INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

A Popular Introduction

by the same author

LOKĀYATA

A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism

DEBIPRASAD
CHATTOPADHYAYA

Indian Philosophy

A POPULAR INTRODUCTION

WITH A FOREWORD BY
WALTER RUBEN

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I. KEY TO PRONUNCIATION

I. *Vowels*

a . . . as *a* in all
ā . . . *a* in father (fāther)
i . . . *i* in fill
ī . . . *i* in police (polīce)
u . . . *u* in bush
ū . . . *u* in rude (rūde)
ṛ . . . *ree* in free (fṛ)
e . . . *e* in prey
ai . . . *ai* in aisle
o . . . *o* in go
au . . . *au* in Haus (German)

II. *Consonants*

k . . . as *k* in kill
kh . . . *kh* in inkhorn
g . . . *g* in gun
gh . . . *gh* in loghut
ṅ . . . *n* in sink (siṅk)
c . . . *ch* in cheque
ch . . . *chh* in Churchill
j . . . *j* in jet
jh . . . *dgeh* in hedgehog (hejhog)
ñ . . . *n* in singe (siñj)
ṭ . . . *t* in true (ṭrue)
ṭh . . . *th* in anthill (aṇthill)
ḍ . . . *d* in drum (ḍrum)
ḍh . . . *dh* in redhaired (reḍhaired)
ṇ . . . *n* in none (noṇe)
t . . . *t* in tout (French)
th . . . *th* in nathook (more dental)
d . . . *d* in dice (more like *th* in this)
dh . . . *dh* in adhere (but more dental)
n . . . *n* in not
p . . . *p* in put
ph . . . *ph* in uphill
b . . . *b* in bear
bh . . . *bh* in abhor
m . . . *m* in map
y . . . *y* in yet
r . . . *r* in red
l . . . *l* in lull
v . . . *v* in ivy (but more like *w* after consonants)
ś . . . *s* in sure (śure)
ṣ . . . *sh* in shun (ṣun)
s . . . *s* in saint
h . . . *h* in hear
ṁ *Anusvāra*, semi-nasal sound
ḥ *Visarga*, final *h* aspirate sound

II. NOTE ON DIACRITICAL MARKS

a	अ	ḍ	ड
ā	आ	ḍh	ढ
i	इ	ṇ	ण
ī	ई	t	त
u	उ	th	थ
ū	ऊ	d	द
ṛ	ऋ	dh	ध
e	ए	n	न
ai	ऐ	p	प
o	ओ	ph	फ
au	औ	b	ब
k	क	bh	भ
kh	ख	m	म
g	ग	y	य
gh	घ	r	र
ṅ	ङ	l	ल
c	च	v	व
ch	छ	ś	श
j	ज	ṣ	ष
jh	झ	s	स
ñ	ञ	h	ह
ṭ	ट	kṣ	क्ष
ṭh	ठ	ṁḥ	ः

Contents

Preface

THIS book is intended to be a popular introduction to the traditional systems of Indian philosophy. Accordingly, I have tried to work here with the awareness of certain limitations and obligations, about which I wish to be quite clear.

First, it is meant only to be a *popular* introduction. That implies obvious limitations to the form as well as distinct obligations with regard to the content. Secondly, it is meant to introduce only the *traditional systems* of Indian philosophy. Its scope, therefore, is much narrower than that of a full survey of Indian thought.

Being merely a popular introduction, it does not presuppose any previous acquaintance of the reader with the subject. Certain preliminary discussions, particularly about the characteristic peculiarity of the Indian philosophical development, could not thus be avoided. Even in the course of these discussions, the names of the Indian philosophers, philosophical systems and texts inevitably occur. Readers for whom this may be the first book of Indian philosophy may find some difficulty with these names. It has thus been considered worthwhile to prepare an alphabetical list of all these, with short notes on each, which the reader may find useful for the purpose of ready reference. The Indian pronunciations of the names, as also of the technical words occasionally used, may be ascertained with the 'Key to Pronunciation' separately given.

Obviously enough, a popular book should, as far as possible, be brief, easy-reading and non-technical. These conditions can be fulfilled only at the cost of subtleties and textual details. The consequent risk is that one is likely to arrive at a mere skeleton-sketch of Indian philosophy. I have to confess that I could not attempt anything more than that. The notes and references—which, incidentally, to avoid a rather pedantic look are given at the end—will perhaps be considered by the more generous reader as some kind of compensation for the deficiencies of my own discussions. For in these, I had after all the

opportunity to mention at least some of the outstanding works on Indian philosophy. But I am afraid that my anxiety to quote from and refer to mainly such books as may be readily available to the general reader has prevented me from mentioning all such works. I specially regret my failure to refer to the really monumental books on Indian philosophy written by our traditional scholars in the Indian languages. My own mother tongue being Bengali, I could only mention such veritable giants as Mahāmahopādhyāya Candrakānta Tarkālaṁkāra and Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa and could only refer in a desultory manner to the Hindi writings of Shuklaji Sanghavi and Rahula Sankrityayana. I am of course aware that a great many important works exist also in the other Indian languages and I may express the hope here that with the growing realisation of the prestige of our national languages we are going to care more for these than we have hitherto done.

However, this emphasis on the importance of our traditional scholars must not be misunderstood. It does not necessarily mean a defence of the traditional values usually entertained by them. The teacher-student tradition having been by far the most important mode of the transmission of our philosophical ideas for centuries, our traditional scholars are generally the best custodians of our traditional ideas. They are, in other words, our best guides for understanding what our ancient and medieval philosophers actually thought. Nevertheless, it is necessary for us today to develop also a critical attitude to these thoughts themselves. But our traditional scholars are generally opposed to a critical attitude which is not confined to the broader structure of certain traditional values. They are, in short, also the custodians of a veneration for these values. It is necessary for us today to outgrow such a veneration, however much that may offend the prevalent sentiments.

This leads me to explain more fully how I have understood the word *popular* above. For me it means something more than merely a handy presentation and non-technical treatment of the subject. A popular introduction to philosophy has also to care for the *philosophical needs of the people*. From this point of view, the task is indeed less easy than to make it merely easy-

reading. In a book that intends to be really popular it is not enough to explain what our ancestors actually thought and preached; it has the further obligation of discriminating between what is living and what is dead in all these. For, the need to retain what is valuable in our philosophical heritage is as pressing as to reject what is not. The reason is that the philosophical ideas of the past are not just curios for us. These may help or hinder our present progress. Among the stock of our ancestral ideas, therefore, those that go against the requirements of our present progress are in need of being critically surrendered while those that still retain significance for the building up of our desired future are in need of special emphasis.

It may be worthwhile to remember here that from this point of view some significant change has taken place in the country from the situation we had during the period of our national struggle for freedom. Even a certain blind veneration for the past did then become an effective part of our patriotism. An aggressive defence of our traditional philosophy which we come across in the writings of Tilak, e.g., gave us indeed 'a certain morale' and this irrespective of the intrinsic worth of the philosophy itself. The imperialists were then trying to batter our sense of self-respect and argued that being intrinsically inferior both physically and intellectually we Indians were not fit to govern ourselves. As against this, the militant rationalisation of our own philosophy, which was not infrequently expressed in such efforts as the claim that our Śaṁkara was greater than the greatest philosopher of the West, made us at least better fighters for freedom, however much upsetting that might have been for the philosophical perspective proper. After all, as it is well-known, a patriot could then walk to the gallows with firm feet only with a copy of the *Gītā* in his hand.

But the situation today is quite changed. With the consolidation of our national freedom we are no longer in need of any 'compensatory delusion' to boost up our morale. We have, on the contrary, sufficient confidence in ourselves to work for a planned economic development of the country. Thus, we need no longer have any anxiety to prove, e.g., that our conception of *mokṣa* or 'liberation from the earthly bondage' happens to be

the highest ideal ever reached in philosophy. It is contrary to our purpose today to delude ourselves with the idea that our Nāgārjuna and our Śaṁkara are the greatest of all philosophers because they warned us against imagining the world to be real and against relying on reason and experience for the purpose of acquiring true knowledge. For we have urgent tasks ahead of us, tasks that presuppose a better mastery of nature and therefore also a clearer insight into it and its laws. Among our traditional ideas, therefore, it is necessary to nourish those that are helpful for the cultivation of science; it is equally necessary to scrap those that prove inimical to science.

Here is a rather obvious example. We cannot expect our peasants to be genuinely enthusiastic about the land reforms and the advanced agricultural technology offered to them* without at the same time weeding out from their heads the law of *karma*, which for generations taught them that their miserable lot was the result of their misdeeds in the previous births rather than because of a backward technology and an equally backward social setup which we call feudalism. President Radhakrishnan, in his recent Independence Day Message, gave the inspiring call for the complete liquidation of feudalism in the country. But feudalism exists also in our consciousness in the form of feudal ideas, inclusive of course of some age-old philosophical ideas. We cannot hope to retain any softness for these and yet work for the complete liquidation of feudalism. It is not denied, of course, that the most important precondition for the liquidation of the feudal ideas is the liquidation of the material conditions that gave birth to these. But since such ideas also react back on their material conditions and try to entrench these, an effective struggle against these material conditions presupposes also a conscious struggle against their ideological counterpart.

We are ourselves brought up in an atmosphere in which our

* For an interesting field-work as to how the traditional 'value system' is actually causing in our peasantry a resistance to the advanced technology offered to them, see S. P. Bose, 'Peasant Values and Innovations in India', *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. lxvii, No. 5, March 1962.

teachers took special pride in telling us that the concepts of *mokṣa* and *avidyā*, of *karma* and *yoga*, are evidences of the outstanding importance of Indian philosophy. As such, we have no illusion as to how deep had been the veneration for these ideas. To try to be critical of these entails the risk of incurring great displeasure and even of being suspected of anti-national sentiments. But truth is not necessarily what we have become accustomed to imagine as true for centuries and something being time-honoured is no sufficient reason for its acceptance. Were not the institutions of *satī*, of the prohibition of widow-remarriage and of untouchability equally time-honoured in the country? Yet the very circumstance of waging a relentless war against these made Rammohan, Vidyasagar and Gandhi the greatest among our social reformers.

We shall perhaps have to wait for a thought-reformer of an equal eminence. In the meanwhile, however, we may take upon ourselves a humbler responsibility for the execution of which opportunities are created by a happy situation in our philosophical heritage itself. For, among our traditional philosophers there were also those who did strongly challenge the very trends of thought which, for the sake of science and our progress, we propose to oppose today. Here are only a few examples. The idealistic outlook, as associated particularly with the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedānta, enjoyed very high prestige among our traditional philosophers; nevertheless, there were others among them to have strongly condemned it. Again, while the idealists were pleading for irrationalism and a surrender of logic, there were also others to defend logic and refute irrationalism. If the law of *karma* was placidly accepted by a great many of our philosophers, it is worthwhile to remember that already in the 6th century B.C. there were philosophers like Pāyāsi enthusiastically working on an experimental rejection of it. Similarly, in spite of the widespread prestige of the *yoga*-experience in Indian philosophy, there were stalwards, too, like Kumārila, to have laughed at it and called it at best a kind of subjective fancy. In short, if idealism along with all its co-respondents were strong in Indian philosophy, trends opposed to all these were not necessarily weak. The emphasis so far on the idealistic trend,

to say the least, has been lopsided. The acceptance of the Advaita Vedānta, e.g., is even looked upon as a mark of philosophical respectability. Such an atmosphere is not conducive to science and progress. One way of changing it is of course to cultivate an objective attitude to the idealistic outlook along with all the sundry superstitions that grew under its shelter. For this purpose, we have to ask ourselves: wherefrom did it come and whither does it propose to lead us to? For a satisfactory answer to this question, it is obviously difficult to remain confined to the Indian philosophical materials alone. But there is perhaps another way for the Indian reader to get rid of the inflated idea of the importance of idealism in our philosophy. It is the way of being aware that in our traditional philosophy itself there were also vigorous attempts to outgrow idealism. In other words, as against the prevalent emphasis on the importance of our idealistic trend, a counter-emphasis on the trends opposed to it may—though only to a certain extent—serve the purpose of our real philosophical needs.

I should like to be a little clearer about this point. It is by no means claimed that by piecing together the healthier elements of our different anti-idealistic trends one can reach a scientifically satisfactory and integrated outlook. To begin with, such a conception of piecing together is itself arbitrary. Our idealists, in spite of all the sectarian differences among themselves, did in fact contribute to one homogeneous philosophical tradition; but the opposition to them arose in different quarters and because of fundamentally incompatible considerations. As such, little coherence can be achieved by the effort to piece all these together. Secondly, these anti-idealistic trends, like the idealistic one, were themselves historically determined, i.e., had their roots in the socio-economic conditions of ancient and medieval India. These had, therefore, their inevitable and characteristic limitations. Science and technology did not make sufficient progress in the country to warrant a scientifically satisfactory philosophy. Nevertheless, a review of and a re-emphasis on these anti-idealistic trends cannot be without its value. It helps one to be disillusioned about the false prestige of the idealistic heritage, and such a disillusionment is an important precondition

for moving forward to a scientifically satisfactory philosophy. Moreover, notwithstanding all their objective limitations, it will be an error to overlook the positive significance which these often had, just as it is an error to ignore the positive significance of Heraclitus in Greek philosophy because of his scientific limitations.

I would like to add here a few more words about the other limitation of the present book. I have attempted to survey here only the *traditional systems* of our philosophy. These systems do constitute the basis and the bulk of what is technically called Indian philosophy. Yet, even during the medieval period—though outside the scholastic circle and often in fact in the form of open revolts against it—extremely significant events took place in the Indian battle of ideas. Under the given historical conditions, these had to assume the form of religious reforms, though in actual contents—being essentially revolts against feudalism—these contributed vitally to the heritage of our democratic thought. Thus the great popular movements associated with the names of Caitanya, Kabir, and Nānak—to mention only a few—when analysed in their historical setting, are found to contain important elements of a 'revolutionary opposition to feudalism', much as the German movement associated with the name of Thomas Münzer did. Here is how Engels shows why in medieval Europe 'the opposition to feudalism appeared only as opposition to religious feudalism':

> Even the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth century involved positive material class interests; those wars were class wars, too, just as the later internal collisions in England and France. Although the class struggles of that day were clothed in religious shibboleths, and though the interests, requirements, and demands of the various classes were concealed behind a religious screen, this changed nothing in the matter, and is easily explained by the conditions of the time... In the hands of the clergy politics and jurisprudence, much like all other sciences, remained mere branches of theology, and were treated along the principles prevailing in the latter. Church dogmas were also political axioms, and Bible quotations had the validity of law in any court.... And this supremacy of theology in the entire realm of intellectual activity was at the same time an inevitable consequence of the place held by the church as all-embracing synthesis and most gene-

ral sanction of the existing feudal domination. It is clear that under the circumstances, all the generally voiced attacks against feudalism, above all the attacks against the church and all revolutionary social and political doctrines, had mostly and simultaneously to be theological heresies. The existing social conditions had to be stripped of their halo of sanctity before they could be attacked. The revolutionary opposition to feudalism was alive all down the Middle Ages. It took the shape of mysticism, open heresy, or armed insurrection, all depending on the conditions of the time. As for mysticism, it is well known how much sixteenth-century reformers depended on it. Münzer himself was largely indebted to it. (*The Peasant War in Germany*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 54-5).

In India there was of course no exact counterpart of the organised church of medieval Europe. Yet 'the supremacy of theology on the entire realm of intellectual activity' was there and, as we shall see, even the exponents of at least some of our traditional systems—particularly the idealistic systems—were even open advocates of it. It was in this sense that the popular movements of medieval India were revolts, though in the inevitable religious garb. As a matter of fact, the religious garb remained in much use even for the modern reformers like Rammohan, Vidyasagar, Vivekananda, Tagore and Gandhi, who, to say the least, infused a new vitality to the somewhat petrified pattern of Indian philosophising, as became particularly evident after the great vogue of astute scholasticism known as Neo-Nyāya. A survey of Indian philosophy remains obviously incomplete if it does not take note of these great movements of medieval and modern India which took place outside what is strictly called the traditional systems of Indian philosophy. In spite of being keenly aware of this, I have not attempted to cover all these in the present study, my simple excuse being that to do so properly one has also to cover a great deal of controversial grounds concerning the socio-economic history of medieval and modern India and that is probably better done in a separate study altogether.

*

While working on this book and revising the manuscript I have been so vitally helped by my friend Sri Krishna Kumar

Dixit that it is impossible for me to thank him enough. Of course, my views are my own and so are my errors. But for his labourious help, however, the expression of these views would have been much more clumsy and the errors perhaps too many.

I am deeply grateful to Professor Walter Ruben for the somewhat detailed criticism he sent me of the first draft of my manuscript; on the basis of it I revised and in fact rewrote the whole thing. His kindness by way of offering a generous Foreword is indeed too obvious to be ceremoniously acknowledged.

April 1964 DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA

Foreword

DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA is well known in international circles of historians of Indian philosophy, especially as the author of *Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism* (New Delhi, 1959) and as editor of *Indian Studies: Past & Present*. His new study, *Indian Philosophy*, is an attempt to popularise its wealth among his countrymen. As a thought-reformer, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya is conscious of his great responsibility towards his people living in a period of struggle for national awakening and of world-wide fighting of the forces of progress, humanism and peace against imperialism and militarism, as he confesses in his contribution to 'Philosophy Today' (*Seminar*, 25 September 1961). He has thus written this book against the old-fashioned conception that India was and is the land of dreamers and mystics.

Dale Riepe of the USA, a historian of philosophy, has just issued his book *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought* (Seattle, 1961) which runs against this romanticism; in Vienna the indologist Erich Frauwallner in his *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*—especially in the second volume dealing with Vaiśeṣika, Jainism and Lokāyata (Salzburg, 1956)—writes on similar lines. In the chapters dealing with Indian philosophy, P. N. Anikiev of the Soviet Union in his *History of Philosophy* (1957) and in my own work, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie* (1954), some attempt to analyse the history of Indian philosophy from the materialistic angle has been made. In India, following some interesting experiments by M. N. Roy and Bhupendranath Dutta, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's books have opened a new period of Indian investigations into Indian philosophy. If Mādhava began his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* with the Lokāyata as the lowest school and ended with the Advaita Vedānta as the highest school of Indian philosophy, Debiprasad, as a materialist, follows the opposite line. The discussions he quotes from Kumārila and others against the existence of God, etc.,

have been unduly neglected in most of the older representations of Indian philosophy.

As a thought-reformer Debiprasad looks at the old Indian philosophers as sources of inspiration, and as materialist he insists on the values of old Indian materialism. This of course is not easily done. Only the dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin is perfect and scientific, all older forms of hylozoic or mechanical materialism being imperfect, because science had not yet developed sufficiently and because there was no revolutionary class to fight for it. Therefore, the materialistic elements like the atomism of Jainism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda* of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, the doctrine of *sparśa* in old Buddhism, which acknowledges the objective existence of the material world, and similar conceptions in Mīmāṁsā as well as the doctrine of matter as the sole reality in the Lokāyata cannot answer in a proper—i.e. scientific—way the questions: what is the relation of matter and mind and what are the objective laws of development of matter and society? Thus Vaiśeṣika atomism needed the doctrine of God as creator. Sāṁkhya the doctrine of *puruṣa* for whose sake matter moves, and so on. Lokāyata rejected such doctrines of supra-natural entities but could not build up a positive system of ethics, restricting, thus, materialism to fighting against religious conceptions. Such an inadequacy of old Indian philosophy has to be explained through historical analysis. One has to show which were the social forces behind Indian idealism—especially illusionism and agnosticism—that hindered the developments of Indian sciences and worldly activities, and which were the forces working for scientific and social progress. Modern Indians must, thus, become aware of the two opposite trends in Indian philosophy through the ages in order to build the future of India on the best cultural traditions.

To quote a recent paper by M. N. Srinivas, Head of the Department of Sociology, Delhi University, in *The March of India* of December 1961: 'Gone indeed are the days when Indian intellectuals questioned the rightness of activity in the world.... In fact, with the spread of Western science and rational forms of thought, atheism and agnosticism may increase

in India'... The need to act was propagated in the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Yogavāśiṣṭha*, in *Jñāneśvarī* and *Gītārahasya*, in Bankim Chatterjee's *Ānandamaṭha* and by Vivekananda and others up to Gandhi and Radhakrishnan, but always from within the framework of the Vedānta religion. According to M. N. Srinivas, the time has come to consider the necessity of founding activity on science which is opposed to religion. Therefore, the modern Indian philosopher has to look back to scientific, materialistic elements in Indian philosophical tradition, and that is what Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya does.

I regard it a great honour to have this opportunity to say something to the Indian reader. Being a citizen of the Socialist German state, the German Democratic Republic, and being an Indologist it is my duty to explain to my German people what India—especially Indian philosophy—is and was. For some decades my method has been to interpret India and her civilization—unknown to my people—by comparing and contrasting them with Europe and European civilization which are fairly well known to us. Thus, one comes to a world-history of philosophy. I believe that it is essential to be well acquainted with the general history of philosophy in order to clarify the problems of the development of Indian philosophy and that, on the other hand, the material and the viewpoints of the history of Indian philosophy enrich the general history of philosophy enormously. Both points of view, both ways of research, are interconnected.

This comparing and contrasting must include the Chinese tradition of philosophy as well, and it has to be done in a strict historical way. It is not correct to compare and contrast philosophers of these three regions if they do not belong to an analogous stage of socio-historical development. And the result of such a comparison cannot be to judge the rightness or wrongness of a philosophical idea or system, as some representatives of 'comparative philosophy' have done. I would recommend the following procedure.

What we need, first of all, in the actual situation as characterised by the above-mentioned works of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, etc., is the periodizing the history of Indian philosophy. The beginning of philosophy in India is, I think, clear

with the hylozoism of Uddālaka Āruṇi in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* vi; his materialism, still very primitive, being the first systematisation of what Debiprasad in his *Lokāyata* described as the prehistorical this-worldliness, which had been characteristic of the tribal times. Uddālaka lived at about 600 B.C. in the beginning of the Indian states of the Iron Age. Against his materialism, Yājñavalkya immediately formulated the most ancient Indian idealism, along with the doctrines of *karma*, *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa*. Thus started the struggle between these two major schools of philosophy.

In the period following, from the time of the Buddha, about 500 B.C., up to the time of the Nandas who founded the first great all-north-Indian state about 330 B.C., the fight for and against the *karma* doctrine took the shape of *vādas*, i.e. of doctrines, not yet of systems. The Buddha taught the *anicca*— and *anattā-vāda*, especially the chain of the twelve *nidānas*. The materialists taught the *uccheda-vāda*, the *bhūta-*, *yadṛcchā-* and *svabhāva-vāda*; Agnostics an *ajñāna-vāda*, Fatalists taught *kāla-* or *niyati-vāda*, especially Makkhali Gosāla. *Dīghanikāya* (ii) tells us of six philosophers of this time, five of them finding excuses for Ajātaśatru's policy of applying despotical force, only the Jaina avoiding this topic and praising the ascetic freedom from all bonds. In the Jaina *Sūyagada*, in an analogous passage, not this topic but the general oppression of man—specially of slaves—is defended by such philosophers, but of course not by the Jaina author. In *Dīghanikāya* (i), a Buddhist has tried to systematise all *vādas* of that time into sixtytwo ways of philosophy. In *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (i, 2), a short enumeration of such *vādas* is preserved. But, besides, Aupaniṣadas taught some kind of very early Vedānta of which we still do not know the contents. The same holds true for old Jainism, Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Mīmāṁsā. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has already shown in the *Lokāyata* that one root of Sāṁkhya is tribal mythology of God and Goddess. Yoga has its roots in tribal shamanism and was introduced into Indian philosophy by Buddhists in order to prove the existence of *saṁsāra* as told in the legend of the *mahābodhi* of the Buddha. Jainism has some root in tribal animism. *Īśvara-vāda* in some way is connected

with the old form of Śaivism which is testified in the Indus civilization. How, where and when these doctrines were formulated is not yet clear, but it is important for the historian to stress the point that Indian philosophy to a great extent has non-Vedic origins, which runs against orthodox teachings, and that theism played a greater role only in the next period as testified by Pāṇini, Heliodoros, etc.

This next period saw the systematisation of Indian philosophies, the oldest Brāhmaṇical one being Sāṁkhya, which is represented in the numberless forms of epic Sāṁkhya. The *sūtras* of Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and Yoga show the systematisation; and elements in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, in the *Mahābhārata* and *Caraka-saṁhitā* give us some material for the reconstruction of the period before the *sūtras*. Because *īśvara-vāda* was relatively late it happened that Hīnayāna Buddhism, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, and Sāṁkhya had no place for *īśvara* and later on fought against the doctrine of God which, on the other hand, in epic Sāṁkhya and Yoga, in some Vedāntas and later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika played an ever-increasing role as shown by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya.

With the beginning of the feudal age, the *bhāṣya*-period of Indian philosophy—i.e. the period of scholastics—began, and which went on up to the modern times but has to be subdivided into several periods. As regards details, the well-known difficulty of chronology is one of the main hindrances for establishing a series of periods soon.

The more these periods are being fixed the more it becomes clear that the development of philosophy in India as elsewhere is interconnected with social development. To give only one example. In tribal times, some conception of the world as the reality which is eternally moving in contrasts (day and night, summer and winter, etc.) takes the form of a mythological world-history, namely, the story of fighting between gods and demons—as among Indo-Europeans, north-Americans, etc. The conception of *ṛta* is the primitive base for the doctrine of Uddālaka Āruṇi that *sat* is changing (*vikāra*). In opposition to him Yājñavalkya taught that *sat* is unmoving *Brahman*. The Buddha taught his *anicca-* and *anattā-vāda*, being the so-called

middle-path between materialism and Upaniṣad-mysticism. Thus far the Hegelian conceptions of thesis, antithesis, etc. can be applied. But this is not enough. One has to show how it happened that the Buddha taught his doctrine in a special historical surrounding. It was, as Debiprasad has shown, the time when his tribe and the aristocratic class in his tribe were in danger; besides, the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* describes how the Buddha himself witnessed that the Licchavis were in a similar danger. He felt the miseries of the suppressed and exploited people living under slave-holding despotism which was then just beginning; he interpreted the suffering as becoming and decaying and revived the old tribal magico-mythological conception of eternal move (*ṛta*) in his philosophical type of thought.

If we now look at Greece and China we observe that in nearly the same period when Iron Age began Greek philosophy began with the hylozoistic materialism of Thales and other Ionians analogous to that of Uddālaka Āruṇi, followed by some doctrines which denied becoming in the school of Eleatics. And when the old society of tribal aristocracy decayed, Heraclitus in Greece and Lao Tse in China arrived at very similar doctrines of eternal becoming, of primitive dialectical thinking—as did the Buddha. I am now working on a paper which will go into the details. It will become clear that Heraclitus and Lao Tse also suffered with their then decaying old aristocracies and looked back nostalgically at tribal societies with remnants of free, democratic life. In ancient Greece there were at first no systems of philosophy just as they were not in India; only much later Epicureans, Stoics, Peripatetics, etc., began, who are the European analogies to Lokāyata-darśana, etc., living in philosophical tradition up to the beginning of capitalism in Europe and in India. Thus the astonishing similarity between *padārthas* in Vaiśeṣika and categories in Aristotle, between Nyāya's *anumānas* and Aristotle's syllogisms can be explained by analogous development and it is not necessary to accept the theory of Greek influence on Indian philosophy, especially as the *padārthas* can be derived from *dravya, guṇa, kriyā*, etc., in the introduction to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and the categories of Nyāya from the

art of discussion in ancient India. The analogy of Indian and European scholastics has already been hinted at above.

India today has to develop her philosophy from her tradition, and as long as classes continue and class struggle goes on in India, the two main lines of philosophy—materialism and idealism—will continue to fight each other. Idealists will satisfy themselves by re-interpreting Vedānta, materialists will go on in the line of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and build up the Indian dialectical materialism, which is indispensable for winning the class struggle. I as a socialist German Indologist can only help to reconstruct the history of Indian philosophy but that also to a very limited extent. What I would propose is some organised cooperation of Indian and non-Indian historians of Indian and non-Indian philosophy to come to a fairly correct and detailed general history of philosophy as soon as possible.

12 March 1962 WALTER RUBEN

1. *Development of Indian Philosophy*

A SURVEY of Indian philosophy, in the way in which European philosophy is usually surveyed by its historians, is difficult if possible at all. This is largely because of the characteristic peculiarity of its development. In Europe, thinkers succeeded one another, often evolving a philosophy from a radically new standpoint, criticising and rejecting their predecessors energetically. In India, however, the basis for a number of alternative philosophical views had their origin in a considerable antiquity and the subsequent philosophical activities had been — at least in intention — only the development of these original perspectives. Philosophers came one after another but, generally speaking, not to offer any basically new philosophy. Each stood instead for an ancient system and wanted to defend and rationalise it over again, strengthening the arguments of his predecessors rather than trying to find fault with them. There was, in short, the simultaneous development of a number of alternative philosophies, or, as it is aptly said, 'the types remained the same'.[1]

This, it is sometimes claimed,[2] gave a progressive coherence to the philosophical views and, as such, what Indian philosophy might have lost in variety was compensated by the intensity it gained. Notwithstanding what is true in this, the fact remains that the situation as a whole is also indicative of some kind of ideological stagnation. The old thoughts often carried for the new thinkers an inviolable authority, 'the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them.'[3] Changes in thought, even when allowed to occur — as, in fact, they frequently did — were sought to be explained as taking place within a broader structure of unchangeability, the clue to which is to be sought in the general unchangeableness of the socio-economic conditions of the country. 'However changing', observes Marx, 'the political aspect of India's past must appear, its social condition has remained

unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of the 19th century'.[4] 'The structure of the economical elements of society remains untouched by the stormcloudes of the political sky.'[5]

Such conditions, naturally enough, did not favour fresh adventures of ideas or inspire the thinkers to explore new possibilities of understanding the universe and man's place in it. For, as a matter of fact, the general pattern of living remained the same and the lot of man unchanged: the *varṇāśrama dharma* or the rules of caste division defined the former for each and the law of *karma* urged that the latter was not to be grudged, for what one enjoyed or suffered was but the result of one's own doing. 'There is a most intimate connexion and almost an identity between the ways of human power and human knowledge',[6] said Bacon, adding, 'Whence it follows that the improvement of man's mind and the improvement of his lot are one and the same thing.'[7] In India, however, there was for centuries no spectacular innovation in the technique of production, opening before man any fundamentally new possibility of mastering — and thereby understanding — the world he lived in. Even a cursory acquaintance with our philosophical literature gives one the impression of how the potter's tools and the weaver's loom — and their *ghaṭa* and the *paṭa* — defined in an important sense the mental horizons of our philosophers. These were the techniques upon which they were persistently drawing and they would not go beyond these even for illustrating their acutest arguments.

Under these circumstances, the philosophical activities proper were activities within certain predetermined thought-structures which the later philosophers did not deliberately discard. Not that there was no individual philosopher of outstanding abilities, or that there was nothing in the nature of genuine innovation. But none would claim conscious individuality for himself, nor would the philosophical tradition admit it to any. And even when, by way of explaining an old standpoint over again, a philosopher did in fact introduce some palpable innovation, he always argued that this was but an explication of what had been already potential in the ancient wisdom he stood for.

2. *The Philosophical Literature*

THE source-books of these philosophical systems are usually certain *sūtra*-works, i.e. collections of mnemonic sentences or half-sentences, sometimes even isolated words in lieu of a sentence. The mode of the later philosophical writings had mostly been in the nature of commentaries on these, called the *bhāṣyas*, or of commentaries upon the commentaries called the *ṭīkās*, etc. There were also, though comparatively fewer, verse-treatises on the systems called the *kārikās*, long and occasionally somewhat critical dissertations called the *vārttikas*, and, in comparatively later times, quite a considerable number of independent works, both in prose and verse. But the *sūtras* remained for these systems the ultimate stock of wisdom, as it were. Of course, the Buddhists and the Jainas did not have such typical *sūtras;* but they had their own way of following practically the same pattern of philosophical writing.

Tradition attributes the *sūtras* of the different systems to certain authors who are, however, nothing more than mere names for us. For though we have legends and palpable fables about them, there is nothing that can be called strictly historical. The *sūtra*-work of the Vaiśeṣika system, e.g., is attributed to a certain Kaṇāda, also called Kaṇabhakṣa or Kaṇabhuj, literally 'the atom-eater'. The traditional explanation of the name, meant evidently to prove his great austerity, is that the sage who propounded this system used to live on grains collected from fields after the peasants carried off their harvests. But modern scholars[1] are inclined to see in it a term of mockery bestowed on the philosopher because of his theory of the atoms. The name could thus be only indicative of some original hostility to this system, entertained presumably in the orthodox circle. No less interesting was the alternative name of the same philosopher, which might have been his real name. It was Ulūka, 'the owl'. Tradition has a simple explanation for this, too: there was in ancient times a certain sage who, by his great penances, earned the grace of god Śiva and, as a result of this, the god, in the guise of an owl, instructed him in the philosophy of the atoms![2] But

why had god to choose this extraordinary guise for the purpose of imparting philosophical wisdom? No explanation, of course, is offered! Besides, as eminent modern scholars like Kuppuswami Sastri[3] and Garbe[4] rightly point out, Kaṇāda himself, in all probability, was an atheist; for in spite of the introduction of God into his system by its later exponents, the *sūtra*-work itself is conspicuously indifferent to any mention of Him. What, then, could this peculiar name imply? Rahula Sankrityayana[5] is inclined to view it as evidence of Greek influence on the Vaiśeṣika atomism — the owl of Athena left its impress on the philosophy of the country from which it came. Thus it was that it came to be known as Aulūkya-darśana, 'the philosophy of the owl'. But this appears to be farfetched. In the light of comparative anthropology, however, it may be possible to see in this Ulūka the name of an ancient totemic clan to which the philosopher traced his descent, as is still done in the *gotra*-system surviving in this country.[6] Incidentally, this is just one instance of the persistence of the past — of the ancient beliefs and institutions — in Indian culture, throughout its protracted period of development.

So this is about all that we know of Kaṇāda or Ulūka, the supposed founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. As for the founders of the other systems our knowledge is in no way better. In this ocean of uncertainties the only historical fact that we have is that the Buddha, who died at about the age of 80 in 483 B.C., was the actual founder of Buddhism, though it remains for us to see how big was the gap between the simple teachings which were possibly the Buddha's own and the sophisticated philosophical views that were later called the Buddhist philosophies.

The actual date of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, like the other *sūtra*-works, is still largely a matter for conjecture, in trying to determine which the modern scholars have widely differed among themselves. Without entering into the technicalities of this question, we may note here a few points of broad interest. First, as Stcherbatsky observes, 'Some of the *sūtras* display a remarkable knowledge of each other. To judge from the whole tone and drift of the philosophical *sūtras*, they must be the productions of one and the same literary epoch.'[7] What we now

possess as the *sūtras* of the Sāṁkhya system is of course an exception; because it is largely spurious and admittedly of very late origin. Secondly, 'the literary epoch' of which these works were the products could not be later than A.D. 300 or 400; this is a point on which most of the modern scholars would agree, though some would be inclined to push backward the earlier possible limit of this age. Thirdly, whatever might have been the date of the actual reduction of these philosophical views in their present *sūtra*-form, the prevalence of a majority of them in their pre-systematised stage is to be traced to a much earlier period, for the form of the mnemonical aphorisms generally presupposes a long history of discussion and transmission of ideas of which the *sūtras* are the condensed literary outcome. In any case, we have positive evidence of the fact that already at a very early period, which roughly corresponds to the philosophical activities in ancient Greece and China,[8] a surprising number of conflicting philosophical views did crop up in India, or as Stcherbatsky puts it. 'In VI-V century B.C., at the time immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, India was seething with philosophic speculation. A great variety of views and systems were springing up and actively propagated among the different classes of its population'.[9] Most of these were of course only rudimentary and had no great future. But a considerable number of them were not quite so and they eventually developed into major systems of Indian philosophy.

3. *Hangover of Ancient Beliefs*

WE may be yet far from knowing with certainty what led to the birth of so many divergent views at such an early period of our history. But what is noted above is of material importance for understanding a characteristic peculiarity of Indian philosophy: since the development of Indian philosophy meant above all the

development of certain well-defined systems and since the origin of these systems is to be traced to a considerable antiquity, it was inevitable for this philosophy to have developed strong moorings in the past and to retain the relics of the antique — even primeval — ideas and beliefs. This explains the incomplete emancipation of our philosophical thought from all kinds of religious credulities, mythological imagination and even the belief in ritual practices. All these, surprisingly enough, have peacefully coexisted with the most remarkable logical subtleties and dialectical abilities, a peculiarity really difficult to understand for one acquainted only with the European tradition. For the emancipation from ancient myths, as it is commonly said, marked the beginning of European philosophy, with Thales, the first philosopher of ancient Greece. In the old Babylonean cosmology, the world was created from water by the fiat of god Marduk.

> What Thales did was to leave Marduk out. He, too, said that everything was once water. But he thought that earth and everything else had been formed out of water by a natural process, like the silting up of the delta of the Nile.... It is an admirable beginning, the whole point of which is that it gathers together into a coherent picture a number of observed facts *without letting Marduk in.*[1]

But nothing as sharp as this took place in Indian philosophy. Our philosophers, generally speaking, were not so keen on shaking off their Marduks, their world of traditional beliefs and fancies. The Lokāyatas or materialists were by far the only exception to this: insisting as they did on the primacy of sense-perception as the source of valid knowledge, and rejecting the validity of any scriptural authority, they alone could laugh at and vigorously ridicule the superstitions of others. However, the overwhelming majority of Indian philosophers were far from eager to disturb the world of their ancestral beliefs. This does not surely mean that they remained at the same level of intellectual development as, say, that of the Babylonean cosmologists. The Marduks were all that the Babyloneans had, whereas our philosophers, even while attaining real philosophical heights, somehow or other allowed a tolerant corner in their minds to

the traditional lores and superstitions. Here, in other words, was a peculiar coexistence of advanced philosophy with primitive beliefs. And such coexistence was in fact inevitable. For the later philosophers, however much philosophical sophistication they might have acquired, were, on the whole, reluctant to transgress the limits of what they considered to be the ancient wisdom and had thus to eulogise—even rationalise — the primitive elements that were embedded in these ancient thoughts.

Here are a few examples in briefest outlines. In the literature of what is called the Yoga system — particularly in its description of the supernatural powers that are supposed to result from some hoary practices — the line of demarcation between the fabulous and the plausible is indeed very thin. The Jaina system, in its theory of *karma*, e.g., introduces us to some kind of imposing mythology which can, at any rate, hold no interest for what we understand by philosophy. The almost endless discussions concerning the details of the primitive rituals which we come across in the Mīmāṁsā system is sure to make one wonder as to how this could at all pass for a serious philosophy. In the literature of the Vedānta system, again, we come across the most extraordinary practice of quoting the Purāṇas or the mythological literature to justify or reject philosophical positions. These are bound to appear all the more amazing when we remember that, excepting a few, practically all the ablest of our advanced thinkers fully believed in the same Yoga practices; that the same Jaina system was defended by such great logicians as Akalanka, Vidyānanda and Hemacandra, without in the least disturbing its fabulous theory of *karma;* the same Mīmāṁsā system, with its wearisome discussions of the ritual details, had as its staunch champions outstanding philosophers like Kumārila; the same Vedānta, with all its veneration for the Purāṇa, had as its exponents thinkers like Vācaspati Miśra and Śrīharṣa, — certainly great names in the history of philosophy.

Of course, Yoga, as we shall see, was not essentially a philosophy. The primary concern of Mīmāṁsā, again, was the Vedic ritual. Similarly, Jainism and Vedānta are still living creeds in the country. The blend of the philosophical with the nonphilosophical may not, therefore, appear to be so very strange in those

systems. But let us take the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems — or better, in view of their eventual amalgamation, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system—which was above all meant to be an essentially empirical epistemology and ontology; it even foreshadowed such scientific ideas as practice being the criterion of truth. Here are some examples of how ancient beliefs found for themselves comfortable shelter in the philosophical literature of this system. Uddyotakara, one of its ablest representatives and certainly an outstanding thinker, in the course of his refutation of epistemological idealism, took with utmost seriousness the possibility of ghosts having visions in their dreams of rivers of blood or of pus![2] Another outstanding representative of the same system, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, whose philosophical polemic is said to be 'sweeping everything before its tremendous rush',[3] argued with great gusto that his own grandfather performed the Vedic ritual called Sāṁgrahaṇī and gained thereby a village as his property[4]: this was claimed to be conclusive evidence that the Vedic rituals could produce results during the lifetime of their performers. Again, Annam Bhaṭṭa, a still later philosopher, explaining the atomistic hypothesis, summed up the traditional position of the school and spoke in the same strain of bodies like ours made of the earth-atoms and as existing in this earth, bodies made of water-atoms as existing in the realm of the water-god Varuṇa, bodies made of fire-atoms as existing in the realm of the fire-god Āditya and bodies made of air-atoms as existing in the realm of the air-god Vāyu.[5] But who were these extra-mundane creatures made of the atoms of water, fire and air and where are the realms of Varuṇa, Āditya, and Vāyu? Obviously nowhere outside the primitive imagination. But the philosophers did not bother. For the heritage of the primitive imagination was taken for granted. Comments Kuppuswami Sastri: 'The belief that these three varieties of bodies are *ultramundane* existences and are found in the worlds of Varuṇa, Āditya and Vāyu is based on Purāṇic cosmology and does not require any discussion here.'[6] But how can a discussion be thus avoided? After all, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was not just a Purāṇic or mythological view of the world; it was surely one of the most serious of our philosophical systems and has something to contribute to the philosophical

needs of our times. The peculiar tolerance for the Purāṇic cosmology even by its advanced representatives cannot, therefore, be just overlooked.

Many more examples may easily be cited. But it is already obvious that our philosophers did not show any special enthusiasm to give up their superstitions or hoary beliefs. At the present stage of historical researches, it is perhaps premature to venture any satisfactory explanation of this peculiarity. Besides, any explanation that claims to embrace the whole course of Indian philosophical development as taking place in such a vast country with its highly complex ethnological composition is bound to face the obvious risk of over-simplification. Nevertheless, since it would be unrealistic to ignore the problem altogether and since moreover historical parallels have often very significant light to throw on the as yet obscure corners of our understanding, it may be worth while to recall here the situation of ancient Greece where the philosophers, as already noted, began by shaking off the superstitious cosmology and where, moreover, as we shall see, they needed it back at a later stage. For understanding, though negatively, the general philosophical situation of India, it may therefore be worthwhile to ask the question: How was it that the first philosophers of Greece felt no need for the ancient myths which their predecessors — the Egyptians and the Babyloneans — with all their achievements in astronomy, geometry, measurements and medicine, failed to outgrow? We may listen to Farrington who has answered the question clearly. In Egypt and Babylon, the central governments controlling large areas with absolute authority were in as much need of astronomy, geometry, etc., as of superstitions — the latter for the purpose of enforcing their authority. 'A sophisticated Greek of the fourth century B.C., cast a glance at the official religion of Egypt and detected its social utility. The Egyptian lawgiver, he remarks, had established so many contemptible superstitions, first, "because he thought it proper to accustom the masses to obeying any command that was given to them by their superiors", and, second, "because he judged that he could rely on those who displayed their piety to be equally law-abiding in every other particular." (Isocrates, *Busiris*). This is not the type

of society in which men with a rational outlook on the world and human life are encouraged to come to the fore.'[7] Such a necessity to rule with superstitions, however, did not exist in the commercial towns of ancient Greece that witnessed the beginnings of European philosophy.

> In Ionia [as Farrington continues] on the Aegean fringe of the Aanatolian mainland, conditions in the sixth century were very different. Political power was in the hands of a mercantile aristocracy and this mercantile aristocracy was actively engaged in promoting the rapid development of techniques on which their prosperity depended. The institution of slavery had not yet developed to a point at which the ruling class regarded techniques with contempt... Miletus, where Natural Philosophy was born, was the most go-ahead town in the Greek world.... The information we possess makes it clear that the first philosophers were the active type of man.... the novelty of whose philosophy consisted in the fact that, when they turned their minds to wondering how things worked, they did so in the light of everyday experience without regard to ancient myths. Their freedom from dependence on mythological explanations was due to the fact that the comparatively simple political structure of their rising towns did not impose upon them the necessity of governing by superstitions, as in the older empire.[8]

But no less significant is the circumstance that this emancipation of philosophical thinking from the obligation to conform to myths, which made the first philosophers of Greece also the pioneers of the real scientific tradition, was after all only a short-lived one. With the further progress of the institution of slavery, when the industrial techniques passed into the hands of the slaves, arose new 'political exigencies — the problem of controlling the mob and the problem of controlling the slave.'[9] Accordingly, the leaders of Greek thought had to revert back to myth-making.

'When Plato came to the end of his knowledge in any direction he had recourse to a myth. Aristotle, in the same passage in his *Metaphysics* in which he claims that true science never had any connection with production, tells us that myth-making is a sort of science.'[10] Comments Farrington, 'It would, in fact, be fair to describe the Platonic myths, like their predecessors in Egypt

and Babylon, as opinions about nature which have a value for the control of men.'[11] This may be doubted by the modern admirers of Plato. But Plato himself, at any rate, was fully conscious of the necessity of enforcing myths with all sorts of propaganda technique on the minds of the people for purposes of legislation. This is clearly illustrated by Thomson[12] with Plato's writings. Here is an extract from Plato's maturest work, the *Laws*:

> — And even if this were not true, as our argument has proved it to be, could a legislator, who was any good at all and prepared to tell the young a beneficial falsehood, have invented a falsehood more profitable than this, more likely to persuade them of their own free will to do always what was right?
>
> — The truth is a fine thing and lasting; yet it is not easy to make people believe it.
>
> — Well, was it hard to make people believe the myth of Kadmos, and hundreds of others equally incredible?
>
> — Which do you mean?
>
> — The sowing of the dragon's teeth and the appearance of the warriors. What an instructive example that is to the legislator of his power to win the hearts of the young! It shows that all he needs to do is to find out what belief is most beneficial to the state and then use all the resources at his command to ensure that throughout their lives, in speech, story and song, the people all sing to the same tune.

In an earlier work, the *Republic*, Plato searched for a solution of the problem: 'How can we contrive one of those expedient falsehoods we were speaking of just now, one noble falsehood, which we may persuade the whole community, including the rulers themselves, if possible, to accept?'[13] In the *Laws*, he turned back admiringly at the petrified culture of the Egyptians and said that the problem was already solved by them:

> — What are the legal provisions for such matters in Egypt?
>
> — Most remarkable. They recognised long ago the principle we are discussing, that the young must be habituated to the use of beautiful designs and melodies. They have established

their norms and displayed them in the temples, and no artist is permitted in any of the arts to make any innovation or introduce any new forms in place of the traditional ones. You will find that the works of art produced there to-day are made in the same style, neither better nor worse, as those which were made ten thousand years ago — without any exaggeration, ten thousand years ago... The Egyptians say that the ancient chants which they have preserved for so long were composed for them by Isis. Hence, I say, if only the right melodies can be discovered, there is no difficulty in establishing them by law, because the craving after novelty is not strong enough to corrupt the officially consecrated music. At any rate, it has not been corrupted in Egypt.[14]

Superstitions, thus, are not only the products of backwardness but also the instruments to enforce stagnation and backwardness by resisting social progress. Now let us return to consider the Indian philosophical situation. As already observed, with the solitary exception of our materialists or the Lokāyatas, none in Indian philosophy dared reject superstitions in favour of a fully rational approach to the philosophical questions. The Greek situation, as reviewed, indicates that a philosopher is not encouraged to develop a fully rational attitude under circumstances that need to perpetrate myths and superstitions for the purpose of what Farrington calls 'controlling men'. Whether such a situation actually persisted in our country throughout the period of our philosophical activities, which, roughly speaking, extended to the later half of the 17th century, and if so, how, within its general structure, the need of 'controlling men' assumed different forms in different ages is of course a matter for detailed historical research. Meanwhile, it needs to be remembered that our law-givers, at any rate, were clearly anxious to enforce measures to prevent the possibility of the philosophers developing any dangerously rationalistic attitude. This is evident from the apprehension with which they viewed those who insisted on logical thinking without regard for the scriptures and who, incidentally, were freely associated by our law-givers with the heretics and the materialists. Here is just one example. Manu, the greatest of the Indian law-givers, said, 'The Vedas are called *śruti* and the Dharmaśāstras (law-codes) the *smṛti;*

the two are beyond the purview of *mīmāṁsā* (application of reason) in every respect... The *dvija* (literally, the twice-born, i.e., the person belonging to the higher caste) who disobeys these two on the strength of logic (*hetuśāstra*) should be driven out of good society, because one who vilifies the Veda is a heretic.'[15] Kulluka, commenting upon this, made the point even clearer: the authority of the scripture (*śruti*, i.e., Veda) and the law-codes (*smṛti*, i.e. as interpreted by Kulluka, *manvādiśāstram*, the law-codes of Manu and others) must not be judged by adverse argumentation (*pratikūlatarka*); and if one tries to do it, he must be ostracised. But, added Kulluka, this does not mean that reasoning in any form is to be abandoned; that is why the law-giver had prohibited only that type of reasoning which is adverse to the scriptures and the law-codes, viz. advanced by the materialists, the vilifiers of the Veda. Manu himself, in his law-code, returned to the same point and repeated that one should not even speak with the heretics (*pāṣaṇḍin*), the transgressors of the caste-discipline (*vikarmastha*), the hypocrites (*vaiḍālavratika*) and the logicians (*haituka*).[16] But why this feeling of apprehension for the logicians? The commentator Medhātithi explained that the logicians are those that deny the next world and the efficacy of gifts and sacrifices. Kulluka added that the *haitukas* or logicians meant *vedavirodhi-tarkavyavahāriṇaḥ*, that is those who employed arguments against the scriptural authority.

The evidences are clear and decisive. At least our law-givers, exercising as they did a stupendous authority on our philosophers, felt that it was quite unsafe for purposes of legislation — i.e. for 'controlling men' — to allow the development of an unimpaired rational attitude. Veneration for the scriptures and the law-codes, which embodied a mythological explanation of the major phenomena of nature and of the *varṇāśrama* or caste inequities, was evidently needed to keep the masses law-abiding and this veneration was under the direct threat of a rational view of things. Under these circumstances, some of the philosophers — like those belonging to the Vedānta system — frankly surrendered themselves to the law-givers and even tried to evolve some kind of rational justification for their acquiescence.

Thus, they argued,[17] no finality could be reached by reasoning alone, because what was proved by one logician was controverted by another; his thesis, again, was disproved by still another, and so on. Final truth, therefore, can be reached only by surrendering to the scriptures. Śaṁkara,[18] in explaining this position, appealed directly to the authority of Manu himself.

Of course, the basic virtue claimed by the Vedānta system is that it is based directly upon the scriptures or the Vedas. But even the followers of the other systems, whose main theses had nothing to do with the scriptures, expressed, at least formally, that the scriptures possessed the highest authority. Thus the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra,* in spite of being primarily interested in discussing the philosophical categories like substance, universal, etc., declared that the Vedas were of the highest authority.[19] Again, though the Nyāya system was above all interested in discussing the problems of logic, the *Nyāya-sūtra* argued that the Vedas could not contain any of the defects as falsity, self-contradiction and repetition, — one of the special points of this argument being that there was nothing wrong in the ritual injunctions of the Vedas.[20] Of course, the Buddhists and the Jainas did not accept the authority of the Vedas; but they had their own scriptures and claimed strict fidelity to these. Only the Lokāyatas or the materialists remained to challenge all these. Condemned practically by all the other philosophers, they declared:

> Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that
> Brahmins have established here
> All these ceremonies for the dead, — there is no other
> fruit anywhere.
> The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves
> and thieves.[21]

4. *Necessity of an Objective Approach*

As we have already observed, it is premature at the present stage of our historical researches to attempt any full explanation of this peculiarity of Indian philosophy, namely that even in its advanced phase it failed to fully emancipate itself from primitive beliefs and myths. But meanwhile what deserves to be noted from the philosophical point of view is the danger following from an attitude of complaisance towards the hangover of the past in our philosophy. For these may contaminate the contemporary judgment and lure it to come to wrong rationalisations. Thus, for example, one result of the continued attachment of Indian philosophy to the past is the incomplete separation of religion from philosophy. This is readily admitted by our modern scholars for it is impossible to overlook the circumstance that such important philosophical systems as the Vedānta or Jainism are still living creeds in the country. In the ancient and medieval days this must have been all the more so. Haribhadra, a Jaina writer of about the 8th century A.D., in his compendium of Indian philosophies, proposed a classification of these according to their doctrines of god and his commentator Guṇaratna went a step further and described the sectarian marks, rituals, etc., distinctive of the different systems. According to him, the Nyāya philosophers, after their morning oblations, thrice smeared their bodies with ashes; they were generally married, but the better among them were without a wife.[1] There might have been some exaggeration in all these descriptions, but it is impossible to reject the whole thing as imaginary. Thus it needs to be admitted that the advanced thinking of these philosophers did not necessarily liberate them from a backward living. It is, therefore, necessary for us today to be critical of this backwardness and separate it from their genuine philosophical contributions. But that is not always done. We rather frequently find subtle, often ingenious, efforts to rationalise and glorify this backwardness itself or its products. Here is a typical example. Hiriyanna writes:

Indian philosophy aims beyond logic. This peculiarity of

the viewpoint is to be ascribed to the fact that philosophy in India did not take its rise in wonder or curiosity as it seems to have done in the West; rather it originated under the pressure of a practical need arising from the presence of moral and physical evil in life. It is the problem of how to remove this evil that troubled the ancient Indian most and *mokṣa* (liberation) in all the systems represents a state in which it is, in one sense or another, taken to have been overcome.[2]

We shall presently see that there is some exaggeration in thus indiscriminately attributing the ideal of *mokṣa* to all the Indian philosophers. For, in fact, the Lokāyatas laughed at it, the early Mīmāṁsakas were indifferent to it and it was grafted on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika not, at any rate, to enhance its philosophical consistency. Nevertheless, some of the important philosophical systems did advance this as the highest human ideal. For the present, we need only note that this importance given to *mokṣa* in Indian philosophy, far from being any recognition of its real greatness, was perhaps the result of a backward and stagnant economy: the prospect of a greater real mastery of the world being denied, a large number of our philosophers sought refuge in the ideal of escaping it. However, from the point of view of our philosophical needs of today, it is necessary to emphasise that whatever is important in the philosophical heritage of India is so not because of the ideal of *mokṣa* but rather in spite of it.

5. *Some Interesting Developments*

It needs at the same time to be pointed out that this peculiar course of development of philosophy in India led to certain interesting results which have no parallel in the West. An outstanding example of this is the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system, usually referred to simply as the Mīmāṁsā.

The Mīmāṁsakas did reach strikingly radical conclusions, some of which are peculiarly near our own. They argued elaborately

for the rejection of God, in fact of any spiritual agent interfering with the mechanical operation of the results of human action. They made delightful fun of the idea of the creation and destruction of the world and of Prajāpati to whom the twin functions are ascribed. They viewed the world instead 'as a constant process of becoming and passing away.'[1] Even the mighty deities of the Vedas were considered to be nothing more than mere names, the worship of whom was therefore meaningless and foolish. They were indifferent to the *mokṣa*-ideal and praised instead the attractiveness of heaven. But the way in which they defined heaven was quite interesting: heaven was sheer pleasure, and not necessarily other-worldly. They also waged a relentless war against philosophical idealism and gave us arguments in the refutation of idealism which, philosophically speaking, remain astonishingly relevant even today. As a matter of fact, this reaction against philosophical idealism led the Mīmāṁsakas to subscribe to a system of epistemology and ontology which, as we shall see, is not of little significance for the scientific trend in our philosophical heritage. They saw, moreover, that the idealistic outlook in our philosophy derived strong support from the so-called mystic trance or *yoga* experience, they mocked at it and said that it was at best some kind of subjective fancy. In a sense, this was quite revolutionary in Indian philosophy; for, apart from the much maligned materialists, none else dared to question the validity of *yoga*.

Because of his own rather well-kown philosophical affiliation, Radhakrishnan naturally feels repelled by this philosophy. 'It is unnecessary', he says, 'to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā as a system of philosophy'.[2] But it all depends on the philosophical attitude one assumes for oneself. The very features of an ancient philosophy that repel an idealist today may attract a materialist. But this does not at all mean that the Mīmāṁsā as a whole can be regarded as a satisfactory philosophy by the modern materialist. For all these radical ideas that formed the philosophical essence of the system flourished in a priest-ridden society and among those for whom there was nothing more important than the priest-craft itself. From this point of view, the same Mīmāṁsā

is also appallingly orthodox and conservative of all our philosophical systems. Its alternative name is Yajñavidyā, 'the knowledge of *yajña* or the Vedic ritual'. The Vedic *yajña* had in fact been the be-all and end-all for the Mīmaṁsakas. Thus in the same system, we come across elaborate defence of the eternity and absolute validity of the Veda, a wearisome analysis of the methodology of the rituals and all sorts of linguistic assumptions conjured up in their defence. This aspect of the Mīmāṁsā, far from having any interest for us today, appears to be the most grotesque futility that human intelligence could ever devise.

Taken as a whole, thus, the philosophy is more like a puzzle. It has put forth radical ideas but this from an absurdly primitive standpoint. But it is precisely this point that invests its study with an interest of its own. The primitivism, in fact, gives us the clue to its radicalism. The crucial question is: What was meant by the *yajña*, an elaborate defence of which the whole of the Mīmāṁsā had been? The best answer to this is suggested by Gordon Childe[3] and others who observe that *yajña* was originally the sympathetic magic of the early Vedic people. Now, magic is not religion and, as we shall see, its basic assumption is pre-spiritualistic and pre-idealistic; in this sense, magic is opposed to both spiritualism and idealism. Presumably because of our stunted technological development, the tradition of the primitive magical ritual survived in the country and the priest-class, to maintain its authority, tried its best to strengthen the tradition. But in course of time, the inheritors of the tradition found themselves confronted with a serious philosophical situation. On the one hand there emerged a strong theistic tendency, greatly popularised by the *Gītā* and philosophically defended by some of the sects of the Vedānta system and the later followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in particular. On the other hand, there developed the most extravagant idealism which, though it has its sources in the Upaniṣads, was first philosophically formulated by a later offshoot of Buddhism, generally known as the Mahāyāna, and greatly popularised among the orthodox opponents of Buddhism by the Advaita sect of the Vedānta. As philosophers, the comparatively later Mīmāṁsakas could clearly see that both these, viz. theism and idealism, strongly went

against the fundamental assumption of primitive magic. They were thus led to refute both and formulate a counter philosophy in defence of the pre-spiritualistic and pre-idealistic magical outlook. The belief in magic has of course to die its natural death. Nevertheless, there survive for us today the strikingly radical philosophical ideas embodying the ideological potentials of what I have elsewhere hesitantly called the proto-materialism of the primitive society.[4]

6. *Variety Despite Rigidity*

THESE facts, however, must not give one the impression that the philosophical development in India, rigid though it was, deprived Indian philosophy of a real richness of variety or that the philosophical systems, because of their moorings in the past, have nothing to contribute to the philosophical needs of our time. For there are other considerations, too, to be taken note of.

First, as already observed, in a very early period a surprisingly large number of conflicting philosophical views did arise in the country and those of which that eventually grew into major philosophical systems, taken as a whole, did actually cover a fairly wide range of possible philosophical perspectives.

Secondly, though it is the material mode of existence that chiefly determines the ideological superstructure, it does not preclude the possibility of philosophy, once having emerged, acquiring a relatively independent mode of development in accordance with its own laws.[1] In other words, within the general thought-structure determined by the material mode of existence, there exists the distinct possibility of ideas developing according to their own peculiar qualities. This process of change may culminate in a final qualitative transformation of the original ideas. This explains how the subsequent philosophical activities in India, though formally confined within the ancient

thought-structures, did in fact often transgress them. Our traditional scholars try to explain such transgressions as but the discoveries of new potentialities in the old thoughts. But such 'new potentialities' had often been so radical that they led to the splitting up of some of the old systems into a number of new sub-systems with real and radical differences among themselves. Thus the Vedānta, in the course of time, gave rise to a number of different philosophies strenuously refuting and rejecting each other. The Buddhist tradition, again, mentions no less than eighteen different schools of philosophy into which Buddhism was eventually split and at least four of these had vital significance for the development of Indian philosophy. To show how these four differed among themselves: the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas believed 'that there is a self-existent universe actual in space and time, where the mind holds a place in equal terms with other finite things', the Yogācāras were subjective idealists contending that 'thought is self-creating and all-producing' and the Mādhyamikas denied the world altogether, refusing to characterise reality either in terms of thought and matter or even in terms of the existent and the non-existent.

7. *Development Through Contradictions*

THUS, in spite of a certain rigidity caused by the adherence to the past, there was in fact the growth of a multifarious philosophical pattern, though such a thing was always formally denied. And when a number of alternative philosophical standpoints emerge, the ideas underlying them develop according to the basic law of dialectics, i.e., development through interconnection and opposition, through clash and conflict, in short, through contradiction. None of our philosophical systems enjoyed an isolation, as it were. Rather, in spite of the circumstance that throughout the medieval period there had been a persistent

tendency to smother out the fundamental differences between a number of them — a circumstance that creates considerable difficulties in reconstructing the original spirit of some of these—the fact remains that from a remote past the different philosophical views came into sharp conflict with each other and the necessity arose for each to reinforce its original stock of ideas. Already the *sūtras* were fighting and rejecting each other and the task of not only defending their systems against attacks of their rivals but also of actively attacking the rivals in order to ensure their supremacy fell on the later philosophers.

The very manner of our philosophical writing is to expound one's own views by way of a critical rejection of the ideas opposed to it. The philosopher first explains a rival point of view as a possible objection to his own. This is called the *pūrvapakṣa*. And only after elaborately showing its hollowness, he proceeds to explain his own conclusion, called the *siddhānta*. In order to make this *siddhānta* really secure, he often proposes to give full credit to the *pūrvapakṣa* first; this is done by raising a number of possible objections against it and answering all these from the point of view of the *pūrvapakṣa;* only after such an alaborate procedure he opens his attack on the *pūrvapakṣa* and proceeds to explain the *siddhānta*. This makes our philosophical writings not always easy to follow and it is sometimes hopelessly difficult for a modern student, uninitiated by a traditional teacher, to move through the maze of the arguments and counter-arguments and disentangle all the view-points contained therein. However, what the traditional teacher himself will hesitate to admit is that this very mode of philosophical writing indicates how strong was the force of the clash of ideas for their development.

But the clash of ideas was not confined to philosophical writings alone. It frequently found expression in open or public debates. 'Such disputations were an outstanding feature of public life in ancient India. They often were arranged with great pomp, in the presence of the king, of his court and a great attendance of monks and laymen. The existence and prosperity of the monastery were at stake. The authorised winner received the support of the king and of his government for his commu-

nity, converts were made and new monasteries were founded'.[1] Stcherbatsky thinks that the earliest treatise on Indian Logic, the *Nyāya-sūtra*, emerged from this technique of public debate, for it was mainly 'occupied by describing the different methods of carrying on a public debate.'[2] He also draws our attention to how a clash of ideas, again, led to the refinement of this methodology of debate into a system of logic proper. 'It is only in the reformed new Brahmanical logic, the logic which emerged from the struggle with Buddhism, that this part is dropped altogether and the theory of syllogism begins to play the central part.'[3]

This leads us to see the greatest phase of the development of our philosophical ideas through conflict and interconnections. It came with the spread of Buddhism, an important feature of which was the establishment of the numerous *vihāras* or monasteries, which were also the universities of the age. Among the subjects taught there philosophy had its eminence.[4] Some of the greatest names in Indian philosophy are those of the *ācāryas* or teachers of these universities and, great difficulties of communication notwithstanding, these used to draw students from the remotest corners of the country, even from abroad. When the full story of these universities is reconstructed, we shall perhaps know better how these created conditions for the intercommunication of thoughts and thereby widened the mental horizons of both the teachers and the students there. It remains to see, of course, the other side of the picture, namely, how, inspite of all the advantages of these monastery-universities, the total withdrawal of the philosophers therein from active participation in social labour eventually created for them an atmosphere favourable for the malignant growth of a world-denying idealistic outlook and, under its shelter, the belief in all sorts of fantastic superstitions. But more of this later, particularly in connection with the philosophers representing the so-called Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The philosophers of the Buddhist universities retained, above all, at least a formal allegiance to the teachings of the Buddha, which were considered to be sharply opposed to the different forms of the orthodox creeds. Therefore, the philosophers out-

side the Buddhist circle, because of their religious zeal, found it peculiarly obligatory to oppose the Buddhists; the Buddhists, too, in their turn did the same in respect of the others. 'By the champions of all established religions in India, the Buddhists were generally regarded as arrogant nihilists, and they, in their turn, called their opponents outsiders (*bāhya*) and pagans (*tīrthika*).'[5] Behind this clash of religious sentiments, however, the real battle fought was often frankly philosophical. For the varieties of ontological and epistemological views developed particularly by the later Buddhist philosophers had little or no relevance for Buddhism as a religion, nor were those of the others the necessary corollaries of their creeds. Thus, for instance, the Nyāya philosophers are traditionally considered to be Śaivas, i.e. the worshippers of Śiva, though it is impossible to see what bearing this has upon the essentially empirical epistemology, their main concern. In any case, there can be no conceivable connection between Śaivism or Buddhism as creeds and the question, e.g., of the number of the constituent propositions of a syllogistic argument. Yet the controversy on this question between the Nyāya philosophers and the later Buddhists—like the controversies over many other questions of overtly epistemological and logical interest — was a long and sharp one. As a matter of fact such controversies and conflicts were of major consequence for the development of Indian logic and it gave us some of the most advanced texts that we have. Dignāga wrote his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* in direct refutation of the Nyāya position as expounded by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Uddyotakara wrote the *Nyāya-vārttika* to defend Nyāya against Dignāga's attack. In continuation of Dignāga's argument, Dharmakīrti wrote his celebrated 'seven treatises', of which the most important was the *Pramāṇa-vārttika*. On the other hand, Uddyotakara's line of argument was carried forward by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, commented upon by Udayana in his *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*. This is how, through what is called the process of 'negation of negation', Indian logic moved on to higher levels. But these are only a few of the remarkable number of philosophical texts that were the direct offshoots of the clash between Nyāya and Buddhism.

and to these are to be added such stupendous works as the *Śloka-vārttika*, written by Kumārila, largely in refutation of Buddhism, though from the Mīmāṁsā point of view.

Kumārila, however, refuted the theism of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as sharply as the idealism of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, and therefore also, by implication, of the Advaita Vedāntists. This is just an instance of how contradictions existed not merely between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists but also among the non-Buddhists themselves. And the latter, too, were of no small consequence for our philosophical development. There were the materialists or the Lokāyatas who debunked everything that formed part of the orthodox outlook, and were in turn the target of constant attack from all sections of orthodoxy. There were the Jainas, again, fighting on both the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist fronts. No less vital were the contradictions between the orthodox systems themselves. We shall presently see that two of our philosophical systems, viz., the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, were strictly orthodox in the technical sense, though tenacious efforts were made to brand as orthodox four other major systems as well, or better, in view of their philosophical affiliations, the two pairs of them, viz., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Now, not to speak of the fundamental opposition between these two pairs, or between any one of them and each of the technically orthodox systems, the orthodox systems themselves were radically opposed to each other: while many of the Vedānta sects were deeply theistic and some of the most famous sects also overtly idealistic, the Mīmāṁsā stood for stark atheism and a thorough rejection of philosophical idealism. Even the genuinely philosophical controversies among the different sects of the Vedānta itself are not to be overlooked. Here is just an example: an advanced philosophical text called the *Advaita-siddhi* had to be written by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with the exclusive purpose of demolishing the philosophical tenets of one school of the Vedānta in favour of another.

To sum up, we can say that contradictions constituted the moving force of development in the field of Indian philosophy. Nevertheless, it is necessary today to place special emphasis

on this, because it is being persistently denied. What is popularised instead is the so-called 'interpretation of synthesis' or *samanvaya-vyākhyā*. According to this, far from there being any real contradictions among our different philosophical systems, they were in fact complementary to each other, inasmuch as they were like the successive steps that ultimately led to the final philosophical wisdom, as found of course in the philosophy of the Advaita sect of the Vedānta system, i.e. the philosophy according to which the ultimate reality – called Brahman or the Self – is of the nature of pure consciousness and as such the phenomenal world we experience is unreal. As Mm. Jogendranath, one of the most eminent of our traditional scholars, puts it, 'The different philosophical streams got mingled in a perfect homogeneity after reaching the great ocean of the one non-dual Brahman.'[6] Tarkalamkara, too, claims that 'there is no reason to imagine that the philosophical tenets of Nyāya, etc., are really opposed to those of Vedānta; rather, we may say that the Vedānta-view is what they really intended to imply.'[7] The obvious doubt would be that if what the other philosophers really intended was the Vedānta-view, why did they not directly say so? The scholar answers, 'They deliberately kept it suppressed, because the students with ordinary intellect cannot all of a sudden understand such a subtle doctrine.'[8] He explains this with the analogy of ascending the steps of a ladder: the ultimate spiritual wisdom needs to be gradually realised and so our ancient sages led their students from the gross views of the materialists to the subtler and ever subtler views of the different systems so that they could finally reach the subtlest of all, i.e. as expounded in the Advaita Vedānta; if the subtlest view is told to the student at the very beginning, he is likely to be ruined with a baffled understanding.[9]

It may be too much to expect of the modern mind all the credulity needed to take such an argument seriously. Besides, there are sound reasons to suspect that this so-called interpretation of synthesis was only an ingenious devise to proclaim the supremacy of the Advaita Vedānta. For, among our medieval philosophers those who overtly subscribed to this system – like Sarvajñātma Muni in his *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, Madhusūdana in

his *Prasthāna-bheda* and Sadānanda Yati in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* — were among the foremost champions of this interpretation. It is, however, to be noted that a good many of our modern scholars, with their pronounced sympathy for the Advaita Vedānta, still implicitly rely on this same tendency, inasmuch as they generally end their treatment of Indian philosophy with a discussion of the Advaita Vedānta, as if it contains the culmination of Indian philosophical wisdom.

However, what is decisive against this interpretation of synthesis is already stated by no less a traditional scholar than Mm. Phanibhusana[10]. As he points out, some other exponents of rival philosophical systems tried the same trick with the purpose, of course, of proclaiming the supremacy of their own systems. Thus, for instance, Vijñāna Bhikṣu, a late exponent of the Sāṁkhya system, in the preface to his *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, argued that the doctrines of the other systems were but the stepping stones to reach the final philosophical conclusions of the Sāṁkhya. Again, Udayana, a famous exponent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in a passage of his *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, 'attempts to show that in its gradual ascent along the path of *mokṣa* (liberation) the soul is confronted with views which broaden out more and more. The different schools of philosophy representing the varied views thus obtained in passing are conceived to form a graduated series, arranged according to an ascending scale of spiritual realisation, and in such a scheme the lower is always supposed to be a stepping stone to the higher and is to be *superseded* by it.'[11] Of course, the Vedāntists try to interpret this passage to prove that though Udayana was formally a writer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises, he was at heart a Vedāntist. But Mm. Phanibhusana shows the futility of such an effort. For, in the same work Udayana argued that if the Vedas did really contain the doctrine of the unreality of the world — which, we should remember, is the basic claim of the Advaita Vedānta—then the charge of containing error (*anṛta-doṣā*) could in fact be brought against the Vedas; but the Vedas were really free from such a fault. Nevertheless, the fact is that like Vijñāna Bhikṣu and some of the well-known champions of the Advaita Vedānta, Udayana, in this early work of his, did attempt some

kind of interpretation of synthesis, though presumably from the point of view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But, as Mm. Phanibhusana argues, such an interpretation can possibly be put forward by any of the philosophical systems and it cannot be seriously subscribed to by any other. The reasons are quite simple. Exponents of each system considered the views of their own system as truth rather than a means of arriving at some other truth as expounded in some other system. Besides, when the great masters of Indian philosophy refuted their rival systems, they refuted these as philosophically false rather than as half-truths conducive to the realisation of what they themselves stood for. Therefore, notwithstanding all the twists of textual interpretation displayed by the champions of this interpretation of synthesis, it is impossible to conceal the real clash of ideas in Indian philosophy or to deny the fact that contradictions constituted the moving force behind the Indian philosophical development.

8. *What is Darsana?*

It follows from the above that no system of Indian philosophy allows any purely isolated treatment. The development of each being largely conditioned by its inter-connections and contradictions with the others, it can be properly understood only by constanly referring to the others. This creates some obvious difficulty in introducing any philosophical system. But there are certain other difficulties with which we are confronted at the very beginning. For, before taking up any of the philosophical systems, it is necessary to be clear about two basic questions. First, how did our philosophers themselves want to understand the concept of philosophy? Secondly, how many are the basic philosophical systems and in what order is it desirable to discuss these?

The commonly accepted Indian word for philosophy is *darśana*. But then we are not quite certain when this word came to be used and what exactly it means. 'The word *darśana*', says Dasgupta, 'in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda which I consider as pre-Buddhistic'.[1] Others would look at it as attributing too high an antiquity to the text; moreover it is highly doubtful whether the word *darśana* there at all meant philosophy. As Tarkalamkara[2] points out, the actual propounders of the systems never used the word to mean their philosophy; only such comparatively later exponents of the systems like Śaṁkara and Udayana used it to mean philosophy. Moreover, Jacobi[3] shows that the genuinely older treatises like the *Artha-śāstra* were quite unaware of the word, the word for philosophy therein being *ānvīkṣikī*, which later came to stand for logic. In any case, there were philosophies in the country before the word *darśana* came to stand for them.

There are also uncertainties as to the actual meaning of the word itself. Derived from the root *dṛś*, 'to see', it literally means the act of perception. But our modern scholars are generally reluctant to see in it any implication of physical perception, or anything like observation either in the ancient Taoist sense or in the sense of the modern European logic. And if this perception is not physical it must be intuitional. But the intuition of what? Of the *ātman* or the self, i.e. the pure ego, conceived by the Advaita Vedānta as the ultimate reality. 'What is the truth', asks Misra, 'which a *darśana* helps us to realise? The only truth – the final aim of Indian thought – is the perception – the direct realisation – of the *ātman*. All the *darśanas* aim at the true knowledge of the *ātman* according to their own angles of vision.'[4] This intuition of the *ātman*, it is further claimed, means *mokṣa* or liberation. Thus *darśana* or philosophy, as conceived by the Indians, means simply the discipline that is conducive to liberation, i.e., the *mokṣa-śāstra*, in Indian terminology. Though the other disciplines, argues Tarkalamkara,[5] are conducive to knowledge in general, *darśana* alone is the discipline that gives the special kind of knowledge which brings liberation. We are even told that this is the distinctive peculiarity of Indian philo-

sophy. 'In the words of Max-Müller', says Hiriyanna,[6] 'philosophy was recommended in India "not for the sake of knowledge, but for the highest purpose that man can strive in this life",' this highest purpose being to discover and follow the 'way to the other shore across the troubled ocean of *saṁsāra*', i.e., the earthly existence as evil.

All this seems to be sliding down too far along the inclined plane of a preconceived interpretation of the word *darśana* under the strong attraction for one particular system of Indian philosophy, viz., the Advaita Vedānta, according to which *ātman* or the Self is the only reality and the realisation of its true nature means freedom from earthly bondage. As for a pronounced bias for this philosophy, our modern scholars are of course quite outspoken. However, without entering into the technicalities of interpreting the word *darśana*, it may perhaps be observed here that the Advaita Vedānta is in fact only one of the philosophies that we had and so, if the word does in fact carry all these implications, its use should better be strictly restricted. To define *darśana* as *mokṣa-śāstra* and then to claim that since all our philosophies were called *darśanas*, Indian philosophy is essentially a striving after *mokṣa*, is not logically permissible and it is not historically correct. The Lokāyata system, for instance, was certainly called a *darśana*, as certainly as it mocked at the ideal of *mokṣa*. The indifference to this ideal of *mokṣa*, again, on the part of at least the early Mīmāṁsakas could not prevent their system being called a *darśana*. Lastly, as we have already observed, there were philosophies in the country long before their exponents chose to call them the *darśanas*.

9. *The Orthodox Classification*

BUT what are these philosophical systems? The answers suggested by the ancient and medieval writers do not unfortunately agree. Kauṭilya, in his *Artha-śāstra*, mentioned only three systems and called these the Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. The Jaina writers like Haribhadra Sūri, Jinadatta Sūri and Rājaśekhara Sūri agreed with Mallināṭha, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the compiler of the *Sarva-mata-saṁgraha* as to the number of the philosophical systems being six, but they gave widely different lists of these six systems. In the most popular compendium of Indian philosophy called the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, the philosophical systems discussed are sixteen in all. But all these did not have the same significance and the differences between some of these are not philosophically so vital. It has, on the other hand, become an accepted practice these days to treat nine systems as of basic importance, though, as we shall see, many a variety of fundamentally different philosophical views actually developed in the name of only these nine systems.

The conventional classification of the nine systems is under two broad heads, the orthodox (*āstika*) and the heterodox (*nāstika*). Though the great grammarian Pāṇini[1] defined *nāstika* as one who did not believe in the other world — and hence an orthodox or *āstika* was for him one who believed in the other world — 'a post-Buddhistic, but pre-Christian, tradition fixed the meaning of the word *āstika* as one who believes in the infallibility and supreme authority of the Veda.'[2] Perhaps the strongest impetus behind this came from the lawgiver Manu who declared that the *nāstika* is simply a vilifier of the Veda (*nastikaḥ veda-nindakaḥ*).[3] In any case, the tradition became firmly fixed and in Indian philosophy the criterion for orthodoxy is usually considered to be the acceptance of the absolute validity of the Veda. The bias behind all these for the Vedic orthodoxy is obvious. The Buddhists and the Jainas had their own scriptures and as such from their point of view the followers of the Veda were themselves to be treated as but *nāstikas*. Besides, though some of the systems are usually treat-

ed as orthodox in this Vedic sense, they have, from the point of view of their basic philosophical doctrines at least, really nothing or little to do with the Veda either in spirit or in content. In spite of these obvious limitations of the conventional classification, however, there is one advantage in beginning with it; for, at any rate, it indicates how great had been the role actually played by the attitude to the Vedic authority in Indian philosophy.

From the standpoint of Vedic orthodoxy, three systems are declared to be heterodox and there can be no doubt of their decisively anti-Vedic attitude. These are: (1) the materialistic philosophy called Lokāyata, Cārvāka or the Bārhaspatya; (2) many a variety of philosophical views that claimed at least a formal allegiance to the teachings of the Buddha, and hence broadly referred to as Buddhist; and (3) another creed-cum-philosophy — perhaps older than Buddhism — called Jainism, the name being derived from *jina*, 'the victor', i.e., one supposed to have achieved complete mastery over oneself by subduing the passions.

Six systems, again, are declared to be Vedic and these are: (1) the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā; (2) the Vedānta, literally 'the Veda-end', also referred to as the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā; (3) the Sāṁkhya, the real meaning of the name like the actual origin of the system being uncertain; (4) the Yoga, though, as we shall see, it primarily stood for a body of practical disciplines rather than any philosophical theory proper; (5) the Nyāya, a system originally interested mainly in the methodology of debate and questions concerning logic; and (6) the Vaiśeṣika, a system primarily interested in the basic categories of the real, like substance, quality, universal, etc.

Of these six systems, the authority of the Veda is actually decisive for only the first two, viz., for the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta. But it remains for us to consider the alleged Vedic orthodoxy of the other four. However, the first question is: what is meant by the Veda, an attitude to whose authority was conventionally considered to be so important in Indian philosophy?

10. The Veda

VEDA literally means knowledge. To the orthodox, it means knowledge par excellence, the sacred or revealed knowledge. Concretely, however, the word stands for a vast body of literary compositions the whole of which must have taken nothing less than two millennia to come into existence. Naturally enough, these are not expected to be homogeneous, either in style or in content.

The earliest of these are orally composed songs and eulogies by a pre-literate pastoral people—those who called themselves the *āryas* (Aryans) and were at some stage of barbarism—and transmitted to the later generations by a method of sheer retentive memory, and hence also called *śruti*, 'that which is heard'. These immensely old oral compositions are traditionally called the *mantra*, one great division of the Veda, the other being the *brāhmaṇa*, which is in prose and is much later.

The Mantras come down to us in the form of four compilations or Saṁhitās, called the *Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā*, *Sāmaveda-Saṁhitā*, *Atharvaveda-Saṁhitā* and the *Yajurveda-Saṁhitā*, often referred to simply as the *Ṛgveda*, *Sāmaveda*, etc. Of these the *Ṛgveda* is the oldest and considered by the Vedic literature itself to be its foundation. There were once many recensions of these Saṁhitās, only a few of which survive for us today. In the only recension in which we now possess the *Ṛgveda*, it contains 1,028 songs or hymns (*sūktas*), each hymn containing 10 stanzas (*ṛk*) on an average—actually 10,552 stanzas in all. In total bulk it is calculated to be equal to the surviving poems of Homer.[1]

Tradition attributes these hymns to different poets (*kavi*), described as the 'seers' (*draṣṭā*). However, these being of the nature of the primitive folk-songs, it will be wrong for us to treat these as the compositions of individual authors. In any case, it must have taken a vast period of time for the ancient songs compiled in the *Ṛgveda* alone to come into existence. Any absolute dating of the *Ṛgveda* as a whole is, therefore, bound to be fallacious. Even the datings attempted by the

modern scholars of its earliest and latest strata widely vary. Winternitz[2] wants to 'guard against the extremes of a stupendously ancient period or a ludicrously modern epoch' and proposes to place the beginning of the *Ṛgveda* at about 2000 or 2500 B.C. This may be taken as a convenient device for forming an idea of the antiquity of the *Ṛgveda* rather than an exact chronology. The archaeologists[3] today are increasingly inclined to the view that those who composed the *Ṛgveda*, after entering India, destroyed and devastated the cities and citadels of the ancient Indus Valley Civilization: on the one hand, the *Ṛgveda* abounds in eulogising its war-hero Indra as destroying cities and citadels in the same area in which the Indus ruins are excavated while, on the other hand, these ruins themselves indicate marks of being destroyed by barbarian attack. If, therefore, this hypothesis is finally established and the dating of the destruction of the Indus cities accurately determined, we shall have surer clues to the Vedic chronology.

But let us confine ourselves to the actual contents of the *Ṛgveda*. Of course the orthodox claim is that the Veda is the repository of absolute wisdom. But an actual reading of the *Ṛgveda* — restrictions to which, incidentally, were legally enforced in the country for the low-castes and also for women[4] — gives one the inescapable impression that like the songs and chants of the surviving pastoral peoples, these hymns, too, were but the simple expressions of the everyday desires — the desire for cattle, food, rain, safety, victory, health and progeny[5]. Except for some of the admittedly late hymns — which at best give the impression of cosmological speculations and in which the modern scholars are sometimes inclined to discover the germs of the Vedic philosophy — philosophical thinking is by no means a feature of the *Ṛgveda*. As such, the later philosophers had hardly anything to draw upon it objectively. Nevertheless, because of a peculiar reverence for the Veda which was somehow or other firmly rooted among our philosophers, efforts were persistently made to interpret some flimsy fragments from the *Ṛgveda* to prove Vedic authority for all sorts of later philosophical views. One typical example may be sufficient.

Udayana, while defending the atomism of the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika, argued that since the word *patatra* – derived from the root 'to go', and therefore implying movement – occurred in a particular passage of the *Ṛgveda* and since the atoms, too, were conceived as moving, the atomic hypothesis was supported by the Vedic authority.[6] But the actual passage of the *Ṛgveda* cited, as belonging to the latest stratum of the compilation, foreshadowed at best some kind of rudimentary theism: the word *patatra*, though it usually means 'the bird', was interpreted here by Sāyaṇa, the best-known commentator of the *Ṛgveda*, as meaning 'moving feet'. Here is the passage as a whole in a rough English translation:

> That unique deity whose eyes pervade all the directions, whose face pervades all the directions, whose arms and feet pervade all the directions—he, after generating the heaven and the earth, directs these with his two arms and moving feet.[7]

This is just an instance of how obviously fanciful it is to seek support for the advanced philosophical views of the later times in those early songs. It is moreover questionable how far even an advanced religious consciousness or any spiritual attitude in a modern sense, is objectively to be found in at least the genuinely older portions of the *Ṛgveda*. There is no doubt that the hymns and songs are full of extravagant praises for all sorts of deities or *devas*. But they are often crassly human heroes, looting food and cattle for the tribesmen and sharing these out among themselves; sitting with them in their assemblies and addressed by them in endearing terms like 'friends' or the 'best of friends',—often simply natural phenomena and inanimate objects even like the hill (*parvata*), the herb (*oṣadhi*), the tree (*vanaspati*), the forests (*araṇyānī*), the weapons (*āyudha*) like the bow and arrows. Sometimes, again, the deities are just the embodiments of purely this-worldly desires, like 'the protection against abortion', 'the protection against consumptive diseases', 'the protection against the nightmare'. A fascinating deity of this kind is Pitu, i.e., food. The barbarian poets with their healthy appetite praised him for being savoury and delicious and because he 'makes the body fat'. In the general context of all sorts of traditional and modern claims attributing the

highest spiritual wisdom to the *Ṛgveda,* this hymn to Pitu may be quoted here for its obvious interest:

Ṛg. I. 187. Deity Pitu. Poet Agastya

I glorify Pitu, the Great, the Upholder, the Strong, by whose invigorating power Tṛta (the famous) tortured the deformed Vṛtra. Savoury Pitu, honeyed Pitu, we welcome thee; become our protector. Come to us, beneficial Pitu; we welcome thee; become our protector. Come to us, beneficial Pitu; a source of delight, a friend well-respected, and having no envy. Your flavours, Pitu, are diffused through the regions, as the dust are spread through the regions, as the winds are spread through the sky. These (men), Pitu, who are your distributors, most sweet Pitu,—they who are the eaters of you and your juices, increase like you with elongating necks. The minds of the mighty gods are fixed, Pitu, upon you; by your active assistance (Indra) slew Ahi. O Pitu, the wealth which is associated with the mountains went to you; hear you, O sweet one, be accessible to our eating. And since we enjoy the abundance of the waters and the plants; — therefore, O body, may thou grow fat. And since we enjoy, Soma, thy mixture with boiled milk or boiled barley; — therefore, O body, may thou grow fat....

The refrain deserves special notice: 'O, body, may thou grow fat'—*vāpāte pīvaḥ it bhava.* This may give us an indication of how far even the Vedānta—a philosophy which claimed to be based upon the Veda—was in fact removed from the true spirit of the *Ṛgveda* itself. For this philosophy is alternatively called the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā and the name Śārīraka is derived from the word *śarīra,* 'the body', by adding to it the suffix *kan* to imply a derogatory sense. The name, in short, tells its own story: it means that it is the philosophy of the spiritual self or *ātman,* which dwells in the defiled body.[8] Presumably, to the virile pastoral people who composed and sang the early hymns and who cared above all for a hearty meal and a heady drink, such an idea would have no meaning at all.

Pitu, of course, is not a major Vedic deity. The more outstanding of them are Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra and others. But they have interest primarily for the students of comparative mythology and perhaps also of ancient Indian history. From

the philosophical point of view, however, the more significant point seems to be that among the Vedic deities there were those named after 'food', the prevention of 'abortion,' 'consumption' and 'the nightmare.' And these indicate that the early Vedic thought was yet to attain a level of high abstraction, and as such, could not in fact contain any philosophical theory in the modern sense.

We have, moreover, here a peculiarly anomalous situation. Though the later philosophers were never tired of claiming Vedic support for their philosophies, according to the strictly Vedic tradition itself, philosophy—or, for that matter, abstract thinking—was far from being the real purpose of the early compilations or Saṁhitās. Rather than that, the four Saṁhitās were considered to be the special Vedas of the four classes of priests engaged in the performance of the *yajña* or the Vedic ritual: the *Ṛgveda* belonged to the Hotṛ priest, *Sāmaveda* to Udgātṛ, *Yajurveda* to Adhvaryu and the *Atharvaveda* to the Brahman priest. There being no ground to reject this tradition outright, the question arises: what was meant by the *yajña* in which the hymns as preserved in these ancient compilations were supposed to be employed? 'The hymns', says Gordon Childe, 'themselves are really also charms sung to enhance the efficacy of sacrifices that were at the same time sympathetic magic rites to secure rain, wealth and victory.'[9] But if the hymns were also charms, these could not have been propitiations in the later religious sense. The corollary is that we have to look for the magical rather than the religious outlook as forming the subsoil of the Vedic belief. This becomes all the more evident as we pass on to consider the other Saṁhitās and, more particularly, the Brāhmaṇas. But before doing so it may be convenient to recapitulate the points of fundamental difference between magic and religion.

11. *Magic and Religion*

GEORGE THOMSON observed:

A religion may be defined as a system of practices and beliefs resting on the assumption that the world is subject to the control of a supernatural force or agency, which can be influenced by prayer and sacrifice and is apprehended by faith as opposed to knowledge.... The lowest savages known to us have no gods and know nothing of prayer or sacrifice. Similarly, whenever we can penetrate the prehistory of civilised peoples, we reach a level at which again there are no gods, no prayer or sacrifice. What we find at this level is magic. Magic rests on the principle that by creating the illusion that you control reality you can actually control it. In its initial stages it is simply mimetic. You want rain, so you perform a dance in which you mimic the gathering clouds, the thunderclap, and the falling shower. You enact in fantasy the fulfilment of the desired reality. In its later stages the mimetic act may be accompanied by a command, an imperative 'Rain!' But it is a command, not a request.[1]

Whenever [observes Frazer] sympathetic magic occurs in its pure unadulterated form, it assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency.... The magician does not doubt that the same causes will always produce the same effects, that the performance of the proper ceremony, accompanied by the appropriate spell, will inevitably be attended by the desired result.... He supplicates no higher power: he sues the favour of no fickle and wayward being: he abases himself before no awful deity. Yet his power, great as he believes it to be, is by no means arbitrary and unlimited. He can wield it only so long as he strictly conforms to the rules of his art, or to what may be called the laws of nature as conceived by him.... But if religion involves, first, a belief in super-human beings who rule the world, and, second, an attempt to win their favour, it clearly assumes that the course of the nature is to some extent elastic and variable, and that we can persuade or induce the mighty beings who control it to deflect, for our benefit, the current of events from the channel in which they would otherwise flow.... The distinction between the two conflicting views of the universe turns on their answer to the crucial question: Are the forces which govern the world conscious and personal, or unconsci-

ous and impersonal? Religion, as a conciliation of the superhuman powers, assumes the former member of the alternative. For all conciliation implies that the being conciliated is a conscious or personal agent.... Thus in so far as religion assumes the world to be directed by conscious agents who may be turned from their purpose by persuasion, it stands in fundamental antagonism to magic as well as to science, both of which take for granted that the course of nature is determined not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically.[2]

Thus, if the theoretical assumption of primitive magic is at all allowed to be formulated in later philosophical terminologies, it may not be wrong to characterise it as not only pre-spiritualistic and pre-idealistic but also as positively hostile to both, for both spiritualism and idealism rest on the assertion of the primacy of the spirit—an assertion which, when expressed theologically, assumes the form of the idea of God as the creator and governor of the world, while, when expressed philosophically, amounts to the claim that the material world given to sensation and perception is after all only an appearance, being dependent on, or the expression of, the ultimate reality which is of the nature of spirit, mind or consciousness. Such an idea of the primacy of the spirit was yet to emerge in the consciousness of the primitive magician. But more of it later.

12. *Magic and the Vedic Literature*

THE element of magic becomes quite conspicuous as we consider the comparatively later parts of the Vedic literature, about whose ritual use our evidences are more direct. Thus, the *Sāmaveda* is an anthology of those portions of the *Ṛgveda* that were specially intended to be sung by the Udgātṛ priest during the performance of the *yajña*. Its essential element is melody. But

these melodies of the *Sāmaveda* came down from a remote antiquity and were supposed to possess a clear magical potency. As Winternitz puts it,

> The priests and theologians certainly did not invent all these melodies themselves. The oldest of them were presumably popular melodies, to which in very early times semi-religious songs were sung at solstice celebrations and other national festivals, and yet others may date back as far as that noisy music with which pre-Brahmanical wizard-priests—not unlike the magicians, shamans and medicine-men of the primitive peoples—accompanied their wild songs and rites... The melodies of the *Sāmaveda* were looked upon as possessing magic power even as late as in Brahmanical times. There is a ritual book belonging to the *Sāmaveda*, called the *Sāmavidhāna-Brāhmaṇa*, the second part of which is a regular handbook of magic, in which the employment of various *sāmans* (melodies) for magic purposes is taught.[1]

Again, the *Atharvaveda* is mainly a compilation of the primitive magical charms designed to secure the fulfilment of a variety of desires ranging from the cure for fever to the winning of the lover's heart.

> Indeed [says Winternitz] many of the magic songs, like the magic rites pertaining to them, belong to a sphere of conceptions which, spread over the whole earth, ever recur with the most surprising similarity in the most varying peoples of all countries. Among the Indians of North America, among the Negro races of Africa, among the Malayas and Mongols, among the ancient Greeks and the Romans, and frequently still among the peasantry of present-day Europe, we find again exactly the same views, exactly the same strange leaps of thought in the magic songs and magic rites, as have come down to us in the *Atharvaveda* of the ancient Indians[2].

The *Yajurveda* marked in a sense the transition from the ancient Mantras to the latter class of Vedic literature called the Brāhmaṇas. This Saṁhitā survives for us in two forms, called the White-*Yajurveda* (*Śukla-Yajurveda*) and the Black-*Yajurveda* (*Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda*), the difference between the two being that while the former contains only spells and formulas used in the rituals, the latter includes declarations of opinions and dis-

cussions on the rituals over and above. Such discussions became the special theme of the Brāhmaṇas. The spells of the *Yajurveda* are partly in verse and partly in prose sentences, usually called 'formulas'. It is to the latter that we are to seek for the characteristic element of the *Yajurveda*: these were called the *yajus*, from which the Saṁhitā took its name. For us, however, these prose formulas hardly make any sense, or even if they do, the sense is grotesque, absurd or even a mere jumble of ideas. These were indeed not intended to have any sense at all; rather, conceived as spells, these were supposed to possess magical potency. Yet the significance of the *Yajurveda* must not be overlooked. It enables us to see how the ancient Vedic peoples looked at their own rituals. The rituals, as assumed by the text, were frankly magical. The *Yajurveda* mentions many deities no doubt, but the purpose is not to please them but to coerce them magically to serve some definite purpose. 'The majority of the sacrificial ceremonies, as also the *yajus* formulæ do not aim at *worshipping* the gods, but at influencing them, at *compelling* them to fulfil the wishes of the sacrificer'.[3]

13. *The Brahmanas and the Upanisads*

THE theoretical discussions of the Black-*Yajurveda* foreshadowed the Brāhmaṇas. These are in prose and the products of a much later period. Excepting for occasional legends and some striking thoughts, everything about the Brāhmaṇas hinge on the *yajña* or the ritual, usually—though not quite accurately—rendered as 'sacrifice' by the modern scholars. How do these texts look at *yajña*? As magic, or essentially magical. 'In the theosophy of the Brāhmaṇas', observes Keith, 'it is an accepted fact that the sacrifice has a magic power of its own, and that it brings about the effects at which it aims with absolute independence.'[1] No

wonder that some of the modern scholars, with their pronounced bias for spiritualism, feel utterly scandalised by the 'brutal materialism' of the Brāhmaṇas: 'Morals have found no place in this system; the sacrifice which regulates the relationship of man with the gods is a mechanical operation which acts by its innermost energy; hidden in the bosom of nature, it only emerges under the magic action of the priest.' 'It is indeed difficult to conceive of anything more brutal or more material than the theology of the Brāhmaṇas; the notions, which custom has slowly refined and clothed with a moral aspect, surprise us by their savage realism.'[2]

The Brāhmaṇas, though much later than the Saṁhitās, were added to these and to the Brāhmaṇas were appended another class of still later literature called the Āraṇyakas or Forest Texts. The concluding portions of the Āraṇyakas were a still distinct class of literature called the Upaniṣads. These Upaniṣads were the latest class of the Vedic literature proper. This gave the texts the name Vedānta or Veda-end. Since some of the later philosophers saw in these also the culmination of the Vedic wisdom, their philosophy, too, came to acquire the same name, i.e. Vedānta.

The word Upaniṣad is generally taken to mean 'secret knowledge.' Its synonym *rahasyam* means mystery and its derivation being *upa-ni-sad*, 'to sit down near someone', indicates some kind of confidential communication. Legends of the Upaniṣads themselves indicate how difficult it had been in those days to earn the confidence of the wise who alone possessed these mysteries: students were undergoing prolonged period of apprenticeship and the kings spending fortunes for the purpose. Here is one such legend:[3]

Janaśruti was a pious dispenser, a liberal doner, who built rest-houses everywhere with the thought, 'Everywhere people will be eating my food.' Now, one night some swans flew past. One swan spoke to another, 'Hey, Ho, short-sight, short-sight—the glow of Janaśruti has spread like the sky. Do not touch it, lest it burns you up.' To this the other swan replied, 'Come, who is that man of whom you speak as if he were Raikva, the

man with the cart?' The first swan said, 'Pray, how is it with Raikva, the man with the cart?' The other swan replied, 'As the lower throws of dice all go to the highest throw, to the winner, so whatever good thing creatures do, all goes to him. I say the same thing of whoever knows what he knows.' Now, Janaśruti overheard this. Then in the morning he asked his attendant to find out this Raikva, the man with the cart. After searching quite a lot, the attendant eventually approached a man—who was scratching his itches sitting underneath a cart—and asked him, 'Pray, sir, are you Raikva, the man with the cart?' 'Oh, I am indeed', he acknowledged. Then Janaśruti took six hundred cows and a gold necklace and a chariot drawn by a she mule, went to Raikva, offered these to him and said, 'Now, Sir teach me the divinity—the divinity which you reverence.' Raikva indignantly refused the gifts. And then, again, Janaśruti took a thousand cows, a golden recklace, a chariot drawn by a she-mule and his own daughter, too, and offered all these to Raikva along with the village in which Raikva lived and prayed to be instructed in his secret knowledge. Raikva, holding the chin of the daughter up, said, not by all these gifts but simply by the attraction of the sweet face that he was going to impart the knowledge.

The picture of a man scratching his itches under a cart and melting down before the attractiveness of the face of a young girl may not exactly answer the popular idea of an Upaniṣadic sage; but the point is that a nobleman of the age—who could have been a petty king of his region—did not hesitate to offer even his own daughter to receive instructions in the wisdom which Raikva possessed. This gives us some idea of the tremendous importance attached to what passed as the secret wisdom or *upaniṣad* in those days. In the course of time, the name Upaniṣad came to acquire fabulous authority and all sorts of texts imitated the title to share it. We have no less than 200 late texts of this kind which have, really speaking, nothing to do with the genuinely old Vedic tradition. There is even one called the *Āllāh Upaniṣad*, expounding the Islamic view and written at the time of Akbar. Such later literary productions apart, 13 texts survive for us which are genuinely old and which belong to the Vedic literature proper. Here is a list of these, indicating their

relation to the principal Āraṇyakas, Brāhmaṇas and the Saṁhitās:

TABLE 1 : VEDIC LITERATURE

Saṁhitā	*Brāhmaṇa*	*Āraṇyaka*	*Upaniṣad*
Ṛgveda	1. *Aitareya* 2. *Kauṣītaki*	1. *Aitareya* 2. *Kauṣītaki*	1. *Aitareya* 2. *Kauṣītaki*
Sāmaveda	1. *Taṇḍyamahā* or *Pañcaviṁśa* 2. *Ṣaḍviṁśa* 3. *Jaiminīya*	1. *Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa*	1. *Chāndogya* 2. *Kena*
White-*Yajurveda*	1. *Śatapatha*		1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 2. *Īśā*
Black-*Yajurveda*	1. *Taittiriya*	1. *Taittirīya*	1. *Taittirīya* 2. *Kaṭha* 3. *Maitri* 4. *Śvetāśvatara*
Atharvaveda	1. *Gopatha*		1. *Praśna* 2. *Muṇḍaka* 3. *Māṇḍūkya.*

Note : Of the above principal Upaniṣads, *Īśā* actually comes to us as the last chapter of the White-*Yajurveda*. Again, though *Aitareya*, *Kauṣītaki*, *Chāndogya*, *Kena*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīya* come down to us as forming part of a Brāhmaṇa or an Āraṇyaka, the others are not so, though these could have been parts of some Brāhmaṇa or Āraṇyaka now lost. Only *Maitri* and *Māṇḍūkya* are late additions to the list of the principal Upaniṣads.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to assign any definite date either to the Brāhmaṇas or to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. In spite of this, however, modern scholars are generally inclined to view these principal Upaniṣads as, on the whole, pre-Buddha,

i.e. earlier than the sixth century B.C. Only the *Maitri* and the *Māṇḍūkya* could be post-Buddha, but even then these could not be much later.

Of these principal Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya* and *Kauṣītaki* are in prose, and, along with the *Kena,* only half of which is in prose, are generally considered to be the oldest. The *Maitri, Praśna* and *Māṇḍūkya,* though in prose, are the latest. The *Kaṭha, Īśā, Svetāsvatara,* along with about half of *Kena,* are assigned an intermediate period. The lengths of the texts, too, greatly vary. In Hume's English translation, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* covers 104 printed pages, *Chāndogya* 98, while the *Māṇḍūkya* only 3, *Kena* 6 and *Aitareya* 8. It is, moreover, to be remembered that the major Upaniṣads are presumably in the nature of compilations. 'All the principal Upaniṣads contain earlier and later elements side by side, and therefore the age of each separate piece must be determined by itself as far as this is possible from the degree of development of the thoughts which find expression in it.'[4]

14. *Emancipation of Thought*

THE line of demarcation between a Brāhmaṇa and an Āraṇyaka, an Āraṇyaka and an Upaniṣad—or even between a Brāhmaṇa and an Upaniṣad—is not always clear. Nevertheless, what is distinctive of the Upaniṣads is a new spirit altogether. We see in these the first emancipation of speculative consciousness from an all-absorbing interest in the magical rituals. Questions of a distinctly philosophical nature could at last be raised and the answers earnestly sought for:

> What is the cause? Brahman? Whence are we born?
> Whereby do we live? And on what are we established?...[1]

There is something strikingly refreshing about this after the weary maze of the liturgical Brāhmaṇas. Of course, the questions

as raised in the Upaniṣads have often an obvious naivete about them and the answers suggested are generally childlike in their simplicity. What is still immensely important is the fact that with these texts we at last reach an age in which at least some of our thinkers could turn away from such obvious futilities as the almost endless discussions concerning the sacrificial implements, spells and of course the fees. The traditional way of acknowledging this shift of emphasis in the Upaniṣads is to call these the Jñāna-kāṇḍa or knowledge branch of the Veda, and this as contrasted with the Brāhmaṇas, its Karma-kāṇḍa or the ritual branch. Of course, as we shall see, this first emancipation of thought from the dead weight of primitive rituals led it—at least in one of its important aspects—to evolve a world-denying idealistic outlook. Historically, however, that is perhaps the fate of pure reason in its first effort to comprehend reality unaided by the verdict of practice or concrete living.

But all these should not mean, as the over-enthusiastic writings of some of the modern scholars may incline us to imagine, that there was in the Upaniṣads an abrupt break with the past or an open revolt against ritualism. There was, in fact, nothing of that nature. We still find the rich patrons of the philosophers—even the great Upaniṣadic philosophers like King Janaka himself—employing priests to perform the *yajña* and the priests vying with each other with profounder knowledge of the ritual details and the consequent demand for a greater sacrificial fee. Even the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*, considered philosophically to be most important, are not free from the reverential speculation on the ancient rituals, some of which must originally have been only the fertility magic of the primitive times.[2] The earlier part of the *Chāndogya*, which is said to be of the nature of an Āraṇyaka, is full of the magical efficacy of the ancient chants: the Vedic songs and melodies are persistently claimed to possess an inherent efficacy in fulfilling the desire for rain, cattle and offspring. Among the metaphysico-psychological discussions of the *Kauṣītaki*, again, are scattered also the 'descriptions of sacrificial rites, by which one can attain some good or other, or effect a love-charm, ceremonies for the prevention of the death of children, and even...magic for the annihilation

of the enemies."[3] All these make the texts quite desultory, both in style and in content. 'The abrupt changes of subject, the absence of any logical method or arrangement, the universal employment of metaphor are constant stumbling-blocks in the way of classification or orderly analysis.'[4]

There is, therefore, some obvious risk in subscribing to Deussen's claim that 'all the Upaniṣads treat of the same subject, the doctrine of *brahman* and *ātman*.'[5] Not that the Upaniṣads do not mention these or that the doctrine does not hold a predominating importance for those texts. However, the circumstance of the philosophical and proto-philosophical discussions existing side by side with all sorts of archaic elements clearly shows that the Upaniṣads are far from being philosophical treatises of the later sense. Further, however much may be the orthodox claim to the contrary, it will be wrong to expect any monolithic philosophical view consistently worked out in the Upaniṣads. Observed Bhandarkar: 'That the Upaniṣads teach not one but various systems must follow from the fact that they are compilations, just as the *Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā is*.'[6] 'If anything is evident', says Thibaut, 'even on a cursory review of the Upaniṣads—and the impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful investigation—it is that they do not constitute a single whole... Not only are the doctrines expounded in the different Upaniṣads ascribed to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one and the same Upaniṣad are assigned to different authorities.'[7] Therefore, in spite of all that is written as *the philosophy* of the Upaniṣads, it is worthwhile to remember that 'their inner structure reveals that they are heterogeneous in their material and compound in their composition,'[8] that in these 'the various strands of thought are almost inextricably interwoven, and the teaching presented is with difficulty reduced to self-consistency.'[9]

Therefore, instead of seeking for any single philosophy in the Upaniṣads, Barua[10] rightly tries to reconstruct the different philosophical views that we actually come across in the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. He looks at these as the views of the different individual philosophers mentioned in the texts. We are thus told of the philosophies of Mahidāsa Aitareya, Gārgyā-

yaṇa, Pratardana, Uddālaka, Bālāki, Ajātaśatru and Yājñavalkya, not to speak of those of comparatively lesser eminence as Suravīra-sākalya, Māṇḍukeya-Kauṇṭharavya, Raikva, Bādhva, Śāṇḍilya, Satyakāma Jābāla and Jaivali. Of these, according to Barua, Mahidāsa Aitareya was 'the father of Indian philosophy', and with Yājñavalkya of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* not only the 'thought of the post-Vedic period came to a close' but was also largely anticipated the future course of the development of Indian philosophy.

As against the orthodox claim of there being only one philosophy in the Upaniṣads, Barua's emphasis on the different Upaniṣadic philosophies has its obvious importance. There may be some exaggeration but there is also an important truth often ignored or overlooked in his assertion that during the time of Yājñavalkya 'the whole of northern India was resounding with the clash of philosophical battle.' However, the value of all these is considerably damaged by the scholar's strange zeal to discover all manner of Greek equivalents in the Upaniṣadic philosophies: Mahidāsa was the incipient Aristotle of India, Gārgāyaṇa the incipient Plato, Uddālaka was both Anaxagoras and Pythagoras. Again, according to him, Varuṇa not only resembled Diogenes Apollonius but also attempted 'to accommodate to the Eleatic principle a non-Eleatic thesis', and Yājñavalkya's 'is the practical mind of Socrates proceeding to the abstract thinking of Plato, or it may well be that his is a Platonic mind leaning to be Socratic.' And so on. Random comparisons like these speak for themselves and they take us away from a sober understanding of both the Greek and Indian philosophies. This does not of course mean that there had been no parallel development of philosophical views in ancient Greece and India. As we shall see, the idealistic view attributed to Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* had a real resemblance to that of Parmanides and Plato or, at any rate, had a similar role to play in the history of our ideological development. There has, moreover, been lots of serious discussions[11] concerning the possible influence of Indian thought upon the development of Greek philosophy, as there might also have been some Greek influence on Indian thought. But this is not the same thing as

finding Greek parallels for every major phase in the development of Indian philosophy.

Further, to what extent real historicity can be attached to the individual thinkers mentioned in the Upaniṣads is still controversial. Thus, for instance, we are as yet far from understanding the true significance of the *vaṁśa* or line of teachers which is found to occur, with major variations, in the Vedic literature—in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and the so-called *Vaṁśa Brāhmaṇa* attached to the *Sāmaveda*. Keith[12] considers that it is credulous to think that such important Upaniṣadic philosophers as Yājñavalkya and Sanatkumāra were historical persons. Moreover, practically the same philosophical view is often attributed by the Upaniṣads to different teachers. At the present stage of our historical knowledge, therefore, it is perhaps safer to accept Thibaut's suggestion that in the age of the Upaniṣads certain broad speculative ideas were in circulation; these were presumably not 'the creation of any individual mind, but the general outcome of speculations carried on by generations'. 'In the Upaniṣads themselves, at any rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required inspiration.'[13]

We shall see later the importance of this observation. For, even at a much later age, some philosophers strictly outside the circle of Vedic orthodoxy—notably a school of the Buddhist philosophers called the Śūnyavādins—did in fact seize and mould in their own way some such mental possessions of the Upaniṣadic age, viz., the one that contained the potentials for the most extravagant form of philosophical idealism, which was seized and moulded in a somewhat similar way by the Advaita Vedāntists—also called the Māyāvādins—who championed strict Vedic orthodoxy. Thus was the remarkable similarity between the idealistic outlook of the Śūnyavādins and the Māyāvādins, notwithstanding all their sectarian animosity for each other. As Madhva,[14] representing a realistic school of the Vedānta, aptly said, 'The *śūnya* of the Śūnyavādins is the same as the *brahman* of the Māyāvādins'. But more of this later.

15. The Vedic Philosophies

Two of our philosophical systems arose in strict continuity with the Vedic tradition, looked upon the Veda as the most infallible authority and claimed to evolve systematic philosophies on the basis of the Veda. These two, though sometimes called the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā, are usually referred to as the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta. But the actual affiliation of these two systems to the Vedic literature is in need of some clarification.

First, none of these was in fact based upon an actual comprehensive survey of the entire Vedic literature. The Vedānta took its stand on the Upaniṣads and claimed to systematise the philosophy contained therein. Not that it expressed any doubt as to the authority of the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas; but it simply ignored them. The attitude of the Mīmāṁsā to the Vedic literature was still more strange. It fabricated elaborate arguments to prove that the entire Veda is infallible and eternal, i.e. not to speak of any human authorship, the Veda could not even have been revealed by God. It quoted the ancient *mantras* profusely, but the purpose was far from evolving any systematic philosophy from what these actually meant. More curious was its attitude to the Upaniṣads. As parts of the Veda, these too were considered eternal and infallible. But the philosophical or proto-philosophical views of the Upaniṣads, far from contributing anything positive to the general outlook of the Mīmāṁsakas, presented them with peculiar difficulties. For these bluntly went against the philosophical views they subscribed to. Their philosophical views followed from their exclusive concern for the *yajña* and the *yajña* being everything for them they wanted to prove that the entire Veda contained nothing but ritual injunctions and prohibitions. This was, however, a palpable absurdity. For, though the *Yajurveda* and more particularly the Brāhmaṇas were full of ritual injunctions, the literal meanings of the *Ṛgveda* and the Upaniṣads could not obviously be so construed. How, then, could all these belong to the Veda? The Mīmāṁsakas came out with an ingenious answer: nothing in

the Veda which was not *prima facie* an injunction was to be understood in its literal sense. In their terminology, these were but *arthavādas*, i.e. indirect or roundabout praise of some ritual injunction. Here is a typical example. The *Yajurveda* said, 'Vāyu verily is the swiftest deity'. There is nothing in the literal meaning of this which can be called injunctive. So the Mīmāṁsakas argued that its plain meaning was not its real meaning. Rather, it needed to be understood in the general context of another Vedic passage that prescribed a ritual with Vāyu as the deity. When so understood, the passage under consideration meant an indirect glorification of the ritual injunction: as Vāyu is a swift-moving deity, so the ritual with Vāyu ensures swift-coming results.

Whether each passage of the entire Veda can actually be construed to yield such indirect meanings is of course a different question. But the Mīmāṁsakas were satisfied with their general theoretical position and said that such indirect glorifications of the ritual injunctions were necessary, inasmuch as the rituals were after all strenuous undertakings and as such were in need of some kind of psychological impetus for being actually performed and the indirect glorifications provided this. The shrewd priests, subsisting on the sacrificial fees, could not have perhaps argued better. Nevertheless, there developed a peculiar ironical situation in Indian philosophy as a result of these later priests trying tenaciously to stick to the ritualistic standpoint. For though the rituals, as explained in the Brāhmaṇas and the extensive Mīmāṁsā literature were invested with distinctive class-interest of the later times — these were imagined to procure all sorts of gains for the rich patrons and were at any rate made to yield real material benefits to the priests in the form of their fees — the understanding of the essential nature of the rituals remained basically primitive, i.e. as magical acts rather than religious propitiations, and the theoretical defence of this standpoint of primitive magic led the Mīmāṁsakas to develop a philosophical view that strongly went against the spiritualistic and idealistic outlooks, and as such appears to be strinkingly radical even today.

16. The Mimamsa

THE *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, the source-book of this system, is a compilation of 2500 aphorisms attributed to a certain Jaimini. Though believed to be oldest among the *sūtra*-works, it is impossible to be exact about its date, which could be between 200 B.C. and A.D. 200. But the actual origin of the philosophy must have been older. Jaimini himself quoted a considerable number of his predecessors and the theoretical discussions concerning the rituals, the special theme of the Mīmāṁsā, were already vigorously undertaken in the Brāhmaṇa literature, of which the Mīmāṁsā was the direct outcome.

The name Jaimini is very old but nothing historical is known of him. One of the recensions of the *Sāmaveda*, as well as a Brāhmaṇa appended to it, bore his name. Peculiarly enough, the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* itself mentioned the name Jaimini, and at least once, as a distinct opponent. Presumably, there were other older Mīmāṁsakas bearing the same name but differing in matters of ritual details. It is therefore argued that Jaimini was an ancient *gotra* or clan-name.[1]

The earliest extant commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* was by Śabara, and hence called the *Śābara-bhāṣya*. Nothing hitorical, again, is known of him. Jha[2] thinks that his date could not be later than A.D. 400. But there were commentators older than Śabara, whose views and writings he quoted. The most notable of them was referred to as a certain Vṛttikāra. Such older commentaries are, however, lost and the *Śābara-bhāṣya* remained the basis for all subsequent discussions of the system.

The greatest Mīmāṁsakas after Śabara were Prabhākara and Kumārila. Both commented upon the *Śābara-bhāṣya*. Apart from his major work called the *Bṛhatī*, Prabhākara wrote a smaller work called the *Laghvī*. Kumārila's work consisted of three parts, called the *Śloka-vārttika*, *Tantra-vārttika* and the *Ṭupṭikā*, of which the first is philosophically most significant.

The differences between Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara were strong, sometimes even fundamental. This resulted in the

splitting up of the Mīmāṁsā into two schools, called the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara schools, after the names of these two exponents. The usual story is that Prabhākara was a student of Kumārila, though because of his severe criticism of the master he was sarcastically called *guru* or preceptor by Kumārila himself. But Jha[3] considers this to be baseless. Prabhākara, according to him, was a senior contemporary of Kumārila and Kumārila may have lived in A.D. 700. The story of Kumārila being defeated by the great Advaita Vedāntist Śaṁkara is rejected by Keith[4] as a palpable fable, because Kumārila must have been earlier than Śaṁkara.

The most notable exponent of the Prabhākara view was Śālikanātha, who lived possibly in the 9th century A.D. His *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* is taken to be the standard exposition of the school. He wrote besides the *Ṛjuvimalā* and the *Dīpaśikhā*, commenting upon Prabhākara's *Bṛhati* and *Laghvī* respectively. Works expounding the Bhāṭṭa view are really numerous, the most notable of the authors being Maṇḍana Miśra, who was a little later than Kumārila, and Pārthasārathi Miśra, who could have belonged to the 16th century A.D.

The Mīmāṁsā forms the stock-example of how an orthodox system of Indian philosophy is under no necessary obligation to admit the existence of God. Feeble and quite fanciful efforts are sometimes made by the modern scholars[5] to prove that this orthodox philosophy par excellence could not possibly be atheistic. As against all these we may quote Khaṇḍadeva, himself a reputed Mīmāṁsaka of the 17th century, to show how, in the later atmosphere strongly influenced by theism, he looked back at the original atheism of the system and felt utterly scandalised – even horror-struck – by it. 'Thus', he said, 'are explained the views of Jaimini. In saying all these, my words are polluted. There is hope only in a surrender to God.'[6]

Others among the modern scholars consider the denial of God as the greatest weakness of the Mīmāṁsā system. Referring to the absence of God in the system, Radhakrishnan[7] observes, 'This lacuna of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā was so unsatisfactory that later writers slowly smuggled in God.' It is true, of course, that

writers like Vedānta Deśika and Āpadeva did try to 'smuggle in God' into the Mīmāṁsā. But Vedānta Deśika himself was no real representative of the Mīmāṁsā, his own philosophical affiliation being to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. Besides, as it is aptly observed, the very title of his work, namely, *Seśvara-mīmāṁsā* or 'Mīmāṁsā with God', clearly indicates how the concept of God was really alien to the original spirit of the Mīmāṁsā. Again, Āpadeva's God was supposed to have retained the Veda during the time of universal dissolution or *pralaya*. But this could be said only in complete disregard of the authentic standpoint of the older Mīmāṁsakas, for, in spite of all their differences, both Kumārila and Prabhākara elaborately argued why the conception of *pralaya*, like that of *sṛṣṭi* or the creation of the world, was at best a fiction.[8] In any case, the real propounders of the system, far from being bothered by any imaginary lacuna in it caused by the absence of God, were quite anxious to explain why the admission of God went against the fundamentals they stood for. But before taking up the real reasons for their denial of God it will perhaps be better to consider how they actually argued their case.

Śabara's[9] argument for the rejection of God is simply that there is no evidence of His existence. Sense-perception does not reveal God and the other sources of knowledge are after all based upon the sense-perception. But the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in particular claimed to offer proofs for the existence of God and as such both Prabhākara and Kumārila had to argue elaborately against them.

Everything which is made of parts, according to the major argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, i.e. which is neither atomic nor infinite in magnitude, is of the nature of the effect, just as a pot is; and, as an effect, it is in need of a cause in the form of an intelligent agent, like the potter in the case of the pot. Everything in this world—or, the world as a whole—is made of parts; therefore it is of the nature of an effect and as such must be in need of a cause in the form of an intelligent agent. Considering the magnitude of the task this intelligent agent is supposed to perform, He must be conceived as omniscient, omnipotent, etc., i.e. God. He creates the world from the atoms.

the eternal material cause of the world, and periodically also destroys it.

Both[10] Kumārila and Prabhākara came out sharply against this argument. According to both, the individual things of the world have their beginnings and ends; but this does not mean that the world as a whole is ever created or destroyed. Therefore, rejecting the idea of the periodic creation and dissolution of the world, both argued that there is only 'the constant process of becoming and passing away'. As for the cause of the individual things of the world, nothing more need to be assumed than what is actually observed. Thus, for instance, the mundane parents rather than any extra-mundane God are observed to be the causes of the offsprings; why then assume anything more to explain their coming into being?

Kumārila, as was characteristic of him, turned the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument against itself. The whole argument rests on the instance (*dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*) of the potter causing the pot. Now, if the potter be the real cause of the pot then God is not obviously its cause, and as such it is useless to think that God causes everything in the world. If, on the other hand, God is actually conceived to be the cause of everything in this world, then the potter cannot be the real cause of the pot. In other words, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have to renounce either their conclusion or the instance on which it is based, for the instance clearly goes against the conclusion.

Another stock argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas for the existence of God is usually referred to as the moral argument. It is broadly as follows. Because of the law of *karma*, every individual must reap the fruits of his own actions, good or bad, right or wrong. The good actions produce a certain merit and the bad ones a certain demerit, which persist even after the actions are over. The accumulated stock of merits and demerits is called *adṛṣṭa*, which is supposed to produce its proper consequences. Peculiarly enough, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, *adṛṣṭa* itself is something unconscious and unintelligent, and their further assumption is that something unconscious cannot guide itself. So it is necessary to admit the existence of an intelligent agent who alone can guide *adṛṣṭa* and the intelligent agent

that guides the *adṛṣṭa* of all the individual souls must be eternal, omnipotent and omniscient. But, argued Prabhākara, the whole conception of God supervising the *adṛṣṭa* of men is idle. First, God cannot have any knowledge of *adṛṣṭa;* because *adṛṣṭa* being imperceptible such a knowledge cannot be perceptual, and any other form of knowledge presupposes the operation of mind associated with body (while God is supposed to have no body). Secondly, even if God had this knowledge, the supervision of *adṛṣṭa* on his part would have been impossible. For the supervision would require some connection between God and *adṛṣṭa.* This connection can be either contact (*saṁyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*). Contact is possible only between two substances while the *adṛṣṭa* is a quality rather than a substance, even if God is a substance. Again, a quality can enter into the relation of inherence only with the substance of which it is a quality; therefore *adṛṣṭa,* which is a quality of human souls, cannot have a relation of inherence with God.

Kumārila, moreover, made delightful fun of the internal inconsistencies involved in the theistic position. A disembodied soul cannot create anything. To create, therefore, the creator or Prajāpati needs to have a body. But as none can create his own body, another creator will be necessary to create the body of the creator, and so on *ad infinitum.* Again, even a fool does not do anything without a purpose. But what can be the purpose of an omnipotent and all-merciful God creating such a world full of pain and misery? It needs to be remembered here that Kumārila extended his arguments even against the conception of creation as advanced by the Vedānta. According to this, *brahman* or pure consciousness is the ultimate reality and creation is due to the indescribable ignorance called *māyā.* But *māyā,* argued Kumārila, was conceived to be as unreal as a dream and as such could not create anything. Besides, what could be the cause of the creative activity of *māyā* itself? It could not be eternal, for in that case creation itself would be so; nor could the activity of the *māyā* be created by the *brahman* which was conceived to be ever-pure and detached. And on the Vedānta view there was obviously no third alternative.

But why were the Mīmāṁsakas so keen on rejecting the exist-

ence of God? The real clue to their atheism is to be found in their way of looking at the Veda and the Vedic deities. As already observed, the whole of the Veda was viewed by them as nothing but a body of ritual injunctions. At the same time, the Vedic texts mentioned all sorts of deities in connection with the performance of the ritual. How then was the relation between the rituals and the deities to be conceived? Were the rituals mere acts of worship meant to please the deities so that they would grant the desired results? Śabara[11] went into great details of the question and answered it with an emphatic 'No'. The deities had no substantive forms and as such could neither eat the oblations nor get pleased by them. Moreover, there was no question of their granting the desired results because they had no real lordship over the wordly things that were desired and had no way of connecting the things desired with the performer of the rituals. What then were the Vedic deities? Śabara in fact went to the extent of arguing that for a Mīmāṁsaka there was no objection to viewing them as but mere names or sounds necessary for the ritual spells, leaving the modern scholar[12] to comment, 'Is the sound *Indra*, then, all that is left of the great Vedic hero or god? It may be so. Mīmāṁsā is not concerned with that, in effect it does not know'—or perhaps, to be more accurate, the Mīmāṁsā did not bother.

In short, as Śabara categorically asserted, the rituals were not acts of worship or propitiation. Śabara's elaborate discussion of the whole subject makes it quite clear that he was trying to draw a sharp distinction between the rituals as understood by the Mīmāṁsakas and what is usually understood as the essense of religion. And, since he argued that the rituals by themselves, i.e. mechanically or by their own inherent potency and according to their intrinsic laws produced their results, it is quite evident that what he meant by the rituals was the magical acts as we know them today.

This is confirmed by the way in which the theists criticised the Mīmāṁsakas. Rāmānuja[13] said that according to Jaimini the rituals *by themselves* produced the desired results, just as in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like brought about their own rewards, directly or indirectly. As against this,

Rāmānuja maintained the view of 'awarding of rewards by the Supreme Person, since the scriptural texts referring to the different *yajñas* declare that the deities only — Agni, Vāyu and so on — who are propitiated by the sacrifices — which are nothing else but means to propitiate the deities — are the cause of the rewards attached to the sacrifices.' These two were, therefore, the alternative ways of looking at the Vedas and the Vedic deities and between the two there was all the difference between magic and religion.

It was of course quite natural for the Mīmāṁsakas to take a magical view of the Vedic rituals. For they were after all the inheritors of the Brāhmaṇa tradition and, as we have already seen, the Brāhmaṇas, in spite of grafting upon the primitive rituals the later class-interest of the priests, persisted in viewing the *yajña* as essentially magic. However, for the primitive magician, there was no question of defending logically the efficacy of the magical acts. For the later philosophers defending the same theoretical understanding of the rituals, it must have been quite different. As against the inherent efficacy of the magical acts, an important objection was raised in the later times. These rituals were generally imagined to produce results in the future, i.e. some time after the act was over. But how could something which had ceased to exist produce any result at all? In answer to this, the Mīmāṁsakas developed their theory of the *apūrva*, i.e. of an unseen force produced by the ritual acts which continued to operate even after the act itself was over and up to the time of the accomplishment of the actual result. And with this theory of *apūrva*, the Mīmāṁsakas started on a fabulous elaboration of its imaginary details.

The clue to everything about the Mīmāṁsā, therefore, is to be sought in the assumption underlying the primitive magic. The task of defending this primitive assumption in the atmosphere of the advanced philosophical views came on later sophisticated thinkers like Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara. This resulted in the strange ideological affiliations of the Mīmāṁsakas. The defence of the theistic position was offered by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, against whom the Mīmāṁsakas, as champions of the pre-spiritualistic assumption underlying primitive magic, had to

come out sharply. At the same time, they had to evolve some kind of united front with these Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas themselves. Referring to the Mīmāṁsā, Hiriyanna wonders, 'Some of its minor tenets may be allied to what is found in the philosophical portions of the Veda; but, strange as it may seem, the larger part of them and the more important among them have... been borrowed from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.'[14] But this was quite inevitable. Among the tenets of the philosophical portions of the Veda, i.e. of the Upaniṣads, that which eventually became quite powerful was a predominantly idealistic one. The Mīmāṁsakas, far from drawing upon this, found it peculiarly obligatory to resist and reject it, because, as we have seen, the fundamental assumption of primitive magic is not only opposed to spiritualism but also to philosophical idealism. In resisting this idealistic outlook the Mīmāṁsakas found their natural allies in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who, in spite of their theism, were determined opponents of philosophical idealism.

Before taking up the refutation of idealism by the Mīmāṁsakas, it may be useful to have some preliminary idea about the idealistic outlook in Indian philosophy. Idealism is the view that attributes primacy to the spirit, consciousness or mind, i.e. considers it as the fundamental reality and as such makes the material world given to us in our sensations, etc. dependent on it. Historically, as we shall see, such a view was first clearly foreshadowed in the Upaniṣads, i.e. roughly in the 6th century B.C. But the Upaniṣads were not philosophical treatises proper and the idealistic outlook was proclaimed in these mainly in the form of some mystical or intuitive realisation. The work of evolving a philosophical defence proper of this idealism was first taken up by certain philosophers outside the Vedic orthodoxy, namely those who are generally called the Mahāyāna Buddhists, though subsequently it was carried forward by the Advaita Vedāntists with their rigid adherence to the Vedic orthodoxy. Of the two important philosophical schools of the Mahāyāna Buddhists one was called the Yogācāra, the greatest representatives of which belonged to c. 5th century A.D. Its general philosophical conclusion was practically the same as that of Berkeley in European philosophy, one of its main arguments, too, being

that since you cannot jump out of your own ideas and know an object apart from the knowing mind, the ideas alone are real and therefore the material world does not exist. However, there was an important difference between the Yogācāra Buddhists and Berkeley and that introduces us to the characteristic peculiarity of Indian idealism. Although Berkeley denied the external material world and viewed everything as but mere ideas of the mind, he was clearly anxious to differentiate facts from fictions, i.e. to avoid a chimerical scheme of things. This he sought to do by taking recourse to God. Everything was mere idea of course, but the ideas imprinted on the senses were not mere ideas of our own, like our fancies or imaginations, but the ideas of God, of Mind, Spirit or Author. But the Buddhists were atheists and therefore there was no question of the Yogācāra philosophers following such a line of argument. Rather they thought that since ideas alone were real, the world of experience, because it was not experienced as something mental or ideal, was frankly fictitious. As Vasubandhu, the greatest representative of the Yogācāra school, opened his treatise:

> All this world-show is nothing but a manifestation of consciousness and has no reality apart and aloof from consciousness, pure and simple. The things that appear as contents of consciousness are absolutely unreal. That is to say these phenomena have no objective status and are merely subjective ideas. The whole world of appearance has no better status than the hallucinations of a man of diseased vision, who sees a tuft of hair or double moon and so on and so forth.[15]

This will perhaps be called illusionism rather than idealism as ordinarily understood. Whether such a position necessarily follows from the the idealistic outlook is of course a different question. Berkeley, as we have seen, had to appeal to God to save idealism from slipping into it. But the Indian idealists did not bother: if the world of experience had no intrinsic reality, what after all could be its status other than that of the objects of dreams or the contents of everyday illusions? In fact, they counted much on the evidences of the dreams and sense-illusions to prove the general possibility of something intrinsically mental appearing as objective reality? Moreover, beginning with the

Upaniṣads, our idealists showed a marked tendency to establish the primacy of the spirit by proving the unreality or the illusory character of the material world. This tendency was carried to its extreme by the Mādhyamika school, the other philosophical offshoot of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the Advaita Vedānta; both argued vehemently that the phenomenal world was utterly unreal. Moreover, argued our idealists, since the world was unreal and since the so-called sources of our valid knowledge pretended to present it as something real, these were to be considered as invalid and false. We have here the clue to the doctrine of the intrinsic falsity of knowledge, which, though generally attributed to the Buddhists, was, as we shall see, logically the position of all the Indian idealists inclusive of the Advaita Vedāntists.

We may now proceed to consider the refutation of idealism by the Mīmāṁsakas. Kumārila[16] explained the necessity for it from the Mīmāṁsā point of view. If everything was unreal, then neither the ritual acts nor the fruits thereof — in short, nothing with which the Mīmāṁsā was basically concerned— could have any meaning; or, if the world was like a dream then instead of the strenuous undertakings in the form of the ritual performances, people would prefer to fall asleep and enjoy pleasures in their dreams. Thus the incentive to refute idealism did not come from what we call a scientific urge. But the incentive being once there, it carried the Mīmāṁsakas to develop strong philosophical considerations against the idealistic outlook.[17]

Already the Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabara, proceeded to refute idealism. According to idealism, there was nothing that could be called extra-mental. The object of knowledge was only a piece of knowledge itself, i.e. an idea. The different forms perceived were only forms of knowledge and not of any hypothetical extra-mental object. To prove this, the Indian idealists repeatedly cited the instances of the dreams and the sense-illusions: the elephant dreamt of, like the snake wrongly perceived in the rope, was after all only mental; and there being no sure criterion to distinguish between the dreaming and the waking experiences, the objects perceived in the normal waking

experiences, too, were to be understood in the same way. The corollary was that all knowledge, because of their pretentious claim to reveal the extra-mental, were to be treated as false. But, argued the Vṛttikāra, what was perceived could not be a mere idea, nor the form perceived could be a form of knowledge itself, because there was an objective coercion about the acts of perception. In the presence of the cloth one was bound to perceive the cloth and had no option to perceive the pot. Perceptions, thus, revealed the extra-mental objects and not thought itself. Besides, it was useless to argue that all perceptions were like the dream-experiences or the sense-illusions, because the dreams were eventually negated by the waking experiences and the illusions by the correct perceptions that followed. When so negated, they were found to arise from defective causes: dreams from sleepiness, illusions from the want of proper illumination, etc. But the normal waking perceptions were not so negated and were not found to arise from the defective causes. On the other hand, argued the Vṛttikāra, the normal waking perceptions were characterised by clearness and distinctness (*supariniścaya*), i.e., as contrasted with the dreams and the sense-illusions, carried their own certainties.

Both Prabhākara and Kumārila continued the Vṛttikāra's line of argument against the idealists. We may, however, concentrate particularly on Kumārila, in view of his outstanding importance to Indian philosophy. Idealism, he said, was based on a twofold consideration, one epistemological (*pramāṇāśrita*), the other ontological (*arthaparīkṣaṇāśrita*). In Indian philosophy, the latter meant primarily a criticism of the atomistic hypothesis, perhaps because most of the opponents of idealism shared the atomistic hypothesis in their explanation of the objective reality. But atomism being pre-eminently the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, it will be appropriate for us to consider the idealistic objections against it while discussing that system. Kumārila, too, concentrated chiefly on the epistemological arguments of the idealists, obviously because it was by far their strongest point. This epistemological argument, again, was twofold: Kumārila called the first inferential (*anumānāśrita*) and characterised the

second as being based on an examination of the faculty of perception (*pratyakṣa-śakti-parīkṣaṇāśrita*).

The inferential argument of the idealists was summed up by Kumārila as follows: 'The perception of the pillar, etc. is false, because it is a perception; and whatever is perception is found to be false, just as the dream-perceptions, etc. are.' This was the standard form of the Indian syllogism, in connection with which it needs to be remembered that a 'typical example' (*udāharaṇa* or *dṛṣṭānta*) on the strength of which the universal relation (*vyāpti*) between the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) plays what is called a 'pivotal role'. In examining the above syllogism Kumārila, therefore, concentrated specially on the typical instance upon which it hinged. That the dream-perceptions were false was of course readily admitted by everyone. But what was the real ground for this admission? Evidently the following: on waking up one realised that it was so. This meant that the falsity of the dream-perception was ascertained on the strength of the waking perception. But how could the waking perception, without itself being true, thus pronounce falsity upon the dream-perception? In other words, to reject the dream-perception as false it was necessary to accept the waking-perception as true, and thus the instance of the idealists went against the conclusion they sought to establish. Kumārila, therefore, offered a counter-syllogism against the idealistic one: 'All knowledge of the external objects is true, because there is no other knowledge negating it, just as the waking experience that negates the dream-experience is true.'

As against this, the only possible defence of the idealistic position could be that even the waking experience that negated the dream-experience was itself ultimately negated. As a matter of fact, as we shall see, beginning from the Upaniṣads there developed a tendency among the idealists to claim that even the so-called normal waking experiences were ultimately negated by the super-normal experience of the mystic or *yoga* trance. Kumārila could clearly see how the idealistic outlook wanted to derive for itself support from such a claim. So he argued against the possibility of the mystic or *yoga* experience itself. There was no possibility, at any rate in this life, of anyone attaining

such an experience. Besides, if one system of philosophy could claim support to its conclusions on the strength of the experiences of the mystics belonging to that system, others could as well produce their own *yogis* and draw support to their conclusions from the mystic experience gained by them. In short, the so-called *yoga* experience was to Kumārila nothing more than sheer fancy.[18]

Incidentally, such a summary rejection of the *yoga* experience was itself quite revolutionary for the times. For, apart from the materialists, none else in Indian philosophy could dare question the validity of *yoga*. We quote Stcherbatsky.

> The psychology of trance is indeed a characteristic feature of many Indian systems, not Buddhism alone. It appears almost inevitably in that part of every Indian system which is called 'the path' (*mārga*) in which the means of a transition out of the phenomenal world into the Absolute are considered. With the exception of the orthodox Mīmāṁsakas and the materialists, every system in this part, but not in others, contain a certain amount of mysticism.... However, just as the European mind is not altogether and always free from mysticism, so is the Indian mind not at all necessarily subject to it. Not to speak about numerous materialistic doctrines, the orthodox Mīmāṁsakas themselves held about *yoga* an opinion which probably represents just what all of us, so far we are not mystics, think about it, viz. that *yoga* is sheer imagination, just as any other ordinary fanaticism.[19]

But to return to Kumārila's refutation of idealism. Along with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, he wanted to go deeper into the question of the falsity of the dream-experiences. But what exactly was meant by the phrase 'falsity of dream-experience?' To the idealist it meant that there were no real or extra-mental objects corresponding to those that were dreamt of, i.e., this falsity meant objectlessness, *nirālambanatva*. But, argued Kumārila and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, this was just absurd. The dream-experience was false only as an experience; nevertheless the objects dreamt of were real entities actually existing in the external world, though, from the point of view of the dreamer, in a different space-time context. But how could the dreamer thus experience objects that belonged to a different place and a different time? Kumārila's answer was quite simple. Dream-

experience, rather than being a form of perception, was only a form of memory; in memory one recalled real objects that were perceived anywhere and any time. But, as we shall see, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were not satisfied with such a simple answer.

The idealistic argument based on the analysis of perception was substantially the same as offered by Berkeley: whenever you knew an object, that of which you had the real immediate evidence was something mental—a perception or an idea. Therefore, there was nothing extra-mental. In Indian terminology, this was called the *sahopalambha-niyama*, the rule that everywhere the experience of the object meant the experience of knowledge itself. But there was no proof, argued Kumārila, that the knowing mind and the object known was identical. The activity of knowing and the passivity of being known could not belong to the same thing. At the time of perception one inevitably realised that one perceived the object rather than one's own mental state. Thus, while perceiving different colours one did not realise that these colours belonged to his mental state; the realisation, on the contrary, was that these were colours of different objects. Further, if the knower and the known were really identical then there could be no point in separately referring to the two; if, on the other hand, there was any real meaning in separately referring to the two then there could be no sense in saying that the two were identical. Besides, on the idealistic assumption of the identity of the knower and the known, the diversity of our perceptions could not be explained. One had the perception sometimes of cloth, sometimes of pot, or of some other thing. Such diversity could not have come about, from the idealistic point of view, because of the diversity of the objects. So they had to invent some other reason to explain it. The Buddhist idealists claimed that because of an eternal series of *saṁskāras*, i.e., traces of past experiences, there arose an infinite number of mental states, which played the dual role of the knower and the known. But a *saṁskāra*, argued Kumārila, was meaningless without some previous perception, which perception, again, was meaningless without the object.

We have already seen how Indian idealists depended vitally on the evidences of illusory perceptions. These were instances,

according to them, which showed that even waking perceptions were not necessarily perceptions of the objectively real. As a consequence, the problem of illusion acquired considerable importance in Indian philosophy and different theories were put forward by the representatives of different systems, both idealistic and anti-idealistic. We had thus five major theories of illusion, three of which came from the idealists and two from their opponents. The three idealistic theories have come to be called Asat-khyāti, Ātma-khyāti and Anirvacanīya-khyāti—associated respectively with the Mādhyamika Buddhists, the Yogācāra Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntists. According to the first, illusion was the apprehension of the non-being as the being; according to the second, illusion was the apprehension of the subjective as the objective, while the third viewed illusion as the apprehension of an indescribable unreality somehow or other temporarily created. We shall later see the differences of details among these three theories. For the present what interests us is how all these three theories were meant to justify the idealistic position. For that which bothered the idealists most was the felt reality of the material world. Therefore, the idealists wanted to explain it away by showing that the same felt reality was also there in the case of illusory perceptions in spite of the fact that these perceptions were not the apprehensions of the objectively real. If the rope perceived in the snake was non-existent though appearing as the existent, or an idea appearing as an object, or indescribably unreal while appearing to be existent—there was the clear possibility that what appeared to be real in the case of other perceptions was not so; as a matter of fact, claimed the idealists, this took place in all cases of normal waking experiences. Therefore, apart from insisting on the essential difference between the illusory perceptions and the valid ones, the opponents of idealism had to prove that even in the illusory perceptions there was no question of the non-existent or the barely mental or the indescribably unreal appearing as the real. This led them to develop their alternative explanations of illusions.

As an extreme reaction against the idealistic tendency to count on the evidences of illusion for the purpose of explaining away

the evidences of the normal or valid perceptions, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas wanted to deny the facthood of illusion as such. This was the essence of their theory called A-khyāti or non-apprehension. According to this theory, what the others considered to be cases of illusions were nothing but cases of the want of apprehension of the true distinction between two imperfect cognitions. One of these was usually of the nature of perception, the other of recollection. Thus, for example, in the typical case of the so-called snake-rope illusion, what actually took place were two imperfect pieces of knowledge. First, the perception of the rope, though not in the form of a full-fledged perception of the rope, but in the form of an imperfect perception of it in a general way as something barely 'this' (*idam*), i.e., without the distinctive features of the rope. Secondly, the recollection of a snake previously perceived, though again not in the form of a full-fledged recollection, i.e., a recollection with the association of the time and place where it was previously perceived. In the Prābhākara terminology, such a recollection was called the *pramuṣṭa-tattāka-smaraṇa,* 'recollection of an object robbed of its that-ness'. The error, in this view, consisted simply in the failure to have the apprehension of the proper distinction between these two separate pieces of imperfect cognitions. It was thus non-apprehension rather than any real apprehension. Nevertheless, argued the Prābhākaras, these two pieces of cognitions, though incomplete, were cognitions of real objects rather than of the absolute nothingness or of the barely mental or of the indescribably unreal. Insisting thus on the real or the objective content of both the pieces of cognitions, the Prābhākaras felt ensured against epistemological idealism.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas offered another theory of the illusory perception which, though differing fundamentally from the A-khyāti of the Prābhākaras, was meant equally to reject idealism. It was substantially the same as the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and is generally called the theory of Anyathā-khyāti. Rather than denying the positive fact of the illusory perceptions and explaining them simply as missing the distinction between two separate pieces of cognitions, this theory accepted that an illusory perception was a fact and a single—though composite—

experience. It was illusory only insofar as it was the apprehension (*khyāti*) of one real thing in another (*anyathā*), i.e., it was simply a case of mis-apprehension. Thus, in spite of the illusion being a single experience, there were two distinct objects for it, e.g., in the typical snake-rope illusion, the two separate objects being the rope and the snake. Of course the rope was perceived not as a full-fledged rope but as something barely 'this'. Though incomplete, there was nothing illusory about the perception so far, because the character of 'this-ness' did actually belong to the rope presented before the perceiver. When the illusory perception was eventually corrected by the knowledge, 'This is not a snake but a rope', what was really negated was only that part of the previous experience which was concerned with the snake, while the other part of the experience that was connected with the 'this-ness' remained unaffected.

Thus the illusory perception was in fact partially a valid perception of the objectively real. It was illusory only insofar as this objectively real was perceived as something which it was not, e.g. the snake. But even this did not support the idealistic thesis, because though the perception itself was wrong, the object of this perception, too, was a perfectly real entity existing in the objective world. The snake, though wrongly perceived in the rope, was nevertheless real, existing at a different place, at a different time, the illusory perception of which could not change its ontological status. Therefore, illusion was the apprehension of one real thing in another real thing.

As for the Mīmāṁsā system, another topic of considerable epistemological significance remains to be discussed by us. It is the apparently peculiar theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). But the real significance of this theory—or at least one of its main significances—can best be understood in the general background of the conclusion of our idealistic philosophers which amounted to the assertion of the intrinsic invalidity of knowledge. Moreover, since the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, too, joined in the controversy and contributed significantly to the clarification of the problem of validity and of the criterion of truth, it will be convenient to take this up in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

17. *The Vedanta*

THE OTHER major system of philosophy that arose in direct continuity with the Veda is called the Vedānta. As we have already seen, the name literally means the 'Veda-end' or the Upaniṣads, the last portions of the Vedic literature. Vedānta, therefore, meant above all the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. All the Vedāntists claimed to have expounded the fundamental teachings of the Upaniṣads. But the Upaniṣads are not systematic treatises and the philosophical or proto-philosophical views discussed in these texts do not form a unity. The later philosophers claiming to explain the Upaniṣadic views, therefore, had inevitably to face the task of *evolving* a single consistent philosophy out of the Upaniṣads. This was first fully attempted in a work called the *Vedānta-sūtra* or the *Brahma-sūtra*, the Upaniṣadic term for the ultimate reality being *Brahman*. The work is attributed to a certain Bādarāyaṇa. Nothing historical is known of him and the date of the redaction of the philosophical view in this *sūtra*-form is uncertain. Dasgupta believes that it could have been the second century B.C. though in Jacobi's view it was sometimes between A.D. 200 and 500.

All the later Vedāntists accepted this *Brahma-sūtra* as the basic work of the Vedānta philosophy. But the *sūtras* themselves are too cryptic to yield any clear philosophical view and thus left scope for a wide range of possible interpretations. In course of time a considerable number of philosophical views were actually sought to be justified on the basis of different interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtra*. As such, all these claimed the title of the Vedānta philosophy.

We need not enter here into the textual question as to which of these interpretations was in fact truest to the *Brahma-sūtra*, and therefore ultimately to the Upaniṣads. What is more important is to concentrate on that interpretation which, as a philosophical view, became the most powerful one. This is known as the Advaita Vedānta or Māyāvāda. According to this, *Brahman* or the ultimate reality is identical with the Self as pure

consciousness and as such the material world is ultimately unreal, being the product of ignorance, i.e. *avidyā* or *māyā*. Although particularly associated with Śaṁkara, the philosophy is in fact older. Among the pre-Śaṁkara exponents of it, the most important was Gauḍapāda, said to be the teacher's teacher of Śaṁkara. Peculiarly enough, instead of commenting upon the *Brahma-sūtra*, he wrote a verse-treatise called the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. Though the name meant a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, it was in fact largely an independent philosophical work. Śaṁkara was a voluminous writer. Apart from a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, called the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, he wrote commentaries on all the major Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*. Many other works, too, are attributed to him. Śaṁkara's own writings are marked more by a remarkably lucid literary style than a real logical acumen. Among the most important commentators of Śaṁkara were Vācaspati Miśra, Padmapāda and Sureśvara. They explained mainly what Śaṁkara's position positively implied. But the philosophy, as we shall see, is really more destructive than positive and the negative implications of the doctrine were left to be fully worked out by the later dialecticians like Śriharṣa and Citsukha. There are besides a really large number of other texts expounding the Advaita philosophy.

Advaita literally means the non-dual. It is the philosophy of absolute non-dualism because, besides *Brahman* or pure consciousness, it recognises nothing as real. But such a philosophy can hardly leave any real scope for the theistic sentiment proper. The Self alone being real, its true knowledge—i.e. some kind of mystic apprehension of its true nature—is thought to be the highest end; such an illumination is imagined to bring liberation. From the point of view of this philosophy, even God is conceived to have reality only from the empirical point of view, devotion or prayer to whom having nothing more than a mere pragmatic significance. Thus the theistic sentiment is granted at best some kind of concession, but this within the general structure of a philosophy that is designed basically to overcome it. But there continued to flourish in the country a considerable number of theistic sects, among which those that shared the mythology of Śiva were called Śaiva while others

which looked upon God as the mythological Viṣṇu were called the vaiṣṇava.

With the growing prestige of the *Brahma-sūtra* and Śaṁkara's commentary on it there arose the necessity for these sects to reject the Advaita view and justify their own in terms of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus began the emergence of a number of alternative interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtra* on theistic lines. The main question which all of them sought to answer was the relation of the individual Self (*jīva*) to *Brahman*. For all these sects, however, *Brahman* simply meant God, the Vaiṣṇavites like Rāmānuja and Nimbārka conceived this God as but Viṣṇu while the Śaivite like Śrīkaṇṭha thought that He was none but Śiva.

The earliest of such theistic interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtra* was offered by Bhāskara. His view is known as the *bhedābheda-vāda*, the doctrine of difference-cum-non-difference. The individual Self (*jīva*) in this view is both different and non-different from God (*Brahman*). The characteristic analogy with which this was sought to be illustrated was that of the waves and the sea: the waves were different from the sea and yet not different from it.

This was followed by a series of interpretations of the *Brahma-sūtra* from the Vaiṣṇava point of view, differing from each other in various shades of details. Of these, the most outstanding was the interpretation given by Rāmānuja. His theory is known as the *viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda*, the doctrine of qualified non-dualism. Trained in his early life in the Advaita philosophy under a teacher who was a staunch advocate of it, Rāmānuja eventually came under the influence of the Vaiṣṇava movement of the Ālvārs which was current in the Tamil country and sought to 'develop in a complete system, in opposition to the uncompromising Advaitism of Śaṁkara, a philosophical basis for the doctrine of devotion to God which was presented in poetical form in the hymns (*prabandhas*) of the Ālvārs—a task for which his training under a teacher of Advaitism rendered him specially fit.'[1] In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, called the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, he taught a monistic (*advaita*) doctrine, no doubt,

for all was conceived as the *Brahman* or God; but it was a qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) inasmuch as there was also room in it for the reality of the individual souls and the external or material world. 'The highest reality is God, endowed with all desirable qualities, not consisting of knowledge alone, but having knowledge as an attribute, all-powerful, all-pervading, and all-merciful. Whatever exists is contained within God, and therefore the system admits no second independent element. But within the unity are distinct elements of plurality, which, if effects or modes (*prakāra*) of God are yet absolutely real, and not figments of illusion. These are souls, of varying classes and degrees (*cit*), and matter in all its forms (*acit*), which together are re-represented as constituting the body of God, standing beside Him in the same dependent relation as is occupied by the matter forming an animal or vegetable body towards the soul or spirit. Both matter and souls exist eternally in God, and have had 'no absolute end.'[2] In this theistic view, devotion to God or *bhakti*, as a means to salvation, plays an extremely important part. While for Śaṁkara pure knowledge or *jñāna* itself brings the freedom from ignorance, and therefore liberation, in Rāmānuja's view, liberation being ultimately dependent upon the grace of God, can only be attained through an uninterrupted devotion to Him, this uninterruptedness being characteristically illustrated by that of the flow of oil which is without any break.

Of the other Vaiṣṇava teachers the most outstanding were Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha and Caitanya, all of whom—excepting of course Caitanya, who presumably wrote nothing—commented on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Nimbārka's theory is known as *dvaitādvaita-vāda*, the doctrine of dualism-cum-non-dualism. In this view, too, the relation of God to the individual soul is one of dualism as well as non-dualism: this is illustrated by the characteristic analogy of the air assuming different forms or behaving differently under different conditions. 'His teaching was based upon that of Rāmānuja, from whom he was not far removed in time, which he extended and developed in the direction of assigning a quasi-independent position to the individual soul (*jīva*) and to the inanimate universe. This qualified individualism, however, is not to be understood as though these

two can or do maintain an existence distinct or separate from *Brahman*. They are essentially and permanently one with that which is all and in all. The system of Nimbārka, therefore, secures in form at least the monistic position. *Jīva* and the world are distinct from *Brahman* only in the sense that they are developed or evolved from his qualities, force, or *śakti*, so as to constitute the universe of animate and inanimate forms. They exist in him in a subtle (*sukṣma*) guise, which in the world of phenomena takes on a gross (*sthūla*) body, yet remaining essentially united to him, with no detached being or life.'[3] As in Rāmānuja's view, here also a great emphasis is laid on *bhakti* or devotion to God though the followers of Nimbārka direct their worship to the mythological Kṛṣṇa and his spouse Rādhā.

Madhva's theory is called *dvaita-vāda*, the doctrine of plain dualism. According to this, God is only the efficient cause of creation. This God is conceived mythologically as Viṣṇu who, whenever he becomes incarnate, has Vāyu, the air-god, as his son. Madhva himself is said to be an incarnation of Vāyu, 'who came to the earth to destroy the followers of Saṁkara and all their teaching'.[4] This is mythology, of course, but the extreme reaction against the abstract monism of Saṁkara is quite evident in it. Saṁkara's *māyā-vāda* is described by this sect as but Buddhism in disguise. Madhva himself refused any compromise with monism even in the manner of the other Vaiṣṇava teachers, like Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. 'The basis of the whole philosophical system is *dvaita*, or dualism. By this is not meant the dualism of spirit and matter, or that of good and evil, but the distinction between the independent Supreme Being (*paramātman*) and the dependant principle of life (*jīvātman*). There are five real and eternal distinctions (*pañca-bheda*), viz. (*a*) between God and the individual soul, (*b*) between God and matter, (*c*) between the soul and matter, (*d*) between one soul and another, and (*e*) between one particle of matter and another.'[5] Like the other Vaiṣṇava teachers Madhva, too, laid great emphasis on devotion (*bhakti*) as the path to salvation. However, in the heap of the theological and mythological details to be found in the literature of this sect, what seems to be of permanent philosophical value is the merciless criticism of

māyā-vāda and the insistence on the independent reality of matter, the arguments for which evidently enriched the anti-idealistic tradition of Indian philosophy.

Vallabha's view is known as *śudhādvaita-vāda*, the doctrine of pure non-dualism. It explains the relation of God and the souls on the analogy of gold and the golden ornaments. Or, the individual souls are viewed as the sparks from the Supreme Spirit or God and, though separate, are considered to be identical in essence with God. Like the other Vaiṣṇavas, Vallabha, too, lays great emphasis on devotion or *bhakti* and the theory of divine incarnations or *avatāras*. However, one distinct peculiarity of his sect seems to be a vigorous rejection of asceticism, which has led some of the modern scholars to characterise its followers as the Epicureans of India.[6] Vallabha 'maintained that God was not to be worshipped by fasting and self-mortification, that the individual soul was entitled to reverence as a portion of the Supreme Soul, and that the body which enshrined it should be fostered and not subjected to the austerities enjoined in ascetic systems'.[7]

Caitanya, in all presumption, did not write any philosophical work. His philosophical view, as explained by his learned followers, is known as *acintya-bhedābheda-vāda*, the theory of the indescribable difference-cum-non-difference. It is difficult to believe, however, that the theological subtleties evolved in defence of this theory could have had any great mass-appeal. On the other hand, the fact remains that under the leadership of Caitanya, there took place what was by far the biggest mass upheaval in late medieval India, embracing even the lowest strata of the society. Caitanya himself addressed the people in the only language they could then comprehend: the equality of all men in the eyes of God and devotional songs.

Among the non-Vaiṣṇava interpretors of the *Brahma-sūtra* Srīkaṇṭha conceived the *Brahman* or God as the mythological Śiva and considered Him as the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, again, interpreted the *Brahma-sūtra* in another theistic line, which though he liked to call the Sāṁkhya, was in fact far from being true to the original spirit of this philosophy.

Vaiṣṇavism, particularly as the cult of *bhakti* or divine love, meant in medieval India an important form of social and religious reform, the real historical significance of which needs to be fully understood in the light of further research. Philosophically, however, what interests us most is that behind the theological discussions and even the flights into mythological fantasy there developed a strong protest against the extreme idealism of the Advaita Vedānta and the fight against it in real philosophical terms, as is evident in the writings of such outstanding thinkers as Rāmānuja and others. On the other hand, the Advaita Vedānta still exercises considerable influence in our philosophical circles. It is, therefore, desirable for us to concentrate particularly on this version of the Vedānta philosophy. However, since, as a matter of fact, the Advaita philosophy did draw upon a particular trend of the Upaniṣadic thought, a brief sketch of the latter will be useful for our understanding of the Advaita Vedānta.

18. Upanisadic Idealism

We have already had some hint of the philosophical outlook which, though certainly not the only one propounded in the Upaniṣads, was nevertheless a prominent one and it was at any rate to play the most important role in the subsequent philosophical history of the country. In Deussen's presentation of it, the doctrine stands as the simple equation of *Brahman* with *ātman*. Whatever might have been the prehistory of the concept of *Brahman*, in the Upaniṣads it came generally to mean the 'ultimate reality'. The *ātman* meant the Self. Thus the doctrine amounted to the assertion that the Self is the ultimate reality. This was briefly expressed by the 'great sayings' (*mahāvākyas*) of the Upaniṣads, like 'That Thou Art' (*tat tvam asi*), 'I am *Brahman*' (*aham Brahma asmi*), etc. However, the Self or *ātman* did not mean the same thing throughout all the Upani-

ṣadic texts, the concept having its own history of development. In some of the advanced speculations of the Upaniṣads, it came to mean the pure knower or the pure consciousness. Thus, according to the idealistic outlook that finally emerged in the Upaniṣads, the ultimate reality is pure consciousness. The corollary is that the material world normally experienced has no intrinsic reality of its own. This has in fact been the starting point of all the idealistic philosophies that followed, be they Vedic or Buddhistic.

With obvious reservation for the exaggerated claim that this was the fundamental thought of the entire doctrine of the Upaniṣad,[1] we may briefly note here how this view was arrived at in the Upaniṣadic texts. Of all the Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* are not only claimed to be most authoritative but are in fact philosophically most significant. Those portions of the former, again, where a certain Yājñavalkya is recorded to have discussed philosophical and proto-philosophical questions are usually looked upon as most significant. So we begin with these.

Declared Yājñavalkya: 'Lo, verily, it is the Self (*ātman*) that should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought of, that should be pondered on... Lo, verily, with the seeing of, with the hearkening to, with the thinking of, with the understanding of the Self, this world-all is known.'[2] In the *Chāndogya*, again, no less a figure than Prajāpati, the mythical creator of the world, was chosen to make a similar declaration: 'The Self (*ātman*) which is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless, whose desire is the Real, whose conception is the Real — He should be searched out, Him one should desire to understand. He obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands that Self.'[3] But why was the knowledge of the Self to be considered thus supremely important? Prajāpati did not answer. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, however, Yājñavalkya offered an interesting agrument for this total withdrawal of interest from everything external to the purely internal, from everything in the world to the Self alone: 'Lo, verily, not for love of the husband is a husband dear, but for love of the Self is the husband dear. Lo, verily, not for

love of the wife is a wife dear, but for love of the Self is a wife dear. Lo, verily, not for love of the sons are sons dear, but for love of the Self are sons dear. Lo, verily, not for love of the wealth is wealth dear, but for love of the Self wealth is dear.'[4] And so on. Even *Brahman*hood, *Kṣhatra*hood, the worlds, the gods and the beings (*bhūta*) are dear not for the love of these but for the love of the Self. In short, as Yājñavalkya summed up, 'Lo, verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the Self all is dear.'

To us, this may sound some kind of psychology or ethics. What Yājñavalkya intended to discuss, however, was metaphysics. It followed, therefore, that the Self was the ultimate reality behind everything and as such a real understanding of anything was essentially an understanding of the Self; he who knew the Self knew everything, he who knew anything as apart from the Self had only ignorance instead. 'Everything has deserted him who knows everything in aught else than the Self. This *Brahman*hood, this *Kṣhatra*hood, these worlds, these gods, these beings, everything here is what this Self is'.[5] With a series of somewhat clumsy metaphors, he proceeded to explain how the Self being the reality about everything, nothing could be grasped without grasping the Self, or, by grasping the Self alone, everything else could be grasped: 'It is — as, when a drum is being beaten, one would not be able to grasp the external sound, but by grasping the drum or the beater of the drum, the sound is grasped.' And so also about the sound of a conch-shell and of a lute. Presumably, everything in the world was viewed as some kind of emanation of the Self, just as the sounds of the musical instruments emanated from the latter. But what was the nature of this Self by grasping which one could thus grasp everything in this world? Yājñavalkya described it as the great being (*bhūta*) and just a mass of knowledge or consciousness (*vijñānaghana*): 'this great being, infinite, limitless, is just a mass of consciouness.'[6]

This mass of knowledge or consciousness, raised to the status of the ultimate reality, meant first of all a condemnation of knowledge in the ordinary sense. Thus, in the *Chāndogya*,[7] Nārada approached the philosopher Sanatkumāra and confessed,

'Sir, I know the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda*, the *Atharvaveda* as the fourth, Legend and Ancient Lore (*itihāsa-purāṇa*) as the fifth, the Veda of the Vedas (i.e., grammar), Propitiation of the Manes, Mathematics, Augury, Chronology. Logic, Polity, the Science of the Gods, the Science of Sacred Knowledge, Demonology, the Science of Rulership, Astrology, the Science of Snake-Charming and the Fine Arts. This I know, Sir.' This exhaustive list covers all the branches of knowledge then cared for and the names occurring here are found also in other passages of the Upaniṣads.[8] What deserves to be particularly noted, however, is that Nārada felt dissatisfied in spite of knowing all these and therefore approached Sanatkumāra for true wisdom. Naturally enough, the first thing that Sanatkumāra declared was that all these branches of knowledge were but 'mere names' (*nāma eva*). 'Is there, sir, more than name?' asked Nārada. There was, and Sanatkumāra led him finally to the realisation that the Infinite (*bhūmā*), by which was meant the Self, was the ultimate reality:

> Here on earth people call cows and horses, elephants and gold, slaves and wives, fields and abodes 'greatness'. I do not speak thus; I do not speak thus... That (infinite), indeed is below. It is above. It is to the west. It is to the east. It is to the south. It is to the north. It, indeed, is this whole world... I, indeed, am below. I am above. I am to the west. I am to the east. I am to the south. I am to the north. I, indeed, am this whole world... The Self, indeed, is below. The Self is above. The Self is to the west. The Self is to the east. The Self is to the south. The Self is to the north. The Self, indeed, is this whole world.[9]

We do not find in this much effort at conscious reasoning. The thesis is rather presented in some form the idealists would call mystical intuition. But we have here the potentials of a philosophical outlook that had within it the power to condemn and reject not only all the branches of human knowledge and all the faculties of normal apprehension, but also the reality of the world and life itself. It could thus become a decisive impediment to science and progress. In the name of highest knowledge it could—and as we shall see it did in fact—develop into a philosophy which, by reducing nature into a phantom of imagination

and by pronouncing that the sources of knowledge like reasoning and experience are intrinsically invalid, had to go against all efforts at mastering—and thereby knowing—the secrets of nature. In short the claim to highest illumination passed into its opposite.

It is interesting to note here how Deussen, himself a pronounced idealist, was plainly thrilled by this foreshadowing of a world-denying philosophy in the Upaniṣads.

> Very soon, however, it came to be realised that this knowledge of *Brahman* was essentially of a different nature from that which we call 'knowledge' in ordinary life. For it would be possible, like Nārada in the *Chāndogya* to be familiar with all conceivable branches of knowledge and empirical science, and yet to find oneself in a condition of ignorance (*avidyā*) as regards the *Brahman*. This thought, originally purely negative, became in course of time more and more positive in its character. It was negative in so far as no experimental knowledge led to a knowledge of *Brahman;* and it was positive in so far as the consciousness was aroused that the knowledge of empirical reality was an actual hindrance to the knowledge of *Brahman*. The conception of *avidyā* was developed from the negative idea of mere ignorance to the positive idea of false knowledge. The experimental knowledge which reveals to us a world of plurality, where in reality only *Brahman* exists, and a body where in reality there is only the soul, must be a mistaken knowledge, a delusion, a *māyā*. This is a very noteworthy step in advance. It is the same which Parmenides and Plato took when they affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception, which Kant took, when he showed that the entire reality of experience is only apparition and not reality. It is of the greatest interest to follow up the earliest foreshadowings of this thought in India, and to trace how the term *avidyā* passed from the negative idea of ignorance to the positive idea of a false knowledge.[10]

We shall try to follow this up when we return later to discuss the idealistic philosophy of the Advaita Vedāntists and the Mahāyāna Buddhists. For the present let us confine ourselves to the Upaniṣads.

One result of this rejection of the senses and even of the understanding was that the doctrine recoiled back on itself and amounted to the rejection of knowing *Brahman*, i.e. of the very

knowledge in defence of which the normal human knowledge was thus condemned. To know anything is to know it as 'this' or 'that'. But the Self alone being real it cannot be understood in terms of anything else; rather, any attempt to know it as 'this' or 'that' is sinking down into the depths of ignorance and darkness. Hence the famous declaration of Yājñavalkya that the only approach to it could be a purely negative one: 'That Self is not this, it is not that (*neti neti*). It is unseizable, for it is not seized. It is indestructible, for it is not destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unbounded. It does not tremble. It is not injured.[11] But, then, could such a purely negative approach really lead to a positive knowledge of the Self or *Brahman*? Yājñavalkya answered in the negative, the reason being that knowledge presupposed a duality while the Self, as the pure knower, meant a negation of all duality:

> For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees another; there one hears another; there one speaks to another; there one thinks of another; there one understands another. Where, verily, everything has become just one's own Self, then whereby and whom would one smell? Then whereby and whom would one see? Then whereby and whom would one hear? Then whereby and to whom would one speak? Then whereby and on whom would one think? Then whereby and whom would one understand? Whereby would one understand him by whom one understands this all? Lo, whereby would one understand the understander?[12]

Interestingly enough, from the same idealistic standpoint it was declared that though the Self or *Brahman* was thus by definition beyond the range of possible knowledge, every creature enjoyed frequent access to it, though without being conscious of this. 'So, just as those who do not know the spot might go over a hid treasure of gold again and again, but do not find it, even so all creatures here go day by day to that *Brahma*-world (*Brahma-loka*), but do not find it; for truly they are carried astray by what is false'.[13] The metaphor of the buried treasure is of course clear enough; but how can the creatures, without knowing it, have such frequent access to the *Brahman*? Saṁkara, in his commentary on the Upaniṣad, answered the question with one word: *suṣuptikāle*, i.e. in the

state of the deep dreamless sleep, which we, ordinarily at any rate, understand as a state of complete inhibition of cerebration. This answer may seem rather peculiar; yet it was quite in keeping with Yājñavalkya's standpoint. It also leads us to see how the idealist philosopher, rejecting the standpoint of the normal waking consciousness, was driven to seek refuge in that of dream, dreamless sleep and finally even death.

With his profound contempt for the normal waking experiences, Yājñavalkya turned to sleep: 'Upon becoming asleep he transcends this world and the forms of death.'[14] But how can this be?

> Verily, this person, by being born and obtaining a body, is joined with evils. When he departs, on dying, he leaves evils behind. Verily, there are just two conditions of this person: the condition of being in this world and the condition of being in the other world. There is an intermediate third condition, namely, that of being in sleep. By standing in this intermediate condition one sees both these conditions, namely being in this world and being in the other world. Now whatever the approach is to the condition of being in the other world, by making that approach one sees the evils (of this world) and the joys (of the yonder world). When one goes to sleep, he takes along the material of this all-containing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up, and dreams by his own brightness, by his own light. Then this person becomes self-illuminated. There are no chariots there, no spans, no roads. But he projects from himself chariots, spans, roads. There are no blisses there, no pleasures, no delights. But he projects from himself blisses, pleasures, delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus-pools, no streams. But he projects from himself tanks, lotus-pools, streams. For he is a creator.[15]

To illustrate this, Yājñavalkya quoted some ancient verses:

> *In the state of sleep going aloft and alow,*
> *A god, he makes many forms for himself—*
> *Now, as it were, enjoying pleasure with women,*
> *Now, as it were, laughing, and even beholding fearful sights.*

He anticipated and answered a possible objection to this view: 'Now some people say, "That is just his waking state, for whatever things he sees when awake, those too he sees when asleep."

(This is not so, for) there (i.e., in sleep) the person is self-illuminated.'[16]

Two points were sought to be established here. First, in dream the Self was somewhat free from the material inhibitions of the waking state and had a comparatively clearer realisation of itself, because it was self-illuminated. Secondly, the objects experienced in dream had no extra-subjective existence, because these were created by the Self itself, were 'projected' by it. It was but one step further to turn the second suggestion into a secure foundation for epistemological idealism. For, if dreams were evidences for the capacity of the Self to create or project the objects dreamt of, then it had to be admitted that the Self could manufacture the objects of experience and therefore there was nothing to prevent the supposition that the Self was doing the same thing even during the waking state. We have already seen how the later idealists elaborated substantially this line of argument and how, therefore, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, in their refutation of idealism, wanted strenuously to prove that the dream-objects, far from being the projections of the dreaming Self, had real extra-mental existence. Of course for the later idealists the dreams were illusory or false, and not a comparative approximation to truth, as indicated by Yājñavalkya. But we cannot possibly attach too great a significance to this difference. For even the later idealists would be forced logically to admit that dreams, by enabling one to realise how the objects of experience were but products of the experiencer himself, helped one to arrive at a proper understanding of the general falsity of the waking experiences and thus opened before one the path of a higher realisation, for which otherwise there were only the sense-illusions to base oneself upon.

If dreams meant comparative freedom from the earthly bondage for the Upaniṣadic idealists, the freedom was still greater as one sank down into the state of the deep dreamless sleep. In spite of arguing that the objects of dream were but creations or projections of the Self, Yājñavalkya had to admit, perhaps grudgingly, that in dreams one was nevertheless bothered by the fears of the waking state. 'Now when people seem to be killing him, when they seem to be overpowering

him, when an elephant seems to be tearing him to pieces, when he seems to be falling into a hole—in these circumstances he is imagining through ignorance the very fear which he sees when awake.'[17] This partial limitation of the dreaming state, namely being sometimes bothered by the fears of the waking state, was removed as one sank into the state of the deep dreamless sleep. 'As a falcon, or an eagle, having flown around here in space, becomes weary, folds its wings, and is borne down to its nest, just so this person hastens to that state where, asleep, he desires no desires and sees no dream.'[18] And this state of the dreamless sleep or *suṣupti* was a state of the realisation of the Pure Self or *Brahman* because here the Intelligent Soul knew nothing within or without.

> This, verily, is that form of his which is beyond desires, free from evil, without fear. As a man, when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the Intelligent Soul, knows nothing within or without. Verily that is his (true) form in which his desire is satisfied, in which the Soul is his desire, in which he is without desire and without sorrow. There a father becomes not a father; a mother, not a mother; the world, not the worlds; the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas; a thief, not a thief. There the destroyer of an embryo becomes not the destroyer of an embryo; a Cāṇḍāla is not a Cāṇḍāla; a Paulkasa is not a Paulkasa; a mendicant is not a mendicant; an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart.[19]

Again:

> Verily, where there seems to be another, there the one might see the other; the one might smell the other; the one might taste the other; the one might speak to the other; the one might hear the other; the one might think of the other; the one might touch the other; the one might know the other. An ocean, a seer alone without duality, becomes he whose world is *Brahman*... This is man's highest path. This is his highest achievement. This is his highest world. This is his highest bliss. On a part of just this bliss other creatures have their living.[20]

However, the trouble was that even after this state of the deep dreamless sleep one had to return back to the waking state.

The realisation of the absolutely non-dual Self in *suṣupti* was thus only temporary. How could then a permanent realisation be achieved? Judging from the discussion that immediately follows in the Upaniṣad we have the impression that Yājñavalkya had only one answer to offer. It was 'death'—not the death or course of one who was unreleased, i.e. one with desire or attachment, because such a one was destined to be reborn again, but of one who was without desire: being very *Brahman* the released soul goes to the *Brahman*. Here is Yājñavalkya's description of how a dying person casts off all false sense of duality:

> 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not see'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not smell'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not taste'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not speak'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not hear'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not think'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not touch'. 'He is becoming one', they say, 'he does not know.' The point of his heart becomes lighted up. By that light the Self departs, either by the eye, or by the head, or by other bodily parts. After him, as he goes out, the life goes out. After the life, as it goes out, all the breaths go out. He becomes one with Intelligence. What has Intelligence departs with him. His knowledge and his works and his former intelligence lay hold of him. Now as a caterpillar, when it has come to the end of a blade of grass, in taking the next step draws itself together towards it, just so this soul in taking the next step strikes down this body, dispels its ignorance, and draws itself together (for making the transition)... According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action... Now the man who does not desire—He who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the soul—his breaths do not depart. Being very *Brahman*, he goes to *Brahman*.[21]

Thus in the idealistic philosophy death (of a special type) symbolised the final philosophical wisdom. Other philosophers, subscribing to the same idealistic outlook, perhaps hesitated to take such an extreme stand. Instead of death, therefore, they spoke of a hypothetical state of mystic trance—presumably that of the so-called *yoga*—and called it the *turīya* or the fourth state

and this was supposed to yield the highest realisation of the True Self. We shall see later how this conception of the *yoga*, with its roots in primitive practices, usually called shamanism, played such havoc in the field of Indian philosophy. Yoga was supposed to be a state of mind conducive to the total withdrawal of consciousness into itself, i.e. from everything external; it was looked upon by the philosophers representing various systems as a form of discipline for achieving the highest philosophical wisdom. However, along with the modern scientist, the modern materialist would be inclined to look upon such a state of total withdrawal of consciousness from the world as some kind of catalepsy, may be deliberately induced. In any case, even if such a state could be thus deliberately induced, as a condition for achieving positive insight into nature, which science after all aims at, this suggestion of the *turīya* or the *yoga* trance was not much of an improvement upon that of Yājñavalkya, namely that in death alone could one attain the highest illumination. In short, the idealistic outlook of the Upaniṣads became in fact the greatest hindrance to the positive sciences, regardless of the circumstance whether it took its final stand in death or in the *turīya*.

According to the legend of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, King Janaka, a person of fabulous wealth, was so much thrilled by this exposition of the idealistic outlook that he was led to make successive gifts of thousand cows to the philosopher Yājñavalkya. And Yājñavalkya did not show of course any great idealistic indifference to such material gifts. In this way, after the free flights in the realm of pure consciousness, the legend brought us back to the earth. However, when we thus come back to the earth, there perhaps remains a simple and sober question: what really is meant by consciousness in the name of which the idealist philosophers proposed to construct such a world-denying speculative superstructure? From the point of view of the positive sciences there is but one answer to it. It is nothing but a function of the body, particularly of the brain. In India, however, the Carvakas or the Lokāyatas were the only philosophers to have boldly asserted this, although we do not of course expect them to have a positive or scientific knowledge of

the nervous system and particularly of the brain. The idealists, on the other hand, had to condemn positive science itself—in fact, all the branches of positive knowledge that they could then conceive of—in order to make this consciousness the creator of the universe, inclusive of the body whose function it was. Ironically, however, in order to make this fully convincing, it was also necessary to deaden consciousness itself. Rejecting, therefore, the verdict of the normal waking consciousness, the idealists had to take refuge in dream, dreamless sleep and finally, as in the case of Yājñavalkya, in death itself. This is how the idealistic outlook in Indian philosophy stood self-condemned from the time of its very birth.

19. *The Sources of Idealism*

THE TRADITIONAL claim is that the Upaniṣads are parts of the Veda. It is, however, necessary to note that in the Vedic tradition itself the idealistic outlook of the Upaniṣads meant a decisive break with the ancestral convictions. This was virtually admitted in some of the passages of the Upaniṣads wherein Nārada, e.g., is found seeking the knowledge of the Self in spite of possessing the knowledge of the Vedas. The first thing he was told by Sanatkumāra was that, among other branches of knowledge, the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* as the fourth were 'mere names'. Evidently, it was felt that something new—something other than what was contained in the early compilations—was needed. Evidently, again, the need was felt because of a new situation.

What then, was it that accounts for such a new turn of thought in the Vedic tradition? Pending further researches into the socio-economic history of the period, only the bare outlines of an answer can be suggested here. The philosophical view which thus arose to condemn and reject life could only have been the result of the philosophical pursuit turning away from

life itself. As with the development of slavery in ancient Greece, so also in the Upaniṣadic India, the lofty contempt for the material world with its ever-shifting phenomena was the result of philosophical enquiry taking free flight into realm of 'pure reason' or 'pure knowledge', i.e., knowledge divorced from action. This in turn could have been possible only when a section of the community, living on the surplus produced by another, withdrew itself from the responsibility of direct manual labour, and, therefore, also from the obligation of acknowledging the reality of the material world, for the process of labour alone can exercise a sense of objective coercion on consciousness. Theory, in other words, was divorced from practice and became 'pure theory', the things thought of became mere ideas and thus the knower, the subject, sought to emancipate itself from the inhibitions of the known or the object, and to look at the latter as but products of ignorance or *avidyā*.

What was decisive about the Upaniṣadic age was a fully established caste-divided society with the Kṣatriyas, or kings and nobles, as the ruling class and the Brahmins, living under their direct patronage.

> Verily [said the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*] in the beginning this world was *Brahman*, one only. Being one, he was not developed. He created still further a superior form, the Kṣatrahood, even those who are Kṣatras among the gods: Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛtyu Īśāna. Therefore, there is nothing higher than Kṣatra. Therefore, at the Rājasūya ceremony the Brahmin sits below the Kṣatriya. Upon Kṣatrahood, alone, does he confer that honour. This same thing, namely Brahminhood is the source of Kṣatrahood. Therefore, even if the king attains supremacy, he rests finally upon Brahminhood as his own source. So whoever injures him (i.e. a Brahmin) attacks his own source. He fares worse in proportion as he injures one who is better.[1]

So this was how a compromise was struck between the claims to superiority of the two higher castes. By contrast, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the Caṇḍāla, i.e., the lowest caste, was freely bracketed with dogs and swine.[2]

Now if Yājñavalkya, the philosopher of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, gave us an idea of what the new philosophical out-

look of the age was, Yājñavalkya, the lawgiver, told us in so many words that this new philosophy was the prerogative only of the *dvijas*, literally the twice-born, i.e., only the two higher castes called the Brahmins and Kṣhatriyas. Thus, for instance, in the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*[3] the passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* which declared that the Self was to be seen, hearkened to, pondered over, etc. was quoted word for word; but at the end was characteristically added *dvijātibhiḥ*, i.e. only by those that were twice-born. Of course, the lawgiver came to the scene later than the philosopher; yet he was evidently rationalising what became an accomplished fact from a remote past.

How were these castes then related to the labour of production? Our law-codes are quite clear about the answer. According to Baudhāyana,[4] Vedas and agriculture were destructive of each other. Manu[5] said that even when compelled to follow the profession of a Vaiśya (the third caste), the Brahmin and the Kṣhatriya must avoid agriculture, because it is slavish (*parādhīna*) and involves injury. Seven, he added,[6] were the approved ways of getting wealth: (1) legacy, (2) gain, (3) purchase, (4) conquest, (5) agriculture, (6) trade and (7) the acceptance of gifts; the commentator Medhātithi added that the first of these three were permissible for all the castes, but the fourth exclusively for the Kṣatriyas as the last for the Brahmins. Again, while enumerating another list of professions to be followed at the time of distress, Manu[7] said that the Brahmins and the Kṣatriyas must not engage themselves in *vṛddhi*, i.e. the activities of production. More examples are not necessary. The feeling of disdain of the higher castes towards the labour of production is thus clear. It is also significant that 'Numerous names of [low] castes arise from the professions they follow, e.g. the *Ayaskāra* (the blacksmith), *Kumbhakāra* (potter), *Carmakāra* (leather-worker), *Takṣan* (mason), *Tailika* (oil-worker), *Naṭa* (dancer), *Rathakāra* (cart-maker), *Vena* (worker on reeds) etc.'[8]

The genuinely earlier strata of the *Rgveda*, by contrast, knew neither caste distinctions nor contempt for manual labour. Indeed, passages ennobling the collective work of the tribesmen are innumerable in this huge bulk of primitive and semi-primi-

tive poetry. A persistent theme here is the desire to increase food and material wealth and even the gods were frequently described as participating with human beings in raising cattle and increasing food and wealth. The arts and crafts, far from being looked down with contempt, as in the later caste-divided society, were originally considered so important that, in the mythological imagination of the early poets, Tvaṣṭṛ, the craftsman, was raised to the status of a Vedic deity. 'He is a skilful workman, producing various objects showing the skill of an artificer. He is in fact the most skilful of workmen versed in crafty conversation.'[9]

These were not, therefore, the circumstances under which knowledge or wisdom could become divorced from and opposed to action. Significantly, for the early Vedic poets the words for wisdom were also the words for action. Thus, for example, according to the *Nighaṇṭu*,[10] *prajñā* or wisdom had a synonym, *dhī;* the word *dhī*, again, was one of the words meaning action or *karma*. Another synonym for *karma* was *kratu,* which also meant *prajñā* or wisdom. Similarly, *śacī* meant both *karma* and *prajñā*. The implications are clear: there was no wisdom that was not also action or the only wisdom then known was the wisdom of practical activity. Interestingly enough, even the word *māyā,* which in the later idealistic philosophy came to stand for the dark unspeakable principle of cosmic illusion, being mentioned in the *Nighaṇṭu* as a synonym for *prajñā*, presumably had in the origin this significance of the ancient wisdom-action complex.

All this is reminiscent of ancient Greece before the birth there of the idealistic outlook. 'Prior to the fifth century not the contrast but the unity of thought and deed is uppermost. In the epic and lyric knowledge is practical; to know is to know how; wisdom is skill in action and therefore power to act. Heraclitus, the first of the philosophers to turn to this theme, assumes as a matter of course that *logos* and *sophie* carry the double reference of true word (and thought) and right deed.'[11] However, with the growth of slavery and the consequent degradation of manual labour, wisdom tended to free itself from its old bond with action, and therefore also from the world with which, through action, one maintains intercourse.

> For Plato, wisdom meant a knowledge not of nature, but of super-nature constituted by the ideas... As for art — that power to control nature, the slow acquisition of which by man Democritus regarded as identical with his self-differentiation from the animals — it was relegated by Plato to a kind of limbo. It belonged to the sphere of opinion, the bastard knowledge of the slave, not the truth of the philosopher.[12]

> In his *Laws* Plato organises society on the basis of slavery, and, having done so, puts a momentous question: 'We have now made excellent arrangements to free our citizens from the necessity of manual work; the business of the arts and crafts has been passed on to others; agriculture has been handed over to slaves on condition of their granting us a sufficient return to live in a fit and seemly fashion; how now shall we organise our lives?' A still more pertinent question would have been: 'How will our new way of life reorganise our thoughts?' For the new way of life did bring a new way of thinking, and one that proved inimical to science. It was henceforth difficult to hold to the view that true knowledge could be arrived at by interrogating nature, for all the implements and processes by which nature is made to obey man's will had become, if not in fact yet in the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the province of the slave.[12]

In Upaniṣadic India, too, agriculture, the arts and crafts having become the call of the lower castes, the leisured class, viz. the Kṣatriyas, the rulers, and the Brahmins, the priests who subsisted on the direct patronage of rulers, reorganised their thoughts broadly on the same lines as was done by Plato. This deliberate divorce of thought from action gave rise to the emergence of a world-denying philosophy.

This circumstance is somewhat obscured by the anxiety of the modern scholars[14] to prove the Kṣatriya-origin of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. The internal evidences of the Upaniṣads make it impossible to doubt that kings and nobles of the age often took leading part in evolving the strikingly new philosophical outlook recorded in the Upaniṣads. In a legend occurring both in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*[15] and the *Kauṣītaki*,[16] a certain Gārgya undertook to explain the nature of the *Brahman* to king Ajātaśatru of Kāśī. He offered a series of theories — twelve in the first text and sixteen in the second — all of which were rejected by the king as unsatisfactory. So Gārgya said, 'Let me come to you

as a pupil'. 'Verily', answered Ajātaśatru, 'it is contrary to the course of things that a Brahmin should come to a Kṣatriya, thinking, "He will tell me *Brahman*." However, I shall cause you to know him clearly.' And the king told him how by a progressive deadening of the normal consciousness — sinking into the state of dreaming and then further into dreamless sleep — the real nature of the *Brahman* or *ātman* could be realised: 'As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this soul come forth all vital energies (*prāṇa*), all worlds, all gods, all beings.' In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* the king called this soul 'the truth of truths' (*satyasya satyam*) and in the *Kauṣītaki* he explained how it was related to the bodily self:

> When one awakens — as from a blazing fire sparks would disperse in all directions, even so from this self the vital breath disperse to their stations; from the vital breath, the sense-powers; from the sense-powers, the worlds. This self-same breathing spirit, even the intelligent self, has entered this bodily self up to the hair and finger-nail tips. Just as a razor might be hidden in a razor-case, or fire in a fire-receptacle, even thus the intelligential self has entered this bodily self up to the hair and finger-nail tips. Upon that self these selves depend, as upon a chief his own (men). Just as a chief enjoys his own (men), or as his own men are of service to a chief, even thus this intelligential self enjoys these selves, even thus these selves are of service to that self.

Significantly, the metaphor was drawn from the ruling class privilege of the age and it easily reminds us of the situation that developed in Greece with the advance of the slave system. 'This master-and-slave relation became fundamental for Plato's thought in every sphere.'[17] Aristotle 'justified the subordination of slave to freeman by appealing to the subordination of woman to man and of body to soul; but the subordination of woman was a phenomenon of the same nature as slavery, and the subordination of body to soul, or of matter to form, was a projection on the plane of ideas of the cleavage that confronted him in society.'[18] For the Upaniṣadic king, too, the metaphor was not a mere matter of strict philosophy, for he claimed at the same time that this new philosophy of the self contained the clue to the

political power of his class. 'Verily', said he, 'as long as Indra understood not this self, so long the Asuras (demons) overcame him. When he understood, then, striking down and conquering the Asuras, he compassed the supremacy (*śraiṣṭhya*), independent sovereignty (*svārājya*) and overlordship (*ādhipatya*) of all gods and of all beings.'[19]

The claim is repeated, perhaps more sharply, in a legend[20] of the *Chāndogya* which occurs, though with some variations, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Kauṣītaki* as well. A certain Brahmin called Gautama went to the King of the Pañcālas begging philosophical wisdom. In the *Chāndogya* version, the king says: 'As to what you have told me, O Gautama, this knowledge has never yet come to Brahmins before you; and therefore in all the worlds the rule belonged to the Kṣatriyas only.' Evidently, an important historical truth was contained in such a claim, for the royal power and the new philosophical outlook were not after all entirely unconnected. However, as reflected in the ruling-class consciousness, the relation between the two appeared inverted: the royal power gave the kings their leisured-class existence, which in its turn, led them to fabricate the leisured-class philosophy. Cut off from the processes of labour which was the business of the toiling classes, the ruling class could evolve only a philosophy of withdrawal from the material world. They believed they could acquire the purest insight into reality by falling asleep and enjoying the bliss of the dreamless sleep.

But let us return to the theory of the royal origin of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, in favour of which many other evidences from the Upaniṣads are cited by its upholders. But Keith raises a vigorous objection to this theory:

> The true solution of the problem is suggested by the obvious difficulties of the position of the maintainers of the theory: we must adopt a solution which explains why the whole Upaniṣad tradition is Brahmanical, and yet why the texts record actions of importance as regards the doctrine by the princes of earth. It is absurd to imagine that these references would have been left to stand had the Brahmins found them derogatory to their dignity.[21]

That exactly is the crucial point: legends attributing the Upaniṣadic philosophy to princes and kings would not have

been there in the Brahmanical tradition had the Brahmins found them derogatory to their dignity. But since they are still a part of the tradition, it stands to reason that the Brahmins did not find them derogatory to their dignity. Furthermore, it also stands to reason that the Brahmins could not have regarded them as derogatory to their dignity so long as they subsisted primarily on the royal donors. It is true that the *Brāhmaṇa*-literature gives us vague indications of some kind of tussle for power between these two castes; but in the Upaniṣads a distinct compromise is already effected between them. Being neither direct producers like the low-castes nor direct plunderers like the royal caste, the Brahmins, as it appears from various Upaniṣadic legends, agreed to be satisfied with that portion of the surplus which came to them as gifts from the kings. We have already seen how the law-codes rationalised this accomplished situation by declaring that receiving gifts was the source of wealth *par excellence* for the Brahmins, just as plunder was of the Kṣatriyas. In any case, the idealistic philosophy suited the temperament of both the castes, because both were equally aloof from the labour of production, or *vṛddhi* as Manu put it. We thus find the same philosophy being preached in the Upaniṣads by the king Ajātaśatru and the priest Yājñavalkya. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* we find King Janaka thrilled by Yājñavalkya's flight into the idealistic fantasy in direct proportion to the amount of the material wealth offered to the latter. Thus, in short, the upholders as well as the opponents of the theory of the Kṣatriya origin of the Upaniṣadic idealism were wrong in posing the question as one of 'Kṣatriyas *versus* Brahmins', overlooking the circumstance that the two together formed the leisured class and as such none of the two could have any special anxiety to admit the primacy of nature to spirit; rather, a philosophy of the primacy of the spirit suited the temperament of both.

20. *Advaita Vedanta*

THUS the historical cause that gave birth to the idealistic outlook had basically been a separation of theory from practice. In developing it Śaṁkara attempted to evolve a frank philosophical defence of this divorce of theory from practice. *Jñāna* or knowledge and *karma* or action, he argued, were diametrically opposed, and as such the latter, far from having anything to do with the former, was a decisive impediment to it. The controversy was of course posed largely in theological terminology of the age when *karma* primarily meant the ritual or the *yajñā*. The reason for Śaṁkara's apprehension of *karma* in this sense was obvious; he knew well the philosophical consequences of the ritualistic standpoint as had been made evident by the Mīmāṁsakas which left no room for the idealistic outlook. All through his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* Śaṁkara was primarily anxious to refute two philosophical positions: that of (1) the Mīmāṁsakas and (2) of the Sāṁkhya, according to which the world was a real transformation of primeval matter. At the same time, his condemnation of *karma* was also in its broad or general sense. And such a condemnation was necessary for his philosophy. According to this, *Brahman* or the ultimate reality was nothing but the self in the sense of pure consciousness. Nothing else being real, any sense of duality was bound to be false. But *karma* presupposed duality in many ways — the body, the world and what not. To be engaged in *karma*, therefore, meant serious involvement in this duality and that went against the realisation of the exclusive reality of the pure ego. Therefore, rejecting *karma* in all forms, Śaṁkara had to take his stand on pure knowledge of *jñāna* alone. That knowledge led to liberation might have been formally accepted by some other philosophers, too; but none was as serious about it as Śaṁkara for whom knowledge was identical with liberation. For others, knowledge merely enabled one to act in a manner that was conducive to liberation.

But how was this *jñāna* itself conceived? To begin with, it was not a logical or rational one. 'We see arguments', said

Śaṁkara,[1] 'which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallcious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation'. In this context he did not reject outright the validity of reasoning as such; subservient to the Veda or *śruti* it was said to have its use. But there was some obvious danger in such a stand, for the same ground for rejecting the independent validity of reasoning could easily recoil back on the validity of the *śruti* itself. Did not different philosophers belonging to the different Vedāntic schools evolve different philosophies from the same *śruti* and did they not reject and refute one another somewhat in the manner in which the logicians were described to have done it? Besides, the *śruti* itself had its own *karma-kāṇḍa* or the ritual branch enjoining action. Above all, any real allowance to the normal sources of knowledge carried the danger of imputing reality to the body and the external world. Therefore, to fortify his own position Śaṁkara had to deny the validity of all possible sources of knowledge — the senses, reason and even the Veda. And this he actually did in his introduction to the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*:

> The mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self, which is termed ignorance (*avidyā*), is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and all the scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, or with final release. — But how can the means of right knowledge such as perception, inference, etc. and scriptural texts have for their object that which is dependent on ignorance? — Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends upon the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the self or the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, perception and other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e., in the body) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the self is not superimposed. Nor can, in the absence of all that,

the self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate. Hence perception and other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on ignorance (*avidyā*).[2]

Thus the knowledge in favour of which action was condemned meant also a condemnation of knowledge itself, or, at any rate, of all that we are accustomed to call knowledge. From the point of view of the positive sciences, this was indeed a very reckless—even disastrous—step to take, but the idealistic standpoint ultimately demanded it. It was left for the later followers of Śaṁkara like Śrīharṣa and Citsukha to develop and defend this position in terms of advanced Indian logic, implying thereby that the doctrine of the intrinsic invalidity of all knowledge could alone be the real position of the Advaita Vedānta.

True to the spirit of the idealist philosophers of the Upaniṣads, the Advaita Vedāntists, after denying all possible sources of normal knowledge, had only dreams and sense-illusions to fall back upon. This was done mainly in two ways. First, both Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara elaborately reiterated the old Upaniṣadic view that by a progressive deadening of the normal consciousness in dream—and still further in deep dreamless sleep—a clearer and still clearer realisation of the true self was achieved. With Yājñavalkya, Ajātaśatru and Sanatkumāra of the Upaniṣads, this was on the whole a mere declaration. In his commentary on the Upaniṣads, Śaṁkara tried to evolve a comparatively advanced philosophical justification for it. But the doctrine remained essentially unchanged. Secondly, taking clue from the Upaniṣads again, that the dreaming subject was the creator of all that was dreamt of, Gauḍapāda converted this into a secure epistemological foundation for idealism. What one dreamt of was only mental or the internal and there was no sure distinction between the dreaming and the waking experience. In other words, the waking experiences, too, were to be understood in terms of the dreams and since the objects of dreams were but the products of imagination, so were also the objects of the waking experiences. This argument was sought to be

further strengthened by Gauḍapāda with the instances of the patent sense-illusions, which went to show that even during the waking state there were experiences of objects which could not have been there. Precisely the same line of arguments, as we shall see later, had already been advanced by the Mahāyāna Buddhists to defend practically the same philosophical position and Gauḍapāda's exposition of these resembled theirs so closely that Dasgupta and others[3] are somewhat inclined to call him a Buddhist. Even Śaṁkara, in spite of what Stcherbatsky aptly characterises his 'sectarian animosity' for all schools of Buddhist philosophy, did in fact depend on the same or similar arguments for substantiating the same philosophical denial of the material world.

Gauḍapāda's formulation of the Advaita Vedānta was called *ajāta-vāda*, literally the doctrine of no-birth, meaning that the world never came into existence. The pure ego being the only real, the experienced world could never be there; as such it was useless to think that the *Brahman* had ever caused the world. In defence of this position, Gauḍapāda tried to reject the concept of causality and wanted to show the consequent impossibility of change being real. It was practically the same view that Parmenides and Zeno had advocated in ancient Greece and it held the same dangers for the positive sciences. For establishing this view, however, Gauḍapāda simply posed two opposing views of causation against each other and took it for granted that by negating each other, the two views themselves established his *ajāta-vāda*.

> Some disputants wish to say that the existent (*bhūta*) is born; others that the non-existent (*abhūta*) is born. Thus they quarrel with each other. Really speaking, neither the existent is born nor the non-existent is born. Thus the quarrel of these... proves that nothing is born. Therefore, we agree to accept the doctrine of *ajāti* (no-birth), as thus established by the disputants themselves.[4]

Compared to the far-reaching corollaries sought to be drawn from this, the argument itself was hardly convincing. But Śaṁkara, too, followed the same pattern of argument, though of course he presented it in a more advanced form. His conclu-

sion, called *vivarta-vāda* rather than *ajāta-vāda*, was essentially meant to be the same denial of change and causality. Two contesting theories of causality were there in the field. One was called *ārambha-vāda* (or *asat-kārya-vāda*) and was associated with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. According to this, the effect was something genuinely new and not a mere manifestation of what was already contained in the cause. The curd, e.g., was not in the milk; it was something distinctly new. The other view was called *pariṇāma-vāda* (or *sat-kārya-vāda*) and was associated with the Sāṁkhya system. According to this, the effect could not be anything other than what was already contained in the cause: that which was only potential in the cause became actual in the effect. Śaṁkara argued against both these theories, freely utilising the arguments of one against the other. He would thus want us to think that on the one hand, the effect was something new, while, on the other, it could not be anything new. In other words, the concept of causation was infected with an internal contradiction, and as such it was only an illusion. This was the essence of Śaṁkara's *vivarta-vāda* or the doctrine of the illusory modification of the cause. The cause alone was real and what appeared as the effect was only an illusion. The necessity of such a view of causation was obvious for the Advaita philosophy. Admitting that *Brahman* or the self was the only reality, it had to be argued that its modification in the form of the world was only illusory.

This leads us to see why the other names of this philosophy was *māyā-vāda*. For, philosophically speaking, the most serious problem that Śaṁkara and his followers had to face concerned the felt reality of this unreal world. This was sought to be solved mainly on the analogy of the sense-illusions. It was only because of ignorance that one saw a snake where there was just a piece of rope. The Advaita term for ignorance was *avidyā* or *māyā*. This was conceived to function in two ways. First, it covered up the real nature of the object, e.g. of the rope. Secondly, it projected something imaginary upon the object, e.g., the unreal snake. But what was the nature of the imaginary object itself? It could not obviously be *sat* or something really existing; because when the illusion was dispelled

the snake was no longer there. Neither could it be purely *asat* or non-existent, like the 'son of a barren woman', because such a purely non-existent could never be the object of an actual perception. Being thus neither *sat* nor *asat,* it could only be characterised as the *anirvacanīya* or the unspeakable. Hence it was that the Advaita doctrine of sense-illusion was called *anirvacanīyatā-khyāti.* It was in terms of this analysis of the sense-illusion that the felt reality of the material world was sought to be explained, i.e., explained away. Just as, because of *avidyā* or *māyā,* one perceived the snake in the rope, so did one perceive the world in the *Brahman.* This ignorance, on the one hand, concealed the real nature of the *Brahman,* while on the other, projected the false world on it. This world — the creation of *māyā* — was, like the snake perceived in the rope, unspeakably unreal. With the knowledge or the realisation of the true nature of *Brahman* was attained liberation, i.e., the freedom from the earthly illusion.

But, it will be asked, was not there a difference between the perception of the snake in the rope and the perception of the rope in the rope, which by negating the first, proved it to be false? Thus, only by accepting the second to be true could one reject the first as false. And if the second was to be accepted as true then the very conclusion of the idealist, viz. the unreality of the felt world, had to be surrendered. As we have already seen, this was, as a matter of fact, one of the major arguments of the Mīmāṁsakas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in their refutation of the idealistic position. The Advaita Vedāntists, at any rate, felt the difficulties created by such a consideration and tried to wriggle out of these with the help of the hypothesis of the degrees of unreality and even of ignorance itself. The snake perceived in the rope and the world perceived in the *Brahman* were both unreal, of course. Nevertheless, there was some distinction between the two, the first being more unreal than the second, because the illusion of the snake was short-lived and dispelled even during the state of bondage, while the latter was not dispelled till the final illumination or liberation. In the terminology of the Advaita Vedānta, the snake perceived in the rope had only the *prātibhāsika-sattā* or illusory existence while

the rope perceived in the rope had *vyāvahārika-sattā* or existence from the point of view of practical life. The former, not to speak of having any ultimate reality, could not serve even the purposes of practical life while the latter, though equally bereft of ultimate reality, could and did serve these purposes. From the point of view of the ultimate reality or the *pāramārthika-sattā* both were of course utterly false, and as such, it would be wrong to imagine that the rope perceived in the rope had any more reality about it. In other words, there were degrees of untruth and unreality, though these were not to be confused with degrees of truth and reality. For there was nothing real excepting the *Brahman* and the whole structure of practical existence was false and unreal. A corresponding distinction was drawn later in the Advaita philosophy between the grades of ignorance: the ignorance causing the illusion of the snake in the rope was called the *tūlā avidyā* as contrasted with the *mūlā avidyā* that caused the illusion of the world in the *Brahman*. The latter was the basic or fundamental ignorance while the former was ignorance within the general framework of this basic ignorance.

Once this standpoint of the *vyāvahārika-sattā*, or practical existence, was admitted, the extreme idealists could easily explain away the glaring absurdities involved in their philosophical stand. For every grain of positive knowledge, common sense and even popular belief that were rejected as false could now be accepted back and given some kind of shelter under this category. However, this admission of the practical point of view as distinct from the ultimate one meant a surreptitious admission of the real weakness of the idealistic philosophy, the philosophy of pure theory or theory divorced from practice. For the verdict of our practical existence is an outspoken condemnation of everything that idealism stands for. Śaṁkara, as we have seen, found it necessary to reject *karma* in order to evolve his idealistic philosophy of pure *jñāna*. But, even the greatest idealist is after all a human being and he has got to live even if only to preach his life-denying philosophy. This is acceptance in practice the world theoretically rejected. In European philo-

sophy, too, the idealists betrayed the same weakness. As Lenin[5] sums up the question:

> 'This is the fundamental defect of idealism: it asks and answers the question of objectivity and subjectivity, of the reality or unreality of the world, only from the standpoint of theory.' Feuerbach makes the sum-total of human practice the basis of the theory of knowledge. He says that idealists of course also recognise the reality of the *I* and the *Thou* in practical life. For the idealists 'this point of view is valid only for practical life and not for speculation. But a speculation which contradicts life, which makes the standpoint of death, of a soul separated from the body, the standpoint of truth, is a dead and false speculation.' Before we *perceive*, we breathe; we cannot exist without air, food and drink.

Incidentally, the Buddhist idealists too had to face the same difficulty and had come out with the same solution as offered by their Advaita counterparts. Only their terminologies were different. Instead of the *vyāvahārika sattā* they spoke of *saṁvṛti satya*, which meant the same thing, viz. truth from the practical point of view, which was of course ultimately false. And what is decisive against such a makeshift effort at accommodating the verdict of the normal everyday experience within the general framework of the idealistic outlook was already stated by Kumārila[6] in Indian philosophy. All this, he said, was plain humbug. For that which was true was true and which was not true was not so. But instead of this frank admission the idealists only fabricated the cumbrous terminologies and said that there were two kinds of truth, one real and the other false. If what was true from the practical point of view was really not true, what else but simple deception could be the motive behind calling it as some kind of truth, though not really true?

But that is precisely the difficulty of the idealist. It is impossible to reject summarily the world of practical life. It is equally impossible for him to accept it with frankness.

21. *Idealism Versus Materialism*

ENGELS SAID:[1]

> The great basic question of all philosophy... is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. From the very early times when men, still completely ignorant of the structure of their own bodies, under the stimulus of dream apparitions came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not activities of their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and leaves it at death—from this time men have been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.

In European philosophy the first philosopher who fully asserted the primacy of the spirit to nature was Plato. He 'worked out his theory of Ideas in conscious opposition to materialism. In the *Sophist* he wrote, "Why, this dispute about reality is a sort of Battle of Gods and Giants"... The Giants are the materialists. The Gods are, of course, the idealists, including Plato'.[2] Our own early idealists expressed the same view. They, too, worked out their philosophy in opposition to materialism. Their idealism, moreover, was for them the philosophy of the gods or the *devas* while materialism was the *upaniṣad* or the 'secret knowledge' of the devils or the *asuras*.

The clearest expression of this is to be found in a legend of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.[3] Indra and Virocana, the representatives of the *devas* and the *asuras* respectively, approached Prajāpati for the knowledge of the true Self. Prajāpati asked them to look at their own images on a pan of water and they saw their own bodies 'corresponding exactly to the hair and finger nail'. This knowledge of the Self being but the body proved sufficient for Virocana. It was therefore called the *upaniṣad* of the *asuras*. But Indra felt dissatisfied and came back to Prajāpati to be instructed in the idealistic philosophy, which therefore became the philosophy of the *devas*. The *Śatapatha Brāhmana*,[4] too, declared that Prajāpati gave dark-

ness and ignorance to the *asuras* and in the *Maitri Upaniṣad*[5] it was said that Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the *devas*, became Śukra, the teacher of the *asuras*, in order to delude them deliberately with a false philosophy.

All these were surely myths but what is significent is that they were to be found in use in much later times—e.g. in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[6]—for purposes of scaring people away from the materialistic philosophy called the Cārvāka or Lokāyata. Could it be that this materialism was as old as the Upanisads? In any case, we have in the Upaniṣads glimpses of a very old materialistic outlook vigorously rejected by the idealists of the age. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,[7] e.g., referred to a materialistic view according to which there was no other-world; the *Śvetāśvatara*[8] mentioned one according to which the material elements were the ultimate cause. Putting these stray evidences together, we may argue the existence of an ancient materialistic philosophy which was later to be called the Lokāyata.

Another feature of the same materialistic philosophy was a view of causality. According to this, as mentioned by the *Śvetāśvatara*,[9] nature or *svabhāva* was the cause of everything. Śaṁkara explained *svabhāva* as the natural power inherent in different things. Some popular verses were evidently once in circulation explaining this view. Aśvaghoṣa[10] quoted one:

> Who made the thorn sharp?
> And the beasts and birds so varied?
> The sugarcane sweet and the *nim* bitter?
> All these are produced by their very nature.

Mādhavācārya[11] quoted another:

> The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn,
> By whom came their variety? From their own nature was it born.

On the basis of all these and also of a considerable number of references to it in the *Mahābhārata*, Hiriyanna gives us a clear exposition of this doctrine of *svabhāva*, by contrasting it with the doctrine of *yadṛcchā* or accidentalism:

> While the one (i.e. accidentalism) maintains that the world is a chaos and ascribes whatever order is seen in it to mere

chance, the other (i.e. the doctrine of *svabhāva*) recognises that 'things are as their nature makes them'. While the former denies causation altogether, the latter acknowledges its universality, but only traces all changes to the thing itself to which they belong... Hence according to *svabhāva-vāda*, it is not a lawless world in which we live; only there is no external principle governing it... What needs to be noticed about it first is its positivistic character which is implied by the contrast that is sometimes drawn between it and *adṛṣṭa-vāda* or 'belief in the supernatural'... Another point of importance regarding it is its denial of a transmigrating soul ... In this respect the doctrine may be contrasted with what is described as *adhyātma-vāda*, which took for granted an immortal soul. One of the *Mahābhārata* sections, on which our present account is based, states, 'Death is the end of beings.' In fact the repudiation of such transcendental entities is the very aim of this doctrine. As a necessary corollary to the rejection of a permanent soul, the *svabhāva-vāda*, it seems, did not believe in the law of *karma* as commonly understood.'[12]

If the doctrine of *svabhāva*, as rejected by the *Śvetāśvatara*, did have all these implications, it could not have been substantially different from the Lokāyata philosophy. Hiriyanna[13] even thinks that this 'mundane metaphysics' of *svabhāva-vāda* 'seems to have been the original significance of the term Lokāyata ("restricted to the experienced world").' At any rate, the Advaita Vedāntists like Mādhavācārya[14] and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī[15] attributed the *svabhāva-vāda* to the Lokāyata standpoint. There are therefore strong grounds to presume that if this materialism, in conscious opposition to which the idealistic outlook was worked out in the Upaniṣads, was not the same as was known in later times by the name Lokāyata, it contained at least the potentials thereof.

This will perhaps not be seriously objected to. However, little attention is usually paid to another aspect of this struggle between materialism and idealism in the Upaniṣadic age, some points of broad interest about which may be briefly noted here.

Long before Mādhavācarya and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī attributed the doctrine of *svabhāva* to the Lokāyata, Śaṁkara had attributed it to the Sāṁkhya. According to the Sāṁkhya, the world evolved through successive stages called *mahat*, etc.,

as a result of the transformation of the primeval matter called *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*. How did this transformation take place? Saṁkara[16] represented the Sāṁkhya point of view thus:

> Just as grass, herbs, water, etc., independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature (*svabhāvāt eva*), into milk; so, we assume, the primeval matter (*pradhāna*) also transforms itself into *mahat* and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, etc. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformations of the primeval matter is of the same kind.

Saṁkara sought to refute the view by the following argument:

> The transformation of the primeval matter might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed... For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation has no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to produce a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her—for these reasons the spontaneous modification of primeval matter cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

The unsatisfactory nature of such a refutation of *svabhāvavāda* is obvious. The real question is: Was it necessary to postulate any cause over and above what was inherent in the natural things? The evidence of the female physiological apparatus did not prove any such cause. From the point of view of the doctrine of *svabhāva*, the cause of milk was not the grass

as such but the entire natural complex of grass-as-eaten-by-the-cow. That men could get a more abundant supply of milk by feeding the cow more plentifully did not prove any extra-natural cause but simply that men could conquer nature only by recognising the laws inherent in nature or, in modern terminology, that freedom is the recognition of necessity: 'We by no means', said Engels,[17] explaining the materialistic standpoint, 'rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to know and correctly apply its laws.' Thus the materialistic implications of *svabhāva-vāda* could be satisfactorily refuted only by demonstrating that some further supernatural or spiritual factor was necessary for the production of, say, milk. As a matter of fact, Vācaspati Miśra, while commenting upon Śaṁkara, saw the point. 'It might be held', he said, 'that for the transformation of the grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but even in this case an intelligent cause is required and that can only be the omniscient God. As it is said, "A part of the task is performed by the Divine"'.

But let us return to the Sāṁkhya. Before Śaṁkara argued all these, Gauḍapāda[18] said in so many words that 'according to the Sāṁkhya philosophers there is a certain kind of cause called *svabhāva*': *sāṁkhyānāṁ svabhāva nāma kaścit kāraṇam asti.* But why were the Vedāntists thus attributing the doctrine of *svabhāva* to the Sāṁkhya? Because, they found the fundamental position of the Sāṁkhya otherwise ununderstandable. The philosohy, as it came down to us in much later times, was dualistic; over and above the primeval matter, it recognised a multiplicity of *puruṣas*, commonly rendered as souls. But the position of these *puruṣas* was quite peculiar. The typical description of them was that they were secondary and indifferent, *apradhāna* and *udāsīna*. They had, therefore, no real part to play in the evolution of the world. In other words, the world could emerge from the primeval matter only because of its own inherent *svabhāva*. Hence Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara thought that

the doctrine of *svabhāva* was necessarily demanded by the Sāṁkhya standpoint.

Hiriyanna, we have just seen, made the materialistic implications of *svabhāva-vāda* quite clear. Therefore, if Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara were right, are we to view the Sāṁkhya, too, as some kind of a materialistic philosophy?

22. *The Saṁkhya System*

THE Sāṁkhya philosophy seems to present us with any number of problems. The meaning of the term is uncertain and the origin of the philosophy only conjectural. Tradition attributed it to a certain Kapila but made the case quite confounding by also attributing to him a wide range of conflicting myths. The other ancient Sāṁkhya teachers like Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Voḍhu, Sanaka, and Sananda, too, are nothing more than mere names for us. However, two things appear to be certain. The Sāṁkhya ideas were very old and their influence quite extensive. The epic *Mahābhārata*, the medical treatise *Caraka-saṁhitā*, the law-book *Manusmṛti* and the mythological Purāṇas, in so far as they touched upon philosophical topics at all, were as Garbe says, 'saturated with the doctrines of the Sāṁkhya'. Strangely, however, there are uncertainties as to what this philosophy originally was. A certain ancient treatise on the system called the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* is belived to have once existed. But it is lost to us. Apart from the medieval and late medieval commentaries, what we are concretely left with are only two treatises claiming to expound the Sāṁkhya views. These are the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* and the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*. The former contains only 72 couplets and was attributed to a certain Iśvarakṛṣṇa, who, Garbe thinks, could have belonged to A.D. 500. The latter was quite spuriously attributed to Kapila himself, because the actual date of this work is considered to be somewhat near A.D. 1400. Yet the

Sāṁkhya, as we have just said, must have been very old. It was declared by the *Mahābhārata*[1] itself to be eternal (*sanātana*). Garbe and H. P. Sastri argue that it must have been pre-Buddha.[2] Even the Upaniṣads, as we are going to see, presupposed it. But it is doubtful how far the philosophy was preserved in its original form in the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* and even in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*. In the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*, as Garbe rightly points out, 'the Sāṁkhya doctrine no longer appeared in its original unadulterated form; for they (i.e. the *sūtras*) seek to explain away the discrepancy between themselves on the one hand and the teachings of Upaniṣads and the Vedānta on the other.'[3]

As regards the *Kārikā* version of the Sāṁkhya, Dasgupta says:

> The fact that Caraka (A.D. 78) does not refer to the Sāṁkhya as described by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and referred to in other parts of *Mahābhārata* is a definite proof that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya is a later modification... Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavāsin altered the Sāṁkhya according to his own views. Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavāsin was a title of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.[4]

It was therefore with obvious justification that Vijñāna Bhikṣu introduced his commentary on the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* by saying that Time had devoured the Sāṁkhya leaving only a fragment behind; he was going to fill it up with his own words. However, instead of trying to reconstruct the lost Sāṁkhya what he actually did was to twist it into a theistic philosophy based on his own understanding of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra*. 'In order', says Garbe, 'to bridge over the chasm between the Sāṁkhya system and his own theism (which he is pleased to style Vedāntic), Vijñāna Bhikṣu resorts to the strangest means to do away with one of the fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sāṁkhya, which is the denial of God.'[5] So it is quite unsafe for us to rely upon his commentary for an understanding of the philosophy. The same danger exists, more or less, with regard to the other commentators too. For Sāṁkhya had the singular misfortune of having had no commentator who strictly subscribed to the philosophy. The best-known commentators on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* were Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra. We have already seen the real philosophical affiliation of the former

and the latter could not have been free from a bias for the Vedānta inasmuch as he was the famous founder of one of the post-Śaṁkara schools of Advaita Vedānta called the Bhāmatī school, named after his famous exposition of Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. As for the commentators on the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra*, the best-known names were Aniruddha, along with his Vedāntic commentator Mahādeva, and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, whose own philosophy we have already mentioned. Besides, elements of the Sāṁkhya philosophy were being continuously assimilated by various Vedāntic writers in various ways so that the Sāṁkhya gradually faded out, as it were, into the Vedānta. After the great philosophical turmoil in the country caused by the emergence of the later Buddhist logicians, real stalwarts in philosophy came forward to defend the old standpoints of the Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But there were none to defend the Sāṁkhya. For, by this time, the Sāṁkhya, as a distinct philosophy, was practically non-existent. As Stcherbatsky puts it, 'The Sāṁkhyas, after a reform which brought them in the pale of Vedānta, ceased to exist as a separate school.'[6] Some of its old concepts survived no doubt. But these became either empty husks that were filled up with all kinds of Vedāntic notions or just dismantled parts that were used in various kinds of alien philosophical constructions. That, in short, was the history of the Sāṁkhya. Its origin is unknown, its passing away almost unnoticed.

We may, however, begin with some idea of the philosophy as presented by the comparatively later sources like the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*. As in the Upaniṣads, distinct effort was made in the Sāṁkhya to arrive at the first cause of the world. But the view arrived at, like the approach itself, was fundamentally different. It 'not only rejected the *Brahman*, the All-Soul, but emphatically denied the existence of God.'[7] Again, instead of any flight into mystic imagination or sinking down into the state of the deep dreamless sleep, the method of approach was quite rationalistic. As the *Kārikā*[8] said, the cause of the world was to be inferred from the nature of the effect. Accordingly, an effort was made to understand the nature of causality and make it the starting point of the philosophy. This view of causality was called the

satkārya-vāda or *pariṇāma-vāda,* i.e. the doctrine that the effect was only a modification of the cause. What was found in the effect was contained in the cause. Such a view of causality was argued evidently on the basis of everyday observations: If the effect was something entirely new and not what was already contained in the cause, then anything could be produced from anything—the *śāli*-crop, e.g., could be produced from the *vrīhi*-seeds and the *vrīhi*-crop from the *śāli*-seeds. But since the *śāli*-seeds could produce only the *śāli*-crops it had to be admitted that these were already contained in the *śāli*-seeds. Besides, if the effect was really non-existent before being produced, then it could never have arisen at all, for how could the non-existent ever come to being? Of course, as pre-existing in the cause, the effect was only potential; nevertheless the two were essentially the same in the sense of being the implicit and explicit states of the same thing.

It followed therefore that the essential character of the effect contained the clue to the essential character of the cause. What, then, was the essential character of the world, whose cause was sought to be established? Since, argued the Sāṁkhya philosophers, the world was essentially material, its cause, too, must have been so. The cause thus inferred was called *prakṛti* or *pradhāna,* the primeval matter. It was not matter in its gross or explicit form, i.e., the form in which the world was perceived. But it was matter in its subtle and potential form which, because of its subtlety, could not be directly perceived, but the essential materiality of which was clearly inferred. The Sāṁkhya terminology for this primeval matter in its original state, i.e., in the state prior to its being evolved into the visible material world, was *avyakta* or the unmanifest, conceived as formless and undifferentiated, limitless and ubiquitous.

How was the composition of this primeval matter to be understood? The Sāṁkhya answer was that it was to be understood exactly in the manner in which its existence had been inferred. In the Sāṁkhya view, everything in the material world was an unstable composition of three kinds of substances or reals, technically called the *guṇas,* though in the composition of the different objects of the world, one or other of the *guṇas* pre

dominated. These three were called (1) *sattva*, exhibiting qualities of lightness, illumination and joy, (2) *rajas*, exhibiting qualities of movement, excitation and pain and (3) *tamas* exhibiting qualities of heaviness, obstruction and sloth. The primeval matter, too, was accordingly conceived as composed of these three constituents. This conception of the *guṇas* may not definitely answer to our modern ideas. This much is certain, however, that as constituents of the primeval matter these were essentially material. *Sattva* was that aspect of the primeval matter which contained the potential for intelligence, *rajas* for energy and *tamas* for mass or intertia. In the *avyakta* state of the *prakṛti*, these formed a stable equilibrium. A loss of this equilibrium was somehow conceived as the starting point of the evolution of the world from the *avyakta*, but it is not quite clear how exactly the cause of this loss of equilibrium was conceived. 'As a result of disturbance which is not more definitely described, of this condition of equilibrium, the material universe is evolved.' We had, at any rate, in the Sāṁkhya a systematic effort to understand this process of evolution. 'This system', says B. N. Seal, 'possesses a unique interest in the history of thought as embodying the earliest clear and comprehensive account of the process of cosmic evolution.'[9]

In the Sāṁkhya terminology, the process of evolution was as follows: From the disturbed equilibrium of the *avyakta* first arose the *mahat* or *buddhi*. *Mahat* meant the great, *buddhi* the intelligence. From the *mahat* arose *ahaṁkāra*, the sense of the ego. From *ahaṁkāra* arose (1) the *manas* or mind, (2) the five *jñānendriyas* or sense-organs, (3) the five *karmendriyas* or motor-organs and (4) the five *tanmātras* or subtle elements which, in the Sāṁkhya view, were conceived as ultimately giving rise to the five well-known gross elements or *mahābhūtas*, namely earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa* or the empty space.

It may not be easy for the modern mind to grasp clearly all the points that the Sāṁkhya philosophers were trying to explain by conceiving the successive stages of the evolution of the world in such an apparently peculiar manner. It appears to be particularly odd why *ahaṁkāra*, ordinarily understood as the ego-consciousness, should be given such a position in this scheme.

One naturally feels like asking, did it actually mean the same thing in the original Sāṁkhya as it does today? Some of the modern scholars give us the impression of quietly accepting the entire scheme without raising any question about the details; others discover in the details outstanding contributions to scientific thought. B. N. Seal[10] even proposes to interpret the whole thing in terms of 19th century European science. There is the obvious risk in such efforts to read more ideas in the ancient philosophical systems than actually belonged to these. It needs to be remembered that the Sāṁkhya concepts came down from a hoary antiquity and there was something inevitably archaic about these, the exact significance of which is lost to us. However, 'if there is danger of exaggerating the import of these ancient philosophies, there is also danger of denuding them of significance'.[11] The broad significance of the Sāṁkhya view of evolution, therefore, must not be overlooked or underestimated because of our difficulty of understanding certain details of it. And what was of decisive importance about it was the conception of matter in eternal motion. As Stcherbatsky puts it, 'the idea of an eternal Matter which is never at rest, always evolving from one form into another, is a very strong point of the system, and it does credit to the philosophers of that school, that they at so early a date in the history of human thought so clearly formulated the idea of an eternal Matter which is never at rest'.[12] Further, it needs particularly to be noted that this primeval matter itself was conceived by the Sāṁkhya to have had all the potential for motion or *rajas* and even of intelligence or *sattva*. Like the five gross elements or *mahābhūtas*, the *buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas* — in short everything that was conceived as psychical—were conceived to have evolved ultimately from nothing but the primeval matter itself. 'This matter', says Stcherbatsky, 'embraces not only the human body, but all our mental states as well, they are given a materialistic origin and essence'.[13] Understood from this point of view, the Sāṁkhya contained serious potentials for a materialistic philosophy. It was no wonder therefore that Śaṁkara persistently characterised it as but *acetanakāraṇa-vāda*, 'the doc-

trine of an unconscious first cause' and looked upon it as his main philosophical rival, the *pradhāna-malla.*

At the same time, the most serious difficulty of this philosophy, particularly as presented in the later times, must not be lost sight of. At least from the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* onwards, the philosophy admitted, over and above the *prakṛti,* a multiplicity of what were called the *puruṣas,* generally understood as the souls and thus became vulnerable to easy criticism. Garbe,[14] however, tries to find some logical justification for this admission of the *puruṣas.* 'What place, however, in a system which maintains such views is to be found for the soul? Strangely enough, former scholars who made exhaustive investigations into the Sāṁkhya system did not succeed in answering this question. They regarded the soul in this system as entirely superfluous, and hold that its founder would have shown himself more logical if he had altogether eliminated it'. Garbe thinks that the most important function of the soul was 'the illumination of the processes going on in the inner organ. All these processes must indeed remain purely mechanical and unconscious unless the soul, "by virtue of its nearness", illuminates them, i.e. brings them to consciousness.' The basic assumption of such an assertion obviously is that consciousness must be essentially alien to the merely material and as such the merely material can never contain the potential for it. It is, in other words, the assumption of the intrinsic impossibility of the materialistic position. There is no doubt that the later exponents of the Sāṁkhya, perhaps because of their obvious bias for the Vedānta, felt precisely the same difficulty that Garbe echoes. Confronted with a philosophy that made *sattva* or the intelligence-potential as one of the constituents of the *prakṛti* and conceived *buddhi, manas* and the *ahaṁkāra* as the products of this primeval matter, they found relief in its theory of the *puruṣa* which, standing eternally aloof from matter, somehow or other reserved the exclusive right to consciousness. The element of consciousness in everything psychical, being the reflection of the conciousness of the *puruṣa,* became after all a borrowed element, and as such, the danger of making matter primary and spirit secondary was somehow or other evaded. There is, therefore, nothing to wonder at the

commentators of the Sāṁkhya, with their anti-materialistic bias, emphasising the role of the *puruṣa* in the system. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to raise a few simple questions. We have already seen why some of the modern scholars rightly doubted if the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* version of the philosophy was the same as the original Sāṁkhya. What, then, was the place of the *puruṣa* in the original *Sāṁkhya*? Was it understood in the sense of the pure consciousness from which alone the psychic evolutes of the *prakṛti* could borrow consciousness by reflection? If this was not so, the next question would inevitably be: Did the *Kārikā*-version of the Sāṁkhya, by incorporating into it this conception of the *puruṣa* or by investing the *puruṣa* with this new significance, effect any logical improvement upon the system, or make it really incongruous and easily rejectable?

As Dasgupta points out, we have at least one definite evidence of the pre-*Kārikā* version of the Sāṁkhya. It was in the medical treatise called the *Caraka-saṁhitā*. From this version it is quite evident that there were many confusions and conflicting views about the *puruṣa* even in the time of Caraka. As a matter of fact, the entire section of the *Caraka-saṁhitā*[15] that discussed the Sāṁkhya philosophy was introduced with the purpose of dispelling the doubts about the *puruṣa*. Five alternative views of the *puruṣa* were mentioned by Caraka. These were: (1) *puruṣa* meant the five elements (*dhātus*) like *ākāśa* (space), along with the element of consciousness (*cetanā-dhātu*); (2) it was simply the element of consciousness; (3) it was the heap of twentyfour *dhātus*, viz., *manas* (mind), ten *indriyas* (i.e., five sense-organs and five motor-organs), five *arthas* or objects of knowledge like sound (*śabda*), etc., and *prakṛti* composed of eight *dhātus*, viz., the *avyakta*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and five *mahābhūtas* or gross elements; (4) puruṣa was twofold, viz. the eternal and the non-eternal (*anādi* and *sādi*); the former was the same as the *avyakta*, the latter as *vyakta*, and (5) there was no such thing as the *puruṣa*. This last view was for Caraka evidently a *pūrvapakṣa*. What needs to be noted, however, is that the second of the above views, according to which *puruṣa* meant the element of consciousness alone, i.e., presumably a view that was nearest to the *Kārikā*-version of the *puruṣa*, was

not the view that Caraka himself subscribed to. This, too, was evidently of the nature of a *pūrvapakṣa* for Caraka. How precisely he himself proposed to understand the nature of the *puruṣa* is, of course, not quite clear. He attached the greatest importance to the third and possibly also some importance to the fourth of the above views. From the circumstance that all the twentyfour *dhātus* enumerated in the third view were conceived even in the later Sāṁkhya as being basically material, it may reasonably be argued that Caraka himself did not share the later spiritualistic understanding of the principle of the *puruṣa*. At any rate, eminent modern scholars like Sukhlalji and Dasgupta interpret Caraka's position in this manner. Sukhlalji thinks that according to Caraka, soul was only a product of *prakṛti* and not something co-eternal with *prakṛti*, as in the later Sāṁkhya.[16] 'Caraka', says Dasgupta, 'identifies the *avyakta* part of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* as forming one category'.[17] If so, we have a glimpse in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* of an ancient version of the Sāṁkhya which was yet to be clearly differentiated from materialism. For, in this philosophy there was only the concept of the *puruṣa*, understood as the ever-detached soul, that could go against materialism, and if Caraka's understanding of the *puruṣa* itself was materialistic, how else could we characterise his Sāṁkhya?

There is moreover no doubt that the earliest of our idealists viewed the Sāṁkhya as being the strongest of their philosophical rivals and they did this clearly because they were apprehensive of its materialistic implications. The first systematic expression of this was made in the *Brahma-sūtra*. No less than sixty aphorisms in it were clearly designed to refute the Sāṁkhya, whereas forty-three in all were directed against the other rival philosophies. After elaborately refuting the Sāṁkhya doctrine, the author claimed that thereby all other rival theories were virtually refuted.[18] Saṁkara explained it thus: 'that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary (*pradhāna-malla*, literally, the chief wrestler) the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished.' But why did the *Brahma-sūtra* look upon the Sāṁkhya as the most important challenge to the Vedānta? The answer is clear. It understood the Sāṁkhya as *pradhāna-vāda* or as *pradhāna-kāraṇa-vāda*, i.e. the doctrine of

the primeval matter being the first cause, while the Vedānta was *brahma-vāda* or *brahma-kāraṇa-vāda,* i.e. the doctrine of *Brahman,* as something essentially conscious, being the first cause. It was, thus, above all a controversy between *acetana-kāraṇa-vāda* and *cetana-kāraṇa-vāda,* i.e., between the doctrine of the first cause being unconscious matter and the doctrine of the first cause being spirit or consciousness. That was why, after explaining in the first four *sūtras* certain fundamental points about the nature of the *Brahman* and that of the Vedānta texts, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* immediately hastened to explain in course of the next seven *sūtras* that this *Brahman* was a principle of consciousness or an intelligent principle and as such was to be clearly distinguished from the *pradhāna* of the Sāṁkhya, which, being unconscious or material, could not be the cause of the world.

Because of the unfortunate zeal of some of the modern scholars to discover the germs of the Sāṁkhya philosophy in the Upaniṣads it needs to be emphasised here that, by making Sāṁkhya the strongest philosophical opponent of the Vedānta, the *Brahma-sūtra* was consistently following the spirit of the Upaniṣads, because the philosophers of the Upaniṣads had done the same thing, though in their own way. As a matter of fact, the very passages that are usually cited to show the seeds of the Sāṁkhya thought in the Upaniṣads, understood clearly and objectively, are found to be nothing but efforts to disprove and reject the Sāṁkhya ideas. The typical way of doing this was to extol the *puruṣa* over the *prakṛti* and invest the former with patent Vedāntic notions. 'Higher than the *avyakta* is the *puruṣa* and higher than the *puruṣa* is nothing at all', said the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad.*[19] 'Higher than the *avyakta,* however', repeated the text, 'is the *puruṣa,* ... knowing which a man is liberated'.[20] 'Now', said the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,* 'one should know that *prakṛti* is illusion (*māyā*) and that the Mighty Lord is the illusion-maker (*māyin*). This whole world is pervaded with beings that are parts of Him'.[21] And so on. Clearly enough, these were meant to be rejections of the Sāṁkhya view, the use of the typical Sāṁkhya terminologies notwithstanding.

Was it because of the growing prestige of the Upaniṣadic

thought that the conception of the *puruṣa* as pure consciousness, and therefore alien to and eternally aloof from matter, was eventually introduced into the Sāṁkhya, of which we have records from the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* onwards? A full and final answer to the question may be wanting. This much is certain, however, that by introducing such a conception into the system, the Sāṁkhya became only a bundle of inconsistencies. The author of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* himself gave us the impression that after accepting the *puruṣa* in this sense he did not know what exactly to do with it or how to fit it with the fundamentals of the system. As the ever-detached consciousness, the *puruṣa* could not have anything real to do with the process of the material evolution; nevertheless, admitting it to have been there it had at any rate something to do with it. The *Kārikā* wanted to make the *puruṣa* responsible for the superintendence of the modification of the *prakṛti;* but a direct or active superintendence was inconceivable. So the conception of a passive superintendence was invented on the basis of the well-known analogy of the halt and the blind. But it was easy for Saṁkara to show that the analogy did not apply, because the superintendence of the halt over the blind was not purely passive. Besides, as he argued, 'this, your new position involves an abandonment of your old position, according to which the *pradhāna* is moving of itself and the (indifferent and inactive) soul possesses no moving power'.[22] Similar were the difficulties felt by the *Kārikā* in inventing any real purpose that could be served for the ever-aloof soul by the evolution of matter. It declared that this evolution was for the purpose of the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* but it had also to say that the real purpose was the liberation of the *puruṣa*. The two purposes thus conceived contradicted each other. This conception of liberation, too, was evidently borrowed from the Upaniṣads and it cost Sāṁkhya the elementary self-consistency. If the *pradhāna* was real and its modification a real process (*pariṇāma*, as contrasted with *vivarta* or illusory modification of the Advaita Vedānta) and if, further, this was the cause of bondage for the *puruṣa*, then the bondage, too, had to be conceived as essentially real and as such could not be removed by mere knowledge, though the *Kārikā*

uncritically echoed the Vedāntic view and claimed that knowledge caused liberation. In defence of this view of liberation, therefore, the only consistent alternative could be that *prakṛti* and its modifications were after all the products of ignorance and therefore unreal, which meant a surrender of the fundamentals of the Sāṁkhya in favour of the Vedānta. But the *Kārikā* did not do this and thus became a bundle of inconsistencies.

Was it because of this that during the later period of mature philosophical activities no one cared to move forward to defend such an internally inconsistent system? Perhaps the admission of the *puruṣa* in the Vedāntic or near-Vedāntic sense in the later version of this philosophy meant such a logical setback for it that its original spirit had ultimately to wither away, leaving the general outlines of its ancient evolutionary theory to be utilised by the Advaita Vedāntists in their account of the illusory evolution of the world out of the *Brahman* and by the non-Advaita Vedāntists in their account of the real evolution of the world out of God.

23. *The Yoga*

THE *Yoga-sūtra* was attributed to a certain Patañjali. A grammarian of the second century B.C., the author of the Great Commentary (*Mahābhāṣya*) on Pāṇini, bore the same name. Assuming that the two could not have been the same person, Jacobi thinks that the *Yoga-sūtra* was composed after A.D. 450. Others, like Dasgupta, fail to see why the two Patañjalis could not be the same person; in their view the date of the text was much earlier. However, two things are quite clear. First, *Yoga* was not, strictly speaking, a philosophical view at all. It meant certain practices that had come down from a hoary antiquity and were imagined to be conducive to certain supernatural powers. Secondly, though the *Yoga-sūtra* did elaborately dis-

cuss these practices and also a specific philosophical view, there was no inherent connection between the two.

Excepting for the admission of the existence of God, this philosophical view was practically the same as the later Sāṁkhya. Patañjali's philosophy was thus called 'Sāṁkhya with God.' But this admission of God was not of great philosophical signifiance.

> The object of the *Yoga* system [says Garbe] in inserting the conception of a personal God into the Sāṁkhya is merely to satisfy the theists, and to facilitate the propagation of the theory of the universe expounded in the Sāṁkhya. The idea of God, far from being organically interwoven in the *Yoga* system, is only loosely inserted. In the *Yoga-sūtras* the passages that treat of God stand disconnected, and are, indeed, in direct contradiction to the contents and aim of the system. God neither creates the universe, nor does he rule it. He does not reward or punish the actions of men, and the latter do not regard union with Him as the supreme object of their endeavour. God is only a 'particular soul', not essentially different from the other individual souls which are co-eternal with Him.... It is evident that this is no God in our sense of the term, and that we have to do with perplexing speculations the aim of which is to conceal the originally atheistic character of the system, and to bring the assumption of God into bare accord with its fundamental teaching. Assuredly, these speculations prove, were there any need at all for proof, that in the real Sāṁkhya-Yoga there is no room for a personal God.[1]

Just as this God was to the Sāṁkhya quite arbitrary and extrinsic, so was the Sāṁkhya philosophy itself to the Yoga practices. The practices were in fact immensely old. Concrete material relics of the Indus civilization like stone-statues and pictures depicted on the 'seals' unmistakably indicate that the same practices were prevalent in the country as early as the third millennium B.C.[2] In course of time these became the floating possessions, as it were, of all sorts of religious sects and even philosophical systems, of which the Sāṁkhya was but one. Dasgupta observes that

> the *yoga* practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sāṁkhya. Thus the *yoga* practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the Śaivas and Śāktas; ... they grew in

another direction as the Haṭhayoga which was supposed to produce mystical and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers.... The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great....Patañjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of *yoga* practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the *yoga*, but grafted them all on the Sāṁkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us. Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu...agree with us in holding that Patañjali was not the founder of the *yoga*, but an editor.[3]

That the Sāṁkhya metaphysics was quite extrinsic to *yoga* and that the *yoga* was in fact the floating possession of various systems are also evident from many other facts. Sukhlalji[4] has summed these up as follows: Mahāvīra, the great prophet of Jainism, devoted himself for twelve long years chiefly to the yogic practices and the canonical works of Jainism attached great importance to the well-known components of these (*yogāṅgas*). The Buddha, too, before attaining enlightenment, was said to have practised *yoga* for six continuous years and the canonical works of Buddhism, too, did not attach any lesser importance to these ancient practices. Even the Nyāya system, though concerned mainly with the epistemological problems, discussed these practices. The *Nyāya-sūtra* repeatedly mentioned these in approval and so did the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The importance of *yoga* in the Vedānta can easily be judged from the circumstance that the third chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* bore the title *sādhana* and the well-known components of *yoga* like *dhyāna, āsana*, etc., were discussed there. To all these are to be added the internal evidence of the *Yoga-sūtra* indicating, as Sukhlalji points out, that the Sāṁkhya was only one of the many philosophies with which *yoga* was associated. Each chapter of this text ended with the words *yoga-śāstre sāṁkhyapravacane*, etc., and this clearly indicates that even during the time of Patañjali there were in existence *yoga* systems based upon doctrines other than those of the Sāṁkhya.

It is, therefore, logical to look upon *yoga* as essentially certain ancient practices rather than any specific philosophy. What,

then, were these practices? The *Yoga-sūtra* defined *yoga* as *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*. This was obviously the result of trying to explain *yoga* in terms of modified Sāṁkhya. *Citta* (mind?) was supposed to be the product of *prakṛti;* though essentially unconscious, it had some kind of affinity with the *puruṣa* because of the predominance of the *sattva* in it; with the reflection of the consciousness of the *puruṣa* it became apparently conscious. When related to an object, the *citta* assumed the form of the object. This was called the *citta-vṛtti*, i.e. the modification of the *citta*, which may perhaps be roughly called the mental state. Because the objects were most varied, the *citta-vṛttis*, too, were various, and because of the affinity of the *citta* with the *puruṣa* or the soul, a false identification of the soul with the varied modifications of the *citta* took place. The aim of *yoga* was but the controlled cessation (*nirodha*) of these modifications, which meant the cessation of the possibility of the false identifications of the soul with the manifold objects.

Obviously enough, such an understanding of the *yoga* could be maintained only by accepting the philosophy of the modified Sāṁkhya upon which it was based. But we have already seen that it was not essential for *yoga* to lean upon the Sāṁkhya. That such an understanding of the *yoga* seemed a concoction even to Patañjali is evident from his further discussions of the methods of techniques of the *yoga*—i.e. the real *yogic* practices —and more particularly from the results these were supposed to yield. As for the methods and means of *yoga*, the *Yoga-sūtra* mentioned eight. These were the following *yogaṅgas*: (1) *yama* (restraint), (2) *niyama* (discipline), (3) *āsana* (sitting posture), (4) *prāṇāyāma* (breath-control), (5) *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the senses), (6) *dhāraṇā* (attention), (7) *dhyāna* (meditation) and (8) *samādhi* (concentration). Presented thus in broad outlines, the whole thing does not of course appear to be very archaic. However, as we go into the details of these processes—particularly of *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, etc.—the prehistory of the practices appear before our eyes. For these take us 'back to the primitive times, the ecstatic rites of the savage peoples', in which all sorts of manœuvres are still found to be undertaken with the idea of acquiring the most stupendous powers, but

which are in fact nothing but the most strenuous methods of deliberately inducing morbid mental states. Gough, Keith, Valle-Poussin, Garbe and others[5] have clearly shown the origin of the *yogic* practices in such primitive imaginations and customs. That the primitive ideas were actually present behind Patañjali's comparatively sophisticated presentation of the *yoga* becomes clear from his discussion of the supernatural powers called *vibhūtis* which such practices were imagined to yield. These supernatural powers were in fact the stock in trade of all the *yogic* texts and just a few examples may tell their own story.

> Among them was the ability to become infinitely small or invisible; to swell to an immense size, so as to reach even to the most distant objects—e.g., to the moon with the tip of the finger—or to be transported anywhere by the simple act of will. There is mention also of such an intensification of the perceptions that the most remote things, even though separated by intervening walls or the like, come under the cognizance of the senses, and the processes going on in the minds of other men become known in the same way. Other faculties obtainable are the knowledge of the past and future, specially of the hour of one's own death; or the ability to make the dead appear, and to hold converse with them.[6]

Retaining all these obviously primitive beliefs more or less intact, Patañjali somehow or other tried to extol the hypothetical state of the cessation of all the mental modifications as the highest ideal of the *yoga* practices.

For the primitive magician indulging in the weird practices and mistaking the hypnotic and cataleptic states thus induced to be states in which great supernatural powers were actually achieved, there was obviously no question of offering any theoretical justification for all this. But in the subsequent period, our philosophers representing the different systems wanted to mould this primitive inheritance so that these could fit somehow or other with their own philosophies. The belief in the *yoga* practices yielding various supernatural powers was perhaps never fully outgrown. At the same time distinct efforts were also persistently made to view these practices as means or methods of preparing oneself both physically and mentally for

a correct appreciation of the fundamental philosophical truths. So in the course of time there inevitably arose the tendency of the philosophers representing the different systems to defend their philosophies on the strength of the unique experience resulting from the *yoga* practices. Even logicians like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, e.g., maintained that there were four types of perception, the fourth and highest of which was *yogic;* commenting upon this Dharmottara claimed that one possible object of *yogic* perception was the Fourfold Noble Truth propounded by the Buddha.[7] Similar claims could easily be put forward also by the representatives of the other philosophies, there being no objective standard by which to judge the validity of such a hyopthetical unique experience. Kumārila, as we have already seen, saw the danger created for philosophy by claims like this and he bluntly said that the so-called unique experience yielded by *yoga* was after all only some kind of subjective fancy and as such was quite useless for determining the validity of any philosophical view.

24. *The Buddha and Early Buddhism*

THE Buddha died at about the age of 80 in 483 B.C. He did not himself write anything and no work of Buddhism was a product of his own time. We are nevertheless left with quite an extensive and ancient literature of Buddhism. Leaving for the time being the question of how these came to be fixed, we may have some rough idea of their nature. Almost the whole of the oldest Buddhist literature consists of short collections containing speeches, sayings, poems or tales, or rules of conduct, which are combined into larger collections, called *piṭaka* or 'basket'. There were three such *piṭakas*, called the *Tri-piṭakas* or the 'three baskets.' Written in the Pali language, these were: (1) *Vinaya-piṭaka* or 'the basket of discipline', which supplies the regulations for the management of the order (the *saṁgha* or the

community of monks), and for the conduct of the daily life of monks and nuns; (2) The *Sutta-piṭaka,* 'our best source for the *dharma* or religion of the Buddha and his earliest disciples. It consists, in prose and verse, the most important products of the Buddhist literature, grouped in five minor collections called *nikāyas';* (3) The *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* or 'basket of higher religion,' which treated the same subjects as the *Sutta-piṭaka,* though in a more scholastic manner. All these were considered to be canonical. There were also non-canonical works in Pali like the *Milinda-pañha,* recording a dialogue supposed to have taken place between a Buddhist teacher Nāgasena and the Greek King Menander (Milinda) who ruled over north-west India about 125-95 B.C.

There were also Sanskrit works of the Buddhists. But these were of later origin. There were further certain late biographies like the *Mahāvastu* ('The Book of Great Events') in mixed Sanskrit, the *Lalitavistara* ('The Detailed Account of the Play of the Buddha') in Sanskrit prose with long metrical pieces in mixed Sanskrit, the *Buddhacarita* by Aśvaghoṣa, an epic in pure Sanskrit. The *Jātaka-māla* ('Garland of Birth Stories') by Āryaśūra of the 4th century A.D. was in the style of classical Sanskrit literature; but nearly all of the 34 stories in it were taken from the Pali *Jātaka,* a collection of 550 stories compiled in the *Sutta-piṭaka* and forming an important source of the social and economic history of Buddhist India.

None of the early texts of Buddhism was philosophical proper. Buddhist philosophies, strictly speaking, came long after the Buddha and will be taken up by us later. For the present we may have a brief survey of the ethico-religious ideals preached by the Buddha and the view of the world which these presupposed.

The Buddhist tradition summed up Buddha's own teachings as the Four Noble Truths (*ārya-satya*), with which was linked up the doctrine of the dependent origination of things or *pratītya-samutpāda.* A theory of the chain of 12 causes to explain earthly miseries (*dvādaśa-nidāna*) along with the conception of *nirvāna* were, properly speaking, included in the former while from the latter followed the revolutionary views

of universal impermanence (*anityatā-vāda*) and of the denial of a permanent soul-substance (*anātma-vāda*).

The Four Noble Truths were: (1) everything was suffering, (2) suffering had a cause, (3) suffering could be extinguished, and (4) there was a path leading to this extinction. In the famous Sermon at Banaras, these were formulated thus:

> This, O monks, is the sacred truth of suffering: birth is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering; to be united with the unloved is suffering, to be separated from the loved is suffering; not to obtain what one desires is suffering; in short the five-fold clinging (to the earthly) is suffering.
>
> This, O monks, is the sacred truth of the origin of suffering: it is the thirst (for being), which leads from birth to birth, together with lust and desire, which finds gratification here and there: the thirst for pleasures, the thirst for being, the thirst for power.
>
> This, O monks, is the sacred truth of the extinction of suffering: the extinction of this thirst by complete annihilation of desire, letting it go, expelling it, separating oneself from it, giving it no room.
>
> This, O monks, is the sacred truth of the path which leads to the extinction of suffering. It is this sacred eight-fold path, to wit: Right Faith, Right Resolve, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Effort, Right Thought, Right Self-concentration.

Everything about these obviously hinged on the first noble truth and the first question about it is: Why was the Buddha so much obsessed with the idea that the world was but an ocean of miseries? I have elsewhere[1] tried to answer this question in terms of the colossal social upheavals of the age. It was the age in which North-East India was first witnessing the rise of the ruthless state-powers—those of Magadha and Kosala—on the ruins of the tribal societies. As was characteristic of such an age 'base greed, brutal sensuality, sordid avarice, selfish plunder of common possessions',[2] taxation, usury, extortion and such things were creating new and unheard-of miseries in the lives of the people in whose memory the liberty, equality and fraternity of the tribal life was still somewhat fresh and whose neighbours like the Mallas, Vajjis, Śākyas were still in the state of tribal

simplicity. The Buddha himself belonged to the Śākya tribe and never forgot his tribal pride. But the equality and freedom of the tribes were already threatened because the rising states could not tolerate continued existence of such examples of democracy. Extermination and subjugation of the tribes formed the policy-objective of the early states. Viḍūḍabha, the prince of Kosala, presumably during the life of the Buddha, unleashed the most brutal massacre on the Śākyas, the Buddha's own people, and even the children and women of the tribe were not spared. Ajātaśatru, the King of Magadha and one eulogised as the great philosopher in the Upaniṣads, declared, 'I will root out the Vajjians, I will destroy the Vajjians, I will bring these Vajjians to utter ruin'. He even sent his prime minister to the Buddha to seek his blessings for carrying out this sinister determination. The Buddha, with his strong nostalgia for the tribal life, was naturally alarmed by such naked greed for riches and power. 'The king', he said, 'although he might have conquered the kingdoms of the earth, although he may be the ruler of all land this side of the sea, up to the ocean's shore, would, still insatiate, covet that which is beyond the sea.' He could also see how this greed of the kings recoiled back on themselves and made their power and riches unstable. Two of his early patrons were King Bimbisāra of Magadha and King Prasenajit of Kosala. The former was starved to death by his own son Ajātaśatru and the latter most treacherously betrayed by his son Viḍūḍabha. 'The princes who rule kingdoms', said the Buddha, 'rich in treasures and wealth, turn their greed against one another, pandering insatiably to their desires. If these act thus restlessly, swimming in the stream of impermanence, carried along by greed and carnal desire, who then can walk on earth in peace?' To these were also to be added the hitherto unheard of miseries created in the lives of the people by the new institutions of taxation, slavery, extortion, torture, mortgage, interest, usury: the voluminous *Jātakas* were full of these.

The Buddha himself saw all these. But what was to be done? He was too realistic to believe in any God, prayers and sacrifices which could not, he knew, bring any effective remedy to the miseries he saw all around. He did not ask people to pray and

sacrifice. In the *Buddhacarita,* Aśvaghoṣa even gave elaborate anti-theistic arguments supposed to have been expounded by the Buddha himself. Nor could the Buddha believe in the ascetic self-mortification, which he considered to be 'painful, unworthy and unprofitable.' He was, again, far too disturbed to take seriously the Upaniṣadic claim that the metaphysical wisdom could bring salvation. He asked his disciples to turn away from 'opinions concerning the beginning and hereafter of things.' For it was no use behaving like a fool who, with an arrow plunged into his flank, wasted time speculating on the origin, maker, etc., of the arrow instead of pulling it off outright. Therefore, when asked metaphysical questions that he considered to be unprofitable, he simply remained silent. In short, the problem that oppressed him most was essentially a practical one. It was the problem of the bewildering mass of sufferings he saw around. And he wanted to have an essentially practical solution for this. But how, under the condition in which he lived, such a solution could at all be evolved?

There was no question, of course, of really removing the real miseries from his world. That meant skipping over stages of historical development and jumping, as it were, towards socialism which alone, on the basis of the stupendous development of the human productive power, could assure plenty and equality for all. Rather, the further development of the productive power which alone could eventually ensure such conditions presupposed, during the time of the Buddha, a further intensification of exploitation and all the miseries that it entailed. Therefore, the only alternative left for the prophet was to invent an ideal solution of the real problem and, as a precondition for this, to effect such psychological transformation of the personality in which the sense of the felt misery could be overcome. 'A new doctrine', said the Buddha, 'do I teach for subduing the mental intoxicants that are generated even in this present life.' Elsewhere he said that his purpose was to bring 'a quietude of the heart.' And how was this to be achieved? Only by inventing the theory and practice of a religion appropriate for the age. It was indeed a religion without God, for belief in God is not a necessary prerequisite of religion. 'Religion', says Marx,

'is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the *opium* of the people. The abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of the people is required for their *real* happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about its condition is *the demand to give up a condition which needs illusion*'.[3] Obviously enough, it was historically impossible for the Buddha to raise the demand to give up a condition which needs illusion. The only alternative left was to create the right type of illusion of the age.

'I have gained coolness', declared the Buddha, 'and have attained *nirvāṇa*. To found the Kingdom of Truth, I go to the city of the Kāśi; I will beat the drum of the immortal in the darkness of the world.' But where was this Kingdom of Truth to be found? Significantly, the Buddha did not look forward to what had already emerged and was emerging fuller and fuller everyday—the pomp and grandeur of the rising state-powers. Instead, he looked backward to the tribal collectives and wanted to revive what Marx called 'the imaginary substance of the tribe.'[4] Apparently, he was pleading for a moral reform of the world. In the fourth noble truth, he spoke of right faith, right resolve, etc., values, as we can easily judge from the *Jātakas*, that were most ruthlessly trampled upon in the society in which he lived. The Buddha could clearly see the futility of practising all these in the society at large. So he asked the people to take the *pabbajjā* and the *upasampadā* ordinations, i.e. 'to go out' of the actual society and 'to arrive at' the life of the *saṁghas* or the order of the monks. For within the *saṁghas*, things were different. Modelled consciously on the tribal collectives—without private property and with full equality and democracy among the brethren—these alone could offer the real scope to practise the 'simple moral grandeur of the ancient gentile society',[5] for which the Buddha was really pleading. Thus the *saṁghas*, as classless societies within the bosom of the class-society, could become the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of a spiritless situation.

The *Vinaya-piṭaka* went into great details of the organisational principles of the *saṁghas*. But it was also necessary for the new

religion to have its theoretical basis. This was summed up by the Four Noble Truths. Of these the third, viz. the one concerned with the extinction of suffering, contained the famous conception of *nirvāṇa*. It was conceived as the state in which the suffering was completely overcome, the mental intoxicants completely subsided. However, the grand superstructure of this philosophy of sorrow had its obvious foundation in the second noble truth, namely that sorrow had its cause. The Buddha had, therefore, to go into sufficient details of this and in doing that arrived at a theoretical formulation that was truly revolutionary.

In search of the cause of suffering, early Buddhism started with a general theory of natural causation, known as the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda*. It meant, 'that being present, this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises.' It had therefore also the negative implication, 'that being absent, this does not become; from the cessation of that, this ceases.' Thus 'a series, though begun, admits of being put an end to.' The chief significance of this doctrine for early Buddhism was of course essentially practical. If everything was dependent on certain definite conditions, and therefore had to cease with the dissolution of these conditions, the basic fact about the world, namely suffering or misery, too, must have been so. In other words, suffering had for itself certain definite and ascertainable conditions with the dissolution of which it had to come to an end. So the Buddha asked with great earnestness the question concerning the conditions of suffering and answered it in terms of a chain of twelve causes, known as the *dvādaśa-nidāna*.

> From ignorance (*avidyā*) spring impressions and dispositions (*saṁskāras*), from the dispositions springs consciousness (*vijñāna*), from consciousness springs the psycho-physical organisation (*nāma-rūpa*), from the psycho-physical organisation spring the six *āyatanas* (viz. the five sense-organs and the *manas*), from the six *āyatanas* springs contact (*sparśa*), from contact springs sensation (*vedanā*), from sensations springs thirst (*tṛṣṇā*, desire), from thirst springs attachment (*upādāna*), from attachment springs the will to be born (*bhava*), from the will to be born springs birth (*jāti*), from birth spring old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair. Such is the origination of the whole mass of suffering.

However, philosophical corollaries of real importance were also drawn in early Buddhism from this doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda*. These were the doctrines of universal impermanence and of the denial of the soul as a substance. The exact reason with which these corollaries were drawn from the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda* is not quite clear: it was perhaps thought that since everything was dependent upon the collocation of certain conditions, and since it was perhaps also assumed that nothing born of the collocation of conditions could be permanent, the conclusion was drawn that everything was bound to come to an end, just as the Nyāya system took it for granted as a philosophical common sense that everything born was bound to be impermanent (*janyatvāt anityam*). In any case, the doctrines of universal impermanence and of the denial of the permanent soul were somehow or other connected in early Buddhism with the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda* and there is no doubt that these doctrines were of real philosophical significance.

Both these doctrines arose as reactions against the Upaniṣadic thought according to which the soul was a pure substance that transcended all changes. This soul being the ultimate reality, all the concrete mental states were after all unreal. With early Buddhism, it was just the reverse. The transient sensations and thoughts, along with the physical frame with which these were associated, were real and the idea of any soul over and above these was just a superstition. The personality was thus viewed as just an aggregate (*saṁghāta*) of the mental states and the body.

> The aggregate is sometimes described as *nāma-rūpa*, utilising an old Upaniṣadic phrase, though its meaning is here very much modified. By the first term, *nāma*, is meant not 'name' as in the Upaniṣads, but the psychical factors constituting the aggregate; and by the second, *rūpa*, the physical body so that the compound signifies the psycho-physical organism and may be taken as roughly equivalent to 'mind and body.' That is, Buddha took as the reality...the very things that were explained away as not ultimate in the Upaniṣads and denied the substratum which alone according to them is truly real.[6]

A more detailed description of the personality in early Buddhism was that it consisted of five *skandhas* or factors, viz. *rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, saṁjñā* and *saṁskāras*, of which the *rūpa-skandha* meant the physical body, the other *skandhas* being psychical.

Material things, too, like the self, were considered as just aggregates of the qualities perceived and, according to early Buddhism, none of the aggregates could persist even for two successive moments.

> So the self and the material world are each a flux (*saṁtāna*). Two symbols are generally used to illustrate this conception—the stream of water and 'the self-producing and the self-consuming' flame... It will be seen thus that every one of our so-called things is only a series (*vīthi*)—a succession of similar things or happenings, and the notions of fixity which we have of them is wholly fictitious.[7]

Philosophically speaking, this conception of everything having its being only in an eternal flux was by far the most significant contribution of early Buddhism and it is not a little surprising to note that precisely the same view, along with the same illustration of the fire, was proclaimed about a couple of generations later by Heraclitus in ancient Greece and, further, is being reinstated, though of course with an incomparably richer content, by modern science.

> Thus we have [says Engels] once again returned to the mode of contemplation of the great founders of Greek philosophy: that all nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from grains of sand to suns, from protista to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change. Only with the essential difference that what for the Greeks was a brilliant intuition is in our case the result of strict scientific research in accordance with experience, and hence appears in much more definite and clearer form.[8]

What Heraclitus did for early Greek philosophy was also done by the Buddhists for early Indian philosophy. It was all the more significant that this conception of change or becoming was presumably arrived at by synthesising the conceptions of being and non-being. 'This world', said the Buddha, 'generally

proceeds on a duality, of the "it is" and the "it is not." But whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no "it is not" in this world. Whoever, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no "it is" in this world.'[9]

We had here perhaps the first instance of dialectical thinking in Indian philosophy, though it needs at the same time to be remembered that with the Buddhists this emerged not as the result of a scientific approach but rather as a religious reaction against the Upaniṣads.

25. *Jainism*

JAINISM, still a living creed in the country, had its origin much earlier than the Buddha. Its church came to be divided into two rival camps, called the Śvetāmbaras or the white-robed and the Digambaras or the sky-clad, because the ideal of the former was to wear white clothes while that of the latter to go about stark naked. Both the sects had fabulous mythological accounts of their origin but the real history of the split is not known. The two differed mainly in matters of ritual observances rather than in dogmas or doctrines and as such the difference has hardly any interest for us. The greatest prophet of the religion was Mahāvīra, a senior contemporary of the Buddha. But according to the Jaina tradition he was not the founder of the creed. He was supposed to be the last in the long line of successive prophets called the Tīrthaṁkaras. The immediate predecessor of Mahāvīra was Pārśva, who, Jacobi thinks, could have been a real person and lived about 250 years before Mahāvīra. According to the Jainas, Pārśva's predecessor was Ariṣṭanemi, who died 84,000 years before Mahāvīra's death. Ariṣṭanemi was preceded by Nāmi who, it was stated, died 500,000 years before Ariṣṭanemi. And so on. The time-gap between the teachers

swelled in this way to such fantastic dimensions that ultimately arithmetic failed the Jainas and they had to be satisfied with the claim that their religion was eternal. However, the list of the Tīrthaṁkaras has this interest for us that all of them bore some clear totemic emblem: the bull, the elephant, the horse, the ape, etc., etc. This gives us some idea of the currents of primitive beliefs from which Jainism drew. As we shall see, primitive elements formed the subsoil of Jainism throughout the long history of its survival in the country.

As for their canonical literature, the Jainas claim that there were originally 14 Pūrvas and 11 Aṅgas, of which the former were all lost. The Digambaras think that the 11 Aṅgas, too, were lost; what survive today as the 11 Aṅgas and accepted by the Śvetāmbaras as genuine are, according to the Digambaras, spurious texts. In any case, these are the oldest Jaina literature that we have today. For a long period these were handed down to the successive generations through oral tradition until A.D. 454, when the final redaction of the canon took place. But the principal source of a systematic exposition of the Jaina philosophy was *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* by Umāsvāti, claimed to be their own by both the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras. All subsequent expositions of the Jaina philosophy were based upon this. In the long history of its existence, Jainism had ultimately a galaxy of logicians to defend the ancient position. The most prominent of them was Akalaṁka, accepted by both the camps. But he was preceded by Siddhasena (a Śvetāmbara), Samantabhadra (a Digambara), and succeeded by Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra, Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Yaśovijaya, the first two being Digambaras and the last three Śvetāmbaras. Hemacandra was by far the most encyclopædic and prolific of the Jaina writers; he was a poet, a grammarian and a logician and quite outstanding as all these.

The special peculiarity of the Jaina standpoint was its Anekānta-vāda, with which were linked up the logical doctrines called Syād-vāda and Sapta-bhaṅgīnaya. Anekānta-vāda is sometimes rendered as the doctrine of non-absolutism, though perhaps non-extremism would give us a better idea of it. It was an effort to steer a middle course between the Upaniṣadic doc-

trine of the ultimate reality being absolutely permanent, i.e., without beginning, change and end, and the Buddhistic doctrine of the eternal flux. Instead of subscribing to any of these alternatives, which were considered to be extremes, the Jainas wanted to effect a compromise and acknowledge partial truth in both. Permanence was true and so was change. Accordingly, reality was viewed as not of a permanent and unalterable nature; it underwent the processes of production, continuation and destruction. Thus the doctrine amounted to the somewhat commonplace assertion that 'existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material being continues forever to exist as matter; this matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus, clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay or its colour may come into existence and perish.'

In defence of such an attitude of philosophical compromise, the Jainas invented a peculiar dialectical devise known as Syād-vāda. *Syāt* meant 'may be' and is explained as *kathañcit*, which in this connection may be translated as 'somehow.' It was thus the doctrine of the 'may be' or 'somehow.' The claim, in other words, was that any assertion, like any other—and inclusive of its opposite—was somehow true, i.e., none was wholly true but each was a part truth. Thus, e.g., the assertion, 'the jar exists', was only somehow true, i.e. true in the sense 'it exists as a jar.' At the same time, the assertion 'the jar exists not' was somehow true, because the jar did not exist in any other form, say that of the cloth. Therefore, both these assertions, viz., 'it exists' and 'it exists not' were to be qualified by the word *syāt*, 'may be' or 'somehow'.

Supplementary to this was the doctrine of the seven *nayas*. The *nayas* meant the 'ways of expressing the nature of things', i.e. judgments. The Jainas thought that there were in all seven possible ways of passing a judgment upon anything. These were (1) It exists (*asti*), (2) It exists not (*nāsti*), (3) It exists as well as exists not (*asti ca nāsti ca*), (4) It is indescribable (*avaktavyam*), (5) It exists and is indescribable (*asti ca avaktavyam ca*), (6) It exists not and is indescribable (*nāsti ca*

avaktavyam ca), (7) It exists and exists not and is indescribable (*asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyam ca*). But since all these judgments were only somehow true, each was to be qualified by the word *syāt*. This gave the scheme of a seven-fold conditional judgments, namely: (1) *syāt asti*, (2) *syāt nāsti*, (3) *syāt asti ca nāsti, ca*, (4) *syāt avaktavyaṁ*, etc.

As applied to the ordinary things of the world, all these were only evolving a cumbrous scheme out of sheer truisms. To say that the jar exists as a jar and therefore it does not exist as a cloth—and therefore, further, the jar somehow exists and somehow exists not—is simply to add a little bit of dialectical flavour to what is just banal. Jacobi thinks that the doctrine was originally evolved by the Jainas to silence the agnosticism of a contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra called Sañyaja Belaṭṭiputta.

> Would any philosopher [says he] have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents? The subtle discussions of the Agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the Syāt-vāda must have appeared to them a happy way leading out of the maze of the *Ajñāna-vāda* (Agnosticism). It was the weapon with which the Agnostics assailed the enemy turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahāvīra's creed convinced of the truth of Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya.[1]

If this was true, then, philosophically speaking it could hardly have meant any improvement, for this was simply substituting agnosticism by eclecticism.

One result of the above doctrine was to look upon the rival philosophical standpoints as possible part-truths. Rather than accepting any philosophy as wholly true or wholly false, the Jainas wanted to find—formally at least—some truth in any philosophy that might have been proposed and thus accept it as somehow true. Obviously, it is difficult to maintain such a position with any real philosophical seriousness. One cannot, e.g., seriously claim that idealism is somehow true and so also is materialism. The doctrine of the Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya, it needs to be remembered, was not meant to effect any real synthesis of contradictions; it wanted only to effect some kind of super-

ficial compromise between all sorts of philosophical positions. And, philosophically at least, that is just impossible. A philosopher has necessarily to be a partisan in the sense of being a positive defender of his own views. Even the sceptic has to defend his scepticism. As a matter of fact, the Jaina philosophers themselves had to defend their own positive views as against the views of their opponents. If asked squarely, whether these views, like the views opposed to these, were only somehow true, could they answer in the affirmative and yet claim philosophical seriousness?

These positive views of the Jainas appear to us today as a curious blend of primitive notions and ethico-religious ideals. All things, i.e. all substances, were divided into two broad classes, the non-souls (*ajīva-kāya*) and the souls (*jīva*). The former were of five types: (1) *kāla* or time, (2) *ākāsa* or space, (3) and (4) two subtle substances called *dharma* and *adharma* and conceived as mediums of motion and rest respectively, (5) *pudgala* or matter. Excepting time or *kāla*, all these, i.e. the soul as well as the four types of the non-soul, were called *astikāyas*, i.e. as occupying different places (*pradeśas*) simultaneously, though what precisely was meant by this is not clear. 'Space, *dharma* and *adharma* are the necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz., souls and matter; space affords them room to subsist; *dharma* makes it possible for them to move or to be moved; and *adharma* to rest'. The typical ways of explaining these curious concepts of *dharma* and *adharma* were to resort to analogies. *Dharma* was like water to the fish which enabled it, without compelling, to move; *adharma* was like shadow for the traveller which, without compelling, enabled him to rest. Presumably, these ideas represented a stage of thought at which sufficient abstraction of the concept of space was not achieved; for the function of space, as conceived by us, is inclusive of these functions attributed to *dharma* and *adharma*. The same feature of incomplete abstraction was to be found in the Jaina conception of matter, soul and *karma*. *Pudgala* or matter was conceived in terms of the four well-known elements, viz. earth, water, fire and air and their ultimate constituents were said to be atomic. But the conception of the atom had its

own peculiarity. The atoms were conceived as viscous or dry: when one was viscous and the other dry, or when two had different degrees of viscosity and dryness, a combination of them took place and such compounds combined with others. Besides, the atoms were conceived as subject to change and development (*pariṇāma*). But more of atomism when we discuss the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

Over and above this atomistic hypothesis, a distinction was somehow or other drawn between two states of matter or *pudgala*, called the subtle and the gross. The things perceived consisted of gross matter while the subtle matter was supersensuous. But this subtle matter hardly meant what we are accustomed to call matter. It was that matter which, for instance, got transformed into the different kinds of *karma*. The conception of *karma*, again, was highly peculiar. Ordinarily it meant human action and was usually conceived by the Indian philosophers as leading to the good or bad results in this life or in another which the performer of the action had to enjoy or suffer. In Jainism, however, *karma* was also conceived as something essentially material which got attached to the soul somewhat in the manner in which dirt got attached to a sticky substance. We can perhaps understand this theory better if we take the clue from the Jaina conception of the soul, with which this theory of *karma* was so much mixed up.

Not to speak of the animals and plants, the Jainas thought that everything in this world had souls, that everything—even the four elements—were only the bodies of the souls. This doctrine, as Jacobi[2] points out, is to be traced to some primitive form of animism. The natural qualities of the souls were perfect knowledge, intuition or faith, highest bliss, etc.; but these were weakened or obscured by the defilement of *karma*.

> The defilement of the souls takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into *karma* pours into the soul; this is called influx (*āsrava*). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passions (*kaṣāya*) which act like a viscous substance and retain the subtle matter coming into contact with the soul; the subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it; this is called binding (*bandha*) of *karma*-matter. The subtle

matter 'bound' or amalgamated by the soul is transformed into eight kinds of *karma*, and forms a kind of subtle body (*kārmaṇa-śarīra*) which clings to the soul in all its migrations and future births and determines the individual state and lot of that particular soul... Now, when a particular *karma* has produced its effect in the way described, it is discharged or purged from the soul. This process of 'purging off' is called *nirjarā*. When this process goes on without interruption, all *karma*-matter will, in the end, be discharged from the soul, and the latter, now freed from the weight which had kept it down before the time of its liberation (for matter is heavy, and *karma* is material), goes up in a straight line to the top of the universe where the liberated souls dwell.[3]

For the modern mind these things are indistinguishable from mythological imagination. As a matter of fact, the fabulous details of the theory of *karma* worked out in Jainism did draw a great deal from primitive mythology and had hardly anything to do with logical thinking.

The ethics of the Jainas followed directly from their theory of *karma*. The highest goal conceived was to get rid of all old *karma* and to stop the influx of any new *karma*. 'Therefore, the whole apparatus of the monastic conduct is required to prevent the formation of new *karma;* the same purpose is served by austerities (*tapas*) which, moreover, annihilate old *karma* more speedily than would happen in the common course of things'. For actually achieving this, the Jainas had practically nothing new to suggest. They also spoke of the right faith, right knowledge, right conduct as conducive to liberation. They also attached great importance to the ancient *yoga* practices and in fact developed quite an extensive literature on these. The special feature of the Jaina ethics, however, was perhaps its great stress on the practices of non-injury or *ahiṁsā;* the Jainas in fact made a veritable creed of it.

26. *Later Schools of Buddhism*

As an ideal solution of a real problem—a religion designed to console the people floating in the ocean of impermanence and sufferings, or, as the Buddha himself put it, 'to subdue the mental intoxicants that are generated even in this life'[1] and to bring 'a quietude of the heart'[2]—early Buddhism was a good palliative. As such it could easily claim the patronage of the merchants and the monarchs, which of course, was readily extended. The gift of the Jetavana, a pleasure garden near Srāvasti, gives us some idea of the magnitude of this patronage:

> When the Buddha accepted Anāthapiṇḍika's invitation to visit Śrāyasti, the latter, seeking a suitable place for the Buddha's residence, discovered this park belonging to Jetakumāra. When he asked to be allowed to buy it, Jeta's reply was: 'Not even if you could cover the whole place with money.' Anāthapiṇḍika said that he would buy it at that price... Anāthapiṇḍika had gold brought down in carts and covered Jetavana with pieces laid side by side... Anāthapiṇḍika built in the grounds dwelling rooms, retiring rooms, store rooms and service halls, halls with fireplaces, closets, cloisters, halls for exercise, wells, bathrooms, ponds, open and roofed sheds, etc.... It is said that...Anāthapiṇḍika himself spent fiftyfour crores in connection with the purchase of the park and the buildings erected in it.[3]

Even granting some exaggeration in all these, we have no reason to reject the whole account as fictitious. Fabulous sums were really being spent on the monks preaching this new morality and religion. Moreover, as testified by the Rock Edicts of Aśoka, by the third century B.C. Buddhism became the state religion of the greatest Indian empire.

With the accumulation of such financial and political support and of course with the stabilisation of the new social set-up, Buddhism as an ideology was destined to undergo definite internal modification. It had to drift away from the original necessities it was invented unconsciously to serve. The subsequent history of Buddhism in India had on the whole been a history of gradual shift from the strict observance of the

codes of conduct to *yoga* practices, metaphysical and mystical speculations. In certain circles, there also developed an all-absorbing interest in the problems of pure epistemology and logic.

Notwithstanding all that Indian philosophy positively gained from these later Buddhists, it is necessary to note that their advance carried on its heels marked signs of relative regression. The culmination of the whole movement was an extravagant world-denying idealistic outlook that proved inimical to science and sympathetic only to sundry superstitions. In the context of the Buddha's own distaste for metaphysical speculations and his pronounced atheism, this line of the subsequent development of the Buddhist philosophy may appear somewhat strange. However, the clue to it — i.e. to both the positive and negative aspects of the later phases of Buddhist philosophy — is to be found in the withdrawal of the philosopher-monks from the labour of production. Subsisting wholly on the gifts of the merchants and kings, they were of course relieved of the worries of their own material existence. This created conditions for a kind of philosophical specialisation — the possibility of being exclusively concerned with learning and thinking, with discourse and debate — the conditions, in short, for raising Indian philosophy to a new level of development. This explains the positive aspect of their contributions to philosophy. They could and did evolve not only new and newer philosophical positions for themselves but also sharp and ever-sharper objections to the philosophies outside their own orthodoxy, providing them thereby with the need of a better defence on a higher level. We have noticed this while discussing the general pattern of Indian philosophical development. But it would be wrong to ignore the other side of the picture. Their exclusive concern for theory or mental labour — i.e. their aloofness from material or manual labour — deprived them of a living contact with the world and the spirit of interrogating nature to gain a better insight into natural laws. This gradually led to the development of a sense of delusional omnipotence of thought itself, so much so, that it came to be believed that thought dictated terms to reality and as such was the only reality. The physical world, conse-

quently, became only a phantom of imagination, a dream or a fabrication of ignorance. In short, the development of idealism among the later Buddhists was no more a mystery than the birth of idealism outside Buddhism. We have already seen how, among the Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic philosophers, basically the same process of development took place and how they were led to evolve substantially the same idealistic outlook. As such, there is little to wonder at the free exchange of philosophical ideas between the Vedāntists and the later Buddhists, notwithstanding all their mutual religious animosities.

Before we take up the later schools of Buddhist philosophy, it may therefore be worthwhile to have some idea of the conditions under which the monks philosophised, i.e. to see how aloof they actually were from the labour of production. The centre of most of their philosophical activity, particularly in its latest phase, was the monastery of Nālandā. Both Yuan Chwang and I-tsing, the Chinese travellers to India in the 7th century A.D., spent fairly long time at this monastery as students of Buddhism and they have left us somewhat detailed descriptions of it. According to Yuan Chwang, the monastery site was originally purchased by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and five kings in succession contributed to the construction of the enormous halls, etc., which, during Yuan Chwang's stay, accommodated 10,000 students and 1,500 teachers. 'Learning and discussing', said Yuan Chwang,[4] 'they find the day too short'. But how could they at all afford to live such a life of pure contemplation? I-tsing gave us the answer. The monks maintained themselves from the revenue from 200 villages gifted by kings of different generations to the monastery. There must therefore have been a few thousand toilers, the surplus product of whose labour enabled these philosophers to free themselves fully from the labour process and thereby to develop their dialectical specialisation. The stories of the other *vihāras* were presumably similar.

With this background in mind, we may now turn to the history of the later schools of the Buddhist philosophy. It is perhaps best introduced with the story of the Buddhist councils. Immediately after the death of the Buddha, a council of the Buddhist

monks was convened at Rājagṛha to draw up the canonical texts and the creed in its purity. This was the First Council and its main achievement was to settle the Dharma and the Vinaya. There was as yet no mention of the Abhidharma. This is significant. For the Abhidharma mainly embodies the metaphysical-mystical speculations of the later Buddhists while the Dharma and particularly the Vinaya were chiefly concerned with the codes of conduct. Apparently the monks at the First Council were still too near the Master to have drifted far away from his original emphasis.

However, some kind of resistance to the codes of conduct was not long to grow among the monks. We hear that after about a century a Second Council had to be convened at Vaiśāli specially to consider this question. A large number of monks regarded some of the orthodox codes of conduct to be no more useful and demanded their relaxation. The Second Council decided against any such relaxation, but these monks refused to surrender. So they were thrown out or expelled. These monks convened a separate council of their own, in which ten thousand were said to have congregated. 'Indeed, it was a great congregation of monks (*mahā-saṁgīti*), from which they were called the Mahāsāṁghikas, as distinguished from the orthodox monks, the Thera-vādins (Sthavira-vādins)'.

In the course of a few decades the Mahāsāṁghikas had grown remarkably fast in power and popularity. They modified the rules of conduct, re-drafted the canonical literature and introduced certain ideological innovations into the Buddhistic standpoint. Two of these innovations deserve special mention. First, the Mahāsāṁghikas originated the theory of the *Lokottara Buddha* or of the Supernatural Buddha. The Buddha was no longer conceived as an ordinary human being who, moved by the miseries of his fellow beings, preached the doctrine of the cessation of sufferings; he was viewed as a supernatural or supermundane being, a veritable deity. We shall presently see how this theory was developed further by the later Mahāyāna Buddhists in whose view the Buddha became virtually the God, receiving a highly ceremonial form of worship from the devotees. This by itself indicates that the view persistently asserted in

the Buddhist tradition, viz. that the Mahāsāṁghikas were the forerunners of the Mahāyāna, could not be entirely baseless. We have moreover faint glimpses of some metaphysical assertions of the Mahāsāṁghikas that may be taken as foreshadowing the idealistic philosophy of the later Mahāyāna. Thus, e.g., they are said to have upheld the following view: 'The original nature of the mind is pure; it becomes contaminated when it is stained by *upakleśa* (passions) and *āgantukarajas* (adventitious defilement).' 'This view of the Mahāsāṁghikas', comments A. C. Banerjee,[5] 'may be considered the precursor of the idealistic philosophy of Yogācāra, in which the *ālaya-vijñāna* is the storehouse of pure consciousness which becomes impure only when it is polluted by worldly objects.' But more of this later.

The second great split among the Buddhists was supposed to have taken place at the Third Council convened under the patronage of King Aśoka. Many a metaphysical tendency must have in the meanwhile developed among the monks, for we hear that at this Third Council no less than eleven schools (*nikāyas*) of the Buddhists were expelled from the church by the Theras or Sthaviras. In this list of the eleven occurs the name of the Vātsīputrīyas who were charged with admitting what Stcherbatsky calls 'a shadowy semi-real personality', i.e. the soul as some sort of substance.

Most of those who were expelled at the Third Council took shelter at the monastery of Nālandā and, as a whole, came to be called the Sarvāstivādins. Towards the end of the Maurya period (200 B.C.) they shifted to Mathurā and finally to Kashmir and Gāndhāra, where, under the patronage of King Kaniṣka (*c.* A.D. 100), they became very powerful. The Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir and Gāndhāra called themselves the Mūla — i.e. the Original—Sarvāstivādins. Round about A.D. 100, Kaniṣka got them to convene another council, which is usually referred to as the Fourth Council. Literary activity in a really big scale is said to have taken place in it. 'The king built a monastery for the accommodation of 500 monks who were called upon to write commentaries on the Piṭakas. The commentary on the *Sutta-piṭaka* was composed in 100,000 *ślokas*. The *Vinaya-vibhāṣā*, a commentary on the Vinaya, also consisted of 100,000

ślokas, and the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā*, which was composed in the Council, also ran to the same number.' These commentaries, the story goes, were inscribed on copper plates and encased in stone boxes for being preserved in a tope made for the purpose. But no such copper plate has so far been discovered and some of the modern scholars suspect the whole account as highly exaggerated. However, it may safely be presumed that some process of fabrication of the scriptures to justify the new philosophical position of the Sarvāstivādins went on in the Fourth Council. The Piṭakas said to have been commented upon could not have been the original Pāli Piṭakas; these were, in all likelihood, the compositions of the Sarvāstivādins themselves. This much at least is certain that the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā* — often referred to as the *Mahā-vibhāṣā* and sometimes simply as the *Vibhāṣā* — which acquired supreme scriptural authority for the Sarvāstivādins, was not at all a commentary on the *Abhidharma-piṭaka*. It was in fact a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna* by Kātyāyanīputra, a book manufactured by the Sarvāstivādins themselves. Though preserved in Chinese translation, the Sanskrit original of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, along with the *Vibhāṣā*, is lost to us. Nevertheless, this *Vibhāṣā* was once considered to be so important by the Sarvāstivādins that they are also called the Vaibhāṣikas, i.e. the followers of the Vibhāṣā.

From the philosophical point of view, however, their work of greatest significance was the *Abhidharma-kośa* by Vasuvandhu, about whom we shall presently see more. This was commented upon by Yaśomitra in the *Sphutārthā-abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, though the commentator warned against Vasuvandhu's strong leanings for another school of Buddhism called the Sautrāntika. The same criticism of Vasuvandhu, though much more sharply posed, was found in another work of the Vaibhāṣikas called the *Abhidharma-samaya-pradīpa* by Saṅghabhadra (or probably by one of his disciples).

The common idea that Sarvāstivāda was so-called because it accepted the existence (*asti*) of everything (*sarva*)—i.e., of both the mental and the extra-mental—is because of an unfortunate misrepresentation of the philosophy by Saṁkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*.[0] The Buddhist sources explained the

name as the doctrine that affirmed the existence of things in all the three times, i.e., the past, present and the future (*sarva kāle asti*). Thus the *Abhidharma-kośa* (v. 24) describes the Sarvāstivādins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything—past, present and the future. It was, really speaking, a view on the notion of time, which attracted a great deal of interest among the Buddhist philosophers. A discussion of the doctrine of impermanence that the Buddha preached demanded from the later philosophers an effective handling of the notion of time. However, the way in which the Sarvāstivādins themselves handled the question appears to be somewhat odd, because it palpably went against the doctrine of impermanence itself. Nevertheless, the Vaibhāṣikas claimed that the strongest evidence for their own position was to be found in the utterances of the Buddha himself. They also advanced independent logical grounds for the existence of things in the past, present and future. One had ideas of things in the past, present and future; but how could these things be the objects of one's ideas without actually existing? Besides, in the Buddhist view, past actions produced results; but no result could come from the bare nothing. Therefore, past actions existed throughout the interval and for all time to come.

How the Sarvāstivādins themselves tried to bring all these in line with the fundamental doctrine of flux and more particularly with the notion of *nirvāṇa*—which presupposed the extinction or future non-existence of what they themselves characterised as defilement or *āsrava*—was of course a different story. Presumably they had their own difficulties. For, we hear of no less than four alternative ways in which this problem was sought to be solved.[1] But we need not go into the details of all that. What interests us more is the ontology of the Vaibhāṣikas.

The basic point of their ontology was the doctrine of the 75 *dharmas*. In their philosophy, *dharma* meant the element or the real. Of these 75 elements, 72 were said to be *saṁskṛta-dharmas*, while the remaining three were called *a-saṁskṛta-dharmas*. The word *saṁskṛta* (from *saṁskāra*) was used in the technical sense of 'combined together (to create the medium of *saṁsāra* or earthly existence).' Here is the list of the 72 *saṁskṛta-dharmas*:

11 *rūpas, citta,* 46 *caitasikas* and 14 *citta-viprayuktas.* By the 11 *rūpas* were meant the 5 senses (*indriya*), 5 objects of senses (*indriyārtha*) and *avijñapti,* i.e. subtle matter resulting from *karma*—the last obviously reminiscent of Jainism. *Citta* meant the mind and the *caitasika,* the mental phenomena, conceived to be 46 in variety. The *citta-viprayuktas* were 14 types of relations common to the material and psychical spheres.

All these 72 elements, when acted upon by the combinatory force or *saṁskāra,* as accompanied by what was called defilement or *āsrava,* resulted in the instrument of attachment to life, which was called *upādāna-skandha,* or *sāsrava-saṁskṛta-dharma.* For the monks seeking salvation, therefore, the major problem was: how to get rid of this? Vaibhāṣkas thought that *āsrava* or defilement had to be removed first. That is, the whole thing had first of all to be turned into *anāsrava-saṁskṛta-dharma*—a state of the 72 elements with the combinatory force (*saṁskāra*) operating upon them but 'without contamination of defilement' (*anāsrava*). For, in the view of these monks, the combinatory force sustained itself by the defilement. With the removal of the defilement, therefore, the *saṁkāra* or the combinatory force was conceived to be receding and this process was imagined to lead finally to a state where the *saṁskāra* ceased to operate altogether. In this stage, there existed no *saṁskṛta-dharma* and this was the state of *nirvāṇa* or liberation.

The 3 *asaṁskṛta-dharmas,* i.e. elements with no combinatory force operating upon them, were: (1) *ākāśa* or space, (2) *pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha,* or cessation with the help of knowledge and (3) *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* or cessation without knowledge. The last two were in fact nothing but *nirvāṇa,* the former representing its curative aspect while the latter the preventive.

Obviously, the whole of this imposing superstructure of the 72 *saṁskṛta-dharmas* hinged on the view of *āsrava* or defilement, the presence of which stimulated the combinatory force and the absence of which made it to recede. What, then, was the cause of this defilement? From the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, there was only one answer to this. It was *avidyā* or ignorance. Obviously, again, there was only one remedy for ignorance. It was *prajñā* or knowledge. With the dawn of knowledge, therefore, there

remained all the *dharmas* or elements, but without the combinatory force operating anywhere. Thus was repeated the old story: knowledge meant liberation.

Now, the Vaibhāṣikas, as the so-called Hīnayānists, believed in the *nirvāṇa* of the individual rather than of the collective whole. Logically, therefore, their position amounted to the assertion that when an individual attained *nirvāṇa*, the elements that went to constitute his own organism continued to exist, though in a dismantled form; along with this there existed the elements or *dharmas* constituting the un-liberated organisms and the material world. These implications enable us to differentiate the Vaibhāṣika position from the nihilistic possibilities resulting from the view that ignorance was the root cause of bondage and the instrument of bondage, viz., the body and the material world, and that, therefore, knowledge, by dissolving the bondage and the instruments of bondage, led to liberation. Such possibilities perhaps always existed for the Buddhists because of the early doctrine of *avidyā* being the root cause of sufferings. But these became fully actual with all their nihilistic consequences with the later amalgamation of Buddhism with the fundamentals of the Upaniṣadic idealism, as it took place in the so-called Mahāyāna schools. Before passing on to discuss these schools, however, we may try to be clear about two points.

First, behind all these new terminologies of the Vaibhāṣikas, their fundamental position was not much different from the Vedānta-tainted Sāṁkhya, according to which, too, there was a multiplicity of the *puruṣas* somehow or other getting entangled in the evolutes of primeval matter and seeking salvation in the freedom from this entanglement. The individuals whose *nirvāṇa* formed the ideal of the Vaibhāṣikas might not have been conceived exactly in the same way as the later quasi-idealistic Sāṁkhya conceived its *puruṣas;* there may moreover be plenty of terminological objections to any equation of the *dharmas* of the Buddhists with the constituents of *prakṛti* of the later Sāṁkhya. Nevertheless, the parallels are quite clear. As Stcherbatsky[8] boldly asserts, for the *guṇas* of the Sāṁkhya, the Vaibhāṣikas had their dharmas or elements. We have already seen how, by moving towards this quasi-idealistic position, later

Sāṁkhya became but a bundle of inconsistencies. The materialistic philosophy had eventually to pass into its opposite, i.e. to merge away imperceptibly into the fully idealistic philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta. A somewhat similar fate awaited the Buddhists. The Vaibhāṣikas themselves did not, of course, squarely face the difficulty created by their half-hearted move to the idealistic or quasi-idealistic position. They did not bother to offer any clear answer to the question: What happened to the *dharmas* or elements that combined to produce the other—i.e. the un-liberated—organisms and the material world with the dawn of *nirvāṇa* of an individual? The safest solution from the idealistic point of view was to deny the problem itself. This could be done by proclaiming that, from the point of view of the highest metaphysical wisdom, all this talk of the physical world and the physical organism was but empty bubble in which only the un-enlightened or the ignorant could indulge. We have already seen how the Upaniṣadic idealists and the Advaita Vedāntists actually did it and it remains for us to see how the Mahāyāna Buddhists, too, took the same decisive step towards a full-fledged world-denying philosophy.

Secondly, in spite of this drifting away of the Sarvāstivādins from the original teachings of the Buddha towards a quasi-idealistic metaphysics, the Sautrāntikas—who, really speaking, represented an early offshoot of Sarvāstivāda itself—wanted vigorously to defend the Buddha's own emphasis on impermanence or change, which, as we have already seen, must have been seriously endangered by the Sarvāstivāda view of the existence of everything at all times. As a consequence, they argued against Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas. We are unfortunately left with no actual writings of the Sautrāntikas, though, from the refutation of some of their tenets in the Vaibhāṣika as well as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā works and from the defence of these by the later Buddhist logicians, we may have some idea of these.

The main theological issue between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas was the scriptural authority of the *Vaibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharma*-texts written by the Sarvāstivādins themselves, like the *Jñānaprasthāna* of Kātyāyanīputra, upon which the *Vaibhāṣā*

was a commentary. The Sautrāntikas rejected the authority of these and took their stand upon the *sūtras*, which were supposed to embody the direct utterances of the Buddha himself. This gave them the name Sautrāntikas, meaning the followers of the doctrines of the *sūtras*. Behind this theological issue, however, was perhaps concealed the attitude of denouncing extravagant metaphysical speculations which a stand based on the *Abhidharmas* necessarily entailed. In any case, trying to be true to the *sūtras*, the Sautrāntikas tried to understand the Buddha's doctrine of impermanence in right earnest. This led them to develop two important philosophical positions. First, rejecting outright the Sarvāstivāda thesis that everything existed always, they argued that everything existed only in the present. Proceeding on this line they developed the theory of *svalakṣaṇa*, though the name itself was of comparatively later origin. Modern scholars usually call this the 'doctrine of momentariness.' It was defended by the Buddhist logicians as vigorously as it was refuted by the Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and the Jaina logicians. Therefore, it can be reconstructed fully from their writings. Secondly, the emphasis of the Sautrāntikas on impermanence was so great that they refused to believe that even *nirvāṇa* could be a state of permanent bliss. *Nirvāṇa* was believed instead to be a state of mere cessation of transmigration, and hence of sufferings. Of course, the Vaibhāṣikas rejected such an idea and said that this was understanding *nirvāṇa* simply as passing into nothingness.

On the basis of the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā criticism of the theory of momentariness and of the defence of it by the later Buddhist logicians[9], we may put it as follows. The starting point was a view of the existent or the real. A thing was real only in so far as it performed some function: *arthakriyākārī sat*. Because, however, one real could occupy only one spatio-temporal position, it could perform only its unique function. But what was meant by performing its function? In the Buddhist view, it simply meant the production of its effect. Therefore, a real was real only in so far as it produced its unique effect. But what, then, was the unique effect of the real? Its passing away or changing into the next state of its being. Therefore, anything real was real only in so far as it passed away into the next state

of its being. In short, it was momentary.

The obvious objection to this would be that we do not actually perceive a thing as passing away into something else every moment. The jar I perceive, e.g., is perceived for a considerable period of time before it disintegrates or changes into something else. According to the theory of momentariness, however, it was a wrong view altogether. For all perceptible changes were preceded by a series of imperceptible changes, the perceptible change being only the nodal point at which the quantitative accumulation of imperceptible changes resulted in a perceptible —and therefore qualitative—change. Such terminologies are of course somewhat modern. But these represent exactly the doctrine as defended by the Buddhists.

Or, we may put their argument thus: Let us suppose that a thing, say *A*, seems to exist for some time, say 4 moments, after which it is perceived to change into *B*, which, after seeming to exist for few more moments, is again perceived to change into *C*, and so on. During these four moments of the seeming existence of *A*, let it be called *A1*, *A2*, *A3* and *A4*. After this *B* emerges. The successive moments of this process may, therefore, be represented as: *A1*, *A2*, *A3*, *A4*, *B*.... Now, *A4* produces *B*. But what produces *A4*? Obviously *A3*. But since *A4* and *B* are conspicuously different from each other, logic demands that their respective causes, too—viz. *A3* and *A4*—must be different from one another and this in spite of their apparent sameness. Likewise, *A2* and *A3* must be different from each other just as *A1* and *A2* must be different from one another. And so on—in spite of the apparent persistence of an object for some moments.

In the language of the Buddhist logicians, a thing perished without requiring a cause of destruction and while perishing it was replaced by something different from itself, which something was what it caused. It was when a thing was replaced by (i.e. when a thing caused) something conspicuously different from itself that people sometimes said that the former thing was destroyed by a particular cause. But really speaking this was only a more complex case of 'causation of a positive entity', and not a case of 'causation of destruction.' As Rahula Sankrityayana[10] puts the argument: When the cause was considered to be

more valuable than the effect, people said that the cause was destroyed; when, however, the effect was considered more valuable than the cause, people said that the effect was produced. But the two were simply the two ways of describing the same situation, just as the burning of the wood could alternatively be described as the destruction of the tree or the production of the charcoal. What actually took place was only the series of some reals ceaselessly causing the next in the series.

Svalakṣaṇa stood for the unit of the real, which was at the same time the unit of change. That *svalakṣaṇa* was the unit of the real was expressed by saying that a *svalakṣaṇa* was that which was *arthakriyākārin*, i.e. capable of performing a function. That it was the unit of change was expressed by saying that a *svalakṣaṇa* was *kṣaṇika* or momentary. Literally, however, it meant the 'self-defined'; it was so-called because a unit was conceived as one in terms of which something else was measured but which was itself chosen rather arbitrarily. That a *svalakṣaṇa* was only an arbitrary unit was expressed by saying that no name was intrinsic to it. Thus the same aggregate or series of *svalakṣaṇas*, when viewed as the cloth was called the cloth-*svalakṣaṇa*, when viewed as the thread was called the thread-*svalakṣaṇa*. However, this emphasis on the arbitrariness of the process of naming a *svalakṣaṇa* was carried by the Buddhist logicians to such an excess that, as we shall presently see, it created a crisis for their logical standpoint itself. Most of them, because of this excess, saw no harm in admitting the idealistic thesis that the very fact of the object appearing there over against the subject was a case of illusion. This idealistic thesis carried on its heels the doctrine of the intrinsic falsity of knowledge and as such made serious epistemology and logic really impossible. We shall see how the Buddhist logicians proposed to overcome this difficulty. However, let us first have some idea of the idealistic position to which the Buddhist philosophers finally succumbed.

The idealistic outlook was fully and finally vindicated by two schools of later Buddhism known as the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. Both were offshoots of a broad theological movement which is commonly referred to as the Mahāyāna. The exact

origin and development of the Mahāyāna are yet to be worked out by historians, though it is fairly certain that by the beginning of the Christian era it had become quite powerful. The name itself was a concoction. It meant 'the Great Vehicle', intended to ennoble its own followers. By contrast, the older Buddhists were called the followers of the Hīnayāna or 'the Lower Vehicle.' The theological basis of such an abuse was that the so-called Hīnayānists cared for the salvation of the individual rather than of the collective humanity, which the so-called Mahāyānists claimed to be their own ideal. The plain fact, however, was that the Mahāyāna represented a complete departure from the spirit of original Buddhism. Here is how Stcherbatsky[11] describes the departure:

> When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a path to personal Final Deliverance, consisting in an absolute extinction of life and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder—when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of Saints, a religion highly devotional, highly ceremonious and clerical, with an ideal of Universal Salvation of all living creatures, a Salvation by the divine grace of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas, a Salvation not in annihilation, but in eternal life, — we are fully justified in maintaining that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between the new and the old within the pale of what nevertheless continues to claim common descent from the same religious founder.

Two things were evidently required to claim continuity of the Mahāyāna with the original teachings of the Buddha: the fabrication of myths and the fabrication of scriptural texts. The Mahāyānists did both. They denied that the Mahāyāna was 'anything save the true doctrine of the Buddha, which, however, as too important and abstruse, was not made known generally by the Master, a fact which accounts for its non-appearance in the Pāli canon or at least for its comparative insignificance.' They spread the rumour that 'the Buddha had preached a higher truth to a select few and that this truth *was to be revealed after a passage of five centuries* after the *nirvāṇa*, that is, the higher truth was to be propagated only when the believers had practised

the lower truth.' The reference to the five centuries after the *nirvāṇa* was quite pointed, because round about this time there came into being, somewhat mysteriously, a number of scriptural texts supporting the Mahāyāna position. Written in hybrid Sanskrit these tests are called the *Mahāyānā-sūtras*. The more important of these are the *Prajñāpāramitā, Samādhirāja, Laṅkāvatāra, Saddharma-puṇḍarīka,* etc., which, though called *sūtras,* were actually written in verse and running prose and not in the usual *sūtra*-style of cryptic aphorisms. Though containing much of philosophical discussions, these appear to us today to be on the whole more of a mass of superstitious theology, the main purpose of which was to make a cult of the Buddha, the supernatural, or virtually, God, who possessed *karuṇā* (compassion) and *bodhi* (enlightenment); by the act of worship this compassion of the Buddha could be roused to bring about universal salvation. This was how the Buddha's own denial of God recoiled back on Buddhism and the Mahāyāna became in fact the vehicle for all sorts of superstitious dross.

To soothe an uneasy conscience caused by attributing high scriptural authority to these late and concocted texts, the Mahayānists started to believe in right earnest that the texts did not actually come into being abruptly; they were supposed to have survived among some jungle-tribe called the Nāgas and Nāgārjuna, the first great champion of the Mahāyāna, dissatisfied with his own former affiliation to Sarvāstivāda, wandered as a pilgrim student from the Himalayas to the seas and in the course of these sojourns he came across the records of the Sermon of Transcendental Wisdom (*Prajñāpāramitā*), as preserved among the Nāgas. 'To use modern language, we can say that Nāgārjuna discovered the records of the Buddha's secret sermons called *Prajñāpāramitā* among an obscure tribe with serpent totem.'[12] Could it really be that Nāgārjuna was the real author of the *Prajñāpāramitā* and the myth of his discovering it was only meant to conceal this fact? This much at least is certain that the philosophical position for which Nāgārjuna himself evolved his characteristic dialectical defence was, in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, 'neatly packed into a magic formula' and dogmatically presented on the authority of the Buddha.

Along with all sorts of theological superstitions, a strong metaphysical tendency showed itself in the *Mahāyāna-sūtras,* which, in the manner of the idealistic speculations of the Upaniṣads, wanted clearly to undermine the felt reality of the physical world. The empirical reality, called the *saṁvṛti satya,* was real only from the point of view of our practical existence and had no ultimate reality or *pāramārthika* satya. From this world-denying tendency of the *Mahāyāna-sūtras,* there finally emerged two idealistic schools of philosophy, called the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra, their respective philosophical doctrines being known as Sūnya-vāda and Vijñāna-vāda.

The leader of the Mādhyamika school was Nāgārjuna, who belonged to the second half of the second century A.D., a contemporary and friend of the Sātavāhana king Gotamīputra Yajña Śrī, and was for a long time the chief abbot of Nālandā. His *Mādhyāmika-kārikā,* written in Sanskrit verse, was the basic work of this school. This was commented upon by Buddhapālita (A.D. 5th century) in the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti,* by Bhavaviveka (A.D. 5th century) in the *Prajñā-pradīpa* and by Candrakīrti (*c.* A.D. 6th century) in the *Prasannapadā.* Another outstanding representative of the Mādhyamika view was Āryadeva, the successor of Nāgārjuna at Nālandā. He was, 'according to Candrakīrti's account preserved in Tibetan,... the son of the king of Sinhala and renouncing the world after being anointed the crown prince he came to South India and eventually became Nāgārjuna's disciple.' Among his many philosophical works, the most important was the *Catuḥśataka.* Śāntideva's *Śikṣā-samuccaya* and *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* too, are among the outstanding Mādhyamika works; he belonged to A.D. 7th century.

The first work of the Yogācāra school is attributed to a certain Maitreyanātha (*c.* A.D. 4th century), about whose real hisotricity, however, there is some controversy. It is generally believed that he wrote many books (now preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations) among which the *Madhyānta-vibhañga* may specially be mentioned. The most influencial of the early representatives of the Yogācāra, however, were the two brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, both of whom spent some years as abbots of Nālandā. They lived in *c.* A.D. 450. The most important philo-

sophical work of Asaṅga was the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*. Vasubandhu was the same as the author of the *Abhidharmakośa*, the basic work of the Vaibhāṣikas; under the influence of his elder brother Asaṅga, he gave up his original Vaibhāṣika affiliations and produced the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, the philosophical classic of the Yogācāras.

The central point of the Mādhyamika philosophy was substantially the same as that of the Upaniṣadic idealists, though it remains a matter of textual and historical research to determine how much the Mādhyamikas actually drew upon the Upaniṣads. It is fairly clear, however, that they were the links between the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedānta. It will, therefore, be wrong to dismiss as baseless the tradition that survived in the country accusing the Advaita Vedāntists as being but disguised Buddhists. At the same time we find the Mahāyānists like Śāntarakṣita frankly admitting that the defects of the Vedānta idealism were but slight. In the sense of defending practically the same philosophical position the Mahāyānists—particularly the Mādhyamikas—were as much of disguised Vedāntists as the Advaita Vedāntists were disguised Mahāyānists. This point was somewhat obscured by Śaṁkara's own condemnation of all the schools of Buddhism, inclusive of a summary rejection of the Mādhyamika view. But this only indicates a religious reaction rather than any real philosophical difference. Stcherbatsky makes the point quite clear:

> Śaṁkara accuses them [i.e. the Mādhyamikas] of disregarding all logic and refuses to enter in a controversy with them. The position of Śaṁkara is interesting because, at heart, he is in full agreement with the Mādhyamikas, at least in the main lines, since both maintain the reality of the One-without-a-second, and the mirage of the manifold. But Śaṁkara, as an ardent hater of Buddhism, could never confess that. He therefore treats the Mādhyamika with great contempt... on the charge that the Mādhyamika denies the possibility of cognizing the Absolute by logical methods (*pramāṇa*). Vācaspati Miśra in the *Bhāmatī* rightly interprets this point as referring to the opinion of the Mādhyamikas that logic is incapable to solve the question about what existence or non-existence really are. This opinion Śaṁkara himself, as is well-known, shares. He does not accept the authority of logic as

a means of cognizing the Absolute, but he deems it a privilege of the Vedāntin to fare without logic, since he has Revelation to fall back upon. From all his opponents he requires strict logical methods.[13]

The world-denying philosophy of the Mādhyamikas was called Śūnya-vāda, the doctrine of the void. Nāgārjuna's argument for the denial of the world of experience was: *tat tat prāpya yat utpannam na utpannam tat svabhāvataḥ.* It meant, whatever was produced depending upon this or that was not produced out of itself. That is, it did not exist at all. The original doctrine of *pratītya samutpāda,* according to which every real thing had a cause (otherwise it was not a real thing), was twisted to mean that everything that had a cause was bound to be unreal. 'The Law of Dependent Origination' (*pratītya bhāva*), said Nāgārjuna,[14] 'is equivalent to and proof of the intrinsic unreality of things. A thing which is found to come into existence in dependence upon an antecedent fact must forfeit its claim to intrinsic reality.' As Stcherbatsky explains, 'A dependent existence is no real existence, just as borrowed money is no real wealth.'[15]

This understanding of the *pratītya-samutpāda* was a new weapon gifted by Nāgārjuna to the armory of the idealists. In common with all the Indian idealists, Nāgārjuna preached that the empirical world was there because of our ignorance and that, with the dawn of *prajñā* or knowledge, it would no longer be there. What remained was *śūnya* or the void. Some of the modern interpreters try to defend the Mādhyamikas by claiming that the *śūnya* is not to be understood as the bare void or the mathematical zero, but as the technical term for the indescribable ultimate reality. Even admitting this to be true, it is at best only a terminological innovation. The Upaniṣadic idealists denied the empirical world and gave to the ultimate reality the name *Brahman.* The Mādhyamikas, proceeding on similar lines, called the ultimate reality the *śūnya.* But this *śūnya* was with the Mādhyamikas just an esoteric or mystical concept and that made it somewhat impossible even to argue seriously against their position. If the ultimate reality was characterised as consciousness, as was done by the Upaniṣads

and the later Advaita Vedānta, then there could at least be the possibility of looking at it as a serious philosophical thesis and, therefore, of defending or refuting it logically. With mysticism, however, this was not possible. What argument, positive or otherwise, could one offer when it was declared that the ultimate reality was just mystical?

Idealism is, in a sense, mystical. For, it was ultimately on the basis of some mystical experience that the unreality of the felt world may be claimed to have been realisd. But the specific feature of *Śūṇya-vāda* was to make philosophy all the more mystical by grafting on it all sorts of ideas borrowed from religion and superstition. The *śūnya* was identified with *Nirvāṇa*, with the Cosmical Body of the Buddha and what not. The result was the degradation of the simple atheism of original Buddhism —even of the so-called Hīnayāna—into the form of a fantastic theism and pantheism. 'This unique reality,' says Stcherbatsky, 'although declared to be uncharacterisable, has been variously characterised as the... "Cosmical Body of the Lord", as Buddha's Dharmakāya. In this last attribution the unique essence of the universe becomes personified and worshipped under the names of Virocana, Amitābha, the goddess Tārā and others, as a supreme God.'[16] Naturally enough, serious philosophical interest ceases here.

The other school of the Mahāyāna philosophy was called Yogācāra. It characterised reality as *vijñāna* rather than the indescribable *śūnya*. Hence the doctrine was known as *Vijñāna-vāda*. The synonyms used for *vijñāna* were *citta* or *manas*, i.e., the mind. But since a substantive theory of the mind—a mind over and above the states of consciousness—was really alien to Buddhism, the view amounted to the assertion that fleeting ideas or momentary states of consciousness alone were real. Accordingly, any self apart from these states of consciousness was denied and of course the most strenuous efforts were made to disprove the existence of the objective world.

Here is how Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya explains the origin of the philosophy:

> It is clear that originally *Vijñāna-vāda* is based on a number of Upaniṣadic passages containing the word *jñāna*

and *vijñāna* referring to the *ātman* (self) or *brahman* (the Absolute) in their Vedāntic interpretation. *Ātman, brahman, jñāna* and *vijñāna* are identical in sense in this connection. There are passages which can easily be interpreted from the idealistic (i.e. the Vijñāna-vādin) point of view.'[17]

In his article on the 'Evolution of Vijñāna-vāda,' Bhattacharya quotes passages after passages from the texts of the Upaniṣads as well as of the Vijñāna-vādins to show the essential identity of the two. The name Yogācāra is explained by him as follows: 'The word *yogācāra* (literally, a practitioner of the *yoga*) originally meant an ascetic, but gradually it was employed for an idealist of the school... Thus one who proceeds along with *yoga* is a Yogācāra.'[18]

But though the central conception of this philosophy was thus taken from the Upaniṣads, the Buddhist Yogācāras proposed to evolve sound logical arguments for it. We have already seen how all these arguments were sought to be rejected particularly by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas. We have also seen that the Indian idealists, beginning from the time of the Upaniṣads, condemned and rejected all the normal sources of valid knowledge. It was obviously difficult, if not impossible, to build up any serious epistemology and logic on the basic assumption that the sources of valid knowledge are all false. Notwithstanding this, however, there did emerge a number of great Buddhist logicians devoting themselves seriously to the epistemological problems and yet accepting the Yogācāra point of view. Dignāga (*c.* A.D. 500), e.g., wrote the first masterpiece of Buddhist logic called the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* and also another work called the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* to explain and defend the Yogācāra position. He was followed by Dharmakīrti (*c.* A.D. 650), the author of the *Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Pramāṇa-vārttika,* etc., Śāntarakṣita (A.D. 8th century), the author of *Tattva-saṁgraha,* Kamalaśīla (A.D. 8th century), the author of the *Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā,* Dharmottara (A.D. 9th century), the author of the *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā,* Arcaṭa (A.D. 9th century), the author of the *Hetubindu-ṭīkā,* Durvekamiśra, the author of the commentaries on the *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* and *Hetubindu-ṭīkā,* Jñānaśrī (A.D. 10th century), the author of the

Kṣaṇabhañga-siddhi. All these writers on epistemology and logic are regarded as belonging to the Yogācāra school and there is no doubt that most of them defended this philosophy. How, then, could this be at all possible? How did they reconcile the idealism of the Yogācāra with their serious preoccupation with epistemological and logical questions?

The most serious difficulty for an idealistically inclined logician was with regard to the question of the object or *artha* of knowledge. To say that cognition alone existed was to claim that the only object of cognition was cognition itself. Really speaking, this meant that there was no *object* as such. And a science of knowledge without the object of knowledge did not make much sense. The Indian idealists in particular, because of their claim that the physical world was after all the product of ignorance, could not, with any measure of consistency, contribute seriously to the study of the laws of knowledge: for knowledge had for its object the physical world which, being ignorance-born, could not obey any law and, as a result, the knowledge of this ignorance-born world, too, could not obey any law, i.e., epistemology became impossible. This was why the Advaita Vedāntists like Gauḍapāda and Śaṁkara and the Mādhyamikas like Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti did not—because they could not—contribute anything positive to epistemology and logic. But in spite of this incompatibility of idealism with logic, how did philosophers like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti contribute to logic? Only by assuming that the *artha* or object of knowledge was 'somehow' there and closing their eyes as to 'how' it could be there. Thus in the *Pramāṇa-vārttika,* Dharmakīrti said, 'How cognition, which is the sole existing reality, can appear in the form of the objects, even I did not know... Just as people, under the magical spell, see the pieces of mud, etc., not in their own form but in certain other forms, so does cognition appear there not in its own form but in the form of objects.'[19] Earlier he remarked, 'Closing, like elephants, our eyes to the real situation, we proceed like ordinary people to consider the nature of objects.'[20]

This was a frank admission that only on the view of the ordinary people, i.e., on the assumption of the independent existence

of the objects of knowledge, could one proceed with serious epistemology. For accepting a position like that, these logicians could fall back upon some school of Buddhism that maintained the independent existence of the material world and, as a matter of fact, they effected some sort of compromise with the Sautrāntikas, who upheld such a position. Thus, for example, they said that *pramā* was correct (*abhrānta*) knowledge. It was difficult to maintain this from the strict Yogācāra point of view, because all knowledge, as knowledge of the extra-mental, was bound to be *bhrānta* or incorrect. Therefore, Durveka had to admit that this definition of *pramāṇa* was not offered from the Yogācāra point of view but rather from that of the Sautrāntikas.[21] To emphasise this he added that all their thesis could not be defended from the Yogācāra standpoint, e.g., the thesis that *svalakṣaṇa* was the object of perception could not be so defended. As a matter of fact, for all serious epistemological purposes, these Buddhists had to assume the Sautrāntika standpoint, their formal acceptance of *Vijñāna-vāda* notwithstanding. It is perhaps because of this that an advanced writer on Buddhist logic like Stcherbatsky characterises the philosophical position of the logicians by the peculiar name, 'Sautrāntika-Yogācāra.' This should be taken to mean that they were Yogācāras in so far as their metaphysical views were concerned and Sautrāntikas in so far as they were also serious logicians.[22]

27. *The Nyaya-Vaisesika*

FROM their earliest phases, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems were closely related and in course of time the two were actually amalgamated. Hence the two are usually treated together under the joint name Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. There are uncertainties as to why the systems came to acquire these names. According to a tradition of the Chinese Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣika was so-called

because it was supposed to be 'superior to' or 'distinct from' the other systems; Indian tradition, however, connected the name with *viśeṣa* or 'particularity,' a distinctive category recognised by the Vaiśeṣikas. Nyāya, again, was one of the older terms for Mīmāṁsā. It originally meant 'exegetic principle or maxim.' How it eventually came to stand for a new system of philosophy is not clearly known. Kuppuswami Sastri suggests that syllogistic reasoning formed the special theme of this philosophy and that *nyāya* meant illustration or example (*udāharaṇa*), conceived by this system as constituting the most important of the five members of the syllogistic expression. In spite of all these conjectures, however, the names remain rather obscure.

The source-books of these systems, viz., the *Nyāya-sūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* were attributed to Gotama (Gautama) and Kaṇāda respectively. Nothing historical is known of either and the dates of the redaction of these *sūtras* are conjectural. Jacobi thinks that the former could have been redacted between A.D. 200 and 400 while the latter somewhat earlier. But unlike the Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, the actual origin of these two philosophies need not be traced to any great antiquity, for there is no tradition like that. On the contrary, the distinctive features of these two systems were quite new in the Indian philosophical tradition and presumably both took shape sometime near 300 or 200 B.C.

We are left with no early commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, though it is sometimes conjectured that there was one called the *Rāvaṇabhāṣya*. The earliest comprehensive exposition of this philosophy was in the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* by Praśastapāda (*c.* A.D. 5th century), which, though not actually a commentary on the *sūtras*, is often mentioned as the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. This was commented upon by Vyomaśiva (A.D. 8th century) in the *Vyomavatī*, Śrīdhara (A.D. 10th century) in the *Kandalī* and Udayana (A.D. 10th century) in the *Kiraṇāvalī*. The commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* was by Vātsyāyana (*c.* A.D. 4th century), and is therefore called the *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*. This was severely criticised by the Dignāga. Against his attack, Uddyotakara (A.D. 7th century), wrote the *Nyāya-vārttika* in

defence of Vātsyāyana. Vācaspati Miśra (A.D. 9th century), in his *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, or simply the *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, continued the argument of Uddyotakara. The next great Nyāya philosopher was Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 9th century), who—we do not know why—had to write this *Nyāyamañjarī* in prison! Then came Udayana, who, apart from his *Kiraṇāvalī*, commented upon the *Tātparyaṭīkā* in a work called the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*. He wrote besides two major works, called the *Ātmatattva-viveka* (*Bauddha-dhikkāra?*) and *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, the latter dealing mainly with proofs of the existence of God.

There were a large number of other works on the system but Udayana was by far the last great exponent of what is called the old or *prācīna* phase of the Nyāya tradition. Its new or *navya* phase began about the 12th century with Gañgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*. Among his most renowned followers were Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Gadādhara and Jagadīśa. What was distinctive of the neo-Nyāya was an almost exclusive emphasis on terminological precision and refinement of definitions. This led to a decline of interest in the positive philosophical tenets and to an exclusive preoccupation with the formal aspects of the thinking process, which is considered by some as the lapse of the Nyāya into scholasticism. Hiriyanna, e.g., observes: 'Gadādhara has been described as the prince of Indian schoolmen. Roughly speaking he lived in the same time as Lord Bacon whose denunciation of scholasticism, as a modern writer observes, may be "most aptly illustrated by extracts from Gadādhara's writings"'.[1]

This is where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as a philosophy proper, culminated. As for its origin, we may seek some clue in the alternative names of the authors of the two *sūtra* works. Gotama was called Akṣapāda. The name sounds odd; for as Garbe[2] suggests it means 'the eye-footed', i.e. with the eyes directed on the feet, and as such it could have been only a nickname. Perhaps, such a nickname was invented because of the mundane, i.e. thoroughly empirical, attitude that characterised his philosophy. That the name Kaṇāda or 'atom-eater' could have had a similar implication has already been observed. All this is significant. For, though in the later times it was tenaciously claimed that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was a Vedic philosophy and though

our traditional scholars are never tired of tracing its origin to the Upaniṣads and even to the Saṁhitās, the really distinctive peculiarities of this system appear to be quite new in the Indian philosophical tradition. We may begin with the atomistic hypothesis. There is no doubt that the Jainas, Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and even the Mīmāṁsakas gave support to it. But it was not, even in their own eyes, so vital for their systems as it was for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Besides, there is nothing to indicate that historically, the admission of atomism in these systems was earlier than the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras* in which the hypothesis was already seriously posed and defended. Apart from atomism, certain other elements of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika appear to be equally new in Indian philosophy. These are the theory of the universals, the theory of syllogism and the tendency to classify everything in the universe under certain definite categories. Significantly, all these were already there in the Greek philosophical tradition and, thanks to the researches of Cornford, Thomson, Farrington and others, we are better informed about the social conditions of which these philosophical ideas were the outcome. In default of a corresponding investigation into the Indian social conditions, the easy hypothesis, to which Keith[3] and others took resort, was that of the wholesale borrowings by the Indians from the Greeks. Apart from the possibility of independent parallel development of philosophical ideas in different countries under similar social conditions—a possibility which this hypothesis appears completely to overlook—the fact remains that even for an alien idea to take root in a new soil it is necessary for the soil to have been prepared in advance. That is, even admitting that Greek influence was at work behind the formation of those Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideas, it is necessary to investigate into the Indian social conditions—which must have had some general resemblance to those of Greece—under which alone these ideas could be seriously accepted and developed. Lastly, what is ignored by the upholders of the hypothesis of wholesale borrowing is that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*, in spite of including elements that remind us of Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, contained a lot more; besides, these three Greek thinkers did not after all represent the same philosophy and the

theories of the atoms, universals, syllogism and the categories are not exactly the same in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, i.e. are used as elements of a new philosophy.

Stcherbatsky suggests that the Nyāya philosophy originated from the studies in the methodology of the public debate, which was widespread in the country from considerable antiquity. The internal evidences of the *Nyāya-sūtra* make it impossible to doubt the truth contained in this. For it was, as a matter of fact, to a considerable extent a treatise on the technique of the public debate. The second part of the first chapter and the whole of the fifth chapter discussed the different techniques of public debate called *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā,* and defined the various types of quibbling or *chala,* sophisticated refutation or *jāti* and the point of defeat or *nigrahasthāna.* But this interest in the public debate cannot wholly account for the contents of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika *sūtras.* These were actually quite heterogenous and may roughly be brought under three heads, viz., topics of public debate, elements of traditional faith and an essentially empirical epistemology and ontology. How and with what consistency all these were sought to be synthesized in the two *sūtras* is of course a different question.

In the opening aphorism of the *Nyāya-sūtra* it was claimed that knowledge of sixteen things led to liberation or *niḥśreyasa.* That this concept of liberation was artificially brought in to placate the traditional faith was quite obvious from the list of the sixteen things. Some of these, viz. *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* were just topics of public debate; some others like *pramāṇa, saṁśaya, dṛṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava* and *hetvābhāsa* belonged to epistemology or proto-epistemology; one was a broad category called *prameya* or the object of knowledge. However, the objects of knowledge, as enumerated in a subsequent *sūtra* presented a curious blend of ontological and ethical concepts, inclusive of *apavarga* or liberation, again. These ethical concepts were discussed at length in the first and second parts of the fourth chapter, where the view of liberation reappeared, conceived as the cessation of sufferings. In the second aphorism, it was already said that suffering was due to birth, birth due to action (or, as Vātsyāyana interpreted it, merits and

demerits caused by action), action due to defect, defect due to false knowledge or ignorance (*mithyā-jñāna*). Did Gotama say all this just in order to win the ears of people under the strong influence of the Upaniṣadic and Buddhistic ideas? Similar might have been the reason for his defence of the Veda as a source of valid knowledge. It came in the general context of testimony as a source of valid knowledge; but the main point argued was that the Vedic injunctions, correctly followed, did yield results and that there was nothing *prima facie* wrong about these injunctions. Such declarations could have earned the confidence even of the ritualists, though Gotama refused to go to the extent of supporting the claim of the Mīmāṁsakas that the Vedas were eternal. This claim was vigorously rejected by both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika *sūtras*. Along with all these, the *Nyāya-sūtra* went to the extent of supporting the traditional faith in the efficacy of the yogic practices.

The same tendency to accommodate somehow or other the broad features of traditional faith was quite palpable also in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. It opened with a claim to explain *dharma* and, in the second *sūtra, dharma* was defined as that from which resulted the prosperity in this world (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*niḥśreyasa*). In the third *sūtra* was declared the validity of the Veda as the source of *dharma*. The text even claimed the authority of the Veda (though without quoting any Vedic passage) to justify purely ontological positions. Again, the first two parts of the sixth chapter were entirely devoted to the discussion of *dharma;* however, the details of *dharma*, as the text understood it, were just such commonplace practices of the age as feeding and offering gifts to the Brahmins, maintaining purity particularly in connection with eating, etc., etc. In the second part of the fifth book, the author returned again to touch upon the conception of liberation. But the artificial character of how all these features of the traditional faith were somehow or other jumbled up with the central doctrine of the system, viz., the six categories, was most glaringly evident in the fourth aphorism of the text, where it was declared that the philosophical knowledge of these categories, viz. substance, quality, action, universal, ultimate particularity and the relation of inherence led to libe-

ration. No wonder that a popular couplet ridiculed the resolution of explaining *dharma* culminating in a discussion of the six categories as like going to the sea having resolved to go to the Himalayas.

Notwithstanding this medley of the assorted elements of traditional faith, both the *sūtras* were basically serious about an essentially empirical epistemology and ontology for which there was no parallel in Indian philosophy before these works. But throughout the period of its real development, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers remained true to both these aspects of the *sūtras*, viz., the acceptance of the traditional faith and a serious preoccupation with an empirical epistemology and ontology. However, the traditional faith thus artificially accepted having nothing to contribute to the philosophical needs of our times, we may concentrate on the latter which, at any rate, contained the real philosophical contributions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

'The system starts with the postulate that all knowledge by its very nature points to an object beyond it and independent of it.' In defence of this position the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, beginning with Gotama, had to wage a relentless war against philosophical idealism, and in doing this they found their natural allies in the Mīmāṁsakas, who, as we have already seen, for reasons peculiar to themselves, were equally opposed to idealism. Moreover, since, as we have seen, the idealist's position amounted to the assertion that all knowledge—or at any rate, all empirical knowledge—was inherently false, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, along with the Mīmāṁsakas, had to take a determined stand against this position. Already, the *Nyāya-sūtra* refuted the view that valid knowledge (*pramā*) was an impossibility and upon the later exponents of the system devolved the task of building up a positive theory of validity and invalidity of knowledge. But they could not share the extreme alternative suggested by the Mīmāṁsakas, according to whom all knowledge was intrinsically true (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). The Mīmāṁsakas argued that all knowledge, as knowledge, was true; only some were rejected as false purely on practical considerations. In other words, only those elements of knowledge that failed to produce successful

activity were treated as false, though from the theoretical point of view they too were inherently true. As they put it:

> The object of cognition... is that which a cognition reveals and a cognition is a cognition only as it reveals some object. This being so, it follows that a cognition cannot fail to be valid or true from the nature of the case. For how can a cognition be a cognition and yet fail to cognize or reveal its object? And how can it reveal its object without being valid or true?... No doubt there are cases where a cognition is rejected as false, but this is because it fails to lead to certain expected results and not because it fails to reveal its object.[4]

But this was virtually surrendering to the main claim of the idealists, whose thesis depended upon the elimination of the standpoint of practice from that of philosophical theory proper. Rejecting the Mīmāṁsā theory, therefore, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas came out with their own theory of extrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity (*paratah prāmāṇya* and *paratah aprāmāṇya*). According to this, a knowledge by itself was neither true nor false; both its validity and invalidity depended upon and were determined by conditions different from those that produced the knowledge itself. Thus, a knowledge became valid not because of the conditions that produced the knowledge itself but because of some additional condition called 'excellence' or *guṇa*. Similarly, another cognition could be invalid because of the additional conditions called defect or *doṣa*. How far these positions could be maintained with regard to all forms of knowledge was of course a different question. With regard to the knowledge derived from verbal testimony the position was quite clear, because the validity of such a knowledge could be dependent upon the additional factor called the trustworthiness of the person imparting it and its invalidity upon the untrustworthiness of such a person. But the same was not so obviously true with regard to the perceptual and inferential knowledges, because any additional factor upon which was dependent the truth or falsity of such forms of knowledge could not be so easily pointed out. In spite of this difficulty, however, there is no doubt that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas developed a really revolutionary theory with regard to the question of the ascertainment, i.e. the criterion of

determining, the truth or falsity of a knowledge. How was one to know that a particular knowledge was true or false? What was the test of truth? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas answered that there was only one such test and that was practice. A knowledge could be known to be true or false only after putting it to the test of practical life. If in practice it led to a successful result, it was to be accepted as true. If, on the other hand, it failed to lead to such a practical success, it was to be discarded as false. Thus, e.g., the knowledge of water in a mirage was false because it could not lead one to quench the thirst; the knowledge of water in a pool, e.g., was true because it could actually lead to the quenching of thirst. This was one of the most significant ideas developed in our philosophy and it closely resembled the modern scientific idea of practice being the criterion of truth. We quote Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint.

At the time when a piece of cognition first impels you to undertake an action, you are certainly not sure that this cognition of yours is valid, e.g., the cognition of a blue object is not at the same time an assurance that this cognition is valid. Of course, subsequently you may become sure that a cognition that you earlier had is valid, but this assurance is not automatic, and that, in turn, is because it depends upon *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*.... Here one might ask, 'What is the *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* on which, according to the Naiyāyika, depends the assurance that a piece of cognition is valid?' To this we reply, 'the Bhāṣyakāra (Vātsyāyana) himself says, *"pravṛtti* stands for an effort and *sāmarthya* for this effort turning fruitful." This means that he understands by *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* the cognition of fruit-in-the-form-of-an-effective-action.' But then it might be urged, 'How is this cognition of an effective action different from the original cognition (whose validity is under dispute)? And if the former, too, requires another cognition in order to assure you of its validity, you will be faced with an infinite regress.' To this we reply that this objection is incoherent, because it goes counter to the testimony of our everyday experience. For the cognition of an effective action stands in no need of being tested. The cognition that impels you to undertake an action can do so without your being assured of its validity, while the cognition of an effective action, in as much as its acquisition implies the fulfilment of the purpose concerned, does not require that its validity should be tested.

Hence, here there is no occasion for an infinite regress. Or we may say, the latter cognition stands in no need of test because there never arises a doubt concerning it. The cognition that impels you to undertake an action often takes for its object something non-existent; e.g., you may have cognition of water in the presence of sun's rays. That is why people are doubtful of the validity of a cognition that impels you to undertake an action. But the cognition of an effective action in relation to water never takes place except in the presence of water. That is why people are never doubtful of the validity of this type of cognition. Hence, here there is no occasion for an enquiry into the validity of the cognition of an effective action, for all enquiry presupposes doubt. Or we may say that the cognition of an effective action is of such a peculiar nature that it automatically assures you of its own validity. And to the question as to wherein lies this peculiarity, our reply is as follows: 'Various types of purpose can be served by water, e.g., you may clean yourself with it, drink it, bathe in it, offer it to gods and manes (*pitṛ*), wash your clothes with it, relieve yourself of exhaustion or heat with its aid, etc., etc. But none of these purposes are found to be served for one who is impelled to undertake an action by false knowledge. It might be said that all these purposes are found to be served even in a dream. To this we reply that a waking man has a clear consciousness of the nature: I am now awake and am not in dream. And in the company of this type of consciousness the purposes in question are never served except in the presence of water.'[5]

With their fundamental postulate of the essentially objective and real existence of the world known, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas proceeded to develop a rational explanation of it. This led them to their theory of the *padārthas*. A *padārtha* literally meant a namable or denotable thing or a thing which corresponded to a word. It was defined as a knowable or valid and cognizable thing. The scheme of the *padārthas* thus represented an effort to arrive at a satisfactory classification of all knowable and namable things. Kaṇāda himself mentioned six *padārthas* or broad categories under which everything known could be classified. These were: (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) activity (*karma*), (4) universal (*sāmānya*), (5) ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and (6) the relation of inherence

(*samavāya*). Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, added a seventh to this list and called it *abhāva* or non-existence.

Of these, the most important was substance or *dravya*. Substances were conceived as nine in number, viz. (1) earth (*pṛthvī*), (2) water (*ap*), (3) fire (*tejas*), (4) air (*vāyu*), (5) *ākāśa*, (6) time (*kāla*), (7) space (*dik*), (8) self (*ātman*), and (9) mind (*manas*). The first five were called *bhūtas*, i.e., substances having some specific quality that could be perceived by one or other of the external senses. These sensory qualities were odour, flavour, colour, touch and sound. It was further maintained that of these qualities the earth possessed the first four; water the second, third and fourth; fire the third and fourth; air the fourth only; *ākāśa* only the fifth. But the first four of these *bhūtas* differed from the fifth in an important respect. We may understand this better if we begin with the conception of *ākāśa*. It was arrived at by trying to solve the problem of sound. Sound is neither a substance nor an action. As such, it was a quality. But if it was a quality, it had to be the quality of some substance. This substance was *ākāśa*. It was conceived as partless and all-pervasive. But the first four *bhūtas*, i.e. earth, etc., were conceived in two varieties, called eternal and non-eternal. By the eternal variety of earth, etc., was meant their atoms while by the non-eternal variety the products of these atoms. Thus in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, all the atoms were not homogeneous in quality: the earth atoms were qualitatively different from the water atoms, etc., the water atoms from the earth atoms, etc., and so on. This is one of the important points on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism differed from the Jaina version of it. The Jainas conceived all the atoms as homogeneous in quality—agreeing, in this respect, with Democritus.

The argument put forward by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas for the atomistic hypothesis was this: 'The minutest particle visible in the sun's rays coming through the small window-hole (*trasareṇu*) is made up of parts, because it is a substance perceived visually, as is a jar. Again, the component part of the particle in question is also made up of parts, because it goes to compose a *mahat*-sized substance, as does a *kapāla* (i.e. the component part of the jar).' For all practical purposes, the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas understood by the *mahat* size a perceptible size. There were, thus, two steps in the argument: (1) Everything that had a perceptible size is made of parts, as is a jar. The mote seen in the sun-beam has a perceptible size. Therefore, it is made of parts. But the same major premise could not be used to prove that the parts of the mote, too, have parts. For, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, such motes were the smallest among the perceptible-sized things; therefore, their parts, which were still smaller, could not have perceptible or *mahat* size. So, to prove that the parts of such particles, too, were made of parts, a second syllogism with a new major premise was posed. (2) The parts that go to compose a *mahat*-sized substance are themselves made of parts, as are the component parts of a jar. The parts of the mote compose a *mahat*-sized substance, viz., the mote itself. Therefore, these parts are themselves made of parts.

But, it was argued, this process of dividing a thing into smaller and still smaller parts had to terminate somewhere, i.e., had to have a rest (*viśrāma*), beyond which there could not be any further division into still smaller parts. For, apart from the possibility of the infinite regress or *anavasthā*, which all the Indian philosophers wanted scrupulously to avoid, the conception of the process of resolving into parts not terminating anywhere was committed to the absurdity of equating the mote with the mountain. For such a conception of infinite divisibility meant that both the mote and the mountain were made up of an infinite number of parts, and if so, the two were to be equal in size. To avoid this possibility, the process of division had to have some termination. The smallest parts thus arrived at, which were not further divisible into parts, were called the atoms.

Concretely, the conception was as follows. The mote in the sunbeam, i.e., the smallest among the perceptible-sized particles, was called the *tryaṇuka*, i.e., the triad. It was so called because it was conceived to be made of three parts, each of which was called a *dvyaṇuka* or dyad. The *dvyaṇuka* was of course not perceptible. But being the component part of a perceptible object it had to be made of parts. The parts of a *dvyaṇuka* were conceived as two and each of these called a *paramāṇu* or atom. But a *dvyaṇuka* itself was not perceptible; therefore its compo-

nent parts, i.e., the *paramāṇus,* were not conceived as made of parts.

Somehow or other, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas understood the production of an effect only in terms of the combination of parts. Therefore, the *paramāṇus,* which were not made of parts, could not be produced. Again, only things that were produced were conceived to have an end. But the *paramāṇus,* which were not produced, did not have any end. In short, the atoms were eternal, i.e., both beginningless and endless.

Let us now consider this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism in relation to its Greek parallel. In Greek philosophy, Democritus evolved the atomistic hypothesis to offer a rational solution of the problems of his own times, particularly those that were created by his predecessors, viz. Parmenides and Heraclitus. Somewhat like our Upaniṣadic idealists, Parmenides made the one Immutable Being the only reality. Somewhat like our early Buddhists, again, Heraclitus made change or becoming the only reality. 'The atoms, like the One of Parmenides, were uncreated and eternal, solid and uniform in substance, in themselves incapable of change; but, being in perpetual motion in the void, they wove, by their various combinations and dissolutions, all the pageant of our changing world. Thus was provided an element of eternal rest to satisfy Parmenides and an element of eternal change to satisfy Heraclitus. A world of Being underlay the world of Becoming. But the achievement of this reconciliation required a bold revision of the logic of Parmenides in the light of experience. The existence of void had to be admitted equally with the existence of matter. The experience of the fact of change compelled the assertion that what-is-not exists just as certainly as what-is.'[6] It is not difficult to see the broad similarity of the situation with which our Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, too, were confronted. On the one hand, there was the doctrine of the eternal and immutable *Brahman* of the Upaniṣads while, on the other, the doctrine of the perpetual flux of the Buddhists. They could thus have arrived at the atomistic hypothesis as offering a way out. The atoms, being eternal and immutable, provided for the Being, their conjunctions and dissolutions for the Becoming. But some of the most significant features of Democritus were

not there in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The most serious of this was connected with the movement of the atoms. What was the reason for the atoms to take on the multiform combinations and produce the wealth of the organic and inorganic worlds?

> Democritus finds this in the nature of the atoms themselves, to which the vacuum affords room for their alternate conjunctions and disjunctions. The atoms, variously heavy, and afloat in empty space, impinge on each other. There arises thus a wider and wider expanding movement throughout the general mass; and, in consequence of this movement, there take place the various complexions, like-shaped atoms grouping themselves with like-shaped. These complexions, however, by very nature, always resolve themselves again; and hence the transitoriness of worldly things. But this explanation of the formation of the world explains in effect nothing: it exhibits only the quite abstract idea of an infinite causal series, but no sufficient ground for all the phenomena of becoming and mutation. As such last ground there remained, therefore, only absolute predestination or necessity (*ananke*), which, as in contrast to the final causes of Anaxagores, he is said to have named tyche, chance.[7]

It is true, as George Thomson[8] points out, that this conception of *ananke* had a mythological prehistory. In the system of Democritus, however, 'the idea of *ananke* has shaken off its mythical associations and become an abstract idea like the modern scientific concept of natural law.' In any case, the atomism of Democritus led him to a deterministic view of the universe in which there was no place for God or the Creator and Destroyer. Hence was his 'polemic against the popular gods, the idea of whom Democritus derived from the fear occasioned by atmospheric and stellar phenomena, and an ever more openly declared atheism and naturalism constituted the prominent peculiarity of the later Atomistic school.'[9]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism, however, developed in a somewhat opposite direction. Kaṇāda himself did not mention God, and in all presumption he was an atheist. But the later philosophers of the system not only believed in God but became even the foremost advocates of the proofs for His existence. Why did atomism fell to this peculiar fate in our philosophy? It can perhaps be traced to the technology in terms of which

the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas wanted to understand the process of production. As already observed, they conceived the production of an effect only as the combination of parts. Their typical example was that of producing the jar by combining or joining its two parts called *kapālas*—a technique of pottery which is no longer in practice in our country.[10] Since the production of all effects was sought to be understood in terms of this technique, the production of the composite objects from the atoms, too, was conceived as essentially a matter of joining the atoms. And if it was a matter of joining, then there must be a joiner, as the potter is in the case of the jar. This was how God came into the system to fill up the gap of the atomistic hypothesis.

> In the atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, it is assumed that the fiat of the omnipotent God, in conjunction with the inevitable vestiges of the works done by embodied souls (*jīvāḥ*), causes *concretive* activities of various kinds in various atoms; and as a result of such activities, they come into contact with each other and composite products in the shape of dyads, triads, and so on, arise. Thus creation (*sṛṣṭi*) takes place... The fiat of the omnipotent God, again, in the absence of any demand for creation on behalf of *jīvas*, causes *descretive* activities of various kinds in atoms, with the result that the contacts (*saṁyogāḥ*) by which two atoms are held together in dyads are destroyed and all the composite products, beginning from dyads, crumble to pieces.[11] (This was the conception of *pralaya* or universal dissolution brought about by God—an essentially mythological idea which God carried on His heels.)

The fatal weakness of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism was, therefore, its failure to conceive the atoms as either autodynamic or being moved by the natural laws. Democritus, as we have seen, could do away with God by taking resort to the conception of necessity or *ananke* in the sense of natural law. His followers went a step further and made the atoms autodynamic. Thus in Greek philosophy, atomism was finally fortified against theism and became stark atheism. Interestingly enough, on this question of motion and God the Jainas maintained a position that was similar to that of the Greek atomists: for they were themselves atheists and yet upheld atomism. But this similarity must not be misunderstood. For, even though no

believers in God, the Jainas subscribed to the doctrine of *karma* as emphatically as did the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. So according to them also the merits and demerits accumulated by men had—though of course without being supervised by God—a bearing on the formation of the physical universe out of the atoms. This was obviously introducing mythology into atomism, which Democritus and his followers would never do.

Over and above their theism, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas made another concession to the idealistic outlook by their acceptance of the Self (*ātman*) as a substance separate from the physical ones. But their concept of the Self was not without kinship with the materialistic outlook. For, according to them the Soul was not necessarily and essentially conscious but became so only when associated with the body. Even in conjunction with the body, the Soul was not always conscious. Thus, e.g., as against the Vedāntists they maintained that during the state of dreamless sleep the Self endured without consciousness. Nevertheless the conception of the Self without the body remained a vital loophole in this philosophy through which all sorts of Vedāntic and near-Vedāntic ideas like that of *mokṣa* or liberation could be easily smuggled in into this essentially empirical system.

Ninth in the list of the substances was *manas*. Though commonly rendered as 'mind,' it was not exactly what we mean by the word. *Manas* was conceived of as the internal sense (*antaḥ indriya*) and as serving a twofold function: First, it secured for the Self direct knowledge of the internal states like cognition, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc. (which were all conceived as qualities of the Self). Secondly, it also served as a vital link for securing knowledge of the external objects: the senses came in contact with the objects, the *manas* came in contact with the senses, the Self came in contact with the *manas*—and thus the Self could perceive the objects. In this connection it was argued that since the *manas* was atomic in size and hence could not come in contact with more than one sense at a time, we could not have more than one piece of sensuous cognition at a time.

Apart from substance or *dravya*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas conceived of six other *padārthas* or categories, called quality or

guṇa, action or *karma*, universal or *sāmānya*, ultimate particularity or *viśeṣa*, inherence or *samavāya* and non-existence or *abhāva*.

Guṇa or quality was recognised as a distinct category of reals. The qualities inhered in the substance and in that sense were dependent upon substance. Yet they were altogether distinct from the substance because they could by themselves be known and were thus independent realities. A list of 24 *guṇas* was given, viz., colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike, volition, merit, demerit, and tendency. Thus the list included material as well as mental qualities, the latter inhering in the substance called the Self.

Karma or actions (motions), like the qualities, though conceived as inhering in the substance alone, were also understood as independent realities. Five types of motion were enumerated, viz., motion acquired by things thrown upwards, motion acquired by things thrown downwards, contraction, expansion and simple motion, i.e., movement from one place to another.

The *sāmānya* or universal 'is equivalent to *jāti* and is understood to stand for a generic feature which inheres in all the individuals constituting a class and is eternal. The individual units of a class may come and go, but the generic attribute common to the whole class exists for ever. Humanity, or more literally manness, which is common to all mankind, is eternal and it existed before the origin of man and will continue to exist even after the annihilation of all mankind.'[12] The conception was clearly reminiscent of Plato, but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas never went to the extent of viewing the particulars as but shadows of the universal.

Viśeṣa or ultimate particularity, on the other hand, was conceived as the differentia of the impartite things, i.e., of things which could not be distinguished otherwise. Thus, e.g., two earth-atoms were identical in every respect; yet they were two. Therefore, each had its distinctive particularity. This was *viśeṣa*.

Samavāya or inherence was the relation conceived as obtaining between the members of the following five pairs: (1) subs-

tance and quality, (2) substance and action, (3) particular (*vyakti*) and universal (*jāti*), (4) impartite substance (*niravayava dravya*) and ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) and (5) parts and the whole (or, as it was alternatively called, the material cause and the product). In order to better understand this concept of *samavāya*, it needs to be contrasted with that of *saṁyoga*. *Samavāya* is a relation as is *saṁyoga*. But while *saṁyoga* obtains only between two independently existing substances, *samavāya* would cover all the remaining cases of relation. As a matter of fact, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas posited *samavāya* precisely when they came to realise that some sort of relation must obtain between the members of the above-stated five pairs but that *saṁyoga* could not be such a relation.

To the six categories already discussed, viz., substance, quality, action, universal, ultimate particularity and inherence, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas added a seventh, viz., *abhāva* or negation. This was the result of carrying to its logical extreme the tendency to view everything as objectively real. 'If all knowledge points to something outside it, so also should the knowledge of negation do, and imply its existence apart from such knowledge. As in the positive sphere, here also knowledge must be different from the known. In other words, absence of an object is not the same as knowledge of its absence.' Thus, e.g., when I do not perceive a jar on the ground, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would like me to say that I perceive the non-existence or negation of the jar there. They enumerated four varieties of such non-existence or negation. The first two of these concerned the relation of a material cause and its effect. A material cause prior to the production of the effect concerned is said to possess the 'prior non-existence' (*prāgabhāva*) of this effect. Thus, e.g., the threads, before the production of cloth, possess the prior non-existence of the cloth. On the other hand the material cause, posterior to the destruction of the effect concerned, is said to possess the 'posterior non-existence' (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*) of this effect. Thus, e.g., after a piece of cloth is torn into threads, these threads possess the posterior non-existence of the cloth. A third variety of non-existence is called 'mutual non-existence' (*anyonyābhāva*). Mutual non-existence of a thing exists in every-

thing other than itself. Thus, e.g., the mutual non-existence of this piece of cloth exists in everything other than this piece of cloth. Perhaps a simpler expression for this 'mutual non-existence' would be 'difference from' or 'separateness from.' As a matter of fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas themselves conceived separateness or *pṛthaktva* as one of the twentyfour qualities and this could well serve the purpose of this 'mutual non-existence'. The fourth form of non-existence was called 'absolute non-existence' (*atyantābhāva*). This should cover all the remaining cases of non-existence which we can broadly classify under two heads, viz. (1) temporary non-existence of something somewhere, e.g., the absence of the jar on the floor just now, and (2) absolute non-existence of something somewhere, e.g., the absence of colour in air. It is surely difficult to see how the first of these two could be called 'absolute non-existence'; but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would insist that this too is a case of 'absolute non-existence' though it could be suspended for the time being, e.g., whenever a jar is brought on a floor the absolute non-existence of this jar on this floor is suspended. However, a minority of them would admit that this was really a fifth variety of non-existence called 'temporary non-existence' (*sāmayikābhāva*).

We may now proceed to discuss the positive features of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology and logic. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the Nyāya-Vaiṣeśika philosophers were the first to take a really serious interest in the problems of what we call knowledge in our everyday life. Thus they wanted to understand what was meant by valid knowledge of an object of our everyday experience, how many were the types of this knowledge, what were the distinguishing marks of these various types, and so on and so forth. Whoever in Indian philosophy pointedly raised these questions were after all inspired by the spirit of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Thus in the subsequent period we find certain Mīmāṁsakas, Buddhists and Jainas seriously devoting themselves to these problems and it is these philosophers that we have been referring to as the Mīmāṁsā logicians, Buddhist logicians and the Jaina logicians respectively. That these logicians differed among themselves and with the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣikas in many a point of details is not so important as the circumstance that they were all drawn to a serious study of empirical knowledge, which was persistently decried by the idealists as useless and false. The whole range of the problems of knowledge as discussed by these four schools of logicians cannot obviously be covered here. We may have instead only some idea of how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas looked at these.

Consistent with its emphasis on the extra-mental reality of the world, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas conceived knowledge as manifestation of the objects. But such a manifestation was not necessarily valid. Thus, when one saw a snake in a rope, an object was no doubt manifested; still the knowledge was wrong. A knowledge, therefore, could be valid (*pramā*) or non-valid (*apramā*). What, then, were the distinguishing marks of valid knowledge or *pramā*? A *pramā* was a certain (*asaṁdigdha*), faithful (*yathārtha*) presentation (*anubhava*) of the object. Four forms of knowledge failed to satisfy one or more of these marks and were hence considered non-valid or *apramā*. These were: (1) memory (*smṛti*), because the object of memory was not a presentation; (2) doubt (*saṁśaya*), because it had no certainty; (3) error (*bhrama* or *viparyyaya*), because it was not faithful and (4) *tarka*, by which was meant a hypothetical argument that did not yield any positive knowledge of an object. But what was technically called a non-valid knowledge in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was not necessarily a false knowledge. Thus, e.g., memory was non-valid because it was not presentative; nevertheless, it was not necessarily false. To distinguish a true knowledge from a positively false one, great stress was laid on the second of the above three marks, viz. faithfulness or *yāthārthya*. Thus a knowledge was true when it corresponded to the nature of its object (*tadvati tatprakāraka*) and false when it did not so correspond (*tadabhāvavati tatprakāraka*). But, then, how to know whether a piece of knowledge corresponded to the object or not? We are already familiar with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply: success of our practical activities in relation to the object of knowledge (*pravṛtti-sāmarthya*) or the failure thereof (*pravṛtti-visaṁvāda*) enabled us to find if the correspondence was there or not, i.e., whether the knowledge was true or false.

The means of *pramā* or valid knowledge was called *pramāṇa*. Four such means were recognised in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, viz. (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*anumāna*), (3) comparison (*upamāna*) and (4) verbal testimony (*śabda*). Incidentally, the Vaiśeṣikas originally admitted only the first two and considered comparison and verbal testimony as coming under inference. Corresponding to these four *pramāṇas*, valid knowledge or *pramā* too was considered to be of four types, viz., perceptual, inferential, etc. *Upamāna* or comparison was that means of valid knowledge by which was known, with the help of an analogy, the relation between names and the objects denoted by the names. Thus, e.g., one was told that a *gavaya* or wild cow was akin to cow; he went to the forest and came across an animal which was akin to cow; so he knew that this was a *gavaya*, the thing denoted by the word *'gavaya'*. Verbal testimony or *śabda*, as a source of valid knowledge, meant words of authoritative persons. This could be either empirical (*laukika*) or Vedic (*vaidika*), but as against the Mīmāṁsakas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas never agreed that the latter was eternal. The Vedas were authoritative, because these were the words of God.

Perception was defined as knowledge produced by sense-object contact and, as we have seen, in order to be a valid knowledge (*pramā*) it was to be definite and true. Two modes of perception were recognised, viz. (1) *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate, (2) *savikalpaka* or determinate. *Nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception was the bare perception of a thing along with its generic and specific qualities but without any judgment about it as this or that thing. *Savikalpaka* was the determinate perception of a thing along with the predicative judgment about it as this or that. It necessarily presupposed a *nirvikalpaka* or bare perception of the object without explicit recognition or characterisation.

In the *navya* or neo-Nyāya a new classification of perception into ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*) was introduced. In the former, the sense came into contact with the object in the usual or normal way. In the extraordinary perception, the sense-object contact was extraordinary. Thus, e.g.,

when one perceived a cow, one at the same time perceived the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*), viz., 'cowness' as inhering in the cow; this universal, again, became the medium through which all the individual cows, i.e., all the loci of the universal cowness, were also perceived. In other words, the *sāmānya* or universal established an extraordinary connection of the sense with all the cows and through this connection, all the cows were perceived. This form of the extraordinary perception was thus called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*. The second form of the extraordinary perception was called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*. In this, a previous knowledge was conceived as establishing an extraordinary connection of the sense with the object. The typical example of this is 'the sandal-wood looks fragrant' where the past knowledge of the fragrance somehow or other established an extraordinary contact between the visual organ and the object of olfactory perception proper. Our modern writers, therefore, compare this with what is called complication in modern psychology. Among other things this mode of extraordinary perception was designed to explain the well-known cases of illusory perception, e.g., of the jungle snake in the rope before us: when the visual organ came in contact with the rope the previous knowledge of the general similarities of the rope and the snake got stirred up in one's mind and became the medium of establishing an extraordinary contact of the sense with the jungle snake, resulting in the perception thereof. The third form of extraordinary perception was called *yogaja*. It was supposed to be the perception of the past, present, hidden and infinitesimal objects—a perception that one could have by developing supernatural powers through yogic practices. This third form of perception was recognised even by the old Naiyāyikas—as indeed by most of the philosophers excepting the Cārvākas and the Mīmāṁsakas—but the other two were the innovations of neo-Nyāya.

Whether such innovations of neo-Nyāya actually meant any logical improvement of the system is of course a different question. It is not necessary for us here to enter into the technicalities of the logical difficulties sought to be solved by the recognition of the *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* perception.

This much is clear, however, that the recognition of the third form of the extraordinary perception, viz., the yogic one, meant only a revival of the age-old superstition. Of course the belief in *yoga* had always been there in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But that was a mark of the real weakness of this otherwise empirical philosophy. In re-emphasising this superstition and trying moreover to invent some logical status for it, neo-Nyāya really went against logic, at least against the essentially empirical approach to the problems of logic which was the real contribution of the philosophy.

Anumāna or inference was understood as the process of ascertaining, from the apprehension of some mark (*liṅga*), something else, because of the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the two. Thus, e.g., because of the universal concomitance of smoke and fire, from our apprehension of smoke in the hill we could inferentially know fire in the hill. In this example, smoke was the mark or *liṅga,* also alternatively called *hetu* or *sādhana.* It was thus the equivalent of the middle term of Aristotle's syllogism. The fire in this example was called the *sādhya,* because it was sought to be known by the inference, and was the equivalent of the major term. The hill, here, was called the *pakṣa,* as it was the subject under consideration of the inferential process. It was thus the equivalent of the minor term. In Aristotelian logic, the argument would be put as follows:

All cases of smoke are cases of fire—(Major Premise).
The hill is a case of smoke—(Minor Premise).
Therefore, the hill is a case of fire—(Conclusion).

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did not evolve this simple syllogistic form consisting of three propositions only. According to them, this inference, as a conclusive proof, was to be stated in terms of the following five propositions:

1. The hill has fire.
2. For it has smoke.
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven.
4. The hill has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire.
5. Therefore, the hill has fire.

These five numbers of the demonstrative syllogism were called

(1) *pratijñā*, (2) *hetu*, (3) *udāharaṇa*, (4) *upanaya* and (5) *nigamana* respectively. The repetitions involved in this five-membered syllogism were obvious and it was left for Dignāga, the Buddhist logician, to revolutionise the form of the demonstrative inference by reducing the number of its members to only two.

> From these five members Dignāga retained only two, the general rule including the examples and the application including the conclusion. Indeed the main point in every syllogism, just as in every inference, is the fact of the necessary interrelation between two terms as it is expressed in the major premise. The second point consists in the application of the general rule to a particular case. This is the real aim of an inference, i.e., the cognition of an object on the basis of the knowledge of its mark. When these two steps are made, the aim of the syllogism is attained, other members are superfluous. It thus consists of a general rule and its application to an individual case.[13]

Thus, Dignāga would put the same argument in the following form:

> Wheresoever there is smoke there must be some fire, as in the kitchen, etc. And there is such a smoke on the hill.

Obviously enough, the validity of this inferential process depended on the validity of the *vyāpti* or the invariable concomitance of the *liṅga* and the *sādhya*. Hence the Indian logicians were much concerned with the question of establishing a valid *vyāpti*. In the beginning, it was perhaps thought by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that a frequent observation (*bhūyodarśana*) of two things going together could justify a *vyāpti* between them. But it was soon realised that certain particular types of relations between the two things were necessary in order to justify a *vyāpti* between them. Thus, e.g., if *B* is an effect of *A*, *B* could be said to be a valid *hetu* for inferring *A*. In other words, there was a valid relation of *vyāpti* between *B* and *A*. Similarly, if *B* was the cause of *A*, *B* could be said to be a valid *hetu* for inferring *A*. In the *Nyāya-sūtra*, these two cases were called *śeṣavat* and *pūrvavat* respectively. But even the *Nyāya-sūtra* admitted one more type of relation that could justify a *vyāpti*. It was

called sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Thus, when a relation was found to obtain between *A* and *B* and a similar relation was found to obtain elsewhere in which *C* was a factor analogous to *A*, one could infer another factor *D* analogous to *B*. Obviously enough, unless the similarity of situation was clearly defined, i.e., the relation in question was precisely named, this could not act as a criterion for testing the validity of a proposed *vyāpti*. From this point of view, the Buddhist logicians were justified in accepting only the causal relation as the basis of a valid *vyāpti*. Of course, the Buddhists, too, admitted an additional type of relation called *svabhāva* or *tādātmya* to jusitfy a valid *vyāpti*. Thus, e.g., 'Whatever is an oak is a tree' was a *vyāpti* based on this type of relation. Obviously, this type could be employed—and validly so—when the entire connotation of a word (e.g., of the tree) was included in the connotation of another word (e.g., of the oak) and we are arguing that whatever thing bore the latter name also bore the former. For all practical purposes of inferring one thing from another, however, this type of relation was of no use and as such the causal relation remained the sole useful criterion for justifying the *vyāpti*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also discussed the problem of the fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) of inference. Thus, e.g., if one argued on the basis of the *vyāpti* that all knowable objects were fiery, the argument would be fallacious because 'knowable' was related indiscriminately to the fiery objects like the oven as well as the non-fiery objects like the lake. Such a fallacy was called *savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika*. There were in all three types of such fallacies, the example given represented one of these types. Again, if one argued that 'sound is eternal because it has a cause', the argument would involve the fallacy of *viruddha* or contradictory, because, on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, whatever was caused was bound to have an end. A third kind of fallacy was called *satprātipakṣa* or the inferentially contradicted middle. Thus the inference 'sound is eternal because it is audible' is validly contradicted by another inference like this: 'sound is non-eternal because it is produced'. Again, when the *liṅga* was as unproved as the *sādhya*, the resulting fallacy was called *sādhyasama* or *asiddha*. E.g., 'sound is eternal because it is per-

ceived visually'. Here, the ground on which sound was sought to be proved to be eternal was itself in need of a proof. There were in all three types of *asiddha*, one of which was represented by the example given. Lastly, when one inference was contradicted not by another inference but by some other source of knowledge like perception, the fallacy involved was called *bādhita*. E.g., 'fire is cold because it is produced'. This was false, because perception testified that fire was hot and not cold.

28. *Lokayata*

'Thought and consciousness', says Engels, 'are products of the human brain.' The truth of this, as George Thomson comments, 'is so plain that it might almost seem to be obvious; yet philosophers have piled tome upon tome in order to deny, distort or obscure it.' Thus a large section of the contemporary philosophers, 'while claiming to be specialists in the study of thought, continue their disputations without regard to what scientists have learnt about the actual mechanism of the human brain.'[1]

In Indian philosophy, as we have seen, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, with their serious preoccupation with the problems of epistemology, argued that the material body was indispensable for consciousness. Yet they could not outgrow the age-old superstition about the soul and its liberation. Knowledge, feeling and volition were conceived as states of an embodied soul and in liberation, the soul becoming disembodied, was devoid of consciousness. It was but one step further to establish epistemology on a secure scientific basis and assert that it was plain nonsense to talk of a soul apart from the body and that the conception of liberation was at best a deception. This step was actually taken by our Lokāyatas or the Cārvākas, i.e. the ancient materialists.

Here now [said Śaṁkara] the Lokāyatikas, who see the

> Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness, although not observed in earth and other external elements—either single or combined—may yet appear in them when transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which consciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the reason, 'On account of its existence where a body is'. For wherever something exists if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a quality of the latter; light and heat, e.g., we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on—which by the upholders of an independent Self are considered qualities of that Self—are observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as an abode of these qualities different from the body cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body only. The Self, therefore, is not different from the body.[2]

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* designed two aphorisms specially to represent and refute this philosophy. In the Buddhist Piṭakas, we come across not only the name Lokāyata but also distinct references to the view that identified the body with the Self. Along with the Saṁkhya and Yoga, the *Arthaśāstra* (*c.* 4th century B.C.) mentioned the Lokāyata. The *Mahābhārata* and the earliest Jaina sources, too, mentioned this philosophy and even the Upaniṣads were not silent about materialism. Judging from all these, we can easily see that the materialist tradition in India is very old—probably as old as Indian philosophy itself. Under these circumstances, we do not expect our ancient materialists to have gained a positive knowledge of the brain and understood consciousness as its function. Nevertheless, extremely meagre though their scientific data were, the way in which they tried to explain consciousness in terms of their own observations was really remarkable. 'The Lokāyatikas', said Saṁkara, 'do not admit the existence of anything but

the four elements.'[3] By themselves the elements did not possess consciousness, still consciousness was viewed as emerging from them. How could that be possible? Just as rice, argued the Lokāyatikas, and the other ingredients of producing wine did not by themselves possess any intoxicating quality, yet, when combined in a particular way, these caused the intoxicating quality to emerge, so did the material elements constituting the material human body, though themselves without consciousness, caused consciousness to emerge when combined in a particular way to form the human body. It was surely one of the most significant things said by our ancients to establish the primacy of matter over the spirit.

But what are the sources of our information of this materialistic philosophy? Unfortunately, only the writings of those who sought to refute and ridicule it. In other words, the Lokāyata, is preserved for us only in the form of the *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e. as represented by its opponents. Not that there never existed any actual treatise of this system. Tucci, Garbe and Dasgupta cite conclusive evidences to show that actual Lokāyata texts were known in the ancient and early medieval times. But such texts are lost to us. As against this, Sukhlalji and Parikh have roused some hopes in the recent years with the claim to have discovered at long last an actual Lokāyata text called the *Tattvopaplava-siṁha* by a certain Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, which, as edited by them, was published in 1940. But a critical examination of the actual contents of the text can only cause disappointment. The title literally means, 'The lion that throws overboard all categories'. It was so chosen because the main purpose of the work was to show the impossibility of any valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and hence the impossibility of any view of reality. In short, it represented the standpoint of extreme scepticism according to which no category—either epistemological or ontological—was possible. Naturally enough, the view expounded by Jayarāśi was called *Tattvopaplava-vāda*, i.e. the doctrine that threw overboard all categories (*tattva*). He never called it the materialistic view for the very simple reason that it was not that, nor was his view referred to by any other text as the view of a materialist. As we shall presently see, the references to this view had inva-

riably been references to the *tattvopaplava-vāda.* Therefore, in order to identify Jayarāśi's real philosophical affiliation, we may ask ourselves a simple question: Who, in Indian philosophy, are definitely known to have upheld such a position? As we have already seen, only the extreme idealists like the Śūnya-vādins and Advaita Vedāntins did consistently argue that all the normal sources of knowledge were invalid. That was why Nāgārjuna chose the title *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana* or 'Destruction of the sources of valid knowledge' for one of his works and Śaṁkara argued that all *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra* or use concerning the sources of valid knowledge and objects of valid knowledge was based on ignorance or *avidyā.* It was left for the followers of Śaṁkara like Śrīharṣa and Citsukha to give a scholastic exposition of the consequences of this standpoint. Śrīharṣa called his philosophical work *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya,* literally, 'the sweetmeat of refutations', because he wanted to establish the Vedāntic view by refuting all sources of valid knowledge and his follower Citsukha offered highly scholastic arguments in support of such a position.

We have already seen why Indian idealists from the age of the Upaniṣads felt the necessity of denying validity to the normal sources of knowledge. But how could all this have anything to do with the Lokāyatikas, whom we are obliged to accept as uncompromising materialists? In fact, the whole of the older and authentic Indian philosophical tradition is quite outspoken on this point. In other words, if Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa had any real philosophical affiliation, it was with the extreme idealists;[4] and it was only by the Lokāyatikas that this idealistic position, along with all its superstitious concomitants, was totally rejected in Indian philosophy in favour of its consistent philosophical alternative, viz. materialism. From this point of view, the Jaina writers like Vidyānanda were fully justified in bracketing the three philosophical positions, viz. of *Śūnya-vāda, Tattvopaplava-vāda* and *Brahma-vāda.* As a matter of fact, the editors of Jayarāśi's work in their introduction, quote a passage from Vidyānanda where this was actually done. They also quote many other references to Jayarāśi's views mainly from the Jaina sources and the significant point is that in all these the view

was referred to as *Tattvopaplava-vāda* and never as a materialistic doctrine. On the other hand, two positive tenets were persistently attributed to the Lokāyatikas in the older and authentic Indian philosophical literature. These were: (1) the primacy of sense perception as the source of valid knowledge and (2) the ultimate reality being just the four well-known material elements. Jayarāśi, on the contrary, attempted to refute both these, the former explicitly and the latter implicitly. In fact if Jayarāśi referred pointedly to any ontological view as being logically untenable, it was the doctrine of the four elements. As he said in the very beginning of his text, 'Even the categories like earth, etc., which are so well-known to the people, do not stand logical scrutiny; what to say of the other categories?'

How, in the face of all these, does a scholar like Sukhlalji associate his name with the thesis that the *Tattvopaplava-simha* was written from the Lokāyata point of view? The only substantial argument put forward is that Jayarāśi 'carries to its logical end the sceptical tendency of the Cārvāka school'. Thus the assumption is that a sceptical tendency was inherent in the Lokāyata standpoint. But what is the ground for such an assertion? The editors of the text have presumably in mind the representation of the Lokāyata view by its opponents, the most popular of which was the one by the Vedāntist Mādhavācārya (A.D. 14th century) Mādhava attributed to the Lokāyatikas an argument against the validity of inference: inference depends upon the validity of the *vyāpti* or the universal relation between the *sādhya* and the *linga;* but the knowledge of such a universal relation is impossible; it could not be obtained from any source of valid knowledge—not from perception, because its scope is limited to the particular instances only; not from inference, because it is itself dependant upon a *vyāpti*. If this was really the position of the Lokāyatikas, then there is of course some justification in assuming a sceptical tendency inherent in their outlook. But the question is, did the Lokāyatikas really argue like this? The answer is presumably in the negative, in spite of the fact that the refutation of the Lokāyata that we come across in various sources was to a large extent directed against their claim of the primacy of sense perception and their criticism of inference as

a source of valid knowledge. We shall presently see what this criticism could have really meant. For the present, let us raise another question: Is substantially the same argument against the validity of *vyāpti* definitely expounded in Indian philosophy from the point of view of some other philosophical system? The answer is in the affirmative. For it was expounded by Śrīharṣa in his 'Sweetmeat of Refutation', i.e., from the standpoint of the Advaita Vedānta. This point is too easily overlooked by most of the modern writers on Indian philosophy, who, uncritically attribute to the Lokāyatikas the doctrine of a total rejection of the validity of inference. On the other hand, there are at least two distinct grounds to think that the Lokāyatikas did not actually stand for such a total denial of inference.

Dasgupta[5] salvages for us a valuable piece of information concerning the real attitude of the Lokāyatikas to the inferential process. Its special importance consists in the circumstance that here the Lokāyata standpoint was explained by one who was himself a Lokāyatika. His name was Purandara. Tucci[6] quotes a text in which he was described as *Cārvāka-Mate granthakartā*, i.e., a writer with the Cārvāka views. Dasgupta substantiates the point and argues that he belonged to the 7th century A.D. His attitude to inference, as summed up by Dasgupta, was as follows: 'Purandara... admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the law of *karma* which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience.' On the basis of the comments of the Jaina author Vādideva Sūri, Dasgupta explains Purandara's point thus:

> The main reason for upholding such a distinction between the validity of inference in our practical life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an inductive generalisation is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence together with agreement in absence, and no case of agreement in presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by the senses. Thus, since in the supposed supra-sensuous transcendent world no case of a *hetu* agreeing with the presence of

its *sādhya* can be observed· no inductive generalisation or law of concomitance can be made relating to this sphere.

This was certainly quite a sensible position and that this could have been the real position of the Lokāyatikas was further hinted at by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jayanta said that the more sophisticated ones among the Cārvākas maintained that there were two types of inferences, one called *utpanna-pratīti* and the other called *utpādya-pratīti*. The former meant inference about something the knowledge of which already existed and the latter meant inference about something the knowledge of which did not exist. The inference of God, etc., was an inference of the second type. Who, as Jayanta made the Cārvākas exclaim, would deny the validity of the inference of the fire, etc.? But the reasoning mind could not agree to the inference concerning the Soul, God, the Next World, etc.[7]

This was substantially the position that Purandara defended. And if this was the position of the Lokāyatikas, then the sceptical tendency so glibly attributed to them must have been unfounded. Referring to the above statement of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Hiriyanna comments, 'Thus it is commonly assumed by the critics that the Cārvākas denounced reasoning totally as a *pramāṇa;* but to judge from the reference to it in one Nyāya treatise, they seem to have rejected only such reasoning as was ordinarily thought sufficient by others for establishing the existence of God, of a future life, etc. Such a discrimination in using reason alters the whole complexion of the Cārvāka view. But this is only a stray hint we get about the truth. What we generally have is a caricature.'[8] Unfortunately, however, most of the modern scholars, being themselves deeply out of sympathy with materialism as a philosophy, are satisfied with such caricatures and do not make any serious effort to reconstruct the lost tradition of ancient Indian materialism. Here is an example.

We have just seen that Jayanta spoke of the 'more sophisticated one's (among the Cārvākas). His actual word for this is *suśikṣitatarāḥ*. Elsewhere[9] he added to the name Cārvāka an abusive epithet *dhūrta*, meaning 'the cunning'. Now on the basis of these sarcastic and abusive epithets used by Jayanta our modern scholars have conjured up two schools of Cārvāka, one

called Dhūrta, the other Suśikṣita, and we are told that the first did not believe in the validity of inference while the second did. In spite of the wide popularity of this classification of the Cārvākas, we do not come across any other basis for it in Indian philosophical literature. That Jayanta's own statements cannot really substantiate it is obvious from the circumstance that he uses the word *suśikṣitatarāḥ* and not simply *suśikṣita*. Besides, it was obviously a matter of literary style with Jayanta, as is evident from his similar use of sarcastic adjectives with regard to the other systems of philosophy. Thus, e.g., he uses the same word *suśikṣita* at one place for the Prābhākaras,[10] at another place for the Bhāṭṭas[11]; and nowhere is it taken to mean any separate school. With the Cārvākas, however, it is different because our modern scholars are basically out of sympathy with them.

The same lack of seriousness characterises the usual attitude of the modern scholars to the ethical views of the Cārvākas, which they are pleased to call hedonism pure and simple. For this is how the opponents of materialism are usually inclined to view the materialistic morals. 'By the word materialism,' says Engels, 'the philistine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust of the eyes, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, avarice, miserliness, profit-hunting and stock-exchange swindling—in short all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private.'[12] A somewhat similar ethical outlook is usually attributed to the Lokāyatikas. But there are many evidences to show that this was not so. We may quote here only one. It occurs in the Śāntiparva of the *Mahābhārata*.

After the great Kurukṣetra war, when the Pāṇḍava brothers were returning triumphantly, thousands of Brahmins gathered in the city-gate to bestow blessings on Yudhiṣṭhira. Among them was Cārvāka. He moved forward and addressed the king thus: 'This assembly of the Brahmins is cursing you for you have killed your kins. What have you gained by destroying your own people and murdering your own elders?' This outburst of Cārvāka, abrupt as it was, stunned the assembled Brahmins. Yudhiṣṭhira felt mortally wounded and wanted to die. But then the other Brahmins regained their senses and told the king that this

Cārvāka was only a demon in disguise. And then they burnt him, the dissenting Cārvāka to ashes.

Cārvāka being only a demon in disguise was of course the typical myth with which people were sought to be scared of the materialistic philosophy. But the point is that in this *Mahābhārata* passage, the philosopher said nothing that could even remotely suggest any ethics of blind selfish pleasure. For the dark deeds of which Yudhiṣṭhira was accused were that of killing the kins and murdering the elders. In the Kurukṣetra war, it was just this that had happened. Kins had to be killed. The old moral values of the tribal society were being trampled upon and destroyed. Cārvāka's protest against this was outspoken and courageous. But he was burnt to ashes and the moral standards had to be revised and restated to suit the new situation. This was done in the *Gītā*. On the eve of the Kurukṣetra war, Arjuna felt depressed. He would not kill his kins and destroy the elders. He would not fight. So Kṛṣṇa had to elevate his mind to the lofty metaphysical height where death did not matter. But before doing so, he had to dwell on the more matter-of-fact and mundane considerations. He argued, 'You will attain heaven if you are killed in this battle, and, if you win it, you will enjoy this earth.' This was quite outspoken. There was prospect of pleasure in either alternative—a real philosophy of pleasure. Could it, therefore, be that those who were accusing the Lokāyatikas of a gross philosophy of pleasure were themselves subscribing to it, though surreptitiously?

Discarding, therefore, the commonplace view that our materialists were plain hedonists, we may concentrate on their serious contribution to Indian ethics. From the ethical and practical point of view the most significant contribution of our materialists appears to be their revolt against the doctrine of *karma*, which had in fact been—and is—the pivot of Indian reaction.

It is indeed difficult to exaggerate the role played by the doctrine of *karma* both in and outside our philosophical circles. 'All rise of metaphysical speculation on the part of the Indian systems of philosophy—and more particularly the nourishment and development of this speculation—has been due to a belief in the doctrine of *karma* and a desire to get rid of the transmigrat-

ing circle and thus attain transcendental release.'[13] Even pronounced atheists like the Buddhists and the Jainas laid supreme stress on this doctrine: in fact, in their philosophy *karma* became so important that it made God superfluous. Others that did not discard God did in no way minimise the role of *karma*: the divine dispensation, according to them, was not arbitrary but expressed itself through the *karma*-law. But this doctrine had been more than a mere matter for academic discussions. Made to percolate for centuries among the masses through such methods of popularisation as the village recitals of the epics, mythologies and various other types of popular works on religion, it did acquire a living grip on the minds of our millions.

The essence of the doctrine is of course simple. Every human action has its own inevitable result. A virtuous action results in something good, a vicious action in something bad. Therefore, whatever you enjoy or suffer now is the result of your own past actions and the way you are now acting is going to determine your future. Such a doctrine had inevitably to lean on the conception of a transmigratory soul. For it has to explain why the virtuous man is frequently found to suffer a life of miserable existence and the vicious to prosper. Reinforced by the idea of rebirth and the Other World, the doctrine claims that the virtuous action, though it may not bring prosperity in this life, is sure to do so in some future life while the prosperity of a person who is now vicious must be the result of some good actions of his past life, just as his present vices, though not punished right now, will surely make him miserable in some future life. One obvious implication of this doctrine, therefore, is that our own past looms over us like a dark unalterable force. As Radhakrishnan puts it, 'whatever happens to us in this life we have to submit in meek resignation, for it is the result of our past doings.'[14] Its other implication is to offer some kind of justification for the observed diversity of human conditions. As Hiriyanna explains, 'its value as a hypothesis for rationally explaining the observed inequities of life is clear.'[15] It is, thus, easy to understand why, beginning from the times of the Upaniṣads, this *karma*-doctrine was harnessed to justify the caste system. 'Accordingly', said the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 'those who

are of pleasant conduct here, the prospect is indeed that they would attain a pleasant womb—either the womb of a Brahmin or the womb of a Kṣatriya or the womb of a Vaiśya. But those who are of stinking conduct here, the prospect is indeed that they would enter a stinking womb—either the womb of a dog or the womb of a swine, or the womb of a Candāla'.[16] In the *Gītā*, again, God Himself was made to declare that He created the four castes according to the same law of *karma*: 'the four-caste division has been created by Me according to the division of virtue and action (*guṇa-karma-vibhāgaśaḥ*)'.[17]

In the general context of this traditional understanding of the law of *karma*, it is not of little significance to note that our materialists were by far the only philosophers to have vigorously rejected it. We have already seen how the *svabhāva-vāda* or the doctrine of natural causation was persistently attributed to them and the Jaina writer Guṇaratna[18] rightly saw in this the denial of the law of *karma*: *anye punarāhuḥ, mūlataḥ karmaiva nāsti, svabhāva-siddhaḥ sarvo'pyayam jagat-prapañca iti*, i.e., according to some there is no such thing called *karma* at all; all the manifold world is to be explained by natural causes. Indeed, rejecting as they did the conception of a transmigrating Soul it was only logical for our materialists to have rejected the law of *karma*.

One of the earliest Indian materialists was Ajita Keśakambali, possibly a contemporary of the Buddha. An early Buddhist source summed up his view thus:

> There is no such thing, O king, as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds.... A human being is built up of the four elements. When he dies the earthly in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away; till they reach the burning-ground men utter forth eulogies, but there his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not.[19]

Another materialist of roughly the same period was Pāyāsi, described as a prince by both the early Buddhist and Jaina sources. The Buddhist dialogue *Pāyāsi-suttanta* and the Jaina work *Rāyapaseṇaijja* were devoted to the refutation of his views and to the description of his eventual conversion to Buddhism and Jainism respectively. The former summed up his views thus: 'Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deed well-done or ill-done.' The special interest of these Buddhist and Jaina works is that they preserve for us a series of arguments supposed to have been offered by Pāyāsi in defence of this position. These give us some idea of how a philosopher of those early days, with understandably inadequate scientific data at his disposal, would have rejected the idea of the other world, rebirth and *karma*. We quote from the *Pāyāsi-suttanta*:

> I have had friends, companions, relatives, men of the same blood as myself, who have taken life, committed thefts, or fornication, have uttered lying, slanderous, abusive, gossipy speech, have been covetous, of malign thoughts, of evil opinions. They anon have fallen ill of mortal suffering and disease. When I had understood that they would not recover from that illness, I have gone to them and said: 'According to the views and opinion held, sirs, by certain wanderers and Brahmins, they who break the precepts of morality, when the body breaks up after death, are reborn into the Waste, the Woeful Way, the Fallen Place, the Pit. Now you, sirs, have broken those precepts. If what those reverend wanderers and Brahmins say is true, this, sirs, will be your fate. If these things should befall you, sirs, come to me and tell me, saying: "There is another world, there is rebirth not of parents, there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done." You, sirs, are for me trustworthy and reliable, and what you say you have seen, will be even so, just as if I myself had seen it.' They have consented to do this, saying, 'Very good,' but they have neither come themselves, nor dispatched a messenger. Now this...is evidence for me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth not by human parents, nor fruit or results of deeds well done and ill.

Similarly, went on Pāyāsi, he had friends and kinsmen who lived a perfectly virtuous life and were therefore, on the assumption of the *karma*-doctrine, supposed to be reborn 'into the

bright and happy world'; they agreed to report to Pāyāsi if they were actually so reborn; but none after death made any such report which, for Pāyāsi, was another proof that there was no other world, rebirth or *karma*.

Pāyāsi's next argument had a refreshing sarcasm about it. It urged upon the supporters of the *karma*-doctrine to put into practice the precepts they professed:

> I see wanderers and Brahmins of moral and virtuous dispositions, fond of life, averse from dying, fond of happiness, shrinking from sorrow. Then I think: 'If these good wanderers and Brahmins were to know this—"When once we are dead we shall be better off"—then these good men would take poison, or stab themselves, or put an end to themselves by hanging, or throw themselves from precipices. And it is because they do not know that, once dead, they will be better off, that they are fond of life, averse from dying, fond of happiness, disinclined for sorrow.' This is for me evidence that there is no other world, no beings reborn otherwise than of parents, no fruit and no result of deeds well and ill-done.

Evidently, our ancient materialists were fond of sarcasm on the same or similar lines. For they easily remind us of the verses attributed to the Cārvākas in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*:

> If the *śrāddha* produces gratification to beings who are dead,
> Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.
> If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the *śrāddha* here,
> Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?

Verses like this were in circulation from a considerable past. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, a certain Jābāli tried to persuade Rāma to give up the foolish ideas concerning the *karma*-doctrine with similar verses:

> And the food by one partaken, can it nourish other men?
> Food bestowed upon a Brahmin, can it serve our Fathers then?
> Crafty priests have forged these maxims, and with selfish objects say,
> 'Make thy gifts and do thy penance, leave thy worldly wealth, and pray!

But let us return to Pāyāsi. In the *Dialogue* under discussion he offered four more arguments which, notwithstanding the crude methods of punishment then prevalent, cannot but impress us with their insistence on experimental verification.

> Take the case of men who having taken a felon red-handed bring him up, saying: 'This felon, my lord, was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you wish.' And I should say: 'Well then, my masters, throw this man alive into a jar; close the mouth of it and cover it over with wet leather, put over that a thick cement of moist clay, put it onto a furnace and kindle a fire.' They, saying 'Very good', would obey me and... kindle a fire. When we knew that the man was dead, we should take down the jar, unbind and open the mouth, and quickly observe it, with the idea: 'Perhaps we may see his soul coming out!' We don't see the soul of him coming out! This is for me evidence that there neither is another world, nor rebirth other than by parentage, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.

Similar experiments were proposed by the prince for a felon caught in the act and was therefore going to be executed:

> And I say: 'Well then, my masters, take this man and weigh him alive, then strangle him with a bowstring and weigh him again.' And they do so. While he lives, he is more buoyant, supple, wieldy. When he is dead, he is weightier, stiffer, unwieldier. This is evidence for me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than by human parentage, nor fruit nor result of deeds well-done or ill-done.

Again:

> Take the case of the men taking a felon red-handed and bringing him up saying: 'My lord, this felon was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you wish.' And I say: 'Well, my masters, kill this man by stripping off cuticle and skin and flesh and sinews and bones and marrow.' They do so. And when he is half dead, I say: 'Lay him on his back, and perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out.' And they do so, but we see the passing of no soul. Then I say: 'Well then, lay him bent over... on his side... on the other side... stand him up... stand him on his head... smite him with your hand... with clods... on this side... on that side... all over; perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out.' And they do so, but we see the passing of no soul. He has sight and there are forms, but the organ does not perceive them; he has hear-

ing and there are sounds, but the organ does not perceive them; he has smell and there are odours, but the organ does not perceive them, he has a tongue and there are tastes, but the organ does not perceive them; he has a body and there are tangibles, but the organ does not perceive them. This is for me evidence that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.

All these give us some idea of how our ancient materialists argued their case. A modern materialist would not of course take resort to such crude demonstrations in support of his thesis. He has an immeasurably vast stock of scienfitic data to substantiate his materialistic outlook, i.e., his materialism has become immeasurably richer by the accumulation of knowledge from the progress of science. What is still of decisive significance about our early materialists is that they—in their own way and in spite of inadequate scientific data—succeeded in defending those elemental truths which were sought to be obscured by the increasing prestige of spiritualism and idealism.

Winternitz once observed that 'it proved fatal for the development of Indian philosophy that the Upaniṣads should have been pronounced to be revelations.'[20] This is true particularly in the sense that it meant a divine sanction for the world-denying idealistic outlook, and as such this became the most serious obstacle to the development of the scientific spirit in Indian philosophy. No less fatal, however, had been the loss of our materialistic texts. This has deprived us of a proper idea of our heritage of scientific thinking and has in consequence given idealism and spiritualism exaggerated importance in Indian philosophy.

It is, therefore, important for us today to recover the relics of the Lokāyata and, on the basis of a careful examination of these, to reconstruct the half-forgotten and half-distorted history of Indian materialism. From what is said above, however, it follows that there is an obvious risk in undertaking this task with a pronounced bias against materialism as such. For whatever that survives of the Lokāyata survives in the form of the *pūrvapakṣa* —i.e., for being ridiculed and rejected. Under this circumstance, any preconceived bias against materialism may easily mislead

one to take the caricature of the Lokāyata at its face value. As a matter of fact, this has actually happened in the case of most of the modern writers on Indian philosophy, notwithstanding the great wealth of their textual scholarship.

Fortunately, with the growing strength of the popular movement in the country, we are witnessing today a growing prestige of the materialistic philosophy itself. This is no accident, at least not so from the point of view of the Indian tradition. For in Indian philosophy Lokāyata meant not merely the materialistic philosophy but also—and distinctly enough—the philosophy of the people. *Lokeṣu āyataḥ, lokāyata*: it was called Lokāyata because it was prevalent among the people. Therefore, however much one may inflate the academic myth concerning Indian spiritualism and Indian idealism, the Indian people remain the inheritors and the custodians of Indian materialism. It is also for them to enrich it with the ever-growing wealth of scientific knowledge. We have thus to reassert the elemental truth of our ancient materialism, though of course on an immeasurably higher level.

Notes and References

1. *DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*

1 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* 5 vols. Cambridge, 1922-55. i, 5.

2 *Ib.* i, 65.

3 *Ib.* i, 66. Cf. Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy.* vol. i. London, 1923. p. 46: 'Reverence for the past is another national trait. There is a certain doggedness of temperament, a stubborn loyalty to lose nothing in the long march of the ages. When confronted with new cultures or sudden extensions of knowledge, the Indian does not yield to the temptation of the hour, but holds fast to his traditional faith, importing as much as possible of the new into the old. This conservative liberalism is the secret of success of Indian culture and civilization.' The temper of defending ideological stagnation is of course obvious. But what is *dogmatic liberalism*? One wonders.

4 Marx, K. & Engels, F. *On Britain.* Moscow, 1953. 380.

5 Marx, K. *Capital.* vol. i. Moscow, 1954 ed. 358.

6 Bacon, F. *Novum Organum.* II, iv.

7 Quoted from *Thoughts and Conclusions* (*Cogitata et Visa*) by Farrington, B. *Francis Bacon.* London, 1951. 68.

2. *THE PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE*

1 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xii, 569. Cf. Keith, A. B. *Indian Logic and Atomism.* Oxford, 1921. 20.

2 Interestingly, even a sophisticated philosopher like Praśastapāda (*Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha.* Banaras, 1895 ed. 206 & 329) fully subscribed to this myth. It is of course a persistent claim of the Indian philosophical and mythological literatures that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies (i.e. Indian logic and atomism) were revealed by god Śiva. See Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. *Nyāya-darśana,* 5 vols. (Bengali), vol. i. 2nd ed. 2ff.

3 Sastri, K. *A Primer of Indian Logic.* Madras, 1951. Intro.

xxvii. Referring to an early (though now preserved only in fragments) commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, the author comments, 'the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as were quite in keeping with the text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the Vaiśeṣikas as *ardha-vainā́śikas* (half-nihilists), while the work of Praśastapāda gave a theistic turn to the Vaiśeṣika system and presented its doctrines in an anti-Buddhistic *āstika* setting. Of course, Dasgupta (*op. cit.* i, 280ff.) maintains that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* was 'ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines' and that the Vaiśeṣika system originally represented an old school of Mīmāṁsā. Significantly, the Mīmāṁsā itself was an atheistic system and as such even from Dasgupta's point of view there is hardly any scope for attributing to Kaṇāda any belief in God.

4 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* ix, 424: 'The *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya sūtras* ...contain no mention of God.... There can be no doubt of the originally atheistic character of both systems.... When later the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems came to be blended together, the combined school adopted the theistic views, but never saw in the Personal God, whom they assumed, the creator of matter.'

5 Sankrityayana, Rahula. *Darśana-digdarśana.* (Hindi) 581. Such a peculiar interpretation of the name is obviously the result of the author's view that Vaiśeṣika atomism came from Greece to India, a view subscribed to by S. C. Vidyabhusana (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.* 1918) and vigorously defended by Keith, A. B. *Indian Logic and Atomism.* 18ff. In our discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, however, we have tried to argue against it.

6 Chattopadhyaya, D. *Lokāyata.* New Delhi, 1959. 206ff. But there is some difficulty in assuming that Kaṇāda belonged to the *Ulūka-gotra*, because the Indian philosophical tradition refers to him also as a Kāśyapa, i.e. as belonging to the Kāśyapa (tortoise) *gotra.*

7 Stcherbatsky, T. quoted by Jacobi, H. in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society.* xxxi, 9.

8 For the chronological coincidences of the philosophical activities in ancient India, China and Greece, see Table in Intro. xliii-xliv of *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times,* ed. Hughes, E. R. London, 1942.

9 Stcherbatsky, T. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.* Leningrad, 1927. 2.

3. *HANGOVER OF ANCIENT BELIEFS*

1 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* 2 vols. London, 1944. i, 32.
2 See Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. *Nyāya-darśana* (Bengali) v, 160.
3 Kaviraj, G. *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature.* Calcutta, 1961 ed. 18.
4 *Nyāyamañjarī.* 274: *asmatpitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ sāṁgrahaṇīṁ kṛtavān sa iṣṭisamāptisamanantarameva gaurmūlake grāmamavāpa.*
5 *Tarkasaṁgraha.* Ch. i (Perception) 5-7.
6 Sastri, K. *A Primer of Indian Logic.* 65.
7 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* i, 29-30.
8 *Ib.* i, 30-1.
9 *Ib.* i, 148.
10 *Ib.* i, 140.
11 *Ib.* i, 141.
12 Thomson, G. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* 2 vols. London, 1949 & 1955. ii, 324ff.
13 *Republic.* 414.
14 Quoted by Thomson, G. *op. cit.* ii, 324-5.
15 *Manusmṛti.* ii, 10-1.
16 *Ib.* iv, 30 & 33.
17 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra.* ii. 1. 11.
18 *Ib.*
19 *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra.* i. 1. 3.
20 *Nyāya-sūtra.* ii. 1. 57ff.
21 Quoted in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha.* Ch. i.

4. *NECESSITY OF AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH*

1 *Tarkarahasyadīpikā.* 49.
2 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* London, 1956. 18. The most outstanding populariser of such ideas is of course Radhakrishnan. Here are two random quotations from his *Indian Philosophy,* vol. i, London 1923: 'Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual. It is the intense spirituality of India, and not any great political structure or social organisation that it has developed, that has enabled it to

resist the ravages of time and the accidents of history' (p. 24-5). 'The dominant character of the Indian mind which has coloured all its culture and moulded all its thoughts is the spiritual tendency. Spiritual experience is the foundation of India's rich cultural history. It is mysticism, not in the sense of involving the exercise of any mysterious power, but only as insisting on a discipline of human nature, leading to a realisation of the spiritual' (p. 41).

5. *SOME INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS*

1 Keith, A. B. *Karma Mīmāṁsā*. London, 1921. 62. Cf. Jha, G. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*. Banaras, 1942, 47.
2 Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*. ii, 428.
3 Childe, V. G. *What Happened in History*. London, 1957 ed. 167.
4 Chattopadhyaya, D. *Lokāyata*.

6. *VARIETY DESPITE RIGIDITY*

1 It must not, however, be forgotten that the material mode of existence remains the *primus agens*, the ultimate determining factor, for the ideological superstructure.

7. *DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CONTRADICTIONS*

1 Stcherbatsky, T. *Buddhist Logic*. 2 vols. Leningrad, 1932. i, 34.
2 *Ib*. i, 27.
3 *Ib*.
4 Hiuen Tsiang said that in order to be allowed to enter the monastery of Nālandā one had to qualify oneself by answering difficult philosophical questions and, according to the Buddhist tradition, some of the reputed Buddhist philosophers held the post of the 'gate-keeper scholar' (*dvāra paṇḍita*) at the same monastery.
5 Stcherbatsky, T. *op. cit*. i, 2.
6 Tarka-samkhya-vedanta-tirtha, Jogendranatha. *Bhāratīya Darśanaśāster Samanvaya* (Bengali) 104.
7 Tarkalamkara, Chandrakánta. *Fellowship Lectures* (Bengali) 5 vols. v, 180.

8 *Ib.*
9 *Ib.* v, 127-9.
10 Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. *Nyāya-darśana* (Bengali) iv, 124-31.
11 Kaviraj, G. *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature.* 21.

8. *WHAT IS DARSANA?*

1 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* i. 68 n.
2 Tarkalamkara, Chandrakanta. *Fellowship Lectures.* i, 67.
3 Jacobi, H. in *Indian Antiquary.* xlvii, 102ff.
4 Misra, U. *Conception of Matter According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.* Allahabad, 1936. 2. Cf. Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy.* i, 44: 'Darśana is a word which is conveniently vague, as it stands for a dialectical defence of extreme monism as well as the intuitional truth on which it is based. Philosophically, *darśana* is putting the intuition to proof and propagating it logically... A *darśana* is a spiritual perception, a whole view revealed to the soul sense. This soul sight, which is possible only when and where philosophy is lived, is the distinguishing mark of a true philosopher.' But what is *soul sight* and *soul sense,* apart of course from being literary fireworks?
5 Tarkalamkara, Chandrakanta. *op. cit.* i, 65-6.
6 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* 18-9. A similar understanding leads Basham to render the traditional Indian word *ṣaḍdarśana* (the six *darśanas*) as 'the Six Systems of Salvation'. Basham A. L. *The Wonder that was India.* Calcutta, 1963 ed. 323: 'The six schools were actually of differing origin and purpose, but all were brought into the scheme by being treated as equally valid ways of salvation.' For a more sophisticated presentation of practically the same understanding of Indian philosophy as a whole, see Potter, K. H. *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies,* Prentice-Hall Inc. 1963.

9. *THE ORTHODOX CLASSIFICATION*

1 Pāṇini. iv. 4. 60.
2 Sastri, K. *A Primer of Indian Logic.* Intro. vii.
3 *Manusmṛti.* ii, 11.

10. *THE VEDA*

1 Macdonell, A. A. *A History of Sanskrit Literature.* London, 1905. 41.

2 Winternitz, M. *A History of Indian Literature.* vol i. Calcutta, 1929. 310. But the question of Vedic chronology is very complex and still largely controversial. In his introduction to R. C. Dutt's Bengali translation of the *Ṛgveda* (reprinted Calcutta, 1963), S. K. Chatterjee adduces strong philological grounds for a much later date of the *Ṛgveda.*

3 Chanda, R. P. in the *Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India* xxxi, 3-5, was the first to suggest the hypothesis that the Ṛgvedic references to the destruction of the *pūras* and *dūrgas* in the land of the seven rivers were presumably references to the destruction of the cities and citadels of the Indus Valley. The hypothesis of the Indus cities being destroyed by the invading Aryans was hinted at, though not without his characteristic caution, by Childe, V. G. *New Light on Most Ancient East.* London, 1934. 223. However, on the basis of his own archæological excavations of 1946, Wheeler boldly asserted that for the final destruction of the Indus cities and citadels, 'On circumstantial evidence, Indra stands accused'. See Wheeler, M. in *Ancient India,* iii, 82ff. For a comprehensive survey of the archæological and literary evidences in support of this hypothesis, see Piggott, S. *Prehistoric India.* London, 1950. 214-89.

4 *Śāṅkhyāyana Gṛhya Sūtra* iv. 7.47; *Vāsiṣṭa Dharma Śāstra* xviii, 12; *Manusmṛti* iv, 99.

5 That the basic theme of the *Ṛgveda* is but the simple expression of everyday desires should be overwhelmingly obvious to any of its unbiased reader. What prevents one to see it clearly, however, is the age-old myth about this primitive and semi-primitive poetry. Accordingly, in my *Lokāyata,* 545ff, I felt obliged to quote a large number of Ṛgvedic passages to show what is rather obvious. It is no use repeating all these over again. But we can quote here H. P. Sastri, a traditional scholar of great eminence, who helps us much to emancipate ourselves from the hoary myth about the *Ṛgveda.* The following is a rough English rendering of one of his charmingly simple Bengali essays:

The very name *Veda* evokes in every Indian an emotion

of overwhelming awe: One is a rare-born who reads the *Veda* and one who understands it as a veritable incarnation of Siva or Viṣṇu. Purity of body and mind is the precondition of Vedic study, which brings the power of achieving the impossible with the help of the spells. Viśāmitra utters the spell, and lo, after a draught of twelve long years there comes rain in torrents. I utter a spell here and my enemy in Delhi is annihilated. With Vedic spells, the barren becomes a mother, the sick cured, the poor prosperous and the dying man back to life. When you are in need of any proof, just claim that it is declared by the *Veda* and none will dare to contradict you. Such indeed are the ideas of the ignorant: the *Veda* is a miracle and a miracle-maker; it is inscrutable, unreadable, ununderstandable, unapproachable. Without the grace of the goddess of learning and the accumulated merit of the pious acts of the previous births, none can have an access to the *Veda*.

But what exactly is the *Veda*? It is nothing but an anthology of some poems, songs, etc., composed by various gifted poets in different times, under diverse conditions and with various purposes. While trying to explain this we hope that it would kindly be skipped over by those that have high things to say about Sanskrit as a mere matter of profession and therefore who, without ever bothering to read the *Veda* only know that it is composed by the God Brahmā. Actually speaking, this literature is somewhat like Palgrave's *Golden Treasury of Songs and Lyrics*, an anthology of songs and poems of many a gifted poets.... An anthology of songs is of course merely so; but how could the *Veda* being essentially so, acquire such a stupendous influence on religion? What explains this veneration for the *Veda* over hundreds of years?

The great antiquity of the *Veda* is about the main reason for this. Of all the books in the world, the *Veda* is surely the oldest .... Moreover, for purposes of knowing anything about the age in which it was composed, we have only the *Veda* to depend upon.... Let us imagine a situation where after a lapse of about 3000 years all the books written by the Englishmen become extinct, leaving only the *Golden Treasury* to survive. Under such circumstances, the *Golden Treasury*, too, is likely to acquire a similar importance. It alone would then tell us about the thoughts, poetic capabilities and the social customs of the Englishmen.

The historian and the archæologist will of course concentrate on the great antiquity and historical value of the *Veda*. From the poet's point of view, however, there is no other poetry in the world that can be compared to the *Veda*. The *Veda* is not an epic of the Homerian type; yet each poem (*sukta*) of the *Veda* is an epic in its own way. It was then only the childhood of mankind and there could be nothing to compare to the tremendous power man has acquired on the external world today.

Under these circumstances, everything—fire, air, cloud, thunder, lightning, storm—appeared to be veritable gods. It needs a great deal of development of abstract thinking to arrive at the conception of the presiding deities; men in their childhood were yet to develop it. They saw everything with the child's eyes, pictured everything with brightest hues. Their eyes were the eyes of the poets. At the same time, the knowledge, the labour and the mastery over the internal world which the composition of Homer's colossal poem presupposes were not possessed by them. They could just express the depths of their hearts, their awe and fear, their apprehension, hope and aspiration. And how did they express all these? There was nothing clever, nothing thoughtful, nothing laboured about their expressions. Whenever they felt any fear or awe it soon occupied the whole of their inner being. And they immediately expressed it in words. The words like the feelings, were simple, clear and noble. There was no burden of the rhetoric, no anxiety to conceal anything or to discriminate between good and bad taste, no calculated cleverness for purposes of appealing to others. Their expressions had the same nobility as their feelings. ...Whatever they looked at appeared to them to be colossal, wonderful and novel. A hillock would have thrilled them a hundred times more than the great Himalayas thrill us today. Lest it upsets the social norm, we refuse sometimes to express what we feel; these poets expressed the same feelings in a highly magnified yet simple language. They were poets, because they were full of that sense of wonder which is the universal characteristic of the poet's heart. Yet, compared to them, our poets today are dry men of affairs.

Nevertheless, the *Veda* is regarded above all as a religious work... How was it that for thousands of years it was worshipped by millions of people? How could some poems and songs eventually acquire this scriptural status? It will be a folly to suggest that people were just fools to

have imagined this. Really speaking, the process is indicative of some important psychological truth. Those who composed these songs believed that they could do it because of some divine aid. Their fellowmen, too, believed that the composers worked under divine inspiration. Let us suppose that you are a poet while I am not and the two of us stay together. With your strong imagination you see everything as full of beauty; being not a poet I see the earth just as it is, the sky merely as the sky. Here lies the difference between the two of us. We know this to be a difference resulting from our different mental make-up. But people then were not aware of this. They could only note that when the poet sang he experienced a peculiar inner unrest which was not normally felt by him. How was this unrest to be accounted for? Accustomed as he was to see gods everywhere, the poet saw in this, too, the working of god. So he said, 'God has worked me up like this'. And the others wondered: Since he can do what we cannot, he must have been aided by god. ...In the course of time, the names of the poets who actually composed these songs were forgotten and the deities imagined to have helped the poets came to be known as the real authors of the *Veda*. This led Mādhavācārya to claim that a *ṛṣi* (Vedic poet) was one who *saw* the *mantra*, the root *ṛṣ* meaning 'to see'. It was because of this, again, that Bhavabhūti was somewhat annoyed with Kālidāsa's use of the word *mantrakṛt* ('the maker of *mantra*'); instead of *mantrakṛtām*, he said, the word should rather be *mantradṛśām;* the *ṛṣis* never made the *mantras*, they merely saw them. ... Eventually, with the final supremacy of monotheism in the Brahmanical religion, the authorship of the *Veda* was attributed to the Supreme God. God being eternal, the *Veda*, too, was considered eternal. Being the work of God, the *Veda* can contain no error; it is all-truth, all-holy, all-illumination. Thus it was that a collection of songs acquired the scriptural status....

In the Vedic age people were very simple and straightforward. It is extremely difficult for us to enter their mental world. We should be able to understand the *Veda* much better if we can project ourselves in imagination into the Vedic world. We should then have some real idea of the activities and the politics of those days and should understand a lot of what the poets had to say. But it is not easy to enter that world. For this purpose, it is necessary to know a great deal about the

ancient world and about the mental make-up of the ancient peoples. It is not enough to know only about India; it is also necessary to know the history of the ancient world wherever the Aryans appeared. (*Harapasād Racanāvalī* in Bengali. Calcutta, 1960. ii, 389-97. Quoted by Suniti Kumar Chatterjee in his introduction to R. C. Dutta's Bengali translation of the *Ṛgveda*. Reprinted, Calcutta, 1963).

6 *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*. Auto-commentary. v. 3.
7 *Ṛgveda* x. 81. 3—*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* iii. 3.
8 Tarkalamkara Chandrakanta. *Fellowship Lectures*. i. 66-7.
9 Childe, V.G. *What Happened in History*, 167.

11. *MAGIC AND RELIGION*

1 Thomson, G. *Religion*. London, 1950. 5-9.
2 Frazer, J. G. *The Golden Bough* (abridged ed.) London, 1949. 48-51.

12. *MAGIC AND THE VEDIC LITERATURE*

1 .Winternitz, M. *A History of Indian Literature*. i, 167-8.
2 *Ib*. i, 128.
3 *Ib*. i, 184.

13. *BRĀHMAṆAS AND THE UPANIṢADS*

1 Keith, A. B. *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads*. Harvard Oriental Series, 1925. 260.
2 Levi, S. Quoted by Winternitz, M. *A History of Indian Literature*. i, 208n.
3 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. iv. 1.1.-iv. 2.5.

14. *EMANCIPATION OF THOUGHT*

1 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. i. 1.
2 Chattopadhyaya, D. *Lokāyata*, 101.
3 Winternitz, M. *A History of Indian Literature*. i, 245.
4 Gaden, A. S. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. xii, 542.
5 Deussen, P. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. Berlin, 1907. 22.
6 Bhandarkar, R. G. *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*. Strassburg, 1913. 1.

7 Thibaut, G. in *Sacred Books of the East,* xxxiv. Introduction. ciii.
8 Hume, R. E. *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads.* Oxford 1951 ed., 7.
9 Gaden, A. S. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xii, 541.
10 Barua, B. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy.* Calcutta, 1921. 51-187.
11 Keith, A. B. *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads.* 601ff. Keith's own conclusions are, however, arbitrary.
12 *Ib.* 395.
13 Thibaut, G. in *Sacred Books of the East.* Introduction. civ.
14 *Aṇubhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra.* ii. 2.29; *yat śūnyavādhinaḥ śānyam tadeva brahma māyinaḥ.* Others to have sarcastically referred to the close similarity between the Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism are Pārthasārathi Miśra (*Śāstradīpikā,* Nir. ed. 111) and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī.* Chow. ed. ii, 96). Vijñānabhikṣu, in his introduction to the *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* quoted from the *Padmapurāṇa* the phrase *pracchanna Bauddha* ('disguised Buddhists') describing the Advaita Vedāntists. Among the modern scholars who have elaborately discussed the question of the ideological affinity between the Advaita Vedāntists and the Mahāyāna Buddhists are V. Bhattacharya (in *Indian Historical Quarterly,* x, 1-11), H. Jacobi (in *Journal of American Oriental Society.* xxxiii, 31ff), L. de la Valle Poussin (in *Journal Royal Asiatic Society.* 1910, 128ff.), T. Stcherbatsky (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.* 36ff) and S. N. Dasgupta (*A History of Indian Philosophy.* i, 423ff). Cf. also S. Mukherjee in the *Nava-Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publications.* i, 105ff.

16. *THE MĪMĀMSĀ*

1 Sastri, N. in *Indian Antiquary.* I, 172.
2 Jha, G. *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in Its Sources.* 14.
3 *Ib.* 17f. Cf. Keith, A. B. *Karma-Mīmāṁsā.* 10.
4 Keith, A. B. *Karma Mīmāṁsā.* 11. The writings of Saṁkara and Kumārila, too, give us the inevitable impression that, as

a thinker or logician,Kumārila must have been immensely superior to Śaṁkara; even if any philosophical debate between the two could actually take place, Śaṁkara had not even a remote chance of defeating Kumārila. Śaṁkara's real merit was a lucid literary style and he must have borrowed from Kumārila those arguments that suited his purpose.

5 Max-Muller, F. *Collected Works.* London, 1903. xix, 210-12; Muir, J. *Original Sanskrit Texts.* 5 vols. London, 1873. iii, 95; Sarkar, K. *Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation.* Calcutta, 1909. 508.

6 *Bhāṭṭadīpikā.* Mysore ed. iii. 53. Though palpably absurd, the story invented by Ānandagiri in his *Śaṁkaravijaya,* viz. that Śaṁkara met Kumārila when the latter was immolating himself as punishment for the sin of having discarded Īśvara (god) out of his zeal for the doctrines of Jaimini, is not without significance with regard to the atheism of genuine Mīmāṁsā.

7 Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy.* ii, 427.

8 For Prabhākara's views, see Jha, G. *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā.* Allahabad, 1911. 85-8 and Keith, A. B. *Karma Mīmāṁsā.* 62ff. Much more interesting, however, are the arguments of Kumārila. See *Ślokavārttika,* Sambandākṣepa parāihra-vāda, verses 41ff. In his English translation of the *Ślokavārttika* (Calcutta, 1907), 355ff, Jha quotes a number of important passages from the commentaries of Sucarita Miśra and Pārthasārathi Miśra on the *Ślokavārttika.*

9 Śabara on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra.* i. 1.5.

10 For Kumārila's arguments against the possible existence of God, see *Ślokavartika,* Sambandākṣepa-parihāra-vāda, verses 41-116. For the standard exposition of the anti-theistic arguments of the Prābhākara school, the modern scholars generally depend upon Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañjikā.* See Jha, G. *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources.* 44-7 and Keith, A. B. *Karma Mīmāṁsā,* 63 f.

11 Śabara on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra,* ix.1.6-10.

12 Sastri, N. in *Indian Antiquary.* I, 241.

13 *Śrībhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra,* iii. 2.39-40.

14 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* 300.

15 *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.* verse 1. Tr. Bagchi, S. S. in the *Nava-Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publications.* i, 369.

16 *Ślokavārttika,* Nirālambana-vāda. verses 1-3, 12-3.
17 For Śabara's refutation of idealism, see his commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra.* i.1.5. Kumārila's anti-idealistic arguments are to be found in the sections known as Nirālambana-vāda and Śūnya-vāda of the *Ślokavārttika.* For the refutation of idealism by the Prābhākara school, see Jha, G. *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources,* 56ff.
18 *Ślokavārttika.* Pratyakṣa-sūtra. verses 28-32. Cf. Nirālambana-vāda. verses 94-5.
19 Stcherbatsky, T. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.* 19.

17. *THE VEDĀNTA*

1 Keith, A. B. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* x, 572.
2 *Ib.*
3 Gaden, A. S. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* ix, 373-4.
4 Grierson, G A. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* viii, 233.
5 *Ib.* viii, 234.
6 Mackichan, D. in *Encylopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xii, 581.
7 *Ib.*

18. *UPANIṢADIC IDEALISM*

1 Deussen, P. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.* 39.
2 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* ii. 4.5.. Henceforth the names of the Upaniṣads are given in abbreviations. Translations of the Upaniṣadic passages are mostly from Hume, R. E. *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads.*
3 *Ch. Up.* vii. 7.1.
4 *Bṛ. Up.* ii.4.5.
5 *Ib.* ii.4.6.
6 *Ib.* ii.4.12.
7 *Ch. Up.* vii.1.2.
8 Cf. *Bṛ. Up.* ii.4.10; iv.1.2; iv.5.11.
9 *Cr. Up.* vii. 24-5.
10 Deussen, P. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.* 74-5.
11 *Bṛ. Up.* iii.9.26; iv.2.4.
12 *Ib.* ii.4.14.
13 *Ch. Up.* viii.3.2.
14 *Bṛ. Up.* iv.3.7.

15 *Ib.* iv.3.8-10.
16 *Ib.* iv.3.14.
17 *Ib.* iv.3.20.
18 *Ib.* iv.3.19.
19 *Ib.* iv.3.21-2.
20 *Ib.* iv.3.31-2.
21 *Ib.* iv.4.2-6.

19. *SOURCES OF IDEALISM*

1 *Bṛ. Up.* i.4.11.
2 *Ch. Up.* v.10.8.
3 *Yājñavalkya Smṛti. iii.* 191.
4 *Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra.* i.5.101.
5 *Manusmṛti.* x.83-4.
6 *Ib.* x.115.
7 *Ib.* x.116-7.
8 Kane, P. V. *History of the Dharmaśāstras.* vol. ii. Poona, 1941. 100.
9 Macdonell, A. A. *Vedic Mythology,* Strassburg, 1897. 116.
10 *Nighaṇṭu* ii.1 and iii.9.
11 Vlastos, G. Quoted by Farrington, B. in *Philosophy for the Future.* New York, 1949. 4.
12 Farrington, B. in *Philosophy for the Future.* 5.
13 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* i, 105-6.
14 See, e.g., Deussen, P. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.* 17ff.
15 *Bṛ. Up.* ii.1.
16 *Kauṣ. Up.* iv.
17 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* i, 142.
18 Thomson, G. *Æschylus and Athens.* London, 1946. 368.
19 *Kauṣ. Up.* iv.20.
20 *Ch. Up.* v.3; *Bṛ. Up.* vi.2; *Kauṣ. Up.* i.
21 Keith, A. B. *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads.* 495.

20. *ADVAITA VEDĀNTA*

1 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra.* ii.1.11. Tr. Thibaut.
2 *Ib.* Adhyāsabhāṣya.
3 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy,* i, 423 & 429.
4 *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* iv.3.5.

5 Lenin, V. I. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1947. 141.

6 *Ślokavārtika.* Nirālambana-vāda. verses 6-10.

21. *IDEALISM VERSUS MATERIALISM*

1 Marx, K. and Engels, F. *Selected Works.* 2 vols. Moscow, 1962. ii, 369.
2 Thomson, G. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* ii, 323.
3 *Ch. Up.* viii. 7-15.
4 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.* ii.4.2.5.
5 *Maitri Up.* vii.9.10.
6 *Viṣṇu Purāṇa.* iii.18.14-26.
7 *Kaṭha Up.* i.20; ii.6.
8 *Śv. Up.* i.2. However, apart from such stray references to the materialistic outlook recorded in the Upaniṣadic literature, the important question remains whether the view attributed in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* to a certain Uddālaka Āruṇi is to be taken as a materialistic one. Ruben, following Jacobi, argues in favour of this possibility. See Ruben, W. *Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya : Materialism and Idealism* in *Indian Studies.: Past & Present.* iii, 345-54.
9 *Śv. Up.* i.2.
10 *Buddhacarita.* ix.52.
11 *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha.* Ch. 1.
12 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* 103-5.
13 *Ib.* 104.
14 *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha.* Ch. 1.
15 On *Gītā.* xvi.8.
16 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* ii.2.5. Tr. Thibaut.
17 Engels, F. *Dialectics of Nature.* Moscow, 1954. 242. Cf. Bacon, F. *Novum Organum.* i.3.
18 Gauḍapāda on the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.* verse 27.

22. *THE SĀMKHYA SYSTEM*

1 See Garbe, R. *Aniruddha's Commentary on the Original Parts of Vedāntin Mahādeva's Commentary on the Sāṁkhya-sūtras.* Calcutta, 1892. Intro. xxi.
2 Garbe, R. in *Encyplopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xi, 189; Sastri, H. P. *Bauddha Dharma* (Bengali) 37.

3 Garbe, R. *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya.* Harvard Oriental Series, 1895. Pref. xi.
4 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* i, 218.
5 Garbe, R. *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya.* Pref. xii.
6 Stcherbatsky, T. *Buddhist Logic.* i, 47-8.
7 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xi, 190.
8 *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.* verse 8.
9 Seal, B. N. *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.* Varanasi, 1958. 2.
10 *Ib.* 1-56.
11 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* i, 36.
12 Stcherbatsky, T. *Buddhist Logic.* i, 18.
13 *Ib.*
14 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xi, 191.
15 *Carakasaṁhitā,* Sarīrasthāna.
16 Sanghavi, Sukhlalji. *Adhyātma-vicāraṇa* (Hindi). 15-6.
17 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* i, 214.
18 *Brahma-sūtra* ii.1.12.
19 *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* iii. 11.
20 *Ib.* vi.8.
21 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* iv. 10. In my *Lokāyata,* 425ff, I have quoted many more passages like these to show that as a matter of fact the Sāṁkhya formed the *pūrvapakṣa* for the Upaniṣadic idealists.
22 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* ii.2.7. Tr. Thibaut.

23. *THE YOGA*

1 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xii, 831-2.
2 Chanda, R. P. in *Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India.* xli, 25; Marshall, J. *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization,* 3 vols. London, 1931. i, 53-4.
3 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* i, 228-9.
4 Sanghavi, Sukhlalji. *Darśana Aur Cintana* (Hindi). i, 251-2.
5 Gough, A. E. *Philosophy of the Upanishads.* London, 1882. 18; Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* xii. 833; etc.
6 Garbe, R. *op. cit.* xii, 832-3.
7 Dharmottara's commentary on the *Nyāyabindu.* i.11.

24. *THE BUDDHA AND EARLY BUDDHISM*

1 Chattopadhyaya, D. *Lokāyata.* Chapter 7. References to the Buddhist texts quoted here are to be found in this earlier work.
2 Engels, F. *The Origin of the Family,* etc. Moscow, 1952. 163. Ch. ix in particular gives us all the basic clues to the understanding of early Buddhism.
3 Marx, K. and Engels, F. *On Religion.* Moscow, 1957. 42.
4 Quoted by Thomson, G. in *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* ii, 93.
5 Engels, F. *The Origin of the Family,* etc. 163.
6 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* 139.
7 *Ib.* 141.
8 Marx, K and Engels, F. *Selected Works,* ii, 65-6.
9 Quoted by Hiriyanna, M. *op. cit.* 142.

25. *JAINISM*

1 Jacobi, H. in *Sacred Books of the East.* xlv, Intro. xxviii.
2 *Ib.* Intro. xxxiii.
3 Jacobi, H. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* vii, 468-9.

26. *LATER SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM*

1 Rhys-Davids, T. W. *Dialogues of the Buddha,* vol. iv. London, 1921. 121.
2 *Sacred Books of the East.* xiii, 84.
3 Malalasekera, G. P. *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names.* 2 vols. London, 1937-8. i. 963-4.
4 *2,500 Years of Buddhism.* New Delhi, 1956. 188.
5 *Ib.* 116.
6 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* ii.2.18.
7 See *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western.* ed. Radhakrishnan, S. 2 vols. London, 1952. vol. i.
8 Stcherbatsky, T. *The Central Conception of Buddhism,* 22.
9 The following points occur in Dharmakīrti's defence of momentariness offered in the *Hetubindu.* The text, restored in Sanskrit from its now available Tibetan translation, is appended to the *Hetubindu-ṭikā,* Gaekward's Oriental Series. For the general defence of momentariness, see p. 56 (line 16) to p. 63 (line 14). For the special points raised

here, see p. 56, lines 16-24; p. 57, lines 3-9; p. 58, line 26 to p. 59, line 7 and p. 61, lines 6-9. The most outstanding work in English on the Buddhist theory of momentariness is Mookerjee, S. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*. Calcutta, 1935.

10 Sankrityayana, Rahula. *Darśana-digdarśana* (Hindi). 762.

11 Stcherbatsky, T. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvaṇa*. 33.

12 *Ṛgyan-Drug Mchog-Guyis*. Sikkim, 1962. 26. cf. '*The Laṅkavatāra* and a *Mahāmegha-sūtra* put into the mouth of the Buddha words like the following: 'Four centuries after my *nirvāṇa* this Ānanda will be the *bhikṣu* called Nāga; he will teach the Great Vehicle'. *ERE*. viii. 335.

13 Stcherbatsky, T. *op. cit*. 38.

14 *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, verse xxii. Tr. S. Mookerjee.

15 Stcherbatsky, T. *op. cit*. 41

16 *Ib*. 47.

17 Bhattacharya, V. in *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, i, 180.

18 *Ib*.

19 *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, Ch. iii, verses 353-55.

20 *Ib*. Ch. iii, verse 220.

21 Durveka's sub-commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*. K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. 44.

22 It may be mentioned here that rather than evolving any 'coherence' theory of truth—as was done, e.g., by Bosanquet, in order to make room for logic within the general framework of the idealistic outlook—the Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti accepted the 'correspondence' theory of truth. 'Correspondence of knowledge with reality is regarded as the test and warrant of its validity and this correspondence is attested when knowledge leads to the actual attainment of the object by creating a volitional urge for the object presented. So the purpose of knowledge is served when it reveals an objective reality in its true character; and the actual attainment of the object, which takes place by reason of a chain of psychical facts, beginning with the desire and volitional urge and ending in actual physical endeavour, is only a bye-product' (Mookerjee, S. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*. 273). It is not difficult to see why such an understanding of the nature of truth should fail to be consistent with the Vijñāna-vāda standpoint, according to which knowledge is essentially object-less (*nira-*

lambana). As a matter of fact, this inconsistency was keenly felt by the later commentators on the Buddhist logical texts. Here is a significant example:

Dignāga defined perception as a cognition 'which is free from conceptual construction' (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhām*). With a view to excluding errors from the category of perception, Dharmakīrti added to the definition the further clause *abhrānta* (non-erroneous). Vinītadeva, by way of justifying this addition, argued that it could meet the position of the Yogācāras, too. But Dharmottara came out sharply against such a claim and Dharmottara's commentator argued that there was no question of reconciling this definition of perception with the Yogācāra standpoint, because the definition was offered from the Sautrāntika point of view. Here is how Mookerjee sums up the controversy: 'He (Vinītadeva) interpreted *abhrānta* as meaning "not lacking correspondence with reality" (*avisaṁvādaka*). But this alone would be wide enough to include inference as the latter too does not lack this correspondence. So the other clause "free from ideal constructions" is added for the exclusion of inference, which is invariably attended with ideal elements. "*Abhrānta* should not be construed", says Vinītadeva, "as meaning a cognition which is contrary to and so erroneous in respect of the object. This interpretation of the word *abhrānta* would make the definition absolutely futile as all knowledge, let alone perception, is erroneous with regard to its object according to the Yogācāras and accordingly this definition has been so worded as to meet their position also." This interpretation of Vinītadeva has been strongly animadverted upon by Dharmottara. Dharmottara observes that this interpretation of the word *abhrānta* as "not lacking correspondence with reality" is itself futile, as from the context which treats of true and authentic knowledge and of perception as a sub-species of the same, we have it that perception must not be incongruent with fact, because authentic knowledge connotes this very congruence and not anything else. So Vinītadeva's interpretation would make the definition tautologous, as the definition in relation to the context would read as follows: "The cognition which is not incongruent and is free from ideation (*kalpanā*) is not incongruent." But this reiteration of "not incongruent" does not answer any purpose. So the word *abhrānta*

should be taken to mean that which is not contrary to the real object presented in it. But what about the position of the idealist? The definition so interpreted will not meet their purpose. The author of the sub-commentary assures us that there is absolutely no difficulty as the definition has been propounded from the Sautrāntika's position and not from the idealistic standpoint, though the former is not the orthodox position of the master (*ācarya*): *etac ca lakṣaṇa-dvayam ityādinā ... vinītadevavyākhyā ... dūṣitā. tena tv'evam vyākhyātam: "abhrāntam iti yad visaṁvādi na bhavati, evaṁ satya anumānasyā'py etal lakṣaṇaṁ prāpnoti'ti kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇaṁ tanivṛttyartham — yady evam vyakhāyate, ālamvane yan na bhrāntam tad abhrāntam ity ucyamāne sarvaṁ pratyakṣaṁ jñāam ālambane bhrāntam iti na kasyacit pratyakṣatvaṁ syāt. tathā cā'ha. 'sarvam ālambane bhrāntam muktvā tathagataj̃ñānam' iti yogācāramate, tad apy atrā'cāryena saṁgṛhītam" iti. tad ayuktam ... nanū'ktam yogācāramatam asaṁgṛhītam syād iti. ucyate. bāhyanayena sautrāntika matānusāreṇā'cāryena lakṣanaṁ kṛtam ity adoṣaḥ. Nyayabindu-ṭīkā-ṭippanī* (Bib. Bud.). 18-9.' Mookerjee, S. *op. cit.* 277-8.

27. *THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA*

1 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* 228.
2 Garbe, R. in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* ix, 422. Phanibhusana, in his *Nyāya-darśana* (Bengali) i, 2n, quotes a number of medieval philosophical texts in which the name occurs as *caraṇākṣa*, etc., which indicate that the real meaning of the name might have been 'one with eyes on feet'.
3 Keith, A. B. *Indian Logic and Atomism.* Oxford, 1921. 18f.
4 Mitra, S. K. *Studies in Philosophy and Religion.* Calcutta, 1956. 157.
5 *Nyāyamañjarī* (Banaras Sanskrit Series). i. 158-9.
6 Farrington, B. *Greek Science.* i, 60-1.
7 Schwegler, A. *Handbook of the History of Philosophy.* London, 1867. 26.
8 Thomson, G. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* ii, 311.
9 Schwegler, A. *op. cit.* 26. Schwegler's own bias for Hegelian idealism is of course obvious.
10 Among the metal workers the technique persists in various places of the country. For its persistence among the potters,

see Pemberton, R. *Report on Bootan.* Calcutta, 1962 ed. 76.
11 Sastri, K. *A Primer of Indian Logic.* 61.
12 *Ib.* 18-9.
13 Stcherbatsky, T. *Buddhist Logic.* i. 279.

28. *LOKĀYATA*

1 Thomson, G. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* ii, 302.
2 *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra.* iii.3.53. Tr. Thibaut.
3 *Ib.* iii.3.54.
4 K. K. Dixit, (*Indian Studies: Past & Present.* iv, 98ff) rightly insists that for the purpose of determining the real ideological affiliation of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa the following internal evidences of the *Tattvopaplava-siṁha* must be taken note of. For in the text itself, Jayarāśi uses the phrase *tattvopaplava* twice from which we can judge the essence of his *tattvopaplava-vāda.* 'The first occurrence is where Jayarāśi is saying to an adversary that if the latter adopts a particular position there arises the contingency of everything being unreal and from it follows *tattvopaplava*: ... *sarvasya mithyātvam āpadyate tataḥ tattvopaplavaḥ syāt* (p. 9). The second occurrence is where he is in effect saying to the same adversary (though in another connection) that if our knowledge of existence is no guarantee of actual existence and if our knowledge of absence no guarantee of actual absence we would be plunged in uncertainty about everything whatsoever and that would mean *tattvopapalva*: ... *yadi ca bhāvanjñānam bhāvavyavasthāṁ na karoti tadā sarvabhāveṣu anāśvāsaprasañgaḥ. tatprasaktau abhāvasyāpy anavasthitiḥ, tad anavasthitau ca tattvopaplavāḥ* (p. 14). So according to Jayarāśi the doctrine of *tattvopaplava* should at least mean the doctrine that everything is unreal and that we have no certain knowledge about anything whatsoever.' These evidences are clear and decisive and it remains for us to raise a simple question: who in Indian philosophy wanted to prove that everything was unreal and that knowledge was an impossibility? There is only one answer to this question: none but the extreme idealists like the Mādhyamika Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntists maintained both these views. If, therefore, Jayarāśi had any philosophical affiliation, it was only with the extreme idealists. As a matter of fact, the Jaina logician Vidyānandin showed a

clear understanding of this philosophical affiliation of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa; he bracketed the positions of the Tattvopaplavavādins, Śūnyavādins and Brahmavādins and said: *sarvathā śūnyavādinastattvopaplavavādino brahmavādino vā jāgradupalabhdhārthakṛiyāṁ kiṁ na vādhakapratyayaḥ* (Quoted by the editors in the Intro. of the *Tattvopaplava-siṁha*).

This means that according to Vidyānandin there were three schools in Indian philosophy—namely, those of the Śūnyavādins, Tattvopaplavavādins and Brahmavādins—which maintained that there was some form of experience which negated the normal waking experience. We have already seen (p. 62) why the Indian idealists argued in favour of its possibility: such an experience could be the conclusive ground for providing the unreality of the world. If, as Jayarāśi himself said, a major implication of his *tattvopaplavavāda* was the unreality of the world, it could only be logical for the Tattvopaplavavādins to have argued in favour of such an experience. Therefore, Vidyānandin's comment could not have been drawn from his own imagination and it conclusively proves the idealistic affiliation of Jayarāś Bhaṭṭa.

Therefore, it is quite amazing to note that even a responsible scholar like A. L. Basham makes the following statement: 'Besides numerous quotations attributed to materialists in religious and philosophical works *one materialist philosophical text* has survived. This is the *Tattvopaplava-siṁha*' (*The Wonder That Was India*. 297). On the contrary the fact is that the text opens with Jayarāśi's rejection of the materialistic thesis that everything is made up of four physical elements and its editors themselves never went to the ridiculous extent of claiming it to be a *materialist philosophical text*. Their contention rather is that the text represents the view of one branch of the Cārvāka school which deviated from the 'orthodox' materialism of the Cārvākas and developed the *tattvopaplava-vāda*. As against such a claim, again, we may mention another interesting internal evidence of the text itself. Towards its end, Jayarāśi claims to have exposed certain deep-rooted aberrations of the intellect which even Bṛhaspati (*suraguru*) failed to expose. Now, it is impossible to deny the fact that according to the Indian philosophical tradition Bṛhaspati is somehow or other conceived to be the founder of the Cārvāka philosophy. It is

equally impossible to deny that according to the Indian philosophical tradition, no real representative of a system would ever dream of boasting intellectual superiority to the founder of the system itself. Jayarāśi, who claims to be intellectually superior to Bṛhaspati, could thus hardly be a follower of Bṛhaspati himself, i.e. could hardly be the leader of any imaginary offshoot of the Cārvāka or Bārhaspatya system. It is moreover necessary to remember that Jayarāśi claims as his final achievement the annihilation of the vanity of the *pāṣaṇḍin's* (p. 125). Now, whatever might have been the exact meaning of the word *pāṣaṇḍin*, it could by no stretch of imagination have excluded the Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas.

5 Dasgupta, S. N. *A History of Indian Philosophy.* iii, 536f.
6 Tucci, G. in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress,* 1925. 36.
7 *Nyāyamañjarī.* i.113.
8 Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* 188.
9 *Nyāyamañjarī.* i.59.
10 *Ib.* i, 161.
11 *Ib.* i, 273.
12 Marx, K. and Engels, F. *Selected Works,* i.375.
13 Sanghavi, Sukhlalji, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics.* Calcutta, 1961. 116.
14 Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy,* i, 249.
15 Hiriyanna, M. *op. cit.* 79.
16 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.* v.10.7.
17 *Gītā.* iv.13.
18 *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* on *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya,* verse 50.
19 Rhys-Davids, T. W. *Dialogues of the Buddha,* vol. i. London, 1899. 73.
20 Winternitz, M. *A History of Indian Literature.* i, 265.

For fuller account, see sections indicated by square brackets

Abhidharma-kośa, by Vasubandhu, a basic work of the Sarvāstivādi Buddhists [26].

Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the third and chronologically last of the Buddhist Piṭakas, supposed to be dealing exclusively with metaphysical problems [24].

Abhidharma-samaya-pradīpa, by Saṅghabhadra or one of his disciples, a work of the Sarvāstivādi Buddhists written strictly from the Vaibhāṣika point of view [26].

Abhidharma-vibhāṣā, a commentary on Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*, supposed to have been composed in the Fourth Buddhist Council held under the patronage of King Kaṇiṣka (c. 2nd century A.D.) [26].

Acintya-bhedābheda-vāda, doctrine of indescribable dualism-cum-nondualism—the philosophical doctrine of the Caitanya school of Vedānta, known as Bengal Vaiṣṇavism [17].

Advaita-brahma-siddhi, by Sadānanda Yati, a manual on Advaita Vedāta[7].

Advaita Vedānta, a school of Vedānta championed by the famous Śaṁkara viewing pure consciousness as the only reality [20].

Ajita Keśakambalī, a materialist contemporary of the Buddha [28].

Akalaṅka, a Jaina philosopher of c. A.D. 750, who gave the first final shape to the basic Jaina positions in logic [25].

Akṣapāda, alternative name of Gotama, the supposed founder of the Nyāya system [27].

Ālambana-parīkṣā, by Dignāga, a treatise in defence of the Yogācāra idealism [26].

Aniruddha, a commentator on the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* belonging to the 15th century A.D. [22].

Aṅga, a class of the sacred literature of the Jainas [25].

Annam Bhaṭṭa, a 17th century Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher famous for his manual *Tarkasaṁgrahaḥ* [3].

Āpadeva, a 17th century Mīmāṁsā philosopher [16].

Āraṇyaka, a class of literature belonging to the Veda discussing mainly magical and proto-philosophical questions [13].

Arcaṭa, a Buddhist logician of *c.* 9th century A.D., who commented on Dharmakīrti's *Hetu-bindu* [26].

Arthaśāstra, an early treatise on socio-polity attributed to Kauṭilya [28].

Āryadeva, *c.* A.D. 320, a prominent exponent of Mādhyamika Buddhism [26].

Āryaśūra, *c.* 4th century A.D., the author of the *Jātaka-mālā* [26].

Asaṅga, *c.* A.D. 450, an early systematiser of Yogācāra Buddhism [26].

Āsuri, supposed to be an ancient Sāṁkhya teacher [22].

Aśvaghoṣa, *c.* 2nd century A.D.; a Buddhist poet, dramatist and philosopher [24].

Atharvaveda, one of the earliest of the four compilations of the Vedic literature, containing mainly magical charms [10].

Ātma-tattva-viveka, a comparatively earlier work of Udayana: a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika text particularly in refutation of the Buddhist view of the Self [7].

Bādarāyaṇa, the supposed author of the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Baudhāyana, *c.* 300 B.C., an early author on law [3].

Bhagavadgītā, usually referred to simply as the *Gītā*, a verse-treatise on philosophy and religion forming part of the *Mahābhārata* and enjoying the widest popularity in the orthodox circles [28].

Bhāmatī, by Vācaspati Miśra, a commentary on Saṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* [22].

Bhāskara, the earliest known theistic commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*, who lived between Saṁkara and Rāmānuja [17].

Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā, a Mīmāṁsā text by Khaṇḍadeva [16].

Bhāṭṭa Mīmaṁsa, the school of Mīmāṁsā founded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa [16].

Bhāvaviveka, *c.* 5th century A.D., an exponent of the Mādhyamika Buddhism [26].

Bhedābheda-vāda, dualism-cum-nondualism—the philosophical doctrine of Bhāskara [17].

Bodhicaryāvatāra, by Śāntideva, a religious poem popularising Mahāyāna Buddhism [26].

Brāhmaṇas, a class of Vedic literature discussing above all the Vedic rituals [13].

Brahma-sūtra, or the *Vedānta-sūtra,* the first systematic presentation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and attributed to Bādarāyaṇa [17].

Bṛhatī, Prabhākara's bigger commentary on Śabara's commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* [16].

Buddha, the founder of Buddhism who died in 483 B.C. [24].

Buddhacarita, a poetical biography of the Buddha by Aśvaghoṣa [24].

Buddhapālita, *c.* 5th century A.D., an exponent of Mādhyamika Buddhism.

Caitanya, born in A.D. 1485, founder of a religious movement usually referred to as Bengal Vaiṣṇavism [17].

Candrakīrti, *c.* 6th century A.D., a Mādhyamika philosopher best known as the commentator of Nāgārjuna [26].

Caraka, *c.* 2nd century A.D., the supposed compiler of the medical treatise called the *Caraka-saṁhitā* [22].

Cārvāka, also known as Lokāyata, the names for materialism as also for the materialist philosopher [28].

Catuḥ-śataka, by Āryadeva, an important text on Mādhyamika Buddhism [26].

Citsukha, *c.* A.D. 1220, an Advaita Vedāntist famous for his destructive criticism of empirical ontology and epistemology [20].

Dharmakīrti, *c.* 7th century A.D., the greatest Buddhist logician after Dignāga [26].

Dharmottara, *c.* A.D. 847, commentator of Dharmakīrti [26].

Digambara, a sect of Jainism [25].

Dignāga, *c.* A.D. 500, the founder of the Buddhist school of logic [26].

Dīpaśikhā, by Śālikanātha, a text on Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā [16].

Durveka, a Buddhist logician who commented upon Dharmottara and Arcaṭa [26].

Dvaitādvaita-vāda, dualism-cum-nondualism—the philosophical doctrine of the Nimbārka school of Vedānta [17].

Dvaita-vāda, dualism—the philosophical doctrine of the Madhva school of Vedānta [17].

Gadādhara, *c.* 17th century A.D., an exponent of neo-Nyāya [27].

Gaṅgeśa, *c.* 13th century A.D., the founder of neo-Nyāya [27].

Gauḍapāda, *c.* A.D. 800, supposed to have been the teacher's teacher of Saṁkara [17, 20].

Gītā, see *Bhagavadgītā*.

Gotama, *see* Akṣapāda.

Guṇaratna, *c.* 15th century A.D., a Jaina author best known for his commentary, called the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpika*, on Haribhadra's compendium of Indian philosophy called the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* [3].

Haribhadra, *c.* 8th century A.D., a prolific Jaina writer, best known for his compendium of Indian philosophy called the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* [25].

Hemacandra, A.D. 1088-1172, a versatile Jaina author who also wrote on philosophy and logic [25].

Hetu-bindu, a work on Buddhist logic by Dharmakīrti [26].

Hetu-bindu-ṭīkā, Arcaṭa's commentary on the *Hetu-bindu* [26].

Hīnayāna, 'The Lower Path', abusive name invented by the Mahāyāna Buddhists to describe their predecessors [26].

Jagadīśa, *c.* A.D. 1700, an exponent of neo-Nyāya [27].

Jaimini, the supposed author of the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* [16].

Jainism, a monastic religion with its own philosophical views [25].

Jātaka, stories of the 'previous births' of the Buddha [24].

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *c.* 9th century A.D., a great exponent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the author of *Nyāya-mañjarī*. [27].

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, *c.* 8th century A.D., an extreme sceptic often misrepresented as a materialist [28].

Jñānaprasthāna, by Kātyāyanīputra, on which the *Mahāvibhāṣa* of the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists was a commentary [26].

Jñānaśrī, a Buddhist logician of *c.* 983 A.D. [26].

Kamalaśīla, *c.* A.D. 750, a Buddhist logician who commented upon Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṁgraha* [26].

Kaṇāda, supposed author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* [2, 27].

Kapila, the supposed founder of the Sāṁkhya system [22].

Kātyāyanīputra, perhaps earlier than the 2nd century A.D., the author of the *Jñānaprasthāna* [26].

Kauṭilya, *c.* 4th century B.C., the supposed author of the *Arthaśāstra*.

Khaṇḍadeva, a Mīmāṁsā philosopher of the 17th century A.D. [16].

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, by Śrīharṣa, a work on the Advaita Vedānta presenting for the first time a detailed criticism of the categories of empirical epistemology and ontology on behalf of this school [17, 20, 28].

Kiraṇāvalī, by Udayana, a commentary on Praśastapāda's work on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy [27].

Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, a late medieval commentator on the *Manusmṛti*.

Kumārila, *c.* 8th century A.D., the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsā [16].

Laghvī, Prabhākara's shorter commentary on Śabara's commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* [16].

Lalita-vistara, a biography of the Buddha inspired by the Mahāyāna ideas [24].

Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, one of the most important Mahāyāna-sūtras [26].

Lokāyata, see Cārvāka.

Mādhava, an Advaita Vedāntist of the 14th century A.D., best known for his compendium of Indian philosophy called the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* [9, 28].

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *c.* A.D. 1500, an Advaita Vedāntist.

Madhva, *c.* 13th century A.D., founder of the dualistic school of Vedānta [17].

Mādhyamika, a Mahāyāna Buddhistic school of philosophy founded by Nāgārjuna viewing reality as 'the void' [26].

Mādhyamika-kārikā, Nāgārjuna's basic text of the Mādhyamika philosophy [26].

Mahābhārata, one of the two great epics of India, which assumed its present form sometimes between 400 B.C. and A.D. 400.

Mahāsāṁghikas, the first to be expelled from the orthodox Buddhist church, who founded their own sect of Buddhism [26].

Mahāvibhāṣā, same as the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā* [26].

Mahāvīra, a Jaina prophet and an elder contemporary of the Buddha [25].

Mahāyāna, 'The Great Path', a name assumed by a later sect of the Buddhists to ennoble their own stand as compared to that of their predecessors, whom they called the Hīnayānists, 'the followers of the Lower Path' [26].

Mahāyāna-sūtras, certain theologico-philosophical texts claimed to be scriptural by the Mahāyāna Buddhists [26].

Maitreyanātha, *c.* A.D. 400, the founder of the Yogācāra school of the Buddhist philosophy [26].

Maṇḍana Miśra, *c.* 9th century A.D., an important exponent of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā [16].

Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, by Gauḍapāda, the earliest available work on the Advaita Vedānta [17, 20].

Manu, the supposed author of the *Manu-smṛti*, the most authoritative work on Indian law, which probably took its present form before A.D. 200.

Māyā-vāda, illusionism—the philosophical doctrine of the Advaita Vedānta [20].

Milinda-pañha, one of the earliest non-canonical Pali works on Buddhism [24].

Mīmāṁsā, one of the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy based mainly on the ritual parts of the Veda [16].

Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, the source-book of the Mīmāṁsā [16].

Nāgārjuna, *c.* A.D. 200, the founder of the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhist philosophy [26].

Nimbārka, *c.* 12th century A.D., one of the theistic commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Navya-Nyāya, or neo-Nyāya, the latest phase of the Nyāya philosophy initiated by Gaṅgeśa [27].

Nighaṇṭu, the earliest glossary of the Vedic words.

Nyāya, one of the major systems of Indian philosophy interested mainly in the questions of epistemology and logic [27].

Nyāya-bindu, by Dharmakīrti, a work on Buddhist logic [26].

Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā, by Dharmottara, a commentary on the *Nyāya-bindu* [26].

Nyāya-kandalī, by Śrīdhara, a commentary on Praśastapāda's work on the Vaiśeṣika system [27].

Nyāya-kaṇikā, by Vācaspati Miśra, a Mīmāṁsā text, being a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Vidhi-viveka* [27].

Nyāya-kusumāñjali, by Udayana, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika text mainly devoted to the proofs for the existence of God [27].

Nyāya-mañjarī, by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, an important work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system [27].

Nyāya-sūtra, the source-book of the Nyāya system attributed to Gotama or Akṣapāda [27].

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the joint name assumed by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophies when the two were eventually amalgamated [27].

Nyāya-vārttika, by Uddyotakara, the earliest of the extant commentaries on Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* [27].

Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi, by Udayana, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika text, being a commentary on the *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā* [27].

Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā, by Vācaspati Miśra, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika text, being a commentary on the *Nyāya-vārttika* [27].

Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha, by Praśastapāda, the earliest extant

systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and is often referred to as the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* [27].

Padmapāda, *c.* A.D. 820, a famous post-Śaṁkara Advaita Vedāntist [17].

Pañcaśikha, referred to as an early Sāṁkhya teacher [22].

Pāṇini, the great grammarian, earlier than 300 B.C.

Pārśva, a Jaina prophet before Mahāvīra [25].

Pārthsārathi Miśra, *c.* 16th century A.D., an important exponent of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā [16].

Patañjali, the supposed author of the *Yoga-sūtra* [23].

Pāyāsi, a materialist, probably a little later than the Buddha [28].

Piṭakas, the earliest compilations of the Buddhist canonical literature [24].

Prabhācandra, *c.* 9th century A.D., a Jaina logician [25].

Prabhākara, *c.* 7th century A.D., the founder of the Prābhākara school of the Mīmāṁsā [16].

Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā, the school of Mīmāṁsā founded by Prābhākara [16].

Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, a Mahāyāna-sūtra [26].

Prajñā-pradīpa, by Bhāvaviveka, a work on Mādhyamika Buddhism [26].

Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, by Śālikanātha, the most important exposition of Prabhākara's views [16].

Pramāṇa-samuccaya, by Dignāga, the basic text on Buddhist logic [26].

Pramāṇa-vārttika, by Dharmakīrti, his most outstanding work [26].

Prasanna-padā, by Candrakīrti, the best known commentary on the *Mādhyamika-kārika* [26].

Praśastapāda, *c.* 5th century A.D., the author of the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* [27].

Purandara, *c.* A.D. 700, a Lokāyata philosopher.

Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, same as Mīmāṁsā.

Pūrvas, a class of early sacred literature of the Jainas [25].

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, *c.* 16th century A.D., the most famous commentator on Gaṅgeśa [27].

Rājaśekhara Sūri, *c.* A.D. 1340, a Jaina author.

Rāmāyana, one of the two great epics of India, composed in the 3rd century B.C. and received its present form in the 2nd century A.D.

Rāmānuja, *c.* 11th century A.D., the most important of the theistic commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya, referred to as an early Vaiśeṣika work [27].

Ṛgveda, the earliest and most important compilation of the Vedic literature [10].

Ṛjuvimalā, by Śālikanātha, a commentary on Prabhākara's *Bṛhati* [16].

Śabara, *c.* A.D. 400, the author of the earliest extant commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* [16].

Śābara-bhāṣya, Śabara's commentary on the *Mimamsa-sutra* [16].

Sadānanda Yati, *c.* 18th century A.D., the author of the Advaita-brahma-siddhi [7].

Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya, by Haribhadra, a compendium of Indian philosophy [9].

Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, a Mahāyāna-sūtra [26].

Śālikanātha, *c.* 7th-8th century A.D., the most famous commentator of Prabhākara [16].

Samādhiraja, a Mahāyāna-sūtra [26].

Samantabhadra, an early Jaina philosopher [25].

Sāmaveda, one of the four early compilations of the Vedic literature containing hymns meant to be sung during the performance of the ritual [10].

Śaṁkara, *c.* A.D. 788-820, the most important figure among the Advaita Vedāntists [17, 20].

Sāṁkhya, one of the earliest systems of Indian philosophy [22].

Sāṁkhya-kārikā, by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the earliest extant work on Sāṁkhya [22].

Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, by Vijñāna Bhikṣu, a commentary on the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* [22].

Sāṁkhya-sūtra, a late medieval work on the Sāṁkhya [22].

Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī, by Vācaspati Miśra, a commentary on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* [22].

Sañghabhadra, a Vaibhāṣika Buddhist who came after Vasubandhu [26].

Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, an agnostic contemporary of the Buddha [25].

Śāntarakṣita, *c.* 8th century A.D., the author of the *Tattva-saṁgraha,* a work on Buddhist logic [26].

Śāntideva, *c.* 7th century A.D., a populariser of Mahāyāna Buddhism [26].

Śārīraka-bhāṣya, the name of Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* [17, 20].

Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, by Mādhava, the most popular compendium of Indian philosophy.

Sarvāsti-vāda, the doctrine of a Buddhist philosophical school according to which everything exists always [26].

Sautrāntika, a school of Buddhist philosophers [26].

Sāyaṇa, *c.* 14th century A.D., the most well-known commentator on the early Vedic literature.

Siddhasena, an early Jaina philosopher [25].

Śikṣā-samuccaya, by Śāntideva, a religious poem popularising Mahāyāna Buddhism [26].

Ślokavārttika, by Kumārila, his most important philosophical work [16].

Sphuṭārthā-abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā, by Yaśomitra, a commentary on the *Abhidharma-kośa* [26].

Śrī-bhāṣya, Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Śrīdhara, *c.* A.D. 991, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher who commented upon Praśastapāda [27].

Śrīharṣa, *c.* A.D. 1150, a representative of the Advaita Vedānta, famous for his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* [17, 28].

Śrīkaṇṭha, a theistic commentator of the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Sthavira-vādins, the older orthodox followers of the Buddhist church [26].

Śūnya-vāda, the philosophical doctrine of the Mādhyamika Buddhists viewing reality as 'the void' [26].

Sureśvara, *c.* 9th century A.D., a famous post-Śaṁkara Advaita Vedāntist [17].

Sutta-piṭaka, one of the three early compilations (*piṭakas*) of the Buddhist canonical literature [24].

Śvetāmbara, a sect of Jainism [25].

Tantra-vārttika, by Kumārila, a Mīmāṁsā work [16].

Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā, by Guṇaratna, a commentary on *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya.*

Tarka-saṁgraha, by Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa, a popular manual of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika [3].

Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, by Umāsvāti, the earlier systematic exposition of the Jaina philosophy [25].

Tattva-cintāmaṇi, by Gaṅgeśa, the basic text of neo-Nyāya [27].

Tattva-saṁgraha, by Śāntarakṣita, a treatise on Buddhist logic.

Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā, by Kamalaśīla, a commentary on the *Tattva-saṁgraha* [26].

Tattva-vaiśāradī, by Vācaspati Miśra, a commentary on Vyāsa's commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* [23].

Tattvopaplavasiṁha, by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, a work on extreme scepticism wrongly attributed to the materialists [28].

Thera-vādins, the Pali word for the Sthavira-vādins [26].

Ṭupṭīkā, by Kumārila, a Mīmāṁsā work [16].

Udayana, *c.* 10th century A.D., the last great representative of the older phase of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika [27].

Uddyotakara, *c.* 6th-7th century A.D., the commentator on Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyaya-sūtra* [27].

Upaniṣad, a class of the Vedic literature representing its latest phase [13].

Umāsvāti, *c.* 1st century A.D., the earlist systematiser of the Jaina philosophy [25].

Uttara-Mīmāṁsā, or Vedānta, an orthodox system of Indian philosophy based on the Upaniṣads [16].

Vācaspati Miśra, *c.* 9th century A.D., author of very important commentaries on works belonging to various systems, namely Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta.

Vaibhāṣika, a school of Buddhist philosophers [26].

Vaiśesika, one of the major systems of Indian philosophy interested mainly in the questions of empirical ontology [27].

Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, the source-book of the Vaiśeṣika system attributed to Kaṇāda [27].

Vallabha, *c.* 15th century A.D., a theistic commentator of the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, *c.* 15th-16th century A.D., the first to introduce neo-Nyāya in Bengal [27].

Vasubandhu, *c.* 5th century A.D., originally a Vaibhāṣika Buddhist though later converted to Yogācāra Buddhism [26].

Vātsyāyana, *c.* 4th century A.D., the author of the earliest extant commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* [27].

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* [27].

Veda, a vast body of literature—the earliest in the Indo-European languages—and considered to be most sacred by the orthodox Hindus [10].

Vedānta, same as Uttara-Mīmāṁsā [17].

Vedānta-sūtra, the same as the *Brahma-sūtra* [17].

Vibhāṣā, the same as the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā* [26].

Vidhi-viveka, by Maṇḍana Miśra, a work on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā [16].

Vidyānanda, a Jaina logician [25].

Vijñāna Bhikṣu, *c.* 16th century A.D., a theist philosopher claiming affiliation to the Sāṁkhya [22].

Vijñāna-vāda, subjective idealism—the philosophical doctrine of Yogācāra school of the Buddhists [26].

Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, by Vasubandhu, a philosophical defence of Vijñāna-vāda [26].

Vinaya-piṭaka, one of the three early compilations (Piṭakas) of the Buddhist canonical literature dealing with the questions of monastic discipline [24].

Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda, qualified absolutism, the philosophical view of the Rāmānuja school of Vedānta [17].

Vṛttikāra, an early commentator on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* quoted by Śabara [16].

Yoga, certain ancient practices supposed to be conducive to supernatural powers, though also taken to be the name of a major system of Indian philosophy [23].

Yogācāra, a Mahāyāna Buddhistic school of philosophy founded by Maitreyanatha and Asaṅga viewing ideas as the only reality [26].

Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, by Asaṅga, a basic text of the Yogācāra Buddhism [26].

Yoga-sūtra, the basic work on Yoga attributed to Patañjali [23].

Yājñavalkya, an important philosopher of the Upaniṣads [18].

Yājñavalkya-smṛti, a work on Indian law probably belonging to A.D. 100-300.

Yajurveda, one of the four early compilations of the Vedic literature having its main theme the Vedic rituals [10].

Yaśomitra, the author of a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* [26].

Yaśovijaya, a Jaina logician [25].