

D. S. MARATHE

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and
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neighbours
a
common
man's
view

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
INDIA & HER NEIGHBOURS

[A COMMON MAN'S VIEW]

D. S. MARATHE

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To

“ The Deccan Queen ”

To those that know that the Deccan Queen is not a person but is a fast train travelling daily between Bombay and Poona the dedication is bound to appear a bit quixotical but when the full story is told it would not be considered to be so inexplicable as it would otherwise appear.

It all began in a bus and ended in a train. The author met the publisher whom till then he knew but slightly in the bus while on his way to the High Court where he practises as an advocate. When in conversation the publisher learnt that the author had to spend six hours and more in the train every day on his way from Poona to Bombay and back he suggested that this time should be utilized for writing a book and offered to publish it.

The author accepted this sporting offer because at that time it sounded almost like a challenge and this small book is the result. Friends suggested that since practically the whole of the book was written in the train it should be dedicated to the Deccan Queen. The suggestion could not but be accepted.

482 Shanwar Peth, Poona.
26-1-64.

D. S. Marathe

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I. A common man's view

The relations of a country with other countries are not ordinarily a subject of interest to the common man for the simple reason that they do not normally affect his life one way or the other. But we are at present passing through a period in which our relations with our neighbours and with the neighbour's neighbour are not at all smooth and jolt the bullock cart of our day-to-day existence out of the rut almost once every fortnight.

The ordinary man is realizing in an increasing measure that his nation is not suspended in a vacuum; that it is affected by what goes on in neighbouring countries and that the events in his country do in their turn affect the lives of his neighbours.

It is this increasing awareness that he has neighbours, that has roused his curiosity about their character, about their policies, and the likely effects of these policies that is intended to be satisfied by this book and is a book written by one ordinary man for other ordinary men. This is not a book written by a superior being for the inferiors, neither is it a book written by an expert for non-experts. The writer lays no claims to erudition and does not pretend to have any sources of information not open to ordinary individuals.

What the reader will find in the following pages will be an attempt to understand the problems that confront our country in its relations with other countries, far and near. He will also find the writer's reactions to the events and to the policies adopted. They are the reactions of

one who does not belong now and never at any time belonged to any political party. These reactions are not therefore representative of any group whatsoever. They are the reactions of a very common man to uncommon circumstances and will, it is hoped, be found to be of some interest by those that do not want to be lectured to by anybody.

The various chapters will be devoted to the discussion of subjects like India and the United Nations Organization, India and Pakistan, India and Ceylon, India and Nepal, India and Indonesia, India and Malayasia etc. to be followed by general remarks.

No attempt will be made to shape the chapters in such a way that they will look like summaries of the white papers on these topics. Wearisome details will as far as possible be avoided. The discussion will be in broad and general terms. Neither is the writer qualified to go into details nor will the common man have the patience to wade through that mass of details only to discover at the end that the author has not committed himself by expressing any definite opinion.

No attempt will be made to hide opinions in a mass of verbiage; on the contrary some readers are likely to find the author too blunt and opinionated to suit their prudish tastes. Unfortunately for them and fortunately for him he does not have the mill-stone of a reputation that is to be preserved hanging round his neck and dragging him down.

In dealing with the various subjects no attempt will be made to begin with the beginning of history and then to bring the subject up-to-date. The author prefers to dwell more on the events of the last few months and so

much of the past only will be given as is necessary to understand the present.

The emphasis will be more on what is known as Real politik than on the spiritual politics that is the speciality of our present day politicians, because the author looks upon politics only as the science of enlightened self-interest.



II. The approach

Normally big countries do not have to worry much about their relations with neighbours that are not themselves of any great size. India being a country of continental dimensions would not ordinarily have had to be particular about her relations with her neighbours. It is small countries, not big ones, that have to adapt themselves to the circumstances created by big adjoining countries.

But there are two factors that ought to influence our policy-makers in their dealings with the small countries that surround us. One of these factors is that we are weak and the other is that we are in the vicinity of two great powers whose capacity to expand and whose wish to expand territorially and also ideologically ought to strike terror into our hearts and also in the hearts of those countries near us who have a newly acquired freedom to maintain.

There is only one measure of strength in this materialistic world and that is the power to strike. It is the strength of the blow that you can deliver that ensures you respect in politics. If a Khrushchev brandishes a shoe then the representatives of other countries tolerate it because the armed might of Russia will enable him to carry his policies through.

Strength in war is the only strength that counts and how much of that we possess has been amply demonstrated in our recent armed clash with China. Strength in war is inseparably connected with the industrial development of the country. That we can develop industrially

no body doubts but that is a matter for future generations and politics cannot be based upon hopes and wishes. It has to reckon with the present. On account of our territorial expanse we have the commitments and liabilities of a great power whereas our assets are limited because of our industrial and scientific backwardness, not to talk of our want of cohesion and of our weak sense of nationalism.

What ought in reality to dominate the whole of our policy is the ever present danger of communism. The danger is not merely an ideological one but it is a physical one as well. Chinese aggression has recently demonstrated how real it could be. To-day Russia attacks India only with psychological weapons. Tomorrow Russia or weapons supplied to China by Russia can, if necessary, blast our industries and our cities out of existence and there is precious little that we can do about it.

These two factors cannot be wished away and they ought really speaking to teach us modesty in our behaviour with our neighbours and it is in the context of these two big factors that we ought to examine the question of our relations with our neighbours, big and small. We cannot afford to treat a neighbour with contempt because his country is small and the people are backward. His territory may be strategically important to our potential enemies. Caution is prescribed by our weakness and by the proximity of powerful countries that are only waiting for an opportunity to pounce upon us and convert us to communism.

What has to be taken into consideration in the shaping of our policies is that we have to take the world as it is and make the best of it. This might appear to be a mere platitude but unfortunately such a simple truth is dis-

regarded by our policy-makers, who project their personal likes and dislikes about forms of government into their policies and create unnecessary difficulties for India.

We are a small power and we cannot become big in a short time. We cannot impose our will upon any nation and we cannot remould circumstances to suit our tastes. Let us recognize our limitations and learn to work within them. Let us concentrate our attention on what is good for us and leave the world to take care of itself.

The danger that threatens us is a danger that threatens several countries besides us. Communism is a menace to the whole non-communist world and countries that are near any communist country are peculiarly susceptible to the danger not merely of insidious infiltration but also to that of an armed attack. Propaganda is not the only weapon with which the communists work. They do employ fifth columnists who foment revolutions in neighbouring countries and the insurgents get armed help from the nearest communist country. Once the communists gain control of the government of any country then the process of the forcible conversion of the rest of the population to communism starts and nothing can prevent such a country from becoming in its turn a centre for the spread of communism.

This is the course that communism has run in Central Europe and this is the course it is running in country after country in Asia. Africa and South America would prove no exception if only the communists are granted sufficient time.

Countries that face a common danger could and should draw together if they are at all serious about defending themselves against the common menace. Temporary advantages can no doubt be gained by one of such

countries compromising at the expense of another small power. The temptation to do so might be irresistible and therefore patience and forbearance have to be exercised with such neighbours. Ill will is not necessarily the motivating factor. Craven fear and the desire to flaunt an immediate advantage might have got the better of prudence and reason.

Exercise of the virtues of patience and forbearance would however be a negative way of approaching the problem. What is wanted is a positive approach. Until the neighbouring countries are aroused to a proper awareness of the danger we cannot expect logical or coherent conduct from them. It is easy to criticize, easier still to make fun of shortsighted policies but a statesman resists that temptation, a mere politician does not, and gains a cheap reputation for greater perspicacity but loses his country the co-operation and friendship of a neighbouring state.

There are several countries in this world that feel themselves threatened by Communism. Some of them are big, some are small; some are our neighbours, others are not; but almost all of them would like to come together and forge schemes of joint defence if, not for an offensive, to exterminate the enemies of humanity.

The duty of the statesman would be to seek out the common elements, weld them together, create an awareness of danger where at present there is gloomy apathy, remove suspicions that exist and get all of them to co-operate in fighting common danger. It may be a heroic desire to fight China alone but it is an excessively foolish one. If tomorrow Chinese Communism is destroyed or is taught a lesson then such act would enure not for the benefit of India alone but for that of a host of other

countries in Asia. If these nations are to benefit ultimately then why should they not be called upon to pay for these benefits? Why should we or for the matter of that any other country go to the trouble of doing that single-handed which is to bring gains to a number of other countries?

We shall have to approach our neighbouring countries from this point of view and regulate our relations accordingly. We should not try to impose our will upon such of them as are to-day not in a position to resist us neither should we try to pick a quarrel with those that do not just now see eye to eye with us but who would, given some time, realise that their interests do not necessarily clash with our interests.

It is in the light of these observations that we would request our readers to approach the question of our relations with our neighbours and also to judge the propriety or otherwise of the policies that have been and are being followed by our rulers.



III. India and the U. N. O.

The United Nations Organization is the neighbour of every country and in the physical sense the neighbour of no country. We cannot escape having relations with this supranational organisation and our relations with this organization affect our relations with other countries. It would be useful therefore to begin with a discussion of this organization, of what our relations with it are and what they could be and should be.

Idealists have great hopes that one day this organization will develop into a sort of a world government and will regulate the relations of every nation with every other nation on the basis of respect for each other's rights and in the interests of world peace and world order.

The propaganda made for world organizations during and after the first world war has raised the hopes of the idealists high. The common man shares some of these wishes and hopes that some how through the good offices of this organization his nation will benefit. How exactly the benefits are to flow from association with this organization he does not know and does not care to reason out.

In order to find out whether these hopes have any basis that could be called reasonable and whether the wild expectations raised in the hearts of the simple-minded have even a remote chance of fulfilment, we have to trace the history of the origin of this organization and of its predecessor the notorious League of Nations.

The tremendous advances made by science in this century and in the last two decades of the one that preced-

ed it have changed the nature of warfare almost beyond recognition. Of old warfare it could be said that armies used to engage in it. But now it is whole nations that engage in it. Not only has the number of men put on the battlefield increased enormously but the number of persons who have to work in order to keep the soldier, sailor and airman properly supplied with weapons, munitions, vehicles and food has become so large that when a modern nation is at war it is hardly possible to find a man in the country whose work is not connected directly or indirectly with the war. Immense sacrifices are demanded of the individual by modern wars and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has lost most of its meaning now-a-days.

An order was sufficient in old days to move an army into battle. No soldier ever dreamed of asking why he was called upon to fire or why a ceasefire was ordered. But when a whole nation is to be launched into a war the end of which cannot be foreseen, the mere announcements of decisions taken by rulers are not enough. The country has to be prepared psychologically for the entry into war and also to enable it to see it through. Unless the whole populace is convinced that it is fighting for a just and worthy cause it does not agree to the tremendous sacrifices that alone can bring the titanic struggle to a successful close.

In old times rulers did not bother to give any cause for the war into which they rushed the country but now the rulers have to do a lot of propaganda in order to convince their subjects of the necessity and justness of the appeal to arms. It is this necessity that has given birth to institutions like the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization.

People agree to huge sacrifices only if high ideals are placed before them. The first world war was fought to end all wars and to make the world safe for democracy. It ended by making Europe safe for France and her minions, and it gave Britain a few more territories to administer. As for the war which was to end all wars it was only the first of a series of global conflicts. The second world war only made the greater part of Asia and Europe safe for communism and sowed the seeds of a nuclear conflict before which all the previous world wars will pale into insignificance.

The cynic will say and with a lot of justification too, that the League of Nations was devised for the purpose of securing an air of legality to the dispositions of enemy territory made by the victorious powers and also for putting down in the name of the maintenance of world peace all attempts by the vanquished nations to seek an amelioration of their lot. This dual object being achieved no justification for its existence remained and no body lamented the end of that body.

But similar circumstances arose during the course of the Second World War. The American President and the British Prime Minister thought of having an Atlantic Charter binding nations together. Japan's entry into the war provided a stimulus to the idea and twentysix nations proclaimed in 1942 their intention to form a supernational organization. Next year Britain, France, Russia, China and America declared in Moscow their intention to found an organization of nations peacefully minded and their representatives drafted in Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 a constitution for this body. At the Yalta Conference it was decided to call together the representatives of several nations. Fortyfour nations adopted this

constitution in Washington by subscribing to the United Nation's Charter and that was how the United Nations Organization came into existence.

This organization suffers from practically all the infirmities that discredited the League of Nations. But before going into that question it would be desirable to look at the professed objects of this organization. Promoting World peace, World security and striving for establishment of friendship and co-operation between the different nations are given out as the aims of this body.

The members of this organization bind themselves to follow certain principles. These are that all members shall receive equal treatment at the hands of the organization, that the organization shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any country, that the provisions of the Charter shall be followed, that all disputes shall be settled in a peaceful manner, that no nation shall attempt to deprive any nation of its independence and that when the organization tries to enforce sanctions against any nation then the members will help the organization and not the guilty nation. That these high sounding principles do not form the basis of the conduct of the nations and that the offending nations are almost always the big powers we shall discuss later.

Members are of two kinds, the founder members and those that have joined later on. Those that join the organization have to fulfil certain conditions. Only a peaceful and independent nation can join. Such a country must undertake to abide by the terms of the Charter and must be in a position to do so.

The real difficulty however in the way of new nations becoming members is of a different type. Every applica-

tion for membership has to be approved of by the Security Council of this organization otherwise it cannot be taken up for consideration. Every resolution of the Security Council must be a unanimous one. There is no question of a majority vote. Even if one member vetoes the resolution, then the Security Council cannot approve of it. Russia has used this veto more than a hundred times and America not even once. We can say that up-till now there has been some horse-trading done between the Western Powers and Russia in the matter of admitting nations to membership. Russia has seen to it that for every pro-western nation admitted to membership one pro-red or so-called neutralist nation has been admitted to the benefits of membership. This is the way recruitment to the ranks of this organization has been going on so far.

The United Nations Organization has got two principle bodies, the General Assembly and the Security Council, of these the General Assembly is more or less of a glorified debating club. Every member nation is entitled to send five representatives to this Assembly but has only one vote in it. The resolutions of this body are only recommendatory and bind no one. World peace, world security and making suggestions to the other bodies comes within the purview of the work of this body. This Assembly cannot in general discuss questions that are before the Security Council for deliberation. It is only with the permission of the Security Council that the Assembly can discuss any important matter.

The Security Council is the body that is supposed to be working all the time. It has eleven members of whom the five members, America, Russia, Britain, France and Nationalist China are permanent members while the

other six are elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years. Trivial questions can be decided by a majority of seven members but the most galling condition and the condition that has destroyed almost completely the utility of the whole organization is the condition that every important question must be decided according to the wishes of a majority of seven which must include all the five nations mentioned above. Even if a single one of these five votes against the resolution then that resolution fails. If world peace is threatened it is the Security Council that has to direct what steps are to be taken. If an explosive situation is developing in any part of the world it is the Security Council that has to examine the situation and resolve upon remedial measures.

The U. N. O. has other bodies for dealing with questions in which all nations are concerned or are likely to be concerned. Education, Labour Organizations, food and agricultural organizations, world health organizations and organizations dealing with tariff and trade agreements, organizations that seek to promote co-operation between nations in matters of economic and social interests, could be mentioned as bodies that are doing useful work. So far as these subsidiary purposes are concerned the United Nations Organization is a distinct advance upon the defunct League of Nations and association with it is bound to be profitable for India.

But as a world organization regulating the political relations between the different nations in the interests of world peace and world security the U. N. O. is a ghastly failure. Instead of promoting better relations it has turned out to be a body whose working leads to a widening of the breaches and to the promotion of ill-will all round.

We know that this is a grave charge to make but the history or the working of this body leads to practically no other conclusion. The principle share of the blame for this has to be borne by the red powers and by the so-called neutralist nations. The Communists and the also-rans amongst the nations have been using the platform of this organization for doing propaganda. The representatives of the Western Powers cannot be completely absolved of the charge of using this organization for propaganda purposes either. The so-called neutral block has also taken part in the mud slinging. Every occasion has been used for making fiery speeches and thundering denunciations of the opponents. The result is increasing bitterness, for the debates of the various bodies of this organization receive world wide publicity. Every word and every phrase is remembered and hurled back when a suitable opportunity occurs.

The worst of the participation in these debates is that enemies are made for causes that do not benefit the nation the least little bit. If in the debate on the happenings in Hungary, the Indian representatives had not opened their lips or had restricted themselves to polite unmeaning phrases a lot of misunderstanding could have been prevented. As it is the representatives of India have not missed a single opportunity of criticising western powers for their imperialism. We can hardly recall an occasion when on crucial questions they have not sided with the red block and against the west or benefited the red cause by abstaining from voting. These were not questions which affected the interests of India as a nation.

So far as India is concerned participation in the debates of the U. N. O. has meant spoiling our relations with the only powers that could and that did help India in her

hour of need. The vitriolic speeches of Menon in the bodies of the United Nations Organization have been responsible for the loss of an amount of good will.

That we should have opinions on world affairs the common man can understand. But that it should be deemed necessary to express them in an unnecessarily offensive manner or that we should express them at all when our interests as a nation are not affected one way or the other the common man cannot understand at all. Can our representatives not keep silent when controversial questions with which India is not concerned are being debated? If they must speak why should they not restrict themselves to harmless platitudes about the necessity of settling disputes in a peaceful manner and so on, is a question that the common man would like to ask?

This is not all. Our representatives take the lead in organising groups of Afro-Asiatic nations which will stand up against the western powers. We as a nation, should not discriminate between western imperialism and red imperialism but we do, and that at a time when the western powers are the only ones that help us out of our difficulties. If in the U. N. O. bodies our representatives are engaged or are suspected to engage in intrigues against powers that are friendly to us then does it not create the impression that we, as a nation, bite the hand that feeds us. Does our participation in the affairs of the U. N. O. not do us more harm than good is a question that the common man cannot help asking himself.

About the utility of the U. N. O. the common man does not harbour many illusions. The U. N. O. cannot by itself do anything. It is the big powers like America and Russia that in the final analysis decide what the U. N. O. is to do, and when they are at logger heads the

U. N. O. achieves nothing. In Korea the U. N. O. could do something but that was because Russia remained aloof. In Katanga the Americans under cover of the U. N. O. are doing something but that too is being done because Russia does not take so much interest in what is happening in the Congo. Any way Russia does not show enough interest to threaten war over the question. What has India gained by having the Kashmir question referred to the U. N. O. ?

The common man would be grateful to our rulers if they do not allow our association with the U. N. O. to work to our disadvantage by having our relations with other countries spoiled. We do not want our representatives to poke their noses into affairs that do not concern us. Japan also has representatives in the U. N. O. but do they open their lips to harm their own country ? Meddling in international affairs should be given up. For that we need not dissociate ourselves from the U. N. O. but the only thing necessary is that our representatives to the U. N. O. should be directed not to try to hold the centre of the stage. Our rulers should learn and practise modesty and if association with the U. N. O. teaches them that, then it will have served its purpose. Unfortunately it is just the opposite that is happening.

The common man suspects that the interests of the country are being sacrificed to feed the vanity of its rulers. India is a newly arrived country. It would not do for its leaders to strike up poses amongst the assembled politicians of the world. Ultimately the words of a politician carry only that much weight that the strength of his country can lend them. It is not the sentiments that a representative of India can exude or the polished phrases in which he clothes them that is going to raise the

prestige of the country. The people who are sent out by mature countries as representatives are trained to distinguish between action and rhetoric high sounding phrases and tactics that are pursued to secure petty advantages. They are not going to be taken in by sermons on public morality. They are sufficiently posted with the details of the black deeds of the country enemical to their country to give stinging replies. What is the advantage to be gained by public accusations and refutations? Can they ever lead to any composing of differences? A Menon might earn the reputation of being India's Vyshynski but does it further the cause of India? Are the delegates of Pakistan ever going to be convinced of the badness of their country's ways? Are the delegates of the Western Nations ever going to be convinced by the speeches of our representatives of the justness of India's cause? If that result cannot be achieved by any speech-making then why waste good foreign exchange over the expenses of costly delegations.

Far more could be done in the way of securing good will and even direct help through the moral diplomatic channels. If the Ambassadors and the staff of the embassies is chosen with greater care and what is absolutely important if they are given definite instructions about the objectives to be achieved and about the fixed policies of the country then they could work in a more determined and less obtrusive manner to secure the interests of the country and achieve more than all the flashy oratory of the members of our delegations to the United Nations Organization.

But normal diplomatic channels are being by-passed and the favourites of our rulers are being sent to foreign countries because these favourites consciously or uncon-

sciously sing the praises of their masters. They are not vigilant about the interests of their country. What matters more in their eyes is that their patrons should be held up before humanity as the ushers of new eras in politics than that the interests of the country should be guarded.

This is not service to the country. This is worship of their Delhi idols in full view of the world. We cannot help thinking that even on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly or when addressing the more select Security Council these representatives cannot forget that their real audience is in New Delhi and that what matters is whether they continue to be efficient instruments for doing propaganda on a world scale for their masters for the purpose that the present rulers of India should be held by the world to be men who have placed lofty ideals before them and who are uncompromising in the pursuit of these ideals.

It is this that makes the common man feel sick. This insistence by the people that our government sends out that the world should learn morality and good conduct at the feet of Indian masters is revolting. Who has assigned to us the role of school masters? Do our representatives in the U. N. O. merely echo sentiments uttered by higher political dignitaries when they roundly rate so-called western imperialism. How incongruous it looks when we move heaven and earth that Goa should not be discussed by the U. N. O. That is the view Westerns take of our actions.

If India has spiritual truths to give to the world then they cannot be matters of politics. There are several spiritual truths that we have to learn yet and the simplest of them is that self advertisement and spiritual worth are absolutely inconsistent with each other. Why should

over politicians not leave India's spiritual heritage alone when to judge by the accusations that highly placed Congressmen make against each other their pasts would not bear inspection? The world is not made up of fools though it might contain quite a number of sinner politicians. Our opponents in the U. N. O. also have sharp tongues and they can bring up quite a number of inconsistencies between high sounding principles and between conduct that can be justified only on grounds of expediency. Why indulge in verbal acrobatics and provide opportunities to our enemies to bring down our prestige?

The way the Chinese issue has been handled by India in the U. N. O. has exasperated the Americans. Every year the Indian representatives have been pressing for the admission of China into the United Nations Organization. America is of the view and that is a view shared by many nations that in the Korea affair China actually waged war with the U. N. O. and that China cannot therefore be admitted into an organization with which it wages war. India is of the opinion that the existence of Communist China is a reality of which the U. N. O. must take note. On grounds of realism the view of the Indian leaders could be justified but that does not mean that we should go deliberately out of our way to provoke America and sponsor year after year China's entry into the U. N. O. Is the common man not justified in thinking that our country's interests have been sacrificed in order to make out that our politicians stand for certain high principles, and that they are so broad minded that they even support China's cause after China attacked India? Such forbearance on India's part does not appeal to the common man. He rather feels that after the un-

provoked attack on India championing the cause of China in the U. N. O. is a type of saintly behaviour that the country can ill afford.

The part played by India in Africa is another point about which the common man is sore. The Africans are struggling against the Europeans and are trying to drive away the Europeans from South Africa and if possible also from East Africa. We have no cause to love the Europeans in South Africa or their policies of apartheid. But have we any business to make the cause of the Africans our own and fight in the U. N. O. and elsewhere on their behalf. How are Asiatics being treated by the Africans? Are Asiatics not equally abhorred by the Africans? Are they not being unceremoniously bundled out of Africa? Do they not have to come back to India with such belongings as the Africans graciously allow them? What can the Indian Government do about it? To put it in plain words do our citizens not stand in the same boat as Europeans do in Africa. Both are unwanted and both will, if the Africans have their way, have to leave Africa. Why should our representatives take up the cudgels in the U. N. O. on behalf of people that are kicking us out? A common man is no saint and he cannot appreciate fighting the battles of people to whom we are unwanted.

Again what interests did we have to protect in Katanga? Why should the troops badly needed to protect our frontiers have been sent to overawe Tshombe whose quarrel with the Central Government in Congo hardly affected Indian interests. If India as a member of the U. N. O. owes certain duties to that organization it certainly does not owe any duties higher than those owed by other member-nations. Russia does not even discharge its financial obligations to this Organization while the rulers

of India feel that they must even send a sizable troop contingent to enforce the writ of the U. N. O. The common man has a suspicion that it is not the mere desire to appear important and high principled that prompted those actions. Russia made a half hearted attempt to work up a revolution in Congo. Its stooge Lumumba was captured and ultimately done to death by Tshombe. All red minded nations and all neutralist countries had a grievance against Tshombe. Russia did not want to take any active part (not even a financial one) in subduing Tshombe. Active aid in clipping the wings of such a man would please the proved faction in the United Nations Organization. That according to some persons who will no doubt be deemed ungenerous was the motive behind Indian military aid to the U. N. O. cause.

In this particular case India's action has been of use to a part of the Western Block as well and if motives are to be attributed then the one of pulling chestnuts out of the fire for America could with equal justice be attributed. National interests divided the Western Powers on the Congo question. French, British and Belgian interests lay in supporting the cessation of Katanga from the central Congolese government. American capital hoped no doubt to profit from the subjugation of Tshombe. Whether the shares of the Union Miniere the mining concern behind Tshombe changed hands we shall not know but we can say that the presence of Indian troops in Katanga helped Tshombe to see reason. America has succeeded in humiliating British, French and Belgian capital but where do Indian interests come in all this? What have we gained out of the Congo affair? Are India's troops either actively or by their presence to serve the causes of other nations? Would it be too much

to ask that our relations with the U. N. O. should be placed on a sounder and more national footing and should not be determined by what our representatives think will please the powers that be in Delhi. A nation's money and a nation's energies or even a part of them should not be frittered away in purposeless activities; we say purposeless because adding to the personal prestige of an individual or of a political party cannot be called a national purpose.



IV India and Pakistan

The creation of a separate state of Pakistan is according to some people a monument to the ineptitude of the leadership of the Congress. According to some people if some of the Congress top-ranking leaders had handled the situation a little more tactfully the demand for a separate Muslim state would not have been made. There are others that say that if some of the Congress leaders had not been in such a hurry to get into the saddle, the agitation for a separate Muslim state would have died a natural death.

But these are matters of speculation. They have very little interest for us now. It is a fact that hundreds of thousands of Muslims felt that it would not be safe to entrust their fate to a Hindu majority for they were convinced that in a democratic set up it was inevitable that the Hindus should be in a majority. Right or wrong, they did not care to put any faith in the secular state that the Congress leaders intended to set up. They felt that in the long run the Hindus would dominate India and they were not happy at the prospect.

The creation of a separate state for the Mohamedans was attended by massacres which created feuds that threatened to last for several generations. Loss of life, loss of property, the uprooting of millions from places where they had been living for generations were not calculated to promote good will. We might go one step further and say that Pakistan and India had very good grounds to hate each other right from the time they were

called into existence by the British who were in a hurry to quit India.

There were plenty of other grounds also for continuing to quarrel with each other. A large section of Mohomedans, as many as forty millions still continued to stay in India. Their fate was and is a matter of great interest to their coreligionists in Pakistan. They can never give up their interest in the Mahomedans of India and this is resented as undue interference in the internal affairs of the country.

Not all the Mohomedans in India would support the cause of the Government in case India is involved in hostilities with Pakistan. That is the fear entertained not merely by the bigoted Hindus but also by those that want to be realists. Mutual fear and suspicion go a long way in explaining the unhappy course of Indo-Pak relations.

To these factors making for bad blood between the two countries must be added some more. One of these is the difference in approach to several questions in politics. When Pakistan was created the Muslims claimed that every institution would be shaped by their religious beliefs and that an ideal state would be created for the practice of Islamic religion and culture whereas India kept religion severely aloof from politics and afforded equal opportunities for persons professing different faiths and beliefs. The difference in outlook was a fundamental one and estranged Pakistan and India still further from each other.

This however is a factor that given time will lose its importance. The modern trend in all countries in the world is to attach greater importance to material values and less to spiritual ones. The chances therefore are that in another twenty-five years the difference in outlook will not be so great as to make people despair of ever

achieving a common approach to problems of mutual interest. Already signs are not wanting of a change in the outlook of the Pakistanis shifting of the emphasis. Time cure is the best cure for certain differences.

India professes great faith in the principles of democracy. Democracy is new to the Indian soil and our politicians have the enthusiasms of the proselytes for the creed to which they have been recently converted. The Pakistanis have not had very good experience with the democratic ways and consequently are still experimenting with different forms of government.

Our democratic leaders are very unhappy about it and they have a theoretical bias against the autocratic leaders of Pakistan, a bias that prevents their making efforts to draw closer together to Pakistan. But this is not a permanent factor. Democracy is losing its glamour for the man in the street in India. The common man is more inclined to admire a dictator who can bring down prices immediately than democrats who talk of running the black marketeers up the nearest lamp post but send them instead to Parliament or put them on planning and advisory bodies and suffer them to contribute to the party coffers. When greater political experience is gathered, people will care less for the form of government and more for the substance of government. Differences in the theoretical approach to political problems will cease to have that importance that they have at present.

The differences in approach to the political problems of the world constitute for the present a very powerful disturbing factor. The world is divided into two blocks and Pakistan has made her choice. Pakistan does not mind siding with the so-called imperialists of the West while India although it professes to be non-aligned is suspected

by many western powers of very strong leanings towards Communism. Without calling one right and the other wrong at the present stage we can say that the differences are too great for successful attempts at reconciliation of the two outlooks.

But we must also take into account the possibility of a change in the Indian outlook. The present bias has been given to Indian policies by Shri Nehru and by those that are drawn to him by common outlook and by hopes of profit. These men are not many in number neither are they persons who if Shri Nehru's protecting shield were withdrawn from them could exercise any great influence over public opinion. They have clustered round Nehru in times when an indulgent and indolent public gave Shri Nehru the whole and sole authority to mould the foreign policy of India.

The public has become more critical now about our foreign policies and this is due in no small measure to its disillusionment over the Panchsheela principles and to the culmination of the Bhai Bhai business in the Chinese invasion of India. What falls from the lips of Nehru is no longer lapped up with the former degrading avidity.

The common man is beginning to think that the western powers are our natural friends and they are our only dependable support against communist expansionism. There is a veering away from the Nehru-line in the matter of our foreign policies. The public is beginning to realize the necessity of a departure from policies that makes us draw away from our real friends and leaves us more and more defenceless.

That will make for a greater appreciation of the stand taken by Pakistan. A few months back when the leader of Pakistan offered a defensive alliance to India Shri

Nehru indignantly spurned the offer and asked the question "Defence against whom?" Though Nehru did not know the answer the common man in India knows now that it was an offer to fight the Chinese menace jointly. The public is wondering what made our leader reject that offer so unceremoniously. If the public had any say in the matter such an offer if repeated would stand a fair chance of acceptance. In view of the growing Chinese menace and in view of the necessity of defending our country by all the means available and with all the aid we can get from all quarters we think that differences in approach to the problems of the world will not long keep India and Pakistan apart. Common danger is likely to draw us closer together.

But that does not exhaust the list of the things over which we differ. There are other things over which we differ violently. The dispute over the canal waters, the dispute over Kashmir, the demand for a corridor linking the two parts of Pakistan, the future of the Hindus in East Pakistan, the status of the Mahomedans in India are all questions over which we could come to blows and questions which offer great scope for propagandists on both sides.

So long as we cling to Kasmhir the question of the canal waters is going to be a source of trouble for us. The upper reaches of the rivers to the waters of which parts of West Pakistan owe their fertility are in India. That we could divert water from these rivers to Punjab and Rajasthan is itself galling to the Pakistanis. That we have reached an agreement on the quantity of water to be apportioned to them or on the amounts to be paid to them to enable them to construct new canal systems is a mere palliative. If the question is one of control of the

waters then there is no permanent solution. Unless there is good will on both sides and a spirit of accommodation, no temporary solution even can be found. Given good will however the division of waters should not lead to trouble for there is enough of water for both the countries. It is therefore a problem that does not require a separate treatment.

The dispute over Kashmir is the biggest stumbling block. The state of Kashmir and Jammu was a state with a predominantly Mahomedan population and a Hindu Raja. When the partition of India took place, the states were given the option of acceding either to India or to Pakistan because in theory they were sovereign and there can be no restriction of sovereignty. That would have been a contradiction in terms.

Sovereignty in the States resided in the ruling prince since the British chose to withdraw their position of paramountcy. If the Hindu ruler chose to exercise his sovereign rights and opt for India then his Mahomedan subjects could legally speaking do nothing about it.

Probably the Ruler of Kashmir wanted to remain independent but when the Mohomedan subjects became restive and when a revolt was staged in one part and volunteers and tribes people began to exercise active armed pressure he called on the Government of India which could help only on condition that Kashmir acceded to India. It was under these circumstances that the accession of Kashmir to India was brought about. The choice had been made by the ruler and under difficult circumstances. Pakistan says that the accession had been brought about by coercion. India can say that Pakistan's attempt to annex Kashmir was foiled by the Ruler with the help of India. Pakistan's armies were pushed out

from the greater part of the territories they had occupied and a cease-fire brought about through the efforts of other powers and the situation remains uneasy even now.

One point was clear and that was that the decision to accede to India had been taken by the ruler and not by his subjects. Pakistan put it forward as a matter of principle that the wishes of the people be consulted in the matter. Shri Nehru did not say no but he made it contingent upon Pakistan's vacating the aggression before a plebiscite. Pakistan retorted by saying that India must also withdraw her armies. Neither country was prepared to withdraw her armies and for several years the armies of both the countries are entrenched in their respective portions of Kashmir.

In the meanwhile the people of Kashmir have given themselves a constitution by democratic processes. They have solemnly resolved to form a part of India. Our Congress rulers can say with some sort of justification that if at one time the accession of Kashmir to India was only a matter of an exercise by the sovereign of his absolute rights, now it has been ratified by the ruled people in a perfectly legitimate and democratic manner. Our Congress Government wants the world to look upon the matter as a concluded matter.

The legalistic aspect does not interest the common man nor does the democratic jargon about plebiscites and referendums impress him much. The common man feels that the majority of the people of Kashmir have a different religion and a different culture, that with people of the same religion and same culture living just across the border they are bound to feel more attracted towards them than towards a country with a predominantly Hindu population. If today they feel that association

with India is better it may be due to certain economic and other advantages. We can continue to give them these special advantages only for a short time and that too at the expense of the rest of India. That is not a state of things that can last for ever. Would it not be natural for the Kashmiries to begin to wish later that it would have been better if they had been with Pakistan and not with India. Are the ties of religion and culture not going to prove stronger than economic ties? An India in difficulties, an India fighting for her life with her back to the wall might find herself forsaken in her period of distress. That is the lesson taught by the history of peoples who are living under alien rule. And the rule of people with a different religion and with a different culture is bound to be looked upon as alien rule. That is the question that troubles the common man. The Czechs after living more than thousand years under Austrian rule abandoned Austria when Austria was in mortal trouble. Why insist on retaining in our midst people who are bound to feel that they are not of us?

Would it not be more statesmanlike to agree that they should form part of a state of their own choice. It might sound cynical but would it not be possible to bargain with Pakistan over that part of Kashmir that is inhabited principally by Mohomedans and get in exchange say a part of East Bengal which is Hindu in character or which could easily be made Hindu in character without displacing many persons. As for the strategic importance of the retention of Kashmir to India the common man will not be prepared to swallow all these arguments especially now that the Chinese have demonstrated that the Himalayas afford no adequate protection.

Supposing we come to some sort of agreement with Pakistan over Kasmir would it not help us to face the common enemy China better. To turn cynical again if we have to fight the Communists then would the lives of some Indian soldiers not be saved by getting the Pakistanis stand shoulder to shoulder with us and would many battles not be fought on the soil of Pakistan? Would that not spare our territories at least partially? Would that not place us in a better position if at some distant period Pakistan tries to get funny?

Once India and Pakistan pass through the ordeal of the life and death struggle with communist powers, and that sooner or later we shall have to face, then the ardour of the fire-eaters in both the countries will have been dampened considerably and then extravagant demands like those for a corridor joining East Pakistan and West Pakistan and for conquering Pakistan and creating an Akhand (united) India will be given up.



V. India and Nepal

Nepal is one of the few independent Hindu kingdoms perhaps the only one left independent if we do not count those in Indo-China because they have at their head persons who cannot strictly be called Hindus.

There are no doubts about Nepal being a Hindu kingdom. Both the ruler and the ruled are Hindus. But since India under her Harrow-educated leader has chosen to be a secular state because being non-secular is a sign of backwardness. The fact that Nepal is a Hindu kingdom is not in any way expected to affect our relations with this mountain state. If at any future date religion ceases to be discredited in India then this fact will assume some importance.

This mountainous country has provided India with fighters who have earned respect on European battlefields and a nation like Britain does not disdain to employ Gurkhas. When non-violence began to dominate our politics warlike races whether they be the Gurkhas or Rajputs or Marathas began to be treated with a sort of undeclared hostility by our men in politics.

Nepal has for several hundred years been ruled over by a family of Rajput origin. As was the fate of several ruling families in various countries power came to be wielded by the Prime Minister alone and his office became hereditary. The Prime Minister was also the Commander-in-Chief and his authority rested in Nepal on the support given to him by the Ranas who formed the aristocracy. The King was a titular head and out of fear that control over his person might be used by the

rival faction among the Ranas to wrest real power from the hands of the Prime Minister, the King was guarded like a prisoner and the palace differed from a prison only in this that its windows did not have bars.

From this golden cage the King was rescued with the help of the Indian Government and the father of the present King was specially grateful for the aid rendered to him. The close ties that the Nepal Congress had with the Indian Congress did help the Indian Government and the Royal Family of Nepal to draw together. Fear of India's armed intervention restrained the Ranas and they reconciled themselves to the revival of the power of the Kings of Nepal.

If then the adoption of an attitude hostile to the Congress is resented by the Congress rulers of India there is a history behind it and the resentment is not all of it unwarranted. But the record of the Nepali Congress after the restoration of the authority of the King has not been an unsullied one.

The ideal placed before Nepal was that of a constitutional monarchy after the English pattern. It was with a view to introducing some sort of democracy in a country which had not yet outgrown its feudal structure that India lent her aid to the revolutionary movement in Nepal and there was nothing wrong about that. If the Nepali Congress had been equal to the task of governing the country tolerably well then our relations with Nepal would not have deteriorated to the extent to which they have in the last few years.

But all was not well with the Nepali Congress. The Koirala brothers and their followers dominated that institution almost completely. When they quarreled amongst themselves and their followers out of a sense of

loyalty to their leaders carried these quarrels to ridiculous extents, the prestige of the Nepali Congress as a whole was lowered. Men with character either could not be attracted to that institution or they could not find their way into it with the result that it became the nest of corrupt and incompetent men who had wormed their way into that organization by dint of their capacity for unfair practises.

Bad government and the mounting discontent of the populace compelled the king to intervene and suspend the operation of democracy. This happened not once but twice and each time the Government of India received a shock.

How far it was really necessary to suspend democracy and take over the reins of government in the interests of the public we can never know. It is possible to take the view that a king who wanted to be a real ruler utilized public discontent and took over power. This would certainly grieve those that love democracy but then what can we Indians do about it. There is no denying the fact that the so-called representatives of the people had proved themselves to be worthless. Whether this demanded a return to autocracy would be a matter of opinion and dishonest motives need not necessarily be attributed to the two sides.

As lovers of democracy the resurrection of parliamentary institutions would no doubt gladden our hearts but there are limits to what a neighbouring state can do and should do. We must not allow our love of political theories to run the better of our discretion.

After all we cannot impose a democratic form of government on other countries. We do not have the necessary strength for that and as for the moral justification there

is none. We must not try to impose our dogmas on other peoples. It is for them to choose the form of government that pleases them most. If they are not satisfied with one form it is upto them to upset it and substitute another. We cannot walk in and impose what we deem to be real democracy on them.

But what we, the common men, are concerned with is the feasibility of this course of action rather than its morals. Strong nations can always find moralizers to whitewash their actions and make them out as saviours of the world. If years ago we had invaded Nepal and made it one of the states of India then only a little more commotion would have been caused than that occasioned by the Goa affair. The world would not have been interested to the point of interfering seriously with the progress of Indian armies in Nepal.

But that time is passed, The conditions have changed and changed materially. China has had leisure to digest Tibet and is now on the borders of India and of Nepal and has massed armies there. If India were to attempt any adventerous policies then the king of Nepal has only to shout for help and Communist China would step in to protect the monarchy of Nepal however incongruous such an action might appear to mere theorists.

That danger was there and exists in a more intensified form still in the present. If we cannot conquer Nepal and impose our will upon the Nepalese why should we not adjust our policies to the changed circumstances. Is it not our duty to do so?

Should we as men of common sense drive the king of Nepal into the arms of the Chinese by making a grievance of the fact that democracy is suppressed in his

country? It is in the light of this danger that we have to examine our policies.

After the suppression of democracy in Nepal—and we are referring to the second suppression—the discontented people ran away and took refuge in India. From Indian bases they conducted their agitation against autocracy. If the war that these malcontents had been carrying on were merely a leaflet war then it would not have mattered much. But the Nepalese rebels were inciting open rebellion against the constituted authority in the country and Indian arms were captured from the insurrectionists.

The Nepalese king and Ministers complained that the attitude of the Government of India was not only not correct but was one of positive hostility to Nepal. Affording asylum to political refugees is a right that every nation possesses but political refugees are expected not to abuse the hospitality of the country in which they reside by engaging in acts which would spoil the relations between the two countries. The country affording asylum is also expected not to tolerate such activities.

Allowing Nepalese refugees to stay in India was not and could not by itself be an act of which Nepal could in justice complain. But the complaint of the Nepalese Government was that Nepalese refugees were accorded a different treatment from that meted out to Tibetan refugees and consequently had greater opportunities to work mischief.

Their plea was that if the Government of India could prohibit Tibetan refugees engaging in insurrectionist activities against China why should similar restrictions not be imposed on the Nepalese staying in India and openly working for the overthrow of the Nepalese Government. We are afraid no satisfactory reply was

given to this argument and the argument could not be called an unreasonable one.

In fact the course that our relations with Nepal were allowed to take almost laid itself open to the charge that although India professed unconcern with the internal affairs of Nepal and proclaimed a policy of non-interference yet no effective steps were taken to prevent the use of India as a base for armed operations carried on by revolutionaries against the lawfully constituted government of Nepal and that it was only after it was realized that the King of Nepal was not a man of straw and that he would, if necessary, be helped by powerful neighbours, that the anti-Nepalese rebels in India were stopped. In short it was argued that the change in the Nepal policy of the rulers of India was forced upon them by circumstances and did not arise out of any good will.

Many of us are angry with Nepal for having established friendly relations with China. We think it is a suicidal policy for them to follow. But we must not allow sentiment to get the better of reason. What success we with our immensely larger resources have had in protecting ourselves against Chinese expansionism (to use the official phrase) is evident to the whole world. If the Nepalese thought discretion the better part of valour and made peace with China on such terms as they could get them we at least have no business to complain. Assurances of help given by those that are not able to help themselves carry no conviction in politics and besides that our policies are suspect. Many countries believe that India does not want to take and is incapable of taking a firm stand against Communist countries. Who would then care to put faith in our promises of aid and brave the wrath of the communists? We are weak and we are irresolute. We are

not worth entering into an alliance with. That is the impression carried by our neighbours, big and small, and we cannot say that it is a wholly undeserved one.

It is necessary to wean Nepal away from China. It is necessary in the long term interests of both India and Nepal. But that is certainly not going to be facilitated by getting angry with the King of Nepal or by fomenting unrest. Weakening the power of the Nepalese King would be a dangerous expedient for the Chinese also could take advantage of unsettled conditions in Nepal and there already is a pro-Chinese section in Nepal. What we are faced within Nepal is a delicate situation that calls for the exercise of great patience and tact. A patronizing and insulting attitude could very well spoil our relations beyond repair. We must not forget that we have to deal with a proud young King of not negligible talents.



VI India and China.

Manu, the lawgiver has laid it down as a proposition that neighbours are enemies. The corollary that necessarily follows from this proposition is that your neighbour's neighbour is your friend because he is the enemy of your enemy. Based on this proposition and its corollary are Kautilya's famous table of a nation's natural friends and natural enemies, and the system of alliances that he recommends.

So long as the buffer state of Tibet separated us, India and China were not enemies. The day that state disappeared our enmity with China started because we became neighbours and Manu's law came into operation making natural enemies out of neighbours. That two big countries with a common border should look upon each other with suspicion and that they should be inclined to be hostile towards each other is the most natural thing in the world if they want to expand or if they want to make their weight felt in politics. But that does not mean that they should be perpetually at war with each other. That is not the sense in which Manu's dictum that neighbours are enemies is to be understood.

That neighbours are enemies only means that the tendency of neighbours is always to oppose each other in the prosecution of foreign policies. This is a proposition that holds good irrespective of the political complexion of the governments in power in the various countries. One can expand only at the cost of the other and one can dominate only at the expense of the other.

Some readers might be inclined to say that if the wish

to expand and the wish to lord it over others is given up then there is no reason for hostility. But it takes two to remove all the causes of conflict. It is not enough that one nation gives up the desires that lead to clash of interests.

If the other party does not renounce the wishes for gains then the question comes up how far its neighbours should yield and how far they should continue to yield. A time comes when the country whose rights have been encroached upon puts its foot down and says "No further yielding come what may" and then recourse to arms becomes unavoidable.

Such a point of no return came in respect to China and the way like the proverbial way to hell was paved with good intentions on our part and evil intentions on the part of the Chinese. They went on nibbling at our border and the thing got so much on the nerves of our leaders that orders were given that the Chinese trespassers should be thrown out. That they refused to be thrown out and that they bundled us down the Himalayan passes is another matter.

A new factor has come into politics now and that is a factor that has lent an edge to Chinese hostility. This new factor is communism. The role that militant religion played at one time in world history is being played now by communism. To personal ambitions and to national Chauvinisms as factors that disturb the peace of the world is added communism as one of the forces that brings world peace into trouble. And communism is a force that threatens world peace to a degree that no other force in the world has succeeded in doing yet.

Communism is an outlook upon life. It determines the actions not only of individuals but also of whole

peoples and unlike many other ideologies it is intolerent. In fanaticism it exceeds even the force of religious beliefs of the past.

There is no question of 'live and let live' with the communists. It is one of the dogmas of the communists that communism in order to exist must spread over the whole world. It cannot exist in isolation. So long as there is a single non-communist country in the world it will make all efforts to destroy communism. In theory there cannot be any co-existence. Capitalist economy is going to crumble and communism is bound to be established all over the world.

In very self-interest therefore every communist country is bound to help in the spread of communism all the world over. What from this help takes depends upon the strength of the communist country and also upon its distance from the country which is to be helped on communism.

All communists believe in the inevitability of historical materialism. But there are some communist countries that want to help history to fulfil itself because they do not want to wait till fate overtakes capitalism.

On this point the communists pretend to be divided. China wants to give armed aid to the historical processes. Russia counsels patience. Both are agreed about the goal to be achieved but China would not mind expending a few million men in order to achieve that object.

China thinks that her population will make-up for any deficiencies in the matter of armaments and want of technical advances. China thinks that even after the nuclear holocaust some few millions will still remain alive and amongst these few the Chinese will have enough of Communists left to help the communists to rule the

world. These calculations are made in cold blood and these arguments find expression in cold print.

The Chinese papers have been accusing the Russians of cowardice and the Russians have tried to frighten them by speaking of the nuclear teeth of paper tigers. The trouble with us is that we refuse to read that which we do not want to believe.

Even as Hitler made no secret of his intentions and of his plans, the Chinese leaders are not hiding their designs and still the majority of our leaders are not prepared to give them any attention. They seek refuge under the idea of what they call Chinese expansionism and refuse to give it the right name of red imperialism. This bewilders the common man and for a time he lulls himself into a false sense of security with the comforting thought that after all his leader understands politics better.

When however events overtake the leaders and find them totally unequal to the occasion, when the President and the Prime Minister are compelled to confess that they have been living in a dream world of their own creation and that they have been too credulous then the common man is disillusioned. He finds that his Ceasors are only stuffed with saw-dust.

This process of disillusionment has just started and if the Chinese had not delayed their hand a few more weeks then all the idols of the nation would have been found on scrap heap. We mean in the figurative sense. That time may yet come. We should not forget what the leaders of Poland did within a few weeks of the beginning of the Second World War.

The common man thinks therefore that it would be safer to act on the assumption that China is not merely a

big neighbour whose expansionsim we have to beware of but China is the inveterate enemy of the non-Communist world and that India's resources in men and materials hold a peculiar fascination for that slant eyed people. China has that loyalty to Communism which the proselyte has for the religion that he has newly embraced.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that China will not leave a single stone unturned till India is converted to Communism. If we look upon China as a power that is determined to spread her ideology by fire and sword then we have to adopt towards China a policy materially different from the one we have been pursuing so far. We cannot afford to rest then till China gives up her Communism or is rendered harmless. This does not mean that we should try to impose by force of arms a non-communist way of life upon China. It only means that we have to be extremely vigilant about Chinese activities and we have to take steps to neutralize Chinese influence in our part of Asia because of the dangers inherent in the spread of Chinese Communism in these parts.

Where China is concerned we have to be very careful for a number of reasons. Democracies always suffer from a handicap in dealing with countries having a totalitarian form of government. Totalitarian countries can take decisions, change decisions, and implement decisions with lightning speed. Since in totalitarian countries the taking of decisions is done by one or two individuals or by a handful of people only, the decisions can be and are kept secret for a very long time. Hitler took the decision to make war on Russia several months before the actual invasion of Russia and yet the invasion did come as a surprise even to Stalin and this led to the loss of life of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. But why go so

far? Did the Chinese not catch the Indian leaders napping?

In democracies decisions on important matters cannot be taken without preparing the populace for these decisions well in advance. When populations have to be made ready in advance there can be no surprise and no secrecy. Whatever advantages speed in thought and action give are lost to democracies. That is the handicap referred to above. China is a communist country and therefore it believes in dictatorship. India is a democracy and therefore it can neither take decisions rapidly nor can it execute them with celerity. We have therefore to think out plans in advance and also to give orders as to what is to be done if certain contingencies arise.

Again China is the country with the largest population in the world. Numbers are a great asset if the leadership of the country is resolute. In the final analysis it is the men that produce wealth. The greater the number of men that a country possesses the more wealth it can produce. The greater the population of any country the more men it can put on the battle-field. The man power of China is its biggest asset. The seven hundred and odd millions of China enable her to put the largest army possible in the world on battle field—China with her seven hundred millions is always going to be stronger in battle than India with her four hundred and forty millions.

Communist China's natural enemies would be Japan, Russia and Kaishek's China. Out of these we shall have to rule out Russia as an enemy of China for the present. Whether we should do that or not is a point that is hotly debated now-a-days and on that would depend the line to be followed by India.

Our present policy seems to be based on the differences between Russia and China. We must therefore examine these differences with a view to finding out how much we can exploit them and how far we can depend upon them to help us out of our difficulties with China. At present China and Russia have border trouble.

In the old days Russia had designs on the Liaotung peninsula. Russia had very large interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway. They arose out of Russia's search for a port in the warm waters. The defeat that Russia sustained at the hands of Japan about the turn of the century was a great setback to Russian ambitions in this region. Russia could not come south because Japan dug herself in. Korea was occupied by Japan and Japan aided the rise of the warlord Chang Tso Lin. That blocked the way of Communist Russia. Manchuria became for all practical purposes a Japanese possession.

The Japanese spread further west and obtained a sort of control over the persons that had grasped power in inner and outer Mongolia. We can say that the Japanese almost cut off communication between the Communists of China and the Soviet Republic except for the well nigh impossible line through Sinkiang into the heart of China. This was the position by the beginning of the Second World War. The border trouble if any was between Russia and Japan, not between Russia and China.

The disappearance of Japan as a power brought China and Russia face to face in the region extending from the Pamir plateau to the sea of Japan. Border trouble if any between Russia and China has its origin therefore in the period beginning with the end of the Second World War.

Russia wanted China to go communist and therefore made important concessions. Russia could have become the heir to the Japanese and grabbed the northern portion of China as well as Korea. Not only were large stocks of Japanese arms handed over to the Communists but Russia gave up all claims over Manchuria and Korea. Korea had in the past asserted its independence as against China and though Korea before the Japanese occupied it had Kings of her own yet China had never ceased claiming suzerainty over it.

Korea was claimed by China and with the tacit consent of the Russians, the Chinese communists conquered half of it back from America. Russia has no reason to quarrel with China either over Korea or over Manchuria because Russia has voluntarily given up all her claims in that region.

While China was in an anarchic state the Russian Communists spread over Outer Mongolia and also over Inner Mongolia. The Mongolians who were in a feudal state of development made rapid progress under the Communists and Mongolia has also been industrialized. For all practical purposes the Mongolian Republic has become one of the Soviet Socialistic Republics.

The Chinese Gommunists have been sore about it. The Chinese have always claimed that the Mongol Chiefs have paid tribute to the Emperors of China. Whenever the Emperors of China have been weak the Mongols have asserted their independence. We can say therefore that China has at all times claimed suzerainty over Mongolia and has occasionally been able to net the Mongol Chiefs to acknowledge it. What Tibet is between India and China that Mongolia has been between Russia and China.

One more thing has to be taken into account in considering the politics of this region and that is the character of the population. There are some people who are not prepared to acknowledge those people as Chinese who live beyond the famous Chinese wall. we need not go to that length but we must admit that those Chinese that live north of the China wall are different from those that live in China proper.

It is little known to us that at a time we might say almost within living memory there were more Mohomedans within the confines of China than there were in the whole of India. The most rapid advance in history has been that of Islam. A broad belt extending from Gibraltar in the west to the sea of Japan in the East was converted to Islam and the northern regions of China have a very strong Mohomedan population.

The people from this region have therefore always received a stepmotherly treatment from the Central Government of China when China had a central government. Mahomedan uprisings and terrible reprisals have always kept down the population of this region. Even now however there are about forty million Mahomedans in China and they are to be found mostly in this region. China's championship of the cause of the peoples inhabiting this region has been understandably lukewarm. That is one of the reasons that make us think that the dispute over Mongolia is not going to spoil Sino-Russian relations seriously.

The other region in which Russian and Chinese interests seem to diverge is South East Asia. But we do not believe that Russia seriously intends to compete with China so far away from the heart of Russia. That Russia

after having given up Manchuria and Korea would seriously think of fighting China over Laos or over Indonesia seems to be as probable as that Britain would try to reconquer India by force of arms.

Common sense would seem to dictate that that communist country should lend active aid to the insurgent communists that is nearest the scene. Russia as being the more advanced country might lend more aid in the matter of the wherewithals of war or it might agree to supply technicians and scientists of which China is bound to run short but when it comes to lending troops then it is China that is going to take the lead in South East Asia. That was what China did in Korea. That was what it did in Vietnam, that is what it is doing in Laos and that is what it would do in a number of other Asian countries where in its opinion there is a chance of a communist revolt succeeding. Can Russia send enough troops by air to remote parts of Asia? Would it not be sensible to suppose that Russia would not mind the use of Chinese troops for that purpose in remote corners of Asia?

The picture that some of our patriots want to conjure up, a picture of Russia and China fighting over the division of Asian spoils does not at all appeal to us. Not only can we not envisage such a turn to the present Sino-Russian dispute but we think that this reasoning is being advanced as an apology for the pro-Russian policy that is being followed by a section of the Indian politicians. We are asked to see a hidden meaning in our siding with the Russians on almost every occasion on which they differ with the Western powers. Not only that but we are called upon to admire the success of a diplomacy that has isolated China from her communist ally.

There could be no more harmful delusion than this isolation of China business. It is India that has been isolated from her neighbours and when India's neighbours proclaim themselves neutral in the Sino-Indian conflict one cannot help thinking that the mischievous smile with which this culmination to India's neutralism is regarded by some Western observers is not at all unjustifiable. Neutralism has like a boomrang returned to India.

It is we that are isolated and our leftists are trying to hide this fact by pretending that if the Sino-Russian differences are if not of Indian making then they are at least being fostered by Indian politicians. The credit for weaning Russia away from China is to be given to Indian Macchiavellies. That is the line of argument that many so-called intellectuals seriously advocate in private conversation also. There could be no bigger nonsense than this and no more dangerous nonsense. The goal that the Russians and the Chinese have set before themselves is the same. Russia wants to be cautious; China thinks the time is ripe for throwing all caution to the winds. That is all. Can this difference of opinion have come about as a result of the clever handling of India's Foreign Policies? But such absurd arguments are seriously advanced by some educated people in India. That only shows how little we, as a nation, are alive to the realities of politics.

It is possible that there is a personal side to this quarrel between Russia and China, Mao and Khrushchev might be rivals for the leadership of world communism. The human element cannot be eliminated from politics even by the communists. But the data from which inferences could be drawn is lacking. We are allowed to

know so little about Khrushchev the man or Mao the man that it is not desirable to speculate about their psychological make up and how that would influence the course of the relations between the two countries. But if the personal factor is more important than what we think it is then it would be still more dangerous to bank upon Sino-Russia differences for the protection of India, Khrushchev goes then the diehards in Russia would draw closer to China than at present and the red bloc might become more violent and more aggressive than before. Again if Mao were to be ousted from Chinese politics earlier, then Khrushchev's Russia is sure to make an all out bid for rapprochement with China and we cannot say that such a move will not succeed. That might restrain China for the time being but that would not mean the disappearance of the Chinese threat. It would mean that a China working hand in glove with Russia will be able to threaten India much more seriously than at present. Those whom ideology unites are not going to be parted easily and most certainly not by wishful thinking.

There is another aspect of the Sino-Russian conflict that must also be considered. We are told that the roots of the Sino-Russian conflict go deeper. The bogey of the "Yellow Peril" is being raised in another form. The Russians, it is hinted, are afraid of the rise of the Yellow Race. Whites against the yellows is stated to be the real nature of the Sino-Russian conflict. Some of us are seriously arguing that Russia is drawing closer to America because after all the Americans are whites and the Chinese are not.

We cannot accept this theory of racial conflict. We do not mean to say that racial conflicts have not taken place in history or that people will not ever fight people

that belong to a different race. People have fought for all sorts of things and the masses, like children, can be made to fight for things that in the eyes of rational people are things of no consequence. That has happened hundreds of times before and that can happen any number of times if there are skilful people to work the masses up into a passion. That is more or less a matter of propaganda and perseverance.

But that is precisely what would come in the way of a racial conflict between Russia and China. Both the Chinese and Russians have been indoctrinated too long and too deeply with communism to set any store by racial theories. They have been taught to treat racial differences as matters of no consequence. It has been dinned in their ears so long that heredity counts for naught and that it is only training that matters, that they are not likely to look upon the racial factor as one that can or should divide peoples.

Neither the Russians nor the Chinese have been made race-conscious. They have been made class-conscious. They have been told that the workers of the world whatever the country to which they belong are one. You cannot educate a people long into one way of thinking and then suddenly ask them to think a different way. Those that have been made class-conscious cannot in a short time be made race-conscious. Such reorientation of thinking will take several years and that is what makes us think that Russians and Chinese will not come to blows for the reason that they come from different races. Deeducating people and reeducating people takes a long time and so far ahead into the future we need not try to peer. It is no use trying to think of the post-Russian-Revolution world in terms of slogans that were fashion-

able in the years before 1918. Circumstances have changed radically and the modes of thinking have changed and if we do not take account of that it is we who shall come to grief.

Like drowning men our intellectuals are clutching at straws. Sino-Russian differences are relied upon by them for helping us out of our difficulties with China and that is a wrong approach to the whole question. We have to solve our difficulties. Others are not going to solve them for us. However strong the tie between our leftist politicians and Russia may be, that country is not going to help us out of our troubles except on its own terms. Going red will be the price that we shall have to pay if we want Russia to help us effectively in our struggle with China. Is the country prepared to pay that price? If the country is not so prepared then the country will not get real aid from Russia. It will get aid from Russia but that aid will be just enough to make the Americans feel that after all Indian Leaders have good relations with the Russians and therefore they must be kept at an arms length and never be depended upon. In short it will be aid to enable the Indian Leftists to keep the masses pacified by singing the praises of a neutrality that gets us aid from both the rival blocks.

It is silly to imagine also that Russia will give substantial aid to India just to have the teeming millions of India on her side in the conflict with China. That conflict if and when it comes will be a conflict in which Japan may very well cooperate with Russia in curbing the growth in power of China. But these are matters for future generations to worry about. Russia and China are neighbours and if both want to expand they might come into conflict later on but that will only be when their

ideological fervour has worn off. At present there are no signs of that. For the present their only differences are those created by their ideological fervour and by the difference in degree of such fervour.

The only point on which the Russians and the Chinese seem to be divided is over the question when, where and how to take active part in aiding the historical process by which decadent capitalism will be finally overthrown and communism established all over the world. The common end unites them, the methods appear to divide them. Instead of considering their views as antagonistic to each other we are inclined to believe that they are complementary to each other. Where Chinese methods are not likely to succeed because their very violence will attract a counterblow, the Russian methods of waiting, watching, and undermining will succeed. One tries to force the pace, the other is content to go slow but both are dragging in the same direction and there is an inevitability about the drag that frightens the wide awake people.

Russia has made tremendous progress in science, in technique, and industrialisation. Can Russia be seriously afraid that China would catch up with that progress and eventually surpass the Russians? Even with a fierce determination these things cannot be done in a short time. And will the Russian scientists and technicians be resting on their laurels all the time?

Would it be necessary to go to war with China merely to arrest the industrial, scientific and technical progress of China. We do not think that such an end can be contemplated for the present Sino-Russian differences. Russia and China are ardent believers in communism. They are not going to fight amongst themselves just to

help the non-communist world. Russia with her industrialisation and with her scientific progress can make a very good use of the Chinese man power. China with her hundreds of millions clamouring for weapons must necessarily need the support of a highly industrialized power like Russia. There is no getting away from the fact that Russia and China both need each other badly.

We must not commit the mistake of thinking that Russia and China have leaders of the quality we find in India. Both of the countries have cold and calculating leaders who would shrink at nothing and yet who would not risk the life of a single man more than they actually need. If they can use each other then they would not hesitate to do so and they would not allow differences in theory to come in the way of co-operation.

Let us take it for argument's sake that Russia is afraid of the growing might of China. Russia would then like China's wings to be clipped. If that can be done at the cost of some capitalist nation so much the better for Russia and for Communism.

If a Stalin could make peace with Hitler not for the sake of peace but just to encourage him to defy the western powers cannot Russia's present rulers encourage China in her adventurist career and get China embroiled with the west. Would America and Britain not cut China to proper size and get reduced in power in the bargain? Is China not sufficiently powerful to make America and Britain expend a sizable portion of their strength? Getting China and the West to fight each other does not require much of an exercise of the arts of diplomacy. In fact it is the Chinese leaders that are

thirsting for war and it is the Russians that are reining them in.

That the Russians hold back the Chinese at a time when merely letting them go would involve them in a life and death struggle out of which they can emerge only seriously crippled is in our opinion the strongest proof that they want to conserve Chinese strength. One does not try to preserve the strength of a nation of whose growing might one is afraid and of whose friendliness one is not sure. If Russia wanted China to be weakened then Russia would not have advised China to stop the war with India.

For these reasons we are not prepared to put faith in the Sino-Russian quarrels, at least not to the point of believing that we Indians can profit from them. We rather think that the differences between Russia and China are only minor ones and that the two of them have long term plans for bringing about communist revolutions in the rest of the world.

We cannot understand why Khrushchev should be disbelieved when he says that he looks upon the Chinese as brothers and when he says further that an attack upon China will be regarded by him as an attack on Russia. The interests of China and Russia do not clash sufficiently to warrant the presumption that the two will fight each other. A clash may come later on but not until after the end of the third world war.

If we accept this reasoning then we shall have to be all the more careful in our dealings with China. It would be safer to assume that whatever their internal disputes so far as the rest of the world is concerned, the Communist bloc countries react as one country and that

it would be highly dangerous to make any assumptions to the contrary.

We come to this then that our relations with China cannot be considered in isolation and will have to be considered in the context of our relations with all the red bloc countries. We cannot dream ourselves away from this fact and non-alignment would be the most dangerous kind of self-delusion. A full scale war with China would mean a war with the the whole red bloc and in such a war India would most certainly not find herself alone. The greater the danger from China the stronger will be the pressure internal as well as external to give up the ghost of non-alignment and to forge joint plans for defence against Communism.

Supposing China makes a full scale attack then as things stand at present there is no limit to the depth to which they can penetrate. Unaided India is no match for China and no red bloc country need come to the help of China in such an unequal combat.

What will be the reaction of the Indian public in case the western powers set conditions before granting help? At first the Indians will get angry but the public will in the end get ready to accept these terms even if they involve scuttling the Congress. If the country is in peril and if there is no other way of remaining in power then we have no doubt that many Congress Ministers themselves will come forward with proposals to throw the present leadership overboard and agree to reconstitute the Ministry in such a way as to make it more acceptable to the powers that can save us from deadly peril. The masses will do nothing but ambitious people are bound to seize upon this opportunity for getting rid of the ruling clique and climbing into power.

Non-alignment will certainly go then but it will have gone at a time when but few opportunities remain to cash the benefits of alignment. Disasters will be crowding upon a nation prepared neither psychologically nor physically to face them or to bear them with composure. All the measures taken by the men in power then will be panicky measures and very few of them could be wise measures. It would be inhuman to expect leaders to keep cool in such trying times and under such difficult circumstances.

If schemes of help and measures of co-operation are not previously discussed and agreed upon down to the minutest detail then even with the best of wishes and with the most modern means of transport aid cannot be rushed to all the parts of the country at which it is needed and it cannot be delivered in time. If that does not happen then it means that armies cannot be saved and positions cannot be held.

We Indians have not had any experience of war for the last hundred years and by we is meant the populace. With the dropping of the first bomb from the air the inhabitants of big cities will be in a mad hurry to evacuate the towns. The stampedes will claim thousands of lives not to speak of the complete cessation of all productive and useful activities. Our people have had no experience of war. They have no discipline and even the civic sense is very weakly developed. That would mean that not only will the armies be lost but even civilian populations will be reduced very much in size. The loss of life and the loss of property will be staggering and all because we have clung to non-alignment for an inordinately long time.

That the onward march of the Chinese armies will be

halted at some point north of the Vindhyadri mountains. we have no doubt about that but that will have been done by the American and Common-wealth forces and that too by having recourse to nuclear weapons. They might even get the forces of the Kuomintang Chinese to create a diversion by attempting an invasion of the Chinese mainland. We cannot visualize with sufficient accuracy and in detail the possible courses of action the western powers might follow and the complications these actions might give rise to. Neither is it necessary to make such an attempt. The only point that we are seeking to make out is that terrible losses will have been inflicted in the meanwhile upon our poor country-men and all because non-alignment has become a dogma with us.

That alignment would mean involvement in the third World War no sensible man will deny but the point is; can we at all avoid that entanglement? Militant Communism will not leave us any other course open. Supposing we manage to remain aloof then the victorious communists will not take long to settle accounts with us and then we shall be completely at the mercy of the Communist powers. How much of honesty and decency they have we should really be under no illusions about.

Supposing the Communists are compelled to struggle long then whatever the duration of such a struggle the Communists are bound to make efforts to lay continents bare in a scorched earth policy or in the alternative to treat us like a conquered people and make us work for them and subject us to untold hardships. Where will the benefits of our non-alignment then be?

Non-aligned we cannot remain indefinitely. It would be suicidal to do so. When elephants fight grass does get trodden under their feet. We are not so far removed

from the possible theatres of war as to get off unscathed. Our teeming millions and our resources offer too big a prize for the combatants to keep away from us. And we must never forget that for the communists every one who is not with them is against them.

Co-existence is only a matter of tactics with them. They will accept co-existence only so long as they think time is on their side in their war with non-communism or as they deem politic to call it, with capitalism. The non-communist world must hang together or the nations will hang separately. China has awakened our sleepers rudely but there are quite a number of them that want to go to sleep again. Nobody can afford to sleep in the snow. That sleep will turn out to be the last sleep.

Leaving aside the question of Communism for the time being and even looking upon China as an expansionist power if that term satisfies our political mice, what are we going to do about China? Are we going to live in perpetual terror? That we cannot trust China is evident even to the most stupid of us by now. That China is strong now and under her ruthless leaders is going to grow stronger still than us we should not doubt. Is fear of China something that we shall always have to learn to live with? The Congress is not going to continue in power for ever in India.

How are we to solve the Chinese puzzle. Single handed we can do nothing. To be constantly ready for war on the Himalayan border is going to be an intolerable situation for us Indians. That feat, even if we are able to perform it, will swallow up so much of our energy that we shall have little left to do anything else.

We must take the help of some other power in the fight against China. Supposing we are able to push the

Chinese back from the Himalayas does the struggle end there? The Chinese will not allow a peace to be dictated to them merely because they have been forced back from one mountain range. They have several mountain ranges to fall back upon. The passes that lead from south eastern Tibet into China are between twelve to eighteen thousand feet above sea level. There is practically no direct route through Tibet into Central China. The way lies through the North Western provinces of China. Are our armies going to march several thousands of miles and impose our will on China or are we going to traverse the road through Bhamo and what about Burma then? The whole idea sounds extremely ludicrous. It is alright to talk about the courage and the patriotism of the Indian soldiers but those that speak of Indians fighting China to a point at which China will have to bend to the wishes of India betray, we must say, a sad lack of the knowledge of the geography of China. To make a speech before the masses and get appaluse is one thing and to plan a war and bring it to a successful close is quite another.

This very idea of going it all alone and doing things single handed is insane in the conditions that obtain in the world at present. No single nation is powerful enough today to resist the onslaught of two or more powers. Neither America nor Russia is in a position to do that and we cannot hope to acquire within a reasonable time strength comparable to that of either of these two nations.

Whether China is considered merely as an expansionist country or whether we look upon China as a communist country determined to play an active role in converting the whole of the world to communism one thing is certain and that is that we are no match for

China neither can we hope to come anywhere near the fighting strength of China within a few generations, not to talk of surpassing her. When this fact is taken into account then the necessity of alliances will be realized unless of course we are prepared to yield to China every time no matter how much that affects our permanent interests adversely.

Apart from the fact that China's power alone is sufficient to make us almost despair of success in a war there is a positive side to Chinese policies which should make us take a much more serious view of the Chinese menace than what our present leaders seem to be capable of. The Chinese do not believe in neutralism. They have set about winning friends with a will. They are driving wedges between us and our neighbours.

In spite of the fact that cultural and historical ties ought to draw Nepal towards India they have secured a foot-hold in Nepal by promising economic aid and by agreeing to aid in constructing a net-work of communications. That Nepal should have agreed to accept Chinese aid in building up communications and in setting Nepal on her feet is a triumph of China's diplomacy and woeful proof of India's want of it. Situated as we are it is we that have to woo our neighbours. In the final analysis a hostile Nepal or even a neutral Nepal is going to cost us much more in a war with China than all the costs of full scale economic aid to Nepal. War is a much expensive affair than economic aid.

In a way we can call economic aid bribe offered to Nepal in order to keep that country on our side in a possible conflict with China. There is also another line of thought suggesting that some countries can blackmail India by threatening to join the enemy ranks. That

would be the worst light in which the requests for help made to us by neighbouring countries could be put. But even if we accept the truth underlying such comments we have to face the demands made by our neighbours and we have to face them in a realistic manner. It is no use pretending to be righteously indignant about it. In this world every country tries to exploit every other country. What else are we doing when we clamour for aid from America and the western countries? Are we not exploiting their anti-communism? We should not make a wry face if our small neighbours give us a dose of our own medicine and ask us to help them. We must face facts with a proper sense of realism. Ultimately economic aid is much cheaper than war.

The Chinese are prepared to starve sections of their own people and divert much needed funds towards aiding countries which would otherwise go over to the side of India. Such a high price the Chinese are paying in aid of their aggressive designs. They are waging the cold war with a grim determination. Pointing out the immorality of their course of action or waxing indignant over the opportunism of our neighbouring countries is not going to help us in the least.

The choice of means is rarely if ever left to us by our enemies and we must learn not to mix morals with politics. They bear that as little mixing as fire and water do. We ought to give all possible economic help to our neighbours even if that means tightening our belts. No price can be too great for preventing accession to the strength of our enemies.

To day Nasser imprisons the Communists of his own country and yet he has the cheek to demand economic aid from Moscow and Moscow gives that aid. It is not

that Russia is weaker than Egypt. Russia can crush Egypt to dust but Russia does not even attempt it because Russia knows that that would merely drive Nasser into the arms of America. Egypt as a country that stands at the meeting point of three continents is much too important a strategic prize to be handed over on a platter to the Western Powers. Russia feels compelled therefore to turn a smiling face towards a Nasser that imprisons and persecutes communists. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Level headed politicians always meet lukewarm friends and smiling enemies with equal and unfailing courtsey. War is the last resort and all other means have to be tried out before recourse is had to arms. We cannot help feeling that the weapon of economic aid has been used much more skilfully by the Chinese than by our leaders.

In the case of such of our neighbours that already have a quarrel with us, they did not have to give even economic aid. It looks as if the Chinese have succeeded in winning over Pakistan. Some politicians from Pakistan, think that more is to be gained by making friends with China than by continuing to keep friends with an America that is not prepared to bring pressure to bear on India to make her yield some at least of the demands in respect of Kashmir. At present the Americans are content to make general remarks that a defence of the subcontinent of India can hardly be conceived of without the collaboration of Pakistan, But such general remarks are lost upon Indian leaders and do not help the Pakistanis to gain their objectives in Kashmir.

China's offer to give full scale aid has under these circumstances attracted them. That is the inference that we draw from speeches by responsible Chinese that China

will give unstinted support to Pakistan in case Pakistan is menaced by another country. Pakistan does not want any aid in her quarrel with Afghanistan. The only country meant could be India. In a war with India, in case it comes to a war between Pakistan and India, China will be found ranged on the same side as Pakistan. There is no other meaning that can be drawn from the words used by the spokesmen of both the countries.

Whether ultimately the pro-China group in Pakistan will dominate the policies or whether saner counsels will prevail in Pakistan is another matter. In the long run association with China is going to be more harmful to Pakistan than mere non-success in obtaining Kashmir. But then we cannot say that the leaders of nations always take the saner view. Disasters would not overtake nations if their leaders behave in a rational manner. But these things are always in the hands of the gods. All that we can say for the present is that the Chinese have scored a success in Pakistan, a success to which our stubbornness is also a contributing cause.

What we want is a more elastic approach. We should not refuse to play the game that the Chinese are playing. If the Chinese are trying to secure friends we should not disdain holding out the hand of friendship to our neighbours. Our stand-offishness may be consistent with ideal neutralism but we have seen how ill it has served us. In our hour of peril it was only the vigorous aid rushed by the Western powers that stemmed the tide of Chinese aggression. Our Bandung friends were too indifferent to make any but the most timid and unmeaning of gestures. By harping upon neutralism we are not going to get any friends, let alone allies. And yet if we are to secure friends as against China then the present time is the

most favourable one because so long as the world looks upon China as a communist country the world will be prepared to help us and it has demonstrated its readiness in the clearest manner possible. We have got to take advantage of this readiness not only for our short term needs but also for our long term ones.

Not only have we got to align ourselves with those that have today the courage to stand up against communism but we have also to make friends with powers whose permanent interests are bound to conflict with those of China. Such a power is Japan and community of interest ought to draw us together. Apart from the fact that Japan can, if need be, help us against China, Japan can help us on to our industrial feet.

But that is a long term policy. If the policy of drawing nearer to Japan is to be successful then we have to be first a nation that is worth allying itself with. Even for a policy of alliances some sort of strength is required. The greater our strength the more an alliance with us will be coveted. The readiness with which other countries come forward and make proposals to us will be the real measure of our strength. So long as we are weak even small countries like Nepal will smile at our assurances of support.

If to-day we approach Japan for aid against China we shall meet with a polite but firm refusal. The refusal will be polite because the Japanese are an extremely polite people but it will be firm because India has no strength worth mentioning and no country cares to ally herself with weaklings because in an alliance both the sides seek some advantage.

There is also another reason why India is not considered worthy of a proposal of alliance. At present people from

other countries do not have much faith in the reliability of India as an ally. Foreigners carry the impression that the leaders of India do not know which way the permanent interests of India lie. Some like the Americans get exasperated that India should kick her real benefactors and try to make friends with countries that are making ready to cut her throat. The obstinacy with which our leaders look away from facts which do not square with their mental image of the present and of the future is the biggest obstacle in the way of getting aid. No body can help a country whose leaders do not know what they want.



VII India and Burma

Nature has been very liberal to Burma. It is surrounded on three sides by mountain ranges that were once considered to be impregnable. These ranges however could not prevent the spread of the most dangerous of ideologies. Burma is divided into Upper Burma which is principally the valley of the Irawati walled in by three mountain ranges and Lower Burma which is made up of the plains of the Irawati, Sittang and Salween rivers and includes also the Arakan and Tenasserim areas.

Burma is but thinly populated because its two hundred and sixty thousand square miles have only eighteen millions living in them. Two thirds of this population is concentrated in the Irawati river delta. One third of the total area is forest area and its teak is famous. The mineral wealth of Burma is considerable. It produces more silver and lead than any other eastern country and supplies the world sixty percent of its tin. Cobalt, copper, gold and other minerals are found in Burma and it leads in the production of tungsten. The petroleum resources of the country are well known to us. Rice produced in Burma can feed several countries besides Burma.

For a country like India which is on the road to industrialisation the importance of Burma as a supplier of food and raw materials can hardly be exaggerated. In fact before the political upheavals in this part of Asia, 1/3rd of Burmese exports were absorbed by India and half of Burma's imports were provided by India. We

both of us could supply each others needs very well and together we could form a powerful economic unit.

But economic considerations rarely prevail with the masses. They are incapable of thinking in terms of economies; they are not allowed to get over tribal, racial, religious and regional considerations by ambitious leaders. Such considerations prevent even the real unification of Burma; all the greater obstacles do they present to economic cooperation between the two countries. The populace is divided between five principal racial groups. Of these the Burmans proper number about twelve million. They come of Mongolian stock and live in the plains of the Irawati and of the Chindwin. Most of them are Budhists by religion. Although they form the majority group there are few soldiers amongst them because under the rule of the British they were not admitted to military service. The second largest group and the group that has provided the maximum political trouble is that of the Karens. They formerly lived near the Thai border but now they are found in large numbers in the delta of the Irawati river. The majority of them still live in the Eastern hills. They number about two and a half million and have under the British received the most favoured class treatment. As they were accepted in military service and as about one tenth of them had embraced Christainity they possessed in the administration an influence out of proportion to their numbers. That explains partially their hostility to the majority group. The third largest group is that of the Shans. Really speaking the million Shans that are found in Burma today are Thais and would have formed part of Thailand if the British had not conquered the Shan states and annexed them to Burma. Since their conquest

however the inhabitants of the thirty Shan states remained loyal to the British and after them to the Union of Burma. The Chins form the fourth racial group and are about the same in number like the Kachins who are three hundred and fifty thousand strong. The Chins are a primitive warlike race that was never subdued completely and that yet lives in a primitive tribal organization between the Arakan hills and the delta of the Irawati. The Kachins who live on the border of India and Burma provide the labour force. The Chinese and the Indian minorities are not at all liked in Burma and yet it is these minorities that have helped to develop the country. The Chinese are the merchants, pawn brokers and skilled craftsmen. The Indians at one time numbered about a million but more than half of them, had to leave when the protection of the British was withdrawn from them. The Hindus came mostly from southern India and provided the capital for trade and industry. With their disappearance from the field the Burmese economy has not exactly prospered. That will give some idea of the people that go to make Burma.

Uptil the British came the history of Burma has been one of tribal wars and of struggles between chieftans. We can say that it was the British that unified Burma and put it on the map. Until 1937 Burma had been administered as a part of India. In that year it was separated from India and the people were given a sort of self-government.

The percentage of literacy in Burma is fifty and that is much higher than that in India. Political consciousness however developed rather late amongst the Burmans. It was in the year 1930 that the Thakin party was brought into existance. The word Thakin means master and the

idea was that the Burmese should be masters in their own house. Like many people newly awakened to political consciousness several of the Thakins have had too strong a pull at the jug of Marxism to retain sobriety.

When the second world war came the patriots whether Marxists or not were in too great a hurry to obtain independence not to jump at the hand held out to them by the Japanese. A Burmese Independence Army was formed. It cooperated with the Japanese and when the Japanese looked like losing this army promptly transferred its allegiance in 1945 to the British and the Americans and cooperated with them in driving out the Japanese. But if the Japanese had been driven out that did not mean that the Burmese became independent. They had only succeeded in bringing the old masters back. The old masters however were in a chastened mood and they promised Burma at least Dominion status if not actual independence. In 1947 the Burmans, Karens, Chins, Shans and Kachins, the five principal racial groups of Burma agreed between themselves to cooperate in building a new and united Burma.

The British agreed that Burma should have a Constituent Assembly. A treaty was signed in London in October 1947 and on the 4th of January 1948. Burma became an independent republic and U Nu became the Premier. With independence however the real troubles started for Burma. The country had been laid waste by two major campaigns. The economy had received a shock from the effects of which it has not recovered even now. The non-Burmese like the British and the Indians who had helped the country to develop, had been forced into the wilderness and unaided the Burmese did not know how to start building the economy anew. The

country was determined to get rid once and for all of the imperialists and of the exploiters. But it was only the so-called imperialists and exploiters that could set the economy of the country on its feet again. Their aid was spurned and the country relapsed into chaos.

Lawlessness was wide-spread and the beginning was made by the Communists, the pioneers in disruptive activities. Within three months of the attainment of independence the Communists raised the standard of revolt against the government of the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League. They were joined soon by the Peoples Volunteer organization a semi-military group of ex-soldiers and anti-Japanese agitators that had once owned allegiance to Aung San who deserted the Japanese cause and joined the British when they looked like winning. The Karens who wanted a separate state for themselves also revolted and for some time the rebels formed a sort of a Peoples Democratic Front and attempted to govern a large part of Central Burma separately. By 1950 the Government succeeded in winning some of the lost territories from the rebels. The Peoples Volunteer Organization was the first however to break with the Communists and join the government. The Karens suffered defeats and in 1955 that is almost four years after the revolt started the government claimed to have broken the back of the communist insurrection.

General elections could be held and the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League secured 144 seats out of 233. Two years later the Karens were given a separate state. In 1956 a general amnesty was given and by 1957 many communists and Karens surrendered and made peace with the government. But all could not go well with the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League. There were splits

in that party itself. The principal reason for these splits could be given as the inability to solve the economic problems.

The economic problem was one of rehabilitation after the ravages of the Second World War and of the Civil War that followed. The party began to be pulled in two directions by the rightists and by the leftists and as if this were not enough U Nu began to emphasize the role of Buddhism in the affairs of the state. That introduced a third disturbing element. So far as oil and the mining activities were concerned the Government was forced to enter into partnership with foreign firms because no other method worked. This displeased the Leftists who maintained and who still maintain like their counterparts in India that the panacea for all economic ailments is nationalization of industries and concerns.

The leftists want to influence the foreign policies as well in the red direction. They wanted the country to side with the Communist bloc and to that end they advocated a non-involvement policy that looked suspiciously like the non-alignment policy of certain Asiatic countries whose leaders think that they can dupe western politicians indefinitely and milk them for aid. After independence Britain had entered into a defence agreement with Burma. The term expired in 1954 and in the non-renewal of this agreement we can see the victory of the leftists.

U Nu the Premier seems to have played the role that several leaders in these small countries delight in playing namely that of pitting the leftists against the rightists in order to stay in power for as long a time as possible. Such leaders very often succeed in displeasing both the rightists and leftists.

Till 1954, the leftists had not become very strong and at the time of the signing of the SEATO agreement Burma neither joined it nor was opposition offered to that treaty organization by Burma. With all his acrobatics however U Nu could not retain power for long and in 1958 he invited General Ne Win to take charge of the administration.

The change put more vigour into the administration and the fight against the communist rebels was prosecuted with more seriousness and resulted in the capture and the surrender of five thousand rebels. Ne Win voluntarily relinquished power after eighteen months of wise and benevolent rule. The leftists increased in influence and in 1960 a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed with China. After some transfer of petty regions the border was delineated and treaty defining the new frontier with China was signed by U Nu on behalf of Burma and Chou en Lai on behalf of China. The Burmese are friendly with the Chinese now and they have to be friendly. A ready-made road exists leading from the heart of China into Burma and the Burmese cannot ignore this fact. They are vulnerable to a Chinese attack and that strengthens the hands of the leftists in Burma for aid is just across the frontier. The readers will pardon this use of the word leftists. In several Asiatic countries many communists for tactical reasons style themselves as leftists and the non-communist leftists are usually so weak that they allow their policies to be practically dictated by those amongst them whose heart is blood red and who are organized.

In 1962, Ne Win again assumed power this time on his own and not at the invitation of the Premier. The reason given for this assumption of power was that Ne

Win thought that the growing power of the left wing socialists was a menace to the peace and prosperity of the country.

How much of truth there is in the reason given we outsiders can hardly find out. Power is sweet and any reason advanced for taking it is as good as the other. If we are to go by the actions they tell another story. The process of nationalisation advocated by the extreme left wingers is proceeding at a furious pace, even the banks have been nationalized. This does not look like opposition to extreme leftism. The acceptance of an interest-free loan of 84 million dollars from China does not indicate hostility to leftism either.

The truth is that democracy has failed in Burma. What the public wants is good government. If Ne Win with the help of his revolutionary council can give the country some measure of peace a certain amount of prosperity will follow. Whether Ne Win succeeds in bringing about the single party system that he advocates or not what he looks like doing is governing in a dictatorial fashion. So long as they last, dictatorships are not necessarily bad but the trouble with them is that continuity is not assured.

So far as we Indians are concerned we can take it that whoever rules in Burma the Burmese administration is to be more favourable to China than to India. The reason is simple. The Burmans have more reason to be afraid of China than of India. Until India acquires strength and until India is led by men who exhibit a greater fixity of purpose and a firmer handling of her foreign relations India is not going to be respected. Without respect there can be no collaboration especially by small powers. Till

then Burma is a closed region and a state that is somewhat hostile to us.

If this state of things is to be changed then we have to give up certain of our fixed ideas. One of them is about the holiness of democracy. There is no last word in perfection in politics. If we find democracy useful let us practise it but let us not go about insisting that others swear by it. Short of taking over the administration of another country there is no other way of ensuring that such country shall have a form of government that is to our liking. The Americans are learning this simple truth from their various Asiatic and South American ventures after having made a mess of it in Central Europe, Because of their almost unlimited resources they can permit themselves the luxury of receiving political education like children, that is by committing follies and getting spanked for them. Our resources are extremely limited and we cannot afford to finance democratic experiments in other countries. We must adopt the policy of dealing only with those people that can deliver the goods in any country be they democrats or be they dictators. All that matters is that they should not be communists for we need a very very long spoon indeed to sup with them and such a one we do not possess.

Again the attitude of correctly standing aside can be overdone and a country that like India is sweet upon neutralism is prone to overdo it. The truth is that politics like nature abhors a vacuum whether it be a partial vacuum or an absolute one. Weak countries are the partial vaccums of politics. Surrounding nations simply walk in. If you do not get in, that does not mean that the weak country will be left in isolation. Some big neighbour will have absorbed it in its sphere of influence.

Burma has got into the Chinese sphere and if possible we have to take Burma out of it. We can do this only by preventing Burmah from falling into the clutches of the leftists. Every Burmese party and government has to be helped that can keep the country from sliding into Communism. Even if it is a Burmese dictator that attempts to keep his country away from Communism we have got to help him in very self interest. It is no use trying to be over nice about these things. We know that this smacks of interference in the internal affairs of another country but who does not do it because as we have said politics abhors a vacuum. If we do not take enough interest in the affairs of our neighbours somebody else does it and gets into power men and parties that are willing to influence the policies of their own country in favour of the country lending support. We see that China is doing it in country after country in South East Asia. Britain is taking counter measures. America is maintaining armies, a fleet and air armada in the areas likely to be infected by Communism. Can these measures be squared with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country? Why not recognize that the paramount consideration is guarding the interests of our own country? Why should we have moral compunctions in respect of the countries that have allowed Chinese infiltration in their politics? If a country allows the Chinese to influence its internal policies why should we not try to influence them in such a way that our interests would be furthered?

Burma, like many of our other neighbours, has an uncertain political future. Every thing is in a flux. The constitution has not yet crystalized the political parties have not built any traditions, and their principles have

not yet taken any firm shape. Under these circumstances our policies will necessarily have to be elastic. How can we help it? Our leaders are fond of the word dynamic. If policies are reactions to circumstances how can they be rigid while circumstances are changing?

The ties by which we can bind Burmah to us will primarily be economic ones and such ties will last longer than the good-will created in the present day politicians of Burma. Not only are the politicians not immortal but in democracies there is no knowing when they might be forced to climb down from power and in that case all the pains taken to cultivate good relations with political leaders are so many efforts wasted.

We must therefore work for economic collaboration and not for political subversion. The success obtained by political subversion is only a temporary one. If economic ties are created then they build a sort of a constant pressure and changes in the personnel of political bodies do not affect the ultimate directions given, for even politicians cannot for long disregard the economic interests of their own countries.

Building up a community of economic interest with a neighbour like Burma will in the long run prove more useful to India than trying to exploit politically the chaotic conditions in that country. If we can secure the cooperation of some political sections then the other sections will necessarily go against us; so bitter are the relations between the various political parties of Burmah.

In this respect the private sector can do more than cooperation at government level. If the private parties cannot achieve any particular objective then the prestige of the government is not involved and efforts can be made in other directions. What would be required

would be an encouragement at government level for the subjects of both governments to invest in each others businesses. A two-way flow of capital, goods and even of labour would contribute to the prosperity of both the countries and that would in the long run secure maximum co-operation in facing common danger.

A further merit of such a policy would be that it could not be dubbed interference in the internal affairs of another country.



VIII. India and Malayasia

A new nation has come into existence in South East Asia and we shall have to learn to live with it however distasteful the rise of such a nation might be to those of us who claim to be such staunch opponents of imperialism that they go out of their way to oppose powers that are really helpful to India. Because the British have played the midwife at the birth of this new nation some are bound to look upon the new nation as a stooge of imperialism and therefore as a nation whose rise is to be opposed tooth and nail.

The new nation that we speak of is Malayasia and in order to get some idea of what the new nation is going to be like we have to consider the background. That takes us to the question of Chinese expansion in South East Asia-Chinese expansionism is a great danger to the rest of Asia if of course we prefer to call the danger by that name and not by the name of Chinese Communism which name really speaking gives a clearer idea of the danger.

About ten to fifteen million Chinese have moved over into the South Asiatic countries. In Malaya there are about three million Chinese. In Singapore there are twelve hundred thousand Chinese, in Siam there are more than three million Chinese, in Indonesia there are twenty five millions, in South Vietnam there are a million of them. Laos has fifty thousand and Cambodia has five hundred thousand Chinese. In Burma there are three hundred and fifty thousand Chinese, North Borneo has about three hundred thousand Chinese and the Philli-

piners have two hundred thousand. In some countries the Chinese have been given the status of nationals and there they no longer count as Chinese. The number of the Chinese that are found in this part of Asia is therefore larger than the figure of ten to fifteen millions given above and not smaller.

With China over-population has always been chronic. In the seventeenth century the Chinese were prohibited to leave the country and the Chinese Government treated the people that left China as criminals and pirates but with the change in the dynasty the ban also went.

The Chinese went out first as labourers and as pedlars but as soon as they had accumulated sufficient capital they opened shops. Their strongest point was their willingness to sell goods on credit. They soon succeeded in establishing an economic hold on the populace. One Chinese invited another and in course of time the Chinese developed colonies in various parts of the country. That of course was peaceful expansion.

The Chinese have not shown themselves to be mixers. The Chinese in foreign countries have their own schools, their own newspapers and their own political societies and even their secret associations. They cannot share the hopes and aspirations of the people of the country they live in. What they earn they send to China. Even for dying they go to China and when that is not possible a handful of the earth they have brought from China is thrown in their graves; so strong is their tie with the motherland. In Siam and Indonesia some took to themselves Siamese and Indonesian wives but in such cases they have always insisted on bringing the children up as Chinese.

The Chinese have not supplied merely labour to the South East Asian countries. They have supplied capital for the development of these countries but it was not capital brought by them from China rather it was capital that they had managed to accumulate in the country of their choice. In other words they have acquired an economic hold over several of the small countries of South East Asia. This hold threatens in some cases to become a strangle hold.

From economic domination to political domination it is not a far cry and the first step towards obtaining it is that of claiming a special status for the Chinese. That the Chinese should not be called upon to obey the laws of the countries in which they resided, that disputes in which they were involved should be decided by Chinese courts were concessions that they wrung from some of the countries in which they had taken up their residence. Extra-territorial rights have long been recognized as indicia of imperialism and to this extent the Chinese have to be called imperialists.

The greatest handicap to the spread of Chinese influence in southern Asia was however the want of a strong central Government that could and would back their claims. If it had not been for that then the Chinese ere now had well established themselves in the countries bordering on India. But this difficulty does not exist any longer and the Chinese have now not one but two strong and determined governments ready to make the cause of the overseas Chinese their own. Their other ally is the principle of democratic government.

The overseas Chinese divide themselves now into two classes. Those that stand for Communism and those that do not stand for communism. Those that stand

for communism have the strong backing of Red China. Those that do not find it profitable to profess Communism are strongly supported by Chiang Kaishek's Government.

Whether the Chinese in foreign Asiatic countries are to proclaim themselves to be Communists or to avow themselves to be just plain Chinese is decided by considerations of interest. Their real political convictions, if they have any strong convictions, are difficult to get at and it is not going to make any great change in calculations for we may take it that the Chinese will not be ready to fight the Chinese for the benefit of foreigners. In Siam the Chinese call themselves nationalists, in Indonesia their interests are looked after by the embassy of Red China.

Their increasing influence, economic as well as political, is looked upon with great concern by the south Asiatic countries and the acceptance of democratic institutions makes them peculiarly susceptible to the danger of Chinese expansionism. In some countries their numbers are so large that granting them the right to vote and contest elections places the governments of those countries at the mercy of the powerful Chinese minorities. Where political dissensions split the majority vote there the Chinese minorities practically rule. This is apart from the political influence that their hold over the economy of the country gives them.

The countries of South Asia are really nervous about the Chinese who are spreading their tentacles everywhere. It is against this background that we have to discuss the efforts of the various peoples to combat the Chinese menace and our relations with our South Asiatic

neighbours will be largely determined by this common fear of Chinese expansionism.

We do not say that these considerations govern our relations with them at present but we the common people feel that our foreign policies should be shaped with relevance to our national interests and should not be moulded so as to secure a dogmatic adherence to a non-alignment which makes foreigners think that our leaders have hitched the Indian wagon to the red star.

Uptill now the Western Imperialists had stemmed the rising tide of Chinese expansionism but the Second World war has changed the face of Southern Asia almost completely. The Chinese have lent a helping hand in this process. Like true communists they affected nationalism and took part in the liberation struggles of several south Asian countries. They joined the various national movements and after the liberation of these countries from the yoke of western imperialism they consolidated their positions in the various countries by taking the lead in forming coalitions and in giving socialist slogans to the liberation movements.

The Dutch have left, the French have left, the Jpnansse are cleverly standing aside and watching the game, the British are preparing to give up their last strong-holds, the Americans almost regret the pressure they brought on the European powers to leave the region. The Russian and Chinese vultures are hovering in the sky ready to swoop down any moment they think favourable. Thus could Southern Asia be described in a short paragraph.

From this area the British want to withdraw. They have come to the conclusion that trying to maintain political supremacy in the old fashioned way with the

help of the army is no longer practicable. The British investments in oil, rubber, tin and wood concerns in this area are not negligible and they do not want to write them off which they would be forced to do if political power is captured by leftists masquerading as antimperialists. They would like to hand over power to people who would not been unfriendly to them. How to do that is their problem. In Singapore they have been fighting the guerilla bands of the communists for such long years that they do not now want the communists to come into power and expropriate them under pretext of nationalisation of concerns.

It would be wrong to suppose that the British want to stay on for the sake of political power. That sort of Imperilism they have shed in the post Second World War period. They are not prepared to irritate the local people any further by clinging to that power. What they want is a strong power in this region. They want a power whose weakness will not tempt the Communists to walk in.

There is also another reason why they are not prepared to withdraw from this region in favour of the Communists. The route to Australia and New Zealand still passes through this region and if the Communists were to be in power here then they could block the way for non-communist countries. The British are not going to throw the cards down. They have a few trumps still left. They want now to deal with the problem by political means.

They want to hand over power to a strong government that would not knuckle down under Communist pressure, and such a government they hope to set in power in a newly constituted nation. The nation that they want to set up is Malayasia.

The British had made Malaya independent already and they wanted Malaya to take the lead in forming Malayasia. They wanted Malaya and Singapore to unite but this the sagacious leader of Malaya refused to do. Singapore has a population of about seventeen hundred thousand. Seventy five percent of them are Chinese and if the British were to leave Singapore then a democratic constitution would have placed power in the hands of the Chinese. That was as good as saying that the Communists rule Singapore. Malaya although it had a monarchical form of government was burdened with a similar problem for the people had to be associated with the actual task of government and when that was done the weight of the Chinese numbers was bound to make itself felt. Of the total population of seven million and one hundred thousand the Malaysians form only fifty percent while the Chinese form forty percent.

If Malaya and Singapore alone were to combine then the new state would have had three million and eight hundred thousand Chinese on hand while the Malaysians themselves would have numbered only three million and six hundred thousand. In order to obtain a bare majority even the Malaysians would then have had to lean heavily on the million Indians and Pakistanis and others who go to make up the rest of the population. It might have meant handing over Malaya to the Chinese if the Chinese were able to secure the help of some non-Malaysian elements. A democratically governed united state of Malaya and Singapore would have turned out to be a state practically ruled over by the Chinese.

The way out of these difficulties had got to be a democratic way because authoritarian solutions to problems lay themselves open to the charge of being

branded as agents of imperialism. Whether such an imperialism is termed neoimperialism or whether it is taken to be just the old type of imperialism it hardly matters both are equally distasteful and equally out of joint with the times.

Including non-Chinese elements in the new state and especially elements that are definitely hostile to the Chinese is a way to counterbalance the influence that their numbers are bound to give to the Chinese in any democratic set up.

The leaders of Malaya suggested therefore that a state be formed which would include non-Chinese and anti-Chinese elements in sufficient proportion. The New State of Malayasia is therefore composed of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. The new state has a territory measuring about three hundred thousand square kilometers and a population of ten millions.

The Chinese will number four million and one hundred thousand no doubt. But the Malaysians with seven million and one hundred thousand people of their own and with the help of nine hundred thousand Indians and one million Dayaks (who are the traditional enemies of the Chinese) and other non-Chinese peoples, hope to control the Chinese element effectively even in a democratic set-up. There are other democratic tricks to which recourse is going to be had as well. To use the current phraseology although all men are equal some are going to be more equal than the others. Company promoters know how to make the voting value different for different kinds of shares. All men therefore will not be entitled to equal voting rights in the new state of Malayasia.

The constitution of the new state is partly of the federal type with certain subjects administered by the

centre and the rest by the component states. All the federating states do not have equal rights. Singapore is to have more of autonomy than the other states because it was in a better bargaining position. In other words Singapore could block the formation of the new state more effectively. Singapore has secured higher rights in the matter of education and labour legislation. Defence, law and order, currency, foreign exchange and foreign relations are going to be federal subjects and the rest state subjects.

Malaya and Singapore agreed to form part of the new State. North Borneo and Sarawak being under British influence signified their assent to this proposal and the Sultan of Brunei had expressed his willingness to federate long before. There were therefore no internal difficulties now which could make the new state of Malayasia a still-born child.

But there are external difficulties and they are not negligible. Indonesian leaders had declared that they would prevent the creation of this new state by force of arms if necessary. The hostility of Indonesia can only be understood properly if we attach due importance to two factors.

One reason for the opposition of Indonesia is a perfectly natural one. Rivals are not brooked. Malayasia will be a state of sizable dimensions and it could compete with Indonesia in influence in that part of Asia. That is an opposition that is inherent in the nature of things. Whoever rules in Malayasia and whichever party is in power in Indonesia they are going to look askance at each other.

That one does not like the rise of a strong power in the neighbourhood it is easy to understand but that does not

necessarily mean that one goes to war to prevent that and the Indonesian leaders declared their resolve to prevent the formation of the state of Malayasia by making war if necessary.

That they should threaten to do it requires a more convincing explanation than the mere general aversion that every country normally has for its powerful neighbour. Indonesia had more than its ordinary share of struggle in getting out of the clutches of Western Imperialism. The bitterness of the struggle against the Dutch enabled the Communists to get a firmer foothold in Indonesia than elsewhere. We Maharashtrians know what great adepts the Communists are in ingratiating themselves into public favour. They seize upon every popular cause and not only do they make it their own but they also try to lead the agitation in its favour. That was the way they obtained a foothold in Maharashtra and that was how they wormed their way into public favour in Indonesia. They made such good use of the opportunities presented by the antifascist struggles and by the struggles against imperialism that they have built up in Indonesia the second largest communist party in Asia the first being naturally the Communist party of China.

That is the real explanation to the bitter hostility between Indonesia and Malayasia. Malayasia to use the invective of the Communists would be a stooge of imperialism while Indonesia with its well knit and numerically strong party is bound to look after the interests of world communism. China is for the present the more militant partner amongst the Communist countries and there is a free masonry amongst the communists that the rest of the world has to beware of. It is that which

is responsible for the belligerent attitude adopted by Indonesia.

This does not mean that the Communists run the Government of Indonesia. But the rulers of Indonesia are men who cannot do without the support of the Communists in the country and they find that it pays to bark at the behests of the communists. Russia supplies aeroplanes, submarines and other wherewithals of war to such countries as are prepared to toe the Moscow line.

A foreign policy that caters to the needs of the communists is a *sine qua non* for help from Russia and China. Sukarno is killing two birds with one stone. By trying to prevent the rise of Indonesia he can assure his country of an uninterrupted supply of war materials and he can get the communists to strengthen his hands in internal politics. One suspects that Sukarno remains in power not by virtue of the good that he does to his country and the consequent good will of the populace but he stays in power by playing off one clique against the other. A man of such a type whatever the amount of bluff and bluster he might indulge in is in reality afraid of well organized parties and moulds his policies in such a manner as to get the support of large organizations.

That is the real reason in our opinion of Indonesia's opposition even to the concept of a Malayasia. This position is not going to change soon and it would be in our interests to side with Malayasia rather than with Indonesia.

Malayasia is not going to be an easy proposition. Apart from the trouble that semi-communist countries like Indonesia might make for her Malayasia will have such a heterogeneous population that it will lead a precarious existence for quite some time. Countries with

such constitutions afford great scope for foreigners and to that extent Indians will get more scope than in many other countries.

It will require great skill to regulate our relationship with a nation like Malayasia in such a way that our country benefits from the anti-Chinese sentiment that will determine the politics internal as well as external of country like Malayasia.

The form that the hostility of Indonesia has taken is that of economic confrontation. Confrontation is the word that Sukarno has used to describe the steps that he has taken as against Malayasia. He has mobilised his forces and he has kept them ready in Borneo. Malayasia has also mobilized its forces and kept them ready for contingencies. Britain too is not unready to rush in for supporting Malayasia in case the necessity arises. That has restrained Sukarno so far, and he has to content himself therefore with the economic confrontation of Malayasia.

Economic confrontation has up till now taken the form of confiscation of the properties of Malayasian nationals. It has also meant the severance of economic relations between the two states. Economic boycott is not a weapon having one edge only. It harms the user of the weapon as well, it brings economic hardship on the nationals of Indonesia too for sooner or later it leads to reprisals. Apart from the loss to the nationals of Indonesia of their properties in Malayasia which are bound to be taken over by the Malayasian Government the disruption caused to the economy of the country is bound to bring greater losses still. A country like Indonesia which has hardly come yet out of the economic chaos caused by the sudden cutting off of relations with

Holland is not likely to come out unscathed out of economic battles with a neighbour with whom it had close economic relations.

For Sukarno political triumphs have, one suspects, been always more important than the economic well-being of his own people. The way he dealt with Dutch interests in Indonesia is proof if any were needed. As it is his economic warfare with Malayasia is in the long run going to prove more harmful to him than to Malayasia for Malayasia is supported by the Western World which can certainly absorb the products of Malayasia and supply her needs. It is Indonesia that is likely to suffer more. The powers like Britain that are ready to stand by Malayasia in event an armed clash with Indonesia are not likely to let Malayasia down in economic battles. That is the only sense in which Sukarno's programme of "economic confrontation" of Malayasia can be understood. Whether Indonesia harms herself more by this confrontation or not India gets an opportunity of establishing closer economic contacts with both countries and on terms more favourable than before. Two nations cannot quarrel without benefitting third parties and the wide awake alone can make good use of such opportunities. Would the common man not be justified in expecting his government to be alive to opportunities especially those for developing better relations with neighbours?

Malayasia has agreed in principle to be a member of a confederation. This confederation is going to consist of Malayasia, Philippines and Indonesia. If this confederation comes into existence then it can hardly be expected to take the Communist line in foreign politics so long at least as Malayasia and the Philippines have a

say in the matter and so long as Indonesia does not succeed in dominating the confederation completely. Sukarno's motives in agreeing to join a confederation of which Malayasia is a member must be mixed. It would not be much of a mistake to call him the Nasser of South East Asia. If by getting the Phillippines to side with him he can outvote Malayasia in the councils of such a confederation he would certainly not let such an opportunity go.

But what seems to have weighed with him is the intervention of Japan. It is the good offices of the Japanese representatives that have drawn these three nations together. This is the first time since the end of second world war that the Japanese have shown an active interest in the politics of Asia. If Japan asserts herself and takes interest in the politics of this part of Asia then the whole complexion of Asiatic politics will change. After all Japan is a big power and if it begins to throw its weight then many of the smaller nations could topple over. After the second world war Japan has kept severely aloof from the politics of Asia. It cannot do so indefinitely. It cannot allow China to overrun Asia for Communism. Japan's place is on the side of America. When India was invaded by China last year Japan had about eight of her ministers in America and Kennedy asked for a declaration from Japan and got one to the effect that Japan would support the anti-Communist cause. This caused quite a furore in Japan at that time as people were afraid it meant the entry of Japan into a world war that seemed to be very imminent then. The Japanese Premier had to make a speech and assure the nation that Japan's entry into the war was not so near as the people feared. We

think that Japan will be a stabilizing factor in South East Asia and Japanese policies will if nothing at least not be pro-communist. Indonesia would like to get more economic aid from Japan and would not care to flout Japan's wishes but that we shall discuss later. For the present we can say that Japan's influence would be used in the cause of peace between Indonesia and Malayasia.



IX India and Indonesia.

We little realize how big Indonesia is. It is the sixth largest state in the world. It occupies as large a surface of the earth as the North Atlantic. Its area excluding West Irian is 583479 sq. miles. Its population is today a little larger than that of Japan and in a few years time it is expected to reach the impressive total of about one hundred and forty millions. It is composed of more than three thousand islands and what is more important for us it has the second largest communist party in Asia; but to that we shall come later.

It has about seventy million Mahomedans, about three million Christians, one million and seven hundred thousand Hindus and two million and three hundred thousand Buddhists most of them being Chinese. The country has twenty five major languages and about two hundred and fifty dialects. The official language is Bahasa Indonesia an adaptation of the Malayan language but this official language is still in the making.

Indonesia includes today the islands of Java, Bali, Sumatra, Zombok Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, Borneo, Kalimetan (in part) Celebes, Halmahera, Molucca and thousands of other islands. Now it has added West Irian (which is Dutch New Guinea) to its possessions. Of all these however the island of Java is the most important one since two thirds of the population of Indonesia is concentrated on this island which has an area of only eight percent of the total area of this country.

Indonesia can in a way be called a "lost possession" so far as India is concerned. But it was lost hundreds

of years ago. The association of India with this country started about two thousand years ago. For over seven hundred years Hindus came in waves into this country and settled down in various parts of the country. They founded kingdoms and two dynasties the Shri Vijaya and the Shailendra dynasty which ruled for several centuries. The greatest Hindu influence is found in Java, Sumatra, Bali and the Moluccas although traces are found in Borneo and the Celebes. Even now Hindus continue to live on the island of Bali.

The Hindu influence suffered a set-back in this region with the advent of the Mahomedans. The Arabs who came first as traders became in course of time the rulers of the country and they were already towards the end of the thirteenth century as Marcopolo found, firmly entrenched in northern Sumatra. They spread gradually to the rest of what we know as Indonesia today. The Hindus had degenerated to an almost unimaginable extent. There is no other explanation to the feats of a handful of Arabs so far away from their mother country.

The Europeans came in first early in the sixteenth century. The first to come were the Portuguese. The Spanish came close upon their heels. Both however being catholic countries the Pope in order to prevent quarrels which could only benefit the non-catholic world drew a line on the globe east of which the Portuguese were not permitted to go and to the West of which the Spanish were not allowed to come in.

The Spanish walked out but the Portuguese could not consolidate their power in this region. Moluccas was all they could hold to, barring a few more islands. The British and the Dutch came in next. The more serious opponents were the Dutch. They founded a Dutch East India

company and out of their clashes with the Portugese they emerged triumphant almost invariably.

The Dutch obtained a foot-hold in the island of Java and changed the name Jakarta to Batavia and made it their capital. The only European power with which they had to fight for supremacy was England and fight they did with varying success. After 1674 the British retired from the field and concentrated their attention on India. The Dutch did not rule wisely and were not very firm in the saddle. The Napoleonic wars brought the British into occupation again but they relinquished their territorial gains in 1816 by the Treaty of Vienna and the Dutch assumed authority again.

The Dutch ruled over Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Molucca, Bornco, and new Guinea (now known as West Irian), Sunda islands. Dutch rule however was different from what we with our association with the British understand by colonial rule. It may be that the British wanted clerks conversant with the English language but there is no denying the fact that they did impart us an education that enabled us to judge their civilization and culture for what it was worth and accept what we liked of it. The Dutch did not care to create a class of educated people that could take over from them with the result that when finally they had to leave, the country was without administrators, without technicians and without any educated class that could with a little effort fill in the vacuum left at their departure. The country only had politicians and politicians are like naughty children left to guard a house. They can hurt each other, they can break down things, they can make a nice mess of every thing but one thing they cannot do and that is run a household with some pretence at efficiency. And that is

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what has happened to Indonesia. The substratum that makes for efficiency in administration is entirely lacking in Indonesia. They are trying to create this class in Indonesia but you cannot whistle a class into existence. Everything worth having, takes time to build up and whether so much time will be granted to them is a question that is difficult to answer. We are afraid events will overtake them and Indonesia may again lapse into chaos. But we must not anticipate.

In one respect the Dutch were materially different from the British colonial administrators. The British did not intermarry on any scale worth mentioning, with the ruled people. But the Dutch did not observe that taboo. They married freely with the Indonesians and it would surprise many of us to note that the Dutch aristocracy and even persons connected with the Dutch Royal family carry Indonesian blood in their veins. The children of such marriages have not received the treatment meted out to social inferiors. Contrary to expectations this has not smoothed the relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians. Only one factor that normally makes for ill feeling is not present, but that is all.

Want of education has retarded the growth of political consciousness in Indonesia. In 1911 the movement styled "Sharikat Islam" started. It started as a religious movement but it soon turned into an anti-Dutch political movement and received the support of the Dutch Socialists.

The Dutch were forced to introduce democratic institutions and this brought into existence political parties. Fracti National was a party that stood for the use of constitutional means. The Social Democrats also founded a party for themselves in Indonesia in the year 1914. In

1919 the third Communist International started its activities in Moscow and things began to move in other countries also. Partai Communis Indonesia was founded in 1920. This was the beginning of the Communist movement in Indonesia and within four years it gathered so much strength that it could undertake sabotage. The Independence movement led to large scale disturbances in 1926 and those figures that are prominent in politics now entered that field about this time. The national party of Indonesia was formed in 1927. Dr. Sukarno, the present strong man of Indonesia, came to be thrown into a prison from which he was liberated by the Japanese in 1942. The national party was banned in 1930 and it split into factions. One of them was led by Dr. Mahommad Hata who though a great force in Indonesian politics is for the present biding his time. He was also imprisoned and was set free first in 1942 by the Japanese. This period was the period of agitation and of incarceration. It is very doubtful whether if the Second World War had not intervened the Indonesians could without external aid have succeeded in driving out the Dutch.

The Second World War brought a radical change. When communications with Europe became impossible there was chaos in the country, Those that stood for the independence of the country were made use of by the Japanese. But the Japanese only exploited them. The Japanese wanted to establish an imperialism of their own. They wanted tools and neither equals nor masters.

Sukarno and Hata founded an association by name Putera Tenaga Rajkat but the Japanese only used it for recruiting labour. Another association by name Pabellu Tana Air founded for the defence of the country was used for imparting compulsory military training

As the war drew to an end the patriots were in a hurry to proclaim the independence of the country. An army for the liberation of the country was also mobilized. The Japanese went, but the British came in and they posed a new problem. How to get them out was not so much of a problem as to make them go without bringing anybody in. The Dutch began to come in and establish themselves in their old places. The leaders of the independence movement tried to forestall them by proclaiming the independence of the country with Sukarno as President and Dr. Hata as the Vice President.

Hereupon followed a period of hectic negotiations. The Dutch were not unwilling to grant self-rule to the Indonesians who however started quarreling amongst themselves as to the form of the government. The different islands were clamouring for a federal form as that would give them a large measure of autonomy. Some patriots wanted a unitary form as in their opinion it would be a stronger form than the federal one.

In 1947 the Dutch started taking forcible possession. This the patriots resented and their guerrilla bands began roaming the country and doing battle with the Dutch settlers. The unsettled conditions offered an ideal opportunity to the Communists to make a bold bid for the capture of power but the liberation army crushed the communists mercilessly.

The Dutch then made a unique offer. The offer knocked the bottom out of the charge of imperialism. The Dutch offered in effect to have a joint government for Holland and Indonesia. They offered to form a joint ministry. Indonesian Ministers being given the control over the affairs of Holland was certainly something unique but the offer to have a commonwealth comprising both the

countries was not acceptable to the Indonesian leaders. Presumably they did not want to share power with anybody. What the Indonesian leaders wanted was sequestration of Dutch property in Indonesia without paying compensation of any sort and they wanted absolute control over affairs Indonesian which they would not have obtained if they had accepted the proposal for the setting up of joint ministries. Just as they would have obtained control over Dutch affairs the Dutch Ministers would have exercised control over the affairs of Indonesia. The Dutch offer was not accepted and on the 15th of August 1950 a unitary state of Indonesia came to be established.

Proclaiming a unitary state is one thing and unifying the country is another thing. All sorts of separatist tendencies began to manifest themselves. Differences on the basis of religion and on the basis of regional royalties all came to a head and every island demanded a measure of autonomy that could hardly be reconciled with the unitary character of the state. Indonesia had an army that could crush local revolts and that is why we see Indonesia now as a single country otherwise it would have been split up into a number of small independent countries.

There are at present three forces that shape the destinies of that country. The army is at one end. At the other end are the Communists and in the middle stands Sukarno. That is how the Indonesians describe the government of their own country. 'There is no democracy in Indonesia in the sense in which we understand the word. Sukarno fashions and refashions the constitution just as he likes. He calls the government of the country a guided democracy. What he does in reality is

that he holds the balance between the army and the forces of communism and plays one off against the other. '

In foreign policies therefore he is on the side of the communists. He finds it profitable to do so. He gets arms, ammunition and aeroplanes etc. from Russia. Out of the two communist countries Russia is the more distant one and the less fitted to assert herself in South East Asia. That means that the independence or whatever is left of it of Indonesia is more likely to be respected by Russia than by China. This move is certainly a shrewd one. If this aid is used to strengthen his own country then it would not be a wrong one. However it would not do to forget that he who sups with the devil needs a long spoon indeed. Whether Sukarno has such a long spoon or not events will show. In general we can say that progress achieved with the aid of Russia, even though it might be more rapid than the one achieved with the aid of non-communist countries, has its dangers.

All co-operation with communist countries necessarily brings in its wake for every country a lenient policy towards its own communists. When the Communists are given a large measure of liberty then they undermine the loyalties of the people to their own countries. Their aim is always that of bringing about a revolution in the country to which they belong. If communist aid is obtained at the risk of having a communist-fostered revolution on hand then a cautious man who is prepared to take a look ahead would not care to take such a risk. But the trouble with countries on which fate has forced independence without duly preparing them for it, is that power has gone into the hands of people whose philosophy of life is 'after me the deluge'. These new leaders do not care what happens to their country

after their death. They do not take into account the fact that their successors might not inherit their skill in playing with fire. A Nassar may put all communists in his own country under lock and key but there are a number of strong men in other countries, whose weak point is communism. They cannot be firm as against the communists. It is such people who are going to be instrumental in the spreading of communism in their own countries. Perhaps they may not wish it to happen and yet their lust for power has made them take their countries on dangerous paths. As we have said before they may possess the skill of sleep walkers but their successors will, in all probability, not have that skill.

Our relations with Indonesia will require careful handling. We must reckon with the possibility of Indonesia relapsing into chaotic conditions after the disappearance of the present leaders. Out of that chaos might emerge a dictatorship of the proletariat. That would mean adding one more to the list of our inveterate enemies.

If we want to prevent such a catastrophe then we must be prepared to support the saner elements in Indonesian politics. We must establish contacts with them and we must devise ways and means of containing communism. We might have to spend hundreds of thousands of rupees for establishing contacts and for maintaining them. The communists complain that the Americans are working against them in all the parts of the world. We cannot hope to imitate the Americans in this respect but if we want to remain independent we shall have to take the lead in starting a movement to contain communism in our part of the world. For America it may be altruistic work. We do not believe it. But for us Indians it is a

matter of life and death. It is from the point of view primarily of containing communism that the foreign relations of India with her neighbouring countries will have to be regulated.

It is not as if there are no level headed persons in Indonesia. There are many such persons and at one time or the other they have taken some part in Indonesian politics. If the Bandung Conference and the activities connected with it have been put to good use then these persons ought not to be unknown to our politicians. These people must be watched by our government, for some of them are likely to come into power after the departure of Sukarno from the scene. Sukarno's position is like that of a juggler who manages to keep several balls in the air at one and the same time. If there is a slackening of attention if as a result of advancing age, he loses his grip over the situation then either the army or the Communist Party might throw him over and in that case a struggle for power will begin between the army and the Communists. If the army wins then there is likely to be a liquidation of the Communist Party but a civil war might be necessary for that, because the Communists are not likely to give up without a bitter struggle and unless the western powers are prepared to hold the ring China will intervene and make success easy for the Communist of Indonesia.

If on the other hand the Communists succeed and the Indonesian army on account of factions or groups is not able to climb into power then the western powers will step in. The Western Powers cannot afford to let Indonesia go red. They will have to step in. The form that their intervention will take will be that of supporting what in communist jargon are called the rightists. All that

India will have to do will in that case to be wait, watch and sympathise with those that stand up against Communism. If India wants to play a more positive role then India can actively stand by the anti-communists. That will be a more expensive role to play and though the expenses might in the end be justified in view of the magnitude of the danger to be averted yet our country may not be in a position to raise the necessary monies.

What we need therefore is the collaboration of similarly minded nations. As we have said before the smaller Asiatic nations either do not realize the danger that spreading Chinese Communism poses for them or they are helpless and fear paralyzes them into an inaction that is not unlike that of rodents and small birds that allow themselves to be swallowed up by snakes. But there is an Asiatic country that is neither small nor fear-struck. Japan is a power that wants to contain communism in South East Asia. Japan as we have said earlier has started taking interest in Asiatic politics. As the nearest big power it is cast for the role of the protector of the small nations in South East Asia. And Japan does take an interest in affairs Indonesian. Sukarno often visits Tokyo and Japan's advice and mediation are responsible for Indonesia's agreeing in principle to the formation of a confederation of Malayasia, Indonesia and the Phillippines.

We can at least offer our moral support to the formation of such a confederation. Even that would be something. We can and should observe neutrality in the present dispute between Malayasia and Indonesia because it is in our interests to secure the friendship of both but if Indonesia were to make that impossible then our place is in the anti-communist group.



X India and Ceylon

Ceylon has of late become an object of an interest that is out of proportion to her size and importance. That is due partly to the fact that Ceylon has a woman as the Prime Minister and partly to the fact that Ceylon has assumed the role of a mediator between India and China. But these are factors of temporary interest only.

Ceylon is an island having an area of about twentyfive thousand square miles and a population of about eighty lakhs. The influence that Ceylon can exercise over Asiatic affairs is therefore much smaller than the influence that a country like India can exercise. But Ceylon has a strategic importance. It can control ocean traffic from the East to the West and also from the North to the south. It straddles the water-ways and in the hands of a hostile power it could harm the western powers and also India. The importance of Ceylon therefore arises more from her strategic position than from size or strength. That also accounts for the indulgence shown to her politicians by powers that could crush that country in no time.

Our interest in that country stems partly from the fact that it could be regarded as an extension of India in the southerly direction, partly from the fact that a large number of Indians live there and also from the fact that if the Chinese were to get bases in that country that could constitute a very serious menace to us.

China could rake up history and claim that for quite a number of years Ceylon was a vassal of China. That happened more than five hundred years ago and yet it would not deter the Chinese from setting up a claim to

that country if they felt they possessed the naval strength today to support such a claim however preposterous it may sound to us now. And who knows those that have glimpses of world history might be inclined to recognize such claims. The recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet cannot lightly be forgotten by us.

India's associations with Ceylon date back more than two thousand years not to mention the mythological period of the Ramayana. The Aryans from India in their march southwards conquered the original inhabitants of Ceylon and gave them kings and also their language. It is little realized that the Sinhalese language unlike the languages of southern India is a language from the Sanskrit group of languages. It can be said with some measure of truth that the Ceylonese internal struggle between the Sinhalese and the Tamilians is in a way a struggle between Dravidians and the descendants of the Aryans of old. But to that aspect we can turn later.

The population of Ceylon is a mixed one and that gives rise to quite a number of stresses and strains. Out of a total of eight millions about $5\frac{1}{2}$ million are Sinhalese and about two millions Tamil in extraction. Out of these two millions nine hundred thousand are permanent residents of Ceylon and the rest are persons whom the majority of the Ceylonese would like to call Indians. They are persons who are likely to be treated as a foot-ball between India and Ceylon. Of the five and a half millions of Sinhalese about 3.4 millions of Sinhalese are called the lowland Sinhalese and the rest regard themselves as Sinhalese from the high lands. There is not much good will between the high and the low Sinhalese. The high Sinhalese look down upon those from the lowlands whom they call the upstarts and

the new rich, that is as people who have no backbone and who are prepared to ally themselves with any one, be he a native or be he a foreigner for the sake of money and power. The Sinhalese from the highlands are the aristocrats and they claim to be guided by principles alone. There are about four hundred and fifty thousand people in whose veins Moorish blood flows. These people and the twenty eight thousand Malayans who have found a home in that country are Mahomedans by religion. The Buddhists form the majority measuring more than five millions. The Hindus come next being one million and six hundred thousand. The Christians are about seven hundred thousand in number.

The ill feeling between the Tamils and the Sinhalese arises out of a variety of causes some historical, some political, some economic. For the time being the economic ones prevail. India's relations with Ceylon tend to be affected by the disputes between the Sinhalese and the Tamils and therefore it would be desirable to go into the origin of these disputes.

The Tamils were brought to Ceylon in comparatively large numbers by the British during their rule. The Tamils naturally tended to side with the British and that was one of the things that antagonized the Sinhalese. The Tamils at least in the beginning took more to the study of English than the Sinhalese. The rulers of Ceylon favoured the persons knowing their own language more than those that were reluctant to learn English. It was quite natural for them to do so. But the result was that although the Tamils represented a bare twenty two percent of the population yet in Government services, in business and in trade the Tamilians supplied about seventy percent of the personnel. This

disparity between numbers and importance in the various walks of life is enough to make the populace hate the class that appears to be the favoured class. The prosperous and the industrious are always envied by those on whom fortune does not smile.

The Tamils in their turn do not make it easy for the Sinhalese who are insisting upon the use of the Sinhalese language for all official purposes. They demand that the constitution of Ceylon be amended in such manner that the Tamil speaking people get a sort of Tamilstan enjoying a very large degree of autonomy and connected with the Sinhalese by a loose federal tie. We can say that it is a war to the knife between the Tamilians and the Sinhalese in Ceylon. For the present the Sinhalese have the upperhand and they are using the brute majority that they possess to very good purpose. So long as Ceylon has a democratic constitution and so long as the political and other quarrels that divide the parties in Ceylon do not assume serious proportions this state of things is not going to be changed.

That brings us to the question of the complexion of politics in Ceylon. Unlike India, Ceylon did not have to struggle for independence and the political parties in Ceylon did not have to pass the acid test of a revolutionary struggle. Political institutions in Ceylon are of comparatively recent origin and have not had much time to grow roots and become firmly embedded in the social structure of the country.

Ceylon under British domination had the first elections in 1909 and they were fought on a caste basis and not for political principles. The Ceylon National Congress was founded in 1919 by the Tamil people and by the Sinhalese from the lowlands. In 1921 the Tamils got out

of this Congress because the Sinhalese would not consent to the Tamils having a separate electorate of their own.

In 1920 the Ceylonese got a legislature but it was a mixed affair having a large proportion of non-elected members. It was only in 1931 that the Ceylonese got adult franchise. The Ceylonese have taken long to learn the technique of democracy.

The British promised self-rule to the Ceylonese during the Second World War even as they did to India and they kept that promise in 1947. In 1948 Ceylon became one of the Dominions in the Commonwealth and British interference in the internal affairs of the country ceased.

When the British left, the country's political power came first into the hands of the wealthy and of the educated. In 1948 the United National Party was founded. The founders of this party were admirers of the Western nations and it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the affairs of this party were managed by the two families Senanayake and Kotelwala. From 1947 to 1953 the Premiership was in the Senanayake family with the son succeeding the father. In 1953 Sir John Kotelwala became the premier and power still remained with the United National Party. This party managed to retain power till 1956 when it was defeated by a coalition, by a sort of United Front under the leadership of Bandernayake and since then Bandernayake's party has wielded power. The United Front that defeated the United National Party in the elections bore the name Mahajan Eksath Peramuna.

The largest political party in this Front was Bandernayake's party the S. L. F. P. these being the initials. The full name is Shri Lanka Freedom Party. The next in order of importance is the Marxist Lankasamaj Party.

This is the party of the Trotskyite Socialists. The third political party is that of the Sinhalee Bhasha Peramuna and the fourth party is the Swadheen Paksha (the independents).

The United National Party which was defeated in the elections by the Mahajan Eksath Peramuna was decidedly Pro-West and Pro-English. The parties that united against this party were bound together by various ties prominent amongst which was a common hatred of the West. The United National Party stood for English as against Sinhalese or Tamil and therefore the linguistically fanatic elements combined against it. The United National Party being formed of those steeped in western culture could not be very enthusiastic about Buddhism (which was the religion of the majority) and so the fanatic Buddhist joined the coalition against it. In foreign politics the United National Party stood for close association with the Western powers and naturally all the Communists whether they called themselves Stalinists, Trotskyites or merely Marxists banded together against the United Nationalist Party.

Bandernayake was a true leftist demagogue and therefore did not have the least hesitation in promising all things to all extremists. He promised to abolish English, he promised to nationalize all concerns, he promised socialism, he promised to make Sinhalese the only official language of Ceylon, he agitated for the taking back of bases from the British, he promised to make Ceylon a truly neutral country, he promised to revive Buddhism and it may be that his inability or unwillingness to implement some of these promises resulted in his murder at the hands of disillusioned Buddhist monk.

The brief span of power granted to Bandarnayake

enabled him however to give a leftist twist to the policies of Ceylon. Ceylon is definitely an anti-west power now. Again the legislative measures that he took for making Sinhalese the official language has involved his party in a bitter struggle with the Tamil element. Perhaps it is the bitterness of this struggle against the Tamils that helps Bandarnayake's widow to keep together the heterogeneous elements that go to make up the coalition government.

The coalition headed by Mrs. Bandarnayake now is continuing the policies of her husband and that means in foreign politics a non-alignment which for all intents and purposes is an alignment with Communism. The effective representative of Communism in South Asia is China and so we can take it that under its present leaders Ceylon is more likely to side with China than with India. This can have very unpleasant consequences for us. Ceylon can develop into a Cuba of the Indian ocean.

That is the greatest danger for us. There were rumours that the Ceylonese contemplated giving the Chinese a base in the harbour of Trincomalee. The rumour was denied but we can never be quite sure that something like that will not happen. Ambitious persons in order to retain power are prepared to call in anybody for help. If such ambitious persons profess communism then it is more easy for them to call in foreigners. Communists have no national sentiments and they are sure to call in nations like China and Russia to help them to retain power. Castro's example is not going to be an isolated one.

The growth of leftism in Ceylon must be watched with great anxiety by India. We cannot be indifferent to the political complexion of Ceylon. Geography and strategic

considerations do not allow us the luxury of indifference to what goes on in Ceylon. Our safety demands vigilance and we have to be lynx-eyed. Already the Communists are strong in southern India and if they make common cause with the leftists in Ceylon the security of the peninsula would be threatened.

The Tamil element in Ceylon and the enlightened section of the Sinhalese especially that one that views the veer towards the left with great apprehension could be very useful to us. We do not want to interfere unduly in Ceylonese politics but we cannot afford to sit idle and watch power slip into the hands of the unscrupulous Marxists in Ceylon.

There is no doubt that this would not be consistent with Panchasheela but are we going to impose upon ourselves restrictions by which no power considers itself bound. The common man has no use for principles that do not help to serve the cause of the nation and we mean the cause of the nation from a long term point of view. Mere opportunism is shortsightedness in politics and we do not want that either.

We have to take the long term view and that dictates our taking an interest in Ceylon which could be called an interest inconsistent with the perfect independence of Ceylon. We cannot suffer Ceylon to be used as a base by a power that is hostile to India neither can we allow it to be absorbed in the sphere of influence of a country with an aggressive ideology. Ceylon is geographically too much a part of India for us to be so indifferent as to the power that has the sway in Ceylon. Having a government in Ceylon that is friendly to us is imperative for our defence purposes.

The only portion of India that could with difficulty be invaded by a land power is the peninsula. The base for India's defence will have to be therefore the southern part of India. The Northern part and central India are exposed to attack by the countries with large armies. If southern India is to be the principal base then we cannot afford to allow Ceylon to be converted into a base for operations by the communist powers. That would completely knock the bottom out of our defences.

To-day a coalition government headed by the leftists is in power in Ceylon. Under cover of working against imperialism the communist are working their way into power in Ceylon. The leftists of Ceylon are avowedly Trotskyists which amounts to saying that they are more receptive to Chinese advances than to Russian ones. If Ceylon's leaders take Ceylon into the Chinese Camp and if the Chinese obtain bases in Ceylon then many cities in southern India would come within easy bombing distance. An invasion of southern India by forces using Ceylon as the base could become serious for us and even though repulsed might cause the loss of life of hundreds of our soldiers. Those rulers of India that allow such a contingency to arise will have the blood of so many of our soldiers on their hands.

We simply cannot allow Ceylon to be non-aligned in the sense in which that word is understood by thinking people namely as being equivalent to aligned with communism. If we are to prevent that then we must help the anti-communist parties to assert themselves in Ceylon. The strength of the anti-communist parties in Ceylon is not a negligible quantity yet. We could bring a compromise between these elements and the Tamils or we can by championing the cause of the Tamils in

Ceylon exercise a pressure on the parties working for power in Ceylon. This pressure could be used for preventing Ceylon from drifting into the Chinese camp.

Again the potentialities of India as a buyer and supplier could be exploited in the interests of integrating the economies of the two countries. Our leaders talk of planned economy but they cannot use the economic weapon in furthering the political interests of the nation. This weapon is not one to be despised and in skilled hands it could work wonders in the non-violent way.

If India chooses to take the initiative in this direction then India would get the support of America, Britain and Australia and possibly of Japan not to speak of South East Asian countries. For that however we shall have to come down from the pedestal of neutralism. That is a step which the present ruling party in India is not under its obstinate leadership likely to take. Detailed discussion about the steps to be taken would be uninteresting in the present circumstances.



XI. General Remarks.

Our relations with our neighbours should be determined by considerations of our interests. It almost sounds sinful to say that in days when every politician of every third rate country talks in terms of world peace, of world interests, of the interests of humanity and so on.

We confess we are a sinful lot. Our vision is narrow. We cannot look much beyond our frontiers. Not only are we not ashamed of the narrowness of our vision but we are positive that the others are no better. Whatever the language that the leaders of various countries talk, the policies of nations still continue to be based upon that which is calculated to serve national interests. At least that is the primary aim of the various nations—big and small.

The interests of the big nations are spread far and wide and therefore while serving their own interests they can lay claim to serving the interests of large regions and of large sections of humanity. If the United States back the UNO in undertaking the unification of Congo we cannot call that action an entirely selfless one. An independent Katanga served British, French and Belgian interests more than a Katanga which forms only a province of Congo. A Union Minierie that does not through Tshombe run the government of Katanga is more susceptible to American influence than one in an independent Katanga. To put it in slang all nations talk big and act small. Even in those cases where they seem to act selflessly they are serving their own interests and because they are looking to their long term interests they

are acting in a way apparently contradictory to their short term interests and therefore they appear to act selflessly. In politics there is no such thing as selflessness. A politician while handling the affairs of his own country cannot be charitable or generous at the expense of the public tax payer. A conscientious politician (the phenomenon is not so rare as one would imagine) is a trustee for the interests of his country and a trustee cannot be untrue to his trust in order to gain a reputation for generosity.

That is the nature of politics all over the world and according to the accepted standards there is nothing wrong in guarding the interests of one's own country and in doing nothing else. The common man therefore expects his government to do that and nothing else. What language the politician talks is another matter. That would be governed by the dictates of political fashion. Pretending to make the world safe for democracy was the vogue once, guarding the interests of humanity as a whole may be the current fashion. What the common man expects the politician to do is to look after the interests of his own country and the achievements of a politician are judged by this standard. Philosophy may be all right to talk about but reason is a safer guide and the common man expects men in authority to exercise reason. He knows that circumstances cannot be changed by any magic wand. He also knows that hard work and perseverance alone work miracles. He does not expect miracles but some things he expects in those that guide the destinies of his country and that is that they have clear heads and that they are steadfast of purpose. Wangling and dithering disgust him though perhaps he might take some time to find out that his leaders are at their wits end and in a blue funk.

A Tezpur and Bomdila and Sela illuminate the common man's political horizon like a flash of lightening and the glimpse that he gets of the realities in such moments frightens him to such an extent that a thousand volumes of glimpses of world history cannot reassure him. The common man is powerless to bring about any political change but in the long run his disenchantment is going to count.

The whole of our part of Asia is in a flux. Nobody can prophecy with any degree of certainty that the nations that we have named so far as our neighbours will exist for any very long time. What form disintegration will take, what amalgamations will take place, what shape the new nations will take is all very uncertain. Most of the states we have discussed are new formations. The people in these states have not had time, to develop national consciousness which is the sine qua non of a nation's existence.

Unless the wish to constitute a nation is present, unless the desire to continue to form a separate state is present there can be no separate entity. Nationalism has yet to arrive in Asia. In Europe internationalism has arrived as is evinced by the formation of the European Economic Community. There they have gone one step further while we in Asia have not yet taken to nationalism with the determination to make a success out of it.

It may be that caught between the millstones of Communism and Democracy we in Asia may be ground into pulp. The shape of the things to come is indefinite and great circumspection and a great elasticity of approach will be required if we are to weather the political storms that are bound to burst upon us with an elemental fury. The present lull is very deceptive.

We can deal with Britain as a unit, we can transact business with West Germany as a unit, we can look to America for protection as a unit but we cannot deal with Burma, Indonesia and Malayasia as units. Even Ceylon is divided. In all these countries if some elements are for us, some are bound to go against us.

Normally it is not considered good form for a foreign government to get itself mixed up in the internal politics of a foreign country. It is positively derogatory to the independent status of that country. This is the theory but in practice where high stakes are involved every country does it. China has created one party in India favourably inclined to it. Russia has done the same. America may not have done it so blatantly but America would not feel it so awkward or out of the way if a political party in India were to stand for closer cooperation with her in the field of international politics.

Laying aside the sacred Mumbo Jumbo of Panchasheel we also have to play the same game in the countries that surround us. We need not stand upon ceremony in these matters. If Britain was served by a Colonel Lawrence in Arabia we need a number of such persons in our neighbouring countries for the situation is very delicate and the opening weeks of the Third World War will see us engaged in a very bitter and very difficult struggle for bare survival. When the western powers are engaged in the global conflict we shall certainly not be neglected by them but they cannot devote undivided attention to us and we shall need all the help we can get from powers—big and small. The gravity of the danger will make us grateful for even tiny bits of help.

Aid from neighbouring countries will have to be worked for. Today this might sound fantastic because

China has succeeded in making separate treaties with them. Today even small countries might spurn our offers of alliance because we have proved that we are unable even to defend our own borders. But this situation is not going to last for ever. As we increase in strength alliance with India will be coveted by our neighbouring countries. We have to work silently for that period. We need not worry now if our diplomats receive rebuffs in the beginning. It is not mere skill in diplomacy that achieves success for diplomats. It is the strength of the nation they represent that lends weight to their words.

But before we can take a hand in shaping our relations with our neighbours in a way that is advantageous to us we must create the machinery which will enable us to work in India and in foreign countries. In this respect we are a very backward country. Britain has a permanent staff that collects information from foreign countries, collects it and supplies the foreign office with data on the basis of which the heads of the departments can make suggestions for moulding policies. We do not know whether India has any such machinery but judging by results it would appear as if we have no such machinery, or if we have any it does not function properly.

Do we have people that know the languages of our neighbours? And if we have such people in government employ do they know what information regarding our neighbours is to be collected? Granting that there are such persons have they been trained to act as observers? Is the study of the languages of neighbouring countries encouraged by our government or is information vital to government purposes to be gathered through interpreters? What is the nature of the cultural and other missions we send abroad? Do those that go out

of the country keep their eyes open and see things for themselves? Do they publish their impressions. What harm is there if they publish material that is not secret? Would such publications not increase the interest that our men feel for our neighbours? Is an increase in the general knowledge possessed by our people about the ways, manners and problems of our neighbours going to be harmful? What does government do to promote better understanding?

Unless there is an increasing interest in the things that are going on around us the material which will help us to mould our policies will not be there. Till such time comes our foreign policies will be very much subjective. What we want is objectivity. Our foreign policy is made for us by one individual and is necessarily any thing but objective. As equity in England varied with the Chancellor's foot similarly our foreign policy will vary with each Prime Minister. That is not at all a desirable state of things. A foreign policy in advanced countries is based upon national needs and therefore does not vary easily. The modifications made by the politicians who are essentially birds of passage are minor ones and do not effect any change in the general trend. We have to build up such traditions and under a temperamental chief we do not think it would be easy to build any traditions. However some one will have to start doing it.

As we have said before our nationhood like everything else we have is a recent acquisition. All talks about India having been big and having been unified once is though strictly speaking not nonsense is yet equally useless. Memories of what was or what happened hundreds of years ago do not help in the present because these memories are treasured in books and are a reality only

to book worms. Politics is concerned only with that of which the masses are conscious or with that of which the masses can without an undue expenditure of time and energy be made conscious.

If the masses have no consciousness about the bigness or unity of the country then the fact of the country having once, in the hoary past, been big does not act as a motive or even as an incentive to the people. It cannot influence their actions and therefore though historically speaking India's prowess and unity might have been a fact yet politically speaking it is not a fact. Except under British Rule India has for the last several hundred years not been unified. An alien rule can only give us common hatred of the rulers as a unifying factor. In fact discontent with foreign rule has been the basis on which our political parties having a country wide appeal were built up. Attainment of independence has knocked out that basis from our political life and that has made the political parties spineless institutions. Though they might profess many principles yet there are no particular principles, by which they stand. Opportunism cannot become a principle. There are no traditions adherence to which would enable them to weather the political storms which arise from time to time. Foreign observers might be deluded by tall talk about democracy, about high moral principles and so forth but we know that the reality is quite different. To tell the truth India's fate is not likely to be much different from that of her neighbours. Chaos—political, economic and social is—not so far off as we want it to be. Government is in the hands of selfseekers who can hardly see beyond their noses, let alone plan for the future. Under these circumstances all talk of what should be done is talk in the air

and of no more importance than an academic discussion. It is only in this light that what follows should be taken by the readers. It is an intellectual exercise and nothing more.

In order to have a foreign policy there must first be an understanding of the conditions. A policy that takes no account of the circumstances has no meaning. Broad outlines can be fixed and general principles can be fixed but for the working out of details a thorough knowledge of the conditions obtaining in the neighbouring countries is essential. For obtaining this knowledge we must establish agencies of our own in India and in other places in the world. Some of these agencies will be open and some will necessarily be secret. Every developed country in the world has a network of spies at home and abroad. There is no use being pretending to be more highsouled than others. But leaving aside the case of the building up of secret services there is a lot that can be done openly and without incurring any suspicions.

The trouble with us is that the knowledge of our neighbouring countries possessed even by our so-called enlightened classes is surprisingly scanty. And knowledge of our neighbours is going to be more useful to us than knowledge of the different schools of philosophy or of the different currents in literature. Truth to tell, we prefer to live in a dream world of our creation and refuse to take note of realities. What is wanted is an objective study of our surroundings. Different sections of our intellectuals must study the different aspects of life in our neighbouring countries and they must learn to present the results of their study in a dispassionate manner. At present very few Indian intellectuals are interested in taking note of what is going on in the world. A study of

our newspapers, of our magazines and of the literary output of our authors of note will convince us that what the literate in India are interested in are sex, crime, sport, and politics of the dirty post and power-hunting type. What goes on in the world or even in our immediate neighbourhood hardly interests the majority of the Indians that can read and write.


What the majority of the people are not interested in that it does not pay to learn, and our intellectuals coming mostly from the classes that are always hard up for money, turn their attention to the acquisition of a kind of knowledge that can easily be cashed. Our leisured classes are more interested in food, drinks, women and merry making than in intellectual pursuits. Since the public is not going to give any encouragement to the study of our neighbours it is the central government that must do it. If the State does not finance the study of foreign people, cultures and of foreign affairs and if the State does not guarantee employment and decent wage to those that have dedicated their lives to such studies then the State cannot have the information that alone will enable it to fashion purposeful policies. In the absence of such a class that can and that has acquired special knowledge and that can give advice when necessary our policy makers will always be groping in the dark. The formulation of policies in the absence of factual data is found to be a subjective affair and that is what is happening here.

Apart from the gathering of information there is such a thing as working on it, classifying it, comparing the information gathered from different sources, verifying it, evaluating it and then working out the likely effects of different courses of action. This has to be done by experts. Ultimately the decisions are to be taken no

doubt by the Minister-in-charge of foreign affairs but he must be duly posted with facts and figures. This work has to be done by efficient officials whose qualifications must be something more than skill in the art of flattery of those higher up. The writer on the occasion of his visit to Bonn was shown a film giving details of the way in which the Press and Information Department of the German Government worked in gathering and classifying the information that poured in every hour from different parts of the world. For westerners there might be nothing extraordinary about it but for educated Indians it could be an eye opener. When talking with the head of the India Department in the Foreign office in Bonn the writer was amazed at the wealth of information possessed by him about Indian happenings of which we educated Indians take, if at all, only a passing note.

What we want is a well organized foreign office. Never having been inside the Foreign Office in New Delhi and not knowing a single individual working there the writer has absolutely no idea of its organization and functioning. It may be that our policies or rather the want of them may be no fault of that section of our Central Secretariat but the common man can go only by the results and the results leave everything to be desired. Locating the fault and apportioning the blame correctly is not the job of the common man. What we the common men think is that our policy makers seem to be wrapped up in darkness which to use Milton's expression could be called 'darkness visible'. Some rude shock awakens them and then they begin to grope in the darkness in another direction but unless by some unforeseen stroke of luck the element of chance favours them they are not going to find the right way.

This is a highly undesirable state of affairs. Decisions on foreign policies cannot be taken intuitively and the welfare of the nation should not be allowed to depend upon the waves of emotion that overpower ministers who are noted for their strong feelings. The foreign policies of every nation demand a continuity of purpose that can be secured only by making them as impersonal as possible. That can be done only by having a highly organized and efficient Foreign Department and by seeking its advice and giving it due weight.





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