

FREDERICK  
ENGELS

THE ROLE  
OF FORCE  
IN HISTORY

*A Study of Bismarck's policy  
of blood and iron*

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*Translated by* JACK COHEN  
*Edited with an introduction by*  
ERNST WANGERMANN

*Additional Notes and a Chronology of  
Germany from 1858—1890 by*  
MAHADEVPRASAD SAHA

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FREDERICK ENGELS

# THE ROLE OF FORCE IN HISTORY

[With Theory of Force from Anti-Dühring]

*A Study of Bismarck's policy of  
blood and iron*

*translated by*  
JACK COHEN

*edited and with introduction by*  
ERNST WANGERMANN

*with additional notes and an exhaustive  
chronology of events in germany  
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MAHADEVPRASAD SAHA

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


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## NOTE

his unfinished study by Friedrich Engels on Bismarck's policy of blood and iron" in Germany has not previously been translated into English. The translation is made from *Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte*, published by Dietz Verlag, Berlin, in 1964.

The editor is indebted to the German editors for the informative material in the numbered footnotes: the footnotes of the German edition have been adapted in accordance with the presumed needs of English readers. Engels' own footnotes are marked with an asterisk.

The text is divided into seven numbered sections corresponding to Engels' draft outline for his study. This draft outline is reproduced in the Table of Contents, and will give the reader some indication as to how Engels intended to complete the unfinished final chapter.

E. W. and J. C.  
1967



*The Role of Force in History* is an unfinished work by Engels. Originally, towards the end of 1886 he thought of publishing the three chapters on the theory of force contained in the second section of *Anti-Dühring* in which he established the materialistic conditions of the relations between economy and politics. He planned to rewrite these chapters. Further, Engels wished to elaborate also the two chapters entitled "Moral and Law—Eternal Truths" and "Moral and Law—a Comparison" taken from the first section of *Anti-Dühring*. Moreover, Engels thought to append the chapters on "The Role of Force in History" to these. The fundamental thesis enunciated in these three chapters was based on the history of Germany (1848-88) wherein, from this standpoint, "the entire Bismarckian politics" was analysed. The brochure was to have the title "*The Role of Force in History*."

Engels began his work on the fourth chapter towards the end of 1887, but it had to be interrupted in March 1888 because of other urgent undertakings, and this bore the title "The Theory of Force." It contained the abovementioned three chapters of *Anti-Dühring*, the unfinished manuscript of the fourth chapter for the edition planned by Engels, the draft of the introduction to it, sections of the entire fourth chapter, the notes which he wanted to develop in his concluding remarks but which remained unwritten, as well as a chronological chart of the history of Germany of the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century taken specially from "*Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, 1815-85*" (History of Recent Times, 1815-85) by Constantin Bulley (Second edition, Vols. 1-4, Berlin, 1888).

The draft of the unfinished chapter, the draft of the foreword and a few sections were for the first time published by Eduard Bernstein in the *Neue Zeit* under the title "Gewalt und ökonomie bei der Herstellung des neuen Deutschen Reichs" (Force and Economy in the Establishment of the New German Empire). The manuscript prepared by Bernstein for the press is an excellent example of how unscrupulous the right Social Democrats were with the manuscript remains of Engels. Without caring for the authenticity of the manuscript and considering it inviolable, Bernstein divided it arbitrarily into small sections, gave them unwarranted titles, added notes and interpreted Engels' text in a way that suited his purpose. It cannot be ruled out that owing to this unscrupulous handling of Bernstein a part of the manuscript has been lost.

In 1896 a French translation of the work as well as the three chapters from *Anti-Dühring* was published in numbers 6—9 of the journal *Devenir Social*. A single Italian edition of it appeared in 1899 in Rome; it was a complete translation of the German text in the *Neue Zeit*. An incomplete Russian translation was published in St. Petersburg in number five of the journal *Nautschoje Obosrenije*.

In the first Russian edition of the Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. XVI, Part I, 452-507, 1937) Engels' work was published for the first time in accordance with the manuscript. In this edition all the changes made by Bernstein (the sub-division into sections, the innovated sub-headings etc.) were removed. The title of the work too was brought in line with that formulated by the author.

In the volume before us along with the manuscript edition of Engels of the fourth chapter of *The Role of Force in History*, the draft foreword, the sections of the entire fourth chapter as well as the notes he wanted to develop in his concluding remarks which would have served as a key to the contents of the unfinished book, are published.



The English edition first published by Lawrence and Wishart comprised the translation of only *Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte*. In the present Indian edition, besides the three chapters on force from *Anti-Dühring* and the parts on this subject from the preparatory notes on the same work, has been included from the Moscow edition (1969). The notes on these two sections are also from this edition. For the convenience of readers some additional notes and a chronology of events from German history have been added.

The University of Chicago Press issued in 1967 *The Peasant War in Germany* and *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* as the first volume in its Classic European Historians. There is no doubt that *The Role of Force in History* shall be accepted on all hands as a classic on the period it covers.

M. D. Mundhra, (London), and Sunil Kumar Basu helped me in writing the additional notes and preparing the chronology. By far the greatest personal debt I owe to the latter who first suggested to me the need for an Indian edition of this work. Without his advice and encouragement my humble part in this work would not have been what it is. I must thank my friend Mr. Benoy Krishna Datta for lending me several books from his personal collection. I am also grateful to Jogen Bose and Mihir Kumar Mukherji who prepared the index.

Asiatic Society  
Calcutta

MAHADEVPRASAD SAHA

15th April, 1970



# CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION: <i>by Ernst Wangermann</i>	1
THE ROLE OF FORCE IN HISTORY	
1848 — Postulate of National States — Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary	17
Louis-Napoleon's Policy of Conquest: Nation in return for Compensation — Italy	23
Situation in Germany — Unity (1) by Revolution, (2) under Austria, or (3) under Prussia	28
Army Reorganisation — Conflict — Bismarck — the Policy not original	36
War, 1864 and 1866 — Revolutionary Means	42
The Franco-Prussian War — Empire — Annexation of Alsace-Lorraine — Russia the Arbiter	47
Bismarck at the end of his tether — <i>Kulturkampf</i> — Protectionist Tariff and Agrarian-Bourgeois Alliance — Colonies — Socialist Laws — Suppression of Trade Unions — Social Reform — Militarism because of Alsace-Lorraine — the Junker asserts himself	66
The Force Theory extracted from Anti-Dühring	83
Engels's Preparatory writings for Anti-Dühring	115
Additional Notes	122
A Chronology of Events in German History from 1858-1890	129
Index	145



So great was the success of Engels' *Anti-Dühring* that there were frequent requests for reprints, new editions, translations, and the publication of individual sections as pamphlets. One such request, in the middle of the 1880's, was for a separate publication in German of the three chapters entitled "The Force Theory", in which the relationship between political force and economic factors is examined. Engels considered that a mere republication of these mainly theoretical chapters was, under the circumstances, inappropriate. Considering the recent course of German history, the German reader had the right to know his opinion "about the very considerable rôle played by force in the history of his own country during the last thirty years".<sup>1</sup> For this projected publication, therefore, Engels wrote a fourth chapter, containing an account of German history in the period 1848 to 1888 from the point of view of historical materialism. Together with the "Force Theory" chapters from *Anti-Dühring*, it was to be published under the title "The rôle of force in history". Like so many of Engels' projects, this one had also to be abandoned because of his work in preparing the second and third volumes of Marx's *Capital* for publication; the fourth chapter was not completed.

The unfinished manuscript was first published with some arbitrary alterations in 1896 by Eduard Bernstein in the *Neue Zeit* on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Second German Empire.<sup>2</sup> This publication provided the basis for French, Italian and Russian translations during the following years. A Russian translation based on the surviving manuscript (a part of which has been lost), was published by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow in 1937. All the manuscripts prepared by Engels for the projected work on "The rôle of force in history" were published in the

1. The quotation is from Engels' draft preface to "The rôle of force in history", p. 7 of the German edition.

2. *Neue Zeit*, XIV. 1. Band. pp. 676-687, 708-718, 740-747, 772-781, 810-818.

original German in 1964 in the German Democratic Republic.<sup>3</sup> It is this edition which has been used in preparing this first English translation of the unfinished fourth chapter. The list of contents is based on Engels' draft outline for the chapter.

Written eighty years ago, in the period from December 1887 to March 1888, Engels' study has lost none of its freshness, and stands up extraordinarily well to the critical light of modern research.

What was at issue in the debate about the rôle of force in history? Dühring had asserted in his textbooks on philosophy and economics that the basis of the exploitation of man by man was an historical act of force which created an exploitative economic system for the benefit of the stronger man or class. The impulse of a revolutionary movement, therefore, must be moral indignation against the existing unjust imposition of force to perpetuate exploitation. Engels, in his refutation of Dühring, demonstrates the absurdity of postulating political force and the system of power it maintains as independent, prior factors in human history. On the basis of his extensive historical knowledge, he illustrates how the end to which force was employed, and the weapons which it had at its disposal in various periods, depended on the state of the productive forces and other economic factors. In this way, political power had always, in the long run, to adapt itself to changes in the balance of economic and social forces, and to yield to the dictates of economic development. A mode of production and its corresponding political system must be judged, not on the degree of force required for its maintenance, but on whether it impeded or accelerated economic development. Slavery, when it first emerged, was an historic step forward, because it dissolved the primitive community and developed the productive power of society. Whenever, in the past, political force had come into conflict with economic development, the conflict had always ended with the overthrow of political force: economic development had broken through inexorably and without exception.<sup>4</sup>

In the unfinished fourth chapter, Engels attempts to apply these general propositions to an analysis of the Bismarckian "blood and iron" phase of Prussian-German history. He

3. *Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte*, Bücherei des Marxismus-Leninismus, Band 61, Dietz Verlag Berlin 1964.

4. Cf. *Anti-Dühring*, Part 2, chapters 2-4.

claims to demonstrate "why the policy of blood and iron was bound to be successful for a time and why it is bound to fail in the end". Though political reaction was victorious in 1815 and again in 1848, it was unable to prevent the growth of large-scale industry in Germany and the growing participation of German commerce in the world market. The incompatibility between modern industry and commerce and Germany's feudal-bureaucratic political system with its territorial divisions was becoming more obvious from year to year. This incompatibility, magnificently described by Engels on the basis of his personal experience as an industrialist, brought the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie into the movement for German unification. They brought into it a hard-headed business attitude and a new note of cool calculation.<sup>5</sup> "German unity had become an economic necessity."

Engels discusses the different political developments by which unity might, in principle, have been achieved. He gives a remarkably optimistic assessment of the possibility of unification from below by a victorious popular revolutionary movement, overthrowing the German princes and their would-be protector Louis-Napoleon. The possibility of unification under the hegemony of Austria, on the other hand, is briefly dismissed as incompatible with the aims of Habsburg great-power policy. Engels was evidently unaware of the determined efforts made by the Austrian ministers Schwarzenberg and Bruck in the 1850's to secure the removal of the customs barrier between Austria and the German Customs Union, precisely to lay the economic foundation for an Austrian hegemony in Germany.<sup>6</sup> As to the evolution of Prussian policy towards an initiative for German unification, the most significant factor in Engels' analysis of it is Louis-Napoleon. The army reorganisation of 1860/61, which gave rise to the great "conflict" between the Crown and the liberal-bourgeois majority in the Chamber, was imposed on the Prussian government by the Napoleonic threat, real or apparent, to the Left Bank of the Rhine. As the conflict developed, there seemed only two possible

5. Georg v. Siemens, later director of the *Deutsche Bank*, discussed even the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1866 only from the point of view of economic considerations: cf. H. Böhme, *Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht*, Köln-Berlin 1966, p. 205.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-45.

outcomes to it: either a *coup d'état* and the return to undisguised absolutism on the pre-1848 pattern, or surrender to the liberal majority and the acceptance of parliamentary control over army affairs. The generals were quite prepared for the *coup d'état*, but the king, William I, who had only just succeeded to the throne, hesitated to violate his coronation oath so soon after taking it, and did not wish to risk this supreme affront to liberal opinion. Surrender, on the other hand, was obviously unacceptable both to the king and to the generals.

A third way out was found by Bismarck, appointed Prime Minister of Prussia in September 1862. Bismarck's policy, Engels argues, was nothing more nor less than the application of Bonapartism to the Prussian-German situation. Louis-Napoleon had been able to destroy the political domination of the bourgeoisie, because he secured its social domination. The suppression of parliament was accepted in a situation in which profits soared. Inspired by this success, Bismarck defeated the liberal bourgeoisie in the struggle for political power by carrying out effectively the bourgeoisie's own national and economic programme. Such a policy suggested itself the more readily because it made possible the resumption of the traditional Prussian territorial expansion. If the policy of blood and iron was successful in the period 1864 to 1870, this was so, according to Engels' argument, because it was employed to serve, not some arbitrary policy dictated by Bismarck's whim, but the execution of the programme of the rapidly developing German bourgeoisie. In return, the bourgeoisie accepted its defeat in the struggle for constitutional control over the government, and contented itself with a parliament without power.<sup>7</sup>

Engels had demonstrated why, in the light of his theory, "the policy of blood and iron was bound to be successful for a time". On what grounds did he assert that "it (was) bound to fail in the end"?

Engels argues that Bismarck could have given long-term

7. Laws passed by the popularly elected *Reichstag* were subject to approval and implementation by the *Bundesrat* whose members were appointed by the "associated governments" of the Empire, and in which the Prussian delegation could not be outvoted. The army was specifically excluded from the competence of the *Reichstag*, and the army estimates were voted for a period of seven years (*Septennat*).



stability to his newly-created Empire only by acting in accordance with historical development—sacrificing the bankrupt Junkers, steering a course towards an English type of bourgeois parliamentary régime with a bourgeois landed aristocracy as its honorific representatives, and thus, to put it in his own words, “adapting Germany’s political to her industrial conditions”. Bismarck did not do this. On the contrary, he preserved the old Prussian state, and created conditions in which the Junkers, his own class, could continue to enjoy their age-old predominance. For the sake of the interests of his class, he was going to defy the dictates of historical development. Engels seems almost surprised that a statesman who had tasted the signal triumphs which were the reward of acting in accordance with historical development, should at the height of his power embrace a reactionary policy which he describes unhesitatingly and without qualification as “doomed to failure”. How did the policy in fact fare?

Like most of their contemporaries, Marx and Engels were surprised by the overwhelming Prussian victory over Austria in 1866. Up to that time, Bismarck had seemed to them the servant of Russia, not the executor of the German bourgeois programme. However, they quickly reappraised the situation.

“Apart from a Prussian defeat,” Marx wrote to Engels, “which might perhaps (but these Berliners!) have led to a revolution, nothing better could have happened than their overwhelming victory.”<sup>8</sup>

Engels replied, detailing what seemed to him the positive aspects of the new situation:

“The situation in Germany now seems to me fairly simple. From the moment Bismarck carried out the little-German bourgeois programme<sup>9</sup> with the Prussian army and with such colossal success, Germany has moved in this direction so decisively that we no less than others must accept the *fait accompli*, whether we like it or not. As far as the *national* side of the question is concerned,

8. Marx to Engels, 7 July 1866, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, XXXI, p. 233.

9. i.e. the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony, excluding the German-speaking provinces of the Habsburg Empire.

Bismarck will presumably have to establish the little-German Empire with the frontiers demanded by the bourgeoisie, i.e. including south-western Germany: the phrases about the Main frontier and the optional South German separate confederacy are presumably intended for purely French consumption, and meanwhile the Prussians are marching on Stuttgart....

"Politically, Bismarck will be compelled to rely on the bourgeoisie, because he needs them against the Princes. Perhaps not immediately, since his prestige and the army are sufficient for the moment. But as soon as he wants to secure from parliament the conditions necessary for central governmental power, he will have to make concessions to the bourgeois. And the natural course of events will compel him or his successors to appeal to the bourgeoisie again and again. This means that even if for the moment Bismarck does not make more concessions than he absolutely must, he will nevertheless be driven more and more into a bourgeois direction.

"What is good about the whole thing is that the situation has been simplified, and a future revolution made easier by the elimination of riots in the small capitals and the acceleration of political development. When all is said and done, a German parliament is something quite different from a Prussian chamber. Everything connected with the petty states will be swept along by the movement, the worst particularist influences will fade away, and the political parties will at last become national parties instead of local ones."<sup>10</sup>

As against all these positive aspects, Engels saw only one major negative one for Germany, namely that the whole country would be flooded by Prussianism. He added that nothing could be done against this. The only reasonable course, therefore, was to accept the actual situation without approving of it, and to utilise the greater opportunities which would now present themselves for the organisation of the German working class on a national basis.<sup>11</sup>

In the light of this optimistic perspective, Bismarck's efforts to secure the continuation of the old Junker supre-

10. Engels to Marx, 25 July 1866, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, XXXI, pp. 240-241.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

macy did indeed seem to be doomed to failure. But Engels' optimism was not universally shared in the German labour movement. Wilhelm Liebknecht, Marx's friend and fellow exile, who had returned to Germany in 1862 and was successfully building up a working-class political party there, reacted to the events of 1866 quite differently. He considered that the positive aspects were completely outweighed by the increase and consolidation of the military might of Prussia. Far from "accepting" the new situation, Liebknecht made opposition to Prussia the main point in his propaganda and agitation, and he co-operated with the *Volkspartei* and other petty-bourgeois and particularist groups. Marx and Engels were highly critical of this, fearing that association with these elements would fatally compromise their party in the eyes especially of the north German workers.<sup>12</sup> Liebknecht persisted in his line, and justified it in a letter to Engels:

"No doubt, our work has been *simplified* by the events of last year (1866), but at the same time it has been made more difficult. A few dozen disunited, or at least not really co-operating enemies are more easily overcome than one who has concentrated the power of these few dozen in his own hands. If Prussia consolidates herself, it will not be possible for any foreign Power to defeat her, and not even a revolution in the wake of the forthcoming French revolution<sup>13</sup> could overthrow her. She would only fall when the German proletariat is ripe (through numbers and intelligence) to assume power. But we still have several generations to wait for that."<sup>14</sup>

Thus there were two diametrically opposed estimates concerning the consequences of the Prussian victory for future revolutionary prospects. Liebknecht's pessimistic estimate may seem to have been contradicted by the impressive

12. Cf. Engels to Marx, 22 May 1868, Marx to Engels, 29 July 1868, Engels to Marx, 3 March 1869, *ibid.*, XXXII, pp. 90, 128, 271. Cf. also R. P. Morgan, *The German Social Democrats and the First International 1864-1872*, Chapter I.

13. The revolutionary overthrow of Louis-Napoleon's régime was confidently expected.

14. Liebknecht to Engels, 11 December 1867, *Wilhelm Liebknecht: Briefwechsel mit Karl Marx u. Friedrich Engels*, The Hague 1963, p. 82.

growth in the 1870's and 1880's of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD),—"the most revolutionary party known to history", Engels called it in *Anti-Dühring*—and especially by Bismarck's spectacular failure even to retard its rate of growth through the repressive Socialist Law.<sup>15</sup> But did the million or so socialist voters and the few dozen socialist M.P.'s in the powerless *Reichstag* really represent a serious threat to the Prussian power structure, rebuilt and consolidated by Bismarck in the years after 1866?

It has become fashionable to interpret Engels' interest in the electoral fortunes of the SPD as evidence that in the last period of his life he had virtually become a reformist waiting for a parliamentary majority.<sup>16</sup> But even in his most optimistic moments, Engels did not envisage an eventual socialist majority in the *Reichstag* simply taking over political power from the Junkers and generals. Such a majority could not emerge from the infertile soil of Bismarckian political stability and reaction; it could only follow the disintegration of the Bismarckian political system.

"Our turn can only come," Engels wrote to August Bebel, "when the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties have openly and in practice proved their inability to govern the country."<sup>17</sup>

Clearly, Engels considered the revival of some kind of liberal-bourgeois opposition to Junker reaction to be a prerequisite for any real political advance. In 1886 he thought that there were signs of such a revival, indications

"that the German bourgeois was once more being compelled to do his political duty, to oppose the present system, so that at long last there will be some progress again."<sup>18</sup>

He asked Bebel to send him any bourgeois papers which reflected this important development. Bebel replied that he

15. The law was enacted in 1878 after an attempt on the life of the Emperor. All the party's publications were suppressed and its public political activity prohibited. The law was defied by very successful illegal activities.

16. Cf. for instance G. Lichtheim, *Marxism*, London 1961, Pt. 5.

17. Engels to Bebel, 28 October 1885, *August Bebel: Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Engels*, The Hague 1965, p. 242.

18. Engels to Bebel, 13 September 1886, *ibid.*, p. 286.

saw no evidence to sustain Engels' hopes. Only one bourgeois paper was opposing the Socialist Law; and this was due to the influence of its editor Franz Mehring, who not long after went over to the Social Democrats. "The bourgeois opposition in Germany," he concluded, "is finished for good."<sup>19</sup> Engels thought nevertheless that the government of Bismarck's successors, who would inevitably be smaller and less capable men, would drive the German bourgeoisie willy nilly into opposition. He refused to believe that the political stagnation of that time could be anything but transitory.<sup>20</sup> He was too sanguine. The feeble bourgeois political stirrings which did follow Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, were quickly nipped in the bud by a Junker-bourgeois compromise, the so-called *Sammlungspolitik*, which launched the German empire on a policy of overseas expansion and produced the naval race. All potential bourgeois political energies were henceforth channelled into enthusiasm for the navy and Anglophobia.<sup>21</sup>

If the German bourgeois could not be "compelled to do his political duty", the labour movement had to lead the struggle for political democracy. Marx and Engels had always been convinced that the working class could achieve power only in the political context of a democratic republic. When the SPD programme was fundamentally revised in 1891, Engels urged that the "political demands" should include the democratic republic and the abolition of the reserved princes' rights.

"Surely you cannot revolutionise society, while Bavarian-Württemberg separate rights exist, and while the map of Thuringia presents its present pathetic aspect. Prussia, on the other hand, must cease to exist, and must be divided into self-governing provinces, so that specific Prussianism ceases to weigh so heavily on Germany."<sup>22</sup>

Engels' suggestions were rejected almost without discussion

19. Bebel to Engels, 12 October 1886, *ibid.*, p. 295; cf. especially note 10 with some of the evidence on which Bebel based his assertion.

20. Engels to Bebel, 23 October 1886, *ibid.*, p. 298.

21. Cf. P. Anderson, *The Background of anti-English Feeling in Germany 1890-1902*, Washington 1939, pp. 66-68, 128-130.

22. Quoted in *August Bebel*, *op. cit.*, p. 425, n. 6.

by the SPD leadership. Bebel briefly indicated the reasons for this :

“To adopt the republic as our aim is impossible under our German conditions. Our people would be driven into a corner in their agitational activity, being constantly confronted with the accusation : you are going to use force. . . . To make a stand against the petty states is unnecessary. We should be playing Prussia’s game, and this would be both purposeless and unsuccessful. . . . In the Party, this question is regarded as irrelevant and finished. The petty states exist like dozens of other equally superfluous institutions which will disappear of their own accord when the ground on which they stand begins to shake.”<sup>23</sup>

This letter shows to what extent the policy of the SPD was dictated by opportunist considerations even at the time when the phraseology of the party programme was at its most revolutionary. The refusal to tackle the problem of the monarchy was only one example of the Social Democratic leaders’ determination to exclude from the Party’s programme anything which might be construed as a policy of violence. Moreover, the letter reveals a quite extraordinary lack of political understanding. The idea that a campaign against the petty states would serve the interests of Prussia could arise only from a complete misunderstanding of Prussia’s policy in 1866. The decision taken in that year not to annex all the petty states was in the best interests of Prussian policy. The survival of some of these states was a prerequisite of the survival of Prussia as a distinct entity—Bismarck’s overriding aim.<sup>24</sup> The bland assurance that they would disappear when the ground underneath them began to shake, completely missed Engels’ point that the existence of the states was an essential element in the stability of the ground. In the years which followed the adoption of the

23. Bebel to Engels, 12 July 1891, *ibid.*, p. 425. The Erfurt Programme, adopted in 1891, is often referred to as a fully Marxist programme. In fact, as the foregoing shows, Engels had important reservations about it, though he welcomed it as a great advance on the semi-Lassallean Gotha Programme.

24. Cf. Sir Henry Howard’s report from Munich, 21 August 1866, quoted in V. Valentin, *Bismarck’s Reichsgründung im Urteil englischer Diplomaten*. Amsterdam 1938, p. 337.

Erfurt programme, the SPD in fact failed to make any progress in the struggle for the democratisation of the German political structure. Even the 1910/11 agitation for the reform of the Prussian franchise—unchanged since the reactionary revision of 1850!—ended fruitlessly.<sup>25</sup>

The pivotal support of Prussian power was, of course, the army. In 1848 it had suffered only a temporary and partial defeat. Forty years later, it was incomparably stronger, both in numbers and equipment. Engels gave much thought to the implications of this increased strength for the perspectives of revolution. There could be no question after 1848 of a head-on clash between people and army :

“An unarmed people is a negligible force against the modern army of today.”<sup>26</sup>

It followed that in a militarist country like Germany, a successful revolution could only take place if it began in the army itself. Engels, as “representative of the general staff of the Party”,<sup>27</sup> advocated policies designed to undermine the spirit of absolute submissiveness of the rank-and-file of the Prussian regiments, which were still recruited largely from the oppressed masses of rural labourers.

In 1884, when the army seemed to him “a more infamous tool of reaction than ever before”,<sup>28</sup> Engels suggested that the Parliamentary Party should put down a resolution demanding the lease of Crown domains to co-operatives of rural labourers for common cultivation.

“With this, and this alone, can we win the rural labourers ; this is the best method of drawing their attention to the fact that their future calling is the cultivation of the estates of their present gracious lords for the common account.”<sup>29</sup>

As so often, the party leaders in Germany totally failed to

25. For the leadership's refusal to use the weapon of the political mass strike, as demanded by Rosa Luxemburg, cf. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, O.U.P. 1966.

26. Engels to Bebel, 11 December 1884, *August Bebel*, op. cit., p. 204.

27. This is how he refers to himself in the same letter, *ibid.*, p. 205.

28. Engels to Bebel, 28 October 1885, *ibid.*, p. 239.

29. Engels to Bebel, 11/12 December 1884, *ibid.*, p. 205.

understand Engels' line of thought. Bebel wrote that it would be a waste of time to put down resolutions for policies which the present government could on no account entertain.<sup>30</sup> Engels agreed that when the Party made positive suggestions, it should suggest what was practicable.

"But," he added, "*objectively* practicable, not necessarily practicable for the present government. I go further, when we suggest socialist measures calculated to lead to the overthrow of capitalist production (like this one), then only measures which are *objectively practicable* but *impossible* for this government. . . . This proposal will not be carried out by any Junker or bourgeois government. To show the rural proletariat of the eastern provinces the way to end Junker and tenant exploitation; to put the means to do this into their hands; to set in motion the very people whose enslavement and stultification produces the regiments which are the foundation of Prussia; in short, to destroy Prussia from within at the root—they certainly wouldn't do that. It is a proposal which we must take up under all circumstances as long as the large estates exist . . . With this alone can we destroy Prussia, and the sooner we popularise this proposal the better."<sup>31</sup>

The correspondence between Engels and Bebel on this point was the beginning of a long controversy about the SPD's agrarian programme. Engels' proposals were not adopted by the Party, many of whose leaders were never really convinced that the backward rural labourers could be influenced by socialist ideas. On the other hand, the Bavarian leader Georg v. Vollmar strongly urged policies to reassure the wealthy, labour-employing peasants of his country. The consequent failure to make significant headway among the rural labourers meant, of course, that the German army remained what Engels called it in the 1880's—"a more infamous tool of reaction than ever". In 1907, Karl Liebknecht, Wilhelm's son, tried to alarm the Party concerning the spreading virus of militarism, especially among the conscripted national service men. His proposals, like Engels' earlier ones, were rejected.

Thus, by the time of Engels' death in 1895, practically

30. Bebel to Engels, 7 December 1885, *ibid.*, p. 248.

31. Engels to Bebel, 20 January 1886, *ibid.*, p. 252.



no progress had been made in undermining the power and stability of the old Prussia. The increasingly impressive electoral showing of the SPD tended to hide its almost total political frustration from its own eyes as well as from those of its enemies. Even Engels was on occasion tempted to oversanguine predictions. But shortly before his death, when the SPD leaders demanded serious cuts in his preface to Marx's *Class Struggles in France* with its discussion of German revolutionary tactics and prospects, he expressed serious misgivings about the party's growing estrangement from the revolutionary tradition.<sup>32</sup> The SPD leaders feared that the complete version would provide the government with a pretext for a new Anti-Socialist Law. Their readiness to buy the continuation of their party's restricted legality at such a price was indeed a dramatic illustration of the vigorous survival of Bismarck's conservative political edifice after his own departure from the political scene.

Engels often attributed such aberrations to the opportunism and petit-bourgeois tendencies which were bound to emerge in a working-class party growing as rapidly as was the SPD. Generally, he was confident that a party with a sound rank-and-file membership could digest such tendencies or, if necessary, eliminate them by an organisational split. It was above all his impression that the spirit of the rank-and-file in Germany was sound that kept him optimistic to the end about revolutionary prospects in Germany.

But all the time, Engels was aware of the one development which would destroy the sound spirit of the rank-and-file—the outbreak of a major international war. When in the 1880's the outbreak of such a war seemed probable, he wrote :

“I regard a European war as a misfortune. This time it would be terribly serious, and produce a conflagration of chauvinism for years to come, as every people would be fighting for its existence. All the work of the revolutionaries in Russia, who are on the threshold of victory, would be frustrated and destroyed. Our own party in Germany

32. Cf. Engels to Richard Fischer, 8 March 1895, now published from a surviving copy in *International Review of Social History*, XII, 1967 Pt. 2.

would be overwhelmed and broken up by a wave of chauvinism, and the same would be the case in France.”<sup>33</sup>

At the height of the Bulgarian crisis in 1886, Engels returned to the subject of the probable consequences of a major international conflict :

“So much is certain, the war would push back our movement all over Europe, and destroy it altogether in some countries. It would exacerbate chauvinism and national hatred. Among all the uncertainties, one thing only is certain—that after the war we should have to start again from the beginning, though on a more favourable basis than we have even today.”<sup>34</sup>

It was presumably with this prospect in mind that Engels considered the possibility of a general war being deliberately unleashed as the only remaining antidote to the growth of the revolutionary movement. This was going to be Engels' concluding point, as we can see from the draft outline for the unfinished part of the chapter: “a peace worse than war the result—at best; or a world war.”<sup>35</sup> Whether the peace of the last years before 1914 had in fact become “worse than war” for the ruling class in Germany or elsewhere, and whether this was a factor in the decisions of July and August 1914, is still an open question—the subject of much current historical research. The consequences of the international conflict for the labour movement were, however, exactly as Engels had anticipated them thirty years before—at least in Germany.

One can hardly fail to conclude that Bismarck's reactionary Junker empire enjoyed as much long-term stability as any more up-to-date bourgeois régime would have done. Liebknecht's gloomy prognostication as to the results of the great increase in Prussian power was borne out more completely by subsequent German history than was Engel's optimistic assessment of the “positive aspects” of 1866. If German industry had scope for expansion, provided by the national market, the arms race and an expansionist foreign

33. Engels to Bebel, 22 December 1882, *August Bebel*, op. c. p. 143.

34. Engels to Bebel, 13 September 1886, *ibid.*, p. 286.

35. Draft outline for the last section of chapter four, German edition, p. 118.

policy, the Germany bourgeoisie adapted itself with increasing enthusiasm to anachronistic political conditions, and scorned its traditional liberalism. The labour movement, in virtual isolation, proved itself unable to enforce a reform of the political structure, and within it failed to make any significant advance towards the attainment of political power, despite its impressive organisational successes.

German history may, therefore, provide an example, not indeed of political force determining economic conditions, but of an outworn, reactionary régime securing its survival by combining military conquest with some adjustment to the requirements of industrial and commercial expansion. It is an example of a reactionary régime successfully drawing the political sting out of economic expansion. As such, it is still an essential object of study, especially for the labour movement. The justification for publishing Engels' work is the brilliant and indispensable contribution which it makes to this study.

ERNST WANGERMANN



Let us now apply our theory to contemporary German history with its practice of violence and Blood and Iron. This will enable us to see clearly why the policy of blood and iron was bound to be successful for a time and why it is bound to fail in the end.

### 1

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 carved up Europe in such a fashion that the complete ineptitude of the rulers and statesmen was revealed to the whole world.<sup>1</sup> General war of the peoples against Napoleon had been the reaction of all the peoples whose national feelings he had brutally outraged. By way of thanks, the aristocrats and diplomats who took part in the Vienna Congress affronted these national feelings even more brutally. The smallest dynasty was given more consideration than the largest nation. Germany and Italy were split up into small states once again. Poland was divided for the fourth time. Hungary remained subjugated. And one cannot really say that the people were wronged, for why did they put up with it and why did they greet the Russian Tsar (Alexander I) as their liberator?

But it could not last. Since the end of the Middle Ages, history had been moving towards a Europe made up of large, national states. Only such national states constitute the normal political framework for the dominant European bourgeois class (*Bürgertum*), and in addition, they are the indispensable pre-requisite for the establishment of the harmonious international collaboration of nations without which the rule of the proletariat cannot exist. If international peace is to be ensured, then all avoidable national frictions must first be eliminated, every people must be independent and

1. The Congress of Vienna was in session from September 1814 to June 1815, and devised a new European settlement after the Napoleonic upheaval.

masters in their own house. Thus along with the development of trade, agriculture and industry and with them, of the social predominance of the bourgeoisie, national feeling developed everywhere and the fragmented and oppressed nations demanded unity and independence.

As a result, the Revolution of 1848 was concerned everywhere outside France with the satisfaction of national as much as liberal demands. But everywhere, there appeared behind the victorious bourgeoisie, the threatening shadow of the proletariat which had really won the victory and which drove the bourgeoisie into the arms of the recently defeated enemy, the monarchist, bureaucratic, semi-feudal and military reaction, to which the revolution succumbed in 1849. In Hungary, where this did not happen, the Russians marched in and overthrew the Revolution. Not satisfied with this, the Russian Tsar (Nicholas I) went to Warsaw where he sat in judgment as the supreme arbiter of Europe. He nominated Christian of Glücksburg, his subservient creature, as successor to the throne of Denmark. He humiliated Prussia as she had never been humiliated before, by prohibiting even the slightest expression of ambitions to exploit the movement for German unification, and compelled her to re-establish the *Bundestag* (Federal Diet) and to subordinate herself to Austria.<sup>2</sup> Thus at first sight, the total result of the Revolution seemed to be that in Austria and Germany, government was carried on in constitutional form but in the old spirit, and that the Russian Tsar dominated Europe more than ever before.<sup>3</sup>

In reality however, the Revolution thoroughly shook the bourgeoisie of the dismembered countries out of their long-inherited torpor, especially in Germany. They had secured a share, albeit a modest one, in political power and every political success of the bourgeoisie is exploited in an industrial upswing. The "mad year"<sup>4</sup> now happily behind them, had indicated quite clearly to the bourgeoisie that the old

2. This was decided at the Warsaw Conference of October 1850 and put into effect by the Treaty of Olmütz, November 1850.

3. In the Habsburg Empire the "decreed constitution" of 1848 was actually revoked in 1850, and even constitutional forms disappeared.

4. Some reactionary German historians described 1848 as "das Tolle Jahr", an expression taken from the title of a novel by Ludwig Bechstein about the Erfurt riots of 1509.

lethargy and torpor must be ended once and for all. As a result of the discoveries of gold in Australia and California and of other factors, an unprecedented expansion of world commerce and an upswing in business activity took place. The development of large-scale industry which had emerged since 1850 and, especially since 1840 in the Rhineland, in Saxony, Silesia and Berlin as well as in one or two towns on the South, now rapidly increased, and domestic industry in the agricultural areas became more and more widespread. The building of railways was speeded up, and emigration which, despite all this, increased on an enormous scale, created a German trans-atlantic steamship service which required no subsidies. German merchants, settled firmly in all overseas centres of commerce, handled an ever-increasing amount of world trade and began gradually to undertake the sale not only of English but also of German industrial products.

But the existence of a mass of petty German states with their many differing commercial and industrial laws was bound to become an intolerable fetter on this powerfully developing industry and on the growing commerce with which it was linked—a different rate of exchange every few miles, different regulations for establishing a business, everywhere, literally everywhere, different kinds of chicanery, bureaucratic and fiscal traps, even in many cases still, guild restrictions against which not even a licence was of any avail. And in addition to all this, the many different settlement regulations and residential restrictions<sup>5</sup> which made it impossible for the capitalists to deploy available labour forces in adequate numbers in the places where iron-ore, coal, water-power and other natural resources offered opportunities for the establishment of industrial enterprises. The ability to exploit the massive labour force of the fatherland in unrestricted fashion was the first condition for industrial development, but wherever the patriotic manufacturer sought to concentrate workers from all over Germany, there the police and Poor Law authorities stepped in against the influx of immigrants. A German Civil Code and complete freedom of movement for all German citizens, a uniform system of commercial law, these were no longer

5. These regulations secured the right of subjects to a permanent home, and were connected with the old poor law.

the patriotic fantasies of over-excited students but were now essential conditions of life for industry.

In every state and petty state there were, moreover, different currencies, different weights and measures, often two or three different kinds in the same state. And not one of these countless varieties of coins, weights or measures was recognised on the world market. As a consequence, the merchants and manufacturers who traded on the world market or who had to compete with imported goods, were compelled, in addition to using all these different coins, weights and measures, also to use foreign ones; cotton yarn had to be stapled in English pounds according to weight, silk goods made up in metric units, foreign accounts made out in pounds sterling, dollars, francs. And how were large-scale credit institutions to carry on in these very small currency areas with banknotes in guilders here, in Prussian talers there, alongside gold talers, "new-two-thirds" talers, Mark Banco, Mark Currant, 20 guilder pieces, 24 guilder pieces...<sup>6</sup> all complicated by endless currency calculations and fluctuations in the rates of exchange?

And even if it were possible to cope with all this, how much energy was dissipated in all these irritations, how much time and money lost? At last even in Germany people began to realise that, in these days, time is money.

Developing German industry had to establish itself on the world market. It could only expand by means of exports. This demanded that German businessmen operating abroad enjoyed the protection of international law. French, English and American businessmen could always permit themselves a little more license abroad than at home. Their embassies stood by them and in case of emergencies there were always a couple of warships to fall back on. But the Germans! In the Levant, the Austrians at least could depend on their Embassy to some extent even though it was not of much use. But whenever a Prussian businessman abroad complained to his embassy about some injustice or

6. The Prussian taler was valid in Prussia from 1750 to 1857; the gold taler was a currency unit in the Free City of Bremen; the "new two-thirds" taler was a North German silver currency; Mark Banco was a Hamburg bank currency used for international trade; Mark Currant was a silver coin in use since the seventeenth century; the 20 guilder piece was the currency unit in the South German states since 1776.



other, then the reply was always : "It serves you right. What are you doing here anyway ? Why don't you stay at home?"

The citizen of a small state above all was without rights anywhere. Wherever you went, German merchants were under foreign—French, English, American—protection or had to become naturalised citizens of their new homelands as quickly as possible. And even if their Embassies had wanted to act on their behalf, what use would it have been ? German envoys abroad were themselves treated rather like bootblacks.


One can see from all this that the desire for a united "Fatherland" had a very material foundation. It was no longer the dim impulse of the students of the Wartburg days, when "strength and courage burned in German souls",<sup>7</sup> and when, accompanied by a French melody, "forth rushed the Youth with battleflag on high, for the fatherland to struggle or to die"<sup>8</sup> in order to re-establish the romantic splendour of the medieval Empire, when the banner-bearing youth became a quite ordinary Pietistic servant of princely absolutism—in his old age. Neither was it any longer the much more down-to-earth call for unity advanced by the lawyers and other bourgeois ideologists of the Hambach Festival,<sup>9</sup> who believed that they loved unity and freedom for their own sakes and who seemed quite unaware that proposals to organise Germany as a cantonal republic on the Swiss model, which was the idea of the least muddled amongst them, were just as impracticable as the Hohenstaufen Imperialism of the students.<sup>10</sup> No, it was the demand arising from the immediate commercial needs of practical businessmen and industrialists for the elimination of all the

7. The Wartburg Festival of October 1817 was an early demonstration in favour of German unification. It was organised largely by university students and professors whose sense of political realities was somewhat limited.

8. The words are taken from the song: "Jugend-Muth und Kraft" by E. Hinkel, *Deutsche Volkslieder*, Mainz 1849.

9. The Hambach Festival of May 1832 was a demonstration in favour of constitutional liberty and national unification organised by South German liberals and radicals. It was more representative and revealed more political maturity than the earlier Wartburg Festival.

10. The period of the Hohenstaufen dynasty (1130-1254) was considered the most glorious period of the medieval German Empire.



historically out-dated rubbish which obstructed the free development of trade and industry, for the removal of all the unnecessary irritations, which all his competitors had overcome, and which the German businessman had to put an end to at home if he wished to play a part on the world market. And the people who now demanded it knew what they wanted. They were in business, had been brought up in business, knew how to transact business and were willing to talk business. They knew that while one can demand a pretty stiff price, one must also be prepared to reduce it fairly considerably. They sang songs about the "German fatherland" in which Styria and Tyrol and "Austria rich in honour and in victories" were also included, and which stretched :

*"Van der Mass bis an die Memel,  
von der Etsch bis an den Belt,  
Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,  
über alles in der Welt."*<sup>11</sup>

(From the Maas right up to Memel,  
From the Adige up to the Baltic,  
Germany, Germany above everything,  
Above everything in the world.)

But for this ever-growing fatherland they were prepared to agree to a considerable rebate—20-30 per cent—for full payment in cash. Their plan for unity had been worked out and it was an immediately practicable one.

But German unity was not merely a German question. Since the Thirty Years' War, no single all-German question was ever settled without quite open intervention of other Powers. Frederick II conquered Silesia in 1740 with the aid of the French. In 1803, France and Russia literally dictated the reorganisation of the Holy Roman Empire through the Recess of the Imperial Diet. Then Napoleon organised Germany to suit his own convenience. And finally, at the Vienna Congress, Germany was again split up into thirty-six states and over two hundred territorial units—large and small—largely at the instigation of Russia, but also of Eng-

11. From the "*Lied der Deutschen*" written in 1841 by Hoffmann von Fallersleben.

land and France, who were abetted by the German Princes, just as at the Regensburg Diet<sup>12</sup> in 1802-3, which made the dismemberment even worse. In addition, parts of Germany were handed over to foreign rulers. Germany was thus not only rendered powerless and helpless, exhausting herself in internal strife and doomed to political, military and industrial futility; but what was much worse, France and Russia had, as a result of repeated use, acquired a right in the dismemberment of Germany, just as France and Austria assumed the right of seeing to it that Italy remained partitioned. This was the right which Tsar Nicholas asserted in 1850, when he prohibited in most brutal fashion any "unauthorised" changes in the constitution and enforced the re-establishment of the Federal Diet—that expression of the impotence of Germany.

The unification of Germany had therefore to be won in struggle not only against the Princes and other enemies within the country but also against the foreign Powers; or alternatively with the help of the foreign Powers. And what was their position at that time?

## 2

In France, Louis-Napoleon had made use of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat to become President with the aid of the peasantry and to become Emperor with the aid of the army. But a new Emperor Napoleon, brought into existence by the Army and operating within the frontiers of France as fixed in 1815, was an impossible absurdity. A re-born Napoleonic Empire meant the expansion of France up to Rhine, the realisation of the hereditary dream of French chauvinism. But to start with, the Rhine was not Napoleon's for the taking. Any more in this direction would have resulted in a European coalition against France. But there was the alternative possibility of strengthening France's general power position, of gaining new laurels for her army by joining with practically all the rest

12. Since the seventeenth century, Regensburg had been the regular meeting place of the Imperial Diet. At the diet of 1802-1803, the German Princes eagerly co-operated with Napoleon and Alexander in the hope of ensuring their own survival in the general reorganisation.

of Europe in a war against Russia, which had quietly used the period of revolutionary upheaval in Western Europe to occupy the Danubian Principalities and to prepare a new war of conquest against Turkey. England allied herself with France. Austria was friendly to both. Only heroic Prussia kissed the Russian rod and remained in a state of neutral friendship with Russia. But neither England nor France wanted to inflict a really serious defeat on their opponent, and the war therefore ended in a mild humiliation for Russia and a Franco-Russia alliance against Austria.\*

The Crimean War made France the leading power in Europe and the adventurer, Louis Bonaparte, the outstand-

\* The Crimean War was one colossal comedy of errors during which one was bound to ask, "who is deceiving whom?" at each new scene. But the comedy cost untold treasure and close on a million lives. The war had hardly begun before Austria marched into the Danubian Principalities. The Russians withdrew in the face of this. As a result, a war on Russia's frontiers with Turkey became impossible so long as Austria remained neutral. But in order to secure Austria as an ally in a war fought on this frontier, it was essential that the war be waged seriously with the aim of re-establishing Poland and pushing back Russia's Western frontier once and for all. Prussia, through whose territory all Russia's imports still came, would thus have been forced to join in. Russia would then have been blockaded both on land and by river and must soon have been defeated. But this was not the intention of the allies. On the contrary. They were delighted to be relieved of the danger of having to wage a serious war. Palmerston proposed to transfer the battlefield to the Crimea, which suited the Russians, and Louis-Napoleon was only too happy to join in the project. The war in the Crimea could only be a sham war and so all the main participants were satisfied. But Tsar Nicholas took it into his head to wage a real war and overlooked the fact that the terrain suitable for a sham war was quite unsuitable for a real one. Russia's advantages in defence, the expanse of its thinly populated territory, impassable and poor in resources, redounded against Russia with every Russian offensive and nowhere more so than in the Crimea. The Steppes of Southern Russia, which should have become the graveyard of the attackers, became the graveyard of Russian armies which Nicholas, with brutal, stupid disregard urged on to Sevastopol one after another, the last on in deep winter. And when the last hurriedly mustered companies with hardly any equipment, poorly provisioned, had lost two thirds of their strength on the march (whole battalions perish in the snow) and the rest were in no state to drive the enemy out of Russia, then the arrogant, empty-headed Nicholas collapsed miserably and poisoned himself. Once this had happened, the war became a sham war once again and peace was soon concluded.

ing figure of the day—which really is not saying much. But the Crimean War did not result in France acquiring any new territory. It thus harboured the seeds of a new war, one in which Louis-Napoleon would fulfil his real destiny as the man who had “enlarged the Empire”.<sup>13</sup>

The basis for this new war was already laid in the first one, in that Sardinia was allowed to join the alliance of the Western Powers as a French satellite, with the special rôle of outpost against Austria. It was prepared further at the conclusion of peace through the understanding reached by Louis-Napoleon with Russia, to whom nothing was more acceptable than meting out punishment to Austria.<sup>14</sup>

Louis-Napoleon was now the idol of the European bourgeoisie; not only because he had “saved society” by his *coup d'état* of 2 December 1851<sup>15</sup> when he destroyed the political domination of the bourgeoisie, only to preserve its social domination; not only because he showed how, under favourable conditions, universal suffrage could be transformed into an instrument for the oppression of the masses; not only because under his rule, industry and commerce and particularly speculation and stock-exchange swindling advanced at a rate previously unknown; but above all, because in him the bourgeoisie saw the first “great statesman” who was flesh of their flesh, bone of their bone. He was an upstart, a *parvenu*, like every other real bourgeois. Willing to try anything, he had been a Carbonari conspirator in Italy,<sup>16</sup> artillery officer in Switzerland, debt-ridden aristocratic tramp and Special Constable in England.<sup>17</sup> Always and everywhere the Pretender, he prepared himself in all

13. “*Mehrer des Reichs*” was part of the official title of the Holy Roman Emperors.

14. The close understanding reached between France and Russia after the Crimean War culminated in the secret treaty of March 1859. Russia promised neutrality in a Franco-Sardinian war against Austria, while France was to support Russia's efforts to secure revision of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

15. Louis-Napoleon made himself President of France for life in violation of the 1848 constitution.

16. The *Carbonari* were Italian secret societies during the first half of the nineteenth century, which kept alive the traditions of the French revolution and helped to prepare the way for Italian unification.

17. As Special Constable Louis-Napoleon had taken part in the preventive measures against the Chartist demonstration on 10 April 1848.

countries by his adventurous past and his moral failings for the post of Emperor of the French and arbiter of Europe's destinities, just as that bourgeois *par excellence*, the American bourgeois, prepares himself for becoming a millionaire by a series of partly honest and partly fraudulent bankruptcies. As Emperor, he not only subordinated policy to the interests of capitalist profit and stock-exchange swindling, but he conducted his policy quite on stock-exchange lines and speculated on the "principle of nationality".<sup>18</sup>

The right to impose fragmentation on Germany and Italy had hitherto been an inalienable, fundamental right of French policy. Louis-Napoleon now began to barter it away bit by bit against so-called compensation. He was ready to help Germany and Italy end their fragmentation, provided both countries paid him for every step towards unification by ceding territory to him. In this way, not only would French chauvinism be satisfied and the Empire gradually restored to its 1801 frontiers,<sup>19</sup> but France would be able to pose again as the enlightened and liberating power, and Louis-Napoleon as the protector of oppressed nations. And the whole bourgeoisie, full of enthusiasm for enlightenment and nationality, because they were supremely interested in eliminating all obstacles to trade on the world market, would unanimously applaud this world-liberating enlightenment.

A beginning was made in Italy, where unrestrained domination by Austria had prevailed since 1849. Austria was the general scape-goat of Europe at that time. The meagre results of the Crimean War were not put down to the irresolution of the Western Powers, who had only wanted a sham war, but to the indecisive attitude of Austria, for which no-one was more responsible than the Western powers themselves. But Russia was so outraged by Austria's advance on the Pruth—her thanks for the help Russia gave her in Hungary in 1849—(although it was precisely this advance which had saved Russia) that she regarded any attack on Austria with the greatest pleasure. Prussia no

18. Napoleon III specialised in exploiting the nineteenth-century movement for national self-determination for the purpose of Great Power ambition. Cf. Marx's work *Herr Vogt*, in Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Vol. 14.

19. The Treaty of Lunéville of February 1801 confirmed the annexation to France of Belgium, Luxemburg and the Left Bank of the Rhine.

longer counted, and had already been treated like dirt at the Paris Peace Congress. And so the war for the liberation of Italy "right to the Adriatic" was plotted with the connivance of Russia, unleashed in the spring of 1859 and concluded in the summer at the river Mincio. Austria was not thrown out of Italy. Italy was not liberated "right to the Adriatic", nor was she unified. Sardinia was able to expand, but France acquired Savoy and Nice and thus her 1801 frontier with Italy.

But the Italians were not satisfied with this. Small-scale manufacture still prevailed in Italy at that time. Large-scale industry was still in its infancy. The working class was not by any means completely expropriated or proletarianised. Workers still owned their own means of production in the towns, and industrial work was undertaken in the agricultural areas by small landowners and working peasants as a supplementary source of income. As a consequence, the energy of the bourgeoisie was not as yet spent in the struggle against a modern, class-conscious proletariat. And since the fragmentation of Italy was due primarily to domination by Austria, under whose protection the Princes carried mis-government to the most extreme lengths, the big, landed aristocracy and the urban masses backed the bourgeoisie as the champion of national independence. But Austrian domination was shaken off in 1859—except for Venetia—and its further intervention in Italian affairs under cover of Russia or France made impossible. Nobody was afraid of her any longer. And in Garibaldi, Italy possessed a hero like those of Antiquity, a man who could, and did, perform miracles. He put an end to the whole kingdom of Naples with his thousand volunteers, actually united Italy and tore holes in the artificial web of Bonapartist policy. Italy was free and virtually united, not through the machinations of Louis-Napoleon, but through the Revolution.

After the Italian war, the foreign policy of the Second French Empire no longer seemed a mystery to anyone. The conquerors of the great Napoleon were to be chastised, but *l'un après l'autre*, one after the other. Russia and Austria had received their share of attention; the next one to be dealt with was Prussia. And Prussia was more despised than ever; its policy had been cowardly and pathetic during the Italian war, just as it had been at the time of the Peace

of Basle in 1795.<sup>20</sup> The result of its policy of keeping a "free hand" was that it stood completely isolated in Europe, that all its neighbours large and small, were looking forward to the spectacle of Prussia being chastised, that it had a "free hand" only to surrender the Left Bank of the Rhine to France.

In the first period after 1859, the conviction was widespread, and nowhere more than in the Rhineland, that the Left Bank of the Rhine was irretrievably lost to France. People did not like it, but they saw it coming like an inescapable fate and, if the truth be told, they did not fear it too much. Old memories of the French, who really had brought freedom, were re-kindled in the minds of the peasantry and of the petty bourgeoisie. Of the bourgeoisie, the financial aristocracy, especially in Cologne, was already deeply involved in the fraudulent transactions of the Paris Credit Mobilier<sup>21</sup> and other Bonapartist companies, and called loudly for annexation.\* ✓

## 3

But the loss of the left Bank of the Rhine meant not only the weakening of Prussia but also of Germany. And Germany was split up more than ever. Austria and Prussia, more alienated from each other than ever because of Prussia's neutrality in the Italian war, the mob of petty princes looking to Louis-Napoleon half in trepidation, half with longing, as the Protector of a new Confederation of the Rhine<sup>22</sup>—this was the situation in the official Germany.

20. The Peace concluded unilaterally by Prussia during the war of the First Coalition. Prussia's refusal to aid Austria unconditionally against France in 1859, generally made a bad impression in Germany.

21. The Bank founded by the Pércire brothers in 1852. It specialised in stock-exchange speculation and industrial investments. Despite its close links with Napoleon III's régime, it failed in 1867.

\* Marx and I were able to convince ourselves on the spot on a number of occasions, that this was the general outlook of people in the Rhineland. Industrialists on the Left Bank used to ask me, among other things, how their concerns would fare under the French Customs tariff.

22. The Confederation of the Rhine, founded in 1806, organised the German states apart from Austria and Prussia as satellite states of Napoleon I. It disintegrated in 1813.



And this was at a time when only the united forces of the whole nation could have warded off the danger of dismemberment.

But how were the forces of the whole nation to be unified? Three courses were open after the attempts of 1848, nebulous without exception, had failed, and by their failure had dissipated much of the fog.

The first was the real unification of the country by the elimination of all the separate, individual states, in other words, the open revolutionary way. This course had just succeeded in Italy, where the Savoyard dynasty had joined forces with the Revolution and thereby won the Crown of Italy. But our German Savoyards, the Hohenzollerns, and even their most audacious Cavours, of the Bismarck stamp, were absolutely incapable of such bold deeds. The people would have had to do everything themselves in a war over the Left Bank of the Rhine and they would, presumably, have been capable of doing what was necessary. The inevitable retreat of the Prussians across the Rhine, static war around the Rhine fortresses, the inevitably following betrayal by the South German Princes might have sufficed to let loose a national movement in face of which all the dynasties would have been scattered to the winds. And Louis-Napoleon would then have been the first to sheathe the sword. The Second Empire could only use reactionary states as enemies, against which it could pose as the heir of the French Revolution and the liberator of the peoples. It was powerless in face of a people themselves involved in a revolution; indeed, a successful German revolution could have provided the stimulus for the overthrow of the entire French Empire. This is the best course events might have taken. If the worst had come to the worst, if the dynasts had overcome the movement, the Left Bank of the Rhine would have been temporarily lost to France, the active or passive betrayal by the dynasts would have been exposed to the whole world, and Germany would have had no choice but Revolution, the expulsion of the Princes and the establishment of the unified German Republic.

As things stood, this way of unifying Germany could only have been embarked on if Louis-Napoleon had started the war for the Rhine frontier. This war did not take place for reasons which will be mentioned later. As a result, national unification ceased to be a desperately urgent, life-

and-death question which had to be settled immediately, today or tomorrow, on pain of destruction. The nation could wait for a time.

The second course was unification under Austrian predominance. Since 1815, Austria had willingly retained its position as a compact state covering a well defined area, conditions imposed on it by the Napoleonic wars. It did not lay claim to its previous possessions in South Germany of which it had been deprived. It was satisfied with attaching to itself old and new territories which could more easily be assimilated geographically and strategically to what remained of the old core of the Monarchy. The separation of German Austria from the rest of Germany, begun through the protectionist tariffs of Joseph II, intensified by the Italian policy of Francis II, and consummated by the dissolution of the Empire<sup>23</sup> and the Confederation of the Rhine, was not overcome after 1815. Metternich surrounded his state with a real Chinese wall on its German side. The tariff wall kept out Germany's material products, the censorship its intellectual ones; the unspeakable chicanery with regard to passports limited personal contact to the absolute minimum. Internally, security was maintained by a régime of arbitrary absolutism, which was unique even in Germany and which was directed against any kind of political stirrings, however faint. Austria thus stood absolutely apart from the whole bourgeois-liberal movement in Germany. The events of 1848 at least brought about the dismantling of most of the intellectual wall, but the consequences were hardly conducive to bringing Austria closer to the rest of Germany. On the contrary. Austria emphasised more and more its position as an independent Great Power. And thus, although the Austrian soldiers of the Federal fortresses were very popular, while the Prussian soldiers were hated and reviled, and though Austria was still popular and respected in the predominantly Catholic southern and western parts of Germany; nevertheless, nobody seriously thought of German unification under Austrian domination, except perhaps one or two German Princes, rulers of small or medium-sized states.

It could not indeed be otherwise. Austria herself did not

23. Francis II's renunciation of the Imperial Crown in August 1806 marked the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire.

desire anything else, although she secretly fostered romantic dreams of Empire. The Austrian tariff barrier eventually remained the only material barrier in Germany, and it was all the more deeply resented for that. The independent Great Power policy was pointless, if it did not mean the sacrifice of German in favour of Austrian, that is, Italian, Hungarian etc. interests. After the Revolution, Austria remained what it had been before, the most reactionary of all German-speaking states, the one most reluctant to adapt itself to modern developments, and in addition, the only specifically Catholic Great Power. The more the post-Revolution government sought to re-establish the old Papal and Jesuitical order,<sup>24</sup> the more it found it impossible to maintain its influence in a country which was two-thirds Protestants. And finally, unification under Austria would only have been possible by smashing Prussia. However small a disaster for Germany this would be in itself, the destruction of Prussia by Austria would have been just as calamitous as the destruction of Austria by Prussia would be before the impending victory of the Revolution in Russia (after which it will be unnecessary because Austria, made superfluous by such an event, must then collapse of itself).

In short, German unity under Austria's wing was a romantic dream and stood revealed as such, when the Princes of the small and medium-sized states met in Frankfurt in 1863 to proclaim Francis-Joseph as German Emperor. The King of Prussia simply stayed away and the Kaiser comedy ended in a miserable fiasco.<sup>25</sup>

There remained the third way—unification under the leadership of Prussia. And because this is in fact what happened, we descend from the sphere of speculation to the more solid if rather dirtier ground of practical *Realpolitik*.

Since Frederick II's time, Prussia regarded Germany as it did Poland, simply as an area to be conquered, an area where one seized what one could, but it was understood as a matter of course that one had to share it with others. Sharing Germany with others—with France above all—

24. The measures taken by the Schwarzenberg ministry and its successors amounted to the dismantling of the work of Maria Theresia and Joseph II with regard to Church-State relations, and culminated in the *Concordat* of 1855.

25. Bismarck had to struggle hard to prevail on the King to decline the invitation to Frankfurt.

had been Prussia's "German vocation" ever: "*Je vais, je crois, jouer votre jeu; si les as nous partagerons*" (I believe I shall play y I get the aces, then we'll share)—these we parting words to the French Ambassador E set out on his first war. True to this "voca: betrayed Germany at the Peace of Basle ir in advance to the cessation of the Left Bank to France (the Treaty of 5 August 1796) ir a promise of more territory, and promptly r ward for the betrayal of the Reich in the 1 the Federal Diet dictated by Russia and Fra betrayed its allies, Russia and Austria, aga soon as Napoleon dangled the bait of Han for which it went every time; but it got cau ning but stupid machinations, and so began war with Napoleon and got its deserts at Jen the effect of this beating, that even after th 1813 and 1814, Frederick William III wante from all the West German outposts and con the occupation of North-East Germany and, withdraw from Germany, as Austria had gon have meant that the whole of Western Germa been transformed into a new Confederation under Russian or French patronage. The succeed. Westphalia and the Rhine provinc on the King against his will and with them a vocation".

Apart from the purchase of a few small tions ceased for the time being. Internally, t cratic Junker order gradually began to emer promise of a constitution, made at a time of was not fulfilled. But despite this, the bou ingly proposed, even in Prussia, for without dustry, the haughty, arrogant Prussian state now count for nothing. Slowly, reluctantly, ir doses. economic concessions had to be mad geoisie. And in one sense these concessic

26. Prussia received the secularised bishopric other West German territories.

27. For a recent short summary in English of and unsuccessful policy in 1805-1806. cf. F. M *Napoleon and the Awakening of Europe*, London

e prospect of fostering Prussia's "German vocation", namely in that Prussia, in order to put an end to the tariff barriers which divided its two halves, invited the adjoining German states to form a Customs Union. This is how the *Zollverein* (Customs Union) came into existence. It remained a pious hope until 1830 (only Hessen-Damstadt had come in) but afterwards, in consequence of the somewhat more rapid tempo of political and economic development it soon secured the economic annexation of Central Germany to Prussia.<sup>28</sup> The non-Prussian coastal states remained outside until after 1848.

The *Zollverein* was a great success for Prussia. That it signified a victory over Austrian influence was the least important aspect of it. The most important thing was that it united the bourgeoisie of the small and medium-sized principalities on the side of Prussia. Apart from Saxony, there was no German state in which industry had developed to the extent the Prussian had. And this was not due solely to natural and historical factors, but also to the larger customs area and a larger home market. And the more the *Zollverein* expanded and admitted the petty states in this home market, the more the burgeoning bourgeois of these states got used to Prussia as their economic and potentially their political leader. And the professors whistled to the tunes sung by the bourgeois. What the Hegelians deduced philosophically in Berlin—that Prussia was destined to stand at the head of Germany—was demonstrated historically by the disciples of Schlosser, especially by Häusser and Gerinus. It was of course assumed that Prussia would change its whole political system and fulfil the demands of the ideologists of the bourgeoisie.\*

But all this did not happen out of any special love for the Prussian state, in the way the Italian bourgeoisie accepted Piedmont as the leading state after it had placed itself

28. The final formation of the *Zollverein* was achieved in 1834. Its success did much to strengthen Prussia as against Austrian influence in Germany.

\* In 1842, the *Rheinische Zeitung* discussed the question of Prussian hegemony from this standpoint. In the summer of 1843, Gerinus told me in Ostend, that Prussia must come to be the leader of Germany but that three things were necessary in order that this could come about: Prussia must have a Constitution, it must institute freedom of the Press and it must pursue a national foreign

openly at the head of the national and constitutional movement. It happened reluctantly; the bourgeoisie accepted Prussia as the lesser evil, because Austria excluded them from its markets and because in comparison with Austria, even Prussia seemed to have a certain bourgeois character, if only because of her mean financial policy. Unlike other large states, Prussia possessed two good institutions: universal military service and universal compulsory education. She had introduced them in times of desperate danger and, when times improved, she merely eliminated the possible dangers inherent in them in certain circumstances by deliberate neglect and restricted application. But they continued to exist on paper and with them Prussia could one day arouse the potential energy dormant among the mass of the people, to an extent which was unattainable in other countries with the same population. The bourgeoisie accepted these two institutions. In 1840 the compulsory year of military service, which involved the sons of the bourgeoisie, was circumvented fairly easily and cheaply by bribery, especially as the Army itself looked down on the *Landwehr*<sup>29</sup> officers recruited from the commercial and industrial strata. And the larger number of people with a certain minimum of elementary knowledge which compulsory education undoubtedly produced in Prussia, was most useful to the bourgeoisie. As large-scale industry progressed, their numbers were even inadequate.\* Complaints about the high cost of both institutions, which had to be paid for by increased taxation, were voiced mainly by the petty bourgeoisie. The rising bourgeoisie calculated that the considerable but unavoidable future costs of becoming a Great Power would be amply compensated by increased profits.

In short, the German bourgeois indulged in no illusions about Prussian kindness. If, from 1840 onwards, they leaned towards the idea of Prussian hegemony, this was only because and to the extent that the Prussian bourgeoisie,

29. The *Landwehr* was created by Scharnhorst in 1813. It was a reserve consisting of older men who had done their regular service.

\* At the time of the *Kulturkampf* (i.e. the 1870s), manufacturers in the Rhineland complained to me that they could not promote otherwise suitable workers to be foremen because of their lack of education. This was particularly true in the Catholic districts.

anks to its greater economic development, assumed the onomic and political leadership of the German bourgeoisie a whole; because and to the extent that the Rottecks and 'elkers of the old Constitutional South were overshadowed by the Camphausens, Hansemanns and Mildes of the Prussia North, the lawyers and professors by the merchants and manufacturers. The Prussian Liberals of the years just before 1848, especially those in the Rhineland, did indeed display a far more vigorous revolutionary spirit than the vassal-oriented liberals of the South. Two of the best popular political songs since the sixteenth century were composed at this time, the song about the *Bürgermeister Tschech* and the one about the *Baroness von Droste-Fischering*, the very thing insolence of which now horrifies the same people, who as young men sang them so lustily in 1846.<sup>30</sup>

But all this was soon to be changed. There was the February Revolution and the March Days in Vienna and the Revolution of 18 March in Berlin. The bourgeoisie was victorious without having had to engage in any real struggle; it had not at all wanted the serious fighting which had occurred. For the bourgeoisie who only recently had fought with Socialism and Communism (especially in the Rhineland) now suddenly discovered that it had not bred but at best a few industrial working-men, but a working *class*, one which, though still half-asleep, was nevertheless slowly awakening and developing into a proletariat, revolutionary by its innermost nature. And this proletariat, which had won the victories for the bourgeoisie everywhere, was now putting forward demands, especially in France, which were incompatible with the continued existence of the whole bourgeois order. On 23 June 1848 the first terrible struggle between the two classes broke out in Paris. The proletariat was defeated after four days of fighting. From that time onward, the mass of the bourgeoisie throughout the whole of Europe went over to the side of reaction, and united with the bureaucrats, nobles and priests whom it had just overthrown with the help of the workers, in order to fight against the "enemies of society", these self-same workers.

In Prussia the bourgeoisie left its own elected representatives in the lurch and greeted the dissolution of the elected

30. Both songs are published in *Historische Volkslieder der Zeit von 1756 bis 1871*, Vol. II, p. 63.

Assembly by the Government in November 1848 with open or concealed joy. The Junker-bureaucratic Ministry which now ruled in Prussia for ten years had perforce to rule in a constitutional form. But it revenged itself for this by a system of petty chicanery and oppression, unprecedented even in Prussia, under which no-one suffered more than the bourgeoisie.<sup>31</sup> The bourgeoisie, however, had become contrite, meekly accepted their buffetings and kicks as punishment for their erstwhile revolutionary aspirations, and gradually learned to think what they later avowed quite openly : "We are only dogs after all."

## 4

Then came the Regency. In order to demonstrate his loyalty to the King, Manteuffel had surrounded the successor to the throne, the later William I, with as many spies as Puttkamer now employs to watch the editorial offices of the *Sozialdemokrat*.<sup>32</sup> As soon as William became Regent, Manteuffel naturally received a parting kick and the New Era began.<sup>33</sup> It was only a change of décor. The Prince Regent graciously deigned to allow the bourgeois to be liberals again. The bourgeois made use of this permission with great satisfaction, but deluded themselves into thinking that they now wielded power and that the Prussian state would have to dance to their tune. But this was not by any means the view prevailing in "authoritative circles". The reorganisation of the Army was to be the price paid by the liberal bourgeoisie for the New Era. By this the Government required only the application of conscription on the scale which had been customary up to 1816. As far as the liberal opposition was concerned, they could say absolutely nothing against it which would not have contradicted their own talk about Prussian leadership and Prussia's German destiny. But the

31. Engels is referring to the ministries of Count Brandenburg (1848-1850) and Otto v. Manteuffel (1850-1858).

32. As Prussian Minister of the Interior from 1881-1888, Robert Puttkamer was responsible for the execution of the Anti-Socialist Laws.

33. William became Regent because of Frederick William IV's incurable madness (October 1858). He dismissed the Manteuffel ministry. The resulting optimistic illusions among the liberal opposition gave rise to the term "New Era" in the bourgeois press.



liberal opposition made it a condition of acceptance that the maximum legal period of military service should be two years. This was in itself a quite rational demand. But it was questionable whether it could be forced through, whether the liberal bourgeoisie throughout the country was ready to go to the limit in blood and treasure in order to fight for this condition. The Government insisted on three years, the Chamber on two. The "conflict" broke out.<sup>34</sup> And with the conflict over army reorganisation, foreign policy again became decisive, for home policy as well.

We have seen how Prussia by her attitude in the Crimean and Italian wars had forfeited the last shreds of respect. This deplorable policy could be partially excused by reference to the poor state of the Army. Since it was impossible before 1848 to impose new taxes or raise new loans without consent of the Estates, and since the government was not willing to recall them for this purpose, there was never enough money for the Army, which degenerated completely as a result of this unbridled stinginess. The régime of spit, polish and parades, introduced by Frederick William III did the rest. How helpless this parade army proved itself to be on the battlefields of Denmark, can be read in the pages of Count Waldersee's memoirs. The mobilisation of 1850 was a complete fiasco. Everything was lacking and what was available was mostly useless.<sup>35</sup> All this was changed when the Chambers voted money. The Army was jolted out of the old routine, field service largely replaced parade-ground drill. But the strength of the Army remained the same as it had been in 1820, while all other Great Powers had greatly increased their armed forces, especially France, the very country from which danger now threatened. And this despite the fact that conscription existed in Prussia. Every Prussian was a soldier on paper, and though the population had increased from 10½ millions

34. "*Der Konflikt*" is the term used in German historiography for the constitutional conflict which arose from the refusal of the liberal majority in the Prussian Lower House to accept unconditionally the army reorganisation proposals submitted by the Minister of War, von Roon, in February 1860. It lasted until the Chamber elected in 1866 agreed to Bismarck's Indemnity Bill.

35. The minor military action in Hesse in the autumn of 1850 revealed the inadequacy and outdatedness of Prussian equipment and tactics.

in 1817 to 17 $\frac{3}{4}$  millions in 1858, the Army was not capable of calling up and training more than a third of the possible intake. The Government now demanded that the Army be increased to a size corresponding almost exactly to the increase in population since 1817. But the self-same liberal deputies who ceaselessly demanded that the Government stand at the head of Germany, safeguard her position in the face of foreign powers, re-establish her prestige amongst the nations, argued and haggled and would make no grants except on the basis of the two year term of military service. Had they the power to achieve this aim, about which they were so obdurate? Were the people, or even the bourgeoisie, ready to back them up and fight?

On the contrary. The bourgeoisie applauded the verbal battles between the deputies and Bismarck. But in actual fact, they organised a movement which, although unconsciously, was in reality directed against the majority in the Prussian Chamber. The violations of the constitution of Holstein by Denmark, the forcible attempts at Danisation in Schleswig, infuriated most German citizens.<sup>36</sup> They were used to being bullied by the Great Powers, but to be kicked around by little Denmark was more than they could bear. *The Nationalverein*<sup>37</sup> (National Society) was established, deriving its support especially from the bourgeoisie of the small states. And the *Nationalverein*, liberal to the core though it was, demanded first and foremost, national unification under the leadership of Prussia, under a liberal Prussia if at all possible, but if necessary under any kind of Prussia.

What the *Nationalverein* demanded most of all was that at long last some progress should be made, that the miserable position of Germans as second class citizens on the world market be ended, that Denmark be cut down to size, that the Great Powers be met with determination in Schleswig-Holstein. And the demand for Prussian leadership was

36. The Danish efforts in this direction culminated in the total annexation of Schleswig to Denmark, proclaimed in November 1863.

37. The foundation of the *Nationalverein* in September 1859 was inspired by the events in Italy earlier that year, which marked a great advance towards the unification of the country, and especially by the success of the Italian National Society. The pivot of its policy was to encourage the Prussian Government to accept genuine constitutionalism and to take the initiative for German unification. It was opposed to direct revolutionary action.

now freed from all the unclarity and day-dreaming which still clung to it until 1850. By now everyone knew that it meant the expulsion of Austria from Germany and the end of petty-state sovereignty, and that neither of these two objectives could be gained without civil war and the partition of Germany. But people no longer feared civil war and the partition of Germany was no more than the logical conclusion of the Austrian tariff barrier. German industry and commerce had developed to such an extent, the number of German business houses spanning the world market had become so numerous, that petty states at home and lack of rights and protection abroad were no longer to be tolerated. And while the strongest political organisation which the German bourgeoisie had ever possessed was, in practice, expressing this vote of no confidence in them, the deputies in Berlin were haggling about the length of military service!

This was the situation when Bismarck set out to intervene actively in foreign policy.

Bismarck is Louis-Napoleon translated from the French adventurist Pretender to the Throne into the Prussian Junker Squire (*Krautjunker*) and German officer-cadet. Like Louis-Napoleon, Bismarck was a man of great practical understanding and immense cunning, a born, crafty businessman, who in other circumstances would have rivalled the Vanderbilts and Jay Goulds on the New York Stock Exchange, and indeed he most effectively steered his private ship into port. But this heightened grasp of practical affairs is often linked with a corresponding limitation of vision, and it was in this respect that Bismarck was "superior" to his French predecessor. For the latter, after all, had his "Napoleonic ideas"<sup>38</sup> which he had worked out for himself during his days of vagabondage (they looked like it), while, as we shall see, Bismarck never exhibited even the ghost of an original political idea and was only good at picking up and using for his own purposes other other people's finished ideas. But this narrowness was his good fortune. Without it he would never have been able to view the whole of history from an exclusively Prussian standpoint, and had there been any chink in his fixed Prus-

38. The allusion is to Louis-Napoleon's book *Des Idées Napoléoniennes*, published in Paris in 1839.

sian outlook, through which the light of day might have penetrated, he would have failed in his whole mission and there would have been an end to his glory. To be sure, once he had fulfilled in his own way the special mission prescribed for him by forces outside himself, he was at his wits' end. We shall see what somersaults he was driven to perform as a result of his absolute lack of rational ideas and his inability to grasp the historical situation which he himself had created.

If Louis-Napoleon had learned from his own shady past not to be too scrupulous in his choice of means, Bismarck learned to be, even less scrupulous from the history of Prussian policy, especially from the history of the so-called Great Elector (Frederick-William) and of Frederick II, and could be so with the reassuring consciousness that he was being true to the tradition of the fatherland. His business acumen taught him to keep his Junker inclinations in check when necessary. When it seemed necessary no longer, they came crudely to the fore again; this was, of course, evidence of decline. His political methods were those of a young member of the Officer Corps. In his attacks on the Prussian Constitution in the Chamber, he did not hesitate to use the phrases and methods by means of which one extricates oneself from awkward scrapes in the officers' mess. All the innovations he introduced into diplomacy were borrowed from officer-cadet conventions. But whereas Louis-Napoleon often became unsure of himself in decisive moments, as for example, at the time of the *coup d'état* in 1851, when Morny had literally to use force in order to get him to go through with what had been begun, or on the eve of the war in 1870, when his uncertainty undermined his whole position, it must be said for Bismarck that nothing of that kind ever happened to him. His willpower never deserted him. Rather was it the case that it was often suddenly transformed into open brutality. And it is this above all which was the secret of his successes. All the ruling classes in Germany, Junkers and bourgeois alike, had so lost all traces of energy, spinelessness had become so much the custom in "educated" Germany, that the one man amongst them who still had willpower thereby became their greatest personality and a tyrant over them, so that they were ready to dance to his tune even against their better

nature and judgment. "Uneducated" Germany has not yet reached that stage. The working people have shown that they have willpower which even Bismarck's strong will cannot break.

A brilliant career lay open before our Junker from the old Mark, if only he had the courage and wit to seize the opportunity. Had not Louis-Napoleon become the idol of the bourgeoisie precisely by dissolving their Parliament but increasing their profits? And did not Bismarck have the same business acumen which the bourgeoisie so admired? Did he not follow his Bleichröder, just as Napoleon followed his Fould? Was there not a contradiction in Germany in 1864 between the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Prussian Parliament who haggled about the length of military service, and the bourgeoisie in the *Nationalverein* outside, who wanted national action at any price, action for which troops were necessary—a contradiction very similar to that in France in 1851 between the bourgeoisie in the Chamber, who wanted to keep the power of the President in check, and the bourgeoisie outside, who wanted order and strong government, order at any price; a contradiction Louis-Napoleon resolved when he scattered the parliamentary windbags and gave peace and quiet to the bourgeoisie? Wasn't the situation more favourable in Germany for a bold attempt? Did not the reorganisation plan come ready-made from the hands of the bourgeoisie, and were they themselves not clamouring vociferously for an energetic Prussian statesman to carry out their plan, drive Austria out of Germany, and unify the small states under Prussian hegemony? And if in the event the Prussian constitution suffered a few knocks, and the ideologists inside and outside the Chamber were pushed on one side according to their deserts, could not one rely on universal suffrage, as Louis-Napoleon had? What could be more democratic than the introduction of universal suffrage? Had not Louis-Napoleon demonstrated its complete harmlessness—if handled appropriately? And did not precisely this universal suffrage offer a means of appealing to the broad masses, of coquetting with the reviving social movement, if the bourgeoisie should prove obstreperous?

Bismarck seized the opportunity. What needed to be done was to repeat Louis-Napoleon's *coup d'état*, to make clear to the German bourgeoisie, in the sharpest possible fashion, where real power lay, to dissipate their liberal illusions in the most violent manner, but to carry out those of their national demands which coincided with Prussian aspirations. Schleswig-Holstein provided the first pretext for action. The ground for his foreign policy was prepared. The Russian Tsar (Alexander II) was won over by Bismarck's services in the struggle to crush the insurgent Poles in 1863<sup>39</sup>. Louis-Napoleon was likewise mollified and could excuse his unconcern, if not his secret acquiescence, in Bismarck's plans by reference to his beloved "principle of nationality". Palmerston was Prime Minister of England but had appointed the puny Lord Russell to the Foreign Office only in order that the latter should make a fool of himself there. But Austria competed with Prussia for supremacy in Germany and could not afford to be outbidden by Prussia in this affair, especially as in 1850 and 1851 she had conducted herself even more contemptibly than Prussia as a lackey of Tsar Nicholas in Schleswig-Holstein.<sup>40</sup> The situation was therefore extraordinarily favourable. No matter how much Austria resented Prussia, when Frederick VII, King of Denmark, died, they had no choice but to advance together against Denmark—with the tacit approval of France and Russia. As long as Europe remained neutral, which is what happened, the result was a foregone conclusion. The Duchies were conquered and surrendered at the peace treaty.<sup>41</sup>

Prussia had the subsidiary aim in this war of trying out its army, which had been trained on the basis of new principles since 1850, and strengthened and reorganised in 1860. It surpassed all expectations and that in the most varied conditions of war. The battle of Lyngby in Jutland

39. The reference is to the Alvensleben Convention of February 1863 providing for joint operations against the insurgent Poles. For the more recent view that the Convention was a blunder rather than a piece of farsighted statesmanship, cf. W. N. Medlicott, *Bismarck and Modern Germany*, London 1965, pp. 35-36.

40. In the period 1848-1851, Austria had played a consistently pro-Danish rôle in the Schleswig-Holstein question.

41. By the Treaty of Vienna of October 1864.

demonstrated both the great superiority of the needle gun over the muzzle loader and that its correct use was understood, for 80 Prussians posted behind a hedge put more than three times their number of Danes to flight by their rapid fire. They were likewise able to observe that the Austrians had learned only one lesson from the Italian wars and the fighting methods of the French, namely that shooting was of no use whatever; the real soldier must charge at the enemy with the bayonet. This was duly noted, and indeed it was impossible to imagine a more welcome enemy tactic in front of the new guns. In order to demonstrate this to the Austrians at the earliest possible opportunity, the Duchies were assigned at the peace to the joint sovereignty of Austria and Prussia, thereby creating a purely provisional situation which was bound to produce one conflict after another, thus leaving Bismarck free to exploit any one of these conflicts in order to deliver his great blow against Austria. In line with the tradition of Prussian policy of exploiting a favourable situation "ruthlessly and to the utmost", as Herr von Sybel puts it, it was only natural that under the pretext of liberating Germans from Danish oppression, 200,000 North Schleswig Danes were annexed to Germany. The man who was left empty-handed after all this was the Duke of Augustenburg, the candidate for Schleswig-Holstein supported by the petty states and by the German bourgeoisie.

In the matter of the Duchies, therefore, Bismarck had fulfilled the wishes of the German bourgeoisie against their will. He had driven out the Danes, he had defied the foreign Powers and these had not lifted a finger. But no sooner had the Duchies been freed, than they were treated as conquered territory; their wishes were not consulted and they were arbitrarily divided provisionally between Austria and Prussia. Prussia had become a Great Power again and was no longer the fifth wheel on the European wagon. The fulfilment of the national aspirations of the bourgeoisie was well under way, but the method chosen was not the liberal, bourgeois one. The Prussian military conflict therefore continued and even became more insoluble. The second act of Bismarck's spectacular drama had, therefore, to be begun.

The Danish war had fulfilled one part of the national aspirations. Schleswig-Holstein was "liberated". The Protocols of Warsaw and London, in which the Great Powers:

had put their seal on Germany's humiliation before Denmark,<sup>42</sup> were torn up and flung in their faces, and they had not done a thing. Austria and Prussia stood together once again; their troops had been victorious together and no potentate now thought of violating any part of German territory again. Louis-Napoleon's designs on the Rhine, relegated to the background hitherto by preoccupations elsewhere—by the Italian Revolution, the Polish uprising, the Danish complications and finally by the campaign in Mexico<sup>43</sup>—were now without any possible hope of realisation. Externally, the world situation was thus just what a conservative Prussian statesman could desire. But up to 1871 Bismarck was never a conservative and least of all at that time, and the German bourgeoisie was by no means satisfied.

The German bourgeoisie continued to be caught up in the familiar contradiction; on the one hand it demanded exclusive political power, that is, a ministry elected from the liberal majority in Parliament; and such a ministry would have had to wage a ten year struggle with the old system represented by the Crown before its new ascendancy would have been definitively accepted; that would have meant ten years of internal weakness. On the other hand, it demanded a revolutionary transformation of Germany which, in practice, could only be achieved by force, that is, only by actual dictatorship. And from 1848 onwards, the bourgeoisie had demonstrated again and again, at every decisive moment, that it did not possess even a trace of the energy and determination needed to attain one or the other, let alone both these objectives. In politics there are only two decisive powers, the organised force of the State, the Army, and the unorganised, elemental force of the popular masses. How to appeal to the masses, the bourgeoisie had forgotten once and for all in 1848. It feared them even more than it

42. The two protocols of 1851 and 1852 regulated the succession in the Duchies in favour of the Danish ruling house.

43. Taking advantage of the American Civil War, Napoleon III launched an armed intervention against the Mexican government in 1861. In 1864 a Mexican "Empire" was established under Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph of Austria. Soon after, the French troops were defeated by the Mexicans, and after the conclusion of the Civil War, the enterprise had to be abandoned. Maximilian refused to desert his supporters and was executed in 1867.



feared absolutism. The Army was not at their disposal by any means. But it was most certainly at Bismarck's.

In the conflict over the Constitution, which still raged, Bismarck had fought against the parliamentary demands of the bourgeoisie with all his might. But he longed most avidly to fulfil their national demands, for these coincided with the most secret and deeply felt aspirations of Prussian policy. If he could now fulfil the wishes of the bourgeoisie once again against its will, by making the unification of Germany as formulated by the bourgeoisie a reality, then the conflict would disappear of itself and Bismarck would become the idol of the bourgeois in the same way as his model Louis-Napoleon.

The bourgeoisie provided him with the aim; Louis-Napoleon showed him the way; only the actual execution was Bismarck's own work.

If Prussia was to achieve supremacy in Germany, it was necessary not only to drive Austria out of the German Confederation by force, but also to subjugate the petty states. Such a "brisk, jolly war"<sup>44</sup> of Germans against Germans had always been one of the main methods used by Prussia to expand its territory. No Prussian worth his salt shrank from such a thing. Neither could the second main method, an alliance with foreign powers against Germany, cause serious misgivings. Alexander, the sentimental Tsar of Russia, was in Prussia's pocket. Louis-Napoleon had never disputed Prussia's Piedmontese mission in Germany and was quite willing to do a deal with Bismarck. If he could get what he needed by peaceful means in the form of compensation, he preferred it that way. After all, he did not need to get the whole of the Left Bank of the Rhine at once. If he could get it piecemeal, even a strip at a time, for every new advance made by Prussia, it would be noticed less and still enable him to attain his goal. A square mile on the Rhine counted for far more in the eyes of the French chauvinists than the whole of Nice and Savoy. Negotiations were therefore opened with Louis-Napoleon, and his agreement secured for Prussia's expansion and for the establishment of a North German Confederation. There is no doubt

44. The German phrase is "frischer, fröhlicher Krieg", which was coined by the German historian Heinrich Leo in 1853, and caught on in subsequent years.

whatsoever that stretches of territory on the Rhine were offered to Louis-Napoleon in exchange. In his negotiations with Govone, Bismarck mentioned the Rhenish possessions of Bavaria and Hesse. It is true that he denied this later, but a diplomat, especially a Prussian diplomat, has his own ideas as to the limits within which one is justified, or even obliged, to do violence to the truth. Truth, after all is like a woman and according to a Junker's idea, she really quite likes it.<sup>45</sup> Louis-Napoleon was not so stupid as to agree to Prussia's expansion unless he was promised some compensation. Bleichröder would sooner have lent money without interest. But he didn't know his Prussians well enough and he was outwitted in the end. In short, once Bismarck made sure of him he concluded an alliance with Italy in order to prepare the way for the "stab in the heart".

Philistines in many countries have been deeply affronted by this phrase. Quite wrongly. *A la guerre comme à la guerre*. It simply proves that Bismarck understood the German civil war of 1866<sup>46</sup> to be what it really was, namely, a *revolution*, and that he was prepared to carry it through by revolutionary means. And this is what he did. His treatment of the Federal Diet was revolutionary. Instead of subordinating himself to the constitutional decisions of the Federal authorities, he accused them of violating the Federal Constitution—a mere subterfuge—dissolved the Confederation, proclaimed a new Constitution with the aid of the Reichstag elected on the revolutionary basis of universal suffrage and finally drove the Federal Diet out of Frankfurt.<sup>47</sup> He sent a Hungarian Legion into Upper Silesia, which was commanded by General Klapka, who had participated in the Hungarian Revolution, and by other

45. Govone's reports were published in 1873, causing a sensation in the *Reichstag*. Bismarck angrily denied their truth, but most modern historians except doctrinaire believers in Bismarck's German-nationalist sentiments, agree as to their authenticity. Cf. E. Eyck, *Bismarck, Leben und Werk*, Zurich 1941-1944, II, pp. 218-221; O. Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, pp. 294-295.

46. All German states were involved in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The great majority took part on the side of Austria, while Mecklenburg, Oldenburg and a few other North German states took the side of Prussia.

47. Prussia's military successes forced the Federal Diet to transfer itself to Augsburg and finally to disperse in August 1866.

officers who had done likewise, and which consisted of Hungarian deserters and prisoners of war, who were now to make war on their own legitimate sovereign. After the conquest of Bohemia, Bismarck issued a proclamation, "To the inhabitants of the glorious kingdom of Bohemia", which was a real affront to the traditions of legitimacy.<sup>48</sup> At the peace he secured for Prussia the whole of the territory of three legitimate German Princes and of a Free City, and the expulsion of Princes who reigned "by the grace of God" no less than the King of Prussia, did not trouble his Christian and legitimist conscience in the least.<sup>49</sup> It was, in short, a thorough-going revolution carried out by revolutionary means. Naturally we are the last people to blame him for this. On the contrary, we blame him for not being revolutionary enough, for being a Prussian revolutionary from above, for beginning a whole revolution in a position in which he could only carry through half a revolution, for being satisfied with four paltry petty states once he had embarked on the path of annexation.

## 6

But now in creeps little Napoleon demanding his due. While the war was raging he could have taken what he pleased on the Rhine, for not only was the country denuded of men but so also were the fortresses. He dallied in anticipation of a long drawn-out war which would exhaust both sides, but instead suffered the rude shock of Austria being subjugated in eight days. At first he demanded Rhenish-Bavaria and Rhenish Hessen along with Mainz, territories which Bismarck had mentioned to General Govone as possible compensation. But Bismarck was not now in a position to hand them over even if he had wanted to. The gigantic successes of the war had imposed new obligations on him. Prussia could not have agreed to barter away the key to the Middle Rhine, Mainz, to a foreign power at the very moment when it assumed the rôle of Germany's guardian and protector. Bismarck rejected the demand. Louis-

48. For Bismarck's encouragement of the revolutionary forces within the Habsburg Empire in the summer of 1866, cf. Pflanze, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-308.

49. The annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau and Frankfurt to Prussia was decreed by a law of 1866.

Napoleon was prepared to be flexible. He now demanded only Luxemburg, Landau, Saarlouis and the Saarbrücken coal-mining area. But Bismarck was likewise unable to hand these over, the more so since Prussian territory was involved. Why had Louis-Napoleon not helped himself at the right time, when the Prussians were tied up in Bohemia? In short, nothing came of compensation for France. Bismarck knew that this would mean a war with France later on, but that was just what he wanted.

Prussia did not exploit her favourable position at the peace talks as ruthlessly as had been her custom when in luck. And for good reasons. Saxony and Hessen-Darmstadt were brought into the new North German Confederation and were therefore treated leniently. Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden had to be treated gentle because Bismarck had to conclude secret defensive treaties with them. And as far as Austria was concerned, had Bismarck not rendered her a service by destroying the traditional ties which bound her to Germany and Italy? Had he not really helped her to establish herself as an independent Great Power, a position she had sought to achieve for so long? Hadn't he known better than the Austrians themselves where their interests lay, when he beat them in Bohemia? Given correct treatment, must not Austria come to realise that the geographical situation, the mutual inter-locking of the two countries, made a Germany united by Prussia its natural and necessary ally?

This is how, for the first time in her existence, Prussia was able to surround herself with the aura of magnanimity: she used a sprat to catch a mackerel.

It was not only Austria which was beaten on the battlefields of Bohemia, but also the German bourgeoisie. Bismarck had shown them that he knew better than they did themselves what suited them. A continuation of the conflict by the Chamber was now out of the question. The liberal demands of the bourgeoisie were put into cold storage for a long time, but their national demands were being fulfilled more and more every day. Bismarck carried out their national programme with a speed and precision which filled them with astonishment. And after he had brought home to them, *in corpore vili* (on their own vile bodies) their flabbiness and inertia and consequently their total incapacity

to carry through their own programme, he assumed the mantle of magnanimity towards them and applied to the totally disarmed Chamber for indemnity in respect of his violations of the Constitution. Moved to tears, the now harmless Progressives adopted the proposal.<sup>50</sup>

In spite of this, the bourgeoisie were reminded that they too had been defeated at Königgrätz.<sup>51</sup>

The Constitution of the North German Confederation was based on the model of the Prussian Constitution as authentically interpreted during the conflict. Refusal to pay taxes was made a crime. The Federal Chancellor and his ministers were nominated by the King of Prussia independently of any parliamentary majority. The independence of the Army from Parliament, secured as a result of the constitutional conflict, was retained in relation to the Reichstag. But the members of the Reichstag could console themselves for this by the uplifting thought that they had been elected by universal suffrage. They were also reminded of this fact—and in an unpleasant fashion—by the sight of two socialists (August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht) sitting amongst them. This was the first time that socialist deputies, representatives of the proletariat, had ever appeared in Parliament. It was an ominous sign.

All this was unimportant at first. What mattered was to exploit and extend the new national unity, at least of the North, in the interests of the bourgeoisie and by so doing, to attract the South German bourgeoisie to the Federation. The Federal constitution transferred the economically most important concerns from the jurisdiction of the individual states to the Federation—common citizenship, and freedom of movement throughout the whole Federal area, rights of settlement, legislation concerning industry, trade tariffs, shipping, coinage, weights and measures, railways, waterways, post and telegraph, patents, banks, foreign policy as a whole, consulates, protection of trade abroad, medical inspection, criminal law, judicial procedure, etc. All these matters were now speedily made the subject of, on the whole, liberal

50. The opposition liberals (Progressives) had lost substantially in the elections held while the Austro-Prussian War was still in progress. The Indemnity Bill was adopted in the Lower House on 3 September 1866 by 230 votes to 75.

51. The decisive battle of Sadowa, fought on 3 July 1866, is usually referred to in German books as the battle of Königgrätz.

legislation. And so, at long, long last, the worst excrescences of *Kleinstaaterei* were finally eliminated: those which had been the main obstacles to capitalist development, on the one hand, and to Prussian ambitions on the other. But this was no world historical achievement, as proclaimed by the now chauvinistic bourgeoisie, but a very, very late and incomplete imitation of what the French Revolution had brought about seventy years earlier and what all other civilised states had introduced long ago. Instead of boasting, they ought to have been ashamed that "well educated" Germany was the very last in these respects.

Bismarck was most forthcoming to the bourgeoisie in economic matters during the whole period of the North German Confederation, and even with regard to questions of parliamentary powers he revealed the iron fist only in a velvet glove. It was his best period; one might, on occasions even have doubted his specific Prussian limitations, his inability to understand that there are other, more powerful forces in history than armies and diplomatic tricks based on them.

Bismarck not only knew that the peace with Austria foreshadowed war with France; he actually wanted it. This war was to be the means for completing the Prussian-German Empire, the task allocated to him by the German bourgeoisie.\* The attempts gradually to transform the Parliament of the Customs Union<sup>52</sup> into a Reichstag and thereby to draw the South German states more and more

\* Before the Austrian war, Bismarck, answering a Minister from one of the states who had attacked him on account of his demagogic German policy, said that in defiance of all phraseology, he would drive Austria out of Germany and destroy the Confederation. "And do you think that the states will just look on and do nothing?" "You will do nothing at all"—"Then what is to become of the Germans?" "I will take them to Paris and unite them there." (From a statement made in Paris before the Austrian war by the Minister concerned and published during the war in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* by its Paris correspondent, Mrs. Crawford.)

52. The *Zollverein* was recognised after the war of 1866, and a *Zollparlament* was established as its highest organ. Bismarck hoped to achieve closer union with the South German states by gradually increasing the jurisdiction of this parliament. His hopes were frustrated by the electoral successes of the anti-Prussian parties in these states in 1867 and 1868.

into the Confederation, founded on the firm resolution of the South German deputies: No extension of jurisdiction! The attitudes of the governments just beaten on the battlefield were no more favourable. Only a palpable new demonstration that Prussia was not only more powerful than they were, but powerful enough to protect them, that is, only a new all-German war could bring about their speedy capitulation. Moreover, the dividing line of the Main,<sup>53</sup> though secretly agreed in advance between Bismarck and Louis-Napoleon, nevertheless seemed to have been enforced on the Prussians by the latter; unification with Southern Germany was therefore a violation of the formally agreed right conceded to the French to keep Germany divided, in other words, a cause of war.

In the meantime, Louis-Napoleon had to see whether he could not find some stretch of territory on the German frontier which could serve him as compensation for Sadowa. Luxemburg had been excluded when the North German Confederation had been established; it was now, apart from the tie with Holland through the person of the Grand Duke, an independent state. It was just about as French in character and outlook as Alsace and had far greater inclination to France than to the Prussians, who were positively hated.

Luxemburg is a most striking example of what the political *malaise* of Germany since the Middle Ages has done to the people inhabiting the Franco-German frontier areas, and it is all the more striking, since Luxemburg nominally belonged to Germany until 1866. Until 1830 it consisted of a German and a French half, but the German half soon succumbed to the superior French culture. The Luxemburg Emperors<sup>54</sup> were French in speech and education. Like the other Low Countries, Luxemburg had remained in only nominal union with Germany from the time of its incorporation into the Burgundian countries in 1440, and its membership of the German Confederation in 1815 did nothing to alter this. After 1830, the French part and a considerable portion of the German part went to Belgium.

53. The frontier between the North German Confederation and the South German states is referred to in German books as the *mainlinie*.

54. The heads of the Luxemburg dynasty were elected Holy Roman Emperors with short interruptions from 1310 to 1437.

But in the remaining German Luxemburg, everything remained French, the courts, the authorities, the Legislative Chamber, all conducted their business in French; all public and private documents and commercial records were written in French, all secondary schools taught in French. The speech of the educated people was and remained French, a French, of course, which groaned and creaked under the weight of the High-German sound-shift. In short, two languages were spoken in Luxemburg, a popular Rhine-Frankish dialect and French, but High-German remained a foreign language. The Prussian garrison stationed in the capital made matters worse rather than better. This is shameful enough for Germany but it is true. And this voluntary gallicisation of Luxemburg, moreover, puts similar developments in Alsace and in German-Lorraine in their proper light.

The King of Holland, William III, sovereign Duke of Luxemburg, was very much in need of ready cash and was quite amenable to offers made by Louis-Napoleon to buy the Duchy. The Luxemburgers would have given unconditional support to incorporation into France. Proof of this was their attitude in the war of 1870. From the point of view of international law, Prussia had no grounds to object, for she had herself brought about the exclusion of Luxemburg from Germany. Her troops were stationed in the capital as the federal garrison of a German Federal fortress. As soon as Luxemburg ceased to be a Federal fortress, Prussian troops no longer had any right to remain there. Why then did they not return home? Why was Bismarck unable to agree to the annexation?

Simply because the contradictions in which he had tied himself now came into the open. *Before* 1866, Germany was simply a territory for annexation by Prussia, which had to be shared with foreign Powers. *After* 1866, Germany had become a Prussian *protectorate* to be defended from foreign depredations. True, whole slices of Germany had been excluded from the newly created so-called Germany, in deference to Prussian interests. But the right of the German nation to its own territory now imposed on the Prussian Crown the duty of preventing these parts of the old Confederation from being incorporated into foreign states, of keeping open the possibility of their joining the new Prussian-German state in the future. This is why Italy stopped



short at the frontier of Tyrol.<sup>55</sup> This is why Luxemburg could not be handed over to Louis-Napoleon. A truly revolutionary government could have proclaimed this quite openly. But not the Royal Prussian revolutionary who had finally managed to convert Germany into one of Metternich's "geographical concepts". He had put himself in the wrong from the point of view of international law and could only extricate himself by applying his favourite officer's mess interpretation of international law.

That he was not laughed out of court for all this was due only to the fact that Louis-Napoleon was far from ready for a large-scale war in the spring of 1867. An agreement was reached at the London Conference. The Prussians evacuated Luxemburg; the fortress was dismantled, the Duchy was declared neutral.<sup>56</sup> War was postponed once again.

But Louis-Napoleon could not be satisfied with this. The expansion of Prussian power was quite acceptable to him as long as he received a corresponding compensation on the Rhine. He would have been satisfied with very little, prepared to take even less, but he had received nothing at all, had been utterly cheated. A Bonapartist monarchy in France was, however, only possible if its frontiers were gradually advanced towards the Rhine and if France remained the arbiter of Europe, if not in actual fact at least in appearance. The advance of the frontiers had come to grief; the position of arbiter was already threatened. The Bonapartist press was calling loudly for revenge for Sadowa. If Louis-Napoleon wanted to save his throne he had to remain true to his rôle and to secure by force what he had been unable to secure by persuasion, in spite of all his good services.

Hectic preparations, therefore, diplomatic as well as military, on both sides. And in fact, the following diplomatic developments resulted :

Spain was looking for a candidate for the throne. In March 1869, Benedetti, the French envoy in Berlin, heard

55. Prussia had refused in 1866 to accede to Italian demands for the cession of Tyrol as well as Venetia.

56. The London Conference took place under the presidency of the English Foreign Secretary in May 1867. Luxemburg's neutrality was guaranteed by the countries represented, i.e. Austria, Russia, Prussia, France, Italy, Great Britain, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg.

a rumour that the throne was being offered to Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern. He received instructions from Paris to make further enquiries. Von Thile, the Under-Secretary of State, assured him on his word of honour that the Prussian Government knew nothing about it. Benedetti heard the Emperor's view on a visit to Paris, "this choice of candidate is essentially anti-national, the country will not stand for it; it must be prevented."

All this, incidentally, revealed that Louis-Napoleon was fast losing his grip. For what could indeed be a more satisfactory "revenge for Sadowa" than having a Prussian Prince on the Spanish throne—the troubles which were bound to follow, the involvement of Prussia in internal Spanish politics, perhaps even a war, a defeat for the tiny Prussian navy, in any case Prussia in a most grotesque situation in front of Europe? But Louis-Napoleon could no longer permit himself the luxury of such a spectacle. His credit was so exhausted that he felt himself bound to adopt the traditional standpoint—namely, that a German Prince on the Spanish throne would mean that France was menaced from two sides and could not therefore be tolerated—an attitude which had become childish and untenable since 1830.

Benedetti therefore called on Bismarck (on 11 May 1869) in order to seek more information and to make France's attitude clear to him. He did not find out anything very definite from Bismarck; but Bismarck most certainly learned from Benedetti what he wanted to know, namely that proposing Leopold as a candidate would mean immediate war with France. Thus Bismarck was in a position where he could let war break out whenever it suited him.

As was to be expected, Leopold's candidature was heard of again in July 1870 and led to war directly, despite Louis-Napoleon's efforts to avert it. He realised not only that he had walked into a trap, but that his own throne was at stake, and he had little confidence in the veracity of his Bonapartist advisers who assured him that everything was ready down to the last brass button, and even less in their administrative capacity. But the logical consequences of his own past drove him to destruction; his own vacillations served only to accelerate his doom.

Bismarck, on the other hand, was not only absolutely prepared in the military sense, but this time he really had

the people behind him, who beneath all the diplomatic lies uttered on both sides grasped one simple fact: that this was a war not simply for the Rhine, but for their national existence. For the first time since 1815, reservists and the *Landwehr* (territorial reserves) again flocked to the colours gladly and enthusiastically. It was immaterial now, how all this had come about, or which small area of the two-thousand year old national inheritance had or had not been promised to Louis-Napoleon by Bismarck off his own bat. What was necessary was to show foreign powers once and for all that they were not to interfere in Germany's internal affairs, and that Germany was not obliged to support Louis-Napoleon's shaky throne by ceding German territory. And in the face of this national upsurge, all class differences, all ambitions for a new Confederation of the Rhine animating the South German courts, all restoration attempts of expelled Princes vanished into thin air.

Both sides had sought alliances. Louis-Napoleon had the firm support of Austria and Denmark and the fairly certain support of Italy. Bismarck had Russia on his side. But Austria, as usual, was not ready and was unable to intervene effectively before 2 September, and on that day Louis-Napoleon had already been captured by the Germans, and Russia had warned Austria that if she attacked Prussia she in turn would be attacked by Russia. But it was in Italy that Louis-Napoleon's double-dealing policies came home to roost. He had sought both to advance Italian national unity and to protect the Pope from it at one and the same time. He had kept troops in Rome that were now needed at home but which nevertheless he could not withdraw without obliging Italy to respect Rome and acknowledge the Pope as a sovereign ruler; all of which prevented Italy from standing by him. And finally, Denmark was ordered by Russia to remain passive.

But more decisive than all the diplomatic exchanges for the localisation of the war were the swift blows of the German army from Spichern and Wörth to Sedan. Louis-Napoleon's troops were defeated in every battle, and finally some three-quarters of them were sent off to Germany as prisoners of war. This was not the fault of the soldiers, who fought bravely enough, but of the military leaders and of the Government. But if, like Louis-Napoleon, you establish an empire with the aid of a gang of hooligans, and if this

empire is maintained for eighteen years by handing over France to be exploited by this gang, if all the important positions in the state are likewise occupied by members of this gang and all the subordinate ones by their hangers-on, then you should not embark on a life and death struggle, if you do not want to be left in the lurch. In less than five weeks the whole fabric of the Empire, so long admired by all European philistines, collapsed. The Revolution of 4 September,<sup>57</sup> simply cleared away the refuse, and Bismarck, who went into the war to found a Little-German Empire, woke up one fine morning to find himself the founder of a French Republic.

According to Bismarck's own proclamation, the war was not waged against the French people but against Louis-Napoleon. All justification for the war disappeared with his overthrow. This was the illusion held by the otherwise not so naïve Government established on 4 September, and they were most amazed when Bismarck suddenly revealed his Prussian Junker side.

There are no greater Francophobes in the world than the Prussian Junkers. For not only had they, who had been immune from payment of taxes before, suffered badly from 1806 to 1813 because of the punishment which the French were able to inflict on them as a result of their own backwardness; but much worse was the fact that the godless French by their outrageous revolution had so turned people's heads that the old Junker domination was more or less finished with even in Prussia, that the poor Junkers had to wage a fierce struggle, year in year out, to retain what little was left of their position, and a large number of them had already been reduced to the level of a shabby, parasitic aristocracy. Revenge had to be taken on France for this, and that is what the Junker officers in the army did under Bismarck's instigation. Lists had been drawn up of the French contributions imposed on this basis, calculations were made as to what each Department was to be made to pay—naturally taking France's greater wealth into account. Food, fodder, footwear were requisitioned with conspicuous

57. The news of Napoleon's defeat at Sedan produced an uprising in Paris on 4 September 1870, in the course of which the Republic was proclaimed and a Government of National Resistance set up, headed by the commander of the Paris garrison, Trochu.

ruthlessness. The mayor of one of the towns in the Ardennes, who declared that he was unable to make the required deliveries, was given 25 strokes without more ado. The Paris Government published all the evidence about this. The *Francs-Tireurs* who operated so precisely according to the principles of the Prussian *Landsturm* decree of 1813<sup>58</sup> as to give the impression that they had closely studied them, were shot out of hand, without mercy, when captured. The stories about the sending back of chiming clocks to Germany are likewise true; the *Kölnische Zeitung* itself reported on this. But according to Prussian accounts, these clocks were not stolen but discovered in houses near Paris the owners of which had fled, and were therefore classified as unclaimed property, and annexed for the benefit of loved ones at home. Thus, under Bismarck's leadership, the Junkers saw to it that despite the unobjectionable behaviour of the troops as well as of the greater part of the officers, the specifically Prussian character of the war was impressed upon the French, who naturally held the entire army responsible for the petty acts of spite of the Junkers.

And yet, these same Junkers were to demonstrate their respect for the French people in a fashion unheard of in all previous history. When all attempts to relieve Paris had failed, when all the French armies had been driven back, when Bourbaki's last big offensive against the German communication lines had been driven back, when the diplomacy of Europe had left France to its fate, then starving Paris had at last to capitulate.<sup>59</sup> And the Junkers' hearts beat more quickly at the thought of marching in triumph into the godless nest and wreaking full vengeance on the Parisian archrebels, the full vengeance denied them by Alexander of Russia in 1814 and by Wellington in 1815. Now they could punish the hearth and home of the Revolution to their heart's desire.

Paris surrendered. It paid 200 millions indemnity. Its fortifications were handed over to the Prussians. The garrison laid down its arms and handed over its field artillery. The cannon defending the city walls had their gun carriages

58. This decree of April 1813 provided for the organisation of volunteer battalions without uniform, who were to carry out guerrilla activities behind Napoleon's lines.

59. The Government of National Resistance concluded an armistice and agreed to the surrender of Paris on 28 January 1871.

taken away. All defensive weapons belonging to the State were handed over, one by one. But the real defenders of Paris, the National Guard, the Parisian people in arms, remained untouched, for nobody thought of taking away their weapons, neither their rifles nor their cannon.\* And in order to show the whole world that the victorious Germans had come to a respectful halt before the armed people of Paris, the victors did not enter Paris but were content to occupy the Champs-Élysées, a public park, for three days, guarded, watched and surrounded by Parisian sentries. Not a single German soldier set foot in the Paris Town Hall. None walked the boulevards, and the two who were allowed into the Louvre to admire the works of art had to obtain permission to do so, for it was a breach of the surrender terms. France was defeated, Paris was starving, but its people, as a result of their glorious past, had ensured *this* respect for themselves at least, that no victor dared to suggest that they disarm; none had the temerity to visit them in their homes or to desecrate the streets, battleground of so many revolutions, by a triumphal parade. It was as if the newly-baked Emperor, William I, were raising his hat to the living revolutionaries of Paris just as his late brother had done to the fallen fighters of the March struggles of 1848 in Berlin, and as if the entire German army stood behind him with arms presented.

But this was the only concession which Bismarck was compelled to make. Under the plea that there was no French Government with which peace could be made—a statement as true and as false on 4 September as it was on 28 January—he made the utmost use of his success in the true Prussian manner and only declared himself ready for peace talks after the complete overthrow of France. In the Peace Treaty itself, the “favourable situation was ruthlessly exploited” in the same good old Prussian style. Not only was the unheard of sum of 5 milliard Francs extorted as war indemnity, but two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, along with Metz and Strassburg, were taken from France and incor-

\* These were the property of the National Guard and not of the State and were therefore not handed over to the Prussians. It was these weapons that Thiers ordered to be stolen from the people of Paris in March 1871, and as a result of this, the uprising began which led to the establishment of the Commune.

ported into Germany.<sup>60</sup> With these annexations, Bismarck appears as an independent politician for the first time, who no longer carried out in his own way a programme prescribed by others, but as one who translated the products of his own brain into action. And, as a result, he committed his first, colossal blunder.

Alsace was conquered by France mainly in the Thirty Years War. With this, Richelieu departed from Henry IV's dictum:

The Spanish tongue may belong to the Spaniards, the German to the Germans, but wherever French is spoken, that belongs to me;

and in so doing he was basing himself on the principle of the natural frontier of the Rhine, the historical frontier of Ancient Gaul. This was stupid, but the Empire, which included the French-speaking areas of Lorraine and Belgium as well as Franche-Comté was in no position to blame France for annexing German-speaking areas. And if Louis XIV annexed Strassburg in peace-time with the aid of a pro-French party in the town,<sup>61</sup> Prussia has no real cause for indignation, for in 1796 it tried to do exactly the same kind of thing by seeking, though unsuccessfully, to occupy the Free Imperial City of Nuremberg without having been invited by any pro-Prussian party in the town.\*

60. A preliminary peace was signed on 26 February 1871, and the final Peace of Frankfurt concluded on 10 May 1871.

61. Louis XIV annexed Strassburg in 1681 with the active collaboration of the Catholic party headed by Bishop Fürstenberg.

\* Louis XIV was attacked on the grounds that his *Chambres de Reunion* had seized German territory which did not belong to him in peace time. Prussia's most malignant enemies could never make a similar charge against her. On the contrary. After she had made a separate peace with France in 1795 in direct violation of the Imperial Constitution and had assembled her small, equally rebellious neighbours around herself behind the demarcation line of the first North-German Confederation, she utilised the desperate situation of the South-German Estates—the only ones continuing the war in alliance with Austria—in order to attempt annexations in Franconia. They established "Chambers of Reunion" in Ansbach and Bayreuth, (which belonged to Prussia at that time) modelled on those set up by Louis XIV, and advanced claims on a number of neighbouring areas, compared to which Louis' legal pretences were absolutely convincing. And when the Germans, defeated, withdrew, and the French marched into Franconia, the rescuing Prussians occupied the Nuremberg area, including the suburbs right up to the

As a result of the Peace of Vienna in 1735, Lorraine was traded to France by Austria, and was finally taken into complete French possession in 1766.<sup>62</sup> For centuries it had belonged only nominally to the German Empire; its Dukes were French in every way and were almost always bound to France by alliances.

Up to the time of the French Revolution, a number of petty principalities existed in the Vosges whose rulers regarded themselves as sovereign princes in relation to the German Empire but acknowledged French sovereignty. This dual position was advantageous to them. And if the German Empire tolerated this situation instead of calling the sovereign gentlemen to account, then it had no reason to complain when France, in view of its sovereignty, took the inhabitants of these areas under its protection against the expelled dynasts.

Up to the time of the French Revolution, this German area was, on the whole, hardly gallicised at all. German was the language used in the schools and was the official language for all internal matters, in Alsace at least. The French Government favoured the German provinces, which, after long years of war devastation saw no more enemies in the land after the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Empire, torn by perpetual internal conflicts, was not really in any position to tempt the Alsatians to return to the motherland. The people enjoyed peace and quiet at any rate. One knew where one stood, and so the most influential philistines submitted to God's inscrutable wisdom. After all, their fate was not unique; the people of Holstein were also under foreign, namely Danish, occupation.

Then came the French Revolution. What Alsace and Lorraine had never dared to hope for from Germany was

town walls, and extorted a treaty from the trembling Nuremberg burghers (2 September 1796) according to which the town accepted Prussian domination on one condition—that Jews should never be allowed within the town precincts. Archduke Charles advanced again very soon after, defeated the French near Würzburg on 3 and 4 September 1796 and as a result, Prussia's attempt to impress the Nurembergers with Prussia's German mission faded into thin air.

62. The treaty of 1735 provided for a manifold re-allocation of territories, including the transference of Francis, Duke of Lorraine to Tuscany whose Medici rulers had died out, and of the defeated Polish king Stanislas Leszinsky to Lorraine, subject to the reversion of the Duchy to France on the latter's death, which occurred in 1766.



presented to them by France. The feudal chains were broken. The subject peasant, obliged to perform servile labour, now became a free man, the free owner in many cases of his farm and fields. In the towns, patrician domination and guild privileges disappeared. The aristocracy were driven out. And in the areas where petty princes had held sway, the peasants followed the example of their neighbours; they expelled the dynasties, the local authorities and the nobles, and declared themselves free French citizens. And nowhere in France did the people rally so enthusiastically to the Revolution as they did in the German-speaking areas. And when the Empire declared war on the Revolution, when the Germans not only still obediently wore their own chains, but also allowed themselves to be used to impose the old slavery on the French and the recently overthrown feudal lords on the peasants of Alsace, then the people of Alsace and Lorraine ceased to consider themselves German. They now learned to hate and despise the Germans, and the *Marseillaise* was written and set to music in Strassburg and was first sung by the people of Alsace. The German-French were now forged into one nation with the national French, with whom they fought side by side for the Revolution on hundreds of battlefields.

Has not the Great Revolution worked the same miracle in the Flemish areas around Dunkirk, amongst the Celts of Brittany, amongst the Italians of Corsica? And if we complain of the fact that this happened to Germans too, then have we forgotten all our past history which has made this possible? Have we forgotten that the whole of the Left Bank of the Rhine, which played only a passive part in the Revolution, was French in outlook when the Germans marched in again in 1814, and remained so until 1848, when the Revolution of that year again rehabilitated the Germans in the eyes of the Rhinelanders? Have we forgotten that Heine's enthusiasm for the French and even his Bonapartism were simply a reflection of the general outlook of the people west of the Rhine?

In 1814, when the allied forces invaded France, it was precisely in Alsace and German Lorraine that they met the most powerful hostility, the fiercest popular resistance, because it was in these places that the people were afraid of the danger of being forced to become Germans again.

And this despite the fact that German was practically the only language spoken there at the time. But once the danger of being separated from France had passed, once the urge for annexation on the part of the romantic German Chauvins had been suppressed, then the need for greater linguistic integration with France was understood, and from that time on the schools were gallicised, which the Luxemburgers had also done voluntarily. Nevertheless, the conversion proceeded very slowly. Only the present generation of the bourgeoisie is really gallicised, while the workers and peasants speak German. The position is roughly similar to that existing in Luxemburg. Literary German (with the partial exception of the pulpit) has been superseded by French, but the popular German dialect has only lost ground near the linguistic border, and is used colloquially much more than in many parts of Germany.

This was the land which Bismarck and the Prussian Junkers sought to make German once again, supported by that revival of chauvinistic romanticism which appears to be inseparable from all German questions. To try to make Strassburg, the home of the *Marseillaise*, German, was just as stupid as to try to make Nice, the home of Garibaldi, French. But Louis-Napoleon at least observed the properties in Nice and permitted a plebiscite to be taken on the question of the annexation; and the manoeuvre succeeded. But quite apart from the fact that the Prussians for very good reasons abhorred the use of such revolutionary measures—for nowhere has the majority of the people ever asked to be annexed to Prussia—they knew only too well that the population was even more solidly for France than the French-speaking French. And so the *coup* was carried out simply by the use of force. It was an act of revenge against the French Revolution. One of the territories which had been integrated with France precisely through the Revolution was torn away.

But the annexation nevertheless fulfilled a military purpose. By acquiring Metz and Strassburg, Germany came into possession of a defence line of enormous strength. As long as Belgium and Switzerland remain neutral, a French attack in force cannot be initiated anywhere else but in the small area between Metz and the Vosges, and to meet it, Coblenz, Metz, Strassburg and Mainz constitute the largest

and strongest quadrilateral of fortresses in the world. But half of this quadrilateral, like that of Austria in Lombardy,<sup>63</sup> lies in enemy territory and serves as strongholds for holding down the local population. Moreover, in order to complete the chain of defences, it was necessary to extend them beyond the German-speaking area and to annex a quarter of a million French people.

The great strategic advantage is thus the only justification for the annexation. But can this gain be compared in any way with the harm which the Germans did to themselves by this annexation?

The Prussian Junkers were blind to the great moral disadvantage in which the young German Empire placed itself by openly and frankly declaring brute force as its basic principle. On the contrary, unwilling subjects kept down by force are a necessity for them, as a proof of increased Prussian power and, generally, they have never had any other kind of subjects.

But even the Junkers should not have been blind to the political consequences of the annexation. And these were quite clear. Even before the annexation had been ratified, Marx proclaimed to the whole world in a circular of the International: "*The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine makes Russia the arbiter of Europe.*"<sup>64</sup> And the Social-Democrats repeated this again and again from the tribune of the Reichstag, so often that in the end the truth of this statement was finally demonstrated by Bismarck himself in his speech to the Reichstag on 6 February 1888 in which he cringed before the almighty Tsar, the arbiter of peace and war.

For it was crystal clear. By seizing two of the most fanatically patriotic provinces from France, the French were driven straight into the arms of anyone who offered them hope of getting these provinces back again and France was converted into the eternal enemy. Bismarck, who was a worthy and conscientious representative of the German philistines in this matter, demanded that the French should renounce not only legal but also moral claims to Alsace and Lorraine, and that they should even rejoice that these two

63. Engels is referring to the quadrilateral of fortresses formed by Mantua, Verona, Legnano and Peschiera.

64. Cf. Marx, Engels, *Werke*, XVII, pp. 271-279.

parts of revolutionary France had been "returned to their ancient fatherland", with which they wanted to have nothing whatever to do. But unfortunately the French are not going to do this, just as the Germans during the Napoleonic wars did not renounce their moral claim to the Left Bank of the Rhine, though the people in this area at that time did not have any strong desire to return to Germany. As long as the people of Alsace and Lorraine yearn to return to France, so long France must and will strive to secure the return of these areas, and she will try to find the means to do so, including allies. And her natural ally against Germany is Russia.

If the two biggest and strongest nations in Western Europe neutralise one another by their mutual hostility, if there is an eternal bone of contention between them which incites them to war on one another, then the only country which profits from this is Russia, whose hands are all the freer as a consequence: Russia, whose own expansionist aims Germany is the less able to counter, the more Russia can rely on unconditional support from France. And was it not Bismarck who put France in the position of having to beg Russia for an alliance, of having to agree to the surrender of Constantinople to Russia if the latter would only support her in the matter of her lost provinces? And if despite this, peace has been maintained for seventeen years, what other reason is there for this than the system of conscription introduced in both Russia and France, which requires sixteen or, with the most recent variation of it, even twenty-five years in order to provide a full muster of properly trained annual levies? And now that the annexation has dominated all European politics for seventeen years, is it not at this moment the fundamental cause of the crisis which threatens the whole continent with war? Remove this one fact and peace is assured.

The Alsace bourgeois who speaks French with a German accent, this hybrid coxcomb who gives the appearance of being more French than any real Frenchman, who looks down on Goethe and raves about Racine, but who nevertheless cannot rid himself of the guilty conscience of his crypto-Germanity and who, precisely because of this, must boast of his contempt for all things German, so much so that he is not even capable of acting as intermediary between France and Germany—this Alsace bourgeois is, to be sure, a con-

temptible fellow, whether he is a Mulhouse manufacturer or a Paris journalist.

But what made him what he is? What else but German history over the past three hundred years? And was it not the case until very recently that nearly all Germans abroad, especially the businessmen, were true "Alsations" who denied their German origin, who really tortured themselves into assuming the nationality of their new homeland and, as a consequence, made themselves just as ridiculous as those citizens of Alsace who were more or less compelled to do the same thing by their circumstances? In England for example, nearly all the immigrant German merchants between 1815 and 1840 were anglicised, spoke almost only English even among themselves; even to-day, you can see various old German philistines on the Manchester Stock Exchange, for instance, who would give half their fortunes to be able to pass as real Englishmen. This has changed only since 1848, and from 1870 onwards even German lieutenants of reserve visit England, and Berlin sends its contingent. As a result, the former servility has been replaced by a Prussian arrogance, which makes us Germans abroad no less ridiculous.

Has the unification of Alsace with Germany perhaps become more acceptable to the people of Alsace since 1871? On the contrary. They have been subjected to a dictatorship, while next door, in France, there is a Republic. The officious, pedantic Prussian *Landrat* system has been introduced, compared with which the execrated French prefectorial system—strictly regulated by law—seems perfection. The last remnants of freedom of the press, assembly and organisation were quickly eliminated. Recalcitrant city councils have been dissolved and replaced by German bureaucrats acting as mayors. The "notabilities" on the other hand, that is, the completely gallicised aristocrats and bourgeois, were flattered and protected in their exploitation of the peasants and workers who, though by no means pro-German, nevertheless speak the German language and are the only elements to whom a policy of reconciliation might have appealed. And what was the result of all this? Simply that in February 1887, when all Germany let itself be intimidated into giving the Bismarck *Kartell* a majority in the Reich-

stag,<sup>65</sup> Alsace and Lorraine voted for out-and-out supporters of France and rejected anyone who was suspected of even the slightest sympathy for Germany.

So if the people of Alsace are what they are, have we the right to be angry about it? By no means. Their resistance to the annexation is a historical fact, which cannot be denied but which needs to be explained. And in this connection we must ask ourselves: How many and how great were the historical sins which Germany had to commit to bring about such an attitude in Alsace? And how must our new German Empire appear to the outside world if, after seventeen years of attempted germanisation, the people of Alsace unanimously shout, "Spare us that!"? Have we the right to delude ourselves that two successful campaigns and seventeen years of Bismarckian dictatorship can suffice to undo all the effects of three hundred years of ignominious history?

## 7

Bismarck had reached his goal. His new German-Prussian monarchy was publicly proclaimed in Versailles in the luxurious state apartments of Louis XIV. France lay defenceless at his feet. Defiant Paris, which he himself had not dared to touch, was provoked into the rising of the Commune by theirs and then subjugated by returning prisoners of war, soldiers of the ex-Emperor's army. All the philistines of Europe gazed at Bismarck in awe, in the same way as he had gazed at his model, Louis-Napoleon, in the 'fifties. With Russian assistance, Germany had become the most powerful state in Europe, and all power in Germany was in the hands of Bismarck the dictator. The question now was: what would he do with his power? If until then he had carried out the unification plans of the bourgeoisie, though not by bourgeois but by Bonapartist methods, this matter was now fairly settled. It was now necessary to make his own plans and to show what ideas he could produce himself. And these would reveal themselves in the course of the internal construction of the new Empire.

65. The *Kartell* consisted of the Free Conservatives and National Liberals, who won the 1887 elections in a campaign in which the danger of a war of revenge by France was deliberately and grossly exaggerated.

German society is made up of big landowners, peasants, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and workers.

Landed property is in the hands of a few magnates (especially in Silesia) and a large number of medium-sized landowners, who are most numerous in the old Prussian provinces east of the Elbe. It is these Prussian Junkers who more or less dominate the whole landowning class. They are farmers themselves, in so far as their lands are cultivated under the direction of stewards, and they are often enough also owners of distilleries and sugar-beet factories. Their lands are generally settled in the family through entail. The younger sons go into the army or the civil service, so that this petty landowning aristocracy is linked with an even smaller aristocracy of officers and officials, an aristocracy which is constantly increased by the acquisition of noble status by many of the bourgeois higher-ranking officers and officials. In the lower reaches of this whole aristocratic connection, there exists naturally a numerous parasitic aristocracy, an aristocratic *lumpen* proletariat, which lives on its debts, its dubious enterprises, beggary and political espionage.

All these constitute the Prussian Junker class and they are one of the main bulwarks of the old Prussian State. But the landowning core of the Junker class are in a quite weak position. The obligation to live according to their status becomes more and more expensive every day; supporting younger sons until they have passed their military or civil service examinations, maintaining daughters until they marry, all this costs money; and since these take priority over all other considerations, it is no wonder that incomes do not suffice, that debts must be contracted, or even mortgages taken out. In short, the whole Junker class is always on the brink of financial disaster; every misfortune, whether it be a war, a harvest failure or a trade crisis, threatens them with disaster, and it is therefore no accident that for a century they have been saved from destruction only by state assistance of various kinds, and that in fact they only continue to exist by means of state aid. This quite artificially maintained class is doomed to extinction. No state aid can keep it alive indefinitely. But with it, the old Prussian State will also disappear.

*The peasants* are not a very active political element. If the peasant owns his own land, his condition deteriorates

more and more by the disadvantageous conditions of production facing the small farmer, deprived of the old communal mark or common pasture, without which there is no grazing ground for his cattle. If he is a tenant-farmer, his position is even worse. The small farm presupposes a predominantly natural economy (i.e. living off the produce); it is ruined by a money economy. This is the reason for the small farmer's indebtedness, for his mass expropriation by the holders of mortgages, and for his recourse to domestic industry in order not to be driven from the soil altogether. Politically, the peasantry are either indifferent or reactionary. They are ultramontane (Right-Wing Catholic) in the Rhineland, because of the old hatred of Prussia. In other areas they are particularist or Protestant-Conservative. Religious feelings still serve this class as an expression of social or political interests.

We have already dealt with *the bourgeoisie*. It has enjoyed an unprecedented economic upsurge since 1848. Germany had an ever-increasing share in the colossal expansion which followed the commercial crisis of 1847—an expansion caused by the appearance in this period of oceanic steamship transportation, by the enormous expansion of the railways, and by the gold discoveries in Australia and California. It was precisely its drive for the elimination of the obstacles to trade imposed by the petty states, and for a position on the world market equal to that of its competitors, that set Bismarck's revolution in motion. Now, with the French milliards flooding into Germany, a new period of feverish industrial activity was opening up for the bourgeoisie, one in which Germany revealed itself to be a great industrial nation for the first time, by being involved in a German national economic crash.<sup>66</sup> The bourgeoisie was already the most powerful class economically, and the Government had to defer to its economic interests. The revolution of 1848 had transformed the state into an outwardly constitutional form in which the bourgeoisie could establish and extend its political domination. Despite this, the bourgeoisie was still far from exercising real political power. In the constitutional conflict of

66. The financial collapse of 1873 ended the period of feverish speculation and unsound investments, stimulated by the "French milliards", and known in German history as the *Gründerzeit*.



the 'sixties, they had not been successful against Bismarck. The elimination of the conflict as a result of the revolutionising of Germany from above had further taught the bourgeoisie that the executive power was, at most, dependent on them only very indirectly, that they could neither appoint nor dismiss ministers, nor control the army. In addition, they were cowardly and flabby in face of an energetic executive power, but then so were the Junkers; the bourgeoisie had more excuse, for they were involved in direct economic conflict with the revolutionary industrial working class. What was certain, however, was that they had gradually to destroy the Junkers economically and that they were the only section of the propertied classes who had any hope of a future.

*The petty-bourgeoisie* consisted firstly of remnants of the medieval crafts more prevalent in Germany than in the rest of Western Europe because of Germany's long standing backwardness; secondly, of bourgeois whose fortunes had declined; thirdly, of elements, previously propertyless, who had risen to become small traders. With the expansion of large-scale industry, the existence of the whole of the petty bourgeoisie lost all semblance of stability. Changes of occupation, periodic bankruptcies, became the rule. This class, formerly so stable, which had been the élite corps of German philistinism, sank from its former contentment and passivity, its piety, subordination and respectability, into general disintegration and discontent with the fate which God had ordained for it. The remnants of the artisans demanded the re-establishment of guild privileges; of the others, one section became mildly democratic and "progressive" in outlook;<sup>67</sup> the other even drew close to the Social Democrats, some virtually joining the labour movement.

Finally, *the workers*. Of the agricultural labourers at least those in Eastern Germany still lived in semi-serfdom and were therefore politically of no account. On the other hand, the Social Democrats had made rapid advances amongst the urban working class, and grew in the measure that large-scale industry proletarianised the mass of the

67. The minority liberals who refused to "indemnify" Bismarck for his violation of the constitution in 1866 continued to use the name "Progressive Party". In 1884 they united with the left wing of the National Liberals to form the *Deutschfreisinnige Partei*.

people and consequently exacerbated the class contradictions between capitalists and workers. Although the Social Democratic workers were still split into two mutually hostile parties,<sup>68</sup> the main difference between them had, on the whole, disappeared since the publication of Marx's *Capital*. The more rigid Lassallean attitudes, their preoccupation with the single demand for Co-operative Producers' Associations assisted by the state, gradually faded away, and the Lassalleans showed themselves more and more incapable of providing the core of a Bonapartist, state-socialist workers' party. The damage done by some of their leaders in this connection was made good by the common sense of the masses. The unification of the two Social Democratic factions, delayed almost entirely by purely personal questions, was certain to be brought about within a short space of time. But even while the division existed—and in spite of it—the movement was powerful enough to frighten the industrial bourgeoisie and to hinder it in its struggle with the Government, which was still independent of it. After all, the German bourgeoisie had never since 1848 been able to rid itself of the Red Bogy.

This class structure was the basis of the parties in Parliament and in the Diets. The big landowners and a section of the peasantry made up the mass of the Conservatives.<sup>69</sup> The industrial bourgeoisie constituted the right wing of bourgeois liberalism, the National Liberals,<sup>70</sup> while the left-wing, the smaller democratic or so-called Progressive Party, was

68. The two parties were the *Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein*, founded by Lassalle in 1863, and deriving most of its support from the workers of Berlin, and the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*, founded at the Eisenach congress in 1869, based mainly on Saxony, whose leaders, Bebel and Liebknecht, kept in close touch with Marx and Engels and the International Working Men's Association.

69. The Conservative Party was founded in 1848 to represent the interests of the Junkers in the Prussian National Assembly. It fought stubbornly in defence of feudal privileges and monarchical absolutism, and opposed the unorthodox tactics employed by Bismarck to bring about Prussia's hegemony in Germany.

70. The majority of the Liberal opposition in the Prussian Lower House accepted Bismarck's Indemnity Bill in 1866, and henceforth provided the bulk of Bismarck's majorities both in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Chamber under the name of National Liberals. Only the left wing under Edward Lasker carried on the semblance of a struggle for genuinely constitutional government.

provided by the petty-bourgeoisie supported by a section of the bourgeoisie and of the working class. The workers, finally, established their own independent party, the Social Democratic Party, to which members of the petty-bourgeoisie also belonged.

A man in Bismarck's position and with his past, if he had any understanding of the situation at all, must have come to the conclusion that the Junkers, as they were, could not be regarded as a viable class, that the bourgeoisie alone of all the propertied classes had any hope of a future (if we ignore the working class, the understanding of whose historical mission we do not expect from him), and that therefore, his new Empire would be the more securely founded, the more he prepared its transformation into a modern bourgeois state. Let us not expect of him what it was impossible for him to accomplish under the circumstances. An immediate transition to parliamentary government, with the Reichstag having decisive power (like the English House of Commons), was neither possible nor, in itself, advisable at the time. Bismarck's dictatorship, exercised through parliamentary forms, was bound to have appeared to him still necessary. We are not attacking him for maintaining it for the time being. We are only questioning the purpose for which it was to be exercised. And it can hardly be doubted that the preparation of conditions corresponding to the English constitution was the only way holding out the prospect of a firm foundation and a peaceful development for the new Empire. Leaving the greater part of the Junker class to go to its inescapable doom, it still seemed possible that out of the rest, and out of new elements, a new class of independent big landowners would evolve who would be nothing but the ornamental crown of the bourgeoisie, a class to which the bourgeoisie, in the full enjoyment of its power, would be bound to leave the representational functions of state, and thus the most lucrative positions and very great influence.

By making political concessions to the bourgeoisie, which in any case could not be withheld for all time (at least this is how the matter was bound to appear from the standpoint of the propertied classes), and by making them gradually and in small and infrequent doses, the new Empire would be brought into a position in which it could catch up with the other states of Western Europe which

were far in advance of it politically, shake off finally the last relics of feudalism, as well as the philistine tradition which still permeated the bureaucracy so strongly, and, above all, stand on its own feet when its by no means youthful founders were called to their fathers.

This would not have been difficult. Neither Junkers nor bourgeois possessed even the average amount of energy. The Junkers had consistently proved this for the last sixty years, during which time the state had acted in their own best interest against the steady opposition of these Don Quixotes. The bourgeoisie, likewise tractable by its whole previous history, still bore the bruises of the constitutional conflict; since then, Bismarck's successes had further eroded their power to resist, and fear of the menace of the advancing working class did the rest. Under such circumstances, the man who had realised the national aspirations of the bourgeoisie would have little difficulty in fulfilling their now very modest political demands at a pace of his own choosing. But he had to be clear about the end in view.

From the standpoint of the possessing classes this was the only rational policy. From the standpoint of the working class, it is true, it was already too late to establish a lasting bourgeois predominance. Large-scale industry, and with it the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, developed in Germany at a time when, almost simultaneously with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat was able to appear independently on the political stage, and when, consequently, the struggle between the two classes had begun before the bourgeoisie had acquired either exclusive or predominant political power. But even though it is too late in Germany for a secure and firmly-founded domination of the bourgeoisie, it was still the best policy in 1870, in the interests of the propertied classes as a whole, to aim at such a domination. For only in this way was it possible to eliminate the numerous relics left over from the days of decaying feudalism, which still permeated legislation and administration. Only in this way was it possible to transplant the full results of the great French Revolution in Germany; to put an end to the whole antiquated condition of Germany; to take the road of modern development consciously and definitively, and to adapt her political to her industrial condition. Then, when the inevitable conflict between the bourgeoisie and the

proletariat broke out, it would at least be fought out in normal conditions, in which everyone could see what the issue was, and not in the confusion, uncertainty, incompatibility of interests and perplexity which we saw in Germany in 1848; though this time all the perplexity will be on the side of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat now knows what it wants.

As things stood in Germany in 1871, a man like Bismarck was indeed forced to undertake a policy which sought to steer a middle course between the different classes. And in this respect he cannot be blamed. But, we must ask, what was the aim of this policy? If, irrespective of the tempo with which it was carried out, it was directed consciously and resolutely towards the final establishment of bourgeois rule, then it would be in harmony with historical development, in so far as this was possible at all from the standpoint of the propertied classes. But if it was directed towards the maintenance of the old Prussian State, at the gradual Prussification of the whole of Germany, it was doomed to ultimate failure. If it was simply aimed at maintaining Bismarck's domination, then it was Bonapartist and was bound to end like all Bonapartism.

The Imperial constitution was the first task. As a basis on which to work there was the constitution of the North German Confederation on the one hand, and the treaties with the South German states on the other.<sup>71</sup> The forces with the aid of which Bismarck had to launch the constitution were the dynasties represented in the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council)<sup>72</sup> on the one hand, and the people represented in the Reichstag on the other. The rights of the

71. The reference is to the treaties concluded in November 1870, by which the South German states secured a greater measure of autonomy than had been accorded to the member states of the North German Confederation. The provisions of these treaties were incorporated in the constitution of the German Empire of April 1871. Bavaria secured autonomy of military organisation in peace time.

72. The *Bundesrat* was the second Chamber provided for by the constitution of the North German Confederation and the German Empire. Its members were nominated by the Associated Governments. The representatives of the Prussian Government could not be outvoted. All legislation voted in the popularly elected Reichstag had to be approved by the *Bundesrat* which was, moreover, in charge of the execution of the laws.

dynasties were defined in the North German constitution and in the treaties. The people, on the other hand, had a right to a big extension of their share in political power. They had won freedom from foreign interference and unification—in so far as it could be said to exist—on the battlefield. The people were therefore entitled to decide what this independence was to be used for, how this unification was to be implemented in detail, how it was to be turned to account. And even if the people acknowledged the legality of the North German constitution and of the treaties, that did not prevent them from securing a greater share in political power in the new constitution than they had enjoyed under the previous one. The Reichstag was the sole body which in practice expressed the new "unity". The greater the authority of the Reichstag, the freer the Imperial constitution as compared with those of the separate states, the more firmly would the new Empire be integrated, the more must the Bavarian, the Saxon, the Prussian, merge into the German.

All this must have been clear to anyone who saw further than the end of his nose. But this was not Bismarck's view by any means. On the contrary, he utilised the patriotic hysteria which set in after the war precisely for the purpose of inducing the majority in the Reichstag to renounce not only any extension of the rights of the people but even a clear definition of these rights, and merely to take over into the Imperial constitution the legal principles contained in the North German constitution and in the treaties. All attempts by the small parties to secure the inclusion of the specific rights and liberties of the people in the constitution were defeated, and so was a motion by the Catholic Centre Party (*Zentrum*) demanding the insertion of the article in the Prussian constitution that guaranteed freedom of the press, of association and assembly, as well as the independence of the Church. Thus the Prussian constitution with all its limitations was still more liberal than the Imperial constitution. Taxes were not voted annually but agreed to once and for all "by law", so that for the Reichstag to vote them down is impossible. The Prussian doctrine, incomprehensible to the world outside Germany, that the people's representatives have the right to veto expenditure on paper while the government goes on collecting the money in hard cash, was thus applied to

the whole of Germany. The Reichstag is deprived of the most essential powers and reduced to the humiliating position of the Prussian Chamber after the constitutional revisions of 1849 and 1850, the violations perpetrated by Manteuffel,<sup>73</sup> the constitutional conflict and Sadowa. But the *Bundesrat* enjoys all the authority which the old Federal Diet nominally possessed, and enjoys it in reality, because it is free from the shackles which rendered the Federal Diet impotent. The *Bundesrat* not only has a deciding voice in legislation in addition to the Reichstag, but is also the highest administrative authority, since it issues the regulations for the execution of the laws and, in addition, has power to decide questions relating to "deficiencies in the execution of Imperial laws", that is, deficiencies which in other countries can only be remedied by new law (see Article 7, para 3, which seems very like a deliberate constitutional trap).<sup>74</sup>

Consequently Bismarck sought his main support not in the Reichstag, which represented the unity of the nation, but in the *Bundesrat*, which represented separatist division. He who posed as champion of nationality, lacked the courage to place himself at the head of the nation or its representatives; democracy was to serve him, not the nation. Rather than rely on the people, he relied on devious and underhand dealings behind the scenes, on his ability to scratch together a majority, even if a recalcitrant one, in the *Bundesrat*, by diplomacy, the carrot and the stick. The pettiness of his approach, the baseness of his outlook which is thus revealed, correspond absolutely to the character of the man as we have learned to know him by now. All the same, it is surprising that his great successes did not, at least momentarily, raise him above his own level.

The situation, however, was that the whole constitution of the Empire depended on a single firm pivot, namely the Imperial Chancellor. The *Bundesrat* had to be placed in a position which made any responsible executive other than the Chancellor impossible, and which therefore excluded the admissibility of responsible Imperial Ministers. In actual fact, every attempt to put some order into the ad-

73. Engels uses the term *Manteuffelei*, an allusion to the constant violations of the Prussian constitution which occurred under the ministry of Otto von Manteuffel (1850-1858).

74. For a recent summary in English of the constitutional position under Bismarck, cf. Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

ministration of the Empire through a responsible ministry met with insurmountable resistance, on the grounds that it infringed the right of the *Bundesrat*. The constitution, as was soon discovered, was "made to measure" for Bismarck. It was a step further on the road to his personal rule, based on a balance of the parties in the Reichstag, and of the separate states and in the *Bundesrat*—a step further on the road to Bonapartism.

In general, apart from one or two concessions to Bavaria and Württemberg, one cannot say that the new Imperial Constitution represents a retrograde step. But this is about the best that can be said of it. The economic needs of the bourgeoisie were satisfied in the main, but the same barriers that existed at the time of the constitutional conflict were erected against their political aspirations in so far as they still had any.

In so far as they still had any. For it is undeniable that in the hands of the National Liberals, these aspirations declined considerably and continued to do so all the time. These gentlemen, far from demanding that Bismarck should facilitate their collaboration, were much more concerned to display their readiness to let him have his way wherever possible, and frequently even where it was, or should have been, impossible. No one can blame him for despising them—but were his Junkers any better or braver?

The next field in which national unity remained to be established, currency, was dealt with by the Bank and Currency Laws of 1873-75. The introduction of a gold currency was an important advance. But it was introduced only in a half-hearted and hesitant fashion and it is not quite firmly established even now. The money system which was adopted—a third of a *taler*, now called a mark, with decimal sub-divisions—had been proposed by Soetbeer towards the end of the 'thirties. The real monetary unit was the gold 20 mark piece. This could have been made to exchange at par with either the English sovereign, the gold 25 franc piece, or the American gold 5 dollar piece, with only a slight alteration in its value, and could thus have been linked with one of the three great currency systems of the world market. Nevertheless it was preferred to create a separate currency system, which made trade and currency calculations unnecessarily difficult. The laws concerning Imperial treasury notes and banks restricted the paper-



money swindles of the small states and of their banks and, coming as they did after the great crash of 1873, they bore the mark of a certain prudence befitting Germany's inexperience in these matters. Here also, the economic interests of the bourgeoisie were, on the whole, taken into account.

Finally there were the negotiations for a unified code of law. The resistance of the Southern states to the extension of Imperial powers to the sphere of civil law was overcome. The code of civil law, however, is still in process of elaboration, while the penal code, civil and criminal procedure, commercial and bankruptcy law, and the organisation of the judiciary have been regulated on a uniform basis. The elimination of the varied formal and substantive legal norms of the petty states was in itself an urgent requirement of progressive bourgeois development, and this elimination constitutes the chief merit of the new laws, much more than their actual content.

English law has a history in which a good deal of old Germanic freedom survived beyond the Middle Ages; which does not know the Police State, for it was nipped in the bud in the two revolutions of the seventeenth century; and which culminated in two centuries of uninterrupted development of civil liberty. French law is based on the great Revolution, which, after completely destroying feudalism and the arbitrary police powers of absolutism, translated the economic requirements of the newly established modern society into the language of juridical, legal norms in the classic code proclaimed by Napoleon. Compared to these, what is the historical foundation for our German Law? Nothing but the passive centuries-old process of the decay of the Middle Ages, spurred on mostly from outside and still far from completed; an economically backward society still haunted by the ghosts of the feudal Junker and guild craftsman searching for a new body; a legal system in the fabric of which arbitrary police despotism still tears one hole after another every day, despite the disappearance of princely cabinet justice in 1848. The fathers of the new law books of the German Empire have graduated from this worst of all possible bad schools and the quality of their work is correspondingly bad. Quite apart from the judicial aspect, political freedom comes off badly enough in

this legislation. Though Assessors' Courts<sup>75</sup> provide the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie with the means to help keep down the working class, the state nevertheless safeguards itself as much as possible against the danger of a revived bourgeois opposition by limiting trial by jury. The political paragraphs of the penal code are frequently marked by a vagueness and flexibility, as if they were specifically designed for the present Supreme Court and vice versa. The new codes of law mark an advance on the old Prussian Code.<sup>76</sup> That goes without saying. Stöcker himself would find it difficult to cook up anything as ghastly as that code of law to-day, even if he allowed himself to be circumcised.<sup>77</sup> But the provinces which have hitherto lived under French law recognise only too well the difference between the classical original and the faded copy. It was the renunciation of their programme by the National Liberals which made possible this first step backwards, the strengthening of the authority of the state at the expense of civil liberty.

We have still to mention the Imperial Press law. The penal code had already settled the question in respect of material law. The establishment of uniform formal regulations for the whole Empire, the elimination of stamp duties and monetary deposits which still existed here and there, therefore, constituted the only real advances brought about by this law.

In order that Russia could maintain its reputation as a model state, so-called local self-government was introduced. What it amounted to was the removal of the most objec-

75. Assessors' Courts (*Schöffengerichte*) were introduced in some German states in 1848 and in the German Empire in 1871. These courts consisted of the judge and two assessors. Unlike juries, they decided both the question of guilt and the extent of the punishment. Appeals could be lodged against their verdicts. Assessors had to be at least thirty years old, and there was a residential and property qualification.

76. The Prussian Code, promulgated in 1794, unified judicial administration for all the Prussian provinces on the basis of the strict feudal separation of orders.

77. Adolf Stöcker (1835-1909) was one of the leading exponents of the reactionary, backward-looking "*volkish*" ideology which gained considerably in influence during the last decades of the nineteenth century. In 1878 he founded the Christian Social Party whose main electoral plank was anti-Semitism. Cf. George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, London, 1966 pp. 126-145.

tionable relics of feudalism, while as much as possible of the old state of affairs was retained. This was the purpose of the new district organisation. The manorial police powers of the Junkers had become an anachronism. They were abolished in theory as a feudal privilege, but the essence was retained by the establishment of manorial districts based on the large estates, in which the landowner himself either exercises the powers of a communal mayor in his capacity of steward of the manor, or at least nominates the steward. Further, the whole police authority and jurisdiction in the remaining districts was conferred on a district prefect, who is of course almost everywhere a big landowner. The landowners control also the rural (i.e. non-manorial) districts. The feudal privileges of individuals were taken away, but the absolute authority connected with these privileges was handed over to the whole class. In a similar manner the large landowners in England transformed themselves into Justices of the Peace and controllers of rural administration, police and magistrate courts, and thus retained continued possession under new modernised title of all the important positions of power, which could no longer be held on the old feudal basis. But this is the only similarity between English and German "local self-government". I should like to see the English minister who would dare to propose in Parliament that elected local officials should have to be confirmed in office or could be replaced by men more acceptable to the central government; that government officials should be appointed, vested with the powers of the Prussian *Landräte*, district governments and provincial governors; that the central government should have the reserve powers of intervention in local government affairs at all levels as provided for in the German District Government Act; or above all, that there should be power to deny citizens due process of law, a power unknown in lands where English is spoken or English law prevails, but provided for on every page of the District Government Act. And while both district administrations and provincial Diets in Germany are still composed, in the old feudal manner, of representatives of the three orders large landowners, towns and rural communes—in England an ultra-Conservative ministry introduces a Bill transferring

the administration of all the counties to authorities elected on the basis of almost universal suffrage.<sup>78</sup>

The District Government Bill for the six Eastern provinces (1871) was the first sign that Bismarck had no intention of allowing Prussia to be absorbed into Germany but, on the contrary, that he was determined to make these provinces even more the firm bastion of old Prussianism. Under cover of new names, the Junkers retained all the essential positions of power, while the helots of Germany, the rural workers in these areas, domestic and wage-labourers alike, remained in their previous state of *de facto* serfdom, admitted to only two public functions—to serve as soldiers and to provide voting cattle for the Junkers in elections to the Reichstag. The services hereby rendered by Bismarck to the revolutionary Socialist Party are invaluable and merit the greatest gratitude.

But what is one say about the stupidity of the Junkers who attacked the District Government Bill, designed exclusively in their interest to prolong their feudal privileges, only with modernised nomenclature, and stamp their feet in the manner of spoiled children? The House of Peers, or rather, the House of Junkers, first of all threw out the Bill, which had already been delayed a whole year, and only accepted it after twenty-four new "Peers" had been created. The Prussian Junkers once again proved themselves to be petty, die-hard, hopeless reactionaries, incapable of providing the basis for a great independent party with an historical rôle in the life of the nation, as the English landowners are in fact doing. They thereby demonstrated their complete lack of understanding. Bismarck had only to demonstrate their equally complete lack of character, and a little pressure applied judiciously transformed them into a pro-Bismarck party *sans phrase*.

The *Kulturkampf*<sup>79</sup> was intended for this purpose. The execution of the plan to create a Prussian-German Empire

78. The reference is to the County Councils Act (1888) passed during Salisbury's second Administration, which was pending in Parliament at the time Engels was writing the present manuscript.

79. This term was applied by the National Liberals to Bismarck's conflict with the Catholic Church during the eighteenth-seventies. The term is in itself a measure of Bismarck's success in using the conflict as a diversion to distract attention from his major policies.

was bound to produce, as a reaction, the unification into a single party of all the anti-Prussian elements, based on the previous separatism. These motley elements found a common banner in Ultramontanism.<sup>80</sup> The rebellion of common sense, even among large numbers of Catholics, against the new dogma of Papal infallibility on the one hand, and the destruction of the Papal States and the so-called imprisonment of the Pope in Rome<sup>81</sup> on the other, stimulated the closer union of all the militant forces of Catholicism. Thus the specifically Catholic Centre Party (*Zentrum*) already emerged in the Prussian Diet during the war, in the autumn of 1870. It had only 57 deputies in the first German Reichstag, but grew at each succeeding election until it had more than 100. It was composed of extremely varied elements. Its main basis in Prussia was amongst the small peasants of the Rhineland, who still regarded themselves as "Prussians by compulsion" (*Musspreussen*). In addition, they received support from the Catholic landowners and peasants of the Westphalian bishoprics of Münster and Paderborn and from the Catholic Silesians. Their other main source of strength were the South German Catholics, especially the Bavarians. The strength of the *Zentrum*, however, lay far less in the Catholic religion than in the fact that it reflected the hostility of the mass of the people to the specific Prussianism which now claimed domination over Germany. This hostility was particularly marked in the Catholic areas; this was accompanied by sympathy for Austria, now excluded from Germany. In line with these two popular trends, the *Zentrum* was decidedly separatist and federalist.

The essentially anti-Prussian character of the *Zentrum* was immediately recognised by the other smaller Reichstag fractions, who were anti-Prussian for local reasons, (not like

80. This term is generally applied to the forces within the Catholic Church which defended the claims of the Papacy against the powers of the secular state.

81. After the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome, the Italian army occupied the city in September 1870. A referendum in October resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of incorporation in the Italian national state. The Pope excommunicated all those responsible for the annexation, and declared himself a "prisoner in the Vatican". The conflict between the Papacy and Italy lasted until the Concordat concluded between Pius XI and Mussolini in 1929.

the Social Democrats who were so for general and national reasons). Not only the Catholic Poles and Alsatians, but also the Protestant Hanoverians became close allies of the *Zentrum*.<sup>82</sup> And although the bourgeois-liberal faction never understood the real character of the so-called Ultramontanes, they nevertheless revealed an inkling of the actual state of affairs, when they denounced the *Zentrum* as a party "without a fatherland" and an "anti-Imperial" party.

*The MS breaks off here.*

82. The representatives of the Poles, Alsatians and anti-Prussian Hanoverians formed separate parties in the Reichstag, which consistently opposed Bismarck's government.

THE FORCE THEORY  
*Extracted from Anti-Dühring*





“In my system, the relation between general politics and the forms of economic law is determined in so definite a way and at the same time a way *so original* that it would not be superfluous, in order to facilitate study, to make special reference to this point. The formation of *political* relationships is, *historically, the fundamental thing*, and instances of *economic* dependence are only *effects* or special cases, and are consequently always *facts of a second order*. Some of the newer socialist systems take as their guiding principle the conspicuously mere semblance of a completely reverse relationship, in that they assume that political phenomena are subordinate to and, as it were, grow out of the economic conditions. It is true that these effects of the second order do exist as such, and are most clearly perceptible at the present time; but the *primary* must be sought in *direct political force* and not in any indirect economic power.” This conception is also expressed in another passage, in which Herr Dühring “starts from the principle that the political conditions are the decisive cause of the economic situation and that the reverse relationship represents only a reaction of a second order . . . so long as the political grouping is not taken for its own sake, as the starting-point, but is treated merely as a *stomach-filling agency*, one must be harbouring a hidden portion of reaction in one’s mind, however radical a socialist and revolutionary one may seem to be.”

That is Herr Dühring’s theory. In this and in many other passages it is simply set up, decreed, so to speak. Nowhere in the three fat tomes is there even the slightest attempt to prove it or to disprove the opposite point of view. And even if the arguments for it were as cheap as blackberries,<sup>1</sup> Herr Dühring would give up none of them. For the whole affair has been already proved through the famous original sin, when Robinson Crusoe made Friday his slave. That was an act of force, hence a political act. And inasmuch as this enslavement was the starting-point and the basic fact underlying all past history and inoculated it with the original sin of injustice, so much so that in the

later periods it was only softened down and "transformed into the more indirect forms of economic dependence"; and inasmuch as "property founded on force" which has maintained its legality right up to the present day, is likewise based on this original act of enslavement, it is clear that all economic phenomena must be explained by political causes, that is, by force. And anyone who is not satisfied with that is a reactionary in disguise.

We must first point out that only one with as much self-esteem as Herr Dühring could regard this view as so very "original," which it is not in the least. The idea that political acts, grand performances of state, are decisive in history is as old as written history itself, and is the main reason why so little material has been preserved for us in regard to the really progressive evolution of the peoples which has taken place quietly, in the background, behind these noisy scenes on the stage. This idea dominated all the conceptions of historians in the past, and the first blow against it was delivered only by the French bourgeois historians of the Restoration period"; the only "original" thing about it is that Herr Dühring once again knows nothing of all this.

Furthermore: even if we assume for the moment that Herr Dühring is right in saying that all past history can be traced back to the enslavement of man by man, we are still very far from having got to the bottom of the matter. For the question then arises: how did Crusoe come to enslave Friday? Just for the fun of it? No such thing. On the contrary, we see that Friday "is compelled to render *economic* service as a slave or as a mere tool and is maintained only as a tool." Crusoe enslaved Friday only in order that Friday should work for Crusoe's benefit. And how can he derive any benefit for himself from Friday's labour? Only through Friday producing by his labour more of the necessaries of life than Crusoe has to give him to keep him fit to work. Crusoe, therefore, in violation of Herr Dühring's express orders, "takes the political grouping" arising out of Friday's enslavement "not for its own sake as the starting-point, but merely as a *stomach-filling agency*"; and now let him see to it that he gets along with his lord and master Dühring.

The childish example specially selected by Herr Dühring in order to prove that force is "historically the funda-

mental thing," in reality, therefore, proves that force is only the means, and that the aim is economic advantage. And "the more fundamental" the aim is than the means used to secure it, the more fundamental in history is the economic side of the relationship than the political side. The example therefore proves precisely the opposite of what it was supposed to prove. And as in the case of Crusoe and Friday, so in all cases of domination and subjection up to the present day. Subjugation has always been—to use Herr Dühring's elegant expression—a "stomach-filling agency" (taking stomach-filling in a very wide sense), but never and nowhere a political grouping established "for its own sake." It takes a Herr Dühring to be able to imagine that state taxes are only "effects of a second order," or that the present-day political grouping of the ruling bourgeoisie and the ruled proletariat has come into existence "for its own sake," and not as "a stomach-filling agency" for the ruling bourgeois, that is to say, for the sake of making profits and accumulating capital.

However, let us get back again to our two men. Crusoe, "sword in hand," makes Friday his slave. But in order to pull this off, Crusoe needs something else besides his sword. Not everyone can make use of a slave. In order to be able to make use of a slave, one must possess two kinds of things: first, the instruments and material for his slave's labour; and secondly, the means of bare subsistence for him. Therefore, before slavery becomes possible, a certain level of production must already have been reached and a certain inequality of distribution must already have appeared. And for slave-labour to become the dominant mode of production in the whole of a society, an even far higher increase in production, trade and accumulation of wealth was essential. In the ancient primitive communities with common ownership of the land, slavery either did not exist at all or played only a very subordinate role. It was the same in the originally peasant city of Rome; but when Rome became a "world city" and Italic land-ownership came more and more into the hands of a numerically small class of enormously rich proprietors, the peasant population was supplanted by a population of slaves. If at the time of the Persian wars the number of slaves in Corinth rose to 460,000 and in Aegina to 470,000 and there were ten slaves to every freeman,<sup>3</sup> something else

besides "force" was required, namely, a highly developed arts and handicraft industry and an extensive commerce. Slavery in the United States of America was based far less on force than on the English cotton industry; in those districts where no cotton was grown or which, unlike the border states, did not breed slaves for the cotton-growing states, it died out of itself without any force being used, simply because it did not pay.

Hence, by calling property as it exists today property founded on force, and by characterizing it as "that form of domination *at the root of which lies* not merely the exclusion of fellow-men from the use of the natural means of subsistence, but also, what is far more important, the subjugation of man to make him do servile work," Herr Dühring is making the whole relationship stand on its head. The subjugation of a man to make him do servile work, in all its forms, presupposes that the subjugator has at his disposal the instruments of labour with the help of which alone he is able to employ the person placed in bondage, and in the case of slavery, in addition, the means of subsistence which enable him to keep his slave alive. In all cases, therefore, it presupposes the possession of a certain amount of property, in excess of the average. How did this property come into existence? In any case it is clear that it may in fact have been robbed, and therefore may be based on *force*, but that this is by no means necessary. It may have been got by labour, it may have been stolen, or it may have been obtained by trade or by fraud. In fact, it must have been obtained by labour before there was any possibility of its being robbed.

Private property by no means makes its appearance in history as the result of robbery or force. On the contrary. It already existed, though limited to certain objects, in the ancient primitive communes of all civilized peoples. It developed into the form of commodities within these communes, at first through barter with foreigners. The more the products of the commune assumed the commodity form, that is, the less they were produced for their producers' own use and the more for the purpose of exchange, and the more the original natural division of labour was extruded by exchange also within the commune, the more did inequality develop in the property owned by the individual members of the commune, the more deeply was

the ancient common ownership of the land undermined, and the more rapidly did the commune develop towards its dissolution and transformation into a village of small-holding peasants. For thousands of years Oriental despotism and the changing rule of conquering nomad peoples were unable to injure these old communities; the gradual destruction of their primitive home industry by the competition of products of large-scale industry brought these communities nearer and nearer to dissolution. Force was as little involved in this process as in the dividing up, still taking place now, of the land held in common by the village communities (*Gehöferschaften*) on the Moselle and in the Hochwald; the peasants simply find it to their advantage that the private ownership of land should take the place of common ownership.<sup>4</sup> Even the formation of a primitive aristocracy, as in the case of the Celts, the Germans and the Indian Punjab, took place on the basis of common ownership of the land, and at first was not based in any way on force, but on voluntariness and custom. Wherever private property evolved it was the result of altered relations of production and exchange, in the interest of increased production and in furtherance of intercourse—hence as a result of economic causes. Force plays no part in this at all. Indeed, it is clear that the institution of private property must already be in existence for a robber to be able to *appropriate* another person's property, and that therefore force may be able to change the possession of, but cannot create, private property as such.

Nor can we use either force or property founded on force in explanation of the "subjugation of man to make him do servile work" in its most modern form—wage-labour. We have already mentioned the role played in the dissolution of the ancient communities, that is, in the direct or indirect general spread of private property, by the transformation of the products of labour into commodities, their production not for consumption by those who produced them, but for exchange. Now in *Capital*, Marx proved with absolute clarity—and Herr Dühring carefully avoids even the slightest reference to this—that at a certain stage of development, the production of commodities becomes transformed into capitalist production, and that at this stage "the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws that are based on the production and circulation of commodities, become by their own inner

and inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite. The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, has now become turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange. This is owing to the fact, first, that the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself but a portion of the product of others' labour appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, that this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, but replaced together with an added surplus. . . . At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man's own labour. . . . Now, however (at the end of the Marxian analysis), property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his own product. The separation of property from labour has become the necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated in their identity.\*" In other words, even if we exclude all possibility of robbery, force and fraud, even if we assume that all private property was originally based on the owner's own labour, and that throughout the whole subsequent process there was only exchange of equal values for equal values, the progressive evolution of production and exchange nevertheless brings us of necessity to the present capitalist mode of production, to the monopolization of the means of production and the means of subsistence in the hands of the one, numerically small, class, to the degradation into propertyless proletarians of the other class, constituting the immense majority, to the periodic alternation of speculative production booms and commercial crises and to the whole of the present anarchy of production. The whole process can be explained by purely economic causes; at no point whatever are robbery, force, the state or political interference of any kind necessary. "Property founded on force" proves here also to be nothing but the phrase of a braggart intended to cover up his lack of understanding of the real course of things.

This course of things, expressed historically, is the history of the evolution of the bourgeoisie. If "political conditions are the decisive cause of the economic situation," then the modern bourgeoisie cannot have developed in struggle with feudalism, but must be the latter's voluntarily begotten pet

\* *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1961, pp. 583-84.—Ed.

child. Everyone knows that what took place was the opposite. Originally an oppressed estate liable to pay dues to the ruling feudal nobility, recruited from all manner of serfs and villains, the burghers conquered one position after another in their continuous struggle with the nobility, and finally, in the most highly developed countries, took power in its stead: in France, by directly overthrowing the nobility; in England, by making it more and more bourgeois, and incorporating it as their own ornamental head. And how did they accomplish this? Simply through a change in the "economic situation," which sooner or later, voluntarily or as the outcome of combat, was followed by a change in the political conditions. The struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal nobility is the struggle of town against country, industry against landed property, money economy against natural economy; and the decisive weapon of the bourgeoisie in this struggle was its means of *economic* power, constantly increasing through the development of industry, first handicraft, and then, at a later stage, progressing to manufacture, and through the expansion of commerce. During the whole of this struggle political force was on the side of the nobility, except for a period when the Crown played the burghers against the nobility, in order to keep one estate in check by means of the other; but from the moment when the bourgeoisie, still politically powerless, began to grow dangerous owing to its increasing economic power, the Crown resumed its alliance with the nobility, and by so doing called forth the bourgeois revolution, first in England and then in France. The "political conditions" in France had remained unaltered, while the "economic situation" had outgrown them. Judged by his political status the nobleman was everything, the burgher nothing; but judged by his social position the burgher now formed the most important class in the state, while the nobleman had been shorn of all his social functions and was now only drawing payment, in the revenues that came to him, for these functions which had disappeared. Nor was that all. Bourgeois production in its entirety was still hemmed in by the feudal political forms of the Middle Ages, which this production—not only manufacture, but even handicraft industry—had long outgrown; it had remained hemmed in by all the thousandfold guild privileges and local and provincial customs barriers which had become mere irritants and fetters on production.

The bourgeois revolution put an end to this. Not, how-

ever, by adjusting the economic situation to suit the political conditions, in accordance with Herr Dühring's precept—this was precisely what the nobles and the Crown had been vainly trying to do for years—but by doing the opposite, by casting aside the old mouldering political rubbish and creating political conditions in which the new "economic situation" could exist and develop. And in this political and legal atmosphere which was suited to its needs it developed brilliantly, so brilliantly that the bourgeoisie has already come close to occupying the position held by the nobility in 1789: it is becoming more and more not only socially superfluous, but a social hindrance; it is more and more becoming separated from productive activity, and, like the nobility in the past, becoming more and more a class merely drawing revenues; and it has accomplished this revolution in its own position and the creation of a new class, the proletariat, without any hocus-pocus of force whatever, in a purely economic way. Even more: it did not in any way will this result of its own actions and activities—on the contrary, this result established itself with irresistible force, against the will and contrary to the intentions of the bourgeoisie; its own productive forces have grown beyond its control, and, as if necessitated by a law of nature, are driving the whole of bourgeois society towards ruin, or revolution. And if the bourgeois now make their appeal to force in order to save the collapsing "economic situation" from the final crash, this only shows that they are labouring under the same delusion as Herr Dühring: the delusion that "political conditions are the decisive cause of the economic situation"; this only shows that they imagine, just as Herr Dühring does, that by making use of "the primary," "the direct political force," they can remodel those "facts of the second order," the economic situation and its inevitable development; and that therefore the economic consequences of the steam-engine and the modern machinery driven by it, of world trade and the banking and credit developments of the present day, can be blown out of existence by them with Krupp guns and Mauser rifles.

Dühring: pol. conditions are the decisive cause of  
eco. situation.

Dir. pol. force is pri., eco. is sec.



# THE FORCE THEORY

(Continuation)

But let us look a little more closely at this omnipotent "force" of Herr Dühring's. Crusoe enslaved Friday "sword in hand." Where did he get the sword? Even on the imaginary islands of the Robinson Crusoe epic, swords have not, up to now, been known to grow on trees, and Herr Dühring provides no answer to this question. If Crusoe could procure a sword for himself, we are equally entitled to assume that one fine morning Friday might appear with a loaded revolver in his hand, and then the whole "force" relationship is inverted. Friday commands, and it is Crusoe who has to drudge. We must apologize to the readers for returning with such insistence to the Robinson Crusoe and Friday story, which properly belongs to the nursery and not to the field of science—but how can we help it? We are obliged to apply Herr Dühring's axiomatic method conscientiously, and it is not our fault if in doing so we have to keep all the time within the field of pure childishness. So, then, the revolver triumphs over the sword; and this will probably make even the most childish axiomatician comprehend that force is no mere act of the will, but requires the existence of very real preliminary conditions before it can come into operation, namely, *instruments*, the more perfect of which gets the better of the less perfect; moreover, that these instruments have to be produced, which implies that the producer of more perfect instruments of force, commonly called arms, gets the better of the producer of the less perfect instruments, and that, in a word, the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this is turn on production in general—therefore, on "economic power," on the "economic situation," on the *material* means which force has at its disposal.

Force, nowadays, is the army and navy, and both, as we all know to our cost, are "devilishly expensive." Force, however, cannot make any money; at most it can take away money that has already been made—and this does not help much either—as we have seen, also to our cost, in the case of the French milliards.<sup>5</sup> In the last analysis, therefore,

money must be provided through the medium of economic production; and so once more force is conditioned by the economic situation, which furnishes the means for the equipment and maintenance of the instruments of force. But even that is not all. Nothing is more dependent on economic prerequisites than precisely army and navy. Armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at the time in production and on communications. It is not the "free creations of the mind" of generals of genius that have had a revolutionizing effect here, but the invention of better weapons and the change in the human material, the soldiers; at the very most, the part played by generals of genius is limited to adapting methods of fighting to the new weapons and combatants.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, gunpowder came from the Arabs to Western Europe, and, as every school child knows, completely revolutionized the methods of warfare. The introduction of gunpowder and fire-arms, however, was not at all an act of force, but a step forward in industry, that is, an economic advance. Industry remains industry, whether it is applied to the production or the destruction of things. And the introduction of firearms had a revolutionizing effect not only on the conduct of war itself, but also on the political relationships of domination and subjection. The procurement of powder and fire-arms required industry and money, and both of these were in the hands of the burghers of the towns. From the outset, therefore, fire-arms were the weapons of the towns, and of the rising town-supported monarchy against the feudal nobility. The stone walls of the noblemen's castles, hitherto unapproachable, fell before the cannon of the burghers, and the bullets of the burghers' arquebuses pierced the armour of the knights. With the defeat of the nobility's armour-clad cavalry, the nobility's supremacy was broken; with the development of the bourgeoisie, infantry and artillery became more and more the decisive types of arms; compelled by the development of artillery, the military profession had to add to its organization a new and entirely industrial subsection, the corps of engineers.

The improvement of fire-arms was a very slow process. The pieces of artillery remained clumsy and the musket, in spite of a number of inventions affecting details, was still a crude weapon. It took over three hundred years for a weapon

to be constructed that was suitable for the equipment of the whole body of infantry. It was not until the early part of the eighteenth century that the flint-lock musket with a bayonet finally displaced the pike in the equipment of the infantry. The foot soldiers of that period were the mercenaries of princes; they consisted of the most demoralized elements of society, rigorously drilled but quite unreliable and only held together by the rod; they were often hostile prisoners of war who had been pressed into service. The only type of fighting in which these soldiers could apply the new weapons was the tactics of the line, which reached its highest perfection under Frederick II. The whole infantry of an army was drawn up in triple ranks in the form of a very long, hollow square, and moved in battle order only as a whole; at the very most, either of the two wings might move forward or keep back a little. This cumbrous mass could move in formation only on absolutely level ground, and even then only very slowly (seventy-five paces a minute); a change of formation during a battle was impossible, and once the infantry was engaged, victory or defeat was decided rapidly and at one blow.

In the American War of Independence, these unwieldy lines were met by bands of rebels, who although not drilled were all the better able to shoot from their rifled guns; they were fighting for their vital interests, and therefore did not desert like the mercenaries; nor did they do the English the favour of encountering them also in line and on clear, even ground. They came on in open formation, a series of rapidly-moving troops of sharpshooters, under cover of the woods. Here the line was powerless and succumbed to its invisible and inaccessible opponents. Skirmishing was re-invented—a new method of warfare which was the result of a change in the human war material.

What the American Revolution had begun the French Revolution completed, also in the military sphere. It also could oppose to the well-trained mercenary armies of the Coalition only poorly trained but great masses of soldiers, the levy of the entire nation. But these masses had to protect Paris, that is, to hold a definite area, and for this purpose victory in open mass battle was essential. Mere skirmishes would not achieve enough; a form had to be found to make use of large masses and this form was discovered in the *column*. Column formation made it possible for even poorly

trained troops to move with a fair degree of order, and moreover with greater speed (a hundred paces and more in a minute); it made it possible to break through the rigid forms of the old line formation; to fight on any ground, and therefore even on ground which was extremely disadvantageous to the line formation; to group the troops in any way if in the least appropriate; and, in conjunction with attacks by scattered bands of sharpshooters, to contain the enemy's lines, keep them engaged and wear them out until the moment came for masses held in reserve to break through them at the decisive point in the position. This new method of warfare, based on the combined action of skirmishers and columns and on the partitioning of the army into independent divisions or army corps, composed of all arms of the service—a method brought to full perfection by Napoleon in both its tactical and strategical aspects—had become necessary primarily because of the changed personnel: the soldiery of the French Revolution. Besides, two very important technical prerequisites had been compiled with: first, the lighter carriages for field guns constructed by Gribeauval, which alone made possible the more rapid movement now required of them; and secondly, the slanting of the butt, which had hitherto been quite straight, continuing the line of the barrel. Introduced in France in 1777, it was copied from hunting weapons and made it possible to shoot at a particular individual without the probability of missing him. But for this improvement it would have been impossible to skirmish with the old weapons.

The revolutionary system of arming the whole people was soon restricted to compulsory conscription (with substitution for the rich, who paid for their release) and in this form it was adopted by most of the large states on the Continent. Only Prussia attempted, through its *Landwehr* system,<sup>6</sup> to draw to a greater extent on the military strength of the nation. Prussia was also the first state to equip its whole infantry—after the rifled muzzle-loader, which had been improved between 1830 and 1860 and found fit for use in war, had played a brief role—with the most up-to-date weapon, the rifled breech-loader. Its successes in 1866 were due to these two innovations.<sup>7</sup>

The Franco-German War was the first in which two armies faced each other both equipped with breech-loading rifles, and moreover both fundamentally in the same

tactical formations as in the time of the old smoothbore flint-locks. The only difference was that the Prussians had introduced the company column formation in an attempt to find a form of fighting which was better adapted to the new type of arms. But when, at St. Privat on August 18<sup>s</sup> the Prussian Guard tried to apply the company column formation seriously, the five regiments which were chiefly engaged lost in less than two hours more than a third of their strength (176 officers and 5,114 men). From that time on the company column, too, was condemned as a battle formation, no less than the battalion column and the line; all idea of further exposing troops in any kind of close formation to enemy gun-fire was abandoned, and on the German side all subsequent fighting was conducted only in those compact bodies of skirmishers into which the columns had so far regularly dissolved of themselves under a deadly hail of bullets, although this had been opposed by the higher commands as contrary to order; and in the same way the only form of movement when under fire from enemy rifles became the *double*. Once again the soldier had been shrewder than the officer; it was *he* who instinctively found the only way of fighting which has proved of service up to now under the fire of breech-loading rifles, and in spite of opposition from his officers he carried it through successfully.

The Franco-German War marked a turning point of entirely new implications. In the first place the weapons used have reached such a stage of perfection that further progress which would have any revolutionizing influence is no longer possible. Once armies have guns which can hit a battalion at any range at which it can be distinguished, and rifles which are equally effective for hitting individual men, while loading them takes less time than aiming, then all further improvements are of minor importance for field warfare. The era of evolution is therefore, in essentials, closed in this direction. And secondly, this war has compelled all continental powers to introduce in a stricter form the Prussian *Landwehr* system, and with it a military burden which must bring them to ruin within a few years. The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there only to provide soldiers and feed them. Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe. But this militarism also bears within itself the seed

of its own destruction. Competition among the individual states forces them, on the one hand, to spend more money each year on the army and navy, artillery, etc., thus more and more hastening their financial collapse; and, on the other hand, to resort to universal compulsory military service more and more extensively, thus in the long run making the whole people familiar with the use of arms, and therefore enabling them at a given moment to make their will prevail against the war-lords in command. And this moment will arrive as soon as the mass of the people—town and country workers and peasants—*will have a will*. At this point the armies of the princes became transformed into armies of the people; the machine refuses to work, and militarism collapses by the dialectics of its own evolution. What the bourgeois democracy of 1848 could not accomplish, just because it was *bourgeois* and not proletarian, namely, to give the labouring masses a will whose content would be in accord with their class position—socialism will infallibly secure. And this will mean the bursting asunder *from within* of militarism and with it of all standing armies.

That is the first moral of our history of modern infantry. The second moral, which brings us back again to Herr Dühring, is that the whole organization and method of warfare, and along with these victory or defeat, prove to be dependent on material, that is, economic conditions: on the human material and the armaments material, and therefore on the quality and quantity of the population and on technical development. Only a hunting people like the Americans could rediscover skirmishing tactics—and they were hunters as a result of purely economic causes, just as now, as a result of purely economic causes, these same Yankees of the old States have transformed themselves into farmers, industrialists, seamen and merchants who no longer skirmish in the primeval forests, but instead all the more effectively in the field of speculation, where they have likewise made much progress in making use of large masses.

Only a revolution such as the French, which brought about the economic emancipation of the bourgeois and, especially, of the peasantry, could find the mass armies and at the same time the free forms of movement which shattered the old rigid lines—the military counterparts of the absolutism which they were defending. And we have seen

in case after case how advances in technique, as soon as they became applicable militarily and in fact were so applied, immediately and almost forcibly produced changes and even revolutions in the methods of warfare, often indeed against the will of the army command. And now-a days any zealous N.C.O. could explain to Herr Dühring how greatly, besides, the conduct of a war depends on the productivity and means of communication of the army's own hinterland as well as of the theatre of war. In short, always and everywhere it is the economic conditions and the instruments of economic power which help "force" to victory, without which force ceases to be force. And anyone who tried to reform methods of warfare from the opposite standpoint, on the basis of Dühringian principles, would certainly earn nothing but a beating.\*

If we pass now from land to sea, we find that in the last twenty years alone an even more complete revolution has taken place there. The warship of the Crimean War<sup>10</sup> was the wooden two- and three-decker of 60 to 100 guns; this was still mainly propelled by sail, with only a low-powered auxiliary steam-engine. The guns on these warships were for the most part 32-pounders, weighing approximately 50 centners,\*\* with only a few 68-pounders weighing 95 centners. Towards the end of the war, iron-clad floating batteries made their appearance; they were clumsy and almost immobile monsters, but to the guns of that period they were invulnerable. Soon warships, too, were swathed in iron armour-plating; at first the plates were still thin, a thickness of four inches being regarded as extremely heavy armour. But soon the progress made with artillery outstripped the armour-plating; each successive increase in the strength of the armour used was countered by a new and heavier gun which easily pierced the plates. In this way we have already reached armour-plating ten, twelve, fourteen and twenty-four inches thick (Italy proposes to have a ship built with plates three feet thick) on

\* This is already perfectly well known to the Prussian General Staff. "The *basis* of warfare is primarily the *economic* way of life of the peoples in general," said Herr Max Jähns, a captain of the General Staff, in a scientific lecture (*Kölnische Zeitung*, April 20, 1876, p. 3).<sup>9</sup> [Note by Engels.]

\*\* German centner of 50 kilograms, i.e., half of the metric centner.—Ed.

the one hand, and on the other, rifled guns of 25, 35, 80 and even 100 tons (at 20 centners) in weight, which can hurl projectiles weighing 300, 400, 1,700 and up to 2,000 pounds to distances which were never dreamed of before. The warship of the present day is a gigantic armoured screw-driven steamer of 8,000 to 9,000 tons displacement and 6,000 to 8,000 horse power, with revolving turrets and four or at most six heavy guns, the bow being extended under water into a ram for running down enemy vessels. It is a single colossal machine, in which steam not only drives the ship at a high speed, but also works the steering-gear, raises the anchor, swings the turrets, changes the elevation of the guns and loads them, pumps out water, hoists and lowers the boats—some of which are themselves also steam-driven—and so forth. And the rivalry between armour-plating and the fire power of guns is so far from being at an end that nowadays a ship is almost always not up to requirements, already out of date, before it is launched. The modern warship is not only a product, but at the same time a specimen of modern large-scale industry, a floating factory—producing mainly, to be sure, a lavish waste of money. The country in which large-scale industry is most highly developed has almost a monopoly of the construction of these ships. All Turkish, almost all Russian and most German armoured vessels have been built in England; armour-plates that are at all serviceable are hardly made outside of Sheffield; of the three steel-works in Europe which alone are able to make the heaviest guns, two (Woolwich and Elswick) are in England, and the third (Krupp) in Germany. In this sphere it is most palpably evident that the “direct political force” which, according to Herr Dühring, is the “decisive cause of the economic situation,” is on the contrary completely subordinate to the economic situation, that not only the construction but also the operation of the marine instrument of force, the warship, has itself become a branch of modern large-scale industry. And that this is so distresses no one more than force itself, that is, the state, which has now to pay for one ship as much as a whole small fleet used to cost; which as to resign itself to seeing these expensive vessels become obsolete, and therefore worthless, even before they slide into the water; and which must certainly be just as disgusted as Herr Dühring that the man of the “economic situation”, the engineer, is



now of far greater importance on board than the man of "direct force," the captain. We, on the contrary, have absolutely no cause to be vexed when we see that, in this competitive struggle between armour-plating and guns, the warship is being developed to a pitch of perfection which is making it both outrageously costly and unusable in war,\* and that this struggle makes manifest also in the sphere of naval warfare those inherent dialectical laws of motion on the basis of which militarism, like every other historical phenomenon, is being brought to its doom in consequence of its own development.

Here, too, therefore we see absolutely clearly that it is not by any means true that "the primary must be sought in direct political force and not in any indirect economic power." On the contrary. For what in fact does "the primary" in force itself prove to be? Economic power, the disposal of the means of power of large-scale industry. Naval political force, which reposes on modern warships, proves to be not at all "direct" but on the contrary *mediated* by economic power, highly developed metallurgy, command of skilled technicians and highly productive coalmines.

And yet what is the use of it all? If we put Herr Dühring in supreme command in the next naval war, he will destroy all fleets of armoured ships, which are the slaves of the economic situation, without torpedoes or any other artifices, solely by virtue of his "direct force."

\* The perfecting of the latest product of modern industry for use in naval warfare, the self-propelled torpedo, seems like to bring this to pass; it would mean that the smallest torpedo boat would be superior to the most powerful armoured warship. (It should be borne in mind that the above was written in 1878).<sup>11</sup>. [Note by Engels.]

# THE FORCE THEORY

## (Conclusion)

"It is a circumstance of great importance that as a matter of fact the domination over *nature*, generally speaking (!), only proceeded (a domination proceeded !) through the domination *over man*. The cultivation of landed property in tracts of considerable size never took place anywhere without the antecedent subjection of man in some form of slave-labour or *corvée*. The establishment of an economic domination over things has presupposed the political, social and economic domination of man over man. How could a large landed proprietor even be conceived without at once including in this idea also his domination over slaves, serfs, or others indirectly unfree? What could the efforts of an individual, at most supplemented by those of his family, have signified or signify in extensively practised agriculture? The exploitation of the land, or the extension of economic control over it on a scale exceeding the natural capacities of the individual, was only made possible in previous history by the establishment, either before or simultaneously with the introduction of dominion over land, of the enslavement of man which this involves. In the later periods of development this servitude was mitigated, . . . its present form in the more highly civilised states is wage-labour, to a greater or lesser degree carried on under police rule. Thus wage-labour provides the practical possibility of that form of contemporary wealth which is represented by dominion over wide areas of land and (!) extensive landed property. It goes without saying that all other types of distributive wealth must be explained historically in a similar way, and the indirect dependence of man on man, which is now the essential feature of the conditions which economically are most fully developed, cannot be understood and explained by its own nature, but only as a somewhat transformed heritage of an earlier direct subjugation and expropriation." Thus Herr Dühring.

[ Thesis : The domination of nature (by man) presupposes the domination of man (by man).

Proof : The cultivation of landed *property in tracts of considerable size* never took place anywhere except by the use of bondmen.

Proof of the proof : How can there be large landowners without bondmen, as the large landowner, even with his family, could work only a tiny part of his property without the help of bondmen ?

Therefore, in order to prove that man first had to subjugate man before he could bring nature under his control, Herr Dühring transforms "nature" without more ado into "landed property in tracts of considerable size," and then this landed property—ownership unspecified—is immediately further transformed into the property of a large landed proprietor, who naturally cannot work his land without bondmen.

In the first place "domination over nature" and the "cultivation of landed property" are by no means the same thing. In industry, domination over nature is exercised on quite another and much greater scale than in agriculture, which is still subject to weather conditions instead of controlling them.

Secondly, if we confine ourselves to the cultivation of landed property consisting of tracts of considerable size, the question arises: whose landed property is it? And then we find in the early history of all civilized peoples, not the "large landed proprietors" whom Herr Dühring interpolates here with his customary sleight of hand, which he calls "natural dialectics,"<sup>12</sup> but tribal and village communities with common ownership of the land. From India to Ireland the cultivation of landed property in tracts of considerable size was originally carried on by such tribal and village communities; sometimes the arable land was tilled jointly for account of the community, and sometimes in separate parcels of land temporarily allotted to families by the community, while woodland and pastureland continued to be used in common. It is once again characteristic of "the most exhaustive specialized studies" made by Herr Dühring "in the domain of politics and law" that he knows nothing of all this; that all his works breathe total ignorance of Maurer's epoch-making writings on the primitive constitution of the German mark,<sup>13</sup> the basis of all German law, and of the ever-increasing mass of literature, chiefly stimulated by Maurer, which is devoted to proving the primitive

common ownership of the land among all civilized peoples of Europe and Asia, and to showing the various forms of its existence and dissolution. Just as in the domain of French and English law Herr Dühring "himself acquired all his ignorance,"<sup>14</sup> great as it was, so it is with his even much greater ignorance in the domain of German law. In this domain the man who flies into such a violent rage over the limited horizon of university professors is himself today, at the very most, still where the professors were twenty years ago.

It is a pure "free creation and imagination" on Herr Dühring's part when he asserts that landed proprietors and bondmen were required for the cultivation of landed property in tracts of considerable size. In the whole of the Orient, where the village community or the state owns the land, the very term landlord is not to be found in the various languages, a point on which Herr Dühring can consult the English jurists, whose efforts in India to solve the question: who is the owner of the land?—were as vain as those of the late Prince Heinrich LXXII of Reuss-Greiz-Schleitz-Lobenstein-Eberswalde<sup>15</sup> in his attempts to solve the question of who was the night-watchman. It was the Turks who first introduced a sort of feudal ownership of land in the countries conquered by them in the Orient. Greece made its entry into history, as far back as the heroic epoch, with a system of social estates which itself was evidently the product of a long but unknown pre-history; even there, however, the land was mainly cultivated by independent peasants; the larger estates of the nobles and tribal chiefs were the exception; moreover they disappeared soon after. Italy was brought under cultivation chiefly by peasants; when, in the final period of the Roman Republic, the great complexes of estates, the *latifundia*, displaced the small peasants and replaced them with slaves, they also replaced tillage with stock-raising, and, as Pliny already realized, brought Italy to ruin (*latifundia Italiam perdere*)<sup>16</sup> During the Middle Ages, peasant farming was predominant throughout Europe (especially in bringing virgin soil into cultivation); and in relation to the question we are now considering it is of no importance whether these peasants had to pay dues, and if so what dues, to any feudal lords. The colonists from Friesland, Lower Saxony, Flanders and the lower Rhine, who brought under cultivation

the land east of the Elbe which had been wrested from the Slavs, did this as free peasants under very favourable quit-rent tenures, and not at all under "some form of corvée."

In North America, by far the largest portion of the land was opened for cultivation by the labour of free farmers, while the big landlords of the South, with their slaves and their rapacious tilling of the land, exhausted the soil until it could grow only firs, so that the cultivation of cotton was forced further and further west. In Australia and New Zealand, all attempts of the British government to establish artificially a landed aristocracy came to nothing. In short, if we except the tropical and subtropical colonies, where the climate makes agricultural labour impossible for Europeans, the big landlord who subjugates nature by means of his slaves or serfs and brings the land under cultivation proves to be a pure figment of the imagination. The very reverse is the case. Where he makes his appearance in antiquity, as in Italy, he does not bring wasteland into cultivation, but transforms arable land brought under cultivation by peasants into stock pastures, depopulating and ruining whole countries. Only in a more recent period, when the increasing density of population had raised the value of land, and particularly since the development of agricultural science had made even poorer land more cultivable—it is only from this period that large landowners began to participate on an extensive scale in bringing wasteland and grass-land under cultivation—and this mainly through the robbery of common land from the peasants, both in England and in Germany. But there was another side even to this. For every acre of common land which the large landowners brought into cultivation in England, they transformed at least three acres of arable land in Scotland into sheepruns and eventually even into mere big-game hunting-grounds.

We are concerned here only with Herr Dühring's assertion that the bringing into cultivation of tracts of land of considerable size and therefore of practically the whole area now cultivated, "never and nowhere" took place except through the agency of big landlords and their bondmen—an assertion which, as we have seen, "presupposes" a really unprecedented ignorance of history. It is not necessary, therefore, for us to examine here either to what extent, at different periods, areas which were already made entirely or mainly cultivable were cultivated by slaves (as in the hey-

day of Greece) or serfs (as in the manors of the Middle Ages); or what was the social function of the large land-owners at various periods.

And after Herr Dühring has shown us this masterpiece of the imagination—in which we do not know whether the conjuring trick of deduction or the falsification of history is more to be admired—he exclaims triumphantly: “It goes without saying that all other types of distributive wealth *must be explained historically in similar manner!*” Which of course saves him the trouble of wasting even a single word more on the origin, for example, of capital.

If, with his domination of man by man as a prior condition for the domination of nature by man, Herr Dühring only wanted to state in a general way that the whole of our present economic order, the level of development now attained by agriculture and industry, is the result of a social history which evolved in class antagonisms, in relationships of domination and subjection, he is saying something which long ago, ever since the *Communist Manifesto*, became a commonplace. But the question at issue is how we are to explain the origin of classes and relations based on domination, and if Herr Dühring’s only answer is the one word “force,” we are left exactly where we were at the start. The mere fact that the ruled and exploited have at all times been far more numerous than the rulers and the exploiters, and that therefore it is in the hands of the former that the real force has reposed, is enough to demonstrate the absurdity of the whole force theory. The relationships based on domination and subjection have therefore still to be explained.

They arose in two ways.

As men originally made their exit from the animal world—in the narrower sense of the term—so they made their entry into history: still half animal, brutal, still helpless in face of the forces of nature, still ignorant of their own strength; and consequently as poor as the animals and hardly more productive than they. There prevailed a certain equality in the conditions of existence, and for the heads of families also a kind of equality of social position—at least an absence of social classes—which continued among the primitive agricultural communities of the civilized peoples of a later period. In each such community there were from the beginning certain common interests the safeguard-

ing of which had to be handed over to individuals, true, under the control of the community as a whole: adjudication of disputes; repression of abuse of authority by individuals; control of water supplies, especially in hot countries; and finally, when conditions were still absolutely primitive, religious functions. Such offices are found in aboriginal communities of every period—in the oldest German marks and even today in India. They are naturally endowed with a certain measure of authority and are the beginnings of state power. The productive forces gradually increase; the increasing density of the population creates at one point common interests, at another conflicting interests, between the separate communities, whose grouping into larger units brings about in turn a new division of labour, the setting up of organs to safeguard common interests and combat conflicting interests. These organs which, if only because they represent the common interests of the whole group, hold a special position in relation to each individual community—in certain circumstances even one of opposition—soon make themselves still more independent, partly through heredity of functions, which comes about almost as a matter of course in a world where everything occurs spontaneously, and partly because they become increasingly indispensable owing to the growing number of conflicts with other groups. It is not necessary for us to examine here how this independence of social functions in relation to society increased with time until it developed into domination over society; how he who was originally the servant, where conditions were favourable, changed gradually into the lord; how this lord, depending on the conditions, emerged as an Oriental despot or satrap, the dynast of a Greek tribe, chieftain of a Celtic clan, and so on; to what extent he subsequently had recourse to force in the course of this transformation; and how finally the individual rulers united into a ruling class. Here we are only concerned with establishing the fact that the exercise of a social function was everywhere the basis of political supremacy; and further that political supremacy has existed for any length of time only when it discharged its social functions. However great the number of despotisms which rose and fell in Persia and India, each was fully aware that above all it was the entrepreneur responsible for the collective maintenance of irrigation throughout the river valleys, without which no agriculture was possible.

there. It was reserved for the enlightened English to lose sight of this in India; they let the irrigation canals and sluices fall into decay, and are now at last discovering, through the regularly recurring famines, that they have neglected the one activity which might have made their rule in India at least as legitimate as that of their predecessors.

But alongside this process of formation of classes another was also taking place. The natural division of labour within the family cultivating the soil made possible, at a certain level of well-being, the introduction of one or more strangers as additional labour forces. This was especially the case in countries where the old common ownership of the land had already disintegrated or at least the former joint cultivation had given place to the separate cultivation of parcels of land by the respective families. Production had developed so far that the labour-power of a man could now produce more than was necessary for its mere maintenance; the means of maintaining additional labour forces existed; likewise the means of employing them; labour-power acquired a *value*. But the community itself and the association to which it belonged yielded no available, superfluous labour forces. On the other hand, such forces were provided by war, and war was as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each other of several groups of communities. Up to that time one had not known what to do with prisoners of war, and had therefore simply killed them; at an even earlier period, eaten them. But at the stage of the "economic situation" which had now been attained the prisoners acquired a value; one therefore let them live and made use of their labour. Thus force, instead of controlling the economic situation, was on the contrary pressed into the service of the economic situation. *Slavery* had been invented. It soon became the dominant form of production among all peoples who were developing beyond the old community, but in the end was also one of the chief causes of their decay. It was slavery that first made possible the division of labour between agriculture and industry on a larger scale, and thereby also Hellenism, the flowering of the ancient world. Without slavery, no Greek state, no Greek art and science; without slavery, no Roman Empire. But without the basis laid by Grecian culture, and the Roman Empire, also no modern Europe. We should never forget that our whole economic, political and intellectual



development presupposes a state of things in which slavery was as necessary as it was universally recognized. In this sense we are entitled to say: Without the slavery of antiquity no modern socialism.

It is very easy to inveigh against slavery and similar things in general terms, and to give vent to high moral indignation at such infamies. Unfortunately all that this conveys is only what everyone knows, namely, that these institutions of antiquity are no longer in accord with our present conditions and our sentiments, which these conditions determine. But it does not tell us one word as to how these institutions arose, why they existed, and what role they played in history. And when we examine these questions, we are compelled to say—however contradictory and heretical it may sound—that the introduction of slavery under the conditions prevailing at that time was a great step forward. For it is a fact that man sprang from the beasts, and had consequently to use barbaric and almost bestial means to extricate himself from barbarism. Where the ancient communes have continued to exist, they have for thousands of years formed the basis of the cruelest form of state, Oriental despotism, from India to Russia. It was only where these communities dissolved that the peoples made progress of themselves, and their next economic advance consisted in the increase and development of production by means of slave labour. It is clear that so long as human labour was still so little productive that it provided but a small surplus over and above the necessary means of subsistence, any increase of the productive forces, extension of trade, development of the state and of law, or foundation of art and science, was possible only by means of a greater division of labour. And the necessary basis for this was the great division of labour between the masses discharging simple manual labour and the few privileged persons directing labour, conducting trade and public affairs, and, at a later stage, occupying themselves with art and science. The simplest and most natural form of this division of labour was in fact slavery. In the historical conditions of the ancient world, and particularly of Greece, the advance to a society based on class antagonisms could be accomplished only in the form of slavery. This was an advance even for the slaves; the prisoners of war, from whom the mass of the slaves was re-

cruited, now at least saved their lives, instead of being killed as they had been before, or even roasted, as at a still earlier period.

We may add at this point that all historical antagonisms between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes to this very day find their explanation in this same relatively undeveloped productivity of human labour. So long as the really working population were so much occupied with their necessary labour that they had no time left for looking after the common affairs of society—the direction of labour, affairs of state, legal matters, art, science, etc.—so long was it necessary that there should constantly exist a special class, freed from actual labour, to manage these affairs; and this class never failed, for its own advantage, to impose a greater and greater burden of labour on the working masses. Only the immense increase of the productive forces attained by modern industry has made it possible to distribute labour among all members of society without exception, and thereby to limit the labour-time of each individual member to such an extent that all have enough free time left to take part in the general—both theoretical and practical—affairs of society. It is only now, therefore, that every ruling and exploiting class has become superfluous and indeed a hindrance to social development, and it is only now, too, that it will be inexorably abolished, however much it may be in possession of “direct force.”

When, therefore, Herr Dühring turns up his nose at Hellenism because it was founded on slavery, he might with equal justice reproach the Greeks with having had no steam-engines or electric telegraphs. And when he asserts that our modern wage bondage can only be explained as a somewhat transformed and mitigated heritage of slavery, and not by its own nature (that is, by the economic laws of modern society), this either means only that both wage-labour and slavery are forms of bondage and class domination, which every child knows to be so, or is false. For with equal justice we might say that wage-labour could only be explained as a mitigated form of cannibalism, which, it is now established, was the universal primitive form of utilization of defeated enemies.

The role played in history by force as contrasted with economic development is therefore clear. In the first place,

all political power is originally based on an economic, social function, and increases in proportion as the members of society, through the dissolution of the primitive community, become transformed into private producers, and thus become more and more divorced from the administrators of the common functions of society. Secondly, after the political force has made itself independent in relation to society, and has transformed itself from its servant into its master, it can work in two different directions. Either it works in the sense and in the direction of the natural economic development, in which case no conflict arises between them, the economic development being accelerated. Or it works against economic development, in which case, as a rule, with but few exceptions, force succumbs to it. These few exceptions are isolated cases of conquest, in which the more barbarian conquerors exterminated or drove out the population of a country and laid waste or allowed to go to ruin productive forces which they did not know how to use. This was what the Christians in Moorish Spain did with the major part of the irrigation works on which the highly-developed agriculture and horticulture of the Moors depended. Every conquest by a more barbarian people disturbs of course the economic development and destroys numerous productive forces. But in the immense majority of cases where the conquest is permanent, the more barbarian conqueror has to adapt himself to the higher "economic situation" as it emerges from the conquest; he is assimilated by the vanquished and in most cases he has even to adopt their language. But where—apart from cases of conquest—the internal state power of a country becomes antagonistic to its economic development, as at a certain stage occurred with almost every political power in the past, the contest always ended with the downfall of the political power. Inexorably and without exception the economic development has forced its way through—we have already mentioned the latest and most striking example of this: the great French Revolution. If, in accordance with Herr Dühring's theory, the economic situation and with it the economic structure of a given country were dependent simply on political force, it is absolutely impossible to understand why Frederick William IV after 1848 could not succeed, in spite of his "magni-

ficent army,"<sup>17</sup> in grafting the mediaeval guilds and other romantic oddities on to the railways, the steam-engines and the large-scale industry which was just then developing in his country; or why the tsar of Russia, who is possessed of even much more forcible means, is not only unable to pay his debts, but cannot even maintain his "force" without continually borrowing from the "economic situation" of Western Europe.

To Herr Dühring force is the absolute evil; the first act of force is to him the original sin; his whole exposition is a jeremiad on the contamination of all subsequent history consummated by this original sin; a jeremiad on the shameful perversion of all natural and social laws by this diabolical power, force. That force, however, plays yet another role in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one, \* that it is the instrument with the aid of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms—of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of an economic system of exploitation—unfortunately, because all use of force demoralizes the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has been given by every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision—which may, after all, be forced on the people—would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has penetrated the nation's mentality following the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parsons' mode of thought—dull, insipid and impotent—presumes to impose itself on the most revolutionary party that history has known!

\* *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1961, p. 751.—*Ed.*

1. Here Engels quotes Falstaff from Shakespeare's *King Henry IV* (Part I, Act II, Scene IV): "If reasons were as plentiful as blackberries I would give no man a reason upon compulsion".

2. The reference is to O. Thierry, F. Guizot, F. Mignet and A. Thiers.

3. Engels probably borrowed these facts from W. Wachsmuth's *Hellenische Alterthumskunde aus dem Gesichtspunkte des Staates* (A Study of Hellenic Antiquity from the Viewpoint of Its State System), Part 2, Section I, Halle, 1829.

*Banquet of Sophists*, Book VI, by the ancient Greek writer Athenaeus is the source for the number of slaves in Corinth and Aegina during the Greco-Persian wars.

4. Engels used G. Hanssen's *Die Gehöferschaften (Erbgenossenschaften) im Regierungsbezirk Trier (Village Communities [Hereditary Comradships] in Trier Region)*, Berlin, 1863.

5. This is a reference to the 5,000 million francs that France paid to Germany as an indemnity in 1871-73 under the terms of the peace treaty, after her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

6. The *Prussian Landwehr system* under which units of the Armed Forces were formed of able-bodied reservists of senior ages who were assigned to the *Landwehr* after they had served in the regular army and been in the reserve for the established period. The *Landwehr* was first formed in Prussia in 1813-14 as a people's militia to combat Napoleon. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, it was used in battle alongside regular troops.

7. The reference is to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

8. In the *Battle of Saint-Privat*, August 18, 1870, German troops, at the cost of enormous losses, defeated the French Rhenish army. It is also known as the Battle at Gravelotte.

Engels evidently obtained the data on the losses sustained by the Prussian army in this battle when he studied documents in the official history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, compiled by the department of Military History of the Prussian General Staff (*Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71*, Vol. I, Book 2, Berlin, 1875, p. 669 et seqq. 197\*-199\*, 233\*).

9. Max Jähns' report "Machiavelli and the Idea of General Conscription" was printed in the *Kölnische Zeitung* Nos. 108, 110, 112 and 115 on April 18, 20, 22 and 25, 1876. The italics in the quotation are by Engels.

*Kölnische Zeitung* (Cologne Newspaper)—a German daily published under this title in Cologne from 1802 onwards; it was the mouthpiece of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie.

10 *The Crimean War* of 1853-56, between Russia and a coalition consisting of Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia, broke out as a result of a clash of their economic and political interests in the Middle East.

11. The end of the note given in parenthesis, was added by Engels in the third edition of *Anti-Dühring*, published in 1894.

12. Dühring called his "dialectics" "natural" to distinguish it from the "unnatural" dialectics of Hegel. See E. Dühring, *Natürliche Dialektik. Neue logische Grundlegungen der Wissenschaft und*

*Philosophie* (Natural Dialectics. New Logical Principles and Philosophy), Berlin, 1865.

13. Dealing with a common subject, the works (12 volumes) are a study of the agrarian, urban and medieval Germany. These works are: *Einrichtung der Mark-, Hof-, Dorf- und Stadt-Verfassung* (Introduction to a History of the Rural, Urban and Public Power System in Germany), Erlangen, 1856; *Geschichte der Bauernhöfe und der Hofverfassung in Deutschland* (History of Manor Households, Peasant Household System in Germany), Vols. I-IV, Erlangen, 1865-66; *Städteverfassung in Deutschland* (A History of the Urban System in Germany), Vols. I-IV, Erlangen, 1869-71. The fourth volumes are devoted to a study of the urban system.

14. From Heine's poem *Kobus I.*

15. Engels ironically changes the title of Heine's poem to refer to the two influential Reuss princes of the Younger Line (Lobenstein-Ebersdorf). Greiz—capital of Reuss of the Younger Line, Reuss-Greiz). Schleitz—a domain of the Younger Line, Reuss-Schleitz—was not a possession of the Reuss family.

16. Gaius Pliny Secundus, *Naturalis historia* (Natural History), Book XVIII, § 35.

17. This is an expression from Frederick William III's message (January 1, 1849) to the Prussian Army regarding the assessment of this message see K. Marx's article "The Prussian Army,"

From Engels's Preparatory Writings  
for *Anti-Dühring*<sup>1</sup>





## PART II

### Ch. II

Wherever *slavery* is the main form of production it turns labour into servile activity, consequently makes it dishonourable for freemen. Thus the way out of such a mode of production is barred, while on the other hand slavery is an impediment to more developed production, which urgently requires its removal. This contradiction spells the doom of all production based on slavery and of all communities based on it. A solution comes about in most cases through the forcible subjection of the deteriorating communities by other, stronger ones (Greece by Macedonia and later Rome). As long as these themselves have slavery as their foundation there is merely a shifting of the centre and a repetition of the process on a higher plane until (Rome) finally a people conquers that replaces slavery by another form of production. Or slavery is abolished by compulsion or voluntarily, whereupon *the former mode of production perishes* and large-scale cultivation is displaced by small-peasant squatters, as in America. For that matter Greece too perished on account of slavery, Aristotle having already said that intercourse with slaves was demoralizing the citizens, not to mention the fact that slavery makes work impossible for the latter. Domestic slavery, such as exists in the Orient, is another matter. Here it does not form the basis of production directly but indirectly, as a constituent part of the family, and passes imperceptibly into the family (female harem slaves).

### Ch. III

In Dühring's reprehensible history force holds sway. In the real, progressive historical movement, however, what dominates are the material gains which are retained.

### Ch. III

How is force, the army, maintained? By *money*, hence again dependent on production. Cf. Athens' fleet and policy

of 380-340. The force exercised against the allies came to nought for lack of the material means to wage long and energetic wars. The English subsidies, granted by the new industry, modern industry, defeat Napoleon.

### Ch. III

#### [*The Party and Military Training*]

In considering the struggle for existence and Dühring's declamations against struggle and arms it should be emphasized that a revolutionary party must know also how to struggle. It will have to make the revolution, possibly some day in the near future, but not against the present military-bureaucratic state. Politically that would be as insane as Babeuf's attempt to jump from the Directorate immediately into communism; even more insane, for the Directorate was after all a bourgeois and peasant government.<sup>2</sup> But in order to safeguard the laws issued by the bourgeoisie itself the Party may be compelled to take revolutionary measures against the bourgeois state which will supersede the present state. Hence the universal conscription of our time should be taken advantage of by all to learn how to fight, but particularly by those whose education entitles them to acquire the training of an officer in one year's voluntary service.

### Ch. IV

#### [*On "Force"*]

It is recognized that force also operates with revolutionary effect, namely, in all "critical" epochs of decisive importance, such as the transition to sociality, but even then only in self-defence against reactionary enemies abroad. However the upheaval in England in the sixteenth century depicted by Marx also had its revolutionary side. It was a basic condition of the conversion of feudal landed property into bourgeois landed property and of the development of the bourgeoisie. The French Revolution of 1789 likewise applied force to a considerable extent; August 4 merely sanctioned the peasants' deeds of violence and was supplemented by the confiscation of the estates of the nobility and church.<sup>3</sup> The forcible conquest by the ancient

Germans, the foundation, on conquered territory, of states in which the country, and not the town, dominated, as in antiquity, was accompanied—precisely for the latter reason—by the transformation of slavery into the milder serfdom, or feudal dependence, (in antiquity the transformation of tilled land into pastures was a concomitant feature of the latifundia).

#### Ch. IV

[*Force, Community Property, Economics and Politics*]

When the Indo-Germans migrated to Europe they ejected the aboriginal inhabitants by *force* and tilled the land, which was owned by the community. Among the Celts, Germans and Slavs community ownership can still be traced historically and among the Slavs, Germans and also the Celts (rundale) it still exists even in the form of direct (Russia) or indirect (Ireland) feudal bondage. Force ceased as soon as the Lapps and Basques had been driven off. In internal affairs equality or voluntarily conceded privilege prevailed. Where private ownership of land by individual peasants arose out of common ownership, this division up to the sixteenth century took place purely spontaneously among the members of the community. It occurred in most cases quite gradually and remnants of common possession could be encountered very frequently. There was no idea of using *force*; it was applied only against these remnants (England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Germany mainly in the nineteenth century). Ireland is a special case. This common ownership quietly persisted in India and Russia under the most diverse forcible conquests and despotisms, and formed their basis. Russia is proof of how the relations of production determine the political relations of force. Up to the end of the seventeenth century the Russian peasant suffered little oppression, enjoyed the right of movement and was hardly a bondsman. The first Romanov attached the peasants to the soil. With Peter began the foreign trade of Russia, which had only agricultural products to export. *This* brought on the oppression of the peasants. It grew in the same measure as *exports, for the sake of which it had been introduced,*

until Catherine made the oppression complete and ended legislation on the subject. This legislation, however, permitted the landed proprietors to grind down the peasants more and more, so that their yoke became ever harder to bear.

#### Ch. IV

If force is the cause of social and political conditions, what is the cause of force? The appropriation of *products* of the labour of others and of labour-*power* of others. Force was able to change the consumption of products but not the mode of production itself; it could not transform bond labour into wage-labour unless the requisite conditions existed and bond labour had become a fetter on production.

#### Ch. IV

Hitherto force—from now on sociality. Purely a pious wish, a demand of “justice.” Thomas More set up this demand already 350 years ago,<sup>4</sup> but it has not yet been met. Why should it be fulfilled now? Dühring is at a loss for an answer. In reality, modern industry sets up this demand not as a demand of justice but as a necessity of production, and that changes everything.

1. Engels's preparatory writings for *Anti-Dühring* consist of two parts. The first comprises separate sheets of various format (altogether—35 manuscript pages), containing extracts from Dühring's book and Engels's notes, of which those that were used in *Anti-Dühring* were crossed out. The second part consists of large format sheets (altogether 17 manuscript pages) divided into two columns: the left hand column contains mainly extracts from the 2nd edition of Dühring's *Course of Political and Social Economy*, and the right-hand column contains critical notes by Engels; some of the entries are crossed vertically—they were used in *Anti-Dühring*.

In addition, the preparatory writings for *Anti-Dühring* include: a note on slavery, extracts from Fourier's *The New Industrial and Social World* and notes on modern socialism, which were the initial variant of the *Introduction to Anti-Dühring*. These three notes are in the first batch of materials for *Dialectics of Nature*. The present edition gives two of the notes among the preparatory works for *Anti-Dühring*, and the key divergences between the first and final texts of the *Introduction* are reproduced in the footnotes to the first chapter of the *Introduction*. . . . .

2. This refers to the period of Jacobin revolutionary-democratic dictatorship (June 1793-July 1794), when the Jacobins retaliated with revolutionary terror to the counter-revolutionary terror of the Girondins and Royalists.

*Directorate* (a body of five Directors, with one of them standing for re-election every year in rotation)—the organ of executive power in France under the 1795 Constitution adopted after the fall of the Jacobin revolutionary dictatorship in 1794. It existed until the *coup d'état* effected by Napoleon in 1799; while it was in office it maintained a reign of terror against democratic forces and upheld the interest of the big bourgeoisie.

3. On August 4, 1789, pressured by the growing peasant movement, the French Constituent Assembly formally proclaimed the abrogation of a number of feudal duties, which had been, in effect, abolished by the insurgent peasants. However, the laws promulgated on the heels of this proclamation repealed without redemption only personal duties. All feudal duties were repealed without redemption only under the Jacobin dictatorship by a law on July 17, 1793.

The decree on the confiscation of Church property was passed by the Constituent Assembly on November 2, 1789, and the decree on the confiscation of the property of nobles in exile was passed by the Legislative Assembly on February 9, 1792.

4. The reference is to Thomas More's *Utopia*, the first edition of which was published in Louvain, Belgium, in 1516.

*Congress of Vienna—(18 September, 1814—9 June, 1815)*

They joined together the conquerors of Napoleon the first. From the Congress Austria, England and Russia changed the map of Europe, in order to restore the interests of the national reunions and the independence of the peoples. The division of Germany remained. Along with Austria and Prussia many other small states acquired new territories which were taken over from Napoleon; for example, Bavaria received the territories stretching upto Austria, Prussia received the Pfalz, Würzburg received portions of the duchy of Frankfurt, etc.

The fall of Napoleon left the disposition of the empire to the four powers who overthrew him—Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain. Other countries, of which Spain, Portugal and Sweden were most important had shared in this task and had signed the treaties of Paris in 1814, but the four greater powers were bound together by a special alliance (treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 1814). Thus, though the treaties with France stipulated that all countries that had taken part in the war should send plenipotentiaries to a Congress at Vienna, the four powers meant to make the decisions themselves, and, as they could not agree at Paris, bound France by a secret article of the treaties to recognise these decisions at a future date. All Europe sent its most important statesmen to Vienna. With them came a host of courtiers, secretaries and ladies to enjoy the magnificent hospitality of almost bankrupt Austrian court. The social side of the Congress made a great impression on the age, and on history. It was one of the causes of the long and unexpected delay in producing a result, for Metternich at least sometimes subordinated business to pleasure.

p. 17.

*Division of Poland—Period of Division 1138-1414*

Boleslaw III divided Poland among his sons, so that Poland, like its neighbours Germany and Kievan Russia, ceased to be a united state for two centuries. Henry I, the Bearded tried to unite it in the XIV century.

*First partition (treaty), 1772—at St. Petersburg between Prussia and Russia on Feb. 6-17, 1772; the second treaty, which admitted Austria also to a share of the spoil, was signed on Aug. 5-16 the same year.*

*Second partition, 1793—Signed Sept. 23, 1793. Russia got all the eastern provinces of Poland, while Prussia got Dobrzyn, Kujavia, Great Poland, Torun and Danzig. Poland reduced to less than 1/3 of its original dimensions.*

*Kosciuszko and Third Partition* effected after the revolt (unsuccessful) of patriots under the leadership of Kosciuszko by successive treaties in 1795 and 1796 between Austria, Prussia and Russia. Name of Poland wiped from the map of Europe, to appear only after more than a century. p. 17.

*Christian, Baron of Glücksburg (1818-1906)*

Successor to a Danish throne since 1852, under the name King Christian IX (1863-1906). p. 18.

*Thirty Years War (1618-48)*, general European war, fought mainly in Germany. There were many issues—territorial, dynastic, religious—and throughout the war there were shifting alliances and local peace treaties. The whole conflict can be understood only as the struggle of a number of German princes, backed by foreign powers such as France, Sweden, Denmark, and England, against the unity of the Holy Roman Empire and the house of Habsburg, which then ruled Spain, the empire, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, most of Italy, and the South Netherlands. The war began when the Protestant Bohemian nobles deposed King Ferdinand (later Emperor Ferdinand II) and elected Frederick the Winter King in his stead. The imperialist forces under Tilly and the Catholic League under Duke Maximilian I of Bavaria defeated the Bohemians at the White Mt. (1620) and were victorious in the Palatinate over Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick (1622-23), but the intervention of Christian IV of Denmark on the "Protestant" side opened a new phase. Defeated by Tilly and Wallestein, the Danes by the Treaty of Lübeck withdrew from the war (1629). A new issue was brought up in 1629, when Ferdinand II attempted to enforce the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and to confiscate lands that had been secularized after 1552. Gustavus II of Sweden, backed by France, marched into Germany, defeated the imperials at Breitenfeld (1631), on the Lech (1632), and at Lützen (1632); though he was killed in his last victory, the Swedes continued in the war. The tide seemed to turn in 1634, when the imperials won the great victory of Nördlingen. A compromise peace was concluded among the German states at Prague (1635). To prevent an imperial victory and the expulsion of the Swedes, France now openly joined Sweden, and the war entered its last and bloodiest phase, spreading to Low Countries, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and Scandinavia. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, the Swedes Bañer, Turstenson, and Wrangel, and the French under Louis II de Condé and Turenne were, despite temporary set backs, victorious. Peace negotiations began 1640 but the fighting continued until the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and—in the case of France and Spain—until the Peace of Pyrennes (1659). Germany was in ruins, depopulated and starving. The Holy Roman Empire became a hollow shell. The house of Austria began its decline. France emerged as the chief power in Europe. p. 22.

*Louis Napoleon*

After the death of his brother in 1831 and that of Duke of

Reichstadt in 1832 made Louis Napoleon heir to his uncle's claims, since neither his father nor his uncles Joseph and Lucien wished to pursue them. King, Louis Philippe, anxious to conceal the fact that he had a rival, silently deported him to the U.S.A. in 1836: without trial or fuss. He returned to Europe in 1837. From Switzerland he went to England. Returned to France in the hope of gaining the throne but was tried and imprisoned. Escaped from prison May 26, 1846. Elected in the election of Sept. 1848. Stood for presidency the same year and was elected. In the plebiscite of Dec. 20 (1851) was voted dictatorial powers for ten years. In Nov. 1852 he held another plebiscite and was elected emperor of the French; and on Dec. 2, 1852, he assumed the title of Napoleon III. (Napoleon II was Napoleon I's son, technically assumed to have reigned in 1815). Thus the tragic period known as the second empire was inaugurated.

On April 24, 1859 he declared war on Austria.

The grandiose plan to establish "Latin Empire" in Mexico involved Napoleon in further difficulties (1862-67). He annexed Cochin China to France (1862). He said: The Napoleonic idea is not an idea of war, but a social, industrial, commercial and humanitarian idea" in youth. Marx declared that his principles were not liberty, equality and fraternity but "cavalry, infantry and artillery." During the Franco-German War declared by France on July 19 (1870) he surrendered on Sept. 2, and the third republic was proclaimed in Paris on Sept. 4. Napoleon III died in England on June 9, 1873.

p. 23.

*Frederick II*—routed Silesia in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48). The plea for the outbreak of this war which brought together a series of European feudal states, mainly Prussian and taken into the Habsburgian lands which fell to Maria Theresa, daughter of Karl VI who had left no male heir on his death. In December 1740 Frederik II conquered Silesia belonging to Austria. France and Bavaria at first adopted a well-meaning neutrality towards Prussia. After the Austrian troops had tasted a few defeats these states encircled Prussia. England, which aspired to weaken France as its commercial competitor took sides with Austria. Austria was helped militarily and diplomatically by Sardinia, Holland and Russia. Frederick II of Prussia betrayed twice in this battle his allies in as much as he contracted a separate treaty with Austria in 1742 and 1745. In 1742 Prussia occupied the largest part of Silesia, and after the end of the battle the whole of it.

p. 31.

*Metternich, Clemens, Fürst von (1773-1859)*—dominating figure of the Holy Alliance (1815) drawn up by the tsar Alexander I, signed by Emperor Francis I and by William III and ultimately by all European rulers, excepting the King of England, the Pope and the Sultan of Turkey, directed against the liberties of the people, camouflaged by religion. Espionage, censorship, and armed suppression of liberal movements were essential features of Metternich's policy, and the era 1815-1848 has been called the



Age of Metternich. This symbol of oppression was ousted by the revolution of 1848. He had to flee hidden in a basket of dirty linen and seek shelter in Brighton (England). p. 30.

*Schlosser, Friedrich-Christoph (1776-1861)*—Social historian, liberal, head of the school at Heidelberg for the writing of German history. p. 33.

*Häußler, Ludwig (1818-67)*

Historian, Pupil of Schlosser, the state Professor at Heidelberg. Became in 1850 an ordinary professor in Heidelberg. He fought for the unity of Germany and took part in the inception of the newspaper *Deutsche Zeitung* (1847). He belonged (1845-50) and 1860-65 to the membership of the second Royal Chamber and was the co-founder of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Der Deutsche Liebegeordnetag* (1862). He was one of the leaders and important person in writing German history from the death of Friedrich the Great to the foundation of the German Federation (1854-57), 1869. Published after his death is History of the French Revolution (1789-1799). Published in 1867. p. 33.

*Gervinus, Georg Gottfried (1805-71)*

Historian and Liberal politician. Professor at Heidelberg. P. 33.

*Rotteck, Karl Wenzesl von Rodecker (1775-1840)*—Liberal historian and politician. p. 35.

*Welcker, Karl Theodor (1790-1869)*

A jurist from Bad, liberal publicist; 1848-49 member of the National Assembly at Frankfurt (Right centre) p. 35.

*The song of Bürgermeister Tschech*

The ballad of mayor Tschech originated in 1844. Tschech who was the mayor of Starkow upto 1841 delivered two shots at Frederick William the Fourth on the 26th July 1844 but missed the aim.

The ballad of the free Lady Droste-Fischering originated in 1845 as a parody on "Holy Rock" in Trier where in those years pilgrimages were carried out. p. 35.

*Camphausen, Ludolf (1803-90)*

Banker in Köln, one of the leaders of the liberal bourgeoisie in Rhineland; Prime Minister of Prussia (March-June 1848). He made a defamatory political pact with the counter revolutionary forces. p. 35.

*Hanseman, David Justus (1790-1864)*

Great capitalist, leading representative of the bourgeoisie in Rhineland. From March to Sept. 1848 finance minister of Prussia, made a defamatory political pact with the counter revolutionary forces. p. 35.

*Milde, Karl August (1805-1861)*

A cotton millowner from Breslau, liberal, May to June 1848 President of the Prussian National Council (Right Wing); Commerce Minister (June-Sept. 1848). p. 35.

*Waldersee, Friedrich Gustav (1795-1864)*

Baron. Prussian General and writer of war stories War Minister (1854-58). p. 37

*Vanderblit, Cornelius (1794-1877)*

American railroad magnate. Expanded shipping interests; known as commodore Vanderbilt. In Civil War (1861-65) entered railroad field and by 1867 controlled New York Central RR. He extended railroad empire and amassed large fortune. Gave money to found Vanderbilt University (1872 chartered). A son, William Henry Vanderbilt, 1821-85 succeeded his father as president of New York Central RR. His son Cornelius Vanderbilt, 1843-99, helped found Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York city. p. 39

*Gould, Jay (1836-92)*

American capitalist. Helped defeat Cornelius Vanderbilt for control of Erie Railroad. He and James Fisk (1834-72) caused Black Friday (24 Sept. 1869) panic when thousands were ruined. Later, Gould controlled four Western railroads. His son, George Jay Gould (1863-1923), inherited all his father's holdings and, through daring policies, seemed to have a transcontinental system in his grasp. p. 39.

*Morny Charles Auguste Louis Joseph, Duc de (1811-65)*

President of the French legislative body, and one of the chief supporters of the Second Empire. Illegitimate son of Hortense de Beauharnais and Flahaut De La Billarderie. After an army career, amassed huge wealth in large trading speculations. Entered politics and chosen a member of the Chamber of Deputies. As a result of the coup d'etat of December 2, 1851, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte assumed dictatorial powers and Morny became minister of the interior. He resorted to intimidation and suppression on a large scale to assure the outcome of the plebiscite (1852) that made Bonaparte Emperor Napoleon III. Subsequently Morny was made president of the legislative assembly. p. 40.

*Bleichröder, Gerson von (1822-93)*

Famous bankhouse was founded by him in Berlin in 1853. It developed into the leading private bank in Europe through his cooperation of Rothschild and influence of Bismarck. It is still a leading bank in West Germany. Bleichröder financed Bismarck. p. 41.

*Fould, Achille (1800-67)*, French financier and politician. Fould gave backing to Louis Napoleon (later Napoleon III), whom he served 4 times as minister of finance and once as minister of state. In his tenure as finance minister the Bank of Algeria was founded and the floating debt was reduced (1863) by a loan. P. 41.

*Sybel, Heinrich von (1817-95)*—German historian, chief works founding of the German Empire by William I (Eng. tr., 7 vols, 1890-98) and *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzugs* (1841). p. 43.

*À la guerre comme à la guerre*—One must take things as they come. p. 46.

*Klapka, György (1820-92)*—Hungarian army officer, one of the leaders in the revolutionary war of 1848-49. In 1866, as a Prussian major general, organized a Hungarian corps in Silesia. Then he changed his views, was allowed to return to Hungary and entered parliament as a supporter of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. In 1877 Klapka was employed on reorganizing the Turkish army in view of the approaching war with Russia. Wrote books on his memoirs, on the Crimean War, Hungary's struggle for freedom. p. 46.

*Bebel, August (1840-1913)*—Turner by trade, a prominent leader of the German Social Democratic and international working-class movement. Beginning his political activity in the early sixties, he became a member of the First International. Together with Wilhelm Liebknecht he founded the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party (the "Eisenach party") in 1869; was repeatedly elected to the Reichstag. In the nineties and at the turn of the century he fought reformism and revisionism in the ranks of the German Social-Democratic movement. Lenin considered his speeches against the Bernsteinians "a model of the defence of Marxist views and of the struggle for truly socialist character of the workers' party." p. 49.

*Liebknecht, Wilhelm (1826-1900)*—a prominent leader of the German and international working class movement, a founder and leader of the German Social Democratic Party. From 1875 and to the end of his life was a member of the C.C. of the party and editor of *Vorwärts*, its central organ. From 1867 to 1870 he was a deputy (member) to the North German Reichstag, after 1874 was repeatedly elected a deputy to the German Reichstag. He cleverly used the rostrum of the Parliament to expose the reactionary foreign and domestic policies of the Prussian Junkers. He was repeatedly gaoled for his revolutionary activity. He actively participated in the 1st International and in the organisation of the 2nd International Marx and Engels held in high esteem. At the same time they criticised some of his mistakes, such as his conciliatory attitude towards enemies, and helped him to adopt correct stand. p. 49.

*Benedetti, Vincent (1817-1900)*—French diplomat, remembered chiefly for his rôle as ambassador in Berlin, in the events leading to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Published *Mu Mission en Prusse* (1871), *Essais diplomatiques* (Eng. tr., 1896). p. 53.

*Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, duc de (1585-1642)*—French prelate and statesman; commonly known as Cardinal

Richelieu; chief minister to Louis XIII in 1624, a position he retained until his death. At home he aimed to make the monarchy absolute and ruled as a virtual dictator. He was founder of French absolutism. He ruthlessly crushed the opposition by the nobility, and destroyed the political power of the Huguenots. He encouraged trade with India and Canada. Abroad he sought to establish the supremacy of France by breaking the power of the Habsburgs. Richelieu reformed the Sorbonne University and found the French Academy.

He participated in the Thirty Years War on the Protestant side from 1635. p. 59.

*Henry IV (Henry of Navarre, 1553-1610)*—Bourbon King of France. p. 59.

*Holstein*, former duchy of North Germany. In 1459 it passed by inheritance to Christian I of Denmark. p. 60.

*Vosges*—department of Eastern France, largely in Lorraine. p. 60.

*Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864)*

German petty bourgeois Socialist, publicist and lawyer, headed the General Association of German Workers (1863), supported the policy of unification of Germany "from above" under the hegemony of Prussia, originator of opportunism in German Social Democracy. p. 70.

*Soetbeer, Adolf Georg (1814-92)*—German economist and statistician. Secretary of Hamburg Commerz deputation, organized a bureau at Hamburg whose *Tabellarische Ubersichten des hamburgischen Handels* constitutes one of the earliest German publications of statistics of trade and prices. He was effective exponent of unified gold standard in general. His memorial of 1856, a draft of currency legislation is of great historical interest. He wrote several historical monographs on the subject in the 1860's. p. 76.

*Persian Wars (500-449 B.C.)* fought between the Greek city-states and the Persian empire. p. 87.

*American War of Independence (1775-83)*—struggle by which the thirteen colonies on Atlantic seaboard of North America won independence from Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris (1783). U.S. recognized as a nation. p. 95.

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN  
GERMAN HISTORY FROM 1858-1890

1858 (1861) — 1888 William I (b. 1796) who succeeded Frederick William IV as regent when the latter was adjudged insane, and then as king. The success of the Italians in 1859-60 against Austria aroused a storm of liberal and nationalist sentiment in Russia and all Germany.

1860-62—Workers' Educational Associations founded.

1862 *Sept.*—1890 *March*. Bismarck (Count 1866. Prince 1871), minister-president of Prussia, later Chancellor. Bismarck-Junker, avowed enemy of parliamentary institutions—had made a reputation for ultra-conservatism through his staunch advocacy of the king's cause in the United Landstag of 1847 and the assembly of 1848; had subsequently served as Prussian representative to the Frankfurt Diet (1851-59), ambassador to Russia (1859-62), ambassador to France (1862). He was already known for his strength and boldness, was detested by Liberals for his conservatism and for his insular Prussian outlook on the German problem, and was feared by the king for the audacity of his views. Bismarck was made minister without portfolio, then minister-president. He carried on constitutional struggle with the Landstag for four years.

1863, *Feb. 8*. At the time of the Polish insurrection against the Tsarist rule for complete independence Bismarck sent Count Alvensleben to assure the Tsar that he had Prussia's co-operation against the rebels; four Prussian corps (half the army) was despatched to the Polish frontier. This action made it possible for Russia to resist the attempted intervention by Austria, Britain, and France on behalf of the Poles; it was the Tsar's trust and friendship during the wars to German unification.

Agitation for the unification of "Germany" had revived rapidly after 1859. Austria and the South German states favoured reform of the Germanic Confederation. German Liberals generally favoured a parliamentary *Kleindeutschland* after the Frankfurt tradition of 1848. Bismarck had

learned at the Frankfurt Diet to distrust Austria, was convinced she must be extruded from Germany, preliminary to German union under the leadership and domination of Prussia.

*May 23 (1863)*—General German Workers' Union founded by Lassalle.

*1863, August.* A congress of princes, summoned by Emperor Francis Joseph I of Austria to reform Germanic Confederation, but really meant as a bait to German Liberalism miscarried when Bismarck induced King William to refuse to attend. Bismarck's next opportunity came in connection with the highly complicated Schleswig-Holstein question. A royal proclamation of Frederick VII of Denmark (1863, March 30) in substance announced the annexation to Denmark of the Duchy of Schleswig. This act was a breach of the London Protocol (1852) by which the powers guaranteed at once the inseparability of the duchies and their personal union with Denmark under the king, also of an engagement given by Denmark to Austria and Prussia (Dec. 1851) not to incorporate Schleswig or to treat it separately. Frederick's act also thrust a new charter on the Duchy of Holstein (which retained its independence), without consulting its representatives. This was to fly in the face of Germanic Confederation, of which Holstein was a member. Expectation of English and Swedish support was an important factor in shaping Danish policy during 1863 and early 1864. In July the Germanic Confederation demanded that the two duchies should be taken forcibly from Denmark and submitted to the rule of the German Duke of Augustenburg (son of the claimants to the succession). On Oct. 1 the Diet voted federal execution action against Denmark) and instructed Hanover and Saxony to furnish troops. Nov. 15. Frederick VII (i.e. and) died, who promptly signed a newly drafted constitution (of Nov. 13), not formally incorporating Schleswig, but clearly tending to that end.

*Dec. 24.* Federal troops entered Holstein. The Diet was still supporting the duke of Augustenburg, whose claims had been discarded by the London Protocol. Hence Bismarck could now separate Prussia from the action of the Diet and declare Prussia the upholder of the Protocol.

1864, Jan. 16. Austria joined Prussia in an alliance and the two powers agreed to send an ultimatum to Denmark demanding repeal of the constitution (otherwise they would invade), to settle the future course of the duchies only "by mutual agreement."

Feb. 1. Austrian and Prussian troops invaded Schleswig. Denmark quickly abandoned the defense of the *Dannewirke*. Germans began invasion of Denmark.

April-June. The London Conference, engineered by the British to save Denmark, miscarried, due to the cleverness of Bismarck and stubbornness of the Danes. War renewed, crushing defeat of the Danes, the surrender of the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia (definitive Peace of Vienna, Oct. 30).

After prolonged negotiations, Bismarck manouvered Austria, seriously embarrassed at home by political demand of the Hungarians Aug. 1865, into the *Convention of Gastein*. Joint sovereignty was to be maintained, but Austria was to administer Holstein. Prussia to administer in return Schleswig (Lauenburg going to Prussia in return for money payment to Austria). An impossible situation was created: Austrian Holstein became a virtual enclave in unfriendly Prussia. Under the skillful hand of Bismarck, Austro-Prussian relations rapidly worsened. Prussian relations with Austria were excellent.

1865, Oct. At Biarritz Bismarck and Napoleon III, and appears to have dropped vague hints of compensation for France in the Rhineland, in return for which he won a promise of French neutrality from the emperor, convinced that Austria would be victor in the coming war.

1866, April 8. Bismarck, aided by Napoleon, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy: Italy to join Prussia if war broke out between Austria and Prussia within three months, with Venetia as a reward.

April 9. Bismarck introduced a motion for federal reform into the Frankfurt Diet, evidently with the idea that Austria would reject it and precipitate a conflict. Both parties began to mobilise. Last minute effort to compromise (Gaben mission) proved fruitless.

June 6. The Austrian governor of Holstein summoned the Holstein Diet in order to discuss the future of the duchy. Bismarck denounced this as a violation of the

Gastin Convention and ordered Prussian troops into the duchy.

*June 12.* Austria, realizing that conflict was inevitable, signed a secret treaty with Napoleon III. In return for French neutrality, Austria promised to cede Venetia to Napoleon (who was to retrocede it to Italy), whether Austria won or lost the war. In the event of Austrian victory, Austria was to be free to make what changes she wished in Germany, but if these changes disturbed the European balance of power (as they were bound to do), Austria was to consult with Napoleon before making them. Verbally Austria agreed in this case not to oppose the erection of a neutral buffer state (client of France) along the Rhine.

*June 14.* On Austria's motion, the Frankfurt Diet voted federal execution against Prussia for violating federal (Holstein) territory. Most of the German states, including the larger ones like Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover, sided with Austria against Prussia. The Prussian government declared the federal constitution violated and the Confederation at an end. The war began.

*June-August.* The *Seven Weeks' War*.

*July 5.* Napoleon offered mediation, which Bismarck accepted only on condition that the terms of peace should be determined before an armistice was concluded. Napoleon—ill, his will crippled, unwilling to envisage the use of force—yielded; accepted Prussian terms imposed in the *Preliminary Peace at Nikolsburg* 26 July. Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, Frankfurt were to be incorporated in Prussia; Austria was to be excluded from Germany (the Germanic Confederation came to an end); German states north of the Main River were to form a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership; the South German states were to remain independent and to be permitted to form a separate confederation. King Wilhelm insisted on taking Austrian Silesia, territory from the South German states and Saxony. Bismarck had seen the importance of not provoking Napoleon for the moment, of not alienating Prussia's potential allies for the future. He resisted and won the point.

*Aug. 16.* Napoleon instructed his ambassador Count Vincent Benedetti, to ask for Luxemburg and for Prussia



support for the acquisition of Belgium by France. Benedetti was induced by Bismarck to put these demands in writing, along with the French offer to sanction the union of North and South Germany in return (the *Benedetti Treaty*). Bismarck then took advantage of illness (Sept.-Dec.) to evade a definite reply. The draft treaty was communicated to the English in 1870 and influenced British opinion in favour of Prussia during the war with France.

*Aug. 9-22.* Bismarck took advantage of the French demands to push his peace negotiations with the South German states (Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria). They were let off on very generous terms, but were induced, in return, to conclude with Prussia military alliances for the event of French attack.

*Aug. 23.* The *Definitive Treaty of Prague* brought the war to a close.

*Sept. 8.* *Bill of Indemnity*, by which Bismarck concluded the struggle with the Prussian parliament. An election during the war has strengthened the Conservatives at the expense of the Liberals. Many of the latter had come over to Bismarck in view of the fact that he was accomplishing their programme of national unification. The bill of indemnity gave retrospective assent to previous expenditures of the government without the consent of the Landstag. It caused an important split in the ranks of liberalism, the majority of the Liberals rallying to Bismarck as the new National Liberal Party.

*1867.* *The North German Confederation*, formed through treaties between Prussia and other states north of the river Main. The constitution was primarily the work of Bismarck himself. The new confederation was one in which the component states retained their own governments, but in which the military forces were controlled by the federal government (the King of Prussia, commander-in-chief). The Presidency (*praesidium*) was held by the King of Prussia, represented by the Chancellor (Bismarck), responsible to him alone. The federal council (Bundesrat) was composed of instructed delegates of federating states, among whom 43 votes were divided, Prussia having 17 and unofficially controlling the votes of several small North German states. The *Bundesrat* had constituent powers, but a two-thirds vote was required for constitutional changes.

The lower house (*Reichstag*) shared equally with the *Bundesrat* in legislation. It was composed of deputies elected from single-member constituencies on the basis of universal suffrage. Bismarck thus achieved predominance of Prussia in the new state, and the maintenance of royal power against the Liberal demands for responsible government.

*1867, April. The Luxemburg crisis.* This grew out of Napoleon's efforts (winter 1866-67) to acquire the Duchy of Luxemburg from the King of the Netherlands, who was suzerain. Bismarck had promised not to oppose the deal, provided it were so engineered that the German national feeling should not be aroused. The French mismanaged the affair, the news leaked out, Bismarck was interpellated in the new North German *Reichstag*, and the king of the Netherlands drew back from the arrangements he had made. There followed a period of acute crisis, which was closed by a compromise.

*May 7-11. An International Conference at London,* which finally signed the *Treaty of London* (Sept. 9): Prussia abandoned her previous right to garrison the fortress of the town of Luxemburg. The duchy ceased to be a member of the Germanic Confederation. Its neutrality and independence were guaranteed by the powers. This settlement was a profound humiliation for Napoleon, who henceforth looked upon a final reckoning with Prussia as inevitable, reorganised his army and initiated negotiations for an alliance with Austria and Italy.

*July 8.* Bismarck brought the four South German states into the *Zollverein* and established a *Zollparlament* (customs parliament) consisting of the North German *Reichstag* plus representatives of South German states. This was effectively a parliament of all Germany, though still empowered to deal only with customs questions. In South Germany there was still much opposition to union with Prussia, due to cultural and religious differences and general suspicion, as well as attachment to states' rights. It became increasingly evident to Bismarck that only war with France and the sceptre of French domination in the Rhineland would drive South German states into the union. War he regarded as inevitable, convinced as he was that France would not peaceably permit the inclusion of the South

German states in the confederation. The sudden appearance of the greatly strengthened neighbour alarmed the French and led to the demand of revenge for Sadowa.

*1868-70.* The Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne after Spanish revolution (Sept. 1868) and the expulsion of Queen Isabella, provisional government of Marshall Serano and General Prim made attempts to secure one of the Portuguese coburgs or one of the Italian princes as king. From the beginning there had been talk of offering throne to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, distant relative of both King William of Prussia and of Napoleon III. Hohenzollern candidacy taken up by Bismarck. Leopold refused to accept unless ordered by the king, but William refused to take an active part.

*1870, June 19.* Leopold induced to change decision and accept offer. King William gave grudging consent, on condition 'that Leopold should be elected by a substantial vote of the Spanish Córtes.

*July 2.* Through misunderstanding Spanish Córtes adjourned before a vote was taken. Secret leaked out and led to a wave of consternation in France, fanned by the French foreign minister, Duke of Gramont.

*July 6.* Gramont's speech in French Chamber indicating war unless Prussian government withdrew candidacy.

*July 9, 11.* French ambassador Benedetti, followed King William to Ems, asked he order Leopold to withdraw. William refused, but sent a secret emissary to advise Leopold to that effect.

*July 12.* Prince Charles Anthony, father of Leopold, withdrew the candidature in behalf of his son, who was absent in the Alps. Not content with this, Gramont and the French government demanded satisfaction and guarantees from King Wilhelm that he was to write to Napoleon a letter of apology, officially disavow the candidature, and promise that it would not be renewed in future.

*July 13.* Wilhelm, at an interview at Ems, rejected Benedetti's demands and repulsed all his efforts to continue discussion. Bismarck on receiving report of happening at Ems, he revised it for publication, giving it a bursque quality and conveying the impression that the negotiations at Ems had come to an end in what was tantamount to the rupture of relations.

July 15. France decided for war on the preparedness of the army and on the support of Austria and Italy.

July 19. France declared war on Prussia.

1870-71. *The Franco-German War.* Bismarck had the armed support of South German states and the neutrality of Russia.

Three German armies invaded France. A French army advanced into the Saar, won a minor victory at Saarbrücken. Then the German avalanche began.

1871, Jan. 18. *Foundation of the German Empire.* During the war German public opinion in favour of union of North and South Germany. Bismarck's negotiations, making essential concessions. By end of November treaties signed with all the German states. On December 2, William yielded.

1871, Jan. 18. *William I proclaimed German Emperor* in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The new German constitution adopted on April 14 by a newly elected *Reichstag*. The new *Reich* consisted of 25 states—four kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg); five grand duchies; thirteen duchies and principalities; three free cities (Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck). Alsace-Lorraine (annexed from France), common property of all German states.

28 May, 1871—August Bebel, after the defeat of the Paris Commune, warned Bismarck that within a few decades the battle cry of Parisian proletariat—war to the palaces, peace to the cottages, death to poverty and unemployment—would be the battle cry of the working class of Europe.

1871-83. *The Kulturkampf.* As Chancellor of German Empire, Bismarck's first struggle was with the Catholic Church in the *Kulturkampf* (from words used by Rudolf Virchow in the Prussian Diet on 17 January, 1873) "The contest has taken on the character of a so-called great cultural struggle (*Kulturkampf*)."  
Conflict grew of the coincident expansion of papal pretensions of German power: promulgation of the dogma of papal fallibility. (July 18, 1870)—this was that the Pope, when speaking *ex-cathedra*, possesses infallibility in decisions regarding faith or morals, in virtue of his supreme apostolic power. This dogma attempted to exalt papacy above Christian states and to extend "faith and morals" to the

political domain. In Germany it wanted to subordinate all groups to its sovereign power.

*July 8, 1871.* Roman Catholic department for spiritual affairs abolished (recognised by the constitution of 1850). "Have no fear—to Canossa we shall not go, either in body or spirit" declared Bismarck to the *Reichstag* (14 May, 1872).

*1872*—Bebel and Liebknecht elected to *Reichstag* and they were each promptly sent to prison for two years. Yet in spite of the ferocious laws of repression and a constant harassing of socialist organisation and punishment of its members, there were 56 socialists in *Reichstag* in 1898, the year Bismarck died and was buried with an unostentatious village funeral in Pomerania.

*1872, June 25.* By an imperial law Jesuits expelled from Germany; their organisation dissolved.

*1873, May.* Adalbert Falk, Prussian minister of public worship, ordered: (1) imposition of penalties by servants of the Church in matters not pertaining to religion to be punishable offence; (2) education of the clergy to be under state supervision and government to have the right to veto all clerical appointments; (3) people to have the right to secede from the church who wished to leave it; (4) subjecting ecclesiastical discipline in the Catholic clergy to state control.

*7 May, 1874*—A single Press Law for the whole *Reich*. Legal system of *Reich* unified. Laws on banking and regulation on industrial disputes.

*1875, Feb. 6.* Civil marriage made obligatory for the empire.

*April 6.* Prussian Diet enacted Breadbasket Bill, suspending all grants in aid to the Church in sees whose clergy refused obedience to Prussian government.

*May 8.* Religious orders and congregations, with the exception of those engaged in nursing the sick, dissolved.

*May.* The war scare, acute crisis in the relations of Germany and France.

*May.* In February 1875 Prussian statesman von Radowitz's mission to St. Petersburg reflected Bismarck's anxiety to hold Russia, in view of Franco-German tension. "Is war in sight?" article in *Berliner Post* referred to new French army law and concluded that war was in sight.

Panic in France. French foreign minister Duc Decazes appealed to England and Russia for support, to discredit Bismarck.

*May 10.* Tsar Alexander and Russian Chancellor Gorchakov visit Berlin. Warning of Gorchakov and British Ambassador Lord Odo Russell led to acrimonious discussion between Bismarck and Gorchakov. France felt strengthened.

*May, 22-27* In Gotha Congress the then two existing German Workers' Organizations—the Social-Democratic Workers' Party (the so-called Eisenachers) led by Liebknecht and Bebel, and the Lassallean organization headed by Hansclever and Tölcke (the General Association of German Workers)—combined to form a single party, the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. Bismarck was enemy of both the above parties.

*1876, Jan.* German imperial bank (*Reichbank*) opened.

*1876*—Association of Tax and Economic Reformers. The Union of German Iron Foundries. The Union of German Iron and Steel Manufacturers. Central Association of German Industrialists.

*11 May, 1878*—Hödel, a half-crazed apprentice plumber with anarchist leanings, fired two shots at the emperor. There was no vestige of justification in fact for Bismarck's raising alarm about a Socialist conspiracy against the state. All his life Bismarck had been haunted by the spectre of revolution. Socialism evoked memories of 1848 and arouse mortal fears and prejudices in him. On the evening of the attack on the emperor, before anything was known about Hödel's circumstances, Bismarck had telegraphed to the secretary of state for forcing affairs from Friedrichruh (where he was on leave); "should we not take occasion from the attempt to propose a bill immediately against the Socialists and their press."

*May 24*—Bill drafted and introduced but rejected, only the two conservative parties voting for it.

*June 2*—Second attempt on emperor's life by Dr. Karl Nobling afforded a second opportunity to raise alarm. Social Democrats had no more planned this incident than the earlier one. Bismarck effectively excited public opinion against the entire left. Bismarck persuaded emperor to dissolve the

*Reichstag* and ordered an election to bring down the Liberal and Socialist representatives to allow a fresh anti-Socialist bill to pass.

June 11—*Reichstag* dissolved.

June 13—July 13. The *Congress of Berlin*, Russia, Britain, Austria, France, Italy and Turkey participated. Bulgaria divided into three parts. Austria given Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Greeks put off with promises for the future. Rumania given Dobrudja, but to hand over southern Bessarabia to Russia. Russia got Batum, Kars, and Ardahan. British occupied Cyprus. France permitted to occupy Tunis. Italians put off with suggestion of expansion in Albania.

July 30. In *Reichstag* elections the conservatives made substantial gains at the expense of National Liberals.

July 30—Elections began; new *Reichstag* not summoned to meet till 9 Sept., by which date the interest in foreign affairs prompted by the Congress of Berlin would have dropped. Two Conservative parties now had 116 votes. (instead of 78); the Centre 94; the Liberal three parties 99, 10 and 26 (instead of 128, 13 and 35); the Social Democrats dropped from 12 to 9. For the first time Conservatives and Centre strong enough to defeat all Liberals and Social Democrats.

17 Sept., 1878—Bismarck introduced fresh anti-socialist bill which was passed on 21 Oct. It remained in force until 31 March, 1881 but was renewed four times. It lapsed on 30 Sept. 1890, when William II refused to renew it.

Oct. 19. *Anti-Socialist Law* passed. It was renewed at intervals until 1890. Electoral campaign waged on the question of repressing socialism, though neither of the would-be assassins of the emperor was a socialist. This law banned meetings, publications, and collections of money which by "means of social democratic, socialistic or communistic designs, aim at the overthrow of the existing order of state or society." Rigorous measures were provided for its execution. In the next 12 years socialism driven underground.

1878-79. Negotiations with papacy for the cessation of *Kulturkampf*. By this time half the bishops of Germany displaced and many fled abroad. Hundreds of clerics removed and many imprisoned, yet fight went on. In 1878:

pope Pious IX died and was succeeded by Leo XIII, who at once opened negotiations with German government.

1879, June 30. Resignation of Falk, minister officially connected with the policy. Bismarck who required the support of the Centre Party for his tariff programme began to introduce ameliorative measures on his own initiative. By 1883 *Kulturkampf* came to an end.

July 12. New protective Tariff Law. Free trade came to an end. German industry hard hit by the financial crisis of 1873 and causing depression, as well as the crisis in agriculture produced by foreign competition. Both industrialists and landowning classes against free trade. New tariff gave protection to industrialists and landowning classes. Bismarck got back the support of Conservatives, Catholic Centre Party and part of the National Liberals, too supported government. National Liberal Party split for the second time, dissidents joining the Progressive Party.

In the decade following the introduction of protection, German industry made great development. Possessed vast supplies of coal and large deposits of iron ore, Germany met competitors. Railway mileage and merchant marine grew. Foreign trade grew with great rapidity, social composition changed much. Urbanization equally striking.

1879, Oct 7. Signature of alliance between Germany and Austria, the foundation of the Brimarckian alliance system. If either party attacked by Russia, the other should come in force to its assistance. If either attacked by some other power, the other should preserve at least neutrality. If some other power supported Russia, then each ally obliged to aid the other. This alliance was the result of a period of tension between Germany and Russia following the Berlin Congress.

1881, June 18. The Conclusion of the Three Emperors' League (Germany, Austria, and Russia). Term 3 years, renewed in 1884 for 3 more years. Provisions: If one of the above powers found itself at war with a fourth (except Turkey), the other two were to maintain friendly neutrality.

The five principles of the secret *Driekaiserbund* signed. They were: (I) the commitment to benevolent neutrality, while reserving the right to give more



active assistance, in the event of war between any of the partners with a fourth state, provided that Turkey were that state a preliminary agreement should be made; (II) the safeguarding of Russia's interest against Britain by a reaffirmation of the rule of the closure of Straits, interpreted as an obligation of Europe to Turkey with the intent that if Britain or any other power broke it, Russia might claim to be released; (III) the safeguarding of Russia's interests in Bulgaria and Austria's in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the principle of reserving action for the future with the intent (in Bismarck's mind) that deferred payment might keep each dependent on Germany; (IV) the solidity of the three monarchs against Socialism; (V) the harmonising of the foreign policies of the three signatories.

1882, *May 20*. Conclusion of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy) for 5 years and renewed at intervals until 1915. Terms: If Italy attacked by France without provocation, Germany and Austria to come to her aid; Italy to come to Germany's aid if latter were attacked by France, if one or two of the above were attacked by or involved in war with two or more great powers, non-attacked member or members to come to the aid of the other or others; if one of allies should be forced to make war on some other great power, others to preserve benevolent neutrality.

1883, *May*. *Sickness Insurance Law, Accident Insurance Law, (1884) Old Age and Invalidation Insurance Law (May, 1889)*, of which costs were divided between the employers and workers, with state contributions to pensions.

These laws never allowed to foster self-reliance or independence of working class, and a sense of this fact, and an increasing resentment at the inequalities of the expanding capitalist system, helped the socialist movement to grow enormously in Germany throughout the period.

1883—85. *Foundation of the German Colonial Empire. Feb.-April*. Establishment of Germans, under Lüderitz, at Angra Pequena (Southwest Africa), marking beginning of German colonial empire (growing agitation from 1875 onward German Colonial Society, 1882) and Bismarck's conversion to imperialism. Opposition by Britain, but German Government took Angra Pequena under its protection (Apr. 24). Two years of growing ten-

sion between England and Germany, dispute extending to East African territory, the Cameroons, etc. Bismarck managed to establish a loose entente with France, especially in the question of Egypt and thereby to oblige Britain to accept Germany as a colonial power.

Between 1870 and 1900 British empire acquired nearly five million square miles of territory and eighty-eight million new inhabitants. France, in rather less time, three and a half million sq. miles and 36 million inhabitants; Germany one million sq. miles and 17 million inhabitants; and Belgium tried to swallow Congo, 77 times its own size.

Oct. 30. Alliance of Rumania and Austria to which Germany adhered.

1883, 15 June—Sickness insurance.

1884 January—*Kölonial Zeitung* (journal).

6 July, 1884—Accident insurance.

15 October, 1884—Definitive proclamation of German Protectorates in Africa.

1886, Dec.—1887, March. Parliamentary conflict over an army bill, Liberal parties making an effort to secure control over appropriations. After elections, government through intervention of Pope, secured the support of Centre Party and won.

1887, Jan. Policy speech by Bismarck, warning Germans against war, redefining German attitude, and advocating large increase in German army.

Feb. 12. *First Mediterranean Agreement*, between England and Italy, adhered to by Austria and Spain. Germany too acceded. Bismarck had encouraged the combination, exploiting acute Anglo-French tension (over occupation of Egypt by Britain) and the Italian-French tension (tariff war, etc.). Provision of maintenance of status quo in Mediterranean, including Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Sea.

April 20. Arrest of Schnaebelé, a French frontier official who was condemned by a German court for espionage. This affair led to great popular excitement.

1887, April. *The Schnaebelé affair*, marking height of tension between France and Germany and European affairs generally. Renewal of Triple Alliance, conclusion of *Reinsurance Treaty* with Russia, formation of Mediterranean Coalition.

1888, *March 9—June 15* Frederick III (b. 1831) succeeded on death of William I. He too died of cancer.

1888—1918. *William II* (1859-1918), the young emperor impulsive and headstrong, soon evinced desire to rule the state himself showed sympathy for workers.

1889, *June 22*—Pension (Old-age and invalidity Insurance Law).

1890, *Jan.* After two readings of a bill to prolong the anti-socialist law it was rumoured that emperor has changed his mind and favoured a policy of mildness. The bill was lost, but it opened a rift between emperor and chancellor, which widened when emperor proposed (Feb.) an international conference on labour questions, opposed by Bismarck as a further weak concession to socialists. Emperor wished to set aside the right of chancellor to be present at interviews of the emperor and ministers. On the Russo-German policy the two differed basically. Fundamental question was who should rule the empire—the emperor or Bismarck? After further irritating incidents, Bismarck was ordered to “ask permission to resign”, but refused.

*March 18.* Resignation of Bismarck, on imperial command. He was made Duke of Lauenburg, but unceremoniously “ejected” from the chancery palace.

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#### POPULATION OF GERMANY

		<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>
1871	— 41,059,000	63.9	36.1
1880	— 45,234,000	58.6	41.4
1890	— 49,428,000	57.5	42.5

#### INDUSTRIAL GROWTH OF GERMANY

(*Production in million tons*)

	1870	1880	1890	1900
Coal	34	59	89	149
Iron	1.3	2.5	4.6	7.5
Steel	.3	.7	2.3	6.7

In steel industry Germany passed Britain by 1900. Machine making and engineering, chemical and textile

industries and ship-building shared in the general expansion, while electrical generating and making of electrical apparatus appeared as new industries. Owing to concentration and mechanisation, textile industry was able to increase its production 14-fold between 1878 and 1900 without increasing the number of workers employed. Chemical and electrical industries had leading positions in Europe.

German industry was more and more geared to export. Expansion and concentration upon export was accompanied by phenomenal increase in the size of businesses.

There was much cartelisation, both horizontally and vertically. There were 4 cartels in 1865, 70 in 1887, 117 in 1890.

#### ERRATA

- p. 15 line 1 German for Germany.
- p. 22 line 15 *Von der Maas* for *Van der Mass*.
- p. 46 f. n. 45 last line *Bismarck* for *Mismarck*.
- p. 63 line 1 fortresses for foreresses.

- Absolutism, 98  
 Adriatic, 27  
 Aegina, 87  
 Agricultural labourers, 69  
 Alexander, 45, 57  
 Alsace, 51, 52, 58-61, 63, 65, 66  
     — bourgeois, 64  
     — and Lorraine, 64  
 American businessmen, 20  
     — Revolution, 95  
     — War of Independence, 95  
 Americans, 98  
 Anglophobia, 9  
 Anti-Dühring, 1, 8  
 Anti-Socialist, 13  
 Arabs, 94  
 Asia, 104  
 Assessors' Courts, 78  
 Australia, 19, 68, 105  
 Austria(n), 3, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27,  
     28, 30, 32, 34, 39, 41, 42, 43,  
     44, 47, 48, 55, 60, 63, 81  
     — influence, 33  
     — soldiers, 30  
     — tariff barrier, 31  
  
 Baden, 48  
 Baltic, 22  
 Baroness von Droste-Fischering, 35  
 Bavaria, 46, 76  
 Bebel, 8, 10, 12, 49  
 Belgium, 51, 59, 62  
 Benedetti, 53  
 Berlin, 19, 33, 35, 39, 53, 58, 65  
 Bernstein, Eduard, 1  
 Bismarck, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13,  
     14, 29, 38-48, 50-52, 54-59, 63-64,  
     66, 71-73, 75, 80  
     — Kartel, 65  
     — revolution, 68  
     — (ian) dictatorship, 66  
 Bleichröder, 41, 46  
 Blood and Iron, 17  
 Bohemia, 47, 48  
 Bonapartist, 28, 70  
  
 Bondmen, 103  
 Bourgeoisie, ruling, 87  
 Bruck, 3  
 Bulgarian Crisis, 14  
 Bundesrat, 73, 76  
 Bürgermeister Tschech, 35  
 Burghers, 91  
  
 California, 19, 68  
 Comphausens, 35  
 Cannibalism, 110  
 Capital, 89  
 Carbonari, 25  
 Catholic, 30  
     — Centre Party, 74, 81  
     — Great Power, 31  
     — Poles, 82  
 Cavours, 29  
 Celts, 89  
     — of Brittany, 61  
 Celtic clan, 107  
 Champs Élysées, 58  
 Chinese Wall, 30  
 Coblenz, 62  
 Cologne, 28  
 Commune, 66, 88  
 Communism, 35  
 Communist Manifesto, 106  
 Confederation of the Rhine, 28  
 Congress of Vienna, 17  
 Constantinople, 64  
 Constitution of the North German  
     Confederation, 49  
 Constitutional South, 35  
 Corinth, 87  
 Corsica, 61  
 Corvée, 102  
 Count Walderssee's memoirs, 37  
 Credit Mobilier, 28  
 Crimean War, 24, 25, 26, 99  
 Crusoe, (Robinson), 85, 86, 87, 93  
 Currency Laws (of 1873-75), 76  
 Customs Union, 33, 50  
  
 Danes, 43

- Danisation in Schleswig, 38  
 Danubian Principalities, 24  
 Democratic Party, 71  
 Denmark, 37, 38, 44, 55  
 Dialectics, 98  
 Dialectical laws of motion, 101  
 District Government Act, 79  
 Division of labour, 107, 109  
 Domination of man (by man), 102  
 Domination of nature (by man), 102  
 Don Quixotes, 72  
 Dühring, 2, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 98-106, 110-112  
 Duke of Augustenburg, 43  
     — Luxemburg, 52  
 Dunkirk, 61  
  
 Economic dependence, 86  
     — domination over man, 102  
     — domination over things, 102  
 Elbe, 67, 105  
 Elector (Frederick William), 40  
 Emperor, William I, 58  
     — of the French, 26  
 Engels, 1-3, 5-9, 11-15  
 England, 22, 24, 65, 91, 105  
     — monopoly of ship construction, 100  
 English, 19, 20, 65, 108  
     — cotton industry, 88  
     — Law, 77, 104  
 Erfurt programme, 11  
 Europe, 14, 18, 24, 35, 42, 53, 54, 57, 63, 66, 97, 104, 108  
 European bourgeoisie, 25  
  
 Fatherland, 21  
 Federal Constitution, 46  
     — Diet, 23, 46  
 Financial aristocracy, 28  
 Firearms, 94  
 Flanders, 104  
 Flemish, 61  
 Foot soldiers, 95  
 Force, 86, 88, 89, 90, 93, 112  
     — direct, 101  
     — Naval political, 100  
     — political, 111  
 Fould, 41  
  
 France, 14, 18, 22, 23, 26, 28, 35, 37, 41, 48, 52, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 91, 96  
 Francis II, 30  
 Franco-German War, 97  
 Franco-Prussian War, 96  
 Francophobes, 56  
 Franks-Tireurs, 57  
 Frankfurt, 31  
 Frankish dialect, 52  
 Frederick, 32  
 Frederick II, 22, 31, 40, 95  
 Frederick William III, 37  
 Frederick William IV, 111  
 Frederick VII, King of Denmark, 42  
 French, 43, 93, 98  
 French Ambassador Beaurau, 32  
     — Chairman, 23  
 French-Comté, 59  
 French Empire, 27  
     — Law, 78  
     — Revolution, 29, 50, 62, 72, 95, 96  
     — Satellite, 25  
 Friesland, 104  
  
 Garibaldi, 27  
 Gaul, 59  
 General Klapka, 46  
 German(s), 19, 31, 62, 89, 97  
 German bourgeoisie, 4, 8, 34, 39, 41, 43, 44, 48  
     — business, 39  
     — businessmen, 20, 22  
     — chauvins, 62  
     — Civil Code, 19  
     — Confederation, 45, 50  
     — Customs Union, 3  
     — Democratic Republic, 2  
     — Emperor, 31  
     — Empire, 60, 63, 66, 77  
     — envoys, 21  
     — history, 17  
     — industry, 14, 20  
     — industry and commerce, Law, 77, 103, 104  
 German-Lorraine, 52  
 German Luxemburg, 52  
     — Marks, 107  
     — philistines, 65

- German philistinism, 69  
   — princes, 23, 30, 47  
   — proletariat, 7  
   — Republic, 29  
   — revolution, 29  
   — Savoyards, 29  
   — Unity, 22  
   — Vocation, 32, 33  
   — Workers, 7  
   — Working class, 6  
 Germany, 9, 11, 17, 18, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 32, 38-41, 45, 48, 62, 64, 69, 72, 73, 81, 105, 112  
 Gervinus, 33  
 Goethe, 64  
 Goulds, Jay, 39  
 Great Napoleon, 27  
   — Power, 34  
 Greece, 106, 109  
 Grecian culture, 108  
 Greek art and science, 108  
 Greek tribe, 107  
 Greeks, 110  
 Gribcauval, 96  
  
 Hambach Festival, 21  
 Hanover, 32  
 Hansemanns, 35  
 Häusser, 33  
 Hegelians, 33  
 Hellenism, 108, 110  
 Henry IV, 59  
 Herr von Sybel, 43  
 Hesse, 46  
 Hessen-Damstadt, 33, 48  
 High-German, 52  
 Hochwald, 89  
 Hohenstaufen Imperialism, 21  
 Hohenzollerns, 29  
 Holland, 51  
 Holstein, 60  
 House of Junkers, 80  
 Hungary, 17, 26  
 Hungarian, 31  
   — Legion, 46  
   — Revolution, 46  
 Ideologists of the bourgeoisie, 33  
 Imperial Chancellor, 75  
   — Ministers, 75  
 India, 104, 107, 109  
 Indian Punjab, 89  
  
 Industry, large scale, 112  
 Italy, 26, 27, 99, 104  
 Italian, 31  
   — bourgeoisie, 33  
   — revolution, 44  
   — War, 27, 43  
  
 Jesuitical order, 31  
 Joseph II, 30  
 Junker(s), 5, 8, 12, 14, 32, 40, 57, 63, 72, 76, 79  
   — bureaucratic Ministry, 36  
 Jutland, 42  
  
 Kaiser, 31  
 King of Holland, William III, 52  
 King of Prussia, 47, 49  
 Kleinstaaterci, 50  
 Kölnische Zeitung, 57  
 Königgrätz, 49  
  
 Landwehr, 34, 55  
 Large landowners, 106  
 Large-scale industry, 10, 27, 72  
 Lassaleans, 70  
 Latifundia, 104  
 Leopold, 54  
 Levant, 20  
 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 7, 12, 14, 49  
 Little-German Empire, 56  
 Lombardy, 63  
 London, 43, 48  
 London Conference, 53  
 Lorraine, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66  
 Louis XIV, 59, 66  
   — Bonaparte, 24  
   — Napoleon, 3, 4, 23, 25, 26-29, 39-42, 44-47, 51-56, 62, 66  
 Low countries, 51  
 Lower Saxony, 104  
 Lumpen proletariat, 67  
 Luxemburg, 48, 51, 53, 62  
   — Emperors, 51  
 Lyngby, 42  
  
 Maas, 22  
 Main, 51  
 Mainz, 47  
 Manchester Stock Exchange, 65  
 Manors of the Middle Ages, 106  
 Manteuffel, 36, 75  
 March Days in Vienna, 35

- Marseillaise, 61, 62  
 Marx, 5, 9, 63, 89  
 Marx's Capital, 70  
 Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, 1  
 Material means, 93  
 Maurer, 103  
 Mauser, rifles, 92  
 Mehring, Franz, 9  
 Memel, 22  
 Metternich, 30, 53  
 Metz, 58, 62  
 Mexico, 44  
 Middle Ages, 17, 77, 91  
 Mildes, 35  
 Militarism, 97  
 Mincio, 27  
 Money, 93  
 Moors, 111  
 Moorish Spain, 111  
 Morny, 40  
 Moselle, 89  
 Mulhouse, 65  
 Musspreussen, 81  
 Muzzle-loader, 96  
  
 N. C. O., 99  
 Naples, 27  
 Napoleon, 17, 22, 32, 47, 77, 96  
 Napoleonic Empire, 23  
     — War(s), 30, 64  
 National Guard, 58  
     — Liberals, 70, 76, 78  
 Nationalverein, 38, 41  
 Neue Zeit, 1  
 New Era, 36  
 New York Stock Exchange, 39  
 New Zealand, 105  
 Nice, 27, 45, 62  
 Nobility, 91  
 Nobles, 104  
 North America, 105  
 North German Confederation, 45,  
     48, 51, 73  
 North German Constitution, 74  
 Nuremburg, 59  
  
 Officer Corps, 40  
 Orient, 104  
 Oriental despot, 89, 107  
     — despotism, 109  
 Original Sin, 112  
  
 Palmerston, 42  
 Papal, 31  
     — infallibility, 81  
 Paris, 35, 54, 57, 58, 66, 95  
     — Peace Congress, 27  
 Peace of Basle (in 1795), 28, 30  
     — Vienna (in 1735), 60  
 Peasant farming, 104  
 Persia, 107  
 Persian Wars, 87  
 Petty bourgeoisie, 28, 69  
 Piedmont, 33  
 Pliny, 104  
 Poland, 17, 31  
 Police State, 77  
 Polish uprising, 44  
 Political force, 2  
 Poor Law, 19  
 Pope, 55  
 Prince Heinrich LXXII, 104  
     — Leopold von Hol-  
     zollern, 54  
     — Regent, 36  
 Production, bourgeois, 91  
 Productivity of human labour,  
 Progressive Party, 70  
 Proletariat, ruled, 87  
 Property, 90  
 Protestants, 31  
 Protestant Hanoverians, 82  
 Protocols of Warsaw, 43  
 Prussia, 7, 10, 12, 26, 27, 28,  
     32, 34-38, 42-44, 47-48, 51-52,  
     59, 62, 96  
 Prussian arrogance, 65  
     — aspirations, 41  
     — bourgeoisie, 34  
     — businessman, 20  
     — Chamber, 38  
     — Code, 78  
     — Constitution, 40, 49  
     — Diet, 81  
     — hegemony, 34  
     — Junker, 56, 67  
     — Landrat, 65  
     — Landräte, 79  
     — leadership, 36  
     — Parliament, 41  
     — state, 33, 36  
 Prussian-German Empire, 50  
 Prussianism, 9



- Racine, 64  
 Realpolitik, 31  
 Red Bogy, 70  
 Regency, 36  
 Regensburg Diet, 23  
 Reichstag, 8  
 Reuss-Greiz-Schleitz-Lobenstein-Eberswalde, 104  
 Revolution bourgeois, 91  
   — in Russia, 31  
   — of 1848, 18  
 Rhenish-Bavaria, 47  
   — Hessen, 47  
 Rhine, 23, 28, 53, 55, 59, 61, 64, 104  
 Rhineland, 19 28, 35, 68  
 Richelieu, 59  
 Rome, 55, 87  
 Rottecks, 35  
 Russia, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 55, 57, 63, 64, 78, 109  
   — and France, 32  
 Russian Tsar  
   — (Alexander I), 17  
   — (Nicholas I), 18  
 Saarbrücken, 48  
 Saarlouis, 48  
 Sadowa, 51, 54  
 Sardinia, 25  
 Satrap, 107  
 Savoy, 27, 45  
 Saxony, 19, 33, 48  
 Schleswig-Holstein, 42  
 Schlosser, 33  
 Schwarzenberg, 3  
 Scotland, 105  
 Second Empire, 29  
   — German Empire, 1  
 Sedan, 55  
 Serfs, 106  
 Silesia, 19, 22, 67  
 Slaves, 109  
 Slave-labour, 87, 102, 109  
 Slavery, 2, 87, 108  
 Small-scale manufacture, 27  
 Social Democrats, 63, 69, 82  
 Socialism, 35  
 Socialist law, 80  
 Socialist Party, 80  
 Soetbeer, 76  
 South German bourgeoisie, 49  
   — Princes, 29  
 Sozial-demokrat, 36  
 Spanish throne, 54  
 St. Privat, 97  
 Steam engines, 112  
 Stöcker, 78  
 Strassburg, 58, 59, 62  
 Styria, 22  
 Supreme Court, 78  
 Switzerland, 62  
 The Workers, 69  
 Theirs, 66  
 Thirty Years War, 59, 112  
 Thuringia, 9  
 Tribal chiefs, 104  
 Tsar, 63, 112  
 Tsar (Alexander II), 42  
   — Nicholas, 23  
   — of Russia, 45  
 Turkey, 24, 104  
 Tyrol, 22  
 Ultramontanism, 81  
 United States of America, 88  
 University professors, 104  
 Vanderbilts, 39  
 Venetia, 27  
 Versailles, 66  
 Vienna Congress, 22  
 Volkspartei, 7  
 Vollmar, 12  
 Von Thile, 54  
 Vosges, 60, 62  
 Wage-labour, 102  
 Welkers, 35  
 Wellington, 57  
 Western Europe, 24, 94  
   — Powers, 25  
 Westphalia, 32  
 William I, 4  
 Working class, 35, 69  
   — peasants, 27  
 Wörth, 55  
 Württemberg, 48, 76  
 Yankees, 98  
 Zentrum, 74, 81, 82  
 Zollverein, 33

