varanasi: Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1966).

2. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The United States government was relatively unconcerned by the 1947 Kashmir crisis, considering the Indian subcontinent as primarily the responsibility of the British. Even though the British had transferred control of the area to indigenous governments, as far as international politics were concerned, the British were regarded as the dominant power in the area. But even more importantly, the United States was preoccupied with Europe. The Kashmir crisis came at a time when the United States was heavily involved in helping repair the material damage to Europe resulting from the Second World War. The lines of confrontation in the Cold War with the Soviet Union were also developing at this time. It was really only after 1949 and the advent of Communist China that Asia became a major foreign policy concern of the United States.

The blockade of Berlin, the Czechoslovakian coup, the difficulties over Greece, the communist revolution in China, and general belligerence of communist countries suggested the expansionist nature of communism. These experiences occasioned a strong anti-communist orientation on the part of the United States. The official American view in the immediate post-war years was that communism is by nature expansionist, and if left unopposed will conquer or take over by internal subversion any country in its path. Accordingly, the United States as the strongest non-communist power to emerge from the Second World War has the moral responsibility of preventing communist expansion.²⁹

In order to contain the spread of communism, the United States developed an elaborate global strategy involving the creation of a system of alliances designed to prevent the aggression of communist countries against their neighbors.

The Korean War produced two significant shifts in American

²⁹See, for example, *Department of State Bulletin*, 28, (January 12, 1953), pp. 43-46; and 28 (March 2, 1953), pp. 331-333.

foreign policy. First, the sudden realization that communist expansion might most likely occur in Asia caused American policy makers to shift their attention away from Europe and toward the underdeveloped countries of the Near and Far East. Initially, the United States expected other western countries, particularly Britain, to preserve the territorial integrity of this area. But it soon became apparent that neither Britain nor France had the capability of defending such a long perimeter in the face of the guerrilla tactics employed by the communists. The second change was in the character of the American foreign assistance program. Foreign aid introduced first as temporary aid to Greece and Turkey and then implemented on a semipermanent basis in the Marshall Plan was intended primarily to provide the economic wherewithal to rebuild war-torn Europe. However, the Korean War brought a major de-emphasis in the economic aspects of foreign assistance in favor of military aid. From 1951 to 1956 more than half of American foreign assistance was of the military variety. Although most of the aid went to NATO countries, throughout the 1950's the proportion going to non-western countries increased significantly.

The United States and Pakistan

The problems of India and Pakistan were brought home to the United States in the early 1950's when both countries experienced serious famine conditions. In early 1952, India petitioned the United States for food assistance in order to relieve serious shortages. Congress responded by authorizing a gift shipment. In June, 1953, the United States gave one million tons of wheat to Pakistan. Later in the same year work began on a long-range program for the dispensation of surplus American agricultural products. This program came as a recognition of the long-term shortages that would be facing many underdeveloped countries. Since the United States had an existing problem of storing considerable agricultural surplus, the two circumstances went hand in hand to produce the Food for Peace Program, otherwise known as PL-480.

The Middle East was regarded by the United States as particularly vulnerable to aggression. Secretary of States Dulles toured the Middle East in 1953 in an effort to encourage the countries of the area to carry a larger share of the burden of their own defense. He had in mind a Middle Eastern defense system patterned after the

NATO alliance. Recognizing the need for enthusiasm and cooperation on the part of the Middle Eastern countries for such an alliance, the Secretary of State offered a promise of American assistance as an inducement. He reported back that many of the countries in the area were receptive to his suggestion.³⁰

As British influence in the Middle East declined, the United States considered it increasingly imperative that some kind of defense arrangements be encouraged. Accordingly, in early 1954 the United States conferred with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran on the subject of mutual defense. These discussions soon led to a series of bilateral assistance pacts between the United States and various Middle Eastern countries. Two of the earliest participants in this program were Turkey — already a member of NATO — and Pakistan. Other Arab countries were not enthusiastic about the American program. Egypt and Syria in particular were extremely critical of American military alliance policies in the Middle East. The Arab countries most receptive to an alliance scheme were those countries nearest the Soviet Union. These countries, known as the northern tier states, entered into a defensive agreement in November, 1955, when Great Britain, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and later Iran formed the Baghdad Pact.

Pakistan had always been receptive to the idea of a defensive alliance with the United States. No doubt the Pakistanis were less concerned with the possibilities of Soviet aggression than with using a defensive alliance with the United States as a vehicle for improving Pakistani international prestige and, even more importantly, obtaining sizeable assistance.

Americans were encouraged by the Middle Eastern developments. The Baghdad Pact was looked upon as reducing the dangers of small wars like Korea. Also, the United States hoped that the Baghdad Pact would set an example for other countries to follow.³¹

Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1958 following a coup which overthrew the government. Subsequently, the alliance was known as the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. Curiously, the United States is not a member of the alliance, but actively supports it through sizeable economic and military assistance.

The most decisive factor in undermining the potential for agreement on Kashmir was American military assistance to Pakistan. As an important element of the alliance system, the United States agreed to supply military equipment to member nations of the various alliances. Such military assistance was all part of the total policy

³⁰*Department of State Bulletin*, 30 (March 1, 1954), p. 327.

³¹*Department of State Bulletin*, 30 (April 19, 1954), p. 581.

design. First, nuclear attack against the United States or free world countries would be deterred by American nuclear strength. Second, massive conventional assaults against the free world would also be deterred by nuclear weapons. The reliance upon nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack derived from the inability of western nations to match Chinese and Soviet conventional military capabilities. Third, probing kinds of aggression similar to the Korean experience were to be contained by developing the local military capabilities of members of the various alliances. This military capability was to come about largely as a result of arms assistance, and to a lesser extent economic assistance, to the member countries. From the point of view of a recipient country like Pakistan, membership in one of the alliances was a convenient way of obtaining considerable American aid.

From the point of view of American policy, military assistance to Pakistan was necessary if communist aggression against Pakistan was to be prevented. Assuming the communists intended to invade Pakistan if given the opportunity, the best way to prevent this would be to develop Pakistan's capability of dealing with at least a minimal kind of aggression. Accordingly, on February 25, 1954, the United States announced that military assistance would be given to Pakistan to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Middle East. Rumors of the possibility of such aid circulated as early as November, 1953, seriously disrupting Indian-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister Nehru informed Pakistan that should American military assistance be accepted by Pakistan, this would affect the future of the Kashmir problem.

Nehru raised three main objections to American military assistance. First, Nehru argued that by receiving American military aid, Pakistan has brought the Cold War to the Indian subcontinent. Thus, the stability that India wanted in order to develop its internal affairs was threatened. Second, military aid to Pakistan upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan, thus forcing the Indians to take remedial action. Third, the United States had established a foothold in South Asia, thus raising the possibility of some new kind of western dominance of the area.³² Thus, rather than promoting international stability, American support of Pakistan has contributed to the instability of South Asia.

Pakistan countercharged that by showing great concern for the military situation in South Asia, India is really masking its own

³²"Letter of the Prime Minister of India addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan 9 December 1953," in Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-347. Also see Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

motives. Ayub Khan argued that United States military aid to Pakistan is intended entirely for defensive purposes. Accordingly, India's desire for assurances that the agreement between the United States and Pakistan would not lead to the use of American military equipment against India means simply that India wants a guarantee from the United States that it will not support Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression. According to Pakistan, India has always contemplated reuniting the Indian subcontinent by force. In order to achieve this end, the Indians want guarantees from the United States that there will be no interference when the time comes to take over Pakistan by force.³³

It should be noted, however, that Pakistan was extremely critical of India's acceptance of military assistance from other countries when it was attacked by China in 1962. But, again, from the point of view of Pakistan, the Indians were merely masking their intentions of conquering Pakistan. President Ayub Khan argued that there is really no need for India to improve its military position *vis-à-vis* China, because the Sino-Indian border problem can be resolved peacefully. According to Ayub, the Chinese are willing to seek a pacific settlement; it is the Indians who are standing in the way of such an agreement. The Indians are building up their military capacity not in order to defend themselves against China, but eventually to engage in military operations against Pakistan.³⁴

The United States became even more concerned about the stability and integrity of the Middle East in 1956 as a result of the Suez crisis. The ill-fated Anglo-French military adventure strengthened the Soviet position in the Middle East. The popularity of Britain, the most important western power in the Middle East, sank to a new low after 1956. The United States moved rapidly in an attempt to fill this western power vacuum by promising even more American support for the Arab states, particularly the northern tier states. President Eisenhower sought to reaffirm explicitly American policies and intentions with respect to the Middle Eastern area. This statement took the form of a special message to Congress in January, 1957, declaring what subsequently came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The President sought congressional support for this doctrine via a joint resolution which was passed March 9, 1957, by sizeable majorities in both houses. Essentially, the Eisenhower Doctrine stipulates that

³³Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Pakistan Perspective* (Washington: Embassy of Pakistan, 1965), pp. 18-28.

³⁴Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan American Alliance: Stresses and Strains," *Foreign Affairs*, 42 (January, 1964), pp. 196, 204.

the United States is willing to support any country in the Middle East requesting such assistance in "resisting aggression from any country controlled by international communism."³⁵ This doctrine was denounced by Egypt and Syria as an attempt to re-establish Western colonial influence.

The situation confronting American foreign policy in the Middle East is much the same as that in South Asia. The United States has addressed itself to policy objectives in the Middle East which are, to a large extent, irrelevant to the political situation in that area. The important dimensions of political rivalry in the Middle East are not so much between communism on the one hand and forces of non-communism on the other. No doubt the Soviet Union would very much like to increase its influence in the Middle East, a task in which it has enjoyed considerable success. But this is altogether different from claiming that the Soviet Union intends, if given the slightest opportunity, to take over its southern neighbors by traditional forms of aggression. The most important aspect in Middle Eastern international affairs is the relationship between the Arab countries and Israel. This has been true since 1947 and continues to be true today. The activities of the great powers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States, are dependent variables in this rivalry between the Arabs and the Israelis. The United States has tended to look upon communism as the independent variable which must be dealt with as a matter of first priority.

American policy makers suggest that the existence of the Central Treaty Organization has been a major factor in deterring communist aggression. It would be impossible to deny that such is the case, but it is also equally impossible to prove that such is the case. It can be proven, however, that the machinery of CENTO is more than sufficient to channel sizeable American military and economic assistance to the participating countries. And, as in the case of South Asia, this assistance helped provide the wherewithal for upsetting the very stability the United States hoped to achieve by extending the aid in the first place.³⁶

³⁵Alexander De Conde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 755-756.

³⁶The alliance system placed the United States in an awkward position in 1961 when India seized Goa. India has considered itself more than patient in waiting for Portugal to voluntarily leave the small enclave on the west coast of India. Finally unable to resist the nationalist pressures any longer, Nehru agreed to evict the Portuguese by force. Since Portugal is a member of NATO, the United States felt obliged to side with her ally and criticize Indian "aggression." American prestige in India was not enhanced by openly siding with the detested practice of colonialism.

Pakistan is linked with the United States through a second defensive alliance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Established in September, 1954, SEATO includes — in addition to Pakistan and the United States — Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, and the Philippines. SEATO is the third major link in the chain of defensive alliances ringing the communist world. As with the Middle East and South Asia, Southeast Asia has involved the United States in another regional conflict situation. The conflict here, however, differs from the other two in that the United States is directly and massively involved in the conflict itself. Since 1965, the United States has introduced more than a half million military personnel into South Vietnam. Now the United States is no longer just helping an ally but is carrying the major burden of the war. The same, of course, cannot be said for the Middle East or South Asia. Yet, one might wonder what would have happened in June, 1967, had the Arabs threatened to overrun Israel. Or what might have happened in South Asia in 1962 had China threatened to overrun India. The point is, the communists in Vietnam were within striking distance of establishing control over the whole of Vietnam, and the United States considers such an eventuality intolerable.

Of all the SEATO members, France, Britain, and Pakistan are not direct participants in the Vietnam fighting. Other countries besides the United States are involved, although minimally. Thailand is having some difficulties of its own with communist insurgency. But Pakistan does not participate in the allied effort, nor for that matter does it support American policy in Southeast Asia. This results in large part from the cooperation and understanding that has developed between Pakistan and China during the early 1960's. Suffice it to say that Pakistan has received American assistance and support through the medium of SEATO, but Pakistan does not support the activities of the organization nor the policies of the United States.

American assistance to Pakistan has always been an extremely important part of the Pakistani economic and military picture. From 1946 to 1964 total American economic aid to Pakistan was in excess of 2.5 billion dollars. During the first five-year plan, almost one-half of the Pakistani budget came from external sources, mostly from the United States. The second five-year plan included about the same percentage of foreign assistance, but twice the amount of the first plan. Although India receives a higher dollar amount of foreign assistance from the United States than does Pakistan, the amount of

aid to Pakistan is more in per capita terms and in percentage of the total budget.³⁷

As has been pointed out before, Pakistan was a willing recipient of American military assistance and has consistently pressured the United States for even more commitments. Pakistan has argued all along that it is unable to fulfill its role in the alliance system without greater American assistance.³⁸

However naive it proved to be, the United States decision to support Pakistan militarily was intended to achieve the goal of containing Soviet aggression. There can be little doubt that American foreign policy makers actually perceived the major problem of the area and the world to be the threat of Soviet and later Chinese aggression. The best way of dealing with this was, in the view of these policy makers, a military alliance system supported by military and economic assistance from the United States.

But American policy drove a wedge between the United States and India. President Eisenhower attempted to allay Indian suspicions over the American military aid program to Pakistan by emphasizing the desirability of strengthening Pakistan's defensive capability and reassuring the Indians that the United States would not allow American military equipment to be used against India. The President's statement, in the form of a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, is clear and unequivocal on this point. He even held open the possibility that similar arrangements could be forthcoming in the future between the United States and India.

Having studied long and carefully the problem of opposing possible aggression in the Middle East, I believe that consultation between Pakistan and Turkey about security problems will serve the interests not only of Pakistan and Turkey but also of the whole free world. Improvement, in Pakistan's defensive capability will also serve these interests and it is for this reason that our aid will be given. . . .

What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. And I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. . . .

³⁷Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-143.

³⁸See, for example, *New York Times*, November 17, 1955, p. 14.

We also believe it in the interest of the free world that India have a strong military defense capability and have admired the effective way your Government has administered your military establishment. If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration.³⁹

Indian doubts as to the reliability of these assurances and the extent to which the United States could prevent Pakistan from misusing military equipment, even if it tried, are not entirely a product of overactive Indian imaginations. One of the main problems recognized even by Americans is that Pakistan does not always use military assistance in the fashion for which it was intended. The United States expects Pakistan to strengthen its military positions along the northern frontier, i.e., the frontier closest to the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, however, chooses to place its military strength along its southern frontier, i.e., its frontier with India. A House Foreign Affairs Committee study of March, 1961, points out that the United States military had been concerned for some time over Pakistan's tendency to develop its military posture more with reference to India than with reference to the Soviet Union or China.

For instance, American funds have been provided for building military cantonments in Pakistan. Department of Defense specifications state that the location of these cantonments should be "in relation to the most likely direction of Soviet-led or inspired attack." The Pakistanis, however, tended to build these cantonments more with a mind to possible future military activities against India.⁴⁰

The reaction of the United States to the second Kashmir crisis caused even more consternation among the Indians. It will be recalled that President Eisenhower had assured India that American military equipment would not be used by Pakistan against India. If such were the case, the United States would actively and forcefully intervene. But, rather than following such a policy, the United States chose to suspend all assistance to both India and Pakistan and to place emphasis upon the United Nations for resolving the problem. India charged that by placing the matter in the United Nations, the United States admitted its helplessness in controlling Pakistan's use

³⁹*Department of State Bulletin*, 30 (March 15, 1954), p. 400.

⁴⁰U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report on U.S.-Financed Military Construction at Kharian and Multan in West Pakistan*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 4.

of American arms. The Indians were also disturbed that the United States suspended not only military assistance, which was minimal to India but significant to Pakistan, but also suspended for a short time all food and economic aid to India.⁴¹

Selig Harrison has argued that Pakistan's reaction to the Southeast Asian crisis suggests less enthusiasm for containing communism than for pursuing an independent policy line. In 1962, the United States began a troop build-up in Thailand. Some other SEATO members followed suit, but not Pakistan. Pakistan declined on the grounds that it could not spare the troops because of the continued Indian threat. There are some doubts about the extent to which India was threatening Pakistan, as evidenced by the fact that during this period the Indians had sizeable military contingents in two United Nations peace keeping forces. An Indian brigade participated in the Congo operation, and Indians constituted the largest contingent in the Gaza Strip force. Although Pakistan did not contribute forces to Thailand because of a fear of India, it was able, in the matter of a few months, to send 1500 troops to West New Guinea to constitute a United Nations force in that area. The inconsistency is explained perhaps by the fact that Pakistan had agreed not to allow its membership in SEATO and receipt of American military equipment to be used to frustrate Chinese aims in Asia. Since the situation in West New Guinea was not of immediate interest to China, Pakistan could participate in this activity without fear of interfering with Chinese ambitions. The same principle applies to Pakistan's refusal to support American Vietnam policy.⁴²

In March, 1963, the Pakistanis announced the widely reported agreement with China over the Sino-Pakistani boundary. This boundary included sizeable portions of Pakistan-held Kashmir. By agreeing with Pakistan on the location of the boundary, China thus placed even more pressure on India in the continuing crisis over the Sino-Indian boundary.⁴³ In addition, Pakistan and China agreed to establish regular air service between the two countries. These developments indicate the cooperation between Pakistan and China, and the resulting isolation of India.

⁴¹Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁴²See series of articles by Selig Harrison, *New Republic*, August 10-September 7, 1959.

⁴³"Boundary Agreement Between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and Pakistan, 2 March 1963," in Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp. 384-397.

The United States and India

Asia and the developing countries in general have confronted American foreign policy with circumstances altogether different from those experienced in Europe. During the 1950's American foreign policy tended to be unaccommodating toward countries and policies which did not conform to official American views. One policy in particular met with American disapproval. This was the policy of nonalignment pursued by many underdeveloped countries, particularly India. India did not choose to participate in Cold War politics and looked upon communist and non-communist countries as being equally guilty of threatening the peace and tranquility of the world. American policy makers considered India either dishonest or at best terribly naive. Secretary of State Dulles at one point argued that nonalignment, or neutrality as he called it, is a shortsighted and immoral conception.⁴⁴ In other words, if you're not with us, then you must be against us. Moreover, Indians retain what freedom they enjoy only because of the effective opposition to communism afforded by the United States and other countries participating in the alliance system. India remains free to pursue its policy of nonalignment only as long as free world countries are willing to defend it. Accordingly, many Americans, particularly in Congress, criticized India's attitude toward the United States and the Cold War on the grounds that Indians enjoy freedom as the result of free world efforts, but were unwilling to carry their fair share of the burden.⁴⁵

Indians are almost as hostile toward military alliances as Americans are hostile toward communism. India has always been especially critical of those alliances involving the underdeveloped world, i.e., CENTO and SEATO. These alliances bring Cold War politics to areas which would be free of power struggles if Americans were not so interested in developing military alliances. As the United States proceeded with its policy of building a chain of alliances around the communist world, India moved in the opposite direction by withdrawing more and more into the protective shell of nonalignment.

Indians argue that American criticism of nonalignment misses the point. Nehru consistently argued that the foreign policy posture of nonalignment is the only meaningful foreign policy course open to developing countries. Nonalignment has both practical and moral

⁴⁴*Department of State Bulletin*, 34 (June 18, 1956), pp. 999-1000.

⁴⁵See, for example, *New York Times*, April 17, 1954, p. 3, and June 10, 1956, p. 1.

advantages. From the practical point of view, underdeveloped countries have neither the time nor the resources to devote to the generally unrewarding game of international power politics. Since India is not directly involved in the Cold War, its vision and judgment are not clouded by self-interest. India can be equally critical of both sides, which it has proved to be on a number of occasions, from the point of view of morality.⁴⁶

It is significant to note that during the 1950's the United States seemed to take the morality of nonalignment seriously. During this period Americans were extremely sensitive to Indian criticism of American foreign policy. Whenever the Indian government criticized some aspect of American foreign policy, the reaction in the United States was to damn India for its ingratitude. Moreover, the occasional summit conferences among nonaligned countries drew large attendance and widespread news coverage and concern in other parts of the world. In recent years the nonaligned summit conferences have been poorly attended, the attention given to them by western countries has been minimal, and almost everyone seems unconcerned with what the developing countries say about American foreign policy. It seems that the policy of nonalignment has lost much of its moral impact.

Since the early 1950's, India has claimed a sizeable portion of the American foreign assistance dollar. Since 1950 when 1.2 million dollars under the Point Four Program was allotted to India for five specific projects, American economic assistance to India has totaled more than five billion dollars. These funds have covered a wide variety of programs, including development aid, technical assistance, commodity assistance such as fertilizers and machinery and various kinds of training programs. One of the most widely publicized American assistance programs to India has been famine relief. It is surely no exaggeration to say that the disasters visited upon India as a result of food shortages would have been considerably more severe without the sizeable food contributions provided by the United States. Many of these food aid programs are either gifts or grants. That is, in some cases shipments of surplus wheat were given outright to the Indian government or grants of money were made available whereby the Indians could purchase American foodstuffs. Even where India is supposed to buy American agricultural commodities under the PL-480 program, the money never actually leaves India. The funds allocated by the Indian government for American food

⁴⁶See Statement by Nehru, *New York Times*, December 19, 1956, p. 1.

imports are placed in special accounts in Indian banks to be used by the United States in India for specific projects subject to the approval of the Indian government. Presently, the United States has extensive rupee holdings in Indian banks as the result of the PL-480 program. The United States has relatively little use for these funds beyond a few educational and related programs.

Up until about 1957, most American aid to India was in the form of grants. These amounted to outright gifts from the United States to India in that repayment was not expected. After 1957, largely as a result of growing congressional hostility toward grant-aid, American assistance to India increasingly took the form of loans rather than grants. Under these conditions, the Indians were expected to repay the United States for the assistance it received. India was not the only country subject to these provisions. The shift from grant to loan status was a general change in the foreign assistance program. But, as was mentioned above with food aid, the terms of American assistance loans remain quite generous. Repayment need not begin for a number of years, and interest is usually very low.

As with Pakistan, foreign contributions play an extremely important role in the development planning of the Indian economy. The first three five-year plans included increasingly larger percentages of foreign contributions. The first plan called for 6 per cent of the total Indian budget to come from foreign sources. The second called for 13 per cent and the third for 25 per cent. The largest single share of these foreign investment funds to India came from the United States.⁴⁷

In addition to the very extensive governmental assistance programs to India, many private American agencies have contributed extensively to Indian development. Many American universities have participated in various aspects of Indian development with financial support from the Indian or the American governments. Contributions from private philanthropic foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller have also been important. American universities and foundations have been particularly involved in the area of agricultural economics.

In contrast to Pakistan, India has received relatively little military assistance from the United States. Up until 1962, the Indians placed minor emphasis upon the development of their military capability. After the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, it became apparent that the Indian military was relatively inefficient and incapable of dealing with any major confrontation with China. The difficulties encountered by the Indian army against the Chinese may have

⁴⁷Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-142.

encouraged Pakistan to take advantage of this weakness resulting in the second Kashmir crisis.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 considerably altered the international politics of South Asia. India was unquestionably the most significantly affected. In the first place, the carefully constructed but extremely fragile philosophy of foreign policy known as non-alignment was all but destroyed by the Chinese. India had consistently attempted to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with the Chinese. India has traditionally been sympathetic toward China for a variety of reasons. Both had experienced western imperialism with the resulting hostility of non-white people to European colonialism. Indian sympathy for China increased considerably when China suffered at the hands of Japanese imperialism, and there was mutual sympathy and cooperation between the two countries throughout World War II. Even after the communist take-over in China in 1949, the Indian government attempted to maintain cordial relations. India has consistently supported Chinese entry into the United Nations and has been critical of American policies in Asia, particularly with respect to Korea and Southeast Asia where Chinese interests are at stake.

Apparently Nehru actually believed that it would be possible for the Indians to remain aloof from all power struggles and to be friendly and cooperative with all countries. He did not mean that nonalignment would keep India aloof from international politics. Rather, India wanted to cooperate with all nations. What Nehru did not reckon with was the likelihood that India would herself become involved in a power struggle. Even though India may not have desired such a confrontation, the Chinese thrust one upon her.

The position of the United States in South Asia was also significantly altered. In one sense, the Indians were forced into a much closer cooperative relationship with the West. But in another sense, the Sino-Indian border war weakened the effectiveness of existing American policies in Asia. By coming to the support of India, albeit with tremendous hesitation and reservation, the United States lost much of its influence with respect to Pakistan.

On October 20, 1962, after several years of minor engagements between Indian border personnel and units of the Chinese army, large-scale fighting broke out between Indian and Chinese forces. China had, for a number of years, been consolidating its position along the Himalayan frontier. In 1962, India attempted to reverse this pattern. Indian Defense Minister Menon vowed that the Indian

army would take a heavy toll of the Chinese and would throw them out of the Indian territory they had already occupied. But the Indian military was helpless in the face of a disciplined and effective Chinese counterattack. Indian forces were pushed back all along the frontier, and it was soon evident that the Indian army could not check the Chinese advance unassisted. Accordingly, on October 30, Nehru made an urgent request for United States military assistance. Such assistance was immediately pledged and other western countries, notably Britain and Canada, made similar pledges.⁴⁸

Indian forces proved to be poorly equipped to fight in the rugged Himalayan terrain. The troops rushed to the area did not have proper clothing or equipment, and supply was all but impossible. While the Chinese had carefully built a number of roads to supply their forces, the Indians were dependent upon pack trains, which often took many days to reach the forward areas. American and other assistance was initially intended to help correct this equipment shortage. By late November the United States had supplied the Indians with aircraft for transportation purposes, and some American Air Force pilots were ferrying Indian troops. Western countries agreed generally to support the Indians as long as they were faced with the Chinese threat, but they also took great pains to point out that military assistance would not be continued on a long-term basis.⁴⁹

By February, 1963, the United States acknowledged that the emergency military assistance program had involved about 60 million dollars worth of military equipment to India. An approximately equal amount had been provided by Britain and other commonwealth countries. Assistance had been designed primarily to arm mountain divisions suitable for fighting in the Himalayan terrain.

One of the touchiest subjects was air defense. The Indians were concerned over their defensive weakness should the Chinese decide to attack Indian cities. Therefore, they requested a protective screen from the United States and perhaps a commitment of interceptor aircraft for eventual Indian use. The United States resisted this pressure, but did agree to conduct a survey of the defense needs of India, including interceptor aircraft. Some American aircraft were located in India for a relatively short time.⁵⁰

After some initial delay, the Soviet Union agreed to supply the Indians with MIG aircraft. Initially only a half dozen planes were sent, but the Soviets promised to let the Indians build a MIG factory

⁴⁸*New York Times*, October 30, 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁹*New York Times*, November 23, 1962, p. 1 and December 4, 1962, p. 10.

⁵⁰*New York Times*, June 20, 1963, p. 5.

which could assemble MIG aircraft for use by the Indian military. The first Soviet planes were sent in January, 1963. In February, the United States sent C-119 transports to the Indians. The United States, Britain, and Canada continued to be hesitant about sending interceptors, although they renewed their pledge to continue assisting India so long as the threat from China remained.⁵¹

By late 1964, the United States had agreed to help India manufacture supersonic fighters if the Indians would agree to drop their plans to build Soviet MIGs. The Indians immediately rejected the offer, and the Soviet Union agreed to supply still more MIGs and help build additional assembly plants. But India did not shun all Western aid. An American ammunition plant, which had been transplanted from St. Louis, began operations. A British promise to help strengthen the Indian Navy was also welcomed.⁵²

But by the time the Indians had developed their military capabilities to the point where they could anticipate greater success in dealing with the Chinese invasion, the Chinese had apparently achieved their objectives. Accordingly, no permanent resolution of the border conflict was achieved. Rather, the front more or less stabilized along a point defined by the Chinese forces. The Indians, nevertheless, continued to strengthen their defensive capabilities in the area. Several Western countries continued to supply India with military assistance until the outbreak of the second Kashmir crisis, whereupon Western assistance was suspended.

The initial American decision to withhold all military assistance to both countries was implemented for only a short period of time. Soon Pakistan was receiving shipments of spare parts. Eventually Pakistan was able to obtain updated American tanks from western Europe. These transactions have the blessing of the United States. The only stipulation is that for every piece of modern equipment received, Pakistan must agree to retire a counterpart piece of obsolete equipment.⁵³ But American involvement in Vietnam and Britain's withdrawal from commitments east of Suez have forced both India and Pakistan to seek other sources of military supplies. India receives support from the Soviet Union, while Pakistan looks toward Red China. In August, 1968, the Soviets announced their decision to supply Pakistan with military assistance.

In spite of the seemingly unbridgeable policy differences between

⁵¹*Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 48 (February 25, 1963), p. 276.

⁵²*New York Times*, August 22, 1964, p. 2, September 22, 1964, p. 7, October 2, 1964, p. 4, and November 27, 1964, p. 3.

⁵³*The Milwaukee Journal*, March 31, 1968, p. 5.

the two countries, India and the United States have gotten along remarkably well. For their part, the Indians have shown considerable patience with the strange quirks of American foreign policy. True, the Indians have been extremely critical of some American policies, but with the exception of Congress, these disagreements have not disrupted a generally favorable atmosphere of cooperation between the two countries. Although some would have preferred doing so, the United States has not shown great indignation because of Indian refusal to cooperate with some of the many American global involvements. However, Americans may have been far less accommodating to the Indians were it not for the great importance attached to successful development of Indian democracy. The belief is widely shared among Americans that the existence of a democratic regime in India is vital to the preservation of all non-communist countries in Asia. If India should fail to develop peacefully by democratic means or should it succumb to communism, there is good reason to believe that all Asia will be eventually lost.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The Concerns of American Security Policy

The twists and turns of international politics since World War II have produced numerous instances of frustration for American foreign policy makers. A revolution of major proportions occurred in America's international position both during and after the war. The long tradition of isolationism was over and massive involvement in international affairs became the rule. Perhaps the American goal of peace through international cooperation was a visage never to approach realization. Nevertheless, the U.S. has consistently attempted to act in concert with other nations whenever possible rather than to pursue strictly unilateral policies. In security policy, in particular, the U.S. has sponsored and supported multi-lateral efforts at preventing and meeting aggression.

The goals and the motives behind these policies are not subject to serious challenge. But, as this study has attempted to show, the specific actions of the U.S. in pursuit of its goals have often led to frustrations and occasionally to results contrary to American desires. The security situation in South Asia and particularly the problem of Kashmir is a good example of the kinds of problems confronting American security policy. To a large extent, problems of American security policy stem from inaccurate and simplistic perceptions of the problem of security itself.⁴⁴

Experience of two world wars in Europe conditioned Americans to view the central problem of international relations as the prevention of major conflicts. As a result, the overriding American international

⁴⁴See, for example, Ross Stagner, *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict* (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 1-50.

goal has been to prevent a potential aggressor nation from dragging the world into a third world war. The expansion of communism and the belligerent posture of the Soviet Union after the war suggested a threat of major aggression. Suspicion of Russian intentions has been reinforced by the deep seated American hostility toward communism. Russian imperialism and international communism became more or less synonymous as far as the U.S. was concerned.

Soviet activities in Europe were proof, in the view of American policy makers, that communism is by nature expansionistic and that communist countries will seek to extend their control over other countries if given the opportunity. The main task of American foreign policy, therefore, is to deny this opportunity. The thrust of American diplomatic, military and economic policy has, as a result, been directed toward the containment of communism. Actually, almost all foreign policy problems have been perceived as parts of or somehow related to the general security threat of communism. Even the problems of underdevelopment have often been seen in these terms. The U.S. should help relieve famine, for instance, because hungry people are susceptible to the lures of communism. This is not to minimize the humanitarian element of the foreign aid program, but to illustrate the central position given to the problem of communism in foreign policy.

Through a system of multilateral and bilateral alliances, the U.S. fashioned a defensive system designed to contain communist expansion. In the realm of nuclear strategy, American policy makers hoped to thwart Soviet attack on the U.S. and Western Europe by the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The line was clearly drawn; communist aggression would be met with vigorous response.

During the 1950's, problems such as economic development, food shortages, and political instability were generally not regarded as problems in and of themselves. American foreign policy makers tended to consider these problems as dimensions of the overall security problem posed by communism. American foreign policy attention has tended to increase in direct proportion to the immediacy of the perceived security threat. The U.S. was first concerned with the threat to Europe. Then, with the Chinese communist revolution and the Korean War, attention was diverted to Asia. The declining influence of Britain in the Middle East and growing Soviet involvement there produced the Eisenhower doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. Castro's Cuba produced the Alliance for Progress and great concern for security in this hemisphere. In each instance the volume of foreign

aid was almost in direct proportion to the severity of the security problem.

Since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the "brinkmanship" of Soviet-American relations has given way to greater cooperation and mutual understanding. Both countries agree to the need for a reduction of arms competition as the partial test ban and non-proliferation treaties and the decision to hold disarmament talks testify. There is considerable understanding and cooperation between the two countries in keeping conflicts limited and confined in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

But while the U.S. has accommodated itself to a major Soviet role in international affairs, the rigid anti-Soviet strategy developed during the 1950's has occasioned American involvement or "commitment" in several international trouble spots. The implementation of the global strategy of containment from the Middle East to East Asia was achieved at the expense of ignoring *regional* security considerations.

South Asian Security Problems and U.S. Policy

South Asia is one of the best examples of the consequences of the failure of American foreign policy to accommodate itself to regional security problems. Part I of this paper is an attempt to delineate the general configuration of the South Asian security system. That Kashmir is the focal point of this system should be evident. As Part I indicates, the Kashmir dispute is the result of a multiplicity of highly complex problems. It is unlikely that all of these problems can be solved simultaneously, if, indeed, they can be solved. There are the deep-seated Hindu-Muslim communal antagonisms. There are the varied problems of economic competition and cooperation between India and Pakistan. There is the problem of security of both countries and particularly Pakistan's suspicions of India. All of these factors have practically nothing to do with communism and relatively little to do with the security concerns of the U.S.

The strategy of containment and the problems to which it is addressed are only marginally related to circumstances of South Asia.

In the first place, containment is designed to prevent Soviet aggression. There is simply no evidence to suggest that the Soviets have even contemplated aggressive moves against South Asia. Second, American concern for Chinese aggression is not shared by South Asian countries. Pakistan and China are friendly. India, at least prior to 1962, did not regard China as a threat and still tries to accommodate itself to Chinese interests.

In addition to the security threat posed by outside aggression, the strategy of containment also recognizes the possibility of aggression from within through internal subversion. The Russian or Chinese army may not be needed to expand communism. The coup d'état, guerrilla warfare, or even the process of democratic elections can lead to communist take over.

American foreign policy makers, therefore, have tended to consider it axiomatic that the very existence of communism constitutes a substantive problem. But this is a particularly difficult problem for the U.S. to attack in that it involves the internal affairs of foreign countries. Nevertheless, the U.S. has pursued a variety of policies designed to reduce the threat to internal security. Among these are diplomatic pressure to encourage governments to restrict the activities of communists. Another is training of and technical assistance to police and counterinsurgency forces. An often unfortunate consequence of these kinds of policies is that they can lead to a strengthening of authoritarianism and a stifling of democratic development. In addition, the activities of security oriented agencies of the U.S. government such as the CIA have seriously undermined the efforts of American agencies and individuals working in non-security areas. AID and USIS personnel and scholars and researchers are at least suspected of being CIA agents. In India particularly, Americans have been faced with this problem.

The U.S. has attempted to deal indirectly with the problem of subversion by attacking the conditions which presumably increase the opportunities for communism. The philosophy of the American foreign assistance program contains the idea that susceptibility to subversion can be traced to the lack of economic and social development. Both India and Pakistan have received large amounts of American foreign aid. This aid has no doubt contributed to economic and social betterment and perhaps even political stability. Nevertheless, American foreign assistance efforts have been frustrating in several ways. American security programs — the alliance with Pakistan through CENTO, SEATO, and the military aid to both India and

Pakistan — contributed directly to the 1965 war. This war was a significant economic burden and worsened Indo-Pak relations. But the foreign aid program has experienced its greatest frustration in the U.S. itself where it has become less and less popular. This is due in part to the failure of foreign aid to produce dramatic results. Moreover, the balance of payments problem has forced cutbacks in foreign aid. One might argue that defense policies and foreign military commitments have been a major factor in undermining America's balance of payments position which in turn has produced cutbacks in foreign assistance and related programs. Many Americans, particularly in Congress, have consistently opposed providing foreign aid to countries that do not support American foreign policy. This is particularly relevant to India whose policy of nonalignment was never looked upon with favor in the U.S.

The threat of communism to internal security in South Asia, then, is largely one which worries the U.S. Neither India nor Pakistan seem deeply concerned with the threat of communist subversion. While communists are restricted in Pakistan, in India the government has not suppressed communist activities. On the contrary, the Communist Party (actually there are several communist parties in India) is a strong contender for power in several Indian states. In at least two states — Kerala and West Bengal — communists have controlled the state government.

One of the greatest frustrations experienced by the U.S. has been its inability to gain the support and cooperation of its allies. The military assistance program to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO presuppose Pakistan's willingness to support American security policies. The record of Pakistan in this regard has been one of only limited cooperation. While it is true that policy makers cannot hope to predict the future, it is possible to make some fairly educated guesses about the feasibility of certain policies. For instance, American policy makers should have asked themselves which is more likely, friction between India and Pakistan, or friction between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. While a military threat to Pakistan from the Soviet Union could have been regarded as *possible* during the late 1940's and the 1950's, during the same period the likelihood of friction between India and Pakistan was highly *probable*. Therefore, the likelihood of conflict between Pakistan and India should have indicated the questionable feasibility of security policies involving Pakistan in activities not related to Pakistan's foreign policy concerns.

Very few policies can be absolutely guaranteed of success for there is always an element of gamble or risk involved. Unfortunately, the kinds and degrees of risks cannot always be anticipated. Yet one factor which should be given careful consideration is the state of affairs that would result should a given policy fail. States often act in the fashion of compulsive gamblers; they are consistently willing to raise the stakes in hopes that the "turn of another card" will be favorable to their position. Once a state has become involved in some situation, it may find it difficult to extricate itself despite repeated frustration. Such matters as national prestige, honor, and pride become part of the stakes and are difficult to sacrifice. In the interest of influence, states continue to spend large amounts of their national treasure in pursuit of policies of dubious value. These policies, moreover, involve a high degree of risk in the sense that should they fail the resulting situation might be more undesirable than the existing situation. The American inability to guarantee that American arms given to Pakistan would not be used against India resulted in a loss of American influence with both India and Pakistan. In the interest of gaining influence, the Russians seem to be initiating a similar high risk policy with their decision in 1968 to supply arms to Pakistan in addition to their contributions to Indian military strength. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. will choose to compete on the same terms thus creating an accelerated arms race like that which exists in the Middle East.

Unintended Consequences of American Policy

The generally stated American goals in South Asia are security from aggression, political stability, and economic development in that order of priority. The objectives of American military assistance to Pakistan are to improve Pakistan's capability for deterring both communist threats of aggression and internal subversion. But it is rather difficult to argue that the primary effect of American aid has been the deterrence of communism. Simply because there has been no aggression does not mean it has been deterred. On the other hand, American aid has enabled Pakistan to conduct military operations against India. Moreover, the objectives of alliance policy have

not been attained. Pakistan does not participate in the collective security operations of alliances, particularly of SEATO in Southeast Asia.

But policies of military assistance and security alliances have had secondary effects of far-reaching consequences. First, Pakistan's participation in American-sponsored alliances disturbs India and exacerbates already strained Indo-Pakistan relations.⁵⁵ Second, by improving Pakistan's military capability (and India's to a lesser extent) the U.S. has encouraged an arms race in South Asia. Third, by joining American sponsored security alliances, Pakistan was led to believe that the U.S. and other alliance partners supported Pakistan in her disagreements with India. American security policy, therefore, has contributed to the frustration of a major goal in American foreign policy — political stability in South Asia.

The goal of economic development has been somewhat less frustrating. Yet the rapid pace of economic growth that many Americans expected would result from our aid has not been forthcoming. This lack of spectacular success has led all too many Americans to regard economic assistance as a wasteful "giveaway." Furthermore, foreign aid, perhaps unfortunately, creates the expectation that the recipient nation will become more sympathetic to the foreign policy of the giver nation. India's failure to support American foreign policy has led to the demand that American aid be stopped, a move which would have serious consequences for Indian economic development.

The U.S. thus finds itself in a situation where its security policies are less and less relevant to contemporary circumstances. We have lost the initiative in South Asia and our policies are obsolete and in fact debilitating. American foreign policy should become more flexible and adaptable and the range of policy options broadened. It is simply no longer practicable to think in terms of lining up some of the nations of the world against the rest. But most important is the need to recognize the regional variations in the politics of security. As this study has shown, South Asia is one such region.

India and Pakistan, no longer fledgling nations, have developed independent foreign policies based upon their own self-interests. That these policies eventually collided should come as no surprise, since the roots of conflict in South Asia date back hundreds of years. But American policy has not recognized the probability that conflicts could exist outside those inspired or related to communism. Conse-

⁵⁵The Soviet decision announced in the summer of 1968 to provide military assistance to Pakistan had a similar effect.

quently, when such conflicts do occur, American policy cannot readily be adapted to the new conditions. The policy must either be abandoned or, as is presently the case, maintained as a fiction. The United States still pretends that CENTO and SEATO have some significance, when in reality their very existence produces more problems than they solve.


This discussion strikes at the heart of the problem of security policy. Security policy presupposes the existence of an enemy posing a security threat.⁵⁶ Without such an enemy, there is no need for security measures. American security policy always regards communism as the source of security threats. These threats, moreover, are usually defined in military terms. Actually the international position of any state can be threatened or challenged in a variety of ways: economically, diplomatically, politically, culturally, etc. Unfortunately, military policy is very restrictive — it does not provide many ways for dealing with other states. Further, military policy often nullifies the effects of other kinds of policies.

Security problems in South Asia are real enough, but they are not particularly relevant to the United States. The persistent efforts by the United States to incorporate the international relations of all areas of the world into American security concerns has produced many discouraging results. On the one hand, there has been failure such as the American effort to build a regional security system in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, there has been the contributory effect of American security policies upon regional developments such as South Asia.

The imbroglio in Vietnam has proved that the United States, in spite of its tremendous military and economic resources, may be unable to achieve some of its objectives no matter how hard it tries. A stable, non-communist regime in South Vietnam, while a desirable goal, may simply be beyond realization, at least within tolerable cost margins. In South Asia, Hindu-Muslim rivalry will not abate to a point of insignificance in the foreseeable future nor will the antagonisms between the governments of India and Pakistan soon resolve themselves. Recognition of these facts would seem to suggest that some American security policies were doomed from the start. The United States might have saved itself considerable trouble and expense. But even more significantly, the abrasive secondary effects of

⁵⁶For a thorough discussion of the importance of the concept of the enemy see David J. Finaly, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), especially Chapters I and II.

some security oriented policies which have helped intensify regional conflicts could have been avoided. In short, the United States should pursue policies which have reasonable chances of success and avoid policies which tend to exacerbate the tensions and strains of the normal process of development in areas like South Asia. It goes without saying, of course, that these conclusions apply to other states as well.



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