

KARNATAK UNIVERSITY



Extension Lectures Series : 10

ŚANKARA'S ADVAITA

BY

R. D. KARMARKAR

**181.482
K 146 S**

D H A R W A R

For Favour of Exchange

DATA ENTERED

CATALOGUED

ŚĀṆKARA'S ADVAITA

BY

R. D. KARMARKAR

(Ex-Principal, Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona,
Ex-Director, Post-Graduate and Research Department,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.)



KARNATAK UNIVERSITY
DHARWAR

Publisher:


S. S. WODEYAR, M.A., LL.B.,
Registrar, Karnatak University,
DHARWAR. (Mysore State)



Karnatak University, Dharwar

OCTOBER 1966

COPIES : 1000



181.482
K146 S

Price : Rupees 3—00 (Indian)
\$ 1 or Shillings 7 (Foreign)



Library IAS, Shimla



00037891

Printer:

A. R. SHEVADE,
Adarsha Printery,
Fort, Hubli.

ŚĀṄKARA'S ADVAITA

P R E F A C E

Prin. R. D. Karmarkar of Poona delivered a course of three Extension Lectures in December 1964 at this University on the subject of Śaṅkara's thought. Those who attended the lectures felt that they were marked by a singular clarity and precision of a mature teacher-scholar. While we are glad that they are now being published in book-form, our hearts are heavy with sorrow in that it is a posthumous publication.

All the fundamental concepts in Śaṅkara's **Advaita** are illuminatingly brought out by the learned author and the role of Analogy in **Advaita** philosophy is well indicated in Appendix I. Appendix II gives in brief an idea of Śaṅkara's date, life and works. Taken as a whole, these lectures may well serve the purpose of an authoritative introduction to the seminal thought of Śaṅkarācārya to a wide interested public.

Proofs of only one forme had the benefit of the author's own correction. The rest of the work has been seen through the press by Dr. B. R. Modak of this Dept. Thanks are due to Vice-Chancellor D. C. Pavate for arranging such lectures from time to time and encouraging Sanskrit studies.

Department of Sanskrit
Karnatak University, Dharwar }
30th November 1966

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

CONTENTS

	Pages
Lecture I: The Fundamental concepts in Śaṅkara's Advaita	1-18
Lecture II: Brahman and the World	19-39
Lecture III: Brahman and the Jīva	40-55
Lecture IV: Mokṣa - The Highest Goal	56-75
Appendix I:	76-102
Appendix II:	103-111

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

IN ŚAṆKARA'S ADVAITA

(*An Introduction to the Advaita Philosophy*)

LECTURE I

I. THE CONCEPT OF ADHYĀSA

The concept of 'Adhyāsa' (super-imposition) is, perhaps, the most important contribution to philosophical thought by the Indian philosophers who are the adherents of the Advaita (Monism, non-duality) philosophy. According to the Advaitins, Brahman is the only Reality (Satya), one without a second; it follows therefore that everything other than Brahman can have no real existence and it must be regarded as Mithyā (false). In the face of what is actually experienced, perceived, enjoyed day after day by all, it appears unbelievable that the world (as also the Jīva, the living Self) could be dubbed as Mithyā by the Advaitins. But if Brahman also is to be Satya, there can be no escape from the conception of everything else than Brahman as Mithyā. So, for the Advaitins, the exact relation of Brahman to the world which is not only not Mithyā, but definitely Satya in the eyes of the common man, is a matter of great importance which has to be properly looked into and clarified.

Śaṅkarācārya, therefore, at the very outset of his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* tackles this question with his usual perspicuity, pointing out to the relevant features only, without indulging in giving any unnecessary details :-

A. *Definition or Explanation of Adhyāsa :*

Śaṅkara explains Adhyāsa as स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः that is, the flashing forth or apprehension (which is false) of what had been seen before (but which is not actually present now) elsewhere, and having the nature of remembrance (not of actual experience or perception).

Adhyāsa thus makes one wrongly apprehend a thing as it is not, and this wrong apprehension persists till one is able to understand the thing as it is.

With the help of two analogies * well-known to the people at large १) शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते the nacre and the silver; २) एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत् the one moon appearing as two— Śaṅkara clarifies the nature of Adhyāsa.

B. *Implications of Adhyāsa :*

Adhyāsa, as the very name implies, requires some base or Adhiṣṭhāna on which the superimposition is made (Adhi stands for Adhiṣṭhāna, Āsa means 'sitting on', 'based upon') :-

1. To take the familiar instance of Śukti and Rajata for the purpose of finding out the implications therein, we find that it is a long process before we are able to superimpose Rajata on the Śukti:—

(a) The Śukti must be actually present in front of us, glittering in the sun-light.

* The frequent use of analogy is inevitable, when one is dealing with an entity like Brahman which cannot be dealt with by Direct perception, being super-sensuous. The Brahmasūtrakāra has used 'analogy' to fortify his position in more than seventy sūtras. See Appendix I.

- (b) We must have seen the shining silver piece before, in the silver-smith's shop some time or other; the impression of that which must have continued all along in the mind, becomes active at the sight of the shining Śukti.
- (c) We therefore, superimpose on the Śukti, the absent Rajata remembered by us.
- (d) And ultimately we come to the conclusion that it is the Rajata that we are perceiving (this wrong apprehension disappears when some reliable person points out that it is the Śukti before us and not the Rajata).

It would be clear from the above that this Adhyāsa or superimposition presupposes that the Adhiṣṭhāna (Śukti in this case) must be a real entity; there can be no Adhyāsa in a vacuum. This incidentally knocks out the Śūnyavāda (the theory propounded by some Buddhists that everything is void); for, the statement 'everything is void' (सर्वं शून्यम्) is a contradiction in terms; we cannot predicate something in the case of a non-existent entity. 'Everything' must be a real entity, if 'being void' is to be predicated of it. You cannot make any assertion about the son of a barren woman, such as 'He scored a century in the Cricket Test Match'.

Later Advaitins describe this Adhyāsa as Nirupādhika - Adhyāsa, superimposition, without any limiting adjunct.

2. The other analogy given by Śaṅkara about one moon appearing as more than one (when we place a finger perpendicularly upon the eye, two moons instead of one are seen) is a case of Sopādhika - Adhyāsa, superimposition helped by a limiting adjunct.

C. *Three more theories about Adhyāsa :*

1. Some (the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas) say that the superimposition is due to the postulating of some attribute of one entity in the case of another (अन्यत्र, अन्यधर्माध्यामः). It is not the whole entity, Rajata that is superimposed on the Śukti, but only its glittering attribute.

2. Mīmāṃsakas hold that Adhyāsa is just illusion or wrong apprehension due to the fact that we are unable to distinguish the Rajata (which is superimposed) from the Śukti (the basis of the superimposition) (यत्र यदध्यासस्तद्विवेकाग्रहनिवन्धनो भ्रमः).

3. Some hold that we simply attribute contrary or different qualities of one entity to another. (यत्र यदध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मकल्पनामाचक्षते).

In any case, says Śaṅkara, it is unnecessary to examine the different theories; it is sufficient for our purpose to note that all agree in holding that the entity *A* is apprehended as possessing the attributes of *B*.

Śaṅkara further says that the simplest definition of Adhyāsa would be - Apprehending a thing as it is not (अन्यत्र, अन्यधर्मावभासता).

Adhyāsa is also called Avidyā (Vidyā alone enables us to see a thing as it is) by Pundits. In Vedānta philosophical works, Adhyāsa, Avidyā, Māyā (illusion), Mithyā-Jñāna (wrong knowledge), Ajñāna (nescience), Vivarta (illusory transformation) etc., are used indiscriminately to signify wrong apprehension.

D. *Adhyāsa does not require the Adhiṣṭhīna to be actually perceptible:*

It may be argued that in the illustrative instance of Śukti and Rajata, Śukti is actually perceived by us, and so the

superimposition of the Rajata on the Śukti is understandable. But how can there be the superimposition of the non-Brahman (world etc.) upon Brahman which is not the object (viśaya) of knowledge ?

The answer is—There is no invariable rule that superimposition takes place only when the Adhiṣṭhāna is the object of knowledge; we actually find that ignorant people attribute blue colour to the Ākāśa which is all-pervading and so not perceptible to the senses. There is nothing wrong, therefore, if one attributes the qualities of the non-Ātman to the inmost Ātman (Pratyagātman) or to Brahman. It is of course clearly understood that in such cases the Adhiṣṭhāna is in no way contaminated by the attributes, good or bad, of the entity superimposed.

E. Even the ' Śāstras ' are based and flourish on Adhyāsa !

All our secular practical dealings in the world, involving as they do the association with the means of proof, the object of knowledge etc., presuppose this Adhyāsa. One would however think that the sacred Śāstras with their injunctions and prohibitions would remain unaffected by the Adhyāsa. Such is not the case unfortunately, for the confusion about Ātman and non-Ātman persists even there. In short, it may be safely asserted that the Śāstras also are founded upon Avidyā !

The above assertion need not be taken to be an astounding one. Take for instance, the Śāstric injunction ' A Brāhmaṇa should perform a sacrifice '. Now, all agree that Ātman is really ' Asaṅga ' (attribute-less); he can function only when he is wrongly identified with the non-Ātman. Ātman can act in accordance with the above injunction, only when he is identified with a particular caste and stage of life, the body, sense organs

etc. This wrong identification or superimposition involves the Ātman in our dealings, emotions etc., in the world. So complete is the fascination for Adhyāsa that man is willing to attribute even the attributes of external objects to the Ātman. Thus :—

1. When one's wife or son is ill, one also feels uneasy, fully aware that the wife and son are quite different from himself—here even the Bāhyadharmā (attributes of outside-entities) is attributed to the Ātman.

2. When one is described as fat, lean, fair, walking, standing etc., the attributes of the body are fathered upon the Ātman.

3. When one is described as blind, deaf, dumb etc., the attributes of the sense-organs are fathered upon the Ātman.

4. When one says ' I am thinking ', ' I am resolving to do this ' etc., the attributes of mind or Buddhi are fathered upon the Ātman.

F. Man not different from a beast !

Man considers himself to be superior to the lower creation, beasts etc., on the ground that he alone is able to think rationally. But this claim can hardly be sustained. Śaṅkara bluntly says that there is hardly any difference between men and beasts as their practical behaviour amply testifies :—

A bull perceiving a man armed with a stick rushing towards him argues that the man wishes to harm him, and so runs away from him; but if the man approaches him with a sheaf of grass in his hand, the bull calmly awaits the arrival of the man—similarly, a man confronted with a dacoit armed with a knife, runs away, but on being accosted by an individual with a friendly gesture, welcomes him. This shows that the bull does not only possess the faculty of reasoning, but he is

able to make full use of it, as the occasion arises. Such being the case, what is the difference between a bull and a man? Both are interested in self-preservation and self-enjoyment. * Of the two, man is the greater culprit, because he ought to have known that the dacoit could harm only his body and not his Ātman, and so forth. A sacrificer is just a little better off, because he has some idea of the other world and knows that the Soul survives after death, but he too suffers from the superimposition of the non-Ātman upon the Ātman and has not realised the real nature of the Ātman.

Actually the Ātman sees not, hears not, thinks not, resolves not, grasps not, moves not, tastes not; it is the eyes that see, the ears that hear, the mind that thinks, the Buddhi that resolves, the hands that grasp, the feet that move, the tongue that tastes!

G. Adhyāsa is beginningless and natural :

People are likely to blame themselves for not understanding the implications of the all embracing Adhyāsa, and to fall into despair at their utter helplessness in the matter. Śaṅkara therefore hastens to add that the Adhyāsa is there from the beginning of the world; rather it is beginningless, and the people at large are really not to blame at all, situated as they are. If anybody is to be blamed for this state of things, it is the Creator Brahma who consciously or unconsciously, created the sense-organs which can be described as 'the tools of trade'

* Cf. आहारनिद्रा-भयमैथुनं च सामान्यमेतत्पशुभिर्नराणाम् ।

Popularly also, we use expressions like 'Vāhika (an inhabitant of the Vāhika country) is a bull', thus identifying man with the bull. The rhetoricians explain the identity as due to the fact that both man and bull possess similar qualities, dullness, stupidity etc.

for the people, as facing outwards, with the result that they cannot secure the knowledge of the Ātman within. *

H. Aim of the Vedānta :

There again is no cause for despair either. The Upaniṣads, *Brahmasūtras* and other works on Vedānta are there to give proper guidance to all readily enough. The aim of the Vedānta philosophy is to show that what is perceived by the so-called means of proof is but a delusion and a snare, and to prove that the realisation of Ātman as he really is, is the only true knowledge that could save one from the inevitable round of births and deaths associated with the Saṁsāra! The challenge of Adhyāsa can be met squarely and successfully only in this way.

II. KHYĀTI – VĀDAS

Śaṅkara himself does not go into details as to how the Adhyāsa gets going. His pupils and successors, however, make an attempt to expound the nature of Adhyāsa still further and the different Khyāti-vādas came into vogue.

The word Khyāti means 'knowledge'. But as the Khyāti-vādas are mostly concerned with investigation into how the knowledge of Rajata is produced in the case of Śukti, Khyāti is often spoken of as 'so-called knowledge' or even 'wrong knowledge'.

The well-known couplet

आत्मख्यातिररात्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्वया ।

तथाऽतिर्वचनख्यातिरित्येतत्त्व्यानिपञ्चकम् ॥

* पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराक् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् ॥

—Kaṭhōpaniṣad II-1.

summarises the five Khyātis referred to in the Vedāntic works. To these five, must be added one more Sat-Khyāti to make the record complete.

Sat-Khyāti :

Rāmānuja is the chief sponsor of this view. According to him, all worlds ultimately mean the Paramātman or Paramapuruṣa with the Cit and Acit forming His body. Everything has within it a portion of everything else. The silver portion in the Śukti, might be a very small part of the Śukti, but it is there all the same. The reason why Śukti is called Śukti is that the Śukti-portion is predominant there in accordance with 'Prādhānyena Vyapadeśa' maxim.

According to Rāmānuja, the Advaitin's view, that the apprehension of Rajata in the Śukti is false or a mere superimposition, is therefore, wrong.

The answer of the Advaitin would be :— We are not content with regarding Rajata as just forming a small portion of the Śukti, as Rāmānuja apparently takes it to be; as far as we are concerned in the eyes of the perceiver, the Rajata is one hundred per cent existing in the Śukti for the time being, but *only in the Vyāvahārika state*. When ultimately we realise that Śukti is the entity, before us the knowledge about its being Rajata is contradicted. Superimposition is thus not a fiction, but a fact.

Before we proceed to a detailed investigation of the various Khyātis, it is worthwhile finding out what exactly are the causes of the wrong apprehension. Three causes are mentioned in this connection :—

(a) Pramāṭi-dōṣa — the blemishes associated with the perceiver—It is possible that the perceiver might have been too much excited or frightened, and so acts in an abnormal manner and

fails to perceive correctly. He might have just some hazy idea about the Adhiṣṭhāna (Śukti).

(b) Pramāṇa-dōṣa—something wrong with the means of perception. It is possible that the eyes of the perceiver might have been affected by cataract etc., with the result that the eyes do not function properly.

(c) Prameya-dōṣa—the Śukti itself might not have been sufficiently near for being seen properly.

Any way, it is not disputed that the impressions about Rajata seen before are awakened owing to the similarity with the Śukti seen now and they are responsible for the superimposition.

Now, about the Khyātis—

1. *Ātma Khyāti* :—The Vijñānvādi (Idealists) Bauddhas who do not admit the existence of any Bāhyārtha (External objects) are of the view that our Buddhi assuming the form of a jar, appears as though outside when we think that we perceive a jar. The Vijñāna which is momentary and is always changing is the Buddhist equivalent of the Vedāntic Ātman. No question about any superimposition can arrive. When the Rajata is perceived as इदं रजतम् (in place of the Śukti), इदं does not refer to the Rajata, but only to the *apprehension as Rajata*.

The refutation of the view is briefly as follows :— The entities jar etc., are actually perceived outside by the sense-organs alone. This cannot be challenged. A blind man can not perceive the Rajata or the Śukti. When we say इदं रजतम्, इदं must refer to something nearby, not to something far away, within the Antaḥkaraṇa or elsewhere. To say that external objects do not exist, they are really the Dharmas or forms of the Buddhi, and appear as though outside is bad reasoning and

worse logic. If the sense-organs are admitted to be capable of perceiving the Buddhidharmas, we ought to be able to perceive Sukha, Duḥkha etc., by the eye etc.

The Ātma-khyāti doctrine is thus contradicted by actual experience and cannot be justified in any way.

2. *Asat-khyāti*:—The Śūnyavādi-Bauddhas admit this. This Khyāti is rejected outright by the Vedāntins, as the Śūnyavāda has no place for the Adhiṣṭhāna being Satya, which is the very basis for superimposition. You cannot imagine a non-existent thing being superimposed upon by another non-existent thing.*

It is possible for the Buddhist to argue that if a person, while dreaming, can perceive another dream within a dream, what objection could be there if the Asat-Rajata is superimposed upon the Asat-Śukti? The answer is—Asat entities like the horn of a hare, or the son of a barren woman cannot be experienced truly or falsely. Any cognition presupposes that the entity to be cognised is a Sat object.

3. *Akhyāti*:—The Mīmāṃsakas admit this Khyāti. They also are स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिन्s, that is, they regard all Jñāna to be Satya in its own right, भ्रमात्मक-ज्ञान being a contradiction in terms. They further hold that all activity is associated with some Prayojana or purpose.

When we have the cognition इदं रजतम् while we are perceiving the Śukti before us, what happens is as follows:- इदं is अनुभव-ज्ञान from what we actually perceive before us; रजतम् is स्मरणात्मक ज्ञान arising from the Rajata seen elsewhere and somehow we are

* The rhetoricians also agree with the Vedāntins. Mammaṭa, describing the उत्प्रेक्षादोष says : उत्प्रेक्षितमपि तात्त्विकेन रूपेण परिवर्जितत्वात् निरूपाख्यप्रख्यम् तत्समर्थनाय यत् अर्थान्तरन्यासोपादानम् तत् आलेख्यमिव गगनतलेऽत्यन्तमसमीचीनमिति निविषयत्वमेतस्य, अनुचितार्थतैव दोषः ।

unable to grasp the difference between Anubhava and Smaraṇa cognitions. Thus we go through the following steps before इदं रजनम् is done full justice—

- (a) There is the non-apprehension of the difference between Anubhava and Smaraṇa.
- (b) Rajata is superimposed upon इदम्.
- (c) The perceiver believes that Rajata is worth having.
- (d) He also infers that the possession of the Rajata would be profitable to him.
- (e) He has a keen desire to have the Rajata.
- (f) And lastly, he actually hastens to the spot to grab the Rajata.

It may be pointed out in refutation of the above view, that whether any apprehension is Satya or not can be determined only when we know that the apprehension is contradicted later or not. We have got to admit Bhrama (illusory comprehension) in the Śukti-Rajata apprehension as it is later contradicted in the form 'This is not Rajata; it is Śukti'. It is futile to say that what is contradicted is not the Rajata, but the practical activity to secure that Rajata. If practical activity comes into the picture, it could only be directed towards the remembered Rajata !

4. *Anyathā-Khyāti* :— This is also known as Viparīta-Khyāti; it is the apprehension of an object as possessing attributes not possessed by it. It is but illusion caused by the superimposition of the attributes of the remembered object (Rajata) on the object (Śukti) before us. The Naiyāyikas (also the Vaiśeṣikas and the Pātañjalas) admit this Khyāti, and hold that Direct perception is caused by the sixfold conjunction (*saṁnikarṣa*) of the sense-organs with the object. When the perception is a particularised one as in the case of the knowledge that Devadatta is possessed of a stick (दण्डी देवदत्तः);

the conjunction of the sense-organ is with both the विशेषण (दण्ड) and the विशेष्य (देवदत्त); but this need not be insisted upon in the case of इद्रं रजतम्, where इद्रं (शुक्ति) is the विशेष्य, and रजत (which is स्मरणात्मक) is the विशेषण with which no conjunction is possible. It is sufficient if there is the conjunction with the विशेष्य, and we have the cognition of विशेषण and the विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव; or, we might say the conjunction with the Rajata is super-normal (*Alaukika*), that with the Śukti being normal. *

* According to the Naiyāyikas इन्द्रियार्थ-संनिकर्ष is the cause of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, (आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियम् अर्थेन), आत्मन् connected with मनस्-इन्द्रियम्-अर्थ (object), and is sixfold—

(१) चक्षुस् संयोग घट

(१) संयोगः


(The eye perceives घट)

(२)

घट

(२) संयुक्तसमवायः

(The eye perceives घटत्व)



चक्षुस् संयुक्तसमवाय


घटत्व

(३)

घट

(३) संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः

(The eye perceives घटरूपत्व)



चक्षुस् संयुक्तसमवाय

घटरूप

समवाय घटरूपत्व

In refutation of the above view it may be pointed out that the special pleading resorted to by the Naiyāyikas to explain the apprehension of इदं (शुक्तिरूपं वस्तु) रजतम् shows that something is wrong with their theory which in fairness must account equally for all Pratyakṣa. Further, strictly speaking the Rajata superimposed upon the Śukti is not surely the same that was seen before and remembered now (in the Rajju-Sarpa illustration, the serpent superimposed could not be the very same seen before). We just have a vague idea about the Rajata or the serpent, that is all. To talk about the विशेषण विशेष्यभाव as not requiring any conjunction with the विशेषण is only sophistry and nothing else.


5. *Anirvacana Khyāti* :— This Anirvacana or Anirvacaniya Khyāti is generally associated with the Advaitins. The apprehension इदं (शुक्तिरूपं वस्तु) रजतम् baffles any description of it in so many words. The Rajata on the Śukti cannot be called Sat as

(As the genus can not have any genus, otherwise there would be the fault of endlessness—*Anavasthā*, there cannot be any घटरूपत्व—त्व to be perceived.)

(४) श्रोत्र ————— शब्द
समवाय

(४) समवायः

(५)



(श्रोत्र is intimately connected with शब्द which is its गुण).

(५) समवेतसमवायः

(श्रोत्र perceives शब्दत्व)

(६) विशेषण-विशेष्य भावः— This is specially admitted to account for the perception of अभाव in the form of घटाभाववत् (विशेषण) भूतलम् (विशेष्य) or भूतले घटाभावः; दण्डी देवदत्तः is perceived in this way.

it is contradicted later when we are convinced that it is the Śukti that is before us. A Sat can never be Asat (no one can change his Svabhāva). The Rajata cannot be called Asat either, as an Asat entity can in no circumstances be perceived or contradicted (but by saying नैदं रजतम् we actually contradict the Rajata.)

There does not appear to be any real necessity for the Advaitins to admit any so called Khyāti. If something cannot be called either Sat or Asat, the result would be only Saṁśaya-jñāna (doubt) which is to be shunned at all costs. The Syādvāda of the Jainas is assailed by the Vedāntins on this very ground. The proper answer by the Advaitins to explain the इदं रजतम् perception would be that the perception is Satya in the Vyāvahārika-state, which could persist only till the right knowledge of the Śukti is forth-coming. Śaṅkara has made it sufficiently clear that the Adhyāsa idea is quite a normal process so dear to the unthinking people in the world, who are content with deluding themselves with false ideas.

It is true that normally, one has to diagnose the cause of the disease first, before thinking of its cure. But as the Adhyāsa-idea is so well-known, and its symptoms and effects are beyond cavil, it is better not to waste one's energy in determining the exact nature of Adhyāsa; one can proceed straightway to inquire how the Adhyāsa can be rendered ineffective. And Śaṅkara assures us that the teachings of the Upaniṣads and the *Vedāntasūtras* would furnish us with the right guidance in this matter.

A. Divisions of Adhyāsa

Later Advaitins try to dissect the idea of Adhyāsa still further, in addition to the two kinds of Adhyāsa sponsored by Śaṅkara.

1. निरुपाधिक (इदं रजतम्) — this Adhyāsa is removed by right knowledge (शुक्तिज्ञान).

2. सोपाधिक (एकश्चंद्रः सद्वितीयः)— this Adhyāsa disappears when the Upādhi (the finger) does not intervene. Unless the Upādhi is removed, a knowledge of the Adhiṣṭhāna does not remove the Adhyāsa. As for instance, when the red flower, Japā-kusum, is placed near the white crystal piece, the crystal would continue to appear reddish even though the right knowledge of the crystal being white is furnished by a reliable person. Only when the red flower is removed, the way to perceive the crystal as it is becomes clear.

3. ज्ञानाध्यास— as illustrated by the *cognition* of the serpent on the rope, the *cognition* of the non-Ātman entities on the Ātman etc.

4. अर्थाध्यास— the superimposition of the wrong entity (Rajata) on the Śukti. This is further subdivided as:

(a) प्रातीतिक— subjective, caused by the apprehension due to blemishes associated with the Pramātr, Pramāṇa and Prameya. When the blemishes are removed, this misapprehension disappears even before the Ātma-Jñāna is secured.

(b) व्यावहारिक— this can be removed only when the realisation of the Ātman is secured.

B. Gauṇa and Mithyā Adhyāsa or Avidyā

Gauṇa (गौण) — metaphorical, subsidiary, due to the possession of some common attributes.

One suffers when one's members of the family are suffering. Although the members of the family are different from oneself, one looks upon them as one's own Ātman or as belonging to

oneself. In other words, when the object superimposed is well known as different, the superimposition is due to the possession of some common Guṇas. The instance गौर्वाहीकः has been already referred to before. Another well known instance is अग्निर्माणवकः, we know that Agni and Māṇavaka are different, but the identification is due to the possession of similar attributes – great lustre, fierce nature etc.

Mithyā — Though Ātman is neither a doer nor an enjoyer, there is the superimposition of being a doer or an enjoyer on the Ātman. This superimposition is obviously Mithyā. When Ātman is realised as being identical with Brahman, all false notions about Ātman disappear*.

C. Avidyā spoken of as two-fold.

1. मूलाविद्या - This Avidyā is responsible for the projection of the whole Prapañca including the five Mahābhūtas. This can be removed by the Nirvikalpaka (attributeless) Jñāna secured from the Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas, तत्त्वमसि, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म, etc.

* Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Bra-Sū 1-1-4 says, अपि चाहुः—

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।
 सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥
 अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।
 अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातृव पाप्मदोषादिर्वाजितः ॥
 देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
 लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥

These verses are ascribed to Sundara Pāṇḍya, a predecessor of Śaṅkara. They are quoted by Śaṅkara without comment. As far as Śaṅkara is concerned, both Gauṇa and Mithyā Adhyāsas are equally false.

2. तूलाविद्या – Limited or temporary Avidyā responsible for the superimposition of Rajata on the Śukti etc. This can be removed by the Savikalpaka Jñāna of Śukti with its natural attributes Śuktitva etc.

BRAHMAN AND THE WORLD

As far as the Advaitin is concerned, there is no problem about understanding the nature of the connection of the world with the one Reality, Brahman which is Nirviśeṣa, Nirguṇa and can be described only negatively as 'Neti neti' (Not this, not this). The Acit-world is superimposed by us upon Brahman. Elaborate details about how the world comes into being, with its ramifications, the part played by the three Guṇas – Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, the Trivṛt-karaṇa or Pañcīkaraṇa process through which the Mahābhūtas, Ākāśa and others pass, the different heavenly worlds, Brahmāloka and others favoured by the *Purāṇas* – all this cannot be dismissed as unimportant as the Śruti which is our highest tribunal in such matters seems to countenance the same. The Śruti (Upaniṣad) – passages describe divergent views; it is essential therefore that an authoritative harmonising (*samanvaya*) of such passages must be undertaken, so that people might not be led astray*. The Śruti-texts are entitled to respect, but surely not at the expense of reasoning. Gauḍapāda † and Śaṅkara ‡ emphasise this aspect throughout. Śaṅkara categorically states that even a hundred Śruti-text* cannot prove that fire is not hot.

* परतन्त्र-प्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकामु स्मृतिष्ववलम्बन्ते । तद्वलेन च श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन् ॥

Ś. B. II-1-1.

† निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्भवति नेतरत् । G. K. III-28.

‡ न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति

किंचदस्ति प्रमाणम् । Ś. B. II-1-11.

Śaṅkara's main task is therefore to prove that the Śruti-texts taken as a whole countenance his main concepts of Advaita and Adhyāsa and that the Śruti alone is our proper guide in the Vyāvahārika state to prepare us for understanding the highest knowledge in course of time.

The Vaiśeṣikas (and the Naiyāyikas) who obviously are believers in a real creation, curiously enough appear to be corroborating the Advaita view that the world is an illusion or a dream. According to them, numbers 2, 3 etc., are अनित्य everywhere; एकत्व alone existing in the नित्य objects is नित्य. All numbers other than number 1 are there when we have expectancy for them*.

1. Poets as Advaitins

Famous poets all over the world appear to have a special fascination for the Advaita idea and often describe the world-phenomenon as a dream, illusory appearance etc.

Kālidāsa, for instance, in his *Śākuntala* makes Duṣyanta say about his meeting with Śākuntalā (which he had forgotten owing to the effect of the curse by Durvāsa), after the curse had ceased to operate—'Was all that experience a mere dream, or jugglery, or mental aberration?' †

* एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् ।

अनित्यगतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ।

— *Tarkasaṅgraha*

The Vaiśeṣikas regard द्वित्व as अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य, and the Naiyāyikas as अपेक्षाबुद्धिज्ञाप्य.

† स्वप्नो नु माया नु मतिभ्रमो नु । *Act V.*

Now this is exactly how the Advaitin explains the existence of the world as seen popularly. One sees in a dream objects created without any material or the assistance of the three-fold cause (Upādāna, Asamavāyi and Nimitta); if the dream-objects can thus come into existence, why should not the world be regarded as a dream-object created by Brahman out of its own Sāṅkalpa as the Śruti vouchsafes? The dream-objects are real in the eyes of the dreamer and last as long as the dream persists; similarly the world persists for one who has not realised the true Reality, Brahman.

Or, the world might be regarded as an illusory appearance projected by a juggler (Brahman) who is not in any way affected by the entities created by his Māyā.

Or, every one creates a world for himself due to wrong knowledge which has no real basis.

Bhavabhūti also speaks of illusory manifestations (Vivarta) as ultimately dissolved into Brahman*.

Shakespeare in the famous passage in the *Tempest* definitely calls the world-phenomena as dreams:—

“Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and;

Are melted into air, into thin air,
And like the baseless fabric of this vision;

The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself;

* ब्रह्मणीव विवर्तानां क्वापि विप्रलयः कृतः। *Uttara V.*

Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded;

Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff,
As dreams are made on, and our little life;
Is rounded with a sleep."

(*Tempest*, Act IV)

The above passage admirably describes Śaṅkara's view as stated by Śaṅkara himself.*

Shakespeare † again, has rightly described the world as a stage, where men and women are merely players playing their allotted parts and make their exit after their work is over. It is all the more necessary that proper guidance should be given to all these actors so that they can play their parts well and herein the Śruti and the Śāstras have a very important duty to perform.

2. Rāmānuja's all-out attack on the Avidyā-concept

The Advaitin cannot remain complacent by just announcing that Brahman in collaboration somehow with Avidyā is able to create the world-phenomena. He cannot shirk his responsibility to point out the exact relationship between Brahman, which is one without a second and Avidyā.

* यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिध्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते,
अवस्तुत्वात्, एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति ।
यथा च स्वप्नदृगेकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति ।

Ś. B. II. 1.9.

† *As You Like It-Act II*

Rāmānuja (11th century A. D.) is a Viśiṣṭādvaitin (believer in Qualified Monism) who admits one Paramapuruṣa with Cit and Acit forming His body; but as he admits all the three, Paramapuruṣa, Cit and Acit as Satya, he can better be described as a Traitin. In his *Śrī-bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*, he vehemently attacks the concept of Avidyā or Ajñāna, pointing out as many as seven Anupapattis or flaws there. These are given below in some detail (together with the possible replies by the Advaitin):—

1. आश्रयानुपपत्ति - The Advaitin cannot point out where Avidyā resides. Avidyā cannot reside in Brahman which is *Jñāna-svarūpa*, neither in Jīva who is himself the product of Avidyā.

Advaitin - It is ridiculous to inquire into the whereabouts of what is after all a figment of the imagination. We can just say to please you, that Avidyā has for its resort the Upādhis.

2. तिरोधानानुपपत्ति - If Ajñāna is able to screen Brahman having Jñāna as its nature, that virtually means the destruction of Brahman!

Advaitin— When one says ‘The Sun is screened by the clouds,’ does it mean that the Sun is dead? The screening by Avidyā merely points out that Brahman’s true nature is manifested to those who have succeeded in getting rid of Avidyā.

3. स्वरूपानुपपत्ति - If the Nirviṣaya Brahman has to resort to Māyā or Avidyā to account for something, Brahman would cease to be one without a second!

Advaitin - Māyā is but a Śakti of Brahman and cannot be different from it. Just as the face is not affected by any

blemishes associated with the mirror in which it is reflected, Brahman does in no way lose its nature in any circumstances.

4. अनिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्ति- Māyā (or, Avidyā) cannot be called Sat or Asat, and so the Advaitin is pleased to describe it as Anirvacanīya (indescribable in so many words). Any way what cannot be actually experienced is, for all practical purposes, not in existence. To call Avidyā Anirvacanīya is just quibbling.

Advaitin - Avidyā itself by resorting to the Upādhis projects the world appearance. No one thinks of Brahman as an appearance or as being like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman.

5. प्रमाणानुपपत्ति - The non-existence or futility of Avidyā can be proved by syllogistic reasoning.

1. अज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रयम्, अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्
(Advaitin - We are at one with you in holding that Ajñāna does not reside in Brahman).
2. अज्ञानं न ज्ञानावरणम्, अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्
(Advaitin - Our view is that Ajñāna does not, cannot screen Brahman in reality; it only superimposes upon Brahman its own nature).
3. अज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम् ज्ञानविषयानावरणत्वात्, यथा शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानम्
(Advaitin - The Hetu is 'Non-proven' (Asiddha); for, according to us, the आवरण is due only to the Adhāsa).
4. ब्रह्म नाज्ञानास्पदम्, ज्ञातृत्वविरहात्, घटवत्
(Advaitin - We also do not regard Brahman as the resort or substratum of Ajñāna).
5. ब्रह्म नाज्ञानावरणम्, ज्ञानविषयत्वात्, यथा शुक्तिकादि
(Advaitin - The refutation is the same as in the case of No. 2 above).

6. तद्ग्रहणं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानम्, ज्ञानविषयत्वात् यथा शुक्तिकादि
(Advaitin – The refutation is the same as in the case of No. 3 above).
7. प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावातिरिक्ताज्ञानपूर्वकम्, प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात्,
भवदभिमतज्ञानसाधनप्रमाणज्ञानवत्
(Advaitin — The syllogism is fallacious, as no illustrative instance is available).
8. ज्ञानं न वस्तुनो विनाशकम्, शक्तिविशेषविरहत्वे सति
जनत्वात्, यथा, ईश्वरज्ञानं मुद्गरादि च
(Advaitin – We never say that Jñāna destroys any entity. Brahmajñāna removes only the imaginary Samsāra).
9. भावरूपमज्ञानं न ज्ञानविनाश्यम्, भावरूपत्वात्, घटवत्
(Advaitin – The syllogism is fallacious, it is सोपाधिक, the Upādhi being पारमार्थिकत्व. What is भावरूप is not necessarily पारमार्थिक *).

6. निवर्तकानुपपत्ति – The Śruti points out that Mokṣa (Liberation) can be had only by the Upāsana of the Saviśeṣa Brahman or the Lord.

Advaitin — Mokṣa can be secured only through the cognition – Brahman is one and Nirviśeṣa – as the Śruti itself has stated again and again. The Upāsana of the Saviśeṣa Brahman is only a step leading to Mokṣa.

7. निवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति – Avidyā cannot be removed by Brahma-jñāna. Avidyā is a positive entity as also Bandha (bondage),

* For a detailed exposition of Rāmānuja's view and the refutation thereof, see Pp 37-46 Notes, Part I 'Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja' edited by R. D. Karmarkar, and published by the University of Poona.

the result of Avidyā, and so cannot be removed by mere Jñāna; that can be done only by devotion to the Lord.

Advaitin – When Brahmajñāna is secured, there is no Avidyā, no Bandha, no Mokṣa even; everything is one; this is the Highest Reality*.

Rāmaṇuja's main attack on the Advaitin's stand centres round on his conception of Avidyā as having a positive existence and as being apart from Brahman. He quotes a large number of Śruti-passages in his favour. The Advaitin finds no difficulty in pointing out many Śruti-passages to prove his contention. While Rāmaṇuja is forced to explain the Nirviśeṣa-passages somehow as referring to the state of Śārīra-Śārīrin (the world is the body of the Paramapurūṣa), Śaṅkara more convincingly gets over the conflict in the Śruti-passages by relegating all Saḡuṇa or Saviśeṣa passages to the realm of Vyāvahārika reality, only the Nirḡuṇa or Nirviśeṣa passages being taken to refer to the Pāramārthika Reality.

After all, whatever view one admits without discarding the authority of the Śruti, there is no escape from admitting some wonderful power possessed by the Highest; reliance upon mere inference cannot take us any where. † The Brahmasūtrakāra also admits such power or Dharma as being possessed by the Ātman

* न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मृमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

G. K. II. 32.

† अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तास्तर्केण योजयेत् ।

Ś. B. II. 1-6.

or Brahman *. Rāmānuja's Paramapuruṣa possesses all possible powers or Śaktis; Rāmānuja, therefore, cannot reasonably object if Ajñāna or Avidyā is claimed by the Advaitins to be fit to perform its functions in a way that cannot be accounted for, by the ordinary means of proof. In the circumstances, the concept of Avidyā as propounded by the Advaitins must be pronounced to be the least objectionable for the purpose of solving the problem of the existence of the world.

Śaṅkara's followers attempt to give a more definite account of the part played by Avidyā or Māyā :—

- (a) Vācaspatimiśra (850 A. D.) says that Māyā, is only a Sahakāri-Kāraṇa.
- (b) Sarvajnātmanuni (900 A. D.) says that Brahman is the Upādāna (material) Kāraṇa, and Māyā, the Dvāra-Kāraṇa.
- (c) Sadānanda (16th century) says in his *Vedāntasāra*, that Avidyā has two powers – (1) Vikṣepaśakti by which the world is projected and brought into being; (2) Āvaraṇaśakti which screens Brahman.

Whatever the difference in the views about the nature of the exact part played by Avidyā or Māyā, the Advaitins subscribe wholeheartedly to the dicta of Gauḍapāda :—

कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया ।
स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥

G. K. II. 12

We shall now discuss two statements from the Upaniṣads about Avidyā, and Vikāra which have some bearing on the point at issue :—

* आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि II. 1.28;
सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च II. 2.32 etc.

3. *Avidyā and Vidyā*

The Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad (11) says—

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयँ सह ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥

As the *Īśāvāsya* categorically has declared

कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः (Verse 2),

Rāmānuja's follower Nārāyaṇa explains अविद्यया as विद्याङ्गतया चोदितेन कर्मणा, मृत्युं as विद्योत्पत्ति-प्रतिबन्धकीभूतं पुण्यपापरूपं कर्म, विद्यया as परमात्मोपासनरूपया, and अमृतं as मोक्ष.

अविद्या is also understood to mean Karman by many Vedāntins, and the passage is taken to point out that Karman enables one to get over death (presumably by securing the different higher worlds, Agniloka, Prajāpatiloka etc., after the physical body is abandoned), but such a person has to be reborn again to experience the fruits of his Karman in the past births—that is, to say, Karman does not make him immortal; it, so to speak, holds Mṛtyu at bay, temporarily. Immortality (Amṛtatva) can be secured only by him who has realised the Ātman (Vidyā means Ātmavidyā).

Curiously enough, the Śāṅkarabhāṣya on the passage in question says :—

विद्यां चाविद्यां च देवताज्ञानं कर्मचेत्यर्थः । अविद्यया कर्मणाग्नि-
होत्रादिना स्वाभाविकं कर्म ज्ञानं च मृत्युशब्दवाच्यं..... अमृतं देवतात्म-
भावमश्नुते प्राप्नोति । तद्व्यमृतमुच्यते यद्देवतात्मगमनम् । At the end of the
Bhāṣya (on Īśa 18), we read 'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते'
.... इति श्रुत्वा केचित्संशयं कुर्वन्ति विद्याशब्देन मुख्या परमात्मविद्यैव
कस्मान्न गृह्यते, अमृतत्वं च? and the Bhāṣya proceeds to explain away
this doubt in detail.

All this, including the unusual procedure followed viz. that of raising a Pūrvapakṣa and answering the same at the end, the tame expression संशयं कुर्वन्ति etc., makes us wonder whether the Bhāṣya on the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* is really from the pen of the great Śaṅkarācārya. We agree that when one is commenting upon a work which emphasises the importance of Karman, purely Advaitic ideas have to be kept in back-ground, but surely this must not be done at the sacrifice of the basic Advaita-concepts. Śaṅkara himself in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* gets over such a contingency by adding some comments explaining the Advaita position clearly.

Śaṅkara has definitely stated that Avidyā, Adhyāsa etc., are synonyms. The passage अविद्यां च can be explained as conforming to the Advaita view quite satisfactorily. Perhaps we may separate सद् as स ह. The meaning of the passage would be :— A person should first try to grasp the real implications of what is meant by Avidyā (Adhyāsa) and Vidyā (Brahmavidyā). When he knows that the world (along with the Jīva) is merely an appearance, a superimposition upon Brahman, he gets over Mṛtyu (that is, *Moha*, infatuation, wrong knowledge; the *Sanatsujītiya* actually equates Mṛtyu and *Moha*) and realises that all pursuits associated with the world are illusory; then he tries to know the real nature of Brahman and ultimately becomes one with Brahman.

4. Vikāra and Vivarta

In the *Chāndogya VI* it is said—

यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्,
वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

The purport of the passage is as follows:— A jar is a product (Vikāra or Pariṇāma) of the clay; but it is a mere expression, a name; what is real about the jar is in so far as it is the clay; everything else about it (its size, shape, colour etc.) is Asatya. It should be noted that the Upaniṣad does not say मृत्तिकैव सत्या; for, when we investigate into the nature of Mṛttikā, we shall have to say पृथिवी, इत्येव सत्यम् (मृत्तिका being a Vikāra of Pṛthivī) and so on till we reach the conclusion ब्रह्म, इत्येव सत्यम्.

In other words, the distinction usually made between Vikāra (a real transformation or Pariṇāma – A jar is the Vikāra of the clay; Curds is the Vikāra of the milk) and Vivarta (an illusory transformation - the serpent is the Vivarta on the rope) is not justified by the Upaniṣadic passage.

If we analyse the well-known illustrations of Vivarta (Rope - serpent) and Vikāra (clay - jar), we find that – In the Rope - serpent illustration, the rope is the Adhiṣṭhāna and the serpent is superimposed upon it; in the clay-jar illustration, the clay is the Adhiṣṭhāna (or Upādāna) and the jar is the outcome.

In both the cases, nothing remains when the Adhiṣṭhāna is removed; it is the Adhiṣṭhāna that matters, not what is superimposed on it, or what is the outcome thereof.

If it is argued that the jar serves some practical purpose, the serpent also can be said to serve the purpose of frightening the observer. Both the jar and the serpent can not exist in the absence of their respective Adhiṣṭhānas.

Philosophically, there is thus no difference between Vivarta and Vikāra; both are Vācārambhāṇa, Nāmadheya and Asatya.

The *Vedāntasāra* defines Vikāra and Vivarta as –

सतत्त्वतोऽन्यथा प्रथा विकार इत्युदीरितः ।

अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथा प्रथा विवर्त इत्युदीरितः ॥ *

Here it is pointed out that in the case of Vikāra or Pariṇāma, a really different entity comes into existence, while in the case of Vivarta, the Adhiṣṭhāna remains the same; no real change takes place therein.

In any case, the Advaitins stand by the Vivarta-vāda which alone can accurately describe the Pāramārthika Reality, while the Vikāra (Pariṇāma)-vāda concerns itself with the Vyāvahārika reality.

It would be clear from what has been said so far that when the Advaitins declare 'Brahman is real, the world is false' (ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या), they do not want to assert that the world is absolutely non-existent like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman. The world is only relatively Mithyā. So long as the knowledge of the one Reality, Brahman is not secured, the world is a reality which can be experienced, and we have absolute freedom to indulge in theories to account for its existence, maintenance and destruction. The Advaitin could have no quarrel with such theories (which apparently are supported by Śruti, Smṛti and Purāṇas) which have only a temporary vogue as they are to be discarded when the right knowledge dawns upon us.

5. *Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva is not justifiable :*

Once the Advaita idea is grasped, many cherished concepts regarded as the sheet-anchor of philosophy have perforce to be given up.

* Another version is यस्तात्त्विकोऽन्यथाभावः परिणाम उदीरितः ।
अतात्त्विकोऽन्यथाभावः विवर्तः स उदीरितः ॥

The Relation of cause and effect believed to be quite-sancrosant as explaining the orderly creation of the world by some Creator, has no place in the Advaita system.

When Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva is admitted, we necessarily assume that Kāraṇa and Kārya are different, Kāraṇa must have existed before Kārya which is Asat before it is produced. It also goes without saying that Kāraṇa and Kārya must have a similar nature.

Now, the axiom प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावः न कथञ्चिद्भूविष्यति (G. K. III-21, there can not be a change otherwise, of one's nature in any circumstances) is acceptable to all. So, we have to accept the following results:—

1. A Sat (Kāraṇa) can not produce an Asat (Kārya).
2. An Asat can not produce any Sat. (In both the above cases, Kāraṇa and Kārya can not have similar natures).
3. A Sat can not produce a Sat (as in that case there is bound to be a transformation or a change of nature in the Kāraṇa-Sat).
4. An Asat can not obviously produce any Asat.

We have to conclude, therefore, that no Relation of cause and effect is possible.

The Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva can not be established by resorting to the Bījāṅkura (seed-sprout) maxim either, because unless we know which comes first - seed or sprout - no relation of cause and effect can be there.

Again, the Bījāṅkura maxim is really fallacious:—

(1) बीज produces (2) अङ्कुर — (3) बीज₁ — (4) अङ्कुर₁ — and so forth. Here though we speak of a beginningless unbroken

succession, it is really not so, for Bija and Bija₁, as also Añkura and Añkura₁ are not the same.

(6) *Dr̥ṣṭi-Sṛṣṭivāda and Sṛṣṭi-Dr̥ṣṭivāda*

दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद—Creation exists only when it is perceptible by some means or other. The perceptible world is dependent upon the perceiver and has only an apparent existence.

सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद—The creation exists only from the practical point of view. It is unreal because it is contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman.

Both these views are but different facets of the Vivartavāda.

Having thus established that nothing else than Brahman really exists, the Advaitin has to turn his attention to the Vyāvahārika state of the world. One is likely to think that one has unbridled licence to think and to act in so far as the practical dealings in the world are concerned. On the contrary, a person is required to submit scrupulously to several restrictions, if he wants to reach the highest goal, Brahman. With this end in view, the *Brahmasūtras* especially have chalked out the following as a practical guide :—

- (a) The Śruti (Upaniṣad) – passages should be interpreted as a whole, and should be harmonised, if there is a conflict, in accordance with the recognised rules of interpretation.
- (b) The Smṛtis can be accepted as authoritative if they are not in conflict with the Śruti.
- (c) Likewise, the Purāṇas and similar popular works may, with reservations, be accepted as guides.
- (d) It is necessary to understand the flaws in the systems of

philosophy not based upon the Śruti, for the purpose of avoiding them.

- (e) The wellknown Pramāṇas, direct perception etc., should be made use of with due care.
- (f) The use of Analogy is sanctioned by the *Brahmasūtras*, as that is the only way to bring home to the common man the nature of the Highest Reality.

As the *Gīta** puts it, for the common man, Śāstra is the proper authority to advise him as regards what is fit to be acted upon.

We shall now refer to some concepts about the evolution of the world which are more or less acceptable to the advaitins.

(7) *Trivṛt-Karaṇa (and Pañcīkaraṇa)*

In accordance with the Śruti and *Brahma-Sūtras*† the Advaitins admit the threefold evolution of the world. Only the three Mahābhūtas (Tejas, Ap and Pṛthivi, excluding Ākāśa and Vāyu) take part here—


* तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ॥

Gīta XVI-24

† संज्ञामूर्ति क्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् ॥

Bra. Sū. II-4-20.

Brahman (Sat, Ātman)



The ultimate product is named after the predominant element constituting it in accordance with the maxim प्राधान्यात्तु तद्वचपदेशः. †

Later on, as the Taittiriya actually mentions Ākāśa and Vāyu as produced from the Ātman (एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः) and as the two are referred to and discussed in the *Brahmasūtras* (II. 3. 1-11), the Trivṛt-karaṇa was enlarged into the Pañcīkaraṇa process, so as to accommodate Ākāśa and Vāyu in the scheme of evolution. (It is pointed out that there is nothing in the Śruti or the *Brahmasūtras*, which can be described as opposing the Pañcīkaraṇa concept).

* Ānandagiri thus describes the Trivṛt-karaṇa process :—

प्रथममेकैकां देवतां द्विधा द्विधा विभज्य, पुनरेकैकं भागं द्विधा द्विधा कृत्वा तदितरभागयोर्निक्षिप्य त्रिवृत्करणं विवक्षितम् ।

† वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

The Pañcīkaraṇa process * is as follows:—

$$\text{आकाश— } \frac{\text{आ.}}{2} + \frac{\text{वा.}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते.}}{8} + \frac{\text{अप्}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ.}}{8}$$

$$\text{वायु— } \frac{\text{वा.}}{2} + \frac{\text{ते.}}{8} + \frac{\text{अप्}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ.}}{8}$$

$$\text{तेजस्— } \frac{\text{ते.}}{2} + \frac{\text{अप्}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{वा.}}{8}$$

$$\text{अप्— } \frac{\text{अप्}}{2} + \frac{\text{पृ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{वा.}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते.}}{8}$$

$$\text{पृथिवी— } \frac{\text{पृ.}}{2} + \frac{\text{आ.}}{8} + \frac{\text{वा.}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते.}}{8} + \frac{\text{अप्}}{8}$$

(Later on, it was thought by some that one half of an element was not a sufficient predominance to be associated with that element, and so they propose the following scheme—

$$\text{आकाश— } \frac{\text{आ. } 21}{25} + \frac{\text{वा.}}{25} + \frac{\text{ते.}}{25} + \frac{\text{अप्}}{25} + \frac{\text{पृ.}}{25} \quad \text{Etc.}$$

The number 25 selected was apparently suggested by the same number of Tattvas admitted in the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution. As this theory is neither referred to in the Upaniṣads, nor in the *Brahmasūtras*, it is generally overlooked by the Advaitins).

* Sureśvara describes it thus—

पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि प्रत्येकं विभजेद् द्विधा ।

एकैकं भागमादाय चतुर्धा विभजेत्पुनः ॥

एकैकं भागमेकस्मिन्भूते संवेशयेत्क्रमात् ।

ततश्चाकाशभूतस्य भागाः पञ्च भवन्ति हि ॥

वाय्वादि भागाश्चत्वारो वाय्वादिष्वेवमादिशेत् ।

पञ्चीकरणमेतत्स्यादित्याहुस्तत्त्ववेदिनः ॥

(8) *The Sāṅkhya theory of world-evolution*

According to the Sāṅkhyas, the Acetana Prakṛti is * responsible for the creation of the world, the Puruṣa or the Cetana element remaining indifferent all the while. The theory of the three Guṇas – Sattva, Rajas and Tamas – can be described as the most noted contribution to philosophic thought by the Sāṅkhyas. Īśvarakṛṣṇas *Sāṅkhyakārikā* † is generally regarded as the standard work on the Sāṅkhya system; it is presumably an abridgement of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (60000 verses) written by Pañcaśikhā long ago.

The world-evolution according to the Sāṅkhyas is as follows :—

1. Puruṣa (who is Niṣkriya, Udāsīna, is neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti).
2. Mūla-Prakṛti (where the three Guṇas are in equilibrium).
- 3-9. Seven Vikṛtis— Mahat (Buddhi), Ahāṅkāra and five Tanmātras (subtle Mahābhūtas).
- 10-25. Sixteen Vikāras—

5 Mahābhūtas—आकाश, वायु, तेजस्, अप् and पृथिवी.

* The older Sāṅkhya apparently admitted two Cetana Puruṣas, Kṣara and Akṣara (referred to in the Gīta XV-16. द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च । क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते॥) But the idea of a Cetana being Kṣara was given up later, and was replaced by that of the Acetana Prakṛti.

The Anugītā XIV-18-25 also refers to the same idea,

ततः प्रधानमसृजच्चेतना सा शरीरिणाम् ।

यया सर्वमिदं व्याप्तं यां लोके परमां विदुः ॥

(B. O. R. I. Edition)

† The date is circa 150 A. D.

5 Jñānendriyas— श्रोत्र, त्वक्, चक्षुस्, रसन and घ्राण.

6 Karmendriyas — वाक्, हस्त, पाद, पायु and उपस्था and Manas*.

(Manas is produced from the Sattva-portion of the Tanmātras; the five Prāṇas—Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna—from the Rajas portion of the Tanmātras).

It may be pointed out here that to speak of Mūla-prakṛti as Avikṛti and at the same time as having seven Vikṛtis is a contradiction in terms.

Broadly speaking, however, the Advaitins find not much to quarrel about the details.†Sāṅkara in his Bhāṣya on *Bra.Sū.* II.1-3, says सांस्ययोगी हि परमपुरुषसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्याती, शिष्टेऽश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपवृंहितौ ||; but he objects to Sāṅkhya and Yoga because द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः| The Advaitins regard the Sāṅkhyas as their chief opponent (Pradhāna-malla) and concentrate their attack on the inherent duality accepted by them and the doctrine that the Acetana Prakṛti can produce the world. The Advaitins rightly point out that in no circumstances can any Acetana entity be credited with any activity; if somehow it could become active, the activity would always be there, as no restraining agency is admitted by the Sāṅkhyas, for the Puruṣa is according to them Niṣkriya and Udāsina. Further, if Puruṣa and Prakṛti are both eternal and separate, there cannot be Mokṣa either. Mokṣa would be

* मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

षोडशकश्च विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः || (*Sāṅ. Kā.*)

† The Kāthopaniṣat says इन्द्रियेभ्यो परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः । मनसस्तु पराद्द्विबुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः || महतः परमव्यवतमव्यवतात्पुरुषः परः । पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः || *I. 3. 9-10.*

possible only if the Prakṛti is regarded as a mere appearance, so that the duality would be only phenomenal and not real.

(9) *Paurāṇik ideas acceptable from the Vyāvahārika point of view*

Details about the world-creation given in the Purāṇas and some Upaniṣads are acceptable to the Advaitins, provided they are not allowed to encroach upon the basic concept of oneness of Brahman—such as

- (a) the seven upper worlds (भूः, भुवः, स्वः, महः, जनः, तपस्, and सत्यम्.)
- (b) the seven nether-worlds (अतल, वितल, सुतल, तलातल, रसातल, महातल and पाताल).
- (c) the fourfold gross body (जरायुज, अण्डज, स्वेदज, and उद्भिज्ज) and so forth.

The world is dissolved at the time of Praḷaya (the atoms even are dissolved at the Mahāpraḷaya; at the Avāntara or subsidiary Praḷayas, only the super structure is dissolved, the foundations remaining intact).

The dissolution takes place in the reverse order * with the Kārya going back into the Kāraṇa.

The position about the creation and dissolution of the world is briefly as follows:—

परा देवता (Brahman with the Upādhis)—आकाश—वायु—तेजस्—अप् and पृथिवी; it is Brahman that creates with आकाश etc., as its Upādhis. The dissolution comes about when पृथिवी is dissolved into अप्, अप् into तेजस् and so on.

* विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ।

BRAHMAN AND THE JĪVA

While it may be conceded after some thought and hesitation, that the non-sentient world which is always changing and perishable owes its existence to its being wrongly superimposed upon Brahman by the Jīva in the grip of Ajñāna, the pronouncement of the Advaitin—The Jīva or the Individual Soul is Brahman itself and none else,—appears to be outrageous and incredible. For, the Jīva is admitted by philosophers (barring the Cārvākas and some Bauddhas) to be a cogniser, imperishable, though subject to births and deaths, and an enjoyer of the fruits of Karmans for which he is responsible. The Jīva has limited powers while Brahman is possessed of absolute unlimited power. How could the Jīva, therefore, be one with Brahman? *The Brahmsūtras* also speak of Brahman as over and above Jīva * and the Jīva as Amśa or portion of Brahman †, conceding at the same time that the Jīva is unoriginated. It looks as if we shall have to admit that the Jīva has a distinct individuality of his own, apart from Brahman.

The Advaitins have propounded several theories to repudiate the above view—

I. *Various Theories about the relation of Brahman and Jīva*

(1) *Ajātivāda*—(Non-production or non-origination theory)

* अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणः | *Bra. Su. III. 4-8*

† अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा.... | *Bra. Su. II. 3-43*

‘Gauḍapāda* describes the Jīva as being on a par with the Jīva in a dream, or māyā-maya or Nirmītika (created by a juggler) and declares that there can be no real birth, death or origination for the Jīva. Once the concept of non-origination is accepted, it follows as a logical corollary that what is understood popularly as being originated, must really be regarded as false or illusory appearance. This naturally leads to—

(2) *Māyāvāda* (which is intimately associated with Śāṅkarācārya) which is merely an elaboration of the Ajātivāda. In fact, it can be said that Ajātivāda and Māyāvāda (Avidyāvāda, Kalpanāvāda) are but the two sides of the same shield.

Śāṅkara’s immediate disciples, however, felt that a further clarification of Śāṅkara’s position in this connection was necessary and that the part played by Īśvara in relation to the Jīva also had to be explained in detail; for, the Advaitins have got to explain these matters even though they might be concerning the Vyāvahārika point of view.

The well-known verse

वाचस्पतेरवच्छेद आभासो वार्तिकस्य च ।
संक्षेपशारीरककृतं प्रतिबिम्बमिहेष्यते ॥

* यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥
यथा मायामयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥
यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥
न कश्चिज्जायते जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि वा ।
एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचन न जायते ॥

G. K. IV. 68-71

refers to three more views in this connection, ascribed to Śaṅkara's immediate disciples.

(3) अवच्छेदवाद — Vācaspatimiśra (850 A. D.) the author of *Bhāmātī* holds this doctrine. Brahman is characterised or limited by the Upādhis and comes to be known as Īśvara or Jīva. The analogy of Ghaṭākāśa, Paṭākāśa is resorted to by the Avacchedavādins to explain their doctrine. Gauḍapāda also attaches much importance to the Ghaṭākāśa analogy which he has elucidated in great detail in his *Kārikās*—

आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।
घटादिवच्च संघातैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥
घटाद्रिपू प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयो यथा ।
आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते तद्वज्जीवा इहात्मनि ॥
यथैकस्मिन्घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ।
न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥
रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च भिद्यन्ते तत्र तत्र वै ।
आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्जीवेषु निर्णयः ॥
नाकाशस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवौ यथा ।
नैवात्मनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवौ तथा ॥
यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मलिनं मलैः ।
तथा भवत्यवुद्धानामात्मापि मलिनो मलैः ॥
मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।
स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेष्वाकाशो नाविलक्षणः ॥
संघाताः स्वप्नवत्सर्व आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः ।
आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते ॥

G. K. III. 3-10..

Śaṅkara also is equally fond of the Ghatākāśa analogy which he has used many times in his *Brahmaṣutra-bhāṣya* (I-1·5; I-2·1; I-2·5; I-3·1; II-1·5; II-1·6; II-3·11; II-3·17 etc.)

We may thus put the equation :-

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Brahman—Upādhis} &= \text{Jīva} \\ \text{or Jīva} &= \text{Brahman} + \text{Upādhis.} \end{aligned}$$

As the Jīva or Individual Soul is directly associated with the Upādhis, body, Antaḥkaraṇa etc., he has only a limited power and cannot be concerned with the whole world. Another entity viz., Īśvara, associated with another set of Upādhis has been admitted, therefore, to explain the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world.

Owing to the Upādhi of Ajñāna, Brahman (or Caitanya) which is one without a second is known as Īśvara, when it becomes the object (Viśaya) of Ajñāna. Jīva becomes the Āśraya or resort of Ajñāna. * All are agreed that there can not be more than one Īśvara; otherwise, these would be constant bickerings resulting in the breakdown of proper administration (somehow, the wise men of the East appear to favour benevolent autocracy, rather than democracy).

As regards Jīva, it is well known that the experience of one Jīva is not the same as that of another; so, the question arises, whether there is one Jīva or many Jīvas:—

(a) Ekajīvavādins — There can be only one Jīva. Jīvas are regarded wrongly as many, because it is the Upādhis that make the Jīva experience differently. As a matter of fact,

* अज्ञानविषयीभूतंचैतन्यमीश्वरः ।

अज्ञानाश्रयीभूतं च जीवः, इति वाचस्पतिमिश्राः ॥

Siddhāntabindu of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

there is no point in accepting Īśvara as a separate entity. Surely the Jīva can create the world, with the assistance of the Upādhis, Antaḥkaraṇa etc. Jīva is one, but the Upādhis being different, we think that there are many Jīvas. The objection that if Jīva is one, when the Śruti talks of Śuka or Vāmadeva as Mukta (liberated), every one in the world ought to have been Mukta is invalid, as the Upādhis are different.

(b) *Nānājīvavādins* — It is better to regard Ajñāna as two-fold—Samaṣṭi (cosmic)—Ajñāna and Vyaṣṭi (individual)—Ajñāna. Īśvara is screened by the cosmic Ajñāna; Jīva is screened by the individual Ajñāna, so that Jīvas are many or different owing to the association with the Vyaṣṭi—Ajñāna.

The Ekajīvavādins regard Ajñāna to be one, and Antaḥkaraṇas to be many, while the Nānājīvavādins take both Ajñāna and Antaḥkaraṇa to be many.

(4) *Ābhāsavāda* — Sureśvara (also called Viśvarūpa, the great Mīmāṃsist Maṇḍanamiśra before he was converted to the Vedānta view) has promulgated the Ābhāsavāda, which has the support of the Śruti and the *Brahma-sūtras* like आभास एव च *Bra. Sū.* II-3·50, and अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् III-2·1. Sureśvara (825 A. D.) is known as Vārtikakāra, on account of his work.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārtika.

The Ābhāsavāda can best be explained by the analogy of the mirror and the appearance of the reflection of the face therein—

Face	Mirror	
—————		
(Bimba)		Apperance of face in the mirror (Pratibimba)

Now, the face seen in the mirror is very similar to the original, but is certainly different from it; it is not Asatya as it is actually perceived. The mirror must be credited with the possession of some power which enables it to project the reflection like the original but different from it. Similarly—

Ātman screened by the Ajñāna, identifies himself with the Ajñāna with the result that he knows not his real nature or the nature of the Ābhāsa. In this state Ātman can be described as the Witness, the Inner Controller and Īśvara, the cause of the world, in relation respectively with the perceptible, the external objects, and the world, that have no real existence.

In the same way, the Jīva associated with, or reflected in the Buddhi (or Antaḥkaraṇa) can be called the doer, enjoyer, knower etc. The Jīva appears to be many owing to the association with different Buddhis.

According to the Ābhāsavāda, the face in the mirror which is the resort or substratum of the reflection, is unreal and different from the original.


(5) *Pratibimbavāda*—Jīva is a reflection of the original Brahma-Caitanya. The reflection in the mirror is not really different from the original, having no separate existence as apart from the original. The mirror has the power, however, to show that the reflection is different from the original.

Sarvajñātmamuni (900 A. D.), the author of the *Samikṣeṣaśārīraka*, and Vivaraṇakāra (Prakāśātman 1200 A. D.) sponsor this view, slightly differing from each other. According to Sarvajñātmamuni, Īśvara is the Caitanya reflected in the Ajñāna and Jīva is the Caitanya reflected in the Buddhi. The Jīvas are many as the Buddhis are many.

According to Vivaraṇakāra, Īśvara is the Biṁba-Caitanya screened by Avidyā, and Jīva is the reflected Caitanya in the Ajñāna limited by the Antaḥkaraṇa etc. As the Antaḥkaraṇa and its accessories are many, the Jīvas are also many.

II. The Doctrine of the Five Kośas (Sheaths)

The connection of the Jīva with what might be called the Internal world is described in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2-5) and in the *Anandamayādhikaraṇa* (I-1. 12. 19) in the *Brahmasūtras*.



Each succeeding Kośa from Prāṇamaya onwards is described as तस्यैव शारीर आत्मा यः पूर्वस्य, that is, the Jīva becomes associated with more and more subtle entities in succession. Ānandamaya is the inmost sheath, as no further sheath is mentioned. The termination 'Maya' as applied to the sheaths means 'to be constituted of, 'having something as an attribute'. But as that sense in connection with the Ānandamaya, would make the Jīva (who is, according to the advaitins, identical with the attribute-

less Brahman) a Saṅga entity, Śaṅkara says that Maya in the case of Ānandamaya, should mean 'abundance of'. Not satisfied with this special pleading Śaṅkara gets out of the difficulty by pointing out that the concluding sentence in the Taittirīya—passage तद्ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा (where पुच्छ is to be understood as meaning 'the main prop') shows that it is the Brahman, the ultimate Reality, which the Upaniṣad-writer has in mind, and the various Upādhis associated with the various Kośas are not to be taken as real from the Pāramārthika point of view.

III. The Doctrine of the Three (or Four) states

Gauḍapāda* elucidates the three well known states associated with the Jīva thus—

- (a) Jāgrat (waking)— The Jīva is able to perceive the gross world, with the help of Upādhis, the sense-organs and the mind; the Jīva resides in the body in the right eye and is known as Viśva (or Vaiśvānara).
- (b) Svapna (dream)— The sense-organs do not function and the Jīva perceives the subtle inside by the mind, resides in the mind and is known as Taijasa.
- (c) Suṣupti (deep-sleep)—Both the sense-organs and the mind remain inactive; the Jīva experiences bliss, resides in the Hārdākāśa (heart-Ākāśa) and is known as Prājña. (The state of swoon† is not regarded as an independent state, being mid-way between deep sleep and death). In the Suṣupti state, both sense-organs and mind remain inactive and the Jīva perceives nothing.

* G. K. Prakaraṇa I.

† मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्तिः परिशेषात् । Bra. Sū. III-2-10.

Gauḍapada expounds the three states in *G. K. Prakaraṇas*. I and II, with a view to establishing the Advaita. People generally regard the Jāgrat-state as the standard by which the other two states should be judged. But there is no valid reason for this belief. We generally talk about the distinction between Sat and Asat seen in the Jāgrat-state.

Whatever is imagined by the mind is regarded as Asat, and whatever is cognised by the sense-organs outside is regarded as Sat. Popularly also, it is believed that objects within are Cittakāla (cognised by the mind, casting as long as the mind is active in that way); the objects outside are both Cittakāla (because they can be perceived only when the mind assumes their different forms, तत्तद्वाह्यवस्त्वाकार) and Indriyakāla (perceivable so long only as the sense-organs function). Anyway, it may safely be asserted that all objects, external or internal, are imagined objects in the ultimate analysis.

In the Svapna-state, the dreamer is known to experience a dream within a dream as is pointed out in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*; and the dreamer consequently is conscious of the objects inside and outside.

In other words, in both the Jāgrat and Svapna states, objects are Antaḥsthāna (residing inside) and are Cetaḥ-Kalpita (imagined by the mind). The experiences in the waking state are contradicted in the dream-state and vice versa, which shows that there can be no real or vital difference between the two states.

In the Suṣupti-state, the perception in the form 'I did not perceive anything' is due to the cessation of the effort by the mind and the sense-organs, and the absence of any objects of perception.

IV. *The Fourth (Turya) State*

The axiom, that alone can be the highest truth or reality which is the same everywhere, irrespective of different environments, is accepted by all. We have found that this state of things is absent in the three states described above. So, Gauḍapāda says that the highest Reality can only be the Fourth (Turya) state, unoriginated, changeless and uncontaminated.

In the Turya state, there is mindlessness (Amanībhāva) or mere-ness (Kevalībhāva). In the Suṣupti-state, the mind is inactive, but the Vāsanā-bījas (seeds of Desire) are still there, that is, the Amanībhāva is only temporary or incomplete. It is only when the Vāsanā-bījas are completely rooted out that the real Amanībhāva is achieved. This can come only through the realisation of the Ātman who is described as Vijnāna-ghana or the highest Samādhi (in the Suṣupti-state, the mind is at best only benumbed) or Asparśa-yoga.

V. *The different states equated with the Mātrās of Om*

Gauḍapāda utilises the idea of the four states associated with the Jīva to expound the Omkāra (or Praṇava)–Upāsanā. The Advaitins are only too glad to take note of the popular ideas, provided such ideas do not come into conflict with the ultimate reality, the oneness of Ātman or Brahman.

As we have seen above, the three states, Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti correspond to the three forms Viśva (or Vaiśvānara), Taijasa and Prājña of the Paramātman associated with the Upādhis. Now, the sacred syllable Om * also has three parts

* तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रयो वर्णा अजायन्त, अकार उकारो मकार इति तानेकधा समभरत्तदेतदो ३ मिति प्रणौत्योमिति वै स्वर्गो लोक ओमित्यसौ योज्जी तपति ।

-Aitareya Brāhmaṇa

(Continued on next page)

A, U, M (अ, उ, म्) and the worshipper of Om is in a position to realise the Highest.

Gauḍapada has dilated at great length on the correspondence between the three states and the portions or Mātrās of the Omkāra. The exposition is a curious mixture of the use of popular ideas and special pleading and the far-fetched manner in which it is done is quite apparent (The Advaitin is always ready to make use of popular beliefs, if they could be fitted in with his philosophy). †

Thus—

Omkāra	Paramātman
1. a) Has three Mātrās A, U, M.	1. a) Has three Pādas: Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña (corresponding respectively to the three states, Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti).

(Contd. from last page)

ब्रह्मणः प्रणवं कुर्यादादावन्ते च सर्वदा ।
सवत्यनोक्तं पूर्वं पुरस्ताच्च विनश्यति ॥

Manu II-74.

अकारं चाप्युकारं च मकारं च प्रजापतिः ।
वेदत्रयान्निरदुहद् भूर्भुवः स्वरितीति च ॥
एतदक्षरमेतां च जपन्व्याहृतिपूर्विकाम् ।
सन्ध्ययोर्वेदविद्विप्रो वेदपुण्येन युज्यते ॥

Manu II-76, 78.

† G. K. I. 19-29.

- b) A is the first letter of the alphabet. b) Viśva deals with the gross which is first perceived and thus resembles A.
- c) A is all-pervading. c) Viśva experiences all outside world, and so can be equated with A.

(The fruit of the Upāsanā of this Mātrā A is that the worshipper secures all his desires, and pre-eminence everywhere, as he meditates upon A as resembling or being identical with Viśva).

2. U represents excellence and links A with M. 2. Taijasa is also excellent; Taijasa perceives the subtle and is the link between Jagrat and Suṣupti.

(The fruit of the Upāsanā of U is that the worshipper secures excellence and equanimity).

3. M represents 'measuring or merging' as M merges into A and U to give the complete idea AUM; M points out the limit of ओम्.
3. Prājña lays down the limits of Viśva and Taijasa; after Suṣupti is over, Jagrat again is in the field.

(By the Upāsanā of the Mātrā M, the worshipper secures omniscience and merges temporarily into the Highest).

The worship of, or the meditation on, the three Mātrās of

Om * as the three quarters (pādas) of the Paramātman, however does not lead to the highest knowledge which consists in the realisation of the Paramātman without any Mātrās or Upādhis. According to the dictum of the *Gīta* (यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः XVII-3) the worshippers of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña could only reach their objects of worship. The worshippers of the Mātrā-less Omkāra has not to go anywhere to secure his goal; he realises himself as Brahman and is the real Muni.

This shows that unless the Jīva gets rid of all Upādhis, he could not be said to be really Mukta.† The sacred symbol Om and its Upāsana had such a great appeal to all, that philosophers had to use these concepts to suit their own views. The three Mātrās of Om came to be looked upon as the three Vedas, or the three Gods of the Trinity, Brahma, Viṣṇu and Maheśa and so forth. Gouḍapāda, points out that the Mātrā-less Om, or the Turya alone can be called the highest goal to be reached.

* The *Gīta* also says—

ॐ तत्सदिति निर्देशो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधः स्मृतः ।

ब्राह्मणास्तेन वेदाश्च यज्ञाश्च विहिताः पुरा ॥

तस्मादोमित्युदाहृत्य यज्ञदानतपःक्रियाः ।

प्रवर्तन्ते विधानोक्ताः सततं ब्रह्मवादिनाम् ॥

(XVII. 23-24)

† *The Prasnopaniṣad* says :— तदेतौ श्लोकौ भवतः—

तिस्रो मात्रा मृत्युमत्यः प्रयुक्ता अन्योन्यसक्ता अनु विप्रयुक्ताः ।

क्रियासु बाह्याभ्यन्तरमध्यमानु सम्यक्प्रयुक्तासु न कम्पते जः ॥

ऋग्भरेतं यजुर्भिरन्तरिक्षं ससामभिर्यत्तत्कवयो वदन्ते ।

तमोङ्कारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं चेति ॥

(V. 6-7)

VI. *The State of Death*

The Advaitin cannot regard the state of death as being associated with the Jīva; for the Jīva discards the major Upādhi viz, the body in that state and becomes free from his chains. But as only the realisation of the Ātman or Brahman can lead to Mokṣa, and as the law of Karman, admitted by all, must have its sway, the philosophers are agreed that the 'ignorant' Jīva goes out of the body with a subtle body (Liṅga-śarīra comprising of the subtle forms of Mahābhūtas, Jñānendriyas, Karmendriyas and Dharma and Adharma) which enables him to experience the fruits of his Karman elsewhere according to his deserts*.

Herein comes very handy the division of Brahman into Para (Higher) and Apara (Lower), the former representing the goal according to the Advaitins and the latter the popular or Paurāṇic ideas about the same. As the Paurāṇic views are very important in the Vyāvahārika state, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras* had to take notice of them and explain them away from their special point of view.

VII. *Jīva is not originated and is Nitya*

The Śruti has declared the Jīva to be Nitya and no Śruti-text exists declaring him to be a product. Jīva can therefore be declared to be either Vibhu (all-pervading) or atomic (as the atom, not capable of being split further is Nitya). The Advaitins ascribe the size of the soul to the Upādhi associated with him. It is also pointed out that the Sūtra

* This question is dealt with in Lecture IV, while discussing the nature of Mokṣa according to both the popular and philosophical points of view.

तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः (Bra-Sū II-3.29) tells us that Jīva is called or designated as *Aṅu* not that he is *Aṅu*.*

Those who regard Jīva to be atomic in size, residing in the heart-region, explain his influence over the whole body, by citing the analogy of the light (गुणाद्वा लोकवत् *Bra. Sū. II-3.25*) and the sandal-juice (व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् *Bra. Sū. II-3.26*). As the light of a lamp though placed in a corner of the room can pervade the whole room; or as the sandal-juice applied to a part of the body produces a pleasurable sensation over the whole body, so the Jīva abiding only in a part of the body, can experience the effect produced all over.

The Jains describe the Jīva as having the dimension of the body (or the middling dimension मध्यम परिमाण), but it is wrong to suppose that they regard the Jīva to be Anitya. What is meant is that the Jīva adjusts himself to the size of the body assumed by him for the time being, that is, they ascribe the size of the soul to the Upādhi of the body, which is practically the view of the advaitin himself.

VIII. Freedom of the Will

There would be no sense in the injunctions given in the Śāstras, if the Jīva has no freedom of the will and does not act

* In the Sūtra there are two तत् words. Reasonably speaking तत् should refer to one and the same thing. Śaṅkara takes the first तत् to mean बुद्धि and the second तत् to mean बुद्धिगुण (अणु). As however a Sūtra is expected to use the minimum of words, Śaṅkara's interpretation is not objectionable. As the context is obviously concerned with the dimension of the soul, the interpretation of तत् as विष्णु (Nimbarka), ज्ञान (Śrīkaṇṭha) ब्रह्मन् (or भगवद्) are not acceptable. Vijñānabhikṣu gives the best interpretation - उपाधिभूतादणुगुणसारत्वात्, अणुगुणव्यपदेशो जीवे ।

according to his judgement. The Dvaitins, however assert that the Jīva acts subject to the will of the Lord who alone dispenses the fruit of the Karman as it pleases Him. The *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa** categorically asserts that the Lord makes the Jīva act, having previously determined whether the Jīva should be taken to the higher world or pushed down to a lower world or hell (whom the Gods want to destroy, they first make him mad). As this would make the Lord an absolute Dictator, philosophers hasten to point out that the Lord does not act arbitrarily, but takes into account the doings and propensities of the Jīva.†

Any way, these matters, according to the Advaitin, are true only from the Vyāvahārika point of view, and they do not affect his basic position that the Jīva is Brahman itself.



* एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्ननिषत्,
एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमघो निनीपते (*Kau. Brā.* III-8)

† ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद् द्रष्टव्यः । यथा हि पर्जन्यो ब्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति ब्रीहियवादि वैषम्ये तु तत्तद्वीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति देव-मनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति ।

(*Ś. B.* II. 1·34)

MOKṢA - THE HIGHEST GOAL

I. *The Nature of Puruṣārtha*

According to the Śāstras, Puruṣārtha (the human goal in life) comprises (1) Dharma (Piety, duty) (2) Artha (Material prosperity) (3) Kāma (Desire, love) and (4) Mokṣa (Liberation). It is the duty of every one to endeavour to do full justice to the above four, to the best of his ability. Mokṣa is the most important of the four constituents of Puruṣārtha; in fact, the word Puruṣārtha is used by the philosophers to connote Mokṣa only.* Saṃsāra or worldly life is prominently associated with misery of all kinds and liberation from it is naturally productive of bliss or Ānanda. Further, it is conceded that this Ānanda must not be a temporary phase not worth aiming at. So, there is a general agreement that Mokṣa must be something permanent, eternal and changeless.

II. *Popular Views about the Highest Goal*

Popularly, Svarga (Heaven, Paradise) is regarded as the highest goal to be reached after death. In the Svargaloka, there is no misery of any kind and all pleasures can be had merely for the asking. The Gods there are immune from hunger and thirst. The Vidūṣaka in Kālidāsa's drama *Vikramorvaśīya* ‡ speaks

* पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दादिति बादरायणः

(*Bra. Sū. IV. 1 - 1*)

‡ नाश्नते न पीयते केवलमनिमिषनयनैर्मत्स्यैरिव स्थीयते ।

• *Act III.*

disparagingly of the denizens of heaven, as they neither eat nor drink but merely stay on with winkless eyes like fish ! *The Kauṣītaki* * apparently describes the popular views in this matter in an elaborate manner as follows :—

The Jīva by virtue of the meritorious deeds performed by him, travels after death by the Devayāna path to the Brahma-loka, passing on the way through Agniloka, Vāyuloka, Indraloka and Prajāpatiloka.

The Brahmaloika has the following important landmarks :—

(1) There is on the outskirts the lake Āra which the Jīva crosses by the mind; those Jīvas who have not fully grasped the highest reality sink here. Here the Jīva encourages the Yeṣṭihas (Moments) and the river Virajā. The Yeṣṭihas make way for him. When he has reached the Virajā he ceases to become old; on crossing the Virajā, he shakes off his good and evil deeds—the good deeds go to his dear relatives and the evil deeds are transferred to his enemies. The Jīva then proceeds to the Brahmaloika without any delay.

(2) The tree Ilya (or Tilya) – Here enters into the Jīva, the Gandha (fragrance) of Brahman.

(3) The city Sārajya – Here enters into the Jīva the Rasa (flavour) of Brahman.

(4) The palace Aparājita – Here enters the Tejas (lustre) of Brahman.

(5) Indra and Prajāpati, the two Door-keepers make way for the Jīva.

(6) The hall Vibha – Here the glory of Brahman enters into the Jīva.

* Adh. I. 3.5.

(7) The throne (Āsandi) Vicakṣaṇā (Far-shining) with the two forefeet, Bṛhatsāman and Rathantarasāman, the two hind feet, Śaitya and Naudhasa, the two lengthwise pieces, Vairūpa and Vairāja; the two crosspieces, Śakvara and Raivata. It is also known as Prajñā (Intelligence).

(8) The couch Amitaujas (Resplendent beyond measure) also known as Prāṇa – Its two fore feet are the past and the future; the hind feet, prosperity and food; the two head pieces. Bhadra and Yajñāyajñīya (Sāmans); the two lengthwise pieces, the Bṛhat and Rathantara sāmans; (these also are the fore feet of the throne Vicakṣaṇā); the binding lengthwise cords, Ṛk and Sāman verses; the cross cords, the sacrificial Yajus – formulas, the spread out cords, the Soma-stems; the bolster, the Udgītha; the pillow, Śrī.

The Brahmaloaka has among its denizens, the two ladies. Mānasī and Cākṣuṣī engaged in weaving the worlds with flowers, Apsarases, Mothers, Nurses, Junior Mothers etc. On entering the precincts of Brahmaloaka, the Jīva is greeted by five hundred Apsarases – one hundred with fruits in their hands; one hundred carrying ointments; one hundred with garlands; one hundred with vestments; one hundred with aromatics and the Jīva is adorned with the decorations of Brahma.

The Jīva then walking slowly and with due deference is ushered into the presence of Brahmā seated on the throne and is subjected to some sort of cross-examination as under—

Brahmā
Who are you ?

Jīva
I am Ṛtu, connected with
Ṛtus (seasons) born of Akāśa,
then transformed into
semen. I am the Ātman of
every being. What you are,
this am I.

- Who am I ? You are Satya.
- What is the Satya ? The Sat is different from sense-organs and the Prāṇas which are Tya. Satya is the Real and all-pervading. You are all this.
- How do you acquire my masculine names ? By Prāṇas (Prāṇa is masculine).
- How do you acquire my feminine names ? By the Vāk (Fem. gender).
- How do you acquire my neuter names ? By the Manas (Neut. gender).
- How do you acquire the odours? By the Prāṇa.
- How do you acquire the forms ? By the Eye.
- How do you acquire the sounds? By the Ear.
- How do you acquire the food juices ? By the tongue.
- How do you acquire the actions? By the Hands.
- How do you acquire pleasure and pain ? By the Body.
- How do you acquire bliss, delight and procreation ? By the organ of generation.
- How do you acquire the movements ? By the feet.
- How do you acquire thought, knowable and desire ? By Prajñā, waters (elements and actions).

Brahmā then says – This world is yours – In this way, whatever conquest or attainment Brahma has, he conquers that and attains to that.

We have given this long extract from the *Kauṣītaki*, which is a crude mixture of fancy and fantasy in an endeavour to take Earth up to Heaven and to transplant earthly notions and superstitions there, to show that some Upaniṣadic writers were not averse to draw upon their fertile imagination. As would be shown later on, the writers of Purāṇas go all out to describe Heaven, according to their cherished notions, in a more comprehensive manner.

The extract from the *Kauṣītaki* is more interested apparently in describing the movements of the 'wise' Jīva entitled to stay in the Brahmaloḳa and does not describe the Devayāna path in detail. The *Brahmasūtras* make an attempt to give an over-all picture of the Devayāna by carefully considering other passages found in the Upaniṣads and also describe the Pitryāna (meant for use by those who are not as yet fit for Mokṣa) and the Third Place (or hell to which the unrighteous are driven).

The *Brahmasūtras* thus describe the journey after death – At the time of death Vāk (the functioning of the Vāk and the sense-organs) merges into Manas; Manas along with the sense-organs is connected with the Prāṇa ; Prāṇa with the Tejas (connected with the other elements).--So far in the case of both the Vidvat (wise) and the Avidvat (ignorant) the same procedure takes effect. From here onwards their paths differ.

The Vidvat goes out by the 101st Nāḍī in the head. As he is all along favoured by the Paramātman, he is able to choose the right Nāḍī.

The Avidvat goes out by any other Nāḍī.

III. The Devayāna Path *

The Jīva taking to the Devayāna is successively guided on his course by :

- (1) Arcis (Fire, Agniloka)
- (2) Day.
- (3) Bright fortnight.

(4) Uttarāyaṇa (December 21st to June 20th. There is reason to believe that the Uttarāyaṇa was taken at some remote time to be the period between June and December or to begin with the Śravaṇa asterism (August) long before the Mahābhārata war, 3000 B. C.) —the six months when the Sun takes to a northerly course.

- (5) Year.
- (6) Vāyu (Devaloka)
- (7) Āditya.

(8) Chandramas (the Moon)— It is worth noting that the Upaniṣad-writers place the Moon higher up or more distant than the Sun.

(9) Vidyut (Lightning)— at this stage, the Śruti uses the expression (अमानवः पुरुषः) एतान्ब्रह्म गमयति but the context shows that the preceding members of the series do the same job. So No.s 1-8, Arcis etc., must be taken to mean 'the supervising deities' who alone can act as guides to the Jīva.

* The word Devayāna itself means 'the path of, or leading to, or used by, the Gods'. But the expression देवयानः पन्थाः is more frequently used, though really tautologous.

- (10) Varuṇa
- (11) Indra
- (12) Prajāpati
- (13) Brahman (Brahmaloaka)

According to Bādari, the worshippers of Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmadeva) go by the Devayāna path. When the Brahmaloaka is destroyed at the Mahāpraṇaya, the Jīva reaches Brahman.

Jaimini holds that Brahmaloaka is eternal and is not the world of Brahmdeva as popularly understood.

Bādarāyaṇa says that the worshippers of (or meditators on) the Paramātman alone go by the Devayāna path. The worshippers of Brahman under a symbol (Pratīka), secure only a limited objective, as also the Yogins.

As regards the nature of Mokṣa secured by the Jīva using the Devayāna path, it is stated that the Jīva manifests himself in his true form, with the natural attributes 'having all the sins destroyed ', ' having all his wishes fulfilled ' etc.

Jaimini says that as the Śruti describes Jīva as associated with eating, sporting etc., he cannot have only Vijñāna or Prajñāna as his nature.

Auḍulomi says that as the Jīva is definitely described as Prajñānaghana eva (प्रज्ञानघन एव), the qualities अपहतपाप्मादि, सत्यसंकल्पत्व must be understood as implying 'the absence of qualities opposed to them'.

Bādarāyaṇa points out that the views of both Jaimini and Auḍulomi are in accordance with the Śruti. The Jīva secures

whatever he wants by his mere thought (Saṁkalpa); no one can boss over him, he is self-ruler (Svarāt) (this however does not mean that the over-all supremacy of the Paramātman is questioned or repudiated).

According to Bādari, the liberated Jīva has no body and sense-organs; Jaimini holds exactly the opposite view. Bādarāyaṇa tries to reconcile both the views, saying that the Jīva can have a body or not, according to his will. For instance, the Jīva can even create Piṭṛloka etc., for his enjoyment if he wills to do so. He, of course, cannot participate in the activity connected with the creation etc. of the world, which is the privilege of the Highest alone. There is extreme similarity (Parama sāmya) between the Jīva and the Paramātman which means that he is privileged to realise the Highest, that is all.

IV. *The Piṭṛyāna*

The Avidvat (Ignorant, who has not realised the Highest) who has Iṣṭa (sacrificial performances) Pūrta (charitable deeds) to his credit, and who has performed duly the various Karmans enjoined by the Śāstras in consonance with the requirements associated with Varnāśrama (castes and stages of life) Dharma—he is not entitled to go by the Devayāna path. He has to take to the Piṭṛyāna—

After going out of the body by way of any Nāḍī the Jīva goes successively through the following stages—

- (1) Dhūma (Smoke)
- (2) Rātri (Night)
- (3) Dark fortnight

(4) Dakṣiṇāyana (Six months when the Sun takes to the Southernly course).

(1-4 refer to the supervising Deities thereof.)

(5) The Moon.

The Avidvat stays in the Moon, till his enjoyment of his ripe Karmans is over, but he has to return to this world for being reborn, to experience the fruits of the remaining Karmans in the following manner.

- (1) Ākāśa
- (2) Vāyu
- (3) Dhūma
- (4) Abhra (cloud)
- (5) Megha (Raining cloud)
- (6) Rain
- (7) Crops
- (8) Semen
- (9) Yoni of a Woman

The Jīva does not become identical with these, but is similar to or closely associated with them. The Jīva returns with his Liṅga-śarīra (subtle body consisting of the subtle forms of Jñānendriyas, Karmendriyas, Prāṇas, Manas and Buddhi).

V. The Third Place (Yamaloka)

Sinful Jīvas go to Yamaloka to suffer the penalty of their evil deeds. Yama assigns them to different hells, (Raurava etc., seven of these are referred to in the *Brahmasūtras*) according

to their deserts, and afterwards they are reborn as worms, insects etc., in this world *. The writers of Purāṇas describe in an elaborate manner the tortures undergone by such Jīvas in the hells, under the supervision of Yama and his officers. The gruesome details given are obviously intended to frighten the Jīvas on the earth about their future and to ensure that they behave themselves strictly in accordance with their duties as enjoined by the Śāstras.

The description of the three kinds of Jīvas after death, found in the Upaniṣadic literature takes note of the various superstitions and popular ideas current now and then. The writers of Purāṇas took advantage of the support of the Śruti and presented to the reader a fanciful picture in this respect, especially when the different sects, Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava etc., came into prominence.

Thus we are told that the Śivalok is situated at the Kailāsa mountain; Śiva occupies his seat with his consort Pārvati, his sons Kārtikeya and Gaṇeśa, Nandin, the bull-vehicle. Śiva's hosts (Gaṇas) are there singing the glory of their Lord. Śiva sends his envoys to escort the Jīvas who are his devotees, to the Kailāsa.

Similarly, Viṣṇu stays at Vaikuṅṭha where Viṣṇu with all his decorations is found in the company of Lakṣmi, Nārada, Tumbura and other favourite disciples. The devotees of Viṣṇu are escorted after death, by the Viṣṇudūtas.

The Jīvas stay in the company of Śiva or Viṣṇu as long as they are permitted to do so by the grace of their Lords. (The

* Read also the article 'Devayāna and Pitṛyāna' published in the Proceedings of the All India Oriental Conference session at Madras (1923), written by R. D. Karmarkar.

Purāṇa- writers love to describe the quarrels between the Viṣṇudūtas and Śivadūtas as to who are entitled to escort the Jīva and whereto, it not being apparently clear whether he was a devotee of Śiva or Viṣṇu!).

VI. The nature of Mokṣa according to the Advaitin

Anyway, there is a general agreement that the state of Mukti or Mokṣa must be free from all pain and full of eternal delight.

The *Taittirīya - Upaniṣad* (II-8) gives the measure of Brahmānanda as follows—

The delight of a human being, young, well behaved, strong, powerful, full of faith, the master of the whole earth, full of every kind of wealth may be taken as a unit of measure*.

Then मनुष्यगंधर्व — आनन्दः = 100 मानुष—आनन्दः

देवगंधर्व—आनन्दः = 100 ²	”	”
चिरलोकपितृ—आनन्दः = 100 ³	”	”
आजानजदेव—आनन्दः = 100 ⁴	”	”
कर्मदेव—आनन्दः = 100 ⁵	”	”
देव—आनन्दः = 100 ⁶	”	”
इन्द्र—आनन्दः = 100 ⁷	”	”
बृहस्पति—आनन्दः = 100 ⁸	”	”
प्रजापति—आनन्दः = 100 ⁹	”	”
ब्रह्मानन्दः = 100 ¹⁰	”	”

* See the article 'The measure of Brahmānanda' by R. D. Karmā published in *E. O. R. I. Annals*, Vol. XXVIII Pp 281-288.

(A Śrotrīya, well-versed in the Vedas and free from desires, is entitled to Brahmānanda. According to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV-3-33) Brahmānanda is only 100° मानुष—आनन्दs).

Some Śruti texts speak of the four-fold mukti, सालोक्य (residence in the same world where the Lord resides), सारूप्य (having the same form as that of the Lord), सामीप्य (being always near the Lord), सायुज्य or कैवल्य (being merged in the Lord)*.

It is clear from what has been said so far that Mokṣa is in some way or other, believed to be associated with—

1. Something to be acquired anew,
2. actual travel to some other region,
3. abandonment of blemishes and acquisition of a better state by the process of polishing,
4. the agency of Yoga, Karman, Upāsanā etc, enabling one to reach the state of Mokṣa.

The Advaitin points out that the above conceptions about Mokṣa would make a mockery of Mokṣa by declaring it to be Anitya. Whatever happens, Mokṣa must be a changeless, eternal state in any circumstances. Mokṣa is 'becoming Brahman itself' and as Brahman is all-pervading, its nature is always there, already secured, like the Ākāṣa.

1. Brahman (or Mokṣa) therefore, cannot be Āpya (to be secured anew).

2. Mokṣa cannot be Utpādyā (to be produced) for the same reasons; for Utpādyatva involves some *Kriyā* (activity) or other, by the mind, tongue or the body—

* *Muktikopaniṣad* 1.17—25.

- (a) Silent meditation (Dhyāna) involves a mental activity.
 (b) Muttering of prayers is not possible without the activity of Vāk.
 (c) Movement by the Devayāna or the Pitṛyāna or to hell, involves the activity of the subtle body*.

(3) Mokṣa cannot be subject to modification of any kind; it must be Avikārya; if it is otherwise, it is bound to be non-eternal. What can be modified or attains to a new state is known to be Anitya.

So, all the above three concepts which make Mokṣa a transient affair, cannot be accepted.

(4) It might be argued that in that case, Mokṣa should be accepted as Saṃskārya (something to be refined or polished)

* The nine-fold devotion process followed by the Vaiṣṇavas—

श्रवणं कीर्तनं विष्णोः स्मरणं पादसेवनम् |
 अर्चनं वन्दनं दास्यं सख्यमात्मनिवेदनम् ||

involves the activity by the mind, tongue (sense-organs) or the body.

1. श्रवणम् — Hearing the glories of Viṣṇu (the ear functions)
2. कीर्तनम् — Singing „ „ „ „ (the Vak „)
3. स्मरणम् — Pondering over „ „ „ (the Mind „)
4. पादसेवनम् — Saluting the feet of the Lord
5. अर्चनम् — Worshipping
6. वन्दनम् — Prostrating before the Lord
7. दास्यम् — Regarding oneself as the servant of the Lord
(the mind and the body)
8. सख्यम् — Friendship with the Lord (— the mind)
9. आत्मनिवेदनम् — Complete surrender to the Lord
(— all the three, mind, tongue and the body)

which would make the original state more alluring. This also would not hold water. Thus—

Refinement is possible in two ways – (a) by securing some additional good qualities or (b) by getting rid of blemishes. In either case, the basic idea that Mokṣa or Brahmabhāva admits of no excess and is always pure is abandoned. Neither can it be said that the Mokṣa-state which is screened is manifested by the refinement-process and does not involve any addition or subtraction, like a mirror manifesting its original refulgence by being polished; for, Ātman can never be subjected to any *Kriyā* which by its very nature is bound to produce some modification, and any *Kriyā*, that does not involve the Ātman can have no effect upon the Ātman. Operations like the bath, sipping of water etc., affect the body or something superimposed on the Ātman by Avidyā.

Atman or Brahman cannot be realised by having recourse to some *Kriyā* or Saṁskāra.

VII. Jñāna and Kriyā are quite different

If the objector were to argue that Jñāna is also a kind of *Kriyā* - it is mental no doubt, but it *is* *Kriyā*, all the same - and so, Jñāna cannot be regarded as different from *Kriyā*, the answer is :—

Jñāna and *Kriyā* are different; thus – *Kriyā* (even a mental *Kriyā* like Dhyāna or Cintana) is dependent on a person who may or may not indulge in it at his will. Jñāna is wholly concerned with the object as it is (*Vastu-tantra*); it is not controlled by any Śāstric injunction or a man's whim.

VIII. The real purpose served by the Śāstric injunctions and prohibitions.

There are Śruti-texts like ‘ Ātman should be seen, heard

etc.', but these are only meant to dissuade a person from indulging in his natural propensities to run after the non-Ātman and to direct his attention to the inmost Ātman or Brahman. The Śruti, therefore, rightly points out that the Ātmatattva is Aheya (not capable of being abandoned) and Anupādeya (not to be acquired anew). As a matter of fact, it is a feather in the cap of the Jñānin that once Brahman is realised, there is the abandonment of everything that is popularly regarded as Kartavya (something to be done) and there is the fulfilment of all desires. The Ātman is always changeless and eternal (Kūṭasthanitya).

It is true that the Śruti-texts, by and large have always a purpose (Prayojana) in view, to which the Kriyā indicated leads. In the case of the instruction about the Ātman, the purpose refers to the cessation of false knowledge which is the cause of Saṁsāra.

The Śruti-texts like 'A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed' do not advocate any Kriyā or refer to any means for some activity (Kriyā-sādhana); they are intended for prohibiting a person from doing something. In the same way, the passage 'Ātman should be seen etc.', means that one should be indifferent to what is not Ātman. Even in bold statements like 'This is a rope, not a serpent' there does exist some Prayojana viz, the removal of fear from the mind of a person who thinks that he has seen a serpent. So, any instruction even about a Bhūtavastu (already existing) is not meaningless.

IX. *The Ātmajñānin and Avidvat*

Some argue that the Ātmajñānin (one who has realised the Ātman) and the Avidvat (one immersed in Saṁsāra).

are actually found to be associated with the practical dealings in the world. This is on the face of it impossible. You cannot envisage any state of things where both the Jñānin and the Avidvat act with the same spirit and in the same way. This is the difference between the two :—

<i>Jñānin</i>	<i>Avidvat</i>
1. He has got rid of the Mithyābhimāna (wrong identification with the body etc.) and so,	1. He identifies himself with the body etc., and even with outside objects; and so,
2. acts like a Sthitaprajña, experiencing no pleasure or pain	2. experiences pleasure or pain.

The Jñānin and the Avidvat act on different planes altogether. A Parivrājaka who is free from all desires is not miserable even if he is robbed of whatever belongs to him, which is certainly not the case with a rich man of the world. The Vidvat or Jñānin can be regarded as being without a body, even when he is alive. He has no Abhimāna for the body, hence is not touched either by Priya (agreeable) or Apriya (not agreeable).*

As the Ātman is one without a second, all Abhimāna for the non-Ātman can be declared to be false and nothing else. What is called Gauṇa Abhimāna can take place (as in the case of 'Vāhika is a bull') only when there are two different objects, but such is not the case here.

X. Ātmavidyā and Karman lead to different goals

Mokṣa, which is the goal to be reached by the Ātmavidyā

*अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः | (Cha. 8-12-1)

is not directly or indirectly connected with Karman or Kriyā. The fruit of Karman is Dharma which could be secured by following the injunctions of the Śāstras faithfully, and by avoiding Adharma as described in the Scriptures. The fruit of Karman admits of increase, decrease or excess. The fruit of Ātmavidyā is only the removal of obstacles in the way of the acquisition of Mokṣa which is always the same, partless, changeless etc. There is no question about excess, refinement, special form of worship in the case of Mokṣa which is just the Jīva's own nature when the screen put up by Avidyā is removed.

XI. Misconception about Advaita refuted.

(a) It appears to be quite easy to attack and ridicule the Advaita idea which speaks of the Highest to be without any attributes (just like a stone, so to speak) and the world as a dream in the face of our actual experience to the contrary. Dr. Johnson, representing the view of the man in the street, attacked Berkley's idealism remarking, 'When Berkely said, and proved there was no matter, it was no matter what Berkely said'. Similarly, a man of the world today might say about Śaṅkara, 'When Śaṅkara said, and proved that the world is a dream, it was just a dream that Śaṅkara dreamt'.

The following story about a Benares Pundit well-versed in the Advaita philosophy makes the position of the Advaitin clear. The Pundit was one day walking through the very narrow lanes of Benares (for which even now Benares is notorious) when he saw a big elephant coming from the opposite direction. The Pundit without a moment's hesitation turned back and took to his heels. A spectator noting the plight of the Pundit whom he knew, slightly exclaimed, 'Punditji, what is all this scare about? You are an

Advaitin, believing the world to be Mithyā, why then this running away ?” The Pundit calmly replied, ‘My dear sir ! The world is Mithyā, but do you not see that my running away is also equally Mithyā ? ’

In other words the world is a dream, or Mithyā, so long as the realisation of the Ātman or Brahman has not taken place.

(b) It is pointed out by the opponents of Advaita, that people want Mokṣa to be a state, where they would be enjoying bliss and experience no misery. But according to the Advaitin, there is total destruction of one’s individuality in the Mokṣa state. One would be justified in keeping away from such a Mokṣa at all costs, and in making no effort to secure it*.

Advaitin--Your notions about the Mokṣa favoured by the Advaitins are all wrong. We believe that the Mokṣa is an inexhaustible store of bliss and there is no association with the non-Ātman of any kind; it is a goal well worth striving for.

(c) The objector — If the Highest goal is without any attributes, what scope is there for any one to achieve the same? What use are the injunctions and prohibitions in the Śrūtis and the Smṛtis which are revered by all ?

* निरस्ताखिलदुःखोऽहमनन्तानन्दभाक् स्वराट् ।
 भवेयमिति मोक्षार्थी श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते ॥
 अहमर्थविनाशश्चेन्मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्यति ।
 अपसर्पेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावगन्धतः ॥
 मयि नष्टेऽपि मत्तोऽन्या काचिज्ज्ञप्तिरवस्थिता ।
 इति तत्प्राप्तये यत्नः कस्यापि न भविष्यति ॥

Śrī Bhāṣya I—1-1.

The Advaitin — To make matters clear, we are prepared to concede that there are two Brahmans, the Higher and the Lower.

The Higher Brahman represents the Pāramārthika state where the Vedas, Śāstras etc. serve no purpose.

The Lower Brahman representing the Vyāvahārika state, affords ample scope for any one according to his ability to strive for the goal of his choice. It is of course understood that the person concerned follows the course of conduct prescribed in the Śāstras that are based on the Śruti-texts. He has full liberty to meditate upon, or worship any deity he likes, provided he understands that all this is just a preparatory stage to enable him to reach the Higher Brahman. The task is not easy; it might be necessary for him to go through several births before he reaches the goal *. The Śrutis and Smṛtis, out of compassion for the common man have chalked out an easier course for him which he would do well to follow scrupulously.

The Advaitin thus stands for universal brotherhood; his motto is — Live, and let live. He has no reason to hate any ideology but he has no truck with the non-Vedic systems which do not believe in the Soul or re-birth.

The Materialists or Cārvākas (who are the cultural descendants of Virocana-Asura referred to in Cha. VIII-7) appear to be at present becoming stronger and nations are vying with one another to achieve material progress in all directions—

* अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् । Gita VI-45.

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान्मां प्रपद्यते ॥ Gita VII-19.

मनुष्याणां सहस्रेषु कश्चिद्यतति सिद्धये ।

यततामपि सिद्धानां कश्चिन्मां वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ॥

thus we are told about the schemes to colonise the Moon, Mars and other planets, aeroplanes cruising at the speed of two thousand miles an hour thus beating the Sun in his course round the earth, the nuclear and hydrogen bombs capable of destroying the whole earth in a few minutes, halting stations far up in the sky etc. One is tempted to ask what then, what further? (Tataḥ kim, tataḥ kim)*. Spiritual values are at a discount, and unless serious efforts are made to strike a proper balance between material progress and spiritual or moral rearmament, the world might come to a disastrous end. For the present there is no satisfactory answer to the query Tataḥ Kim; for the oracles are dumb.

* प्राप्ता श्रियः सकलकामजुषस्ततः किं
दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किम् ।
सन्तपिताः प्रणयिनो विभवैस्ततः किं
कल्पं स्थितं तनुभूतां तनुभिस्ततः किम् ॥

Appendix I

The role of Analogy in Advaita philosophy

The Vedāntins including the Advaitins admit six Pramāṇas— (1) Pratyakṣa (Direct perception) (2) Anumāna (Inference) (3) Upamāna (Analogy) (4) Śabda (Word) (5) Arthāpatti (presumption) and (6) Anupalabdhi (non-perception). The Purāṇa-writers admit two more (7) sām̐bhava (inclusion), (8) Aitiḥya (tradition). Two more (9) Ceṣṭā (sign) and (10) Pariśeṣa (elimination) are also admitted by some.

As regards the other Darśanakāras—

(1) The Cārvākas admit only Pratyakṣa (2) Bauddhas and Jains admit Pratyakṣa and Anumāna (Śabda is included in Anumāna so also Upamāna and others). (3) Viśiṣṭādvaitins admit Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda (The Sāṅkhyas and Pātañjalas do the same). (4) The Naiyāyikas (as also Māheśvaras) admit Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. (5) Some Mimāṃsakas add Arthāpatti, some both Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi to the four admitted by the Naiyāyikas.

Actually, the Highest according to the Advaitins is imperceptible to the senses and is not possessed of any attributes or particularities, and so, only Śabda (or Śruti) can be of some use in understanding Advaita. Analogy also, if used with proper care and under adequate safe-guards can give us a general idea of the Advaita in accordance with the rule दृष्टाच्च अदृष्टसिद्धिः (one can come to know of the unseen with the help of the seen). The *Upaniṣads* and the

Brahmasūtras have frequently resorted to analogical illustrations effectively to prove their points of view.

There is obviously every danger of the cult of analogy being misused or abused. Śāṅkara in his comments on *Bra-Sū. III-2-20* while referring to the Sūryaka (Sun's reflection) illustration in *Bra-Sū. III-2-18*, clarifies the true role of Analogy in a convincing manner. Here are Śāṅkara's Obiter dicta in this connection*. Likewise in his comments† on *Bra-Sū. II-3-40*, Śāṅkara emphasises that only a particular characteristic or particular characteristics are intended for consideration when one compares two objects. It is ridiculous to expect that the two objects compared should be on all fours in every respect; if that were so, there would be identity between them. Comparison is not identity.

It goes without saying that great care has to be taken to interpret analogies. The context, the intention of the writer or

* युक्त एव त्वयं दृष्टान्तो विवक्षितांशसंभवात् | न हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः
 वचनचिह्नचिद्विद्विक्षितांशं मुक्त्वा सर्वसारूप्यं केनचिद् दर्शयितुं शक्यते | सर्व
 सारूप्ये हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभावोच्छेद एव स्यात् | न चेदं स्वमनीषया जलसूर्य-
 कादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनम् | किं पुनरत्र विवक्षितं सारूप्यमिति | तदुच्यते - वृद्धि-
 न्हास-भाक्त्वम् | जलगतं हि सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बं जलवृद्धौ वर्धते, जलन्हासे न्हसति,
 जल चलने चलति, जलभेदे भिद्यते इत्येवं जलधर्मानुयायि भवति न तु
 परमार्थतः सूर्यस्य तथात्वमस्ति | एवं परमार्थतोऽविकृतमेकरूपमपि सद्ब्रह्म
 देहाद्युपाध्यन्तर्भावाद्भ्रजत इवोपाधि-धर्मान्वृद्धिन्हासादीन् । एवमुभयोर्दृष्टान्त-
 दार्ष्टान्तिकयोः सामञ्जस्यादविरोधः ।

† तद्दृष्टान्तप्रचैतावतांशेन द्रष्टव्यः । तथा हि विशिष्टेषु तद्व्याप-
 दिव्यापारेष्वपेक्ष्यैव प्रतिनियतानि करणानि वास्यादीनि कर्ता भवति । स्वशरीरेण
 त्वकर्तृव । एवमयमात्मा सर्वव्यापारेष्वपेक्ष्यैव मन आदीनि करणानि कर्ता भवति
 स्वात्मना त्वकर्तृव ।

speaker, must be given due weight in order to understand the implications and limitations of analogical illustrations.

We give here the various analogies used in the *Brahmasūtras* together with the relevant extracts from the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on them. The analogies cover a wide field; they are taken from the Śruti and Mīmāṃsā works, and popular and superstitious notions are not excluded. Different Bhāṣyakāras interpret them to suit their own cherished views as is to be expected. Śaṅkara on the whole interprets the analogies in a fair manner but takes care to remind the reader now and then that the analogies after all take note of the Vyāvahārika point of view only and must not be taken at their face value.

Śaṅkara is in a far better position on account of his advocacy of Lower and Higher Brahman and the consequential Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika states, and is able to do full justice to the conflicting Śruti passages without sacrificing his main thesis. Other Bhāṣyakāras representing Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śuddhādvaita etc., have either to ignore several Śruti-texts or to offer unconvincing explanations.

Incidentally, the reader would find in the passages quoted below from the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, ample material to understand correctly Śaṅkara's Advaita philosophy —

1.वामदेवत् | (Bra-Sū I. 1.30)

Indra perceives his Ātman as the Paramātman like Vāmadeva (यथा 'तद्धेतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वाग्मिदेवः प्रतिपेदे, अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च |')

2.व्योमवच्च | (I. 2.7)

Brahman, though all pervading is referred to as atomic etc.,

for the purpose of Upāsana, like Vyoman (Ākāśa)— (यथा सर्वगतमपि सद्व्योम सूचीपाशाद्यपेक्षयार्भकीकोऽणीयश्च व्यपदिश्यते, एवं ब्रह्मापि ।).

3. चमसवत् (I. 4. 8)

In अजामेकां (Śve-4. 5) there is no special reason seen to say that Ajā refers to the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna, like Camasa (यथा हि 'अर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्ववृध्नः' (Br. 2.2.3) इत्यस्मिन्मन्त्रे स्वातन्त्र्येणायं नामासौ चमसोऽभिप्रेत इति न शक्यते निरूपयितुम्। एवमिहाप्यविशेषोऽजामे-कामित्यस्य मन्त्रस्य ।)

4.मध्वादिवत् (I. 4.10)

The word Ajā in the Mantra 'Ajāmekām' does not mean 'a ram'; it is only a कल्पनोपदेश, like Madhu etc., [यथा, आदित्यस्या-मधुनो मधुत्वम् (Cha. 3-1) वाचश्चाधेनोर्धेतुत्वम् (Br. 5-8), द्युलोकादीनां चानग्नीनामग्नित्वम् (Br. 8-9)]. The unborn (Anajā) Prakṛti is looked upon as Ajā (female ram).

5. दृश्यते तु । (II. 1. 6)

The world, though different, being Acetana from Brahman, can still have Brahman as its Prakṛti because such is the experience in the world (चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिः, अचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनाम्) Hair, nails, etc., (which are Acetana) are produced from the Cetana beings; scorpions etc., that are Cetana are produced from the Acetana Cowdung etc.

6.लोकवत् (I. 11.13)

The division in the form of Bhoktr (enjoyer) and Bhogyā (object of enjoyment) is well-known in the world (भोक्ता चेतनः

शारीरः, भोग्याः शब्दादयो विषयाः इति । यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तो भोग्य ओदन इति) Though the sea and water are one, (both being water) the mutual difference in the case of foam, waves, billows etc., is experienced (उपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्बुपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्र तरङ्गादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम् ।)

6A, तदनन्यत्व... (II, 1.14)

(The Sūtra does not directly refer to any analogy, it refers to *Chā. VI. 1.1*, where the analogies of मृत्पिण्ड, लोह and नखनिकृन्तन are given to show how एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् is possible. Śaṅkara says तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वम्; यथा च मृगतृणिकोदकादीनामूपरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात्स्वरूपेणा नुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।)

7. पटवच्च (II, 4.19)

Kārya is not different from the Kāraṇa. The Kārya which was Avyakta and Aspaṣṭa before, becomes Vyakta and Spaṣṭa through the causal operation, that is all, like the piece of cloth rolled up (when we cannot say whether it is a piece of cloth definitely), and spread out (when we are sure of its being a piece of cloth of a particular size and shape) तन्त्वादिकारणावस्थं पटादिकार्यमस्पष्टं सत् तुरीवेमकुविन्दादि कारक-व्यापारादिभिर्व्यक्तं स्पष्टं गृह्यते ।)

8. यथा च प्राणादि । (II, 1.20)

Kārya is not different from Kāraṇa though the actual operations of the two are different. Just as the vital breaths (Prāṇa, and Apāna etc.) cease functioning when they are

controlled by the Yoga process, only the Jivana-Kārya continuing; but when the control is removed, the additional functions, contraction and expansion etc., take place, but that does not make any change in the Prāṇas as such (न च प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः प्राणादन्यत्वं समीरणस्वभावाविशेषात् । एवं कार्यस्य कारणादन्यत्वम् ।)

9. अश्मादिवच्च (II. 1.23)

Even though Brahman is one, there is the Kārya-vaicitrya due to the distinction of Jiva and Prājña, like the stone etc.; all stones, jewels, Sun-stones and ordinary stones, are really not different, being possessed of the genus, Pṛthivī (earth-ness), but their functions can be different. (यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्विता-नामप्यश्मनां केचिन्महार्हा मणयो वज्रवैडूर्यादयोऽन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः सूर्यकान्तादयोऽन्ये प्रहीणाः श्ववायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणा इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते ।

यथा चैकपृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि बीजानां बहुविधं पत्रपुष्पफलगन्धरसादि-वैचित्र्यं चन्दनकिपाकादिषूपलक्ष्यते ।

यथा चैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि केशलोमादीनि च विचित्राणि कार्याणि भवन्ति ।

एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यते ।)

10. क्षीरवद्वि । (II. 1.24)

Brahman can create the world, without depending upon any external help, as the milk transforms itself into curds, by its very nature, without any external aid (which might merely help in bringing about the required result more quickly). (एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात्क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते । यथा हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं तथेहापि (ब्रह्म जगत्कारणम्, इत्यत्र) भविष्यति ।

11. देवादिवदपि लोके । (II. 1. 25)

The gods etc., are able to create various objects, high and low, through mere contemplation, without any external aid, as they are possessed of special power (aiśvarya-viśeṣa). Brahman similarly can create the world on its own. (यथा लोके देवाः पितर ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्यैव किञ्चिद्वाह्यंसाधन-मैश्वर्यविशेषयोगादमिध्यानमात्रेण स्वत एव बहूनि नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि च रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासप्रामाण्यात् । तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तुन्सृजति । बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते । पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते । एवं चेतनमपि ब्रह्मानपेक्ष्य वाह्यं साधनं स्वत एव जगत्स्रक्ष्यति ।)

12. लोकवत्तु लीलार्कवत्यम् । (II. 1.33)

Īśvara creates the world, as a matter of sport, not for the sake of achieving anything; for, Īśvara has already secured every thing. We find that such लीलारूप-प्रवृत्ति is found in the worldly affairs as well, in the case of kings etc. (यथा लोके कस्य-चिदाप्तैषणस्य वा व्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमनभिसंधाय केवलं लीलारूपाः प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति, यथा चोद्ध्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसंधाय वाह्यं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनं स्वभावादेव संभवन्ति, एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति ।

13. पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि । (II. 2.3)

The Sāṅkhya opponent argues that the Acetana Pradhāna can be active for the sake of Puruṣa just as the Acetana milk comes out of the teats of a cow naturally to nourish the calf or as water flows on to oblige the creatures.

(The answer to the above is :- चेतनायाश्च धेन्वाः स्नेहेच्छया पयसः प्रवर्तकोपपत्तेः, वत्सत्रोपगेन च पयस आकृष्यमाणत्वात् । न चाम्बुतोऽप्यत्यन्त-

मनपेक्षा निम्नभूम्याद्यपेक्षत्वात्त्यन्दनस्य । क्षीरवत्, (II. 1.24) इत्यत्र बाह्य-
निमित्तनिरपेक्षमपि स्वाश्रयं कार्यं भवतीत्येतत् लोकदृष्ट्या निर्दिशितम् । शास्त्र-
दृष्ट्या तु पुनः सर्वत्रैश्वरापेक्षत्वमापद्यमानं न परानुद्यते ।

14. न तृणादिवत्। (II. 2.5)

Pradhāna can modify itself into Mahat etc., naturally as, grass, leaves etc., are modified into milk etc. (says the Sāṅkhya opponent). The answer is :- grass etc. do require some cause or other to be able to produce milk. Grass chewed by a cow alone produces milk, not the grass chewed by a bull. So, Pradhāna does stand in need of some agency to perform its functions. (धेन्वैव ह्युपयुक्तं तृणादि क्षीरीभवति, न प्रहीणमनड्वाद्युपयुक्तं वा.... तस्मात्, न तृणादिवत्स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्य परिणामः ।)

15. पुहषाऽमवदिति चेत् (II. 2.7)

(The Sāṅkhya opponent argues)—The Puruṣa, even though without दृशक्ति, and completely उदासीन, can activate the प्रधान, as a lame person can direct a blind man to take him to his destination; the lode-stone, without any movement, can make the iron piece move.

(The flaw in the above is pointed out by Śaṅkara :—पङ्कुरपि ह्यन्धं वागादिभिः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति, नैवं पुहषस्य कश्चिदपि प्रवर्तनव्यापारोऽस्ति निष्क्रियत्वाच्च ।... अयस्कान्तस्य त्वनित्यसंनिधेरस्ति स्वव्यापारः संनिधिः परिमार्जनाद्यपेक्षा चास्ति ।)

16. महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् । (II. 2.11)

(The Vaiśeṣikas say that if the Cetana Brahman were to be the cause of the world, the world also would be Cetana; for, the Kāraṇa-guṇa must be found in the Kārya)—

The Siddhāntin points out that the rule referred to by the Vaiśeṣikas is found repudiated by themselves. Thus from the परिमण्डल dimension of the परमाणु is produced the Dvyaṅka which is अणु and ह्रस्व; from the अणुह्रस्व Dvyaṅka is produced the Mahat Dīrgha Tryaṅka. (यथा परमाणोः परिमण्डलात्सतोऽणु ह्रस्वं च व्यणुकं जायते महदीर्घं च व्यणुकादि न परिमण्डलम्, यथा वा व्यणुकादणोर्ह्रस्वाच्च सतो महदीर्घं च व्यणुकं जायते नाणु नो ह्रस्वम्, एवं चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणोऽचेतनं जगज्ज-निप्यत इत्यभ्युपगमे किं तवच्छिन्नम् ?)

17. वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् । (II. 2.29)

The Buddha opponent who denies the existence of external objects says that experiences in the waking state like those in the dream-state, can exist without external objects—The answer to this contention is :— Experiences in the dream-state are contradicted later when the dreamer awakens; those in the waking state are not contradicted.

The experience in a dream is Remembrance, that in the waking state is Upalabdhi (स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योश्च प्रत्यक्षमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयते.तत्रैवं सति न शक्यते वक्तुम्—मिथ्या जागरितोपलब्धिः, उपलब्धित्वात्, स्वप्नोपलब्धिवत्—इत्युभयोरन्तरं स्वयमनुभवता | न च यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति | न ह्यग्निरुष्णोऽनुभूयमान उदकसाधर्म्याच्छीतो भविष्यति |)

18. करणवच्चेत् (II. 2.40)

Just as the Puruṣa can supervise over the group of sense-organs which are by themselves imperceptible and bereft of any form, Īśvara can supervise over the Pradhāna (says the Sāṅkhya opponent).

19. स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् । (II. 3.5)

One and the same expression संभूत can be used with the-

Ākāśa in a metaphorical sense, and with Tejas etc., in a literal sense. The word Brahman is used in तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व, तपो ब्रह्म etc., in a metaphorical sense, but in a literal sense in आनन्दो ब्रह्म.

20. यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् । (II. 3.7)

(यावत्किञ्चिद्विकारजातं दृश्यते घटघटिकोदञ्चनादि वा कटककेयूर-कुण्डलादि वा सूचीनाराचनिस्त्रिशादि वा तावानेव विभागो लोके लक्ष्यते ।)

21. अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् । (II. 3.23)

Just as a drop of the Haricandana, though put on a part of the body, produces joy in the whole of the body, the Ātman, though abiding in a part of the body, can experience what pervades the whole body.

22. गुणाद्वा लोकवत् । (II. 3.25)

Even if Jīva is admitted to be atomic, he produces the effect in the whole of the body, owing to his Caitanya-guṇa pervading the whole body.

(यथा लोके मणिप्रदीपप्रभृतीनामपवरकैकदेशवतिनामपि प्रभापवरकव्यापिनी सती कृत्स्नेऽपवरके कार्यं करोति तद्वत् ।)

A lamp placed in a corner of the room can pervade the whole room by its light (some read आलोकवत् for लोकवत्, the meaning is the same).

23. व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् । (II. 3.26)

गुण can be experienced as apart from the गुणिन्. The fragrance of the flower can be found to exist at a distance from the flower. So, the Caitanya-quality of the atomic Jīva can be experienced elsewhere. (अणोरपि जीवस्य चैतन्यगुणव्यतिरेको भविष्यति...)

न च लोके प्रतीतिर्गन्धवद्द्रव्यमाघ्रातमिति । गन्ध एवाघ्रात इति तु लौकिकाः प्रतियन्ति । ... तस्माद्यथा लोके दृष्टं तत्तथैवानुमन्तव्यं निरूपकैर्नान्यथा । न हि रसो गुणो जिह्वयोपलभ्यत इत्यतो रूपादयोऽपि गुणा जिह्वयैवोपलभ्येरन्निति नियन्तुं शक्यते ।)

24. तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्ध्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् । (II. 3.29)

Jīva is called Aṇu, taking into account the qualities of his Upādhi, Buddhi, just as the Prājña (Paramātman) is spoken of as atomic for facilitating the Saguna-worship. (तस्मात्तद्गुण-सारत्वाद्बुद्धिपरिमाणेनास्य परिमाणव्यपदेशः । प्राज्ञवत् – यथा प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मनः सगुणेषूपाधिगुण सारत्वादणीयस्त्वादि व्यपदेशः ।)

25. पुंस्त्वादिवत्.... (II. 3.31)

The connection of the Buddhi with the Jīva, which is dormant in the deep sleep and Pralaya states is manifested in the Waking and Prasava states (यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वा-विर्भवन्ति एवमयमपि बुद्धिसंबंधः शक्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तप्रलययोः, पुनः प्रबोधप्रसवयोराविर्भवति ।)

Virility is dormant in a child, it is manifested only when the child grows up into a young man.

26. यथा च तक्षोभयथा (II. 3.40)

The Kartṛtva of the Jīva is proved by the injunctions in the Śāstras, as they would be useless, if the Jīva is unable to act. Now this Kartṛtva cannot be natural (Svābhāvika); otherwise, the Jīva would be always enchained by it and there would be no Liberation. The Kartṛtva must, therefore be due to the Ūpādhis.

A carpenter while engaged in his work by using the tools of his trade, feels out of sorts, but after finishing his work, feels quite at ease on going back to his home; in the same way the Ātman in the waking and dream states is miserable owing to the Upādhis, but is completely at ease when he gets rid of the Upādhis and is merged into the Highest in the Suṣupti state. (यथा तु तक्षा लोके वास्यादिकरणहस्तः कर्ता दुःखी भवति स एव स्वगृहं प्राप्तो विमुक्तवास्यादिकरणः स्वस्थो निर्वृतो निर्व्यापारः सुखी भवति, एवमविद्याप्रत्यु-पस्थापितद्वैतसंपृक्त आत्मा स्वप्नजागरितावस्थयोः कर्ता दुःखी भवति, स तच्छ्र-मापनुत्तये स्वमात्मानं परं ब्रह्म प्रविश्य विमुक्तकार्यकरणसंघातोऽकर्ता सुखी भवति संप्रसादावस्थायाम् । एवमयमात्मा सर्वव्यापारेष्वपेक्ष्यैव मनआदीनि करणानि कर्ता भवति, स्वात्मना त्वकर्तैव ।)

27. प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः (II. 3.46)

The Jīva, owing to his identifying himself with the Upādhi, the body etc., due to Avidyā experiences misery in worldly life, such is not the case with the Highest.

Just as the light from the Sun or the Moon appears to be straight or bent, owing to the intervention of the Upādhis, the finger etc., but is really changeless in form—

Just as the Ākāśa appears to move, when the objects the jar, the cloth etc., are moving, but really moves not—

Just as the reflection of the Sun in a water-saucer flickers on, though the Sun's disc remains unaffected—

In the same way Īśvara remains unaffected when the Jīva becomes miserable owing to Avidyā.

(यथा प्रकाशः सौरश्चान्द्रमसो वा विद्यद्वाप्यावतिष्ठमानोऽङ्गुल्याद्युपाधि-संबन्धात्तैष्वजुवक्रादिभावं प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तत्तद्भावं प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि न परमार्थ-तस्तद्भावं प्रतिपद्यते | यथा चाकाशो घटादिषु गच्छत्सु गच्छन्निव विभाव्यमानोऽपि

न परमार्थतो गच्छति | यथा चोदशरावादिकम्पनात्तद्गते सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बे कम्पमानेऽपि न तद्वान्सूर्यः कम्पते |

एवमविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापिते बुद्ध्याद्युपाहिते जीवास्त्र्येऽशो दुःखायमानेऽपि न तद्वानीश्वरो दुःखायते | जीवस्यापि तु दुःखप्राप्तिरविद्यानिमित्तैवेत्युक्तम् |)

28. अनुज्ञापरिहारो देहसंबन्धात् ज्योतिरादिवत् । (II. 3.48)

The Śāstric injunctions concern the connection of the Jīva with the body etc., the Ātman cannot be नियोज्य. Just as—

Though Jyotis (light) is one and the same, fire from the cemetery is avoided, not the other (in the Agnihotra), the light of the Sun associated with a non-sacrificial region is avoided, not the light associated with a sacred place;

earthly objects diamond, the Vaidūrya gem etc., are eagerly longed for, not the dead bodies of men that are also earthly;

the urine and the dung of the cow are regarded as sacred, not those of other creatures.

29. चक्षुरादिवत् तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः (II. 4.10)

Prāṇa is unable to act independently, as Jīva can. The sense-organs the eye etc., are the instruments by which the Jīva becomes the doer and the enjoyer; in the same way the chief Prāṇa is merely *Upakaraṇa* of the Jīva.

30. पञ्चवृत्तिर्भनोवत् । (II. 4.12)

Prāṇa has five functions, just as the Manas has, associated with शब्द etc.

31. प्रकाशवच्चावयथ्यात् (III. 2.15)

Brahman can be taken to possess different forms owing to the Upādhis, for the purpose of Upāsana, like the light from the

Sun and the Moon. (Śaṅkara explains प्रकाशादिवत्, almost in the same words in which he has explained that expression in II. 3.46 — यथा प्रकाशः सौरश्चांद्रमसो वा वियद्व्याप्यावतिष्ठमानोऽङ्गुल्याद्युपाधिसंबन्धात्तेष्वजुवक्रादिभावं प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तद्भावावमिव प्रतिपद्यते । एवं ब्रह्मापि पृथिव्याद्युपाधिसंबन्धात्तदाकारतामिव प्रतिपद्यते । तदालम्बनो ब्रह्मण आकारविशेषोपदेश उपासनार्थो न विरुध्यते ।

32. अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् । (III. 2.18)

In the Mokṣa-śāstra, the Ātman, although pure Caitanya and attributeless, is compared to the reflection of the Sun etc., in water, taking into consideration his association with the Upādhis.— सूर्यकादि- the आदि refers to जलचंद्र.

33. अम्बुवत्, अग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् । (III. 2.19)

The सूर्यकदृष्टान्त (in 32 above) is objected to by the opponent on the ground that the reflection of the Sun in the water that is separate from the Sun, is proper; but the Ātman is all-pervading and the Upādhis cannot be different from him.

(Śaṅkara in his comment on III-2-20 points out that only a विवक्षितांश is required to be common to the दृष्टांत and the दाष्टान्तिक.)

34. प्रकाशादिवत्त्वावैशेष्यं..... (III. 2.25)

The Ātmabheda experienced in the Saṁrādhana (Vision, when the Yogins perceive the Ātman directly) is also due to Upādhis; just as light, Akāśa, the Sun etc., appear to be possessed of distinctive attributes, owing to the Upādhis respectively of the finger, nail, water etc., but they do not abandon their natural attributes.

35. उभयव्यपदेशात्, त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (III. 2.27)

It is pointed out by some that the Śruti speaks of both भेद (ध्यातृध्यातव्यत्वेन द्रष्टृ-द्रष्टव्यत्वेन नियन्तृनियन्तव्यत्वेन) and अभेद as in तत्त्वमसि etc., between Jīva and Prāñña; so we may explain that the real position is as found in the illustration. अहिकुण्डल (the serpent and his coiled body)— though the serpent is the same, his body, coils etc., are different. (यथा अहिरित्यभेदः, कुण्डलाभोग-प्रांशुत्वादीति तु भेदः ।)

36. प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्वात् । (III. 2.28)

The भेदाभेद idea about the Jīva and Prāñña can be explained also as follows :— Just as the Sun's light and its resort the Sun can be spoken of as different, although they are one, being possessed of the genus तेजस्त्व.

37. पूर्ववद्वा । (III. 2.29)

But the position is really what is stated in III, 2.25. Jīva cannot be really in bondage, otherwise Mokṣa would be impossible. If the Jīva is only a particular form or a portion of the Paramātman, there can be no use of the Mokṣasāstra; for, a real Bheda or bondage can never be got over. Therefore the Śruti must be taken to propound Abheda only, and the Bheda is spoken of as being only popularly real. (...अविद्याकृतत्वाद्बन्धस्य विद्यया मोक्ष उपपद्यते | यदि पुनः परमार्थत एव बद्धः कश्चिदात्मा, अहिकुण्डलाद्यादेन परस्यात्मनः संस्थानभूतः. प्रकाशाश्रयन्यायेन चैकदेशभूतः, अभ्युपगम्येत, ततः पारमार्थिकस्य बन्धस्य तिरस्कर्तुमशक्यत्वान्मोक्षशास्त्रवैयर्थ्यं प्रसज्येत । न चात्र, उभावपि भेदाभेदौ श्रुतिस्तुल्यवद्व्यपदिशति | अभेदमेव हि प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन निर्दिशति, भेदं पूर्वप्रसिद्धमेवानुवदत्यर्थान्तरविवक्षया | तस्मात्प्रकाशादिवच्च, अवैशेष्यमित्येव एव सिद्धान्तः ।)

38. बुद्धयर्थः पादवत् । (III. 2.33)

The description of the measure of Brahman in the Śruti is for the purpose of Upāsanā by people who are unable to comprehend the infinite endless Brahman. Just as Vāk etc., are spoken of as the four portions (feet) of Manas, or as the four Agnis etc., of the Ākāśa; or as for the purposes of practical dealings, there are twentyfive-paise coins, where the Rupee is not wanted.

यथा मनभाकाशयोरध्यात्माधिदैवतं च ब्रह्मप्रतीकयोरास्रातयोश्चत्वारो वागादयो मनसंबन्धिनः पादाः कल्प्यन्ते, चत्वारश्चाग्न्यादय आकाशसंबन्धिनः आध्यानाय तद्वत् ।

अथवा पादवदिति यथा कार्षापणे पादविभागो व्यवहारप्राचुर्याय कल्प्यते । नहि सकलेनैव कार्षापणेन सर्वदा सर्वे जना व्यवहर्तुमीशते, क्रयविक्रये परिमाणानियमात्तद्वदित्यर्थः ।)

39. स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् (III. 2.34)

The references in the Śruti about the connection with, and difference from the Paramātman, of the Jīva are concerned with the Upādhis; just as the light of the Sun or the Moon, becomes bigger or different owing to the Upādhis; or as in the case of the needle, noose, Ākāśa etc. Sambandha and Bheda designations are concerned with the Upādhis—

(यथैकरथ प्रकाशस्य, सौर्यस्य चान्द्रमसस्य वा, उपाधियोगादुपजातविशेष्यस्य, उपाध्युपशमात्संबन्धव्यपदेशो भवति, उपाधिभेदाच्च भेदव्यपदेशः । यथा वा सूचीपाशाकाशादिषु, उपाध्यपेक्षयेवैती संबन्धव्यपदेशौ भवतस्तद्वत् ।

40. ... सववच्च तन्नियमः । (III. 3.3)

Followers of the Atharvaveda practise the Śirovrata (carrying the fire vessel on the head); but this feature being a Dharma (requisite) of the Svādhāya (or study), does not make the Vidyā taught different; there is विज्ञैकत्व like the Savas.

(यथा च सवाः सप्त सौर्यादयः शतीदनपर्यन्ता वेदान्तरोदितत्रेताग्न्यभिसंबन्धा-
दाथर्वणोदितैकाग्न्यभिसंबन्धाच्च, आथर्वणिकानामेव नियम्यन्ते, तथैवायमपि
धर्मः स्वाध्याय-विशेषसंबन्धात्तत्रैव नियम्यते ।)

41. उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदात्, विधिशेषवत्समाने च । (III. 3.5)

The attributes of the Vidyās, should be incorporated else-
where provided the purpose is the same like the accessory to
an injunction.

(यथा हि विधिशेषाणामग्निहोत्रादि-धर्माणां तदेवैकमग्निहोत्रादिकर्म सर्वत्र,
इत्यर्थाभेदादुपसंहरणमेवमिहापि ।)

42. न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् । (III. 3.7)

But when the context is known to be different, there should
be admitted विद्याभेद and not विद्यैकत्व. Though there might be
similarity in a general manner between two Upāsānās or Vidyās
they are really different on account of the special attributes
mentioned, just as the Udgītha-worship characterised by the
attribute परोवरीयस्त्व etc., is different from the Udgītha-worship
characterised by the attribute हिरण्यश्मश्रुत्व etc. (यथा परमात्मदृष्ट्य-
ध्याससाम्येऽपि परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीथोपासनम्, अक्ष्यादित्यादिगत-
हिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टोद्गीथोपासनाद्भिन्नम् ।)

43. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (III. 3.16)

In passages like आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्, आत्मन् must
mean परमात्मन् and not mere आत्मन् possessed of special attributes:
This is clear from the fact that in other (*itara*) passages des-
cribing the creation of the world, the परमात्मन् is definitely
meant.

(यथेतेरेषु सृष्टिश्रवणेषु 'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' इत्येव-
मादिषु परस्यात्मनो ग्रहणम् । यथा चेतस्मिल्लौकिकात्मशब्दप्रयोगे प्रत्यगात्मैव

मुख्य आत्मशब्देन गृह्यते तथेहापि भवितुमर्हति ।...अत्र पुनः परमात्मग्रहणानुगुण-
मेव विशेषणमप्युत्तरमुपलभ्यते.... 'स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति'... इत्येवमादि ।
तस्मात्तस्यैव ग्रहणं न्याय्यम्....न चात्रोपक्रमतन्त्रत्वोपन्यासो न्याय्यः।....सामान्योप-
क्रमश्च न वाक्यशेषगतेन विशेषेण विरुध्यते।....प्रतिपादनप्रकारभेदेऽपि प्रतिपाद्यार्था-
भेद इति सिद्धम् ।)

44. पुरुषविद्यायामिव, चेतरेषामनाम्नायात् | (III. 3.24)

In the *Rahasyabrāhmaṇa* of the Tāṇḍins and the Paiṅins, *Puruṣavidyā* is described, where the *Puruṣa* is described as a Sacrifice, his life as the three *Savanas*, and his *Aśiśiṣā* etc., as *Dikṣa* etc. In the *Taittirīyaka*, some *Puruṣayajña* is apparently described तस्यैव विदुषो यज्ञस्य आत्मा यजमानः, श्रद्धा पत्नी etc. The question is whether the attributes of the *Puruṣayajña* described in the *Rahasyabrāhmaṇa* are to be incorporated in the *Taittirīyaka*. The answer is in the negative, for, the conceptions of *Yajna* are quite different. विदुषो यज्ञस्य means the sacrifice performed by the wise one, not that *Puruṣa* is the *Yajña*.

(यथैकेषां शाखिनां ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनां च पुरुषविद्यायामाम्नायं नैवमितरेषां
तैत्तिरीयानामाम्नायं । यदपि किञ्चिन्मरणावभृथादिसाम्यं तदप्यल्पीय-
स्त्वाद्भूयसा वैलक्षणेनाभिभूयमानं न प्रत्यभिज्ञापनक्षमम् । न हि पुरुषस्य मुख्यं
यज्ञत्वमस्ति भवति पुरुषस्य मुख्यो यज्ञसंबन्धः । सत्यां च गती मुख्य
एवार्थं आश्रयितव्यो न भाक्तः । इतरेषां त्वनन्यशेषः पुरुषविद्याम्नायः ।
.... तस्माच्छाखान्तराधीतानां पुरुषविद्याधर्माणामाशीर्मन्त्रादीनामप्राप्ति-
स्तैत्तिरीयके ।)

45. हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्, कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्(III. 3.26)

While describing the course of the departed soul, the *Śruti* passages refer to the abandonment (हान) on the way, of *Sukṛta*

and Duṣkṛta (good and evil deeds), or, to the taking over of these abandoned, by good and bad relatives respectively, or to both (Hāna and Upāyana). The question is, where only हान is mentioned, is the Upāyana also intended to be associated there? The answer is that Upāyana is supposed to be there as well, for Upāyana completes the Hāna-process.

Kuśāchandastuyupagāna is the illustrative instance. In some recensions, only the Kuśas (wooden sticks for counting the Stotras recited) are mentioned; in others, the Kuśas are said to be made out of the Udumabara tree. So, the Kuśas made of Udumbara are intended (यदैतेषु कुशादिषु श्रुत्यन्तरगतविशेषान्वयः, एवं हानावप्युपायनान्वय इत्यर्थः । श्रुत्यन्तरकृतं हि विशेषं श्रुत्यन्तरेऽनभ्युपगच्छतः सर्वत्रैव विकल्पः स्यात् । स चान्याय्यः सत्यां गती ।)

46. उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेः, लोकवत् । (III. 3.30)

After death, some may travel by the Devayāna path, some may not, according to their deserts and intentions. Just as a person desiring to go to another town, looks to the path leading to it, while one not desiring to do so, remains at his own place.

(क्वचिदर्थवती गतिः क्वचिन्नेति । गतिकारणभूतो ह्यर्थः पर्यङ्कविद्यादिषु सगुणेषूपसनेषूपलभ्यते ।...न हि सम्यग्दर्शने तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धिरस्ति...यथा लोके ग्रामप्राप्तौ देशान्तरप्रापणः पन्था अपेक्ष्यते, नारोग्यप्राप्तावेवमिहापीति ।)

47. अक्षरघियां त्वचरोधः...औपसदवत्तदुक्तम् (III. 3.33)

In the description of the अक्षरब्रह्मन्, there are Śruti passages indicating different attributes for being denied of the Akṣara Brahman. The question is whether the different denial-passages are to be regarded as authoritative every where or only in the particular context. The answer is that they are authoritative

every where. Because there is the same ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकार and the same Brahman is recognised every where. औपसदवत्— Just as the Mantras referring to the पुरोडाश, though belonging to the Sāmaveda are to be associated with the Adhvaryu, as the offering of the पुरोडाश is directly connected with the Adhvaryu and all subsidiary matters are dependent upon the principal one.

(यथा जामदग्न्येऽङ्गीने पुरोडाशिनीवूपसस्तु चोदितासु पुरोडाशप्रदानमन्त्राणां 'अग्नेर्वेर्हीत्रं वेरध्वरम्' इत्येवमादीनाम्नातृवेदोत्पन्नानामप्यध्वर्युभिरभिसंबन्धो भवति। अध्वर्युर्कर्तृकत्वात्पुरोडाशप्रदानस्य प्रधानतन्त्रत्वाच्चाङ्गानाम्। एवमिहाप्यक्षर-तन्त्रत्वात्तद्विशेषणानां यत्र क्वचिदप्युत्पन्नानामक्षरेण सर्वत्राभिसंबन्ध इत्यर्थः।)

48. अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत् स्वात्मनः (III. 3.35)

The Pūrvapakṣin argues that in the passage यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः there is विद्यानानात्व as there is repetition of the same idea twice. The answer is there is विद्यैकत्व; for the Ātman is said to be सर्वान्तर; now ten Ātmans can not be सर्वान्तर, (one must be सर्वान्तर, the other can only have a relative आंतरत्व). Just as in the case of the group of elements, the water is inside the Pṛithivi; Tejas is inside the water; there can be सर्वान्तरत्व with respect to them only in a metaphorical sense; or भूतग्रामवत् refers to another Śruti; एको देवः सर्वं भूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। (यथा च पञ्चभूतसमूहे पृथिव्या आपोऽन्तराः; अद्भ्यस्तेजोऽन्तरमिति सत्यप्यापे-क्षिकेऽन्तरत्वे नैव मुख्यं सर्वान्तरत्वं भवति, तथेहापीत्यर्थः।)

49. अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत् । (III. 3.36)

If there is no Vidyābheda, why is there the separate mention in different recensions? The answer is that the repetition or separate mention is for the purpose of removing additional doubts. In the Śvetaketu-episode, स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो (Chā. 6. 8. 7) is repeated nine times, but the Upakrama and

Upasamhāra show that the subject-matter is the same. (आशङ्कान्तरनिराकरणेन चासकृदुपदेशोपपत्तेः, पूर्वस्मिंश्च ब्राह्मणे— वृ. ३।४।२, कार्यकारणव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः सद्भावः कथ्यते । उत्तरस्मिस्तु—वृ. ३।५।१, तस्यैवाशानायादिसंसारधर्मातीतत्वं कथ्यते— इत्येकार्थतोपपत्तिः ।)

50. व्यतिहारो विशिषन्ति हीतरवत् (III. 3.37)

Passages like 'तयोहं सोऽसौ, योऽसौ सोऽहम्', 'त्वं वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवते. अहं वै त्वमसि', where a mutual exchange of objects of contemplation is intended, there should be उभयरूपामतिः; for, here the व्यतिहार is meant for आध्यान; just as other attributes like सर्वात्मत्व are meant for आध्यान or contemplation.

(व्यतिहारेणैह द्विरूपा मतिः कर्तव्या, वचनप्रामाण्यात्... .., यथाध्यानार्थेऽपि सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशे तद्गुण ईश्वरः प्रसिद्ध्यति तद्वत् । तस्मादयमाध्यातव्यो व्यतिहारः' समाने च विषये उपसंहर्तव्यो भवतीति।)

51. प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् । (III. 3.43)

In the *Bṛha*, प्राण is described as श्रेष्ठ among वाक् etc. (अध्यात्म) and वायु among Agni etc. (अधिदैवत); while in the *Chāndogya*, वायु is the संवर्ग (अधिदैव) and प्राण is the संवर्ग (अध्यात्म)—The Siddhānta is that वायु and प्राण should be known as separate for the purposes of contemplation; otherwise the instruction about the division अध्यात्म and अधिदैव would be meaningless. Just as in the sacrifice where three Purodāśa-offerings are to be given to (1) Indra Rāja (2) Indra-Adhirāja (3) Indra-Svarāj though all the three पुरोडाशः are taken in hand together they are to be given separately, because though Indra is one, the different attributes make Indra practically three Indras, and so the पुरोडाश-प्रदान is to be taken as separate.

(राजादिगुणभेदात् याज्यानुवाक्याव्यत्यासविधानाच्च यथान्यासमेव देव-
तापृथक्त्वात्प्रदानपृथक्त्वं भवति, एवं तत्त्वाभेदेऽप्याध्येयांशपृथक्त्वादाध्यानपृथक्त्व-
मित्यर्थः|....द्विद्वैक्त्वेऽपि त्वध्यात्माग्निद्वैवभेदात्प्रवृत्तिभेदो भवति, अग्निहोत्र इव
सायंप्रातः कालभेदात् ।)

[याज्या— the Mantra uttered by the Hotṛ, when the
Adhvaryu calls upon him to perform the sacrifice. अनुवाक्या the
Mantra uttered by the Hotṛ when called upon by the Adhvaryu
to utter the Mantra. At the offering of the पुरोडाश, there is
to be one याज्या and one अनुवाक्या.

There are three Mantras in this context—when the first
पुरोडाश is offered to Indra-Rāja, the second Mantra is the
याज्या and the first Mantra is the अनुवाक्या. When the second
पुरोडाश is offered to इन्द्र-अधिराज, the third Mantra is the याज्या
and the second Mantra, the अनुवाक्या. When the third पुरोडाश
is offered to इन्द्र-स्वराज, the first Mantra is the याज्या and the
third Mantra is the अनुवाक्या. Thus there is व्यत्यास of याज्या
and अनुवाक्या].

52. पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत् | (III. 3. 45)

The imaginary fires, वाक्चितः, प्राणचितः etc., are to be under-
stood as subsidiary to क्रिया, just as on the tenth day in the
Daśarātra sacrifice, the taking hold, etc. of the Soma-vessel, as
imagined in the mind is क्रियाशेष (This is the view of the
Pūrvapakṣin).

(यथा दशरात्रस्य दशमेऽहन्यविवावये, पृथिव्याः पात्रेण समुद्रस्य सोमस्य,
प्रजापतये देवतायै गृह्यमाणस्य, ग्रहणासादनहवनाहरणोपह्वानभक्षणानि मानसान्ये-
वाम्नायन्ते, स च मानसोऽपि ग्रहकल्पः क्रियाप्रहरणात्क्रियाशेष एव भवति, एव-
मयममप्यग्निकल्प इत्यर्थः ।)

53. अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत्... (III. 3.50)

The वाक्चित्त etc., fires are not क्रियाङ्ग but स्वतन्त्र; just as the different विद्याः, Śāṅḍilyavidyā etc., are regarded as स्वतन्त्र.

(अनुबन्धादिभ्यः कारणेभ्यः स्वातन्त्र्यं मनश्चित्तादीनाम् | यथा प्रज्ञान्तराणि शाण्डिल्यविद्याप्रभृतीनि स्वेन स्वेनानुबध्यमानानि पृथगेव कर्मभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरेभ्यश्च स्वतन्त्राणि भवन्त्येवमिति |)

54. न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापत्तिः | (III. 3.51)

The fires मनश्चित्त etc., can not be क्रियाशेष, even when it is granted that the Some-cup is imagined in the mind; because the Śruti-passages make it clear that the मनश्चित्त etc., fires are for the purpose of Puruṣārtha. The Śruti speaks of the मण्डलपुरुष as मृत्यु, and अग्नि also as मृत्यु, but that does not make अग्नि and आदित्य lose their वैषम्य.

(न मानसग्रहसामान्यादपि मनश्चितादीनां क्रियाशेषत्वं कल्प्यम् । न हि किञ्चित्कस्यचित्केनचित्सामान्यं न संभवति, न च तावता यथास्व वैषम्यं निवर्तते | मृत्युवत् | यथा 'स वा एष एव मृत्यु य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषः', 'अग्निर्वै मृत्युः' इति चाग्न्यादित्य पुरुषयोः समानेऽपि मृत्युशब्दत्रयोगे नात्यन्तसाम्यापत्तिः । यथा च 'असौ वाव लोको गौतमाग्निस्तस्यादित्य एव समित्' इत्यत्र न समिदादिसामान्याल्लोकस्याग्निभावापत्तिस्तद्वत् ।)

55. व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वाच्च तूपलब्धिवत् । (III. 3.54)

The Ātman is different from the body. Just as one admits the existence of perception concerning the objects, perception must be admitted to be different from them as well.

(व्यतिरेक एवास्य (आत्मनः) देहाद्भवितुमर्हति तद्भावाभावित्वात् । यदनुभवनं भूतभौतिकानां तच्चैतन्यमितिचेत्, तर्हि विषयत्वात्तेषां न

तद्धर्मत्वमश्नुवीत स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् । न ह्यग्निरुष्णः सन्स्वात्मानं दहति । न हि नरः शिक्षितः सन्स्वस्कन्धमधिरोक्ष्यति अतश्च यथैवास्या भूत-भौतिकविषयाया उपलब्धेर्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यत एवं व्यतिरेकोऽप्यस्यास्तेभ्योऽवगन्तव्यः । उपलब्धिस्वरूप एव च न, आत्मेत्यात्मनो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वम् । नित्यत्वं चोपलब्धे-रैकरूप्यात् ।)

56. मन्त्रादिवद्वाविरोधः । (III. 3.56)

Though some minor differences are seen, the concepts about Udgīthavidyā etc., have to be incorporated in all recensions and not confined only to the particular recension where they are actually mentioned; just as Mantras, attributes and acts mentioned in one Śākhā are incorporated in other Śākhās.

(यथाश्रयाणां कर्माङ्गानां सर्वत्रानुवृत्तिरेवमाश्रितानामपि प्रत्ययानामित्य-विरोधः ।)

57. भूमनः ऋतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं (III. 3.57)

The question is whether in the Vaiśvānara-Upāsana, there is व्यस्तोपासन or समस्तोपासन. The answer is, the समस्तोपासन is more important, as in the case of the sacrifices, Darśapūrṇamāsa etc., the sacrifice as a whole is to be performed, and not the parts like the Prayājā etc.

(यथा ऋतुषु दर्शपूर्णमासप्रभृतिषु सामस्त्येन साङ्गप्रधानप्रयोग एवैको विवक्ष्यते, न व्यस्तानामपि प्रयोगः प्रयाजादीनाम् । नाप्येकदेशाङ्गयुक्तस्य प्रधानस्य सद्दत्; समस्तोपासनपक्ष एव श्रेयानिति ।)

58. विभागः शतवत् । (III. 4.11)

The passage तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते prima facie suggests that Vidyā and Karman together produce the fruit and Vidyā is unable to act independently; but the real purport is - Vidyā

and Karman accompany different persons according to their deserts, just as when one says ' Give a hundred rupees to A and B', A is given fifty rupees and B also fifty rupees, there being no specific condition to the contrary.

(यथा शतमाभ्यां दीयतामित्युक्ते विभज्य दीयते पञ्चाशदेकस्मै पञ्चाशदपरस्मै तद्वत् विभागोऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः — विधान्यं पुरुषमन्वारभते कर्मान्यमिति ।)

59. विधिर्वा धारणवत् । (III. 4.20)

The passage त्रयो वा धर्मस्कन्धाः should be taken to mean that there is an injunction in respect of Āśramas other than the गार्हस्थ्य also; just as in the passage अर्धस्तात्समिधं धारयन्ननुद्रवेदुपरि देवेभ्यो धारयति, उपरिधारण is a विधि, though no specific injunctive expression is there, as उपरिधारण is अपूर्व.

(सतीमप्येकवाक्यताप्रतीतिं परित्यज्य विधिरेवोपगन्तव्योऽपूर्वत्वात् । विध्यन्तरस्यादर्शनात् । धारणवत् । यथा, अधस्तात्...इत्यत्र सत्यामप्यधोधारणे नैकवाक्यताप्रतीतौ विधियत एवोपरिधारणमपूर्वत्वात् । ...चतुष्टवेन च प्रसिद्धा आश्रमास्त्रित्वेन परामृश्यन्त इत्यन्याय्यम् । अपि च भेदव्यपदेशोऽत्र भवति..... न ह्येवं भवति देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ मन्दप्रज्ञौ अन्यतरस्त्वनयोर्महाप्रज्ञ इति । भवति चेवं देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ मन्दप्रज्ञौ, विष्णुमित्रस्तु महाप्रज्ञ इति । तस्मात्पूर्वे त्रयः आश्रमिणः पुण्यलोकभाजः परिशिष्यमाणः परिव्राडेवामृतत्वभाक् ।)

60. सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् (III. 4.26)

Vidyā gives its fruit straightway and is not dependent upon any thing else for that; it certainly depends upon sacrifice etc., for its production. But one must choose what is befitting the end in view. A horse is not yoked to a plough (but in some countries, this is actually done!) but is yoked to the chariot for which the horse is eminently fitted.

अश्ववदिति योग्यतानिदर्शनम् | यथा च योग्यतावशेनाश्वो न लाङ्गलाकर्षणे युज्यते रथचर्यायां तु युज्यते । एवमाश्रमकर्माणि विद्यया फलसिद्धौ नापेक्ष्यन्ते, उत्पत्तौ चापेक्ष्यन्त इति ।)

61. उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् । (III.4.42)

Some hold the view that a life-long Brahmācārin can atone for his lapse in losing celibacy by not committing a great sin; just as a Brahmācārin eating some forbidden food can atone for the same by some Prāyaścitta.

(.... नैष्ठिकस्यापि प्रायश्चित्तस्य भावमिच्छन्ति | अशनवत् | यथा ब्रह्मचारिणो मधुमांसाशने व्रतलोपः पुनःसंस्कारश्चैवमिति ।)

62. सहकार्यन्तरविधिः विध्यादिवत् । (III. 4.47)

In the passage तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्, बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः; even though only one injunctive expression तिष्ठासेत् is mentioned in respect of बाल्य and there is no विधि here in connection with मुनि or मौन, still here injunction is intended, as मौन is an अपूर्व thing; just as the co-operative functions are regarded as विधिः (यथा 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्येवं जातीयके विध्यादौ सहकारित्वेनाग्न्यन्वाधानादिकमङ्गजातं विधीयते | एवमविधिप्रधानेऽप्यस्मिन्विद्यावाक्ये मौनविधिरित्यर्थः |)

63. मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् । (III. 4.69)

Like the Mauna (stage of life), other Āśramas also are approved of the Śruti.

(यथा मौनं गार्हस्थ्यं चैतावाश्रमौ श्रुतिमन्तावेवमितरावपि वानप्रस्थ-गु कुलवासी ।)

64. द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं वादरायणोऽतः । (IV. 4.12)

Bādārāyaṇa says that सशरीरता and अशरीरता are possible in the case of the Mukta, according to his desire; just as the Twelve-day sacrifice can be taken to be a long sacrifice or a day sacrifice. (यथा द्वादशाहः सत्रमहीनश्च भवति, उभयलिङ्गश्रुतिदर्शना-देवमिदमिति)

65. तन्वभावे संध्यवदुपपत्तेः । (IV. 4.13)

If the Mukta wills that he should be अशरीर, the situation is just like what happens in a dream (यथा संध्ये स्थाने शरीरेन्द्रिय-विषयेष्विद्यमानेष्वप्युपलब्धिमात्रा एव पित्रादिकामा भवन्त्येवं मोक्षेऽपि स्युरेवं ह्येतदुपपद्यते ।)

66. भावे जाग्रद्वत् । (IV. 4.14)

When the Mukta wills that he should be सशरीर, the situation is like that in the making state.

(भावे पुनस्तनोर्यथा जागरिते विद्यमाना एव पित्रादिकामा भवन्त्येवं मक्त-स्याप्युपपद्यते ।)

67. प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथा हि दर्शयति । (IV. 4.15)

Just as a lamp becomes many a lamp, owing to its power of transformation, the released wise one can assume many bodies.

(यथा प्रदीप एकोऽनेकप्रदीपभावमापद्यते विकारशक्तियोगात्, एकमेकोऽपि सन्विद्वानैश्वर्ययोगादनेकभावमापद्य सर्वाणि शरीराण्याविशति । एषैव च योग-शास्त्रेषु योगिनामनेकशरीरप्रयोगप्रक्रिया)

Appendix II.

A Brief note on Śankara his Date, Life, works etc.

A. Śaṅkara's Date and Life :

There are available more than fifteen works, which profess to give Śankara's biographical details and achievements, styled 'Śankara's world-conquest', but they differ very much in the details given, and it is indeed a very difficult task to come to any satisfactory conclusion about the same. * The succession-lists (Guru-paramparā) of the pontiffs preserved in the Maṭhas established by Śankara, are found unfortunately not to be reliable. The date of Śankara fluctuates between 6th Century B. C. and 8th Century A. D.; so great is the margin of disagreement between different scholars. Thus :

6th century B. C.— T. S. Narayan Shastri.

1st century B. C.— Sṛingeri Maṭha and Purāṇas.

6th or 7th century A. D.— Telang, Tilak and others.

8th century A. D.— Prof. Pathak.

Without going into details and controversial points, we would only state here the generally accepted versions about Śankara's life.

* Prof. W. R. Antarkar's Ph.D. thesis— 'Śankara-digvijayas, a comparative and a critical study' deals in an exhaustive manner with these problems. The thesis is not yet published; it is proposed to be published at any rate, some extracts from the thesis in the near future. The thesis in question was accepted by the University of Poona and the Ph. D. degree was awarded to Prof. Antarkar.

Śaṅkara—788 A.D.—820 A.D. That Śaṅkara was only thirty-two years old when he departed this life is granted by all.

(1) 788 A.D.— Śaṅkara was born in a learned Brāhmaṇa family in Kerala Pradeśa (old name Malbar) at Kālaḍi. His grand-father was Vidyādhisāja; Śivaguru was his father and Āryāmbika his mother.

(2) 793 A. D.— Thread ceremony was performed when Śaṅkara was only five years old. (Śivaguru died soon afterwards). Vedic studies began at the Gurukula.

(3) 796 A. D.— Permitted to take to Saṁnyāsa by his mother (it is doubtful whether the tradition – that Śaṅkara managed to secure the permission of his mother, by telling her that a crocodile had caught his leg and would not free him till he consented to become an ascetic – is authentic.)

(4) 797 A. D. — 805 A. D. — Govinda Yati, on the Narmadā river, a pupil of Gauḍapāda, accepted Śaṅkara as his pupil. Apparently he stayed with Govinda Yati for about eight years, when he wrote his commentaries upon the Upaniṣads and some minor works, Stotras etc. He also had secured two pupils Citsukha (Viṣṇuśarman) and Sanandana (Padmapāda) during this time. Śaṅkara is said to have been taught by Gauḍapāda himself (this, however is not possible, as Gauḍapāda must have been more than 200years old at the this time; it is true that Gauḍpāda was a great Yogin but it is more reasonable to believe that Śaṅkara was taught by some successor of Gauḍapāda, and predecessor of Govinda Yati). Śaṅkara's mother and Govinda Yati expired during this period.

(5) 805-820 A. D.—Śaṅkara with his disciples (three more had joined him by now, Uttanka, Prabhākara and Hastāmalaka)

went to Prayāga where he succeeded in converting Maṇḍanamiśra, the great Mīmāṃsist, to the Advaita view. (Maṇḍanmiśra was renamed as Sureśvara or Viśvarūpa). One more pupil Toṭaka joined Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara travelled incessantly through Bhārata to propagare his views. He appears to have gone to Kashmir and Nepal as well. He established Maṭhas (Centres of Learning) for this purpose—

- (1) Dvārakā—in the West (the first Pontiff being Hastāmalaka,
- (2) Jyotir—in the Himalayas (Padmapāda who wrote the 'Pañcapādik '),
- (3) Govardhana—in the East (Toṭaka),
- (4) Śrīgeri—in the south (Sureśvara who wrote the 'Vārtikas' and Naiṣkarmyasiddhi.)

One more Maṭha was established at Kāñci, where Śaṅkara himself became the first Pontiff, by ascending the Sarvajñapīṭha there (according to some, the Sarvajñapīṭha was in Kashmir). Śaṅkara died at Kāñci (or at Badrikedāra) in 820 A. D.

Biographers have referred to various miraculous feats performed by Śaṅkara, as for instance, his encounter with Ugrabhairava and Krakaca Kāpālin, his 'Parakāyāpraveśa' (entering into the body of the dead King Amaru), revival of a dead body, etc. (Śaṅkara is also said to have met Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa in person).

Attempts (not convincing) have been made to fix the date of Śaṅkara from the very few references in the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras* to contemporary incidents or personages, for instance, इदानीमिव च नान्यदापि सार्वभौमः क्षत्रियोऽस्तीति ब्रूयात् ।

I. 3.33. (This might with equal plausibility be a reference to the Post-Aśoka period or to Post-Harṣa period).

न हि देवदत्तः स्रुघ्ने संनिधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिपुत्रेऽपि संनिधीयेत ।

II. 3.18.

न हि वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा वभूव प्राक्पूर्णेवर्मणोऽभिवेकादित्येवंजातीयकेन मर्यादाकरणेन निरुपाख्यो वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा वभूव भवति भविष्यतीति वा विशेष्यते । II. 3.18.

(Pāṭallipūtra was ravaged a great deal by floods about the seventh century, but the name Paṭaliputra was well known to people in the 11th century during Alberuni's time.

Pūrṇvarman's coronation was a well known incident and could have been referred to in popular talk long after it had taken place).

गच्छ त्वमितो बलवर्माणं ततो जयसिंहं ततः कृष्णगुप्तमिती । IV. 3.5.

(Here also, the proper names Balavarman, Jayasimha and Kṛṣṇagupta, like 'Devadatta' in Sanskrit literature, do not appear to have any special significance).

B. Śaṅkara's Works :

As many as 400 works, big and small, are found attributed to Śaṅkara. All these could not possibly have been written by the Ādi Śaṅkara; his successors acting as Pontiffs at the different Maṭhas, must have written most of these and tradition accepted these as homage to Śaṅkara. It is difficult to hit upon a convincing yard-stick to measure the various works to find out which of them could be assigned to the great Śaṅkarācārya.

Broadly speaking, the following point among others have to be properly evaluated before coming to some reasonable conclusion :—

(1) We may take the Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras* as the standard by which to judge at least the commentaries on the Upaniṣads. If the basic philosophical teachings propounded in the *Bra-Sū Bhāṣya* are found at variance with those in some of the works, those works can reasonably be regarded as suspect.

(2) The frequency with which certain Śruti works are referred to in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

(3) If we believe that Śaṅkara was essentially a Śruti-śaraṇa, we might unceremoniously reject Śaṅkara's authorship of the Bhāṣyas on Smṛti works.

(4) As Śaṅkara himself refers to the worship of Viṣṇu as Śāligrāma more than once in his *Bhāṣya*, the many beautiful Stotras in honour of various gods and goddesses can be safely attributed to Śaṅkara who was extremely keen to see that the common man is helped in every way to choose the right path*.

In the light of the above criteria, we may come tentatively to the conclusion:—

(1) Of the ten principal Upaniṣads ईशकेनकठप्रश्नमुण्डमाण्डू-
क्यत्तित्तिराः । ऐतरेयं च छान्दोग्यं बृहदारण्यकं दश ॥ we might accept as genuine the *Bhāṣyas*, by Śaṅkara on the *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadā-
raṇyaka*, *Taittirīya*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Aitareya* (this is the order of frequency with which they are quoted in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*).

* Śaṅkara's chief grouse against the Buddhas is that they mislead people
अपि च बाह्यार्थ-विज्ञान-शून्यवाद-त्रयमितरेतरविरुद्धमुपदिशता सुगतेन
स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसंबद्ध - प्रलापितं प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विमुह्ये-
युरिमाः प्रजा इति ।

Bra. Sū. II. 2.32.

In Lecture II, we have expressed our doubts about Śaṅkara having written a Bhāṣya on the Īśa. In our edition of *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* we have given our reasons for rejecting Śaṅkara's authorship of the Bhāṣya on the *Māṇḍūkya*. Similarly we consider both the Bhāṣyas (Pada and Vākya) on the *Īśa* as not the work of Śaṅkara.

Though the *Kauṣītaki* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, are frequently quoted in the *Bra-Sū-bhāṣya*, the Bhāṣya on them cannot be definitely pronounced to be the work of Śaṅkara.

We are of opinion that Śaṅkara could not have written any Bhāṣya on the *Bhagavadgītā*. *

(2) Among the minor works, आत्मबोध, अपरोक्षानुभूति, उपदेश साहस्री (the metrical portion), तत्त्वोपदेश, वेदान्तडिण्डिम may be conceded to have been Śaṅkara's works.

(3) As regards the Stotras, दक्षिणामूर्तिस्तोत्र, हरिमीडे, मोहमुद्गर, दशश्लोकी, कृष्णाष्टक, मातृस्तव, and some others appear to have been written by Śaṅkara.

(C) Śaṅkara as a Philosopher :

Śaṅkara has been acknowledged by all as perhaps the greatest philosopher Bhārata has produced. South India has played a very remarkable part in contributing to the cultural integration of Bhārata through its philosophers and masters in the fine arts and literature, and Śaṅkara's name deserves to be placed in the fore-front of these servants.

* See the article 'Did Śaṅkara write a Bhāṣya on the Gītā?' published in the B. O. R. I. *Annals*.

Firmly convinced that the Śruti texts describe Brahman alone as the absolute Reality and the world and every thing else as Mithyā, Śāṅkara preaches his Advaita doctrine with vigour and relentless logic. Having very carefully studied the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* (under the great Gauḍapada or his pupil) and the important Upaniṣad-texts, Śāṅkara seems to have come to the conclusion that the 'Ajātivāda' (Non-origination) was more or less a negative approach to the problem at hand, and so, in order to make the Ajātivāda more popular and understandable, Śāṅkara boldly takes upon himself to propound the Adhyāsa (Avidyā or Māyā) doctrine.


Propounding a philosophical position is not a very difficult task; the difficulty comes in when one is required to convince others about the authoritative nature of the same. Though occasionally proclaiming that hundred Śruti-texts can not convert an unreasonable proposition into a reasonable one Śāṅkara in the main is Śruti-śaraṇa (swearing by the Śruti). He, therefore, takes great pains to harmonise the conflicting relevant texts. Gauḍapāda himself (*G. K. II*) refers to as many as thirty five different philosophical doctrines claiming to have the backing of the Śruti; likewise the *Anugītā* (*MBh. Āśvamedhika parvan*) refers to many a dissentient view. A way had to be found out of this chaos, and Śāṅkara solves the problem with a stroke of genius by declaring that all views excepting the Advaita are valid for particular individuals in the Vyāvahārika state only. Thus Śāṅkara is able to disarm all opposition based upon the Śruti-texts. Śāṅkara has no quarrel with other philosophical doctrines such as Dvaita, Dvaitāvaita etc., so long as their validity keeps within the limits of the Vyāvahārika state. These different doctrines are rightly described as 'Compromises with Advaita'

and far from doing any damage to the Advaita are, in reality, flattering the Advaita idea.

It has been a puzzle to many how to reconcile the contradictory attitudes of Śaṅkara — On the one hand, we find Śaṅkara declaring that the world is a dream and at the same time taking the most lively and intimate interest in the practical dealings of the world. Acts are more eloquent than words. Śaṅkara in the brief span of his life - only thirty two years - travelled throughout Bhārata, established Maṭhas to preach his philosophy and way of life, successfully meeting his opponents and controverting their views and reconciling the different sectarian forms of worship, by giving them a new orientation. It looks as if this Prince of Advaitins was behaving like a veritable Dvaitin with a vengeance ! The solution of this puzzle has already been given before, that till the realisation of the Ātman has taken place, the world is real enough and the people at large have to be helped to take to the right path in conformity with the code of behaviour sanctioned by the Śruti and the authoritative Smṛties. With this aim in view Śaṅkara toiled ceaselessly and had the satisfaction to find that his efforts had been more less successful in lessening the tension between the various sectarian doctrines that had been flourishing in the country. It is a great tribute to the Advaita doctrine that even the Dvaitins accept the idea of oneness in the state of Mokṣa in a modified form, by admitting Sāyujya, Salokatā, Sārūpya etc., with the Lord as most desirable in the case of the Jīva.

The popularity of the Advaita preached by Śaṅkara is in no small measure due to the simple inimitable style in which he deals with the abstruse philosophical ideas; and the skill with

which he puts his opponent in the wrong box is simply admirable (Sometimes he is found to put the opponent's case more clearly than the opponent himself). Even a cursory glance at the Bhāṣyas of others, on the *Brahmasūtras* would substantiate the above statement. Śāṅkara is undoubtedly a master of Sanskrit prose style, exhibiting the four requisites — uniformity, regularity, precision and balance — of a good prose style, as enunciated by Matthew Arnold. Only Bāṇa could rival Śāṅkara in this respect.



BY THE SAME AUTHOR

KALIDAS *Rs. 4—00*

BHAVABHŪTI *Rs. 3—00*

BĀṆA *Rs. 3—00*


Department of Extension Service & Publications

KARNATAK UNIVERSITY



Library

IAS, Shimla



00037891