By Arnold W. Green.

Recreation, Leisure, and Politics

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

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preface

A sociologist once said that while he could not possibly define sociology, he could readily list the topics which properly fell within the purview of that subject. Other fields of study also appear to have just growed, but likewise by what may be tacit agreement cover a fairly uniform list of topics, however diverse in content. One such field is that which has come to be known as "recreation and leisure."

Most textbooks in this field, for example, examine the topic of work as well as recreation and leisure and go on to include such matters as education, the family and development of personality, the natural setting and conversation, "mass entertainment," and various social problems, especially those of delinquency and the place of the aged in modern society. This essay, while not a textbook, examines the same list of topics.

The point of view expounded, not the range of discussion, provides the frame of reference. It is that the identity of interests becomes less and not more manifest as modern industrial society develops, and to that extent government, especially the Federal government, is limited as the appropriate agency to direct and control the course of action taken.

Arnold W. Green

contents

chapter one

What Has Happened to Walden Pond

What man finds in nature is himself—in terms of both individual and collective experience. Individual experience of this kind can be communicated, but it is so idiosyncratic that it cannot guide a program of reform. Neither can collective experience of nature—especially in the perspective of American history—provide a political blueprint for a "return to nature" in any conceivable practical or even metaphysical sense.

In the perspective of any history, nature exists only through human consciousness. Before that consciousness can arise, human will must be exerted upon nature. Until there is interposed between nature and himself his own man-made world, according to Hannah Arendt, man cannot conceptualize or even visualize nature. "Without a world between men and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity." This world men make requires modification and even destruction of the natural setting.

Human productivity "was by definition bound to result in a Promethean revolt because it could erect a man-made world only after destroying part of God-created nature" (1, p. 139). Individuals and societies ever since have been debating the wisdom of that revolt, whether it should be continued or abated. The revolt can also be continued while it is being deplored, which is the condition of the American present and probable future.

MAN FINDS HIMSELF IN NATURE

Literary definitions of nature perforce have in them the flavor of autobiography. Though not fellow nationals, Wordsworth and De Sade were contemporaries. "Come forth," Wordsworth invited, "into the light of things,/Let nature be your teacher." In De Sade's outlook was a much less maternal personification. For the observation that nature never did betray the heart that loved her, he substituted the assertion that he knew her. His greatest torment, he said, was that he was too puny to offend nature; but insofar as she taught him anything, it was to emulate her crimes

to the best of his ability. "Knowing her dreadful secrets, I felt a kind of ineffable pleasure in copying her heinousness."

In one of Aldous Huxley's novels someone exclaims "Poor Wordsworth!" But also, "Poor De Sade!" Power in the universe must be granted, but the uncaring power of what has been called a de-divinized world is something else again. Both men were faced by what William James called "the contradiction between the phenomena of nature and the craving of the heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit whose expression nature is." De Sade was no more capable of rejecting nature as revealed reason than was Wordsworth, and thus each remained, in his separate way, a true son of the Enlightenment.

On balance, though, each found what he was. Anyone else who seeks to relate himself to nature will also project himself into it. In nature he will find his own hopes and doubts with, in James Baldwin's phrase, "as much of the truth as he can bear." Henry David Thoreau, an individualist who lived his own words with unmatchable perfection, was able to stand a great deal of it.

Thoreau's work almost completely avoids Wordsworth's sentimentalism. He separated from his fellow townsmen more in attitude than physical space. Their life he deplored as a waste of the human spirit, a grasping busy-ness in which they minded everyone else's business except their own. There was implied social criticism in every line he wrote in *praise* of nature. Such praise served to rebut technological progress. He asked what Maine might or might not have to say to Texas on the new telegraph, and was anyone bothering about exactly where the fire-snorting railroad engine was taking the nineteenth century.

The nature that was Thoreau's vision was, then, in large measure a product of a "man-made world." But he was also filled with wonder and joy in the contemplation of nature as concrete reality. His attention, as well as his message, was reduced to a minimum of abstraction, moral or otherwise. With conscious deliberation he simplified his life, sought direct communication with

woodchuck and snowstorm. He restricted himself as far as is humanly possible to serving as an example, instead of taking the easier way of prophet or mentor. It is small wonder that he and his fellow transcendentalists were never entirely at ease with each other. At the last, however, in terms of crude reductionism it was himself he found in nature, as did Wordsworth and De Sade. He turned to the woods, where he "was better known."

Thoreau's words still bring solace to a few. But in the man-made world they are as silent as Walden Pond has become noisy, with a bathing-beach and roaring outboard motors. To those values Thoreau represented, recreational consumership of nature has become as great a threat as the universal activity of destruction and creation in nature.

NATURE AND THE AMERICAN PAST

The early American settlers, especially those with Puritan leanings, tended to look upon nature with the eyes of the early Christian and the medieval monk. Nature was, for some, part of that "flesh" which was alien to the "spirit"; for all it was the adversary. The early settlers fought a harsh and threatening wilderness. Their land-hungry acquisitiveness, disciplined habits, relentless energy, and self-driving religion required not the contemplation of mystery but the application of will. He who would not work could starve, and did starve. Labor and capital were in short supply, and at first sheer necessity absolutely demanded that magnificent effort to survive by the labor of all hands which ensued.

Mastery and conquest of nature thus became the dominant American theme in the relationship of man to nature. To what extent that theme has become muted—and it has—would be difficult to state. The controversy over whether greed was and is at the heart of the matter likewise cannot be settled. The alacrity with which wealth has been voluntarily shared and even given away might lend some caution to that view. The Promethean joy

of wrecking and building, sheer exuberance in the refashioning of physical materials and resources, may in either event surely not be altogether discounted.

The later westward expansion, to which Americans have devoted most of their brief history as well as their collective attention, may be viewed as a mere elaboration of the central theme. In similar case is the motif of rapid movement through space, which runs unimpeded from the tall tales of a century and a half ago about Daniel Boone's swift marches through the wilderness afoot to the airline's assurance that only one meal need be served on the New York–Los Angeles run.

Aeschylus charged Prometheus that his own folly and not the gods was the parent of his woe. In this instance the accuser—an ambivalent impulse to stay the hand in the act of destroying nature—was less definite. At no time in American history, though, was a note of doubt and misgiving altogether quelled. This New-Found Land, the virgin land, the Garden to which the Lord had led his chosen people, upon reflection seemed unredeemable promise by the very act of building as well as destroying. The mood was neither contemplative nor quietistic, for in the protestant ethic lies the injunction to so change this world as to create God's kingdom on earth. But there was a deep sense of obligation and debt, and unease and doubt as well, and out of it in turn arose a sense of guilt.

Literary artists and critics have been most sensitively aware of the continuity in that confrontation of innocence and experience, and doubtless to some extent have exaggerated it. Faulkner has said of the American that the "woods and the fields he ravages and the game he devastates will be the consequence and signature of his crime and guilt, and his punishment." For literary men the call of the frontier has constantly wavered, from one that demands fascinated admiration to one that stutters bewildered shame. It is here, according to critic Leslie Fiedler, where the Dream of Innocence has encountered the resistance of fact,

"where the Noble Savage has confronted Original Sin (the edge of hysteria: of the twitching revivals, ritual drunkenness, 'shooting up the town,' of the rape of nature and almost compulsive slaughter of beasts) ..." (6, p. 132).

The above passage may be somewhat overdone. But Fiedler's central point—that the American Indian has continuously haunted the white man's imagination—is not. Whose "virgin land" was this, and were the chosen people already here? Plymouth's Governor Bradford looked upon the graves of the ambushed Pequot tribe with the self-righteous approval of his God. On the frontier as it moved westward there was renewed justification for another massacre—in reprisal for Indian attack, that is, resistance to land-grabbing repudiation of another treaty.

On the other hand almost every settlement, as it became more or less secure, produced its nay-saying Roger Williams, and its businessmen, army officers, and common citizens who tried in vain to enforce the honoring of treaties and agreements. There were also folk singers and poets, who either deplored or glossed over and sentimentalized. The end result is Boy Scouts practicing Indian lore in city church basements, and Sunday school tracts which release guilt without a brake to a people who no longer want anything from the Indian and no longer need to fear him.

GUILT AND THE RURAL BIAS

Expiation for what was done to the Noble Red Man, as well as a sentimental urge to emulate his mythic relationship with nature, supply much of the mystique of the conservationist movement. Most of the modern literature thunders collective fault and appears more concerned about repentance than staying further change in the natural setting. How much can now be done is open to question. On the other hand, the guilt-repentance emphasis, in any area of attention, as much weakens as it encourages the will. A mood can result which shifts from a futile sense of

total responsibility to congratulation on the new-found purity of one's own intention.

It is, of course, not known how many citizens participate in the assumed collective sense of guilt. Ambivalence, at least, has been constant. Whatever "guilt" may continue to haunt the "American imagination," there were countless salty characters on the frontier who had themselves a whale of a time, and among them were many Indians. The urge to throw off the restraints of civilization runs deep enough to contest both the will to refashion the world and the seduction of inaction. From *Leatherstocking Tales* to modern western, heroic and violent action is shown as necessity to prepare for school, church, and grainfield, but that same action specifically repudiates anything more desirable, or worthy, than itself.

There are, to be sure, murkier ambiguities. An indulgence of the sense of guilt, as well as enjoyment of a comfortable and secure life, owe a debt to the main theme of conquest. Prosperity, the responsibility of leadership, even the proclamation of ideals, all rest upon a base secured by previous ruthlessness and cruelty. Any social order, of whatever ideological pretension, makes identical what the civilized mind tends to deplore and what the civilized life requires for its maintenance. The protection of what men regard as desirable often enforces a further exercise of what, in their loftier expressions of rhetoric, they condemn as reprehensible.

At some point war by most people is regarded as a lesser evil than appeasement and assured ultimate national defeat. Most will also prefer the pipeline that brings their families water to the preservation of a wilderness lake and the forest that surrounds it, even if "future generations" will thus be "denied communion with unspoiled nature." The central question of justice—who owes what to whom—will continue to be debated, but responsible action can start only with what is here and now. Included in what is here and now, in Max Weber's words, is "the average deficien-

cies of people." And what not only is here and now but always has been is a real and not an illusory clash of interests.

It is a rare intellectual honesty that has taken naturalist and conservationist Joseph Wood Krutch into nature herself to explore that clash of interests. He does not say this of Thoreau, but he realizes quite well that Thoreau could proclaim the society of nature to be sweet and beneficent only because gun-toting types had cleared the Concord area of predatory animals. Much of what may be deplorable about the social life of man Krutch acknowledges to be shared, if unselfconsciously, by all or most of those other creatures who inhabit the planet with him.

The most peaceable of all those inhabitants is the mouse, whose reward is to be the one who is eaten rather than one of those who eats. "There is so seldom a tertium quid" in nature, and the facts will not bend. "Perhaps it is best to lose the whole world in order to save one's own soul. But perhaps, also, if ultimate goodness is required, there is no other way of doing it" (8, p. 60).

Although Krutch unlike Spinoza does not specifically so state the case, the implication is plain that whatever moral commitment man may make or character development he may achieve, these will not be taught to him by nature. The guidance for such a burden of choice is not there. Along this line Krutch goes no farther than to say that though "the lion and the lamb may never lie down together it may still be that the more we do elude or mitigate the implications of that fact the better it is for man and beast alike" (9, p. 158).

As for the hope that a "balance" between man and his natural setting may yet be preserved, in either the ecological or metaphysical sense, Krutch is not very optimistic. "If the earth is still livable and many places still beautiful, that is chiefly because man's power to lay it waste has been limited." The power to destroy what remains, he feels, will soon be granted. In his opinion not even so-called enlightened selfishness will suffice to stay man's predatory hand. It is, then, with a much deeper melancholy

than Thoreau's that Krutch extols "the happiness and solace which some of us find in an awareness of nature and in love for her manifestations. . . ."

The sentimentalized guilt which has attempted to mute the main theme of conquest will not stop it. What has accompanied sentimentalized guilt in history, however, is the rural bias. Indeed, that bias has persisted longer and has been more universal in expression than guilt. If it is not an inevitable accompaniment of civilization itself, it is at least an invariable one.

Lewis Mumford has equated human consciousness with the city. In the city man elaborated his technology and division of labor, and his hopes and dreams in literature as well. That literature has perversely retained a basic dislike and distrust of the city, which may possibly have some archetypical significance. Paradise is the *Garden* of Eden, and the Golden Age, always in the past, always has a rural setting.

The Hebrew prophets were given to leaving their sheep behind in the hills to go down into the town to denounce its inhabitants, who had forsaken the ways of Yahweh. While Roman gentlemen could spare little time from public bath, Colosseum, and counting house to visit their revenue-producing *latifundia,* they sighed regretfully when they read Virgil's *Bucolics.* Thomas Jefferson, who, unlike them, put into practice what he preached, also agreed with Virgil that husbandry and the production of virtue are one process. America's major writers of the nineteenth century gave the rural bias a central if probably inadvertent position in their work. For those dreamers, "America was a garden," according to Harry Levin, "an agrarian Eden, which was losing its innocence by becoming citified. Melville had located his City of Woe in London or Liverpool; Poe had tracked down imaginary crimes in an imagined Paris; and Hawthorne had exposed sins most luridly among the ruins of Rome" (11, p. 234).

Only a very slim volume would be required to house all extant poetry that has been written in praise of urban life. And Ibn

Khaldun, the fourteenth-century Arabian sociologist who denounced city dwellers and found hope for the future in the way of life of Berber tribesmen, has had many intellectual descendants. In the modern sociological literature, "social problems" are urban ones. *Gesellschaft* fares ill in comparison with *Gemeinschaft,* and the discussion of "secondary groups" (all urban in origin) is usually pejorative when "primary groups" (all rural in origin) are compared with them.

URBANISM: FACTS AND VALUES

Despite a crude birth rate which has recently been falling, the American population is increasing at a rate closer to that of the so-called underdeveloped nations than that of Western Europe. Births exceeded 4 million in each year of the decade which ended in 1963. The actual growth of 30 million from April, 1953, to April, 1963, was nearly twice that in any other decade since the nation was founded. The number of women aged twenty to twenty-nine will almost double between 1960 and 1980, so even a further drop in the crude birth rate could hardly arrest the upward numerical trend.

Unless this trend *is* arrested, according to Stewart L. Udall, United States Secretary of the Interior, the wilderness will perforce disappear. With increased numbers, even staying the historic impulse to conquer nature by destroying it would be futile. "If there is an irreconcilable conflict between wilderness and water, a people feeling the ominous pressure of population will sacrifice the wilderness to get water" (17, p. 360). Land acquisition for parks and wilderness areas "cannot keep up with an indefinitely expanding population." The alternatives he offers are to "limit access" to the natural setting, or to establish an "optimum man-land ratio" by drastically reducing the birth rate.

The first raises troublesome implications of authoritarianism, questions about whose "democracy" this is anyway. The second is

irresponsible. Citizens in large numbers from time to time have voluntarily limited the size of their families, but surely not to preserve an optimum man-land ratio.

Mr. Udall dwells at considerable length on "overweening private demands," in conjunction with numbers of people. There are, though, several other factors which make the probable immediate future "ominous," in terms of conservation values. One is the systematic exhortation of all citizens to "enjoy the outdoors" and the strenuous efforts—mainly governmental—to make access easy, cheap, and comfortable. Another is the exploitation by all state and many municipal governments of outdoor recreation as a revenue-producing device. Still another is the urbanization of our population, in terms of outlook as well as location and occupation.

In 1962, only 1 person in every 13 was living on a farm. Of those living on farms, 5.7 million were employed, one-third of whom were engaged in "non-agricultural occupations." In 1940, 19 per cent of the labor force was engaged in agriculture; in 1958, 8.4 per cent; and according to Bureau of Labor Statistics projections, the proportion will drop to 5.3 per cent by 1970.

The large, commercially successful farm holdings are those close to or even within the "standard metropolitan statistical areas." Suburbs now absorb about 97 per cent of the population increase, and between 1960 and 1980 they are expected to double in population size. Central cities will about maintain present numbers, while places distant from central cities will continue to lose numbers through out-migration.

Concentrations of population are agglomerating. Mainly because economic opportunity is greatest where land use is most intensive, strip cities of enormous size have developed. This urban sprawl is, though, in part the creature of improved highways and the automobile. In these strips of fifty to several hundred miles in length a central city, suburbs, towns, efficient and specialized commercial agriculture, towns, suburbs, another central

city, and so on, meld in mutual dependence, like-mindedness, instant communication, nearly uniform leisure-time habits, and nearly uniform "man-made world." There the ancient rural-urban distinctions in manner, speech, outlook, activity, and approach to nature have already disappeared. In short, while as late as the turn of the present century the "typical American" might accurately be described as being rural, he must now be described as urban.

His way of life includes an appreciation of and a dependence upon gadgetry. His toys minister to his ease, convenience, comfort, and, conceivably, to his folly. Social critics, anyway, have had a lot of fun with girdles designed to make the ladies "free and joyfully unconfined," and with automatically raised automobile windows and sports cars for overaged sports. Are modern Americans daft or are they the victims of the most visible persuaders who ever operated?

Possibly both questions deserve consideration. On the other hand, the historical evidence suggests that the Roman gentlemen who luxuriated in a public bath while reading Virgil's *Bucolics* have had their counterparts in succeeding centuries. Among them might even be included a number of modern social critics. While it is true that in many times and places gadgetry has been opposed or rejected on moral, religious, and even aesthetic grounds, it is also true that in Western history each innovation has been for the most part acclaimed and eagerly adopted.

Our more rugged forefathers were never successful for long in their efforts (and many were made) to ban the latest frippery from London or discourage the adoption of any practice or gadget which would gratify the desire for ease and convenience. Over a hundred years ago, in a sleepy, almost isolated agricultural village, Thoreau in his resolve to strip his life of all but the most essential gadgetry stood quite alone. His fellow townsmen instead tinkered with and adopted every device and convenience they could lay their hands on that would undermine their "ability

. . . to conduct themselves properly and safely in a truly natural environment." It is this ability which many reformers and politicians say must now be cultivated.

An individual who shared Thoreau's temperament and convictions in more than a literary way could possibly still "go back." The accomplishment would be the more praiseworthy in that it would be monumentally the more difficult. A comparison of prevailing price levels and land availability might lend pause, and so would the sacrifice of family life. No woman known to history ever followed an impoverished philosopher into the woods to face isolation from the buzz of her sisters and deprivation in what she had been trained to regard as an irreducible standard of comfort.

Today, even fewer than in Thoreau's time will be tempted to try to go back. Modern Americans have made of ease and comfort a way of life. Their outlook and habits are so incongruous with life in the outdoors that it is difficult even to imagine a reformation so drastic that they would learn "to conduct themselves properly" there.

Except for use and consumption, the outdoors actually receives little attention. In part to serve his own comfort and convenience, the hypothetical average American prefers a "human scale" in his natural setting. He is not "a lover of nature in all her moods," whether that man-made personification be romantic or classic. What the nature poet may describe as sublime and awesome, or static and calm, fails to stir his imagination. So, too, fails an appeal to that eternal changelessness within change—of season and year, struggle and repose, ebb and flow, life and death—which, according to Robert Frost, forever eludes man's attempt to foist upon it a "design" that will answer his deepest longing.

Instead, he pots his plants, trims back his hedges, and permits his trees scant room. The few animals he encounters, except for his overdomesticated dogs and cats, are to be found in a cage or mounted in a museum. At the zoo he must be discouraged from poking at them to make them move, or from feeding them. The

dramatic show of the diorama at the museum depicts flight and violence, which often do occur in nature, but not constantly.

Nature is thus made subject to his own highly developed consumer values, among which is an appreciation for the active presence of others of his own kind. He may seek temporary respite from the crowd in a city park, but while he may also, as has been claimed, be lonely in that crowd, he usually does not want to forsake it altogether. The city park, which has been called "the area of maximum outdoor recreation use," suits him. He can sit on a bench and read his newspaper, or watch the metallic-haired young women walk their wolfhounds. Refreshment stands and sanitary facilities are nearby. The hum of traffic may be subdued at a distance, but it may also be a comforting reminder that the physical bustle he likes remains an integral part of his universe.

There may be swings and boats and caged animals for the children, and if he cares to he may reflect on their laughter and their pleasure. There are grass and trees and flowers, but they do not intrude upon what is essentially a dramatic spectacle in which audience-deprived musicians, perambulated babies, furtive adolescents, book-absorbed scholars, and hand-clasped lovers play their assigned parts on each day that the sun shines. "Nature," said Thoreau, "is not man, but a retreat from man." Retreat is hardly possible in the city park, but then, it is not much sought there.

The "average" American, however, is not likely ever to visit the city park, for any reason. Very few of the low-income metropolitan residents are interested, but a much more important consideration is the steady migration to inner and outer suburb, where about 80 per cent of all new residential construction is now taking place.

The reasons why the suburbs are spreading have bemused many analysts. All of the reasons so far adduced would require more than the pages in this volume to explore. One reason invariably featured, though, is a mounting desire to work out some

kind of compromise between the advantages of life in the city and a more "natural" life, especially for small children, in what is hoped will approximate a rural environment. The suburb does not.

The breadwinner works in the central city, or even in a nearby industrial-commercial "suburb," and he commutes. Social life is intensively shared among families which are physically close together, but that life is mainly recreational. There is a lawn and shrubbery and perhaps a flower bed in the tiny land area assigned to each property, but little time is found for them by either husband or wife.

They are young, off the economic floor, and as ambitious as they are busy—despite hectic socializing and the popular notion that striving behavior has become unfashionable. After an initial burst of enthusiasm they tend to neglect the lawn and shrubbery for those matters which really interest them. The tyranny of lawn mowing, in fact, has been cited by some researchers as an important reason why some of them have been seeking an apartment in the central city.

The literature on life in suburbia, in sum, does not suggest that the slight concession made there to grass, shrubs, and trees elicits appreciation for nature. How could it? Suburbanites share with other Americans a fondness for ease, convenience, and gadgetry. Their consumer values are no less sovereign and they, too, rely upon others in the formal division of labor to provide most of the goods and services they consume. The wish to be surrounded by others of one's own kind, the search for dramatic spectacle in nature as well as in recreation, are matters of virtually common experience.

An approach to nature as consumer threatens conservationist values. So does the activity which makes possible the suburban environment. The dominant theme of conquest is expressed in the suburban contractor's bulldozers, the state and Federal highway systems, the asphalt airstrips which gouge through what were

recently meadow, field, and forest land. That activity, and the kind and style of life it has brought, is clearly preferred to conservationist values by most Americans, who are diligently adding to their numbers.

CONSERVATIONISM: FACTS AND VALUES

What may be called the idealistic conservationists reject the recreational-consumption values shared by most of their fellow citizens, and they denounce or deplore the technical and economic requirements of the builders and producers. They implore that what remains of the natural setting be preserved intact, and that as much as is feasible of the already upset ecological balance be restored. At times an attitude toward man is implied that is far removed from the one held by most other Americans.

The unquiet desperation of some conservationists can have a sharp edge. Terms like "human blight" and "human pollution" are sometimes used, perhaps without conscious awareness of the choice as well as the judgment that is being made. Conservation as ideology, apart from considerations of the struggle for political power, can thus attract only a few followers.

Not even in Thoreau's own time was the metaphysics of his statistical judgment appreciated: "One man is more than a million." For good or ill, our own present can hardly avoid Bentham's "greatest good of the greatest number." The American way of life, whatever else it may mean, has always justified itself on that proposition, whatever that proposition, in turn, may mean. Public debate cannot avoid it. It can only raise questions about what *is* the greatest good of the greatest number, or whether the proposition itself is meaningless.

In any event, the further proposition that the greatest good is to be secured in and through intervention by government is now a widespread and firmly fixed article of faith. It is one which most idealistic conservationists espouse, to their periodic disillusion-

ment. For example, in the recent past a number of private groups in northern California, including the Save-the-Redwoods League, raised enough money to "save" the Prairie Creek Redwoods Park by giving it to the state of California. In 1964 they were up in arms at the proposal of the state highway engineers to bulldoze a freeway through the Park. A highway division spokesman said that "Our interest is in the travelling public and providing a safe highway that will beautify the country." He shared with the Save-the-Redwoods League a concern for the greatest good.

The history of the American conservation movement is inseparable from the history of anti-trust sentiment, propaganda, and legislation (7, p. 117). On the other hand, while anti-trust sentiment wanted combinations broken up into smaller competitive units, the conservation movement has implored big government to supplant big business in the ownership and control of the natural setting. Disgust with humanity, sentimentalized guilt, romanticized nature, and the rural bias have all somehow, and oddly enough upon reflection, been directed into an appeal to centralized power and control to rescue the natural setting from the villain of the last century.

The central theme of conquest, and rising numbers, comprise the ultimate threat to what remains of the natural setting. A combination of small entrepreneurs and government activity, however, has emerged as the immediate threat, with hot-dog stands, drive-ins, gas stations, sheep herds, and wildcat oilwells on the one hand, and political jobbery at every level on the other.

Small enterprise, at least that which is extractive, is inevitably hit-and-run. Perhaps the only reason why the United States now has a greater stand of trees than it had at the turn of the century —the one bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture—has been the formation of big business, big integrated business, in lumbering. This kind of enterprise plans in terms of decades, balancing

costs, prices, outlets, and resource availability. It is interested in neither short-range profit nor short-term political advantage. The big lumber companies, for example, replant on schedule in their vast holdings, develop disease-resisting seedlings, and utilize many other techniques to protect their private investment.

Perhaps it is already too late to "save" the Grand Canyon site. One possible, and hypothetical, way to delay its further modification might be to make it private property. Idealistic conservationism cannot save it, for idealistic conservationism shuns the problem of scarcity. "Leaving the wilderness intact" is tantamount to not using resources at all. On the record man cannot, or at least will not, forbear.

If a private corporation were permitted to buy the Grand Canyon site, and had permanent control of it, a schedule of use-maintenance costs would be set up, perhaps for as long as a century into the future. Charges to visitors would be scaled not only to guarantee a long-term profit, but also to protect the investment from damage. This will not happen. Not only is prevailing economic-political mythology insuperable, but at this writing the Federal Power Commission has announced plans to build two dams in the site and direct the river which flows through it into a tunnel.

Prevailing mythology holds *the* government to be above the struggle, to be protector and guarantor of the greatest good, the common good. That notion could be true in a metaphysical sense, or might even apply to government viewed as an institution. At any given moment in time, however, *the* government is manned by people who operate, who must operate, in terms of short-range interest. That consideration sways politicians in Federal agencies no less than it does politicians who are elected, because top appointees come and go with the coming and going of elected officials. Both must maintain, gain, or regain power; and a calculation of how this and that voting bloc will go in the next election as surely determines what will happen to a "wilderness

bill" as to one for a new post office or a proposed change in foreign policy.

More voters want a four-lane highway than want redwoods, if the trees would block the way. The condemnation of (but on balance noninterference with) the destruction of nature on the part of a few government spokesmen can be viewed as a sop to the minority bloc of conservationist voters. Thus it is that so much of the conservationist literature has an unearthly quality: guilt and hand-wringing and noble intention, and then shocked surprise when state highway engineers run their chain saws through the last redwoods. Government, unlike business, has extended control. That control, in reaction to the most extensive pressure of votes, is exercised with the hit-and-run tactics of the wildcatter.

Is the greatest good, then, what the greatest number want? If not, should the greatest good of future generations take precedence over the present? If that is the case, should their projected "material welfare" or their "spiritual welfare" weigh more in the balance? Should present want and desire be more sacrificed to the preservation of natural resources or to that of natural beauty?

The greatest good cannot be determined because that abstract sentiment ignores the omnipresence of a clash of interests in human affairs. That conflict occurs not only between opposed groups, but within the ambivalent heart of every citizen. Even the most idealistic of conservationists drives a private automobile, with surrender implied to exhaust pipe, access road, and motel culture despoiling the countryside.

Except in what Pareto called the logic of the sentiments, no one can prove how much recreational and extractive land *use* there "should be," and how much should be reserved for wilderness—even if the matter of living and work space is ignored, and it is by no means being ignored. What will probably most seriously affect the course of the struggle of opposed interests, in the long run, is the rate of technological change and shifts in population size and settlement. If "America as process" is the fundamental

reality about ourselves and our history, and assuming that the pace of indefinite expansionism will not slacken, then the distant prospect for idealistic conservationism is rather dim.

TOURISM

In the particular context of recreation versus conservation, the question of the greatest good of the greatest number raises in turn a number of other issues. Should the greatest number define their own good, or should that—as some writers on the subject of outdoor recreation have asserted—be done for them? If the greatest number now living are encouraged and exhorted to enjoy the natural setting, will there, for that reason if no other, be less of the natural setting for the greatest number in the near future to enjoy?

When an urban people is increasing in numbers and agglomerating in space, can their predominantly consumer values be reconciled with the themes of guilt and repentance, with the ancient rural bias, with the search for the meaning of man's existence in nature instead of with his fellows? The Federal government promotes consumption and invokes preservation of both natural setting and what might be called nature values. The various state governments pursue the tourist's dollar with no ritualized regret.

The original official statement of national park policy was contradictory. Item 3 of that statement reads in part: "The twin purposes of the establishment of such an area as a national park are its enjoyment and use by the present generation, with its preservation unspoiled for the future. . . ." These two objectives "are at variance with one another" (2, p. 131).

The term "Mission 66" was coined by the National Park Service in 1956, for a program designed to end in 1966 with the 50th anniversary of the Service. Announced goals included "protection and preservation," but greater stress was placed upon "additional accommodations and related services." Mission 66 foresaw 80 mil-

lion visitors to the National Park Service units in 1966, but the number reached 88.5 million by 1962. In that same year, the federally owned forest lands attracted even more tourists, 115 million.

What proportion of the visitors in 1966 will be volunteers, and what proportion will answer the call of politicians and social reformers, cannot be estimated. On the other hand, the pressure is obviously building to get more people into public outdoor recreation areas and to bring public outdoor recreation areas closer to the increasing and agglomerating urban population.

The various state governments, as well as the Federal government, are engaged in that public enterprise. Most states have set as a goal that no citizen will live more than 50 miles distant from a state park; Connecticut's objective has been set at 25 (2, p. 105). The state governments, however, are much more eager to use the natural setting as a source of revenue, both direct and indirect, from out-state tourists than to "serve the needs" of their own citizens.

In the New York State constitution is a stipulation that the entire forest preserve must be "forever kept as forest lands." A recent proposal to amend the constitution would permit broader recreational use of large parts of that preserve. If this amendment should carry in the legislature, then only thirty per cent of the Adirondack and Catskill preserves would remain classified as "remote and suitable for wilderness use."

Tourism is big business—for local and state governments. In more than half the states, it is one of the three largest sources of income; it ranks second in New Hampshire and first in New Mexico and Nevada. In late 1963, at a Land and People Conference in Duluth, United States Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman declared that by 1980 "recreation will be the mainstay of the Great Lakes states' economy and it will be a healthy economy."

Pennsylvania gets $1.5 billion a year in tourist and travel dol-

lars and has set a goal of $3 billion by 1970. New Jersey State Conservation Commissioner Robert A. Roe says the resort business brings in more than $1.5 billion a year, more than any other industry in New Jersey. He has warned, however, that more attention must be given the problem of pollution, "which could ruin the state's resort economy."

Conservation, according to Joseph Wood Krutch, is like virtue in that "it has no declared opponents but like virtue again it is defined in so many ways that it needs no enemies." At the end of 1963, in addition to the 530 campsites then operated by the state, New Jersey's Mr. Roe ordered the clearing of 1,000 new campsites to accommodate 35,000 more campers. He expressed hope that the new sites would be ready by May 2, 1964, to serve campers on the way to or from the New York World's Fair, the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, and the state's 300th anniversary celebration.

Governor Brown of California, with reference to a proposed state "parks and beaches bond" issue, recently said: "We have the time now and I am sure the people of California will respond next year [1964] to preserve one of this state's greatest assets—our magnificent forests, beaches, deserts and water recreational areas." In recommending a "California tourist development program," Governor Brown had earlier stated: "Development of the tourism phase of trade will bring about a more thorough promotional effort for the benefit of the economy of the whole state." The protection-consumption contradiction takes on added import when Bernard M. Bergen, Director of the State Development Board, predicts that Arizona might reach the "magic figure" of $1 billion in tourist-visitor spending by 1972, or when Governor Welsh of Indiana says during an address at Versailles: "Our first goal is to double the tourist business within the State."

Former Georgia Governor Vandiver, at the end of 1961, lamented that there is virtually no virgin land left to bring into production, "and superhighways, airports, industrial plants and

urban expansion are covering up good farmlands and fish and game habitat at an alarming rate." He said further that if "we neglect our responsibilities in fish and game conservation, where will . . . 230,000,000 Americans in 1975 find fish to catch and game to bag? Where will they find recreational areas?"

The state governments, notably including Georgia's, are solidly committed to more and more tourism as a source of public revenue. It is, after all, a $23 billion annual business. Tourist money helps to ease the politically grim prospect of piling taxes higher on resistant voters within the given state. Tourist promotion is also solidly backed by the vocal spokesmen of small business—motels, tourist traps, filling stations, restaurants, and the like. When these pressures are added to those exerted by professional outdoor recreationists and national politicians—even though the values expressed may differ—what those 230 million Americans might find in 1975 makes for reflection.

According to Richard Dagenhart of the Asheville Chamber of Commerce, things are moving in North Carolina: "Communities in the state that want a share of the traveler's dollar have to be motivated. Get 'em up and get 'em moving. That's what North Carolina needs." Former Governor Vandiver was not to be outdone by Florida. "We are out to challenge Florida for every tourist dollar which has been her easy mark in the past [and] to make Georgia the stopping state instead of the passing-through state." As part of the promotional advertising, Governor Vandiver promised that 212 outdoor billboards would be erected in Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, *and* Florida. (The 1963 Federal budget handed the Commerce Department $4.6 million "for control of outdoor advertising.")

The ballyhoo and gimmicks and hell-for-leather dollar-chasing are reminiscent of the Florida real-estate boom in the twenties. Trucks with Georgia license plates have giant all-weather decals displayed on their sides which read "For Sights and Sites See Georgia." How many net dollars will be retained from those who

come to see is a moot point. Economists as yet have not worked out the relationship between costs of attracting and serving tourists as against kinds and amounts of tourist expenditures.

At the very least it can be said that the favored dodge of state governments to raise money for promoting tourism, allocation of money from increased taxes on cigarettes and gasoline, is uncertainly in the interest of many state residents. The steady increase in competition for the tourists' dollars among state and local governments is not at all in the interest of nature lovers and conservationists. Can all be reconciled in an inclusive harmony?

As does the Domestic Peace Corps, the new Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior lacks avowed statutory authority. It too arose in executive order, not congressional authorization. The new bureau, foster child of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC), has been charged with the responsibility of "integrating" all existing facilities, public and private. It has a formidable task.

The various state governments, as already noted, are in active competition. Several divergent interests that will be difficult to integrate have also been cited. There are others. The feud between the National Park Service and the Forest Service, for example, has been waged for many years. The interests of their administrators are by no means identical, however similar their activities and stated objectives.

History, and the attitudes expressed by those concerned, indicate that any "integration" which occurs will likely involve extension of governmental control, if not usurpation. The tax cards, as in the case of public versus private electricity, come already stacked. State parks, for example, have been criticized by officials of the Washington Mobile Park Owners Association for their "unfair competition." Private trailer parks, but not state parks, must collect state sales taxes and are required by law to maintain space and sewage-disposal standards which exceed those imposed upon state parks. At present private concessionaires have varying ac-

cess to the operation of state park services. In some states, park motels, restaurants, and the like are all state owned and managed.

Moreover, the same confusion of goals which plagues the state governors and the Park Service was incorporated in the new Bureau's foster parent. The Preamble to Public Law 85-470, the Act of Congress which in 1958 established the ORRRC, stated the contradictory preservation-consumption intention in these words: "In order to preserve, develop, and assure accessibility to all American people of present and future generations such quality and quantity of outdoor recreation resources as will be necessary and desirable for individual enjoyment, and to assure the spiritual and cultural and physical benefits that such outdoor recreation provides."

The Commission, whose statutory authorization expired in 1962, stated its "central objective" to be "to recommend how outdoor recreation opportunities can be brought within reach of all Americans." The Commission also listed the following problems as "clearly calling" for its consideration. They are worthy of note because presumably they will be "implemented" by the new Bureau of Outdoor Recreation: "... meeting needs of metropolitan areas for nearby outdoor recreation opportunities; assuring adequate wilderness resources; meeting pressures for recreation use of national parks, forests, other Federal lands and water impoundments; preserving vanishing shorelines; assuring adequate supplies of public hunting and fishing opportunities; assisting States and their local subdivisions to meet recreation needs; coordinating recreation uses with other resource uses; and providing for public use of private lands for recreation" (13, p. 61). (Use of the terms "needs" and "adequate" in the passage is commented on in the next chapter.)

The Commission set its foster child a large task, and perhaps avoided a few questions while bequeathing its burden upon the new Bureau. The Commission also assumed a very great, if actually uninvestigated, desire on the part of all or most Americans to

claim "their heritage of the outdoors." The Commission thereby avoided the authoritarian implication of those who insist that citizens must be informed of and cajoled into exercising that claim.

TOURISTS: FACTS AND VALUES

Most Americans, to repeat, approach the outdoors as consumers. Many others want no part of the outdoors at all, among whom lower-income groups and urban slum dwellers are overrepresented. Those very segments of the population which are often insisted to have the greatest "need" for public recreation areas do not want them, according to surveys which have been made, whether fees are charged or not and no matter how much effort is expended to to make them more accessible (4, p. 202).

Empirical studies have consistently shown that such visitors and tourists are heavily drawn from the upper income, occupational, and educational brackets (see, for example, 16). More casual and limited studies made of visitors to state and national parks report similar findings, findings borne out by observation and conversations held with park officials.

It is an ironic condition of the welfare state that many of its services are maintained by all taxpayers for the benefit of the relatively well-to-do. Our state and national parks readily qualify. The fees exacted, if any, at such places are nominal. They do not meet any more than a fraction of the costs required to maintain them and to build and repair the access roads leading to them. Through 1963, only 18 of the 30 national parks and fewer than half of the 83 national monuments charged any admission at all.

The Commission favored a redressing of the present imbalance. Public agencies "should adopt a system of user fees designed to recapture at least a significant portion of the operation and maintenance costs of providing outdoor recreation activities . . ." (14,

p. 9). This stand was, however, compromised by an odd notion of "demand," and an insistence that tax monies be used to meet "demand": "Public expenditures [in outdoor recreation] have increased in recent years, notably so in several States, but in general they have not kept pace with the demand" (14, p. 89). Such expenditures, according to the Commission, "will have to be increased substantially."

The records kept of visits to even our national parks are poor. No effort is made to determine what number and proportion drive through to buy souvenirs and postcards and how many, on the other hand, set up camp, trudge through the woods, study wildlife, and attend the ambulatory lectures which are offered in many of them. The subjective desire (possibly a more accurate term than "need") for "personal renewal in nature" has by no means been accurately measured when a rise in the number of "visitors" is recorded. As for "real demand," this could be measured only by charging the market price for the service rendered. If that were done the spoliation from casual use which tax-provided park and forest service promotes might possibly be discouraged.

With a very small percentage exception, those who seek public outdoor recreation not only are well off but bring their urban values with them into the outdoors. The retention of urban values, and thus a basic ambivalence, has been noted even among those campers whose conscious motivation is to enter a wilderness area in order "to get away from it all" (3). These people are not the majority, the casual tourists who litter the roadsides with pop bottles and beer cans, who tear up shrubs to take home and peel tree bark and chip rock slivers for souvenirs. They do not beat a hasty retreat from the natural setting and seek relief from its undramatized spectacle in one of the gaudy tourist traps which ring all of the national parks.

This nature-culture elite might appear to have little in common with the majority of those who, between the end of World War II

and 1959, had more than trebled recreational use of public lands. Its members are vocally dedicated to the appreciation and preservation of the natural setting. They thus provide a critical instance in the admittedly hazardous enterprise of forecasting the result of the strenuous political effort now being made to educate the American people in rural values and to foster for them a spiritual relationship with nature.

The "dominant image" held by visitors to the Quantico Provincial Park in Ontario, Canada, is reported by sociological investigation to be "wilderness as fascination." As they enter the Park, visitors foresee a summons to adventure, an opportunity to struggle with the elements, an escape from the artificiality of civilization (3, p. 167). The same dominant escape motivation was noted in a later study conducted at the Superior National Forest in Minnesota. These forested recreation areas are both roadless, and thus only those unusually committed to the hardy outlook would be attracted.

These campers "want to learn to do things by themselves, to pit their capabilities against the mysterious, and to them possibly threatening, uncertainties of the wilderness" (3, p. 169). Thus 99 per cent of them "strongly favor preserving the area in its natural state." But at the same time 82 per cent wish more campsites or grounds were available; 52 per cent want first-aid stations; 54 per cent, separate toilets for men and women; 49 per cent, places to buy groceries; 16 per cent wish there were some "planned recreation"; and 21 per cent want public telephones. The inconsistency of such responses "for the majority of vacationers . . . are not envisaged as incompatible."

Why? Most of them bring an "urban frame of reference with them." Before their arrival they think of "unspoiled wilderness" as a place equipped with "picnic tables, wells, toilets, washrooms, and the like." Others know what to expect, eagerly look forward to "really roughing it," and then find they are not so determined to leave civilization behind as they had reckoned. Still others, finally, make a discovery that Thoreau was happily spared: that

no matter how romantic a man's approach to nature may be, his wife and children are only too likely to impress upon him what sacrifices in sanitation and comfort his decision to camp out in an area free of gadgetry has cost them.

Some of these people, to be sure, are passionate nature lore-ists who revel in playing at Daniel Boone. But their wishes are inevitably being sacrificed not only to the ambivalence of fellow campers but to the ministrations of nurturing officialdom as well. "The health and welfare of vacationers must be protected."

Increasing concentrations of people in a forested area at a given time inevitably lead to change, even though changelessness is what is intended. "A lake once furnishing safe drinking water may become unacceptable as several thousand vacationers swarm to its shores" (3, p. 170). Drinking water may be piped from a distance to the "wilderness area," and flush toilets required. As such accommodations become more conspicuous, however, Bultena and Taves point out that they destroy "the wilderness image which provides an unique appeal drawing vacationers to an area."

The Commission, and presumably the new Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, have faith that preservation of the natural setting and a rising rate in consumption of it can both be achieved. Secretary Udall, as already noted, appears to have some doubts. He may, further, be correct in his judgment that access must be prohibited as numbers increase, if total destruction of the wilderness is to be obviated. On the other hand, a somewhat less authoritarian step on the part of officialdom might be to stop promoting mass use of the natural setting.

Viewed as a collectivity, the modern American wants entertainment on his own terms. He spends precious little of his leisure time seeking "the truths we discover in nature." It is this condition that the Commission members and several like-minded others want to remedy. Their particular concern, either stated or implied, is the alienation of the modern American from nature. It is by fostering a reconciliation between him and nature that they hope to revitalize other "cultural and spiritual values."

During the summer months, hundreds of thousands of tourists jam the state highways and swing off to the access roads of national monuments and national and state parks. What it is they are seeking is conjectural at best. Possibly many of them do not know. Many others, if asked, would doubtless reply, "a good time." That would be for all a conventional answer, but in some cases possibly an inadequate one. Even an observer's impression—and it is no more than that—may deserve consideration in a matter that is as important as it is inevitably subjective.

According to the Commission, when "an American looks for the meaning of his past, he seeks it not in ancient ruins, but more likely in mountains and forests, by a river, or at the edge of the sea." And they warn: "the American people cannot wander too far off from the great outdoors without losing character and strength and orientation" (14, p. 13). Their subjective opinion may or may not be confirmed for another observer who makes visits, during the same season, to Mount Rushmore and Yellowstone National Park.

At the first tourist level of Mount Rushmore the dusty haze, stirred off the packed earth by shuffling feet, is thick. The screech of arriving cars is continuous, and loud, and the volume control on some of the radios is not turned down. There is spilled popcorn on the ground. An occasional scurrying parent can be seen trying to catch up with a willful charge. And bored, professionally polite functionaries process the motorists who inquire about directions for their return journey.

A national shrine that is dated 1941 by that fact alone invites irreverent comment from even the most sober and least "alienated" of thoughtful citizens. Many have declared Mr. Borglum's four enormous heads to be aesthetically wanting to a degree that is disastrous. Others have cited his work as a prime example of celebration of size at the expense of intrinsic excellence and have called that a characteristic of American culture.

Mount Rushmore is no "ancient ruin," for we have none, but at

the second tourist level, immediately below the statuary, the crowd is quiet, as it is at Plymouth Rock and at the Lincoln Memorial. The scrubbed children emerge from bus after bus, and they as well as their elders stand silent for a long time, with their heads raised and eyes fixed. Something is being communicated, some kind of affirmation is being made. What is sought and what is found remains unknown, but whatever it may be, it is accepted on its own terms, which at the same time are their own terms.

Unlike the crowd at Mount Rushmore, the one at Yellowstone is relaxed, careless, seeking distraction and easily distracted. Old Faithful is a must (everyone has heard about Old Faithful) and, despite the vigorously worded warning signs, many visitors must satisfy by touch that the water is actually hot. The bears, though, are the big attraction. Fat and indolent, they heave their haunches off the roadside as six, eight, or ten cars stop beside them. Out come the cameras and the gum drops. The bears sit up and beg, as their many trainers have taught them.

What their trainers are seeking, according to United States park ranger Don Moser, is "the quaint, the cute, and the faltering hand of man." They respond eagerly to the hoked-up dramatic shows of the tourist traps which ring the Park, and not at all to the eagles along Snake River. "They come to see a wild world, but they are suckers for the souvenir ashtray, the varnished pine plaque inscribed 'Yellowstone' and the Indian totems that are made in Japan" (12, p. 33).

These people cannot, he adds, accept "the natural scene on its own terms. They come to the wilderness because it is different, but they insist on interpreting it in old familiar terms." They do not, in fact, look at the wilderness at all, but seek to prove to contemporaries with postcards and to posterity with camera film that they were there.

Forbidden to destroy, at least directly, so far as they can they impose their own will. When feeding the bears becomes a bore, they usually turn to the tourist traps for that form of diversion

with which they are habituated. Attentionless curiosity that goes unsated only too often degenerates into truculent resentment. Some of those who remain within the Park after boredom sets in revert to petty vandalism, which is kept in check by anxious-eyed rangers.

If encouraged to visit in sufficient numbers, such people could become an even greater threat to "natural values" than those who by background and inclination both relate to the natural setting and impose a disciplined exploitation of campsite, bag limit, or hiking trail. Meanwhile, according to Jim Spracklen, executive director of the Wyoming State Travel Commission, travel in Yellowstone is "the greatest in the history of the Park." In 1962, it held 2 million tourists.

Whether casual tourist or more determined seeker and tramper is more destructive of the natural setting is actually debatable. The more active types are, at best, only slightly less imbued with urban values than the casual tourists. And the sheer weight of human bodies, whatever may be in the minds that move them, has led one supervisor of the forest service to observe that "a flood of people can cause erosion as bad as when there is overgrazing by sheep and cattle."

Further, according to *Time* for July 14, 1961: "In most of the national parks campers can find hot and cold water, city-style plumbing, cocktail lounges, automatic launderies, hairdressers, TV, and enough electric power to light the city of Boise." The relationship of the modern American and nature can be likened to that of Lennie and his little white mouse. Lennie couldn't keep his hands off it and he squeezed it, gently, again and again, until it died.

FORWARD OR BACK?

The social reform movement which seeks to bring nature and the modern American closer together has many roots. One of them, a deep one, is the ancient rural bias. The Chairman of the Commis-

sion, for example, has said that "Asphalt and telephone poles have replaced grass and trees in the lives of too many of our children. Is it possible that *West Side Story* may be replacing *Tom Sawyer* as the leading tale of American adolescents?"

The dream of innocence haunted Twain. His nostalgia, as in all such cases, led more to a yearning for Arcadia than an effort to state factual remembrance. But long before his death in 1910, nostalgia soured from a contemplation of the harsh reality urbanized America had already become. Toward the end he could not even imagine any way back.

None of his major work is thus soured. There were in *Tom Sawyer,* though, adumbrations of what was explictly stated in the later *Huckleberry Finn.* Considering the different literary conventions which prevailed then and now, *Huckleberry Finn* was as thorough a rejection of official creed and dogma as is *West Side Story.* As the raft stopped at one riverbank town after another, the pious platitudes and eye-shielded hypocrisy of several early Victorian types were treated with as much reverence as *West Side Story* accords the pious platitudes and dreary clichés of criminologist and social worker. (Not very long ago, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime was underwriting local plans to furnish rafts that would take groups of teen-agers down the Mississippi.)

West Side Story would doubtless have fascinated Twain. Late in life, he forced himself to acknowledge the predatory element in human nature, which the play's script examines in considerable detail. But the play would also have disturbed him. The dream of innocence, from which his own satire departs and to which it returns, is absent. If *West Side Story* has a "message," it is this: the American can find his own way only in his own place and with his own kind, while Twain could never forgive society for its failure to provide absolutely certain guidelines.

Twain, then, never abandoned the rural bias, even though he was led by experience to stop exhorting others in a nostalgic loyalty to it. To whatever extent the Commission's own projec-

tions might be accurate, they foster the suspicion that Hannibal, as well as Walden Pond, has disappeared into legend and folklore. Between 1960 and the year 2000 population should double in size, "demand for recreation" should triple (14, p. 25), and by the turn of the century three-quarters of the people will be living in metropolitan areas (14, p. 3).

It is an interesting fact that in the realm of moral judgment a fact can point, or can be made to point, in opposite directions. A really *old* saw of the ancient Sumerians, according to Samuel Noah Kramer, was: "We are doomed to die, let us spend; we will live long, let us save." In advising appropriate attitudes toward similar facts of life, the folk wisdom since that time has usually avoided placing contradictions side by side, but it has been no less contradictory. Literary satirists have had one long field day. In one of Anatole France's short stories, a beautiful young woman is lectured by her priest on the awful finality of death and therefore is admonished to renounce all pleasures of the flesh, but instead she infers she had better gather rosebuds while she may.

In similar fashion, the fact—or to be safe, the assumed fact—that American society will continue for the next few decades to become more urbanized has been cited to promote a return to nature. That same assumed fact can lead, or can be made to lead, to the conclusion that an urban society must find its way in terms of urban habits, economics, and values. The latter argument, although it represents minority opinion, does have its supporters.

Denis de Rougement alludes to "the attitude of impotent revolt against the way of the modern world." Such an attitude, he says, exacerbates "the sense of insecurity and the pessimism of the masses; and in that way contributes to keeping up that 'crisis' which is the favorite topic of our best minds" (15, p. 133).

More directly, Henry Steele Commager claims that the myth of rural life as being somehow superior to urban life has already been discredited. With "the population three-fourths urban or suburban, and the countryside itself largely urbanized, and the advantages of urban life so plain, it is inevitable that philosophy

[moral judgment?] should adjust itself to fact" (5, p. 10).

Max Lerner denies the popular notion that the modern American has become "rootless and alienated" as a result of losing or renouncing a close relationship with nature. The modern American, instead, has contentedly settled for new and different values. The pull of property is no longer in the land but in consumers' goods. The communications revolution has gratified a sense of power and pleasure by placing at his disposal the means of sight and sound and movement. "The whole range of popular culture; the feeling of access to new gradients of income and experience; these form the new soil in which the American has found new roots" (10, p. 233).

Commager and Lerner, no matter how correct their view of the scene before us may prove to be, have possibly failed to appreciate the near-archetypical power of the rural bias. Note, as one instance, the juxtaposition of TV sets and "soil" and "roots" in Lerner's statement. Be that as it may, if, as stated earlier in the chapter, an individual projects into nature what he essentially is, then two final questions deserve consideration.

First, if our people *should* continue to become more urban, in activity and outlook as well as residence, are they going to have to create and maintain an ordered life with others more or less independent of those moral, educational, and even religious values which are, by some reformers and politicians, associated with nature? Second, is the cause of conservation likely to be well served by encouraging others, indeed all others, to drive to national and state parks and forests and wilderness areas when the evidence is quite plain that most of them are imbued with the urban values of ease, convenience, and consumption, and want and demand a dramatic spectacle?

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chapter two

Utopia, Trend Lines, and Recreational Interests

Sebastian de Grazia has compared Cockaigne and utopia. "Both lands have their literary genre. Utopia is a possessor of culture; Cockaigne is possessed by the folk. Both express how the world should be reshaped to heart's desire." These contrasting worlds "show how fundamental is the error that the many pine for leisure when what they dream of is ease and abundance" (4, p. 381).

While "the folk" have never interfered with the utopians' imagined state of bliss, the utopians have always sought to improve that to which a persisting majority have given their energy, or their wish. In a recent and quite typical complaint, for example, we are informed that the way to "escape perpetual victimization by the hidden persuaders and waste makers" and to promote "creative leisure-seeking" is "through sound leisure education and firm and thoughtful controls."

The passage is modern; the sentiment is not. The utopians for centuries have come bearing the same message: perfect laws will make perfect men. That tautology, in turn, is always constructed out of distinctive illusions by which a utopian document can be identified.

ILLUSION AND UTOPIA

The intellectual, it is assumed, is not only capable of governing, but is also voluntarily conferred political power. This brilliant politician (so many of them in the real world, alas, are not) is mainly interested in education, and he institutes a system of authoritarian control in that name. The citizens neither contest nor begrudge the power of their new ruler (or rulers, in some cases), because they have been persuaded through education that there is no clash of interests, or that at least there should not be. The resulting harmony of all interests is made static. Man returns to a Rousseauistic state of basic goodness, envy and hostility die, time stops, and heaven-on-earth is achieved. This dream, both innocent and dangerous, is as old as the written record.

Before the above points are established in a brief discussion of some utopian writers, mention should be made of two other illusions that are well-nigh universal among civilized if not preliterate men. These common illusions, in turn, make the illusions of the utopians possible to them and credible to their readers. They are that one's own time is critically important for all time to come and that one's self is critically important in one's own time. As for the first, man's myopic view of history leads every generation to believe that the future will never forget what was done here and now. In Jakob Burckhardt's words, "Everyone regards all times as fulfilled in his own, and cannot see his own as one of many passing waves."

If the present is not viewed as having cosmic significance, then at least it is a beginning or an ending, or at the very least a period of transition. Old men say they hope they will be granted enough time "to see how it will all turn out." Whether world's end or new dawn is anticipated is, for present purposes, unimportant. Apocalypse in either case is forever in prospect. A probable majority of artists have opted for the new dawn, but they as well as those who confidently awaited world's end have been limited in imagination to their own time and place.

In the thirteenth century, before the "modern world" of the historians got started, Dante insisted that "We have come to the last age of the world." At the beginning of the sixteenth century Luca Signorelli painted *The End of the World,* and his dying men wear codpieces and have Italian features. In the eighteenth century William Hogarth tried his hand at the same theme; the broken musket in his engraving *Tail Piece: The Bathos* is one such as was carried at Bunker Hill, a recognizably eighteenth-century copy of the *London Times* shrivels in burning, and the crazily tilted signpost proclaims a gutted Georgian tavern.

More recently the Australian novelist Nevil Shute, in his *On the Beach,* placed the last men to die from radioactive fallout in Australia. Shute's conceit, though, has yet to be proved in error, while Bertrand Russell's projection has already come a cropper.

His short piece on "The McCarthy-Malenkov Pact" relates of a "permanent" arrangement by which these two gentlemen carve up the world between them. Two years after Russell's warning one of them was dead and virtually forgotten, the other was running an electrical power station and virtually forgotten.

Behavior of this kind has been called, perhaps too simply, ethnocentrism in a collective context, solipsism in an individual. It may be that a projection of personal experience upon the universe is inevitable. Whether this is so or not, the second universal illusion, the one that accompanies the pathetic conviction that one's own lifetime is *the* period during which enduring decisions are being made and decisive events are taking place, is closely linked to it. Both, in fact, stem from the same source—that vanity which Hobbes said was constant in human nature.

This other common illusion has been called the psychologist's error. It is the belief that the outer world will or at least should stabilize in terms of one's own changes of mind about it. What ego feels the world reveals. The chattering of one's own teeth is often mistaken for the approaching hoofbeats of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, and a magical conjuncture of glands and moonlight equally often discloses a reality which must be announced to an ignorant world as a unique experience.

Assumptions that what happens to ego affects everyone else become more ludicrous when a writer finds an audience. Probably the most influential author of the first half of the nineteenth century was Auguste Comte, who wrote to his mistress, Clotilde de Vaux, that the future was fortunate in his having met her. Otherwise that world would have been deprived of the principle of Love which, he continued in his letter to her, he would now add to his previously announced principles of Order and Progress!

To repeat, that one's own time is critically important for all time yet to come and that one's self is critically important in one's own time are common illusions. In utopian writing, the given

present determines the future in a calculable way, and that future accords the intellectual a more exalted place than has any past or present. To these elaborations of common illusions, the utopians add some that are uniquely their own: the intellectual turned politician adapts education and rational inquiry in such a way as to achieve a harmony of all interests, and the fact that such a state of affairs could be achieved only in outer appearance, and only by authoritarian control, is either unrecognized or denied; the "mission" of history or progress is then finally resolved in stasis.

UTOPIA: PAST AND PRESENT

Plato never envisioned a political order which could either demolish or encompass the Greek city-state; his *Republic* was designed to arrest its disintegration in fixed and permanent form. His guardians were so many thinly-disguised and idealized Platos—cold passionless logicians, freed from all temptations of lust, greed, and power, who would have only the people's best interest in mind and would rule only in that interest.

Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* resolved all the evils he deplored in the commercial revolution. An hereditary transmission of occupations ended the messy confusion of competition and divisiveness of interests. He declared psychological warfare on the unsettling results of precious metals pouring in from the New World by a decree that all citizens should use a golden chamber pot. All property being held in common, pauperism and enclosures were abolished. Since a passport had to be secured from the prince for travel *within* the country, vagabondage likewise ceased. And all citizens passionately devoted themselves to reason, to the pleasures of the mind. In fact, *by law* they spent a stipulated period of time every day in reading.

In Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* all citizens are empirical scientists, ruled by empirical scientists. Cabet, the gentle agnostic, the

upper-middle-class product of mid-nineteenth century France, depicted in his *Voyage to Icaria* a simple world which had renounced industrialism, a society elegant, fastidious, with a tempered enthusiasm and optimism, dedicated to the life of reason. All men are "brothers," government is democratic, and in this somewhat anachronistic Newtonian intellectual climate it is the Architect of the Universe that is worshiped.

Auguste Comte, a contemporary of Cabet's, in his *Social Polity* found that the near future embodies his own system of "positivism." A world federation of states is formed, with its headquarters established by this Frenchman in Paris, over which the High Priest of humanity presides—and Comte leaves little doubt in his reader's mind exactly whom he has in mind for the job. The theologians of the positivistic religion—a rational worship of science and scientists—are sociologists. Progress and Order are maintained, the while suffused with the light of Love. The workers never dream of revolution, for not only does everyone love everybody else, but education informs everyone of his true interests, that is, that all interests are common and harmonious.

Looking Backward brings to logical fulfillment all of the late nineteenth-century trends of which Bellamy approved. Democracy is expanded into a world federation with its seat of government, for this American, in Washington. Women are emancipated, and with a utopian's vengeance. They not only vote and have an equal determination in all political issues, but they also take the initiative in proposing marriage. The popular vote, in fact, decides every enlightened collective interest. Art and scholarship are enthusiastically pursued by all citizens, who elect the paintings to hang in public buildings, the statues to stand in public squares.

That rational scientific intelligence will soon rule mankind is a dream at least as old as Plato, and, until extreme old age, H. G. Wells spun it into the twentieth century. Many of his books,

notably *The Shape of Things to Come,* are utopian tracts, in which a despotism of the intelligent controls society as well as scientific technology. Wells assumed, and he had much company, that scientific rationalism, engineering, and public education, by their intrinsic worth, would prepare a kind of future that an educated middle-class Britisher could approve. The desperate anguish of his last book, *Mind at the End of Its Tether,* was the product of many disillusionments, but one of them was the fact that Nazi Germany scored higher on scientific rationalism, engineering, and public education than did any other European nation.

All of the utopias so far mentioned were optimistic in tone. Since Dean Swift's savage strictures on human nature and institutions are a matter of controversy—several scholars have argued that he was engaged in party politics—it can be said that not until late in the nineteenth century were doubts raised as to the felicity of utopia. Gabriel Tarde's *Underground Man* did reveal science as being helpless to prevent the rapid cooling of the planet, and the few survivors as being forced to seek the earth's interior. But since only superintellectuals survive in the new environment, where the right to reproduce is strictly limited to those who create a publicly-acknowledged masterpiece, such an existence would probably not be reckoned too unhappy, at least by superintellectuals such as Trade.

Not until Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872) and *Erewhon Revisited,* however, did the prototype of the modern utopia appear, in which the vicious trends of the times—as discerned by a sensitive, disillusioned intelligence—are logically fulfilled. What Butler regarded as the hypocrisy and cant of family relationships in the late Victorian period appalled him (he hated his father) as much as did its political and economic jobbery. Since children insist upon being born, parents are reimbursed for the onus and insult of their arrival. Poverty is a crime, profit-taking the ulti-

mate virtue, and gambling and speculation are taught in the schools so that God and mammon may be worshiped simultaneously.

Yet Butler's generation retained an unassailable faith in linear progress, so that his intimations of crowned immorality failed to attract anything like the large audience which giggled over the japes in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World,* published with the advent of worldwide depression in 1932. Few icons of twentieth-century faith have escaped Huxley's thumbed nose. Sexual repressions are abolished; little children are encouraged to play in especially provided bushes; exclusive sexual and social attachments are anathema; and since "mother" has become an obscene word, there is no possibility of Oedipus and hence no possibility of neurosis.

Our Freud is, then, the new deity, but He is also sometimes referred to as Our Ford, for even babies come off the conveyor belt, with technicians adding bits of chemical and organic substances in controlled stages of assemblage. Technology reaches its apogee. Helicopters darken the skies. Hydroponic techniques produce an inexhaustible food supply, which is further protected by the Malthusian drill, a training in the use of contraceptives required of all schoolgirls. Watsonian psychology is pushed to the ultimate in hypnopaedia, the laboratory-controlled conditioning of children while they sleep in their hygenic crèches.

Everyone is happy, for all sexual, visceral, and social tensions have been lovingly assuaged by total protectionism. And everyone has his grammes of soma, a euphoria-producing drug supplied gratis by the state; everyone has free access to the "feelies," which have supplanted the crude movies of the past. There is no private ownership; everything belongs to everybody. There are no individuals; each works and functions for the good of all, that is to say, for the good of the state. Thus a harmony of all interests—of a sort—is achieved.

Huxley combined all the various yearnings of the twenties,

variously expressed by its liberals, socialists, progressivists, scientists, social reformers, relativists, technologists, analysts. And his conclusion?—that the advocates of the future would detest the realization of their own devices. His protagonist is a "noble savage," brought up in a distant primitive tribe and with a now forbidden volume of Shakespeare. He believes in honor, chastity, sin, suffering, death, and redemption. In the final chapter of the book he hangs himself, for in this passionless pasture world the old landmarks of human experience have become as inapplicable and meaningless as they have been outmoded.

One might suppose that with Huxley as with Butler we are no longer in utopia. That would be a mistake, for although the special features of utopia are with one exception all caricatured, they are with no exceptions all included. Competition has ceased, a harmony of all interests has been made static, and Huxley's particular heaven-on-earth-made-hell fulfills the trends of that present during which he wrote his book. The one feature he fails to caricature is significant. New-style as well as old-style utopians will not renounce the grand and flattering vision of the intellectual at last come to power. In Huxley's book, as in all utopias (and in no society), the creative, sensitive, artistic, and scientific intelligence rules, here in the person of the World Controller and his lieutenants.

George Orwell, unlike Huxley, was a genuine antiutopian. The details of his book *1984* are known to any reader of this one, but his development of the theme of the fallen place of the intellectual to its logical conclusion deserves special notice. Oceania devotes its main energies to falsifying historical documents in accordance with the latest shift in party doctrine. The Inner Party fosters "doublethink," the ability to fasten doggedly upon bold contradictions without even subliminal awareness of disparity, ultimately aims to institute "duckspeak" so that approved slogans will pour from the larynx completely independent of cerebration.

It is the "intellectual" class, the Outer Party (Orwell's choice of

adjective was doubtless quite deliberate), which is charged with rewriting the past and accepting its own falsifications without a tremor of facial muscles that might betray inner struggle. Orwell realized full well, as no utopian writer ever has, that the questioning mind of the intellectual is as much denied access to the higher reaches of political power as is the will-to-believe of the majority. The "firm and thoughtful controls," cited above as an intellectual panacea offered by some in the modern recreation movement, therefore could, if enforced, turn out to be more firm than thoughtful.

FORECASTING, UTOPIAN AND OTHERWISE

That Big Brother smiles for us, however, is by no means certain. The future persistently meanders out of the utopian's line of vision. Plato's hope of stabilizing the city-state was forever lost in Alexander's world empire. More's denunciation of the commercial revolution failed to assess it as an ephemeral prelude to the industrial revolution. Cabet's escape from industrialism proved to be exactly that. The German people hailed and embraced Nazi tyranny, which would appear to be one answer to Bellamy's faith in a future of universal franchise. Fifty years after Butler's predictions British socialism came to power, but neither then nor when the Conservative Party later took over was individual wealth made the supreme virtue—a fairly considerable understatement. Bacon, Tarde, Comte, and Wells all believed that the method of inquiry could serve as a method of government; this belief has never been sustained by any known political system.

Even Huxley's *Brave New World,* published only thirty years ago, already has an antique flavor. His later *Ape and Essence* depicts another grim utopia, probably written because he realized that the atomic bomb had arrested his earlier predictions, with their twenties' babble of bunk and sex. The later book portrays men in the gutted West Coast cities—at the time of its writing

Huxley had moved to California—turning to devil worship and returning to the margin of subsistence.

Modern historians argue whether it will ever be possible to substantiate short-term predictions. And the demonstrated fact that no utopia of the past has ever eventuated in even faint outline points up the further fact that in the social realm all large-scale prediction remains purest fantasy. In the physical realm—disregarding for convenience the wave function of quantum mechanics—factors remain constant; hence invariant relationship is discernible and prediction of probabilities within a respectable margin of error is possible. But in the social realm men's goals and aspirations constantly shift, forcing new directions upon established social trends. Men, in other words, initiate action as well as being acted upon.

Although the hope never dies, no generation has ever been able to ensure that its own deities, instead of new and strange gods, will be venerated by the generations to come. And, at any future, unforeseen emergent factors persist in combining in unanticipated ways with present social trends. For these two reasons neither utopian nor historian ever correctly limns the future.

No cultured gentleman of the late Roman Empire could possibly have seriously entertained the notion that this gang of Christians—slaves, outcasts, renegades, and traitors—would presently organize and eclipse in power the world-dominant state. Christianity, after all, was only one more salvation cult in feeble competition with many others. Roman historians and philosophers treated those early Christians as lightly as their American opposite numbers regarded the Philadelphia cordwainers who organized the first union in this country.

Taking a hard look at the early factory system, Karl Marx projected the revolutions of 1848 into a future of international proletarian revolt and the ultimate establishment of a classless society, for at midcentury isolated camps of owner-managers and manual workers were obviously in the process of formation. What

he did not, could not, foresee was the later evolution of industrialism, with its bifurcation of ownership and managerial functions and its demand for a vast new class of clerks, lesser managers, and technicians, which both halted the drift toward two isolated camps and created new lines of authority within the division of labor, regardless of ideology.

At the end of World War I, Germany was prostrate and French hegemony over Europe was unchallenged. Not one historian predicted on paper that within two decades Germany would engage the world. Instead, many of them attacked the Versailles Treaty, wrote apologies for German militarism, and pleaded for aid to the helpless nation as a counterpoise to French might.

At the end of World War II, the polarization of international power between Russia and the United States was clearly evident. The "nature of the struggle" has become somewhat ambivalent, however, and could possibly become even more so in the near future. Fragmentation of the two power blocs is one clear possibility, although, like all possibilities, it will become actuality only in retrospect.

Demographers have been no more notably successful than utopians and historians in forecasting the future. Back in the thirties many of them announced as "an established fact" or as "a law" that conditions of urbanism, industrialism, and mobility reduced birth rates in a calculable way. Throughout the entire world, at that time, the generalization appeared to stand up. Zealous scholarship even rummaged for data in ancient Roman history, and found verification for the thesis there. And since in history the upper classes have been much more subject than the lower to the three conditions cited, the so-called differential birthrate was explained.

Urbanism, industrialism, and mobility, it was said, directly affect motivation. These factors raise the standard of living; and to maintain an achieved level of living, or attain a higher one, additional pressure is felt by an entire population to voluntarily

reduce the number of its births. The total birthrate of a nation, and not only that of its more prosperous elements, will then find a level of population stability, or may even fall below replacement levels. Statements of this kind appeared in many introductory sociology textbooks written during the thirties, and even into the forties.

Newspaper editors worried in print about the disastrously low birthrates of the thirties, expressing concern that not enough children were being born to maintain a "strong national life." Much attention was paid the system of payments in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy to encourage the formation of large families. In some quarters it was seriously proposed that the government of the United States should institute a similar scheme of payments in order to arrest a threatened decline in American power and prestige.

At the present time, less than thirty years later, the analyses and the warnings and the proposed social reforms all feature the term population explosion or one of its variants. Proposed social-reform measures are now designed to encourage birth limitation, not fecundity. If instituted, they might prove to be as disastrous as a program of subsidizing large families would certainly have been in the late thirties and early forties.

It was noted in the first chapter that the number of births each year in the United States is quite high, and will continue to be high for some time. The general fertility rate as well as the crude birthrate, nevertheless, more or less steadily dropped from 1957 to 1963. These short-term trends may (although we do not know) continue long enough to arrest the much-feared expansion of population, in which case our grandchildren can revert to the kind of population worry expressed during the thirties.

Birth and fertility rates went up from the end of World War II to 1957, a period of prosperity. They went down from 1957 to 1963, a continued period of prosperity. We do not know why. Biologist-philosopher René Dubos may be correct in his claim

that the reasons why large numbers of people in a given population at one time spontaneously increase or decrease their numbers elude explanation.

If we are not certain why fertility rates rise and fall, then predictions of population numbers far into the future are hazardous. Reform programs based upon such predictions would be even more so. It should be noted, however, that a great deal more is known about population trends, and the varying margins of error in predicting them for a stipulated number of years into the future, than is the case with automation, employment requirements, crime, consumer preferences, or a great many other matters of public concern—including recreational activities.

Outside as well as within Communist countries, one reason why large-scale social reforms go awry is the human propensity, by no means limited to classical utopians, for assuming that a discernible trend line of a given present will continue in a calculable way indefinitely into the future. To repeat, in the social realm all large-scale prediction remains fantasy because men's goals and aspirations constantly shift, forcing new directions on established social trends, and because unforeseen emergent factors persist in combining in unanticipated ways with present social trends.

FORECASTING IN RECREATION

If the reader should consult a newspaper dated ten years ago, he would find the political and economic crises therein described to be somehow remote and irrelevant. The question of recreation must surely be a similar case, one which the future must face in terms that the future is going to make and discover.

In recreation, fad is king, outdoors as well as indoors. Family picnicking and camping, as well as bowling, incessant travel, boating, and gambling are all virtually brand-new, no more than ten years old in terms of their modern emphasis and the numbers

of their devotees. But it was not so long ago, in this connection, that the following advice was offered to professional recreation leaders: "Quiet games, opportunity for entertainments of various kinds . . . music from the radio. . . . In other words the 'diversion' type of occupation apparently needs greater emphasis, as compared with the active participatory type" (8, p. 18).

When economic depression was replaced by war boom, recreation shifted to the "active participatory type." Even if that general situation should persist, its specific manifestations will not. Circumstances change; taste and attention are inconstant. Although bowling at this writing is still the favorite family and group sport, for example, there is no assurance that it will remain such indefinitely.

Between 1951 and 1961, the number of lanes tripled. Then in mid-1962 the Bowling Proprietors Association of American reported that "average income per lane is currently running about 15 per cent below a year ago." The downward trend continued. In the third quarter of 1963 the second largest bowling-equipment manufacturer reported earnings 70 per cent off what they had been in the like quarter of 1962. The firm's president said the decline "primarily reflected the reduced sales of new bowling equipment."

Some fads, like mah-jongg, captivate millions and then suddenly disappear. Others, like bicycling, ice skating, and the crossword puzzle, become an almost universal craze, wane, and then come back with a reduced but enduring partisanship. Still others (miniature golf during the thirties) enlist a following that is large, enthusiastic, and short-lived, only to reclaim a later, smaller, and probably again temporary, following. At this writing it is reported that some bowling-alley proprietors are building miniature-golf courses adjacent to their lanes in order to attract new customers who might want variety in their game-playing.

While the entire past is connected with a given present, the more distant the past the more tenuous is the direct connection

that can be drawn with the present. According to Robert M. MacIver, only immediately antecedent events and trends are critical, or even especially relevant, for any attempt to explain a present in terms of a past.

A similar caution is well-advised in any attempt to project into the future either numbers of people or their presumed "recreational needs." The farther any such projection is extended into the future, the more hazardous it becomes. Probable lines of development in the next ten years are unclear in forecast, but conjecture would not be entirely foolish. The year 2000, on the other hand, may prove as upsetting a surprise to recreation forecasters of the sixties as 1964 would doubtless have been to any forecaster in 1923, when more Americans bought mah-jongg sets than radios.

That pitfalls await extended forecasting was indirectly granted by the Commission: "Social behavior continuously changes." But they also stated a "need to forecast the kinds and quantity of American's recreation activity in 1976 and 2000." To this end several surveys were made, designed to garner information about "measurements . . . of characteristics of recreation occasions" and "composition of recreating groups."

These surveys have relevance only for the time, occasions, and groups examined. Use forecasts are hampered by serious problems, according to three researchers of outdoor recreation. Past-use records are short, incomplete, and inaccurate. Variables such as taste, technology, and "availability of opportunities for outdoor recreation" are unpredictable. The most formidable difficulty, however, is "poorly understood causal relations" (1, p. 23).

WHO WANTS, DEMANDS, AND NEEDS WHAT?

Most writing on the subject of outdoor public recreation utilizes a specialized in-group definition of such terms as "demand," "needs," and "adequate." Thus the Commission, in typical fashion, equated

demand with the fairly widespread desire to use facilities maintained with tax money: "Federal, State and local governments are now spending about $1 billion annually for outdoor recreation. More will be needed to meet the demand."

In this realm of idiosyncratic definition, "supply" will constantly and inevitably fall behind "demand" when the only "economic factor" permitted operation is public expenditure. The Commission itself has raised the question: "To a degree that is hard for anyone to foresee, the sheer existence of new recreation facilities can stimulate people to use them, to try new activities, and this in turn leads them to seek still more" (9, p. 32).

Other researchers, too, have noted that supply can hardly keep pace with demand (and thus presumably "planning" would have to be revised year by year) when what is supplied is not paid for by those who exercise "demand." There very probably "will never be enough." If a park is developed "to serve a calculated demand, as soon as that park is completed, its very presence increases the demand." Those who had not considered "wanting" a park in that place quickly overcrowd it (2, p. 18).

A "calculated demand" for any economic good that is worked out on the basis of levying the main cost burden upon all citizens by taxation will doubtless have to be revised upward, indefinitely. Further, when those who utilize a service are not required to make a choice within a range of potential personal expenditures, there is no way of gauging how much they "really want" that service. In the previous chapter, park ranger Don Moser was cited as having complained about the large numbers of tourist-visitors who are totally disinterested in what the national parks have to offer.

Besides "demand," two equally troublesome and imprecise terms often encountered in the public outdoor recreation literature are "needs" and "adequate." According to the Commission: "Our job is to project, to the years 1976 and 2000, the rapidly growing needs of our people." As part of their "threefold mission"

they stated the task of determining "what policies and programs should be recommended to ensure that the needs of the present and future are adequately and efficiently met."

One difficulty is the cussedly various and individualistic expression of needs. What would be an adequate means of satisfaction for one person is either quite inadequate for another or something he does not want in any measure. Even physiological needs, presumably the most basic of all needs, can thus be characterized. The bodily chemistry of different individuals requires varying amounts—including none at all—of certain food elements. Indeed, according to the late Dr. Kinsey, the human male's sexual needs can vary at the ratio of several hundred to one. The range of individual variation is no less evident in what is more conventionally known as recreation.

Roger J. Williams has related the details of an experiment he conducted with five men and five women who were associated with a Biochemical Institute staff. They were all "young people," scientifically inclined, and were or had been married. They "gave evidence of being 'well-adjusted' and all were regularly employed or occupied with congenial tasks."

They were asked to scale intensity of preference over 48 items, at least 33 of which in estimate by common agreement would be reckoned recreational activities. Their responses were so idiosyncratic, and so randomly dispersed, that "each individual in the group exhibited a pattern of wants characteristic of himself alone" (12, p. 65). Any "average," calculated on any relevant basis, was found to bear no relationship to any individual in the group or to the group as a whole.

Consider the "need" for solitude. It may very well be universal, but the expression of it varies from one period of time to another. Modern house interiors, even large ones, compared with those being built fifty years ago are open and accessible. Doors and hallways appear less in evidence than "functional areas" which blend into one another.

The expression of that "need" also varies from individual to individual. Compared with nature lovers, most tourists, sportsmen, and campers are devotees of togetherness who seek comradely noise and warmth. Yet even those whose approach to the natural setting is more athletic and social than contemplative can at times feel a "need" that more requires the absence than the presence of others of their own kind.

The common difficulty, for those who want little as well as those who want a great deal of privacy in the outdoors, is scarcity. The problem is especially acute in facilities maintained by tax money, since both casual visitor and despoiler are not discouraged by having to pay for whatever it is they want. The standards set will never be adequate. "A skier who is calculated to 'need' a certain amount of snow surface for his skiing and is granted this, is pleased at first to find slopes less crowded." In a short while, they are much more crowded. "And so with the hunter, the fisherman, the hiker, and the swimmer" (2, p. 18).

Thoreau desired more solitude than most men of any time and had access to a great deal of it, but he complained at times of feeling hemmed in by the presence of busy others. Today anyone who shares Thoreau's temperament, especially if he lives in the Northeast, will find the means to satisfy such a wish severely limited. He will doubtless also feel that Thoreau's sense of deprivation was unjustified. But Thoreau's sense of deprivation illustrates the principle that human wants and desires always expand to press upon some of whatever satisfactions may be available, and thus render them "inadequate."

For the modern nature lover who has a "need" for solitude in the woods, the presence of another man five miles away, noted in his field glasses, can render his outing inadequate. The wake of one outboard motorboat near the shore of a lake can make the fishing from its bank inadequate for hours. More sedentary types are not exempted. No public library can ever be ordered to be as quiet as some fussy scholars might prefer. To a postage-stamp

dealer's inquiry about whether he needs a certain rare (and expensive) item, a collector may reply that he does need it but his income is inadequate.

Public-supported recreation—indeed any provision whatever—encounters certain ineluctable difficulties in making adequate the supply of satisfactions. What about determining the standards that citizens should accept? The best-selling cigar on the market was once declared by *Consumers' Research* to "taste bad."

There are three considerations in the matter of establishing standards. First, needs, especially recreational needs, are highly individualized. As experienced, they are not needs at all, but wants or desires or preferences. Second, the means to be utilized and resources available for want-satisfaction are scarce.

Third, and most important, how are standards of adequacy (for how many? for all?) to be set, and by whom? As used by many writers in the field of public recreation, "need" and "adequate" appear to be purely arbitrary judgments about what other people *should* want and have. But since many people prefer the race track to the opera, are able to court sleep with a mystery story but not Shakespeare, enjoy bowling but detest hiking, and some find a Mozart concert more exciting than a jazz festival, where and how is consensus to be arrived at? "Indeed, the nature and purpose of most kinds of recreational pursuits are such that their essential contribution to the individual's welfare would be lost once free choice was abandoned" (5, p. 377).

The exercise of free choice in recreation ignores if it does not refute those social critics who have denounced our time as one of rigid conformity and "other-directed" activity. Amateur theatricals, bowling, reading, dahlia-raising, skin-diving, television-viewing, travel (by rented car, tramp steamer, iron "pony," as well as other less and more usual means), gambling, and boating, cover only a tiny segment of the total range. This virtually unencompassable variety has been made possible by a conjuncture of self-defined individual desire and standards of adequate supply maintained by a commercial market.

PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL RECREATION

All public parks and recreational facilities, and all state and local public recreational programs, together comprise only a minor part of the American recreational scene. This generalization holds for total expenditures of money and time, and numbers of participants. Through the efforts of professional leadership, "thousands of towns and cities have taken advantage of public assistance in the development of organized programs." At the same time, "the development of commercial recreation and the do-it-yourself attitude of the public toward recreation has all but eclipsed the relatively limited efforts of public recreation" (11, p. 460).

Comparative recreational expenditures in particular bear out Professor White's contention. The National Recreation Association's estimate of $225 that the "average American" spent on commercial recreation in 1960 is double their estimate for 1950. On the other hand, the average per capita expenditure for local public recreation of reporting cities in 1960 was $3.72, a 38 per cent increase over the $2.70 figure for 1950. (The Association sets a $5 per capita tax figure as "adequate" for local public recreation.)

The Commission estimated that Federal, state, and local governments together now spend about $1 billion annually for outdoor recreation, while "the people seeking the outdoors generate an estimated $20 billion a year market for goods and services." *Fortune* magazine estimates that American consumers spend $40 billion annually for commercial recreation of all kinds. Unfortunately, different sources fail to include the same items, so that even as estimates they are imprecise. According to another estimate, if "secondary" as well as "primary" expenditures for commercial recreation are totaled, "what data we do have indicate that Americans spend about one-eighth of their after-tax income for recreation" (7, p. 204).

The figures may be imprecise, but the short-term trend is obvious. A lot of money is spent for commercial recreation, and con-

trary to a prevalent opinion most of that money goes into active forms of participation, 60 per cent of it into domestic and foreign vacation travel. In 1962 there were 8 million private motor boats; 40 million enthusiasts churned up the water. Anglers took out 32 million licenses and hunters 20 million. About 40 million people went bowling at least once a week.

The Bicycle Institute of America claims that there are 27 million bike owners and 55 million riders. According to the National Sporting Goods Association, Americans spent about $2.5 billion in 1962 on sports equipment, compared with $1 billion in 1947. According to the National Golf Foundation, the number of golfers shooting 15 or more rounds per year went from 5.5 million in 1962 to 6.2 in 1963. (For those who might like reassurance in some degree of statistical balance, it has been estimated that Americans spent more than $1 billion in 1962 on quality books, concerts, opera, ballet, plays, paintings, and sculpture.)

Active forms of recreation have not, however, supplanted passive watching. American leisure-time habits have not changed radically in the last few years. Instead, *both* active and passive recreation have enlisted greater numbers of recruits. Americans now spend much more money, but still much less time, as participants than as spectators.

Information about the time spent attending sports events is unavailable. But the so-called average American adult devotes over four hours a day—about one-fourth of his waking hours—to reading newspapers and popular literature, listening to the radio, and watching movies and television. Upwards of 140 billion man-hours per year are spent watching TV alone, and Nielsen Research estimates that American families spend two-thirds more man-hours watching TV and listening to the radio than members of those families spend working for a living.

There would appear to be, in the cant phrase of the day, a communications gap between the American public and professional recreation leaders. The evidence is clear, according to Pro-

fessor White, that while today's "recreation leaders like to think of themselves as educators of man in the selective use of his ever increasing leisure time," "relatively few of the total public are ever seriously affected by these teachers" (11, p. 461).

By a very wide margin, most of the money and time Americans spend on recreation goes into the commercial market. Organized public recreation activities attract relatively negligible numbers. Comparative attendance records are not available; but of the $3.72 per capita in taxes reporting cities collected in 1960 for local public recreation, very little was allocated for organized activities. Most of it was spent on playgrounds, swimming pools, beaches, golf courses, and parks. The personnel at such public facilities function more as a security factor than as teachers.

Americans have become a mobile as well as a wealthy people and they seek services in recreation far afield—the entire United States or even Europe. The "community center," on the other hand, has become almost a relic of a bygone age, when more or less stable ethnic neighborhoods in large cities required a combined educational and recreational induction into American ways of thinking and doing.

Recreation is now "much more than an organized movement," again according to Professor White. It is "a way of life for every American based upon newly earned economic freedom." People now "want to travel 'Recreation First Class' and are willing to spend extra for the privileges which include freedom *from* organization and regulation; personal choice in activity, and privacy in a group of their own selection" (11, p. 485). Professionals, he adds, had better alter their methods if not their goals, for the tail is now wagging the dog.

Despite much unreckoned duplication of voluntary and private welfare facilities, organized recreation under public welfare auspices has undoubtedly meant much in the lives of uncounted thousands of youngsters, especially on the public playground. Such facilities as public swimming pools, golf courses, tennis

courts, and parks have also attracted and been used by adults in large numbers. To be sure, there have been objections to the practice of taxing all citizens to supply a minority of adults with "free" diversions. In any event, these are not "organized activities"; they are facilities used by individuals or families or small groups of friends, who retain the liberty to come and go on an undirected basis.

Most adult Americans follow their own bent in recreation, in a time and place that provide ample means and opportunity to gratify individual taste and inclination. The insistence of some critics that those same Americans "need" something entirely different and much better has not as yet secured much agreement among the public audience. This fact may in part explain the resentment shown by those same critics toward "commercialized recreation." Organized recreation under public-welfare auspices has not so much failed as it has been ignored.

One critic says that the same citizen "who would violently object to a few more cents on his tax statement for recreation will turn around and spend hundreds of dollars on the same type of recreation the community could provide for less than half what he is spending for the same purpose." Although the method by which these savings could be achieved is not specified, he does not blame the gap between private spending and tax spending upon the public: "This attitude indicates that something is radically wrong with the planning for and methods of carrying out public-supported recreation programs."

So long as some very expensive forms of recreation remain popular and the economy can support them and political authority does not forbid them, the misguided (or unguided) public will doubtless continue to choose to spend its own money on them. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine the costs of, say, foreign travel, attendance at horse tracks, legal betting, hot-rodding, collecting postage stamps and coins, boat ownership, and TV set purchases and repairs ever being paid for with tax money. The

only specific form of recreation the critic cited above mentions in this connection is bowling, and he adds: "It is reasonable to suppose that, within the next decade, other areas of sport and recreation activity will become commercialized into money-making programs. Will the recreation departments be in on the ground floor?" He also inquires: "If forty billion dollars is being spent each year for recreation, wouldn't it seem logical to think that those who have had formal training in the promotion and supervision of recreation should play an integral part?"

It appears doubtful that recreation departments ever will or can be "in on the ground floor." Bowling itself makes an excellent retrospective example. Until about the end of World War II, bowling was associated in the popular imagination with the pool-hall where, as a matter of fact, it was usually located. The "recreation departments," far from encouraging the further growth of bowling, usually denounced it as an evil influence. Bowling as big-time family fun developed in the market, and at its start no one was forecasting the recreation and economic boom to come.

There was no way any such forecast could have been made. A private risk had to be taken, in time and money, by the men who invented, improved, and marketed automatic pin spotters. Lane suppliers and proprietors also took a risk on the uncertain acceptance of family-style bowling. They all made a lot of money from the end of World War II to 1961, and so did the investors who risked their funds in bowling-equipment stocks. The boom, though, appears to be over, a condition reflected in the quoted prices of the stock of the biggest bowling-equipment manufacturer. It reached a high of 63⅝ in 1961, and closed at 17⅝ on March 10, 1964.

Taste and habit in specific forms of recreation are notoriously fickle. But even if in some hypothetical way public recreation could have gotten in on the ground floor of the money-making bowling boom, should all the taxpayers be left with what conceivably could turn out to be a white elephant? Should those men

who have already profited from that boom run that risk, or should the risk—in bowling or any other specific sport or form of entertainment—be handed over to the taxpayer?

If, on the other hand, bowling should survive its present relatively lean period and again prosper, it may do so by expanding services at which even the docile taxpayer might boggle. Further, these ancillary services of near-Byzantine splendor are such as officialdom would never approve.

The Futurama Bowl near San Jose in California, for example, is a lush repudiation of the so-called finer things of life. It attracts women with more than its bowling alleys. It has, according to *Time*, "a five-acre parking lot, nursery facilities for more than 180 children, a restaurant-bar, a dressing room, semiautomated food and beverage service, free coffee, a 'Glamorama Room' with physical therapist, body-building equipment and steam room." Whether these ladies "need" facilities of this kind may be open to question; in either event, they do seem to find them "adequate." Owner Nick Bebek, Jr., says simply: "They go insane!" after discovering how much weight they can lose in the Glamorama Room.

Another, if more subdued and dignified, customer of services that tax money will likely never subsidize is Dr. Albert Hammond. This professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins is also a horse-track bettor of many years' standing. He says that at the track he can always feel at home, never intruding, never intruded upon. " 'And when I am most distrustful of company and resentful of lonesomeness I can find at the track a populous solitude which is neither alienly engrossed like that of Broadway nor personally exacting like that of society' " (3, p. 90). Those in the modern world who in some degree share Thoreau's temperament can, if they wish, seek a modern habitat.

They may encounter discouragement, however, from a combined government policy of squeezing taxes and official approval of only rural-puritanical forms of recreation. Professor Hammond

has been thus discouraged. He reckons that "Over the country as a whole the total take [at horse tracks] can be safely estimated at 16%" (6, p. 35). The roulette players at Monte Carlo get a better break. They have potential access to 36 parts of the money out of every 37 they wager.

GUIDANCE BY EXPERTS

To repeat a queston raised a few pages above: How are standards of adequacy (for how many? for all?) to be set, and by whom? The ladies who patronize the Futurama Bowl and Professor Hammond who attends the horse tracks are defining for themselves the "good life," and pursuing it. Habit, taste, and individual preference govern their definition of what is desirable for themselves, and the marketplace supplies a variety of means from which they can choose.

It is true that technically proficient experts are granted considerable latitude by public opinion in the control of both ends and means in such fields as public sanitation and highway engineering. Technical decisions made in these areas of competence are, of course, backed by political power and even, if need be, by coercion. But that kind of control is experienced by most people as a light hand, because they accept the goals of pure drinking water and highway safety as in their own obvious interest and because the means to those ends are inaccessible to uninformed and unimpowered individuals. To be told what they should or even must do with their leisure time, on the other hand, would likely be experienced in a different way. Assumed expert proficiency to define the ends of recreation, and official control of the means, would be resented by many citizens as authoritarian control.

Claims that such technical expertise entitles those who have been formally trained in it to determine what other people should do in their leisure time can be encountered in the literature on

recreation, especially that which is sponsored by governmental authority. Exaggeration is not intended, and no alarm is being sounded. Most professional workers in the field of public recreation are dedicated to a cause and a job, and are authoritarian in neither act nor intention. Those who in speech and writing invoke a professional elite who will guide and educate a needy mass of unenlightened citizens are in a minority, at least at the moment.

The motives of this minority should not be impugned. They are doubtless much more motivated by a generous hope that has a long tradition than by a bid for power. The hope is that a world properly guided will return to Arcadian innocence and selfless brotherhood. Once likemindedness is achieved, the delusion that private good and public welfare can ever be at variance will disappear. In this outlook the public welfare is the supreme good. This supreme good transcends a discredited notion that public welfare is simply a balance sheet of the interests—both those that are in harmony with the interests of others and those that are not—of the separate individuals who make up a public.

Beyond the harmony of all interests, utopian thought further assumes that all individuals face the world with the outlook of the questing scientist. All men are regarded as seeking rational answers rather than being involved, in Hobbes's famous phrase, in "a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in death." That is why education is so centrally located in all utopian documents, including those written by the minority of professional recreationists who are utopians.

The elite, or Plato's philosopher-kings, or Rousseau's law-giver, or Comte's High Priest of Humanity, do not impose their arbitrary will. They open the eyes of others to scientific reality. "Everyone is capable of discovering the truth, if it is presented to him in the right light. Every member of Rousseau's sovereign is bound to will the general will. For the general will is in the last resort a Cartesian truth" (10, p. 29).

The assumed harmony of interests is expanded by all utopians into an assumed identity of tastes and inclinations. Only unscientific errors about what those tastes and inclinations *really* are keep the unenlightened in darkness. They must be taught what it is they really want, and at the same time those evil social institutions which have deluded them must be destroyed. "People must be released from the oppressive and coercive forces of the machine age and from false standards, so that they may be free to enjoy those things which are recreational and educational in character."

The sentence above comes not from professional recreation but from an academic field. In crude estimate, academicians and public officials are making open pleas of that kind in greater numbers than are those professionals who actually work in the field. Another "outsider" says: "Earnest recreationists should exert pressure on every American state legislature to establish a department of recreation and to empower it to formulate and enforce standards for local communities." But in similar vein an "insider" speaks of the need for developing "creative elites, small groups of connoisseurs who create and mold taste . . . and accept the responsibility for cultural initiative and the development of cultural traditions."

When another outsider sees the need "to educate the people for the 'worthy use of leisure' " and still another insider speaks of the "need" of "our people" for "assistance in defining their own objectives in leisure, in selecting activities that will bring them the greatest reward," they appear, to repeat, to speak for a minority. On the other hand, in and outside the professional ranks of recreation, a near unanimous attitude of distrust and dislike for commercialized recreation is freely expressed. Quite typical is this complaint: "In addition to not adequately serving adults, private organizations apparently fail in fulfilling the recreational needs of youth."

Television, automobiles, juvenile hangouts, bowling alleys,

poolrooms, and the movies are the particular targets of what might be regarded as a puritanical animus. In other words, active dislike for the open market in recreation is more widely shared than is enthusiasm for political coercion, so that the following statement is, as of now, quite extreme: "When society is conducted more for the benefit of all people, rather than for the owning group, entertainment and recreation will be evaluated and approved by psychiatrists, mental hygienists, educators, recreationists, and enlightened laymen before they are offered to the public."

Government spokesmen surely do not go that far. It would be grossly unfair to accuse them of advocating "adequate" solutions as openly and obviously authoritarian as that for meeting "needs." Still, in those who do not share much enthusiasm for what the Nazis called *Freizeitgestaltung* (literally: the shaping of the people's free time), some governmental pronouncements may create a small disquiet.

Former Federal Communications Commissioner Minow once told the National Association of Broadcasters: "It is not enough to cater to the nation's whims—you must also serve the nation's needs." In similar vein, Shane McCarthy, of the President's Council on Youth Fitness, addressed the 1957 National Conference on Education for Leisure with these words: "You are the hub, and the spokes go through every segment of your communities. What we must do is take time and convert it into proper kinds of leisure." And he continued: "What we must do is re-evaluate this social structure on how to live life, and that's what's involved in the President's Council on Youth Fitness."

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

In Centre County, Pennsylvania—for the Northeast an area of sparse settlement—is located what is known as Fisherman's Paradise: nothing but trout, and a great many of them. Sportsmen

come from all parts of the state and from several neighboring states to try their luck, which is assured. Although they stand hip to hip on either side of Spring Creek and only an expert caster can avoid entangling his line with one or more other lines, it is still difficult to leave for home empty-handed. During the limited season two or three state employees, upstream, are constantly dumping into it trout from the state hatcheries.

A rapidly expanding state university is also located in Centre County. Do wildlife and outdoor sport or does higher education get priority? More students inevitably mean more commercial establishments and more sewerage and therefore fewer fish and anglers. That, anyway, is the unqualified opinion expressed by a local engineer in the *Centre Daily Times* for November 24, 1961: "We have to get used to one thing. . . . We're either going to take care of the students, or of fish. We can't take care of both, because Spring Creek simply isn't a large enough stream to keep from being polluted by as many people as there are concentrated in the State College region." Pennsylvania, he added, "has to make up its mind that it must sacrifice certain streams to the march of population and industrialization. If it wants to save some streams for fishing, it will have to designate them and conduct a very, very rigid control of housing and industrial growth in the areas along those streams." And he concluded: "You can't have civilization and wildlife—such as good hunting and fishing —in the very same areas. They are different activities, and one almost automatically banishes the other."

In the above situation there is no harmony of all interests, if, indeed, that condition ever does prevail in any situation. The legislators in Harrisburg are under pressure from voting sportsmen who want more fish and from voting parents anxious for reassurance that their offspring will one day attend the State University. The people's representatives, in their own interest, worsen the condition deplored by the engineer.

The issue will inevitably become more critical than it is at the

present time. Some people in Centre County, for example sportsmen who are also businessmen, will have fairly divided interests. They will then have to make a decision about which side they will support in the struggle.

Others will likely support contesting political pressures without internal debate or equivocation. One side will include those students' parents who reside outside the County. The other will include resident retirees and industrial workers who spend much of their time hunting and fishing.

In all probability, a compromise among the various contending interests will emerge. This will completely satisfy no one. But some will accept it because they have been disciplined to the democratic way of life, and others will capitulate because there will be nothing they can do about their own displeasure. A final probability: whichever side comes closer than the other to believing that in the effected compromise it has won a victory is the side that will announce that the "public interest" has been served and achieved.

The concept of interests is not an easy one to deal with. As already noted there is a tendency—which is possibly universal—to identify public good with personal desire. But personal desire itself can contract as well as expand. A combined system of power distribution and moral containment prevails in all societies, within which men *define* their own interests as well as pursue them. Thus when centralized government over a period of decades assumes increasing control, as has happened in this country, most men will accede to that condition. They come to define their own interests within accepted limits which would, in a previous era, have been resisted. And thus also while most men attempt to make money, now as always they accept moral limits, so that Willie Sutton's classic reply to the question why he robbed banks ("Because that's where the money is") does not figure in their calculations.

To whatever extent men voluntarily, or involuntarily, restrict

the definition of their own interests, those interests are never identical. There are, to be sure, certain interests which are common to all the citizens of a given country and even to all human beings who inhabit the planet. But these are not the interests of which we are aware, the ones with which politicians, lawyers, labor leaders, educators, clergymen, anyone who works for a living, even lovers and certainly utopians, deal.

Laws to protect householders interfere with the occupation of burglary. A moral crusade can reduce the profits of some and render life less bearable for many others. An increase in a public-library budget may make more books available, but that may be small comfort to the taxpayer whose reading is encompassed by the racing form and the sports pages of his daily newspaper. An era of prosperity, combined with technical expertise and easy and free access to technical training, may be in the clear interest of the majority, but it deprives the modern unemployed of the opportunity to blame either ill luck or "the system." A quiet household after the evening meal may be absolutely essential to the well-being of an exhausted husband and father, while his small children may find their enforced inactivity intolerable.

Thus every social order, constantly and by necessity, thwarts interests as these would be defined by various individuals and categories of persons. Such frustration may be accepted without question by the weak, the uncaring, and the unknowing. But it is in some measure experienced by all. They are either reconciled to frustration by the morality they accept, or they are made to fear the threat of punishment. Shared morality and threat of punishment are the basic controls of every social order, the one internal, the other external. By insisting that man is a social animal, Aristotle stressed only the first. By insisting that every man requires a visible and threatening overlord to keep him from running amok, Hobbes stressed only the second.

Perhaps not all, but surely most individuals appear ready to test any situation for whatever the possibilities, limits, and penal-

ties might be if they should push ahead and try for some further advantage. They live in a world, though, which less often offers to give them something than it demands reciprocity—always rationalized with appeals to morality—for any favors granted. That learning process starts in the family.

Even in the so-called child-centered family, a minimal amount of obedience is exacted in payment for parental responsibilities of care and protection. As the small child matures, he is constantly threatened with punishment for disobedience. But he also comes to identify with close others, and "takes the point of view of the other toward the self." In statistically normal development, he accepts with diminishing grudge the hedging in of his own ego thrusts by the enforced interests of others.

The "socialization process," of course, is neither ever entirely successful nor completed. No individual ever becomes wholly reconciled to social necessity—as this is defined for him by others. When he takes his place as an adult in the division of labor, however, he has already learned that it is in his own interest to act as if what he wants is for the most part what he is supposed to want and to be satisfied with.

Social life invokes the iron law of reciprocity: appreciation in the form of either love or reputation is reserved for those who obey, or who appear to obey, common rules. It is in one's own interest that others, at least most others, obey the rules, and one is caught in one's own complicity in the attempt to control them. The others, in turn, watch that one carefully to see that bread is not returned to him until he first casts it upon the waters. Paradoxical as it may appear, for most people it is in their own interest not to pursue certain interests too strenuously and to settle for less than they might otherwise be willing to accept if the area of operation granted to them were in fact wider than it is.

Every social order (in terms of experience, every circle of competing and cooperating individuals) attempts to capitalize inner

controls. They are much cheaper in social effort than are external ones. At the same time, the opposition of others' interests, within as well as outside the given group, reduces the need for enforcing the threat of punishment and subtly fosters shared morality.

The conflict of interests thus plays a complicated role in human affairs. That conflict can and does rend the social fabric, a fact so obvious and so often elaborated upon that it needs only be mentioned. The conflict of interests can also, however, be viewed as the simultaneous weaver, a sort of hyperthyroid Penelope.

That very few interests are in harmony, that whatever the common interest may be it is served by separate and divisive interests, is no persuasive argument. Minds other than those which arrange neat and tidy utopias also yearn for closure and certainty, for an end to mess, muddle, and paradox. It is, moreover, true that respect for the rights of others is strained when they persist in doing what we do not want them to do, which is usually the case. The notion that others must be saved from themselves, in their own interest, is an authoritarian temptation even for those who are reasonably content to mind their own business.

The suspicion that other people—no matter how disciplined by outer authority, limited opportunity, opposing interests, and inner morality—are unable to define their own best interest is one that is easily aroused. Not so long ago a labor leader explained why the issue of a pay raise *or* a pension plan was not going to be put to the membership for a vote: if they had the opportunity they would choose the pay raise and they would be better off with the pension plan. The belief held by experts in various fields that most people in a complex, industrial society are no longer capable of defining their own best interest has led many down a crooked path in the search for a definition of democracy.

There is no answer, no easy one, anyway, to what Edward McChesney Sait has called the central dilemma of modern democracy. "Democracy without experts—and it has a justifiable

fear of them—faces the danger of collapse; with experts—they being a lean and hungry crowd—it faces the danger of being devoured by its own offspring."

In any event, social reality always eludes the variety of terms which may be applied to it. Thus in the modern world no national society concretely fits the summary term "totalitarian" on the one hand, "free society" or "democracy" on the other. But there are degrees of difference which, although they cannot be measured, can still be stated. For present purposes a democratic society is one in which clashes of interest occur more or less without danger of monolithic political reprisal, while a totalitarian society is one in which a ruling political clique decides more or less unchallenged what the general social interest, the "public interest," is going to be.

The young men who drafted the American Constitution never employed the term democracy, but they endorsed what is covered by the above usage. They conceived of order in society as the achievement of means to contain an inevitable clash of interests, not as a utopian resolution of all interests in a totally encompassing and thus mythic common interest. They candidly admitted self-interest in their own deliberations long before revisionist historians got around to pointing out that fact. And in a further departure from utopian thought, they recorded their lack of optimism about human nature. What they attempted to leave us was a system that would check even men like themselves in the common pursuit of self-interest and the lust for power.

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chapter three

Social Problems and Recreation

The following observation recently appeared in a San Francisco newspaper: "The trick is to strike a balance between degenerative toil (such as our ancestors knew) and achieving toil producing a variety of satisfactions." Is the proposed four-day work week a promise or a threat? The "old" forty-hour week lends a dubious hope, in view of what it has already wrought. "If another day is lopped off only to be used in the garden, on jam-packed highways, and in nursing hangovers, we may get better gardens, better wrecks, better hangovers, but what else will we get as a people?"

The citation is pure Americana. Still another problem—another river to cross—looms ahead. Other people are again a cause for worry, again their morals especially are a nagging concern. A puritanical suspicion that the good life might not be altogether good for the character of others tugs at the determined faith in progress. And despite the somewhat atypical minor note of skepticism about change being good in itself, there is the residual if lessening confidence that by addressing the public another problem not only can be but indeed will be solved. "The trick is to strike a balance. . . ."

AN AMERICAN OBSESSION

Does the desire to strike a balance result from confronting a fact, or does it emerge from an attitude? Why was poverty almost as resignedly accepted by the many poor as it was readily accepted by the few rich during the middle ages, while it has become a greater problem in modern America than it ever was or is in any other time or place? It is because as affluence becomes more widespread, so does the attitude that no one should be, or should be allowed to be, poor.

The recognition that a problem exists has much more to do with states of mind than with conditions of fact. A condition is transformed into a social problem when an alarmist attitude is ex-

pressed in popular opinion and/or forced to attention by political power. In the case of poverty, political power attempts to manipulate envy among the few poor and guilt among the many well-off. As for public opinion, de Tocqueville observed some time ago that differences in democratic society (he meant equalitarian) become less tolerable as those differences diminish.

If conditions, as such, are of secondary importance, the rate at which conditions change cannot be so confidently discounted. Where social change is rapid, the awareness of social problems is to that extent fostered, even if it is not formulated. Conversely, the awareness of people who live in isolated, agricultural societies is limited, for the most part, to personal problems. Their way of life remains fairly constant, from one generation to the next. It does not have to change with, or at least react to, a permanent revolution of technological innovation. There is no outmoding of skills acquired in a single lifetime as new ones are demanded. Nor do definitions of property rights shift on the land under their feet, and roles and statuses along with them.

Rapid change has already overtaken or is overtaking most of the planet. The United States still remains above all other countries that which is, in a cant phrase of the moment, problem-oriented. Much of the talk is stale exhortatory rhetoric, stemming from sheer habit after the will and intent to act have tired. Most of the talk deals with essentially frivolous issues, in comparison with many that are denied to be of public concern. But the determination to pose and grapple with problems remains sufficiently strong, of such an intensity, as to make the "problem orientation" of modern America almost a distinctive culture trait.

If "ideas" (or states of mind) have here been given priority over "conditions," that is not to deny that each is inextricably cause and effect of the other. A much deeper concern about social problems has been shown in America than anywhere else, however, despite the fact that what can crudely be described as the "same conditions" have become virtually universal. That being

the case, some justification is afforded for an examination of ideas as if they had independent existence.

The American obsession with problems is not traceable to the Enlightenment, but the Enlightenment provided the key ideas which at the very least served to rationalize that obsession. There is Condorcet's faith in man's perfectibility, which broke the Augustinian tradition of the need for divine intercession in the effort to improve self. Especially noteworthy is Rousseau's revolutionary pronouncement that man is "naturally" good and made evil only by evil institutions, institutions which can easily be reformed once men have been taught that their interests are in fact identical. Add Montesquieu's confusion of the laws of nature with human judicial procedure, and the intellectual ancestry of American nineteenth-century social reform effort is sketched in even though far from completed: "Emerson put his finger on the essential faith of the reformer when he assumed that institutions exist to be improved, that man can improve them along with himself, that the law of human society . . . is one of change" (7, p. 369).

The new European faith had effects both different and more intensive in America than in Europe. After the Revolution had eaten all her children in France, for example, remaining hopes were ground down by militarism and the re-forming of ancient hobbles to the human spirit. What made the shibboleths of the Enlightenment so adaptable to the American ethos was what was unique in the collective American experience.

In this country there was an almost total break with European society, with its mercantilism and feudal memories and fixed classes. Here was plenty of room, land for the taking, a looseness of authority that granted opportunity to get on, and a freedom to the capable and determined to pass those who were not. The resulting drive to production, only disguised somewhat in the westward expansion, piled up a great deal of wealth.

Those who produced it could in a sense afford the luxury of maintaining or at least tolerating a semiprofessional class of re-

formers who sought to use other people's money in various schemes of collective redemption. They were licensed to do so by the conflict of values inherent in the contradictory propositions of equal opportunity and literal equality. The combination was, so far as such developments can be delimited in origin, a peculiar and unique contribution of the American frontier experience. Only with the passing of the frontier, in an emerging climate of urban industrialism, could the reformers denigrate equality of opportunity, emphasize literal equality, and combine the latter with the message of the Enlightenment.

REFORMERS AND THE STATE

The formation of such a class of reformers awaited the late nineteenth century, when the power to tax for more than limited administrative purposes and thus to redistribute wealth politically began to be legitimized. Only by absolute state control, Rousseau had averred, can literal equality be established. He was correct, but few American reformers have ever advocated such control. They have instead defined democracy in such a way as to foster state absolutism and pursued specific goals within that definition. They reversed Rousseau's formula. It was the reformist promotion of literal equality in this country which aided in the growth of state power.

A symbiotic relationship has developed between social reformers seeking to improve other people by making them more alike and politicians seeking to aggrandize their own power. In an earlier epoch social reform was a matter of exhorting the public, in which self-appointed citizens demanded that their fellow citizens join them in taking common action. This approach has by no means disappeared, as the citation which opens this chapter illustrates. It is becoming less typical, however, as it is supplanted by invocations to government coercion.

Cause and effect, here as elsewhere, is not so much a straight

line as a circle. The capability as well as the authority to make decisions, and the funds available to back them up, are now much less diffused than once they were. Social scientists, as well as social reformers, have become aware of the changing facts of life.

When such late nineteenth and turn-of-the-century sociologists as Ward, Sumner, Cooley, and Ross set out to improve their fellow citizens, they used moral precept or attempted to enlighten public opinion. Modern social scientists utilize such means sparingly, or deny that social science can advocate ends of action, or—and this tack appears to be one that is being more frequently taken of late—they turn to the state. The following statement is noteworthy more for its blunt honesty than for uniqueness in sentiment. "The payoff for the social scientist interested in putting his research to practical application is through government, for the most part." In general, problems of appreciable size are solved by public action, "usually in the form of statutes or administrative regulations." Specialized knowledge "ordinarily makes its contribution to social change through action programs to influence legislators and administrators."

The above statement demonstrates how both fashion and power can combine to designate what is and what is not a social problem. Both fashion and the present drift of power, for example, define certain problems in such a way as to require further state intervention in private affairs. On the other hand, there is a diminishing market for promoting as *itself* a social problem (and one of greater magnitude than any other now agitating public attention) the concentration of political power and control in this country. But facts, if not prevailing sentiment, might surely lead to such a conclusion.

The more government taxes in order to "solve problems," the less income do private citizens retain to handle their own problems or to make voluntary contributions in aiding others to solve theirs. Ordering and forbidding may not be extended by any *one*

of many "statutes or administrative regulations," but the indefinite proliferation of them erodes organized social life at what civil servants refer to as "the local level." Nevertheless, the concentration of power and control in government cannot claim the status of social problem because so many people, instead of being concerned, have either become reconciled to or welcome that state of affairs. To repeat: a condition is transformed into a social problem only when an alarmist attitude about that condition is expressed in popular opinion or is forced to attention by political power.

WHO DEFINES AND WHO PAYS?

That conditions or "facts" by themselves do not constitute social problems is a statement worth repeating, for confusion on this point beclouds many discussions of social issues today. Prostitution was no social problem in ancient Greece, where the earnings of priestess-prostitutes built and maintained the religious temples. War was no problem in the old Comanche culture, which defined war as man's natural state. The Hindu caste system until recently was no problem, since the several castes believed their hereditary status to have been fixed since the beginning of time and their religion sanctioned acceptance of hereditary status. The determining factors in the above instances were not "facts," but the distribution of power and the prevailing attitudes toward facts within an institutional framework.

Prostitution in Greece, armed conflict on the reservation, and caste in India have all become social problems in recent times. Power has shifted, the context of experience has changed, as have attitudes, and thus the "facts" have changed as well. These instances, or ones very like them, are also social problems in modern America. A majority of citizens are willing to express a negative public attitude toward all of them.

In modern America, those problems which are widely regarded

as such can be distinguished from others which are mostly defined and exploited by experts and politicians. Since clashes of interest inevitably occur in all "problems," power figures in both cases. But in one case the exercise of power is limited as it is not in the other.

Juvenile delinquency is today a "popular" problem, in the sense that a great many people are interested enough to read and debate about it and even in some cases to do something about it. But whether they exert effort to punish or to change behavior, their power is narrowly restricted.

Problems of the other kind, in comparison with juvenile delinquency for example, can hardly be said to exist in public consciousness. And the proposed "solutions" are inevitably as authoritarian as they may be utopian. One such is the so-called problem of leisure and recreation. The problem of "the constructive use of leisure," according to one textbook, calls for "educating people so that they may know how to use free time wisely. . . ." And "it took a long while," it is admitted, "to make the transition from the laissez-faire philosophy to the recognition of government responsibility in providing leisure-time activities and programs for all citizens."

What shall or shall not be declared a problem, who shall do the defining, and who will direct what means in the announced effort of reform? Science, it hardly need be said, has nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of those descriptive categories in the midst of sheer experience that will be called problems, nor does science have much more to do with the means adopted to seek their solution. Instead of science there is—either separately or in combination—humanitarian concern and political coercion.

But in essence, no matter how much admixed with humanitarian concern or whether the given issue is a popular problem instead of one merely officially announced, the "problems approach" turns out to be a political matter. Prostitution, for

example, cannot by scientific demonstration be proved an "evil." Nor will the expression of anguish over the fate of innocent victims by itself accomplish anything. An effective condemnation of prostitution (effective perhaps for a while and in one place) requires the concerted moral judgment of individuals powerful enough to make otherwise complaisant law-enforcement officials take action. And any humanitarian concern in such judgment and action must ignore the apparent interests of both vendors and customers in the illicit commercial transaction.

Should citizens retain sufficient income to make their own choices about what forms of recreation they want, or should they be taxed enough so that public officials can make those choices for them? "Science" can determine neither whether this issue is indeed a problem nor what should be done about it. The matter rests with subjective judgment on one hand, with a struggle for power on the other. As for humanitarianism in this context, any high school debater should have little difficulty in defending either side of the argument.

In any attempt to designate a social problem, and in any further attempt to do something about it, someone is called upon to pay a price. Since men pursue a multitude of purposes and goals, their interests are likewise diverse and even conflicting. Some goals and purposes are common and shared, and so are the interests they reflect, but it is either a philosophic error with social reformers or a shrewd tactic to assume that there is a harmony of all interests and thus that no one need pay a price for any reform. They may and do, conversely, argue that what may appear to interfere with the present and immediate interests of a few will ultimately redound to the benefit of all.

Actually, the plea that all interests are in harmony was much more often used by nineteenth-century reformers than it is by their twentieth-century counterparts. The latter have hypostatized an entity they call society, and endowed it with a consciousness and a welfare separate and distinct from the individuals and

groups which presumably compose it. The worship of this Baal, sometimes called the "public interest" or "social welfare," now takes precedence over all interests. But what has not changed in the field of social reform, from nineteenth century to the present, is the failure of imagination to understand—whatever the merits of a given case—that a price must be paid.

If the crime problem is defined as one primarily concerned with protecting criminals, then law-abiding citizens will receive less protection from criminals. If peace-at-any-price is the supreme goal in international relations, then the price of foreign domination will be exacted. If the present generation continues to be encouraged to consume the natural setting, then inevitably there will be less of that natural setting for future generations to enjoy. And if professional reformers are granted sufficient tax monies and political power to "educate the public" in directed uses of leisure time, then that public will have less money to spend as they see fit and restrictions will be placed upon what remains of their present right to plan their own lives.

UNANTICIPATED RESULTS AND MAJORITY TASTE

One variant of the dictum that a price must be paid for seeking the solution of a social problem is this: such an effort is invariably accompanied by unforeseen and often by unwanted consequences. Dams create "new lakes for recreational enjoyment," but they also destroy "anadromous fisheries." Improved transportation facilities "have opened up many new recreational opportunities, but have also destroyed the particular value of wilderness areas" (6, pp. 5, 6).

In the above instance, action is limited and consequence is obvious. The scale can be vaster, and relationships more ambiguous. Matthew Arnold and Lester Frank Ward were not alone in

their projection of a mirage that still lingers: universal education will produce a universal flowering of "culture." What has happened instead is that the way of life Arnold and Ward represented is now pursued by an even smaller minority, with self-conscious cultishness.

Any such charge as "the failure of universal education to improve majority taste" is, to be sure, impossible to prove. The more likely fact is a constancy of majority taste under any and all dispensations of formal schooling. What is perfectly evident, though, is the insistence of many intellectuals and organized-recreation publicists that "modern mass entertainment" is responsible for preventing a universal flowering of "culture" under the dispensation of universal compulsory and free education.

It is the popular-entertainment *industry* which is new, but not popular entertainment itself, nor the level of taste at which it is directed. In no period of time has a majority desired "the best that has been thought and said." The comic drama in ancient Greece was slanted to the "lowest" themes and appeals. The Roman circuses are a matter of legend. The religious processions of the medieval period took on some of the aspects of a modern county fair or crossroads carnival. In the sixteenth century Montaigne saw medieval culture breaking down and noted "escape, distraction, entertainment, and, last but not least, vicarious living." D. W. Brogan has reminded us that the college graduate who "never cracked a book" after he graduated has existed for quite some time, since before Columbus discovered America. He says he is neither surprised nor shocked to learn that America spends much more money on sports than on books. "All societies in the past have done so."

The argument is sometimes made that literary taste in the past was far superior to that of the present. That may be so, although the proposition cannot be tested. The fact that any era hands down to posterity only the best of its published work, however, lends caution to drawing a broad contrast between golden past

and shoddy present. A century ago, Hawthorne, Thoreau, and Melville were selling only a few hundred copies of their books. At the same time, now-forgotten "damned scribbling women" like Fanny Fern, Grace Greenwood, and Mary Jane Holmes were selling hundreds of thousands of their vapid romances.

In this very probably permanent situation there are no easy formulas. There is, of course, one that is frequently advanced, and that is to "educate the people." This hardy perennial is usually accompanied by the unexamined cliché that "the preservation of democracy rests with an enlightened electorate." It is possibly just as well that habit, custom, and a balance of contesting interests have remained to be relied upon.

In mid-1964, according to the ARB ratings, the TV shows which attracted the largest audiences ranked as follows: *Beverly Hillbillies, Bonanza, Dick Van Dyke Show,* and *Candid Camera.* Only the numbers, not the proportions, have changed. Majorities in the past eagerly turned to their contemporary equivalents of *Hillbillies.* Their modern descendants have received a much higher average level of formal schooling. If their taste remains at the same level as that of their ancestors, then present proposals to raise standards of appreciation by educating the people might be examined for the amount of coercion they either admit or imply.

There may be no easy formulas, but the value judgment some highbrow critics have passed on modern popular entertainment skips over its "deliberate appeal to base instincts" to center on its subsidiary effort to homogenize "high" and popular art. Their fear is not so much that the bad will drive out the good, but that the distinction between the two is becoming blurred. Thus while *The Untouchables* may have done nothing to elevate taste, at least it did nothing to confuse it. Unabashed tripe of that kind can be enjoyed, at many conceivable levels of communication.

Until production on the program was dropped, it is reliably reported that every Thursday night nearly all the residents in one college dormitory gathered. They ignored the plot in favor of

waiting for some misguided citizen to accept Eliot Ness's plea to divulge information about some gangster. This was the signal for all to cry in unison, "You'll be sorry!" The dubious moral communicated, apparently, was that anyone who cooperates with Ness is marked for a violent end. It is quite unlikely, however, that any of the young men in that dormitory audience were being led into a life of crime, or even being corrupted in some more subtle way.

In the outlook of some highbrows, *The Untouchables* does not threaten like the TV "serious dramatic show" in which a heavily identified sensitive soul rolls his eyes heavenward and softly intones a liturgy of "Shakespeare, Dante, Nietzsche, and James" when his crass boss inquires to know what is more important than boosting the firm's sales. Modern advertising has also gone high class, and thereby also lowered the fences of distinctiveness, separation, and discrimination.

John A. Kouwenhoven is especially prejudiced against the Container Corporation's ads in the "Great Ideas of Western Man" series, which won the top award in the 1960 *Saturday Review* competition. No "great idea," he says, can be expressed in a single sentence which is removed from its context and irrelevantly juxtaposed with a reproduction of a modern painting. Such an enterprise is "obviously intended to appeal to the public's respect for education and for the arts." One wonders whether such an enterprise can even sell containers, whatever else is being hawked.

The question of modern taste, and that of unanticipated and unwanted consequences of problem solving, especially in terms of leisure and recreation, have been brought together by Peter Blake. The achievement of general prosperity has solved the problem of poverty—and thereby helped to create a hideous blight that spreads with our suburban areas. Most Americans, as well as most of the inhabitants of the other industrialized societies, "are, indeed, fairly indifferent to the issue of beauty." The mess along the fringes of our suburban highways—shops, hot-dog

stands, drive-ins, gas stations, and the like—"is not the work of some numerically small and diabolical pressure group but, rather, the work of hundreds of thousands of 'average citizens.'" And a new generation of farmers is befouling the rural landscape with big and small tin cans: "trailers, silos, storage tanks, prefab sheds, and just plain ordinary oil drums. These are people of goodwill, not money-mad lobbyists. Why, then, do they behave like vandals?" (3, p. 5).

There are, he believes, two main reasons. Most of us have lost the discriminating use of our eyes. Screaming colors, posters, and "spectaculars" have all dulled our senses, so that a rose becomes less a rose than a symbol for something else—spring or love or whisky. Also, affluence has made us a throw-away civilization, the concept of "lasting values" has about disappeared, and universal vandalism has become almost accepted policy.

John A. Kouwenhoven has turned Blake's thesis around, and views waste not as an unanticipated consequence of solving the problem of poverty, not even as a price that has had to be paid for it, but instead as an integral part of those very attitudes and values which made the achievement of affluence possible. "America is process"—that is the underlying reality, the mission, and even the goal. We cannot preserve anything, for all is change; we cannot hope to "conserve" a wilderness we are bound by our genius, drive, and institutions to attack and use; we can only work out methods for exploiting it more effectively. To change our life of change is impossible. "There are several ways in which the paradox can be stated, but they all add up to something like: 'Waste not; have not' or 'Nothing succeeds like a mess'" (16, p. 219).

Undisturbed, the beer can remains by the highway. No one picks it up, opens the ends, and flattens the can for roofing material, as is the practice in many parts of the world. We have beer cans to spare. More important, the cans are casually tossed out of passing cars because the tossers are hurrying on to someplace else

and they tend to respect constituted authority only when it threatens them. "Whose highway is it, anyway?"

Blake's angry denunciation of vandalism, though, is something Kouwenhoven declines to indulge. It is quite likely that "we may not be able to get rid of the mess without also getting rid of the abundance." And further, much further, the waste and consequent untidiness may be "as much a result of democracy as of abundance."

Kouwenhoven argues that democracy is not the by-product of abundance, as David M. Potter and others have insisted. Abundance is instead the by-product of the democratic outlook, which resents and resists the placing of limits upon individual determination of private goals. His thesis resembles that of Max Weber, who traced the rise of modern capitalism not to a set of material conditions (a Marxian or quasi-Marxian approach) but to social institutions, specifically in his case to the protestant ethic. In both views the goose came before the golden eggs, the producer before the result.

Which came first—if one did—may remain open for debate. In his attempt to grapple with the issue, Professor McGuire has said simply that "An affluent society is a product, primarily, of a closely meshed and well-integrated business system" (18, p. 264). One tangential relationship does, however, appear to be unequivocal. What is variously called liberty and freedom and democracy, and cannot very well be defined, does not find vested authority, immobilized hierarchical arrangement, and "national planning" congenial. The potentially tragic consequence which responsible conservationists might care to consider is the price that would have to be paid for a rigorously instituted and administered national political program of conservation, or even a program designed merely to control the vandalism Blake deplores.

There is, as Aldous Huxley pointed out, an affinity between neatness and authoritarianism. "The good life can be lived only in a society where tidiness is preached and practiced, but not too fanatically, and where efficiency is always haloed, as it were, by a

tolerated aura of mess." But Huxley's statement, it must be admitted, asserts an inevitable relationship and does not offer a "solution" to a "problem."

In any event, we cannot have it both ways. An egalitarian democracy cannot be maintained while the egalitarian and restless majority are simultaneously directed to the sort of civic consciousness and deep concern for spiritual and artistic values which we imagine a few aristocratic philosophers in ancient Greece to have embodied. We cannot even have leisure, according to de Grazia, for the life of leisure can be possessed only by a few who live in a rigidly structured society such as that in which ancient Greek philosophy flourished.

EDUCATE THE PEOPLE

An almost supernatural faith in education, a faith that minds can be as well as should be molded into any desired shape by training and exhortation, is universal in the modern world. Anthropologist Leslie A. White has likened this faith to the magic of primitive man, who believes he can force the external world to comply with his own wishes and desires. When the shaman is faced by the fact that his magic has failed to do what he promised his fellow tribesmen it would accomplish, he says that what they all need is more and better magic.

By education the modern reformer usually means something different from training of the mind. He is much more likely to be interested in changing attitudes and values, and thus in showing others what their real interests are. Coercive intent often slips into such an enterprise. His faith in education, however, shared by his audience, tends to shield both from any evidence of such intent.

No matter how well-meaning and idealistic the promoter with an urge to improve the character of others may be, the implication of both his faith and his determination is authoritarian. The

point is one to which a great many will take exception, especially on the paradoxical issue of "the need for democratic leadership." Doubtless most educated Americans today, for example, would agree so readily with the second sentence of the following statement, made at the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth, that they would not bother to examine the unsupported claim of the first: "There is a rising demand for a leisure-time intelligentsia. And the efforts of national organizations to provide the best possible programs for the leisure of children and youth may help to develop this intelligentsia." The recreational reformer who made the following prediction is less fuzzy about what he wants: "The time is coming when education and recreation will be as well regulated as public health."

No criticism of recreation—in the sense of what people elect to do with their work-free time in pursuit of pleasure and enjoyment --is here intended nor should be inferred. But that is not what is meant by the word recreation as it is used in some quarters. Instead: "As the quality of both recreation and education improves, the line of demarcation between the two becomes ever more faint and indistinct." And in one further step, recreation is defined beyond education to become political reform. As expressed by still another writer who by no means lacks company: "Recreation may be utilized to make democracy function."

Misguided hope and profound misunderstanding of human nature have accompanied and fed the constant utopian illusion. And all utopian thought features education, directed by an enlightened elite, as a panacea for renovating the minds and hearts of other men. Fortunately, most utopias remain of the mind and in books. The few attempts that have been made in history to actualize them have always had disastrous consequences. Savage repression is laid on those, never a few, who fail to see that their own interests and those of their enlightened elite are exactly the same.

There is the further difficulty that every elite is composed of

individuals, who not only pursue their variant self-interests but want to educate others in variant ways. Plato overcame that difficulty with a sleight-of-hand trick. He made his philosopher-kings simultaneously the products of perfect (fixed and static) education as well as the innovators of perfect education. But time does not stop, and the real world in which imperfect men live demands qualities and responses that are not fixed and static. And unlike Plato, most of his intellectual descendants have not kept their eyes on eternity. Thus for several centuries they have propagandized, cajoled, educated, and exhorted others to be altruistic, forgiving, kind, and nurturing, while they have also exhorted others to be self-reliant, ambitious, patriotic, realistic, and loyal to one divisive cause or another.

Times change, the interests of the educators change, the "needs of society" change, and one set of demands is made at the expense of the other, or both may be made at once. In any event, the priests, scribes, philosophers, teachers—all the official and self-appointed agents of social control—have the job of "education" to do over again in each generation. We remain in moral rectitude and political wisdom, as historian Crane Brinton has pointed out, about where we were when the ancient Hebrews and Greeks tried their hands at it.

In the Western tradition, from Plato to Marx and beyond, enlightened minds have conjured up the perfected social order of final redemption, the final day of ultimate harmony. Utopian dream may or may not be harmless, but the reality never is. Even the small utopian communities, entered by compact of a few like-minded and convinced individuals, all disintegrated under the iron restriction of enforced uniformity. But since they were small, and escape was always available to the surrounding and unconvinced world, ensuing disaster was always limited.

What was lacking in the small utopian communities was the means to enforce uniformity, through unescapable coercion. Escape routes were cut off by the sheer scope of the French and

Russian revolutions. In those movements the hope that others will be and do what is wanted, and the belief that they can be educated to realize that all interests are the same, combined with political power of matching intensity. Coercion strips off its ideological mask when utopian scheme, however compromised by reality, is transformed into action. Coercion is effective, however, only to the extent that it cannot be challenged or avoided.

Coercion is universal and inevitable. Some measure of coercion, it is true enough, not only ultimately controls all political regimes but also is to be found in many social relationships within them. Beyond a difference of degree in coercion between largely democratic and nearly authoritarian arrangements, however, is the disguising of coercion as principle in the latter. Coercion then becomes more difficult to resist, blunt, or dislodge. It is even more difficult to identify.

On the other hand, coercion can never impose absolute order for more than a short while upon the shifting entangled mass of separate interests. The evidence is quite clear that resistance to coercion is as inevitable as coercion itself. Education-as-coercion is surely faced with limits in its effort to reduce variability in behavior and to enforce predictable responses. Human beings, in short, are not indefinitely and infinitely conditionable, not even in the Soviet Union, where Marx and Pavlov and Stalinism have had a day long enough to approach the end of "a short while."

Some of our Russian friends, for example, appear to be as upset and bewildered by their juvenile delinquency problem as we are by ours. And their favored explanation begs as many questions as do many of ours. "The influence of the imperialist camp is expressed through the diverse efforts of the ideologists of imperialism to corrupt the minds of Soviet people, particularly the youth" (22, p. 13).

In their view, at least their official view, "survivals of the past" reenforced by American propaganda are mainly responsible for delinquency. Their disinclination to consider that some delin-

quents might not be so much the victims of undesirable conditioning as rebels against official dogma trying to do what they want, is widely shared in this country. So is their proposed solution—education. The salient difference is that while our reformers would instruct law-abiding Americans about their duties to society and the delinquent, their reformers would instruct the Soviet delinquent in his duties to society. "The most important and most effective means of combatting crime is the systematic education of people in the spirit of communist morality . . ." (22, p. 12).

THE FALLACY OF INFINITE CONDITIONABILITY

Those reformers in and outside the field of professional recreation who regard their fellow citizens as being indefinitely conditionable in a desirable condition share a common myth with most other educated Americans. To an indeterminable extent, that myth has been promulgated by American social science, which derived it from the same source as did Marxist social science—the Enlightenment. And although the consequences of the myth are clearly visible in political proposals now being made to transform leisure-time habits and attitudes, those consequences ramify far beyond such proposals.

"It may be one of the most arrogant errors of social science to claim and enlist legislative support for the hypothesis that men could become predominantly altruistic creatures without strong hostilities toward anyone if only they could be properly conditioned" (23, p. 127). Professor Schoeck goes on to observe that while it is still "fashionable" to ignore or deny the existence of human nature and its "stubborn and mischievous potentialities," at the same time those who are in the intellectual swim "are only too eager to assume there is a world-wide identity of human nature when they dream of a world free from conflict and with equal standards of living." Schoeck concludes that either one or

the other of these views must obviously be given up. That would appear to be the case, on logical grounds. But one of the enduring functions of any myth is to shield bald contradictions from the eyes of its devotees.

[This is not the place either to defend or expand upon the proposition that human nature is a reality, a persistent reality, apart from the specific environmental conditioning to which it may be subjected. Two books are especially recommended: Joseph Wood Krutch, *The Measure of Man* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954); and Robert Ardrey, *African Genesis* (New York: Atheneum, 1961). The first lays stress upon the moral element in human nature, the second upon the aggressive and predatory.]

The popular assumption that human nature is nonexistent because the material of personality is soft and plastic is used as often to denounce conditioning as it is to defend it. If nowhere else, that generalization will stand up when it is applied to reformers in the field of recreation. With a fairly high consistency they are hostile to "commercial recreation"—that which is supplied at a price by a vendor to a purchaser. They are particularly concerned about the visible power of movies and television to warp minds, especially young minds.

The "facts" are not easily come by in an enterprise so subtle as communication with an audience. At the level of "common sense" a study of 912 junior high school youth disclosed no difference in the TV viewing habits of a "no theft" and a "high theft" grouping, although the latter was found, on average, to attend the movies a little oftener than the former (10, p. 738). Interpretation of such results is hazardous. It would be foolhardy, for example, to infer that television viewing has no effect on the rate of juvenile delinquency while going to the movies has a slight effect. Anyone who made such a claim would have to assume that the total audience was a passive recipient of stimuli.

While it may be true that at a certain time and place one or

more juveniles have been swayed by viewing a TV program or movie to emulate the model portrayed, we do not know how many react in such a way nor can we ascertain the intensity of reaction to the stimulus. The total social setting is one in which crime is featured in novels, magazines, comic strips, newspapers, adult and juvenile conversation, and in concrete reality as well as on TV and at the movies. No one knows, and much less can measure, the effect of one program or even the effect of one medium of communication.

Human beings in fact differ markedly in intelligence, insight, sensitivity, aesthetic appreciation, sensibility, knowledge, sophistication, and moral sense. To any act or argument or program of entertainment, each of them brings what he already is. This variety of background, experience, and judgment ensures differentiation in selection and reaction. To the extent that authoritarian coercion is lacking, differentiation of response in action can be expected as well.

The unhidden persuaders do not have us at their mercy. An advertisement to one man is convincing, to another an occasion for mirth, while a third becomes angry and vows never to buy the product. Regarding the so-called mass media, Reuel Denney has said: "One must ask in connection with any audio-visual presentation how many of the audience are seeing it as documentary, how many are seeing it as fiction, and how many are seeing it as persuasion. This is one of the questions about form that censorship often begs" (9, p. 52). If control of the mind means "making people take certain actions contrary to their rational conclusions, their real desires, and their moral convictions, then there have been no demonstrable examples as yet of control of the mind through mass communication" (20, p. 235).

The most that can be said for the kind of indirect propaganda which stems from much entertainment is this: it appears to have the power to intensify patterns of behavior that are already established. That it can change behavior is open to question. Attitude

changes in a popular-media audience consist "more often of modifications than of conversions . . ." (15, p. 292). Various studies of the effects of moviegoing can claim no more than that such effects are "selective," that they are "determined primarily by an individual's background and needs" (1, p. 234).

Recent studies of the effects of television viewing upon young children reach similar conclusions. What children do with television is more significant than what television does to them. What an adult or even a child is more determines what he will receive from any social stimulus than the form of the stimulus itself. Thus a child who feels deprived of parental love is more likely to be upset by a TV program which features a happy household than by a stylized and emotionless gunfight. In any event, research also shows that by the time children have reached the eighth to tenth grades they have become "light viewers," and more selective in their choices of programs.

If the effects of popular entertainment upon its recipients are possibly somewhat less deleterious than some critics have insisted, what about the beneficent effects upon personality and behavior they claim result from the forms of recreation they approve? The question has elicited much more affirmation than research. There are, however, a few studies available, conducted under controlled conditions, which undertake to trace a relationship between personality factors and recreation interest and participation. In general such studies will support neither extravagant hope nor cavalier dismissal. The one cited below is representative in its findings of those that have been made.

Warren M. Bartholomew selected 152 recreational activities and classified them according to nine categories: active sports—30; nature and outing activities—21; arts and crafts—20; clubs—15; literary and dramatic activities—15; social activities—12; quiet games—10; musical activities—9; and "less active" activities—20. Using these categories he compared male college freshmen whose interest in recreation exceeded the statistical norm with

those who fell below it, selecting an "upper quarter" of 117 cases from his total sample and a "lower quarter" of the same number.

As between these two groups Bartholomew found no appreciable differences in scholastic aptitude or in socioeconomic status, but marked differences in the home-and-family experience of recreation in the direction which one would expect. Nevertheless, "almost twenty-five per cent of the lower quarter had scores exceeding the mean score of the upper group."

The heart of Bartholomew's matter, though, deals with personality differences. In terms of group averages, these were found to be negligible. When three standard scales of personality measurements were applied, average emotional adjustment differences between the two extreme groups on all scales were so small as to prove statistically unreliable. "There was a mere suggestion that the lower recreational interest group was more self-sufficient. There was also a mere suggestion that the upper recreational interest group tended to be more dominant" (2, pp. 114, 115). These findings have limited application, but they may serve to balance the claim of one reformer that "recreation makes democracy function," and that of another: "Recreation builds moral and spiritual values."

There is a difficulty, a large one. Bartholomew means by recreation what people like to do and actually do in their work-free time, while those reformers who claim that recreation can reform society mean by recreation the reformation of society. Their self-validating prophecy requires Plato's sleight-of-hand trick to be fulfilled. In this instance it is paraphrased as: perfect recreation-education will result in perfect people and a perfect society.

One book informs that recreation produces all of the virtues, including some which are not altogether consistent, such as restraint and ambition, friendliness and justice, initiative and obedience, and so on. The same book warns, though, that recreation must be "properly directed" and that those who are directed require "proper preparation." Another writer, a recreation commis-

sion administrator, says that the best tool for building democracy is recreation—if it is "properly administered." No exception can be taken to claims such as these, as amended. What is proper, though, must be fairly inclusive if it is, in the administrator's words, to "shape the lives and personalities of people" in order to provide "opportunities for self-expression and leadership."

DELINQUENCY AND ORGANIZED RECREATION

Although many American citizens may feel their lives are already "properly directed" enough, there are doubtless many more who are concerned about juvenile delinquency. Enthusiasm for easy "solutions" may have waned, but recreation as a means of arresting delinquency still remains one of the most popular panaceas. However effective it may or may not be, an equally important issue is this: can recreation-as-personal-enjoyment be directly associated with any social-reform purpose whatsoever and still serve well the interests of personal enjoyment?

Any recreational activity, whether practicing a solitary hobby, patronizing a commercial establishment, going for a swim at the "Y," or even participating in a public recreational program, is presumably entered upon because it is or is expected to be enjoyable. The motive is presumably self-ish, in a strictly nonpejorative sense. The average citizen, it is true, may derive personal pleasure from contributing to a charity or engaging in some civic duty, but in the ordinary course of events he surely keeps such enterprises separate in mind and activity from the pursuit of personal enjoyment in his work-free time. The insistence that recreation is something more and different may be one reason why public recreation programs have failed to attract widespread loyalty and attention.

One writer, for example, advises recreation leaders that when aged people come to a center they should be "encouraged to play

games" with "persons of differing background and experience, including race and social class." This is excellent advice for any such leader to follow in order to prove where he stands on the critical issue of social prejudice. How about the old people who want only to play a game of cards and may possibly not understand, or even resent, being made the object of a social experiment?

Most of them have less interest in associating with people of differing race and class background, or even of identical race and class background, than in associating with people they like or think they might get to like. More to the point, public-recreation administrators have not been granted the police power of the state, as have public-school administrators, nor can they compel attendance, as can public-school administrators. They are thus going to have to use a carrot instead of a stick to increase what they themselves complain is a deplorably low attendance record at organized public-recreation functions.

Some public-recreation administrators, with what may be reckless courage, have far exceeded the fashionable norm of merely stating that recreation will either prevent or reduce delinquency. They seek changes in agency rules that will enable recreation staff to look for known delinquents—those who have been ejected from YMCAs and similar facilities for stealing and other antisocial conduct—and bring them into the organized group activity of nondelinquents.

Can the functions of recreational programs for nondelinquent youth be combined with the rehabilitation of delinquents, even assuming that they should be? The normal and inevitable sanction attaching to all group life, with the possible exception of the family but not of the criminal gang, is that members shall obey the rules or face expulsion. When adult authority brings malcontented troublemakers and nondelinquents together in social affairs which neither actively sought, the prospect of rehabilitating the former must be balanced with the probability of arousing

disaffection among the latter. If the rules are equally applied to the delinquents, they will either rebel or leave; if the rules are relaxed for the delinquents, those youngsters who more or less accept the rules will resent a special privilege that is not, and cannot be, extended to them.

The above is, to be sure, a very special situation, and the recreation-delinquency reform program neither stands nor falls with it. On the other hand special situations are always encountered, and these include what any individual, delinquent or nondelinquent, is. Actually, any attempt to prove either that recreation prevents or cures delinquency, or fails to accomplish either end, falls into the error of crude environmentalism. It is the *meaning* which any given situation has for an individual which ultimately "determines" what his reaction to or action within that situation is going to be. Investigation of even the most rudimentary scientific kind, however, cannot deal with the concrete individual, with what he totally and distinctly is.

This apparent dilemma can be, if not dispelled, then at least modified. Recreation, or any similar descriptive category introduced by an investigator, may have different meanings for different individuals that cannot be stated. At the same time, inferences about what the central tendencies of meaning are for described classes of individuals can be drawn if the time-and-place context of the category is examined. But when that is done the descriptive category, more often than not, disintegrates as a causal explanation.

In other words, if in some times and places delinquents are found to attend church more often than nondelinquents, to be more faithful in attendance at Boys' Clubs and playgrounds, to play more games and to be more athletic than nondelinquents, and to be much more "group oriented" in their behavior, it does not follow that attending church and so on *cause* delinquency. Described factors always operate within a total context that is specific to a time and place, and doubtless even the same "prop-

erly administered" playground or Sunday school or Boys' Club or whatever could be associated with "wholesome personalities" in one time and place and be associated with (*not* "cause") delinquency in another. Thus a playground in a middle-class neighborhood is likely to "produce" no delinquents, while one in a high-delinquency area is likely to provide a handy place for predatory activity and a hangout where gangs can plan their rumbles. In neither instance could the playground be properly held accountable.

The above warning will serve to preface Frederic M. Thrasher's finding in a New York City Boys' Club that "delinquency increased with duration of membership" (25). As for church affiliation and attendance, some researchers claim nondelinquents score slightly higher than delinquents while other researchers deny any such relationship exists. When the records of several hundred delinquents referred to the Passaic Children's Bureau were examined, 92 per cent were found to claim affiliation with some church while 54 per cent were found upon investigation to be attending church regularly (17). And: "It is notewothy that of 16,500 youths coming to the attention of the Juvenile Crime Prevention Bureau of the Detroit police in 1947, 68 per cent attended church, 44 per cent 'regularly' " (24, p. 366).

Again, the above do not signify that churches are "breeding grounds of crime," any more than the fact that many local Christian Endeavors and Epworth Leagues serve youth primarily as places of assignation proves that young people's religious societies foster sexual license. What has happened *is* this: the total context of both, for large segments of the population, means something different from what it once did, and therefore *is* something different.

Attendance at a young people's religious society at one time proclaimed a separation of those who were self-consciously respectable from those who were not. In the modern era even the churches tend to decry moral righteousness; instead they dep-

recate distinctions and emphasize social togetherness. The churches may be a little out of step in failing to celebrate romance and the things of the flesh as supremely good, but they do not dare to be a Daniel. Many youngsters who attend a Christian Endeavor meeting can therefore be expected to behave afterward as do those youngsters who start their evening at a public dance.

VIRTUE AND EXERCISE

Much the same can be said about sports and athletics. When Walter Camp was playing football at Yale and James A. Naismith was inventing basketball at a Springfield, Massachusetts, YMCA, the official tone of social life was maintained by the striving, respectable upper middle class. Athletics and sports embodied the cult of "muscular Christianity," the admonition to "keep clean" as well as "keep fit." The social atmosphere exuded earnest purpose, Teddy Roosevelt, Kipling's "If," playing the game (and not primarily, at least in moral emphasis, to win), and Frank Merriwell, who neither drank nor smoked nor treated girls with anything other than reverence.

It is this fading mystique which is invoked by those who declare a direct and intrinsic relationship to exist between physical fitness, sports, and recreation on one side, and all of the moral and spiritual virtues (far in excess of nondelinquency) on the other. But this happens to be a time in which, for whatever it may be worth, Leo Durocher has opined that nice guys finish last. An incumbent major-league manager has proclaimed the motto "Do anything you can get away with."

The public appears to be largely resigned to professional boxing as a racket and wrestling as a substitute for vaudeville. But when the fast buck, jazzed-up entertainment, and winning at any price are publicized as having come to dominate the amateur ranks in commercialized sport, even collegiate play, greater concern is stirred. Football is played in college stadiums for the

benefit, among others, of scouts from professional teams seated in the stands. College basketball players from time to time are exposed for having "shaved points" at the hire of professional gamblers. The Gallup-Hill study of attitudes held by American youth has reported: "Fifty-four per cent of the college men... think their teams could be reached by bribes" (12, p. 74).

Every present is a time of wickedness when compared with the time of an adult's formative years, or with the time in which his parents grew up. There have, of course, been changes. Whether such changes have been drastic enough to deform the "American character" during recent years is not nearly so certain as that new fashions in verbal responses have appeared.

There is a dubious relationship, as Mark Twain and a number of psychologists have pointed out, between what men do and what they say. In human affairs, action is much more stable and consistent than is explanation, rationalization, and justification. The Kinsey reports indicate far less change in sexual behavior during the present century than the puritanical moralizing at its beginning and the "liberal discussion" at its middle might imply.

In many circles at the present time it has become fashionable to deprecate motives, even one's own. Heroes are confidently expected to deny their own heroism, and good men their own generosity. During the Victorian era, especially its second half, there was a well-nigh universal tendency to ascribe the loftiest of motives, even to obvious personal dishonesty. It is quite possible that any falling off in integrity since that time, in sports, athletics, and elsewhere, is more proclaimed in the word than proved in the deed.

As a matter of fact, according to Prescott Sullivan, there were more "fixed" baseball games in the 1870s than in baseball or any other oganized sport in succeeding decades. The crooked players were "brazenly indifferent to criticism." They "made so little effort to cover their trail that they'd accept bribes right out on the field." Seven members of the University of Michigan's 1893 foot-

ball team, John Underwood has reported, were not even students at the university.

There is no intrinsic relationship between a given physical activity and a moral purpose, except what is supplied by the mind—and such meanings can change. Further, although such an activity does not produce approved attitudes and values, the desire to associate oneself with such attitudes and values can lead to engaging in an approved activity. Thus in one time and place an individual will contemplate his own navel in order to impress others, while in another time and place—much more typical in history—he will devote himself to a more strenuous activity. And just as Hindu fakirs today practice stunts that no longer carry religious significance to their admiring crowds, so do American athletes perform in a setting that is more "secular" than that of a few decades ago.

The activity, and the interest and admiration it elicits, can continue in time after the attitudes and values which once attached firmly to it have slipped their moral moorings. There are still, to be sure, rules to be kept or broken, and the notion of "fair play" is mentioned from time to time. But attitudes and values associated with sports and athletics have become for the most part individualized, professionalized, and stripped of the "character-building" emphasis.

What has changed *in the area of attitudes and values* is disclosed by comparing, say, the magazine *Sports Illustrated* with any of the Frank Merriwell stories. In both, courage, skill, and competence are lauded, but in the modern version it is the "real pro" who is "doing his job"—and that about suffices. The life style that is being celebrated in each is almost alien from the other. A similar contrast can be drawn between the fustian sports columns written by the late Bill Cunningham and the laconic, saturnine prose of Red Smith.

From one point of view, then, the continued linking of sports and games with moral probity may be dreadfully old-fashioned,

if not reactionary. If it is held that sports and games or any recreation program is going to solve the problem of juvenile delinquency, then an intrinsic connection between physical activity and character is either stated or implied. It is probable that there is no such relationship. In the most thoroughly controlled and extensive investigation of juvenile delinquency ever made, delinquents on average were found to be more athletic than nondelinquents, to be physically stronger, and to be more skilled at playing games (13).

DELINQUENCY AND CAMPING

A variation of the theme being examined is that of curing or preventing delinquency with camping. Such reform proposals are often associated with "our pioneer heritage" and "the land which nurtures the spirit" and the like. The results of research that has been done on the subject, though, have been cautiously assessed.

It is possible that camping may have some value in the effort to "rehabilitate" delinquent youths. Observed changes have been limited in scope, however, and the persistence of them has not been ascertained. "Furthermore, it must not be construed that camping is a 'cure-all' for delinquency, although statements to this effect frequently appear" (5, p. 17). In fact, "disapproved behavior has been experimentally induced within a camp setting."

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey recently sponsored a bill to set up a 150,000-member youth conservation corps. In the spring of 1964, this bill had passed the Senate. Of it Senator Humphrey has said that a giant step toward "the *prevention* of delinquency and the improvement of physical fitness could be accomplished" today provided a counterpart of the old CCC were in existence to ensure "not only healthful, useful outdoor work, but educational opportunity for boys and young men with too much time on their hands" (14, p. 55).

He has further stated he is "convinced that young men in substantial numbers would seize the opportunity to roll up their sleeves and join a great national effort on the land." Perhaps. But it is also possible some of them might resent the detached characterization of them as having "too much time on their hands." And many of them might prefer to pursue their private career interests, even as United States senators and writers.

The old CCC camps offer few guidelines of expectation. The young men who flocked to them in the thirties were driven by a severe depression. Lacking—at this writing—a depression, and assuming Senator Humphrey's carrot to be somewhat less than enticing, the only other stick likely to be effective would be political coercion. In that event, is a generation that has been imbued with the values of having fun and welfarism, that has unlimited time and pocket money to spend, going to "roll up their sleeves"?

There is little, other than rhetoric, to go on. Anyway, the atmosphere at "Camp Pioneer," run by the New York Agricultural and Industrial School (reformatory) appears to fall a bit short. The camp is made ready for the inmates by state employees. "Battens are removed from windows, the grass cut, refrigerators and stoves installed, and numerous lesser details attended to, prior to the first campers' arrival" (8, p. 106). The schedule is not rigorous. "The early-to-bed and early-to-rise routine is cast aside in favor of a more restful and less set pattern."

In the spring of 1964, Senator Humphrey's bill was entangled with President Johnson's proposal to "enlist" 100,000 draft rejectees and school dropouts. Half of these young men would go to job training centers; the "less competent half" would be assigned to camps where they would work on conservation projects. Both groups would receive a more modest version of that free and compulsory education which they had previously failed, or had failed them.

Work in a camp, even with rudimentary training in reading and arithmetic tied in, is difficult to visualize as appropriate train-

ing for taking even a modest place in a complex, technological economy. Further, the assumption of total governmental responsibility is unlikely to motivate many young men to "roll up their sleeves," even though Donald K. Kohler of the Area Redevelopment Administration has said: "You have to train people to fill the jobs, and you also have to motivate them to want to fill them."

Even assuming that such motivation can be donated or decreed, Senator Humphrey's relatively modest goal appears to have been sacrificed to the larger campaign. According to *Time* for March 27, 1964, "Poverty Czar" Sargent Shriver has insisted: "These centers and camps will not be dumping grounds for juvenile delinquents, dope addicts or drunkards."

Camping may be an ineffective means to combat or prevent delinquency, but the goal is easily comprehended. Camping as a means to erase social and economic inequality is defeated in intention. President Johnson's omnibus proposal incorporates a basic American dilemma. We use work and education to generate equality of opportunity, that is, a near-equal opportunity to prove inequality of ability and accomplishment. But at the same time we cannot permit those who have been passed in the race or who have dropped out to remain behind. We insist they shall make themselves equal in the literal sense.

THE FLABBY AMERICAN

Although most citizens regard juvenile delinquency as a social problem and want something done about it, the matter of physical fitness at this writing remains largely the concern of politicians and reformers. Among the many reasons for this difference in public interest, one may be paramount. In the first instance, other people are to be improved; in the second, everyone, including one's self, is called to task. Even the implication that one's self should be improved for the common good is not flattering.

There may also be resentment at interference with one's own

plans and outlook, as related in a story told by Francis Williams. He was present at a country house where Augustus John was also a guest. John was asked at breakfast whether he would like to ride a horse before starting work, and he declined. John was equally cool to the idea of a brisk walk or a later game of tennis or of golf.

"'But however do you keep fit, sir?' asked one of the younger men. John looked coldly from one happy, blank, healthy practical face to another.

"'Fit for what?' he inquired morosely."

And that, Williams concluded, "has always seemed to me one of the key questions of our civilization."

At the lowest level of sensibility and propaganda the answer to John's question is ready, and drearily familiar—to beat the Russians. This is of course more often implied than stated, but the promise or threat, or both, are either on stage or in the wings. But can salvation be found in physical exercise? Is our "soft living" a matter of physique or of mind?

More to the point, a program of physical fitness inaugurated and promoted by the state might without too much difficulty one day fall under state control. Such ventures in the past, while justified as national defense measures, have actually been designed to regiment social life. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, L. H. Weir wrote that it was in Italy, Germany, and Russia, where he found "the most gigantic organization and direction of recreation as a medium of indoctrination of the children, young people and adults with definite social-economic-political ideas, aims, and purposes" (26, pp. 11, 12).

The President's Council on Youth Fitness has not revealed any such conscious intention. The stated rationale is very similar to that of curing or preventing delinquency with recreation: character and morality can be improved with physical activity. Most public statements made so far have been somewhat vague, as was

this one by Abraham Ribicoff when he was Chairman of the Council: "Intellectual and emotional growth, good human relationships, spiritual insights—all these we want for our children" (19, p. 233).

Some public statements, on the other hand, have not been vague. Shane MacCarthy, former Executive Director of the Council, once said: "Recreation planning for fitness concerns itself with basic values in our society. For example, the questions Why and How people live must be answered clearly if recreation plans for fitness are to be meaningfully accurate and helpful" (21, p. 6).

The "questions of Why and How people live" are not, however, likely to "be answered" by "recreation." Throughout history they have instead been answered by the people of a given society themselves—within whatever restriction by political authority they either accepted or were subjected to. Any "meaning" of collective existence either emerges from collective experience into collective consciousness or is manufactured as a slogan. At best a slogan is one-way communication; at its worst, imposed authority. At this writing a Goals for America "blueprint" is being drawn up, supplemented by "Youth Fitness councils and/or committees" which "exist on every level—National, state, and local—and in hundreds of organizations."

That blueprint and the problem of physical fitness may interest few beyond politicians and reformers and perhaps their "hundreds of organizations." On the other hand, querulous griping by the middle-aged over the habits—moral as well as physical—of the coming and little-heeding generation remains, as it has always been, a popular indoor sport. Present concern may not add up to a popular social problem, but such concern does have precedent. A century ago alarmed observers found the national health to be jeopardized by a refusal of teen-agers to take enough exercise. "Ralph Waldo Emerson had written despairingly of 'the invalid

habits of this country,' and from abroad the London *Times* had issued grave warnings of possibly dire consequences for our national well-being" (11, p. 183).

Former President Kennedy once called the modern American the "flabby American." Robert H. Boyle agreed, and said the present "general physical ease of life" is responsible (4, p. 63). Can anything be done about that unhappy condition? Probably not within the traditional American political design and the way, given an admittedly conjectural continuation of present lines of development, it is now going. An assumption that "physical fitness" can be incorporated within instead of being imposed upon the present American way of life is, as likely as not, an example of the fallacy of contextual choice.

THE FALLACY OF CONTEXTUAL CHOICE

The fallacy is well known when it involves two very different social systems at the same moment in time. Cultural anthropologists have emphasized the extent to which each social system is a "functional whole." Elements of culture or organization borrowed from another society similar in culture and organization are easily engrafted. Elements borrowed from or imposed by another society which is alien in thought, tradition, and organization are unassimilable. Thus "freedom" and "independence," which accompanied specific lines of political and economic development in the West, are now having disruptive and destructive effects in those "nations" of Africa which are based upon tribal organization and a feudal economy.

The fallacy of contextual choice can also involve one social system in its own historical perspective. The belief that an institution or collective habit that arose under a certain set of conditions can at a later time be revived intact is an error. Not only has that institution or collective habit inevitably changed but so also have changed the conditions which fostered its development. The

physical fitness program may well be an example of the fallacy.

In any era there are some individuals who are more physically fit than others; they are stronger and enjoy better health. Physical fitness as more or less characterizing an entire people, on the other hand, occurs as a by-product of a time and place. The optimum conditions appear to include enough affluence and knowledge to check debilitating hunger and disease, but also privation sufficient to *require* a great deal of physical exertion out-of-doors. The only alternative known in history is full control of youth training by the hirelings of a totalitarian state, as in Plato's *Republic.*

To whatever extent politicians and reformers are limited to public-relations techniques instead of political coercion, a physical fitness program is likely to enlist few exercisers. An increasing proportion of American golfers will doubtless ride in carts when they play, and drive to the course instead of walk. As an increasing number feel encouraged to consume the natural setting, they can with equal confidence be expected to transform what remains of the wilderness into an extension of motel culture.

Man has always sought, and therefore probably always will seek, to lessen the drudgery of physical toil and to make his work-free time as easeful as circumstances permit. It may be there is no going back—no matter how ridiculous some of the byways taken —without the force of catastrophe or political coercion.

There is, finally, the question of how "real" the matter of physical un-fitness is at present. A similar concern, it was noted above, was expressed in this country shortly before the Civil War, when urbanization was getting under way in earnest. Further, what is the meaning of statistics, even those which in themselves may be accurate, when they are selected in order to justify a program of action that is either planned or under way? Thus while advocates of the Youth Fitness Program invariably cite figures which imply sloth and flabbiness, the ORRRC has cited other figures, and interpreted them, in such a way as to stress how active and ath-

letic Americans have become and how great the need is for more outdoor public facilities to supply a growing "demand."

According to the ORRRC, between June 1, 1960, and May 30, 1961, more than 90 per cent of all Americans engaged in some form of outdoor recreation. The "youth group," those twelve to seventeen years of age, were by far the most active. They spent more time swimming, bicycling, and walking, in that order of frequency, than any other age group, and they spent more time in these activities than in any others. "It is clear that Americans are seeking the outdoors as never before. And this is only a foretaste of what is to come."

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chapter four

Entertainment and Adjustment: Youth and Age

Usage of such terms as "leisure," "recreation," and "entertainment" tends to lack uniformity. "Leisure," for example, can refer to means or ends or style: to non-work time, to activities, or to mood and attitude. The values and prejudices which are commonly attached to these terms, on the other hand, are less various than the definitions of them.

RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

Associations made and communicated with "leisure" and "recreation" are more often positive than are those with "entertainment." An aura of slight distaste in use, though, may surround all of them. Even "leisure" and "recreation" are somewhat alien to the residue of Calvinism—hard work, acquisition, production, systematic and disciplined effort—which has by no means disappeared from American life. The frequent encountering of such phrases as wholesome recreation, keeping fit, productive leisure, and employing leisure time, indicates how viable the work ethos still remains.

"Movies Are Your Best Entertainment" was a favored Hollywood trade slogan during the forties, and it surely reflected a belief that times had changed considerably since Phineas T. Barnum felt he had to advertise his melodramas as "lectures." Entertainment remains nevertheless, in public stance and statement, characterized as mindless diversion and distraction, a means of "wasting time" instead of "using" it.

The official attitude of observer and commentator, not the energy output of participants, assumes priority in the classification of what is entertainment, what recreation. Thus most games of cards would be reckoned entertainment, while listening to others playing instruments—provided they were playing "good music" —would be called either leisure or recreation. If one were to draw up a list of what are commonly conceded to be entertainment on one side, and recreation on the other, the first, neverthe-

less, would be heavily weighted with passive or spectator functions, the second with mostly active ones.

That Americans in their boredom move from one distraction to another—in popular magazine, radio and TV program, and motion picture—is a frequent charge. The seriousness of this (still another) "problem" is difficult to judge. There remains considerable diversity in entertainment as well as recreation. Also, it appears likely that if "too much time" is spent in spectatorship, such a condition reflects what has been called the privatizing of social life, the withdrawal of concern by the citizen for his community.

In this view, entertainment in the modern world is not so much foisted on a helpless public as it comprises a substitute for involvement. In political and economic terms, most people do not act so much as they accept being acted upon. As it is "they" who make such decisions at a distance, so it is "they" who bring entertainment from a distance. And for some in the audience, what is brought from a distance has more interest and compels more attention than the immediate world outside the family circle.

How much the antipathy to "mere entertainment" cited at the opening of the chapter is generally held is a matter that cannot be settled. The "true" case is elusive. The advice to take it easy! or live it up! may be informally exchanged among persons whose public pronouncements hew closer to the traditional line.

In any event, the old are more adjusted to those values which appear to be on the defensive than are the young. The latter, in turn, are more adjusted to what lawyers call emerging societal facts. These facts have been summarized, and doubtless exaggerated and distorted, in the popular jargon: other is superseding inner direction, alienation is replacing commitment, the welfare state encroaches upon the open society, consumer replaces producer orientation, the concentration of power and control is undermining local community life, rationalized bureaucracy is supplanting the organic solidarity of *Gemeinschaft,* and so on.

WHAT YOUTH AND THE AGED SHARE

The concern of American adults with the problem of juvenile delinquency is but a special manifestation of their concern with all adolescents. Those near the end as well as those near the start of the life cycle have also attracted particular attention. One important reason is the same in both cases.

Young and old no longer have what once was theirs, a part to play in social life that is integrated with those played by members of other age groupings. Through a combination of voluntarism and constraint, young and old (as age groupings, not as individuals) are limited to a life of non-action in which they are protected and cared-for spectators, more consumers than producers of their own time. The young, however, appear to be better adjusted to that life than the old.

Conceived as time, leisure is at a maximum at both ends of the scale of maturity. The aged person and the adolescent have an abundance of time on their respective hands, and entertainment takes up a great deal of it. There are in addition two aspects of their collective condition which are of primary importance. The first they share; the second presents them with radically different situations. What they share is a state of virtual suspended animation in the social order. In lowest common denominator, neither has a job.

The slackening of the drive to work hard, to produce and save, and the accompanying rise of consumer standards in leisure and recreation and entertainment, has by no means been a smooth and easy replacement. The point is made in the next chapter that some occupational groupings work harder and longer than ever before. Further, although work may have lost much of its charm and necessity in the affluent society, holding a job has become, if anything, more vital than ever before to a sense of genuine participation, to the preservation of self-respect, and indeed even to an

awareness of identity. *Holding* a job establishes the fact that one has a place in a social order which measures each in terms of his "contribution to the material prosperity of the group, in spite of the lip-service paid to other values, such as art, scholarship, religion, social wisdom, moral development" (10, p. 74).

Unlike most other social critics who have examined this issue, De Grazia does not believe any slackening in the compulsion to work, apart from the need felt to hold a job, has occurred. In fact, as the notion of literal equality becomes an acute manifestation of guilt in the few and of envy in the many, all *must* work in order to meet the ideological demands of industrial society, whether avowedly socialist or not. "The ideas of work and equality" block the way of "the improvers and the culture critics" (7, p. 433). Since there can be no leisure class, there can be no leisure. Thus —and this is not De Grazia's observation—we have American hereditary millionaires, who at the turn of the century would have sought live American chorus girls or embalmed European culture, instead seeking high elected political office.

Revolutionary economic and political changes have made status in the economic order more insecure and thus more precious. Wealth and property are being divorced. The social struggle is now waged much less over control of property than it is over who is going to get how much of the collective, and increasingly collectivized, wealth.

Productive property is for the most part no longer local, but a network that spreads over several states or even international boundaries. Those who "own" it are faceless stockholders who exert as much control over "their" companies as the recipients of old-age pension checks do over "their" government. Those who manage are not owners but salaried government or corporation bureaucrats who, like all other hired hands, are more concerned about their share of the wealth than any property.

Small family farms and local industries are, in the near term, disappearing. The "density" of neighborhood and to some extent

of family life is thereby loosened. Economic and many social and political interests as well have become more specialized and relatively independent of *specific* others. People now relate to the world outside the family by way of union, industrial, and government hierarchies that are independent of spatial location and local decision. There has been a gain in personal independence, to be sure, but it has been bought at the price of becoming a replaceable part. Is a widely publicized "togetherness" an attempt to impose upon endless and sterotyped—that is, replaceable—conversation the "image" of an integrated social life?

Between 1940 and the present time, the proportion of self-employed persons in the labor force shrank from about one-fifth to about one-eighth. Ours has become an employee society. In an employee society almost everyone works *for* someone else. The someone else is in most cases vast, distant, and impersonal, but it is in such employment that one finds a place and is placed by others. Not many of the very few remaining large family fortunes are managed as property by modern heirs; such fortunes are usually transformed into corporations or foundations for which the heirs in turn may go to work. But their work effort, like that of the unskilled, is no longer needed. It is an ironical circumstance that the psychological necessity of holding a job may have been intensified at the same time that each job has become less essential and each jobholder more replaceable.

Hannah Arendt views the "threat of automation" in a special, a psychological, way. Employees identify and justify themselves not so much as autonomous and creative individuals as contributors to the physical maintenance of society. This function, she believes, is one which automation may well-nigh destroy. "What we are confronted with is the prospect of a society of laborers without labor, that is, without the only activity left to them. Surely, nothing could be worse" (1, p. 5).

Miss Arendt may have exaggerated both the nature and the

extent of this plight, a matter to be explored in the next chapter. But to whatever extent it is real, it is one which is especially acute for the adolescent young and the old. The former are faced with what Edward B. Reuter called tolerated parasitism, in a world that feels neither haste nor necessity to induct them into a job and other adult responsibilities.

These responsibilities can even be snatched from them. In this politicalized employee society the adolescent young are as vulnerable as the aged to massive expedients launched in response to computer reckoning of voting pressures. On February 24, 1964, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz said that 2 million teenagers, of the 3.5 million then working, should be sent back to school. He also suggested that the age limit for compulsory school attendance, then sixteen years in most states, be raised by two years. "Getting 2 million of them back to school is 'the most fruitful opportunity for immediate advance' toward a solution of the unemployement problem, Mr. Wirtz argued" (23, p. 8).

This society also cuts off the old from their paying jobs at a specified age. Except for typical members of the grouping, they may not slacken off work gradually on the family farm, or continue as long as physically able in a family business enterprise. And old workers no longer induct apprentices into a skilled craft and thereby maintain status and respect.

Unemployment is a much greater psychological hazard to old men than it is to old women. Women may comprise about one-third of the labor force, but this does not mean that one-third of all women are denied more traditional roles. With few exceptions, those women who work outside the home do so sporadically—perhaps before marriage for a few years, and then for a few more years after the children are grown or have left home. Home activities and housewife role remain, and to these most women return —if, indeed, in any definitive sense they ever left them—at an age when their male contemporaries are left without an habitual

place. These facts are probably not unconnected with the swift widening in the upper-age brackets of the marked disparity between male and female death rates.

SEGREGATION OF THE OLD

Informal socializing has tended to transfer from the neighborhood to the job situation. As the job supplants both family background and residential location in supplying identification, so do one's job associates become more important in supporting identification. Especially for industrial workers is the job appreciated as the place where informal companionships are formed. Here and not the neighborhood is the real world, where the discipline of the job is alleviated by exchanged confidences, joking, and the sense of belonging.

The sociality of the job has much to do with the fact that only a very few men sixty-five years of age or older voluntarily retire while still in good health. John E. Anderson and others have made the point that male retirees miss the social relations of the job more than the job itself. Sebastian de Grazia believes that the social life of the job is so basic that any "lifeline" cast by the retired man must provide a substitute "respectful contact." Institutions or organizations "can be formed to provide human contacts but by contrast the association they offer is almost frivolous" (6, p. 130). In this connection a social worker has stated that "despite the rash of publicity and claims made for the Golden Age Clubs, Senior Centers and similar programs, only 2 per cent of the aged avail themselves of them . . ." (3, p. 419).

The job and the family provide the main anchors of emotional security in modern life. The aged have lost the former and are losing the latter. They comprise our largest segregated minority. They are not usually even considered an intrinsic part of the family. An investigation of textbooks on the family showed the

family concept to be limited to marriage and the rearing of children, limited to the life cycle from courtship to the time that children leave home (2). In many such books the position is taken that the family should not be burdened with responsibility for the aged.

The predominant background of the modern aged, in sharp contrast to that of their own married children, was rural. In that traditional way of life, old age may have been a personal but it was not a social problem. The aged gradually relinquished activity and control in the home or on the farm. Food and space were abundant, and in a large household containing many people the aged could continue, until bedridden, to perform some useful activity. Community and religious sanctions, in most circles, were so uncompromising that any alternative to aged persons living with their married children was unthinkable.

Today about one-half of all widowers and widows over sixty-five years of age who are not institutionalized live entirely alone, and one-tenth of them live with people to whom they are not related. Modern values have so shifted that young people no longer feel an unequivocal sense of obligation toward aging parents. The avidity with which modern government seeks to concentrate dependency upon itself undoubtedly has helped to reduce the sense of responsibility among married children. Many at least believe that their tax burden entitles them to be relieved by government of caring for their own parents.

Eugene Gilbert's survey of teenage opinion provides a chilling forecast of worse to come. Nearly 70 per cent of teen-agers favor government medical care for the aged. Even more of them are emphatic about not wanting their parents ever to live with them. As for extending financial aid to parents in a separate home, 68 per cent of the boys and 57 per cent of the girls "don't really think there is much chance they will really be called upon" (5, p. 21).

Apart from a waning financial obligation to maintain their par-

ents in a separate home, new values and pressures make a common home in most cases unacceptable to married children. They have typically moved far away from where they were brought up, to a small apartment or suburban house where space is restricted and there is no productive work their parents can do. The costs of maintenance are paid with money, not by direct production on the home site, and the costs are heavy.

Married children are caught between their own self-interests and a set of obligations which stem from a fading tradition. Their parents are made to feel unwanted if they are placed in a home for the aged. But if a common home is established, the two generations trample upon one another's toes psychologically. The old continue to regard their grown children as wards and subordinates; their children expect the old people to accept a reversal of roles, and to become their subordinates—in a household so small that old and young can hardly secure momentary privacy.

So it is that most aged parents as well as their children agree that segregation is in the best interest of both, the latter expressing more enthusiastic affirmation than the former. The old are thus becoming retired from family life as well as work. The most optimistic of plans and forecasts places a majority of the expected 20 million people over sixty-five years of age by 1975 in ghettos called retirement city and senior citizens' suburb.

The old are, finally, segregated by the accent on youth in our culture. Those who say that physical and chronological aging are not identical processes are doubtless correct. Perhaps those who suggest that many old people still have a "real," that is, job-for-pay contribution to make also have a point. There is merit in the claim that many would be better off if they were permitted to continue working a little longer than is the present case. But along with the stark terror of physical deterioration and imminent death, the old—whether they hold onto a job or not, whether they are rescued from physical segregation or must meet the last of life as well as death alone, whether they find "satisfactory

recreation" or less relieved boredom—must face the additional fact that they are out of joint with the bustling, hectic, self-conscious fun around them.

All cultures and civilizations have celebrated youth and strength. The main prizes always have and must go to the active and dominant and attractive ones. Popular anthropology has been guilty of romanticizing the way old age is an honored and enviable state in some other times and places. (What goes unacknowledged in such accounts of elaborately respectful treatment is the fact that the young are always beholden to the old for an anticipated transmittal of family property, a means of protecting the interests of the aged which has almost disappeared in contemporary society.) At the same time, though, we subject our old people to a degree of condescension and emotional withdrawal that is possibly unique in history.

WHAT YOUTH AND THE AGED DO NOT SHARE

If old age and youth in modern America share a state of suspended social animation, the single term covers very different conditions. The middle-aged appear anxious to ape and identify with the one grouping, to be ill at ease with the other. Youth is celebrated and old age shunned, denied, or even disapproved. Consider the implications of one simple fact: the most complimentary remark one can make to an old person—so considered by receiver as well as donor—is that he does not look his age.

"In a society that changes as swiftly as ours, the experience of the older generations tends to become irrelevant to the younger" (24, p. 90). But the old are guilty of more than irrelevance in life; they represent death, from which avoidance reactions become steadily more marked. The blunt acceptance in the old New England name of burying ground was later softened to cemetery. Modern cemeteries, in their turn, have become parks and lawns,

and the statuary encountered in them expresses the exuberance of Eros more than the compassion of the *Pietà*. There is an active distaste for old age, a determination to push the foreknowledge of one's own death from consciousness—and it spells a refusal to come to grips with life itself.

Although preoccupation with death may blight the will and is, in many cases, accompanied by melancholia, it is equally true, as Freud insisted, that a headlong flight from any such reality can have only disastrous consequences—for self and for others. As for the others, George Soule asks, "Is there an unconscious wish behind our society's segregation of the old, regardless of their real values and capacities?" (19, p. 117). We apparently "feel it indelicate to refer to those old in years except perhaps as 'the elderly' or 'our senior citizens.'" We think of them as unlike ourselves, as "social reformers used to think of 'the poor' or 'the slum dwellers' —outsiders often stigmatized as 'the unfortunates'" (19, p. 4).

When Henry Adams said that Americans take their tragedy lightly he grossly underestimated the true state of affairs. Most of them, especially those who have been educated and fall in step behind such culture bearers as Mary Baker Eddy and Norman Vincent Peale, altogether deny tragedy. It is rejection by the young and middle-aged of that reality with which the old are forced to live constantly that segregates the old to a degree far beyond forced retirement from the job and being unwelcome in the homes of their married children.

Our accent on youth is hectically determined. Pepsi-Cola, according to the airwaves jingle, is the drink for those who *think* young. If you can't be young, and perhaps if you can't look young, then all that is left is to think young. "Why Grow Old?" is the title of a syndicated newspaper column. Why indeed? The difficulty is that the only sure preventive is one which most individuals hesitate to employ.

The life of the aged "is what it is largely because they have been turned out to stay around and then die quietly without

disturbing anyone" (6, p. 146). Who but the young could possibly be well adjusted to noise, gaiety, and trivial silliness? Who is there to listen if the old, deprived of other functions, should have meditative counsel to offer? The avoidance of the old may even go beyond denial of the common fate to include resentment of a complete shattering of the ancient belief in an afterlife. "If I've only one life...," pleads the aggressively young model in the advertisement, "let me live it as a Clairol blonde." In terms of what most people live for—the dominant leisure, cosmetic, entertainment, and consumption values—the young will never have it so good.

Recreation and entertainment both reflect and embody the maladjustment of old age. The new "active leisure" as *Holiday* magazine calls it, "is largely unintended for the old; the facilities of our national parks and perhaps even government allocation to recreational facilities are weighted in their consideration of youth" (14, p. 54).

Entertainment in the so-called mass media is even more directly centered upon the fun-and-games epoch of modern youth. These toys of compelling attention are adjusted to the young in their themes, treatment, and market appeals. The old not only have less money to spend than the young, but research indicates they have little influence upon the consumer preferences of others.

Other studies show that old people spend about the same number of hours before the television set as "the national average." It can safely be assumed many of them do so with little joy. Such predominant themes as romantic love and violence celebrate youth in its rawest aspects, and these themes "neither reveal the problems of the older adult to the rest of society nor are directly meaningful for the old viewers." They may thus "make the old feel all the more isolated and unimportant" (15, p. 269).

Consider, too, the faddist character of our entertainment and recreation. Situation comedies displace quiz shows and are dis-

placed in turn by westerns on TV; bowling comes in and perhaps wavers, while boating and skin diving become popular. Year by year more people travel greater distances, but yesterday's popular way to travel may fall out of fashion. Styles in jokes and humor and songs and dress change rapidly.

Even if the pace of change were more sedate, the old would still be physiologically impelled to conserve energy instead of waste it. They yearn for what was known and believed, they cling to habits acquired by customs now discarded. The stability they crave is found only in memory, and on this count alone they are isolated and maladjusted.

WHAT THE OLD WANT

The tradition in which most of the modern aged were socialized was moralistic, prejudiced, narrowly protestant. It preached independence, self-help, and discipline of the passions. Why, then, do they in large numbers listen eagerly to political snakeoil salesmen who promise bigger doles? Because they want bigger doles?

Surveys of opinion made among their ranks show that a clear majority of the old do indeed "want" this or that handout. It is doubtful, however, that anyone's public acknowledgement of desire and wish reveals information of much depth. An interview situation is always limited by the interviewer's suppositions, communicated directly or subliminally.

Moreover, people of any age will say they want, and actively seek to get, whatever may be realistically available. A questioned mill worker may state that he wants an extra fifteen minutes on his lunch hour, when what he really wants is to be the boss, if, indeed, being the boss would actually satisfy him. Likewise, some of the old might prefer an honored place in the family and community to a dole of any magnitude.

This assumption draws support from the tone of the Townsend

Plan literature. It made of the pension a symbol of redress, a means of striking back and grabbing, if only money, something for obscurely felt deprivations. "All thinking people realized," said the late Dr. Townsend, that the Plan "was a manifestation of power and determination on the part of the people to right the wrongs that had afflicted them so long and so severely" (22, pp. 150–151). The "wrongs" Dr. Townsend dwelt on at great length were the modern social, economic, and political deviations from small-town American family and community life at the turn of the century.

While it would be presumptuous to state what any other human being "really wants," it can safely be said that the old do not want a shelf. Most of them are on one, and it is more comfortable for many because of various tax-maintained subsidies. Yet because of their background, in which self-help, thrift, and paying one's own way figured largely, it cannot be altogether comfortable—doubtless less comfortable, anyway, than it would be for their grandchildren, magically placed in their position.

A few decades ago, says George Soule, old age was by no means the present "problem." There were fewer old people, and as a rule they were not segregated, either in their work or their social surroundings from the rest of the population, except for "those few who were penniless, incapacitated, and without families to care for them." The study of modern centenarians he then cites may throw some light on what many old people "really want": the most common factor shared by these 100-or-more-year-olds was their evasion of "the segregation often involved in retirement or dependency" (19, p. 27).

Most of the modern aged emphatically do not want "the segregation often involved in retirement or dependency." Various studies consistently show that very few of them seek retirement, that even fewer want it at that moment when they are informed at their place of work that their services are no longer required. Loss

of income has something to do with it, because even with welfare-state provisions in most cases their level of living will recede. To some extent, though, the prospect of a work-free day has in itself a forbidding aspect.

In a study that inquired what respondents would do if inherited money provided a comfortable living, the proportion who said they would want to go on working declined from 90 per cent at ages 21 to 34 to only 61 per cent at ages 55 to 64. Most older men, then, continue to want the *experience* of work, regardless of economic circumstance. Evidently the land of Cockaigne is granted only a divided loyalty. Interestingly enough, at any age those who are least qualified by background and experience to utilize work-free time are those who are most willing to retire. "Men in white-collar occupations were more likely to say they would continue to work than men in manual jobs, while, among the latter, skilled and semiskilled workers were more likely to express a preference for continuing to work than the unskilled group" (9, pp. 28–29).

If those who are least qualified by background and experience to utilize work-free time are those most willing to retire, they want to exchange little for less. Among the unskilled are large numbers who do not read, never took much interest in the world beyond the family and the job, do not have long-established friendships, and never had an interest in garden puttering or other skilled hobby that might substitute for the discipline that the job once exerted on the routine of their days.

Unskilled workers are not, however, equally deprived by retirement. Social reality is ultimately an individual experience. Valid characterizations according to descriptive categories can be arrived at, and it is necessary as well as valuable to make such characterizations. But significant individual variations—in action, reaction, and their meaning—persist within them. In his investigation of leisure-time activity, Robert J. Havighurst demonstrated both of these last two propositions.

On one hand, "vitality" and "creativity" and "development of talent" tend to be positively related with "class position." To him that hath in maturity, generally speaking, more is given at retirement. On the other, there was "much more variability in the meanings of favorite leisure activity among people of a given sex, age, or social class" than there was between such groupings. "Thus it appears that the meanings people find in their favorite leisure activities are more dependent on their personality than on age, sex, or social class" (11, p. 318).

It follows that the last days of any individual will have whatever meaning may be in terms of inner resources. That is not an entirely unfortunate circumstance. The wares of a fun-and-games epoch can afford small consolation. The busy cheerfulness of bureaucratic proposals to solve a problem is impertinent. "There should be appropriate agencies on federal, state, and local levels to provide coordination, consultation, aid, and services to senior citizens for free-time activities, including recreation, voluntary services, and citizenship participation." The piece cited ends with the note that the "challenge to society is to define expectations for adventurous living in the later years . . ."

Psychiatrist Charlotte Buhler faults those expectations for adventurous living. The old person has been "sucked up" into a directionless process we call "progress," but it will not warm his heart. "For his, and incidentally for everybody's sake, we have to rediscover the importance of the integrity of our inner life and what we owe ourselves, regardless of the 'progress' around us. And we have to try to teach it again" (4, p. 371). It may be, though, that inner integrity is something each must discover for himself—just as Plato finally said, in effect, that the virtuous life is undefinable: it can only be recognized and lived.

Margaret E. Mulac, a professional worker in recreation who is manager of the Golden Age Hobby Show in Cleveland, Ohio, has cautioned the old that effort on their part is required. They "must make way for youth" and reach only for what is attainable. In

their own interest they should control the very human demand for special privileges and immunities. If others shun them, they might make sure that their own "unpleasant whining" does not contribute.

Too many programs and approaches, she feels, only justify and encourage the self-pitying tendency of many of the aged. If all the emphasis is placed upon the obligations of industry and the responsibilities of government, then the old are denied the dignity of retained autonomy. We attempt to take our younger disabled off the list of those who are "done for" and "put them on the list of those who can 'do' for themselves." She advises that a similar effort be made in the interest of the aged.

Miss Mulac feels strongly that the aged should remain as active and busy and involved as possible. While Dr. Buhler's claim that the examined life is the greatest good may be correct, given most American old people as they are and the world around them as it is a case surely could be made for continued purposeful endeavor. Thus Miss Mulac is somewhat critical of golden age clubs because they segregate, emphasize "needs," and promote self-pity. We are "coming dangerously close to letting a portion of our retired population believe they are *entitled* to special help solely because of their age" (16, p. 182).

Work, companionship, and the reward of appreciation for expended effort—these she seeks others to achieve through her Golden Age Hobby Shows. These shows are for the "haves," not the "have nots." The visitors are of all ages. "They come to admire and buy and not to pity." Yet she admits that the hobbyists represent not the average but an exceptional group who "are happy now because they have managed to lead happy lives at any age. They have, in a sense, been preparing for a happy retirement all their lives" (16, p. 183).

If Miss Mulac is correct, only a minority of the retired aged do or can find life fully worth living, and that state can be achieved only with activities and an outlook similar to those which pre-

vailed when they were young. A much smaller minority, surely, is capable of accepting Dr. Buhler's recommendation. An expanded shelf is being cushioned for the rest.

COCOON AND PLAYPEN

All attempts to characterize an entire people are ill-advised, bound to be wildly inaccurate. Some anthropologists have claimed that personality differences in even simple, preliterate societies are more striking than are similarities. A complex civilization, of course, offers much more hazard to any attempt at characterological summary. And even if description is limited to a segment of a population, to state, for example, that the modern American aged or their adolescent grandchildren are or feel thus-and-so should rightly invite skepticism.

But attitudes, especially attitudes toward entertainment, work, leisure, and politics, are much more superficial than personality traits. To some extent the "modern adolescent" on these counts can legitimately be described as being "different" from, say, what his parents were when they were adolescents during the thirties or early forties. Middle-aged moralists, to be sure, have always deplored the attitudes and behavior of the young. The only point being made is that while most of what excites perennial middle-aged disapproval is unchanging, some of it does change.

During the thirties the young were thought to be militantly idealistic, impatient to make over the world. At that time one writer declared that the young "are receptive because they have had little social experience—experience systematically kept from them . . . consequently young people possess little ballast for their acquired ideals, which therefore soar to the sky." The most widely held opinion on the subject now is quite different: it is that our youth are tempted not in the least to argue with City Hall.

Conflict and rebellion, as well as idealism, are now thought to

be pretty much outmoded—although their assumed passing is conventionally regretted. The adolescent is now usually depicted as being unable, as well as untempted, to rebel against or for anything. Such a state of mind could result in part from a homogenization of formerly opposed styles and ideas. "Folk songs" written by erstwhile Communists are now sung at Baptist Sunday school picnics under the minister's directon. Socialists, atheists, bohemians, and advocates of free love may have become blurred out of sharp focus and differentiation. "Nowadays, with all the adults jostling each other to get into the middle of the road, there seems to be a dearth of ready-made doctrines which the adolescent can espouse and offer as alternatives to the corruption and mediocrity he wants to escape from" (20, p. 318).

He finds himself, declare Stone and Church, adjusted to the very things he feels maladjusted to. Nuzzled gently into line by parents, various protective bureaucracies, and his own fun-time-all-the-time peer group, there is no place where his spirit can break through. The only way he can assert his individuality is to carry "whatever fad is prevalent one more step toward its ultimate utterness." Since so much of the time there isn't very much he really wants to do anyway, and because the intensity of his desire for those things he cannot have is low and well controlled, "he uses such passing fancies to fill up the vacancy of waiting."

His parents impress upon him the need to be liked by others and to accept and follow public opinion. He thus becomes highly dependent upon his fellows to inform him who he is. Lacking personal standards by which to assess performance, he becomes obsessed with concern about what he can do to make others like him. He cannot judge himself except in the eyes of others, but there is a secret he doesn't know: these others in turn are looking to him for approval and direction.

The argument is taken up by many other writers that the adult world no longer offers the young a challenge. Not only is there little to rebel against: there is very little to come to grips with.

They are supplied with either a cocoon or a playpen. At every step they are "cautioned, watched and studied, treated as subjects for analysis," these children of understanding parents. "The adolescent is unable to rebel, since before overt rebellion occurs his parents will no doubt demonstrate their 'understanding' of his wish to rebel by assuring him that it is perfectly natural" (21, p. 48).

The unwillingness or inability of parents to establish and enforce standards which their children could alternately contest and accept in part stems from rapid social change. Whatever experience parents had as adolescents is felt by them as well as their children to be inapplicable. The child's future place is virtually independent of family property, as well as influence. The world outside the family increasingly encroaches upon the socialization process, and that world sanctions both dependency and the demand for literal equality. Hence parental tolerance, understanding, uneasy bafflement, and hoping for the best.

If parental authority has waned, parental responsibility has not. The sights have been raised, from supplying material needs and character training to an all-encompassing if in many ways ineffective care and concern. A similar arrangement of his life awaits the child in school. He receives encouragement neither to work out his own schemes and outlook or to take action on his own volition. He is persuaded to allow others to do things for him.

Such an arrangement may spell maladjustment for the aged person, but possibly not for the adolescent—either in the world he knows or the one he will graduate into as an adult. Where hard work, self-reliance, and initiative are less and less required by a social order which spreads a blanket of governmental protectionism, the adolescent's training is excellent preparation for facing reality—provided the blanket remains whole.

There is one impression that is especially striking after examining on the one hand what has been written by members of the

older generation about youth, and on the other listening to and reading about what youth say about themselves, and it is this: older people are much more disturbed, worried, and frantic about youth than are young Americans themselves. The self-pitying beatnik and tough delinquent are in the minority, and so are the lusty sex experimenters, cheered on by older writers who are fighting a battle that has subsided more than it has been won or lost. In short, if adolescence is a period of *Sturm und Drang*, then that condition has been successfully avoided by very many representatives of this generation.

They are reasonably content, reasonably satisfied with themselves, do not want the boat to be rocked and are quite willing to remain reasonably still themselves. They do not, according to the Gallup-Hill survey, want to travel or seek adventure, but to marry, build a nest, stay in it and have young ones. They are, on the average, quite well adjusted.

Their evasiveness—if it is that—in matters of idea and spirit, politics and religion, and even of personal conviction, is in step with that bland tolerance accepted as an ideal which Michael Novak has said characterizes adult life. But it may be that youth is to some extent adjusted to the sources of its own maladjustment, is faced by a vacancy of waiting while it celebrates the cult of security. Much implied disquiet, anyway, both in the immediate present and for the personal future, is disclosed in what may appear to be an unlikely source.

THE TEENAGE MAGAZINES

Some really new magazines can be recognized by the word "teen" (lower case) in combination with one or more other words: *teen parade, teen world,* and so on. They are purportedly designed for both sexes; the cover picture invariably shows a young couple in a state of "dating." Primarily, though, they appear to be aimed at young girls. Lead articles or stories are typically entitled: "Why

Boys Don't Date Outside Their Crowd"; "What About 'Love At First Sight?' "; and "What Kind of Boy Will You Attract?"

To strangers from another time, this is an alien world. Completely absent are the protestant-ethic themes of yesterday, of exhortation to work hard and win; nothing whatsoever can be found about careers and planning for the future, not even about marriage and the family—somewhat surprising in material written largely for girls; nothing about "how to" make or fix this or that; nothing at all about education, except, perhaps, for an article on "How to Cram for That Awful Exam." And, it need hardly be added, completely absent are the religious and moral homilies of the day before yesterday.

This neon-lit playpen bars out everything except fun, and the inmates are depicted as staring blankly at one another when they are not "having fun." Much of their fun is had by staring outside the playpen with adoration and envy, tinged with a little hostility, at the guttersnipe millionaires who sing their songs for them—"the only poetry they know," according to Max Lerner. "Elvis Don't Leave Us!" is the caption of a typical teenage magazine treatment, and it is sub-captioned "Elvis, you were so moody and restless—you were just like every other teen in the world. Elvis, do be yourself!"

In the playpen fun is all, but the commercial people in charge of it subject the inmates to occasional electric shocks with advertisements—at the prospect of being unattractive, unpopular, undated, left out. The articles and advice to writers-to-the-editor (there is very little fiction) deal almost exclusively with one single theme: the duty to become a popular "date." The theme is handled somewhat gingerly, as in a story which appeared in *teen world.*

"Mom never said another word to me about not letting Mark kiss me too much, or anything like that. But Mark seemed to sense that I just wanted to take things a little easier, and he went along with it." The story ends with the girl going to a party with

the patient Mark, where she intends to have "fun, lots of fun, fun."

Although the reader is informed that nothing is going to be transgressed, it is not made clear if there is anything which could be. What is "too much" is left unspecified; and so is "anything like that." In *teen-agers' ingenue* the girl is warned that "Passionate Pammy, Icicle Joy—/ Neither one will get the boy."

This and similar forms of non-advice on sexual behavior are infrequently encountered. No particular stand is taken on bodily contact; there is no suggestion that either physical enjoyment or risk may attend a girl's "dating." The one overriding concern is popularity—not popularity with any one boy, but popularity in general. The girls who write letters-to-the-editor appear to view themselves not as persons but as objects designed to be assessed. Too young for marriage, or making a competitive score, they are engaged in an enterprise which resembles what one Senator has said is the objective of American foreign policy: "We would rather be approved than succeed."

IMAGE AND ADAPTATION

In the determined search for fun, the committee-decided reassurance of fun, friendship across sex lines appears to be absent. Expressed wish is not so much to be with a particular person as to be seen with anyone whom the committee will approve. What they seem primarily concerned about is "projecting an image," the same intention which is often announced to explain or justify a great deal of economic and political activity. It may be the following title of an article in one of these magazines indicates that realistic training for adult life is begun early: "Now Is Your Chance to Learn What Your Special Personality Really Is, And Your Special Appeal to Boys!"

These teenage magazine themes of the projected image and

concern for the package instead of the contents are granted high-adjustment application in the most impeccable of scholarly journals. The following, for example, is drawn from the *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development:* "Throughout our materials it was seen that the socially successful girl was the one who acted *as if* she were sexually mature, but who does not allow herself to feel the emotions which she appears to be acting out."

The girl who "matures early" is the one who is "better fitted to enter into competition in a culture founded not on love and mutually expressed heterosexual affection, but on patterned social, intellectual, and physical competence." According to this researcher, in the "dating gangs" high school boys must inhibit their sexual aggressiveness or be outlawed by the mutually protective gossip of the female cliques. The basic skill learned in such groups "is how to be with a lot of people without ever getting close to them emotionally." (Still, male adolescents can hardly be uniformly tamed by the "dating gangs," else those rather impressive statistics on high school pregnancy remain unexplained.)

Sex in the teen magazines is sanitized and aseptic, vulgar in the extreme but as distantly removed as is possible from description of or incitement to Dionysian revel. The magazines do not spell out any standard of conduct, not even in terms of calculated self-interest. What they do state or imply is the questionable thesis that "how far" the girl "should go" is a distance that her "personality" will determine, a distance that boys are bound to respect, and her "popularity" will thus be ensured. They do not admit the dilemma Margaret Mead has described as the requirement that a girl must be both seductive and virginal—play the game of love, but not to the end. They ignore the fact that "popularity" encourages "going far enough" to satisfy—perhaps within mechanically administered limits—male tissue and ego demands, while at the same time in most circles the fulfillment of the suburban romance

still requires a reputation for some degree of body inviolability. Some of the toys in the playpen are complicated, and not much fun at all.

That so many girls' letters-to-the-editor should reveal bewilderment and unhappiness is quite understandable. The printed answers are worthlessly sentimental, which may reflect commercial policy. But on one count these magazines remain closer to reality than many of the "sophisticated" books on teenage life and morals written for teenagers and their parents: while these magazines do not admit the imperious nature of male sexuality, neither do they promote the popular myth that male and female sexual interests are identical.

The "average teen-ager," it should be noted, is likely to remain as elusive as the "common man." At this writing all of the teen magazines have not attained the annual circulation of *Boys' Life* (for the Boy Scouts) and the *American Girl* (for the Girl Scouts), where more traditional values continue to find expression. Although in many ways the teenage grouping more nearly approximates a homogeneous outlook and way of life than do American adults, the extent to which this is true can easily be overstated. There are, after all, budding young scientists who perform chemistry experiments in the family cellar, young girls who practice violin with a determination to become concert stars, and a scattering of young moralists who attend Epworth League and Christian Endeavor meetings not to arrange a "date" there but to express disapproval of those who do.

But the impression remains that such youngsters can hardly be adjusted, that they are in a real sense going contrary to the times. Those who are adjusted are egalitarian and tolerant and accepting, not so much on principle as by drifting with the current. Besides such distinctions as race and religion and ethnic group, not so long ago conscious standards of social class, of ambition and intellectual drive, and of moral propriety served to distinguish among the young almost as much as they served their par-

ents in the same way. It is of course a sociological commonplace that most social distinctions are, if not being erased, then becoming hazy in outline. And teen-agers, denied access to the division of labor, in most matters are on average even more egalitarian than their parents.

It has been said, rather cavalierly, that in America everyone is friendly but no one has friends. To whatever extent that condition prevails, it results in part from practicing the technique for maintaining egalitarianism—instant adaptability. Superficiality of response is essential to the technique; otherwise one could not make himself available to everyone else and reasonably expect that they would make themselves available to him.

A concern about sales has come to supersede production in more than the strictly economic realm. It is not only, as master-salesman Elmer Wheeler has put it, that what sells is the sizzle and not the steak, but that everyone is under some pressure to sizzle at a uniform heat. All markets are now ultimately controlled by mass purchasing power, and the demand for instant adaptability from all suppliers is high.

A diminishing proportion of people work with their hands or engage in direct production. An increasing proportion sell, promote, interview, and seek to learn the "group consensus" with polling techniques, hoping therewith to discover what the present state of affairs is and what is going to happen. There is, in short, functional relevance in that assurance so often offered to vocational counselors by high school youngsters that they need no encouragement to "work with people" because they love to work with people.

TEENAGE OPINION

The teenage magazines accurately reflect several dominant adolescent values, as these have been formally reported. The most obvious and pervasive one is popularity. According to the famous

Purdue Public Opinion Poll of a cross-section of high school students, "Want people to like me more" stands at the very top of the list of youthful desires.

The anti-intellectualism of the magazines also finds such support. The Gilbert Youth Research Company announced a few days before the start of a recent Christmas vacation that only 16 per cent of their high school informants intended to do any studying during that period. In this connection the Purdue researchers found that almost three-fourths of American high school students believe the most important thing they can learn in school is "How to get along with other people." Only 14 per cent place academic learning first.

Accompanying a disdain for learning, the same investigation found a pronounced tendency to espouse authoritarian control and to accept welfare-state solutions to public issues. More than half the young informants approve of censorship—of books, magazines, newspapers, radio and TV. A like proportion advocate wiretapping by the FBI and local police, use of the "third degree," and coercion to force recalcitrant witnesses to testify against themselves. "About half of our teen-agers assert that most people aren't capable of deciding what's best for themselves . . ." (17, p. 601). A large majority "consistently value others' opinions above their own" and more than half of them feel that the government should divide large estates among the poor.

They tend to favor socialistic enterprise and control while they also tend to pay ideological obeisance to "free enterprise." On the question "Who should own and control peacetime uses of atomic energy, such as generating electric power?"—61 per cent said the Federal government, 21 per cent private enterprise, and 18 per cent had no opinion. On the other hand, to the proposition "Democracy depends fundamentally upon the existence of the free enterprise system"—57 per cent agreed, 15 per cent disagreed, and 28 per cent were uncertain.

Do confused semantics and loyalties lurk in the above results?

Whether they read or not, many teen-agers may be aware that the Russian system is groping toward means to decentralize unworkable controls, while the opposite tendency is evidenced in our own system. Under Russian communism the main source of state revenue is a stiff sales tax, while above an untaxed minimum the income tax is a flat 13 per cent levy. Under American capitalism the main sources of state revenue are a 50 per cent tax on corporate profits plus a steeply graduated income tax.

The common complaint (including that registered in the Gallup-Hill survey) that American youth are ignorant about the differences between the Soviet and American systems may not be entirely justified. Confusion may result, at least in some instances, not so much from lack of knowledge about the differences as awareness of the movement toward a common center. On the other hand, ignorance about those realities of our own economic system which flout popular mythology is common, even among college students. A recent study showed, for example, that 58 per cent of college seniors who had never taken a course in economics and 41 per cent who had taken such a course believed corporate dividends had risen faster and farther than wages in recent years.

Consider, though, that it was adult Purdue researchers and not American youngsters who made up these questions. The intensity of the teen-agers' concern, at least on the average, in issues of this kind may be doubted. To the extent that the teenage magazines can speak for modern youth, there is an almost exclusive concern with the hedonistic present, with self and its preening and its pleasures. They have the committee assurance that fun is for all just as fun is all.

The "teenage culture" may be separate from that of the adult, but it is not distinctive. The Hechingers, for example, are disturbed over teenage expense accounts and especially the widespread teenage assumption that material gratification must not only be instantaneous but also equally allotted. Parents should insist, they feel, that there is nothing disgraceful about their not

being able to afford something that an adolescent in some other family has.

"Somewhere along the road the all-important concept of equal opportunity has become confused with a claim to equal possessions in an affluent society" (12, p. 159). That "claim to equal possessions" is also voiced by envious voting blocs, justified by politicians, and acceded to by a majority of voting adults. Adolescents may be more strident and extreme than adults in such demands, but the expectation of instant gratification with money earned by others represents adjustment to the world of adults more than rebellion against it.

WORK-FREE TIME AND MEANINGFUL WORK

In all previous history only a privileged few have been rescued from all the troubles that toil is heir to by an abundance of income and work-free time. Suddenly, within the lifetime of fairly young adults, this happy state of affairs has become the lot of almost everyone in this country. Little joy, however, is being expressed in public.

In the manner of Americans, at least educated Americans, we are telling one another that we must set about solving these new problems. As we once worried about others' physical welfare under conditions of material deprivation, now we worry about their character under conditions of affluence. Alternately, it is true, we may worry about those few who have not become affluent.

Dr. Johnson once said that only the very rich have ever argued the blessings of poverty with any conviction. And involuntary poverty surely impoverishes the spirit. There may be, to be sure, a psychological optimum. Personal problems, Emile Durkheim and other researchers have shown, tend to become more acute in boom as well as depression. Under both conditions established expectations of self and others are upset. Many people, of course, would risk being extremists and endorse the statement recently

made by an entertainer: "I've been rich, and I've been poor, and rich is best."

Whether most citizens would agree with them or not, social critics appear to be fairly unanimous in this judgment: a sort of listless malaise has settled upon the business of buying things and having fun. Will instant gratification spoil the fun? In any event, when "life is real, life is earnest," most people do appear to live with more zest. Effort applied to a goal, whether illusory or shabby or noble or however described, takes people out of themselves. Whatever the natural state of the human animal may be, most representatives of the species on the evidence have been strivers. It has been said of Max Beerbohm that he lived his life untroubled by the desire to impress others or to justify himself with productive labor. To few men has such good fortune been granted.

To justify one's self with productive labor means to work at something which others, as well as one's self, can regard as essential. The slave's lot is hardly a happy one, but his work is wanted, he has a place in the scheme of things that others deem important. The immigrants who came by the hundreds of thousands in each year around the turn of the century also performed essential work. Many of them at the same time were exploited, but being exploited may be compensated, to some extent, by the knowledge that the labor being done is "meaningful" to the exploiter.

The question may at least be raised whether many Americans, whatever other satisfactions they derive from their work, can now feel as needed and essential as once did the slave and the immigrant. Many jobs are now being saved from being automated or eliminated by some other technological advance only through political intervention. The efforts of most men, even those whose jobs are "safe," appear puny alongside the pile of goods that has grown steadily higher as we have moved from an era of lessening scarcity into one of insecure abundance. Some of that insecurity is spelled out in articles which express worry about what will hap-

pen to the economy if defense spending should slacken, still more in statements made by spokesmen for many an industry who bewail the "overproductive capacity" of that industry.

In technical terms "overproduction" is impossible, a contradiction. Production rises or falls in adjustment to market demand. But in the real world of the politicalized economy, overproduction is a reality, the most glaring examples being those in agriculture and the allocation of defense contracts, both in part created by computing voter reactions.

Further, businessmen usually argue "overproduction" to a congressional investigating committee when they want a more efficient competitor to be coerced into desisting from "unfair pricing policies" (that is, from offering goods for sale at a price low enough to dispose of "overproduction") or when they seek a hike in protective tariff rates. Some of these spokesmen are vocal defenders of "our free enterprise system." Others, who know what has been going on and can see what is coming, offer this defense: since they no longer control the terms of their own economic survival, they are forced to employ means not of their own choosing.

Whether the pile is too high or not, advertising and marketing research must move noisily and nimbly to reduce it. Brilliant young men, with the right if not the vest to sport a PBK key, earnestly debate for hours the comparable "impact" of this and that proposed advertising jingle. Teen-agers' adjustments to the pile are many and varied. One of them is constantly to keep something in hand from which to eat or drink. Another is the "teen-agers' charge account"—no money down, and parents' signatures not required.

We have been told that facts such as those listed above will force us to back up, that "economic man" is dead, that the "protestant ethic" is an engine with too much horsepower for the modern economy. One derivation of this argument is the insistence that we must find some form of self-justification other than work,

perhaps in "creative leisure." The frenzy of buying and consumption and promotion on one side, the unabated drive to produce on the other, it is said, can lead only to catastrophe.

Through such rhetoric often winds the "wisdom of the East," but it has limited application. Men do not slough off a predominant orientation that is centuries old, such as the teleology of the West—in answer to an emergent set of conditions that is only a few years old and may last only a few more. And the "philosophic calm" and "contemplative resignation" of the East arose out of centuries of heat, starvation, plague, and futility. People in such circumstances eagerly grasp for "Western materialism" when its means become available, even though they may misunderstand and misuse them.

The argument that the mourning period for economic man is long past and the proposal that everyone stop working so hard and devote himself to "leisured pursuits" share the same basic shortcoming. A long-range and radical-authoritarian political reform is either proposed or implied to change a set of conditions that arose in a short period of time, conditions that will continue to change in ways and a direction we cannot foresee. It could even be that the present burden of a pile of goods might at some future time become the Golden Age of the past.

But however probable the short life of the present relationship between production and consumption, there appears to be, there at least has been reported to be, fairly widespread dissatisfaction with the total experience of the job. If that claim is assumed to be true, most men may find their work unrewarding because they do not feel that what they are doing is essential to anyone else. Are we, as has been suggested, the victims of our own success? Essential work, as *idea,* does seem more clearly defined under conditions of scarcity. Then, further gains in production are not treated as problems but hailed as obvious progress toward physical survival and well-being. But then, also, most of the gainfully employed are engaged in direct production—and not in styling,

packaging, promoting, selling, expediting, public relations, personnel, and "services."

And it may be that among the diminished proportion who still engage in direct production can be found some who experience less self-justification in what they do than did their predecessors. Compare the farmer of a few decades ago, laboring to supply a local market with food, with his grandson producing food that will be hauled to a government warehouse to be stored until it rots. As for a sense of dedication, those work gangs who raced across a continent laying rails fast enough to beat out a rival railroad were surely in a different case from the worker in a "defense plant" who knows that he has been hired, along with several other supernumeraries, to fatten up the wage costs on a "cost-plus" contract. The coal fireman riding a diesel locomotive with clean hands, the union-contracted extra musicians at the recording studio who leave their instrument cases unopened, the building-trades workers who on order slow the job down and use shoddy methods, at times may feel as absurd as left-bank existentialists.

The theme of Arthur Miller's *The Misfits* is estrangement from work function. "It's better'n wages," is the laconic observation made by one character after another, whether he gets ready to perform for an audience of hooting drunks at a rodeo or capture wild horses that will be processed for dog food. If they cannot relate in a way meaningful to them with the economy, then they will give it as little time as they must. What they want is a challenge, something that will test skill and courage, but they find these are good only for amusing others or for trivial commercial purposes that defeat the heroic posture. Perhaps the unflagging popularity of camping, hunting, and fishing, now all playacting but dealing with what were once serious matters of survival in an economy of scarcity, recapture for many something worthwhile that is blessedly relieved of the intellectual's irony which Miller foisted on his virtually inarticulate characters.

Job dissatisfaction may be one important reason why present attempts to manufacture a sense of collective dedication have not been entirely successful. A voluntary sacrifice for something requires the sense of being an integral part of it. Moreover, invoking the rhetoric of voluntary sacrifice upon others is especially difficult to "implement" at a time when others are also being told that little really needs to be sacrificed. Spartan virtues cannot be stored on a shelf with directions to use in case of emergency.

Exhortation to voluntary effort has a rather thin sound after it has filtered through the directive apparatus. The dilemma is illustrated in a small way by the report of the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth. The first half of it issues a call to individual adults and their children to get cracking. There is a considerable denunciation of soft living—the togetherness, the "'decline' in moral and spiritual values," the "permissive upbringing" of children. The proffered solution is a "strong and happy family." But such a condition, like so many others, sadly enough, is something that no governmental directive can call into being. So the second half of the report describes in promotional terms the "progress" that specified government bureaus and government-sponsored groups are making, mainly in tax-maintained recreational projects.

ACHIEVEMENT AS NEED

According to A. H. Maslow (13) there are five universal goals which deserve to be named basic needs: physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization—arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency. Each need will, in sequence, monopolize consciousness and organize the capacities of the organism until it is gratified. When "a need is fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent ('higher') need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivators."

Maslow warns that his schema is a statement about general tendency, and will not reveal how or why any individual acts as he does. It will not, for example, explain why some men deliberately choose martyrdom and thus sacrifice all physiological needs; Maslow suggests that such men may have had all such needs gratified in earlier life. All that Maslow insists upon is that "the person will *want* the more basic of the two needs when deprived in both."

Several other qualifications might be noted, but they fall beyond the margin of the present discussion. What may be of interest, however, is an attempt to extend Maslow's theory in terms of present materials. Thus it is hypothesized that when the more basic needs of physiological gratification, safety, and love are fulfilled without effort, challenge, or risk, attainment of such higher needs as esteem and self-actualization is in that degree rendered more difficult.

Jack Dempsey would, unless checked, have fought anytime, anywhere, just to augment his reputation, but many old-time managers take a dim view of most of the new youngsters because "they didn't start hungry enough." There is no intent to advise others to start broke for their own good. Neither is there any quarrel with the proposition that rich is best. The hypothesis merely states a highly probable relationship.

Perhaps more clearly demonstrable is this claim: the condition of the "common man" and the equally hypothetical "average teenager" includes a virtual guarantee of physiological gratification and safety, at least in the very short and temporary period of the present. There is widespread agreement, anyway, that "love" is made relatively easy of access by the fun-oriented society in which they both live. The "typical youth," according to the Gallup-Hill survey, "wants very little because he has so much and is unwilling to risk what he has" (8, p. 64).

But what about Professor Maslow's "highest needs," of esteem and self-actualization? The difficulties in achieving them occur

on two levels—that which the self envisions as being accomplished, and that which others reflect to the self by the judgments they pass. What has been generally overlooked is that the raising of living standards has not been accompanied by a comparable increase in psychic reward. When everybody has a great deal then nobody has much more, just as when everybody is somebody then nobody is anybody (with apologies to Gilbert and Sullivan). Crane Brinton claims that modern society has almost transformed the ancient agon into the proposition that everyone shall have a prize. But what, then, is the prize to the recipient, and to the beholder?

Further, aggressive and envious egalitarianism, by passing a negative judgment upon exceptional conduct and achievement, has created that "conformity" scare which so many indignant spokesmen appear to regard as a mysterious visitation from places unknown. Everything has its price, and that for the burial of snobbery is an attempt to live down to the Joneses by deprecating one's own accomplishments as well as those of others. And it is not only in the schoolroom and the recreation program that recognition for achievement tends to pass over individuals in favor of groups and teams.

EQUALITY AND BOREDOM

Among those writers who have noted some social and psychic costs of the egalitarian society are David Riesman and his associates. The orientation to the past of feudal society is closed to the "middle class" they describe. This class is also said to have virtually renounced the orientation to the future which until recently guided their way. "Both past and present have so disappeared from view as to dull the pleasure of the here-and-now" (18, p. 338).

Form and style have disappeared from informal discourse, says Riesman, owing to an insistence upon casualness and a conspira-

torial flouting of rules which very few people any longer know. A kind of compulsive and mushy affability militates not only against a display of personal achievement but against the presentation of a self to others that is sufficiently structured to make one's acquaintance of genuine value to them. Guests do not learn artistic ways of recounting experiences when everyone has an equal right, and opportunity, to talk.

Every topic remote from the small store of common experience becomes an unwarranted and resented affirmation of self-importance. "In getting rid of pressure on each other to shine, they have permitted themselves to become drab." Riesman concludes his empirical study of party-going with the observation that it was "noteworthy" how many of those investigated prepared to attend a "good time" without anticipating one. "An overequalitarian ethos has the same effect on sociability as on the schools: by denying differences of skill and motivation, it compresses all into a limited range of possibility" (18, p. 340).

Why do they deny such differences? "The anxiety generated by the prospect of losing prestige and popularity may lead people to act so as not to distinguish themselves" (24, p. 271). We have not got rid of snobbery, according to Van den Haag, we have democratized it. Egalitarian snobbery is gratified by the numbers that acknowledge popularity, and the inchoate longing for popularity expresses a "craving for indiscriminate acceptance."

The "formlessness" of social intercourse to which Professor Riesman alludes has not, then, ushered in an era of noncompetition. Egalitarianism has not so much granted the boon of brotherhood as it has exacted the price of extending indefinitely the number with whom each invidiously compares himself. To "succeed" in a rigidly structured class system requires only that a few be outdistanced, and not very far at that. In a "loose" system such as our own, which must also contain an egalitarian ideology, there are no plateaus where, not ambition, but wish and want and envy may pause and abate.

There is here an apparent contradiction. Prizes—at least in intent—go to all. Social pressure and ideology and political income redistribution either deprecate or undermine superiority. Adjustment for the superior person has in social terms become in part an effort to disguise his accomplishments. What, then, has happened to striving behavior in the old-fashioned, the career sense? It is obviously still very much in evidence.

Obstacles to achieving esteem and self-actualization have indeed been erected, but by no means do all find them insurmountable. Fortunes and career reputations can still be made, and power gained, no matter what the odds or the added complications of the "democratic image." Further, the insuperable demands of a division of labor, now as ever, ensure that some will receive greater income and wield more authority and thus be granted more *functional* prestige than others. Effort to achieve is still being expended, however compromised *social* distinction and the acknowledgment of superiority may have become. And the results of such effort continue to place some in a higher social space than others.

At the same time, the gap between "top" and "bottom" has been narrowed—in income, levels of material existence, and acknowledged superiority and inferiority. Precisely because of that fact, more and not fewer invidious comparisons are being drawn between self and others by those at or near the bottom. It is not so far down as once it was, but there are fewer people there and it has become a lonely place.

With virtually free education for all, with "massive administrations of aid," the few who remain there cannot so readily blame ill luck as could their parents. The major social pressure they feel is no longer to stay where they are; it is a determined insistence on helping them to improve themselves. Most of them are thus resentfully apprehensive that they will be forced to learn how they weigh in the balance.

There are fewer deep and irreconcilable grudges between peo-

ple separated by a vast social distance, as in a rigid caste system, than in a situation where literal equality is almost, but inevitably not quite, a reality. The short span of social distance that remains unbridged looms larger than ever in the envious mind. If Riesman's party-goers do not permit one another to discuss their achievements, or even their distinctive tastes and specialized knowledge, they are no less acutely aware, indeed some of them are more fretfully aware, that in all dimensions they are not buddies and good guys together.

It is open to question whether modern America can properly be described as having a "class structure." If it could, there would be no conformity to worry about. America throughout the nineteenth century did have a class structure. Definitive stratification was accompanied by economic dynamism, and high mobility was paradoxically coupled with severe status restrictions. Yet it was that unstable combination of conditions which encouraged individualism, innovation, and self-autonomy. The catalysts of nonconformity at that time were challenge, opportunity—and effort required to surmount resistance to effort.

Each stratum within a class structure maintains separate and distinct standards of comportment, and competition for favorable attention is restricted either within an individual's class or by the class he is striving to enter. The consequences, for individuality, are similar to those in the modern home where parents miraculously retain more than a vestige of authority. The adult in one situation, as the child in the other, can test, in part incorporate and in part reject, the standards imposed. Paradoxically again, individual distinctiveness is strengthened and defined by limits placed upon momentary wish.

By and large these conditions no longer obtain. In a strictly relative sense, of course, there are no standards and no exclusions, and hence reduced individuality. In the world outside the family as well as within it, an atmosphere of permissiveness encourages aimlessness. Thus it is not approbation of a valued few that is sought so much as a superficial acceptance measured in numbers

which requires instant adaptability to the numbers—that is, popularity.

On the other hand, the structure and demands of the division of labor still must accommodate to "old-fashioned" career strivers and the competitive seeking of reputation among work mates and colleagues. The rewards, though, may have been diminished. Satisfaction in achievement is countered by conventional self-deprecation, the egalitarian pressure to be popular, as well as by the near disappearance of class structure.

John W. Gardner and others have stated that the minority of hard-working successful men are tending to withdraw from their communities and their civic responsibilities. They can still find esteem and self-actualization, but for the most part these are restricted to the specialized area within which they work. Some of them have to pander to the crowd in order to succeed, but few of them care to join it.

Self-actualization, if not esteem, requires competition with others. Superior achievement is sought, whether the tradesman's profits, the scholar's knowledge, the craftsman's skill, the soldier's courage, or the saint's humility. But individual success arouses envy as well as admiration in others, and envy has become legitimized. The gang, the kids, and the crowd demand that one be a "good guy"—that is, one of the crowd.

In Louis Kronenberger's phrase, ours is the "century of the common manner." Familiarity is expected in others, and the "good guy" is understood to welcome any and all invasions of his nonexistent privacy. The committee demand for instant adaptability, plus the fun-and-games values of the adolescent peer group, militate against the kind of character development that lends drive to the wish to achieve.

A minority will always strive to succeed, for the matter is as much individual as it is cultural. A number of surveys, however, show that the proportion of youngsters who declare an intention to try for the top is diminishing. Even if business success were not in the politicalized economy treated with suspicion and disdain, it

might still represent for many of them a rather dubious prospect.

A child can study diligently, work hard at his chosen field of endeavor, and as an adult wind up living in a house, driving a car, entertaining and traveling on the same or only slightly differentiated scale as the boy he grew up with who graduated from the playpen to desultory application and then to government subsidy, benefit, and security. When the hard-working and the provident face discrimination in a tax policy designed to buttress egalitarian ideology through a coercive redistribution of income, only highly motivated individuals can reasonably be expected to exert more than marginal effort. The values held by many teen-agers can to some extent thus be explained.

EQUALITY AND TASTE

The same leveling process has occurred in education, with similar unwanted and unforeseen consequences, most notably the encouragement of sloth and apathy. The high hopes of the education-and-leisure utopians are not going to be fulfilled. What is made difficult to get becomes a challenge to effort, and therefore highly prized. What is made "free and compulsory" is scorned. There is no way out of this basic dilemma. When everyone is required to "be educated," education, by those simultaneously coerced and subsidized, receives little attention and less appreciation.

The burial of snobbery is not being mourned; an estimate of the funeral costs is being made. Modern Americans of all shades of opinion have a personal distaste for snobbery that outvotes any desire they might feel to see it institutionally reintroduced. Nevertheless, when education in the past was highly prized it also served snobbish ends—for those who wished to attain social position and those who merely wanted to embellish position already secured. This is not to say there was no real appreciation, only

that the formal seeking of knowledge was securely grounded in the in- versus out-group phenomenon.

A majority who now yearn for the symbol of cultural equality without its fact, says Leslie Fiedler, also demand "a B.A. for everyone, with the stipulation that no one be forced to read to get it." The badge may be sought, but the process is avoided. When the process of education is almost completely removed in practice and ideal from social class or social position, and made free and compulsory to all, it is bound to inspire widespread anti-intellectualism. Uninformed taste that is also unmotivated will inevitably spit back what it is forced to feed on, especially when that forced feeding in the form of traditional subject matter is no conceivable aid in getting the things that are really wanted.

Those utopian hopes that "cultural standards" would rise and take everyone along with them to the heights, once cultural objects and training were made available to all, have been proved an illusion. On the other hand there is no evidence that popular taste, if of recent dubious improvement, is now "any worse" than it has ever been. The assumption of a uniformity in popular taste throughout history will confer solace or arouse depression, perhaps according to how intensively is felt the urge to improve others.

However intensively felt that urge may be at the present time, it is fashionable to express it in public. A complaint that something must be done attends the learning of facts such as the one reported by Eugene Gilbert: in early 1962 *The Untouchables* was by a long chalk the favorite TV program. It may be that a combination of sentimentalized egalitarianism and dogmatic utopianism hinders exploration of the possibility that most people actually want this sort of thing. Gilbert Seldes somewhat rudely rejoined: "How does he know they aren't enjoying themselves?" when Adlai Stevenson said of TV programming: "They [the audience] aren't even enjoying themselves."

Perhaps, though, Stevenson was not so far wrong in raising the

question about how much they are enjoying themselves. There is now not a minority, but a majority, of both youth and adults who have money and work-free time in abundance, but are denied access to power and snobbery and the other toys which eased the boredom of the small monied-and-leisured aristocracies of the past. This new majority does not live at a peak, but on a level plane, and despite its money and work-free time it does not seem likely it can get that "esteem" and "self-actualization" which accompanied money and leisure, as well as career achievement, in the past.

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chapter five

Work and Leisure

It was Proust's opinion that while life may bring disappointments, "in work is consolation." Others, and Proust himself for that matter, have found in work much more than that: a reason for being for which no amount of pleasure-seeking, jockeying for position, posturing for attention, or even coerced acceptance of serving distant others can substitute. Most of these people have been artists, and they have treated work and leisure as a flow of life experience and not as separate compartments of effort and idleness.

WORK AND SELF

There is, however, no state of salvation or happiness especially reserved for artists. The "flow of life experience" is neither easy nor entirely uninterrupted. Indeed, a case can be made for labor which alternates with separated leisure or even idleness, as over against creative work. The artist may even seek out labor—repetitive, noncumulative, impermanent labor—as a respite from his work, or from the emotional-metaphysical consequences of his work.

Lionel Trilling says of Matthew Arnold's acceptance of the post of inspector of schools in 1852 that although Arnold did his job well, "it hastened his poetic end." But that was not, in Trilling's opinion, an unmixed tragedy, for he quotes Arnold's admission that the writing of poetry tore him to pieces. Inspecting schools balanced Arnold's books: "To be a poet in the intervals of a routine job is well-nigh impossible. Yet work ["labor" is a substitute term for "routine work"]—routine work—is one of the 'ways' of the Bhagavad-Gita, an alternative to contemplation and an escape from despair" (10, p. 158).

In whatever way work or labor or both may serve the self, as variant of either satisfaction or release, the efforts of all, even those of the artist, are expended in the world and pretty much on the world's terms. "Art for *my* sake" was D. H. Lawrence's battle

cry, but he could neither find nor create a world—and he tried to do both—that was nearer his heart's desire. In the real world there are many others, and each like the others must settle for what he can get, which in varying degree always depends upon what the others will grant. The efforts of each must be used primarily to justify his existence and place in the common world he shares with these others.

THE DRAFTED VOLUNTEER

This requirement is no emergent condition of modern society, for it was imposed upon the Tanala rice grower, the Comanche hunter, the fishermen and taro gatherers of the Trobriand Islands, and upon the various members of India's ancient castes. Caste membership was reckoned in terms of descent, but it was rooted in an occupation passed down from father to son. In all these cases, in all societies, what a man or woman does is a card of identity, and how he or she performs maintains or diminishes reputation among a small group of the closely known—the most durable and effective means of social control in all times and places.

If not always in one's own interest, it is invariably in the interest of others that one should be controlled by them through one's own reputation. The willingness to labor, even to work, could hardly otherwise be depended upon. Voluntarism and external pressure are never encountered entirely alone; only the admixture varies. The question may be hypothetical, but still of interest to consider, how much artists as well as laborers in the absence of external pressure would take it easy, daydream, and shirk responsibility. Most and possibly all men are motivated both to exert effort and to loaf.

Work is man's taskmaster as well as his boon companion. There was neither work nor labor in the Garden of Eden. In paradise, arcadia, or the Golden Age, there is more passivity than action.

And when utopia in the future instead of arcadia in the past has captured imagination, there is always the bright promise of only an irreducible minimum of effort expended in the spontaneous joy of doing what one wants to do anyway.

But in the real world there is a continuing necessity for both work and labor. When utopia leaves books to enter the real world, the external pressure to work and labor is made less dependent upon the informal opinions of intimates by the application of depersonalized state coercion. The link that remains between dream and reality is the insistence that what everyone wants to do is what the enlightened few who govern want them to do.

TROUBLED WORK-FREE TIME

If we have neither returned to paradise nor achieved utopia, we are at least a people with lots of time on our hands. This time is not leisure, in the classic sense; it is work-free time. And it is accompanied with continued expectations of self—and more important, of others—that effort be expended to justify self.

The universal ambivalence toward work and ease or non-work is thus perhaps heightened. Such ambivalence, anyway, has made confused and confusing the considerable debate about recreation now endlessly engaged. The "new leisure" is saluted with joy, but it also stirs apprehension, at times in the same speech or piece of writing.

There is, for example, a considerable literature on the adjustment of factory workers to added increments of work-free time—which is not cited here because it is contradictory. Some researchers find workers to be content with more such time, to have no difficulty in finding ways to use it happily. Other researchers report querulous boredom is the lot of men untrained in its ways. Still others by indirection imply that both conditions are fulfilled, which makes sense in the case of concrete individuals if not for a hypothetical average.

As was pointed out in a previous chapter, Americans are in fact finding lots of ways to use work-free time—in travel, entertainment, hobbies, and sports, mostly on their own terms and volition. True, how much they are therewith enjoying themselves is a moot point. Many critics, anyway, are saying that those same Americans are as "alienated" from their new sources of enjoyment as they are supposed to be from work and labor themselves. If they are so alienated, it is because this new majority find their work-free time unaccompanied by either the lofty status or the outstanding achievement possessed by members of the leisured minority in the past. Now, that time may be granted without the striving that allays discontent, or without the effects of striving that enhance reputation.

This kind of judgment, though, sets a trap—provided one is sufficiently antidemocratic in final commitment to want to do something about the judgment. It has an affinity with those judgments which emanated from many late eighteenth-century salons. We (that is, the cognoscenti) can live with the new rationalism, the destruction of the old religion; but what about the peasants? If intellectuals now worry about the work-free time of "the masses" instead of the peasants' loss of faith, has a snobbery of the self-elected enlightened been retained and are the political implications similar?

Since intellectuals are only slightly more emancipated than peasants from the will to believe, in someone or something, worrying about the peasants' loss of faith was as much time wasted as it was arrogant. And on balance the evidence suggests that the "modern masses" do not find the new leisure uncongenial. It is true that "they" have shown little enthusiasm for either the finer things of life or organized public recreation programs. On the other hand, the modern intellectual—as were his predecessors—is related to those finer things mainly by his work. As for organized public recreation programs, the former poor and uneducated children of immigrants who once sought guidance as well as recrea-

tion at settlement house and community center have become well off and independent. They and their children pursue individualized recreational interests, on or off tax-subsidized facilities.

A case could be made for the proposition that "the masses" could utilize their leisure time in "better ways" than those they presently seek. Doubtless the same could be said about everyone who has ever discussed the issue. But if the term free society is to be anything more than a dreary cliché, who has appointed whom to be his fellow citizen's timekeeper? That key issue has supplied the framework of this essay. To whatever extent men are not permitted to define their own interests, no matter how cogently it may be argued that it is really or ultimately in their best interest that others define their interests for them, then to that extent is the condition authoritarian. In an employee society where centralized government constantly arrogates as well as accepts voluntary surrender of economic control, and of much of social life as well, recreation appears to be the one area where freedom of choice and action remains clearly in evidence.

Hope is not in abundant supply in discussions of the work-leisure issue. Most assessments of automation as psychological plight have been grim enough, although in some such cases the enlightened few have not been exempted from the plight of the many. Such critics accept Freud's dictum that work is a necessity to bind man (all men) to reality, and some of them agree in substance with Durkheim that some measure of disciplined, productive effort is necessary to maintain personality, selfhood, and even sanity. One of them, Daniel Bell, says that work has now become a greater necessity than ever in the past, for the decline of religious faith leaves nothing else with which to quell the nagging consciousness of imminent death.

What, then, will happen "when not only the worker but work itself is displaced by the machine?" Bell leaves the question hanging, but if the ultimate nightmare of perfected feedback should one day totally eliminate the workman and leave millions of citi-

zens with literally nothing to do except consume production in which they took no part—a highly conjectural if logically possible development—a demoniacal revolt against such a denial of human worth would possibly occur, according to predictions made by some science-fiction writers anyway.

However, to repeat an earlier observation, trends discernible at any given present never fulfill themselves logically, never continue uninterrupted in time, so that "ultimate nightmare" is a no more likely future prospect than is ultimate happiness. Whatever necessity or inevitability men are able to "prove" in history is always limited to retrospective imagination. And the more complex and rapidly changing a given present is, the greater the number of possible different events and trends that can eventuate in the near term. That is why the present seems peculiarly ill-adapted to either the innocence or mischief of devising "plans" for the use that citizens shall make of their leisure time.

The near future could very well dispose of the "problem of leisure" by making hard work a requirement for survival. The very immediate prospect, though, is a continuing or even spreading loss of "meaningful" work. Oddly enough, attention has centered almost solely upon the declining proportion of the work force that is engaged in direct production, whereas a sense of work dedication may also have become denied to many white-collar people.

Two men, a hospital and a university administrator, have each testified that they once did their own jobs with the help of one secretary. Now each has two secretaries and three assistants who handle certain routine matters, make minor decisions, and periodically consult with the boss on what they have done. Neither man could explain how or why these people were added to his staff, since neither had requested them. Both relate a similar incident: a local flu epidemic left each of them for several days with only one secretary, as in the old days. All the work got done, with no particular strain or unusual effort.

The danger of reading too much into these incidents is obvious, even though they are by no means isolated. But can it be—and this is speculation on the order of free flight—that there is some kind of "unconscious impulse" at work to fit supernumeraries into manufactured job slots and thus take up the slack in a social order that prepares by training and lauded aspiration for white-collar functions? If that loaded question should have any merit, its implications will first become apparent outside of business enterprise, in areas such as universities, hospitals, and government bureaus, where there is little or no pressure to hold down costs because competitive market conditions are less active or even absent.

THE GOLDEN MEAN?

The main concern, though, is the social-psychological balance sheet of work-leisure at the present time, and not at the unknowable tomorrow. While the golden mean is the goal, usually unspoken, of the first-rate minds who have dealt with the issue, the golden mean appears to be something that can be achieved only by individuals and not by civilizations. The new work-free time that has been achieved for all has not brought leisure in any meaningful sense. Denis de Rougement has called it "the concrete paradox: the technical qualities, the utilitarian attitude, and, in a word, the efficiency which have brought the problem up are precisely those qualities and attitudes which least predispose one to a fruitful use of leisure."

His outlook is a fashionable one. It is shared more or less, and to name only a few, by Aldous Huxley, Robert Maynard Hutchins, R. M. MacIver, David Riesman, Joseph Wood Krutch, and Hannah Arendt. The proposed solutions or controlled protests, however much they do vary, tend to polarize around either leisure or work. Thus a loss of faith that the golden mean is in the real world a valid collective goal is tacitly admitted.

Some downgrade work and claim that intellectual pursuits and/or the play impulse must be cultivated as a substitute for work and to enrich life. Others see no alternative to work as both psychological and socioeconomic requirement. On the one hand Morris is followed in celebrating the worker-as-artist or the syndicalist in his utopia of workers-as-brothers; on the other Carlyle's sour notion that unremitting toil is and must remain man's hope as well as his lot is accepted.

Some writers have endorsed both points of view. One, for example, once said: "Far from having to be the residue sphere left over from work-time and work-feeling, [play] can increasingly become the sphere for the development of skill and competence in the art of living." In a later piece he pointed out that when work time is reduced many workers become moonlighters and take another job. Polls disclose that most workers do not want a shorter work week; they do want a shorter defined work week that will grant an increase in time-and-a-half pay. Apparently, they need a "self-definition" from holding a job and the experience of "the punctuations of life provided by regular employment."

Play, of course, is not leisure, at least by most definitions. But some degree of ambivalence and indecisiveness on the leisure-work issue is frequently encountered. The reason may be this: it is believed that a "leisure ethic" is required to balance a diminishing need for all-out effort; but that belief accompanies a realization that probably nothing can be substituted by most people as they are, in a society as it is, for such effort.

De Grazia rejects the ideal of leisure as golden mean. He regards leisure as something only a minority can enjoy, as something which requires a propertied class that is relieved of pressure to justify itself with work. A doctrine of equality extended to work stunts the life of leisure, the love of ideas and the play of imagination. "Democratic society could not and cannot offer the kind of freedom that one has in leisure. Too many intelligent

persons believed, and still believe, that that freedom is a luxury" (4, p. 429).

Others view leisure not as the lost private reserve of a saving remnant but as the task of a civilization, by "exploring and extending a specific cultural heritage," in Daniel Bell's words. The scene before us, however, fails to cheer him. It leaves Van den Haag, who treats of leisure in a similar way, likewise disheartened. In effect, we no longer have a cultural heritage!

Reduced cultural diversification has been divorced from social stratification, a development which in turn corrodes standards of comportment. Religious and civil bonds have been totally dissociated. Scientific rationality and mobility have undermined the "sacramental bonds of society." The technological and economic changes which have benefited us have also left us without the bonds which were destroyed with those changes.

"It is when we have leisure and comfort that we most need an ethos to give meaning to our freedom. Yet the means we use to free ourselves from material necessity weaken the ethos we need to employ our freedom purposefully" (11, p. 195). In this outlook we would appear to be left not with alternatives of work or leisure, or a balance between the two, but with work on one hand, and play and entertainment without form, tradition, relatedness, or discovery on the other.

HOW NECESSARY IS EFFORT?

The protestant ethic and the Calvinist ethos, while they may be moribund, are by no means dead. At issue, however, is how much the present social order is dependent upon whatever spark remains in them. Clyde Kluckhohn has pointed out that the secular values of the work-success ethic, future-time orientation, and independence and moral commitment have all been yielding for some time to contesting values.

American youth in the previous chapter were crudely charac-

terized as being "adjusted" to a new politicoeconomic order. In it the values of hard work, frugality, self-autonomy, and innovation have become, if not outmoded, then considerably compromised by social security, progressive taxation, dependency, and governmental assumption of responsibility and direction. The need to work, of course, will remain overriding when those teen-agers are ready to join the division of labor, however old or new or compromised the combination of motives to work may be. Still, credit unlimited, expense accounts, and enormous increases in per capita expenditures for recreation surely indicate some shift toward appreciation of the hedonistic present. Mortgaging the present for the future no longer securely identifies the middle-class way of life.

It may be that living for tomorrow bestows more on the deferrer than living for today offers the consumer. But individual welfare aside, there is a question whether in strictly economic and technical terms the present system "needs" an abundant supply of the old-fashioned virtues. On the record there is no national society which has achieved industrialization without saving, thrift, doing without, working hard, playing little, and a disciplined sacrifice of the present to a projected future. This fact is more clearly understood by Communist imperialists than it is by American foreign-aid enthusiasts. On the other hand, a system that has moved beyond what economists call the takeoff stage appears to be in a position to achieve further increases of production with relatively less input of physical and psychic energy.

There is no quarrel with those historians who have found the "reason" this or that civilization "fell" to be a malaise of spirit and a flagging of effort. The only suggestion here is that at a certain stage a given system can afford a considerable amount of corruption and waste of all kinds—at least for a while. Indeed John A. Kouwenhoven, cited in a previous chapter, asserts there is an intrinsic relationship between mess and waste on the one hand, and democracy and the vaunted economy of abundance on the other.

There are limits, of course, to the extent that any set of factors may be profitably linked in a conceptualized relationship, just as there are limits to the extent that any trend line can continue in a given direction. Joseph Wood Krutch and others who have argued that the economy of abundance is about to devour its beneficiaries may have a point. But matters such as these are settled—if they actually ever are—only in retrospect. Men now, as in the past, are always in the dark about where the collective enterprise is taking them.

The input of physical and psychic energy is also to some extent independent of specific values and attitudes. What can for the sake of convenience be summarized as the protestant ethic, for example, could very likely continue to wane without being accompanied in the same degree by a slackening of work effort. The specialization and formal interdependence of the modern division of labor enforce depersonalized requirements which operate regardless of individual dedication. They enforce attention to a narrow task that must be completed in a certain way at a certain time in order that the work of others, closely if impersonally integrated with one's own operations, will not stall.

The requirements are being met, as of now, sufficiently to push upward the lines on the business charts. But they exact a price and are accompanied by strain and passive resistance. Managerial gripes about employees who are clock watchers, security seekers, and coffee-break artists single out many villains—including government welfare programs and a general deterioration of character. On the other hand a number of social critics, even if they do not call management itself the villain, do so by association: estrangement from work and goof-off proclivities result not so much from a loss of old-fashioned virtue as from resentment of the formal integration of effort planned and imposed by management.

The "break in consciousness" between work and socialized play has thus been completed. Under preliterate conditions, the argument continues, work and socialized play are undifferentiated.

Progress splits them apart, at first in the work gang or room of artisans or office clerks all working steadily at a common task. Later, a series of separate and isolated tasks are assigned which are not integrated with the tasks of others in physical contact or direct communication, but instead are passed along either a literal or figurative conveyor belt.

Work, or perhaps better, labor, then becomes a stultifying and estranging experience, according to these same critics. Both the passive acceptance of canned distraction and the frenetic search for a "good time" in recreation comprise in part a self-defeating release from work alienation. This conclusion may have some validity. It does appear, though, to contradict De Rougement's notion that the reason modern man cannot find or create a "fruitful use of leisure" is the application to leisure time of those habits of "efficiency" that have created the leisure time. On the other hand, to be effective those habits need to be possessed more by those who do the directing than by those who are directed.

SOME WORK HARDER THAN OTHERS

Whatever may motivate or enforce labor and work, the results are quite uneven. At one end of the scale are the nonworking school-attending young, the involuntarily retired, and the permanently or intermittently unemployed—a growing if not altogether envied leisure class. At the other are professional men, the self-employed, and managers, who work longer and harder than all others. Harold L. Wilensky says that while "the affluent society may foster an underlying preference for leisure, the emerging structure of opportunity means that a growing minority works very long hours while increasing millions are reluctant victims of too much leisure" (13, p. 33).

Most of the real recent gains in work-free time have accrued to laborers and operatives in the private nonagricultural industries, and in agriculture since 1940. "Professionals, executives, officials and other civil servants, and the self-employed have benefited

little, and in some occupations have lost out." So-called upper-strata men tend to work 50 hours a week, lower-strata 40. "One breakdown of average hours of business executives shows about 43 hours at the office plus seven hours doing paper work and business reading at home." These 50 hours are augmented by an additional 10.7 hours spent in "business" entertaining and journeying to work (with occasional conferences and paper work en route), and a still additional amount of variable time spent in business travel.

With minor fluctuations ironed out, there is not only a constant tendency for men in higher positions to work longer hours than those in lower positions, but also for the higher-salaried men within the same occupational categories to work longer than their lower-salaried colleagues or associates. In a 1959 comparison made of long-hours men in several samples ranging from upper-middle class professionals to high-income operatives, it was found that only 19 per cent of those who made under $10,000 worked 55 or more hours, whereas 31 per cent of those men who made that amount of money or more worked that number of hours (13, p. 39, adapted from Table 3). But variations within income as well as occupational groupings are so extensive, Professor Wilensky warns, that it might be a mistake to assume that those at the top welcome more work and seek to escape more leisure than those at the bottom. He is less inclined to credit the long hours spent at work by the productive minority in modern society to their internal drive than to the necessity of the situation facing them.

But even if ambition remains more a spur than Wilensky assumes, it need not be fashioned out of old-fashioned virtue. His "upper-strata" men are in an arena where competition pays off —as it always has and must to motivate those who carry the main burden of effort and responsibility. In a discussion of sports in a previous chapter, the risk was noted of accepting at face value changing fashions in rationalizations as accurate indicators of changing realities in behavior. Basic motives change little.

In one epoch ambitious and able men say they strive for the

greater glory of God, while in another they say they "want to have it made when I'm forty." In both instances much the same agon looms—the prize, the struggle for reputation, money, and power. And behind these "meaner motives" is the drive to achievement, the supreme goal of self-actualization. A vaunted religious motive and a declared wish for security could be closer akin than speech reaction would indicate or self-awareness would admit.

Wilensky's "upper-strata" men, he has shown in a separate study, not only work harder but make much "better use" of the little work-free time they have than the majority do with their abundance of such time. In fact, "low leisure competence" was revealed in his survey to be correlated with a shortened work week. The golden mean is as absent in fact as it is in aspiration. "For students of American culture who look forward to the leisure-oriented society, in which we retreat from work to the more diversified joys of ever-shorter hours, the moral is that those who have most leisure have least resources for its creative use" (14, p. 188).

WORK MOTIVES, OLD AND NEW

Religious motives were questioned above as ever having been directly responsible for the drive to achievement. Specifically, the protestant ethic never was a motive. Max Weber himself constantly warned against treating any of the "ideal types" he introduced as if they were motives. For him the protestant ethic was an abstraction useful for throwing some light on another abstraction, the course of history. Indeed the only motives he took seriously were interests, and fairly obvious ones at that.

The impression nevertheless remains strong that Calvinism was, as Emerson called it, "an iron belt to the mind." However tangible or intangible, there was restricted guidance and direc-

tion provided. Even though the "basic motives" of an Andrew Carnegie and a Persian rug merchant should remain "the same," one participated in a specific phase of Western teleological dynamism and the other did not. And even today the protestant ethic, however compromised and diluted, continues to lend "meaning" to individual and collective striving. At the very least, whatever reality may be embodied in that abstraction continues to affect what we say and write, and even the most radical empiricist would not care to argue that overt behavior is totally unaffected by what is said and written.

But the further question has been raised about how many people, even in the recent past, were ever affected by the protestant ethic, whether it is regarded as motivation once removed or mere ideology. If the "bourgeois entrepreneur" ever worked to minimize "his creature comforts" and "drove hard against the environment because of his need to prove himself before God," it can be doubted that the ordinary worker ever did. He was driven to work by hunger and if—although this observation is not added—a different face on the matter was presented in his nonconformist chapels, we are still left with the puzzle of how much ideology and how much making a virtue of necessity was involved.

Whatever it is that may drive the minority to work long hours today, what has become the most popular imputed motive for the majority to work as hard as they do is not the maintenance of reputation among the personally known but the desire to buy things. Hunger is no longer a factor, and the discipline of the division of labor is as disregarded as the protestant ethic is consciously dismissed. The majority are led to crave prodigality, not frugality, and lavishness of display, not asceticism.

The modern worker, says Daniel Bell, has been "tamed" by the "consumption society," by "the possibility of a better living which his wage, the second income of his working wife, and easy credit will allow" (1, p. 32). This same observed plight has been extended from factory workers to all Americans. According to De

Grazia, Americans universally "want more time," but not for leisure or worship or politics. "They want more time for home and family and more time to enjoy themselves. Both aims seem to require purchases; therefore both require more time and more work" (4, pp. 425–426).

Neither of the writers cited goes on to attack the marketplace. Both are sophisticated, thoroughly grounded in history, and therefore presumably realize that freedom in the marketplace of ideas has always, and only, been associated with freedom in the marketplace of objects. But their point of view, that the modern majority are driven to desire material objects, driven to work to get them and thereby sacrifice any hope of enjoying leisure, in lesser hands becomes a prelude to a wholesale attack on modern business, which provides the objects.

MARKETPLACE AND INTELLECTUAL

Businessmen do not have the popular prestige they once had, a fact reflected in various "scales of occupations" which have appeared over recent decades. The reasons for this change are many, and basic. Intellectuals are not "to blame" for it. On the other hand, they have played a part.

Their particular attention has been directed to the general area of recreation and leisure. Many of them have gone beyond raising questions about the worth of modern leisure, consumption habits, and entertainment, which is a legitimate enough focus of attention. They indict the men and the institutions that have provided the means and access to cultural objects of any and all descriptions.

The marketplace is no more to be blamed for low standards than it is to be praised for high ones. Unless political coercion intervenes, whatever customers are willing to buy will be placed on sale. Suppliers in a market do not petition to serve, as some of their naive defenders claim; they seek to make a profit. Through

advertising and the installment plan they do, in a sense, aid in "creating" desire, taste, and habit, but the relationship between what is offered and those desires, tastes, and habits which exist at a given moment is one of interdependence and constantly shifting mutual adjustment. To lambaste the market for supplying what is trite, silly, and wretched is one thing, and so is trying to persuade others away from what is trite, silly, and wretched. To identify the market as the personified enemy of mankind is another.

Many contemporary social critics share a common outlook in the area under discussion; they also embrace the same dilemmas. Their ambivalence toward leisure itself combines with an open distrust and dislike of the commercial recreation and entertainment which most Americans have eagerly sought. They combine a sentimentalized faith in all men with an ill-concealed contempt for the judgments and standards of most of them. What is apparently difficult for many intellectuals to accept is the fact that most of their fellow citizens are either unable or disinclined to accept what they themselves claim to live by and for. Their frustration has resulted, in H. Stuart Hughes's words, from having "tried to combine elitism and democracy—things compatible perhaps in a Periclean or Jeffersonian sense of popular government led by 'the best,' but, under contemporary conditions, radical opposites."

Robert Frost once replied to a question that the difference between Carl Sandburg and himself is that while Sandburg says "the people—yes," he, Frost, says "the people—yes, and no." It is in a different way that many modern intellectuals both affirm and deny the people, and without Frost's knowledge about and willingness to live with whatever limitations the people may exhibit. They share what Leo Rosten has called "the compulsive egalitarianism of eggheads."

They cannot, like intellectuals of the past, associate assumed personal superiority with a superior class, for their own retained loyalties won't permit that, and class snobbery has in any event

been buried. "But the intellectual's snobbery is of another order, and involves a tantalizing paradox: a contempt for what *hoi polloi* enjoy, and a kind of proletarian ethos that tacitly denies inequalities of talent and taste" (7, p. 344). Thus the need—and for what follows Mr. Rosten is not responsible—for shifting the blame from the people, with whom they identify, to a personified enemy of the people.

On this issue the predominant mood of intellectuals is not disillusioned utopianism but disappointed utopianism. Those who have not surrendered the goal simplify and garble the work of social critics. A message that is by formal design theoretical and dispassionate analysis of commerce and consumership is translated into slogan and an incitement to acquiesce in seeing others ordered about. In order to rescue the people from the marketplace in entertainment and recreation, some intellectuals appear willing to invoke authoritarian control in the guise of the public interest.

Both the mood and the intention have been brought together in statements made by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The first: " 'The most dangerous threat hanging over American society is the threat of leisure' " (9, quoted on page 359). The second: "Government has not only the power but the obligation to help establish standards in media, like television and radio, which exist by public sufferance" (8, p. 394).

AUTOMATION AND CONJECTURE

Mr. Schlesinger's characterization of leisure as a dangerous threat is one that is being voiced frequently at the moment. Such warnings are usually accompanied by the prediction that automation will radically upset civilization, perhaps even wreck it. That the present and future effects of automation will be awesomely disruptive is not, however, certain.

The work-free time now available is abundant only in terms of

a shortened perspective. The large families of the late nineteenth century were historically abnormal. Just as the present-day family is small only in comparison with that which preceded it, so is the present more-or-less standard forty-hour week short only in comparison with the work week which accompanied those large families.

From about the middle of the first century A.D. to Hadrian's reign (117–138), the "height" of the Empire, "Rome enjoyed at least one day of holiday for every working day" (3, p. 206). Hours of work increased slightly from that time until the middle ages, and then the increase was rapid. By 1700, manual employees in England worked a twelve-hour day, by 1800 one of fourteen to eighteen hours (13, p. 34). Manual and white-collar workers today put in about the same number of hours as did the medieval guildsman. And, as was previously noted, the "upper strata" have probably lost and not gained leisure time in recent years.

It has been argued that the immediate prospect is not one in which automation, by sheer technological requirement, must further reduce the work week and the rate of employment. Daniel Bell calls "silly" that scare picture of "a dismal world of unattended factories turning out mountains of goods which a jobless population will be unable to buy." Even if, he adds, "automatic controls were suddenly introduced, regardless of cost considerations, into all the factories that could use them, only about 8 per cent of the labor force would be directly involved" (1, p. 49).

Unless subjected to political meddling, periods of rapid technological change have also been periods of low unemployment. And in those industries which cut labor requirements per unit of product, the rate of employment goes up. "From 1909 to 1937, Solomon Fabricant found employment negatively correlated with unit labor requirements" (2, p. 283).

But even if automation should increase total employment, such a result will be, as it is now, unevenly applied. The short-term

interests (the only interests they have) of the old and the unskilled are not well served by technological displacement. "Job retraining" is as distasteful to them as it is of dubious value to a reluctant potential employer. At any rate, says Mr. Brozen, many more of these men are displaced by changes in taste and by business failures than by automation. And in the long run (that prospect in which unhappily not all may share) reductions in the *relative* number of machine operators will be amply compensated by the additional number of maintenance men, engineers, office employees, and other non-machine operators who must be hired. So runs what may be called the optimistic view of automation and employment.

Indeed, when total numbers and not separate categories of the employed are reviewed, despite automation the job market in recent years has continued to absorb more workers. In 1951, 62 per cent of the civilian population aged twenty to sixty-four years were employed; from 1953 through 1961, 63 per cent were employed in each year. This constant proportion of job holders hides the fact of population increase. Thus the total population in that age range was 86 million in 1951, and 98.2 million in 1961. The total number of jobs, in other words, went up in that period.

But to repeat an earlier observation: that a relationship has held and continues to hold does not necessarily signify that it will do so indefinitely. The pressure of population increases in the next few years, political and union jobbery in hiring practices, and the pricing of labor out of the market may carry the present rate of unemployment higher—especially in the teenage bracket. In 1963, 2.8 million American youths reached eighteen. In 1965, as a result of the World War II baby boom, 3.8 million will reach that age, a figure that will remain fairly constant through the rest of the sixties and into the seventies. This means a net increase of about 2 million jobs a year will be "needed," more than twice the nation's job growth of 900,000 annually during the period 1951–1961 (12, p. 12).

If rates of unemployment should rise sharply in the next few years, automation will receive much of the blame, misplaced or not. Barring a severe depression brought on by government through internal wage and fiscal inflation, the employment demand for the educated and the technically competent will remain high. What automation, in any event, will not do is expand the job market for those who cannot qualify.

The political answer will doubtless be that "automation" (that is, the job market) has failed, and after fruitless attempts to reeducate and retrain, the dole and make-work will be utilized on a vaster scale than has ever been. The obvious alternative of permitting the low-status job market to operate will probably be avoided. In that case, it will not be government so much as commonly shared values that will be responsible. Our attitudes have eliminated many more jobs than has automation.

In a contradictory way, in the modern egalitarian society, everyone is supposed to exceed the social average, or it is assumed all should be aided to reach that condition. Unlike the European public school system, for example, ours is single-purposed about preparation for professional or white-collar careers. Only about 4.5 cents out of every secondary school dollar is spent to train students in various trades and mechanical skills, the demand for which far exceeds the supply. The service-repair industry alone opens up 700,000 jobs a year, which is the approximate number of unemployed 16- to 19-year-olds who left school in 1960.

The household servant has virtually disappeared, mainly because relief clients are not expected to take such work. Hundreds of thousands of job openings are not being met in other "bemeaning" trades, such as waiters, butchers, body-repairmen, and the like. It is not so much that unemployed men in San Francisco and Los Angeles refuse to fill the ranks of badly needed "stoop labor" in the fruit and vegetable fields of California, but that there is a growing consensus that no one should have to perform such tasks.

Automation tends to augment requirements of competence in many job assignments. At the same time, a popular reluctance to permit work at jobs with low requirements of competence encourages management to introduce further automation wherever it is applicable. While Mr. Bell views the "threat" of automation as of little moment in immediate prospect, he foresees a time when its effects will be revolutionary.

Depreciation of capital investment, not labor, will become the major cost. Automated plants are enormously expensive to shut down: the "flow" must continue unimpeded by any human preference for rhythm of living. Traditional work periods are being recast and at some time could become scrapped, so that sleeping, eating, and social and sexual life would be "fitted in" around the clock of a twenty-four-hour day. Any remaining vestige of traditional life in home and neighborhood would have to adjust. Further, the rising demand by those same plant workers for services of all kinds, also around the clock, would impose the same chaotic jumbling of work-leisure upon all those who work in motels, resorts, garages, restaurants, and in entertainment.

Certain psychological difficulties of modern work would surely not be alleviated. Segregation and isolation of each jobholder has been predicted. The tendency is already apparent in the highly specialized tasks assigned in the bank and business office as well as in the industrial plant.

Such conditions prevent communication and undermine the sense of community. There may be an added difficulty in maintaining identity. If labor or work and ego, and personality itself, are closely joined—and most students of behavior accept that dictum—then the man who was a shoemaker was spared the fate of his grandson who is a "stud torquer" or a "back winder."

Several researchers have reported that even specialization short of automation thwarts the universal wish to impress self upon the task at hand. "There is good research evidence to show that for many people work satisfaction is bound up with the possibility

that the worker can maintain some control over decisions of what work to do and over the disposition of his time and routine" (6, p. 384). Under the discipline of the modern division of labor, that "possibility" is well-nigh limited to goofing off.

But if "productivity improvement" under automation should continue in its present course, there could be no organization of slow-downs, not even the baffled revolt of exceeding the imposed norm. Even the right to strike could be abrogated, in fact if not in declared intent. The erstwhile legitimization of union power to stop entire industries is already being questioned by a majority of voters, according to various public-opinion polls. And that power, given the heavy capital investment of automation and its inherent requirement of operation continuity, would threaten many more citizens than industrial managers and stockholders with financial ruin. Government intervention could even continue to "favor the unions" in the question of wages and hours, while that intervention in either case became absolute. Automation could thus aid in supplying interested politicians and agency functionaries with a power to control economic life that is far beyond their present means.

If automation can be associated with an immediate threat of authoritarianism from one direction, it presents a later potential threat from a different direction. *If* a new division of labor should erect a wall between the highly skilled and hard-working minority of technicians and administrators on one side, and a majority that was unemployed or marginally employed on the other, the political balance of power would shift to the former. The majority might be granted a giant dole to consume the pile of goods and services built with the effort of others, but they would not be allowed to make the rules governing the life of the minority. For those who prefer muddle to the logical working out of combined factors of change, it is fortunate that muddle is the usual condition, and that it might remain so.

Is long-term and stable totalitarianism an inevitable result of

sheer technological change and the displacement of traditional laboring and working segments of a given population? Further advances in industrialization appear to be accompanied as often by more restlessness as by more pliability on the part of the "masses." A dependable servility and compliance of human nature is not at present being convincingly displayed by the "New Soviet Man."

Monolithic control is being softened at the top and resisted, not at the bottom but at the middle, by the new bourgeoisie that inevitably emerged with industrialization and that is denied by official decree even to be in existence. And the Russian people in their most persistent tradition are peasants, while in the American are incorporated the freeholder and the authority-be-ignored pioneer. At any rate, as Isaiah Berlin has pointed out, there is nothing that is inevitable in history.

RECREATION AND COMMUNITY

Some projected effects of automation on leisure as well as on work spell authoritarianism, whether or not the projectors descry it. Professor Gabor points out that in all history the majority have had to work in order to support a leisured minority. "For the first time in history we are now faced with the possibility of a world in which only a minority need work, to keep the great majority in idle luxury" (5, p. 104).

At first, make-work on a grand scale would have to be arranged, because work is an ancient and compulsive habit. Later, the majority would have to be adapted to leisure, and their work become "occupational therapy." The leading minority would have to forget "that the majority are 'objectively' useless because they can be replaced by machines."

They would have to "find their reward in the happiness of the common man, in a paternal feeling which must never show itself in paternalism" (5, p. 105). It is almost certain that the majority

would find such an existence dreary and cheerless. What is even more certain is that the leading minority would find their own interests ill-served by devoting themselves to such a complicated game of chicanery.

Meanwhile, most Americans are pretty much engaged in pursuit of recreation and pleasure. Many of them do not appear, anyway, to be miserable and unhappy and bored—as is quite often charged. On the other hand, work and work-free time have been divided into separated spheres of attention and activity. And recreation, like labor and work, tends to isolate and segregate—by families as well as by individuals. Play has not become, and shows no sign of becoming, an emergent means for reuniting neighborhood and community.

It was conjectured in the previous chapter that work or labor tends to become "meaningless" when an individual's effort is not obviously essential to the welfare of others, when by fact or impression one's contribution is that of a supernumerary. It was not argued that privation is any blessing or desirable state of being. What was pointed out is that affluence, like any other condition or accomplishment, exacts a price.

A doubt about personal usefulness may be further heightened when a highly specialized assigned task is totally isolated from community life. The modern operative or white-collar employee, to repeat, puts in about the same number of hours as did the medieval guildsman. But not only did the latter exert a control over his operation and materials that is denied the former, and not only was his work visibly essential to the life of the community, but he also took an active interest in community life.

By no act of will can we "go back," and even the most sentimental of traditionalists would likely resist being magically transported to that time. Reflection upon the superstition, dirt, disease, and mortality rate which then prevailed should even for him invite a second thought. And the hereditary classes and casual brutality of that time indicate that in the past as well as the

present a price was paid for whatever men had. What they did have is illustrated in Rembrandt's *Night Watch:* craftsmen and burghers by day, drawn from those closed classes, are preparing to go out to police their city streets.

We, in contrast to them, have achieved affluence, a degree of success in curbing self-assertiveness, some greater measure of kindliness, about the same amount of leisure time but possibly more enjoyment of recreation. Whether the price was inevitable or not is a moot question. The price, though, has included a sense of meaninglessness in work, a split in the work-leisure rhythm of life, individuation (as distinct from individualism), and isolation.

These, in turn, have undermined the sense of community shared with one's fellow citizens and accelerated the drift toward authoritarian control. Specialization of assigned tasks accompanied by a formal and remotely controlled division of labor encourages both the aggrandizement of political power and the invocation of it by citizens who are hired hands, consumers, and voters, but who have lost interest in action and decision making. The modern citizen does not police his own streets; he implores or demands that somebody do something.

ON SOLVING PROBLEMS

Americans tend to share a faith that life is wholly a matter of defining and then finding solutions to problems. There is much to be said for thumb-twiddling, Aldous Huxley once observed, but he was European born and bred. There is, to be sure, a great deal that can be said against thumb-twiddling. In what has been called the problem-oriented society, its dangers need not be expanded upon.

The determination to mind everyone else's business does not today so much impel to action as it further heightens the for-God's-sake-something-must-be-done-about-this impulse. And that impulse, in recent years, has been seeking and demanding an

expansion of governmental control. Something-must-be-done becomes somebody-must-do and everybody's somebody is the Federal government.

A clear majority want the kind of favors for themselves and for others that only access to still other people's tax money can get them, and the argument that the process has gone on so long, and dipped so deep, that this same majority are only taking what is simultaneously being taken from their own pockets is not persuasive. A smaller number are anxious to see other people coerced in a more direct way, by ordering and forbidding, and the most ready means is to invoke the administrative apparatus. Again, no argument will dissuade; the urge to power, even vicarious power, like the impulse of envy is its own justification. When men succumb to either in the name of the common interest, they can be dissuaded only if the more productive and democratic members of their society act, and are able to act, to protect their own interests.

Further taxation and coercion, provided they are thought to be aimed only at someone else, may be unobjectionable to many. On the other hand, the argument that further taxation and coercion can promote democracy is somewhat casuistical. It is the right of a politician, public recreation administrator, regulatory-commission head, or intellectual to demand more government control over the economy and the citizens' work-free time. They have an equal right to demand more tax dollars in order to reeducate the people in attitudes they approve. They are, however, on uncertain footing when they claim such measures will revive old-fashioned virtues, instill a love for the land, raise standards of excellence, and establish new and shining goals for America.

American citizens have ample time left over from their jobs with which to cooperate with their neighbors in building a common life together. Many of them do not choose to. All of them are subjected to certain "conditions of modern life" which render such an effort difficult—perhaps, as some have claimed, even im-

possible. But if such choice or effort is futile, then consider the possibility that all of the remedies discussed in previous chapters cannot bring about what they are purported to be designed to accomplish.

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