BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

From Earliest Times to 1950

by

SIR READER BULLARD
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E.
...er (afterwards Ambassador)
... Persia 1939-46


INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY · SIMLA ·
ii as
25.9.51
SYRIA
IRAQ
DAMASCUS
BAGHDAD
R. Tigris
R. Euphrates
Ahwaz
Khorramshahr (Mohammerah)
Basra
Shatt al Arab
KUWAIT
Kharaq
Bushire
PERSIAN GULF
Bandar Abbas
Basidu
Hormuz
Henjam
Jask
Bahrein
QATAR
TRUCIAL OMAN
GULF OF OMAN
Muscat
HEJAZ
Medina
Khurma
MECCA
Jidda (Jedda)
Turabao
RED SEA
ERITREA
YEMEN
Sanaa
ADEN PROTECTORATE
Shihr
Mukallap
Mocha
Lahej
Aden
ADEN
Perim
GULF OF ADEN
ARABIAN
SOMALILAND
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
LEGEND
DATA ENTERED
The MINERVA Book Shop

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 1950

by

SIR READER BULLARD

K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

H.M. MINISTER (AFTERWARDS AMBASSADOR) AT TEHRAN 1939–46

1951

HUTCHINSON'S UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Hutchinson House, London, W.1.

New York *Melbourne* *Sydney* *Cape Town*

Printed in Great Britain
at the Gainsborough Press, St. Albans,
by Fisher, Knight and Co. Ltd.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

THE term "Middle East" is used in this book to include what used to be called the Near East as well as most of the Middle East proper. It covers Turkey and Iran (Persia), Cyprus, Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Israel and Jordan), Iraq, Egypt, the Sudan, and the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.

Many kind hands have helped to remove at least some of the defects from this work; but the writer's greatest debt is to Mr. C. J. Edmonds, C.M.G., C.B.E., and to Mr. A. L. F. Smith, C.B.E., M.V.O., LL.D., for their untiring and invaluable advice.

It is to be noted that although the writer held posts under the Foreign Office for many years, any views expressed in this book and the responsibility for them are entirely his own.

INTRODUCTION

THE Tin Islands (Kassiterides) to which the Phoenicians traded are believed to have been the Scillies and perhaps Cornwall. Matthew Arnold's "grave Tyrian trader", finding the competition of the Greek coaster too severe, sought for new markets beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. Other Phoenicians went further afield, until one of them sighted some British beach and there "undid his corded bales". Now what came out of those bales? Matthew Arnold does not say, though he might have compiled a probable and picturesque list from the 27th chapter of Ezekiel, where the Hebrew prophet enumerates the commodities which constituted the trade of Tyre and the countries whence they came. Tyre was then the principal state of Phoenicia, and the Phoenicians, living at the junction of many land and sea routes, received and exchanged goods from Sicily and Spain, Asia Minor and Egypt, Arabia and Iraq and countries further to the east. It is probable that the Phoenicians who came to the Scillies for tin gave in exchange much the same articles as English ships fetched from Syria in Elizabethan times: fine woven materials, dyed stuffs and spices.

The conditions which made Phoenicia a trading centre gave it also strategic importance: as the passageway between a ring of great empires it was an emporium in peace and a battle-ground or a line of communication in war. The ancient empires passed away, but the Middle East into which they were absorbed became an object of vital interest to new states—France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Germany, Italy, the United States. The number of "questions" which have had their origin in the Middle East is large: it is sufficient to mention those relating to the Straits, the Suez Canal, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Baghdad Railway, Palestine.

The Middle East lost its value as the trading link between

East and West when the sea route to India was discovered, but it retained its strategic importance, and this has been enormously increased by the exploitation of its oil supplies and the development of air communications. The oil reserves, which extend in a long line from Iraq (perhaps from North Persia) through South Persia and along the western coast of Arabia to Qatar, are already known to be almost as large as those remaining in the Western Hemisphere, perhaps larger. It is through the Middle East—Cairo, Baghdad and the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf—that the great airlines run connecting Europe with India, Australia and the Far East. Ancient and modern commerce join when the pipeline which carries oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean forks at the Euphrates and embraces, along the coast, a territory which in ancient times was roughly Phoenicia. Not far away, in Palestine, is the traditional site of Armageddon, where those who read prophecies into the Book of Revelation look for a battle to be waged in which evil will be finally overthrown. If an ideological war will satisfy them, let them know that it has begun in the Middle East already.

PART I

PILGRIMS AND CRUSADERS

FOR the first written records of relations between Britain and the Middle East (apart from the early reference to the Tin Islands) a leap of perhaps a thousand years must be made, from the Phoenician trader to the English pilgrim. Pilgrims from Mediterranean countries were probably visiting the Holy Land as early as the fourth century, but distance, the imperfect Romanization of Britain, the conquest by the pagan Saxons, and the competition between the Roman and the Irish missionaries tended to keep Britain in spiritual isolation from Europe until the supremacy of Rome was accepted at the Synod of Whitby in 662. Only two generations later the Englishman Willibald spent the ten years from 721 to 731 on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, stimulated perhaps by the example of that Flemish pilgrim who, when wrecked on the English coast on his way home, gave to Bede the account of his journey which is inserted in the *Ecclesiastical History*. The sea route to the Mediterranean was barred by the Arab Caliphate in Spain, and Willibald had to travel through France; and even that route was threatened by the Saracens until their defeat by Charles Martel in 732.

Willibald's narrative reveals the risks and hardships of travel in those days. In spite of the danger from brigands in the Alps and in Italy he managed to reach Naples, whence he sailed first to Syracuse, then to the Morea, Chios and Samos, and then to Ephesus, near Smyrna. He walked to Adalia, reached northern Syria via Cyprus (where he nearly died of starvation) and walked to Homs. Here the Saracens put him in prison, but they eventually released him and even gave him a pass which enabled him to visit all the places open to Christians.

Letters known to have been written to King Alfred by the Patriarch of Jerusalem have not survived, but they probably resembled those written to the King of the Franks, in setting forth the destitution of the Church in Palestine. Money was needed to keep the churches from falling into ruin, to ransom Christians from captivity, and even to redeem the Patriarch's property from pawn. It was perhaps in return for help sent that England received a series of medical prescriptions which were simpler than the Anglo-Saxon remedies of the time and contained less magic and more common-sense: they were copied out in English medical books for many years. The tale that Alfred sent envoys with gifts to St. Thomas of India has been rationalized by the modern historian into the despatch of gifts to the shrine of St. Thomas at Edessa (Urfa), where the saint was believed to have been buried.

Not piety alone took men to the Middle East. It was intellectual curiosity that moved Athelard, who travelled in Egypt, Palestine and Arabia, "being of a good wit and being desirous to increase and enrich the same with the best things." Then there were the three emissaries from Edward the Confessor, who went to the Bishop of Ephesus to ascertain whether the King had seen truly when it appeared to him in a dream that the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, who until then had lain upon their right sides, had turned over to the left—a presage of seventy-four years of disaster. It is related that they were politely shown the Sleepers and confirmed the accuracy of the King's vision. "Neither were the calamities foretold any long time delayed."

The connection between the Middle East and Britain as illustrated by archaeological finds, the influence of Byzantine and Middle Eastern art and architecture upon ours, and the benefit which came to England, as to other western countries in the Middle Ages, by the transmission of Greek learning through Arab channels, lie outside the scope of this book. A word, however, may be said about the wanderings of coins. The Baghdad coins, struck by various Abbasid Caliphs, which were found in the Orkneys, may have been collected by pirates anywhere in southern Europe; Saxon coins dug up in the Middle East are supposed to have been paid out in Danegeld. What led

Offa, the eighth-century ruler of Mercia, to adopt a gold dinar of Baghdad as his currency can only be guessed: perhaps like the bezant at a later date it had gained wide acceptance as a medium of exchange. In any case, in an Edinburgh museum can be seen the sole known specimen of this remarkable coin, with its Arabic inscription only a little blurred and with OFFA stamped across the centre. Had the Mercians been able to read the inscription the coin might have been repudiated as heretical, for while they could have approved "God is most great" they would surely have regarded "He has no companion" as rank Arianism.

In spite of all the cross-legged warriors on tombs in English churches, the crusading movement found relatively little support in England. Whether because the Saracen menace was more remote, or because in newly-conquered England there was plenty of scope for Norman ambition and greed, or for some other reason, the English contribution to the Crusades was small in comparison with that of France. An English contingent was concerned, it is true, in the one permanent territorial gain, apart from Sicily, that was made during the Crusades: that, however, was not in the Holy Land but in Portugal, where some English crusaders, on their way to join the French King in the Levant, landed and helped the King of Portugal to recover Lisbon from the paynim. It is estimated that some four or five thousand men from England went on the First Crusade. There were some great names among them, and the English wife of Baldwin, afterwards first Christian King of Jerusalem, set off on the Crusade with her husband: she never lived to be Queen, however, for she died in Asia Minor on the way to the Holy Land.

Romantic legend has obscured the part played by the two royalties from England who went on the Crusades: Richard I, and that Lord Edward who became Edward I. On his way to Palestine Richard captured Cyprus from its Byzantine ruler, a secret ally of the Saracens, but he gave it away to Guy de Lusignan, and so severed an English connection

with Cyprus which was only renewed some seven hundred years later. Richard's military skill, which won the victories of Acre and Arsuf and may perhaps have postponed for a long period the Moslem conquests in Europe, could not recover Jerusalem in the face of dissensions among the Christians and the diseases that attacked their armies. His personal exploits, however, struck the imagination of his stay-at-home compatriots and even, if tradition is to be believed, that of his enemies. According to Joinville's *Chronicles* King Richard "did there such mighty deeds that the Saracens stood in great fear of him; so much so, as it is written in the book of the Holy Land, that when the Saracen children cried, their mothers called out, 'Wisht! Here is King Richard,' in order to keep them quiet. And when the horses of the Saracens and the Bedouins started at tree or bush, their masters said to the horses, 'Do you think that is King Richard?'"

The Crusade that Edward proposed to join was over before he arrived, and his operations, however gallant, were raids of no military importance. In strategy however he showed his quality by proposing to the son of the Mongol Khan of Persia that they should make a concerted attack on their common foe, the Saracens of Syria: it was not his fault that the scheme failed. It is not for this however that Edward stands out in the popular history of the Crusades, but for the wound inflicted on him by the poisoned dagger of one of the original "assassins", those hashish-eaters sent by the fanatical Old Man of the Mountain (the Lebanon) to compass the death of prominent Christians.

Although the English part in the Crusades was small, the movement had an important effect upon the social development of England, for the collection of vast sums of money to cover the cost of the campaigns and the ransom of Richard I helped to hasten the transfer of power from the feudal to the commercial classes: it involved the raising of loans and the replacement of many a personal landlord by a business man intent upon nothing but the recovery of the loan, and it enabled some of the towns to purchase at least partial immunity from royal interference. It also involved an important innovation in the system of taxation: the Saladin Tithe

was the first tax on movable property ever levied in England. The Crusades may also have done something in England, as they are believed to have done on the Continent, to develop the feeling of nationalism. Intercourse between nations does not automatically increase mutual affection and respect.

When the Venetians, who provided the shipping, diverted the Fourth Crusade to the Byzantine Empire in order to get rid of a commercial rival, and thereby weakened the main rampart against the advancing Turk, no English took part in that discreditable attack. Such English participants as there were in that campaign were on the right side. According to Villehardouin's account of the siege of Constantinople, "They (the Franks) planted two ladders at a barbican near the sea, and the wall was well defended by Englishmen and Danes . . . and those within . . . cast them out in very ugly sort, keeping twenty-two as prisoners." Where the English and Danes guarded the wall no entry could be effected, but a breach was made elsewhere and the city was taken. When the Frankish envoys were admitted for a parley it was the English and Danes who formed the guard of honour. These men were probably at that time the most important element in the Emperor's Varangian Guard. The Varangians were at first mainly Northmen, but the proportion of English gradually increased, especially after the Norman conquest, when more and more Englishmen, and Danes from England, went into exile. Hakluyt says that upon the appearance of the Emperor coming from his oratory, "clashing their halberds together to make a terrible sound the Varangians in the English tongue wished him a long life." It is probable that the companies composed of other races also hailed the Emperor in their own tongues, but the preponderance of the English gave colour to the story on which Hakluyt relied.

That the English were not a mere ceremonial force is shown by their defence of Constantinople and by the part they played in an earlier conflict when the Byzantine army was nearly destroyed in a battle near Konia against the Seljuk Turks. Writing to Henry II of England the Emperor of Byzantium said (and this shows that not all the English were exiles):

"Some of your Lordship's great men were with us." There is almost no record of the Guard after the Latin conquest of Constantinople. Funeral stones believed to bear the names of Varangians were to be seen in Constantinople as late as 1865. The British Ambassador wished to remove them to the English cemetery, but permission was refused and the stones were eventually used for building; and copies which had been made were destroyed in a fire.

PART II

THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS

In the commercial expansion which followed the discovery of the West Indies and the Cape route to India the English at first remained far behind. While the Spaniards were finding the Philippines, the French Sumatra, and the Portuguese uncounted new lands beyond India, British seamen and merchants were just beginning to secure a footing in the Levant trade, hitherto carried on mainly by the Venetians. From about 1511 the English began to traffic to the Greek islands and sometimes to Syria. From Greece came that profitable commodity Corinth grapes (currants); but for the spices which were essential for the food of those days, and for raw silk and cotton and fine materials made from them, it was necessary to go to Syria. To the desire to secure the profits of the carrying trade was now added the need to find markets for English woollen goods. The English were not content to go on supplying wool for others to weave: they had become manufacturers, and already had a surplus of woollen textiles to dispose of.

The formal establishment of trade with Turkey dates from 1553, when Anthony Jenkinson went to Aleppo and obtained from the Sultan, Sulaiman the Great, permission for English merchants to trade there on the same terms as the Venetians and the French. Whether this at once led to profitable business or not (and the Venetians did not welcome interlopers), attempts were made at the same time to establish direct contact with China, then believed to be peculiarly suited to absorb surplus English woollens. The attempt to find the way to China by the North-West Passage having failed, trial was made of the North-East Passage. The bulk of the expedition was lost, but the pilot, in another vessel, found himself in the

north of Russia, hitherto accessible from England only by land, and making his way to Moscow he obtained from the Czar a letter to Edward VI inviting English merchants to his realm and promising them a free mart and free liberties. The astute Jenkinson saw here a chance to tap the Oriental trade at a point farther east than Syria, and he secured the command of the first expedition trading into Russia, in 1557. The Russian trade was valuable in itself, but Jenkinson, though he wrote his principals a long and conscientious report about it, persisted in his original design. He made his way to Bokhara through dangers which justified his pride in being the first to unfurl the Cross of St. George on the Caspian Sea.

Jenkinson found Bokhara useless as a centre for English trade, but the journey was not wasted: from Indian merchants there he learned that there would be no demand for heavy woollens in Bengal, and on his way back he found that at Astrakhan English goods brought from Syria by Armenian merchants were on sale at prices with which he could hardly compete. Jenkinson now tried Persia, after returning home and obtaining from Queen Elizabeth letters to the Czar and to "the Great Sophy" (the Shah). Travelling again through Russia he reached Qazvin, then the capital of Persia. One of the frequent wars between Turkey and Persia had been raging, and Jenkinson had hoped to create a favourable impression by offering the Shah a trade route safe from Turkish interference. Just as he reached Qazvin, however, there arrived a Turkish envoy to conclude peace. The negotiations with "Shaw Thomas" (Shah Tahmasp) were complicated by Persian ignorance about England, by the lack for some time of an interpreter who could read any of the Queen's letters, which were written in Latin, Italian and Hebrew, and by the hostility of some of the Shah's advisers. Religious fanaticism also played a part: the first interview ended stormily on a theological note, and as Jenkinson left the palace servants obliterated his footprints with sand to avert defilement.

In spite of this discouraging beginning the mission was successful: resident agents of the Muscovy Company followed, and six years later the Shah conferred on English merchants the privileges necessary to enable them to live and trade in

Persia. The Shah himself showed an interest in trade with England which perhaps helped to disguise its uneconomic character. One of the factors went as far as Tabriz, only to find the market there well stocked with English goods carried thither from Aleppo, or even from Venice by the Armenians. Now and then a good sale was made or a profitable exchange effected, but there was always brigandage in Persia to be feared, and piracy on the Caspian, and officialdom in Russia. And there were bad debts, Persian "dukes" being sometimes reluctant payers.

Not only foreign dukes, however, were to be feared. When the East India Company helped to drive the Portuguese from Hormuz it took all the booty they had secured to "sweeten" the King's favourite, the Duke of Buckingham. That, however, was half a century later. At this time Hormuz was a goal of desire calculated to be six weeks away from the English factors in Northern Persia. A barren island in the Persian Gulf, Hormuz had nevertheless become a busy market under its Persian governors, and after its capture by the Portuguese it survived for a century as an emporium of fabulous wealth. It received the wares of China, the East Indies, Siam and India, and collected for exchange silk, horses and Bahrain pearls. Even without this standard of comparison, however, the trade in North Persia must have seemed meagre. The route was long and vulnerable, and it was difficult to compete with the Armenian middlemen; and in the end the English factors abandoned their trading centres in Persia. An attempt to revive the project two centuries later failed, from the same causes.

These first representatives of English trade in Persia, besides being men of energy and ability, must have been honest fellows, for when the Shah wished to send a considerable sum of money to Mecca as a pious offering, he bought English coin from them, giving as his reason that their money was got by good means and with good consciences, whereas his own, which was "rather gotten by fraud, oppression and unhonest means", was not worthy to be made an oblation to the Holy Prophet. On the whole this reputation for honest dealing has been well sustained in the Middle East, and a very valuable asset it has been to British trade. An unusual step to maintain the belief in

the Middle East that an Englishman's word is his bond was taken by the War Office at the end of the First World War, when a merchant of Asia Minor who had cashed to an unlimited extent cheques drawn by British officers who were prisoners-of-war presented this mass of paper in London. The living signatories paid their debts; the War Office met the cheques of those who had died.

Overlapping the abortive attempt to establish trade with Persia there was a very successful effort to follow up Jenkinson's initiative in Turkey. Sultan Sulaiman being dead, the privileges granted by him had by the custom of the time ceased to be valid, and an enterprising group of London merchants sent a delegation to Constantinople to prepare the way for a more formal envoy. As a result of this move the first Ambassador to the Sublime Porte left England in 1578, travelling overland in order, apparently, to escape the notice of our trade rivals in the Mediterranean. His mission was highly successful, in spite of the strong opposition of the French Ambassador, and he returned home with a letter from Sultan Murad to Queen Elizabeth, conveying assurances for English merchants to enter, trade in and leave the Ottoman dominions without hindrance and on the same terms as the French, the Venetians, the Poles and the subjects of the King of Germany.

The merchants to whose enterprise this success was due were rewarded in 1581 by the grant by Queen Elizabeth of a monopoly of trading into the territories of the Grand Signior (the Sultan). This was the beginning of the Levant Company, which was not dissolved until 1825, though during its later years it was only a shadow of its former self. In 1605 there was much argument for and against the prolongation of the charter, and to support their request for an extension the Company pleaded not only the sale in Turkey of woollen goods representing the labour of many workmen, but also valuable political services: they had secured the release of many Englishmen from slavery, and moreover they had persuaded the Porte not to agree to a Spanish proposal for a non-aggression pact whereby Spanish troops keeping watch on the Turkish frontier would have been released to take part in the Armada against England in 1588.

There was no clear demarcation in the Levant Company between political and commercial functions. The Ambassador supervised the commercial as well as the official duties of the consuls, who were appointed by him, and his salary was paid by the Levant Company; but he was also the diplomatic representative of the Crown. The post of Ambassador soon became a Crown appointment, but the consuls in Turkey were officials of the Company until 1821. The Company even employed chaplains to minister to their staff. The Reverend Edward Pococke, before becoming the first professor of an Arabic lecture founded at Oxford by Archbishop Laud, spent five years at Aleppo, from 1630, as chaplain to the "Turkey merchants," and later he was chaplain to the Embassy in Constantinople. He was a great Orientalist, and collected some valuable manuscripts which are now in the Bodleian.

The consulates in Syria were used as bases for some remarkable journeys. Consider for instance the second journey of Master Robert Newberry, who left England in 1580; travelled from Syria to Basra overland and thence to Hormuz, where in spite of the attempts of the Venetians to incite the Portuguese Governor against him he remained unmolested for some months; landed at Bandar Abbas and made his way through Persia and Asia Minor to Constantinople; and returned home via Roumania and Poland after an absence of nearly two years. His third journey, however, was the most important, for although he himself never returned from it, one of his companions, Ralph Fitch, wrote an account of it which contributed much to the establishment of trade with India and the Persian Gulf. Newberry, Fitch and two others sailed for Syria in 1583 in *The Tiger* of London, a vessel which attained immortality by the mention of its voyage "to Aleppo" in the witches' scene in Macbeth. They followed Newberry's earlier route but had not his good fortune at Hormuz, for they were arrested and sent to Goa, and had to escape by stealth. The party eventually split up, and Newberry, who planned to travel northwards from India, disappeared on the way. The expedition, however, had been successful, for it showed that trade with India via the Persian Gulf was dangerous because of Portuguese hostility, and that the route to follow was that by long sea.

Given the hardships and dangers to which these travellers were exposed it is surprising that so many of them returned home. Some, like Jenkinson and Newberry, went back to the Middle East several times. The death-rate was very high, not so much from violence, though deaths from brigands are mentioned and one traveller at least was burned by the Inquisition at Hormuz, as from dysentery, malaria and other diseases. To see the number of deaths in its true proportion however the death-rate of Europeans in the Middle East should be compared with that of the contemporary population of England, who suffered from epidemics of cholera and typhus and even plague, and from absurd and disgusting remedies administered for such mysterious maladies as the Purples, Head-mould-shot and Rising of the Lights.

Travellers of that age had no easy means of acquiring the languages of the countries they visited, and the Oriental words they employ in their writings are usually distorted and sometimes unrecognizable. Like the British in India who heard the lament for Hassan and Hussein as "Hobson-Jobson" they tended to approximate any foreign word to something familiar. Thus Shah Tahmasp became "Shaw Thomas", and the Caliph Omar "one Homer". The lack of knowledge of local languages sometimes led to trouble. Queen Elizabeth's letters to the Shah were addressed to "the Great Sophy", it having been supposed that *safavi*, which was the name of the dynasty, was his title. To be called Sophy was no compliment to a shah, the sufis being dervish mystics who were often mendicants. The first English Ambassador to the Porte had to use Latin in his correspondence with the Turks, and this was not always successful. On one occasion he wrote a stiff letter accusing the responsible Turkish official of making three mistakes in transmitting communications from the Sultan, and he added: *Ut deinceps similes errores non evenient precamur . . . quod spero te facturum*—don't let it happen again.

These pioneer merchants managed to collect a great mass of local information. Their letters to their principals contain not only commercial information but also notes on routes and conditions of travel, picturesque details about local dress and customs, and even reports on religious beliefs. Some of their

descriptions hold good today. The boats on the Euphrates and the rafts on the Tigris, both built for down-stream traffic only, have not changed, nor have the appearance and way of living of the Marsh Arab—nor his expertness in thieving, which caused the Elizabethan travellers great loss. At that time, it seems, the Marsh Arab was much afraid of the gun, but by 1914 he had mastered the use of that western weapon, and would steal a rifle from under a sleeping British soldier as skilfully as he stole a casket belonging to Master John Eldred from under the head of his sleeping servant in the year 1583.

The merchants were quick to detect local susceptibilities and to spare them. When the Shah included in an immense order one hundred clothes brushes, the factor stipulated that they must not be made of pigs' bristles; and the Company were speedily warned of the danger of addressing the Shah as the Sophy. Some of the sources of wealth which were noticed were of no value to our trade at the time but acquired importance later on. One informant reported how the oil of Baku (then Persian territory) was used as an illuminant throughout Persia. Centuries later British skill and capital were to help in the development of the Baku oilfields, as well as of many oilfields farther south. Jenkinson noticed "licoris" growing in profusion along the banks of the Volga. In the nineteenth century, when liquorice came to be used as a flavouring for tobacco, a British company made a business of the export of liquorice root from the Caucasus, Asia Minor, Syria and Iraq. Many British troops who have served in Iraq will remember Makina, near Basra. That is *Makina mal Sus*, the Liquorice Machine, one of the Company's baling factories.

The spirit of overseas adventure was aroused in the reign of Henry VII, and even the journeys into Russia by sea began before the death of Edward VI, but exploration and commercial expansion grew so rapidly under Elizabeth that Hakluyt rightly attributes special virtue to her protection. He gives credit to the Spanish, Portuguese and French explorers, but demands that justice should also be done to the deeds performed by the English during the reign of Queen

Elizabeth. In a well-known passage in the Epistle Dedicatory to his Voyages he asks:

"Which of the kings of this land before her Majesty, had their banners ever seen in the Caspian Sea? Which of them hath ever dealt with the Emperor of Persia, as her Majesty hath done, and obtained for her merchants large and loving privileges? Who ever saw before this regiment an English Ligier in the stately porch of the Grand Signior at Constantinople? Who ever found English Consuls at Tripolis in Syria, at Aleppo, at Babylon, at Balsara, and which is more, who ever heard of Englishmen at Goa before now?"

Yes, no one (to modernize Hakluyt's language) ever saw before that reign an English Ambassador at the Sublime Porte of the Sultan at Constantinople, or English Consuls at Tripoli and Aleppo, Baghdad and Basra. But trade was not to stop there. On the last day of 1600 a charter was granted to the East India Company for a monopoly of direct trade with the Orient. The rich cargoes known to have been brought home from the East by Portuguese and Dutch traders had aroused the ambition of English merchants to share in so profitable a business, and the defeat of the Spanish Armada had led the English to defy the Spanish-Portuguese claim to a monopoly of the eastern trade. It is significant that the East India Company was founded mainly by members of the Levant Company. By its means English trade penetrated into the Middle East by the back doors: the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The first attempt to trade up the Red Sea was made by two vessels which arrived at Aden in April 1609 after a year's voyage, bringing a cargo of iron, lead, tin and cloth. It was not a success. Aden was found to be a garrison town rather than a trading centre, and on such goods as were saleable there the duties were high. The chief factor, John Jourdain, made a remarkable journey from Aden to Sanaa, in the Yemen, and from there to Mocha, but he failed to obtain any reduction in the customs dues from the Pasha of Sanaa, who moreover warned him not to return without a special permit from Constantinople.

The second expedition, made under the command of Sir

Henry Middleton in 1610-11, was no more successful. At Mocha Middleton and several of his men were imprisoned by the Governor: they escaped, and Middleton blockaded the port to exact compensation. A later governor admitted the fault of his predecessor, but alleged that misunderstanding had arisen from the misconduct of some of the English sailors who, having procured drink from the Jews, got drunk, insulted women and defiled mosques. "Read, blush and amend" says Purchas.

The Red Sea trade was desired because bilateral trade was found to have a serious drawback. Exports to India did not balance the cost of the goods it was desired to buy, and this necessitated the export of specie from England on a ruinous scale. The remedy appeared to be to carry goods from India—Oriental as well as English—to Mocha, for sale to the Egyptian merchants, who paid largely in bullion. In spite of setbacks the trade took root, and a factory was established at Mocha which was maintained until the middle of the eighteenth century. It was from here that England first received the coffee which affected English life considerably through the establishment of the coffee-house as a social centre.

Hopes of trade with Persia had been raised again by an approach made by the Shah to James I and other European rulers. The Shah's emissary was an Englishman, Robert Sherley, one of two remarkable brothers who laid the foundations of a regular Persian army. Robert Sherley's mission, to find an outlet for Persian raw silk, failed because the Persian terms were too onerous; but later he helped to establish trade with England by obtaining for the East India Company three imperial decrees recommending English vessels to the governors of the Gulf ports. One of these decrees served as the basis for English trade at Jask, where business was opened by the export of seventy bales of silk on which the Company made a large profit.

The attempt to enter the Persian trade by way of the Gulf met with strong Portuguese opposition. The fact that from 1604 we were at peace with Spain, of which Portugal at that time formed part, did not ensure for the first English ships that reached India a friendly or even a neutral reception from the Portuguese. Not only did they use diplomatic means to

influence the Great Mogul against the interlopers, but the English ships were attacked by Portuguese vessels which, however, were less heavily armed and less skilfully managed than the English and were repelled with heavy loss. The conflict extended to the Persian Gulf, where the English vessels that shipped the first consignment of silk had to beat off a Portuguese attack. Reinforced from Goa the Portuguese now became involved in hostilities with the Shah, who thereupon invited the English to assist in the recapture of Hormuz, threatening in case of refusal to cancel all commercial privileges. The combined assault resulted in the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz, which fell into decay and was replaced by Jask, on the mainland.

English trade at Jask began to prosper, thanks not only to the elimination of Portuguese competition but also to a clause in the agreement concluded before the attack on Hormuz, whereby English goods were exempted from customs dues, and the English divided equally with the Persians the duties on the goods of other nations. The Headquarters of the English trade in the Gulf were transferred later to Bandar Abbas and finally to Bushire. A "factory" was established by the East India Company at Basra, about 1640, but it was abandoned for lack of trade some twenty years later.

The Portuguese danger had now disappeared, but European vessels proceeding to the East were exposed to attack by Arab pirates. This threat was met by international action, about the year 1700, when the French undertook to patrol the Persian Gulf and the Dutch the Red Sea, while the British accepted responsibility for the South Indian seas.

The attempt already mentioned to revive trade with Persia via Russia in the eighteenth century is described by Jonas Hanway, whose physical courage in the face of perils in Persia was equal to the moral courage he showed in carrying the first umbrella ever seen in London and in attacking tea-drinking in a pamphlet war with Samuel Johnson. The main object of the attempt was the sale of woollens and the purchase of raw silk. The Levant Company preferred to leave the profits of the Persian trade, and the risks, to the Armenians, with whom they could do business in Aleppo. Persian silk

could also be bought in St. Petersburg, but the (English) Russia Company wished to cut out the middlemen, and they obtained permission from the Russian Government in 1743 to trade to the Caspian Sea. The Company were allowed to build a vessel in Russia for the Caspian trade, but permission for a second was secured with greater difficulty, the commercial rivalry of the Russians having by now been aroused.

Some pretext for Russian hostility was furnished by a certain John Elton, formerly a seaman but later a factor of the Russia Company in North Persia, who took service with the Shah for the building of ships on the Caspian "after the European manner". It was not to be expected, says Hanway, that the Russians would welcome the appearance of Persian naval or even merchant vessels on the Caspian. Fearful of Russian hostility the Company urged Elton to leave the Shah's service. Elton however refused, or was not allowed by the Shah, to resign. By the exercise of unusual ability and energy he managed to get some vessels built, in spite of the unwillingness of the Persians, forced labourers to a man, to work on a job where they were often left without rations owing to the "indiscretion" of the Persian officers.

Probably commercial rivalry alone would have sufficed to bring the English experiment to an end, but the Russian Consul in North Persia is said to have had his own reasons for opposing the English traders: he could not levy toll on them as he could on the Armenians. He could however make their lives a burden. He persuaded the Russian authorities at Astrakhan to prevent the two English vessels from returning to Persia, on the pretext that any Persian goods they might load might be contaminated by plague. The Russia Company were therefore compelled to sell the vessels cheap to their Russian rivals. In 1746 the Russian Government prohibited the English trade with the Caspian, and within a few years the English factors left Persia. In the disorders which followed the death of Nadir Shah they had been robbed of goods to the value of £80,000. They were convinced that the receivers of the stolen property were the Russians, and that "a good part" was in the house of the Russian Consul himself; but no satisfaction could be obtained.

PART III

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION

CONTACT with India having been established by sea, it was natural that our Levant trade should decline. The sea route was so much cheaper for Indian goods and even for Persian silk brought from the Persian Gulf that they could be re-exported from England and sold in the Levant at lower prices than those charged for similar goods brought overland via Iraq and Syria. In Egypt, English trade almost ceased to exist and the English consulates were abolished, and in Syria English interests were in the hands of foreigners, usually Italians. This was to the advantage of France, whose Levant trade, closely bound up with her long-standing friendship with Turkey, was the mainstay of her commercial prosperity.

When the English turned their attention again to the Levant it was in order to use it as a shorter route to India. An attempt made in 1698 to create a route for Red Sea goods through Egypt failed because the Porte refused to allow any Christian vessels to navigate the Red Sea north of Jeddah. This prohibition was ostensibly based on the nearness of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina to the coast, but economic motives too were doubtless at work. Dues collected at Jedda would go to the Turkish treasury, but it was the Mamelukes who enjoyed the revenues of the Egyptian customs; moreover, if the Red Sea route became too attractive, Turkish profits on the overland route through Iraq and Syria would fall off.

The prohibition was contrary to the permission granted to English vessels to visit all Ottoman ports without hindrance, but it remained in force until in 1766 Ali Bey, one of the Mamelukes, obtained supremacy over his fellows and asserted

his independence of the Porte. He threw open the port of Suez to foreigners, and wrote to the Governor of Bengal stressing the advantages of trade with Egypt. The recipient of this message was Warren Hastings, who sent presents in return and a letter promising that a ship should be sent to Egypt the following year. Ali Bey was soon ejected by a rival who, however, confirmed the invitation to British traders and lowered the customs dues in Egypt to 8% as against the 14% commonly levied at Jedda. The British Government regarded this without enthusiasm, fearing that it would annoy the Porte and injure the trade of the East India Company.

The great partisan of the Egyptian route was George Baldwin, who was eventually appointed Consul in Egypt. He established a route through Egypt for despatches between Britain and India. Hitherto the route had been via Aleppo and the Persian Gulf, but although the service maintained by the East India Company's officials was very efficient, Baldwin's service via Egypt reduced the time taken by a half and sometimes even two-thirds. The Porte objected to the new arrangement, and even more strongly to the passage of goods through Egypt; they had economic grounds for that, and perhaps they suspected the motives of the British. The Government in London blew hot and then cold. They organized a mail service via Egypt, but then decided to abandon the scheme, close down British trade in Egypt and recall Baldwin. By then however hostilities with France had begun, and Baldwin proved the value of his route by sending on the news of the outbreak of war with such promptitude that the British authorities in India were able to seize Pondicherry, and so paralyse French activities in India, before the French heard that war had been declared. It was pointed out later that had this means of communication been open when peace was made it would have saved the lives of at least some of the eighty British officers and two thousand men who were killed after the conclusion of peace.

British activity in Egypt aroused the suspicion of the French: not content with disputing India with them the British were now trying to gain a foothold in Egypt. The French had tried to prevent the English in Elizabeth's reign from establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with the Porte;

and now it seemed to them essential to exclude the British from Egypt. The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 was not an original project: he merely acted on a plan which had been contemplated for over thirty years.

French policy in Egypt was one aspect of that Eastern Question which began to cause Great Britain concern in the eighteenth century. The Eastern Question has been well defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual recession of the Ottoman Empire from the frontiers it reached at the height of its expansion. This recession began at the end of the sixteenth century, under Russian and Austrian pressure. From that time the chief element in the Eastern Question was the attempt of Russia to increase her influence at the expense of Turkey, either by territorial expansion, or by securing control of the Straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus), or by establishing a right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey.

The long alliance of France with Turkey had tended to make British policy towards Turkey rather cool. Moreover the importance of our trade with Russia seemed to make the maintenance of friendly relations with her essential. Chatham declared friendship with Russia to be the cornerstone of his foreign policy. It was William Pitt who began to have doubts, and with good reason, since the declared policy of the Empress Catherine included the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople and the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire under a Russian nominee. Victorious over the Turks (thanks in part to the British officers in the Russian navy) Catherine imposed on Turkey in 1774 the Treaty of Kainarji, under which Russia retained the footing she had secured on the Black Sea and asserted a right of interference in Turkish internal affairs. The Porte not only had to agree to freedom of worship for all Christians in Turkey but also to promise a friendly hearing to any representations that Russia might wish to make on behalf of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Porte.

The apprehension which this aroused in Great Britain was increased by the unprovoked attack made on the Crimea by Russia a few years later. The first overt sign of a change in British policy was a decree forbidding British seamen to

enter the Russian service. Pitt was even prepared to declare war on Russia to maintain the balance of power. Fox supported Russia; Pitt believed in Turkey as an ally. The two policies coalesced in the conclusion of an alliance between Great Britain, Russia and Turkey against French policy in Egypt.

The news of the defeat of Napoleon's fleet at the Battle of the Nile was sent to India by the British by a special messenger who accomplished the journey in seventy days by the old route via Syria and Iraq, which remained in use until the end of the Napoleonic wars. British forces, by assisting the Turks in the defence of Acre and defeating the French troops left behind in Egypt when Napoleon returned to France, played a decisive part in arresting Napoleon's first move towards India. One of the rapid shifts of alliance which were common at that time brought Great Britain into a conflict with Turkey from which she emerged with little credit. The British fleet managed to enter the Sea of Marmara, but had to retreat on finding that Constantinople had been heavily fortified at the instigation of the French envoy.

An attempt to seize Egypt was even more disastrous. By this time Mehmed Ali, an Albanian who had become Pasha of Egypt, had organized a force which was far superior to the Mameluke rabble that Napoleon had overthrown. The invading British force was defeated and Mehmed Ali paraded a large number of British prisoners of war and displayed four hundred British heads on the citadel in Cairo. One of the captives, a Scottish soldier, became a Moslem and took service under Mehmed Ali, and in the war between Egypt and the Wahhabis of Arabia he was the first to enter the breach in the walls of Medina. This was probably that Osman whom Kinglake met in Cairo—Oriental in the number and seclusion of his wives but still unconquerably Scottish in his books: the Edinburgh this and the Edinburgh that, and above all the Edinburgh Cabinet Library.

Napoleon's attack on Egypt and his declared designs on India induced the British Government to occupy the island of

Perim, and then, when their forces were driven out by the climate and lack of water, to occupy Aden, which however was also evacuated when the danger was past. At the same time there was concluded the first of those agreements which built up for Great Britain a special position in the Persian Gulf. In 1793 the ruler of Muscat bound himself to the British against the French and the Dutch for the duration of the war. A more formal agreement in 1800 authorized the residence of a British political agent at Muscat. An attempt by the French to establish a mission there failed, and the French menace diminished when Great Britain captured Mauritius from France in 1810.

Great Britain and Muscat co-operated against the pirates, who by then had become so bold and powerful that they captured a cruiser of the East India Company. The Company were remarkably patient, and even treated with severity any of their captains who engaged in combat with the pirates and could not prove that they had not "provoked" the attack. In the end, however, action had to be taken against the pirates, whose natural unruliness was increased by the instigation of the Wahhabis, at that time their overlords, and their main centre was captured and destroyed on two occasions. The search of the creeks which served as pirate lairs developed into British naval surveys which were eventually extended to the whole of the Gulf.

During the Napoleonic wars French influence in Iraq was ousted by British, and from that time the position of the British Resident at Baghdad was accorded special importance by H.M. Government and the East India Company. Many distinguished men held the post, among them, in the early days, the Orientalists Claudius James Rich and Sir Henry Rawlinson.

In Persia a process parallel to that which has been traced in Turkey had been going on: danger from the French diminishing,

danger from the Russians growing, and growing the more rapidly because of the decay of the power of Persia. Since the capture of Hormuz there had been commercial relations between Britain and Persia: after the French invasion of Egypt diplomatic relations were opened by Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, representing the Government of India. Under the arrangement he concluded, Persia was to assist in protecting the North-West frontier of India in return for help in the event of an attack on Persia; British merchants were to have wide trading privileges; and French subjects were to be expelled. Invoking this agreement Persia sought British help against constant Russian pressure: failing to secure it she turned to the French, who by then were at war with Russia. A treaty was concluded which was intended to further Napoleon's designs on India, but it was stillborn because Napoleon then concluded with the Czar the Treaty of Tilsit, which virtually gave the French a free hand in Europe and the Russians in Asia.

Malcolm's position was weakened by the arrival from Baghdad of a British envoy, Sir Harford Jones, representing not the Indian but the British Government. Fortunately the two envoys managed to establish a *modus vivendi*. British intervention helped to bring about peace between Persia and Russia, and in 1814 an agreement was concluded under which Persia was to prevent the passage of any European forces through Persia to India and to make no agreements hostile to Great Britain. In return Persia was to receive an annual subsidy of £150,000 so long as she engaged in no aggressive war, and to be protected against aggression from any quarter.

British diplomacy was kept busy for twenty years by a train of events set going by the revolt of the Greeks against the Turks. The British Government wished to remain on good terms with the Porte; on the other hand they had to take into account the strong philhellene feeling in Britain (it was in the cause of the Greeks that Byron met his death), and also the risk that Russia might adopt a separate policy in regard to Turkey. In the end the British fleet joined the French and

Russian fleets in destroying in 1827 the combined navies of Turkey and Egypt at Navarino. Moreover under a British naval threat to Alexandria Mehmed Ali withdrew from Greece the Egyptian troops without which the Sultan could not subdue his rebellious Greek subjects, and this, reinforced by strong pressure from the Powers, resulted in the independence of Greece in 1832.

Mehmed Ali had been promised several provinces as a reward for his help, but the Sultan withheld them on the ground that his expedition against the Greeks had been unsuccessful. Mehmed Ali thereupon embarked on a struggle with the Sultan which twice brought his troops within striking distance of Constantinople. On the first occasion the inclination of the French towards Mehmed Ali's policy and the British desire not to quarrel with France enabled the Czar to come forward as the Sultan's only friend, the British fleet at the Dardanelles, whose object was to protect Constantinople from Mehmed Ali, being taken by the Sultan as a threat to himself. Russian troops were landed on the Bosphorus, and in return for this protection Turkey signed with Russia in 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi, which under the cloak of a military alliance gave Russia the right to interfere in Turkish affairs by force of arms. Moreover it contained a secret article (which however soon became known) that if Russia was at war with a third power it was the duty of Turkey as an ally to close the Dardanelles "in case of need", i.e. if the Russians wanted them closed.

The abrogation of this treaty, which British and French protests could not effect, was brought about by the second conflict between Mehmed Ali and the Sultan, when suspicion of French support for Mehmed Ali brought Great Britain and Russia together. These two Powers, with Austria and Prussia (France was left in the cold at first but later became a signatory) concluded the Convention of London which, together with military pressure and a revolt in Syria against Egyptian misrule, relegated Mehmed Ali to Egypt, of which he became hereditary Pasha. The main features of the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi were tacitly abrogated by the Convention, which recognized the "ancient rule" that while Turkey

was at peace no foreign warship should be admitted to the Straits.

The foreign policy of Great Britain, which was directed by Palmerston at this time, settled down to determined support of the territorial integrity of Turkey. Several considerations favoured this policy: fear lest the break-up of Turkey should lead to a European war; regard for our communications with the East; and the growing trade with Turkey, where British merchants found raw materials and British manufacturers a profitable market.

The reduction of Mehmed Ali to submission enabled British trade in Egypt to profit by a treaty of commerce which had been concluded with Turkey in 1838. This Treaty provided for the abolition of monopolies and gave foreigners the right to buy and sell any commodity in Egypt, and it fixed at the low rate of 3% the customs dues on goods imported from abroad. The foreign goods (mainly British) which now entered Egypt destroyed the state industries which Mehmed Ali had established to clothe and equip his army and incidentally to provide consumer goods for the public. Some Egyptian writers of today consider that these industries might have developed into sound enterprises, given Egypt a better balanced economy than it came to possess in the time of Ismail, and perhaps averted the financial crisis which led to the British occupation. On the other hand it has to be admitted that they were highly uneconomic, being run with forced labour and kept alive by very high import duties. Less debatable was Mehmed Ali's encouragement of the cultivation of cotton in Egypt, where climate and soil are suitable to the better qualities. Most of this cotton was exported to Britain, where it helped to build up the supremacy of Lancashire in the manufacture of high-grade cotton materials.

The Russian attempt to secure control of the Straits, which might have succeeded if the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi had remained in force, was excessive, and British opposition to it was reasonable. On the other hand, when the pendulum swung too

far the other way, as it did after the Crimean War, it soon swung back because the position was unnatural.

It is customary to deride the causes of the Crimean War as trivial, but the real cause was serious enough: it was not in the last resort the dispute about the custody of the Holy Places, begun by Napoleon III, who alleged acts of infringement of Roman Catholic rights by the Greek Orthodox clergy, but the attempt by the Czar to vindicate his claim to be the protector of all the Christians in Turkey. The Czar tried to buy off British opposition by a plan for the division of Turkish territory if Turkey should break up, but received an evasive reply; and the controversy continued until the invasion of Turkish territory by Russian troops drove Turkey to declare war and Great Britain and France came to her assistance.

After the defeat of Russia the position of Turkey was improved by the Treaty of Paris (1856), whereby the Black Sea was neutralized, and the Powers repudiated any right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey in exchange for a declaration by the Sultan of good intentions towards his Christian subjects. On the other hand the break-up of Turkey was inaugurated by the grant of autonomous status to territories which eventually developed into the independent states of Roumania and Serbia. Russia recovered her position during the Franco-Prussian War, when with Prussian consent she denounced the Treaty of Paris, which prevented her from keeping warships in the Black Sea while leaving Turkey free to maintain a fleet in the Sea of Marmara. Russia's right to keep warships in the Black Sea was confirmed by the Treaty of London (1871), which also permitted Turkey to open the Straits in peace or war to warships of an allied or friendly Power.

In spite of the repudiation by the Powers of any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, they continued to take an interest in the treatment of the Ottoman minorities. In Crete the "liberal" Powers, Great Britain and France, tended to bolster up the Turkish Government against the claims of the Greek inhabitants of the island, lest the dispute should cause a European war, but in the Lebanon a minority was supported with good effect. Massacres of Christians in the Lebanon and at Damascus led to the despatch of warships to

Beirut by Great Britain, France, Russia and Prussia and several smaller Powers and to the landing of a force international in status though exclusively French in composition. In consequence of this demonstration the Lebanon, whose population was almost entirely Christian, was created an autonomous province under an Ottoman Governor-General to be selected with the approval of the Powers from among the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Trouble in Bulgaria had a less happy end: a revolt which broke out there was repressed by the Turks so savagely as to give rise to the cry of "Bulgarian atrocities". This brought out the deep division which existed in political circles in Britain. Gladstone campaigned for four years against the Ottoman Government; Disraeli followed the by now traditional policy of affording general support to Turkey lest her collapse should lead to chaos and war. The Russian Government, less disturbed by divided counsels, declared war on Turkey in 1877 and in less than a year forced her to accept the Treaty of San Stefano, whose main provision envisaged the creation of an enormous Bulgaria having frontiers on the Aegean as well as the Black Sea and including parts of Macedonia to which Greece laid claim on racial grounds. Turkey had been warned not to expect British help: financial circles had been alienated by the suspension of payments on the Ottoman Public Debt, and pro-Bulgarian feeling in Britain was strong; but the Treaty of San Stefano revived the fear of Russian domination of Eastern Europe and of a Russian threat to our eastern communications. A British fleet was sent to the Bosphorus and at British instigation a congress sat at Berlin to revise the Treaty of San Stefano.

The resulting Treaty of Berlin was much more favourable to Turkey: hence the claim by Disraeli, the chief British delegate, to have brought back peace with honour—a claim marred by the revelation in the course of the Congress of a secret agreement by which Great Britain was to occupy Cyprus and in return to defend the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan against further aggression, provided that he carried out essential reforms. If the reforms were effected, and if the Russians returned Batum, Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, then Cyprus

would be returned. The arrangement for the occupation of Cyprus naturally led to demands for "compensation" by some other Powers: France requested a free hand in Tunisia, and Italy hinted at claims on Albania and Tripoli in Africa. Only Germany made a good impression on Turkey by asking for nothing.

The subsidy paid to Persia under the Agreement of 1814 was discontinued when hostilities broke out again between Persia and Russia in 1825, Persia being technically the aggressor. British good offices however were used to bring about peace, which was effected by the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1827. This treaty is of general interest, because the privileges it granted to Russia (some of them ancient rights now confirmed) were henceforth enjoyed by Britain and other Powers in virtue of most-favoured-nation rights.

The British representative in Persia at this time, Sir John Macdonald, of the Indian Political Department, played an important part as a peacemaker. When the Persians insisted on going to war he ordered the British officers employed in the Persian Army to keep out of the fighting, and did his best—with some success—to ensure good treatment for Russian prisoners of war in Persian hands. In the peace negotiations he served as a go-between, trying to moderate on the one hand the intransigence of the Persians and on the other the Russians' demand for an indemnity; and at the request of the Russians he agreed to receive the instalments of the indemnity for payment to the Russians. Macdonald also played an important part after the murder by a Tehran mob of the Russian Envoy to Persia, the playwright Griboyedov. He took over the protection of Russian interests and endeavoured to make the Persians realize the enormity of the crime which had been committed. For his efforts he received the thanks both of the Czar and of the Shah of Persia.

In the end Persia was saved by the preoccupation of the Russians with Turkey, which induced the Czar to seek the help of Persia rather than to crush her. "Russian policy towards

[Persia] was to grow increasingly friendly during the next twenty-five years, until the part played by Persia in furthering Russia's designs against Afghanistan and Turkestan led to the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-57." On two occasions, in 1838 and in 1856, the British Government had to protect Afghanistan from Persian aggression. In 1838 they had to threaten intervention to compel the Shah to raise the siege of Herat, whose gallant defence was organized by a British officer, Eldred Pottinger. In 1856 it required the occupation of the island of Kharaq and military operations on the Karun to restore the *status quo*. In neither case was any concession or indemnity demanded of Persia by the British Government.

H.M. Government also exerted themselves to remove one cause of instability in the Middle East by helping to fix the frontiers of Persia, which were in dispute both on the west and on the east. The Treaty of Erzerum, concluded between Turkey and Persia in 1847, led to the appointment of a mixed commission which, at great financial cost to Great Britain and Russia, succeeded in deciding that the Turco-Persian frontier lay within a strip of territory twenty to forty miles wide. On the east, the frontier was defined in 1872 by a British arbitrator whose decision, confirmed by the British Foreign Secretary, was eventually accepted both by Persia and by Afghanistan.

In 1872, at the culmination of a period of Anglophilism in Persia, a naturalized British subject named Baron de Reuter was given by the Shah one of the most extraordinary concessions ever granted. It gave him for seventy years a monopoly of railways and tramways in Persia, all the mines except gold, silver and precious stones, irrigation, road, factory and telegraph enterprises, and for twenty-five years the farm of the customs dues. That the British Government was lukewarm towards this unreasonable arrangement is not surprising: even without the hostility of Russia it could hardly have subsisted. The Shah cancelled the concession in the end, on the ground (disputed by the concessionaire) that the specified amount of work on a north-to-south railway had not been done within the prescribed time. Lord Curzon assessed the situation correctly when he wrote: "(since) a strong Persia should be the object of British diplomacy, we may congratulate ourselves that a

scheme which postulated the reduction of that country to impotence broke down."

A request for British assistance in the reorganization of the Persian Army was refused, and the Persian Government engaged an Austrian mission for the purpose. At the same time the Russians began the formation of a body of Persian troops known as the Persian Cossacks, which however formed no part of the Persian Army.

The dispute which began early in the nineteenth century, as to whether H.M. Government or the Government of India should be responsible for diplomatic relations with Persia, lasted for nearly half a century. The difficulty resulting from the presence of Malcolm, representing India, and Harford Jones, representing the Home Government, was solved for the moment by the appointment of Sir Gore Ouseley as sole envoy to Persia, but the question of principle was not settled until 1860, when it was agreed that diplomatic relations should be in the hands of the Foreign Office and that the Government of India should contribute towards the cost of the diplomatic establishment in Persia. This arrangement subsisted until India became independent, the Government of India having an important voice in all matters relating to British policy in Persia. Moreover the British consulates in East and South Persia were usually filled by members of the Indian Political Service, who also staffed the political posts in the Persian Gulf and the British Residency (later styled British Consulate General) at Baghdad.

The first steamship voyage from England to India, in 1827, was adjudged a failure, but very soon a successful voyage from India to Suez was made by a vessel built in Bombay and fitted with English engines, and plans were made for regular steamer services between England and Egypt and Egypt and India. This necessitated safe and speedy transit across Egypt, and Captain Chesney, R.A., was sent to study the problem on the spot. One possibility he considered was a canal, but although he decided (in spite of Napoleon's engineers) that the Mediterranean and the Red Sea did not differ greatly in level, he inclined to the belief that the "alternative" or "direct" route through Syria and Iraq was to be preferred, and obtained

permission to survey it. Two steamers sent out in sections were carried overland from the Syrian coast to the Euphrates and assembled there. One was lost in a storm; the other reached Basra, but with such difficulty that the unsuitability of the Euphrates for steamer traffic was considered proved. Surveys of the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Karun were however made and much valuable information was collected. Incidentally, the presence of British vessels in Iraq in 1840 served as a useful diversion on the flank of the Egyptian forces campaigning against the Sultan: they underlined Palmerston's warning to Mehmed Ali that any advance made by him towards Baghdad and the Gulf could not be viewed by H.M. Government with indifference.

Out of the Euphrates expedition arose the British concession for the navigation of the Tigris. Among the officers of the expedition were three brothers named Lynch. One was drowned, one died of disease, but the third lived to establish on the Tigris a steamer service which seems to have operated at first in virtue of the *farman* granted by the Sultan for the Euphrates expedition.

Hope of using the Syria-Iraq route was not abandoned until towards 1860. A concession for a railway was granted by the Sultan to a British company, coupled with a guarantee of interest at 6% on the capital required for the first section, but the House of Commons refused to underwrite the guarantee, and without that additional security the company refused to take up the concession. It is interesting to speculate on the way in which the Eastern Question would have developed if a British railway had been built from Syria to Basra some twenty years before the date when Germany began her *Drang nach Osten*.

Thanks to improvements in steam navigation and to the efforts of the Indian Navy (later called the Royal Indian Marine), by 1830 regular steamship sailings had been established between Bombay and Suez, and the growth of passenger and mail traffic called into being a considerable overland organization. From Alexandria to Cairo the journey was by water, but the eighty-mile desert crossing from Cairo to Suez necessitated the establishment of rest houses and the provision

of food and water—a scheme in which Thomas Waghorn was one of the most zealous pioneers. Until that was done very elaborate preparations for the journey across Egypt had to be made by the traveller himself. One set of hints compiled for such travellers recommended a formidable list of necessaries, including cooking water, and a milch goat with a cradle so that it could be carried on a camel.

The development of telegraphic communication with India and the Middle East was carried out largely by British companies encouraged and assisted by the British and Indian Governments. In Persia the (British) Indo-European Telegraph Company operated the foreign telegraphic communications from 1870; in Turkey offices were established by the Eastern Telegraph Company.

Palmerston's suspicions of French designs on Egypt led him to oppose a railway scheme proposed by Mehmed Ali, whom he believed to be under French influence, and later to encourage the construction of the Alexandria-Suez Railway (completed by 1858) as preferable to a French canal. Canals had been planned, and sometimes built, from early times, but always between the Red Sea and the Nile. It was Napoleon who first contemplated the building of a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, but the miscalculation of his engineers, who estimated that there was a difference of level of over thirty feet between the two seas, blocked the scheme until the time of de Lesseps. Chesney's report that there was no such difference of level was not accepted.

The canal scheme met with considerable British support from the first: the India Board and the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company were both in favour of it; but nothing could overcome the hostility of Palmerston, who, it must be admitted, could produce support for his policy in the tendency of the French to recommend the canal as certain to prejudice British interests. Probably typical of his country was the small French investor who applied for shares in "the railway in the island of Sweden", and when told that what he wanted was presumably shares in the canal in the isthmus of Suez replied that it was all one to him so long as it was "against the English".

That the canal was built in the end, in spite of formidable

obstacles, technical, financial and political, was due to the persistence of a Frenchman, de Lesseps, and to the support he received from Said Pasha, second in succession to Mehmed Ali, who defied the Sultan's ban on the canal and provided the labour and a great part of the capital. Once the canal was built the British Government paid a handsome tribute to de Lesseps, who for his part erected a statue to Waghorn, whom he regarded as the chief pioneer of the overland route. British shipping at once took the first place in the Suez Canal traffic, and this led to constant complaints from British shipowners and merchants that the dues were too high. Disraeli's secret purchase of the Khedive's shares did not give Great Britain a proportionate voice in the management of the Canal. The statutes of the Suez Canal Company, which confer the right to one vote on a shareholder with twenty-five shares, limit the number of votes that any one shareholder may exercise to ten, so that 250 shares are equal in voting power to the 350,000-odd shares held by H.M. Government. It is true that British shipping interests were later given extra representation on the Board, but the management remained, and still remains, predominantly French.

Voices had been raised in Britain from time to time in favour of a British occupation of Egypt as a guarantee of security for our communications with the East, and they were sharpened by anxiety lest the French, who discussed their ambitions freely in their press, should seize Egypt and hold us to ransom. When, however, Napoleon III suggested a division of North Africa in which Great Britain should take Egypt, France Morocco and Sardinia Tunis, Palmerston refused. The British occupation was not the result of a careful plan, but of a series of events in which H.M. Government were first dragged along by France in support of a strong policy and then left to act alone in consequence of a change of government in France. The first of these events was the virtual bankruptcy of Ismail, who had become Pasha of Egypt in 1861 and purchased from the Sultan the title of Khedive. Some writers extol Ismail

because he promoted some remunerative works such as the completion of the Suez Canal and the construction of the port of Alexandria, but he seems to have supported schemes of all kinds regardless of their suitability and of the capacity of his people to pay for them: these included grandiose extensions of territory, an opera in Cairo and a disastrous war with Abyssinia. The Egyptian debt was 3½ million when Ismail came to the throne; in fifteen years it rose to 94 million. Meanwhile the fellahin who formed the bulk of the population were subjected to forced labour, conscription and crushing taxation, applied with cruelty and partiality by the village headmen and the provincial governors.

The Egyptian debt represented foreign loans raised at high rates of interest and discount, and if the British creditors, who ranked second only to the French in importance, were not left to collect their dues as best they could, with no backing but legitimate diplomatic support, it was not only because of the influence the bondholders wielded, though that was unhealthily great, but also because a collapse of the administration in so sensitive a spot as Egypt might cause dangerous international complications. Already Germany, although the financial interests of German nationals in Egypt were insignificant, was fishing in these troubled waters.

Ismail was compelled by the Powers to accept control in various forms: first the Public Debt Office, which involved international control of Egyptian finances; then a system of Anglo-French control; and finally, in 1878, a constitutional ministry in which the Minister of Finance was British and the Minister of Public Works French. Ismail however chafed against the control exercised by this ministry and may have connived at the military mutiny which secured its dismissal. He was deposed by the Sultan, at British and French instigation, and was succeeded by his son Taufiq, who was at once faced with a general feeling in favour of reform and by a military movement under Ahmad Arabi, an Egyptian officer of peasant origin who eventually became Minister of War and virtually dictator of Egypt. Arabi secured the redress of certain military grievances, and then, under pressure of a second mutiny, forced the Khedive to grant a constitution on

advanced European lines. The Khedive appealed for help to his suzerain, but the Sultan's intervention, which had British but not French approval, was tortuous and incompetent and satisfied nobody.

The Khedive's authority was supported strongly by France, whose Premier, Gambetta, uneasy at the difficulties encountered by the French in Tunisia, adopted a "strong" policy in favour of the Khedive and the French bondholders. Apprehensive lest the French, if left to act alone, should occupy Egypt again, and suspicious of the Arabi movement in which unfortunately they failed to see the genuine national feeling which undoubtedly existed, the British Government joined with the French in presenting in January 1882 a note in support of the Khedive's authority which gave rise to fear among the Egyptians that the two Powers might occupy Egypt.

A change in French policy was brought about by the fall of Gambetta, and the French fleet, which had joined the British in the harbour of Alexandria, withdrew before the bombardment of July 11th, 1882. This bombardment was caused in the first place by a massacre of Christian Egyptians and of foreigners in Alexandria which confirmed H.M. Government in their belief that the Arabi movement was fanatically anti-foreign, and secondly by the refusal of the Egyptians to cease work on some forts which commanded the British fleet. The bombardment and occupation of Alexandria were followed by the defeat of Arabi's troops by a British force at Tell-el-Kebir—a defeat which a proclamation by the Sultan against Arabi may have helped to bring about. The Khedive, thoroughly scared by the military mutiny, wished to have Arabi executed, but on the advice of Lord Dufferin, who was probably influenced by Arabi's British friends, Arabi's sentence of death was commuted to exile in Ceylon, whence he was allowed to return to Egypt in 1901.

The occupation of Egypt has been attributed variously to the sinister influence of the British bondholders, to the blindness of our officials on the spot, and to the intransigence of a British admiral. All these factors doubtless played a part, but it seems certain that if H.M. Government could have

secured their interests without an occupation, or by an occupation with French or Italian participation, they would have been glad to avoid the isolated action they eventually took. Once the occupation had been effected, however, other factors came into play.

The expansion of Egyptian power into Arabia, when Mehmed Ali's son Ibrahim defeated the Wahhabis and advanced into the Yemen, hastened the British occupation of Aden, though its value as a harbour and a coaling station on the route to India would probably have led to its occupation in any case sooner or later. The immediate cause was an outrage to an Indian vessel flying the British flag, in which the Sultan of Lahej bore some share of responsibility. An offer to purchase Aden from the Sultan was refused, and a foolish plot to seize the British negotiator furnished a pretext for a British occupation of the port in 1830. The occupation was eventually accepted by the Sultan against payment of an annual subsidy. Perim was reoccupied in 1857, when the Suez Canal project was being debated, and later a lighthouse and a cable station were established on it. British influence now began to extend eastward from Aden to Mukalla and Shihr, where a virtual protectorate was established. Socotra, which, like Perim, had been occupied and then evacuated, acquired importance when the Germans began their campaign of annexation. The island was bound to Great Britain by a treaty in 1876, and ten years later it was taken under British protection.

In the Persian Gulf the struggle to put an end to piracy led to the conclusion, in 1820, of a General Treaty of Peace between the Government of India and a group of small Arab states, most of them situated on what came to be called Trucial Oman or the Trucial Coast. This Treaty, together with the establishment of British naval patrols, put an end to piracy, at least against other than local vessels. One of the provisions of

the Treaty was aimed at the overseas slave trade. To stop this traffic, which had been made a felony in English law in 1811, was one of the objects of British policy in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea during the nineteenth century. Provisions designed to prevent it were inserted in treaties with Muscat and Bahrain (in Jedda, in 1858, interference with the slave trade caused a riot in which two foreign consular officers were murdered). If the Gulf shaikhs had to give up piracy and the slave trade, they benefited by securing peace between themselves, enforced by a British Resident at Bushire, who in Persia was a consular officer but on the Arab side of the Gulf had influential advisory functions.

The final stage in British relations with the Gulf shaikhs was accomplished when, at various dates, they signed undertakings not to make any territorial concession and not to enter into any agreement with any government but the British, and, in some cases, not to allow a representative of any foreign state but Great Britain to reside there except with British consent. Bahrain, which was one of the signatories of the Treaty of 1820, acquired a special importance for Great Britain in 1861, when the Persians, who had been ejected from the island by Arabs in 1782, reasserted their claim, and when the Turks also laid claim to it. In face of these dangers the Shaikh signed an agreement in which in return for some degree of British protection he promised to abstain from war, piracy and slavery by sea, and recognized British jurisdiction over British subjects in Bahrain. British assistance was again afforded in 1871, when the Turks, having annexed Hasa, showed a desire to extend their sovereignty to other territories, Bahrain among them.

PART IV

DRANG NACH OSTEN

AFTER the Treaty of Berlin the rivalries of Great Britain, France, Russia and Austria in the Middle East were complicated by the irruption of Germany. The impact of Europe took more and more an economic form, and its momentum was increased by the privileges which foreigners enjoyed in Turkey and Persia. These privileges, known as Capitulations (from the *capitula* or chapters into which the ancient agreements or charters were divided) had diverged far from their original intention. They were based on a principle widely held until modern times, that the sovereignty of a state applied only to its own subjects, foreigners being excluded from its rights and obligations. When, after the conquest of Constantinople, the Sultan left it to the Venetians to provide a governor or consul to govern the Venetian community and administer justice, he was merely confirming a practice which had long existed in the Byzantine Empire.

The formal basis of the capitulatory régime in Turkey was the Franco-Turkish Treaty of 1535, by which other powers came to benefit when most-favoured-nation treatment became the rule. When Anthony Jenkinson obtained his "safe conduct or privilege" from Sultan Sulaiman in 1553 it provided that he should enjoy the same liberties and privileges as the French and the Venetians "and more if it be possible". Some of the earlier "privileges" granted by the Sultans or the Shahs merely extended to foreigners elementary rights already enjoyed, at least in theory, by local subjects, such as immunity from enslavement, and protection against any who would take their goods from them against their will or go back on a bargain; but the French in 1535 and the English in 1580

secured for their consuls certain rights of jurisdiction over their respective nationals.

In early times the Capitulations mattered little to the Turks: trade was small and foreigners were few; moreover Turkey was strong enough to look after herself. The decline of Turkey, however, coincided with an increase in the number of foreigners resident in her territory, while large-scale manufacture and the accumulation of capital led the West to seek foreign outlets for its goods and money. The judicial privileges which protected foreigners from arbitrary treatment could also be used to save them from well-deserved penalties; and the privilege designed to exempt foreigners from the poll-tax payable by the non-Moslem subjects of the Porte was expanded until foreigners were paying less in taxation than natives of the country in general. Then the Powers gained a hold over the finances of Turkey by means of an article in the Turkish treaty with Venice which limited to 2% the duty on imported goods. The dues were gradually raised to 8%, where they stayed for a long time: it was not until 1907 that the Powers allowed the Porte to raise them to 11%. In 1881 the Powers set up the Public Debt Administration, on which Turkey had only one member (without a vote), to collect and distribute the taxes on tobacco and several other important articles. The Powers also had a majority on the board controlling the quarantine services, though here some justification was furnished by the need to prevent the transmission of epidemics by foreign pilgrims visiting the Moslem Holy Places in Arabia and Iraq. Several of the Powers, among them Great Britain, even had their own post-offices in various Turkish towns.

In cases in the courts between a foreigner and an Ottoman subject the foreigner could not be compelled (to speak summarily of a complicated and contested question) to pay a debt or to discharge a penalty unless a representative of his embassy or legation was present and signed the judgment. Even where the diplomatic representative belonged to a country with a high standard of justice and fair-play this procedure often caused friction and delay; where the standards were lower the foreign liquor-seller, brothel-keeper or smuggler of hashish might snap his fingers at the law for years. It is true that the

Turkish courts, like the rest of the administration, were not all that could be desired. On the other hand the capitulatory régime itself discouraged reform to some extent: few judges would be at their best on a bench shared with a foreigner claiming a veto; and the financial limitations kept the state very short of money and favoured the foreigner at the expense of his local competitor. The Capitulations were the more repugnant to the Turks in that they applied not only to genuine foreigners but also to the descendants to remote generations of foreigners who had come to Turkey long before, and even to protected persons of Ottoman origin (and their descendants) who had secured foreign protection, sometimes as a favour, sometimes even by bribery. In Persia, though there were differences in procedure, the privileges enjoyed by foreigners were substantially the same as in Turkey.

Under the Cyprus Convention the treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte and the protection of Asiatic Turkey against possible encroachment by Russia had become matters of official concern to H.M. Government, who now gave special powers to their consuls in Asia Minor. They had already, even before the war of 1878, begun to form a specialist branch of the Consular Service, the Levant Consular Service, which retained its separate existence until the 1930's. When Gladstone came into power, however, in 1880, the special powers given to consuls were withdrawn, and claims to the right of intervention by Great Britain by herself ceased to be raised. Gladstone preferred joint pressure by the Powers, in virtue of the rather vague provisions of the Treaty of Berlin relating to reforms in Turkey. He considered that the acquisition of Cyprus brought no advantage to Great Britain, whether military or political—an opinion which drew from Queen Victoria a marginal note: "I do not in the least agree in this." Whatever value the island had at first was certainly greatly diminished when Egypt was occupied. Perhaps this was why Cyprus profited so little from the British connection for a very long time. Little was spent in developing the island, and a

very ungenerous arrangement about the tribute payable to Turkey caused deep resentment and was modified too late to allay this feeling.

It was Disraeli, the supporter of Russia, who arranged the British occupation of Cyprus; it was Gladstone, the Liberal, who was responsible for the British occupation of Egypt. This involved the ending of the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey which had lasted, with two brief intervals, for nearly a century. Russia was regarded by Turkey as the permanent enemy. France, after her defeat by Germany, was seeking compensation in North Africa. Turkey clearly needed a friend, and Germany applied for and obtained the post. Bismarck's general attitude was that the Ottoman Empire was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, but even in his time von der Goltz began (1882) the reorganization of the Turkish Army, and from 1888 it was not Bismarck that counted but the young Emperor William II, whose visit to Turkey in 1889 inaugurated a period of Turco-German friendship which culminated in the alliance of 1914. When Great Britain protested against the Armenian massacres of 1894-96, the Sultan was able to disregard the public warning given by Lord Salisbury, for he knew that even if the Russians had not been cold towards the suggested intervention, he could count on the Kaiser's support.

German support was again afforded when in 1907 the condition of Crete led to the landing of troops by the Powers, the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, and the handing over of the island to Prince George of Greece as an autonomous province under Turkish suzerainty. The Germans (and the Austrians) withdrew from the Concert of Europe. The highest point in Turco-German friendship was the visit of the Emperor to Turkey in 1898, when at the grave of Saladin in Damascus he assured the Moslem world of Germany's eternal friendship. A concrete return for this assurance was made in the following year, when the Sultan promised to the German-owned Anatolian Railway Company a concession for the continuation of the line from Konia to the Persian Gulf.

Germany again stood aside when the other Great Powers, in the hope of ending misgovernment and mutual slaughter in

Macedonia, forced the Sultan to agree to the formation of a Macedonian gendarmerie trained and led by officers appointed by the Powers. This force remained in being, without however doing much good, until the "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908. This revolution was hurried on because a meeting between King Edward VII and the Czar at Reval was wrongly interpreted by the Young Turks as the prelude to intervention in Turkey. The revolution was followed by popular demonstrations in Turkey declaring friendship towards the "liberal" Powers, Great Britain and France, and the government which was formed adopted ostensibly a pro-British attitude. It is unlikely however that the inner circle of the Young Turk organization had any use for liberalism except as a means to win the support of Great Britain and to set her against Russia. There was nothing liberal, for instance, in their attitude towards the minorities of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand Great Britain could do nothing when Bulgaria declared her independence, Austria annexed two Turkish provinces, and the Cretans declared their island annexed to Greece, or when the Italians made war on Turkey in 1911.

When Turkey was attacked by the Balkan Powers in 1912 the Great Powers announced that at the end of the conflict they would not allow any modification of the *status quo*; but after Turkey had suffered severe defeats Mr. Asquith said, "the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which have cost them so dear." Great Britain took the leading part in the peace moves which resulted in the Treaty of London, but when the Balkan Allies fell out among themselves Turkey tore up the Treaty and secured better terms without British intervention.

The Convention for the extension of the German Railway, which was concluded in 1902, showed the line as forking to Basra and to a point on the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon by the Ottoman Government and the concessionaires. It was doubtless with this in mind that the Turkish Government had tried three years before to bring under direct Turkish administration the Shaikh of Kuwait who, although he had the rank of *qaimmaqam* (governor, third grade), was in fact independent. H.M. Government, though they had recently rejected a request by the Shaikh for British protection, warned the Turkish

Government off, taking their stand on the need to maintain the *status quo*. In 1899 they made an agreement with the Shaikh whereby his affairs were taken under British protection in return for an undertaking not to lease or sell any part of Kuwait territory without their consent.

It was not only the "Baghdad" railway that seemed to threaten British interests. Russian officials in Persia had specific orders to do their best to establish Russian claims in the Gulf. In fact, so dangerous had Russian designs appeared in 1892 that H.M. Government had encouraged German commercial activity in the Gulf as a counterweight to Russian influence. This influence was reinforced by the forward policy of France. The French attempt to establish at Muscat a coaling station that might well have become a naval base was rejected by the Sultan in virtue of his agreement with H.M. Government, and although a shed adequate for coaling was allocated to the French, the check embittered Anglo-French relations. Particularly embarrassing to British interests was an extraordinary practice whereby the French gave the right to fly the French flag to dhows belonging to local owners—even to subjects of Muscat and Aden—and so afforded protection to smugglers, pirates and gun-runners. This difficulty was solved by a decision of the Hague Tribunal which was substantially against the French, but it was not until the Entente of 1904 that Anglo-French relations in the Gulf began to improve.

In 1903 a statement intended to define the British position in the Gulf was made by Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary. He said: "We should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified post on the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to our interests and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal." Some British writers have regarded this claim as based reasonably on the fact that "we have policed its waters, built lighthouses, laid down buoys and cables, suppressed piracy, put an end to the slave trade and controlled the traffic in arms." It is true that all this had been done, but with one important exception it was done in defence of our trade and security, and if others benefited (as they did) by the *pax britannica*, that was incidental to our purpose. Peace in the Gulf was essential to

the defence of India and of our eastern communications, and the establishment of a potentially hostile power on its shores would have been a threat to peace. The one task that was disinterested was our suppression of the slave trade: this was a genuine reflection of the humanitarian spirit of the age and, far from bringing us any benefit, often complicated our relations with the local rulers.

The special position which Great Britain had built up in the Gulf extended in a milder form up to Baghdad. It is true that the British Residency, which was always staffed from the Indian Political Service, was now called the Consulate General, out of deference to the Turks, who thought that "residency" implied a claim to sovereignty; but the Consul-General still had an escort of over thirty Indian sepoys, and a small steamer maintained by the Royal Indian Marine. The Young Turks tried to secure the abolition or reduction of these signs of an exceptional position, but the question was still in dispute when war broke out in 1914.

The anxiety of H.M. Government about their position in the Middle East did not make them intransigent. On the contrary, from about 1906 they made great efforts to settle all outstanding questions with Turkey, and the success attained showed how little Germany had to complain of so far as the Middle East was concerned. By the Potsdam Agreement of 1910 the Russians withdrew their objection to the Baghdad Railway in return for the recognition by Germany of Russia's special position in Persia, and agreement with the British and the French in 1914 gave the Germans all the security they could desire for their interests.

These agreements came after years of negotiation with Turkey, usually with success, about the legal position in Turkey of British religious and educational institutions; the Sultan's veto on Egypt's borrowing powers; the Turco-Persian frontier; British navigation rights on the Tigris and Euphrates; the status of Kuwait; and other matters. A series of Anglo-German agreements gave to British interests the monopoly of the transport by river of material for the Baghdad Railway, and secured British participation in German port works at Baghdad and German in the (British) Tigris Steam Navigation Co.

Great Britain undertook not to oppose or to support opposition to the Baghdad Railway, while Germany accepted Basra as the terminus of the line, renouncing the branch line to the Gulf and agreeing that there should be no port or railway station on the Gulf without previous agreement between Great Britain, Turkey and Germany. The coping stone seemed to have been placed on Anglo-German co-operation in the Middle East when the Turkish Petroleum Company, three-quarters British and one-quarter German, obtained from the Grand Vizier the promise of a concession over oil rights in the provinces of Baghdad and Mosul.

As compensation for the cancellation of his concession de Reuter was given permission to found with British capital a Persian state bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia, with the exclusive right to issue banknotes. This institution, which was founded in 1889, gave up its character as a state bank when the National Bank of Iran was established in 1927, but for nearly forty years it remained (except for the Russian Bank, which was not a commercial institution) the sole bank in Persia, providing a solid base for Persian commerce throughout a period of confusion, disorder and war. From 1888, when the navigation of the Karun was thrown open to the world, Messrs. Lynch Brothers established a steamer service between Mohammerah and Ahwaz, and later, with the approval of the Persian Government, they built a road through Bakhtiari country from Ahwaz to Isfahan. A tobacco concession granted to a British subject in 1891 was less successful. It struck on that core of patriotic resistance in the character of the Persian which surprises only those who judge him by his usual patience and indifference. Convinced that the rights of Persia were being sacrificed the Persians embarked upon strikes and disturbances which compelled the Shah to cancel the concession and pay compensation to the holder. Better fortune attended another British concession—that for the right to prospect for and exploit oil, which was granted to Mr. d'Arcy in 1901. It took seven years to strike oil in paying quantities, but then the

South Persian oilfields revealed themselves as among the richest in the world.

Balked for a moment in her designs on Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin, Russia turned her attention to Persia. As compensation for the establishment of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia she secured from the Persian Government an option on any railway concession that might be granted during the next five years, and in 1890 converted this into an agreement prohibiting the construction in Persia of any railway whatsoever. The pace of Russian aggression was hastened towards the end of the century when the throne of Persia devolved upon an incompetent spendthrift who fell completely under Russian influence, and when the South African War showed the world the unpreparedness of Great Britain. A branch of the Russian Ministry of Finance was set up in Persia as a Russian bank, following political ends without regard to financial profit and loss. It gained an important hold by lending money on real estate and foreclosing in case of non-payment.

Thanks to the influence she had obtained, Russia was able to effect a coup which at first seemed likely to ruin British and Indian trade in Persia. This was by the conclusion of a new customs agreement with Persia in 1903. Hitherto the duty on all imports had been 8%, under the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turkmanchai, by which the other powers also benefited. Russia was within her rights in concluding a new agreement, and we could claim equality of treatment under the most-favoured-nation rule; only it was so devised as to discriminate in fact though not in theory against our trade. It imposed specific duties which were light on goods mainly of Russian origin, such as petroleum and sugar, and heavy on articles such as tea and piece-goods which came mainly or wholly from British or Indian sources. Our trade was not in fact ruined by this tariff, because a great expansion which occurred left room for both British and Russian trade, and because there set in for a few years a period of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. By 1914 our great trade rival in Persia was no longer Russia but Germany. In 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika Line began direct sailings to the Persian Gulf, and the German firm which

served as its local agents had branches in South Persian ports and Basra which showed great activity and began to take a steadily increasing share of the import and export trade of the Persian Gulf.

The British Legation in Tehran played a curious rôle in the agitation for a national assembly which raged in Persia in 1905-06. The consent of the Shah (who died very soon afterwards) was extorted by the Oriental device of taking *bast* (sanctuary): over ten thousand Persians camped in the grounds of the British Legation for several weeks, until the Shah gave in. The news was well received in Britain, and the British became popular in Persia for the moment, the more so as the Russians were openly backing the new Shah, a violent reactionary. The Persians were therefore all the more deeply disappointed when it was announced in 1907 that Great Britain and Russia had come to an agreement dividing Persia into spheres of influence. The Convention began with a mutual undertaking to respect the integrity and independence of Persia and then proceeded to define three areas: the north, where Great Britain was not to seek or support others in seeking political or economic concessions; a southern area in regard to which Russia gave a similar undertaking; and a central area where both Powers were free from such restraint and existing concessions were maintained.

The Anglo-Russian Convention was widely attacked: it was held that it was disadvantageous to us, and (by many) that it was unfair to Persia. It is true that the Russian zone, which reached and included Kermanshah and Isfahan, contained the capital and, except for oil, the greater part of the country's wealth, while the British zone was a small triangle on the Gulf bounded on the north by Bandar Abbas, Kerman and Birjand. Our zone and the neutral zone however together covered the whole of the Persian shore of the Gulf, and our oil concession was now recognized by Russia. Moreover, the Convention must be regarded in the light of Russia's arbitrary behaviour in Persia during the previous ten years. If she now agreed to limit her ambitions this must be attributed to her defeat by Japan and to the revolution of 1905, and to some extent to our entente with France, Russia's ally.

Among the Persians, who were united against the Convention, the criticisms were directed rather against us than against the Russians: tyranny was accepted from the Russians as natural to them, whereas Great Britain was expected to behave in accordance with her liberal traditions. Great Britain had long supported Persia against Russian aggression, just as she had supported Turkey in the Crimean War and at the Congress of Berlin and had almost gone to war with Russia over the Afghan frontier. She now appeared to have abandoned her traditional rôle and the Persians could not forgive her. They did not want Great Britain to adopt a policy of non-interference in Persian affairs, but to take all measures including, if necessary, war to save Persia from Russia. They did not realize the apprehension with which we regarded German penetration in the Middle East. We could not afford to quarrel with Germany and Russia at the same time, and when a chance offered itself to diminish Anglo-Russian friction, not only in Persia but also in Tibet and Afghanistan, we had to take it.

Critics of British action might be required to prove that Persia was the worse off for the 1907 Convention, and it is difficult to do that. Without the Convention we should have been worse off, Persia certainly no better. Nevertheless the need to maintain a common front with Russia in public, sometimes placed us in an invidious position. For instance, when that able American, Mr. Shuster, who had been given control over the finances of Persia, fell foul of the Russians by refusing, not very wisely, to recognize that they had any exceptional rights in Persia, and the Russians demanded his dismissal, Britain could only support the demand. Mr. Shuster was one of those who held that Great Britain was blind to her own interests in not opposing Russia more strongly, and morally blameworthy in sacrificing Persian to British interests. Now on the first point, time proved him to be wrong: Russia and Germany did not unite against us, as he thought they would. As to the moral issue: now that the United States Government are assisting Turkey and Persia to maintain their independence, the Shusters of today would have a right to criticize Great Britain if she failed to do the same; but in 1907, when we were dependent on our own efforts, it was not for those who

considered themselves permanently neutral in such matters to pass harsh judgments upon us.

An attempt by the new Shah to crush the constitutional movement was resisted by the Persians and he was forced to leave the country. With Russian connivance he returned, through Russia, but he was again driven out. British influence favoured the constitutionalists, but it seemed as though nothing could arrest the growing aggressiveness of the Russians in the north, where their bombardment of the shrine at Meshed and the cruelties they practised against the Shah's opponents at Tabriz were merely outstanding examples of their general behaviour.

Having occupied Egypt for lack of a plan, H.M. Government set forth their policy to the Powers in a circular in which they announced their intention to evacuate Egypt "as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it." They appear to have considered themselves absolved from this undertaking when a convention providing for the evacuation, concluded between Great Britain and Turkey in 1887, had to be abandoned because of French and Russian opposition. The French had resumed their freedom of action as soon as they found that Great Britain, having borne the cost and odium of the occupation, did not intend to revert to the Anglo-French condominium, and they continued to embarrass the administration of Egypt until the Entente of 1904, and even to some extent afterwards.

In their desire to avoid too deep entanglement in Egyptian affairs H.M. Government tried to keep out of the Sudan question, which became acute in 1883. Since its conquest by the sons of Mehmed Ali, the Sudan had been under Egyptian sovereignty: one can hardly say rule. The most flourishing industry was the slave trade. General (then Colonel) Gordon, employed in the Sudan by the Khedive, fought the slave trade and tried to establish security and good government, but his influence did not extend far from his headquarters, and when

he left the country it fell back under his Turkish successor into chaos.

At the moment when Egypt was convulsed by the military mutiny the Sudan was in revolt under a Sudanese who claimed to be the Mahdi, i.e., the descendant of the Prophet destined to establish a reign of peace and justice. After the British occupation the Egyptian Government wished to reconquer their lost territory and asked for British approval. H.M. Government refused to give an opinion, but when the destruction of an Egyptian army under a British officer in Egyptian service, Hicks Pasha, exposed Egypt to danger, they abandoned their neutral attitude and insisted on the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons from the Sudan. Gordon was sent to Khartum to effect the withdrawal. He sent away thousands of refugees and collected some of the outlying garrisons, but he was besieged, and was killed when the Mahdi captured Khartum in January 1885, two days before the arrival of a British force sent to his relief. The Sudan was now evacuated, the Egyptian troops being withdrawn to Wady Halfa. The Sudan danger was one factor in the problem of the evacuation of Egypt. The British representative had recommended the withdrawal of the British troops from Cairo and the reduction of the garrison in Egypt to 3,000 when the Hicks disaster altered the situation. Moreover, the death of Gordon aroused such deep feeling in Britain that no British Government would have dared to evacuate Egypt at that time.

After Arabi's defeat order restored itself. The problem of political reform was studied by Lord Dufferin, and H.M. Government accepted his proposals for the formation of Provincial Councils and of a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly. It was hoped that these bodies, though their functions were mainly advisory except in matters of finance, would serve as a school for democracy and a guarantee against the return of abuses. Later on Egyptian Nationalists were to compare them unfavourably with the Constitution of 1882, but that had been extorted from the Khedive by a military mutiny and was drawn up without regard to previous conditions in Egypt. It is natural that people new to constitutionalism should demand the latest pattern in parliaments, but it should be remembered

that the Assembly had financial powers such as the English Parliament took centuries to win—powers which in 1909 enabled it to reject a proposal, backed by the Egyptian Government, for the prolongation of the Suez Canal concession.

In the 1880's there was little discontent at the British occupation. The ruling classes were relieved at the restoration of order; the masses benefited by the economic and financial reforms. H.M. Government made a good choice for their first representative in Egypt after the occupation: Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who had already been employed in Egypt in connection with the financial control. Although styled merely Agent and Consul-General and enjoying no exceptional precedence among the foreign consuls, he had a small British force to back him and British advisers in various ministries whose advice amounted to instructions; so that he was the mainspring of the Egyptian Government.

Baring's main task, apart from the Sudan danger, was to avert a second bankruptcy, for there were clear signs that this would lead to European intervention. More than once bankruptcy seemed imminent, but solvency was eventually attained, in spite of the reduction of the financial burdens resting on the poorer classes. The revenue, which was £9 m. in 1883, was £13 m. twenty years later, although taxation had been reduced, and large sums spent on reproductive works such as canals, drainage and the completion of the dam at Aswan which had been begun in the time of Mehmed Ali.

Even without legislation it was found possible to alleviate the lot of the fallah: the posting of the tax demands showed every tax-payer exactly what he had to pay, and the postponement of the date of payment until at least part of the crop was saleable made it unnecessary to borrow from the money-lender to pay the tax. Government by the whip ceased; the device of forced labour was replaced by paid, voluntary labour except for local work on flood prevention; and the conscription law was applied fairly and life in the Army made tolerable and even attractive. The use of the whip, and forced labour except when required for the Nile floods, had been prohibited not long before the British occupation, and the evidence of some British consular officers is quoted to show that the prohibition was

effective in some areas. Under the British-inspired administration, however, which was not subject to changes of policy with changes of personnel, and which injected reforms even into the remoter parts of the country, the more humane policy became established and was soon taken for granted.

Baring's task, and the task of all Egyptian Governments until 1937, was greatly hampered by the Capitulations, which in Egypt had been extended, sometimes by negligence, but in Mehmed Ali's time with the deliberate intention of winning foreign support and encouraging foreign investment. In order to limit the abuses of foreign consular jurisdiction the Egyptian Government had established in 1876, with the consent of the Powers concerned, a system of "Mixed" Courts, in which a majority of the judges were foreign. These courts dealt almost exclusively with civil and commercial cases affecting foreigners: the financial and police privileges remained, and these were sufficient to hamper the administration considerably. Except for the land and house tax no direct taxation could be imposed on foreigners without the consent of their respective governments, and the protection afforded to persons accused of crimes made the suppression of such abuses as the traffic in drugs very difficult.

As the finances of Egypt revived, Baring was able to take up again the question of the Sudan. The Mahdi did not long outlive Gordon: he died in 1885, leaving as *Khalifa* (successor) one Abdullah, who was as fanatical as the Mahdi and even more brutal. Under his devastating rule the population of the Sudan fell rapidly, and the condition of the survivors was wretched in the extreme. Meanwhile the Egyptian Army, which had been disbanded by the Khedive after the defeat of Arabi, had been reconstituted under British officers, the rank and file being partly Egyptian conscripts, partly volunteers from the Sudan. By 1896 it was possible for the Sirdar (Commander in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army, Sir Herbert (afterwards Lord) Kitchener, to begin a methodical advance which ended two years later in the defeat of the *Khalifa* at Omdurman and the capture of Khartum. The *Khalifa* was killed and his army destroyed in the following year, and the Mahdist threat to Egypt was removed.

The reconquest of the Sudan presented a problem which was solved by a compromise embodied in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899. Turkey was not a party to the Agreement, though Ottoman suzerainty over the Sudan still subsisted. The Agreement laid down that the British and Egyptian flags should both be flown in the Sudan, where, moreover, Egypt would be entitled to maintain some troops, and that the Governor-General should be appointed by the Khedive on the recommendation of H.M. Government. Egyptian legislation was not to apply to the Sudan. The Capitulations were to cease to have force in the Sudan, where foreigners would enjoy no special privileges and without the Governor-General's consent no foreign consul would be permitted to reside.

Baring, now Lord Cromer, retired in 1907, after serving as virtual governor of Egypt for twenty-five years. His administration is now often attacked on the ground that he did little for education and industry, and did nothing to prepare his charges for self-government. It is true that little money was devoted to education and much to interest on loans, but Cromer was right in eschewing some forms of state education having more show than substance, and the little he did was soundly conceived. For his policy in maintaining Egypt as an almost exclusively agricultural country there is less excuse. It is unfair however to judge nineteenth-century administrators by twentieth-century standards. By any standards Cromer was one of the most devoted servants that Egypt ever had. For the restoration of Egyptian finances alone he is entitled to respect and gratitude.

Nevertheless, in Egypt Cromer was given little credit. A generation grew up that had not known the whip and forced labour, while the defeat of Russia by Japan and the Turkish Revolution had set new ideas moving in Egyptian minds. The end of the Cromer régime was marred by the Denshawai incident, where in a dispute about shooting pigeons two British officers were beaten by villagers and one who ran off to get help died of heat exhaustion. Four Egyptians were executed, several flogged, and several others sent to prison. The sentences were imposed by a special Egyptian tribunal duly constituted under a decree passed some years before, but they could have been modified by the occupying Power, and

Cromer, who though on leave at the time could have intervened, did nothing. The men imprisoned were released the following year, but the harm was done, and it was perhaps chiefly because of Denshawai that when Cromer left on retirement not a cheer was raised by the people whose material condition he had done so much to improve.

Cromer's successor, Sir Eldon Gorst, who had instructions, and also the desire, to develop democratic institutions in Egypt, began with the Provincial Councils, whose powers he caused to be increased. The Legislative Council and the Assembly, however, were not interested in anything but politics, and the popular mind was filled with slogans about Denshawai, the Sudan, and the control of the Canal. The campaign of vilification of Great Britain with which the noble goal of independence was pursued culminated in the murder of the Prime Minister, a Copt, and soon after Gorst died, a disappointed man. For the next three years the British representative was Lord Kitchener, to whose military reputation it was perhaps due that Egypt remained quiet until he left for home on the outbreak of war in 1914, though the tranquillity may have been due in part to his pressing through the Five Feddan Law, which protected from seizure for debt the property of any person owning less than 5.19 acres. On the other hand it was in Kitchener's time that there began the steep increase in the number of British officials and a deterioration in their quality—a cardinal mistake in an administration where the advice of senior British officials was equivalent to an order.

Not long before the outbreak of war in 1914 an approach had been made to Lord Kitchener in Cairo by Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, through his son Abdullah, to ascertain what would be the attitude of H.M. Government if the strained relations between the Turks and the Arab subjects of the Sultan should result in hostilities. True to the traditional British policy of avoiding anything that might lead to the break-up of Turkey Lord Kitchener gave a rather discouraging reply. These talks however were to have an important sequel very soon.

On the eastern side of Arabia a power was arising which was destined to eclipse Hussein's—that of Abdul Aziz Al Saud, better known as Ibn Saud. In 1902 he had recovered, by one of the most remarkable raids in history, the capital, Riyadh, from which his father had been driven by the traditional enemies of the Al Saud, the Ibn Rashid family of Hail. After consolidating his position he succeeded in 1913 in ejecting the Turkish garrisons from Hasa and the coast towns of Nejd. Weakened by their wars with Italy and the Balkan States the Turks were in no position to undertake operations to eject Ibn Saud from Hasa. Moreover, H.M. Government showed clearly the interest they took in Persian Gulf affairs, and even offered their mediation. The offer was not accepted, but the agreement concluded left to Ibn Saud the substance of what he had gained, though he accepted the title of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Nejd (including Hasa) with the powers of a *vali*, and agreed to the re-establishment of small Turkish garrisons on the coast.

PART V

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

To the general anxiety aroused in Britain by the outbreak of war was added particular apprehension about our interests in the East, for the dominant group in the Turkish Government showed from the first a strong bias in favour of Germany. This was the more disappointing to H.M. Government because so many questions at issue between Turkey and Great Britain had recently been settled and the Turkish Government had even engaged a number of British experts to work in various official departments. If the British public, too, were surprised and disappointed that was probably because they had been relying on the traditional Anglo-Turkish friendship long after it had ceased to exist. The breach came when Great Britain occupied Cyprus under duress and then occupied Egypt, and it had been maintained by the British policy of restricting Turkish rights in Egypt. Moreover, Great Britain was now the ally of Turkey's ancient enemy, Russia. What could the Allies offer Turkey? Great Britain, France and Russia gave the Sultan an assurance that if Turkey maintained neutrality her independence and integrity would be respected during the War and provided for at the peace settlement, but the Turks had not forgotten that the assurance given at the beginning of the Balkan War, that no conquests made from Turkey would be recognized, had been dropped when conquests had been effected.

At this time the Turkish Navy was being trained by a British naval mission, but in Turkey the Navy counted for little and the Army was everything, and the Army was burning to avenge the defeats of the Italian and Balkan Wars: it had been trained by German officers for thirty years, believed the German Army

to be invincible, and wanted to be on the winning side. Then the Young Turks, for all their Pan-Turanian sentiments, were also Ottoman imperialists, and the Germans could offer them as bait, at no cost to themselves, all the territories formerly Turkish and now in the hands of the British, the Russians or the French. It is possible that as an additional bribe the Central Powers offered to renounce the Capitulations: in any case, in September 1914 the Turkish Government declared them to be abolished, and the Allies could only submit under protest.

It was learned later that Turkey was pledged to Germany by an alliance concluded on August 2nd, and the Allies did well in delaying her entry into the war by three months. The British Government, in exercise of a legal right, requisitioned two warships which were building for Turkey in British yards: if this had not been done it would not have influenced the decision of the Turkish Government in our favour, but the ships were being built by public subscription and their seizure gave the war party in the Turkish Government a popular cry. The Germans were able to provide ready-made substitutes in the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, which escaped the British fleet and took refuge in the Dardanelles. To evade the obligation to neutralize these ships the Turkish Government claimed to have bought them, but they remained German, manned by Germans and exercising great influence. It was under a German officer and on orders from the German admiral that at the end of October Turkish destroyers bombarded Russian Black Sea ports—the incident which compelled the Allies to declare war on Turkey.

The state of war created an anomalous situation in Egypt and Cyprus, where the occupying power was at war with the suzerain to whom the populations owed allegiance. Great Britain therefore annexed Cyprus and declared Egypt a British protectorate. This regularized the anomaly, but it aroused the criticisms of our allies and led to demands for compensation.

The support given to Turkey by generations of British statesmen, in spite of the misgovernment and the ill-treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte, was shown to have been justified to some extent by the complications which resulted from the attempts to dispose of portions of the Ottoman Empire. To win the support of Greece at the beginning of the War the Allies offered her first Northern Epirus, then "very important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor," and finally "the town of Smyrna and an important hinterland." In October 1915, to induce Greece to give help to Serbia, Great Britain offered her Cyprus. All these offers were rejected. On the other hand, when M. Venizelos came into power and offered three Greek divisions to support on land the British Navy's attempt to force the Dardanelles, the valuable offer had to be refused because Russia, to whom Great Britain and France had had to promise Constantinople, would not consent to it. In 1917 Adalia and Smyrna were offered to Italy by the Inter-Allied Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne. Before the Gallipoli campaign was undertaken it was suggested, as a simple and uncostly way of cutting Turkish communications with Egypt and Iraq, that a British force should be landed somewhere near Alexandretta. This had a celebrated precedent in the seizure of Edessa (Urfa) in the First Crusade, for the protection of Jerusalem, but it made no appeal to the French, who declared that it would be an unfriendly act. They had no intention of seeing others "partant pour la Syrie."

The disposal of the Arab territories of Turkey caused difficulties which have not yet been completely solved. The interested parties were the local population and their self-appointed spokesmen, the Allies and, later on, the Jews. If all of these could have been brought into conference together it is just possible that an agreement acceptable to all might have been worked out. Circumstances however imposed other methods. When, soon after the War began, Lord Kitchener sent a message to the Sharif Hussein, reminding him of the talks just before the War and asking him what policy he would

follow if Turkey should come into the War against the Allies H.M. Government had not even begun to contemplate a Zionist policy in regard to Palestine, while to bring in the French and the Russians might have delayed the negotiations with the Arabs until too late. H.M. Government, however, in their negotiations with the Sharif through his son the Amir Abdullah, tried not only to preserve their own rights but to leave a margin for their Allies. The negotiations were embodied in eight letters known as the McMahon Correspondence, after the High Commissioner in Cairo who acted for H.M. Government in the matter. Had the contents of the letters been reduced to a formal agreement, care would doubtless have been taken to avoid ambiguity, but the correspondence was still in the stage of claims and reserves when the Sharif decided to declare war on Turkey.

Unfortunately the McMahon Letters, which remain as the only record, are a monument of ambiguity. For instance, the word *vilayet* is used both in its technical sense, for province, and in a vague sense for area or district. Then the definition of the portions of the Arab territories which H.M. Government wished to exclude from the area in which they undertook to support Arab independence is also vague. This is a cardinal point, because H.M. Government have always claimed that what they said excluded Palestine and the Arabs that it did not. It is easy to think of two or three forms of wording by which the exclusion of Palestine could have been made indisputable, but none of them was used. Instead, one of the British letters speaks of the "portions of Syria lying west of the *vilayets* [here *areas*] of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo." Now Palestine lies to the south of the southernmost of these areas, and only if the line Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus is produced southwards does it exclude Palestine. To add to the confusion the correspondence contains a British reserve in favour of the French which may or may not refer to Palestine as well as to the Lebanon.

The correspondence went on from July 1915 until January 1916; the Arab Revolt began in the following June. Meanwhile there had been negotiated and concluded, during the preceding months, an Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement (the Sykes-

Picot Agreement) regarding the Ottoman Dominions. Under this agreement Russia was to have, besides Constantinople and a strip of territory on each side of the Bosphorus, the greater part of the four Turkish provinces adjacent to the Russian frontier. Russia laid no claim to any Arab territory, and recognized the claims of France and Great Britain in regard to them. As between themselves Great Britain and France agreed that there should be:

(1) an international zone in Palestine (a large part of what in fact became Palestine was left in Syria);
(2) a British zone of Basra and Baghdad;
(3) a French zone of Syria (and Cilicia);
(4) an independent Arab state or federation, between the British and French zones, divided into British and French spheres of influence.

The French admitted afterwards that when this Agreement was negotiated they had been cognizant of the McMahon correspondence. On the other hand the Sharif remained in ignorance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until after the Bolshevik Revolution. The Agreement was still a secret when the Balfour Declaration was published in November 1917. This Declaration was the outcome of negotiations which began early in 1915, when Sir Herbert (afterwards Lord) Samuel proposed that Great Britain should annex Palestine and should settle there a large number of Jews. Many motives underlay the Declaration: sympathy with the disabilities suffered by the Jews in many countries and with the undying hope in many Jewish hearts of a return to Palestine; the belief among many Christians in Britain and the United States that the return of the Jews to Palestine would be in accordance with the Divine will; the hope of securing a bastion of defence for the Suez Canal; and finally (and this was the principal motive) a desire to secure for the Allied cause, and for British policy, the support of Jewish communities in the United States and other countries.

The text of the Declaration, which had been long debated by British and American Jews, was not approved by all of them, for many feared that it might tend to cause them to be regarded

as foreigners in their countries of residence and allegiance, and a clause designed to safeguard the position of Jews not citizens of Palestine was therefore inserted. The document that was eventually issued read thus:

> "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

To ally the uneasiness caused among the Arabs by the Balfour Declaration, H.M. Government sent Commander Hogarth to deliver a message to Sharif (by now King) Hussein in the Hejaz. The message contained these assurances:

(1) H.M. Government were determined that in Palestine no people should be subject to another;
(2) the Holy Places in Palestine must be subject to a special régime approved of by the world, though
(3) the Mosque of Omar would not be subjected to any non-Moslem authority.

The message ended:

> "Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as H.M. Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, H.M. Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the realization of this ideal."

Hardly had this message been delivered to King Hussein, who seems to have been satisfied with it, when the Sykes-Picot Agreement, hitherto secret, was published by the

Bolsheviks. They had discovered it in the Czarist archives and, having at that moment no use for imperialism, they repudiated the advantages which it purported to confer on Russia. The Turks communicated the text to Faisal, second son of King Hussein, and proposed a separate peace with the Arabs. H.M. Government sent an evasive explanation which reassured Hussein and other leaders of the Arab movement. Further reassurance was conveyed in two declarations of British policy issued in 1918: the first was in reply to a memorial from seven prominent Arabs in Cairo; the second was an Anglo-French declaration issued on November 7th. The latter, which referred to Syria and Iraq, declared to be one of the aims of the British and French Governments "the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations", and stated that the two Governments were "at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and [Iraq]." Then there was the twelfth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which laid down the principle that the non-Turkish nationalities then under Turkish rule "should be assured an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Attempts to reconcile the letters, agreements and declarations which have been quoted were bound to meet with difficulty.

One of the weapons on which the Germans had relied was the influence of the Sultan as Caliph with non-Turkish Moslems. The Sultan declared a *jihad* (holy war), and the Germans declared themselves to be the friends of Islam and even, in their less official propaganda, alleged that the Kaiser was a Moslem. The call to a *jihad* had, however, little effect, except upon the Imam of the Yemen, who had been in a state of sporadic war with the Sultan for years, yet, when war broke out between Turkey and the Allies, threw in his lot with the Turks. Approaches by the Resident at Aden met with no success, and Turkish troops based on the Yemen were able to occupy Lahej and even to enter a suburb of Aden. The Turks were pushed back a little, but they remained in Lahej until the Armistice. This force might have become a danger centre for Arabia and Africa if it had been joined by a German mission

which set out through the Hejaz to undertake propaganda, arms smuggling and other activities against the Allies, but the Arab Revolt broke it up and rendered it harmless.

After raising the standard of revolt the Sharif Hussein took the title of King of the Arab Countries: the British and French Governments, however, recognized him only as King of the Hejaz. He began by capturing Mecca; then with British help he took Jedda and other coast towns; and by the middle of 1917, when the British forces had cleared the Sinai Peninsula and established themselves before Gaza, the Sharifian forces were in possession of Aqaba, at the head of the Red Sea. The large Turkish garrison in Medina had been by-passed and left as a bait. The Turks dissipated much energy in trying to re-inforce and supply the garrison, using a railway beset by Arab forces led by the Amir Faisal and inspired by T. E. Lawrence and other British officers.

The value of the Arab Revolt to the Allied cause, though far from being as decisive as it appears, for instance, to a recent Arab writer who refers to the capture of Damascus "by Faisal", was great. It is strange, however, in view of subsequent events, that the Arabs of Palestine took little part in the Revolt. On the other hand many hundreds of Palestine Jews volunteered for service in the British Army, in particular in the Zionist Mule Corps, which went through the Gallipoli campaign, and the British Intelligence Service received most valuable information from Jews living behind the Turkish lines, who risked their lives and in some cases met with death in the service of the Allied cause.

Ibn Saud, who in 1915 had concluded a treaty of alliance with the Viceroy of India, applauded the Sharif's declaration of war against the Turks and was ready to co-operate with him, but the arrogance of Hussein towards one whom he considered an upstart made co-operation impossible. Ibn Saud's help was valuable in tending to counteract the influence of the Ibn Rashid family, who sided with the Turks. If he had received larger supplies of arms (not even the arms promised him by

the British were delivered in full), he might have been an even more useful ally. Some admirers of Ibn Saud have, however, gone too far, alleging that in supporting Hussein H.M. Government were backing the wrong party. That is to view the issue in the light of Ibn Saud's subsequent career and not of contemporary conditions. It was Hussein who had first proposed a common front against the Turks; his position as Sharif of Mecca and his descent from the Prophet gave him influence in the Arab world; and finally he was in contact with the Turks and better able to engage them than was Ibn Saud, whose territory in Nejd was remote and whose power was largely counter-balanced by that of Hail, the capital of the Ibn Rashid family.

In the decisive battle in Palestine which began in September 1918 an important feature was the isolation of the main railway junction behind the Turkish lines, just before the British attack, by a force which made a desert journey of some three weeks round the left flank of the Turkish Army. This force was composed mainly of Arabs, both regulars and irregulars, but it contained also some Algerian gunners under French officers and a Gurkha demolition party with an Egyptian Camel Corps detachment; and the operation was directed and the force supplied by Lawrence and other British officers. Damascus fell on October 1st, and an armistice with Turkey was signed on the island of Mudros at the end of October. The Amir Faisal, who was greeted in Damascus with great enthusiasm, was left to administer Syria; the Lebanon was held by the French. Palestine was left to the British. All the areas were under the ultimate control of General Allenby, the British Commander-in-Chief.

When Turkey joined the Central Powers H.M. Government, fearing that to leave the status of Egypt unchanged would invite trouble, yet seeing strong objections to annexation, declared the country to be a British protectorate. The Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was in Constantinople and sided with the Turks, was declared to be deposed, and was replaced by a son

of Ismail with the title of Sultan. When announcing the existence of a state of war with Turkey the British G.O.C. in Egypt declared that Great Britain undertook the entire responsibility for the defence of Egypt. Egypt was thus supposed to be neutral in a war for which she served as an important base. The people were in fact neutral in feeling that the war was no concern of theirs, and in spite of the Sultan's call to a *jihad* there was no active pro-Turkish movement in Egypt, even when in January 1915 the Turks made an attack—easily repulsed—on the Canal.

The decision not to ask Egyptian troops to serve against their former suzerain may have been generous in intention, but it was humiliating to them to be told that they would not be called upon even to defend their own country. In fact some Egyptian units did serve with the Arab forces, but the numbers were not large. On the other hand the Egyptians were asked for help which imposed very heavy burdens on them. Forced labour was used for the Canal defences. Heavy pressure was used to secure men for the Egyptian Labour Corps: the British authorities asked for volunteers, and they were secured by the methods of Ismail rather than of Cromer, and were sent not only to Palestine but even to France, and suffered a considerable number of casualties. Those fellahs who were not recruited were often impoverished by the seizure of their cattle and donkeys for war purposes. The right to requisition had been reserved in the G.O.C.'s proclamation, and payment was made for the animals taken; but that was little consolation to a man who thus lost his means of livelihood and who perhaps saw a neighbour spared by the influence of the village headman. The harsh methods were not applied by the British authorities, who if they had had the men to spare for supervision might have eliminated the worst abuses; but the British were held responsible in the popular mind, and the stored-up grievances were to burst out into violence after the armistice.

It was clear that a hostile power established in Turkish Iraq (styled Mesopotamia during the War and later, officially, Iraq—

a term which, for convenience, is used throughout this book) would constitute a great danger to our interests in the East. German submarines, carried overland in sections, might operate from the head of the Persian Gulf. The Shaikh of Kuwait would be at the mercy of the enemy; so would the Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose territory, half independent of Persia and allied to Great Britain, would invite attack—the more so since the newly-built refinery of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan was situated there. Turkish and German pressure might bring Persia into the enemy camp, and that would expose India and Afghanistan to the penetration of enemy agents.

The defence of British oil interests in Persia is sometimes believed to have promoted the expedition to Iraq. In fact, H.M. Government considered that oil alone would not warrant such an expedition; but since they decided upon the expedition in order to safeguard other and older interests it is possible that the importance of oil was never fully weighed. In any case, long before the War was over the oil supplies from Abadan, thanks to the energy with which production was developed by the Company, had become a most valuable factor in the prosecution of the War. These supplies, about 270,000 tons in 1914, had nearly reached 900,000 tons a year by the end of the War.

In anticipation of hostilities with Turkey a division of the Indian Army was concentrated at Bahrain, and a week after the Turkish attack on the Russian ports the force occupied Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab. The advance northwards proceeded in the face of great difficulties, and Baghdad was captured in March 1917, just when the news of the Kerensky Revolution gave rise to doubts as to Russia's willingness or ability to fulfil her undertaking not to conclude a separate peace. When the Turks signed the Mudros Armistice the British forces were some thirty miles south of Mosul, but they occupied Mosul under the terms of the Armistice as a strategic point necessary to prevent a threat to security.

The Iraq campaign was very costly in men and material, and it may be asked why it could not have been run in the same way as the campaign in the Hejaz and Palestine, where valuable

help was afforded by Arabs paid, stimulated and sometimes led by the British. Whether towards the end of the War Arab assistance could not have been profitably used in Iraq is an arguable question, but the difference in policy at the beginning has a reasonable explanation. The Hejaz, where in any case we had no political interests, had a sparse and mainly nomad population; in Iraq there was a large settled population living under a complicated system of administration whose collapse, as the Turkish Army retreated and the leading officials fled, necessitated the appointment of substitutes who at that moment could only be British. The conception of Arab independence was not recognized until half of Iraq had been occupied by British forces, and by the time the Sharifian troops had got as far as Aqaba, Baghdad had been in British occupation for some months.

The difference in policy is implied in the McMahon correspondence, where Iraq was one of the regions as to which the British Government made reserves. When the Government of India, acting on behalf of the Home Government, despatched the expeditionary force to Iraq, they had in mind the possibility that Basra and perhaps Baghdad might be annexed to the British Empire or even to India, and although the development of relations with the Arabs and with our Allies soon ruled that out, no promises of independence were made specifically to Iraq, unless this can be read into the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, and by then the War was nearly over. The British Army authorities in Iraq rejected on military grounds any suggestion that Arabs should be used as allies against the Turks: the Iraqi Arab they knew was not the officer fighting against the Turks in the Hejaz or Palestine, but the tribesman or villager whose passion for loot was one of the difficulties of the Iraq campaign.

Given the coolness of British policy in Iraq, unable to promise independence or even to state that the Turks would never return, it is surprising that many Arabs nevertheless took service in the civil administration or gave support in other ways. A flowery proclamation issued in 1917 after the capture of Baghdad, though it held out vague prospects of the restoration of Arab greatness and invited "nobles and elders and

representatives to participate in the management of . . . civil affairs" gave no definite undertaking that the Turks were gone forever. Once the Turks had signed the Mudros Armistice however the choice clearly lay between various degrees of independence.

Though nominally neutral throughout the War, Persia was in fact a battleground. The presence of large Russian forces in North Persia was likely to provoke a Turkish invasion, and in fact the moment Turkey entered the War the Turks raided into Persian Azerbaijan. On the other hand our expeditionary force making for Basra received help from the Shaikh of Mohammerah who, although our ally, was under Persian suzerainty.

German plans to stir up Persia against the Allies were put into effect as soon as war began. German emissaries were at work, and to prevent them from penetrating into India or Afghanistan the Government of India established in East Persia a line of military posts: the East Persia Cordon. One small party of Germans managed to slip through and to reach Kabul, but they were unable to overcome the caution of the Amir and withdrew. The ablest of the German agents, Wassmuss, was captured by the British in South Persia, but he escaped, and remained there, a serious threat to British interests, until the end of the War.

The Turks appreciated the value of oil supplies and struck into South Persia, where local tribesmen, at their instigation, cut the pipeline in several places. With the assent of the Persian Government, who could do nothing against the Turks but lodge a protest at Constantinople, a British force was sent to Ahwaz; and the threat to the oil finally faded away as the Turks were driven back in Iraq. Meanwhile the steady support of the Bakhtiari tribe, traditionally friendly to the British and now with a stake in the oil industry, helped to assure the safety of the oilfields.

Elsewhere in Persia however British interests were the object of violent attacks. German emissaries raised considerable

forces of irregulars, stiffened by Persian gendarmes who were in some cases led by their Swedish officers, and these forces set out to eliminate British influence in South Persia. Without hindrance from the Persian Government they secured control of several towns, capturing or driving out the British consuls and residents and robbing many of the branches of the Imperial Bank of their funds. To parry this danger the Government of India sent Sir Percy Sykes to raise a force of Persian volunteers, with British and Persian officers and a stiffening of British and Indian troops, to restore order in Southern Persia. These South Persia Rifles, as they were called, became an excellent force. They combined with the Russians to form a chain across Persia as an additional means of blocking the way to the East against enemy agents—a chain of which the northern portion disintegrated after the Bolshevik Revolution.

The conclusion of an armistice between Turkey and Bolshevik Russia in December 1917 led to the despatch through Persia of two British forces on adventurous and, as it proved, ineffectual missions. One force, under General Dunsterville (Kipling's "Stalky"), was sent from Baghdad to Baku; the other, under General Malleson, was to reinforce the East Persia Cordon and to prolong it through Meshed to Merv on the Trans-Caspian Railway. Both were to combine with any elements prepared to resist a German or Turkish advance, to try to intercept enemy agents, and to counter enemy propaganda. Dunsterville was to try to prevent the oilfields and refineries of Baku from falling into the hands of the advancing Turks and Germans; Malleson to attempt to secure shipping on the Caspian. Dunsterville succeeded in reaching Baku, but the situation was too confused for any effective action to be taken, and after a month the force was withdrawn to Persia. There it remained, under the name of Norperforce, until the spring of 1921, when policy and economy combined brought about its withdrawal. While in North Persia it engaged in sporadic brushes with troops of the Soviet Government, who were supporting an anti-British and anti-Persian revolt in the Persian province of Gilan.

After the withdrawal of Dunsterforce from Baku its western

outposts came into contact with Assyrians (Nestorians) and Armenians who had been offering stout resistance to the Turks in Turkey and North Persia. General Dunsterville promised them arms, but before the arms could be delivered to them they were defeated and scattered by the Turks. The survivors, many of them with their families, drifted down the road to Iraq, assisted with food supplied by the British Army. Many of the refugees died on the way: the fifty thousand-odd who reached Iraq were maintained by the British Government for several years. Eventually those of the Armenians who were willing to go to Soviet Armenia were transported to Batum at British expense. The Assyrians stayed on in Iraq to be a problem to themselves and others for many years.

General Malleson's campaign is remembered chiefly because of the unfounded charge brought against him by the Russians of having been responsible for the execution of twenty-six Bolshevik commissars. These commissars, who had been sent to bring the Caucasus and Trans-Caspia over to the Bolshevik cause, were captured by anti-Bolshevik forces and were shot on the order of a Russian who was governing Krasnovodsk on behalf of the Trans-Caspian Provisional Government. As soon as he heard of the sentence of death General Malleson tried to save the commissars, who, he considered, ought to be interned; but he was too late.

The war with Turkey took four years, but in spite of her complete defeat it took longer to make peace. The Allies could not agree on the terms to be offered to Turkey, and meanwhile Constantinople was occupied by British, French and Italian troops; while in September 1919, under an arrangement between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Venizelos, Greek troops landed at Smyrna under the guns of the British, French and American fleets. This invasion, which was accompanied by acts of cruelty and oppression the ancient enmity between Greek and Turk made inevitable, was the one thing needed to establish the Turkish Nationalist movement which, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (afterwards Atatürk, the first

President of the Turkish Republic), represented a revolt against the slackness of the Ottoman régime and a resolve to oppose any attempt to divide up Asia Minor or Thrace. The Sultan felt it essential to work with the Allies, and in May 1920 his representatives signed the Treaty of Sèvres. That the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire should be given up was inevitable (even the Nationalists admitted that), but the Treaty of Sèvres also allocated Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli and Smyrna to Greece. Moreover France and Italy, under an agreement with Great Britain, were given zones of influence in Asia Minor. The possibility of the formation of a Kurdish state to which the eastern provinces of Turkey might adhere was also envisaged. The problem of Armenia was left to the United States.

The Treaty of Sèvres remained a dead letter. The harsh terms hastened the transfer of popular support from the Sultan to the National Government, which had meanwhile secured recognition from Soviet Russia. The Greek Army met with unexpected Turkish resistance, while H.M. Government, whose pro-Greek policy had always been opposed by the Government of India, was fiercely attacked by Indian Moslems. Meanwhile the French made an agreement with the Turkish Nationalists, in October 1920, under which the conflict between France and Turkey was to cease and the French were to evacuate Cilicia. Italy made a similar agreement: Italian troops were to be withdrawn from the part of Asia Minor they had occupied, and Italy was to support all the Turkish demands relative to the peace treaty and especially the demand for the restitution of Smyrna and Thrace to Turkey.

With France and Italy now neutral or even friendly to Turkey, the British forces in Turkey were isolated. The Greeks were defeated by the Turks in August 1922 (the Allies declaring themselves neutral) and evacuated Smyrna. The French and Italian troops evacuated their positions on the Dardanelles, leaving the British forces alone before the advancing Turks. But for the steadfastness and restraint exercised by the British G.O.C. and his troops, war with Turkey might have flared up again. Eventually an Anglo-Turkish armistice was signed at Mudania, and peace between the Allies and Turkey was concluded at Lausanne in 1923. The Nationalist Government,

now the Government of Turkey, gave up all the territories claimed as Arab except Mosul, which was left for further negotiation. The Capitulations were abolished; so was the Ottoman Debt Council. Having secured these excellent terms the Turkish Government proceeded to abolish the Ottoman Caliphate to the consternation of Indian Moslems, whose loyalty to the Caliphate had not been without influence on the peace negotiations.

Simultaneously with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne an attempt was made to deal with the Straits, by a convention signed the same day. Apart from regulations on transit through the Straits the main provisions were: (1) demilitarization of the Bosphorus, all the islands but one in the Sea of Marmora, and certain islands in the Aegean; (2) establishment of a Straits Commission, responsible to the League of Nations; (3) an international guarantee of freedom of navigation of the Straits and of the security of the demilitarized zone by all the means the League Council might decide in the event of either being imperilled by an attack or a threat of war.

As soon as the Mudros Armistice with Turkey had been signed the various promises and declarations which had been made in respect of the Arab territories were presented for payment. The French were not prepared to forgo their claims in the Middle East merely because French troops had done little of the fighting there. They were in a strong position, because they had no responsibility for the McMahon correspondence and on the other hand they held under the Sykes-Picot Agreement two cards which interfered seriously with British plans: Mosul, and a share in a small internationalized Palestine. It was mainly these two cards which enabled the French to obtain a free hand in Syria. In return France gave up Mosul in favour of Iraq, and withdrew her claims in respect of Palestine.

A visit to the Peace Conference in Paris by Faisal, early in 919, secured nothing for the Arabs. The British were pre-

occupied, the French hostile. A determined attempt by the Jews to secure Faisal's recognition of Jewish claims in regard to Palestine resulted in the signature of an agreement on January 3rd between Faisal on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of the Hejaz and Dr. Weizmann for the Zionist Organization. This purported to provide for the establishment of diplomatic relations between "the Arab State and Palestine" and for Jewish immigration into Palestine. (It also provided, by the way, that any matter in dispute should be submitted to the British Government for arbitration.) The Agreement was endorsed by Faisal in Arabic as having his concurrence if and only if the Arabs obtained their independence as defined in a memorandum presented to the Foreign Office on January 4th. "January 4th", which is a day after the date of the Agreement, must be a slip for January 1st, on which date Faisal presented to the Peace Conference a statement of claims in which he requested, among other things, that the Powers should take no step inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of Syria, Iraq and Palestine under one sovereign government and should ensure to the Arabs open internal frontiers and common railways and telegraphs and uniform systems of education. These conditions were not fulfilled, so the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement never had any validity.

The disposal of the Arab territories was decided at the San Remo Conference, in April 1920, by Great Britain, France and the United States. Great Britain received a mandate over Iraq, France a mandate over Syria and the Lebanon. Great Britain also received a mandate over Palestine, coupled with the obligation to apply the Balfour Declaration. These decisions aroused deep resentment in Syria. The Lebanon had been under French administration since the Mudros Armistice, but Syria had been run by Faisal's Government under loose supervision by the British, and a "General Syrian Congress" had elected Faisal King of Syria (including not only the Lebanon but also Palestine)—an election which the British and French Governments however refused to recognize. The violence of feeling was such that some of Faisal's Arab advisers were for declaring war on the French. On the other hand the French were irritated by the extreme Arab nationalists and by

occasional attacks (whether authorized by the Damascus Government or not) on French posts by the Arabs. An ultimatum presented in July 1920 by the French High Commissioner was accepted by Faisal, but it was followed by hostilities on a wide scale, and the French captured Damascus and compelled Faisal to withdraw.

These events in Syria affected Iraq. Syrian nationalists had already begun to squeeze out Iraqi officers from the Arab administration in Syria, and now that Faisal himself had been excluded, by the French, the Iraqi officers of Faisal's army saw no future except in their own country. Meanwhile Iraq was disturbed by the long delay in reaching a settlement—a delay due in the first place to divergences of view between the British, the French and the Americans, but also to the inability of the British Government and the Iraq Administration to decide upon a policy. Most of the senior British officers in the Iraq Administration favoured a period of supervision for the new Iraq State, whereas H.M. Government, who had been more closely connected with the Arab Revolt and the various promises made to the Arabs, realized that a greater step towards independence was inevitable.

The Iraqi officers of the Arab Revolt, who included such distinguished figures as Nuri Pasha Said and Jaafar Pasha, wished to take over the administration at once—a policy inacceptable to the British G.O.C., who was still responsible for law and order and for the defence of Mosul against a possible Turkish attack. In the middle of 1920, when tempers on both sides were becoming frayed, Sir Percy Cox, who after being in charge of political affairs and civil administration in Iraq had been H.M. Minister in Tehran, was recalled to London to prepare to take up the post of High Commissioner in Iraq. Unfortunately some months elapsed before he could return to Baghdad with a definite policy, and before then a serious rising had broken out. The Arabs who took part in the rising ranged from officers who had fought with the British against the Turks in Arabia and Palestine to Euphrates tribes-

men who have a long tradition of disorder and who were to revolt against their own Arab Government of Iraq in 1935–36. There were real grievances, in that the British had kept order and collected taxes with a precision (some say a severity) unknown in Turkish times, and the sight of large numbers of British toops leaving the country seemed to offer a good opportunity to obtain satisfaction—and loot. The rising was undoubtedly encouraged by the secret distribution of money out of funds which H.M. Government had paid to King Hussein as a war subsidy, but that does not mean that the cry for independence was not genuine and did not evoke a wide response. The rising was suppressed, and the collection by the British Army of 65,000 serviceable rifles as a penalty helped to ensure security for the next few years.

In October 1920 Sir Percy Cox arrived in Baghdad. The Naqib of Baghdad was persuaded to become President of a Council of State, to serve as an interim government. This body, although nominated by the High Commissioner, inaugurated a régime which within ten years was to pass into independence.

PART VI

BETWEEN THE WARS

WHEN the War came to an end H.M. Government found themselves involved in a complex of Middle Eastern problems which became the more difficult the longer a solution was postponed. Yet delay was inevitable: the various declarations and promises called for fulfilment; many interested parties had to be consulted; the Mandate system had to be worked out. Then H.M. Government naturally wished to ensure that the sacrifices made by Great Britain and other parts of the Commonwealth in the Middle East should not be thrown away and the special position we had won occupied by others to our hurt. On the other hand they wished to demobilize their forces as quickly as possible—a process which was reversed at one moment when troops had to be sent back to Iraq to deal with the rising of 1920. They also had to face a strong popular demand for a large reduction of expenditure in the Middle East—even for the complete evacuation of Iraq and Palestine. The task of finding a solution was entrusted to Mr. Churchill, who became Secretary of State for the Colonies. He formed a Middle East Department, and in 1921 summoned at Cairo a conference of all the Middle East experts. From this conference emerged plans for Iraq and Trans-Jordan.

As part of the policy of economy it was decided that the maintenance of order should be transferred from the War Office to the Air Ministry. Lawrence is credited with having been the first to "realize that air control backed with a few armoured cars would be infinitely cheaper than the old-fashioned army of occupation." It was certainly cheaper, but while it was adequate for protection against raids from the desert, it proved to be unsuitable for the maintenance of order

in settled areas. In Palestine, for instance, the Administration found itself unable to deal with the Arab disorders of 1929 until ground troops had been sent in from elsewhere.

The tendency of the East to struggle against control or interference by the West was well exemplified in the Middle East throughout this period. To find that tendency among the Greek-speaking population of Cyprus (four-fifths of the whole) was not surprising, for any gratitude that may have been felt at the removal of Turkish rule had been allowed to die by neglect of the island's needs, while the attractions offered by union with Greece to a race-conscious, demagogic people were great. But the tendency was just as strong among Arabs who had just been freed from Turkish domination mainly by the efforts of the Allies. Here ideas of freedom and democracy and self-determination which had been used as a war weapon by the Allies were turned against them when hostilities had ceased. The imposition of western influence upon three of the Arab areas through the Mandate system set up a strong reaction. The "A" Mandate system, which was devised for some Arab territories of Turkey to bridge the gap on the other side of which lay independence, applied in varying degrees to Palestine (with Trans-Jordan), Syria (with the Lebanon) and Iraq, whose independence was "provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance, until they are able to stand alone." The system was unwelcome to the Arabs, who had expected greater things from the War and who gave to the word "mandate" the most pessimistic interpretation. It was in regard to Palestine that the greatest hostility was aroused: the obligation on the Mandatory to promote Jewish immigration and the establishment of a National Home for the Jews seemed likely to postpone indefinitely the day when Palestine would be able to "stand alone".

One advantage the Arabs did win from the Mandate system: the abolition of the Capitulations. The Mandatory Powers guaranteed judicial and administrative reforms which would ensure justice and good government to all in the respective mandated territories, and they secured in return the consent of the other powers concerned, including the

United States, to the abolition of the Capitulations. Turkey secured her freedom from these controls by the Treaty of Lausanne, Persia a few years later. The last Middle East territory to benefit was Egypt, which with British help got rid of the Capitulations in 1937.

The United States Government did not join the League of Nations, but as an important element in the Allied victory they claimed for the United States and its citizens in "A" mandated territories rights equal to those enjoyed by states members of the League and their citizens. They also requested publication of the draft mandates before final approval by the Council of the League. The particular interest taken by America in the Jewish question, on political, religious and humanitarian grounds, induced her to approve the grant of the mandate for Palestine to Great Britain. As to Iraq, America subordinated her recognition of the British Mandate to the transfer to American interests of a quarter-share in the Mosul-Baghdad oil. This was the beginning of American participation in the working of the Middle East oilfields: today it extends in proportions varying from 25% to 100% to all the oil concessions in the Middle East except the completely British Anglo-Persian (now Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company. The process began as a matter of business: its vast strategical significance did not become generally visible until after the Second World War.

Soviet Russia was on the whole less in evidence than Czarist Russia had been. For one thing there were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and any Arab States except Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and the Soviet Legation to those two countries was closed down in 1938. Towards Turkey, Soviet policy seemed at first to have taken a generous turn: Kars and Ardahan, spoils of the war of 1878, were restored to Turkey. In Persia, after the attempt to set up a Soviet state in North Persia had failed the Soviet Government in 1921 made a treaty with Persia which, though less benevolent than appears on the face of it, was a great improvement on the behaviour of the Russians, whether Czarist or Bolshevik, until that time. The treaty was followed by the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia. When Nationalist Turkey was

struggling to avert the consequences of the military collapse of 1918, Russia came forward as her only friend; but when in the 30's Anglo-Turkish relations improved, Russian friendship for Turkey cooled off. In Persia, where Riza Shah forbade political propaganda, Soviet influence, after its violent political beginning, was felt rather in commerce: until just before the Second World War, when it was displaced by German, Russian trade held the first place.

Germany maintained her interest in the Middle East even in the days of defeat, and under Hitler she revived the *Drang nach Osten*, regarding Turkey, Persia and Iraq as her preserves, and leaving to Italy (for the moment) Egypt and Syria and Palestine. Both Powers devoted much money and care to propaganda, and many young men from the Middle East went to Germany or Italy, either for a free education or for a short conducted tour, and returned full of the advantages of a totalitarian régime—at least to those who get into it on the ground floor. Governments in the Middle East were less susceptible to totalitarian blandishments. Italian aggression in Ethiopia actually helped in two cases to promote Middle East solidarity: the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and an Iraqi-Persian agreement about the Shatt-al-Arab frontier both owed something to the Mussolini menace.

The Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the efforts of Italy to establish herself on both sides of the Red Sea caused H.M. Government much concern, and eventually led to the conclusion in 1937 of an Anglo-Italian agreement designed to prevent friction in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Information as to troop movements was to be exchanged, and no naval or air base was to be established in certain areas without previous notification. The two parties declared it to be a matter of common interest that neither they nor any other Power should acquire sovereignty or a privileged position of a political character in Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. Finally it was agreed that neither would engage in injurious propaganda against the other. The propaganda in Arabic from the Italian radio station at Bari did in fact cease, but it was replaced immediately by Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

With France British relations in the Middle East were not

happy. The French regarded the establishment of the Arab Government in Damascus as a British trick to circumvent French vested interests in Syria and tended to attribute to British machinations any difficulties they suffered, whether as a result of their own policy or because of the struggle between East and West from which Britain suffered no less than France. Their suspicions were quickened from time to time by articles in reputable British newspapers pointing out that the Zionist policy would be greatly simplified if it could be applied to an area comprising Syria as well as Palestine.

The force of nationalism which split the Arabs away from Turkey tended to divide them from each other. The Peace Treaty cut up the Arab territories into a number of separate states: even the 'Fertile Crescent' was divided into the three mandated territories of Syria, Palestine and Iraq, and two of these were afterwards sub-divided; but they would have been split in any case by the rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashimites (King Hussein and his sons), and by the local jealousies which soon showed themselves. The allocation of Arab territories, under mandate, to Britain and France, and the tracing of national frontiers with insufficient regard to economic needs, helped to exaggerate local differences, and the setting up of customs barriers and the introduction of passports and visas and foreign ministries tended to crystallize them.

There were however forces working the other way. The improvement in land communications, in which the chief link was the cross-desert route between Palestine-Syria and Iraq, with the British-owned Nairn Transport Company as the pioneers and the most important element, encouraged the movement of passengers and goods across the newly-established frontiers, and this tendency increased as air travel began to knit together the bases in the Middle East. H.M. Government strove for years and in the end with a marked degree of success to reduce friction between Ibn Saud and his northern neighbours by promoting agreements designed to facilitate the use by the tribes of their traditional grazing grounds and to deal effectively with frontier disputes. Complete agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

having proved to be unattainable, a neutral zone was created in each case. The formation of the Arab League, although left by H.M. Government to Arab initiative, was welcomed by them, both in its early and its concluding stages. The main cause however of the gradual rapprochement between the Arab States (including Egypt which, though Arabic-speaking, is not Arab) was their common hostility to the Zionist policy.

Although peace with Turkey was concluded at Lausanne in 1923 and even the apparently insoluble Mosul question was settled in 1926, it was long before good relations between Turkey and Great Britain were restored. The Turks had gained the peace, and this fact, coupled with the abolition of the Capitulations, made them at first difficult to deal with. Then the British had to live down not only the occupation of Constantinople (now Istanbul) and the support given to the Greeks, in both of which they had taken an important part, but also the deportation of a number of prominent Turks, most of them charged either with the ill-treatment of British prisoners-of-war or with the persecution of Ottoman Christians during the War.

As was to be expected, foreigners in Turkey not only lost the privileged position they had hitherto enjoyed but at first suffered prejudice in comparison with Turkish subjects. The British suffered no more than other foreigners, but in that our communities had been on the whole wealthy and prominent, they felt the change more than most. The prosperous British communities in Istanbul and Smyrna were shrunken and impoverished; the property of all or most of them had suffered from requisitioning or other exactions during the War. New laws inspired by a jealous nationalism were bound, even though applied fairly, to bear heavily on established foreign interests. A branch of a British bank was threatened with suppression for delay in giving effect to the law that one-half of the employees in a foreign firm must be Turkish Moslems; over forty reliable British insurance companies had to close

their Turkish branches; the headmistress of the admirable English High School for Girls in Istanbul was arrested and the school in danger of being closed for refusal to accept as teacher of Turkish a person selected by the Turkish Ministry of Education but afterwards admitted to be unsuitable.

The majority of the British Maltese community were left without employment by legislation closing to foreigners a large number of occupations. Most of them had been established in Turkey for generations and could not return to Malta, and they remained on in Turkey destitute except for such relief as could be afforded out of funds supplied by H.M. Government and the Government of Malta.

In spite of these difficulties an improvement in Anglo-Turkish relations began to be visible towards 1930. The interest that Great Britain must necessarily have in the independence and prosperity of Turkey must have been evident to President Atatürk, who moreover was not the man to think worse of the British for standing out against the Nationalists when their Allies had rushed into appeasement, or for defending the claim of Iraq to Mosul when they could have secured their own economic interests by striking a bargain with the Turks. Whatever the cause, the improvement in relations continued. The adoption of English as the second language in Turkish schools, in place of French, may have had no political significance, but the outlook seemed definitely brighter when some old financial claims were settled and some Turkish officers were sent to England for training, though this did not prevent the Turks from driving the hardest possible bargains when buying out British interests in Turkish economic concerns. To this period belongs the withdrawal of the Eastern Telegraph Co. in 1932 from its offices in Turkey.

The goodwill of H.M. Government was shown at the Montreux Conference on the Straits question, in 1936, when they concurred in a solution much less favourable to British interests than the traditional policy. The Turkish Government had asked several times that the demilitarization clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne should be annulled, but it was not until Hitler had successfully defied the Allies by re-occupying the Rhineland, and Italy had defied the League of Nations and

annexed Ethiopia, that Turkey's request began to seem reasonable and her manner of securing redress entitled to respect. The result of the ensuing conference, held at Montreux, was more favourable to Russian interests than any international instrument since the abortive Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi in 1833. Today "Except . . . by express invitation of the Turkish Government in time of war no large fleet of a non-riverain state can be introduced into the Black Sea, while Soviet warships can be sent out into the Mediterranean or transferred to the Baltic or the Pacific or vice-versa." The decisions taken might have diverged less from the traditional policy if Italy, with her Mediterranean interests, had taken part in the conference; but she was still indignant at the sanctions imposed during the Ethiopian War and refused to attend.

Exchange difficulties hampered the desire of Turkey to give an economic turn to the rapprochement with Great Britain. Turkey wanted to purchase British aircraft and to give British firms a contract for the construction of large iron and steel works, but she had insufficient sterling because Great Britain was unable to buy Turkish exports up to the required amount. These difficulties were however overcome and a clearing arrangement concluded. At the same time some Royal Air Force officers were lent to the Turkish Government as instructors. On the cultural side the work of the British Council in Turkey was beginning to be appreciated by the Turks (the British Council, by the way, by making a well-timed grant, saved the English High School for Girls from extinction). Two agreements signed in 1938 gave a British guarantee of £10 million for industrial development in Turkey and a credit of £6 million for armaments to be purchased by Turkey in the United Kingdom. In May 1939 there was signed an Anglo-Turkish Declaration which was a forerunner of the Treaty signed between Great Britain, France and Turkey in the following October. It provided for the conclusion of a reciprocal security pact, and for co-operation and mutual assistance if aggression should lead to war in the Mediterranean.

Great Britain was selected as the Mandatory for Palestine by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but the Mandate was conferred by the Council of the League of Nations. In its preamble the Mandate quoted the text of the Balfour Declaration, whereby, it said, recognition had been given to "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in the country." It made the Mandatory responsible for securing the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions; for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race or religion; and for facilitating Jewish immigration under suitable conditions "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced."

The hope of the eventual return of the Jewish people to Palestine had been kept alive throughout the exile. There had always been a movement back to Palestine by individuals or groups, usually personal and spiritual in aim but occasionally based on a concerted economic plan as well. During the Egyptian occupation of Palestine from 1831 to 1840 the return of the Jews to Palestine was much discussed in Britain, and the first British Consul in Jerusalem was charged, on his appointment there in 1838, to regard the protection of all Jews, of whatever origin, as one of his official duties. The rate of return was accelerated by the settlement schemes supported by Sir Moses Montefiore and Baron Edmond de Rothschild, with the result that during the last thirty years or so before 1914 an average of perhaps two thousand Jews entered Palestine every year.

With the issue of the Mandate the Jews expected a rapid increase in the Jewish population of Palestine. Many of them took it for granted that the conversion of the country into a Jewish state was only a matter of time, and Dr. Weizmann, President of the Zionist Organization, when asked at the Versailles Conference what he meant by a Jewish National Home, said he meant that Palestine should become as Jewish as England was English. At the other end of the scale the Arabs at the General Syrian Congress which elected the Amir

Faisal King of Syria declared their opposition to Jewish immigration into any part of Syria, which for them included Palestine. The Arabs as a whole have never agreed that the McMahon correspondence excluded Palestine from the area of Arab independence. H.M. Government have always contended that it did, and Sir Henry McMahon and Sir Gilbert Clayton, who conducted the negotiations, declared in writing that it was always understood that Palestine was excluded. From Faisal's attitude in Paris, and the attitude of King Hussein when he heard the Hogarth assurance, one may conclude that the Arabs understood that in some way or other H.M. Government retained a voice in the disposal of Palestine. It is unfortunate that the McMahon correspondence, on which so much was to turn, was not clear on this point. Nor was the Mandate free from ambiguity, and the Arabs in any case never recognized the Mandate, since it was based on the Balfour Declaration, which was made without their knowledge and consent and, in their opinion, violated earlier pledges to them.

Given this conflict of opinion it is not surprising that there were two outbreaks of disorder in Palestine even before the issue of the Mandate, at Easter in 1920 and in May 1921, when many Jews were killed by Arabs and many Arabs killed or wounded in the repression of the disorders by the authorities. Nevertheless the immigration of Jews proceeded on a considerable scale. Authorized Jewish immigrants numbered some 5,500 in 1920 and 34,000 in 1925. The numbers fell for a while after this, because of the economic crisis, and although Jewish immigration remained a standing grievance with the Arabs, the immediate cause of the serious outbreak in 1929 was an incident at the Wailing Wall. An attempt by the Jews to introduce a screen at the ritual and its removal by the authorities, whose duty it was to maintain what they believed to have been the *status quo* subsisting in Turkish times, led to demonstrations and counter-demonstrations which developed into an Arab revolt against the authorities as responsible for the alleged aggressive policy of the Jews. These disorders were the more serious because several years of internal peace had seemed to justify the policy of entrusting the maintenance

of order almost entirely to the Royal Air Force, and the authorities had allowed most of the British ground troops to be removed from Palestine and had almost none to assist the police.

In the ten years from 1920 nearly a hundred thousand Jews were admitted officially into Palestine; in the seven following years, over 180,000: a total of well over a quarter of a million. For the Arabs the question was, would the flood continue until the Jews outnumbered the Arabs? The Mandate was rejected by the Arabs, but even the Mandate said that Jewish immigration was not to prejudice the "rights and position" of the non-Jews, and the Arabs' rights and position would certainly be prejudiced, in their opinion, if they became a minority in a land where they had been a majority. During the period between the wars four attempts were made by H.M. Government to clarify the ambiguities of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate: the White Papers of 1922 and 1930, the Royal Commission of 1936, and the White Paper of 1939.

The 1922 White Paper repudiated Dr. Weizmann's interpretation of the Jewish Home, that Palestine should become as Jewish as England is English: H.M. Government had no such aim in view; nor did they contemplate the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine or the imposition of Jewish nationality on the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole. It declared it to be essential that the Jewish community in Palestine (this included future immigrants) should know that it was in Palestine as of right, and not on sufferance. The establishment of the Jewish National Home, the White Paper continued, required that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration, which however should not "be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

It was widely believed at the time that the White Paper of 1922 ruled out the possibility of the establishment of a Jewish state, but the Royal Commission of 1936 held that it did not, and this opinion seems to have been held from the first by the Zionist Organization. The White Paper, which was issued just

before the Mandate, was accepted by Dr. Weizmann on behalf of the Zionist Organization, whose activities, he assured H.M. Government, would conform to that policy. The Jews may have believed that by their enthusiasm and skill and capital they could so increase the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine that enough Jews to outnumber the Arabs could be brought in without violating the White Paper definition. The White Paper however did not say that Jewish immigration should be up to the limit of economic absorptive capacity, but that it should not exceed that limit.

Here then was another cause of friction. The Zionist Organization frequently criticized as too small the quota fixed by the Administration for Jewish immigration, maintaining that the country could support more. This may have justified, in the eyes of the Jews of Palestine, their conniving at illegal Jewish immigration which, though it later reached much larger figures, was already considerable in the 1920's. Many Jews were smuggled into the country; many who had received temporary permits stayed on when the permits had expired. How many thousands these illegal immigrants numbered in the early years of the Mandate was never ascertained, but in 1931 6,000 cases where the offence was admitted had to be condoned by the Administration under pressure from the Zionist Organization, which had promised to conform to the White Paper policy but now hinted that unless the 6,000 cases were condoned the forthcoming census might be wrecked by the refusal of the Jewish population to co-operate.

The second attempt to define the position was made by H.M. Government in 1930, on the strength of the majority report of a commission appointed to investigate the outbreak of 1929. This statement of policy stressed rather the obligations of the Mandatory Power towards the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. It was therefore received badly by the Zionists, who regarded the obligations towards the Jews as the main purpose of the Mandate and consequently as taking precedence of all others in Palestine. It was also criticized by the supporters of Zionism in Britain. Dr. Weizmann resigned from the presidency of the Zionist Organization, which was now, from 1930, recognized as the Jewish Agency as defined in the

Mandate. So great was the outcry that the Prime Minister felt himself obliged to write a letter to Dr. Weizmann repudiating any intention of going back on the promises to the Jews.

Although the White Paper of 1930 was so unsatisfactory to the Jews, it was used by H.M. Government to damp down the demands based by the Arabs on the provision in the Mandate about the development of self-governing institutions. In 1923 the Arabs had rejected a scheme for the establishment of a legislative council, chiefly because acceptance would in their opinion constitute recognition of the Mandate. They were now told that nothing better could be granted, for "it is useless for Arab leaders to maintain their demands for a form of constitution which would render it impossible for H.M. Government to carry out, in the fullest sense, the double undertaking . . . to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other." The question of self-government was cardinal to the Arabs. Even under the Turks they had enjoyed provincial government; Iraq was now close to independence, and two countries regarded by the Palestine Arabs as far less advanced, viz., Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, were completely independent; yet Palestine was refused political powers for the very reason for which they were sought: that they might be used to check Jewish immigration. The Palestine Administration, it was pointed out, could not even enforce the official quotas for Jewish immigration: thousands came in illegally, and either the Administration was condoning the illegality or else it was unable to control the Jews.

The Royal Commission of 1936 attributed the Arab revolt of 1933 to two main causes: the denial of independence, and the grievance of Jewish immigration. The Jews claimed that there was nothing in the Mandate to prevent their becoming a majority in Palestine, and later on they could quote the memoirs of Mr. Lloyd George in support of their contention: "There can be no doubt as to what the [Imperial War] Cabinet then had in their minds. It was not their idea that a Jewish state should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time

arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth." This statement, which is undoubtedly well-founded, confirms the fears the Arabs had, that whatever provisions for their protection the Mandate might contain, the right of self-government might be withheld from them until the Jews secured a majority and could vote the Arabs down. On the other hand the Jews might be excused if they were encouraged by the attitude of statesmen of the status of Mr. Lloyd George to regard as legitimate a policy which to the Arabs seemed atrocious.

Looking back one may ask whether it was not unfortunate if the Jews received the impression that H.M. Government were prepared to do gradually and by stealth what they could not do openly and at once. It must be remembered however that some British statesmen were sceptical as to the desire of the Jews to return to Palestine and as to the capacity of the country to absorb more than a small number of immigrants, and that probably most of them believed that in any case the process would be so slow that it would be many years before the number of Jews began to approach that of the Arabs; by which time the Arabs might have been won over, by familiarity and by economic benefits enjoyed, to acquiescence in some form of Arab-Jewish state. Whatever the reason, when the Balfour Declaration was being drafted H.M. Government rejected a formula recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jews in favour of the wording "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people," and it was on that narrower wording that the Mandate was based.

The possibility that they might some day become a minority in Palestine was never put before the Arabs. All hope of a gradual development of the situation was dashed by the advent of Hitler to power. This was not until 1933, but even in the 1920's some Jews fled from the terror to come, and from 1933 onward the numbers of Jews looking to Palestine as a refuge were enormous. Over 30,000 were admitted officially in 1933,

42,000 in 1934, and nearly 60,000 in 1935. These numbers may not have exceeded the economic absorptive capacity of the country, but the Arabs naturally began to work out roughly a calculation which was to be done accurately by the Royal Commission of 1936—in how many years, allowance being made for the rate of natural increase of the two races, a given volume of Jewish immigration would make the Jews in Palestine equal in number to the other inhabitants. The Commission, beginning with 1937, showed that the two communities would be equal in number in about 1960 with an annual immigration of 30,000, and in about 1947 with an annual immigration of 60,000. It is true that the Jews were to a large extent making their prosperous fields and orchards out of highly unpromising land. It is also true that prosperity tended to spread among the Arabs resident near Jewish centres, and that the state social services from which Arabs benefited more than the Jews, since the Jews often had their own, were financed by taxation to which the Jews as the wealthier part of the population contributed proportionately more than the Arabs. But "Man shall not live by bread alone", and it is strange that the Jews, from whose scriptures this truth is quoted in the New Testament, and who have poured into the Zionist movement so much that is spiritual, should have expected economic profit to outweigh the Arab desire for independence and self-government.

A second attempt to set up a legislative council, made in 1935, was also a failure, this time chiefly because of opposition from the Jewish side. There was also much opposition in Parliament, partly on the general ground that self-government in such a country needed a longer preparation, but chiefly because it might prejudice the establishment of the (still undefined) Jewish National Home. It did not diminish the belief of the Arabs that their case never received a fair hearing, that two of the speakers against the proposal in the House of Commons, and two in the Lords, were themselves Jews. Disturbances broke out again in 1936, encouraged perhaps by nationalist agitation in Egypt and Iraq. They were serious, and compelled the Mandatory Power to bring in large bodies of troops from outside; but an appeal was made by the rulers

of Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia, urging the Palestine Arabs to avoid further bloodshed, and the combination of the appeal and the measures taken by the authorities to restore order was on the whole effective. Throughout the disorders the Jews had shown discipline and restraint, but it must be remembered that "the conflict was between a nationalism which was being satisfied, under powerful protection, and a nationalism in process of frustration."

This moment seemed favourable for the departure for Palestine of the Royal Commission already mentioned which had been appointed to ascertain the underlying cause of the disturbances, to investigate the manner in which the Mandate was being implemented, to find out whether Arabs or Jews had any legitimate grievances, and if so to make recommendations for their removal and the prevention of their recurrence. Of the many commissions which have investigated the Palestine problem, the Peel Commission, as it was called from the name of its chairman, was the best equipped for its task, and the report it produced is a masterly state paper. Its work was vitiated in Arab eyes because it took the Mandate and Balfour Declaration for granted, but within the limits of its terms of reference it gave the Arab side of the case a fair hearing, in spite of the refusal of the Arabs, until a few days before the Commission's departure for home, to give evidence before it.

The Commission reported in 1937. It found that the underlying causes of the recent outbreak, as of its three predecessors, were (1) the desire of the Arabs for independence and (2) their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home. There were, it stated, subsidiary factors: the progress of neighbouring Arab States towards self-government; the flight of Jews from Europe; the conviction that the Jews could always influence H.M. Government while the Arabs could not; the distrust of the Arabs because of alleged breaches of pledges given to them during the War; alarm at the continued acquisition of land by the Jews; the immoderate tone of much Jewish propaganda; and uncertainty as to the intentions of the Mandatory. The Commission criticized the Administration for the optimism which led it to denude Palestine of troops between

1922 and 1928 and thus render itself unable to protect the Jews against the Arabs or to suppress the disorders with adequate firmness, but it was satisfied that the Jews were mistaken in claiming that Arab disturbances were due merely to Government weakness.

In a detailed study of illegal immigration the Commission estimated at about 22,000 the number of Jews who had been introduced into the country illegally in 1932–33. As to illegal Arab immigration it found that the influx was largely seasonal, and that the residue that remained was not so considerable as to disturb seriously the economy of Palestine. Finally the Commission came to the conclusion that the principle of economic absorptive capacity ignored factors which wise statesmanship could not afford to disregard: political and psychological factors should also be taken into account. It therefore advised that a limit should be placed on Jewish immigration, which it considered should be fixed for the next five years as the "political high level" of 12,000 a year, subject to the other limit of economic absorptive capacity. This however was suggested merely as a palliative, to be adopted only if the Commission's main recommendation should be rejected.

The Commission held that the hope had not been justified, and never would be, that the Arabs would gradually become reconciled to the Jewish National Home policy because of the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring to Palestine as a whole. Two national communities were in a state of irrepressible conflict: a million Arabs against 400,000 Jews. By adopting a more rigorous and consistent policy H.M. Government might have repressed the conflict for a time, but they could not have resolved it. The position of the Mandatory was highly invidious. The Crown Colony system of government was suitable to neither community; yet to set up self-government was impossible, since no system could be devised which while doing justice to both parties would be acceptable to both. Peace, order and good government could only be secured (failing a new policy) by a rigorous system of repression —a system morally repugnant to H.M. Government and moreover leading nowhere. Meanwhile both sentiment and interest made it desirable to retain the friendship of the Arabs

and the Jews. To neither party could be given all it wanted: it was not possible, the Commission held, to hand over to the Arabs 400,000 Jews, most of whom had entered Palestine with the assistance of H.M. Government and the approval of the League of Nations; on the other hand it was equally impossible that a million Arabs should be handed over to the Jews if the Jews became a majority. In the circumstances the Commission saw only one possible solution: partition.

Under the tentative scheme of partition set forth in outline by the Commission there would be a Jewish state comprising the coastal part running north from a point midway between Gaza and Jaffa to the Lebanon, with its northern part extending eastwards to the Lake of Tiberias. There should be a new mandate to ensure the inviolability of the Holy Places and free access to them. For this purpose there should be an enclave covering Jerusalem and Bethlehem and running down through the Jewish state and including the port of Jaffa. The Mandatory should also be entrusted with the charge of Nazareth and the Lake of Tiberias. The rest of the country would be left to the Arabs and united with Trans-Jordan in one state. There would be provision for the transit of goods from one state through the other, and economic adjustments which would include a subvention from the Jewish state, as the more prosperous, to the Arab, and the payment of a lump sum of £2 million by the British Treasury to the Arab state to replace the standing contribution to Trans-Jordan.

H.M. Government announced that they were in general agreement with the findings of the Commission. They proposed to limit Jewish immigration to 8,000 for the next eight months and to prohibit any land transfers that might prejudice the scheme of partition while the details were being worked out. They stressed the advantages of the scheme to both sides: the Arabs need no longer fear that the whole of Palestine would become Jewish, while the Jews would have a definite territory in which they would be free to admit as many other Jews as they wished and to develop the Jewish National Home in their own way.

With the approval of Parliament and of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations H.M. Government

decided to appoint a commission to report on the partition proposals in detail. Meanwhile the scheme had aroused violent controversy. The Twentieth Zionist Congress was divided on the subject, but its resolution, while it attacked the proposals as a violation of the pledges to the Jews and declared the Royal Commission scheme to be unacceptable, authorized the executive to "ascertain the precise terms of H.M. Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State."

The Palestine Arabs, with the support of the Arab States, rejected the partition scheme outright. Were they wise to reject it? Dr. Weizmann evidently believes that something like the Commission's proposals would have been acceptable to the Jews, and since the area eventually occupied by the Jews by military force is considerably larger than that recommended for the Jewish State by the Royal Commission, it may be asked why the Arabs rejected the scheme out of hand instead of using it (as the Jews were prepared to do) as a basis for bargaining. It is one thing, however, to abandon part of your country after a military defeat, but another matter to give it up freely. In Palestine there were a few far-seeing Arabs who admitted in private that some compromise with the League of Nations and the world-power of the Jews was desirable, and that partition was the best kind of compromise; but even if they had had the courage required to state their conviction openly, they would have found no support among the mass of the Arabs whether in Palestine or elsewhere, and they would probably have been assassinated. Behind this obstinacy was the conviction (based partly on the success with which the Jews had circumvented the immigration regulations) that if the Jews were given part of Palestine they would use it as a base for the acquisition of the rest. If this suspicion seems exaggerated it may be recalled that when a Zionist complained that the proposed Jewish state did not include such-and-such an area, Dr. Weizmann said: "It won't run away." The Arabs believed too that neither H.M. Government nor the League of Nations would be able (even if willing) to prevent Jewish expansion.

The publication of the report of the Royal Commission led to an intensification of the disorders which had gone on

sporadically throughout the sittings, and eventually the Administration had to take action against the instigators. The Arab Higher Committee and the National Committee in Palestine were declared unlawful organizations, and the secretary to the Higher Committee and three of its members were exiled to the Seychelles. The Mufti of Jerusalem, the centre of Arab resistance, who had been deprived of his office of President of the Supreme Moslem Council, fled to the Lebanon. (During the War he went to Baghdad, whence, after the anti-Ally movement he helped to foment had failed, he fled to Persia and then to Germany; finally he joined in the anti-Jewish movement and helped to raise Bosnian Moslem units for service against the Allies.)

It was now that the Partition Commission began its work, without the co-operation of the Arabs. The rough scheme proposed by the 1936 Commission was too complicated and—political considerations apart—would have had to be modified; but the terms of reference laid down for the Partition Commission, as to the defence, self-sufficiency and finance of the potential states, were so strict that critics accused H.M. Government of almost inviting the Commission to find partition to be impracticable. It must have been clear that partition could not be imposed on the Arabs without the use of force, and to try to settle outstanding questions by peaceful means was the general policy of H.M. Government at that time. As applied to Palestine this policy can be regarded as appeasement—a sacrifice of the Jews in the interests of British policy, or as reasonable hesitation to enter into a quarrel with the Arab world at a moment of crisis on the basis of documents as vague as the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

Whatever the purpose of the wording of the terms of reference, the Partition Commission did in fact report that within those terms they could not suggest boundaries which would afford a reasonable prospect of self-supporting states. H.M. Government declared that administrative, political and financial difficulties made partition impossible, and that they intended to make a determined effort to promote an understanding between Arabs and Jews, and to that end to call a conference in London of representatives of the Palestine Arabs

and of neighbouring states on the one hand and of the Jewish Agency on the other.

The Arabs were given a free choice of representatives except for the Mufti, whom H.M. Government refused to receive. The Arabs refused to sit with the Jews, so representatives of H.M. Government had to negotiate with the two parties separately. For the first time the Arabs secured attention for the basis of their claim: the McMahon correspondence was now translated and published. H.M. Government expressed regret that misunderstandings had resulted from some of the phrases used, and admitted that the Arab point of view of the boundaries of the area of Arab independence had been shown to have greater force than had appeared hitherto; but they held to their opinion that the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was excluded from that area.

Neither the Arabs nor the Jews accepted the proposals put before them and H.M. Government felt free to formulate their own policy. This they did in the 1939 White Paper, which stated, twenty years late, that the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as "a National Home for the Jewish people," had been a fundamental cause of hostility between Arabs and Jews, and that a clear definition of policy and objectives was essential.

Like the Royal Commission, H.M. Government held that the framers of the Mandate could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population, and they therefore declared unequivocally that it was no part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. That the undertaking to work for the establishment of a Jewish National Home had been carried out was proved, they held, by the fact that since 1922 more than 300,000 Jews had entered Palestine, bringing the Jewish community to about one-third of the total population.

In discharge of their duty "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" H.M. Government set before themselves as objects the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as would provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategical requirements of both countries. During

the transitional period all departments of government would gradually be placed under Palestinian directors with British advisers, with a view to the conversion of the Executive Council on which they would sit into a Council of Ministers in due course. As to immigration, H.M. Government could not agree that economic absorptive capacity should be the sole criterion. They could not accept the Arab contention that Jewish immigration should be stopped forthwith, but proposed that when 75,000 more Jews had been allowed in, over the next five years, no further Jewish immigration should be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce in it. The growth of the Arab population and the transfers of land from Arabs to Jews in the past made it necessary, they held, to empower the High Commissioner to regulate transfers of land—a provision which was put into effect by an ordinance prohibiting the acquisition of land by the Jews in one area, leaving it free in another, and subjecting it to the consent of the High Commissioner in each case in the remainder of the country.

If this White Paper failed to satisfy the Arabs, in that the prospect of self-government was dependent on too many conditions, it aroused the anger and despair of the Jews, who, at the moment when the plight of the Jews in Germany and Central Europe was most desperate, saw the unlimited immigration into Palestine that they had hoped for cut down to 75,000, and the Jewish community in Palestine condemned to the status of a permanent minority, in violation, as they contended, of promises that neither party in Palestine should be subject to the other. There was a good deal of opposition in Parliament, while the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations declared unanimously that the White Paper policy involved a new interpretation of the Mandate, and decided by a majority of four to three that the Mandate could not be interpreted in such a way as to cover the White Paper policy. Before the Council, to which the Commission was merely the advisory body, could consider the question, it was silenced by the outbreak of war.

The Amir Faisal went to Iraq in 1921 with the support of H.M. Government, who had announced that they considered him the most suitable candidate, and the Iraqi supporters of Faisal, who controlled the new administration, acted with the moral support of the British advisers in pushing his candidature. The strongest justification for this is to be found in the tranquillity which reigned in Iraq after Faisal's accession, and the acceptance which he won from many who beforehand had been lukewarm towards him, or even hostile. The Council of State offered the throne to Faisal, with the proviso that his government should be "constitutional, representative and democratic and limited by law", and the referendum went in his favour everywhere except in the Kurdish areas.

The word "mandate" translated into Arabic did not convey to the Iraqis any of the sense of temporary trusteeship that it was intended to have, but was rather held to connote, if not annexation and a colonial status, a sort of protectorate remote from the hopes held out to the Arabs during the War. To meet this difficulty it was decided that H.M. Government should regulate the relations between Great Britain and Iraq by a treaty which would in effect enable them to discharge the obligations incumbent on them under the Mandate. The Treaty, which was signed in October 1922, included an undertaking by H.M. Government to use their good offices to secure the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible, and a protocol signed in the following year laid down that when Iraq became a member of the League, the Treaty should lapse. The Treaty was not ratified until 1924. In the following year the Council of the League of Nations, sceptical as to the fitness of Iraq for self-government, recommended that the Mandate should be continued for twenty-five years unless Iraq had been accepted as a member of the League before the expiry of that period. Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty provided for, *inter alia*, the transfer to Iraq on very favourable terms of the British-built railways, port facilities and other public works; the establishment of a judicial system which, while not completely independent, was a great advance on the Capitulations; and the employment of British advisers by the Iraq Government.

The young Iraqi Government had to struggle not only with constitutional and other internal problems but also with the foreign complication resulting from the uncertainty as to her northern frontier. This however was unavoidable, for peace could never have been made with Turkey if the Mosul question had not been left aside for separate treatment, and that question took over two years to settle. The Mosul Vilayet was not one of those mainly Arab areas which the Turkish Nationalists had been from the first prepared to abandon: it contained a considerable population of Turkish stock, and a much larger Kurdish population which, if left outside Turkish control, might have a disturbing influence on the Kurds in Turkey. Under the British war-time administration the Kurds of Iraq had acquired privileges never known in Turkish times, such as the use of Kurdish in education and in official business, the raising of Kurdish levies with Kurdish officers, and measures of fiscal autonomy. Unable to come to an agreement Great Britain and Turkey submitted the Mosul question to the League of Nations, whose Council fixed a frontier such as to leave in Iraq practically the whole of the Mosul Vilayet. Turkey refused to accept the award and turned again to Russia, who was glad to profit by the occasion and to sign a treaty of non-aggression. Eventually however a three-power discussion between Great Britain, Turkey and Iraq resulted in the signature in 1925 of a treaty in which Turkey accepted the frontier laid down by the League, receiving in return for twenty-five years a share of any royalties the Iraq Government might receive on oil in the Mosul Vilayet.

Oil had figured largely in the negotiations about Mosul. At one moment the Turkish Government, with the object of influencing the British Government, had offered to British interests not only the oil in the disputed territory but also concessions for several ports and many thousands of miles of railway. At another time, in order to win American support at the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish Government had granted to American interests a wide economic concession which included rights over part of the Mosul oilfield. H.M. Government protested against this concession, on the ground that British interests had a prior claim resting on a written

promise given in 1914 by the Turkish Grand Vizier to the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which 50% of the shares were held by the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. and 25% each by Shell and the Germans. Under an agreement concluded at San Remo in 1920 the German shares were transferred to French interests, with the proviso that the Company should be under permanent British control. The United States Government refused to recognize the claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company, alleging that it violated the principle of equality of opportunity for the subjects of all nations in mandated territories. This objection was met by the transfer to American interests of half the holdings of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., and the Turkish Petroleum Co. (which now became the Iraq Petroleum Co.) obtained a concession from the Iraq Government. Oil was struck in large quantities near Kirkuk in 1927, and in 1934 oil began to be delivered from there to Haiffa and Tripoli by a pipeline which forks into two at a point on the Euphrates.

Although the Council of State established by proclamation of the British High Commissioner in November 1920 contained the germ of self-government, the High Commissioner was still the head of the government, and he made use of his powers when acceptance of the draft treaty seemed to be unreasonably delayed. Once the Treaty was signed, and the newly-elected Assembly had ratified it, the High Commissioner ceased to be responsible for the administration of the country and became the adviser to the Iraq Government. Until 1932, when Iraq joined the League of Nations, he remained responsible to the League for Iraq, and on certain specified points he was still entitled to have the last word; but on all other matters he could only offer advice, and his advice was not always taken.

The undertaking given by the British Government in 1922, to recommend Iraq for membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible, was made more definite in 1929, when 1932 was fixed as the year for the recommendation. This promise was followed in 1930 by the conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which was to run for twenty-five years with effect from the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. The Treaty

provided for co-operation in foreign affairs and for mutual assistance in the event of war, the Iraqi assistance to consist in furnishing all facilities including the use of railways, aerodromes, etc. Air bases were to be leased to Great Britain, and British military assistance was to continue to be provided. Where foreign officials were required by the Iraq Government, British subjects would ordinarily be preferred. The British Ambassador at Baghdad was to take precedence over the representatives of other Powers.

A few months later H.M. Government informed the League of Nations of their intention to recommend in 1932 that Iraq be admitted as a member unconditionally. The League gave the application a cool reception, being doubtful about the fate of the minorities in Iraq and sceptical as to the political, administrative and social progress the country had made hitherto. Had the application been rejected H.M. Government would infallibly have been held responsible by the Iraqis, and they therefore authorized the High Commissioner to inform the Mandates Commission that "should Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which has been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with H.M. Government." The Council of the League eventually agreed to the admission of Iraq provided that she made a declaration guaranteeing minority rights, the administration of justice, international law and other safeguards. Iraq signed the declaration and was admitted a member of the League in October 1932.

The moral guarantee given by Great Britain on behalf of Iraq was invoked less than three years later, when Iraqis massacred over three hundred Assyrians, some of them women and children. This was the culmination of a period of mutual suspicion and dislike. The Iraqis resented the presence in their midst of this body of refugees, differing from them in race, religion and language, whose homeland and been left almost entirely to Turkey by the decision of the League of Nations. The problem of their disposal, by settlement in Iraq or otherwise, was complicated by the attitude of the Assyrians, who tended to regard themselves as protégés of the British. The massacre arose out of the return of some hundreds of armed Assyrians from an unauthorized attempt to emigrate to Syria.

The British Government, bound by its assumption of moral responsibility but no longer able to exercise any control over the Iraq Government, was in an invidious position. Eventually the Iraqi representative at Geneva expressed regret for the incident, in which "unjustifiable severity" had been used, and offered to assist as generously as possible those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq to make a home elsewhere.

The other large minority, the Kurds, had felt some apprehension at their not being mentioned in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or given a specific guarantee before the League of Nations. Ten years before they had been encouraged by the abortive Treaty of Sèvres to hope for a united and autonomous and even independent Kurdistan, and the Iraqi Kurds had never settled down whole-heartedly under the Iraq Government. The efforts of the British High Commissioner to induce the Iraq Government to grant a special régime to the Kurdish districts were hampered by a series of Kurdish revolts which were not the less difficult to counter because they represented personal ambitions rather than a widespread feeling of discontent.

Anglo-Iraqi relations did not become perfectly cordial with the establishment of Iraqi independence. The extremists might say that this was because the independence was not complete, but the question is less simple than that. King Faisal, although capable of giving secret encouragement to the intransigence of his subjects, appreciated the value of the British connection; but he died in 1933, and for six years the throne was held by his son, Ghazi I, who was an extreme nationalist and militarist and very young.

The government created by a military *coup d'état* in 1936 lasted only a year, but all the succeeding governments until June 1941 were formed under army influence. This tended to encourage chauvinism, as was shown by the greater vehemence with which Iraq now asserted a claim to Kuwait on the ground that in Turkish times it had been a sub-district of the district of Basra. Nazism also became fashionable, and the Germans were not slow to take advantage of this. The German Minister in Baghdad did not need the almost superhuman skill with which he is often credited, to find sympathizers in the Iraq

Army. He also found many supporters among young Iraqis brought up to believe that independence from Turkey had been won by the Arab revolt and that self-government had been wrung from the British by the disorders of 1920, and often disappointed of the rapid advancement to which they felt themselves entitled. But the German Minister had a second and deadly weapon in anti-Zionism. The Iraqis, like other Arabs, were totally opposed to Jewish immigration into Palestine and believed that it was a breach of the promises made to the Arabs during the War. Thus by 1939 there had formed, at least in the larger towns, a political atmosphere unfavourable to that co-operation in time of war that had been provided for in the Treaty of 1930.

So long as Faisal ruled in Damascus, Trans-Jordan was part of his territory, though his administration was too weak to cope with raids from the desert which, but for British intervention, might have reduced the country to poverty and anarchy. Upon the issue of the Mandate for Syria to the French the British withdrew not only from Syria but also from Trans-Jordan, though the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem kept an eye on Trans-Jordan too. After the Cairo Conference the rulership of Trans-Jordan was offered to the Amir Abdullah with the promise of a grant-in-aid, provided that he agreed to do his best to check hostile movements in Trans-Jordan against the French. The Amir had hoped for Iraq, of which the Syrian Congress had elected him King when they elected Faisal King of Syria, but he accepted the offer of Trans-Jordan and set to work to create an administration amid the distractions caused by raids from the desert, the Zionist problem on the west, and the existence of a French mandated territory on the north. British help was given not only by means of a grant-in-aid but in administrative advice and assistance, and British officers organized the Arab Legion (the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force was part of the Palestine security services). These forces had to be backed by British aircraft and armoured cars, for Wahhabi raids were carried out on an increasing scale until the

repulse of a large Wahhabi force in 1924 by British aircraft put an end to the menace.

In virtue of one of the clauses of the Mandate H.M. Government obtained the approval of the League of Nations to the exemption of Trans-Jordan from the application of some of its clauses, in particular those relating to the Jewish National Home. The Zionists have claimed that in acquiescing in this exemption they were "giving up" something which had been promised to them, but whatever ambiguities can be found in the McMahon correspondence, there is no doubt whatsoever that it left Trans-Jordan within the area of Arab independence. The relations between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan were formally settled in 1928 by a treaty which had in fact been regarded as in force since 1923. H.M. Government recognized the Trans-Jordan Government as independent, on condition that it was constitutional, but the Amir agreed to be guided by the advice of H.M. Government in foreign relations and to follow an administrative, financial and fiscal policy such as to ensure the stability and the good organization of the government and its finances.

One of the problems of H.M. Government was the dangerous feud between their allies King Hussein and Ibn Saud. It is unfortunate that these two rulers never met, for even if Hussein had failed to recognize the statesmanlike qualities of his great rival he could not have failed to realize that here was a man who could not be provoked with impunity. The quarrel had begun with the extension of Wahhabi tenets into territory claimed by the Hejaz, when the oases of Khurma and Turaba went over to Ibn Saud. Early in 1918 King Hussein was so rash as to demand of Ibn Saud recognition as King of the Arab Countries and to incite Ibn Saud's rivals, the Ibn Rashid family of Hail, against him. The capture and annexation of Hail by Ibn Saud, and the defeat inflicted on the Amir Abdullah in 1919 when he tried to recover Turaba from the Wahhabis, failed to bring King Hussein to reason. An attempt made by H.M. Government at the end of 1923 to bring about peace through a conference

between Nejd, the Hejaz, Iraq and Trans-Jordan was doomed from the start, because King Hussein would not send representatives unless Ibn Saud agreed beforehand to territorial concessions that were manifestly impossible. Yet at that moment Hussein was unable to control his own tribes round Mecca and Medina and to prevent their levying toll on foreign pilgrims.

Having failed in their prolonged attempt to compose the differences between the two rulers, H.M. Government, who had continued their subsidy to Ibn Saud for some years after the cessation of the much larger subsidy to King Hussein, brought their payments to him to an end. This was in March 1924. A year later the Wahhabis began a campaign against King Hussein, and the Hejaz was entirely in their hands by the end of 1925. Ibn Saud's new status was recognized by H.M. Government in 1927, by the Treaty of Jedda. This treaty differed from that of 1915, which had been concluded with the Viceroy of India and was based on the Trucial Coast treaties. Ibn Saud was now treated as an equal, H.M. Government recognizing "the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of H.M. the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies." The special position of H.M. Government in the Gulf was recognized by an article in which Ibn Saud undertook to "maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are in special treaty relations with H.B.M. Government."

Under another provision Ibn Saud undertook "to cooperate with H.B. Majesty by all the means at his disposal in the suppression of the slave trade." This was another blow at the slave trade on which H.M. Government had been waging war for over a century. All the treaties with Persian Gulf rulers contained clauses aimed at its eventual suppression, and British naval patrols in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had helped to make the trade more difficult and expensive. The abolition of slavery in the Ottoman Empire by the Constitution of 1908 had little effect in Arabia. The Yemen, the Hejaz and Nejd were all eager markets for slaves, and the demand created the supply, which came chiefly from Ethiopia. King Hussein, who regarded slavery as sanctioned by the Quran, had always

resented the exercise by the British Agency in Jedda of the ancient right to manumit refugee slaves, and Ibn Saud held similar views. The emancipation of slaves in Arabia is always going on, albeit slowly; slaves are manumitted from motives of religion and humanity, and a slave woman who bears a child to a free master cannot be sold or employed on servile duties and on her husband's death becomes free; and it was hoped that Ibn Saud with his great authority would be able to stop the importation of fresh slaves and that slavery in Arabia would consequently disappear in the course of time. Ten years later Ibn Saud published a decree forbidding the introduction into his realm of any person alleged to be a slave and not proved by a certificate to have been a slave before a given date. The promulgation of this decree was held by H.M. Government to justify their renouncing the right of manumission in Saudi Arabia.

It says much for the steadfastness of Ibn Saud's friendship for H.M. Government that the relations between them were never seriously disturbed, even though King Hussein enjoyed British support for some years after his attitude towards Ibn Saud had become a great embarrassment, and though British support was also used in favour of Hussein's sons, the rulers of Trans-Jordan and Iraq, in the days when attacks by fanatical Wahhabis involved British military action to repel them. The relations even survived the years of bitter controversy about Palestine. Although he was always ready to support the Arab cause by diplomatic means, either alone or jointly with other Arab rulers, Ibn Saud refused to take part in the disorders in Palestine and used his influence more than once to bring them to an end. The good relations were strengthened in 1938 by the visit to Jedda and Riyadh of H.R.H. Princess Alice and the Earl of Athlone—a visit the more successful because during its progress rain fell in Saudi Arabia for the first time for some two years, and the American company that was boring for oil in Nejd struck their first gusher. "A lucky footfall," said the Arabs.

Although the Yemen was made independent of Turkey by the Allied victory, that did not make the Imam friendly to the

British, and he began to encroach on Aden territory, disregarding the frontier which had been agreed between the British and Turkish Governments in 1914. The Imam's refusal to come to terms may have been due in part to Italian encouragement. When H.M. Government, after repeated warnings, had ejected the Yemeni troops from Aden territory, they succeeded in making with the Imam a treaty (1934) in which they recognized the independence of the Yemen while the Imam agreed to recognize the territorial *status quo* pending further negotiations. The Imam also undertook to assist in preventing the trade in African slaves.

If by the beginning of the Second World War the Italians had not established themselves in a privileged political position in the Yemen, it was probably not so much because of the undertakings given by the Italian Government in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1937 as because the Imam was fundamentally xenophobe and offered powerful passive resistance to foreign penetration from whatever quarter.

Between the Wars Aden, which had long been under the Government of Bombay, was transferred first to the Government of India and then to the Colonial Office. The Protectorate, which is bounded by the Aden Colony, the Yemen, the desert and the territory of the Sultan of Muscat, had been left for years to its own devices, but in 1937 a tolerably successful effort was made to establish peace in place of chronic feuds and their attendant insecurity and poverty. Some hundreds of rulers of varying grades of importance were persuaded to sign a three-year pact; the result was a marked increase in freedom of movement and in prosperity. Any group that broke the pact and refused to return to ways of peace and to discharge any penalty imposed by the Government was liable to have its dwellings, after repeated warnings, bombed from the air. This policy has been criticized, but unless the territory is to be left to anarchy it is difficult to think of a better policy. Persuasion without punishment is ineffective. Ground expeditions

mean not only loss of life to local troops and their British and Arab officers but far more casualties to the offenders than are ever caused by the bombing, which is effected only after repeated warnings indicating the place and time of the air action have been dropped on the offending area.

The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded with Muscat in 1939 leaves nothing of the special position of Great Britain, which in fact never amounted to a protectorate. Bahrain acquired additional importance by the discovery of oil by an American company, and by the establishment there of the British naval station transferred from the Persian islands. There is a good natural airfield in Bahrain territory: it forms part of a series of airfields along the Arab coast of the Gulf which were formerly adequate but have been rendered much less useful by the development in the size and performance of aircraft. Oil was discovered in Kuwait and other territories ruled by shaikhs in special treaty relations with H.M. Government. The Kuwait oil is exploited by British and American interests in equal shares; the other concessions are held by the interests which own the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The Mudros Armistice once signed, Anglo-Egyptian tension reached breaking-point. In addition to the general grievances arising from war conditions, the political classes resented the declaration of a protectorate over their country. It was, however, to take eighteen years to establish a new status by agreement. If H.M. Government seemed slow to see how the world was moving, Egyptian politicians were too ready to stir up an excitable people and loth to tell them when aroused that their demands were impracticable. The most prominent of these leaders was Zaghloul Pasha, founder of the Wafd Party, so named from the *wafd* (delegation) which addressed a demand for complete independence to the High Commissioner

immediately after the Armistice. The Egyptians expected a relaxation of British control, because of the promises made to the Arabs during the War and as a reward for the hardships they had suffered; yet it seemed likely that control would be intensified, to judge by the growth of the number of officials from 300 in 1898 to provision for nearly 1,700 in the budget for 1919-20. The Nationalists wished to send a delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris, but H.M. Government objected, and even refused to receive a deputation consisting of the Prime Minister and one of his colleagues. Agitation threatened to degenerate into violence, and the British military authorities deported Zaghloul and three of his colleagues to Malta. This set in motion a series of strikes, acts of violence and savage murders of British subjects. A slight lull resulting from the appointment of Lord Allenby as High Commissioner and his release of the deportees on condition that they remained away from Egypt gave place to more violence, and Lord Allenby had to threaten to make use of his special powers.

Meanwhile Zaghloul and his colleagues had presented themselves to the Peace Conference, but his intransigence won him no sympathy there, and the recognition by President Wilson of the British protectorate over Egypt showed that the Anglo-Egyptian dispute must be settled by direct negotiations. A mission was sent to Egypt by H.M. Government, under Lord Milner, to make recommendations for a settlement, but it was boycotted by the Nationalists because the protectorate was the basis of its terms of reference. In spite of the boycott the Milner Mission was able to make a fair estimate of the situation and above all to see that the Nationalist agitation had much more support among the population than British circles in Egypt had hitherto believed. Back in London Lord Milner had talks with Zaghloul which failed because Zaghloul would not accept anything short of complete independence, while H.M. Government were reluctant to pass straight from protectorate to independence and the military authorities clung to a practice which was obnoxious to the Egyptians—the retention of British troops in Cairo.

Seeing no hope of agreement with the Wafd or any other Egyptian party, H.M. Government decided upon a unilateral

declaration. This was issued in February 1922. It declared the protectorate to be at an end and Egypt to be an independent sovereign state, but until such time as any changes should be brought about by agreement it reserved four essential points to the discretion of H.M. Government:

(1) the security of the communications of the British forces in Egypt;
(2) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
(3) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
(4) the Sudan.

The Khedive now took the title of King, and Egypt, subject to the reserves, became mistress in her own house. Zaghloul, who had been deported to the Seychelles, since he would neither agree to anything himself nor allow anyone else to do so, was allowed to return in the following year. When the Constitution came to be prepared H.M. Government intervened, on the one hand to prevent the insertion of anything contrary to the reserves, and on the other to secure more liberal terms for the people than the King wished to allow them. Martial law, which had been in force since 1914, was abolished, and elections were held. The Wafd secured a large majority and Zaghloul became Prime Minister.

The agitation which Zaghloul had promoted, for complete independence and the incorporation of the Sudan in Egypt, did not cease with his appointment as Prime Minister; nor did he do anything to allay it. It spread to the Sudan, where it was promoted mainly by Egyptians: some Sudanese took part in it, but Sudanese troops helped to put it down. In Egypt a long series of murderous attacks on British soldiers and officials culminated in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army. As compensation for this crime H.M. Government required not only the punishment of the perpetrators and the payment of an indemnity, but also the withdrawal of Egyptian officers and military units from the Sudan. The

next few years were more tranquil: the Egyptian public was perhaps sobered by the assassination of the Sirdar and by the aggressiveness of Italian policy. Zaghloul had resigned when the ultimatum was presented, but he became President of the Assembly, where he showed a keener sense of responsibility in a task which ended with his death in 1927. When the King dismissed his successor, Nahas Pasha, in 1929, and suspended Parliament for three years, there was a lull in political agitation during which negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt were continued, and although they were not successful they brought about an improvement in relations and made it possible to conclude an agreement about the waters of the Nile which preserved the rights both of Egypt and of the Sudan. It was not until 1936, however, that an Anglo-Egyptian treaty was concluded, and that was when Mussolini's Ethiopian adventure had given Egypt a warning.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 envisaged an alliance whatever amendments might be effected in its provisions. The British military occupation was brought to an end and British troops, which were to be limited to 10,000 ground troops and 400 pilots, were to be withdrawn to the Canal as soon as accommodation could be provided there. Of immense importance was Article 7, which provided that in case of war each of the signatories should come to the help of the other in the capacity of an Ally. The execution of this provision helped to defeat the Axis and to save Egypt from becoming an Italian colony. In 1956 the parties were to review the question whether the Egyptian Army was in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and security of navigation of the Suez Canal. Some slight progress was made with that perennial cause of dispute: the Sudan. The question of sovereignty and administration was left untouched, but Egyptian armed forces, which had been banished from the Sudan for more than ten years, were to be allowed back and (subject to reasons of public order and health) Egyptian immigration into the Sudan was to be allowed. Great Britain was to back the application of Egypt for membership of the League of Nations, and to take agreed steps with the object of securing the abolition of the Capitulations; and meanwhile Great Britain abandoned in favour of the Egyptian

Government responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners.

A conference at Montreux in 1937 settled the question of the Capitulations. The privileges of foreigners were to be abolished forthwith, except judicial privileges, which were to cease after 1949, when the Mixed Courts and the foreign Consular Courts were to come to an end.

Although nominally neutral throughout the War Persia had in fact been a battleground. The country was in a state of anarchy; the treasury was empty; there were three armies—the Persian Gendarmerie with its Swedish officers, some of whom were compromised by having sided with the Germans; the Persian Cossacks with Russian officers; and the British-officered South Persia Rifles. To H.M. Government and the Government of India the restoration of order seemed the first essential, and an Anglo-Persian agreement was drafted whereby H.M. Government would lend to Persia some officers to organize a single Persian armed force and some experts to assist in reforming the Ministry of Finance, and would make Persia a loan of £2 million. The reasons which justified this agreement in British eyes were less obvious to others, and opposition to it sprang up, though not so much among the Persians—at least at first. The United States and French Governments objected that the Agreement attempted to secure individual advantage out of a victory won by the common effort, and the label of imperialism was attached to a scheme which at least contained some other and better elements. The agreement was in fact never ratified, but the main object it had in view, the restoration of order, was effected by a Persian of qualities sufficiently rare for his rise to have been unpredictable. This was Riza Khan, an officer of the Persian Cossacks. In 1921 a *coup d'état* put into power as Prime Minister a journalist whose position depended entirely on the support of Riza Khan, who became Minister of War. It was this Government that refused to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty, which thereupon lapsed.

In 1925 Riza Khan became Riza Shah, first of the Pahlevi

Dynasty. Years afterwards, when the good he had done for his country was beginning to be outweighed in his subjects' minds by mistakes and faults, it became customary to blame the British for his accession to power. For this there is no evidence whatsoever. In point of fact the *coup d'état* took both H.M. Government and the British Legation in Tehran by surprise. On the other hand the Persian people as a whole, weary of years of anarchy, welcomed the accession of Riza Khan to power and eventually to the throne. The British, like everyone else, profited by the restoration of order, but they suffered more than any other foreigners by the political and economic changes effected by Riza Shah.

The extension of the power of the Tehran Government to the provinces by Riza Khan, as Minister of War, incidentally struck a blow at one who had for years been a good friend of H.M. Government: Shaikh Khazal of Mohammerah. H.M. Government had given him assurances not only of protection against any foreign power but of support in obtaining a satisfactory solution in case the Persian Government should encroach on his jurisdiction or recognized rights or his property in Persia. The assurances were conditional: the Shaikh and his descendants must observe their obligations towards the Persian Government and be guided by the advice of H.M. Government; and the Shaikh was warned that support might have to be limited to diplomatic action. The Shaikh came to an agreement with the Persian Government on the disputed question of taxes, but Government operations in a neighbouring province aroused his fears and he rashly denounced Riza Khan and his policy. He was removed to Tehran, where he was detained until his death a few years later, and his shaikhdom ceased to exist. Such privileged positions as the Shaikh had long held must inevitably be diminished when once a central government becomes effective, and there was no case, under the letter of the agreements, for invoking the assistance of H.M. Government; but the Shaikh's long immunity from interference by Tehran, and his friendship with H.M. Government, may well have persuaded him that his position was unassailable, and the discovery that it was not must have been very bitter.

Having established his authority throughout Persia Riza

Shah turned his attention to foreign affairs, and in 1927 he notified the Powers that all extra-territorial agreements were to terminate after one year, when new treaties would be concluded. H.M. Government agreed to the abolition of the Capitulations, but they concluded a very necessary agreement whereby the Persian Government undertook in return to provide certain guarantees in the way of procedure and to establish decent prisons. This was in 1928. The year before, the Persian Government had revived a claim to Bahrain which they had raised at various times since the British treaty with Bahrain in 1820, and in particular in 1869. The occasion for its revival now was the treaty of 1927 containing a provision whereby Ibn Saud agreed not to interfere with Bahrain. In a note of which copies were sent to all member states of the League of Nations the Persian Government alleged that the Persian claim had been admitted by the British Foreign Secretary in 1869. In their reply, which was also communicated to members of the League, H.M. Government rejected the Persian claim, denying that it had been admitted in 1869 or at any other time. The Persian Government's protest has been repeated from time to time, especially when the Shaikh of Bahrain gave an oil concession first to a British syndicate and finally to an American company. A long and complete reply was given by H.M. Government in 1929. The only result of this unfortunate controversy, which arises out of the Persian occupation terminated in 1783, is the creation of difficulties for persons travelling between Bahrain and Persia.

The abolition of the Capitulations was followed by several other measures designed to normalize the relations between Great Britain and Persia. Hitherto Great Britain had maintained the lights and performed quarantine duties on the Persian littoral as well as elsewhere in the Persian Gulf: these duties, so far as they related to Persia, were now handed over to the Persian Government. In 1931 the Indo-European Telegraph Company withdrew from Persia almost completely, and in 1935 the British naval coaling stations at Basidu and Henjam were transferred to Bahrain, which then became the British naval station in the Persian Gulf.

Relations with the Persian Government, already somewhat

strained by the growing nationalism of Riza Shah's régime, were seriously disturbed in 1932 when the Shah announced the "cancellation" of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession, which was not due to expire until 1961. The Persian Government had been discussing with the Company for some years the method of calculating their share of the profits, which they found unsatisfactory; and their dissatisfaction was intensified by the sharp fall in oil revenues during the world slump which began in 1929. The Shah's unexpected action aroused grave apprehension in London. Not knowing what it might portend H.M. Government sent naval units to the Persian Gulf, but that this was not the old style of naval demonstration was proved by their submission of the dispute to the League of Nations. The League referred the issue back to the disputants, who concluded in 1933 a new concession to replace the existing one. The period of the concession was extended to 1993; the concessionary area was to be limited to one hundred thousand square miles, to be selected by the Company within five years; and the Government's revenue from the concession, revised to their satisfaction, now included a tonnage royalty protected against sterling/gold depreciation. An excellent feature of the new agreement was a provision whereby a regular stream of young Persians were to receive in Britain the professional education necessary for the oil industry.

An agreement concluded with Persia in 1928 permitted British aircraft travelling to and from the East to land at aerodromes on the Persian shore of the Gulf. When, however, the arrangement came up for renewal the Persian Government made it a condition that the route should lie not along the coast but over the mountains, via Shiraz. This condition, which was doubtless inspired by ancient suspicion as to British policy in the Gulf, was too onerous to be accepted, and British airlines transferred to the Arab side of the Gulf.

Riza Shah set up, in foreign trade, currency and clearing restrictions which did not suit British methods, but which fitted in very well with those of the Hitler régime. Moreover in production Persia and Germany were complementary, one having raw materials and some foodstuffs to export, the other manufactured goods. In this way the Germans secured a

commercial hold which they turned into a political asset. They obtained a very large share of the business resulting from the Shah's desire to industrialize his country. They built factories, sent Germans to show Persians how to run them, and then provided Germans to give training to young Persians in technical schools. One British product however the Shah was determined to have: aircraft. At his request a British firm set up in Tehran a factory where under the direction of British technical experts Persian craftsmen built aeroplanes to British designs, with British engines.

In 1935 Riza Shah decreed that his country and his people should be called not *Persia* and *Persians* but *Iran* and *Iranians*. This is the wish of the present rulers of Persia, so the terms *Iran* and *Iranians* will be used in this book from now on. The confusion which this creates for English people is not diminished by the fact that the *Persian* language and the *Persian* Gulf remain unaffected by the change.

PART VII

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AFTER

IN 1914 our eastern communications had been threatened by Turkey's decision to side with the Central Powers. This time we had no cause to expect hostility from Turkey, and some slight reason to hope for her assistance. Italy however revealed a very hostile neutrality, and there was much anxiety at the equivocal behaviour of Russia. Feeling themselves equally threatened by these dangers, Great Britain, France and Turkey concluded in October 1939 a treaty providing for mutual military help in certain circumstances, Turkey making a proviso that her obligations were not to compel her to enter into conflict with Russia. When Italy became a belligerent, Turkey pleaded the risk of her being involved in hostilities with Russia as a reason for not implementing her obligations under the Treaty. The behaviour of Russia towards Finland, Poland and the Baltic States might well give Turkey pause, not to mention the adhesion of the French in Syria to Vichy. The defection of France increased Great Britain's obligations towards Turkey, economic as well as military. Turkey's normal trade channels were blocked by the War, and she needed fresh markets for her exports and fresh sources of supply for the war material without which she could not defend herself, far less lend help to the Allies, and Great Britain had to try to fill the gap. British trade with Turkey doubled; the British Government made pre-emptive purchases of large quantities of Turkish dried fruit and tobacco, and managed, in spite of other urgent demands, to deliver considerable quantities of war material.

In Palestine, where both Arab and Jewish terrorists had been active, the outbreak of war brought internal tranquillity. The Executive of the Jewish Agency undertook to support Britain against Germany. The chief of the Arab leaders were not in Palestine, but similar assurances of help came from groups of Palestine Arab notables. The Jews assumed that in return for their help the White Paper of 1939 would be dropped, and their anger was intense when they found that the Palestine Administration considered it essential to restrict the transfer of land to the Jews. There were demonstrations, with some outrages, against the White Paper, but on the whole the decision of the Jews to co-operate with the British against Germany was followed, except by the irreconcilables who, as the Stern Group, began a campaign of terrorism in 1940. Only in their opposition to Germany, however, were the British and the Jews united: on all other points disagreement seemed to arise. The Zionists could not believe that any desire to do justice entered into the policy of H.M. Government towards the Arabs: it was merely cowardice, "appeasement".

Early in the War the Administration in Palestine rejected a Jewish demand for permission to raise bodies of Jewish troops, holding that the recognition of Jewish as opposed to Palestinian forces would be improper. Small Jewish units for embodiment in larger formations were authorized, but it was not until 1944 that the Jewish Brigade became an accomplished fact. To the Jews this delay was inexplicable except on the ground of hostility to the Jews, and the astonishment became anger when the possibility of a German break-through in Egypt threatened to expose the Jews in Palestine to German and Arab vengeance. To provide for emergencies the Jews obtained by well-organized robbery (sometimes with the connivance of venal British soldiers) large quantities of British arms and explosives, and in the light of the fact that some of this material must have been used against British troops and Palestine Government property and officials later on, the reluctance of the British authorities to countenance the formation of specifically Jewish units seems less unreasonable.

The intransigence of the Jews was naturally hardened by the rush of Jewish immigrants to Palestine from Europe, where

the Germans, who were beginning their brutal policy of extermination, allowed some Jews to proceed to Palestine, not out of humanity but to create a problem for the British. Great Britain had been very generous in admitting Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe into Britain before the War, but to allow large numbers into Palestine and perhaps turn the Arab majority into a minority in the middle of a world war might well seem impolitic as well as unjust. The decision to turn the refugees back or to transfer them for the duration of the War to some British territory, e.g., Mauritius or Cyprus, was, however, met by the Zionists with violent protests and abuse and by acts of terrorism. The Jews received much encouragement from extremist support in America, where in the Biltmore Programme the Jews had demanded that Palestine should be a Jewish Commonwealth, a Jewish army should be created, and unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine, under the control of the Jewish Agency, should be allowed—a policy which was adopted by the Zionist Organization.

In spite of the Axis propaganda to which they had been exposed for several years Egypt and Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. By the time Italy came into the War however the military situation of Great Britain had become so weak that both Governments hesitated to commit themselves further. Eventually the Egyptian Government broke off relations with Italy, but with conditions designed to soften the blow. The Iraq Government refused to do so, and the Italian Legation in Baghdad remained open to serve as a centre of Axis propaganda and intrigue. About the sympathies of Ibn Saud there was no doubt, but no treaty bound him to take part in the War, from which indeed the possession of the Holy Places of Islam tended to debar him. Economically Saudi Arabia was dependent upon Great Britain and, later, the United States for assistance, for the revenue from the pilgrimage was reduced by war conditions, and the income from oil was not yet considerable.

In Iran the Shah's scheme of industrialization and rearmament was brought to an end by the Allied command of the seas, for although the land route through Russia was still open, much of the German material was too bulky to send that way, and the additional freight charges were enormous. H.M. Government granted Iran credits to the value of £5 millions, but when Riza Shah found that the goods he wanted—steel rails, aircraft and weapons of war—were just what we could not spare, he repudiated the credit. Iran was officially neutral, but nothing could make the Iranians as a whole really neutral. In spite of the Russo-German non-aggression pact Germany was regarded in Iran as the eternal foe of Russia and therefore as the natural friend of Iran, and Great Britain shared to some extent the odium attaching to Russia, as her Ally in the First World War, and as having helped her, as the Iranians mistakenly held, to "carve up" Iran in 1907. Moreover the Iranians knew Germany as a favourable market and source of supply, and the Germans as professing a flattering respect for their common Aryanism. Except in the south and east, where the British had been known for scores of years, Iran was almost solidly pro-German. The Shah probably wanted nothing but to keep out of the War and enjoy business as usual. His closing of the British and American schools in 1940 was merely one manifestation of the nationalistic policy which he had consistently followed; and the pressure he put on the Oil Company in the same year, in order to secure higher payments than the reduced sales of oil warranted, was only a sign of his determination not to suffer by a war which he regarded as no concern of his.

The dangerous year 1940 was survived somehow. The campaign in North Africa had not gone badly, but the Mediterranean was becoming unsafe, and the large French forces in Syria needed constant watching. Early in 1941 the weakest link in the Middle East chain broke. This was Iraq, where prominent military leaders, far from trying to carry out the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, urged their fellow-countrymen to seize the chance

to free Palestine and Syria from Jews and mandates. A *coup d'état* brought into power in April 1941 a politician, Rashid Ali, who was entirely dependent on the military leaders. It was clear from his conduct that Iraq would be pushed into the German camp unless H.M. Government took steps to prevent it. They therefore despatched a brigade of troops to Basra—a measure so clearly within the terms of the Treaty that Rashid Ali could only concur. On being notified, however, of the approach of a second brigade, Rashid Ali maintained that it ought not to land until the first had moved on. This contention was not well-founded, and in any case the first brigade was prevented from moving northwards by the seasonal floods.

The arrival of the second brigade compelled Rashid Ali to hurry on an anti-Ally movement which had been designed to coincide with the arrival of the Germans in Syria in force—an event delayed by the unexpected British resistance in Crete. The siege by Iraqi troops of the R.A.F. cantonment fifty-five miles west of Baghdad failed completely. The Iraqi troops were half-hearted, and were unable to overcome the stout defence made by the small garrison, reinforced by small bodies of troops flown up from Basra and supported gallantly by the British-officered Levies, especially the Assyrians; and by the time relief came across the desert from Palestine the besieged had sallied out to the attack. To raise a relief force in Palestine at this moment had been extremely difficult. The Zionist extremists, Irgun Zvai Leumi, gave some assistance, but without the help of the Arab Legion the expedition would have been impossible. The anti-Ally movement in Iraq, which had left large areas unaffected, soon collapsed, and Iraqis came into power who kept their country firmly attached to the Allied cause. With their support Iraq became the centre where the resistance to the Axis threat to the Middle East was organized. The Iraqis had before them an encouraging declaration made by Mr. Eden, then Foreign Secretary, in May 1941, before the collapse of the Rashid Ali movement, expressing British sympathy with the Arab aspirations towards union. Mr. Eden made it clear, however, that while Great Britain would support any scheme that commanded general approval, the initiative must come from the Arabs themselves.

There remained the danger in Syria to be cleared up. During the troubles in Iraq the French authorities in Syria had not only placed Syrian aerodromes at the disposal of German aircraft but had even forwarded munitions for Rashid Ali by their railway. After a short campaign the Vichy army was defeated by British and Free French forces, which had begun their advance with a proclamation in which General Catroux, speaking in the name of General de Gaulle, gave a guarantee of liberty and independence to Syria and the Lebanon and a promise to negotiate a treaty to that end. H.M. Government associated themselves with these promises, which were amplified by Free French statements that the Free French Army had come to put an end to the Mandatory régime. By mid-July the Vichy forces had surrendered, and attention could be turned to yet another danger-spot: Iran.

By now Russia was a belligerent, having been attacked by her near-ally Germany. Riza Shah can hardly have wished that Russia should win, but there is no evidence that he actively assisted the Germans, though in his controlled press news from anti-Allied sources predominated in the proportions of two or three to one. Little or nothing was done however to ensure that the Germans should not undermine Iranian authority, as they had done that of Norway and Holland before the invasion. What picture of the world Riza Shah formed for himself it is hard to imagine. Completely illiterate, in spite of his great abilities, he was compelled to receive all information through others. Wrapped in suspicion he cut himself off from foreigners and saw only his ministers and chief officials, who had good reason to know that he did not welcome unpleasing news. The representations of the British and Soviet Governments, if they ever reached him, had little or no effect. H.M. Government even named to the Iranian Government certain serving German officers residing in Iran under commercial disguises, one of whom had helped to instigate the troubles in Iraq; but the Shah was quite certain that there could be no fifth column in his country.

In his belief that his control was effective everywhere the Shah placed a faith in his ill-paid officials and police that was hardly justified. That is why the Mufti of Jerusalem, Rashid Ali and other leaders of the anti-Ally movement in Iraq, who had fled to Iran when their plans failed, were able to live in Tehran for months without any serious attempt being made to prevent them from plotting a revenge; and why the Shah refused to take proper precautions to immobilize seven Axis merchantmen which were lying at Bandar Shapur. The British authorities were convinced that some at least of these ships had explosives concealed on board, and it was feared that one of them might steal out one night and sink itself in the narrow channel which is the sole entrance to the Shatt-al-Arab. Such an operation, if successful, would have cut us off from Iraq and from our oil supplies at Abadan. The reasonable request that to guard against this risk the Iranian authorities should either remove the Axis crews from their vessels or take away essential parts of the machinery was met by a blank refusal: there were no explosives on board, and the Iranian police were fully able to prevent any untoward incident. How completely the Shah was mistaken was proved when the British troops entered South Iran: two of the German vessels were blown up by their crews, one of them with such violence that it became a total wreck.

H.M. Government were justified in thinking that the vulnerable oil industry in South Iran, which was essential to the Allied cause, was exposed to risks which an actively neutral policy on the part of Iran would have eliminated. German agents already in Iran, or others dropped by parachute as some were in fact dropped later on, might have done the installations enormous harm; while if the Shah could have been assassinated (and there is some evidence of a German plot to that end), a German parachute landing in Tehran might have swung the Iranian Army over to the side of the Axis. If this, or something like it, had happened during such a crisis as occurred in 1942, when the Germans penetrated into the Caucasus on one side and came close to Alexandria on the other, Allied interests in the Middle East might have been in the greatest peril.

It has been said that the sole reason for the Anglo-Russian

occupation of Iran was the desire to open a safer route for aid to Russia than the sea route to Murmansk, but it is probable that if ever a defensive-offensive was justified, it was justified in this case by the obvious inability of the Shah to counter any serious German coup. Then many Iranians, and some foreign writers, have argued that in any case the Allies' object could have been attained without the occupation. The alternative to occupation, however, would have been a threat to occupy: this has no moral superiority over occupation, and is less effective. The despatch through Iran of enormous quantities of goods and war material was only effected by Allied control of Iranian communications, with Allied troops to guard them and a strong Allied counter-espionage service to check Axis agents. Nevertheless the occupation was bound to disturb the political and economic life of Iran, and as H.M. Government desired that this disturbance should be reduced to the minimum they gladly accepted a suggestion that the status of occupation should be replaced by a treaty between Great Britain, Russia and Iran.

Iranian resentment at the entry of foreign troops was the less intense because the blame was attributed to the Shah's policy, and there was a general expectation that he would abdicate or be dismissed by the Allies; and when he remained on the throne there was an outburst of discontent against Great Britain (a safer target than Russia) which might have become embarrassing. Nevertheless the common belief that the Allies called upon the Shah to abdicate is unfounded. The Shah was probably aware of his unpopularity among his own people, and from the tone of the Persian broadcasts by the B.B.C., now permitted to criticize his actions, he must have realized that he could expect little support from H.M. Government. What decided him to abdicate however was a movement of Russian troops from Qazvin, some ninety miles from Tehran, towards the capital. This advance was carried out under an agreement whereby British and Russian troops were to occupy the suburbs of Tehran in order to hasten the promised expulsion of the Axis representatives from Iran and the arrest and surrender to the Allies of the German residents in Tehran. The moment the Shah heard of the Russian advance he wrote

out his abdication and left for the south, where he was given a passage on a British steamer. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Mohamed Riza, then twenty-three years of age, who faced courageously the task of co-operating with the Allies and converting an autocracy back to a régime planned on democratic lines.

Negotiations between the three Powers ended in the signature of a treaty in January 1942. Iran was to help the Allies by providing facilities for the passage of troops and supplies and assistance in furnishing material and labour. The Allies were to be free to maintain the necessary forces in Iran, but the presence of their troops was not to constitute a military occupation, and they were to withdraw the troops not later than six months after the conclusion of hostilities or of peace, whichever might be the earlier. Later, American technical troops joined the British and Russians in the task of despatching aid to Russia through Iran: they ran the railways from the south to Tehran, and large road convoys.

In spite of the Tripartite Treaty, the Allied occupation of Iran aroused some concern in Turkey. The Turks now had the Russians as neighbours on the east as well as on the north, and they feared the effect that the Russian occupation of Iranian Kurdistan might have on the Kurds in Turkey. 1941 was not a good year for Anglo-Turkish relations: Axis pressure, and the pressure of other circumstances, was strong, and Turkey signed a non-aggression treaty with Bulgaria and then made with Germany a treaty of friendship which included a guarantee of non-aggression and an undertaking to settle by friendly means all questions of common interest. The difficult situation in which Turkey found herself was appreciated by H.M. Government, who were in fact given confidential information of the negotiations with Germany at every stage; but the conflict of interests in Turkey caused us great anxiety from time to time. The great cause of dispute was the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany, which continued until April 1944, when it was cut off completely.

The position of the Allies in Egypt was greatly strengthened in February 1942 by the return to power of Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Party. Although British pressure was required to bring about the change there is no doubt that the appointment of Nahas Pasha was generally popular. With a friendly government in Egypt added to those in Iraq, Iran and Syria, the Middle East remained quiet in spite of the approach of the Germans on north and west. At the most critical time, when Rommel was less than one hundred miles from Alexandria, the Egyptian Government remained firm, perhaps preferring the known British to the unknown Italians; for it was taken for granted that in the case of an Axis victory Egypt would fall to Mussolini.

With the destruction of the Axis forces in North Africa in May 1943, the tide turned sufficiently to reassure the Middle East as to the outcome of the War. Iran was still further heartened when at the Tehran Conference in November the assurances given to Iran by Great Britain and Russia in the 1942 Treaty were reaffirmed with the support of President Roosevelt. Turkey however, in spite of the improvement in the Allied position, refused a request, towards the end of 1943, to enter the War: she maintained that her defences were inadequate and that her neutrality would serve the interests of the Allies, as well as her own, better than her participation in the War, since as a neutral she could insulate Syria and Palestine from Axis aggression. History will probably judge that this decision was sound, but H.M. Government felt that they could not continue to send to a neutral Turkey war material for which active use could be found elsewhere, so supplies were stopped and the British military mission was withdrawn.

The shortage of shipping and the dislocation of foreign trade resulting from the War were bound to cause hardship in the Middle East, and with the object of reducing this to a minimum H.M. Government set up in Cairo in 1941 the Middle East Supply Centre, a body which became Anglo-American the following year. Its objects were to economize

shipping and to encourage the development of local resources and the fair distribution both of the surplus of such resources and of such imports as the Allies could spare. The growing of wheat was encouraged in Egypt by the replacement of much cotton by grain, and in Syria by the extension of cultivation: with the help of a South African tunnelling company enough water was brought through the mountains in Syria to irrigate many thousands of acres in the coastal plain—a permanent addition to the wealth of the country. Lend-Lease goods were imported and distributed in large quantities, especially essential goods such as sugar, tea, piece-goods and medical supplies. These goods were carried in Allied vessels at risk of life—a fact rarely known to the beneficiaries, and when known regarded with indifference. Technical advisers lent by the Middle East Supply Centre made valuable studies of agricultural and other problems. For several years in succession a campaign was waged against the locust menace, which was particularly grave at that time. Even Saudi Arabia welcomed British and Egyptian help in fighting the locust. In Iran the campaign was waged on a wide scale, with British experts and Indian troops co-operating with Iranian officials, and Soviet aeroplanes spraying danger spots from the air.

Everywhere in the Middle East heavy spending by the Allied forces tended to cause inflation. Little was done by the respective governments to counteract this, since rationing and price control require official organizations such as the Middle East cannot easily create and heavy taxation was not acceptable to the richer taxpayers; consequently prices rose steeply and the gulf between rich and poor grew even greater than it normally is in those parts.

This process was perhaps seen at its worst in Iran. Moreover the abdication of the Shah slowed down the administrative machine, of which he had been the mainspring for a quarter of a century. In particular the supply of bread in the "deficit" areas was threatened, owing to the collapse of the scheme by which the Government collected wheat at a fixed price in the surplus areas for sale to the bakeries in areas where local supplies were inadequate. In the first two years after the entry of foreign troops the British carried 70,000 tons of grain

to Iran. In addition the British Government supplied at their own expense a number of officials to assist the Iranian authorities in checking the crops and seeing that the quantity the state required to buy was delivered. After the engagement by the Iranian Government of Dr. Millspaugh and other Americans to assist in the financial and economic reorganization of the country these British officials, and others appointed to help with transport, co-operated with the Americans. If all three Allies in Iran could have collaborated in economic measures for the benefit of the country, the situation might have been much better, but the Russians preferred to follow their own policy in isolation. This was the more regrettable as the north, where Russian troops were stationed, is by far the richest food area in Iran.

On the whole British relations with Iran went forward with surprising smoothness. The British Intelligence Service could not rely fully on Iranian police co-operation in tracking down and arresting German agents and parachutists, and the Iranians, by nature too generous towards offenders, could not always appreciate the need to intern Iranians of known anti-Allied sympathies; but many distinguished statesmen and officials co-operated cordially with the Allies, and many thousands of Iranians worked for the Allies on railways, convoys, ports, and elsewhere. For instance, the motor convoys run by local drivers and mechanics under British supervisors belonging to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation carried more Aid-to-Russia than the convoys run by the military authorities of the United States or Great Britain or Russia.

Early in 1944 representatives of a British oil concern and of two American oil companies applied to the Iranian Government for oil concessions in South Iran. The applications were being examined when in the autumn the Soviet Government asked for the right to prospect for oil over most of northern Iran and to exploit a large area if oil should be found. The Iranian Government decided to postpone consideration of all applications for oil concessions until after the War. The British and American applicants accepted this decision as within the rights of any sovereign state, but the Iranian Prime Minister was attacked by Soviet propaganda with such violence that he

resigned in order not to embarrass his country. The Iranian Parliament rushed through, with only a few dissenting voices, a law prohibiting under severe penalties even the discussion, let alone the grant, of any oil concession to any foreign state or person, without its prior approval.

Meanwhile there had been growing up in Iranian Azerbaijan, where Soviet troops were stationed in virtue of the Treaty of 1942, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which the Iranians believed to be the creation of the Russians and the Russians declared to be a spontaneous movement which but for the repressive policy of Riza Shah would have revealed itself many years before.

The pressure of Russia on her southern neighbours, Turkey and Iran, which had been felt for centuries, was nominally brought to an end by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, but it revived as soon as the German threat to Russia was removed in the Second World War. The Germans had done their best to arouse mutual suspicion between Russia and Turkey. They claimed to have discovered in the archives seized by them in Paris evidence proving that at the time of the Russian attack on Finland Turkey connived at an Anglo-French plan for an air attack on Baku. On the other hand they alleged, when their attacks on Russia had brought to an end the German-Russian agreement, that the Russians had asked what would be Germany's attitude if Russia annexed the Straits. Russia now complained that Turkish neutrality had helped the Germans—an accusation rebutted by Turkey with military arguments which make a pretty convincing case. In 1945 Russia demanded back the districts of Kars and Ardahan which with a great display of generosity she had returned to Turkey after the First World War. Russia also demanded the cession to her of bases on the Bosphorus, to enable her to join in the defence of the Straits. This demand had already been addressed by Russia to her Allies at the Potsdam Conference: the Soviet Government regarded as inadequate the offer by Great Britain and the U.S.A. of a

joint guarantee of the complete freedom of the Straits in peace and war.

In order not to show complete intransigence even in the face of these unreasonable demands on the part of Russia, the British and United States Governments made a formal request to the Turkish Government for the calling of a conference to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936, whose text provides for periodical revision. It is true that the modifications which they themselves proposed were not important, but a conference would have given the Russians an opportunity to ventilate any real grievance that they might have had. The Russians however, in a menacing note, rejected the Turkish proposal for a revision of the Convention.

All this time a war of propaganda against Turkey was being waged by Soviet press and radio. In addition to claims to the former partly Armenian provinces of Turkey, fantastic claims to large parts of Asia Minor were made on behalf of Georgia; and Turkey was accused of allowing Great Britain to establish military bases near the Straits. Greek communists were encouraged to operate in parts of Greece near the Turkish frontier, and "incidents" on the Russian frontier of Turkey compelled the Turkish Government to watch that region also with great care. Turkey was not in the least daunted by Russia's threatening attitude, but she was compelled to keep a large army on foot, and this, added to the cost and inconvenience of partial mobilization throughout the War, threw a heavy strain on her economy. The sequel to this can be found in a message addressed to Congress by President Truman in March 1947. Turkey, he said, had sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States to enable her to effect the modernization necessary to maintain her internal integrity. H.M. Government were no longer able to give Turkey financial and commercial aid. Only the United States could supply it. The object was "to ensure the peaceful development of nations, their free institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian régimes which undermine the foundations of peace and hence the security of the U.S.A." In consequence of this message funds were voted to assist Turkey (as well as

Greece), and the request of those countries for American civilian and military personnel to assist in the task of reconstruction was granted.

Russian pressure on Turkey was at least exercised from outside. On Iran it could be exercised from the inside, owing to the presence in North Iran of Russian troops, though under the Treaty of 1942 this was not to constitute a military occupation. Great Britain and Russia had agreed in rejecting an Iranian demand that foreign troops should be withdrawn as soon as Germany was defeated, since it was held that the Middle East would be an essential link in the Allied chain of communications until the defeat of Japan; but it was taken for granted, by Great Britain and Iran, that within six months from the defeat of Japan, i.e., by March 2nd, 1946, all foreign troops would have been removed from Iranian soil. That this assumption was shared by the Soviet Union appeared to be proved by a letter addressed by the Soviet Foreign Minister to the British Foreign Secretary in September 1945, saying that the Soviet Union attached "extraordinary significance" to the exact discharge of this obligation. Before March 1946 however Iran had had to appeal to the United Nations against Russian conduct in Iran. The movement in Azerbaijan against the authority of Tehran increased in violence. The Iranian Government despatched a small body of troops with the intention of reinforcing its feeble garrison in Tabriz, but the Soviet authorities, while professing complete neutrality, stopped these troops at Qazvin; and in December, when the dissidents in Azerbaijan were taking forcible possession of key points, they confined the Iranian garrison in Tabriz to barracks.

The British and Americans endeavoured to find a solution to this problem but failed, and the Iranian Government were unable to induce the Soviet Government to negotiate about Azerbaijan. An Iranian appeal was therefore addressed to the Security Council, on the ground that Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran might lead to international friction.

The Soviet representative on the Security Council tried to justify Soviet conduct in Iran by making against the British Government allegations in regard to Greece and Indonesia which were untrue or irrelevant, or both, and stated that the Soviet Government were prepared to resume negotiations which they alleged had been broken off by the Iranian Government. The Council agreed that direct negotiations between the two parties might go on, but recorded its right to be kept informed of their progress.

The negotiations were not completed when March 2nd, 1946, came round. The last British troops left Iran that day (the Americans had left some time before), but the Russians announced that while they would evacuate North-East Iran, Soviet troops would remain in the other northern provinces until the situation was clarified. The situation was "clarified" in April, when the Russians secured from the Prime Minister, Qavam al Saltana, a written promise to introduce in the Persian Parliament within seven months a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company, the shares being held in the proportion of 51% to 49%, for the exploitation of the oil reserves of North Iran; and to settle the Azerbaijan question in a peaceful manner and in a spirit of benevolence towards the people. Iran thereupon withdrew her appeal to the United Nations, and some two months after the date by which the Russians had undertaken by treaty to evacuate Iran, their troops did in fact leave. Delays in the elections (particularly in Azerbaijan, where it took time to re-establish government control) postponed until August 1947 the submission of the necessary bill to the Iranian Parliament, which in October rejected it with only two dissentients. This decision was assailed most violently by the Soviet propaganda machine, which attributed it to treachery on the part of the Iranian Prime Minister, to intrigues by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and in fact to anything but the real cause, viz., the fear of the Iranians lest the working of oil deposits in Iran by a company predominantly Russian should lead to Russian infiltration into the internal affairs of Iran.

Meanwhile Soviet propaganda, and the Tudeh Party in Iran, which followed the Soviet lead, had been trying to

redress the balance by attacking British interests. A political strike of the workers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was engineered, one of the propaganda weapons being a racial campaign against the Arab employees of the Company. At the same moment a similar strike broke out in the oil installations at Kirkuk, in Iraq. It is essential that such foreign companies should be model employers, but it is reasonable to look upon these strikes with some scepticism, in view of the kind of propaganda that was used to foment them, and of the superiority of the terms of employment in the two companies to those in other fields of labour in Iran and Iraq.

Propaganda emanating from the same source also accused the British of fomenting troubles which broke out among the South Iranian tribes in 1946. Now it is traditional for the Iranian tribes to resent control by Tehran, and this movement was probably in part a reaction from the submission forced upon them by Riza Shah; but it can be attributed in part to patriotic dissatisfaction with the policy of Tehran at the moment, which seemed to be based on subservience to the Soviet Government and to its supporters in Iran, the Tudeh Party. In any case, the existence of a strong Iran is essential to British interests, and for that reason, as well as on other grounds, H.M. Government had decided in 1941 that on no account was any encouragement to be given to any Iranian tribe against its Government, and they had applied that policy strictly ever since. It was at first disturbing to find that the Iranian Government appeared to believe Soviet reports that two British officials had instigated the unrest and should ask for their removal; but the request was not persisted in, and it was realized that it had no relation to fact and did not represent the real attitude of the Iranian Government towards H.M. Government or towards British officials.

The situation of Iran as a weak neighbour of a strong and exacting state has been changed, like that of Turkey, by the decision of the United States to assist her to maintain her internal stability. In January 1948 a credit of $25,000,000 was granted to enable Iran to buy from the United States surplus war material for her army and gendarmerie, both of which had been under reorganization by American administrative

officers for some years. The following month the Soviet Government protested that the American advisers wished to make Iran a strategic base for the United States. Americans, it was alleged, were making an aerodrome near the Soviet frontier and building fortifications. Reference was made to the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921, of which, it was stated, the action of the Iranian Government was a breach, and a hint was given at the clause in the Treaty which allows Russia to send troops into Iran if Iran is being used as a base for a movement hostile to Russia. That clause is not applicable, since its scope was limited by a subsequent exchange of letters to pro-Czarist movements, but in any case the charges were flatly denied by Washington. In May 1948 the United States decided to send to Iran non-aggressive weapons, including tanks, guns and fighter aircraft, to the value of $60,000,000. The object of this military aid, it was explained, was to strengthen the internal security of Iran—a matter of interest to the United States, whose desire it is to maintain the internal security of the Middle East.

In 1949 two important British interests in Iran, the Bank and the Oil Company, entered into discussions with the Iranian Government. The concession of the Imperial Bank of Iran came to an end, but permission was given to it to continue to operate in Iran, upon terms which should be very satisfactory to the Iranian Government. The current concession of the A.I.O.C. is valid until 1993, but in view of the dividend-stabilization policy of H.M. Government, to which the Company has conformed, the Company expressed its readiness to enter into discussions with the Iranian Government with a view to redressing any hardship which the Government might consider that they had suffered from the adoption of that policy. At the request of the Government the field of discussion was enlarged to cover other economic considerations, and an agreement was reached in July 1949, though it has still to be ratified by the Iranian Parliament. It provides for increases in the royalty rates which should make the State's oil revenues an increasingly important source of finance for its schemes of economic development.

Syria, with the Lebanon, which at the beginning of the Second World War was entirely under French control, had become before it ended almost completely independent. The French promises of independence and of the termination of the Mandate had been qualified by an announcement that France did not renounce her "tutelary friendship" or the privileged position she had acquired through the centuries; and the British, on the conclusion of hostilities with the Vichy forces, had declared themselves disinterested in Syria and recognized the predominant position of the French. The French-dominated régime which took over from the Vichy officials was extremely unpopular with the people, and when, under pressure by the British, who were responsible for law and order, the French allowed elections to be held, the results were a sweeping victory for the Nationalists, who soon made clear their intention to seize the governing powers still held by the French. Cut off from France, and unwilling as a minority in exile to sign away a special relationship dating from the Crusades, the Free French rashly adopted the extreme measure of arresting the Prime Minister of the Lebanon and his cabinet, whose reinstatement however they reluctantly agreed to under strong British pressure.

The French now entered into agreements for the transfer of powers they had hitherto exercised, but no agreement on the transfer of the *troupes spéciales*, i.e. the local army, seemed to be possible. The French had attributed their troubles to the alleged hostility of the British Minister, but his successor, who made strenuous efforts to mediate between the French and the local governments of Syria and the Lebanon, could not bring about an agreement, the negotiations foundering on the demand by the French of the right to keep bases and to maintain troops in both states. The arrival of Senegalese troops in Syria soon after the German armistice suggested to the Syrians and Lebanese that the French, now free of the German danger, intended to use force. Fighting occurred in several places, and the French proceeded to bombard Damascus, as they had done over twenty years before. The maintenance of order in the Middle East being still essential to the promotion of the war with Japan, the British G.O.C. ordered the French authorities

to cease fire and to confine their troops to barracks. The order was complied with, and by the end of 1946, after an appeal to UNO by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, all British and French troops had been withdrawn.

The French are inclined to attribute their failure to British hostility and intrigue and not at all to their own mistakes or to the revolt of the East against the West, and they consider the engagement of some British advisers by the Syrian Government, which bars out the French as employees, as a violation of our undertaking to recognize the predominant position of France. That undertaking however was linked with the French undertaking to recognize the independence of the two States. Any preference that the independent governments of Syria and the Lebanon might have given to the French would have been recognized by us, but to compel those governments to accord such a preference, or to allow the French to extort it at the possible cost of hostilities on the Allied line of communications with the East, would have been another matter. Nothing will convince many Frenchmen, however, that they have not been edged out of an ancient right by a series of British intrigues beginning with the setting-up of Faisal's government in Damascus in 1918. The mutual suspicions of France and England are old, and they die hard. In the early eighteenth century the English settlers in America believed that the French Jesuits were telling the Indians that England was under the King of France, and the English authorities brought a group of Indian chiefs to England, so that they might see for themselves that the French King held no dominion there. Perhaps the accusation against the Jesuits was no better founded than the charge levelled against British officers by the French in Syria, of having instigated an Arab attack on some French cars which resulted in the death of the wives of two French officers.

Once it was clear that the Allies would win the War Egypt began to expect as a reward for her services some modification of the treaty with Great Britain. The treaty had been con-

cluded for twenty years, but negotiations for revision might be entered into, with the consent of both parties, after ten years, i.e., in December 1946. To excuse their demand for revision before the appointed time the Egyptians declared that the treaty had been signed under duress, though the duress was much less the presence of British troops than fear of Mussolini, from which Great Britain and her Allies had now saved them. The Prime Minister who succeeded Nahas Pasha when the Wafd fell from power in October 1944 was murdered because he had brought Egypt into the War, and with this encouragement the Egyptian Government in December 1945 made a written demand for satisfaction on two vital points: the withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt, and recognition of the "unity of the Nile Valley" by the establishment of effective Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan.

H.M. Government declared themselves ready to negotiate for the removal of British troops from Egypt, but made it clear that provision must be made for the mutual assistance undertaken under the Treaty of 1936 to be afforded until its expiry. The negotiations were inconclusive, as the Egyptian delegation would not accept any practical formula about mutual assistance, but threw themselves into the arms of the United Nations with a confidence which soon received a shock when the United Nations came to deal with Palestine. But it was on the question of the Sudan that negotiations finally broke down. H.M. Government wished to leave the Sudanese free to make eventual choice of their fate, even if that fate should be independence, whereas the Egyptians wished to tie the Sudan to Egypt for ever, leaving to the Sudanese only the choice as to the form the union should take.

Although the negotiations remained inconclusive H.M. Government did remove all British troops from Cairo and all other points outside the Canal area; but in spite of this valuable concession there were the customary outbursts of mob fury in which students and even schoolboys were prominent; a number of British soldiers were murdered, and the murder and attempted murder of Egyptian statesmen continued. In assessing the value of such outbursts it should however, be remembered that Egyptians treat each other with the greatest

violence, and that the murder rate per million in Egypt is fifty times as high as in the United Kingdom.

Although disillusioned as to the effectiveness and impartiality of UNO the Egyptians have not yet understood the realities of Middle East defence, and still believe, or affect to believe, that the object of the retention of British troops on the Canal is to exercise pressure on the internal affairs of Egypt. The Sudan question also seems at present incapable of settlement by agreement. Formerly it was the subject of a competition in rights: the Egyptians pleading conquest by the sons of Mehmed Ali, possession for a considerable period, the "unity of the Nile Valley", and the major share borne by Egypt in men and money in the reconquest of the country; while the British could advance in their favour the administrative, financial and military reorganization of Egypt without which the reconquest would have been impossible, the stiffening of the Egyptian Army by British troops which bore the brunt of the fighting, and the advance made by the Sudan under half a century of British administration. Such arguments however have now been left far behind. The problem is to develop self-government to the point where the Sudan can decide for herself whether to set up as an independent state or to enter into some form of alliance or union with Egypt.

The problem of the Sudan is complicated by the fact that the southern part is inhabited by primitive tribes differing fundamentally from the Moslem, Arabic-speaking north in race, religion and language, as well as by the obstinacy of the Egyptians, who threw away an opportunity to associate themselves with recent constitutional developments in the Sudan. The amendments to the Constitution which were proposed by the Egyptian Government were incompatible with the position taken up by H.M. Government, and the Constitution came into force with British but without Egyptian co-operation. A party in Northern Sudan which favours immediate union with Egypt boycotted the elections, but they were held nevertheless, and the Assembly thereby elected is showing hopeful signs of public spirit and responsibility. Perhaps the recent shifting of interest to the economic plane will help to place the problem in its proper light. Already the Egyptians have come to realize

that control of the Sudan does not mean control of the Nile, which depends also upon Ethiopia and Uganda. The Egyptian Government have assented to the execution by Great Britain of immense works on the Nile in Uganda and Northern Sudan which may take some twenty-five years to complete but long before then should bring enormous benefits to the agricultural population of Egypt and to the Egyptian budget.

Iraq is allied to Great Britain by the Treaty of 1930, which has effect for twenty-five years from the date of her admission to the League of Nations in 1932, but like Egypt she expected to make some profit out of the War in the form of concessions by H.M. Government. This attitude is natural, though it perhaps ignores the Rashid Ali movement of 1941 which, if it had been successful, might have prolonged the War seriously to the great detriment of Allied interests; and H.M. Government entered into negotiations which resulted in the signature at Portsmouth, in January 1948, of an Anglo-Iraqi treaty declaring that there should be perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries and that the alliance between them should continue. The most important provision related to air bases, which both parties recognized "as an essential element in the defence of Iraq itself and of international security and as a link in the essential communications of both parties": the treaty granted to the R.A.F. continued access to the two principal Iraqi air bases "until such time as Peace Treaties have entered into force with all ex-enemy countries." The Iraqi Government which authorized the signature of this treaty, although it commanded a large majority in the Iraqi Parliament, may not, owing to the absence in Iraq of regular parties based on declared principles, have been as closely representative of the population. Moreover there had been much discontent at the mismanagement of the cereal question, and the Opposition were able to exploit this. The demonstrations which were organized made the Treaty the object of attack; the Government resigned, and the Regent assured the public that the Treaty would not be ratified.

When Germany surrendered the Zionists lost interest in the War and devoted their attention to the Jews in Europe who had escaped the Hitler massacre. These pitiful survivors had been uprooted and reduced to destitution, and many were shattered in mind and body by the horrors they had seen and undergone; and to the Zionist, and indeed to nearly all Jews, it seemed that the gates of Palestine ought to be thrown open to these "displaced persons" as a matter of course. A calm and balanced attitude towards immigration was hardly to be expected from people many of whom had lost relatives or friends in the Nazi gas chambers.

Support to the extremist attitude was given by the acceptance of the Biltmore Programme by both candidates for the United States presidency in 1944; by the request addressed to H.M. Government by President Truman that one hundred thousand displaced persons from among the Jewish refugees in Europe should be admitted to Palestine; and by the victory of the Labour Party, which had always been particularly sympathetic towards the Jewish National Home, in the British General Election of 1945. Moreover the Jews regarded the White Paper of 1939 as "illegal" in that it had failed to secure the approval of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and they had assumed, cynically perhaps, that in so far as it had been applied by H.M. Government, it was as a war measure which would be dropped the moment H.M. Government ceased to need Arab support. Finding that H.M. Government still regarded their obligations under the Mandate as ruling out unlimited Jewish immigration, Jews abroad directed towards Palestine a great flood of illegal immigrants, while some of the Jews in Palestine organized acts of violence against the Mandatory which began with the destruction of bridges, railways and other public property and degenerated to brutal atrocities. In regard to these acts the attitude of the Jewish Agency varied from time to time. As intercepted documents show, in the sabotage stage in 1945 the Agency in London was in correspondence with the saboteurs, though it is true that the instructions given in the most significant document were in favour of "isolated cases" and avoidance of a "general conflict". Later the Agency at times co-operated

with the Administration, at others repudiated the acts of violence but expressed inability to intervene because of its disapproval of British policy.

The Palestine Arabs and the Jews have always been agreed on one point: that the Palestine problem was quite simple. The Arabs held that all that was wanted was that Jewish immigration should cease and that self-government should be granted to the existing population; the Jews, that all would be well if H.M. Government on the one hand allowed Jewish immigration to go on indefinitely and on the other kept a firm hand on the Arabs. The account already given of the successive efforts made by H.M. Government to solve the problem will have shown that the question was not so simple; the failure of the attempts made after the War, not by Great Britain alone, will make the difficulty of the problem still more clear. Before this there had been seven British commissions of inquiry and eight official British statements of policy. The attempts now made showed that no plan could be found that would be acceptable to both parties, and that no state or collection of states (except perhaps Russia and her satellites) was prepared to use force to impose a solution.

A new approach was made in the form of an inquiry by an Anglo-American Committee. The eminence of its members and its composite character aroused hope of a successful issue. Its report however, which was issued in May 1946, was disappointing. After laying down the principle that Palestine was not to be an Arab or Jewish state it recommended mutually incompatible items from the demands of the two parties, and directed the Mandatory back to the provision of the Mandate which had been found unworkable ten years before: to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population should not be prejudiced. It recommended that one hundred thousand Jews should be admitted immediately, as far as possible in 1946, and left Great Britain as Mandatory to administer this policy. The President of the United States, before anyone had had time to consider the report as a whole, supported vigorously the proposal for the immediate admission of one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine. H.M. Government

however announced that they wished to know to what extent the United States would be willing to share the additional military and financial responsibilities which the execution of the Anglo-American recommendations would involve. British experts and an American Cabinet committee then held conversations in London and produced a plan for a federal Palestine with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces. The "Morrison proposals" based on this plan failed however to satisfy the two parties, and H.M. Government, after making yet one more attempt to find a ground of agreement, decided in February 1947 to submit the problem to the United Nations Organization as the successor of the League of Nations.

The United Nations had no greater success than Great Britain had had either alone or in co-operation with the United States. Its special committee of investigation agreed unanimously (August 1947) that the Mandate should terminate as soon as possible and that the economic unity of Palestine should be preserved. A majority favoured a partition scheme however, while the minority recommended a federal state. H.M. Government announced that they could not help by force to put into operation a policy that did not commend itself to Jews and Arabs alike, and that failing a settlement they must make plans for the withdrawal of the British forces and the British administration from Palestine at an early date. The withdrawal was eventually fixed for mid-May 1948. In November 1947 the Assembly of the United Nations approved the partition plan, but in March 1948 the United States Government admitted that partition could not be effected by peaceful means and recommended that Palestine should be placed under the temporary trusteeship of the United Nations. In May 1948, on the withdrawal of British troops and officials, the Jewish State of Israel was proclaimed. The United States recognized it immediately; so did Russia and her satellites. H.M. Government hesitated for some time, awaiting a decision from the United Nations and observant of the principle that to be recognized a state must have fixed boundaries; but they soon gave Israel *de facto* recognition.

The war between Jews and Arabs which followed ended in favour of the side which had the superiority in unity of

purpose, organizing ability and military skill. In addition the Jews showed desperate courage. The decision as to whose "fault" it was that hostilities began depends on how far back one goes to investigate, but once hostilities had begun the Jews deserved the victory they obtained.

There is no room here to consider the events of the last days of the Mandate and the first days of the State of Israel; nor could it be done now (mid-1950) with any hope of arriving at a convincing conclusion. Israel began her career with expressions of gratitude to the United States and Russia and of a desire to maintain friendly relations with them; her silence about Great Britain covered deep hostility. But it is impossible to expect a fair judgment at present. To some extent the Jews are the victims of their own propaganda. Caught between the horrors of Nazi Europe and the British interpretation of the Mandate, the Jews set going throughout the world, and especially in the United States, an anti-British propaganda campaign which must have made some English Jews wonder sadly whether it was worth while to hang Streicher if some of his poison was to get into his victims' pen.

To stir up hostility against Great Britain in the United States was only too easy. In 1939 President Roosevelt gave as one reason for opposing the British White Paper that "the Arab immigration into Palestine since 1921 has vastly exceeded the total Jewish immigration during this whole period." Now if the President of the United States, who was well informed by his own officials, could have this stupendous inaccuracy implanted in his mind, it is not to be expected that the average United States citizen should acquire a well-informed and unprejudiced view of the question, especially as it was easy to represent the Jew as the victim of a powerful Anglo-Arab bully—just the contrary of the picture formed by the Arabs, who saw themselves as vainly seeking a hearing while the Jews employed their great influence throughout the world to distort public opinion in their favour.

Where did the difficulties lie that made the Palestine question insoluble except by force of arms? In the first place the Jew and the Arab each held that he had a complete case against the claim of the other. The Zionist argued that, apart

from his historical claim, the Balfour Declaration was issued by Great Britain to secure Jewish help throughout the world in the First World War, and that the help was given; and that but for that Declaration, which was embodied in the Mandate, she would never have been placed in charge of Palestine. The Arab's case is that Great Britain was not free to make any promise to the Jews in regard to Palestine in 1917, since Palestine was included in the area in which Great Britain had promised to recognize Arab independence over a year before.

Which was right? The writer believes, for reasons already given, that Palestine was excluded from the area of Arab independence, but many Englishmen whose opinions are entitled to great respect reject this view and hold the Arabs to be right. As to the Jewish case: whether Jewish help was given in the First World War, and, if so, whether it was important, is disputed. If, as some distinguished British statesmen have declared, important help was given, the claim has a double edge. If the copies of the Balfour Declaration that were dropped from the air over those parts of Germany and Austria where the Jewish population was thickest, did in fact influence the Jews there in favour of the Allies, was that a factor in the anti-Jewish feeling in Germany that rose to its horrible climax under the Nazi régime? Whether Palestine would have been handed over to Great Britain if there had been no Zionist scheme attached to the grant cannot be said with certainty, but the implication that Great Britain made some rich personal profit out of the trust is incorrect: even if she had wished to exploit Palestine for her own ends, e.g. by means of protective duties, the mandate system and the agreement with the United States would have prevented this, while as a military base Palestine was used for the general good of the Allies.

Another major difficulty was the ambiguity of the formula in the Balfour Declaration: "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people." Did it mean that so many Jews might come in that they would eventually become a majority? To go by what Mr. Lloyd George said long afterwards, we must believe that hints that this would be allowed were given to the Jews, but it was his government which refused to insert in the Balfour Declaration a formula

more favourable to the Jews, and in addition the Mandate imposed on Great Britain two limitations: she was to develop self-governing institutions in Palestine, and while encouraging Jewish immigration was not to prejudice the rights and position of other sections of the population. Could a Jewish minority be turned into a majority without prejudicing the rights and position of the non-Jews? The Jews argued that whereas it would be intolerable for them to have a minority status in Palestine, which they claimed as "their" country because of their historical connection with it, the Arabs need not mind being in a minority, because they would have the moral support of the Arabs in adjacent territories.

If the Arabs were in fact exposed to the risk of being outnumbered by the Jews, should this not have been made clear to them from the beginning? The White Paper of 1922 left this point in doubt. It seems probable that the essential difference in policy between British governments in the 1930's and those in office ten years before, lay in an increase in caution as the point was approached where the Jews would outnumber the Arabs in Palestine. In the early days, before Hitler came into power, there was always room for more Jews without risk of their swamping the Arabs; ten years later the risk was serious and called for a decision. The Royal Commisson of 1936 declared that the Mandate was unworkable, since it was impossible to carry out the Jewish National Home policy and at the same time to develop self-governing institutions; but the partition plan, much as it had to recommend it, foundered on the rock which wrecked a similar proposal by the United Nations Committee: that it could only be effected by the use of force.

H.M. Government had had yet other difficulties to meet. One was the existence in the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency of elements determined to make Palestine into a Jewish state at any price. It was doubtless these elements which, in spite of the Organization's promise to conform to the immigration policy of the 1922 White Paper, helped to wreck it by the encouragement, active or tacit, given to illegal Jewish immigration. Another serious difficulty was the pressure exercised by the United States and the League of Nations,

neither of which had any responsibility for dealing with such trouble as the execution of the policies they advocated might cause. The United States Government sympathized with the Zionist cause to the extent of exempting from income tax, as charitable organizations, societies collecting funds in America for terrorist acts against Great Britain in Palestine, but were not prepared to contribute force to impose the policy they favoured. This applied to American policy throughout, though it must be remembered that at the end the situation was complicated by the fact that H.M. Government were not prepared to use force and Russia was. The memory of the Azerbaijan affair was too recent for possible Russian participation in an international force in Palestine to be contemplated without anxiety.

In a few years the difficulties of the Palestine question will be seen more clearly, and the conduct of H.M. Government and of the Palestine Administration will be judged less harshly than it is at present by the Zionists and their supporters. British officials who worked in Palestine may then get some credit for the work they did in the face of great difficulties—uncertainty as to ultimate policy, constant Jewish criticism, and risk of violence first from the Arabs and later from the Jews. What the Jews accomplished has been well advertised, but little is known of the work of the Administration in reducing the malaria and infant death rates, in improving water supplies and agricultural methods, in reafforestation, in Arab education, and, during the War, in the establishment of light industries from which Israel is now profiting. At the same time the future student will note with surprise the contrast between the severity of the Permanent Mandates Commission towards the Mandatory and the eagerness of the United Nations, ten years later, to escape responsibility; between the respect which the Zionists always demanded for the rulings of the League of Nations and the attitude of Israel towards the United Nations Organization.

The closer relations between Arab States which had been foreshadowed in 1941 were realized, at least nominally, in

1945, when the Arab League was formed and its charter was signed by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The Arabs of Palestine, not being independent, were not eligible for membership, but were represented by an observer. The formation of the League was welcomed by H.M. Government, who appointed a senior officer to maintain liaison with it. Over twenty-five years had passed since the Amir Faisal, at the Peace Conference in Paris, had demanded for the Arab territories "open internal frontiers and common railways and telegraphs and systems of education." Unfortunately, although technical questions were discussed by committees of the League, the League itself confined its attention to the political question of Palestine, and when it was defeated by the Israelis there was little left. The dissensions between the members of the Arab League are most regrettable, but it is for them, not for outsiders, to heal them.

In April 1950 H.M. Government accorded *de jure* recognition to Israel; at the same time they accepted the Arab portion of Palestine as an integral part of the dominions of King Abdullah, and extended the alliance with him to cover the enlarged territory, no longer called Trans-Jordan but Jordan. Two points however remain to be settled: the status of Jerusalem, and the common frontier (at present defined by provisional armistice lines), which the two States may wish to modify by mutual agreement.

In an endeavour to relieve the tension between Israel and the Arab States H.M. Government, in conjunction with the French and American Governments, issued a statement in May 1950 recognizing the need of these States for arms for internal security, self-defence and participation in the defence of the area as a whole, and undertaking to consider in that light any application for arms from any State in that area which had given or might give an assurance that it did not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other State. The announcement ends with a declaration by the three Governments of their resolve to take action to prevent any violation of any frontier or armistice line by any of the States in question.

The status of Jerusalem remains to be defined. The internationalization of the city on the lines approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations has been found, as H.M. Government foresaw, to be impracticable. The Government of Israel have put forward a proposal that a United Nations authority should be set up as warden of the Holy Places, not as sovereign of Jerusalem.

The political approach to reunion between the Arab States has failed to overcome dynastic and personal jealousies and the vested interests which have grown up in a generation. An economic approach would normally be a reasonable alternative, but Syria and the Lebanon have severed even the economic bonds that still held them together. The pipelines which link Iraq with the Mediterranean seaboard and are soon to be joined by the huge pipeline which is to carry Saudi Arabian oil to Sidon, in the Lebanon, should create in the several territories a common interest with each other and with Great Britain and America in security and the steady development of the greatest natural resource in the Middle East. It is to be hoped that the efforts which Iraq and Egypt are making to prevent oil from reaching the Haiffa refinery in Israel constitute only a temporary interruption of this tendency.

Wherever in the Middle East a territory cannot develop its resources and improve its standard of living unaided, help and advice from outside should not be lacking. Already the subsidiary organizations of the United Nations are taking an interest in the Middle East, and the problem of the disposal of the Arab refugees from Palestine has been the subject of a survey by a United Nations commission on which Great Britain and the United States were represented. American interest in the Middle East is proved also by the work of American experts, e.g. on the agricultural possibilities of Saudi Arabia and on a Seven-Year Plan of economic development for Iran. The valuable advisory work accomplished by the Middle East Supply Centre during the War is being continued

by the British Middle East Office in Cairo, whose experts are at the disposal of any Middle East government that wishes to make use of them. This Office has assisted the Iraq Government in the drafting of irrigation schemes which could perhaps be made to fit in with any plan of resettlement of Arab refugees. Middle East governments have had reports furnished on forestry, live stock, the keeping of statistics and other matters, and fresh requests for reports are being received. Negotiations with the Yemen, concluded in October 1950, hold out some hope of technical collaboration of this kind as well as of improved political relations.

It is a corollary to the existence of the British Middle East Office that in territories where British influence is strong or decisive, conditions should be exemplary. The enslavement of the Bahrain pearl diver by debt has been abolished by the Shaikh under British advice, but none too soon. British territories in the Middle East, formerly somewhat neglected, are being developed and their standard of living raised, partly with their own resources, partly with the help of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. In the Aden Colony education and social services, which are being developed rapidly, are spreading gradually even in the primitive conditions of the Aden Protectorate, where, thanks to the prolongation of the truce of 1936 and to the gradual extension of the police services of various rulers, security is becoming what it had never been within the memory of man: the rule rather than the exception. Even the ancient institution of domestic slavery, which of course does not exist in the Colony, is gradually being brought to an end in the Protectorate. Here the main problem is to make an arid country provide for the needs of an expanding population which can no longer find the outlets it used to have in Java and Ethiopia and elsewhere. Cyprus has not only developed a prosperous system of agricultural co-operatives, but evolved ingenious schemes for the protection of young forests from their two enemies: the goat looking for food and the human being in search of fuel. Several Middle East governments have sent experts to study these schemes which, if they could spread over the whole area, might have an enormous effect upon its economy.

If British territories are expected to have model administrations, British companies exploiting oil resources in the Middle East ought to be model employers. How much is already being done to qualify for this title is little known by those who have not seen for example the work of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The benefits enjoyed by its employees are considerable. The housing programme, though much delayed by the War, is gradually providing for many thousands of employees of all grades accommodation superior —usually far superior—to that at the disposal of similar employees outside, and this is accompanied by the provision of pure water and electric light and often ice. The Company's medical service, though still incomplete, nevertheless brings medical assistance to thousands of workmen and their families who in their villages or tribal areas would probably have been without any medical help whatsoever. The provision for clubs and societies, hobbies and entertainment, is on a large scale. The transformation effected in a group of apprentices living in a hostel run by a British warden who takes an interest in his charges could not be believed by anyone who had not seen it. The number of Persians who profit by the Company's educational schemes is very large, from the apprentices trained on the spot to the students taking engineering or medical courses at British universities. Much that is done by the Company for the good of its employees benefits in fact a wider circle, e.g. municipal improvements carried out at cost price or gratis, the building and sometimes the subsidising of local schools, the eradication of malaria by swamp clearance, and other measures. Typical of the Company's work in the sphere of social benefits was the large-scale rationing system which it organized for its employees and their dependents during the Second World War.

Although no part of the Middle East is included in the North Atlantic Treaty, the importance of that area, recognized for over half a century by H.M. Government, is now accepted by the United States, whose support of Turkey and Iran, and of the guarantee to Israel and Jordan, has been mentioned. In

May 1950, after the North Atlantic Council had concluded its session, the British Foreign Secretary issued a statement reaffirming what he had said a year before, after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, that "His Majesty's Government remained vitally concerned in the independence, integrity and security of Greece, Turkey and Persia." He stated his conviction that the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty would be conducive to that end, and concluded: "His Majesty's Government are determined to continue their policy of direct support to these and other countries which are striving through military and economic efforts to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity." A statement in similar terms was made on behalf of the United States by the Secretary of State. Soon afterwards Turkey applied for inclusion in the Treaty. The application was being considered in August, 1950.

EPILOGUE

THE British connection with the Middle East has been long and close. Italian and French commercial relations go farther back, but to Great Britain the Middle East has mattered more, both for itself and as a means of defending British possessions in the East and British lines of communication. The connection has been recorded in an immense body of writings of great variety and interest. Commercial and political motives perhaps account for the majority of them, but many arose out of a pure love of travel—the desire "for to admire and for to see" that animated Athelard and Philby as much as it did Kinglake, who in the 1830's scorned the ordinary Grand Tour and produced from a visit to the Levant that masterpiece *Eothen.*

The range of these writings (to mention only some of high value in literature or scholarship) is enormous, and the occasions that called them forth show a wide variety. Robert Curzon, who also travelled in the 1830's, wrote *Visits to Monasteries in the Levant* as a by-product of his hunt for rare manuscripts; Henry Layard, on his way overland to seek a career in Ceylon (a country which in fact he never saw), acquired in Iran an interest in the Middle East which led him on to important archæological discoveries and the writing of several fascinating books; Henry Rawlinson solved the secret of cuneiform writing in the intervals of his duties as Resident at Baghdad; E. G. Browne, a medical student who took up Persian as a hobby, produced in *A Year among the Persians* one of the best books ever written in English about a foreign country. Richard Burton was a soldier and later an unconventional consular officer, but it was as a private traveller that he made his dangerous visit to Mecca and Medina and recorded his experiences in one of the greatest of travel books. James Morier, an official, and Marmaduke Pickthall, a private traveller, have thrown

more light on the East in the novels *Haji Baba* and *Said the Fisherman* than is to be found in many more solemn works. It is perhaps in books of Arabian exploration that the highest general level has been attained. It must not be forgotten that many nations have contributed to our knowledge of the Arabian Peninsula: Swiss, Danes, Hollanders, Germans, Swedes and others; but the great mass of exploration in Arabia has been accomplished by British travellers, and if Doughty's *Arabia Deserta* stands out as the highest peak, it is part of a long and on the whole a lofty range.

It has been suggested that there is a particular affinity between the English and the Arabs, and there is much to be said for this—so much so that it is a common accusation against the British official in Palestine that, being sport-loving and unintellectual, he gravitated naturally to the side of the Arab and regarded the intellectual, complicated Jew with undeserved suspicion. However, it is Turkey that has seemed most attractive to many Englishmen—not merely to the prosperous communities of the Capitulations period, but also to merchants and others who have lived on there through harder times, and to travellers like Sir Mark Sykes and Aubrey Herbert; many others—officials, merchants, or employees of the Bank, the Telegraphs or the Oil Company—have placed their lasting affection upon Persia; and Soane held peoples of the the Kurds to be the most admirable of the Middle East.

Behind the hundreds of printed volumes lies a mass of unpublished experience. Some of this consists of commercial reports and private letters; some can be found in the modest reports of missionary societies, whose educational and medical work is valued by large numbers of Moslems who are deaf to their religious appeal; some is buried in official papers written by men who worked in Egypt or Iraq or Palestine, or who served in the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, making surveys, keeping watch for slavers or gun-runners, or placing and maintaining lights and buoys and cables. Conditions have changed, but the momentum of that interest in the Middle East which was often affection too is still far from being spent.

For a century and a half Iran, Iraq and the Persian Gulf were regarded as bastions of the defence of India, with an

independent Turkey as a flank guard on the lines of communication. Recent political changes in the Indian continent have not made this view out-of-date. Even if India and Pakistan and Ceylon were not still part of the British Commonwealth, it would nevertheless be a disaster to Great Britain (and to the world) if they came under the control of a foreign power. In addition, the Middle East has acquired a great intrinsic value by the discovery of the oil deposits in Iran, Iraq and Arabia. Already in 1944 a distinguished authority on oil could write: "The centre of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf-Caribbean to the Middle East and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area." Prospecting since 1944 has only served to confirm the accuracy of that forecast. The significance of that fact to the British Commonwealth is revealed by the list of holders of concessions:

Concession	*Holder*
South Iran	British.
Kuwait	Half British, half American.
Bahrain	American.
Saudi Arabia	American.
Iraq, and various concessions along the Arab shore of the Gulf	One-quarter British, one-quarter Dutch-British, one-quarter American, one-quarter French (management British).

Thus four of the Powers signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty and chiefly Great Britain and America, hold between them all the oil concessions so far granted in the Middle East.

The percentages of the world's proved oil reserves in 1943 were:

Area	*Percentage of World Total*
Middle East	42.3
United States	33.9
Caribbean (Venezuela, Mexico and Trinidad)	10.0
U.S.S.R.	9.0
Other	4.8
	100.0

Even if "other," which includes Roumanian and Austrian oil, were all under Soviet control, the reserves at the disposal of Soviet Russia would amount to less than 14% of the world total, as against 86% at the disposal of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers. This calculation is based upon the assumption that the figure of 9% for the Soviet Union is correct, and that the Soviet Government have not discovered reserves of which the outside world knows nothing; but in any case it seems certain that at present the balance is heavily in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, and this doubtless helps to explain the sharp note in Russia's negotiations about Iranian oil.

If oil were found in North Iran it would probably be unprofitable to export it except to, or through, Russia: consequently British and American companies are little interested in it; to H.M. Government its disposal is a matter of indifference so long as no improper pressure is used to obtain a concession for it. The Iranian Government propose to exploit the oil themselves, but are prepared to discuss its sale to Russia—a procedure which would obviate any risk that might arise from the operation in Iranian territory of a company in which the Soviet Government held a majority of the shares. This does not satisfy the Soviet Government, who wish to exploit the oil themselves, and claim as a precedent the A.I.O.C., in which H.M. Government hold more than half the ordinary stock. In fact H.M. Government do not interfere in the management of the A.I.O.C. in Iran; but to dispose of any belief that may exist, that their participation in the ownership of the Company might be exercised to the detriment of Iran, it should suffice to point out that on three occasions the Company has agreed to make to the Iranian Government higher payments than those specified in the concession. The increases agreed to in 1933, 1940 and 1949 were all substantial.

Nevertheless the desire of the Soviet Government for fresh oil supplies can be understood. Russia is an enormous country with rapidly expanding industries, and her chief oilfield, at Baku, is growing old. Now, if a giant, standing on the frosty Caucasus, were to look towards the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf, it would be clear to him that if he advanced in

that direction (cutting as he did so the air communications that link Britain and the rest of Europe with India, Australia and the Far East) he could tread on an oilfield at every step: North Iran, Iraq, South Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar. It is important to keep in mind the difference between the holding of a concession and permanent command over the resources which it represents. In peace-time the companies which hold the concessions for Middle East oil market it on commercial principles—and Russia, of course, can buy from them as much as she wishes; but who would command those resources in the unhappy event of another war? The nearness of Russia, with her immense reserves of man-power, militarized from childhood, is a factor which must be taken into account. At present the Marshall Aid countries obtain half their oil supplies, or more, from the United States and the Caribbean; but the Western Hemisphere wishes to conserve its supplies more carefully than in the past, while its consumption of oil is increasing, so that in a very few years Britain and the other Marshall Aid countries will be dependent almost entirely on the Middle East for their supplies of oil. It can be said that the frontier of Britain is no longer even on the Rhine but in the Middle East.

This is not to regard the Middle East solely from the point of view of British interests. Those interests require the independence and integrity of the Middle East territories to be maintained, and that is the object of those territories themselves. A policy which coincides with the wishes of the local governments and populations and also chimes with the declared aims of the United Nations needs no further justification. The policy of Great Britain has been consistently directed (in her own interests if for no other reason) towards the maintenance of Turkey and Iran as independent states. Only on one occasion was this policy abandoned: this was under the pressure of the First World War, when Turkey allied herself to our enemies, and Great Britain and France had to promise to Russia, to encourage their flagging ally, not only Constantinople but also a free hand in the Northern Zone of Iran. A free hand in Central and Southern Iran was left to Great Britain. If the collapse of Russia had not rendered this agreement invalid,

Great Britain would have had to choose between leaving Central and Southern Iran open to Russian penetration or to accept a common frontier with Russia thousands of miles from Britain.

Russian policy has been no less consistent. Catherine the Great openly proposed to expel the Turks from Constantinople and to re-establish the Byzantine Empire under a Russian nominee. In the Second World War, when Russia and Germany were discussing the conclusion of an alliance against Great Britain, the Soviet Government demanded (1) the establishment of a base for the land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and (2) the recognition of the area south of Baku and Batum in the general direction of the Persian Gulf as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union—an interesting official variant of the claim made by the Bolshevik writer, Troyanovsky, in 1918: "Persia is the Suez Canal of the Revolution. . . . For the success of the Oriental revolution Persia is the first nation that must be conquered by the Soviets." The demand relating to Turkey was repeated at the Potsdam Conference and rejected by Great Britain and the United States. It was later addressed directly to Turkey, who also rejected it. The Russo-Iranian oil controversy and the Azerbaijan dispute may legitimately be regarded in the light of Russia's view of Western Iran down to the Gulf as "the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union" and of the propaganda addressed to Iran in the local languages by the Soviet sponsored wireless. Great Britain however no longer stands as the sole or even the chief defender of Middle East independence: apart from the influence of the United Nations, the assistance given to Turkey and Iran, as well as to Greece, by the United States, has brought into the Middle East a stabilizing factor of incalculable importance.

It gives no satisfaction to write of the Middle East in terms of power politics, but it would be dangerous not to recognize the facts. If an effective united nations organization existed, the world could hand over to it with relief some of the problems of the Middle East. One of the first duties of such a body would presumably be to establish control over all sources of power

for the general good, and there Middle East oil would have an important place. Centuries of anxiety would be laid to rest if the Straits could safely be left to an international body, or to Turkey acting under the guarantee of such a body, and a similar arrangement for the Suez Canal would benefit the world in general as well as the particular interests of Egypt and Great Britain.

Meanwhile the best must be made of American and British support of Middle East countries, buttressed as it is by the North Atlantic Treaty. Within this framework the special position which Great Britain still holds in Cyprus, Egypt and Iraq may be held to have a reasonable basis. The demand of most of the Greek-speaking Cypriots for union with Greece would seem at first sight to constitute a strong case, especially in the light of British policy towards India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. These countries, however, could in case of need contribute powerfully towards their own defence, whereas Cyprus, as part of Greece, instead of being a point of stability would share the risk of invasion to which, but for the help afforded by Great Britain and America, Greece would already have succumbed. If British relations with Egypt and Iraq are studied in this light, the treaties may be considered not as a derogation from their sovereign rights, but as a contribution to the stability of an area only too liable to be disturbed.

The danger to the Middle East is not only physical: there is the more insidious danger of penetration by Soviet propaganda, which can now use, in addition to the usual channels, the institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Middle East which have come into the possession of the Soviet Government. Turkey offers a strong barrier to Communism, not only because of the stout patriotism of the Turk and his suspicion of Russia, but also because under Atatürk and his successors attempts have been made to improve the lot of the people by industrialization and agricultural development, education, and the enrichment of village life. In some other parts of the Middle East the people are particularly exposed to the appeal of Communism, the standard of living being very low, the gulf between rich and poor wide, and social services as a rule rudimentary or non-existent. If this danger is not evident to

statesmen in those territories, it is not for lack of British warnings.

Israel, which has been a cause of violent dissension, might become a pillar of stability, first by being herself solid and prosperous and democratic, and then by assisting her neighbours. Peace, however, is the first requisite, and local peace at least should be the nearer because of the statement made by Great Britain, France and America in May 1950. The Israeli attempt to steer a middle course between America and Russia has already been found difficult. The Korean dispute compelled her to choose, and she sided with the United Nations. Israel could have no illusions as to the motives of Russia in backing her extreme demands, since Zionism is prohibited in Russia and a whole generation of Zionists (to quote Zionist sources) perished in Russia in prison, concentration camp or exile. Relations between Israel and Great Britain are much better than in 1948, but it must be recognized that Israel will follow an independent policy: if Israeli interests require the adoption of a policy prejudicial to Great Britain, it must not be expected that memories of Disraeli the Prime Minister or Reading the Viceroy, or gratitude for racial equality in Britain or for British help in launching the Zionist policy, will have much weight. Israel will walk her own way and will look for help to the Jews in Britain, the United States and elsewhere. As many British and American Jews foresaw, the creation of an independent Jewish state may prove to be a serious embarrassment to Jews in other countries.

The resentment of the Arabs on the subject of Israel, against Great Britain and the United States and the United Nations, might cool to some extent if they could realize that the influence of the Jews of which they complain would probably have created a Zionist problem in any case, sooner or later, and that the irruption of the Jews into Palestine tends to justify itself by the energy, skill and devotion with which they have thrown themselves into the task of regenerating the land. It is true that if "efficiency" were to be the sole criterion, many territories would have to change hands, and that some Jewish agricultural enterprises in Israel are uneconomic; but when all allowances have been made, the Jews put an embarrassing

question when they point to what they have accomplished in Israel and ask what some of the Arab States have made of their opportunities.

Israel and the Arab States could supply each other's needs to a large extent, in that Israel possesses manufacturing capacity far beyond her own wants but cannot live on her own produce, whereas the Arab States (except Egypt) have hardly begun to be industrialized but have an exportable surplus of foodstuffs. This convenient arrangement, however, is not likely to come about, for even if the Arab States abandoned their objection to the importation of Israeli goods, it is now accepted that if the standard of living in the Arab States is to be raised, some industries at least must be created. Great Britain must be prepared to help in this process, as she has done in many countries whose fate mattered much less to her than does the fate of the Middle East. The Israelis have technical and organizing experience which they would doubtless be glad to place at the disposal of friendly Arab States, but politics and pride will probably induce the Arabs to look elsewhere. It is noteworthy that the Pakistan Government held in November 1949 an Islamic Economic Conference at which most of the Arab States as well as Turkey and Iran were represented.

Help from Great Britain would not be lacking, if there was a demand for it. In this we might be partly embarrassed and partly helped by the close connection we have had with the Middle East in recent years. There is a natural tendency to be especially critical of Great Britain in countries where she formerly exercised some degree of control or special influence. With far too many young men in the Middle East social reform consists in discussing in coffee-shops the mistakes of the British. On the other hand there are still Iraqis who remember the co-operation that Iraq received from some of her British advisers, and the difficult days at Geneva conferences when British and Arab officials worked together as though all were Iraqis. Again it is admitted by an Egyptian writer who does not spare the British on occasion, that the British advisers to the Ministry of the Interior used to do what it is almost impossible to induce Egyptian officials to do: live out in the

districts. Every Egyptian administrative or technical official wants to live in Cairo or Alexandria, or, failing that, in some provincial capital. However inferior to self-government "good" government from outside may be in some ways, it may set up a standard that self-government would have taken a long while to attain. If the Egyptians execrated the British for the Denshawai incident, and for the abuses committed by Egyptian officials in the interests of the Allies during the First World War, was that not mainly because the British had set up a standard from which these actions were a sad falling-off?

Granted an improvement in feeling there should be plenty of scope (there is some already) for British advisers with high technical qualifications such as those attached to the British Middle East Office. If Arab refugees from Palestine have to be settled in the Arab States, experts to assist in the task could probably be obtained from Britain as easily as from anywhere. When Greece found herself in 1922 overwhelmed by a flood of refugees from Asia Minor it was from the Indian Civil Service that two able officials in succession were obtained, to advise on the task of settling them in Greece. Then there must be many British engineers who have helped to carry out large irrigation schemes and could perform a similar service in some Arab state. Another matter in which British experience might be of use is trade-unionism and labour legislation. With a century of experience at home, and a knowledge of Middle East problems gained through the Labour Advisers attached to some British Embassies in the Middle East, British experts might be able to suggest ways of avoiding some of the pitfalls which beset all governments in the early stages of industrial development.

It would be natural that British enterprise should secure a considerable share in the large schemes of development that have been planned in various parts of the Middle East. The British contractor and the British consulting engineer have established themselves by the quality of their work, not only in territories where we used to exercise particular influence, but also in Turkey and Iran. There is, however, a risk that the policy adopted by some ultra-nationalist governments may discourage the best foreign firms from offering to work for them.

The phenomenon is perhaps inevitable, but if it scares away good firms in favour of firms who will compensate themselves for abnormal difficulties by illicit profits, it will be disastrous for the Middle East. In industry a partial solution of this problem is perhaps to be found in a device adopted in several cases in Egypt, whereby British and Egyptians have pooled capital and skill and business experience to form Egyptian companies.

The importance of Middle East oil in world politics is clear. What is the effect on the Middle East itself? At first sight it might seem to be wholly good: the country to which it belongs enjoys cheap fuel, a welcome addition to the state revenue, and employment and training for a large number of employees of the concessionaire. There are, however, drawbacks. Oil is a wasting asset, and unless the revenue derived from it is used largely to create permanent sources of wealth, when the wells run dry the country will be as poor as it was before oil was discovered. Moreover, easy come, easy go. The temptation to waste the oil money, or to use it as ordinary revenue and so enable the rich to continue to escape taxation, will be very great. The Iraq Government has made a practice on British advice of earmarking oil revenue for development schemes; two Arab territories under British protection are known to have accumulated large reserves out of the revenue obtained from oil; and the Iranian Government proposes to use a large part of its revenue from the A.I.O.C. to finance a long-term plan of economic development.

The influence of sudden riches upon the rulers of oil-bearing territories in Arabia is difficult to estimate. Will characters that withstood the relative poverty of normal Arabian conditions retain their virtues now that wealth bubbles from the ground? It is to be hoped that nothing will be done by any British authority or company to encourage pointless spending, and that everything possible will be done to underline the transient nature of oil resources and the necessity to spend the revenue it brings in with that fact in mind.

It was suggested at one time that a bank should be set up for all the Middle East territories possessing oil resources, and that the oil companies concerned should set aside a proportion of their profits for investment in long-term projects,

agricultural or industrial, to replace in due course the income from oil. The proposal came to nothing, but not through British opposition.

The importance for persons whose duties take them to the Middle East of an acquaintance with its civilization and one or other of its languages is now well recognized in Britain, where H.M. Government, acting on the recommendations of the Scarbrough Committee (1946) have set aside funds to increase the facilities in universities in the United Kingdom for the study of certain foreign languages and civilizations, among them those of the Middle East, and to grant studentships to persons likely to be fitted after specialized study to fill the additional posts thus created and other similar posts. Before this scheme came into existence there was already established in Jerusalem (it has since been transferred to the Lebanon) a Centre for Arab Studies, under the auspices of the Foreign Office, where some twenty to thirty young men follow an intensive course of one year in the Arabic language and Islamic studies. The students include officers seconded from the armed forces, candidates for employment in the Sudan or under British Government departments, and employees of British banks and oil firms. The interest shown by British companies operating in the Middle East is encouraging. Some of them take advantage of the London School of Oriental and African Studies as well as of the Centre for Arab Studies, and some encourage their employees by a system of money prizes to acquire a knowledge of the local language. The wider facilities for the study of the languages and civilization of the Middle East are particularly important now that two groups of Middle East specialists have disappeared owing to the absorption of the Levant Consular Service in the Foreign Service and the abolition of the Indian Political Service.

It is probably in the matter of education, in the widest sense, that Great Britain can be of the greatest use to the Middle East. British mission and other schools (like British hospitals) in the Middle East cannot compete in number and size with those maintained by the Americans, but for quality they need fear no rival. The success of Victoria College, Alexandria, in welding together into a harmonious body with sound scholastic

attainments boys from all the races and religions of the Middle East, is well known; but valuable work has been done on a smaller scale by many British schools, for boys and for girls, throughout the area. There is a great demand for English education, and it is being met not only by the local British schools (some of them operating under growing difficulties due to shortage of funds or to the restrictions imposed by local laws) but also by the placing of Middle East students in suitable educational institutions in Britain, often with the aid of the British Council.

The demand for places in British universities and colleges is far greater than can be met, although no concession is made to foreign students such as is made for propaganda purposes in some European countries. The practice was driven to the extreme in Nazi Germany, where medical degrees were granted to non-Germans after dangerously short courses; but even in some countries where culture is highly valued it is the custom to accept a lower standard from foreign candidates for degrees, on the ground, it seems, that since the local law will not permit them to practice there, lack of professional competence does not matter. British universities pay the foreign student the complement of expecting him to come up to the same level as the British student—a challenge which the applicant from the Middle East meets usually with success and sometimes brilliantly, in spite of the added difficulty of working in an acquired language. This is appreciated by the students and is beginning to be valued by their Ministries of Education. The British Council grants a certain number of scholarships to Middle East students, to be held at some British university, and also does its best to find places for other applicants. It is gratifying to record that the compliment is being returned by Iran, and that a British student holding an Iranian Government scholarship in the Persian language entered Tehran University in 1950.

At least as important as the scholarships granted by the British Council is its scheme of bursaries, which enables senior students from the Middle East to spend a few months in Britain studying some aspect of education or industry or social or political life. It may be an engineer making a tour of

the great engineering works, or a student of political science seeing how our local government functions, or a magistrate anxious to learn how we deal with the juvenile delinquent. A member of a Middle East delegation who happened to be a lawyer recently evaded an item in an elaborately organized programme of sight-seeing in order to pay his fourth visit to Bow Street, to study how so many cases were disposed of efficiently in so short a time.

It is particularly important that visitors from the Middle East should have opportunities to study the working of British institutions. Self-government is a recent creation in most Middle East countries, and the tendency for people accustomed to autocracy to look to some central authority for every good thing is very strong. In Britain the visitor can learn that although the Government now run a comprehensive health service, grant old age pensions, and provide education, all these activities were begun by private initiative and were for long carried on by charitable or co-operative means; and that university education, and much of the best primary and secondary education, is still uncontrolled by the state. One of the duties imposed on the Moslem by his religion is the giving of charity, but this is often interpreted narrowly as the giving of personal alms. The more difficult task of organizing the regular collection of large funds and the establishment in co-operation with others of schools, hospitals, orphanages and other institutions is not often attempted. Taken as a whole the Middle East has yet to produce its John Howards and Elizabeth Frys, its Lord Shaftesburys and Octavia Hills, and if contact with British people and an acquaintance with our social history can hasten their appearance, the gain would be great.

This does not mean that Middle East governments should leave the social services to private charity, or that they are doing so. Modern Turkey has not omitted social questions from her programme. Iran is hoping to effect many social improvements as a by-product of the Seven-Year Plan. Egypt has a large scheme for the supply of good water to villages, and for the improvement of the public medical service. Iraq's irrigation schemes are on an immense scale. But if there is still room in Britain (as there is) for private enterprise in many

branches of social service, there is still more room in the Middle East, where so little has been done in comparison with the need. Middle East students, seeing what is done in Britain, often with small means, may be encouraged to throw off the fatalism of the East and to apply their knowledge and experience for the benefit of their fellow-countrymen. They will also, it may be expected, adopt the practical approach. They will know that if a country has three times as many officials as it needs, all underpaid and many of them employed less for their fitness than because they are somebody's cousins, this question must be dealt with if large schemes of economic and social reform are to be carried out successfully; that it is useless to re-afforest waste lands unless the public can be induced to allow the saplings to grow into trees; that in medicine the great need is not for enormous and expensive hospitals with the most up-to-date equipment, but for keen young doctors, men and women, who are prepared to work in the country districts where there is at present no medical help, and to cure or, better still, to prevent such common maladies as trachoma, malaria and venereal disease.

The young enthusiast from the Middle East will often admit the need for personal service and sacrifice, but will argue that to regenerate his country by that means would take too long (even if "the Powers" would let him alone while he accomplished the task), and that in any case there are some things that can only be effected by state action: for example, the reform of the land system which in some cases not only keeps the cultivator in semi-serfdom and on the verge of starvation but also impedes all agricultural improvements, and the heavier taxation of the richer classes which is required to finance education and the social services and to reduce the dangerous gulf between rich and poor. How, he asks, are such changes to be carried out by the men who at present get themselves elected as deputies and chosen as cabinet ministers? Sometimes he reproaches the British for not having established more democratic régimes in Egypt and Iraq when they had (as he suggests) the power to do so, and it is not easy to make him realize that the British had to work with those persons who were prominent by reason of education or

influence, unless they were to intervene at every stage and so reduce still further the area of self-government. It was occasionally brought as a criticism against H.M. Government in the Second World War that in Iran they failed to support "democratic" elements. The declared policy of the Allies was to accept any government that came into power by constitutional means, provided that it was prepared to work with the Allies. Any other policy, which in any case could only have been adopted by agreement with the Soviet authorities, whose opinion of what constitutes a democratic element might have differed widely from ours, would have involved detailed interference in the internal affairs of Iran (in violation of the 1942 Treaty) and consequent responsibility for the result.

Nevertheless there is much in the young enthusiast's contention, and it seems certain that either new men will come forward in some Middle East States or the present ruling class will have to acquire a sense of urgency that is lacking at present. In Turkey the attempt begun by Atatürk to lead the people a stage or two on the way to a democratic régime seems (1950) to have had some success; in Iran a measure was passed recently that seems to be designed to prevent a democratic constitution from being strangled by oratory or wanton obstruction. Some of the Arab States, already conscious of the problem to be solved, may be stirred to swifter action by the example of Israel, which seems so far to be able to combine democracy with action, and which may confer on its Arab citizens economic and social benefits not usually found in the Arab world.

Self-government is a difficult art, and Middle East countries have not at their disposal the centuries that Great Britain took to attain it. Moreover democracy as hitherto practised in some Middle Eastern countries has tended to exhaust itself in political manoeuvre and to ignore the grievances crying out for redress. Nevertheless to abandon the pursuit of enlightened self-government as hopeless is to accept the pessimistic conclusion of the totalitarian, no less firmly held because usually concealed, that the best that can be done with man is to turn him from an animal into a performing animal. Great Britain is still one of the chief defenders of the independence of the

Middle East, for her own sake, for its sake, and for the sake of the world; but she is fully aware that the defence cannot be secured by military means alone, but must be backed up by contented peoples. If she refuses to join the pessimists and, by example and any other influence she may possess, helps the Middle East to steer a course between the totalitarian rocks to right and left, the historian of the future, though he will doubtless find plenty of room for criticism, may yet (as Hakluyt did four centuries ago) "speak a word of that just commendation which our nation do indeed deserve."

LIST OF BOOKS

for supplementary reading

While the publications named are recommended in particular for the periods under which they are listed, most of them are useful for later and/or earlier periods as well.

Books shown in italics are by foreign writers

PART I

Beazley, Sir R.	The Dawn of Modern Geography (1897–1906)
Cunningham, Wm.	The Growth of English Industry and Commerce (1910–38)
Hakluyt, Richard	The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation (1589–1600)
Hodgkin, R. H.	A History of the Anglo-Saxons (1939)
Kirk, G. E.	A Short History of the Middle East (1948)

PART II

Curzon, Lord	Persia and the Eastern Question (1892)
Epstein, M.	Early History of the Levant Company (1908)
Foster, Sir Wm.	England's Quest of Eastern Trade (1933)
Longrigg, S.	Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (1925)
Purchas, Samuel	Purchas His Pilgrimes (1626)
Sykes, Sir Percy	History of Persia (1930)
Wilson, Sir Arnold	The Persian Gulf (1928)
Wood, A. C.	History of the Levant Company (1935)

PART III

Graves, Philip	The Question of the Straits (1931)
Graves, Sir Robert	Storm Centres of the Near East, 1879–1929 (1933)
Hoskins, H. L.	*British Routes to India* (1928)
Issawi, Charles	*Egypt: an Economic and Social Analysis* (1947)
Miller, Wm.	The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801–1927 (1927)
Wilson, Sir Arnold	The Suez Canal (1933)

PART IV

Chirol, Sir Valentine	The Middle Eastern Question (1903)
	The Egyptian Problem (1920)
Cromer, Lord	Modern Egypt (1908)
Graves, Philip	Life of Sir Percy Cox (1941)
Hardinge, Lord	The Old Diplomacy (1947)
Hubbard, G. E.	From the Gulf to Ararat (1916) (Turco-Persian Boundary Commission)
Ryan, Sir Andrew	The Last of the Dragomans (to be published by Geoffrey Bles)
Shuster, W. Morgan	*The Strangling of Persia*, 1910–11 (1920)
Sousa, Nasim	*The Capitulatory Régime of Turkey* (1933)
Storrs, Sir Ronald	Orientations (1945)
Twitchell, K. S.	*Saudi Arabia* (1946)
Wilson, Sir Arnold	South-West Persia (1941)

PART V

Cruttwell, C. R. M. F.	A History of the Great War (1934)
Hay, Sir W. Rupert	Two Years in Kurdistan, 1918–20 (1922)
Hourani, A. H.	Syria and Lebanon (1946)
Lawrence, T. E. (T. E. Shaw)	Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1935)
Lenczowski, G.	*Russia and the West in Iran*, 1918–48 (1949)

Official History of the War in Mesopotamia (four volumes)

Royal Institute of International Affairs	Great Britain and Egypt, 1914–36 (1936)
Sykes, Christopher	Wassmuss (1936)
Wilson, Sir Arnold	Loyalties, 1914–20 (both volumes) (1931)
Young, Major Sir H.	The Independent Arab (1933)

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Antonius, G.	*The Arab Awakening* (1938)
Barbour, Nevill	Nisi Dominus: a Survey of the Palestine Controversy (1946)
Bentwich, Norman	Palestine (1946)
Hyamson, A. M.	Palestine: a Policy (1942)
Jeffries, J. M. N.	Palestine, the Reality (1939)
Royal Institute of International Affairs	Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–45 (1946)
Sidebotham, H.	Great Britain and Palestine (1937)
Weizmann, Dr. Chaim	*Trial and Error* (1949)

PART VI

Atiyah, Edward	*An Arab tells his Story* (1946)
Belhaven, The Master of	The Kingdom of Melchior (1949)
de Gaury, G.	Arabia Phoenix
Elwell-Sutton, L. P.	Modern Iran (1941)
Ingrams, Harold	Arabia and the Isles (1942)
Ireland, P. W.	*Iraq* (1937)
Khadduri, Dr. Majid	*Independent Iraq* (to be published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs)
Lloyd, Lord	Egypt Since Cromer (1933–34)
Macdonald, A. D.	Euphrates Exile (1936)
Main, E.	Iraq, from Mandate to Independence (1935)
Monroe, Elizabeth	The Mediterranean in Politics (1939)
Philby, H. St. J. B.	Arabian Days: an autobiography (1948)
Roosevelt, Kermit	*Arabs, Oil and History* (1948)
Royal Institute of International Affairs	Survey, 1925 (Vol. I). Survey, 1934
Speiser, E. A.	*The United States and the Near East* (1947)

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Royal Commission — Report on Palestine (1937)

Report of a Committee set up to consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916 — Cmd. 5974 (1939)

Palestine: Statement of Policy — Cmd. 6019 (1939)

PART VII

Groseclose, E. — *Introduction to Iran* (1947)

Knatchbull - Hugessen, Sir H. — Diplomat in Peace and War (1949)

Millspaugh, Dr. A. C. — *Americans in Persia* (1946)

Paiforce: the Official History of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941–46 (1948)

Royal Institute of International Affairs—The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Jewish Agency — *The Jewish Case before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine* (1947)

The Political History of Palestine under British Administration. (A memorandum by H.M. Government presented in July 1947 to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine)

Palestine: Termination of the Mandate, 15 May, 1948. (A statement prepared for public information by the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office) (1948)

EPILOGUE

Warriner, Doreen — Land and Poverty in the Middle East (1948)

* * * * *

The books listed below (some of them classics) are by British writers and relate to the Middle East but are not necessarily concerned with the relations between Britain and the Middle East.

Bell, Gertrude	Amurath to Amurath (1911)
Bishop, Mrs.	Journeys in Persia and Koordistan (1891)
Browne, E. G.	A Year among the Persians (1893)
Burton, Sir Richard	A Pilgrimage to El Medinah and Mecca (1857)
Curzon, The Hon. Robt.	Visits to Monasteries in the Levant (1849)
Doughty, C. M.	Arabia Deserta (1888)
Eliot, Sir Charles	Turkey in Europe (1900)
"Fulanain"	Haji Rikkan, Marsh Arab (1927)
Kiernan, R. H.	The Unveiling of Arabia (1937)
Kinglake, A. W.	Eothen (1844)
Lloyd, Seton H. F.	Foundations in the Dust (1947)
Lane, E. W.	Modern Egyptians (1836)
Layard, Sir Henry	Nineveh and its Remains (1849)
	Early Adventures (1887)
Morier, James	The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan (1824)
Philby, H. St. J. B.	The Heart of Arabia (1922)
	The Empty Quarter (1933)
Pickthall, Marmaduke	Said the Fisherman (1903)
Rich, C. J.	Residence in Kurdistan (1836)
Scott, Hugh	In the High Yemen (1942)
Soane, E. B.	To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise (1926)
Stark, Freya	Valleys of the Assassins, and other Persian Travels (1934)
	Winter in Arabia (1940)
Stevens, E. S.	By Tigris and Euphrates (1923)
Sykes, Sir Mark	Dar-ul-Islam (1904)
Thomas, Bertram	Arabia Felix (1932)
Villiers, Alan	Sons of Sindbad (1940)
Wigram, W. A. and E. T. A.	The Cradle of Mankind (Life in Eastern Kurdistan) (1922)

	Introduction *and* Pilgrims and Crusaders to *c.* 1600	Merchant Adventurers *c.* 1600–1750	Beginnings of the Eastern Question *c.* 1700–1882	Drang Nach Osten *c.* 1880–1914
ADEN		24	32, 46	53
BAHREIN			47	
CYPRUS	11, 13, 14		37, 38	50, 51
EGYPT	9, 10, 12	25	28-31, 33–35, 40–46	50, 51, 54, 59–64
FRANCE	9, 11, 13	17, 20, 23, 26	28–34, 36–38, 42–46	48/9, 51–54, 57, 59
GERMANY	9	20	34, 36–38, 41, 44, 46	48, 51–58
GREECE	9, 11	17	33, 34, 37	51, 52
HEJAZ			28, 31	49
INDIA	10	17–19, 21/2, 24–26	28/9, 31–33, 38, 40–42	54, 56
IRAN (PERSIA)	10	18–27	28, 32/3, 38–40, 47	50, 53–59
IRAQ	9, 10	23/4	28/9, 31/2, 40/1, 46	54
ITALY	9, 11, 15	17, 20/1	28, 38, 43, 46	52, 65
KUWAIT				52–54
MUSCAT			32, 47	53
PALESTINE (and ISRAEL)	9, 10, 11–14		36	
PERSIAN GULF	9, 10	19, 21, 24–26	28/9, 32, 40/1, 46/7	51–57
RED SEA		24–26	28/9, 32, 40–42, 46	
RUSSIA	9	18/19, 23, 26/7	30/1, 33–40	48, 50–59, 63
SAUDI ARABIA				
SUDAN				59–63
SYRIA AND THE LEBANON	9, 10, 11, 14	17, 18, 21, 23/4	28, 31, 34, 36/7, 40/1	
TRANSJORDAN (AND JORDAN)				
TURKEY	9	17–24	28–39, 42–45, 47	48–55, 58/9, 63–65
UNITED STATES	9			58
YEMEN		24/5	46	

COUNTRIES

First World War 1914–1918	Between the Wars 1918–1939	Second World War and After 1939–1950	Epilogue
72	117/18	159	
76	115, 118, 124	159	164, 166
66–68	87	129, 159	168
66–68, 74, 75	86, 88/9, 91, 94, 100, 118–22	129, 136/7, 146–49, 157/8	168, 170–72, 175/6
66–70, 72–75, 80–84	89/90, 92, 110, 113, 122	127, 130, 132, 139, 145/6, 157	164, 166
66/7, 72, 74, 76, 78/9	89, 105, 107, 110, 112/13, 125/6	128–35, 138/9, 145, 150, 154	163, 167, 174
68, 80, 81	87, 91	140–42, 161	167/8, 171
71, 73/4, 76/7, 83	114–16		
73, 76–79, 81/2	115, 117, 122	137	163/4, 166, 168
76, 78–80	88/9, 122–26	130, 132–39, 141–44, 158, 160–61	162–68, 170, 174/5, 177
68, 70, 72, 75–78, 80, 82–85	86–92, 100/1, 108–13, 115/16	129–31, 133, 136, 149, 157–59	163/4, 166, 168, 170, 175, 176
66, 68, 80/1	89, 92, 93, 117	127, 129, 136, 147	
76	90, 112, 115, 118		164, 166
	117, 118		
69–77, 82–84	86–90, 94–107, 113/14, 116	128/9, 131–36, 147, 150–60	169/70, 177
76	115, 118, 124/5	159	163–67, 172
73	89, 115, 117		163
66–70, 76, 78–81	88/9, 93, 109	127, 130, 132–44, 151, 153, 156	164–69
	88–90, 101, 113–15	129, 137, 157/8	164, 166, 172
	120–21	147–49	
68–70, 72–74, 82–84	87, 89/90, 95, 103, 113	127, 130–32, 136/7, 145/6, 157/8	
	86/7, 101, 103, 113–16	157, 160	
66–70, 72–82, 84	88–93, 109–11, 115–17	127, 135/6, 139–41, 143, 160/1	163, 166/7, 171
70, 80/1, 83/4	88, 109/10, 116, 119, 122, 124	129, 135–44, 150–58, 160/1	164–9, 173
72	88/9, 115–17	157, 159	

INDEX

An asterisk * after an entry means that the country or area in question will be found indexed by periods, corresponding to the parts into which the book is divided, in the grid on pages 184–5.

THE ARABS IN HISTORY

Bernard Lewis

Professor of the History of the Near and Middle East, University of London

AFTER looking at the origins and early history of the Arabs, the career of Muhammad and the rise of Islam are described, then the expansion of the Arabs the creation of the great medieval Arab Empire. The stages in the growth of Arab civilization are traced, and a chapter is devoted to the activities of the Arabs in Europe. After a brief survey of the period of decline, the book concludes with a short account of the Arab renaissance and the genesis of modern Arab nationalism.

Six maps.

ISLAM

BELIEF AND PRACTICES

A. S. Tritton, M.A., D.LITT.

Late Professor of Arabic at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

SUDDENLY the Arabs became a nation, destroyed Persia and robbed New Rome of her richest provinces. They took over and developed Greek science and philosophy; in architecture and several of the arts they need fear no rival. In the beginning it was their religion that united them. Arab in origin, it took from the conquered peoples, welded its borrowings into a unity which admits of much diversity, created a system of law which is worthy of comparison with Roman law, and built up a civilization ahead of anything contemporary in Europe.

7/6d. net each