china's cultural diplomacy

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CHINA'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

(REPRINT)

by

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
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Introduction

THIS monograph has grown out of a more specialised study of the experience various countries have had of "cultural exchange" with Communist China. Although it seemed a simple matter to catalogue the instances and recount the results, I soon realised however that the true meaning of cultural or academic exchange is only explicable in a wider context. Hence this study of Chinese cultural diplomacy in general.

I have not followed the same format in each country section. Although academic exchange and research remain central, I have emphasised for each country a slightly different range of experiences. In this way the general setting and character of cultural relations are suggested, but only in the cases of India and Australia are they sketched in more detail. This procedure will, I hope, bring out the distinctive flavour of each national experience.

One important caution: the material is, by and large, current as of autumn 1960. I have muddied the neat cut-off point somewhat by bringing a few cases—but not all—up to date as new materials came to my attention during the revision and completion of the study. But I have not taken into account the most important developments since that time: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the shifts within the Communist *bloc*, and the rapid deterioration of China's internal situation which has now been openly acknowledged by the Chinese Communists themselves. Rather than try to keep up with the rapid flow of events, I have preferred to leave the manuscript as it was when it left my pen, a historical document of events up to late 1960 and early 1961. To deal with the significance of the latest developments would require a whole new study. For the reader, perhaps the safest approach would be to take it as current as of autumn 1960, and certainly no later than the early part of 1961.

But this means that the reader must be aware of obvious transient judgments. For example, I speak throughout of Russian technicians resident in China. Since the time of writing, however, we have learned that all, or most, of these technicians have been withdrawn. It may very well be that by the time this study sees the light of day, or shortly thereafter, Russian technicians may be back in China. Similarly, my observations on Sino-Polish or Sino-German relations refer only to the period I have indicated; since then, they have gone through several further cycles. Again, to take a very specific example, what I say of the attitudes of West German businessmen is correct as of late 1960; but since then I have learned that many of the very people who were involved

in dealings with Communist China have become severely disillusioned. All of this, however, only underlines the point I have argued at some length in Part 1, Chapter 2, namely, that cultural relations with Communist China are very strongly affected by the political atmosphere at particular moments.

The information on which this study is based comes essentially from four sources: my own observations in Japan, India, and France during the summer of 1960; my own examination of available publications; long discussions, both in the United States and abroad, with persons who have visited Communist China; and materials prepared for me by other people. These latter, who number several score, I should like to acknowledge. But to do so confronts me with a dilemma. The majority of my informants and collaborators have specifically asked to remain anonymous. It would be invidious—however dubious the honour—to list only the small remaining number who have no objection to being mentioned. Moreover, since in no case do I use their materials in just the form they gave them to me, acknowledgment might unwittingly give them a responsibility for my analysis that they might well hesitate to accept. I must therefore reluctantly thank them all in this graceless and anonymous fashion and take upon myself the full responsibility for mistakes and misjudgments.

1. *Visitors to Communist China*

The Volume of Exchange

Since 1949, and particularly since 1951, the Chinese Government has been engaged in a sustained and massive programme of cultural diplomacy.[1] As a starting point for understanding its dimensions, let us accept the rough estimate that between 75,000 and 100,000 foreigners[2] have visited China, and perhaps one-half that number of Chinese have gone abroad. According to Chinese sources[3] these have come from 122 countries and "regions" of the world, in 1,500 delegations and groups. From the Chinese side, "more than 400 groups of Chinese delegates have participated in international sports meetings, drama and film festivals, musical contests, exhibitions, and activities commemorating famous people in the cultural world."[4] Visitors from the Communist

1 A general study of this development still remains to be written. But a number of partial studies, which are very illuminating for particular situations, should be mentioned: Richard Walker, "The Developing Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Asia" (in G. L. Anderson, ed., *Issue and Conflicts* [Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1959]); "Guided Tourism in China," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 6, No. 5, September–October 1957; C. Martin Wilbur, "Japan and the Rise of Communist China" (in Borton *et al.*, *Japan Between East and West* [New York: Harper, 1957]); S. C. Leng, *Japan and Communist China* (Kyōtō: Dōshisha University Press, 1958); Margaret Fisher and Joan Bondurant, "The Impact of Communist China on Visitors from India," *The Far East Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1956; and A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York: Harper, 1960). Frederick Barghoorn's recent study, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton University, 1960), although it deals with the Soviet Union, is extremely illuminating both for comparisons and for an understanding of the general Communist conception of cultural diplomacy.

2 These figures cannot be demonstrated conclusively from the inconsistent data now available to us. I arrive at them by taking as my starting point the annual reports in the Chinese press of the number of "foreign visitors," or "foreign guests." This runs, on the average, about 5,000 per year. But it is quite clear from internal evidence that this figure excludes many important categories of foreign visitors: people who come primarily on international Party business, often not of a public character; students in "revolutionary" schools, for indoctrination, training in tactics, organisation, weapons, guerrilla warfare, etc.; resident students; resident foreigners (of whom there are a large number, including Americans); resident technicians and other personnel, mainly from the Soviet *bloc*, there in connection with economic and technical aid programmes; and probably diplomatic personnel.

3 NCNA, September 17, 1959, summarising the first 10 years of the régime.

4 It is tempting to try to apply an average multiplier to the number of delegations, but this is not possible. Chinese delegations range from two members to as many as the 700 who were reported to have taken part in the 1955 World Youth Festival in Warsaw. Art ensembles may run as high as 100 members, while delegations to scientific conferences may consist of two or three persons.

It is also not clear from these figures whether "cultural delegations" alone are being discussed, or trade union delegations, peace delegations, and similar missions are also included.

bloc are perhaps the most numerous, but Asia is not far behind. In fact, more visitors come from Japan than from any other single country, including the Soviet Union. Most Chinese travellers go to the Communist-*bloc* countries, particularly the Soviet Union, but again South and South-east Asia are not far behind.

Let us examine the composition of this flow a little more closely for sample periods. In 1955 more than 4,760 foreigners from 63 countries visited China. Of these, about 1,000 were from Japan and about 1,300 from the people's democracies (excluding the Soviet Union).[5] In the same year 5,833 Chinese visited 33 countries, 100 of them to Japan and 1,600 to the people's democracies[6]; 435 delegations from non-Communist countries visited China and 249 Chinese delegations visited non-Communist countries.[7]

For the year 1956 we have much more detailed information. In all, a total of 5,200 foreigners from 75 countries visited China. Of these, between 20 and 40 per cent. came from Japan.[8]

[5] Excluding formal diplomatic missions, we have the following figures:

Poland	337
Czechoslovakia	377
Hungary	57
East Germany	145
Rumania	76
Bulgaria	106
Albania	150
Yugoslavia	75
	1,323

(From *People's China*, March 1956, No. 6, pp. 16–17.) We have no data for the Soviet Union for that year.

[6] The figures for Japan are from the Japanese Foreign Office records. To the people's democracies (excluding both formal diplomatic missions and exchanges with the Soviet Union), we have the following figures:

Poland	401
Czechoslovakia	356
Hungary	187
East Germany	272
Rumania	111
Bulgaria	127
Albania	41
Yugoslavia	123
	1,618

(From *People's China*, March 1956, No. 6, pp. 16–17.) It will be noticed that the figure listed here for Poland (401) contradicts other reports in the Chinese press that the Chinese delegation to the World Youth Festival in Warsaw consisted of 700 members (including a 370-member art ensemble and 155 athletes). Perhaps this larger figure was planned but not reached.

[7] Evron Kirkpatrick, *Year of Crisis* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 353–355.

[8] The information on this point is somewhat contradictory. Walker, on the basis of Chinese published data, computes 1,243 Japanese. ("Guided Tourism in China," *loc. cit.*). Kirkpatrick gives the figure of "over 2,000" (*op. cit.*, p. 96). The figure I have come up with from Japanese Foreign Office records is 1,182, which is listed as from the *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*) of April 20, 1957. My own suspicion

590 trade unionists from 43 countries visited China during the year, 344 from non-Communist countries, 246 from Communist countries. The largest single group, 247, came from Japan. The next largest *bloc*, 124, was from the Soviet Union. The third largest group was the Arab workers' delegation from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Libya. Trade unionists also came for the first time from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, and West Africa.

From China, 135 trade unionists visited 13 countries.

Over 300 young people from 39 countries visited China. From China, over 200 youth delegates visited 22 countries.

Nearly 200 scientists from 19 countries came to China to visit, give lectures, or attend scientific conferences.

From China, 76 scientists attended 16 international scientific conferences in 13 countries.

In all, China had "academic intercourse" with 27 countries during that year.

1,100 "writers and artists" from 37 countries (10 for the first time), in 136 groups, visited China. This group included 30 delegates from 20 countries to attend the ceremonies for the 20th Anniversary of the death of Lu Hsun; 12 performing ensembles (theatrical groups, singers, etc.) from nine countries; 65 artists from 15 countries, who brought their own works for exhibition.

From China in the same period, over 1,300 "artists and cultural workers," in 64 groups, visited 39 foreign countries (12 of the countries were visited for the first time). This group included 30 writers to 13 countries; 18 ensembles (Peking Opera, acrobatics, puppet shows, shadow plays, *ping chu*, dancers from the minorities), numbering about 1,000 persons, to 35 countries; 37 artists to 11 countries, who brought back "their own paintings of life abroad"; a writers' delegation, led by Mao Tun, to the Asian Writers' Conference in New Delhi.

Over 2,000 Chinese students went abroad to study, 85 per cent of them to the Soviet Union.

At least 700 new students from abroad came to China to attend universities and higher technical schools there.

China sent 21 "kinds of exhibitions of varying aspects of Chinese culture" to 24 countries.

These data give a fair picture of the usual composition of the foreign visits. The principal variation from year to year is in the national composition, which depends very much on political developments. When the stirrings in the Middle East took on serious proportions, particularly at the time of the Suez crisis, the number of Arab visitors increased markedly. When negotiations are on with Indonesia, Burma, etc., the number of delegations back and forth between China and those countries rises sharply. Since the explosions in Africa and Cuba, the number of African, Cuban, and Latin American visitors has risen steeply.

is that the higher figure is more correct. Japanese Foreign Office estimates are always low because of the basis of calculation (see discussion of this point in the chapter on Japan). In the course of the year, the Chinese estimates will vary with new tallies, so that usually the higher figure is more correct.

Since the overwhelming majority of the visits are political and ceremonial in character, we find a heavy clustering at the time of national celebrations, principally May Day and National Day (October 1). This is the time the Chinese can make their greatest impression of dynamism, national unity, and power, and the presence of foreigners not only graces the occasion but enables the régime to demonstrate that China is internationally accepted and respectable—in spite of the Americans—and that it is even a Mecca for the " progressive, peace-loving people of the world." Probably 60 to 80 per cent. of all visiting, therefore, is timed to coincide with these two occasions. A few sample indications: For May Day 1957, there were 1,000 guests from 63 countries (about 300 of them trade unionists from 46 countries); for May Day 1958, we read of over 700 foreign visitors from 43 countries in the honoured guests' stands. For National Day 1955, there were more than 2,000 foreign guests from 50 countries in the reviewing stands; and for National Day 1960, again there were about 2,000 foreign guests in the reviewing stands.[9] The impact of these great national celebrations, full of good will and euphoria, yet conveying an impression of unshakable power and national support, has much to do with the mood in which the casual visitors see China on their guided whirlwind tours.

A brief word is in order on exchange relations with the Soviet Union. Although, if we exclude formal missions, resident technicians, students, government and Party delegations, etc., we find more Japanese visiting China than Russians, it is precisely these excluded categories that play the most important role in China. According to a Chinese summary of February 17, 1959, in the ten-year period 1949–58, 112 Soviet " cultural groups," comprising 2,301 persons, visited China, that is, an average of about 230 per year. (The corresponding figure for Japan I have estimated as 6,500 persons in 400 organised groups.) But the term " cultural groups " must certainly exclude many important categories, even apart from official delegations: scientific groups, youth groups, economic groups, tourists, etc. We therefore have no data for estimating the total number of Soviet visitors to China of all categories, in spite of their great importance in the internal development of the country.

Leaving aside the obvious and well-known question of Russian technicians in the new industries, we find that Russians have, at least until recently, taken part in very intimate aspects of Chinese internal development. A special report informs us, for example, that " In the past several years some 100 out of more than 140 courses started in the People's University of China were initiated with the assistance of Soviet experts . . .

[9] These figures are for Peking, where the great majority of foreign visitors attend these celebrations. But in fact the number of foreign visitors in China on these occasions is larger, because many attend the celebrations in provincial cities.

At present nearly 700 out of more than 1,040 teachers in the University were directly trained by Soviet experts. With the assistance of Soviet experts the People's University of China has also trained nearly 2,000 teachers for institutions of higher learning throughout the country. At present about one-third of all the teachers of political theory courses in the various institutions of higher learning throughout the country were directly or indirectly trained with the assistance of Soviet experts." [10] The corresponding ten-year figure for Chinese visits to the Soviet Union—2,334 persons in 134 " cultural delegations "—is equally unsatisfactory. It excludes all official delegations as well as non-official delegations that can be defined as other than " cultural." The average of Chinese students to Russia alone, about 1,500 to 2,000 per year, is higher than the average of " cultural delegates," 233 per year.

Another rough estimate that may be useful in visualising the scope of exchange is that for students. At any given time there are probably somewhat over 1,000 foreign students in Chinese universities and higher secondary institutions,[11] which means, I would believe, a total of 3,000 to 4,000 to date.[12] The majority of these, who are from the neighbouring Communist states of Asia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia, come for their basic education; in respect to Chinese educational institutions and culture, theirs are relatively " under-developed " countries. Although a fair number of students come from the Soviet Union,[13] and in lesser numbers from East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary, most of them come to acquire some special knowledge about China,[14] rather than for basic university education. Apart from the

10 Peking Radio, Home Service Broadcast, April 17, 1957.

11 Estimated from partial indications in Chinese sources. For example, a report of March 26, 1955, stated that " Over 950 students from 14 countries were studying in 74 institutions of higher education and secondary technical schools. . . . After the summer of 1955, the number will rise to 1,600." But a report of September 6, 1955, mentions the arrival of " 300 foreign students . . . to take up studies." (If we add these new arrivals to the 950 earlier reported present, we get only 1,250—disregarding those who might have left after finishing their studies. It would appear that the projected target of 1,600 " after the summer of 1955 " was not immediately reached.) For universities alone, that is, excluding the secondary technical schools, the Ministry of Education on September 1, 1956, announced the figure of 700 " new students " from overseas for the academic year 1956–57. 600 foreign students were reported attending the New Year's party given by university students in the Peking Hotel on January 1, 1957. (" Overseas Chinese " are excluded from these figures.)

12 This estimate takes into account the decline of the flow in recent years and the relatively long period of residence of many of the students—in some cases up to seven years.

13 On February 15, 1957, it was reported that 56 Soviet students arrived in Peking, " the largest group of Soviet students who have come to China to study so far." A summary report of student exchange in the *Peking Review* of February 17, 1959, stated that since 1957 113 Russian students had come to China. (This figure probably includes the 56 already mentioned in February 1957.)

14 In the case of the 56 Russians who arrived on February 15, 1957, for example, the subjects to be studied were: Chinese traditional medicine, ceramics, sub-tropical plants, and Chinese history and literature (at Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Peking Medical College).

Communist *bloc*, small numbers come from India,[15] Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, France,[16] and even England [17] and Iceland.

While China attracts students from the backward countries, for her own industrialisation and modernisation programmes, she looks outward, mainly, of course, to the Soviet Union. It would not be far wrong to estimate that somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 Chinese students have gone abroad for study, particularly to the Soviet Union.[18] Every year, 2,000 or more students are sent abroad, usually after careful language preparation, for periods running between two and five years.[19] At least 85 per cent. of these go to the Soviet Union. More modest numbers go to Eastern European countries,[20] and token numbers go to non-socialist countries. In accordance with the student-exchange agreements with India, for example, between eight and ten Chinese students are maintained in Indian institutions of higher learning. For the academic year 1957–58, we even read of 22 Chinese students in West Germany and eight in England.[21]

The unquestionable oddity of the exchange programme is the Afro-Asian Students' Sanatorium, a modern hospital in the Western Hills some 16 miles from Peking. In 1950, on the resolution of the Chinese Delegation to its Second World Student Congress, the International Union of

15 An average of about 7-8 per year attend Chinese educational institutions.

16 1–2 per year for 1958–59. This programme has been terminated, so that as of this time there are no French students in China.

17 There is no formal student-exchange programme between England and China, but a small number of English students are studying in Peking on their own.

18 These figures are close to those estimated independently by John Lindbeck ("The Organization and Development of Science," *The China Quarterly*, No. 6, April–June 1961, pp. 111–112) and Leo A. Orleans (*Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China* (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 79–80). I am in full agreement with them on the difficulty of making estimates from the fragmentary and contradictory material available to us. According to the *Peking Review* of February 17, 1959, 6,561 Chinese students had gone to the Soviet Union between 1951 and 1958. (Of this number, 1,064 had returned upon the completion of their studies, which means that 5,497 were then resident in Russia.)

19 On August 29, 1955, Tass reported that 1,810 Chinese students were "on their way" to the Soviet Union for advanced studies (Barghoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 84). In the same year more than 2,400 were selected in advance to study in the Soviet Union the following year. According to Chinese reports, "They are outstanding graduates of senior middle schools and colleges and universities this year, as well as teachers and scientific research workers." Before going to the Soviet Union, they spent one year studying Russian (NCNA, August 30, 1955). Again, we read that on August 6, 1956, the Minister of Higher Education gave a farewell party to 2,619 students going abroad for advanced studies, "85 per cent. of them to the Soviet Union." A recent indication we have is the report of the August 2, 1960, issue of the *Peking Review* of the return of more than 1,300 "graduates," most of whom had studied "in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for periods of between two and five years in engineering, agriculture, industry, and the fine arts."

20 Exact figures are not available consistently, but we note that as of September 15, 1958, there were more than 100 Chinese students in Poland (they held an anti-American rally in Warsaw on that date) and, for the academic year 1957–58, there were 21 in Bulgaria (UNESCO, *Study Abroad*, XI, 1959–60, Table III, pp. 46–51).

21 According to UNESCO, *op. cit.* In the same period, Germany had 76 students from Taiwan, and England had four.

Students decided to construct a tuberculosis sanatorium for Asian students. The responsibility was assigned to the All-China Students' Federation, the Chinese Government providing the cost of the building and staffing, and student organisations of various Eastern European countries donating the surgical and electrical equipment. The Sanatorium opened in 1954, and in 1956 its facilities were expanded to include African students. According to the report of the Australian Students' Delegation that visited the Sanatorium in 1956 [22]: "Treatment is mainly medical, and is of a high standard. Some minor operations are performed on the premises. Thoracic surgery is performed in one of the major Peking hospitals. . . . All expenses of travel to China are met by the individual, but all expenses including travel and treatment once inside China are met by the ACSF. Even clothes are provided during the stay at the sanatorium. . . . The students usually bring their own textbooks with them, and it is hoped to initiate a correspondence scheme with their own universities." A Chinese report noted that: "Since its opening in 1954, the Sanatorium has admitted over 900 tuberculous students from nine Asian-African countries. 700 of them have recuperated and have been discharged from the Sanatorium." [23]

So far tourism, in the narrow sense, is scarcely developed. The Chinese retain their limited facilities for more purposeful visiting. There is a certain amount of what might be called tourism from Hongkong, sometimes Chinese visiting their families on the mainland, sometimes business men attending fairs in Canton and other cities, and there is an organised tourism for overseas Chinese, which falls in a special category. Otherwise the occasional references to "tourists" are conspicuous by their very infrequency.[24]

22 *Students in China*, Report of a Delegation from the National Union of Australian University Students to the People's Republic of China (no date, no place of publication listed), pp. 24–25.

23 Peking Radio broadcast to North America, June 4, 1957.

24 The largest number seem to come from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, from other Communist countries. For the eleven months ending April 16, 1957, we learn that Shanghai had accommodated 1,400 Soviet tourists from Leningrad and Vladivostok, "who paid their own way to visit China." A small party of Indian tourists visited China in 1956. In 1957, a French tourist agency arranged the visits of over 50 Frenchmen. The Swedish archaeologist Hanna Rydh led a twenty-five-member tourist group on a seventeen-day tour in April 1958. The first Canadian tourist group, of seventeen members, went to China in August 1959, led by Mrs. Claire Wallace, a tourist agent, (Miss Margaret Aitken, niece of Lord Beaverbrook, being a member of this party.) Again, in September 1960, we read of a small party of "young Polish tourists," led by the head of the State Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Youth. In April 1957, a group of seventeen students from six countries—France, England, Israel, Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—visited China as "tourists," the first such group, we are informed, since the liberation. On this tour, organised by the All-China Students' Federation, the students paid "the equivalent of two U.S. dollars per day, which covers all expenses for excursions, transport, food, accommodations and visits" (NCNA broadcast, April 2, 1957). I am informed that at least the students from England were

Mention must also be made of the devoted corps of resident foreigners, often referred to by the Chinese as "peace champions," who take a prominent part in the handling of foreign visitors. Rewi Alley, of New Zealand, is usually present at all important receptions or functions involving foreign visitors, and he is sometimes their host—it was on his invitation that Edgar Snow made his recent trip to China—Kinkazu Saionji, the Japanese "peace champion," who moved with his whole family to China several years ago in order to "help the cause of peace," takes an important part in all activities involving Japanese visitors. It has now become almost a ritual appendix to all reports of meetings and receptions of Japanese visitors that "Kinkazu Saionji, Japanese peace champion, was also present." The resident foreigners include scores from many different countries, including the United States, and their ranks are occasionally swelled by long visits of other favoured "peace champions," such as Jose Venturelli of Chile and Achmed Mohammed Kheil of the Sudan.

By the standards of foreign travel and exchange in the non-Communist world, particularly in the West, these are very modest figures. They cannot bear comparison with the millions of Europeans who visit one another's countries every year (well over 10,000,000 to Italy alone), or the million or so Americans who go to Europe every year. The scale of travel for this, the largest country in the world—about 5,000 to 10,000 foreign visitors per year—is approximately that of a modest Asian country. Even Yugoslavia, which has about 1/30th her population, had 900,000 tourists in 1960; Japan had over 200,000.

But if we consider the difficulties of travel to China and China's long struggle to establish her international position in the face of widespread non-recognition, then this figure takes on a new meaning. Every foreign visitor is another feather in her cap, a mark of recognition, another milestone on the road to acceptance and respectability, another blow to the American policy of non-recognition. The overwhelming majority are drawn from the most influential and articulate strata of their home countries, so that their impact value is incomparably greater than that of ordinary tourists, no matter how large their number.

Foreign visits have, therefore, become a major ingredient of China's cultural diplomacy, and a considerable effort and expenditure are devoted to them. The apparatus of organisations,[25] guides and interpreters, which assures the effectiveness of these visits from the Chinese point of view, is

obliged only to pay their way to Prague or Moscow, whence they were picked up at Chinese expense for the rest of the trip. But this student tourist programme ended with 1957.

25 For details, see Appendix.

both awesome and expensive. And, since China takes care of the expenses of most visitors, at least once they reach Chinese soil, her international tourist account must be very much in the red.

Aims of Exchanges

The general purpose of this massive effort is, to put it in the simplest way, the promotion of China's policies and position in the world. This is, of course, what every country tries to do. What is different is that the Chinese have a much clearer conception of their goals and a greater sense of urgency about them. Nothing is left to chance: the elaboration of methods and means is pursued with unremitting attention and study. The result is a highly differentiated and flexible approach that has shown a remarkable effectiveness.

The ultimate advantage, however, is the ability of the Chinese Communists to control and focus the entire experience, both because of their great organisational skill and their complete control of the environment. The foreigner's encounter with China cannot be left unorganised. Its impact must be under careful control. Most of the visitors come on whirlwind tours in delegations, or organised groups, usually under their own leader and at the invitation of some Chinese organisation. They are taken in hand for a carefully organised itinerary with guides and interpreters and, in the case of important delegations, by some high-ranking person or representative of the appropriate field. For the period of his stay, which may vary from a week to two months—the average is probably three weeks—the visitor is treated as an honoured guest. He is shown every courtesy, surrounded by luxury, and given every attention. He attends receptions, meetings, important events, cultural activities, the theatre and other amusements, and excellent restaurants; he is shown the great sights of Peking and China's other big cities. If he is especially important, he will have the privilege of a tea or a reception, or even a private conversation, with one of the national leaders—Chairman Mao himself, Liu Shao-ch'i, Premier Chou, Kuo Mo-jo, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi. If not, he will be made much over by lesser luminaries, who are nevertheless important in the fields the visitor is interested in: presidents of universities, heads of associations, famous writers and artists, trade union leaders.[20]

In most cases after a short stay in Peking, he will be taken on a grand tour of the country, perhaps to the new industrial developments in Manchuria, to western China, and to the oil-fields of Yumen. In the

[20] Although it has been suggested to me in personal correspondence by people who have lived in China or visited there that "foreign visitors are often deluded, thinking they are talking to key men, when they are really facing subordinates standing in." One correspondent cites a case personally known to him of a Chinese friend, on occasion, impersonating a prominent public figure for the benefit of foreigners.

course of these visits he will see people's communes, new factories, representatives of "ordinary" workers, farmers, students and even of "capitalists" now peacefully working with the new régime. He may even be shown a model prison, or a reform-through-labour camp. He will see examples of the projects the New China takes pride in, such as schools, social services, hospitals, voluntary study programmes, anti-illiteracy activities, parks of culture and rest, museums, dam-building and irrigation control, Chinese-manufactured trucks and automobiles. He will be able to talk with "representative" people, even in their homes, through an interpreter (and in the presence of the interpreter). A good proportion of the visitors are even able to go much farther afield, depending upon their private interests—and their importance: to the Tun-huang caves, to the Gobi Desert, perhaps even to Inner Mongolia. Especially privileged, and reliable, visitors have even been allowed to go to Tibet. In other words, he will be given a very full, even rich and interesting experience, and he will see many things. But he will have been guided, albeit with great skill, in accordance with his susceptibilities and dispositions, over a carefully-prepared stage.[26a] This does not mean that a visitor with a sharp eye and a humane, historical understanding will not see anything the guides do not wish him to see. But it does mean that to the greatest extent humanly possible, they will try to divert him or to have arguments carefully prepared in advance to counter unfavourable impressions.

In China's relations with the non-Communist world, three levels of objectives can be distinguished. The long-range one is certainly revolutionary subversion, the overthrow of existing governments, and the establishment of Communist governments linked to the Communist *bloc*. In the intermediate range, the objective is to improve her basic position in the world: to project a more favourable image; to win friends and neutralise opponents; to gain recognition as an established, powerful state; to establish herself as a model for under-developed countries; to establish her identity with the revolutionary nationalist movements throughout the world; to undercut the Western, and particularly the American, position. The short-range objectives are much more bound to particular situations: breaking through trade barriers, settling border issues in a favourable manner, expanding trade and technical aid. The

[26a] Unsupervised travel is not entirely impossible, depending upon people and circumstances. Visitors who are very much in the confidence of the régime are often able to free themselves of the usual guided itineraries; and, in periods of relaxation, as just before the reversal of the "Hundred Flowers" policy in the summer of 1957, freer travel seems to be more possible. There are even some journalists who have been able to travel rather freely for prolonged periods, in spite of the fact that they were not necessarily pro-Communist.

variations in the foreign-visitor traffic in foreign visitors reflect the preoccupations of Chinese policy very closely. At the height of the anti-Kishi struggle, for example, Japanese visitors were prominently featured. The Burmese border settlement, which was in part designed to undercut the Indian position, was accompanied by a vast flow of hundreds of Chinese and Burmese back and forth, state visits by U Nu and General Ne Win, cultural delegations, trade agreements, Chinese performers and generous offers of aid. More recently, the heroes have been the Algerian FLN, the Cubans, and the Africans.

In the normal international exchange, it is the intermediate and the short-range objectives that are probably most directly operative. The long-range objectives are, to some extent, pursued through different channels, or are regarded as an indirect resultant of the other activities.[27] However, these levels should not be too sharply separated. At their extremes they are undoubtedly very different in character, but they can, and often do, shade into each other. Once a substantial body of supporters is won over (intermediate objective), for example, this may become an important political force, or at least a pressure group, exerting some coherent influence on the internal politics of its own country. This is, in fact, what has actually happened, to some extent, in Japan. Japanese businessmen have been going to China in increasing numbers, purely for the sake of exploring trade possibilities. But the result of their non-ideological desire for trade is that they have become one of the most important pressure groups in the country pushing for relaxation of trade barriers, easing of travel restrictions, and full recognition of Communist China. The China problem has now become a central issue in internal Japanese politics, and the Chinese find some of their strongest advocates

[27] However, the importance of subversive activities should not be underestimated. There is constant consultation between the Chinese and Communist and front organisation leaders from all over Asia. We know, too, that the Chinese supply military training as well as general revolutionary training in special schools. In the body of this report, I have given specific information only about Australia. In the case of Japan, revolutionary subversion is far more extensive. Hundreds of Japanese Communists went to China to escape prosecution under Occupation or Japanese Government regulations. Smuggling and large-scale subsidisation of Japanese Communist-controlled organisations is widely suspected. The December 30, 1960, issue of *Mainichi* provides a circumstantial account of the "Marx-Lenin School" for the training of Japanese revolutionaries. According to this account the school, located in the south-west outskirts of Peking, south-west of Chang-hsin-tien, opened at the end of 1953 with Takakura Teru, a former Japan Communist Party (JCP) member of the Diet, as principal and three Chinese vice-principals, and during its existence trained 1,500 people. The students came from three sources: JCP members smuggled out by the "People's Fleet" and other illegal channels; Japanese residents working in China, awaiting repatriation; and Japanese soldiers who had fought on the side of the Chinese Red Army after the war. It is only fair to mention that Takakura has denied the charge. According to him, his time in China was spent studying agriculture and philosophy. Takakura is also a "progressive" novelist, who has been translated into Chinese. He revisited China in October 1958 on the invitation of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity.

among the "class enemy." In many countries the Chinese Communists have no firmer supporters than businessmen hankering after Chinese markets.

Chinese Methods

This example underlines one of the key operational principles of Chinese cultural diplomacy: *to make contact with the susceptibilities, preoccupations, and dispositions of the visitors.* Every individual, indeed every nation, is viewed as a complex combination of problems and possibilities, of differential susceptibilities and resistances, rather than as an undifferentiated whole. The appeal of the Chinese Communists to "come and see," so eloquently described by Robert Guillain,[28] therefore finds responsive individuals and strata in all countries of the world. In all non-Communist countries there are people who, for many different reasons, are sympathetically disposed towards China. They are by no means all pro-Communists, sympathisers, or fellow-travellers, although these elements always play an important role in the international cultural traffic with the Communist world. It may be that they are sympathetically disposed towards China, either because of its new revolutionary dynamism or out of respect for its great cultural past. It may be as a gesture of disagreement with their own government or of dissatisfaction with their own societies. But in every country, a careful examination of the spectrum of susceptibilities will turn up a surprising number and variety. The Chinese technique is very sensitively calibrated to make contact with them.

The first step is to locate some common point of agreement: this may be opposition to nuclear weapons, or agreement that freer trade is desirable, or perhaps no more than common agreement that cultural relations are desirable. This is then generalised as far as possible to include other matters, logically or emotionally related, as well as agreement to work jointly for these ends. Once such an area has been established, it functions both within its own country as a pressure on national policy and as an international force. Where this area of agreement with China makes contact with important functional groups and issues within national politics, it can become a very powerful force. The best example is, perhaps, Japan, where the points of agreement that diverse elements of the population, such as the intellectuals, students, leftists, businessmen, and trade unionists, are able to establish with China have become central internal political issues. Since many Japanese leftists oppose American bases, American retention of Okinawa, and the American connection generally, they are able to agree with the Chinese on the proposition that

28 *The Blue Ants* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), p. 32.

" the United States is the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese people "; from this proposition, it is only a short step to the proposition that " the United States is the common enemy of mankind."

Once this step is taken, it follows naturally that the two countries, or at least China and the " progressive " elements in Japan, should work together to achieve their common aims. This becomes a formidable force in internal Japanese politics. During the riots in Japan in May and June 1960, for example, the Chinese pulled out all stops in their support of the demonstrations, encouraging the intensification of the " revolutionary situation," and calling for the overthrow of Kishi. Japanese groups then in China lent themselves to a constant round of anti-American activities—great public meetings, speaking on the radio, writing in Chinese journals. The seven-member literary delegation, led by the novelist, Noma Hiroshi, that went to China in May, reported itself exhausted with its activities during the demonstrations; they took part happily in anti-American meetings all over China, and spoke and wrote constantly against the Americans and against Kishi.[29] People who were deeply involved in the anti-Kishi movement were genuinely grateful to the Chinese for their understanding support; the Chinese, for their part, were happy to see that the Japanese understood the implications of their common agreements.

The reader will understand that I am not suggesting that the Chinese were " responsible " for the riots. The example is offered only to show how Chinese cultural diplomacy—in this case in its more militant version of " people's diplomacy "—is able to make contact with the central issues of Japanese politics so that Japanese politics itself becomes extraordinarily responsive to Chinese initiatives. An examination of the " trade offensive " would yield a similar result. Once Japanese companies develop a vested interest in trade with China, the political issue of trade and recognition is no longer abstract, but their own: it is they who carry on the struggle as an internal matter against the government. Since it is their own vital interests that are now engaged, they become extremely vulnerable to Chinese pressure. When the Chinese abruptly cancelled the fourth private trade agreement in May 1958, turning over Japan's quota in good part to West Germany, the adversely affected businessmen turned their anger against the Japanese Government. The subsequent Chinese offer to resume trade with " friendly firms," conditional on the acceptance of the " three principles " did not therefore draw the outraged response that might have been expected in other countries but rather a determined

[29] The group also attended a special Exhibition on Tibetan Problems in Peking and reported itself shocked by the cruelty of the Tibetan lamas, nobles, and landlords. Upon its return, all members wrote in support of the Chinese " liberation " policy in Tibet and against " Tibetan cruelty ". A photographic volume produced by this group has recently appeared: *Shashin-Chūgoku no Kao* (*The Face of China, in Photographs*) (Tokyo: Bunko, 1961).

effort by Japanese businessmen to comply and to create the political conditions that would meet the Chinese demands.

One further feature of the Chinese approach deserves to be highlighted. In their analysis of the importance and susceptibilities of the social forces in other countries, the Chinese are pragmatic and functional, rather than dogmatically Marxist. From a theoretical point of view intellectuals should be considered a *petit-bourgeois* stratum of extreme unreliability; yet in practice the Chinese make their strongest appeal to them. Businessmen should be the "class enemies," and yet the appeal to them is among the most effective employed. Churchmen should be the dangerous dispensers of "opium to the people," yet the Chinese cultivate them very carefully, for propagandistically valuable points of agreement and for their influence on the climate of opinion back home. I do not propose in this book to analyse these matters in detail, but it will be useful to keep them in mind in reading the individual country chapters.

2. *Patterns of Exchange*

Within the Communist Bloc

A basic distinction must be made between Chinese exchange relations with Communist countries[1] and with non-Communist countries. With Communist countries, relations are highly institutionalised and based upon explicit agreements and covenants. In each case, treaties, protocols, and executive arrangements are agreed upon at the highest levels, and implementing agreements between the appropriate lower-level institutions —ministries, academies, associations, universities—are worked out from year to year. (The chapter on Poland describes this in some detail.) These agreements regulate a constant flow of students, teachers, professionals, politicians, government officials, representatives of "people's organisations" and "people's movements," representatives of international organisations, conferences, exhibitions, art shows, festivals, writers, artists, journalists, musicians, performing groups, athletes, trade unionists, and technicians.

Since China lies about midway in degree of development within the Communist *bloc*, we find an important differential. Towards the more-developed countries (the Soviet Union and the Eastern European people's democracies), China is relatively "backward" (although the word is sedulously avoided in public pronouncements). Therefore more Chinese go to those countries, particularly in the learner categories—students,

1 Excluding Yugoslavia, which is in a special category. On the other hand, recent evidence suggests that Cuba and Guinea are falling increasingly into the people's democracy pattern in their relations with China.

trainees, etc., than come to China from them. There are more Chinese students in Russia than Russian students in China, more Chinese students in Poland than Polish students in China, etc. Again, Chinese students start at a lower point in the host educational system, often as undergraduates, and go for longer periods of study, often as much as five to seven years; the students who go to China from the more developed countries are usually advanced specialists—in Sinology (language, literature, history) or for specialised study in such subjects as lacquerwork, Chinese traditional medicine, ceramics, and fine arts.

But in relation to the less-developed Communist countries, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia,[2] China is the "teacher." From them large numbers of learners come to China's higher secondary, technical, and university institutions; very few Chinese go to them for such purposes. The Chinese also provide for them a wide variety of technical training in industry, administration, and agriculture.

With Non-Communist Countries

Among the non-Communist countries, three important cross-cutting distinctions must be noted: recognition and non-recognition; friendly popular atmosphere and unfriendly popular atmosphere; and advanced, as against backward and recently colonial countries. China's relations with each category are somewhat different.

Although it is obvious that recognition is a very important consideration, it is not necessarily the most important. Relations with Japan, for example, which does not recognise her, are much more intense and intimate than those with such countries as the Netherlands, or even England, which do recognise her.

Much depends upon the second consideration, namely the extent to which the Chinese are able to find significant internal strata that are highly sympathetic. This will not necessarily depend upon the formal diplomatic policy of the country in question, but rather more on its internal political dispositions. Among the recognising countries, perhaps India, at least until recently, and the Netherlands provide the extreme cases. To the extent possible, the Chinese try to establish their relations with the friendly countries on the model of those with the people's democracies, by formal agreements, treaties, and protocols. With the non-friendly countries, relations tend to be *ad hoc* and spasmodic. India and China have a considerable structure of exchange relations, but there is very little, whether formally or informally, between the Netherlands and China.

[2] Underdeveloped Albania lies closer to this pattern than to the advanced pattern. Moreover, it is clear that the Chinese are trying to develop the same posture in relation to some of the newly-emergent underdeveloped countries, particularly of Africa and South-East Asia.

Although China and India have exchanged students since 1954, recent attempts to work out a student exchange with the Netherlands have still not borne fruit.

This same distinction holds for the non-recognising countries as well. In France and Japan, for example, even though formal diplomatic relations do not exist, there is a substantial body of public opinion very favourably disposed towards China. Here the Chinese pursue their vigorous programmes of "people's diplomacy," going to "the people" over the heads of their governments. In Japan, this programme has been spectacularly successful; in France, less dramatically so, but equally substantial in important strata of opinion and politics. Agreements of a semi-governmental character are made with non-official organisations, and, particularly in the case of Japan, China has substantial *de facto* relations of a basically official character—cultural exchange, trade agreements, fishery agreements, repatriation, payment protocols; but they are carried out through non-official bodies. Even with France and Italy the Chinese have had a small student-exchange agreement with private bodies, although the former has now been abrogated. At the opposite extreme is, of course, the United States, where there is neither official recognition nor any strong public sentiment favourable to Communist China. Australia and Canada lie somewhere between these two extremes.

The third important distinction is between the advanced countries and the backward countries. In the Chinese strategic view, the neutral and non-aligned states are in a transitory condition; potentially they are allies. The "progessive" and "peace-loving" forces of history include not only the present Communist states but the new revolutionary nationalist states and movements as well. To these latter, China can offer herself as a model with, to some extent, an even greater chance of success than the Soviet Union.[3] As a non-white country, only recently emerged from "semi-colonialism" and backwardness, she has more effective claims to affinity than the Russians, who are whites, and whose Revolution is already so far in the past. And, not least important, her achievements are more likely to impress backward countries than advanced ones. China

3 Although there is some competition, however carefully regulated. The Chinese certainly cannot hope to compete for the time being with the Soviet Union, nor even with most of the Eastern European countries, in technical help, economic aid, and advanced technical training. This may be an important potential source of conflict, although so far the Chinese have been willing to accept a junior role. Some place, however, is obviously provided for her. For example, while Russia puts up its hundreds of millions for the Aswan Dam and other major enterprises in Egypt, China provides more modest help in the Yemen; while Russia makes grand gestures and enormous grants to India, China offers aid to Cambodia and Nepal; while Russia offers unlimited help to West African countries, China sends small aid teams to Guinea. In some countries, such as Burma and Cuba, both countries make contributions; in others, Russia seems to have exclusive rights, as in Afghanistan, even though she is a neighbour also of China.

therefore makes a special effort to identify herself with the backward countries, by declarations of sympathy, political and diplomatic support (*e.g.*, recognition of the Algerian FLN, close relations with Cuba), aid and technical help (as in Yemen, Cambodia, several African countries, and even Burma), and military support (as in the offer of arms to the FLN). One can expect that China will try to develop increasingly with these countries the structure of formal relations that she now has with the Communist countries.

Politics and Exchange

Another consideration that affects the flow of cultural exchange is the general political atmosphere—China's internal situation and her international relations. During the period of the régime's existence, these have gone through sharp changes.[4] The period 1949 to 1952 was one of great tension, marked internally by a massive offensive and externally by support for insurrectionary movements in South and South-east Asia, a " hard " attitude towards neutralists, and the Korean War.

From 1952 on there began a rapid shift to a " soft " and co-operative line. Externally it was marked by improved relations with the outside world especially after the Bandung and the (1955) Geneva Conferences. During this period ambassadorial talks with the United States were initiated and Chiang Kai-shek was offered a post in the Peking Government. Internally also relaxation followed the 1955 campaigns against counter-revolutionaries and Hu Feng-ists and the completion of collectivisation; the climax was the " hundred flowers " period and the rectification of Party members. Within the Communist world, China appeared more and more as a supporter of the " national " road to Socialism.

But from mid-1957 a reaction set in, growing stronger with each new development. Internally China went through another prolonged anti-rightist purge, followed by the high-pressure conversion of co-operatives and collectives into people's communes and the strains of the " great leap forward." Within the Communist *bloc*, China emerged as the great defender of orthodoxy against relaxation and " revisionism." The offshore islands crisis of the autumn of 1958, the Tibetan revolt of 1959, and the growing border problems with India increased the tension even further.

All of these changes have been reflected in the character of cultural exchange. In the initial period of militant internal consolidation and external belligerence, very few visitors were attracted or wooed other than hard-core Communists and fellow-travellers. But from 1952, with the shift to a softer line, the political complexion of the

[4] See A. Doak Barnett's more detailed analysis in his *Communist China and Asia*, *op. cit.*; particularly Chapter 7. My own analysis differs from his only in certain details.

visitors begins to take on a more representative character, first from Asia, where the initial effort at betterment of relations was made, and then from the rest of the world. By early 1957, normalisation reached a high point and there were even the beginnings of normalised academic relations: students were being exchanged with a few non-Communist countries; a few scholars were able to carry on some serious observation and study; materials became increasingly available.

But the anti-rightist campaign of summer 1957 is the watershed in this development. From then on there is a gradual deterioration, which can be illustrated by a few examples. China specialists, unless they were markedly friendly to the régime, found increasing difficulty in going to China. Even some people who had, in the earlier period, been allowed to visit, were refused after 1957 or early 1958. Foreign students from many countries have reported meeting with increasing difficulties in pursuing the study and research they were interested in, and in having close relations with Chinese students. There is some evidence that the Chinese have since that time stopped accepting large batches of foreign students (both from Communist and non-Communist countries) in favour of a policy of less than five students per country. The exchange with India appears to be steadily on the downgrade, and it is now really questionable whether it will continue at all. The small exchange with France was brought to a complete halt in 1960. Since 1959 the flow of Chinese journals, newspapers, and books needed for scholarly work has been almost completely cut off. The official Chinese explanation has been that there there is a paper shortage (even though there is no diminution of the quantity of strictly propaganda publications, like the *Peking Review* and *China Reconstructs*), but the more plausible explanation that has been offered some visitors to China is the danger of "misuse" by the imperialists—in other words, these materials reveal more about internal developments than the Communists wish to have known.

And finally, one more example: since 1957 the Chinese have been very wary of general international scholarly conferences. They now refuse international conferences organised by UNESCO or other UN agencies on the grounds that Taiwan is a member. Yet as late as July 1957 they had been willing to attend a UNESCO-sponsored philosophical conference in Poland. They are also very cautious about conferences on Sinology or Orientology. Although they attended the conferences of the Junior Sinologues until 1956, they have declined to attend them since 1957. More spectacularly, they withdrew their expected participation in the summer 1960 International Orientalists' Conference, even though it was held in Moscow.

These general trends are further affected by China's relations with particular countries. One incident in Sino-Japanese relations provides a good example.[5] On May 10, 1958, the Chinese announced the termination of all cultural as well as commercial relations with Japan. From then on not only trade, but the intellectual-exchange traffic languished. Fewer people were able to visit China, and these were increasingly of a more politically favourable type. The Japanese academic world suddenly found that the flow of publications to which it had by now become accustomed was almost completely cut off.

But this was only the climax of a long and bitter train of events. On March 5, 1958, the fourth private Japanese-Chinese trade agreement, involving an exchange at the level of about $100,000,000, was negotiated in Peking. This time, however, the Japanese Government's benevolent indifference came under pressure from both sides. The Nationalist Chinese Government protested against Japan's increasing ties with Communist China and in protest broke off trade talks then going on in Taipei and announced a boycott. To appease Formosa, the Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi carried a private letter from Prime Minister Kishi which apparently allayed some of the resentment of the Nationalist Government; at the same time Kishi announced that his Government would co-operate with the private trade agreement, but only within the limits of "existing laws" and without recognising Communist China. On the understanding that Japan would not give official status to Chinese Communist trade agencies nor grant the right to fly the Communist flag, Taiwan lifted the boycott, resumed the trade talks, and eventually worked out an agreement for two-way trade at the level of $82,500,000 for the year. In April, the Chinese Communists opened a bitter and sustained campaign against the Kishi Government for "sabotaging" the private trade agreement, and for a "generally insulting attitude" towards Communist China. However, notwithstanding a Nationalist Government protest about the flying of the Communist flag at a handicrafts exhibition in Nagasaki, the Japanese Government did nothing about it. On May 2, a Japanese draughtsman pulled down the flag, thus sparking off a sharp retaliatory reaction. The private trade agreement was cancelled, the Chinese Iron and Steel Mission, which had been in Japan negotiating an agreement since late March, was recalled, existing contracts with Japanese firms were cancelled, the private fisheries agreement was cancelled, and on May 10 Ch'en Yi announced the termination of all commercial and cultural relations. Some 40 Japanese businessmen then in Peking left for home, and a policy of petty harassment began, including the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels, etc.

[5] See the account by Doi Akira, "Two Years' Exchanges with China," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4, October–December 1958.

The climax of this sustained campaign was the deliberate attempt to influence the election campaigns. This seems to have backfired, because the Kishi Government emerged with a slightly increased majority. From then on, Communist China began to relax its attitude, particularly in the sphere of intellectual exchange. However, trade still remains a serious problem, and the *interlocuteurs valables*, such as the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō), the Japan-China Friendship Association, etc., have tried to act as middlemen to get the flow started. Although token exchanges of so-called " consideration goods " [6]—water chestnuts, lacquer materials, etc.—wheedled out of the Chinese Communists have had no real effect on the trade situation (the lost trade, which had gone to West Germany, has still not been fully restored), the pent-up resentment of businessmen has had a growing effect on the Government.

The anti-security pact demonstrations of May and June 1960 offered the Chinese the opening for a new point of departure. Enthusiastic, perhaps overly so, about the " revolutionary potential " in Japan, the Chinese have redoubled their wooing of the groups they see as anti-American: students, intellectuals, trade unionists. Liu Ning-yi, who spent two weeks in Japan in August 1960,[7] returned home with extremely optimistic estimates of these possibilities and urged an intensification of people's diplomacy. The result has been a substantial increase in the volume of intellectual and " people's " exchange, perhaps even topping former records. Some Japanese groups have even hopefully tried to reopen negotiations about the exchange of scholarly materials. Iwai Akira, Secretary-General of Sōhyō, reported on his return from China that Chou En-lai had made a standing offer to Japanese union leaders to visit China " at any time." [8] The export of " consideration goods " was stepped up, and the Chinese estimated the situation in Japan as ripe enough for the attachment of important strings to their offer of a resumption of trade. " Friendly " companies would be permitted to trade, provided they accepted the " three principles ": calling upon the Japanese Government to end its " hostile " policy; rejecting the " plot " to create Two Chinas; and supporting efforts to normalise relations between the two countries.

6 When trade was cut off, the Chinese graciously consented to allow small quantities of special items to be handled by friendly organizations as a token of Chinese good will. This emphasized the idea that the termination of trade was no fault of the Chinese but rather the responsibility of the Kishi Government. It also, incidentally, allowed some friendly organizations to rack up a small profit and to acquire some leverage among business firms interested in doing business with China.

7 Liu led a 15-member delegation to attend both the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Congress and the anniversary convention of the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō). He requested, but was refused, an extension of his two-week visa, in spite of the pressure of " progressive " elements in Japan. In an article in the *People's Daily* on August 27, he wrote that " the Japanese people's future is full of brightness and hope."

8 Kyodo News Agency, October 14, 1960.

In the same way, particular situations in the relations of China with other countries have a strong effect on cultural exchange. When Chinese strategy required the image of Chou and Nehru working together for peace and co-existence, cultural exchange with India exhibited an amplitude, a representative character, and a generosity that have disappeared since the Tibetan events and the border incidents; everything has tightened up. Now that China has made a huge wheat purchase from Canada (which, happily for Peking, coincides with a growing nationalist consciousness in Canada, increasingly articulate resentment of American "control" of the Canadian economy and culture, and the differentiation of the Canadian approach to Cuba from the American), there are many indications that Canadian tourism to China will increase and even that some Canadian scholars may be able to visit. The decision of China to offer all-out diplomatic and military support to the Algerian FLN may have important consequences on French tourism to China; increasingly it will be the leftist anti-Gaullist elements who go, rather than the broad cross-section of the intellectual world that has been attracted hitherto.

INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED

PART TWO: SELECTED NATIONAL EXPERIENCES

1. *Asia and Australasia*

A. INDIA*

A. INTELLECTUAL EXCHANGES

INDIA has been perhaps the most favoured of non-Communist countries in its cultural relations with China.[1] Yet the curve of the Sino-Indian relations has been as affected by political considerations as the relations of China to any other country. The scant 11 years of the Communist régime have been marked by sharp ups and downs. In the first period, 1949–51, relations were cool and tentative, in spite of the presence as Ambassador of Sardar K. M. Panikkar, the distinguished historian, who was very friendly to the new régime, and in spite of India's sponsorship of Communist China for membership in the United Nations. This was the period, it will be remembered, when China was taking a very aggressive attitude towards the border problems between the two countries, and when China still considered India's independence not a "true" one and the replacement of the "bourgeois nationalist leadership" as the order of the day.[2] B. T. Ranadive, Indian Communist Party leader, and Mao Tse-tung were pledging each other that the day of liberation was at hand.

However, beginning in 1951, and particularly in 1952, a notable amelioration began to take place. As early as the spring, an India-China Friendship Association (ICFA) was formed, with Tripurari Chakravarty, Professor of Chinese History at Calcutta University, as secretary of the organising committee. In April Dr. Mohanlal Atal became the first unofficial Indian leader to visit China, going as the Indian delegate to the World Peace Council. The big change, however, came with the six-week visit of a high-level unofficial goodwill mission to China.[3] This group, strongly encouraged by Ambassador Panikkar, and led by the noted Gandhian, Pandit Sunderlal, contained a large number

* The substance of this section, in a somewhat altered form, has appeared in *The China Quarterly*, No. 7, July-September 1961.

1 For a more detailed discussion, see Part II of this section.

2 In the *China Digest* of September 21, 1949, for example, Nehru is labelled the "dregs of mankind" (along with several other South-East Asian leaders).

3 This mission has been fully reported in Margaret Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, "The Impact of Communist China on Visitors from India," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, v. 15, No. 2, Feb. 1956, and in 1952 issues of the *India Press Digests*. See also Panikkar's own book, *In Two Chinas—Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955).

of outstanding intellectual figures, although the balance was somewhat leftist and pacifist.[4] In return, a Chinese cultural delegation of 15 scholars, artists, and scientists, led by Ting Hsi-lin, Vice-Minister for Culture, came to India for a five-week stay. This was one of the first Chinese delegations to visit a non-Communist country.

The pro-China enthusiasm in India reached a high point. Mao Tse-tung's works were translated into English and into Indian languages; branches of the ICFA proliferated; books and articles on the New China spread like a rash.[5] In 1952 hundreds of Indians went to China in a wide variety of delegations, the most important of which were: trade union delegations for the May Day celebrations, the official Indian Government's Cultural Goodwill Mission, led by the Prime Minister's sister, Mme. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, and the 60-member delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in September 1952. There were many individual visits, on the special invitation of the Chinese Government or of Chinese "people's organisations," and there was even a visit of an Indian table tennis team.

This rising curve reached its high point with Chou En-lai's visit to India in June 1954, when the *Panch Sheela* announcement was made,[6] and its sequel, Nehru's visit to China in October 1954.[7] During his stay in Peking, Mr. Nehru could have met hundreds of other Indians conveniently there on a variety of delegations, many for the purpose of attending the National Day celebrations. Mme. Uma Nehru (no relation to the Prime Minister), a member of Parliament, and Gyan Chand, the distinguished economist, were leading a 35-member friendship delegation of the ICFA[8]; Sahib Sokhey Singh, M.P., Vice-President of the All-India Peace Council, and Stalin Peace Prize Winner,[9] was there. We also read of a 10-member women's delegation, a youth delegation, a trade union delegation, the visit of the Mayor of Calcutta, Naresh Nath Mookerjee, and of the Minister of Food and Agriculture of the State of Assam. As a result of the Chou-Nehru visits, the first trade agreement between the two countries was signed on October 14 and along with it an agreement on the exchange of students. In the original modest plan, two Chinese

4 Panikkar: "Though . . . some of its members were connected with front organisations, I had actively encouraged this visit as I felt that I would be able to handle the delegation . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 137).

5 Many members of the first unofficial delegation wrote books and articles and Pandit Sundarlal, leader of the group, edited a book of essays by the members, *China Today*. (Allahabad: Hindustani Culture Society, 1952).

6 Actually the "Five Peace Principles" had first been announced in the preamble to the agreement on trade and intercourse between India and the "Tibetan Region of China," signed in Peking on April 29, 1954.

7 See Dhirendranath Das Gupta, *With Nehru in China* (Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1955).

8 See Sailakumer Mukherjee, *A Visit to New China* (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1956). Mukherjee was Speaker of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly.

9 He had just been awarded the prize on a trip to Russia.

students went to India to study Hindi, and one Indian student went to China to study Chinese.

The climax of this friendly phase was the host of incidents surrounding the Bandung Conference of spring 1955. An expanded agreement on the exchange of scholars was included in the new arrangements that followed the euphoric post-Bandung mood. The year saw scores of cultural events and delegations. In October, an Indian Film Festival was held throughout China, attended, according to the Chinese report, by three million people in China's 20 major cities. For this occasion, an 11-member Indian Film Delegation visited China as honoured guests; they were even treated to an interview with Chairman Mao. At the same time, the Chinese had an important exhibition at the India Industries Fair in New Delhi. In September the Chinese celebrated the 1,500th anniversary of the painting of the Ajanta murals, while Chinese Muslims *en route* to Mecca were being greeted by Indian Muslims and Hindus in New Delhi. The volleyball match between the 15-member Indian National Team and the Team of the Central Athletics Institute of China on October 28 was watched by no less a personage than Chairman Mao himself. Distinguished visitors included Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, then Minister of Health, who spent three weeks in China; a number of M.P.s; Dean D. K. Deb Barman, of Visva Bharati University's Academy of Arts; archaeologist N. P. Chakravarti and his wife; Communist S. A. Dange, General Secretary of the All-India Trade Union Council and Vice-President of the WFTU, just in from Helsinki; B. N. Dey, President of the Indian Society of Engineers, and his wife; B. N. Mukherjee, of WFTU's Asian and Australasian Liaison Bureau; and Raghu Vira, M.P. and distinguished Orientalist, who spent four months travelling the remoter regions with his daughter, herself a philologist and scholar.

The delegations represented important strata of Indian political and intellectual life: a jurists' mission, led by N. R. Das Gupta, Vice-Chairman of the All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers, spent a month in China (returning to praise the Chinese judicial system highly); the Indian Delegation to the Fifth World Youth Festival in Warsaw stopped off in China on its way home; the distinguished scholar C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer, then Vice-Chancellor of Benares Hindu University (BHU), led a delegation of 32 university teachers and students representing 10 universities, on a four-week visit, assisted by Dr. Gopal Tripathi, Principal of the College of Technology of the BHU, as his technical adviser; a cultural delegation, led by A. K. Chanda, made a triumphant tour of China: M. L. Ahuja led a medical delegation that visited and gave lectures in hospitals, medical colleges, and epidemic-prevention stations. In the autumn 10 Chinese students went to India to study in various schools, and 10 Indian students were awarded government scholarships

for study in China (only seven of them actually went). The general plan was to keep up to 10 students of each country studying in the other. Annual quotas were calculated to keep up this figure.

But from mid-1959, after the suppression of the Tibetan revolt and the return of Chinese border pressure, the curve has plummeted downward. The delegation traffic has declined sharply, and although the student-exchange programme continues in operation, many Indians feel that it too is on the decline. Indian students of Chinese have found increasing difficulties in securing materials and permission to visit and study in China, and in general the relations between the two countries remain correct but cool.

Chinese Studies in India

Until the early 1950s, Chinese studies in India were very weakly developed. Visva Bharati University, the institution started by Tagore, in Shantiniketan, West Bengal, has had a tradition of Chinese studies, primarily in classics and religion. Tagore himself had been to China in the 1920s, and the interest generated at that time was advanced substantially by the late P. C. Bagchi.[10] A modest exchange programme was maintained with Nationalist China, which produced a few language scholars.

Since the 1950s, however, there has been a substantial increase in Indian studies of China, partly as a result of the increased political interest and partly as a result of the growing number, albeit still small, of Indians able to handle the Chinese language. The two most important institutions from this point of view are the Indian School of International Studies (ISIS), affiliated with Delhi University, and the Government of India Foreign Language School. Raghu Vira's Indian Academy of Asian Culture is extremely active on Inner Asia and the non-Han portions of China. The Academy claims jurisdiction for all Asian countries (China, Japan, and Korea included), but most of its work is being done on Inner Asia and South-east Asia, primarily in classical, religious, and philological research. A certain amount of operational research is done in the Historical Division of the External Affairs Ministry, under the direction of Dr. S. Gopal (son of President Radhakrishnan).

Students and Teachers

The 1955 agreement on cultural exchange provided for 10 students to be exchanged each way.[11] Although this is an extremely modest programme compared to the thousands of Indian students in English and

10 India's leading old-style Sinologist, authority in Buddhology and Tibetology as well; author of *India and China, A Thousand Years of Cultural Relations* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951); visited China with the first official mission led by Mme. Pandit in 1952.

11 One Indian student and two Chinese students had already been exchanged in 1954.

American universities,[12] it is still the largest student exchange between Communist China and a non-Communist country. The normal period of study was two years, although the student could extend another year if he wished to remain to continue his studies or to carry on some research. The sending side took care of transportation costs, and the receiving side provided the scholarship and facilities for the student during his stay. Indian students were selected by their own Ministry of Education on an open-examination basis, and the Chinese accepted all the Indian nominees.[13]

Under this programme, between 20 and 30 Indian students have gone to China to study, and at various times there have been up to five Indian teachers of Hindi in Chinese schools. The language and literature students have all gone to Peking University, where they first concentrated on language study and then went on in some cases to substantive studies in Chinese history. The students in specialised fields, such as steel manufacturing, irrigation, hydraulics, painting, and lacquer work—all of which were specified in the agreement—were assigned to appropriate institutions. Students of flood control and irrigation, for example, were assigned to the Department of Technical Co-operation with Other Countries of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, under whose guidance they were sent, along with students from other parts of Asia, on study tours of water conservancy works. These students usually spent much of their time touring and did not work on language. Provision was also made for special language study for members of the Indian Embassy in Peking who wished it.

In Peking the students were in the care of the Foreign Student Department of the University, along with other foreign students, who usually numbered between 200 and 250, the majority from Communist-*bloc* countries. Great care was taken to facilitate their stay. They were given much individual attention. Foreign students were required to live in a special dormitory and were not permitted to live with Chinese students. Married couples were given special quarters. The dining room provided either Chinese food or suitable national foods, so that Indian students, as well as others, always had a choice. Each student was assigned a "professor guide," often a senior or even distinguished scholar, who was

12 In September 1956 there were 2,400 Indian students in the United States. See Frederick C. Barghoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 209. In 1958–59, there were 1,511 Indian students in England, and 2,585 in the United States (UNESCO, *op. cit.*).

13 As a generous gesture, Chou En-lai, on his visit to Visva Bharati University in January 1957, announced that he was giving scholarships to the daughters of Prof. Tan Yun-shan who were studying at the University on the same basis as those granted Overseas Chinese. He also agreed to the proposal of the Vice-Chancellor to send Sinological students to China for a three-year period of study, although it is not clear whether this was to be within the formal student-exchange programme or not, nor if anything was ever done about it.

in charge of his academic training. Indian students reported consulting with these advisers approximately once a week. In addition, each student was assigned a "lecturer guide," or junior faculty member, whom they could see several times a week, and a "student guide," who was available to them at all times: for help in their studies, guiding around town, small chores, etc. Often Indian students were in the company of their Chinese student guides every day. While some felt that the guides were there to spy on them, most expressed themselves as happy to have the attention and help. Provision was also made for summer travel, so that students were able to have holidays or to travel around different parts of the country. Students were not aware of any special limitations on their travels, although in each case application had to be made first.[14]

The first period of study usually consisted of an intensive concentration on language. When the student was well enough advanced, he might then be transferred to a regular department of the University along with Chinese students. After two years, if he wished to do some research, he was given guidance and facilities for doing so. At any given time there were between four and eight Indian students in residence at Peking University.

From the Chinese side, approximately the same number of students have come to work in various Indian institutions. The first batch under the formal agreement in 1955 numbered 10 students. Most of them came to study Hindi, although a small number have also worked on English language, Indian history, and water conservancy.[15] The Indian reception is somewhat less well organised than the Chinese, but special efforts are made to make the Chinese students' stay agreeable, as, for example, through summer camps,[16] conferences, etc.

Students also take part in short exchanges, as with student delegations, or as student members of youth delegations. In September 1955, for example, there was the visit of 32 Indian teachers and students led by C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer already mentioned. In January 1956, a Chinese student delegation, headed by the Secretary-General of the All-China Students' Federation, went to an international geography seminar

[14] Compare this account with that of Liu Shui Sheng (pseudonym), "Life in a Chinese University," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 1959, who was in China at roughly the same period, and René Goldman, "Peking University Today," *The China Quarterly*, No. 7, July-September 1961.

[15] Three Chinese students spent 12 months in 1956–57 visiting the Bhakra, D.V.C., Hirakud, and other Indian projects. See: S. Seshadri, "Glimpses of Water-Conservancy in China—Part I," *Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development*, May 1959.

[16] In June 1956, for example, Chinese students at Aligarh Muslim University, along with other foreign students, joined Indian students in a camp near Srinagar, Kashmir, sponsored by the New Delhi Branch of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.

at Aligarh Muslim University. But perhaps the most unusual "student exchange" was the visit of 14 Indian students suffering from tuberculosis to undergo treatment at the Afro-Asian Students' Sanatorium in Peking.

Scholarly Materials

The Indians were, for a long time, very successful in acquiring materials from China. Students were able to collect materials, usually directly related to their scholarly interests, and institutions were able to receive Chinese books and periodicals. Dr. Raghu Vira, Director of the Indian Academy of Asian Culture, was able to collect considerable amounts of materials, some extremely rare, on his trip through China and Inner Asia in 1955 and then later through correspondence with the Chinese. But the Chinese also know how to make grand ceremonious gestures. In December 1955, for example, the Chinese Ambassador to India delivered, on behalf of the Central Theatrical Institute of China and the Central Song and Dance Ensemble, a set of 35 Chinese instruments and books (nine scores and nine volumes on Chinese drama and opera) to the Indian Academy of Music and Drama. For the Buddha Jayanti Year, the Chinese prepared two beautifully printed folios of reproductions and also made a gift to the director of the Nalanda Pali Research Institute of "about 500 rare Chinese volumes on Buddhism and 16 volumes of a comprehensive dictionary of Sanskrit-Chinese Buddhist terms."[17] When the Dalai Lama visited Nalanda, he presented, on behalf of the Chinese Government, the cranium of Hsuan Chuang, who had spent several years studying Buddhism in Nalanda in the early seventh century, along with 1,335 volumes of his translations, and a set of the *Chi Sa* series of the Buddhist scriptures. On October 26, 1957, the Chinese Ambassador presented a gift of books on Chinese life and Chinese translations of Indian works to Delhi University, along with portraits of Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, Nehru, and Tagore, woven in silk, and records of Chinese classical music. Again, when Chou En-lai visited Visva Bharati University in 1957, he promised to send them Chinese books; in May 1958, some 12,000 volumes of Chinese classical and modern works were duly delivered.[18]

In August 1958, it was announced that the Eastern Languages Department of Peking University was compiling a Hindi-Chinese dictionary, and that the Indian Academy of Literature had decided to compile a Chinese-Hindi and a Tibetan-Hindi dictionary.

17 Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

18 In January 1957, Chou also donated 60,000 rupees to the University which allocated the money to the Tagore Jayanti Fund. He was on that occasion awarded an honorary D.Litt.

Senior Scholars

Other scholarly exchanges are arranged from time to time between Indian and Chinese institutes and between government agencies. During his 1956 visit to India, Chou En-lai, very impressed by the work of the Indian Statistical Institute and by the presence of foreigners on the staff, including not only Asians but even an American, proposed that China also be represented. Prof. P. C. Mahalonobis, Director of the Institute, and his wife were invited as state guests to China in May and June 1957. Upon his return in India, it was announced that a co-operative programme had been agreed upon whereby China would send statisticians to work in the Indian Statistical Institute.

Another vehicle of scholarly exchange is the frequent, and often unnoticed, visits back and forth of official study groups. In late 1954 and early 1955, for example, Kanwar Sain, then Chairman of the Central Water and Power Commission, led a team to study Chinese water conservancy and irrigation projects.[19] In the summer of 1956, the Indian Planning Commission sent a number of study teams to China, including one under Pitamber Pant, Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Commission, to study the Chinese economy; a seven-member team, including experts on co-operative organisations, led by R. K. Patil, for three months to study agrarian co-operatives[20]; and a six-member agricultural team, under Deputy Minister M. V. Krishnappa, to study Chinese agricultural planning and techniques. In 1958, Indian teams studied Chinese agriculture, co-operatives, and backyard steel production. And as late as the early part of 1959, we find Indian teams studying Chinese minor irrigation projects, small-scale industries, and steel production. Less intensive, perhaps, are the delegations of professional groups, such as doctors and lawyers, who make observation and lecture tours of China; or individual visits of government engineers or of national or provincial ministers to observe Chinese development in their respective fields.

"Research"

Among the thousands of Indian visitors to China there have been, needless to say, many scholars, indeed many distinguished scholars. Ever since the first unofficial cultural mission of 1951, which included such

19 Sain had already been to China earlier in the year on a preliminary visit with K. L. Rao, Head of the Planning Section of the Commission.

20 Its controversial *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agrarian Co-operatives* (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, May 1957) was answered by a minority report prepared by the Indian Co-operative Union.

people as V. K. R. V. Rao,[21] J. C. Kumarappa,[22] Nirmal Bhattacharya,[23] Mohammad Habib,[24] Mohammed Mujeeb,[25] and the first official mission (led by Mme. Pandit) in 1952, which included Acharya Narendra Dev,[26] Amaranatha Jha,[27] Prof. Bhagavantam,[28] P. C. Bagchi,[29] and B. N. Ganguli,[30] scholars have figured prominently in the lists.

But although most of them have returned to speak and write voluminously on their observations of the "New China," very few (except for the resident students) have done anything that can properly be characterised as "research." The great majority went in organised delegations, official and unofficial, usually timed for important national celebrations in China, like May Day, National Day, Army Day, etc., but a large number have also gone in small groups or as individuals at the invitation of various Chinese institutions. Since these visits were usually emotional political gestures, most of the visitors were content with their short guided tours. But a few have tried to do some independent observation, and an even smaller number have undertaken something in the nature of actual research. Since their visits were usually brief (from several weeks to several months) and they usually had no background in Chinese studies (certainly practically none of them could speak or handle Chinese), they were entirely dependent upon their Chinese hosts not only for interpreting but also for statistics, explanations, and materials. All too often they accepted these uncritically. Nevertheless some managed to travel widely and tried to apply their special disciplines to what they saw in China.

The borderline between this kind of scholarly observation and serious journalism is hard to draw. Often the advantage lies clearly with the skilled journalist, like Frank Moraes[31] or Raja Hutheesingh.[32] What follows, therefore, is a brief listing of some scholarly attempts beyond the usual brief guided tour.

The first that should be noted is perhaps that of Ambassador

21 Director of the School of Economics, Delhi University, and Chairman (1947–49) of the UN Sub-commission on Economic Development.

22 "Gandhian" economist; organiser and President of the All-India Village Industries Association. See his *People's China: What I Saw and Learnt There.* (Maganwadi, Wardha: All-India Village Industries Association, 1952.)

23 Professor, Calcutta University.

24 Professor of History, Aligarh Muslim University.

25 Head of the Jamia Millia Islamia; brother of Prof. Mohammad Habib.

26 Socialist leader and then Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University.

27 One-time Vice-Chancellor of both Benares Hindu University and of Allahabad University; son of one of India's greatest Sanskrit scholars of the turn of the century.

28 Director of Physics Laboratories, Osmania University.

29 The Sinologist (see footnote 10).

30 Professor, Delhi School of Economics.

31 Moraes had been in China during the war, so he had some basis for comparison. See his *Report on Mao's China.* (New York: Macmillan, 1953.)

32 Hutheesingh, a brother-in-law of the Prime Minister, went with both the first unofficial delegation in 1951 and with the first official delegation in 1952. After his second trip, he was far more critical than after his first. See his *Window on China* (Bombay: Casement Publications, Ltd., 1953); and *The Great Peace* (New York: Harper, 1953).

Panikkar, himself a distinguished historian, who was in China from 1948 to 1952. Sardar Panikkar used this opportunity to collect considerable material on Chinese history, which he has utilised in a number of his subsequent publications. But since the Sardar is not a Chinese specialist and does not know Chinese, his work was mainly ancillary to his general Asian and Indian studies and often shows an all too easy acceptance of official Communist interpretations.[33]

Several pro-Communist scholars, such as K. S. Gill [34] and the distinguished mathematician, D. D. Kosambi,[35] have been able to write more than superficial journalistic pieces about China, although they accept uncritically all Chinese data and interpretations.

Dr. Gyan Chand, a distinguished Gandhian and economist, visited China several times with cultural delegations. In 1954, when he was Deputy Head of the Goodwill Mission, he received permission to remain on for several months after the departure of the Mission, to collect economic materials. His book has had a very considerable influence on Indian thinking about Chinese economic development.[36]

Prof. B. N. Ganguli of the Delhi School of Economics also wrote a very influential book after his 1952 visit to China.[37]

Dr. Raghu Vira, M.P. and Director of the Indian Academy of Asian Culture, together with his daughter, Sudar Shana Devi, herself a philologist, was invited for a four-month tour of China by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in April 1955. Dr. Raghu Vira was able to travel widely both in China and in Inner Asia,[38] and he collected tremendous amounts of materials and documents, often extremely rare. These are now in his Academy in New Delhi, being worked on by himself and his colleagues and available to outside scholars.

Dr. S. Chandrasekhar, head of the Indian Population Institute, was permitted to spend two months in late 1958 collecting population data. His subsequent publications have, reportedly, angered the Chinese Communists.[39]

[33] See particularly his sections on China in *Asia and Western Dominance*. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953.)

[34] See his "Turning Labour into Capital," *Monthly Review* (US), Dec. 1958.

[35] Of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, in recent years an expert adviser on statistical techniques. He has visited China several times. See his "China's Communes," *Monthly Review* (US), March 1959. On his most recent visit in October 1960 Kuo Mo-jo gave a special reception in his honour.

[36] He was also a member of the Indian delegation to the Sept. 1952 Conference on Peace of the Asian and Pacific Regions. See his *The New Economy of China* (Bombay: Vora and Co., 1958); also "The Chinese Economy," *United Asia*, v. 8, No. 2, April 1956.

[37] *Economic Development in New China*. (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1955.)

[38] Inner Mongolia, Central China, Tunhuang, as well as the usual places. He took stamps and inscriptions, photographed hundreds of pictures of the Tunhuang caves, established contacts with Buddhist monks, and visited many villages. In the summer of 1959 he attended the First Mongolists' Conference in Ulan Bator.

[39] His main study was *China's Population* (Hongkong Un. Press, 1959). However he

The New Situation

Since 1959, however, the atmosphere has changed. An extremely revealing example is the case of a doctoral candidate at the ISIS. In early 1959 she applied for a visa to study the impact of the West on Chinese educational institutions between 1912 and 1939. In spite of her known friendship for Communist China, she was refused a visa. After the highest-level intervention, she was finally granted a two-month ordinary tourist visa, but with no facilities or help. As a tourist she was not able to stay in the cheap student hostels but had to stay in an expensive hotel. The Chinese were scornful of her subject and refused to give her any help, at libraries, in the collection of materials, or in guidance. After two months of vain effort, she finally left China, very disappointed, although in the end she had been promised some materials on micro-film. These have never arrived. Another example is V. P. Dutt, now Director of the East Asia Section of ISIS, who had spent three years as a student at the University of Peking. In the summer of 1960 he applied for a visa to visit China but was refused.[40]

Materials have also been much harder to come by in the past two years, although this is not a condition limited to the Indians. The Chinese have forbidden the export of books and journals, and the flow through returning students is too narrow to meet the expanded needs of Indian Chinese studies.

The most ominous sign is the apparent waning of Chinese enthusiasm for the student exchanges. In the immediate post-Bandung phase, the Chinese sent their full quota of 10 students. But in 1959–60, after the cooling of relations, the Chinese Government sent only one student (three scholarships were offered by the Indian Government), while India sent four.

Therefore, although there are still four or five Indian students in China, Indians are not very hopeful about the future of the exchange programme. After the experience of the graduate student mentioned above, the refusal of Dutt's visa, the failure of the Chinese to take up their full student quota, the cutting off of publications, and the disturbing implications of letters recently received from Indian students still in China, Indian Sinologists are now beginning to feel that they must become more " realistic." Some are now tailoring their research projects to the materials available to them in India, or that may become so in England or the United States.

has published many articles, critical in tone. At the time of his visit to China he was Professor of Economics at Baroda University.

40 He was to attend the Sovietological Conference called by the East European Institute, headed by Klaus Mehnert, in Japan, and requested permission to visit China on the way there or back.

B. CULTURAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL

Since this chapter is concerned mainly with the Indian experience of "scholarly exchange" with China, I have perforce omitted many details of the larger cultural-diplomatic relations between the two countries. Nevertheless they are extremely important, if only to establish the context within which the "scholarly exchanges," in the stricter sense, take place. Scholarly exchange is only a small part of the total cultural diplomacy between the two countries.

There is no doubt that the two countries approach this exchange from very different points of view. For the Chinese, it is a means of achieving political ends, some very specific and some general. The long-term aim is to win India over to Communism, whether through a gradual conversion of the existing power structure or through a takeover by the Communist Party of India. For this purpose, China's relations with the Indian Communists and fellow travellers are particularly important and much time and attention are paid to them. Indian Communists frequently visit China, whether individually or in formal delegations to state occasions, trade union conferences, party meetings, etc. Moreover, the Chinese play a direct part in the internal developments within the Indian Communist movement, which is now split between the "pro-Russian" and the "pro-Chinese" group. This division is an old one: in an earlier day, the pro-Chinese elements favoured the creation of an independent territorial base, modelled on the Chinese Yenan base, while the pro-Russians favoured a more orthodox line; today, it is a division between the "adventurists" and the "overthrow Nehru" group, led by B. T. Ranadive, and the more "responsible" elements, S. A. Dange, and P. C. Joshi and, until his death recently, Ajoy Ghosh. China's attention to internal developments in India is not confined only to immediate Communist groups. The India-China Friendship Association is a nation-wide organisation that carries on continuing activities and involves the participation of tens of thousands of people. Strongly supported, it can be expected at all times to exert a pro-Chinese influence on Indian thought and politics.

But quite obviously a Communist victory in India can only come as the end result of a long process. The immediate strategy, therefore, which is extremely flexible and differentiated, is designed to support the conditions for this development. One of its techniques is to single out the elements within India, whether ideological or structural, that can be appealed to. Even Gandhians, for example, in spite of their creed of non-violence, are vulnerable to the appeal of Chinese "communitarianism," mass persuasion techniques, and puritanical morality. This is evident in the responses to China of such outstanding Gandhians as J. C.

Kumarappa, Pandit Sunderlal, and Gyan Chand. Some have even argued that, apart from violence—which they deplore but regard as something of the past—Gandhian ideals are more nearly realised in China than anywhere else in the world.[41]

Radical, anti-Western nationalists of all varieties are particularly good targets. Chinese dynamism, which is modern and yet simultaneously rejects the West, exerts a particular appeal for them, and many feel that they have much to learn from China. Indian trade unionists, who do not carry much weight in their own country, are attracted by the high authority they see enjoyed by Chinese unionists. Teachers and professors, although hesitant about state control and indoctrination, are drawn by the high status of Chinese academic people and by their economic security. And for many, the ideological conformity is itself not a sign of authoritarianism so much as a mark of the national unity which they consider the greatest achievement of the Communists. By contrast, the divisions in India—of politics, caste, interest group—make a sad commentary on Indian "failure."

The appeal to national pride, a subtle racialism, and pan-Asianism, are also extremely important, as shown by the high enthusiasm for the Bandung spirit. The intoxicating sense that the two most populous nations in the world can exert a decisive influence on the international situation also wins many to the pro-Chinese ranks. The Chinese have shown an extraordinary capacity to appeal to this national, even racial pride, particularly in the cultural world.

One important technique, which may easily be disregarded by Westerners not attuned to the national sensitivity of the newly-emergent countries, is the organisation of commemoration celebrations for great Indian historical figures. The original basis for this series of commemorations, which is by now a very important part of Peking cultural life, was a decision of the World Peace Council to celebrate the lives of great

[41] Some of India's religious leaders and even "saints," such as Sant Tukodji Maharaj (President of the Bharat Sadhu Samaj, the semi-governmental monks' organisation, sponsored and inaugurated by Gulzarilal Nandaji), Bhikshu Kashyap (the senior Indian Buddhist monk, from Nalanda), Swami Shantanandaji (Founder-President of the Yoga University, New Delhi), and Swami Nirmalji Maharaj (of the Sadhu Ashram of Amritsar, an Urdu poet and convener of the annual All-India Vedanta Conference), have visited China and returned on the whole favourably impressed with China's treatment of religious groups. The Chinese make a point of carefully cultivating religious leaders, largely to counteract suspicions about the treatment of religious groups. For this, a number of instrumentalities are used. While the Dalai Lama was still working with the Chinese Government, he used to maintain good relations with Asian Buddhists. There is also a Chinese Buddhist Association, which maintains relations with Buddhists; a Chinese Christian Association, which endeavours to allay doubts about the treatment of Christians; and the Chinese Muslim Association, which is very important in dealing with certain strata in South, South-East, and Western Asia. In September 9, 1955, for example, the party of Chinese Muslims *en route* to Mecca stopped off in New Delhi, where they were given an enthusiastic reception by both Muslims and Hindus.

world literary and scientific figures. In accordance with this resolution—the World Peace Council decides every year what figures are to be celebrated—the Chinese organise a regular series of commemorative events, which are carried through with real flair and panache. On September 11, 1955, the 1,500th anniversary of the painting of the Ajanta murals was celebrated in Peking, with a large Chinese audience, and many Indian guests, including N. P. Chakravarti, the archaeologist, and his wife, and D. K. Deb Barman, Dean of the Academy of Arts of Visva Bharati University. An especially interesting example is the commemoration of the great classical Indian poet, Kalidasa. On May 26, 1956, a commemoration meeting was held in Peking, attended by over a thousand Chinese along with Indian guests, who happened to be in Peking, some of whom spoke. (The Russians also commemorated Kalidasa in a public ceremony in Moscow, November 1956.) But with their typical attentiveness to detail, the Chinese did stop with a purely *pro forma* ceremony. The Chinese Youth Art Theatre in 1957 produced his masterwork, *Shakuntala*, and in November 1958, Wu Hsieh, playwright and Managing Director of the Theatre, went to Ujjain (India) for the Kalidasa Jayanti celebrations.

The same pattern is seen in the case of Tagore, who has even greater symbolic meaning for Sino-Indian relations. Tagore was an early advocate of Sino-Indian cultural relations, and he started the first serious work on Chinese in the institution he established in Shantiniketan, which later became the Visva Bharati University. This university has always supported Chinese studies, and it has even maintained a few Chinese language teachers on its staff. In January 1957, Chou En-lai made a gift to the University of 60,000 rupees, which was turned over to the Tagore Jayanti Fund. On May 8, 1959, there was a great public ceremony in memory of Tagore held in Peking. Here again, attention to detail is evident. The Chinese translate much of Tagore, and they have made a point of seeing to it that the Indians are aware of this.

Perhaps an even better example of the appeal of Chinese cultural diplomacy to Indian national pride is in the exchange of musical and theatrical groups. Indian performing groups in the West are usually shunted to secondary circuits, of the specially informed, of those with exotic tastes, universities, etc. But in China they are page-one show business. I can well recall the struggle of a small band of Americans to raise the funds necessary to bring to the United States the great Indian dancer Shanta Rao. But Shanta Rao was such a sensational hit in China (and in the Soviet Union as well), that an Indian would be compelled to believe that the Communist countries had a much greater appreciation of the culture of other countries, if not of "culture" in general, than the West. This contrast has been particularly striking and effective. Indian

performers can always expect a better reception in China than in the West. The Cultural Delegation of July 1953, which consisted of actors, dancers, singers, and musicians, was a major cultural event in Peking, and the warmth of the response echoed deep in Indian life. The same was true for the official Government Cultural Delegation, led by the Deputy Minister of Education, Anil Kumar Chanda, in the summer of 1955. Moreover, many smaller troupes, including Uday Shankar, Shanta Rao, the Lakshman sisters, and others, have performed to great applause in China, whereas they cut almost no ice in the United States.

For their part, the Chinese have used their own performing groups to great advantage in India. The visits of the Peking Opera or of other theatrical or operatic groups are always major events in India,[42] and they go a long way towards strengthening the Indian image of China as a "cultural country" and of the Communists as the true protectors of culture. The inability of the Indians to establish nationally-supported theatres, the insecurity of the life of the performers, are contrasted unfavourably with the Chinese official patronage of the arts.

The *éclat* with which the Chinese deal with cultural figures—writers, poets, artists, musicians—*qua* cultural figures makes an enormous impression. It is therefore not surprising that Indian literary and artistic personalities who find themselves devalued, in their own eyes, in India, are enormously attracted by the cultural situation of China. The Chinese play upon this susceptibility very skilfully, so that the visit of an Indian poet, such as Harindranath Chattopadhyaya in October 1953, who finds more public honour in China that at home,[43] accomplishes many political tasks for the Chinese: it wins friends among intellectuals; it convinces the Indian public that the Chinese truly respect their culture; it convinces intellectuals that China—or Communism (the two are sometimes confused, just as the Chinese would like it)—has a better appreciation of culture than the disorganised, directionless "democracies." And the Chinese can be sure that writers will give full publicity to their tours.[44] In referring to Indian artists, the Chinese often use the grandiose eulogistic language of the Communist world—"honoured artist of the

42 There have been dissenting voices, of course, and important ones. Many connoisseurs and even critics of journals and newspapers have considered Chinese productions, particularly the acrobatics and song-and-dance groups, low in quality.

43 Although it should be remembered that Chattopadhyaya has long been friendly to the Communists.

44 To name only a few: In 1952, Mulk Raj Anand, the pro-Communist novelist and editor of *Marg*, the influential art magazine supported by the Tatas; Kudaksh Singh, Punjabi writer; Uma Shankar Joshi, considered the greatest living Gujerati writer; Monoj Bose, Bengali writer; Sashibushan Patnaik, poet; Amrit Rai, writer; K. Nadim, outstanding Kashmiri poet. In 1953, Javtej, Punjabi writer (and also Chattopadhyaya, already mentioned). In 1956, Tara Shankar Banerjee, Bengali poet and dramatist; Jainendra Kumar, Hindi novelist. In 1957, Ramdhari Dinkar, poet; and two writers on the official exchange lists. The attention to regional language writers should be noted.

Indian people," etc.—that an artist never hears at home, a very successful ploy indeed. From the Chinese side, there is a constant stream of performing groups and cultural figures. In January 1959, for example, three Chinese artists set out with much publicity on a 6,000-mile tour of Indian historic art sites. Again, this may not seem much against the large numbers of Americans and Europeans who visit Indian art sites, but because of their organised form, these visits often have much more propaganda impact that the larger numbers of more diffuse visits.

But perhaps the most important appeal of China is her dynamism. Indians, like the rest of the world, accept implicitly the idea of a competition between the Indian and the Chinese paths of development. For all those dissatisfied with India's slow pace, the inertness of her rural masses, the still low rate of economic growth, the lack of national unity, China exerts a magnetic attraction. I am always reminded in this connection of a conversation with an Indian journalist just returned from a month's visit to China one wilting April evening in 1955 at a garden party in New Delhi. " I'm not a Communist," he said to me, " but I could not help being impressed by the dynamism of the country. Look at our people here: they drag themselves about slowly, they're sleepy and dreamy. But in Peking, the people walk rapidly, with vigour, and liveliness. I cannot help feeling that there must be something to a system that brings such dynamism to people." " Have you ever been to a cold country before?" I asked him. It turned out that he had never been out of India, so that the first temperate country he had ever visited was China. I gently suggested to him that he would find the same energetic activity in the streets of Tokyo or London or New York, particularly in cold weather, and that it perhaps had nothing to do with the political system of the country. This idea was entirely new to him; he had been quite prepared to believe that somehow the Communists had truly found the key to unlocking the energies of human beings.

The feeling, sedulously cultivated by the Chinese as well, is that China is a much better model for Indian development than the West. Since the two countries have started out with so many common features—racial affinity, an ancient culture, overpopulation, great poverty, foreign rule—their problems and experiences are more relevant to each other than those of countries differently placed. The result has been—at least until recently—the constant refrain that " we must learn from China," the visits by trade unionists, social workers, engineers, agricultural experts to learn from China. In most cases they come back impressed by the ability of the régime to organise the masses, even if not always by Gandhian methods, which they contrast unfavourably with the difficulties they encounter in their own work.

Since 1951, when the first unofficial delegation arranged by Ambassador Panikkar went to China, the flow of Indian intellectuals to China has been steady. No exact accounting is possible, but the number would run to at least about 2,000 people, drawn from all walks of Indian life: the universities and schools, government agencies, research institutes, the arts, religion, the theatre, the cinema, medicine, law, engineering, industry, politics, civic organisations, the military, trade unions, agriculture. This may not seem a large number as against the number of Indian visitors to England or the United States, but there are two features that make it particularly effective politically. First, the visitors are drawn from the very top strata, so that their views on China have a great impact on their countrymen. Almost every visitor to China is frequently called upon to speak, lecture, write, or to discuss his experiences informally. Apart from the public media, where the attention to China is itself very high, the networks of the India-China Friendship Association and of the many organisations that co-operate with it in its activities, assure a constant audience. Besides that, the visitors publicise their experiences in their own circles, whether trade unions, civic organisations, or other institutions. Secondly, the Chinese treat Indian visitors not as tourists but as state guests. They are met at the airport by ministers and leading public figures; they have audiences with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Kuo Mo-jo, and Ch'en Yi; they are surrounded by attention; they are written up on the front pages of the newspapers and on the radios; they speak on the Chinese radio, often to their own country. Although there are undoubtedly people who dislike all this attention, it would be less than human if many did not go away with the glowing feeling that the Chinese considered them important. The result is that the Chinese succeed in creating a sounding board within Indian society. Whenever the Chinese speak, they can be sure that apart from the Communists themselves there will be large numbers in positions of leadership who will respond and echo their views, at least exerting a moderating influence on hostile opinion and at best decisively influencing Indian opinion or policy. Even in the border disputes, some Indians, and not only Communists, have supported or excused the Chinese position.

The Indian side cannot approach the problem of exchange with the same expectations. There is little effect they can expect to exert in a differentiated way on the Chinese people, except possibly through a relentless and correct friendliness. Therefore, although the Chinese can always count on internal Indian support, the Indians cannot look for the same kind of articulate favourable Chinese opinion. Nor, given the lack of complete media control, can the Indians have the same effect on

Chinese visitors. In this relationship, the Indians are constantly on the moral and ideological defensive. The main bases for their strong support of this level of relations with China have been general: natural curiosity, the Bandung spirit, good neighbourliness, the desire to give a living example of co-existence. Moreover, in view of the strong attraction of China for many Indians, it would have been difficult for a democratic government to defy this public sentiment. The Indian Government has had to go along with it, whether it likes it or not.

The scholarly exchange, it is evident, is only a small part of the total exchange strategy. China cannot hope for the moment to compete with Russia,[45] for example, as a place where the backward peoples can acquire an advanced technology.[46] The student exchanges, therefore, are very limited and largely confined to specialists. On the other hand, an effort has been made to impress Indian technological students with Chinese advances, and in certain fields these efforts have been successful, as in water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, agricultural techniques, etc. The Chinese evidently expect little technical and scientific help from India, except perhaps in such restricted fields as mathematical statistics. Most of their students go to learn about India—language, history, literature, art, and economics. For technical training, the Chinese will send their thousands of overseas students to Russia and other Communist countries.

Therefore it can easily be understood that the Chinese have no great interest in facilitating scholarly research. They do want Indian scholars to write favourable studies of Chinese developments, and to this end they have given assistance to a number whom they feel reliable or at least likely to be influential in a favourable direction. Others are less likely to be allowed to do any serious work. However, the Chinese are not absolutely opposed to it. Their policy is flexible and depends upon circumstances and individuals. If there is political advantage in doing so, they can reverse policy at any time. But they are more interested in the organised groups that can be guided on their tours of the New China and in delegations and individuals that can be touched in some particular way to bring about particular political effects in India. On these the Chinese lavish an inordinate amount of attention.

[45] Although there are not many Indian students in Russian universities, Barghoorn (*op. cit.*, pp. 201–204) mentions 91 Indian metallurgists in the Soviet Union "to complete their technical training" (p. 201), oil engineers "who . . . had been working for several months in laboratories and research institutions in Baku" (p. 202), "Indian specialists in hydrography and forestry taking special courses in the Soviet Union" (p. 202), and "136 engineers and 150 operatives of the Bhilai Steel Mill (who) had gone to the USSR for study under a U.N. technical-assistance arrangement" (p. 204).

[46] Not to mention the United States, where Indian students average between 2,000 and 3,000 at any given time. In the year 1957–58, for example, there were 2,585 Indian students listed in American universities. (UNESCO, *op. cit.*).

Since the Tibetan Revolution and the coming out into the open of the border problems, Sino-Indian relations have undergone a profound change. Lest we overestimate the permanence of the effects of Chinese cultural diplomacy, it is salutary to remember that many of the very people who were lavish and uncritical in their praise of China, have now turned to another view. Most of the Indian students who studied in China, for example, had been either pro-Communist or very sympathetic to the régime. But in recent discussions in New Delhi, I found many of them changing their minds. They now begin to recall hitherto suppressed or disregarded experiences—the doctrinairism, the thought control, the universal spying, the rigid controls, their isolation from Chinese students, the obtrusive militarism. Visitors to China, however favourable their overall impressions, invariably absorb contrary impressions which remain latent until there are circumstances to bring them out. The general political atmosphere exerts a differential effect on this apperceptive mass, so that now the visitors to China are discovering far more unfavourable things than they had discovered in a different political atmosphere. But if there are people who are altering their views, there are also those who remain firmly attached to the image of Chinese friendship and benevolence, in spite of the momentary difficulties. Right from the start, however, there have been many, and even important, dissenting voices to the general chorus of praise of China. Journalists such as Frank Moraes and Raja Hutheesingh have published influential books which exert a moderating influence.[47] Not all cultural tourists have been equally impressed. Even at the beginning of the pro-Chinese fever, we find people like J. C. Kumarappa finding things to criticise as well as to praise (although he was often prevailed upon to suppress his critical view), or Acharya Narendra Dev, or the population expert S. Chandrasekhar.

In the last year or so both the volume and the quality of the exchange has declined. The Indian delegations we read about in China these days seem to be more pro-Communist and far less representative of broad strata than before. To list a few examples: a Communist Party Delegation led by Ajoy Kumar Ghosh attended the National Day celebrations in 1959 and on October 6 was received by Mao Tse-tung; H. D. Malaviya, Indian representative to the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, went to Peking in October 1959; in November of 1959, Dr. A. V. Baliga, President of the Indian-USSR Society of Cultural Relations, and his wife, stopped off in China on their way back from the Soviet Union and were received by Chou En-lai on November 6; in October 1960, D. D. Kosambi, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

[47] See also the observations of trade unionists Brajkishore Shastri, *From My Chinese Diary* (Delhi: Siddhartha Publications, no date) and R. J. Mehta in *Thought*, June 25, 1955.

mathematician, and also a member of the World Peace Council, a leading fellow-traveller, went to Peking, where he was feted in a public ceremony by Kuo Mo-jo.

In reaction against the Chinese border pressures, the Indians have turned with thumping enthusiasm to the idea that the Russians are their friends and supporters against China. During his visit in early 1960 to India, at the height of the border crisis, Khrushchev managed to leave the Indians with the impression that the Russians were sympathetic to them and would take a neutral, if not an outright friendly, position. This impression has been strengthened by continuing Russian aid, which has never faltered throughout the crisis, and by the recent Russian offer of help for road building and development in the border areas, which has direct political and military implications for the dispute with China. In the new Indian atmosphere, therefore, Russia has become a friend and practically a fellow-neutral, while China is the unpredictable threat. What effect this will have on the future of cultural exchange remains to be seen.

B. JAPAN

Let us start out with a few paradoxes. Japan is a non-Communist country that has no diplomatic relations with China. Yet, apart from the Soviet Union, Japan has closer—and a larger volume of—relations with China than any other country in the world, Communist or non-Communist. In fact, if we exclude resident Russian technicians, more Japanese are invited to China than nationals of any other country. Between 1949 and 1958, for example, 2,301 Russians, organised into 112 groups, visited China; in the same period, the number of Japanese was of the order of 6,500, organised into 400 groups.[1] In 1955, more than 4,700 foreigners from 63 countries visited China; of this number, just under 1,000 were Japanese. In 1956, of the 5,200 visitors from 75 countries, perhaps as many as 2,000 were Japanese.[2]

1 The figures for Russia are taken from the *Peking Review*, February 17, 1959, p. 18; the figure for the Japanese is my own estimate, which would be too laborious to explain in detail here. The Russian data excludes resident Russian technicians and students.

From the Chinese side, however, the figures tell a different story. Between 1949 and 1958, 134 delegations, totalling 2,334 persons, visited the U.S.S.R.; but only somewhere in the neighbourhood of 25 delegations, totalling about 400 persons, visited Japan. (Again, this figure excludes the large number of Chinese students in Russia.)

2 The figures for 1955 and 1956 are pulled together from Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.* pp. 353–355; Richard Walker, "Guided Tourism in China," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 6, No. 5, September–October 1957; *People's Daily*, April 20, 1957; S. C. Leng, *op. cit.*; and Japanese Foreign Office materials. There are frequent minor discrepancies in the materials, but they are not important, all tending to err on the side of underestimation. The Japanese Foreign Office, for example, does not include figures for persons "illegally" in Communist China, nor for persons who do not apply for a passport

China maintains the largest and most powerful military forces on the continent of Asia and has a military alliance with the Soviet Union specifically directed against Japan. Yet Japanese pacifists, anti-militarists, and peace-mongers,[3] if not the public in general, look upon China as a great force for peace.

Japan has a strong, stable government that has in every post-war election received a good two-thirds of the popular vote. Yet the Japanese Government is consistently by-passed, and permits itself to be by-passed in the handling of government-type problems between the two countries. Private Japanese groups negotiate agreements with the People's Republic of China on trade, fisheries, repatriation of Japanese war prisoners, repatriation of Chinese residents in Japan, trade payment problems, and cultural exchange.

The Japanese Government places many obstacles in the way of Chinese coming to Japan. Yet the Chinese Government, which always insists on reciprocity and equality of treatment, continues to invite thousands of Japanese visitors. Often the Japanese flow to China is 10 times greater than the Chinese flow to Japan.

Japan has more students of China, Chinese-language specialists, and persons well acquainted with China than any other country in the world. Yet, although they are invited for tours by the thousands, they have even less success than others in securing permission to do systematic research on the mainland of China. Fewer Japanese than Indians, Englishmen, or even Frenchmen, have been able to go to China to do research.

To understand these—and many more—paradoxes, it is necessary to look, even if only briefly, at two things: the historical character of Japanese relations with China, and the political atmosphere within which current relations are taking place.

The Japanese image of China has been formed through a long history of the utmost intimacy, whether of admiration and love, or of war, contempt, hatred, and domination. For Japan, China was the "eternal Rome," under whose inspiration she transformed herself after the 5th century from a tribal, non-literate society to a "cultured" nation. All the major elements of Japan's civilisation—her system of writing, literature, Buddhism, Zen, Confucianism, sculpture, painting, poetry, philosophy—owe their character to Chinese influence. Japan was indeed the "younger brother" and China the "older brother." But from the end of the 19th century, when Japan showed a much greater adaptability to the

for the specific purpose of visiting Communist China; therefore people who already have their passport for some other purpose, but who visit Communist China on their way to or from some other country—which often happens with Japanese visitors to Russia—are not counted. The figures of the Japan-China Friendship Association, which are sometimes hard to come by, certainly exclude "illegal" visitors.

[3] To use a term coined by the Japanese playwright and critic Fukuda Tsuneari.

pressures coming from the West than did China, the relations were reversed. It was Japan who led the way, and China who stumbled behind. In Japanese eyes China was weak and backward, and Japanese national pride reached the point of open contempt. With Japan's defeat in the Second World War, a wave of revulsion against militarism swept the country and a deep sense of guilt towards China took hold of broad layers of the Japanese people. The contempt still remains, but it is overwhelmed by the sense of guilt, which is perhaps one of the most important psychological elements in the current Japanese attitude towards China. Many Japanese have said, in effect, "We have no right to criticise the Chinese, no matter what they do, after all the terrible things we have done to them during the war." This attitude the Chinese know very well how to exploit.

So ambivalent and guilt-ridden an image of China interacted in very complex ways with the post-war situation. Japan was defeated and occupied by the United States. However benevolent the American Occupation—and the majority of the Japanese were at first its enthusiastic supporters—a strong reaction was inevitable. No great nation can long continue to accept a dependent position. The result was a deep secular movement to restore national self-respect and the sense of national self-direction—what a colleague and I have elsewhere called "the search for identity."[4] Unfortunately, however, this wholly natural reaction has become bound up with the profoundest divisions within the country, on both internal and external questions.[5]

Therefore many Japanese began to feel the American relationship as more of a bear hug than a friendly embrace. American troops remained on in Japan after the Occupation; the American alliance aroused fears of a revival of militarism and of involvement in American military actions; economic dependence on America became more an expression of "colonial domination" than of generous, friendly aid; American policy seemed to support the conservatives as against the "progressives." Japanese intellectuals, whose wartime record was far from brilliant, suddenly took to speaking of "*résistance*" (mispronounced from the French as *rejisutansu*). A consistent grouping of socialists, communists, students, trade unionists, and intellectuals emerged with a more or less common stand on many of the issues facing the country: pacifist, or at least anti-militarist; "progressive," or as the French would say, "*progressiste*"; and anti-American, or at least neutralist (later inclining towards the "peace *bloc*").

[4] J. Bennett, H. Passin, R. McKnight, *In Search of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1958).

[5] The general course of this development is too well known to recount in detail here. A useful brief account, as it relates to China, will be found in C. Martin Wilbur, *op. cit.*

The problem of relations with Communist China very soon became a central issue in Japanese politics.[6] Ever since the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which excluded Communist China, America has seemed to most Japanese the principal obstacle to the restoration of normal relations. The non-recognition policy of successive conservative governments has seemed merely supine obedience to America. The failure to develop the scale of trade relations with China envisioned by optimistic Japanese businessmen, economists, and leftists, has been attributed to American restrictions. Therefore the problem of China has become a powerful emotional and political one. The wave of enthusiasm for the New China that swept over the country from 1953 onwards has come to be called in Japan "The China Boom." Given a substantial and articulate minority for whom China has become almost a symbol of "true national independence" and of the right of Japan to self-direction, and a more diffuse majority favouring a greater measure of "normalization," the Chinese are able to play upon a very wide range of Japanese susceptibilities.

Scholarly Exchange

By now hundreds of Japanese scholars have visited Communist China. In fact, it can even be argued that it was scholars who opened the way to cultural relations with China. The pathbreaker—apart from members of the Communist Party—was Prof. Minami Hiroshi,[7] an American-educated social psychologist. In 1952, on his way back from the Soviet Union, Prof. Minami stopped off in China, in defiance of the Japanese Government prohibition then in force. He returned a hero, his prestige in no way dimmed by the announcement that the Government was considering prosecuting him for violation of passport regulations. (In the end, however, no action was taken.) Other pioneers included three members of the Diet, one of whom was also an American university graduate, Mme. Kōra Tomiko, and the redoubtable Waseda University professor, Oyama Ikuo, Stalin Prize Winner, and during the war a leftist refugee in the United States.[8] But this does not mean that they have gone for scholarly reasons. In the strategy of "people's diplomacy," scholars are only another stratum to be wooed and influenced. The great majority go

[6] See the detailed account in S. C. Leng, *op. cit.*

[7] Prof. Minami is one of the band of American-educated scholars that takes a leading part in anti-American activities. During the war, he remained in the United States, where he spent his time taking his Ph.D. at Cornell University. Concerning his visit to China, see his "Watakushi wa Atarashii Hito-bito o Mite Kita" ("I Have Seen the New Human Beings"), *Chūō Kōron*, January 1953.

[8] Prof. Oyama spent most of his time at Northwestern University, working as a research associate. Upon his triumphant return to Japan he took a leading part in the development of the leftist movement, starting from his own base which had been the pre-war Labour-Farmer Party. Prof. Oyama and his wife also visited China in July 1955.

either out of curiosity, or as an expression of their political sentiments. In this, they are no different from non-scholars—trade unionists, politicians, or youth leaders. Going to China is a political gesture for some—of expiation of wartime guilt, of defiance of the Americans, of identification with " progressive " elements at home, of opposition to " reaction "—and for others almost a pilgrimage to the New Jerusalem. Any research, or scholarly activity that may take place is a by-product.

The usual scholarly visit lasts from two weeks to a month. The Japanese come as guests of the Chinese Government or of some appropriate Chinese " people's organisation "; transportation to and from China is usually paid by the sending organisation in Japan, but the stay in China is taken care of by the Chinese. Many go in specifically scholarly delegations—of professors, or of scientists, etc.—but probably a larger number go as members of other cultural delegations, such as those sent by the Japan-China Friendship Association, and its numerous specialised off-shoots, or the National Committee for the Defense of the Constitution, the National Committee for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China, the Japan Peace Council, the Committee for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade, etc. The visits are usually highly ceremonious, with much wining and dining, luxurious touring of showplaces, formal meetings with Chinese scholars, public figures, and national leaders. Only a very enterprising—and courageous—Japanese visitor can break away from these organised events to pursue his own interests. Yet in the course of these visits, Japanese often are able to have some kind of contact, however controlled, with their field, and in some cases they are able to secure materials, books, and documents.

A few examples may give an idea of the scope of this scholarly visiting. The first important cultural delegation, consisting of some 15 scholars and artists, was led by Prof. Abe Nōsei,[9] President of the Peers' College, in October 1954. Among its members were leading figures in Japanese intellectual life: four prominent Sinologists; Wadachi Kiyoo, head of the Weather Forecasting Bureau; the painter Hazama Inosuke; prominent novelist (and also Professor of English Literature at Meiji University) Abe Tomoji; the Buddhist priest and scholar Otani Sonkei; Prof. of Economics Fujita, of Osaka University; and Yoshino Genzaburō, the editor of the magazine *Sekai*.

In 1955 there was a vast increase in this cultural traffic. The most important of the scholarly groups was the Mission of the Japan Science Council in June, led by its then President, Kaya Seiji[10] (now President

[9] See his " Nihon to Shin-Chūgoku " (" Japan and the New China "), *Sekai*, January 1955.

[10] See his report " Kagaku Kenkyū to Kagaku Kyōiku " (" Scientific Research and Scientific Education "), *Sekai*, September 1955.

of Tokyo University), and numbering among its members a distinguished array of natural and social scientists, including Prof. Nambara Shigeru,[11] President-Emeritus of Tokyo University, and Prof. Ushioda Kōji, then President of Keio University. What was particularly significant about this visit, apart from its standing, was that it was the turning point in the Japanese Government's policy on visas to China. Until that time, the legality of most visits, under the terms of the passport regulations, was shaky. The same year saw a number of other important scholarly visits: Ōuchi Hyōei,[12] Marxist economist and former President of Meiji University, and Kuwabara Takeo,[13] critic and specialist in French literature at Kyoto University, spent short periods there, as did the agricultural chemist Sumiki Yusuke [14] and Prof. Noguchi Yakichi of Tokyo University.[15] Dr. Iwasaki Shushi, Director of the New Physicians' Association, visited as a guest of the China Medical Association in September and October, on his way back from the Soviet Union. Prof. Nakamura Akira [16] of Hosei University went to China in November as a member of the Mission of the National Committee for the Defense of the Constitution, led by the former Socialist Prime Minister, Katayama Tetsu. In the same month a 15-member medical mission visited China and on the 7th of November signed an agreement with the Chinese Medical Association to promote the exchange of medical experience. As a result of this agreement, the next years saw a constant flow of Japanese medical men to China in various special fields.

To take another sample period, 1960, among the hundreds of delegations we find a steady flow of scholars going in one capacity or another. In February, for example, Yasui Kaoru, Professor of Law at Hosei University and Lenin Peace Prize Winner, visited China in his capacity of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Japanese Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.[17] In March and April, the important Writing Reform Mission (which is discussed more fully in the next section), led by the poet Toki Zenmaro, made a very important and significant trip. Besides the China specialists in the group, the distinguished constitutional law scholar, Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Professor-

11 See his report, "Soren Chūgoku o Tazunete" ("Visiting the Soviet Union and China"), *Chūō Kōron*, September 1955.

12 See his "Soren Chūgoku ni okeru Keizai no Hatten" ("Economic Development in the Soviet Union and China") *Sekai*, November 1955; and his dialogue with Prof. Nambara, "Sovietto Chūgoku o tabi ni" ("Visiting the Soviet Union and China"), *Sekai*, August 1955.

13 See his "Shisō Kyōson Mondō" ("Questions and Answers on Ideological Coexistence"), *Sekai*, September 1955.

14 He also visited China again in August 1957.

15 See his "Shūdan Nōgyō to Shizen Kaizō" ("Collective Agriculture and the Reconstruction of Nature"), *Sekai*, September 1955.

16 Prof. Nakamura is a leading anti-American ideologue. On his return from China he wrote seven or eight articles on the situation in China, entirely filled with praise.

17 Yasui is a frequent visitor.

Emeritus, Tokyo University, took part. In April and May, a Medical Delegation visited medical and health organisations and scientific research institutions as guests of the Chinese Medical Association. The Delegation signed an agreement on medical exchange with the Chinese Medical Association and the All-China Federation of Democratic Medical Organisations and was granted a one-hour interview with Mao Tse-tung in Wuhan.[18] In May and June, just at the period of the anti-Kishi riots in Tokyo, Takeuchi Minoru, Lecturer on Chinese Literature and Language, Tokyo Metropolitan University, was accompanying as interpreter the writers' delegation led by Noma Hiroshi.[19] In July, a five-member delegation of the China Research Institute, led by Hirano Yoshitaro, spent 10 days in China. In July and August, Nakajima Kenzō, writer and critic (and sometime professor), visited China as Chairman of the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association, to negotiate an agreement on cultural relations. On August 16, his group, together with the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, signed a joint statement "on the principles and concrete programs for cultural exchange for the next period."[20] National Day saw several hundred Japanese visitors, among whom we may note Inouye Kiyoshi, Assistant Professor of History, Kyoto University; a delegation of the Japanese Architects' Association, headed by Nishiyama Ūzō; and a five-member delegation of the Japan Teachers' Union on its way back to Japan from the 3rd World Teachers' Conference in Conakry, Guinée. November saw a lawyers' delegation, which numbered among its members Prof. Kainō, Michitaka, of Tokyo Metropolitan University, and a visit by Fukujima Yōichi of the Japan Science Council, invited by the Academia Sinica.

A. *Sinologists*

Of the hundreds of Japanese China scholars, curiously only a few scores have been able to visit the mainland. One reason for this is that the Chinese have no particular interest in Sinologists as such. They are

[18] Along with several other visiting Japanese groups: the delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Association, the delegation of *Sōhyō* (General Council of Trade Unions), trade unionist Takano Mitsu, and two members of a press delegation.

[19] This is the group mentioned on page 13 as having been "exhausted" by its anti-American activities in China.

[20] *Peking Review*, August 23, 1960. "In accordance with the arrangement, China will invite delegations from Japanese academic circles, writers, cartoonists, artists, calligraphers, photographers, and young people active in cultural affairs as well as prominent personalities in the cultural life of Japan. The Chinese side will also invite a Japanese chorus to perform in China, and will arrange for arts, photography, and calligraphy exhibitions. The Japanese side will invite a Chinese cultural delegation or art troupe in the near future, will arrange for exhibitions of Chinese workers' and peasants' paintings, cartoons, and graphic arts, as well as exhibitions of children's paintings, photography, and calligraphy. In addition, other friendly visits and cultural, art, academic, and sports exchanges will be arranged."

also very wary about research in sensitive areas, particularly controversial recent history. Moreover, the field of Sinology in Japan is divided into numerous factions which by now have taken on a certain political coloration. The older Sinological tradition of classical scholars, philologists, and archaeologists is in general conservative; it is the newer—and younger—historians and social scientists who are enthusiasts of the régime. Often in one and the same institution there is a division between the classical scholars, the *Shinagaku-sha* (or " Sinologists," in the older sense), and the *Chūgoku-Kenkyū-sha* (students of China, in the modern sense). The Chinese cultivate the newer scholars and neglect the older; the older, in their turn, are hesitant to involve themselves in politics or to risk the snub of a visa refusal.

China's favourite Japanese scholar is Hirano Yoshitarō, head of the privately-supported China Research Institute. Hirano, an old China hand, is a very prominent leftist, and his active Institute is the centre for leftist scholars. As a key figure in the exchange network, he, as well as several other members of his Institute, have been to China frequently with one mission or another.[21] Other members of his Institute who have gone to China include: Iwamura Michiō,[22] formerly the wartime China specialist of the *Yomiuri Newspaper;* Takeuchi Minoru,[23] lecturer on Chinese Literature and Language, Tokyo Metropolitan University; and Ōzaki Shōtarō,[24] a student of agricultural history. The Institute itself sent a delegation to China in the summer of 1960, but although they have, through their various visits and their close connections with the mainland, been able to collect large amounts of materials for their Institute, none of them has actually done any research there.

The first high-level cultural delegation to China, led by the President of the Peers' College, Abe Nōsei, in October 1954, included several leading Japanese Sinologists: Kuraishi Takeshirō, Professor Emeritus of Chinese Literature, Tokyo University; Kaizuka Shigeki, Professor of History, Kyoto University; Kainō Michitaka, Professor of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan University; and Hirano Yoshitarō. Prof. Kuraishi was able to collect a large body of materials, such as dictionaries, booklets on Chinese literature, and reprints of the Chinese classics. These he used to

21 Hirano went with the Abe delegation in October 1954 (see next paragraph); as leader of the 1957 delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Association; as a member of the Association's 1958 delegation; and as leader of the Institute's delegation in July 1960.

22 With the 1957 Japan-China Friendship Association delegation in October 1957; with the Association's June 1959 delegation; and the Institute delegation of July, 1960.

23 With the scholarly delegation that included Niida in the late summer of 1959 (see below); in May 1960, as interpreter for a literary delegation, which was extremely active in anti-American demonstrations and activities during its trip to China.

24 With the Institute's delegation of the summer of 1960.

establish his China Cultural Centre in Tokyo, a private institution he has been trying to develop as a centre of Chinese studies.

In June 1957, a delegation of Kyoto scholars, mainly China specialists, went to China for a few weeks' stay as guests of the Chinese Government. The group was led by Shigesawa Toshirō, Professor Emeritus of Chinese Philosophy, Kyoto University, and included Prof. Kaizuka once more. This delegation, too, was able to collect large amounts of materials, books, pamphlets, and reprints, mainly on ancient and mediaeval history. With this collection, they organised an inter-university library, housed in Kyoto University, the *Nitchū Bunka Kyoto Centre* (Japan-China Cultural Centre of Kyoto). Prof. Kaizuka, who is the author of a biography of Confucius that has been translated into English, wrote a biography of Mao Tse-tung upon his return at the request of the Iwanami Publishing House. Later in that year, Prof. Tsukamoto Zenya, the distinguished historian of Chinese Buddhism, visited China on a guided tour with a group of scholars.

Another important group of China specialists went with a scholarly delegation from August to October 1959. This group included Fukushima Masao, Lecturer in Civil Law at Tokyo University's Oriental Culture Institute; Takeuchi Minoru, Lecturer at Tokyo Metropolitan University and Member of the China Research Institute; and Niida Noboru, Professor at Tokyo University's Oriental Culture Institute, and perhaps the leading Japanese authority on Chinese civil law. But this, too, was a ceremonial, not a research visit. The group travelled widely in China, visited a few people's communes, and attended the National Day celebrations; but they did not collect any scholarly materials. All of them "progressives," they were very sympathetic to Communist China at the outset, and particularly favourable towards the people's communes. Upon their return they lectured widely, wrote many articles, and spoke on radio and television in praise of the communes and of the Chinese action in Tibet.[25] Another member of Tokyo University's Oriental Culture Institute, Matsumoto Hoshimi, visited China at another time.

The former head of the Southern Manchurian Railway's SMR Research Bureau, one of the most active of Japan's pre-war research institutes, Itō Takeo, visited China in October 1958 as a member of the delegation of the Japanese People's Association for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations. He is now a member of the Institute of Political Economy (*Seiji Keizai Kenkyūjō*), a research group supported by private funds. Another former member of the SMR Institute,

[25] It was even suggested to me by Japanese scholars that this group had been invited for the specific purpose of "correcting misunderstandings" about the people's communes. This it appears to have done very well.

Doi Akira, has also been to China.[26] Doi Akio, head of the Continental Problems Research Institute (*Tairiku Mondai Kenkyūjō*), visited China as a member of an ex-Army Officers' Delegation in October 1956.[27]

In the field of the theatre, Japanese scholars have had somewhat more success. When the Ennosuke Kabuki Troupe toured China in the fall of 1955, it took several scholars along with it. Tōita Yasuji and Hamamura Yonezō, both junior Sinologues of Keio University, used their spare time to visit Chinese theatres and do some research. Prof. Okuno Shintarō, the senior Keio University Sinologue, went with a literary delegation, but he too managed to acquire some fresh impressions of new developments in the Chinese theatre. Another junior Sinologue went to China as secretary to a political mission. When the time came for return, he managed to remain behind for several months, on the pretext of illness. During this time, he went around visiting research institutes, universities, libraries, and theatres.

There are, however, a few exceptions to the brief, guided tour that should be mentioned. In 1957, a group of archaeologists under the leadership of Sekino Takeshi, of the Oriental Culture Institute of Tokyo University, applied to the Chinese Government for permission to visit a number of archaeological sites. Through the good offices of the Academia Sinica, they were allowed to spend a month touring various excavations, especially of remains of the Yin Dynasty, as guests of the Chinese Government. This group was highly gratified at its treatment, having been permitted to visit all of the sites it had specified in advance.[28] In the same year, archaeologists Harada Toshihito and Komai Wai, made a tour of archaeological research centres at the invitation of the Academia Sinica.[29]

Again, in March 1960, a Writing Reform Mission of about 10 members, led by poet Toki Zenmaro,[30] and including among its members the Chinese language specialist Saneto Keishū, Professor at Waseda University, and Kuraishi Takeshirō,[31] spent several weeks in China. Their purpose was to integrate methods of simplification of Chinese characters in the two countries. Therefore they were able to meet frequently with

26 "Communist China as We See It," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, October-December 1957; "Two Years' Exchanges with China," *op. cit.*

27 See his *Ichigunjin no Mita Chūkyō* (*Communist China as Seen By a Soldier*). He had been a major-general in the Japanese Army and a member of the Russian Section of Army Intelligence.

28 The Chinese have also allowed British and French archaeologists to visit current excavations and historical sites.

29 This visit was supported by the *Mainichi Newspaper*. Dr. Harada is a member of the Japan Academy. Prof. Komai is from Tokyo University.

30 Dr. Toki is Professor-Emeritus of Waseda University, and former Director of the Hibiya Municipal Library; he is now Chairman of the Advisory Commission for Research on the Japanese Language.

31 His second trip; his first was in 1954, with the Abe Delegation. Also a member of the group was Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Professor-Emeritus, Tokyo University Faculty of Law.

the Chinese working on language reform and look into what the Chinese were doing. A good deal of agreement was reached, although it was not complete. Upon its return, the Mission announced that it had reached agreement with the Chinese " in principle," but so far its report has not yet appeared.

Other scholars, however, have not fared so well. A number of cases were brought to my attention of scholars who had been refused entry, although many more do not come to public attention. Prof. Sakamoto, of the Tokyo Foreign Language University, who led the Japanese group to the 1959 Mongolists' Conference at Ulan Bator, applied for permission to go there via China. He had great difficulty in getting it, in spite of his known leftist sympathies, although one day before his departure from Japan he was granted permission to pass through China. However, he was obliged to fly directly from Canton to Mongolia, and he was not allowed a stopover in Peking, which he had wanted. When later he applied for a two-week visa on his return from Ulan Bator, he was refused. Another example is a specialist in Chinese mediaeval history from Kyoto University, who was refused permission to go to China for research.

Therefore, although many Sinologists have been able to go to China, it is equally notable that far more have never been invited or have had their applications rejected. For example, no member of the Rockefeller-Foundation-supported Seminar on Modern China (*Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Iinkai*), headed by the senior Sinologist Wada Sei, has gone to China. Nor has any member of the *Tōyō Bunko*, one of the leading Orientalist institutes in the country. In fact, a listing of those who have not gone would be practically a register of China specialists, starting with the greatest Sinologist of them all, Yoshikawa Kōjirō.

Unless they are specifically invited by the Chinese Government or by a Japanese group forming a delegation, most scholars are hesitant to apply. Some have, but either they have received no answers, or they have been granted only short trips, instead of the longer ones they had hoped for. When Amano Motonosuke, a prominent agricultural historian of Osaka Metropolitan University, in 1954 requested permission to study some aspects of Chinese agricultural history, particularly cultivating skills in ancient and mediaeval China, he was sent books and materials, but no visa.

Other serious scholars, even some who are friendly to Communist China, are fearful of the political pressures. If they go as guests of the Chinese Government, they will feel obliged to speak favourably and will hesitate to dispute the Chinese interpretations and data. Until they are able to go on their own funds, they prefer not to go. Others are afraid that

the Chinese use these scholarly visits for propaganda purposes, and they would prefer to avoid any political involvement.

The reasons for the Chinese disinclination to allow more normal scholarly work are not entirely clear. One possible explanation is that the Chinese welcome tours, delegations, and groups that will provide some political or propaganda advantage, but that they do not wish to be bothered with others. Another possible explanation is that there are too many Japanese China specialists; in the case of England or France the number is small, so they will not clutter up the place. But what is most seriously suspected by Japanese scholars is that the Chinese are using the growing desire on the Japanese side for visits to China as a means of pressure on the Japanese Government to grant recognition.

One consequence of this hope of eventually being allowed to go to the Mainland is that most Japanese scholars are very hesitant to make use of the real resources that might be found on Formosa. Even conservative scholars have told me that they would not go to Taiwan because they are afraid they would not be able to go to the mainland later. "Taiwan, after all," as one explained to me, "is only a provincial backwater." The Chinese are especially sensitive about Japanese who have any relations whatsoever with Formosa. A well-known scholar went to the mainland with some delegation and then later visited Formosa. On his return, he wrote some articles favourable to Formosa, with the result that he came under bitter attack by the Chinese communists, as a "traitor" and "ingrate." These attacks were, of course, echoed within Japanese intellectual circles as well.

B. *Materials*

If scholarly exchange has still, by and large, not gone beyond the stage of the guided tour, the Japanese have managed to accomplish a fair amount, particularly in the collection of materials. Many scholars have been able to bring back materials with them, or to have materials sent. Kuraishi (particularly on his first trip), Hirano, and the Kyoto group made substantial collections, sufficient to give their institutes a good start. Some of the early Japanese delegations succeeded in persuading the Chinese authorities to export scholarly materials to Japan, with the result that a number of book-sellers were able to place contracts with the Chinese international book agency. Through these, and through several shops specialising in Chinese communist literature, Japanese scholars have had access to almost all the published materials they wanted. However, beginning in 1959,[32] the Chinese began to cut down the export of books and

[32] On November 14, 1959, it was announced that China was cutting the export of publications to Japan from the 340 kinds the Japanese had been receiving to 37. Since that time, further cuts have been made.

publications not only to Japan but to the rest of the world. The argument they have offered the Japanese is that with the great development of literacy and the expansion of public education, they are now experiencing a paper shortage. Furthermore, " imperialists " are liable to misuse the materials. Japanese scholars have been very agitated about this, and a number of attempts have been made, all so far unsuccessful, to persuade the Chinese to relax the ban. The 1959 group of China specialists (which included Niida) set out with the firm intention of doing this, but it returned meekly, persuaded by the Chinese of the " paper shortage." Some Japanese have tried to persuade the Chinese at least to send one copy of every book or journal published in China to a single repository. So far, however, the situation remains unresolved, although several recent delegations intended to try to do something about it.

C. *Students*

Legally and officially there are no Japanese students studying in China. However, it is widely known that a number of pro-communist students have attended Peking and other Chinese universities. At the time of the Korean War, when Gen. MacArthur purged the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party and started a purge of Communists in industry, government, and information media, a large number of them fled to China. The outstanding among them was Tokuda Kyūichi, one-time General Secretary of the Party, who actually died in China in 1953 although his death was not announced to the Japanese until more than a year later. Recently, six members of the JCP were arrested in Nagoya immediately on their arrival from China, where they had fled some years previously. The most interesting of the group was Itō Ritsu, former member of the Central Committee, who had been sheltered in China even though he had been expelled from the JCP for oppositionalism.

How many have gone is not known, but many still go back and forth, and many are still there. According to their reports a substantial number of them have filled in at least part of their time in China " going to school." [33] An interesting example is two senior students of a leading Japanese university who ran off to China in 1951. In January 1960 they returned to Japan, saying that they had " studied " at Peking University. Since their Chinese was not very good, it was not clear whether they had attended as regular or as auditing students. Upon their return, they paid their fines (for illegal exit, a modest amount) and then started teaching in high school.

At the same time there are a fair number of Communist Chinese students in Japanese universities. Some of them, of course, are resident

[33] See the note on the " Marx-Lenin " School, footnote 27, page 11.

Chinese who have become Communists. But in other cases, they go to Hongkong, where they secure identity or refugee papers, and then come to Japan. I do not wish to identify the institutions, but from what I have been told by friends, I would estimate that there may be as many as 100 in Tokyo alone.

C. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Australia stands in much the same relation to Communist China as the United States and Canada: it is an Anglo-Saxon country taking a central part in the main political and military alliances of the Western World, and it does not officially recognise the new régime. (New Zealand's position is virtually identical, particularly under its Nationalist Prime Minister, Keith J. Holyoake. The former Prime Minister, Labourite Walter Nash, favoured a "two-China" solution, with an independent Formosa surrendering the offshore islands in return for a guarantee against Communist aggression.) For a long time after the establishment of the new régime, the Government was reluctant to grant permission to Australians to go to the mainland. However, its position is by no means inflexible—the restriction on travel was eventually eased —and the scale of contact is considerably larger even than Canada's.

We have no exact figures of the numbers involved. For the year 1956, we are informed that six delegations from Australia went to China and four from China to Australia.[1] (The same numbers went to and from New Zealand.) But this refers only to organised groups and excludes individual trips of travellers, journalists, businessmen, Communist Party members, and members of peace and similar organisations. The disproportion, however, is typical: far larger numbers of Australians go to China than Chinese to Australia. My own evidence would suggest that 1956 was a relatively modest year and that the exchange has increased since then (although not necessarily of Chinese to Australia).

There seem to be several reasons for Australia's larger showing than Canada's and the United States'. The first is that the "China issue" is deeply embedded in Australia's internal politics. The Australian Labour Party (ALP) has, particularly since the splitting away of strong anti-Communist (mainly Catholic) elements into the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 1955, made recognition a prominent part of its policy against the Government, which holds to a non-recognition policy. Moreover, the Australian Communist Party (ACP), much stronger than its counterparts in Canada and the United States, is a noticeable force in the political, trade union, and university life of the country, and it exerts a

[1] Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

considerable influence on public opinion. The forces politically favourable to the mainland régime are therefore much more organised and articulate, with strong advocates in all strata of the national life. More diffuse, and yet effective, is the feeling of many Australians that the country, in spite of its being predominantly "white" and "European," must face the facts of its geographic position and either become more stringently a part of the "new Asia," or at least come to closer terms with it, if only for the fact that Europe and America are too far away for effective participation in their affairs.

The Chinese, for their part, have taken an ambiguous attitude towards this question. Although from some points of view, Australia can be regarded as a small "Asian"—or at least certainly "Pacific"—nation, its "Oriental exclusion" policy and its minor colonial role in New Guinea and some of the Pacific Islands bring it under the same suspicions as the Euro-American powers. In November 1949, at the Conference of Asian and Australian Trade Unions, it seems that a high-level decision regarding the division of labour between Moscow and Peking assigned Australia (and New Zealand) to the Chinese sphere, a decision that applied to subordinate organisations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), also. Accordingly, Ernest Thornton,[2] a leading Australian Communist, who had been Federal Secretary of the Ironworkers Union from some time in the 1930s until 1949, was assigned to work in the Far Eastern Liaison Bureau of the WFTU being established in Peking. After a brief trip back to Australia, he took up his duties there at some point during 1951–52.

In the same way, many other Australian Communists have taken part in important international Communist activities under Peking's direction. Wilfred Burchett, for example, who, with Alan Winnington, has become famous as a correspondent on the Communist side, in Korea and other places in the Far East, bases himself on Peking, where from time to time, among his other duties, he serves as an adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Communist journalists, usually representing the Australian Communist newspaper, *Tribune*, have gone in a steady stream to Hanoi, where, it is believed, they perform certain liaison functions with Peking. If we include New Zealand along with Australia, then we must also mention the durable Rewi Alley,[3] who is one of the

[2] Not to be confused with the English labour leader and Labour Member of Parliament of the same name, who has also been to China.

[3] Rewi Alley, a New Zealander, is almost a legendary "friend of China." A poet, author, and engineer, he went to China in the 1930s, and together with Edgar Snow and Ida Pruitt, established INDUSCO, a venture in technical aid in the field of industrial co-operatives. He has continued to live in China since the Communist takeover as an honoured guest, one of the small band of devoted "peace partisans" who work in China and help out in international relations. Recent books include: *Man Against Flood* (Peking: New World Press, 1956); *Sandan, an Adventure in*

friends of China and "peace partisans" (as the Chinese always label them) permanently resident in China. Alley, along with other peace partisans (such as Kinkazu Saionji, descendant of the famous Meiji court leader, Prince Saionji, the last of the *Genro* of Japan), is always present to grace international conferences and to greet distinguished Western visitors.

The contact between Australian and Chinese Communist leaders and Party workers is so continuous that it is safe to say that by 1960, virtually every full-time Party functionary, and many non-full-time functionaries as well, has been to China at least once. This relationship began as early as 1949, when Elliott V. Elliott, Federal Secretary of the Australian Seamens Union and member of the Central Committee of the Australian Communist Party, went to Hongkong with the intention of proceeding onwards to Peking to make contact with the Chinese Communist Party.[4]

One important aspect of this relationship is the training of Australian Communists in China. Australian cadres, usually of middle or lower rank, are sent periodically to China for training in a special school located in the environs of Peking. The first such group, about a dozen or so, was sent in 1951 to spend a four-year period.[5] (In fact, it was there for a slightly shorter period.) Since then, several other batches have gone. The second, also numbering about a dozen, went after the first returned home in 1955, although this one spent only about 18 months, returning in 1957.[6]

But the Chinese attitude has wavered between defining "Asia" as a "geographic" grouping, in which case Australia may be included, or as an "anti-colonialist" grouping, in which case it is excluded. A meeting of the Executive of the International Union of Students in Peking in May 1951 suggested an "anti-colonialist," rather than a "geographic" line of division. The result was that it was China that opposed the participation of Australian students in the 1956 Afro-Asian student conference at Bandung. The 1956 Australian Students' Delegation ran into the same

Creative Education (Christchurch [N.Z.]: Caxton Press, 1959). Most recently he was host to Edgar Snow on the latter's trip to China (1960). In 1959–60 he visited Australia and New Zealand.

[4] For reasons that are unclear, Elliott did not at that time go beyond Hongkong.

[5] The operation was conducted with extreme secrecy. Not even close relatives were allowed to know where they were going. The group went to Peking by a roundabout route, perhaps partly to circumvent government passport regulations, via Europe, Prague and Moscow. Later groups, now that government controls are less strict, have gone by the direct route through Hongkong.

[6] Subsequent groups have gone for shorter periods and are reported to have been of "lower quality," that is, drawn from the lower ranks of the Australian Party hierarchy, people of lesser "political reliability," etc.

problem in trying to get the Chinese to commit themselves on the participation of Australia in Asian and Pacific affairs.[7]

But the Australian Communist movement, no less than others, has been bedevilled by the division between "pro-Chinese" and "pro-Russian" elements and between the "orthodox" and the "revisionists," and these divisions have reflected themselves in relations with China. The Australia-China Society (ACS), now under the chairmanship of Prof. C. P. Fitzgerald of the Australian National University, is the principal holding company for formal relations between the two countries. The Society was started just before the Korean War, in 1949–1950.

However, according to qualified observers, in spite of the initial public success of the Society, there was evident from the start a certain lukewarmness on the part of the Australian Communist Party. The Party did not want it to rival the work for Soviet friendship; despite the ACP's growing links with China, it was clearly Party policy that Russia was Socialist fatherland No. 1, and China only No. 2. There were even veiled attacks in the *Communist Review* on Party members who exalted Chinese achievements at the expense of Soviet.[8] Moreover, two branches (New South Wales and Victoria) of the ACS were becoming gathering places for Communists who were somewhat disappointed with Russia and who looked on the Chinese Revolution as a new current revitalising the world revolutionary movement. When Khrushchev's "secret" speech and the Hungarian Revolution split the Communist movement, it turned out that many of the Communists in the ACS were strongly "revisionist." During the period of "revisionist" control, 1956–57, the Society attempted to hold some meetings allowing objective appraisal of Chinese developments in contrast to its earlier insistence on one-sided propagandistic accounts. Two members of the 1956 student delegation, for example, who were in no way Communist, were invited to lead a seminar on the "hundred flowers" policy. Again, when Lord Lindsay's visa was cancelled, the Melbourne branch wrote to the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CPACRFC) asking for an explanation. On another occasion, some "revisionist" members published their findings in the press on allegations of "slave labour" in China; their verdict was that it did in fact exist. However, by 1957, the official Party regained control, both through packing the membership

[7] See *Students in China*, Report of a Delegation from the National Union of Australian University Students to the People's Republic of China (no date, no listed place of publication), pp. 39–43.

[8] It would appear that many Australian visitors between 1952–56 who had seen both the U.S.S.R. and China compared them to the detriment of the former. In 1952–53, left-wingers and Communists found the U.S.S.R. drab, regimented, colourless, lacking in true revolutionary fervour, and coldly bureaucratic. By comparison, they saw China as full of enthusiasm, life, and vigour.

with safe partisans and through expelling or removing the "revisionist" leaders from office.

Until their removal from office in 1957, the "revisionist" element often endeavoured to assure a fair cross-section of Australian views in the composition of official delegations. This policy was successful enough to ensure that the 1956 Student Delegation included known anti-Communists and was able to publish a serious, objective report of its observations. The composition of other delegations, such as the 1956 Cultural Delegation (led by Prof. Fitzgerald), and the 1957 Women's Delegation, led by Myra Roper, Warden of Melbourne University Women's College, was equally broad-based in outlook.

Scholarly Exchange

Australian-Chinese exchanges have therefore always had a strongly political flavour, most of the visits being organised, ceremonious, and political: Communists, sympathisers, official Party or trade union delegations, delegations from various strata of Australian life (students, women, churches, etc.), peace and other international organisations. It is within this context that the scholarly and academic exchanges have taken place. There has been no scholarly exchange in the true sense, except in the limited number of cases discussed below. Scholars and intellectuals have gone with cultural delegations or on short visits, but in almost all cases they have gone as "representatives" of the "intellectual strata" of Australian life, rather than for scholarly purposes. Undoubtedly many of them learned much of value on their short trips—Prof. Fitzgerald on his second trip, when he spent some time alone; Prof. Geddes, who received a rare opportunity to collect information for three days in a rural village; the Medical Delegation that was able to observe medical facilities, teaching, and university courses—but this has been almost accidental.

The first important scholarly contact between the two countries, apart from Lord Lindsay's 1954 visit with the Attlee Mission, was in 1956. Two cultural delegations, one from New Zealand and one from Australia, spent May and June in Communist China. The Australian group, which was formed largely under the guidance of Prof. Fitzgerald, included artists, writers and scholars. In addition to Prof. Fitzgerald, another Sinologist, A. R. Davis, now Professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Sydney, took part. The other scholars were: Dr. Leonard Cox, M.D. (who in 1957 also led a Medical Delegation, see below), leading neurologist; A. R. Penfold, chemist, and former Director of the Museum of Applied Arts and Sciences, Sydney; and P. H. Partridge, Professor of Social Philosophy, Australian National University. Another member of

the Delegation, A. D. Lindsay, the Honorary Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the ACS, was himself also a forestry officer.

The New Zealand group included a number of professors, notably James Bertram,[9] then Senior Lecturer in English literature at Victoria University College; W. R. Geddes, anthropologist (who is now teaching in Australia, at the University of Sydney); Angus Rose, historian [10]; and Roger Durf, archaeologist.

The members of both delegations felt that they were given an exceptionally fair opportunity to see what they wanted and to pursue their own lines of interest. In the words of Prof. Partridge: "... if it was their purpose to influence us, they went about the business with a subtlety and restraint that I would not have expected in a Communist country. Each of us was invited to say what his special interests were, what he wanted to study, what sort of people he wanted to talk to. None of us was prevented from doing what he wanted to do, and it was possible for each of us to move about the country according to our interests. Those of us who wanted to improve our acquaintance with Chinese art and culture could spend our time in museums and in visiting historic monuments and archaeological sites. Some of us discovered for the first time the classical Chinese theatre. Among the eleven of us, we had a wide range of interests, and altogether we dipped into many different aspects of Chinese life." [11] Prof. Geddes received the most unique opportunity: to resurvey the village originally studied by Fei Hsiao-t'ung in 1936, K'aihsienkung. According to Prof. Morton Fried of Columbia University: "Though he received a great deal of co-operation, including the services of interpreters and access to local records, he could stay only three days. Methodically he gathered as much data as possible, using the earlier Fei study as a guide." [12] The result was a 166-page manuscript. Prof. Davis was able to purchase 1,500 volumes of Chinese classical literature.

This first contact was followed, over the next few years, by a number of smaller groups or even individual visits, usually at the invitation of particular institutions in China. In April 1957, for example, Dr. Leonard Cox, who had been a member of the first Fitzgerald delegation, led a medical group for a five-week trip.[13] All of the participants were leading specialists and teacher-examiners in Australian medical institutions.

[9] See his "Open Door to China," *The Nation* (U.S.), 182, June 23, 1956; and *Return to China* (London: Heinemann, 1957).

[10] Prof. Rose published an article on "The Possibility of Promoting Cultural Contacts and Trade Relations Between New Zealand and China," in the Peking press on May 24, 1956.

[11] *Report on China*, Australian Cultural Delegation, 1956, published by the Australia-China Society, New South Wales Branch, p. 26.

[12] Morton H. Fried: "Breaching the China Wall," *Saturday Review*, March 19, 1960.

[13] On the invitation of the Chinese Medical Association.

Disclaiming any interest in politics, and even undertaking to the Government to avoid public speeches on its return, the Delegation set itself the following tasks: (1) to examine student training methods; (2) to examine medical standards; (3) to examine university courses. The Delegation was extremely impressed with its findings. This was not, however, the first visit of Australian medical men. Even before Dr. Cox's 1956 visit, in October of 1955, Dr. Alex Dobbins had been to China along with his wife. But Dr. Dobbins' visit was purely political in character: he was invited by the China Peace Committee to stop off on his way back from Helsinki, where he had gone as an Australian delegate to the World Assembly for Peace. Another example is Prof. Fitzgerald's second visit, in 1957–58, as an individual. There is reason to believe that his visa was first refused, but later granted.[14]

Several New Zealand scholars have also gone back, as individuals, invited by scholarly bodies, and have been able to meet their Chinese colleagues and see what they were interested in seeing. In 1959, for example, Keith Buchanan, Professor of Geography at Victoria University, Wellington, and also editor of *Pacific Viewpoint*, a new journal, spent some time in China. His enthusiastically favourable observations have been reported in a number of journals.[15] On National Day (October 1), 1960, Frederick Page, Head of the Music Department of Victoria University, was noted among the 2,000 honoured guests in the observation stands.

The leader of the 1957 Women's Delegation to China, sponsored by the ACS, was also an academic person, Myra Roper, Warden of Melbourne University Women's College.

Students, Intellectuals, Artists

Aside from academic visits, there has been a fair amount of visiting by intellectuals, in the general sense. Although in the orthodox Marxist view the intellectuals do not form a "class," the Communists take a very pragmatic view and regard them as a politically important "stratum." In fact it has always been an element in the effectiveness of their approach to appeal to intellectuals *qua* intellectuals. This is effective both in countries where intellectuals have a strong self-pride as members of a distinct "estate" and in countries where intellectuals feel disesteemed

[14] The reason for this refusal is unclear, although it has been suggested that the Chinese did not want knowledgeable people to come so soon after the closing down of the "hundred flowers" period. A similar shift in visa-granting policy apparently took place in the case of English scholars, who found it easy to get a visa before then but extremely difficult afterwards.

[15] "The Many Faces of China," *Monthly Review* (New York), May 1959; "The Changing Landscape of Rural China," *Pacific Viewpoint* (Wellington), March 1960; "Understanding Asia," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 1960; and an article on China's changing geography in *Cahiers Franco-Chinois* (Paris).

by society at large. In Australia the appeal has certainly been very effective.

Student exchanges have not been very extensive, although a few exchange visits between Chinese and Australian student organisations have taken place. No Australian students, so far as is known, have attended Chinese schools (nor have any Chinese attended Australian schools). In September 1955, the Australian delegation to the Fifth World Festival of Youth [16] stopped off in China on its way home at the invitation of Chinese youth organisations. But when soon afterwards in October, a meeting of the International Preparatory Committee for the Afro-Asian Student Conference (in Jakarta), to be held in Bandung, took place, the Chinese representative opposed granting the Australians "observer" status. In the end, they were allowed to attend in "press-observer" status. In spite of this, the National Union of Australian University Students invited the Chinese to send representatives to its 20th Council meeting in Adelaide in 1956. Three Chinese observers came. In 1957, an eight-member Australian Students' Delegation, led by Tim McDonald, then of the University of Melbourne, went to China. One of the observers to the Adelaide meeting, a Miss Lao, was assigned as one of their interpreters.[17] In addition to the usual travelling and sight-seeing, the delegation held serious discussions with the Chinese about Australian participation in Asian, or Afro-Asian, events, although without receiving satisfaction. The Delegation was well-balanced and level-headed and returned to write a sensible report,[18] and several members later took part in public discussions where critical observations were freely expressed.

The 1956 Cultural Delegation, which included the first important group of Australian academics, brought along a number of artists [19] and fellow-travelling writer, Alan Marshall. However, already in 1955 there had been a few tentative feelers for the opening of better cultural relations with Australia. The July issue of *I Wen* (*World Literature*) featured five Australian short stories, four by the late 19th-century and early 20th-century writer Henry Lawson, and one by Katharine S. Pritchard,[20] described as the "71-year-old contemporary woman writer and active worker for peace." Then in August 1955, the ACS sponsored the showing of a Communist film in Australian cities. In late 1956 and

[16] Held in Warsaw.
[17] *Students in China, op. cit.*, p. 6.
[18] See their *Students in China*, already cited.
[19] Artists Elaine Haxton, Douglas Annand, Charles Bush and sculptor G. F. Lewers.
[20] Both of them are apparently great favourites in the Soviet Union also. Of twenty-five Australian titles translated into Russian between 1945 and 1959, three are by Lawson and six by Pritchard; of twelve translated into minority languages, four are by Lawson and four by Pritchard. See *Overland*, No. 18, 1960, p. 46.

early 1957, the Chinese Classical Theatre toured Australia under commercial auspices with great success, and in return an Australian theatrical group toured China in 1957. But the 1958 Cultural Delegation, which spent seven weeks in China during the summer, was perhaps the most successful. Led by John Rodgers,[21] the group went at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for a seven-week tour that included performances in many Chinese cities. Several members of the group, including pianist Nancy Weir and conductor Sir Bernard Heinze, remained on after the tour was over.[22] In the same year, the Chinese Opera toured Australia and New Zealand. Another cultural delegation, led by Dr. Maharia Winiata, a Maori (head of the New Zealand-China Friendship Association), visited China in September and October 1959 and attended the National Day celebrations on October 1, and an Australian Cultural Delegation, led by Robert Schollum, made the same tour in 1960.

Private trips have also been made by a number of individuals. In 1953, Dr. Clive Sandy, a dentist, and Mrs. Elizabeth Vassilieff, were invited for a visit to China. Both Dr. Sandy and Mrs. Vassilieff had originally been designated as delegates to the Asian and Pacific Peace Congress held in Peking in September 1952. However, they were refused passports by the Australian Government, and the following year they were named as delegates to the Peace Congress in Vienna. Both went to Vienna via Peking and Moscow, as guests of the Chinese and the USSR Peace Committees. Dr. Sandy subsequently became Chairman of the Melbourne Branch of the ACS, and was re-invited to China for National Day 1960. Mrs. Vassilieff returned to write a volume on her travels, *Peking-Moscow Letters* (1953), and to take occasional part in public discussions about China.[23]

In 1956 and 1957, Miss Dymphna Cusack, a poetess, spent 18 months in China for personal reasons.[24] David John Morris, an engineer, had publicly accused some Australian universities of conspiring with the Australian security intelligence organisation to prevent his appointment to a post at Melbourne University. While the case was being taken up by the University Staff Association, he took a job in China, where he presumably still lives. Collin Graham Scrimgeour, the "Uncle Scrim"

[21] One time a leader of the ACS and also of the Soviet Friendship Society.

[22] Other members were: Laud Martyn, ballet dancer; Thomas White, first clarinetist of the Victoria Symphony Orchestra; Heather Macrae, ballerina, seventeen years old; Graham Smith, painter; Glen Balford, folksinger; and Nancy Ellis, aboriginal soprano.

[23] See her attack on Prof. Richard Walker, "No-Hopers in Never-Never Land," *Overland*, No. 18, Winter-Spring 1960.

[24] See her book, *Chinese Women Speak* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1958); reviewed by Richard Walker in "Australians in Wonderland," *Quadrant*, Autumn 1960.

of the New Zealand radio, went to China in the year 1959–1960 as an adviser on television.

One of the most consequential of the personal visits was that of the chain-store magnate, Mr. Kenneth Myer, in December 1958. As a result of his visit, Mr. Myer has taken keen interest in promoting Oriental Studies at Melbourne University.

Businessmen have been fairly frequent visitors, and there have been several trade delegations back and forth. Also a fair number of Australian journalists have been able to go for varying periods. Apart from Burchett and other Communist journalists, who number too many to be listed in detail, a few examples may be mentioned. The *Melbourne Herald* has managed to keep a correspondent in Peking from time to time, including Reg Leonard in 1956, and then later, Frederick Nossal.[25] In 1957, Francis James, editor of *The Anglican*, accompanied the Anglican Church Mission to China. Peter Russo, however, a sympathetic journalist and Australian correspondent for several British newspapers, seems to have been refused entry. In 1956, eight Chinese journalists came to Australia to cover the Olympics.

Church Delegations

The struggle against religion in Communist countries is part of the esoteric doctrine. Exoterically, the Chinese Communists guarantee absolute freedom of worship and "true" independence for religious bodies: the churches, by freeing themselves from foreign control, by taking part in the national political life, are freer than they have ever been in the bad old days. Muslims are encouraged to visit other Muslim countries and make pilgrimages to Mecca; Buddhists are encouraged to strengthen their organisation and their relations with Buddhist countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, and Ceylon; and Christian bodies endeavour to persuade co-religionists in the outside world that all is as well, and perhaps even better, with them than ever before.

This posture has shown remarkable effectiveness in China's public relations with religious bodies throughout the world. Combined with a number of favourably predisposing elements within organised religious life it has been an important factor in Chinese successes in bringing churchmen of many countries into a prominent position in the China-relations field: in extreme cases the notion that the Communists are the only true practitioners of primitive Christianity, or that the revolution has created the New Jerusalem of sincerity, self-abnegation, and service; in others, the sharing of certain human values, such as opposition to war, or to nuclear warfare, or to social injustice; in others,

[25] See his eight articles reproduced in the *New York Times* between August 21 and 28, 1956. Nossal was actually sent by *The Globe and Mail* of Toronto.

simply tolerance for differing views; in others, the feeling that co-existence is essential; and finally, in still others, the political judgment that at least some kind of accommodation is essential to the avoidance of war.

Therefore, it is not surprising that, except in the case of Catholicism—which as a tight ecumenical organisation, has rival claims to universal revelation and authority, and a competitive international organisation—religious bodies are not repelled by the "atheism" of the Chinese Communists. In fact, an anti-Catholic sentiment is not always disagreeable to some Protestant groups.

Apart from the Catholics and Jews in Australia, leading elements of most of the main religious groups figure prominently in relations with China. The Unitarians, led by the Rev. Victor James, who is active in the ACS and has been to China to attend the 1952 Asian and Pacific Peace Congress, are perhaps the most sympathetic. But Methodists too take an active part in associated activities—relations with China, peace movement, etc., and inside the Presbyterian Church there is a strong pro-China group under the leadership of Rev. Alfred M. Dickie, an officer of the World Peace Council.

Churchmen were already active in the very earliest phases of contact with China. In 1952, several Australian church people took part in the preparations for the Asian and Pacific Peace Congress held in Peking in September of that year. The leader of the preparatory delegation was Dr. John Burton, former secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs (and former Australian Minister to Colombo), but he had along with him Miss Ada Bromham, leader of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Rev. G. van Eerde, a Methodist minister and a well-known Sydney social worker. When the delegates for the Congress itself were selected, the Federal Government announced that they would not be given passports. One group of delegates thereupon dramatically tried to leave the country illegally, but failed. The Rev. Victor James, of the Melbourne Unitarian Church, however, was in possession of a United Kingdom passport and could not legally be stopped from going. Another able to join the delegation was the Rev. Canon Maynard, of the Melbourne Anglican Church. The Rev. Maynard, who is now well over 75 years of age, and who has evolved his own synthesis of Marxism and Christianity, went to Peking by way of London and Moscow.[20] With the Rev. E. E. Collocott, Methodist minister of Sydney, the clerical members of the delegation numbered three out of the six.

[20] The Rev. Maynard is reported to have disagreed with one of the resolutions relating to the British colonies. So that the record could show a unanimous vote, rather than a 1,000—1 split, proceedings had to be suspended while a sub-committee set itself to win the Reverend's agreement or find a compromise solution.

For some reason, the Asian and Pacific Peace Committee languished, its peace-front activities taken up increasingly by the Australian Peace Council. When in November of 1959, an Australia-New Zealand Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament was held in Melbourne, a four-member Chinese delegation attended. Significantly, the principal delegate was Chao Fu-san, Dean of the Theological Seminary of the People's Union of Peking (accompanied by an interpreter, a woman author, and a singer).

The first important official church delegation was that of the Anglican Church in November 1956. Invited by the Rev. C. T. Chen of the Chinese House of Bishops, an eight-member group, under the leadership of Archbishop H. W. K. Mowll, of Sydney, Primate of Australia, toured China for seven weeks. The group returned on the whole quite favourably impressed, although the editor of *The Anglican*, who had accompanied the group, was considerably less whole-hearted.[27] Archbishop Mowll, in a sermon in St. Andrew's Cathedral in Sydney, proposed that a Chinese church delegation be invited to Australia,[28] but nothing came of this.

Following this, a Non-Conformist Churchmen's Delegation was set up to go to China in 1959, with leading officers of the Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and the Church of Christ.[29] This group was, if anything, even more favourable than the Anglican Delegation.

Political Visits

Here I include visits that are more definitely political in character: political parties, trade unions, peace movements, Australia-China friendship groups.

In the earlier part of this section I explained something of the relation of the Australian Communist Party to China. This reflects itself not only in the ACP's taking a leading, and often an open, part in the

[27] In his first sermon upon his return, preached in St. Andrew's Cathedral in Sydney, Dr. Mowll gave himself over to almost unqualified praise of China. In the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of June 24, 1957, the Primate declared that Communist China can become a strong and helpful ally of Australia. The Archbishop of Western Australia, Dr. Moline, who was also a member of the Delegation, writing in the *West Australian* of December 12, 1956, took much the same position. He also mentioned that while in China he had met the Vicar-General of the Catholic Church in "one important city."

However, Mr. James, editor of *The Anglican*, was somewhat less enthusiastic. In a public meeting under the sponsorship of the Australia-Asia Association, he argued that the lack of freedom, of the press included, was worse than under Hitler. On the positive side, he stressed that the Chinese Communists were really proud nationalists, independent of Russia. Anti-foreign feeling was at the bottom of religious persecution, particularly of the Catholic Church. Only two and a half million Christians were now left in China out of an original six million, yet the Anglican Church is free. He also advocated trade with China.

[28] *Sydney Tribune*, January 9, 1957.

[29] I am told that the omission of a Unitarian is significant: the Unitarians are considered so infiltrated by the Communists that they are not included in "clean" delegations.

organisation of relations with China, primarily through the ACS, but also in constant contact, through visits, between the Chinese Communist Party and the ACP. ACP leaders are frequently in China on one pretext or another, whether in an individual capacity or to attend the more strictly *bloc* activities, like Party conventions, national celebrations, international organisation meetings, etc. For some time now, almost every year sees a formal ACP delegation to China. In April-June 1958 for example, timed to allow the delegates to attend the May Day demonstrations in Peking, an eight-member ACP delegation led by Frank Johnson, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, was in China. In 1959, Lance Sharkey, General Secretary, and his wife led a delegation of high officials of the Australian and New Zealand Parties in time for the National Day celebrations (1 October). Again, in February 1960, Lance Sharkey returned home from a long trip through the Soviet Union and China, and in January 1961 he appeared in Peking again on his way home from the Soviet Union. These missions are not simply guided tours; much time is devoted to serious discussion and planning. The members are always meeting Chinese leaders, such as Mao and Chou.[30]

The Australian Labour Party, particularly since the split-off of the more anti-Communist (and to some extent, Catholic) elements into the Democratic Labour Party, has been strongly committed to a friendly policy towards China: increased trade, diplomatic recognition, more contacts and exchanges. But it was not until May 1957 that the ALP sent an official delegation. Announcing the forthcoming delegation, Dr. Evatt, then Leader of the ALP Parliamentary Caucus, said that the ALP policy was that quite irrespective of the internal form of government of China, it was vitally necessary to have meetings and visits both ways. It was also announced that the delegates would be selected by ballot and that the Chinese side would pay all the expenses. The Delegation, under the leadership of Leslie Haylen, MP,[31] numbered four ALP parliamentarians. On their return the Delegation was full of unqualified praise for the régime, reiterated in newspaper articles, in Parliament, at businessmen's luncheons, etc. They proposed: (1) the strengthening of Sino-Australian friendship; (2) unrestricted trade with China; (3) diplomatic recognition of the mainland régime and its admission to the UN.

Individual visits of leading Labour Party people, both from New Zealand and Australia, have been fairly continuous. Even in 1955, for

[30] These meetings only occasionally stray into public notice. On October 15, 1959, for example, we learn that Mao met Lance Sharkey in Tsinan, Shantung Province.

[31] See his book, *Chinese Journey: The Republic Revisited* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1959), and also Richard Walker's blistering review of it, "Australians in Wonderland," *Quadrant*, Autumn 1960. Walker's fundamental criticism is that Haylen, while pretending to give an eye-witness account, really lifts much of his material, almost verbatim, from official propaganda publications, such as *China Reconstructs* and *China in Transition*.

example, we read of the one-month visit of Warren W. Freer, New Zealand Labour MP, and his wife.[32] In January-February 1960, G. L. Tilley, former MP of Victoria, Australia, visited China for 11 days[33]; and in August 1960, MP Thomas Uren, a leading ALP member (and former boxing champion), stopped off in China on his way back from the Anti-H Bomb Conference in Tokyo.

But the relations of the ALP to China cannot be separated from those of the trade unions, particularly the section under ALP control, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The earliest trade union contacts, as already mentioned, were through the Communist union leader, Ernest Thornton, and the WFTU Secretariat in Peking. At the very time the official ALP was sending its delegation, the ACTU also sent a high-level delegation under the leadership of Albert Monk, its President, and perhaps Australia's leading Labour leader. (A New Zealand trade union delegation also went at the same time.) The delegates spent the period April to July 1957 in China and were thus able to attend the May Day celebrations in Peking, as guests of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Monk and his fellow-delegates also returned lavish in their praise of China, but they had some difficulty with fellow trade unionists, particularly in rival unions.[34]

Again, in December 1957-January 1958, Jim Kenny, Vice-President of the ACTU and Secretary of the Sydney Trades Hall Council, the ruling trade union body in New South Wales, went to China with his wife to attend the Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. His favourable witness, after a month's trip as a guest of the Chinese trade unions, was all the more valuable for his being a Catholic.[35] Mr. Kenny even went to mass in Hankow and was quite satisfied with the state of religion in China.

[32] Upon his return to New Zealand, Mr. Freer declared himself in favour of recognition of China, and he spoke widely on his experiences there.

[33] According to Hongkong newspapers, who interviewed him on his arrival from Canton, Mr. Tilley expressed the view that the Chinese commune system was "a most unacceptable thing to Western countries."

[34] A number of trade union and other public figures objected to Monk's statements. See the revealing transcript of Mr. Monk's TV discussion with a panel of journalists on the "Meet the Press" programme in Sydney, August 28, 1960: "Yes, well . . . Mugga Yields to Mr. Monk and Others," *The Observer*, September 17, 1960. Mr. Monk was sick during much of his visit and spent almost half his time in a hospital in Hankow. According to the *Peking Daily News*, quoted by Reuters, on June 12, 1957, just when Mr. Monk was himself in hospital in Hankow, Communist Party offices were being attacked by rioting students in Hanyong, Hankow's twin city. But neither Mr. Monk nor his fellow-delegates were aware of this.

[35] Even though a Catholic, Kenny did not resign from the ALP when the break came but remained to "fight communism from within." Considered a "right-wing" unionist, he found that in China: communism was less extreme than in Russia; there was plenty of private enterprise; state-private joint ownership would not end until 1962; China's system was more "state capitalist" than "communist"; there was no real aid from Russia; it would be "suicidal" for Australia to disregard China's friendship.

Since the first Monk delegation, ACTU May Day and National Day (October 1) delegations have become a regular custom. In 1958, a delegation led by F. E. Chamberlain, Federal President of the ALP, spent a month in China, returning home in June. Mr. Chamberlain was, if anything, even more enthusiastic about China. He could find nothing wrong. "There must be an angry Chinese man or woman, but as yet I have not seen one," he wrote.[36] He found that there was absolutely no poverty, no oppression, and complete political and religious freedom in China. As evidence of the liberalism of the régime, he pointed out that there were eight other political parties functioning in China besides the Communist Party.

In September 1958, a delegation of trade unionists, led by George Neilly, Secretary-General of the Australian Miners Federation, arrived for a tour of China at the invitation of the Chinese Coal Miners Union.

For May Day 1959, a five-member delegation spent three and a half weeks in China. For the first time in this series of ACTU delegations two of the five delegates were acknowledged members of the Australian Communist Party, J. Dawson and H. Field. This was also a very enthusiastic delegation, although Delegate Charles Lynch demurred slightly.[37]

For May Day 1960, another five-member delegation was sent, this one also containing an acknowledged Party member, G. Sealaf, an influential unionist, Vice-Secretary of the Meat Industry Employees Union. William Clifford Loftus, Assistant Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Hotel Workers Union, arrived in China on September 9, 1960, for a tour and to attend the National Day celebrations in Peking.

Most recently, on January 5, 1961, George Atkins, General Secretary of the Australian Blacksmiths Union, went to China at the invitation of the First Engineering Workers Union of China.

From China, trade unionists have gone to Australia, although in much smaller numbers. According to Chinese sources, in 1956, 135 Chinese trade unionists visited 13 countries, on a variety of missions, including

[36] *Perth Daily News*, June 11, 1958.

[37] I have seen a typewritten report by Lynch, entitled "A Look-See at China," dated June 1959, where he is suitably impressed by many of the achievements shown them. But after noting that "some amazing records by voluntary labour have been established, such as building the Ming Tombs Reservoir, holding 75 million tons of water, it was completed in four months, 400,000 people were engaged on the job working shift work, 100,000 a shift," he notes wryly: "The interpreter pointed with pride at the completed job while I was thinking how the boys at the Trades Hall in Sydney would respond if Joe Cahill called for volunteers from among their members to build the Eastern Suburbs Railway, all for free." His conclusion: "As I walked off the aircraft at Mascot and stepped on my native soil I realised that I was back again to a free, democratic and to me the best country in the world."

Australia and New Zealand.[38] The important official delegation, however, was the one that came in October 1960, creating a very considerable stir, almost a scandal. Liu Chang-sheng, Vice-President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), along with a liaison officer from its International Division and an interpreter, spent three weeks in Australia at the invitation of the ACTU. But this visit aroused considerable opposition. The central issue was that the ACTU assessed the member unions for funds to pay for the visit. Many unions thereupon decided to boycott the visit, refused to pay the levy, and even organised demonstrations. A street fight took place in front of the Melbourne headquarters of the ACTU. Many Labour leaders evaded taking part in the official functions and receptions on one excuse or another. Although the main industrial, transport, and building unions supported the visit, the large Ironworkers Society, the independent Australian Workers Union, and the many unions under Democratic Labour Party leadership, refused to take part.

The ACS takes an active part in exchange relations. However, not all exchanges fall under its jurisdiction. Wherever possible, the Chinese prefer the exchanges to take place under more normal, functional auspices: trade union delegations are usually sponsored by trade union organisations; theatrical and opera groups by commercial channels; students by student groups; trade delegations by businessmen. However, the Society has played an important part in facilitating the visits of Chinese: receptions, meetings, publicity, guide service, and interpreters. Then, too, there have been the large delegations arranged under its auspices, including the Cultural Delegations of 1956, 1958 and 1960, already mentioned, and the Women's Delegation of 1957. Leading members of the ACS have been to China on a variety of missions, sometimes along with other delegations, sometimes as individuals, and sometimes on exchange business with their Chinese counterparts of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

The peace activists (or the "peace partisans," as the Chinese call them) appear even more prominently in the network of Australian-Chinese relations. The important Asian and Pacific Peace Congress of September 1952 has already been mentioned. One result of this was the creation of an Australian Committee. But this Committee appears to have been very inactive, so that the principal work in this field was concentrated in the hands of the Australian Peace Council. The peace

[38] Other countries visited were: the Soviet Union, the "People's Democracies," Japan, India, France, Britain, and Italy. In the same year, 590 trade unionists from 43 countries visited China, according to the Peking *Daily Worker* of January 5, 1957.
[39] From 12 countries: Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Portugal, South Africa, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

activists regularly visit China, either for conferences or consultations, or on their way to or from the numerous peace congresses held all over the world. The visits of Dr. Sandy and Mrs. Vassilieff in 1953 provide an example. In 1955, quite a number of Australians stopped off in China on their way back from the Helsinki World Assembly for Peace, the Fifth World Youth Festival in Warsaw, and the World Congress of Mothers in Lausanne. In the same way, Australians were among the thirty-one delegates [39] who came for a visit to China after the conclusion of the World Peace Council Conference in Colombo in June 1957. They were given receptions by leading Chinese dignitaries, including Chou En-lai, and on July 2 a rally was held in Peking to celebrate the success of the conference, where one of the Australian delegates, Sam Goldbloom,[40] said that there was in Australia a rising tide of objection to the tests being conducted on and close to Australian soil and said: "We will continue our campaign to stop all tests." In August 1958, delegates to the Fourth World Conference for Prohibiting Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and for Total Disarmament, held in Tokyo earlier in the month, were invited to Peking by the China Peace Committee after the close of the Conference. Again after the Sixth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and for Total Disarmament, which took place in Tokyo in August 1960, seven Australian and several New Zealanders went to China, including Mr. Uren, ALP MP, and other "peace champions" from Australia. The Australians, along with the West Germans and the Japanese, were given a banquet on August 29 by Liu Ning-yi, President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and Vice-Chairman of the China Peace Committee, and Burhan Shahidi, another Vice-Chairman of the China Peace Council.[41] The Australian delegation, led by Geoffrey Ronald Anderson, Co-Secretary of the New South Wales Peace Council, was also received by Kuo Mo-jo on August 29, in his capacity as Chairman of the China Peace Council.

Proportionately, New Zealand peace partisans have been equally active. In April 1959, New Zealand Peace Council delegates, Willis Thomas Goodwin Airey, Vice-Chairman, and his wife, and Warren Wilfred Freer, another Vice-Chairman (who had already been to China before), and his wife, were given a banquet by Kuo Mo-jo. In June–July 1960, H. W. Auland, ranch owner [42] and Vice-Chairman of the New

[40] Vice-President of the Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism; in 1959, Organising Secretary of the Australian and New Zealand Congress for Disarmament and International Co-operation.

[41] Permanently resident "peace champions," Rewi Alley of New Zealand and Kinkazu Saionji of Japan, along with "visiting peace champions," Jose Venturelli of Chile and Ahmed Mohammed Kheil and his wife, of Sudan, also attended this gathering.

[42] New Zealand's special contribution to China seems to have to do with herding. The August 1955 issue of *China Reconstructs* features an article by New Zealander Max Wilkinson on the north-west countryside. Mr. Wilkinson had come to China

Zealand Peace Council, and his wife spent a month in China at the invitation of the Chinese Peace Council. This was Mr. Auland's third visit.

The reciprocal to these visits from the Chinese side was the delegation to the 1959 Australian and New Zealand Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament, already mentioned, in Melbourne.[43]

2. *Western Europe*

A. FRANCE

France has no official diplomatic relations with Communist China. Its Sinology is highly developed in the traditional literary-philological-historical fields, but modern studies have few practitioners and fewer achievements yet to their credit.

As against this, however, the political atmosphere in French intellectual and academic circles is extremely friendly towards Communist China. The result is a considerable volume of non-official "friendship" and "cultural" missions and visits to Communist China, but very little in the way of serious scholarly research or academic exchange. In 1955, for example, there were 25 delegations exchanged between the two countries,[1] and in 1956, 22 went from France to Communist China, and 15 from China to France.[2] At May Day, Army Day (August 1) and National Day (October 1) we always read of large numbers of French delegations as invited guests of the government: from the French Communist Party; the Confédération Générale de Travailleurs Unifiée (CGTU), the Communist-led trade union federation, France's largest; the French section of the Women's International Democratic Federation [3]; the French Peace Council; the French section of the International Union of Students; the Amitié Franco-Chinoise; as well as from other circles of French intellectual life. Delegations of writers, journalists, businessmen, medical men, and others are often invited for these occasions, and allowed to spend some time before or after, either touring or working for short periods with their Chinese counterparts. For May Day 1958, to take one example, in addition to the usual friendship delegations, two leading French medical men, the cancer specialist, Prof. Lacassagne, and the radiologist, Dr.

in 1948 to develop sheepherding in Kansu and to work with the Kansu Animal Husbandry Bureau, staying on after the Communists took power.

43 It is reported that some of the Chinese delegates embarrassed their hosts by the belligerency of their peace advocacy.

1 Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–297.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 359.

3 Mme. Marie-Claude Vaillant-Coutourier, wife of the famous French Communist, has been the International President. She visited China for the National Day Celebrations in 1959.

Jammet, and their wives, were invited by the Chinese Medical Association to attend the celebrations and then later lecture in various medical institutions.

Institutions

There are three principal academic institutions concerned with China: L'École des Langues Orientales Vivantes, where the Chinese language is taught; L'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises (Sorbonne), the home of the older tradition of philological and antiquity studies; and the recently established Centre de Documentation (Section Chine), of the 6e Section (Social Sciences) of the École Pratique des Hautes Études.

Outside of the academic world the principal society concerned with relations with Communist China is the Amitié Franco-Chinoise, which like many similar societies throughout the world is strongly under Communist influence, although it includes in its ranks a number of non-communist liberals. It is this society that carries on the main activities in the field of Franco-Chinese relations. It has been responsible for sending high-level "cultural missions," such as the Peace Delegation under Gén. Émile-Robert Petit in 1952 and the Youth Delegation of 1952, led by Mlle. Raymonde Dian,[4] cultural delegations,[5] the Women's Delegation of 1955,[6] performing artists (like the Folk Acrobatic Troupe that performed in Peking in February of 1958), writers, journalists, academic people, physical culturists,[7] businessmen, etc., and also for administering occasional programmes, such as the student exchange.

Intellectuals

Apart from the exchanges sponsored and administered by the Amitié Franco-Chinoise, there is a considerable flow of intellectuals under other auspices, very often with political motives. Edgar Faure, a former Premier of France, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre are examples of this kind of visitor (the first two having written books of considerable political influence).[8] Also to be included in this category are: Claude Morgan, the novelist, who visited China in 1952; Claude Roy, leftist poet, writer

[4] Who achieved notoriety for flinging herself in front of a goods train carrying munitions for the Indo-China War.

[5] Such as the sixteen-member delegation of the Amitié, led by Mme. Jeanne Lévy, Professor of Medicine at the University of Paris, that spent one month in China in September and October 1955, in time for National Day; or the April 1957 delegation led by Prof. Kahane, that was able to attend the May Day celebrations.

[6] A ten-member delegation, led by Mme. Marcelle Marguet, spent one month in September and October 1955 in China.

[7] The 1960 Physical Culture Delegation was numbered among the honoured guests in the observation stands at the National Day celebrations.

[8] Edgar Faure spent May and June 1957 in China and on his return wrote *The Serpent and the Tortoise* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958); Mme. de Beauvoir and M. Sartre spent seven weeks touring China widely in September and October 1955; the result is her famous book, *The Long March* (London: André Deutsch and Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959).

and editor, who was in China in 1952 [9]; Gabriel D'Arboussier, French West African leader who at that time (1952) was close to the French Communist Party; Vercors (Jean Bruller), the famous *Résistance* writer [10]; Henri Cartier-Bresson, the distinguished photographer [11]; Alfred Fabre-Luce, historian and writer [12]; Gerard Philippe, the film actor, in February 1957; and Laurent Casanova, writer, who went to China in May 1957 on his way to the Colombo meeting of the World Peace Council.[13] Among political figures, apart from M. Faure (and, of course, many Communists) former Premier Pierre Mendés-France visited China in July 1958, accompanied by the *Député* Roland Dumas; and in September and October of 1955, in time for National Day, two important delegations, one of senators,[14] and one of parliamentarians led by Daniel Mayer, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the French Parliament.[15]

Journalists visit fairly frequently, although aside from Communist journalists, such as Pierre Courtade of *L'Humanité*, the visits are usually short, from a few weeks to a few months. In autumn 1954, for example, A. de Segonzac [16] spent two months in China; in 1955, the Gossets, a husband-wife team, and Robert Guillain, correspondent for *Le Monde*, were there; in 1957, Jean Maurice Herrmann, President of the International Organisation of Journalists, visited Peking to attend an executive committee meeting; in 1958, Lucien Bodard, who was born in China, spent his second extended visit [17]; in July 1958, a delegation of journalists visited China; in 1959 (from July 4 to August 5), Serge Zeyons, Director of *Regards*, was in China; and in April and May of 1960, Émile Servan-Schreiber visited China for one month at the invitation of the All-China Journalists Association.[18] Moreover, Agence France Presse usually maintains a resident correspondent, for the past few years Bernard Ullmann.[18a]

[9] See his *In China*.

[10] See his *Divagations d'un Français en Chine* (Paris: A. Michel, 1956).

[11] See his *From One China to Another* (New York: Universe Books, 1956).

[12] Portions of his journal have appeared in English in *Encounter*, August 1959, and *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1959.

[13] In the company of Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, Vice-President of the World Peace Council and General Secretary of the French Progressive Republican Union, and Soviet writer A. E. Korneichuk.

[14] This delegation, composed of Leo Hamon, Edward Michelet, René Enjalbert, and Bernard Chochoy, arrived in China September 23 and left shortly after National Day, on October 3.

[15] Other members were: Maurice Faure, Jean-Raymond Frugier, and René Kuehn. The group was received by Liu Shao-ch'i, then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, on October 30.

[16] *Visa pour Pékin* (Paris: Gallimard, 1956).

[17] See his "Women of Iron," *The Atlantic*, December 1959.

[18] Not to be confused with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the editor of *L'Express*. M. Servan-Schreiber, who had visited China some 25 years before, edits an economic journal and is a director of *Les Echos*.

[18a] See his "China's Grim Winter: a Reporter's Notebook," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 19, 1961.

Scholarly Work

For a long time a vigorous Centre Française d'Études Sinologues was maintained in Peking. At the time of the Communist takeover, four leading French scholars were working there; Rolf Stein, Dmitri Rygaloff, Max Kaltenmark, and Robert Ruhlmann, all of whom remained on for varying periods. This focus of French scholarship has, however, closed down. Since that time, while a number of scholars have gone to China on cultural missions or for short journalistic visits, very few have gone for sustained scholarly work. Nor have Chinese come to France for academic work, except for occasional conferences.[19]

A few scholars have been able to carry on more than routine observations: René Dumont, the famous agricultural economist,[20] received permission in 1955 to make a study of rural villages. With the help of interpreters assigned him by the Chinese Government, he visited 43 villages in about six weeks.[21] He has since been invited once again to return to study the communes, presumably in the areas he had studied earlier. Three French Communist economists, L. Lavallée, P. Noirot, and V. Dominique, were invited to Peking about 1955 or 1956 to write a book on Chinese economic growth.[22] This, however, is widely understood as the presentation of the official Chinese line. None of the three is a Chinese expert, but simply party-line Communists. They have recently again been invited to return to Peking to bring their book up to date.

Jean Chesnaux, Sinologist, visited China in 1958 as a member of a high-powered cultural mission. He was allowed to remain behind a few months to do some research on the history of the labour movement between 1921 and 1927. Vadim Eliséeff, Curator of Archaeology, Musée Cernuschi, was a member of the same cultural mission as Chesnaux. He

[19] However, in 1955, a technical mission of the China National Import and Export Corporation visited France. In February 1958 an economic and technical mission went to France on a "fact-finding tour" of factories, schools, and laboratories in the railway, motor-car, food, chemical, tele-communications, mining, and electrical machinery industries. The Peking Opera and the Chinese Circus have also had sensational successes in Paris on their European tours, and in May 1958, an 80-member Chinese art ensemble, made up of members of the Shanghai Peking Opera Ensemble and the Central Experimental Theatre of Modern Opera, took part in the Paris International Drama Festival. The Chinese Art Group that took part in the same Festival in the summer of 1955 presented a collection of Chinese classical drama and other publications to the University of Paris. In May 1956, there was a very successful Chinese Pavilion at the Paris International Fair (although nothing was for sale). A French trade delegation had been to China in June 1953, where it signed a trade agreement with the China National Import and Export Corporation, and again on February 16, 1956, a French economic mission signed a protocol on payments and issued a joint statement with the Chinese side on commercial possibilities between the two countries.

[20] Author of *L'Economie Agricole dans le Monde*; and *La culture du Riz dans le Delta de Tonkin* (Paris: 1935).

[21] Reported in his book *Révolution dans les Campagnes Chinoises* (Paris: Éditions Seuil, 1957).

[22] *L'Economie de la Chine Socialiste* (Genève: Editions Librairie Rousseau, 1957). Introduction by Jacques Duclos.

applied to the Chinese authorities for permission to carry on some small excavations, but he was allowed only a month to visit important sites where work was in progress.[23] Étiemble, in the spring of 1957, led a party of Sinologists on a trip to China.[24]

Apart from these main cases, a number of others should be recorded: most of the members of the Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises have been to China with one mission or another, but they have only stayed there three or four weeks and have not undertaken any scholarly work, even in classical fields. When Étienne Balasz applied for a long-term visa, he was offered only the standard tourist visa and decided not to go under those conditions. A six-member delegation of French economists, headed by M. Dumontier, Director of the French National Statistical Institute, and including Henri Denis and Charles Bettelheim, of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (Sorbonne), visited China in the late summer of 1958. Many members of this mission have written of their observations and findings.[25] The linguist, Prof. M. Cohen, spent two months in China before and after May Day 1959, and in the summer of 1960, René Capitant, Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Paris, made a 17-day tour of the country.

There have been several missions of professionals, either at the behest of their professional societies or of the Chinese Government, that have carried on surveys in their own areas. Dr. Wertheimer, Professor of Clinical Surgery at the University of Lyons, led a five-member Medical Delegation in September 1955 at the invitation of the Chinese Medical Association. The Medical Mission of the autumn of 1958, led by Prof. René Fauvert, made a study of Chinese hospital facilities and medical care, reporting their findings in a number of articles in French medical journals.[26] In the same year, the visit (already mentioned) of Drs. Lacassagne and Jammet took place. And in the late summer of 1960, again we read notices of the presence of French medical specialists, this time Profs. Dausset and Ruffie, both hematologists. A forestry specialist spent a month or so three years ago surveying problems of reforestation in China; he too has written about this in a professional journal.

In addition, many academic personalities have been to China on one

23 See his "Les découvertes de l'archaéologie Chinoise," *Table Ronde*, 96, December 1955.

24 Étiemble (he uses no other name) is Professor of History at the Sorbonne and a co-founder of the journal *Les Temps Moderns* with Sartre. A versatile litterateur, he has spent time in China and written extensively about it, although not formally a Sinologist. He had already visited Communist China earlier, in 1955.

25 See the article by Josué de Castro, former President of the FAO, "Victory over Hunger," in the special issue of Économie et Politique (Nos. 66–67, Jan.–Feb. 1960), which contains articles by other economists who have visited China.

26 The other members of the delegation were all from the Faculty of Medicine of Paris. Apart from articles in professional journals, they reported their extremely favourable findings on public health in China in *Le Monde* (9–10 Nov. 1958).

mission or another, usually not connected with their professional fields.[27]

Student Exchange

The principal programme of a formal character is the exchange of students initiated by the Chinese Communists in 1958, at the time of the large cultural mission. However, already in 1956, there had been some suggestion of the possibility of such a programme. When Dean Yen Jen-keng, of Peking University, met the delegation of French students[28] visiting China at a dinner on December 17, he expressed the hope that Peking University would soon be able to receive French students. The Chinese Government offered scholarships to French students for two years of language or history study. This programme was not, however, executed between the two governments, but rather through the Amitié Franco-Chinoise, which convened a selection committee of Sinologists from the various academic institutes. Two students went to Peking in 1958. Both of them ran into difficulties, personal as well as, possibly, political.

The following year, 1959, another French student went to China on this programme. But in late May 1960 the Chinese notified the Amitié that no more applications would be accepted from French students, so for the time being the programme has come to an end. There is much speculation in French circles on the reason for this cancellation, but no clear explanation has emerged. It may be that the harder line of the summer, 1960, resulting from the growing tension of China's relations with the outside world—even with the Soviet Union,[29] as well as disappointment with failure to secure official French recognition of the exchange, may have played a part.

B. UNITED KINGDOM

England was the first of the non-Communist countries to recognise Communist China, January 6, 1950. This recognition was, however, for a long time one-sided, and it was not until April 17, 1954, that the two

27 As Prof. Kahane, who led the 1957 Delegation of the Amitié; or Mme. Lévy, who led the 1955 Delegation. When the Chinese Art Group presented its collection to the University of Paris, a number of professors who had visited China were reported in attendance.

28 This delegation, led by Claude Rossignol, consisted of 16 members, including medical students and students majoring in political science, law, arts, and Oriental languages; the delegation spent 25 days in China. However, there have been other youth and student groups as well. French students were among the first batch of student "tourists" in China, who came on a tour organised by the All-China Students Federation in April and May 1957. Again, there were French delegates among the 37 fraternal delegates attending the Third Congress of the China New Democratic League, which opened on May 15, 1957.

29 As suggested by the Chinese refusal to participate in the Orientalist Congress in Moscow and the forced cancellation of the Congress of Junior Sinologues.

countries reached an agreement on the exchange of *chargés d'affaires*. Since 1950, hundreds, if not thousands of Englishmen have visited Communist China in one capacity or other: as diplomats, journalists, cultural delegates, tourists, artists, scholars.[1] These have included a disproportionate number of Communists, sympathisers, left-wing Socialists, left-wing trade unionists, pacifists, unilateral disarmers, neutralists; and the usual quota of favourites—important intellectual figures known for their sympathy for the new régime—such as Prof. Joseph Needham, the " Red Dean of Canterbury " Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Cedric Dover, Ivor Montague, Stalin Peace Prize Winners Prof. J. D. Bernal and D. N. Pritt, and others. But the delegations have been by no means limited to sympathisers, even in the broadest sense. Large numbers have gone and come critical; others have been politically indifferent. Official Chinese policy seems to be to bring prominent personalities from various fields of British political and intellectual life, most of whom will not have any publicly-expressed views on the subject of China, and give them an interesting month's visit in the hope thereby of winning their sympathy. The net effect has undoubtedly been to create a feeling of normalcy in the relations of the two countries, to reduce political hostility, and to emphasise the differentiation of British public attitudes from those of the United States. The Austin Motor Co. has the distinction of publishing the first commercial advertisement ever taken by the Peking *People's Daily*, a full-page spread on page 8 of the April 20, 1957, edition.

Variety is the keynote of these visits. Official or group delegations range from the large amorphous " cultural delegations " and " goodwill missions," often on the occasion of national celebrations or international conferences (peace, women, youth, trade union conferences; scientific congresses, etc.), to highly specific groups such as the official Labour Party Mission, led by Earl Attlee in summer 1954, the British medical delegation of 1957, or the Irish dramatic delegation, led by R. M. Fox, in 1956.[2] Reuter's News Agency maintains a correspondent in Peking, and many English journalists have been able to visit for varying periods, usually between two weeks and three months.

In return, the cultural flow from China has been fairly substantial, although most of it has been in the form of performing groups or of delegations, rather than of individual visits. The Peking Opera (1955) and the Peking Circus (1956) have had extraordinarily successful runs during the British portion of their European tours. A youth delegation spent a month in spring 1957 at the invitation of the Britain-China Friendship Association, apparently in return for the British youth delegation to

1 In 1955, for example, 23 delegations were exchanged between the two countries; in 1956, the number had gone up to 22 from Britain and 18 from China. (Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-297).

2 R. M. Fox, *China Diary* (London: Robert Hale, 1959).

China of the year before.[3] Trade and cultural delegations have received a good deal of attention, including the Chinese cultural delegation, which in April 1958 visited university and cultural centres throughout England.[4] A Chinese tennis team took part in the Wimbledon Tournament in June 1959. Most recent was the group of five leading Chinese scientists which went to London for the tercentenary celebrations of the Royal Society.

But apart from cultural exchange of this general order, England has been unique among non-Communist Western countries in the number of scholars who have been able to spend extended periods in China actually engaged in serious scholarly activity.

Sinologists

The earliest of the British Sinologists to visit China in a scholarly capacity (except for David Hawkes, now of Oxford University, and Harry Simon, then of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), who were in China when the Communists took over, but left shortly afterwards) was the distinguished physicist, Dr. Joseph Needham, of Cambridge University. Dr. Needham spent some time in 1953 working on his monumental *Science and Civilisation in China*, and then again in the summer of 1958 spent three months in China, travelling some 12,000 miles and collecting additional materials for his history. Prof. E. G. Pulleyblank, of Cambridge University, spent a month in October-November 1954 as a member of a cultural delegation and was able to meet and talk with scholars in his field.[5] In late 1955, Prof. E. S. Kirby, economist of Hongkong University, was able to visit the mainland with a Hongkong University party for three weeks.[6] And in the same year, Dr. J. D. Chinnery of SOAS accompanied a mission of artists and philosophers as interpreter for a brief visit.

During the period roughly from the autumn of 1955 to the summer of 1957, six Sinologists applied to go to China for varying periods and purposes, five of whom were successful in varying degrees. Internally

[3] The Chinese delegation, led by Chang Chao, Secretary-General of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, included a trade unionist, a youth movement leader, a student movement leader, a musician, and an ordained Christian minister. The British youth delegation of 1956 has been described by Michael Croft, founder of Britain's National Youth Theatre, in his *Red Carpet to China* (London: Longmans, 1958).

[4] The delegation was led by Prof. Chin Yueh-lin, philosopher, and included Prof. Chou Pei-yuan, physicist and Deputy Chancellor of Peking University; Mme. Hsieh Ping-hsin, novelist; Prof. Yuan Ching-ching, pedagogue, and others. Before coming to England, the delegation had spent 25 days in Italy as guests of the Italian Centre for the Development of Relations with China.

[5] "A Sinologist in Sian," *United Asia*, vol. 8, No. 2, 1956.

[6] K. E. Priestley, another member of this party, has recently published a study, *Education in Communist China* (Hongkong: Green Pagoda Press, 1961).

this was a period of relaxation, and externally it was the period of better relations with the outside world.

Three of the scholars who applied for visas during this period, Dr. Piet van der Loon, of Cambridge University, Dr. P. D. Hanan and Dr. J. D. Chinnery, of SOAS, were able to spend a full academic year in China. Dr. Victor Purcell, of Cambridge University, refused an official visit to China in 1956, but was permitted to spend three weeks as a private person, both in travelling and in contacting universities and obtaining documentary materials for his research on modern Chinese history.

Mr. Raymond Dawson, of Durham University, however, encountered difficulty in obtaining a visa, so that whereas he had wanted to spend the whole academic year 1957–58 in China, he was only admitted in February 1958 and stayed until August 1958. In direct contrast to Mr. Purcell, Mr. Dawson was told that he must go as a tourist and could expect no help from academic institutions. Consequently he set himself no research programme and concentrated on learning the spoken language and on making a tour of the country. The reason for this difference in treatment is not clear. The only one whose visa was refused in this period was Mr. David Watkins, of St. Antony's College, Oxford, who wished to do research on "colloquial Chinese." The reasons for this refusal are not known.

The scholars who have applied since the summer of 1957 have fared less well. This was, of course, the period, internally, of the anti-rightist campaign and of the fervours of the "great leap forward" and, externally, of increasing Chinese bellicosity, the high spots of which were the anti-Tito campaign and the Formosa Straits crisis of 1958. Mr. Harry Simon, of SOAS, who applied in December 1957 for the period August 1958–July 1959 in order to work on a grammar, was refused on the grounds that two men from SOAS were already in Peking and that no place could be found for a third. This was clearly not the real reason for the refusal, since both the other SOAS men (Hanan and Chinnery) would have left by the time Simon arrived there. That the refusal of Simon's request was related to the changed political atmosphere is clear from the fact that he had actually been able to visit China three times before as an interpreter, twice for a trade mission and once for Penguin Books. Others who have applied since that time were not even given the satisfaction of a refusal: they simply received no answer.

One other Sinologist visited China during this period, but not for scholarly purposes. Basil Gray, the Keeper of the Department of Oriental Antiquities at the British Museum, went as a member of a cultural delegation in May 1957. He spent a month there, and during

this time he was able to talk to a number of scholars in his field and to visit archaeological sites, all of which he considered very worthwhile.[7]

Non-Sinologists

It would be impossible to make a complete list of the many British scholars, intellectuals, political figures, and journalists who have visited China in recent years. Most of them go in organised groups, often in connection with some conference or some national celebration and certainly on the invitation of an official Chinese organisation, although small numbers have been able to go on their own. In most cases they go as guests of the Chinese Government, and a good share, if not all, of their expenses are paid for. There seems to be no systematic attempt to ensure that a visitor is sympathetic to the régime, but there are a number of cases known of people who have been refused a visa or have received no answer to their application. The best known public examples are journalists. Most of the visitors seem to spend about a month, part of it in Peking and part touring, and the range is from two weeks to three months.

Scholars who go for these short trips often feel that they are able to see quite a bit in their own fields. Naturally, this varies with the qualifications of the scholar and with the degree to which he has prepared himself in advance for his trip. Sinologists such as Pulleyblank and Basil Gray have been able to see a good deal. Dr. T. F. Fox, editor of *Lancet*, was able to make a thorough examination of many aspects of medical work,[8] as was Dr. John Baird [9] in the field of dental care. In August 1959, Sir Cyril Hinshelwood, the chemist and President of the Royal Society, was invited for a month of visiting and lecturing, and in September Prof. Robert Macintosh, the anaesthesiologist from Oxford, was invited for a month's visit to institutes of medical research and to undertake scientific activities in Peking and Shanghai.[10]

Mention should also be made of: Dr. J. D. Bernal, University Professor of Physics, Birkbeck College, London (winner of the Royal Medal in 1945 and the Stalin Peace Prize in 1953). Dr. Bernal, well known for his pro-Communist sympathies, has made several trips. In 1954 he was invited for a two-month visit by the Academia Sinica. "Coming on my own," he writes, "I visited some 60 institutions, mostly universities and research laboratories, but also factories and works." [11] In 1959, he led the delegation of the World Peace Council, of whose Presidential Council he is a member, to the National Day celebrations in Peking [12];

[7] See his "The Cave Temples," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1959.
[8] See the report of his trip in the *New York Times*, October 22, 1959.
[9] See his "Public Health in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*
[10] Prof. Macintosh remained on for the National Day celebrations.
[11] See his "Science in China," *United Asia, op. cit.* During this visit he spoke at a meeting in Peking commemorating the 200th anniversary of the death of Henry Fielding.
[12] Mao Tse-tung received him in audience on October 1, 1959.

N. W. Pirie, Head of the Department of Biochemistry, Rothamsted Experimental Station, Harpenden, Herts., and Chairman of the National Committee of Science for Peace, who visited China in 1954 [13];

L. Hawkes, University Professor of Geology, Bedford College, London, who visited China late in 1954 as a guest of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries [14];

Kathleen Lonsdale, F.R.S., Professor of Physics at the University of London, a prominent pacifist and scientist, who visited China in September and October 1955 as Deputy Leader of the British Goodwill Mission, along with Maurice Ohrbach, then a Labour M.P.; during her stay she lectured at the Institute of Organic Chemistry and the Institute of Metallurgy and Ceramics;

Nicolas Kaldor, Cambridge economist, who visited China in 1956 and did some lecturing [15];

Dr. Hinton, entomologist, who attended the National Day celebrations in 1960;

Miss Dorothy Hodgkin, chemical crystallographer from South Parks Road Laboratory, Oxford, who made the longest reported stay in China, over one year, working with Chinese in her field.

Many non-academic intellectuals have been to China either as members of cultural delegations or as individuals. William Empson, the poet, was in China at the time of the changeover to Communist rule, teaching English at Peking University; he remained on with his wife for several years after that. Basil Davidson went to China in the autumn of 1952 with a group of British observers at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. Ivor Montagu, a perennial fellow-travelling British writer, one-time world table-tennis champion, was in China for the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions in 1952, with a substantial [16] (and fellow-travelling) British delegation, and then later in 1954 with a large cultural delegation; during his visits, Montagu was also able to go to Outer Mongolia, where he made a film which has been widely exhibited. In the same 1954 cultural delegation (which included Pulleyblank, Pirie, Hawkes, and others), there were: the professional progressive and anti-colonialist, Cedric Dover, who has made more than one trip; Freda Grimbel, editor of the *Nursery Journal*, General Secretary of the National Society of Children's Nurseries, and Consultant to the UN on the day care of children for Europe and the United Kingdom [17];

13 See his "The Academic Scene in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*

14 See his "A Geologist in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*

15 Mr. Kaldor lectured on Marx and Keynes at Peking University where he is reported to have told his audience that the "capitalist system contrary to Marxist belief, is in no danger of inevitable collapse."

16 Joseph Starobin: *Paris to Peking* (New York: Cameron Associates, 1955) mentions that "33 Britishers were completing a tour of the country . . ."

17 See her "Children in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*

Miles Malleson, actor and playwright [18]; and Denis Mathews, painter, critic, and Secretary of the Contemporary Arts Society, who visited the site of Chang'an with Dr. Pulleyblank. (He went to China again in May and June 1960 to assist in the opening of the exhibition of "British Oil Painting in the Past Seventy Years.")

Other prominent intellectual visitors to China include: Sir Hugh Casson,[19] Professor of Interior Design at the Royal College of Art, one-time Director of Architecture for the Festival of Britain, and A. J. Ayer, the distinguished Oxford logical positivist, who spent two weeks in China in autumn 1955 as members of a cultural delegation [20]; the poet Edmund Blunden, for many years the "resident British poet" in Japan and now on the faculty of Hongkong University, who headed the Hongkong University party that visited China at the end of 1955 [21]; A. C. Scott, the distinguished annalist of the Japanese and the Chinese theatre, who also went in 1955 [22]; Paul Hogarth, the artist, who spent some time in China making drawings; R. M. Fox, who led an Irish dramatic delegation in 1956 [23]; the perennial Hewlett Johnson, "Red Dean of Canterbury," who has visited China at least three times [24]; Lord Boyd-Orr, who has been three times [25]; Lennox Robinson, Director of the Irish National Theatre, in the summer of 1956, who, together with R. J. Minney, took part in a Shaw Commemoration in Peking [26]; Richard Carling who, as Chairman of the Arts Committee of the Britain-China Friendship Association, carried 220 exhibits for the British Graphic Arts Show in Peking in 1956; John Summerfield in October 1956 (he also attended the Lu Hsun memorial celebrations); P. J. Bryer, for a month's visit in the winter of 1957 (during her visit she held a recitation of her own poetic drama); the Scottish poet, C. M. Grieve (Hugh McDiarmid), who visited China in April and May 1957 (during his visit he gave a recitation of his

18 See his "Glimpses of the Chinese Theatre," *United Asia, op. cit.*

19 See his "An Architect in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*; and *Red Lacquer Days.*

20 Which included artists and musicians and Dr. Chinnery as interpreter.

21 The delegation consisted of 18 faculty members and several wives, a total of 24 persons in all.

22 See his "The Classical Theatre in Contemporary China," *World Theatre*, Autumn 1956.

23 Fox, *op. cit.*; he arrived in China in the company of two sculptors, John Bourke and Miss Hilary Heron.

24 As head of the British Peace Delegation in 1952; as a guest of the China Peace Committee from August to October 1956; and again at the same invitation in October 1959, on which occasion he and his wife lunched with Chou En-lai.

25 In 1956; in 1958, when he spent two months, accompanied by his wife (see his book with Peter Townsend, *What's Happening in China?* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); and in 1959 again, this time as President of the British Council for Promoting Trade Between East and West as a Means of Increasing Friendship, Common Interest, and Peace.

26 Every year the Chinese, in accordance with a decision of the World Peace Council, hold commemorations of world literary and scientific figures. Foreign visitors from the countries of the person being commemorated are usually invited to attend. Among English figures, Henry Fielding and Robert Burns have been commemorated (Bernal spoke at the Fielding commemoration).

own poetry at a commemoration evening devoted to William Blake and Henry W. Longfellow)[27]; the writer Ella Winter, who spent two months in August and September 1958; and Sir Herbert Read, who was invited to China for the National Day celebrations in 1959.[28]

Most of the political visitors have been from the Labour Party, although Conservative visitors are far from unknown. Viscount and Lady Stansgate had already been to China in late 1956 and early 1957, for a very warm reception.[29] The year 1960 saw the visits of several important Conservatives: Sir Robert Cary, in February; Field Marshal Montgomery, whose visit in May on the invitation of Chou En-lai must certainly be classed as political; and Cyril Osborne in October.[30]

Already in 1952, a number of British unionists were in Peking for the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions.[31] Again, in 1953, a Scottish Electrical Workers Delegation visited China, and in return that same year a Chinese Electrical Workers Delegation visited England and Scotland.[32] In 1954, unionists such as G. E. Doughty, General Secretary of the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen,[33] and Bryn Roberts, General Secretary of the National Union of Public Employees, were there with various delegations. But the most important event was the official British Labour Party Mission in August 1954, led by Lord Attlee and Aneurin Bevan, which included Ben Parkin[34] and Ernest Thornton,[35] Secretary of the United Textile Workers Association of Great Britain. Thornton had been in China in 1946 and then again for the Asian and Pacific Regions Conference in 1952. Since then a few other Labour Party leaders have visited China, most notable of whom were Ian Mikardo in August–September 1956[36] and R. H. S. Crossman,

27 His chief fellow guest was the Spanish poet, R. Alberti, who also gave a reading; other guests included a large number of Chinese poets, members of the British Cultural Delegation, visitors from Finland and Rumania, and members of the Diplomatic Corps.

28 See his "Transformation in China," *Eastern Horizon*, vol. 1, No. 3, September, 1960.

29 According to Chinese sources (NCNA, December 23, 1956), at a reception given them by Kuo Mo-jo, they are reported to have said, in substance, that there are two opposing forces in the world; one was the force of evil, scheming to split China and the world, while the other was a good one, advocating solidarity among all nations; many British Members of Parliament upheld solidarity and world peace, and opposed war. He also said that the question of China's representation at the UN must be settled.

30 He was received by Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi on October 22.

31 See Starobin, *op. cit.*

32 A Chinese trade union delegation had already been in England in September 1950 at the invitation of the Britain-China Friendship Association.

33 See his "Trade Unions in China," *United Asia, op. cit.*

34 See his "China and the United Nations," *United Asia*, vol. 8, No. 5, 1956.

35 See his "Industrial Expansion in China," *United Asia*, vol. 8, No. 2, 1956; and "China Revisited," *ibid.*, vol. 8, No. 5, 1956.

36 Mikardo, in an article, "Anglo-Chinese Trade," in the *Observer*, December 30, 1956, reported that "Chinese cigarettes are the best I have ever smoked." According to the French correspondent Bernard Ullmann, who spent two years in China, "Excellent cigarettes of Virginia-type tobacco are available to foreigners in designated hotels. The Chinese are entitled to only about six packs a month, and their cigarettes are made of tobacco scraps or substitutes." ("China's Grim Winter: A Reporter's Notebook," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 19, 1961.)

who visited there in August and September 1958.[37] The recent visit of a delegation from the United Society of Boilermakers, Shipbuilders, and Structural Workers was a bit more of a circus. The delegation, together with the Machinery Workers Union of China, issued a joint statement along lines more familiar in the case of Japanese unions. The British side recognised the " tremendous progress China has made since its revolution " and also recognised " the People's Republic of China as the only rightful representative of the Chinese people at the U.N." In return, the Chinese side " firmly supports the struggle carried out by the British boilermakers in opposing American military and rocket bases in Britain and West Germany." [38]

Charles Judd and John A. F. Ennals, then Director and Secretary-General respectively of the World Federation of U.N. Associations, visited China in September–October 1955.

British journalists have had, on the whole, fairly reasonable access to China. Reuter has been able to maintain a correspondent, in spite of the frank reportage of David Chipp during the rectification campaign. A number of journalists, including George S. Gale,[39] were permitted to accompany the Attlee Mission, and since that time many others have been able to go, including James Cameron [40], Nigel Cameron in 1957 [41] and Nicholas Wallaston in 1959.[42] However, we do hear from time to time of difficulties in going or returning again to China. The special correspondent of *The Times* was obliged to wait a long time before he was permitted to return to China in 1960 for a visit, even though he had been there before with the Attlee Mission. The China specialist of *The Daily Telegraph* has been unable to get a visa despite repeated applications, though the Chinese did admit in 1956 and 1957 another of that paper's correspondents; in autumn 1960 there came the reports of Felix Greene [43] and Stuart Gelder being received for interviews by Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi respectively.

Students

Although no formal exchange arrangements exist between China and England, it is known that there are a few English students in Peking

37 " Chinese Notebook," *Encounter*, March 1959.

38 The " agreement " was much more detailed, but along the same lines. The four-member British delegation, headed by John Hepplewhite, went to China in September 1960, in time for the National Day celebrations, at the invitation of the National Committee of the Chinese Machinery Workers Union.

39 *No Flies in China* (New York: William Morrow, 1956).

40 Of the *News Chronicle*, although he went on behalf of the *Manchester Guardian*. See his *Mandarin Red* (New York: Rinehart, 1955).

41 See his *The Chinese Smile* (London: Hutchinson, 1958); also " Taming a Dragon," *Eastern Horizon*, vol. 1, No. 3, September 1960.

42 See his *China in the Morning* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1960).

43 Mr. Greene produced a television interview with Chou for the BBC, " China and the World," which was shown on American television in 1961.

from time to time. Since the act of going to study in China, in the absence of a formal arrangement, is probably a definite political commitment, so far as is known the only students there are leftists. A few mainland Chinese students have been reported in English universities [44]; but there is no general plan of student exchange.

C. THE NETHERLANDS

Although the Netherlands recognised Communist China as early as 1950 [1] and it has a distinguished tradition of Sinological studies, cultural relations between the two countries have been minimal. Even Belgium, Sweden and Norway, among the smaller European countries, seem to have more. In 1955, for example, we read of only five delegations in all exchanged between the two countries [2]; and in 1956, there were five from the Netherlands to China and three from China to the Netherlands.[3] On the Dutch side, there seems to be no strong body of public sentiment actively aroused about relations with Communist China. Since there is no problem of "recognition," no organised group, other than the small Communist Party, takes the China problem as a fighting political issue. Nor, unlike in Japan and several other countries, is Dutch business aggressively interested in the China market.[4] On their side, the Chinese have shown little inclination to cultivate the Dutch, perhaps because to do so offers no particular political advantages. The Netherlands is a small European country with a relatively stable political disposition not easily affected. Indonesia, whose nationalism is very anti-Dutch, is a far more important and valuable target. Therefore we find very few Dutch, of any category, appearing in the lists of visitors to China. At national celebrations, such as May Day, National Day, or Red Army Day, "you suddenly hear pure, authentic Amsterdam dialect" [5] among the foreign visitors. But these delegations are usually party-liners and are not representative of Dutch intellectual life.[6]

44 According to UNESCO, *op. cit.*, there are eight mainland Chinese studying in British higher education institutions (and four from Formosa).

1 The Netherlands decided to recognise Communist China because of her relations with Indonesia, where there was a large Chinese minority. She notified Communist China of her intention to establish diplomatic relations as early as March 1950, but the agreement to exchange *chargés d'affaires* between the two countries was announced only four years later, in November 1954.

2 Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-297.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 359.

4 The most important business delegation was a group of merchants who visited China in 1954. Since 1956, East Asia Line vessels have called at Shanghai and the Taku Bar regularly.

5 According to a personal communication from a long-time Dutch resident of Peking.

6 Examples that appear in the Chinese Press include the Netherlands Communist Party (for the 1955 National Day celebrations, for example, Paul de Groot, General Secretary of the Netherlands Communist Party, and his wife and son, were in China), and the Unified Trade Union Centre of the Netherlands (for May Day 1959, led by Peter Bakkar).

The Dutch colony resident in Peking, small as it was, did not find itself well received. One long-time resident reported that apart from those in his employ, whether as servants or as language teachers, only once did he have a Chinese to his home as an ordinary guest. Others reported that they sometimes employed language teachers simply to have " ordinary " Chinese to speak to. This isolation was exacerbated by a government-inspired strike of houseboys of the Dutch Embassy which broke out in October 1958 and continued well into 1959.

An attempt to establish a Netherlands-China Friendship Association had some initial successes, through the enlistment of a number of non-political scholars. This was under the leadership of Dr. A. F. Wertheim, the famous " third-wayer," Professor of Asian Sociology at the University of Amsterdam. But after the Hungarian Revolution, it disappeared or became extremely inconspicuous, many Dutch scholars finding it too openly political for their tastes. The Netherlands Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, supported by the government, sent the Dutch painter, Jacob Bruyn, in July 1956 with a portfolio of 185 reproductions and prints of Rembrandt. These were exhibited in Peking on the occasion of a Rembrandt Commemoration meeting, where Mr. Bruyn gave a talk.

Sinologists

The Netherlands has a tradition of assigning scholars to foreign service posts. As a result, a few Dutch Sinologists have been able to spend some time in China as diplomats, including Marinus J. Meijer, an outstanding student of Duyvendak, and Carl Barkman. However, they were not able to carry on any scholarly work during their diplomatic tours. (Other scholar-diplomats, like Van Gulik, who served in China before the Communists, have not been sent to post-Communist China.)

The only Sinologist who has so far done scholarly work in Communist China is Piet van der Loon (but since he is on the faculty of Cambridge University he should perhaps be more accurately classified with the British). Dr. van der Loon went to China at his own expense and remained there from October 1956 to June 1957, searching for books and documents. In Peking he worked with the Academia Sinica and the National Library, and he was also able to travel to other parts of China, notably Sian, Hankow and Nanking.

Another Sinologist, Professor A. F. P. Hulsewé, of the University of Leiden, editor of *T'ung Pao*, received a tentative invitation to Peking from the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1958. But this visit has so far not materialised.

Non-Sinologists

Apart from these China specialists, a small number of other academic and intellectual figures have visited China for brief periods.

Film director (and International Peace Prize winner) Joris Ivens and his wife visited China for a month in December 1957 and January 1958 at the invitation of the Chinese Ministry of Culture. Ivens and his wife were feted widely, with receptions by Shen Yen-ping, Minister of Culture, and Kuo Mo-jo, Chairman of the China Peace Committee, lectures in Peking, and discussions with Chinese film people. (He now lives in Poland, and it is not certain whether he still holds Dutch citizenship or not.)

During the same period, Prof. A. F. Wertheim, President of the Netherlands-China Friendship Association, spent a month or so in China. He had just completed a year's stay in Indonesia, and he went both for a medical check-up and to acquaint himself with the Chinese scene. He did not, therefore, do any systematic study or work with Chinese institutions. Upon his return to the Netherlands he published an enthusiastic account of his travels in the left-wing Dutch journal *Nieuwe Stem* (1958). At the end of 1958 Prof. Schermerhorn, head of the Institute of Aerial Cartography of Delft University, spent two weeks in China on his way back from Japan, where he had attended a conference, to Moscow. In the late summer and autumn of 1958 the writer Theun de Vries also spent a short period in China.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, October 1, 1959, the Chinese Government invited a small Dutch delegation, which included a Member of Parliament, Mr. Commelbeck, Prof. H. S. Schoenmaker, Director of the Delft Hydraulics Laboratory, and Mrs. Elizabeth De Jong-Keesing, an educator. After her return to Holland Mrs. De Jong-Keesing published a series of articles in the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.[1] Prof. Schoenmaker, an outstanding authority on dykes, spent some time studying Chinese work in this field.

The plant virologist, Prof. T. H. Thung, made a study visit in the summer of 1960 at the invitation of the Academia Sinica; during this trip he gave a number of lectures at scientific institutes.

In 1957 Mr. J. Thyssens, of the Montaan Tin Co., of Amsterdam, a metallurgical expert, spent about a month in China, including a trip inland.

Chinese in the Netherlands

The return flow from China is even slighter. Small groups of Chinese, particularly scholars, have attended international conferences in the

[1] "Achter de Grote muur," *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, a series of seven articles appearing between February 1 and March 2, 1960. These have since appeared in book form.

Netherlands. A few examples: a delegation from the Society of Chinese Architects attended the Fourth Conference of the International Society of Architects in the Hague, in the summer of 1955. In the same year Chinese scholars attended the Junior Sinologues Conference in Leiden. In 1956 Chinese scientists attended international conferences in the Netherlands.[8]

The most important Chinese visit, however, was the warmly received tour of the Chinese Art Group in the summer of 1955. Following its triumphant tour in France the Chinese Opera went to Amsterdam on July 19, where it was greeted with a large civic reception by Mayor d'Ailly of Amsterdam. It gave eight performances to packed houses in Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam and Leiden. Again, in 1956, the Chinese Acrobatic Troupe performed in the Netherlands, during its eight-month European tour, with great success.

Student Exchange

No formal exchange arrangement exists between the two countries, but an attempt was started in late 1957 (followed up by the invitation to Dr. Hulsewé). The Chinese informed the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they were interested in sending ten students to the University of Leiden to study Dutch language and literature. (During the negotiations this number was reduced to five.) Dr. Hulsewé was asked to serve as adviser to the Chinese students. In March 1960 the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved the plan in principle, subject to some conditions designed to assure the integrity of the students' academic objectives. However, as of early autumn, no official Chinese reaction to this communication had yet appeared, even though the programme was presumably to go into effect in October 1960.

D. GERMANY

Introductory

Germany has an extraordinarily bad starting point for relations with China. The fortunes of postwar politics have cast Germany in a special place in Communist demonology: Nazi, *revanchist*, American puppet—all of these epithets are as persuasive in the Far East as in the heart of Europe. Moreover, there is the physical and political reality of East Germany. The Chinese look to East Germany for their "good Germans." In accordance with the resolutions of the World Peace Council the Chinese duly include Germans among the world figures it commemorates. In 1955 the 150th anniversary of Schiller's death was commemorated in

[8] According to a year-end summary in the Chinese press, during 1956, 76 Chinese scientists attended 16 international scientific conferences in 13 countries.

a public meeting in Peking; in July 1956 there was a Mozart commemoration; in April 1959 a Handel commemoration. At these events the "good" elements of German culture are lauded, and German visitors take part along with the Chinese audiences.

Particularly important is East Germany's trade and technical aid for China's high-pressure industrialization. According to Esslin "East Germany is by far the most important of Communist China's trading partners among all the Soviet satellites, the value of East German deliveries being almost double that of all other Soviet satellites taken together."[1] As is the case with the other Communist countries, East Germany has a formal exchange agreement with China, renewed in protocols every year that specify in great detail the targets for trade and cultural exchange. Technical aid is particularly important: building of pilot plants,[2] shipping of entire factories, engineering advice. Technicians are active in many fields of Chinese life, even in some surprisingly intimate ones.[3] Students are exchanged on a considerable scale between the two countries, and there is a constant procession of intellectual, cultural, civic, political, and scholarly personages back and forth.

But even apart from the very real material benefits of this relation, there exists a particular political affinity between the two countries. Both are "divided" countries—there are "two Germanies" as there are "two Chinas"—although the scale of division is unequal and indeed the implications are in different directions. The East Germans therefore look to their big Chinese brothers, who are much more skilled and much more successful than they in this business, for encouragement and aid. East Germany is also one of the most die-hard of the Soviet satellites, often appearing to harbour a Stalinist reluctance to go along with Khrushchev. In this division within the Communist world, China is the leader of the "ultras," and there is a strong tendency in East Germany to look towards China for leadership. Of course, Russia is too close to make this a very realistic policy, but there are clear signs of nostalgia. The East Germans have even shown some interest in the "communes" as a possible form of organisation for Germany, although for a country like Poland, or even for the Soviet Union, this is "leftist distortion" at its worst. At the same

[1] See M. J. Esslin: "Peking-Pankow Axis?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, July-September 1960, for an extremely illuminating analysis of East German-Chinese relations.

[2] According to a West German businessman who has been to China often, the Chinese are quick to learn. They bought a spinning and weaving plant from East Germany in 1954, but by 1955 they were already able to build one of their own.

[3] Peter Schmid, the Swiss journalist, reported, for example, that he met Harry Goldschmidt, an East Berlin musicologist, who was in China as a guest specialist "to reorganize China's musical life." *Cf.* "Report from Red China: The Sparrow's Fall," *The Reporter*, July 12, 1956.

time, curiously, the opposition within East Germany sometimes tries to use China as a support for its own views, just as the Poles did at one time. While the official Party leadership stresses the ultra-left policies coming from Peking, the opposition elements hopefully cite the Hundred Flowers and Mao's thesis on contradictions. Thus each side, albeit very delicately, hopes to use China to bolster its own position, the official leadership against the Russians, and the opposition against the official leadership.

The place for a "Germany" in China's heart is therefore largely pre-empted by the East. The Chinese are much more interested in the clear benefits of supporting East Germany—for her industrialisation programme, for the relative balance of the Communist and non-Communist world, and in intra-*bloc* ideological disputes—than in the dubious benefits of West German friendship.[4] Nor could the Chinese realistically expect to accomplish much at this time: there are no deep layers of support within West Germany that she can call upon, as she is able to do in so many other countries. The Communist movement is extremely weak organisationally and has little national support. Although neutralist tendencies are not absent and there are political differences that look promising enough—attitudes towards the American alliance, towards rearmament, towards reunification; conflict over the succession to Adenauer within the Christian Democratic Union—they so far do not present exceptionally favourably opportunities for cultivation.

It may very well be that it is only the businessmen whose interests lead them clearly in the direction of strongly improved relations. Not only is there a fear of complete exclusion from the China market, but there is already enough of a trade to whet the appetites of enterprising businessmen. West Germany inherited much of the trade Japan lost as a result of the Chinese severance of trade and cultural relations in May 1958.[5] This trade reached a high point in 1960 but has been going down since then, apparently—in the view of German businessmen—because of Chinese economic difficulties. Many German firms do a substantial business with China, and although none maintains representatives in China,[6] they operate from Hongkong and send representatives to the mainland frequently. As of late 1960 German ships were still regularly visiting Chinese ports. Business and trade associations are giving much attention to China. A trade agreement was finally concluded by a German

[4] According to Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, there were four delegations from Germany to China in 1955; in 1956 there were 11 from Germany and 2 to Germany (pp. 296–297, 359).

[5] Because of the "Nagasaki Incident" of May 2, 1958, when a Japanese draftsman pulled down the Communist Chinese flag at an exhibition in Nagasaki.

[6] That is, as of the time of writing. Some firms have had resident representation in China until fairly recently, but there do not seem to be any right now.

mission to China in 1957 after desultory negotiations that had been proceeding since 1953.[7] In the same year, in May, the East Asia Association and the Hanover Industrial Fair invited the Chinese delegates to the Fair for a discussion on trade between the two countries with about 300 leading industrialists, businessmen, economists, and journalists, including Alfred Kubel, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Fair, and R. Heyn, Chairman of the East Asia Association. At the meeting Ernst Lund, Committee Member of the East Asia Association, pledged to make efforts to abolish the embargo. The Chinese delegation was invited to visit other major West German cities after the Fair.

Scholarly Exchange

Germany has a long and distinguished tradition of Sinological research, perhaps not on the same scale as France's, but still one of the most important in the world. The centre for cultural relations with China was for a long time the Deutschland Institut in Peking, a cultural centre and gathering place for German scholars, students, visitors and business people. Founded in the early 1930s,[7a] it carried on a variegated programme, partly academic, partly social, partly propagandistic, and came to an end in 1945. A similar institution was the Deutsch-Chinesische Kultur Verband, in Nanking, which was perhaps somewhat more social in its activities. Branches of the China Institut of Frankfurt were scattered in various cities of China.

With the end of the war, most Germans in China were repatriated and all of these institutions came to their end. By 1948, the year before the Communist victory, most German journalists as well as other residents had made their departure. A small number, however, remained, for a variety of personal reasons. Prof. Wolfgang Francke, the distinguished Sinologist of Hamburg University, was one of these. Married to a Chinese woman, he was connected with a Chinese university in Chengtu, where he taught and edited a journal. Vincenz Hundhausen, famous translator of Chinese drama into German, was with the German Department of Peking University at the time of the takeover. For a time thereafter he worked for the Government's language school for diplomats in order to maintain himself; he then returned to Germany, where he died

[7] This agreement was negotiated by Wolf von Amerungen, Chairman of the Eastern Committee of the Association of German Industry (Ostausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft). The Chinese refused to sign a formal second agreement apparently because of Germany's non-recognition policy. Ernst von Carnap, of the same organisation, and D. E. Gross, a businessman, were also members of the 1957 mission. However, another leading German businessman, from Hamburg, has declared after a recent trip to China his complete disillusionment with the possibility of doing business there.

[7a] By Prof. Hellmut Wilhelm, now of the University of Washington. Later, Prof. Wilhelm was removed from leadership and the Nazis took it over.

in 1955. The poet Erich Wilberg, formerly a journalist, was caught in the fighting in Peking in 1949 and killed by accident. In addition, a few merchants and missionaries remained behind. The merchants who did not leave earlier were virtually all obliged to leave, at least for a while, by 1956, when most foreign concerns were taken over by the Government. The missionaries suffered diverse fates, some of them executed, some of them imprisoned, some of them permitted to remain but under the most onerous of conditions. By 1955, most of these too had left, voluntarily or expelled.[8]

In the past few years there has been a substantial revival of Chinese studies and of interest in China both in the universities and in institutes and associations. According to a recent report, courses on China are now being given in 11 West German universities and in two East German.[9] These same data yield a tally of 21 faculty members dealing with Chinese studies in West Germany (16 Germans, 5 Chinese), and 10 in East Germany (4 Germans, 6 Chinese). Research on contemporary China, particularly on economic and trade questions, is pursued vigorously at the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Institute of World Economy) associated with the University of Kiel. Some research also centres around the Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, of Hamburg,[10] the Institut für Asienkunde, of Hamburg, the Ostasien Verband, and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie.

An association of an entirely different kind is the Deutsche China Gesellschaft of Hamburg, an attempt at a German-China "friendship society" on the order of those found in other countries. The Chairman is Wolf Schenke, formerly the China correspondent of the Nazi newspaper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, and today editor of a small journal, *Neue Politik*. So far it has not shown much sign of life, nor has it attracted the galaxy of prominent names that its more successful counterparts in other countries are usually able to display.[11] Schenke himself, however, is very active. He writes and lectures a good deal, and he has made several trips to China.

From West Germany, no Sinologist has so far gone to Communist China. In 1958, four Sinologists were invited by the Chinese People's

8 See P. Joh. Fleckner, "Los von Rom," *Rheinischer Merkur*, March 25, 1960, for one missionary's account.

9 See "Wissenschaftliche Nachrichten," in the *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens/Hamburg*, 85/86, 1959, which catalogues courses as of the summer 1959. In West Germany, Chinese subjects are taught in: the Free University of Berlin, Bonn, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Freiburg, Göttingen, Hamburg, Köln, Marburg, Munich and Munster; in East Germany, in the Humboldt University of Berlin and in Leipzig.

10 Which publishes the scholarly journal, *Nachrichten*, mentioned in the preceding footnote. This journal deals not only with China, but with all of East Asia.

11 Although for a while the distinguished Socialist Carlo Schmidt, Vice-President of the Bundestag, and Herbert Müller (see next footnote) were members.

Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CPACRFC): Prof. Wolfgang Francke (Hamburg University), Prof. Peter Olbricht (Bonn University), Prof. Herbert Francke (Munich University), and Dr. Herbert Müller.[12] The invitation came through the Cultural Attaché of the Chinese Embassy in East Berlin. When arrangements were already far advanced, their passports already sent to the Chinese Embassy in East Berlin, the invitation was suddenly withdrawn with the explanation that because of internal reorganisation in the CPACRFC, it was regretfully impossible to effectuate the invitation at this time. So far, the invitation has not been renewed.

By contrast, East German Sinologists and scholars appear to be able to visit China, for longer or shorter periods, with fair ease. These arrangements are usually made through the respective academies of sciences in accordance with the annual executive plan that implements the basic cultural-relations agreement. East German scholars, whether Sinologists or otherwise, are often given considerable help and facilities for extended stays, to observe, lecture, do research, and even collaborate with Chinese colleagues. Prof. Siegfried Behrsing, of the Humboldt University, for example, was able to work with Prof. Fan Wen-lan, of the Historical Institute of the Chinese Academy of Science, when he was there the latter part of 1954 to the early part of 1955.[13]

If the pure university Sinologists have not yet been able to go to China, a few of the non-university China scholars have been. In 1957, Klaus Mehnert, Director of the Ost-Europa Gesellschaft of Stuttgart, an old China hand and student of both Russia and China, was permitted to visit the two countries.[14] Upon his return, he has written many articles on his observations and also on his political conclusions concerning relations between West Germany and Russia and China.[15] However, since his first trip, Mehnert has not been able to secure a visa to return.

Wolf Schenke, the Chairman of the Deutsche China Gesellschaft, has been to China several times, on extended tours. On his first trip, from August to October 1956, he entered by way of Rangoon and Kumming

12 A Sinologist who spent many years as a journalist in China.

13 See his "Po-Lin Min-Pao," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx Universität Leipzig*, 9 Jahrgang, 1959/60, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, Heft 4.

14 Mehnert was born in Russia, and he lived in China for many years. During the war he edited an English-language journal, *Twentieth Century*, in China. Since he is Director of the Ost-Europa Gesellschaft, which is concerned with developments in the Communist world, and therefore can be considered "hostile" by the Communists, his permission to visit China seems particularly significant. He is the author of the extremely influential and best-selling *Moskau, Asien und Wir*, published in 1956, before he went to China. He has recently been appointed Professor at Aachen University.

15 See especially his article in *Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart, July 26, 1956).

together with the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) Member of Parliament Schwann,[16] and travelled widely. On another trip, January to March 1958, he entered via Russia, and travelled about the country accompanied by an official of the CPACRFC.

A few non-China specialists have also been able to visit China. In the same year the University Sinologists saw their invitation revoked, 1958, two members of the Institut für Weltwirtschaft, connected with the University of Kiel, were able to spend some time in China. Dr. Max Biehl made a five-month trip to India, Japan, and China from February to June 1958, in the course of which he was able to travel widely through nine provinces in China. He has since returned to write a number of articles, particularly on agricultural production.[17] Prof. Hugo Heekt, of the same Institute, who is mainly interested in communications, was in China in November and December of 1958. While in China, he and his group received materials about economic plans and communications: shipping, both inland and ocean-going; railroads; the building of canals; the training of men; the wharves in Shanghai and Dairen. They were, however, less successful in getting in touch with economists, either through the universities or through the Academia Sinica.

In 1955, Dr. Heus Krup,[17a] a nuclear physicist of the Johannes Gutenberg University, spent some time in China lecturing to Chinese scientists and research personnel. The anthropologist, Prof. Karl Saller, of Munich University, visited China in 1957. And in 1960, two professors of Marburg University made visits. In May, Prof. Herrfarth, a specialist on government, who had written a book on Sun Yat-sen in the 1930s, received a transit visa which permitted him to go through China from Hongkong en route to the Soviet Union. Prof. Herrfarth had hoped, in view of his earlier work on Sun Yat-sen, to be able to meet Mme. Sun, but this appears to have been impossible. The historian of religion, Prof. Ernst Benz, also spent some time looking into the position of religion. His conclusion was that religion was doing well and that, in fact, a genuine revival of true religion and true freedom of religion was taking place.[18]

However, there have been a number of refusals of visas (or more accurately, no response to visa applications) which suggest a disinclination to allow people who know too much about China. Apart from the

[16] Schwann was a neutralist member of the FDP and for a while the Deputy-Director of Schenke's Deutsche China Gesellschaft. Upon his return from China he opened a parliamentary debate on the sending of a trade mission to China, but without success. He resigned from the Bundestag in 1957.

[17] See, for example, his article on the people's communes in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Bonn), January 21, 1959.

[17a] This spelling, given in Chinese sources, cannot be confirmed. Nor can the name be found in the current faculty list of the university.

[18] See his article on the revival of Buddhism in the *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1960. Benz is well known as the author of an extremely important work on the church in Eastern Europe.

case of Mehnert, already mentioned (not to speak of the cancellation of the invitation to the Sinologists), Otto Schiller, an expert on Asian agricultural problems, and former professor of rural sociology at Stuttgart University, applied for a visa and was refused; he too had been to China before. In 1960, Walter Exner, a specialist in Oriental art, wanted to go to China to arrange for bringing the Tun-huang Exhibition to Germany. When it was learned that he spoke Chinese and had been to China several times in the past, he was turned down.

German and Chinese scholars have occasionally been able to meet in international conferences. In 1955 (Leiden) and 1956 (Paris), Chinese scholars took part in Junior Sinologues' conferences also attended by German scholars. In July 1957, three Chinese philosophers took part in the International Conference of Philosophers in Warsaw,[19] where there were also delegates from Germany. However, when it comes to meetings specifically dealing with Chinese subjects, or even closely related Oriental subjects, the Chinese are much more touchy, as was evident in the forced cancellation of the Junior Sinologues' Conference, scheduled for the summer of 1960 in Moscow, and the Chinese refusal to take part in the XXVth International Conference of Orientalists in Moscow. Although they appeared at the 1955 and 1956 Junior Sinologues' Conferences, they have not done so since; nor did they attend the XXIVth International Congress of Orientalists in Munich, 1957. According to a UNESCO report, in the academic year 1957–58, there were 22 students from Mainland China in West German higher educational institutions.[20]

Intellectuals

East German visitors to China come from the main channels of East German life. Leading writers, politicians, artists, trade unionists, technicians, scientists, symphony orchestras go in constant procession. As Esslin even suggests: "In practical terms the Chinese ally is little more than a provider of much sought after chances for politicians, artists, and journalists, those species that are always encountered in delegations, to vary the monotony of East European capitals and collective farms with an occasional heady draught of exotic landscapes and Chinese cooking."[21]

19 From July 17–20. The Conference was called by the Institute of Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Philosophical Society on behalf of UNESCO's International Institute of Philosophy. The Chinese delegates were: Fan Tsu-nien, Chin Yueh-lin, and Feng Yu-lan. American delegates also attended. (Feng Yu-lan delivered an address on Continuity in Chinese Thought, at the Entretiens de Genève in 1956.)

20 UNESCO, *op. cit.* 76 from Taiwan were also listed. But it is not clear from this table whether they were "resident students" or only "visitors," perhaps even with student delegations. Nor were any of my German correspondents able to throw any light on this matter. All of them considered the figure mysterious and reported themselves unaware of any Mainland Chinese students in Germany.

21 Esslin, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

But this is not the case with West Germany. So far there has not been the outpouring of leading figures in the arts, sciences, and politics that we find from other countries. A small number in these categories have, indeed, gone to visit China, but they are normally quite unimportant people, far from the mainstream of influence in German life. Therefore, although we do read in the Chinese press reports of occasional visits of German artists, architects, writers, and intellectuals, they are so little known that their names hardly linger in the memory. In 1955, for example the writer Paul Distel Barth,[22] and his son, Frank Distel Barth, a journalist, visited China for a short while. Again in 1956, Günther Weissborn,[23] a literary and dramatic critic, spent some time in China and gained favourable impressions. Apart from Schwann, no German political figure or Member of the Bundestag has gone to China.[24]

Of the delegation and peace-activity types, there have been some cases, although in smaller numbers than from other countries, less regular, and less influential. The " Peace Angel of Helsinki," Barbara Pleyer, went to China in 1955, where she was widely acclaimed. West Germans have been included in occasional delegations organised by East Germans. In September 1955, for example, a 17-member All-German Youth Delegation visited China, composed of 10 East Germans and seven West Germans. A similar women's delegation went in the same month, with eight East and six West Germans. Similarly, in the guest lists at most important national functions, such as May Day and National Day, we read of West German visitors. In August 1960, German " Peace champions," Walter Diehl, member of the World Peace Council, and Kurt Dewersdorff, member of the Executive Board of the Action Committee Against Atomic Rearmament of West Germany, visited China at the invitation of the China Peace Committee on their return from the Sixth World Conference for Prohibiting Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and for Disarmament in Tokyo. They were feted along with Australians and Japanese delegates, in a reception by Liu Ning-yi and Burhan Shahidi on August 29.

The level of journalists has been in general much higher, and some leading German journalists have managed to go. Among them we may note Klaus Mehnert, who is partly a journalist, and Wolf Schenke, Chairman of the Deutsche-China Gesellschaft and editor of *Neue Politik*. Josef Kempski, a leading correspondent of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich,

[22] An elderly writer formerly devoted to the furtherance of Franco-German relations, now turned, since he has become rather leftist, to the promotion of relations with Communist China. He has written a very favourable book on China.

[23] Also considered " leftist."

[24] Emil Kemmer, Chairman of the Youth Committee of the Bundestag, was invited in early 1960 but declined to go. He felt that he would be lending himself to propaganda purposes by going at that particular time.

also visited China about 1955,[25] as did Mathias.[26] In 1958, Rolf Poppe, then of *Die Welt*,[27] visited China, even obtaining an important interview with Ch'en Yi on May 12. From March to May of the same year, Dr. Heinrich Bechtoldt, publisher and editor of the journal *Aussenpolitik*, and correspondent for the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, was in China, making observations and interviewing people.[28] He was on the whole quite successful in looking into the things that interested him, although he was not always able to see exactly the persons he was looking for. And in November of that year, shortly after the people's communes started, a two-man roving team from the illustrated *Der Stern* went for several weeks.

The German press is also well served by German-language correspondents from other countries, mainly Switzerland and Austria, who have easier access to China.[29] Lily Abegg, for example, the East Asia correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, visited China in 1956 and has written many articles and a book about it.[30] Since Dr. Abegg had a long experience of China before the war, her observations were particularly valuable. Peter Schmid, a distinguished Swiss journalist who has a wide audience even outside the German-language press, visited China in 1955 also, and has written many articles and a book.[31] The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has had several correspondents in China, including Walter Bosshardt (in 1956) and most recently Steck. In 1958, the Swiss photographer-journalist, Martin Hurlimann, visited China in the course of an 11-week tour of Asia, which has also contributed to the German press coverage of China.[32]

3. *A Communist Example: Poland*

Introductory

Poland's relations with China are governed by two fundamental considerations: first, that Poland is part of the Soviet *bloc*; and second, that it is the Peck's Bad Boy of the *bloc*. Like the other people's democracies,

25 Kempski is the man whose interview with Gen. Salan brought about disciplinary action against the General by President de Gaulle.

26 Journalist and writer, the author of a book extremely hostile to the United States and favourable to China.

27 Now with *Der Spiegel*.

28 See his series of 12 articles in the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*.

29 An illustration of the better relations is the case of the Austrian student, Frederick Bischoff, son of the former Austrian Ambassador to Moscow, who was permitted to spend two years studying at Peking University and even living with Chinese students. He was there during the "hundred flowers" period and its aftermath. He was also able to spend several months in Outer Mongolia. He is currently working on his doctorate in Mongol studies with Prof. Heissig at Bonn University.

30 See her *Im neuen China* (Zurich: 1957).

31 See his "Report from Red China," *The Reporter* (US), in two parts, July 12 and July 19, 1960.

32 *Journey Through the Orient* (Introduction by Satcheverell Sitwell) (New York: The Viking Press, 1960).

Poland maintains a full panoply of relations with China on all levels: diplomatic, party, trade, and cultural. Every year the two countries sign trade, aid,[1] cultural, scientific and technical agreements that establish targets for the year. On all important international occasions, such as May Day, delegations are exchanged. Polish delegations—from the Communist Party, the trade unions, and cultural circles—visit China on China's National Day; and in return, delegations come to Poland for important national events there.[2] Representatives of the two countries meet in international Communist conferences, and they also send observers to each other's national Communist Party Congresses. Both take part in meetings of international organisations that are Communist-dominated, such as the World Peace Council, Women's International Democratic Federation, World Federation of Trade Unions, International Union of Students, World Federation of Democratic Youth, World Federation of Scientific Workers, both in their respective countries and in other countries.[3] Individual Polish musicians[4] and ensembles perform in China,[5] and in return Chinese artistes perform in Poland.[6] Exhibitions are exchanged.[7] Writers,[8] journalists,[9] artists,[10] film people,[11] and athletes[12]

1 In April 1957, for example, full-scale construction began, with Poland's help, on China's largest sugar refinery. (This was the third refinery Poland helped China build.) In September 1959, a Polish coal mining delegation took part in the opening ceremonies of the Chuchow coal dressing plant in central China, which had been built with Polish help.

2 The Chinese even send Military Goodwill Missions on the anniversaries of the liberation of Warsaw.

3 As, for example, a delegation of 20 Chinese scientists that attended the 6th Congress of the World Federation of Scientific Workers in Warsaw, September 24–28, 1959; two Chinese officials to the Architects Conference in Warsaw, April 1953. Polish delegates are almost always present at international conferences in Peking.

4 Some musicians who have been to China (not elsewhere mentioned in this chapter) are: the composer Andrzej Panufnik (who has since gone into exile and now lives in New York); composer and critic Zygmunt Mycielski; pianist Czerny-Stefanska.

5 As, for example, the Polish Army Song and Dance Ensemble, which toured China in September and October 1955 and the dance ensemble "Mazowsce" which went later.

6 The Szechwan Opera Troupe, of 63 members, for example, gave its first performance outside of China in Poland in August 1959. And for the 1955 World Festival of Youth, the Chinese sent a 370-member art ensemble, "the largest ever sent abroad."

7 Such as the exhibition of reproductions of the Tun-huang murals in January 1957 in Warsaw; or the Exhibition of Polish Architecture in September and October 1955, for which occasion a 12-member architects delegation, led by Eugeniusz Wierzbicki, went to China. In 1960 alone, we find mention of an Exhibition of Polish Photographic Art (August, Peking); a Polish Building Exhibition in photographs and an Economic Exhibition (both in September and October).

8 In November 1959, for example, a three-member Polish writers' delegation, led by Stanislaw Wygodzki, arrived in China "in accordance with the 1959 executive plan of the Sino-Polish Cultural Co-operation Agreement." Other examples of literary exchange are the participation of Prof. Kazimierz Budzyk, historian of literature at Warsaw University, in the Adam Mickiewicz Commemoration in Peking in 1955, and of writer Olgierd Wojtasiewicz in the ceremonies of the 20th anniversary of the death of Lu Hsun in October 1956. Jerzy Jurandot, a Vice-Chairman of the Polish Writers' Union, visited China in May and June 1960, and Jerzy Putrament, another Vice-Chairman of the Union, visited China with his wife in September and

For footnotes 9–12 see next page.

visit back and forth. Apart from "tourists,"[13] students, researchers, engineers, and scientists of all categories are exchanged in accordance with the protocols of the annual cultural and scientific agreements. There is a Chinese Club and a Polish-Chinese Friendship Association in Warsaw, which sponsors films and lectures on various aspects of modern Chinese culture and society and publishes an illustrated review, *Chiny*. Chinese writers meet Polish writers in formal conclave, in China or Poland or in the Soviet Union; the two countries participate together in all the joint cultural undertakings of the *bloc*, as, for example, the establishment of an institute for nuclear research.[14]

However, the political problems have not been as simple as in the case of the other people's democracies.[15] Ever since the "Polish October," the events leading to the restoration of Gomulka and the liberalisation of the régime, Poland has been second only to Yugoslavia as a problem child. It has been clear that the Poles were restive under Russian domination and that they were much closer to the West, culturally and ideologically, than to the East. These developments were, of course, profoundly affected by the Hungarian Revolution. For the "hard" Communists, this was a clear demonstration that liberalisation carried too far could only lead to a "bourgeois restoration"; for the "liberals," it was a clear indication that

October 1960. Other writers who have visited China include: the well-known poet Adam Wazyk, in 1952; Witold Zaleski, in 1958; Tadeusz Rozewicz, in 1958; Jerzy Zukrowski, member of the "progressive" Catholic organisation, PAX; Jerzy Pomianowski.

9 A Chinese journalists' delegation, for example, had spent a month in China, summer 1960, just before the arrival of a Chinese Cultural Delegation in August, led by Shen Yen-ping, Minister of Culture and Chairman of the Sino-Polish Friendship Association. Jan Halpern was the Polish representative to the International Organisation of Journalists, which held its executive meeting in Peking in April 1957. These are, of course, apart from regular correspondents and agency and newspaper representatives.

10 Some artists who have visited China are: Aleksander Kobdziej; Kulisiewicz; Eryk Lipinski, caricaturist of the humour weekly, *Szpilki*; Jan Cybis; Winnicki-Radziewicz.

11 for example, a five-member film delegation, led by Jerzy Kawalerowicz, went to China in November 1960.

12 The Chinese contingent to the 1955 World Festival of Youth in Warsaw included 155 athletes, the largest such group ever sent abroad. In August of the same year, a six-member Chinese delegation attended the International Motorcycle Races in Poland at the invitation of Polish organisations. In March 1957, a 17-member Chinese ice-hockey team visited Poland after touring the Soviet Union. And in July 1957, two Chinese tennis players took part in the international tournament in Poland. From Poland also there has been a variety of athletic groups, as for example, a women's basketball team in January 1957; men's and women's gymnastic teams, which were very successful in provincial performances throughout China in 1959; and the recent 18-member Polish football team.

13 Poles were among the first batch of foreign students to visit Communist China as "tourists," in April 1957. And for 1960's National Day celebrations, there was another group of tourists.

14 Decided in a conference in Moscow, March 2–26, 1954, by representatives from the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, and Rumania.

15 See the very revealing article by Leopold Labedz, "Poland: The Small Leap Sideways," *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, July–September 1960.

they could not go beyond certain limits in the face of Soviet military power and her unmistakable determination to use it.

In these complicated developments, China played a peculiar role. In the earlier phases of the liberalisation movement, symbolised by the slogan of "different paths to socialism," or "national communism," the Chinese adopted a sympathetic attitude. Were they not the outstanding example of the independent road? Was not Maoism itself a fresh rethinking of Marxism-Leninism and a creative application of it to special national conditions? Therefore, for a while, whether mistakenly or not, many Polish liberals felt that the Chinese were supporting them in their struggle with the Soviet Union. A "wave of Sinophilia" spread through the country, and there was even a "Club of the Hundred Flowers" in Warsaw. However, once the Hungarian Revolution broke out, China opted for absolute unity of the *bloc*. She shifted her weight to a decisive campaign to win wavering elements in Eastern Europe. This was the first time that the Chinese had entered on ground traditionally regarded as the preserve of the Russian Party. In January of 1957, Chou En-lai led a Chinese Government delegation to Warsaw to discuss the Polish and Hungarian developments.[16] We do not know the details of the complex negotiations, but the two sides were able to agree upon a formulation in a joint statement issued on January 16, 1957, from Warsaw.

However it is indicative of the uneasy relations between the two countries that the delegation of the Chinese National People's Congress and the Peking People's Council, which was touring Europe at the same time, conspicuously neglected to visit Poland. After then it was only with great reluctance that the Poles gave up the hope of a more liberal China. For a long time the Poles persevered in reading Chinese developments and statements optimistically, "... internal developments in China ... continued to provide them with the ideological ammunition against the pressure of the Soviet orthodoxy. ... The literary magazines began to pick up Chinese texts and pronouncements which could be presented as legitimising their own aspirations for political or ideological relaxation, sometimes pointedly contrasting them with the orthodox Soviet attitude."[17] As late as May 1957, Gomulka, at the Ninth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party was still appealing to Mao's thesis on "non-antagonistic" contradictions in a socialist society. But with the Declaration of the 12 Communist Parties in Moscow, November 1957, it became clear to the Poles that the Chinese were so far from supporters of "revisionism" that they were in fact its strongest opponents. Later it

[16] To make this trip, Chou En-lai interrupted his visit to India, part of a swing through South Asia, and went to Moscow, East Germany, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

[17] Labedz, *ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

was increasingly the "Stalinist elements" who quoted the Chinese experience and looked to China for ideological support in internal Party struggles.

Since 1961 the Sino-Soviet conflict has been nowhere observed with greater fascination than in Poland. The Poles have thrown their support to Khrushchev, but whatever their private feelings and hopes, they have carefully abstained from offending Mao and have maintained a studied tone of diplomatic propriety. This led to the curiously inhibited character of *Chiny*. In the several years of its existence there has never been so much as a hint of Sino-Soviet differences, and the magazine devotes incomparably more space to historical *chinoiserie* than to the current politics of the new China.

It is therefore not surprising to find that many Poles tend to look upon China with much the same differentiated attitudes as would be found in a Western country. The description I received from a leading Polish writer of a meeting of Chinese and Polish writers in Moscow in 1957 struck the same note of fascinated horror that one would get from a representative group of Western writers. ("Our group," the Chinese leader reported, "has completed its assigned quota of 472 poems, which means 8,028 lines of poetry. And what has your group achieved, comrade?")[18] The scale of individual cultural exchange, as against official and group visits, is below that which Poland has with a Western country like France.

For a number of years now, Poland has had a formal agreement on cultural exchange with China. A general agreement is first negotiated at the central government level, and then the details are worked out by the corresponding functional groups, such as the Academies of Sciences, the Ministries of Higher Education and of Culture and Arts, the writers' unions, the unions of journalists, etc. The basic agreement, which calls

[18] See Labedz' similar observations: "Not only journalists and occasional scholars visiting China but even the high officials of the régime were returning from Peking horrified by the super-Stalinist atmosphere reigning there. In private conversations some of them would shed the official mask and convey their unofficial feelings about what one of them referred to as 'the great leap forward to 1984.' A journalist's remark was characteristic: 'When I stopped in Moscow on my way home from Peking to Warsaw I felt like coming to Europe.' . . . An author wrote in a literary monthly, *Tworczosc* (No. 3, 1960): 'Even before my departure I had read that the workers and peasants in the Hopei province wrote four million poems on the occasion and "in the framework" of the Great Leap. . . . This "leap" refers to poetry too, and as in its other attainments it reaches here astronomical figures. One hundred thousand poets!' The editor of the semi-official *Polityka* can be even more outspokenly critical. In one instalment of his 'Chinese Diary' (July 2, 1960) he reported pointed questions which he put to his hosts about the disregard of the authority and competence of the university professors and about the attacks on one literary critic who, having expressed some uneasiness about the 'poems written by the masses,' was told that 'talent is a bourgeois concept'" (*ibid.*, pp. 100-101). Two accounts of their travels by Polish visitors have recently been published in book form: Jerzy Putrament, *Chinszczyzna* (Warsaw: 1961) and Leon Zieleniec, *Chiny czyli Wyscig z Czasem* (Warsaw: 1961).

for an exchange of educators, students, journalists, performers, and cultural delegations is renegotiated frequently, in some cases every year. Therefore since the Communist takeover in China, not a year has passed without some cultural exchange between the two countries.

Sinologists

Within the Communist *bloc*, the two principal centres of Sinological research are the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.[19] Poland falls far behind these. In fact there is only one chair of Sinology in Poland, in the Oriental Institute of the University of Warsaw. This chair was held by Prof. Witold Jablonski until his death in Peking in the summer of 1957, and now by Prof. Janusz Chmielewski.[20] The Oriental Institute is part of the Department of Philology, so that Polish Sinology has a strong philological and literary flavour. The centre is a small one, usually having no more than 20 students at any given time. The Polish Academy of Sciences has within it an Oriental Institute whose main work since 1958 has been the compilation of a Sino-Polish dictionary.[21] Therefore, there have not been many people to go to China, and certainly not at a senior level. However, during the last few years, most of the persons who can be considered Sinologists have been to China.

The most important of these are Prof. Chmielewski and his two "*asystenci*," Ph.D. candidates whose status roughly corresponds to that of an American research or teaching associate. Each of them stayed between four and five months. Prof. Chmielewski, whose objective was general orientation and the establishment of scholarly contacts, travelled quite extensively. One of his research assistants spent several months in China trying to gather materials for his Ph.D. thesis, and the other, a woman Sinologist, visited China in spring 1960 under the aegis of the Polish Academy of Sciences in connection with the current work on a Polish-Chinese dictionary. Several junior scholars, in linguistics, geography, and sociology or ethnology, have been able to make rather short visits and to travel a bit and familiarise themselves with their fields.

Only one Chinese Sinologist has been to Poland, Prof. Ho Chia-kuai, who spent about two months lecturing on modern Chinese literature.

Non-Sinologists

A small but steady academic exchange is maintained between the two countries. Its scope can be seen from the example of the year 1958.[22] In October 1957, the Polish and the Chinese Academies of Science signed

19 It is reported that Prague has been designated as the *bloc* centre for Sinological studies.
20 Also concurrently Professor of General Linguistics at the University of Lodz.
21 Officially announced as a venture of the Institute in April 1958.
22 See *Nauka Polska* (*Polish Scholarship*), journal of the Polish Academy of Sciences, for 1959.

an agreement on the exchange of academic personnel and research data. This agreement was then implemented in a detailed statement signed by both parties in Peking on December 30, 1957, calling for mutual visits of scholars for the purpose of lecturing, research, and technical assistance and counselling.[23] In accordance with this agreement for the year 1958 it was decided to make the following exchanges: Prof. Lukasiewicz, the distinguished mathematical logician, to spend four or five months lecturing on the theory of probability; an authority on typology to lecture in China for one-and-a-half months; a mathematician to tour various academic establishments and lecture on functional analysis for three months; two authorities on the theory of elasticity and electro-acoustics to spend one month; two faculty members to acquaint themselves with the Institute of Pedology in Nanking, the School of Forestry and Pedology in Shenyang, and the North-western Institute of Agro-Biology in Wiking; and one linguist to lecture on general linguistics for one-and-a-half months. Under this agreement there were also visits by S. A. Pienawski,[24] apple expert, and scientists Boleslaw Swietochowski and Stanislaw Kowalinski. The non-scientific cultural agreements for 1958 brought poet Tadeusz Rozewicz; writer Witold Zaleski; two representatives of the Warsaw Academy of Sciences, Profs. Stefan Nach-Zemodorski [25] and Leon Michalis; and a five-member delegation of the Poland-China Friendship Association led by Juliusz Burgin. In return, from the Chinese side, the following scholars were to come: Prof. Ho Chia-kuai to lecture on modern Chinese literature for two months; one or two botanists to spend two months doing research; one zoologist for two months; and one micro-biologist for two months.

The joint statement signed in December 1957 further stipulated that the Polish Academy of Sciences would furnish to its Chinese counterpart information on: dialectical and mathematical logic; the production of pure zinc; and some problems in metallurgy and electronics.

These Sino-Polish scientific and technological co-operation agreements first started in 1954, when a conference was held in Warsaw. Under the 1955 agreement, there were visits by Dr. Blazej Lega, expert on coal chemistry, who spent a few months in China lecturing on the classification and chemical processes of coal; Prof. R. Bakst, pianist, who lectured in the North-east Conservatory of Music; Prof. Wyrobinski, civil engineer, and a Vice-President of the Polish Academy of Sciences, who advised the

[23] Prof. Kolozinkowski, Vice-President of the Polish Academy of Sciences, led the delegation that signed the agreement.

[24] "My Trip to China," *Postepy Nauki Rolniczej* (*Progress of Agricultural Science*), Warsaw. The spelling is given as "Pienascze" in Josué de Castro in *Economie et Politique*, Nos. 66-67, Jan.-Feb., 1960.

[25] This romanisation may be somewhat incorrect, since it is transcribed from the Chinese rendering.

Civil Engineering Institute of the Academia Sinica on its future plans and development; Prof. Kuratowski, mathematician, who visited the Mathematics Research Institute of the Academia Sinica; historian Prof. Rozinski; novelist Jerzy Zukrowski, a member of the Catholic PAX organisation; and journalist Stanislaw Malkowski.

The various agreements for 1960 brought Academician Witold Stefanski, parasitologist and Director of Biology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (accompanied by his wife), to spend a month visiting several Chinese cities; immediately after his departure a seven-member delegation of the Chinese chemical industry, led by Peng Tuo, Minister of the Chemical Industry, went to Poland. Other visitors included a journalists' delegation, led by Rakowski; Jerzy Putrament, Vice-Chairman of the Polish Writers' Union, and his wife; Jerzy Jurandot, another Vice-Chairman of the Polish Writers' Union; Jerzy Wladyslaw Jasienski, drama theorist and Director of the Central Bureau of the Ministry of Culture and Arts; the painter Winnicki-Radewicz, who arranged a graphic arts exhibition; an architects' delegation, led by Wojciech Piotrowski, to take part in a Polish Architectural Exhibition; Zofia Lissa, musical theorist; and Stanislaw Bebenek and Jozef Gruder, of the Polish Publishers' Association. Then in September, a six-member delegation of the Polish Academy of Sciences, led by its President, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, went to China to work out co-operation between the two academies "in accordance with the 1961 Executive Plan for Scientific Co-operation." And in October, the Deputy Minister for Heavy Industry led a team of Polish experts to plan more comprehensive co-operation; a protocol for 1961 was issued on November 1. There is a steady stream of groups of this kind, all of them including scientists in their memberships: a delegation from the Polish Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, led by the Minister, in April 1951; a five-member delegation of the Small Production Committee of the Polish Council of Ministers in November of 1959. Some scientists also visit China along with non-academic missions of one kind or another. The distinguished physicist, Leopold Infeld, for example, went in September and October of 1955, along with his wife, as a member of the World Peace Council, then meeting in Peking.[26] From the Chinese side, delegates invariably attend all important scientific and academic functions in Warsaw, such as the Architects' Conference in 1953, or the International Conference of Philosophers in July 1957,[27] or the World Federation of Scientific Workers in September 1959.

[26] His fellow guests on this occasion were Pietro Nenni, D. N. Pritt, and Mme. Isabelle Blume (of Belgium).

[27] Three Chinese philosophers, including the prominent Feng Yu-lan, attended, even though the conference was called on behalf of a UNESCO organism, the International Institute of Philosophy.

Students

Student exchange between the two countries takes place on the basis of agreements between the respective Ministries of Higher Education and, in the case of students interested in the fine arts, the Ministries of Culture and Arts. Beginning in 1950, eligible Polish high school graduates (the criteria of eligibility have never been clearly spelled out) were encouraged to go to China for an extended period of study, five to seven years. In 1951 and 1952, only a few students went on this programme. Then from 1953 through 1956, the number was stepped up to between eight and 12 per year. Most of these were high school graduates who were considered, I am given to understand, politically more reliable than the mature, advanced students of the Oriental Institute of the University of Warsaw. Most of these early undergraduate students went for a complete university education in China: a year or two of language study at Peking University followed by a regular curriculum in the humanities at Peking University, or in artistic, commercial, diplomatic, or agricultural studies at other appropriate institutions.

So far, a total of about 20 students have actually availed themselves of these opportunities. Some of them have since returned to Poland. But apparently the difficulties they have reported, notably in adjustment and in relative isolation from the host society, have not served to stimulate a larger flow of applicants. Since 1957, the practice of sending "freshmen" has been discontinued. The Ministry of Higher Education now only ratifies candidates designated by the University, with a resultant decline of the flow to one or two advanced students per year. These latter usually spend a year or two primarily on language study. The scholarships—somewhat higher for "aspirants" (post-graduates) than for students—are provided by the Polish Government.

These advanced students have reported political and security restrictions on the kind of research and study they have been able to carry on in China. There have been no particular difficulties about ordinary humanities, except possibly in philosophy and political science, but certain subjects seem difficult. The Polish experience also seems to confirm what we have seen in the case of England and of other countries, namely that since the end of 1957 or the beginning of 1958 the situation has tightened up considerably. Altogether, then, there would appear to have been about 35 to 40 Polish students who have studied in China between 1951 and 1960, about double the number from India. Since then there may even have been a further decline in the rate of student exchange.

But in spite of the principle of parity in exchange always insisted upon among Communist countries, there seem to have been more Chinese students in Poland than Polish students in China. In 1953, for example,

we read of more than 100 Chinese students studying in Poland.[28] The bulk of the Chinese students go to Polish academic centres to study medicine or technology, although at least one Chinese is reported to have studied Polish language and literature at the University of Warsaw. The Poles feel that a number of the Chinese accepted by various polytechnic institutes were not fully prepared for their programme of study. Not infrequently, the Chinese candidates for advanced degrees in technology, who expected to complete their studies within a relatively short period of time, had to extend their stay in order to fill in their academic gaps. As is reported of Chinese students in Russia, those in Poland also seem to keep fairly aloof from their hosts and to confine their social activities to their own group. It is reported that the Chinese students carefully avoid the Chinese Club in Warsaw,[29] a modern and somewhat arty-looking café, where Polish intellectuals, both young and middle-aged, gather in the evenings to drink coffee and dance to the strains of unmistakably Western music.

At a more senior level, the exchanges are regulated by the Academies of Sciences. In accordane with the agreement, discussed earlier, for the year 1958, for example, one Polish student in soil mechanics was to go to China, while five Chinese students were to come to Poland: one in soil dynamics and four in technology.

[28] On September 15, 1958, during the Formosa Straits crisis, they held a meeting protesting against American "aggression."

[29] Established during the summer of 1960 by the Polish-Chinese Friendship Association. It has a library and a cinema, and it organises lectures, exhibitions, and *soirées*.

1. Research

WHAT are the prospects of serious scholarly work being done by foreigners in Communist China today? What have scholars been able to see, and what have they not been able to see? What have they been able to do, and what have they not been able to do? In this chapter we shall consider the principles that seem to govern these different possibilities. Later on we shall look into the questions of what we can reasonably expect, or hope for, from the opening up of scholarly relations with China, and of what we can do, or how we can act, so as to maximise the favourable prospects and reduce the unfavourable.

The first thing to notice is that scholarly research in the narrow sense, that is, as an extended period of stay devoted to study and inquiry, with free access to materials, to scholars, to ordinary people, and to locales, is extremely rare. At this stage in their development the Chinese are interested in cultural relations primarily from the standpoint of their immediate, or fairly short-term, political effects. Nor should this be strange: not even in the Soviet Union, with which we have a much longer history of cultural relations, and which may be presumed to have reached a higher level of stability and self-confidence and to have gone well beyond its Stalinist and Zhdanovist phase, would the free scholarship to which we are accustomed be possible.[1] There are no anthropologists doing "participant-observation" of the life of a collective farm or of some national minority in Central Asia, no sociologist or social-psychologist studying attitudes or public opinion by direct methods, no historian who has free access to the archives of the Great Purge of the late 1930s. Our exchange students find themselves sharply limited in what they are able to work on. The general Communist disposition is to consider direct study in a foreign country as almost indistinguishable from spying. It therefore becomes possible only under exceptional conditions.

The Chinese are even less enthusiastic about knowledgeable foreigners studying their country, and certainly do not want them to do so in an intimate and independent way. They have no objection to writers who command an important audience in their home countries using official materials to present the official point of view. They will even encourage this and provide considerable help, as in the case of the three French

1 See Barghoorn's very perceptive observations on this point in his *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*, *op. cit.*

Communist economists,[2] or even some of the Indian scholars whose conclusions, while perhaps less predictable, will certainly be on the politically beneficial side. The publications that result will carry the persuasive aura of authority that comes from having been to China and "seen with their own eyes," and to the extent that they are able to pre-empt the publication media, they will be able to establish the general climate of opinion. But what they do not want is people who have an independent basis of judgment—people who know China well, who speak Chinese, and who may have independent and "unsafe" contacts. I would also suspect in this a strong nationalist undercurrent: foreigners are not really capable of understanding us; the field of Sinology belongs to the Chinese. Probably this has had something to do with their refusal to participate in recent international conferences on Far Eastern problems.

If you are working on a problem that is remote from current ideological preoccupations, and if the probability is extremely high that what you produce will be favourable to the régime and bring credit to it, then you are likely to be able to do your research in China freely and with maximum co-operation from the authorities. If, on the other hand, to take the opposite extreme, you are known to be strongly anti-Communist and are working on the Communist régime itself, your chances of doing so are virtually *nil*. The problem, of course, almost always lies between these two extremes. Most scholars are neither fully committed supporters nor opponents. The question is what possibilities present themselves in the intermediate cases.

Quite obviously, the closer one approaches the first extreme, the easier it will be; the closer one approaches the second extreme, the more difficult it will be. And yet the Chinese are capable of such flexibility that it is not entirely inconceivable that under certain circumstances a hostile scholar could do research there. One can well imagine that for the sake of demonstrating good will to America, or as a show of self-confidence, or to disprove the charge that scholarship is not free, the Chinese might very well make the gesture of permitting such a scholar to do research. The likelihood of this is not very great, but given their extraordinary tactical flexibility, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. The Chinese might even hope to moderate some of his opposition, on the view that even the slightest modification or concession from such a man would be a greater triumph than the unrelieved adulation of a fellow-traveller.

Several considerations immediately present themselves for speculation. One is that the degree of success in gaining admittance to China for scholarly work or for serious observation has some relation to Chinese

[2] Lavallée, Noirot, and Dominique, *op. cit.*

internal politics, the international situation, and China's relations with particular countries. The two years that culminated in the "hundred flowers" policy of early spring 1957 were a period of relative relaxation, both internally and externally. Many scholars, able observers, and even people who knew China well were able to go to China in this period, and often even to carry on fairly serious observation. Five of the six English scholars who applied for visas in this period were granted them, and several were able to carry on real scholarly work. The Frenchman Dumont, the New Zealander Geddes, the Indian Raghu Vira, and several others were permitted their excursions off the beaten path. China specialists, such as Lily Abegg, Robert Guillain, Klaus Mehnert, C. P. Fitzgerald, Harry Simon and Piet van der Loon, secured their visas. A European scholar who had been to China in both 1955 and 1957 described to me the remarkable change of atmosphere. "In 1957," he said, "normalisation was in the air. It was still not possible to see Chinese freely and privately, but one could see them. They might not easily come for a private tea to the hotel, but they would appear at foreign diplomatic receptions. I was unable in the end to make contact with *X*, but he did call me several times to apologise for being unable to keep his appointments. In 1955 there was not even that much contact. When our Embassy gave a reception for me, most of the people invited made an appearance. You could even joke with some Chinese then, if in a heavy-handed way. And it was even possible to do some travelling without guides. Of course, your itinerary had to be approved, but this was fairly easy." The feeling that things were "opening up" was widespread.

But beginning with the late spring of 1957, a radical reaction set in. First, there was the anti-rightist campaign, which succeeded the "hundred flowers" policy, bringing severe tension within the country, drastic measures against intellectuals, the execution of three students in Hanyang, etc. Soon thereafter began the transformation of co-operatives and collective farms into people's communes, and the strains and tensions of the "great leap forward." Externally, this was the period of the virtual breaking of relations with Japan over the "Nagasaki Incident," the Matsu-Quemoy crisis, the Tibetan Revolution, and the Indian border problems. Since then it has been increasingly difficult.

There is no doubt that many scholars and observers still visit China. But it is the considered opinion of close observers [8] that there has been

[8] I quote a few statements that have been conveyed to me personally or by letter (the reader will understand why I have avoided identifying them): A European scholar writes me: ". . . my opinion is . . . (that) there is no difficulty for a journalist or a non-Sinologist obtaining a visa or even an invitation to China. But as soon as somebody knows the language and script they will not easily let him travel about the country . . . generally speaking it is easier if you are a member of a 'conducted tour.' . . ."

A European journalist, who has himself been to China, adds that the Chinese

a deliberate policy, at least since late 1957 or early 1958, of excluding persons who know China well (with the exception possibly of extremely reliable "friends")—people who speak the language, have personal friends, have been in China before, can make comparative judgments, in short, who have an independent basis for judgment. I cannot here discuss all of the cases that come to mind, but let us take a few examples. Practically no English scholars have been able to go for serious study since late 1957. Lord Lindsay, who had spent many years in China (he had also been there in 1954 with the Attlee Mission) and was rather friendly to the régime, was refused entry in early 1958; C. P. Fitzgerald, who had been to China in 1956, had some difficulties in 1958, although in the end he was able to go; the German agricultural economist, Biehl, who had never been to China before, was allowed to visit, but Otto Schiller, who had been there before, was refused; the invitation to the German Sinologists was withdrawn; Mehnert, Abegg, and others who had been able to go in the earlier period, were refused later on, while casual journalists, who know little about China, such as the two roving correspondents of the German illustrated *Der Stern*, have been able to go. The flow of materials—newspapers, magazines, and books—from the mainland gradually diminished until by 1959 it had virtually disappeared. The case is similar with India: when the Bandung spirit prevailed, Indians were able to accomplish a good deal in the way of research and scholarly exchange. Since the revolt in Tibet and the rise of the border problems, Indians find it increasingly difficult to go for serious purposes and to receive materials. In the case of Japan, the Chinese seem to withhold permission for serious scholarly research as a form of pressure on the Japanese Government. They know that hundreds of Japanese scholars are so anxious to go to China that they will continue to exert a strong political influence on Japanese public opinion and on the Government for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations.

Another question might be the relevance of the scholar's topic to his chances of gaining admittance. Here, I think, we must distinguish two things: the subject itself, and the research methods envisaged. There is good reason to believe that the more "sensitive" the field, the more

are much more willing to allow the entry of the casual journalist, without background, who comes to spend two or three weeks, than of the serious journalist who has been to China before or who intends to spend a prolonged period.

An Eastern European says, along similar lines: "I have heard about eminent . . . Sinologists who were refused visas to China, obviously for the simple reason that, understanding the Chinese language, they (had) some possibility of enquiring on their own about the true situation in China."

A scholar who is exceptionally well placed to observe general trends, and who has himself been to China, observes that in the past few years the Chinese "were . . . not admitting anyone who had been before to China, not even some fairly definite fellow-travellers, or great praisers of their achievements. . . . I don't think any foreigners, other than Party members, will be allowed in till the present famine is over."

difficult it will be to pursue. The Chinese are more likely, for example, to allow Japanese archaeologists to visit excavation sites and collections than American social psychologists to investigate the treatment of Chinese intellectuals by means of interviews, questionnaires and "participant-observation." Now, in general, the pattern of acceptances and rejections seems to confirm this view. In the case of the English scholars, the five who were accepted among the six who applied during the thaw period were all pursuing non-sensitive fields; the one refusal was in contemporary literature, presumably a more sensitive field. However, it is clear that this cannot be the only consideration: some scholars have been refused politically innocuous projects, for example, linguistic research for the preparation of a Chinese grammar. As against this, several scholars have been allowed to carry on research in sensitive areas (Dumont, for example, in rural villages; Geddes in Fei's village; an Indian student on people's communes; Chesnaux on labour history in the 1920s—all before the great freeze of late 1957 and early 1958, it should be noted). These can only be explained by reference to other considerations: political reliability; expectation of a favourable result; a calculated risk, etc. It would not be wrong to conclude tentatively that the field of study will have some bearing on the chances of gaining admittance to Communist China, but we should have to add immediately, "other things being equal."

What seems to me most important among the "other things" is the kind of research that has to be done. Insofar as the study can be carried on by means of official materials, documents, and careful guidance, even a sensitive subject may be possible. But insofar as a study involves direct field observation without guidance, free and extensive access to people, and independent work, it seems unlikely that any except the most reliable foreigners will be allowed to do it. Geddes spent three days in a village; but he was with interpreters going through official records: he did not interview peasants, and certainly not in depth and not alone. Dumont was able to spend more time, but since he covered 43 villages in six weeks, an average of about one a day, he cannot have spent much time in serious interviewing or assaying of attitudes, public opinion and problems of the people. The Indian student carried on her studies of the people's communes under direct guidance of faculty members. The likelihood of anthropological, sociological, psychological or other research dependent upon direct observation and intensive contact with people seems very remote.

Nor can we always anticipate in advance just what subjects will be considered sensitive. Archaeology, for example, would seem *ab initio* to be politically non-sensitive, but on the other hand it falls within the area obviously reserved for exclusive Chinese cultivation—its own national

treasures and the authoritative interpretation of its own history.[4] We find therefore that Japanese, English and French archaeologists have indeed been permitted to visit sites and excavations in progress—to do "site-seeing"—but no foreign archaeologist has been able, so far as we know, to do any actual archaeological work, whether on his own or in collaboration with working Chinese archaeologists. Certain other subjects, innocuous in and of themselves, may inadvertently touch some important doctrinal issue and therefore become, at least for a time, sensitive. The study of medieval agrarian economy, for example, may have implications for the Marxist schema of successive stages of human history, from primitive Communism to slavery to feudalism to capitalism. Or the study of the Western impact on late 19th and early 20th century education may raise questions about the orthodox view of the role of Western imperialism.

It would also be useful to be able to generalise about the relation of the scholar's political attitude towards the Communist régime to his chances of getting a visa for scholarly work. In general, there can be no doubt that the more sympathetic the scholar's attitude the more favourable his chances; the more hostile, the less favourable. But here again, this statement cannot be left unqualified; the relationship is by no means so simple. There are examples of extremely sympathetic persons who have not been able to go; contrariwise, there are examples of persons not particularly sympathetic who *have* been able to go. The Chinese authorities cannot always be sure in advance, particularly in the case of people whose attitudes are intermediate, or have not been publicised, what their attitudes will be. Some have returned less friendly than they went; others have only shown their sympathetic attitudes publicly after their return. All that it does seem possible to say is that a markedly favourable attitude, particularly if publicly expressed, will facilitate admittance to China and that a markedly unfavourable public attitude will probably hinder it. Where such clear judgments are not possible, other grounds probably enter the decision: the degree of internal relaxation or tension of China, the international situation as a whole, the relations of China at that particular moment to the country in question, the importance of the individual, his field of interest, etc.

The political calculus involved in these considerations is exceedingly complex and may perhaps be better grasped by examining particular examples rather than by stating explicit rules. Joseph Needham has been able to carry on his researches in the history of Chinese science without apparent difficulty, and on the contrary with an extraordinarily high

[4] The Japan specialist will recall how sensitive archaeology was in pre-war Japan, since its findings might throw doubt on the official mythology of the origin of the Empire, the revealed dates, the "unbroken" dynasty, the character of the "Japanese race," etc.

degree of co-operation. He has been to China many times, and on each occasion he has made extended trips all over the country, up to 12,000 miles or more, with interpreters and as full access to materials as he wants. In the same way, a few other Communist or pro-Communist scholars have been able to carry on some kind of research. The French Sinologist, Jean Chesnaux, for example, was able to study certain aspects of the history of the labour movement between 1921 and 1927. However, even though Chesnaux is pro-Communist, he did not find the unrestricted freedom that Needham apparently does. One likely reason is that the research topic comes uncomfortably close to contemporary issues. Chesnaux's application went for a long time unanswered, and it was only when he happened to be in China as a member of a cultural delegation that he was able, on the spot, to win permission. He spent a month or so on his work, very strictly guided, particularly in the old labour leaders he was brought to interview. Now, for Chesnaux this was no particular limitation, because the selection of individuals for interviewing corresponded largely to his own intentions and also because he was fully expecting to do a study that would be acceptable to the Chinese authorities. But how fully guided this was became clear later on, when he discovered that a Russian woman researcher working on much the same field had been guided to exactly the same people he had seen. However, if Chesnaux had wished to see other people, or to range beyond the particular limitations he himself set on his work, he would very likely have found himself balked.

A different case entirely is Dumont, the distinguished French agricultural economist. While he was in China, Dumont spent six weeks making observations in 43 villages. Now, Dumont was in no sense pro-Communist, and therefore his case is particularly significant. He wrote a very important book on his findings, objective and even critical; however, quite clearly, the general burden of his observations was highly favourable to the Communists. Since then, Dumont has written widely in the European press on the relative rates of growth of India and China, almost invariably to the credit of China. Yet the reported invitation of so independent an observer to revisit these villages seems to be the riskiest thing the Chinese have yet done, and we can only speculate on its meaning. Either they feel confident that his findings will be favourable, or they feel that the testimony of an independent, uncommitted scholar of considerable reputation is far more valuable in public opinion than praise from known pro-Communists.

Another example is the New Zealand anthropologist Geddes who was allowed to visit Fei Hsiao-t'ung's village. The circumstances of this permission are not entirely clear, although we should keep firmly in mind that it was granted in the relaxed period. Prof. Morton Fried of Columbia

University says that Geddes "met Fei in Peking . . . (and) asked if he might visit the village," [5] but we have other information that Fei was forced to go through a period of reform-through-labour in part, at least, because of his requests to revisit this village. Geddes was a member of the New Zealand Cultural Delegation (he has since then left New Zealand and taken a post at the University of Sydney) that visited China at the same time as the Australian Cultural Delegation led by Prof. C. P. Fitzgerald. According to several members of these delegations,[6] the Chinese made every effort to accommodate the individual interests of the members. Some, therefore, were able to visit the Tunhuang caves, some archaeological sites, some museums and important art collections; Geddes requested permission, as an anthropologist, to visit a rural community. In his own view the three days he spent there with an interpreter were extremely fruitful, but any field worker will know that one does not establish much rapport or penetrate the private feelings of respondents in three days. His inquiries involved essentially the examination of village records—of population, of production, etc.—and not personal interviewing of villagers. Why did the Chinese permit him to make this study? Most likely because they wanted to make a good impression on this, the first important delegation of distinguished figures from New Zealand and Australia, and also because there could be no great harm from a few days' examination of statistics in the presence of an interpreter. But would Geddes, had he not been on the spot in the special circumstances of the euphoria created by a cultural delegation—or had this been after the closing down of the "hundred flowers" policy—have been able to spend his three days "studying a Chinese village"? Very likely not.

It is a curious thing that more British scholars, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the field of Sinology, have been permitted to do serious scholarly work than scholars of any other country (Russia may be an exception). Apart from Needham, who is a very special case, five of six Sinologists who applied for a visa in the period before the summer of 1957 were able, in varying degrees, to do some work in China. Three of them were able to spend a full academic year there, one half a year, and one three weeks. The only scholar refused a visa in this period was one who might be presumed to be politically unsatisfactory. Four of the five, in fact all those who spent a long time there, studied subjects remote from contemporary political passions—classical and literary matters. In general, they were able to do what they wanted, although one reported some lack of co-operation, and one was given no help by academic institutions. It may be that this success was mainly achieved through the accident that they happened to apply during the period of greatest relaxation since the

[5] Fried, *op. cit.*
[6] See particularly the reports of Partridge and Davis in the *Report on China*, *op. cit.*

establishment of the régime. Had they applied in the later period, it would have been virtually impossible, as we know from the subsequent cases.

For a long time Indian scholars seemed to be highly favoured. Indian students in China were often permitted to carry on " research " in fields of their own interest. Sometimes they were able to begin upon their research topics soon after their first year of intensive language study. However, here the willingness of the Chinese to permit them to do research may have been conditioned by a number of special considerations. First, there was the general Bandung, and pan-Asian sentiment. Second, the Indian students on the whole were extremely sympathetic to the régime at the start, and it could be presumed that their findings would be friendly and useful in the development of the kind of understanding of China in India that the Chinese wanted. Another very important consideration was probably that all of these were young people, with no prior experience in China and no background either of study or personal acquaintance against which to test official interpretations. Moreover, they were under the guidance of senior Chinese scholars, entirely dependent upon them for the materials they read, and they were not likely to do independent or " field " research. That is, to put it bluntly, their work could be strictly controlled, even when it dealt with unsafe topics, such as the people's communes.

However, the limits of this tolerance have come to light in the recent years. Ever since the Tibetan Revolt and the worsening of relations between China and India, it has been harder for Indians to carry on research there. They have found increasing difficulties in securing visas for scholarly purposes, and indications of non-co-operation have been increasing. Materials are harder to come by, and some resident Indians have encountered a variety of difficulties. Most revealing of all is the case of the very pro-Chinese scholar who tried to go to China in 1959 to do some work on the role of Western education in Chinese development. Even after the very highest level intervention was brought to bear, the Chinese gave her only a limited visa and refused her institutional co-operation. In this case, there seems to have been a combination of factors: the growing hostility towards India and a dislike for her particular research topic. This scholar spent two months in vain, unable to advance her project in any way. Apart from the China students, a few other scholars have in the earlier period been permitted to make some studies. Most of them have been extremely friendly—Ganguli, Gyan Chand, etc.—and their work has consisted largely in spending a few months collecting official documents which they have assembled into extremely favourable interpretations. The soundness of the Chinese estimate of the Indian scholars they have permitted to do some work is evidenced by the fact that S.

Chandrasekhar, the population specialist, is the only one, apart from journalists, who has so far published anything important that is out of harmony with the line the Chinese wish to have projected in India. But in any event, since the Tibetan Revolt, all of this is probably a thing of the past. It is unlikely that any, except the most trusted Indians, will be permitted for some time to carry on serious scholarly work or research. The day when a Raghu Vira would be permitted to travel thousands of miles to the remoter parts of China and meet scholars and religious figures freely and collect vast amounts of material is over. The general tightening up will undoubtedly proceed much further unless there is an extensive relaxation of Sino-Indian tensions.

The case of Japan is in some ways the most interesting. So far, the Japanese China scholars have succeeded rather less than most in obtaining first-hand, direct contact in mainland China with the objects of their research. We may well wonder why, in view of the scope of the Chinese "people's offensive" in Japan, the large number of China specialists there, and the generally sympathetic attitude at least of the younger scholars. Some Japanese scholars have suggested that this is because of Japan's non-recognition policy. But it is obvious that non-recognition is not the sole consideration: some French scholars have been permitted to do research, even though France does not officially recognise China. What seems more likely is that the Chinese are using this growing desire for normal scholarly relations as pressure on the Japanese Government. Another important consideration is the sheer numbers of China specialists in Japan. Their very advantages from the standpoint of useful research—language ability, racial affinity, prior experience in China, detailed knowledge of Chinese history and conditions, personal acquaintances—make the control problem very difficult. The result is that until 1959 the Japanese were able to secure large amounts of scholarly materials, and scholars have gone in their hundreds, but practically none has been able to do serious, sustained research in the field.

2. *Seeing China*

I

ONCE the scholar is in Communist China, what can he see, what can he do? Does he have that free access to materials, people, colleagues and places that is the essence of true scholarly exchange? Or, to take the opposite extreme, is he so restricted and supervised that he can see nothing whatsoever except what the government wishes him to see? Can he obtain a balanced view? Let us see what visitors to China have to say

about this. To start with, we can do no better than quote Robert Guillan's experience:

". . . I am prepared to admit that there is no Bamboo Curtain . . . . Was I prevented from moving about? Not exactly. I covered eight thousand miles in two months. Did I see anything of interest? I certainly did . . . . Was I followed by the police, kept under observation and spied on? I do not think so . . . . I was allowed to take photographs, to make notes and to leave China without my notes or my films being examined . . .

" There is no Bamboo Curtain, and yet a more subtle veil was always kept skilfully and firmly drawn between China and myself. Just listen to this: there are six hundred million Chinese, but in two months I was never left alone to speak with one of them without a witness, and if I was, it was a put-up job. There are five hundred million peasants, but it was a sheer waste of time to ask to stay for a few days in a village, or even to spend twenty-four hours there. I was never able, if I felt inclined, to visit with my guides at random a house in some district of my choice. I could never stop and make enquiries in a factory, a farm, an institution, or some other place unless the visit had been planned in advance. I asked to be allowed to have a conversation with Catholics without witnesses—waste of time. To talk to a non-progressive priest—quite impossible. Was I able to interview a former landowner? My request was refused. Did I receive permission to visit one of the 'reform through labour' camps? I am still waiting for it.

" Like every journalist and visitor to China, I went nowhere without an interpreter by my side, a useful companion but at the same time a constant supervisor. I do not suggest that he was ever a policeman in disguise . . . The essential role of the interpreter is to be present at every meeting his charge may have with a Chinese citizen. That is enough . . .

" The interpreter's role is also to see that his traveller is always under the control of the authorities, with whom he maintains contact . . .

" Nothing is ever left to chance. Would you like to see a Chinese family? It is chosen for you along with the time, the district and the car to take you there. Would you like to meet a Shanghai capitalist . . . He is duly produced and you will learn later that he is the same one that twenty visitors before you have seen. Wherever you go a reception committee awaits you, standing to attention . . . You are never asked if you have any questions; a preliminary account of what you ought to know is inflicted upon you . . . There is never any question of free discussion on a particular subject; there is even less chance of an informal conversation one evening among friends.

" Finally—an unbreakable rule—the attentive guides never show the visitor anything that is not excellent or even exceptional but they refrain from telling him so. . .

". . . every effort is made to protect him from direct contacts with the people as far as possible . . . "[1]

This is the experience of most visitors to China, even those who had no special objection to this stringent control. For the casual visitor on a whirlwind guided tour, without benefit of language contacts, or familiarity with the country, it even has its advantages. It certainly makes more efficient use of his time than would otherwise be possible, and it solves for him the difficulties of hotel accommodation, food, transportation schedules, etc. But even putting the best face on it, it does mean a very high degree of control and even surveillance. The visitor sees China only through a screen, as it were, and only very selected portions of China at that.

For both ideological and practical reasons, then, it is obvious that the guided tour of a group or a delegation is the form *par excellence* for the authorities. It is convenient, it requires fewer interpreters and guides, it simplifies the problems of transportation and accommodation, and it regulates the burden on the receiving organisation. At the same time, it permits the highest degree of guidance and control. Delegations are taken completely in hand from the moment of their arrival and are kept constantly busy with meetings, receptions, exhibitions, social and cultural events, sight-seeing, and briefings. This, at the very least, leaves little time for independent observation.

Nor are the individual visits less carefully managed. The same panoply of guidance and control surrounds them as well. The visitor's itinerary must be approved, and he is at all times in the hands of his guides. (The guides may accompany him all the time, or they may be assigned at various points along his route by the local Intourist branches.) R. H. S. Crossman describes as one of his most memorable experiences in China the few moments he was able to steal away from his guides through a ruse. On a visit to the Great Wall, he challenged them to a race to the top. " Very soon they gave up. I found myself at least a mile and a half away from anyone—for the first and for the last time in China. A lovely, exhilarating moment. I pressed along the top of the Wall, uphill, downhill, and uphill again, until Dr. Sun and Mr. Pan (his guides) were only tiny spots. Then I scrambled down and walked back through the grass at the base, picking wild flowers, feeling easy and happy. . . . I soon lapsed again from grace. I couldn't resist saying to Dr. Sun, 'Thank you for forty minutes of freedom, which I will always remember.' "[2] Many Japanese have also described the lengths to which they had to go to break away from their guides: disappearing into crowds, pretending to go shopping, etc. Admittedly there are wide variations in individual

[1] Guillain, *op. cit.*, 35-38.
[2] Crossman, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

tolerance for this kind of close guidance, but this seems to be a fairly general reaction on the part of foreign visitors who are not captivated by its other side, the VIP treatment.

The intineraries are very carefully planned. Even when the visitor proposes his own schedule, it must be approved by the appropriate Chinese authorities. If one keeps one's requests within reasonable bounds, normally this presents no particular difficulties. Visitors are usually able to visit most of the places they wish in a short period. But it would be unrealistic to entertain the hope of visiting areas of any degree of sensitivity. It is possible, but only for absolutely reliable supporters of the régime, and even then, usually only for very special purposes.

More important is the control of contacts and places to see. In China one does not call upon people casually, or drop into a factory or a university or a private home. All of these things must be arranged, and the system of arrangement guarantees complete control. The pre-arrangements and careful stage-managing which have been so amusingly described by Robert Loh,[3] who himself took part in many of them, shows very careful thought and skill. Normally the visitor is taken to model institutions—schools, factories, kindergartens, collective farms, people's communes. But since many visitors are prepared for the Potemkin-village technique, the Chinese very skilfully have alternatives available. If the first proposal is not acceptable, the visitor will have a choice of others. But the important point is that in virtually all cases, the alternatives too have been pre-selected, or else they are judged to be safe. Some journalists, for example, have felt that they did manage to get off the beaten track; but, as Richard Walker, who has traced these things out very carefully, says, they were mistaken. From their published reports, there is no reason to believe that they did in fact see things that others had not seen.[4]

A Japan Socialist Party delegation, feeling themselves very daring, insisted on seeing a reform-through-labour prison. They visited, with varying reactions that corresponded to their political predispositions, a prison where all the prisoners were under a two-year suspended death sentence, its execution or commutation at the end of that time depending upon the progress of the prisoner's reform. (The right-wingers were shocked, in the same way that most Westerners would be; the pacifists were upset by the capital punishment, but relieved that a humane solution

[3] Robert Loh: "Setting the Stage for Foreigners," *The Atlantic*, December 1959.

[4] "Even the perceptive Scotsman James Cameron, who feels that he 'saw a great deal more than has been seen for some years,' reports on the same model factories, farms, collectives, Shanghai kindergarten, and other sights as, for example, the Indian Dhirendranath Das Gupta, Adalbert de Segonzac and others." (Walker, "Guided Tourism in China," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 6, No. 5, September-October 1957, pp. 33–34.)

was possible; and the left-wingers were delighted at this most intelligent and "advanced" method for dealing with anti-social elements.) But the significant point is that the same prison was visited by at least dozens of other foreign visitors. If the foreigner has truly inconvenient requests then the Chinese are extremely skilful in diverting him. Crossman found himself in the end never able to see the politicians and writers he had asked to see. Prof. Kirby found similar difficulties in trying to meet students at Peking University and in trying to find certain materials.[5] A German visitor reported that he was able to have interviews in various ministries, but never with the particular people he asked for; moreover, he was never able to see the same people more than once. Another German scholar wanted to meet people in his own field but his attempts to contact the Academia Sinica and the universities were invariably unsuccessful; his contacts with the Chinese were channelled through the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and even here it took 17 days before his group was able to secure an interview with the General Secretary. Fabre-Luce reported: "They ask you what you are interested in, whom you would like to meet. But your requests are not always granted. For days on end they repeat, 'We are contacting . . .' To me these mysterious words evoked endless telephoning, busy officials, the search for an ideal interlocutor. Nothing of the kind. The conversation never takes place."[6] Most visitors, of course, never request anything outside the usual channels, so they often have no feeling of limitation. But for anyone who has tried to go beyond the usual routine, the limits are very quickly felt.

The visitor, in short, is discouraged from casual contacts, often by very subtle and skilful means; and if this is not always effective, then one can be sure that non-official Chinese will be very careful not to involve themselves in unauthorised contacts with foreigners. Very often the foreigner's own feeling that he is a guest, and therefore under special obligation to his hosts to behave properly, or his fear of entangling other persons—perhaps old friends, if he has lived in China before—will be sufficient to restrain him. One Japanese scholar who had lived in China many years explained that he never contacted his old friends. He would sometimes meet them at official dinners and receptions, but even then he would only talk to them in company and never take them aside for private conversations. Another, who had also lived there for many years, told me how skilfully he managed to break away from his guides and visit an old friend; and how guilty he felt later when he realised the trouble he could have brought on him. "It is not only risky," he told me, "but

[5] E. S. Kirby, "Impressions of People's China," *South China Morning Post* (Hongkong), January 10, 1956.

[6] Alfred Fabre-Luce: "Chinese Journey," *Encounter*, August 1959, p. 19.

even illegal for a Chinese to meet with foreigners." Although he is probably wrong about that, certainly the ubiquitous pressure and surveillance are sufficient to make it almost impossible in practice, if not in law. In the same way, many visitors, who had lived in China before, have been extremely careful not to contact their former acquaintances if they felt they could bring any danger to them. This self-restraint on the part of the conscientious visitor is a very important control device.

Moreover, the visitor cannot have private, unscrutinised contacts. If he visits "an ordinary worker" in his home, there will be guides, interpreters, or hosts. It does not even require anything so crude as trailing by detectives. If a Chinese has a visit from a foreigner, he can expect a security officer to stop by in an hour or so for a little inquiry. Guides are required to prepare a report every evening on the activities of their wards, and these are carefully inspected.[7] If the visitor hires a car, the driver will keep a record of where he has gone. Robert Loh gives a touching example of his predicament when a bluff Englishman insisted on trying to penetrate his guarded statements. The visitor took him into another room and then asked him to speak frankly. "At this point, I felt real resentment at his naiveté or selfishness. He was naive if he thought I or anyone else could afford to say anything against the Party or Government and if he did not know that cadres minutely questioned every Chinese who had talked with foreigners. He was selfish if, without caring what would happen to me, he planned to write when he returned to England that the Chinese progressive, Mr. Loh, was really bitterly anti-Communist. . . . My job was to save my neck. So I told him emphatically, 'I love the Communist Party and Government more than my own life.' Our private conversation abruptly ended. He seemed disappointed in me. I was certainly disappointed in him. I do not understand how a really intelligent foreigner could expect to have a private conversation with anyone on the Mainland of China."[8] Nor should the intelligent foreigner, questions of surveillance apart, reasonably expect to make a deep contact with Chinese in the course of his whirlwind, casual visit. We need not accept the theory of "Oriental inscrutability" to realise that few people open up their innermost thoughts to the casual visitor. And this is particularly the case with the Chinese who (like the Japanese) have traditionally valued a certain reserve before strangers.

[7] From the letter of a European scholar who visited China with a delegation: "The guides and other officials held regular meetings every evening and morning, after and before each day's activities, in their own rooms (they were several to a room), which they avowed was for the purpose of discussing each day's results and the next day's tasks. Often, throughout each day, one or the other of them would come out with: 'You remember I told you such-and-such yesterday: well, I failed to explain it correctly (or fully, etc.). . . . I should say also on that, etc. . . .' Clearly, from briefing. Quite often it was not the same individual that had said it the day before."

[8] Robert Loh, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

Once this reserve is penetrated, through prolonged association and the winning of confidence, one may expect a more personal relationship, but foreign visitors are usually in China for much too short a time and their contacts are too brief and casual to achieve it.

The visitor's insulation from real contact with the people is therefore heightened by the careful control of the environment as well as by his own lack of language ability, unfamiliarity with people and with the country, and by the normal initial reserve of the Chinese people. And when this is a matter of state policy as well, his chances of real contact are almost non-existent. Even foreign students at the University of Peking are to a great extent isolated from real contact with their fellow Chinese students. They live in separate quarters, have their own dining halls, and their main contact with Chinese students is through their student guides or through formal social activities. How much there is we have no way of knowing, but certainly many of the foreign students, even some Eastern Europeans, complain of their isolation from the Chinese. One Eastern European gave it to me as his firm conviction that the reason for the shift, since 1957, from the policy of inviting large numbers of foreign students for long periods to one of inviting only one or two per country for short periods of a year or two of language study is the prevention of real contact with Chinese students and scholars. A North European student wrote: Since 1957 . . . "The . . . authorities took every possible means to isolate us, to break all personal contacts with Chinese students or other Chinese people . . . I know that many newly-arrived foreign students have no personal contact with Chinese at all." A close personal attachment between a foreigner and a Chinese, particularly if between persons of different sex, can be a very serious matter indeed. Some foreign students are reported to have been expelled for forming such attachments, and some businessmen and other visitors are known to have run afoul of this prohibition. One European told me that he and other members of his party had occasional experiences of being accosted by prostitutes; their hesitation was not only for moral reasons but to some extent for fear that the girls were *agents-provocateurs*. Many visitors therefore feel that their most valuable encounters are accidental ones: chance discussions with people in trains or in crowds; or on park benches or on dark streets at night. These fleet encounters are free of surveillance and anonymous.

While he is in China, the visitor is not only cut off from balanced news of the outside world, but he usually does not know what is happening within China itself. Therefore, unless he has a considerable background or has made very careful advance preparation, he has no way to check his limited, and often even selected, impressions against outside information. I do not speak here of the many persons who unhesitatingly

accepted official Chinese statistics, say about production or agriculture, only to be given the lie by the Chinese Communists themselves when the statistics on the Great Leap Forward were "adjusted." Or of the many visitors who have absolutely no background whatsoever, such as the two European journalists, recently gone to China, who had not heard about the people's communes.

A few examples may illustrate the difficulty of relying upon the first-hand impressions of visitors to mainland China. In the spring and summer of 1957, China was caught up in the excitements of the "hundred flowers" and the immediately succeeding anti-rightist campaign. During that time, there were many foreign visitors in China. Very few of them had the faintest idea of what was going on. An Australian Labour delegation returned with glowing reports of how satisfied the people were even though some of its members were in Hangchow at the very moment that there were riots and attacks on Communist Party headquarters. This outbreak had been sufficiently serious that three middle-school students were publicly executed in the presence of 10,000 people in Hangchow's twin-city, Hanyang. During the same period, foreign visitors were singularly unaware of the agitation among the Chinese intellectuals. Visitors to Peking University during this period saw nothing out of the way. And yet, from independent evidence, we know that the University was in a state of dramatic agitation, seething with resentments and frustrations, with students and professors openly expressing their grievances, even against the Party and the Government, in meetings, debates, discussions and bulletin boards.[9] Another example is the German agricultural economist who toured Chinese rural areas in the very period the people's communes were going into operation but did not know about them. Nobody had bothered to tell him, and the Party resolution had not yet been publicly promulgated; he learned about them after he returned to Germany. Many people have been profoundly impressed with the religious freedom in China, pointing as example to the well-kept operating Buddhist temples they have seen. They have not been in a position to know from independent evidence that the few remaining temples are largely showplaces, a tiny percentage of the number operating before the Communists took power.[10]

It is not surprising therefore that many acute observers have even argued that more information can be obtained in Hongkong than on the

[9] See, for example, the revealing discussion Dr. Robert Lifton had with several former Peking University students: *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 407–410; see also Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers* (London: Stevens, 1960).

[10] Robert Loh reports that "before the Communist victory there were about a thousand Buddhist temples in Shanghai. Less than ten remained when I left the mainland," *op. cit.*, p. 82.

mainland itself.[11] "Getting back to Hongkong," one tells me, "my first question was, 'What's the news from China?'" When I was in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1959, Yugoslav journalists told me that although they keep a correspondent in Peking, they were seriously thinking of sending one to Hongkong "so that we can get some real news from China."

Another problem of the utmost importance is what the visitor feels free to say after his visit. The journalist who wishes to return to China will be very cautious in what he writes; he will often suppress unfavourable material, confining himself to the favourable things he can honestly say or, in some cases even bending the truth. In either event, his reportage will lack balance. The same problem arises for scholars who hope to get into China or, having been there, to return. Many Japanese scholars have told me that they would never make unfavourable statements about China, no matter what their private views, in order to be able to return there. Some European scholars have told me that they are willing to speak in private but that they would never reveal their judgments in public. Raja Hutheesingh, Prime Minister Nehru's brother-in-law, went to China in 1951 and 1952. After his first visit he returned full of praise, but after his second visit he wrote a very critical book. When taxed with the sudden about-face, he explained that although he was very critical the first time, he was careful to write nothing about it so that he could return again; once he decided he was not going back, he felt free to write honestly. Many withhold at least the open publication of their true views for fear of antagonising "progressive" forces in their own countries. J. C. Kumarappa, the great Gandhian economist, is reported to have withheld his critical observations on the persuasion of Pandit Sunderlal, who led the cultural delegation of which he was was a member. Therefore if one reads Kumarappa's report in *China Today*, the volume of impressions edited by Sunderlal, one will receive a misleading impression of his full views. A striking example is the prominent Japanese educational leader who addressed a large meeting of university students on his return from China. Since the students were so enthusiastically favourable to China, his slightest critical comment drew extremely ominous reactions; in the end, carried away by the atmosphere, he turned to an unrelieved paean of praise, drawing thunderous approval for each new favourable statement.[12] When he was later questioned by some of his intimate friends he admitted that he had suppressed his critical observations and that he

[11] This problem has been well discussed by Richard Walker, "Guided Tourism in China," *op. cit.*; by Guy Searls, "The Hong Kong Outpost," *The New Republic*, April 8, 1957; by Frank Robertson at the Tokyo Conference of the International Press Institute, 1957; and by many others.

[12] Donald Keene mentions a similar example. See his "Literary Currents in Postwar Japan," in Borton *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

had, in truth, been carried away by the desire to be "popular" with the students. The experience of *Yomiuri* correspondent Takagi Takeo has also had an effect on Japanese visitors. Takagi visited China for several months, travelling widely to Manchuria, Yunnan, and even some of the border areas. Upon his return he published a journal [13] for which he came under severe attack by the Chinese: violation of hospitality; ignorance; lack of perspective; dishonest criticism; playing into the hands of the imperialists; sensationalist exploitation of the dark side of the situation; evil intentions. Takagi replied to his Chinese critics, and a hot debate ensued, this time with pro-Chinese Japanese partisans joining the attack on him. Very few Japanese journalists would be willing to risk a repetition of this experience. The fear of being "ungrateful" for the wonderful hospitality of their Chinese hosts also acts as an effective restrainer on many people. We must therefore accept many published reports and public accounts only with the greatest caution.

II

Having said all this, I wish to make it entirely clear that I am not arguing against visiting China. I have said that there are enormous obstacles to real contact and balanced observation of Chinese life. The likelihood of serious research, at least for the foreseeable future, seems to me very remote. And I would particularly challenge the claims of any short-time visitor to special authority. But this does not mean that these visits have no value. A sharp, informed eye is capable of important and valuable observations no matter what the obstacles. The essential question is how sharp and how informed the eye.

Every year, for example, hundreds of thousands of Americans visit France. How much do they learn on these trips? How much real contact do they have with the French people? Would we accept their judgments about French politics, the attitudes of the people, General de Gaulle's intentions, the morality of the French middle class, the role of the agricultural lobby in Parliament, the condition of French literature? Quite obviously not. And yet this is what many quickie visitors to China expect us to accept from them. The American tourist in France spends a short period in a special world, self-isolated by his language difficulties and lack of background and personal associations, and held at a distance by the massive indifference of the ordinary Frenchman. The tourist in China has all of these problems in much intensified form, and he has in addition the deliberate state policy and the internal political atmosphere to cope with. It is no wonder that he cannot distinguish propaganda from

[13] *Otonari no Shinseki* (*Our Relative Next Door*), 1955.

statistic, that he cannot evaluate the significance of the selected impressions that are skilfully marshalled before him. How many hundreds if not thousands, of visitors accepted the Chinese claims of " 100 per cent. annual increase in agricultural production " during the Great Leap Forward? After all, were they not eye-witnesses? They had seen with their own eyes the fields dense with grain, they had seen the charts and statistics plausibly expounded by the sincere and hard-working young man from the committee of the people's commune. And yet they were wrong, even though they would not believe it until the Chinese Communists told them so. Similarly, the Indian Mukherjee tells us: " . . . many members of our delegation to China were not even aware of many similar or greater accomplishments of India when we were shown industries or handicrafts of China or the progress China had made in art and culture. A member who has not seen a single river valley project in India was vociferous in praising the achievements of China in this matter when he saw one of her river valley projects which in magnitude was not one-tenth of our big projects." [14]

But for all that, the visitor has seen something; perhaps not enough perhaps without understanding, but still something. At the most elementary level it would not be unfair to say that it is better to have seen something of Communist China than nothing at all. The visitor has acquired, in however inadequate and inchoate a fashion, some physical sense of the reality of life, its sights, sounds, and smells. Even to have a concrete image of the appearance of the streets, the layout of a people's commune, or the spectacle of tens or hundreds of thousands of drafted coolies working on a construction project, has some value. It is true that the visitor will usually see only model institutions, the surface of things, but the surface is a part of life too. If he keeps in mind that what he is seeing is the exceptional, not the average, and certainly not the totality, then he has gained a new understanding and new perspective.

What is more important for our purposes is to consider what the qualified visitor can see. It is the mark of the informed and trained observer that he can read a great deal from any sample of reality that comes to him, however small. He can compare what he sees with the China that he knew before; or with other Asian countries; or with countries in a similar stage of development. A simple walk through the streets offers a world of revelation to the experienced and sensitive visitor. One can even extract positive understandings from the negative experiences that seem to shut one away from the Chinese reality. The discovery that it is difficult to meet Chinese in an ordinary way itself tells a story about the internal political atmosphere.

Let me give an extreme example. A European scholar who had

[14] Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

lived in China for many years wrote me as follows: " . . . it was grim, it saddened me to see the China I used to know reduced to this shabby regimentation. There was a great deal of misrepresentation. We achieved no contact or information, in the sense you are interested in —people refusing to talk about significant topics, and being afraid to do so, even among themselves, and most certainly more so with foreigners." But this too can be an important discovery. It is true that one might know it from the outside, but to experience it physically and directly, even to have it confirmed, seems to me a finding of no little significance. The model commune or nursery or factory reveals something by implication about the non-model institutions. And on the limousine ride to the model factory or people's commune, if the traveller observes carefully he will see many things that have not been specifically prepared for his attention. Every conversation, every contact, whether it be stiff and formal or entirely casual, can become a new source of understanding. Even the conducted tours open up many fascinating subjects for speculation. If the visitor is capable of using his peripheral vision, as it were, he can see a great deal even on a short guided tour: about the surface—the model institutions, the "achievements" of the régime, the character of the leaders and cadres, the visible reality; but by implication about what lies below the surface as well.

There can be no question that the régime makes every effort to control the visitor's contact with China. But no screen can be completely impervious. The monolith, if such it be, has cracks, fissures, even deep crevices through which light inevitably appears. The opportunity for deeper contact or understanding than the régime might wish are far greater than might appear from the grim negative picture that emerges from one side of the experience. Naturally in periods of relaxation, or for visitors from countries that are favoured or being wooed, the opportunities are greater. But even in the tight periods, it would be a great exaggeration to say that the visitor can see nothing. Everything depends upon the observer himself. The more background he has, the more he knows, the more trained his sensitivities, the more points for comparative judgment he has, the more he will be able to see.

The expert invited for a "study visit" or an "inspection tour" of his own field will certainly see much more than the casual tourist, even though it might not be as much as he wishes. He has a professional basis for *rapport* with his counterparts, and he has some basis from which to judge what he sees. The construction engineer will not be overwhelmed by the sight of a Chinese dam, as the Indian visitors described by Mukherjee were, because he has after all seen other dams; he will be in a position to make a hard technical judgment. Nor will the China

specialist credit the modern open-cut mine he visits in Fushun as an achievement of the régime; he will know that it was built by the Japanese. Therefore, as a general rule, we can feel that the more expert the observer the more reliable will be his observations about particular fields. It is true, no doubt, that many professional missions have demonstrated a certain willingness to be deceived, by accepting the exceptional and the model as the general and the average. They would all do well to prepare themselves much more thoroughly for their visits by studying available materials beforehand. Very often they spend all of their time getting information that is already known. But in general the physicists, meteorologists, industrial engineers, medical men, and foresters have been able, or are potentially able, to give us a good deal of insight into what is happening in China. Often this has to be weighed against independent information, but usually it tells us something of value.

The informed and well-prepared visitor can look at the very same things as the casual tourist and come up with entirely different conclusions. Both can look, for example, at the well cared-for Lamaistic Temple in Peking filled at certain hours with praying monks; but they will see different things. The usual visitor is likely to conclude, as indeed the Communists wish him to, that the Chinese are solicitous of religion and that genuine freedom of religion prevails. The informed visitor, who has a background in China, is more likely to see this as a showplace, one of the few remaining, specifically designed to counteract the very charge that there is no freedom of religion; or that this is part of the "soft" campaign not to offend the sensibilities of the "backward" peoples at this stage of development. And this difference in understanding may have nothing to do with political attitudes. The informed visitor, who sees the full meaning of the flourishing Lamaistic Temple more clearly than the uninformed visitor, may still favour the policies of the régime. He may agree that the influence of religion must be eradicated, and therefore he will congratulate the régime on its tactical flexibility or accept this device as a necessary measure at this stage of development, in accordance with his predilections. The same would be true in the case, let us say, of a model prison. The casual visitor may approve or disapprove of the suspended death sentence method, but he will take what he sees at face value. The expert, on the other hand, will be able to place this in some perspective—as against other prison systems, as against the Russian methods—but he will know that what he has been shown is the best, and from this he will be able to make appropriate inferences about those he has not been shown. And yet, as in the earlier example, this has nothing to do with his political attitude: he may be in favour of reform-through-labour; the important thing is that he will see and understand more, whether in the end he is for or against what he sees.

Another important consideration is the length of time the visitor stays in China. All other things being equal, the longer one stays the greater the chance of penetrating the surface and effecting a deeper contact with Chinese life. Since most visits are so very short they have practically no chance of doing so; in the short tourist visit distortions, misunderstanding, and deceptions are at their maximum. But as time goes on the foreigner begins to fall into a more normal rhythm, and to the extent that this rhythm interlocks with some phase of Chinese life his opportunities for meaningful observation are increased. The expert who spends several months working with Chinese colleagues learns a great deal not only about his specialty but about the lives of his colleagues and associates, the constraints at work on them, their emotional rhythms and their problems. An increasing area of Chinese life begins to fall into a meaningful pattern: houseboys, servants, taxi drivers, coolies, shopkeepers, Party cadres, neighbourhood organisations, as well as his immediate colleagues, associates, and assistants. Even the timid scholar who sits in a library for several months finds a segment of life taking on an organised meaning. Many foreign students have complained about their isolation from the Chinese student body, and yet for all of their isolation, which is undeniable, they have been able to see important things about Chinese life that are inaccessible to the ordinary visitor, or even to the small foreign colony that lives within its own community.[15] Moreover the longer-term visitor finds himself increasingly freed of guidance; he will find more opportunities to travel freely—even though his itinerary must be approved—on business or on holiday or for sight-seeing. There must be time for the maturation of certain possibilities. It is only after a long time that the normal reserve of the Chinese, enhanced by the political exigencies, will relax so that the foreigner can meet him on a personal and human level rather than as "representatives." The statistical probability of unsupervised contacts, of casual meetings and conversations, increases with time.

The problem for the serious visitor, then, is to break away from the organised-tour routine as quickly as possible and to establish a meaningful relation to some area of Chinese life with which he has a natural affinity. Some foreign scholars have observed, for example, that when they went to China as guests of the Government or of some "people's organisation," they could make little contact. But when they were invited

[15] As a North European student put it in a personal letter: "For several reasons it is difficult to get explicit information on what is really happening inside China, although you are staying there yourself. But inevitably you know more than a person who is outside China. Many things that you can read about in newspapers in Western countries are secret in China. But through personal contacts it is possible to know many concrete matters and, what is more useful, it is possible to appreciate them and to know the feelings of the common man."

by more functional groups, such as universities, scholarly societies, particular departments within universities, or particular industries, they were able to enter very quickly a more normal relation to their Chinese colleagues. The freedom of these relations, of course, depends very much on the attitude of the régime, but at whatever degree of relaxation or tension they will be more fruitful than official and ceremonial relations. In the academic world, for example, this would mean that the scholar who is invited by the Academia Sinica or by Peking University is more likely to have worthwhile relations with Chinese than one invited by the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

The long-term foreign residents in China—apart from the pro-Communists—are diplomats, journalists, students and businessmen. The diplomats operate under special limitations, even greater than in other countries, which it is not my intention to discuss in this report. The picture for students and businessmen is a mixed one. On the one hand, they do have some functional relation with some area of Chinese life, even if it is a limited one; but on the other hand, their opportunities for observation are severely limited both by the deliberate restrictions imposed upon them and by their preoccupation with their own work. On balance, quite a number have been able to see a great deal of Chinese life. But this does not qualify them as authorities on any complex problem. The journalist who visits for a long period has perhaps the best chance theoretically to observe what is going on. If he has a good background in China, if he is ingenious and energetic, he may see a great deal. But he may equally be so hobbled with restrictions—as well as by his own inadequacies, principally of language and background in China—that he ends up as easily misled as the casual visitor. There is obviously a great difference in what we might expect of a journalist who knows China from before—an Abegg, or a Guillain—and of the ordinary reporter on a quick junket. And if, in addition to having been in China before, he speaks Chinese and is a student of Chinese affairs, we can hope for even more. The failure of the journalists to fulfil our expectations so far is, however, less important here than the fact that they may have exceptional opportunities for serious observation.

What we want, then, is the ideal observer in the ideal conditions. He will be a highly-trained student of Chinese problems and a fluent speaker of Chinese; he will have lived in China before and have many personal contacts with Chinese people; he will have many points of departure of comparative judgment—knowledge of other countries, technical qualifications, etc. And in China he will be able to spend a long time, travelling freely and with free access to persons, places and information. Obviously such an ideal combination does not exist. But an unqualified person in

ideal conditions will come up with much less of value than the ideal person in less-than-ideal conditions.

My own conclusion would be that the more research, or long-term observation, or surveys, or even journalistic observation that serious and qualified foreigners can carry on, the more we can expect valuable materials for the understanding of Communist China. They will have to be submitted to extremely critical tests, just as all other material coming from China, but to the sensitive eye they can tell a lot.

APPENDIX: CHINESE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE ORGANISATIONS

APART from Government agencies themselves, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a large number of "people's organisations" have come to be directly concerned in international exchange. The most important of these are the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CPACRFC), modelled after the Soviet VOKS; the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, which specialises in dealing with foreign political figures; and Intourist, which handles the routine of foreign visits—hotel accommodations, travel, guide service, interpreter service, etc.

Next come such organisations as the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace (headed by Kuo Mo-jo), which takes part "in various international peace conferences and in the activities for friendship and cultural exchange among peoples" (*Handbook of People's China*, p. 171);[1] the Asian Solidarity Committee of China (also headed by Kuo Mo-jo), which "maintains contacts among the Asian countries" (*ibid.*, p. 172); and the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, which has "exchanged visits of delegates . . . organised exhibitions of Chinese products in many countries" (*ibid.*, p. 173). However, international liaison is an important function of virtually all national organisations, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, affiliated to the World Federation of Democratic Youth, "keeps close contact with youth organisations in other countries and participates in the activities of the world peace movement" (*ibid.*, p. 164); the All-China Students' Federation, affiliated to the International Union of Students, "participates in the World Students' Congress, Youth and Students' Festivals and various student conferences, sends . . . delegates to and receives . . . guests from other countries" (*ibid.*, p. 166); the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (also headed by Kuo Mo-jo) has as one of its functions "to increase cultural contacts with other countries" (*ibid.*, p. 167); the All-China Federation of Scientific Societies, affiliated to the World Federation of Scientific Workers, "acts as host to scientific delegates, specialists, experts, and professors from scores of countries and national scientific conferences. It exchanges publications with more than 100 organisations in some 30 countries" (*ibid.*, p. 167); the All-China Athletic Federation "exchanges visits with sportsmen from many countries"; the All-China Journalists' Association, affiliated with the International Organisation of Journalists, "has invited more than 100 journalists from 17 countries" (*ibid.*, p. 170); the Chinese Buddhists Association "made contacts and exchanged visits with Buddhists of many countries, notably India, Burma, Nepal and Japan" (*ibid.*, p. 175); the Chinese Islamic Association has sent delegates to Bandung and to World Peace Assemblies, as well as Haj missions to Mecca (*ibid.*, p. 176); and the Chinese Red Cross Society plays an important role in opening contacts with various countries.[2]

[1] Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957.

[2] See the comments of Donald W. Klein, in his "Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *The China Quarterly*, No. 4, October-December 1960, particularly footnote 30, p. 37.

Another important part of the international exchange apparatus is the friendship associations, now said to number over 40. In addition to the friendship societies abroad, counterpart societies are organised for each country engaged in exchange with China itself. Thus there are Sino-Indian, Sino-Japanese, Sino-Polish, Sino-British Friendship Associations in China, to correspond to the India-China Friendship Association, the Japan-China Friendship Association, etc.

Moreover, virtually every institution and organisation in China takes some part in international exchange where appropriate: Government ministries often have their own exchange programmes, replete with training, education, observation missions, etc., as for example the Ministry of Water Conservancy; universities take part either as sponsors or as hosts for visiting students and academic people; the Academia Sinica plays a major role in inviting foreign scientists and in guiding them once they are in China; individual trade unions, such as the Coal Miners, the Engineering Workers, etc., often deal directly with their counterparts in other countries.

A vast network of guide and interpreter services is maintained, mainly by Intourist, to handle the flow of foreign visitors. Since this is essential to the control and guidance of the tourist, foreigners find themselves saddled with guides and interpreters whether or not they wish or need them. It is a rare foreigner who has had the privilege of travelling the country without the company of some official person.



ABOUT THE BOOK

In China's relations with the non-Communist world, three levels of objectives can be distinguished. The long-range one is certainly revolutionary subversion, the overthrowing of existing governments and the establishment of Communist governments linked to the Chinese bloc. In the intermediate range, the objective is to improve her basic position in the world: to project a more favourable image; to win friends and neutralize opponents; to gain recognition as an established, powerful state; to establish herself as a model for under-developing countries; to establish her identity with the revolutionary nationalist movements throughout the world; to undercut the Western, and particularly the American, position. The short-run objectives are much more bound to particular situations: breaking through trade barriers, settling border issues in a favourable manner, expanding trade and technical aid.

Professor Passin examines in this book the motivation and the modes of operation of China's cultural offensive in Japan, India, Australia, Poland, East Germany, France and England. He also evaluates with ample documentation its success, [illegible] Japan and India. The book [illegible] rest to those who have to m[illegible] sive in the years to come, in [illegible] the free countries of Asia and Africa.

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