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Wayne A. Wilcox

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE RISE OF CHINA

India, Pakistan and the Rise of China

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

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PREFACE

This essay deals with contemporary domestic and international politics in South Asia and attempts to explore specifically the extraordinarily complicated relationship between great and small powers in that part of the world. It is essentially a critique of Indian foreign policy which argues that India since independence has forfeited regional security in the interest of international status. A corollary of this theme is that India's neutralist diplomacy has allowed and continues to allow foreign great powers to exercise a veto over foreign policies which may, in fact, accord with India's and its neighbors' security interests.

The essay is not an indictment of the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of India, or of the Prime Minister. Instead, it tries to explore the assumptions about and images of the world which have guided Indian foreign policy since 1947 and which were largely shattered in the aftermath of war with China in 1962. With the unfair benefit of hindsight, it attempts to illuminate the contradictions in India's heritage, policy and position and to relate them to the South Asian international system which has been profoundly affected by the emergence of a newly independent and vigorous China.

This study was undertaken for its own sake but, if policy implications are to be deduced from it, they must surely relate to the illusions which are sometimes entertained regarding the nature and substance of power, the role which is yet to be played by the Western nations in support of their own interests and their allies in South Asia, and, finally, the aims and methods of Communist China in her relations with weak and divided neighbors to the south.

What has become a small book grew out of a television series entitled "Columbia Lectures in International Affairs" in which I had the pleasure of participating. The material has, of course, been substantially expanded and modified.

I am especially indebted to two colleagues at Columbia University for their shared ideas: Ainslee Embree may take whatever credit is due for the historical treatment, and A. Doak Barnett, for his comments on the Chinese role in South Asia. His book *Communist China and Asia* has also been very helpful. I was in Delhi and Rawalpindi during the border war, and talked over its implications with many Indians and Pakistanis who will go unnamed, but not unappreciated. I alone am responsible for the shortcomings of this book.

W. A. W.

Morningside Heights,
New York

CHAPTER ONE

The Inheritance of the British Indian Empire

The great engines of technological and military power forged in the European Industrial Revolution powered the British nation to the most extensive imperial conquests in history. The brightest jewel in the crown of the King-Emperor was India, the vast peninsula slung low under the belly of Asia and set off from the Central Asian mainland by the Himalayan mountains. Before the British conquest of the subcontinent, local kings and pioneering Europeans like the Portuguese and Dutch had carved out small states, but only under the Union Jack was the entire subcontinent answerable to one master.

The insatiable British East India Company, precursor to more formal imperial rule, conquered Ceylon, the offshore island to the south, in 1798 and had ranged from Upper Burma to the Punjab by the mid-nineteenth century. It was left to Her Majesty's Viceroy to bring all of Burma under London's control in 1886, and to push the western frontiers to the crest of the Hindu Kush mountains frowning down on Kabul, and to the arid steppe of Baluchistan's conjunction with Persia. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, both the eastern and western flanks of the subcontinent were secure, and the frontiers very nearly coincided with India's geographical personality. The impetus of colonial ardor weakened and the final thrust of the British sword was to the north, toward China.

As they pushed ahead in continental expansion in India, the British had followed river valleys and wide coastal plains until they faced rugged mountain ranges. Their military strategists argued that mountains constituted defense lines only if their crests, and reverse slopes were controlled. The so-called forward policy in Burma and along the northwest frontier aimed at dominance of strategic ridge lines.

The vast 1,500-mile northern border of the subcontinent, however, presented an extraordinary topography. The Himalayas soar from the sea-level Gangetic plain to peaks of over 29,000 feet, and almost the entire sweep of the range presents snow-capped heights that defy human control.

Behind the high Himalayas is Tibet, the "roof of the world." The average elevation of the entire plateau is almost 16,000 feet, and its mass can be appreciated only by viewing the gigantic pressure ridge, the Himalayas, which it has created, crushing the Indian subcontinent with Asia's mass at its back. Sealed off from many of the influences molding history in the great cultural basins of China, India and Turkish Central Asia, Tibetan history and society are curious amalgams of religion, race and language.

Buddhism, born in India, finds expression in the unique monastic organization of Lamaism. Chinese influences are similarly aberrant, having passed through the prism of Sinkiang and having been accepted by the society selectively, and at a great distance from their origin. Strange as Tibetan culture appears to the foreigner, it provided a framework for adapting peasants to the rigors of a fierce environment. Monastic Buddhism evolved into a theocratic bureaucracy under the control of the Dalai and Tashi Lamas, and gave Tibet some form of leadership independent of the varying dynastic fortunes at Peking.

Tibet is especially important to India because the Himalayas cannot be controlled from their peaks, and even the passes leading from the high plateau to the Indian plains are difficult to fortify. The East India Company attempted to establish trade relations with Tibet as early as 1774, but

it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that British political interest in Tibet was awakened. This tardy concern related to the decay of Chinese power in China's far-flung provinces, and the lack of military forces in Tibet. In fact, it was Czarist Russia's interest in Tibet which in 1904 stimulated the Indian government to send Colonel Younghusband's mission to Lhasa. The diplomatic fruit of the mission was a convention, signed in 1906 with China, disclaiming British territorial ambition in the region, but demanding that no foreign power be allowed representation in Lhasa.

The British interest in a neutralized Tibet, in which only a powerless Chinese suzerain would be represented, was furthered in the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 in which both states agreed to be represented in the Tibetan capital through the Chinese government. Explicit European support for continued Chinese rule in Tibet brought to an end Tibet's *de facto* autonomy, and the invading Chinese army sent the Dalai Lama into exile in Darjeeling, India. Central Chinese control over the rebellious province did not last, however, and the Tibetan theocrats regained control of their patrimony. The 1917 revolution minimized Russia's foreign involvement in Tibetan affairs, and, in 1918, the Tibetan government formally renounced Chinese sovereignty and declared the ancient state to be independent of foreign rule. The British in India were perhaps more than interested onlookers, but their policy was to maintain a neutralized supra-Himalayan buffer area, and not an extended Indo-Tibetan empire. World War I had had a profound effect on imperial thought, and contact with Tibet between the wars was negligible until official relations were established in 1936-37 by the Gould Mission. Tibet was quiet, China was particularly weak and under attack, and British security in India was not threatened from the north.

Below Tibet, in a wide arc swinging from the junction of Afghanistan, Russia, Kashmir and Sinkiang, through Nepal to the junction of the eastern Himalayas with the

Thanglha range above Burma, lie small kingdoms which were of much more immediate interest to the British Indian government. Most of the petty states were on the southern slope of the mountains, or were perched above the passes leading from Tibet to the great northern plain of India.

In the extreme northwestern tip of the Himalayan arc is Kashmir. It is an extraordinarily beautiful region, coursed by the headwaters of the Jhelum river, which flows south to become part of the Indus system in the Punjab. Near Srinagar, its fabled capital, are the Mughul gardens dating back to the conquest of the great emperor, Akbar, in 1588. On a clear day the mists cease to veil proud Nanga Parbat, its peak rearing over 26,000 feet only eighty miles away. But the history of the region is as tragic as its backdrop is lovely. A British authority once wrote of the Kashmiri people that "a thousand years of tyranny and oppression have sapped their virility."[1] The population was converted to Islam between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, and following the decline of the Mughul empire the gardens of the region passed from hand to hand. In the eighteenth century the Afghans plundered and raped, and in 1819 Ranjit Singh's Sikh armies conquered it and extracted their cruel levies. When the British legions forced the Sikh nation to its knees, they claimed Kashmir as booty.

In 1846, however, the British were unsure of their intentions in the region, having not yet undertaken the administration of the Punjab, and concluded that Kashmir would overextend their defense perimeter. Gulab Singh, the prince of Jammu and several other Rajput hill states in the region, agreed to pay the indemnity demanded by the British of the Sikhs if title to Kashmir was given to him. The British found it expedient to agree, and the corner of the subcontinent most profoundly related to neighboring Asian states was placed under an intermediary's rule.

In the decades that followed, Britain pushed its banners to the heart of Pathan tribal territory in the Hindu Kush

[1]Sir William Barton, *The Princes of India* (London, 1934), p. 120.

mountains and consolidated its rule throughout the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. Western India would one day become the largest irrigated area in the world, and the primary watershed was Kashmir. It was not solely the strategic or economic importance of the region, however, which increasingly encouraged closer British involvement in the state. The harsh rule of the local aristocracy and their agents, Kashmiri Brahmins, was extreme and in the famine of 1871, 60 per cent of the population died. Before and after this great disaster, repression was commonplace and the rule was unpopular. Kashmiris were to breathe a sigh of relief when the Russian expansion into the Pamirs triggered an increased British concern with the weak and exposed Kashmiri flank. In 1885, justifying their actions with reference to local misrule, the Indian government breathed European life into the administration. The exposed frontier districts in the north and west portions of the state were transferred to the direct control of British officers, and the state army was reorganized and officered by the Crown's soldiers. Nonetheless, the fiction of legal sovereignty on the northwestern corner of the subcontinent continued to repose with a prince, and not a viceroy.

Although Kashmir's millions were largely Muslim by religious conviction, both Hinduism and Buddhism had large numbers of followers in the state. The Ladakh region, bordering on Tibet, was largely Buddhist. Its people considered Tibetan their mother tongue, and the capital city of the region, Leh, is often called the heart of "Little Tibet." The aphorism was accepted because Leh was a primary entrepôt for the western Tibetan trade and not because Lhasa's sovereignty was felt. While on the one hand Srinagar is separated from Ladakh by difficult terrain, on the other Lhasa is some eight hundred miles to the east, and would find it impossible to assert control from that distance.

Immediately south and east of the state of Jammu and Kashmir the territories of British India pushed north to Tibet, and to the ridge line broadly defined by the peaks of

Shilla (23,050 feet), Kamet (25,450 feet) and Nanda Devi (25,650 feet). The important Shipki Pass, cut by the river Sutlej as it flows to join the Indus, is precisely on the frontier. The two hundred miles of border between Nepal and the Shipki Pass lie directly north of the very center of modern India, and its pivot city, Delhi. Almost presciently in answer to needs that would arise in the mid-twentieth century, the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun was established in the heart of this region.

Further east in the Himalayan range is Nepal, which stretches for five hundred miles east and west, separating India and Tibet by an average breadth of one hundred miles. The Nepali buffer contains several of the earth's highest peaks, Everest (29,028 feet), Kanchenjunga (28,146 feet), Annapurna (26,504 feet) and Dhaulagiri (26,810 feet). Six peaks rise above 23,000 feet and most of them lie near the Tibet-Nepal frontier, leaving the southern frontier with India accessible. The people are typically Mongolian in features although the official religion is Hinduism. In adjoining regions, there is a large Tibeto-Buddhist population.

Although Nepal is about the same size as England, its terrain is so rough that the population is concentrated in a few valleys, the most important of which is the Valley of Nepal containing the capital, Kathmandu. Before the British advent, the Gurkha tribe from a small Rajput hill state had conquered the Newar tribe and ruled Nepal. The East India Company signed a commercial treaty with the Nepal government in 1791. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Gurkha rulers launched an attack on Tibet, but were rebuffed by a Chinese army of 70,000 men. The Gurkhas appealed to Lord Cornwallis for aid, but it was too little and too late and the Nepalis were forced to accept not only defeat, but nominal Chinese suzerainty as well. In keeping with Chinese practice, the subordinate states sent a tribute to Peking every five years, an obligation Nepal accepted until 1912.

Deflected from their inner Asian empire, the ambitious

Gurkhas expanded to east and west, and then began pushing south where they met British troops. It fell to Lord Hastings to punish them, and although the campaigns of 1814-15 were disastrous for the British, victory was theirs in 1816. The Nepalese ceded their extra-Himalayan territory including Darjeeling to the British, received a British resident in their capital, and agreed to British management of their foreign affairs.

The British policy in Nepal was to keep the government friendly and free from foreign influence, but so long as Tibet remained neutral or weak, not to seek more extensive control. The Nepalese government, fearing more meddlesome control, maintained a posture of neutrality and isolation. At no time, however, was Nepal's legal independence disputed by the British. In 1923 the 1816 treaty was revised to allow Nepal external autonomy. In 1934, Kathmandu's representative presented his credentials to the Court of St. James's, and later to the American President. The British resident was restyled an envoy.

The special relationship between British India and Nepal was in part the product of the Gurkha contingent in the Indian army. In the First World War, over 100,000 Nepali troops fought for the empire, and fought for it exceedingly well. Good relations between Britain and Nepal allowed recruitment without resentment, but more than one colonial officer saw this strange relationship as the product of unique circumstances and some even guessed

> that should imperial power at Delhi show signs of a breakdown, India would certainly lose its Gurkha battalions, and in that event the Gurkhas might again look forward to washing their kukris [curved knives] in the Ganges.[2]

At best, the British might have expected that they would at least serve their own government in Kathmandu should the occasion arise.

Immediately east of Nepal, and directly above Darjeeling, with its western border defined by the most beautiful mountain in the world, Kanchenjunga, is Sikkim. To

[2]Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

its east is a Tibetan corridor reaching about half way down its length to Yatung, and Bhutan. Together, Sikkim and Bhutan have a frontier along India of about 250 miles. Bhutan is isolated from India, with its capital of Punakha lying 100 miles north of Cooch Behar in Assam. Sikkim's capital, Gangtok, is near Darjeeling, and is accessible from there. Both states found their history entangled with that of the Gurkhas before the British arrived on the scene, and they owe their independence to the forced withdrawal of Nepal's authority in accordance with the treaty of 1816. Specific British commitments in both states were irregular until 1910, when the Chinese reasserted control over Tibet. At that time, the British Indian government notified Peking that it would protect the rights and interests of the two petty princedoms. The extreme northeastern tip of the Himalayan arc is pierced by the Brahmaputra River as it winds its way to the Bay of Bengal. The region covering their natural gateway into India was called by the British the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), and as finally constituted came to have a frontier of over 450 miles with Tibet and Burma. Beginning with the Bhutan frontier, it runs east to Lohit agency and then south, delimiting the Burmese frontier. The entire territory is peopled with tribes, and is not unlike the North-West Frontier Province on the other side of the subcontinent.

British involvement in both of these areas was forced in the interests of order and security for the plains below. No settled administration was imposed, however, and the actual frontier involved was defined in tribal rather than geographic terms. The 1880 Frontier Tract *Regulations* of the British government were meant to apply to "any tract inhabited or frequented by barbarous, or semi-civilised tribes adjoining or within the borders of any of the districts included within the territories under the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Assam."[3] This area, in turn, was

[3]Quoted in Government of India, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi, 1962), p. 202.

translated by the cartographers into the watershed boundaries of the region.

The frontier between Burma and Yunnan province of China was well defined in contrast to the Himalayan region. The British and Chinese governments, through the technical good offices of the famous Swiss engineer Colonel F. Iselin, demarcated their frontier in 1935-36 and issued a unanimous report in 1937.

Throughout the north of India, therefore, extremely irregular patterns of colonial administration, political organization and frontier delineation were the rule rather than the exception. It is true that fixed boundaries are largely a European, and not an Asian passion; yet the British allowed confused frontiers to prevail above the zones which were most heavily populated and most important in their British Indian empire. The simple fact is that the British were not threatened, and they could make their will known in spite of shadow governments and legal fictions.

Just as the pattern of frontier administration reflected imprecision in legal forms, a reliance on *Machtpolitik* in crisis, and a superior diplomatic dynamism on the part of the British, so too did it reflect the technology of the day. An army, even a phantom Chinese army, could not threaten the garrisons of northern India if it was forced to operate at mean altitudes above 10,000 feet. The paralyzing winters as well as transport and logistic problems doomed any would-be Chinese Hannibal. Since Tibet could not, therefore, serve as a staging area, the nineteenth-century British generals reasoned that only a militia was necessary to control tribal outbreaks should they occur.

Lack of concern with the Himalayan region on the part of military thinkers was supported not only by the obvious topographical barrier of height and objective considerations of men and materiel in their Himalayan setting, but also by historical example. No major invasion of the subcontinent had come from the north or northeast. The invaders of hoary antiquity as well as of more modern times

had flowed through the funnels of the Bolan and Khyber Passes in the northwest, which have acted as conduits bringing new stock into the Indian plains.

Moreover, the Chinese behind the massive barrier in Tibet were, to use Napoleon's suggestive phrase, a "slumbering giant" of a people. The same European powers which were in control of South Asia and Central Asia were well represented in enclaves in the Chinese heartland. Britain's concern was with the Russian bear, whetting its insatiable territorial appetite with an unprecedented continental expansion into Asia. From behind the wall of the Pamirs, the British saw the spectre of the historic invader: Aryan, Central Asian Turk, Mughul and perhaps now Russian.

British Indian security policy was thus concerned with the northwest, where the lessons of three wars with Afghanistan led to massive fortifications and rail lines. A coherent diplomatic-security policy was therefore forged over several decades. Generations of soldiers, both British and Indian, tended to think in terms of sham battle with the potential foe looming over Asia's *cordon sanitaire,* Afghanistan's Wakhan Peninsula. Over the course of years the entire defense infrastructure — garrisons, logistics, transport facilities, battle plans and troop training — was directed to the northwest and not to the north or east, where that natural arbiter, nature, had erected breastworks more formidable, it was thought, than man could penetrate.

The unparalleled success of British arms, and — by the beginning of the twentieth century — the extremely secure military position of India, became part and parcel of the mentality of generations of Indian leaders, and especially of the young nationalists then being educated in the very hub of the world in 1900, London. The whole of the era partook of the Victorian euphoria of a secure empire, a belief in the inherent superiority of Western civilization (British branch), and a sense of the perpetual rather than the dynamic in international history. Throughout the world Europe stood supreme, teaching its "lesser breeds without

the law" as part of a divine mission. China, most venerable of the civilized areas on earth, lay at the feet of the idols of superstition, disorganization and poverty. Russia had been deflected from her designs on southern Asia. The world was at peace at the end of an era of general peace.

This was the intellectual climate in which Indian nationalism took root and grew, and it is the world the Indian nationalists imagined they had inherited in 1947.

The British Indian Army

An important part of the inheritance bequeathed by the departing British rulers was the Indian portion of the British Indian army. While the illusion engendered by the end of foreign imperial rule is one of weakened colonial strength and emboldened nationalists, the truth more often relates to a change of attitude rather than of power. The British, in 1947, had the strength to remain in the subcontinent, but this would have implied actions which they despised. It has truly been said that Gandhi appealed not to the non-violence of Indian society, but to that of British society, in his nationalist strategy. It is apparent, therefore, that when British troops and vessels left the subcontinent, it stood as a much weaker region in a military sense.

The countries of the region were even weaker than might have been imagined because of the strange nature of the British Indian army. When, in the eighteenth century, the East India Company found its commerce insecure, it debated raising a regular army, but the directors in London were not interested in unprofitable adventurism. The Crown was certainly in no position to underwrite such an army, even if, as was not the case, it had thought it sensible. It was the challenge of another European power, the French, in the mid-eighteenth century which prompted Captain Stringer Lawrence to act for the Company in raising an army of two thousand sepoys (sipahis). Lawrence was captured by the French and his plans for a 7,000-man Indian army lay dormant. Clive, in fact, captured Arcot in 1751 with only two hundred Europeans and three hundred In-

dians. In the siege tactics of medieval Indian warfare, European artillery and discipline were devastating to Indian foes. Thus the illusion of British invincibility developed, and French generals complained that their own troops lacked the confidence to fight against white men.

Recruitment into the Company's army, which steadily grew, was as irregular as its administration. The Indian Muslims, only about 20 per cent of the population, were favored as soldiers. As the Company's dominion expanded in North India, Brahmins and Rajputs from the Kingdom of Oudh were recruited and came to dominate the army of Bengal. At the turn of the century, the new army was reorganized with a characteristic it would retain until the mid-twentieth century, the concentration of authority and control in the regimental colonel — and all colonels were British.[4]

Another characteristic of the army was its reflection of caste and communal differences. Caste in India is defined by a public ethic, and strictures and taboos concern social life and not belief. Cooperation between castes in intimate activity is ritually impossible. The point can best be made by example. Each caste follows different dietary laws and Brahmin troops must eat food prepared in Brahmin kitchens by Brahmin cooks. If Rajputs and Brahmins served in the same unit, not only their field kitchens, but their eating places and the sorts of food to be stocked, would differ radically. When Indians were recruited into army life, the British had to respect ritual differences or face the often serious consequences such as the 1806 army rebellion in Madras. This lends meaning to the popular notion that the great Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 was begun because a new cartridge greased with tallow and lard was introduced.

The Indian Mutiny, needless to say, was the result of more complex forces than an isolated instance of insensitivity to ritual. Tomes are still being produced to analyze

[4]There is a notable dearth of reliable information about the Indian army. A brief historical treatment is Lt. Col. Sir Wolesley Haig, *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, *The Indian Empire* (Indian edition, Delhi, 1957), pp. 153-165, 395-401.

the rebellion, and its interesting metamorphosis through the stages of army rebellion among Brahmins and Rajputs to general Muslim insurrection to a series of pathetic but bloody peasant wars. The time delay between the mobilization of various segments of the insurgent population, and the isolation of the fighting to north-central Indian cities, sealed the rebel fate and sealed with it the fate of the Indian army.

In the aftermath of the Mutiny the British government took control of the subcontinent, and reorganized the Indian army. The Company's European troops, numbering over 15,000 by 1858, were integrated into the British army. The specialist corps of the Presidency armies were amalgamated with the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. When the reorganization was complete, the British Indian army stood at a strength of 65,000 British and 140,000 Indian ranks. European regiments of the line were rotated to include Indian duty, and were concentrated in eastern India where the political problems were most serious. The officer corps and technical services were, in general, British prerogatives.

Of equal importance in the making of the new army was a changed policy of recruitment. The so-called martial races were brought into the army, and other groups and castes were systematically excluded. The most important single region was the Punjab which provided fully half of the Indian army. Its virile peasantry, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu Jat alike, was known for its blunt and rustic bellicosity. The John Lawrence school of administration in the province, with its "whips and spurs at the ready" paternalism, did not unsettle the Punjab with the revolutionary tenure systems introduced in eastern India. The peasant was enfranchised and protected, and the new urban classes of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were nowhere to be found in the Punjab. While it is unfair to any group to suggest a composite mentality, the Punjabi peasant enjoys a reputation for earthiness, direct bearing, physical endurance and

a contempt for the abstract unless it is mystical. What better breed for soldiering?

A second important recruiting ground was Nepal, where the many tribes of the kingdom seemed to have a fierce and almost religious commitment to war. Little men with big feet, their stature, when compared to a Jat Punjabi or a frontier Pathan, is slightly ridiculous, but in battle they know no peer. Armed with the kukri, they are feared masters of hand-to-hand combat. Completely non-Indian in appearance, and legally foreign, Gurkha regiments were doubly immune from the currents in Indian life that had led to the Mutiny of 1857.

Another new group to enter the army were the Pathans, fierce guardians of the Khyber Pass. Bred in the highlands and nurtured on blood feuds and vendettas, they stood their ground against every imperial power in the subcontinent from the twelfth century on. The British fought them in vain, and finally settled upon bribes as a means of keeping the peace on the road to Landi Kotal, and Kabul beyond. The group stereotype of the Pathan is particularly unflattering, portraying the hardy tribesmen as greedy, turbulent bullies — a reputation, it must be said, reinforced by the existence, in every major Indian police station, of a "Pathan Section" charged with keeping track of potential troublemakers. It is perhaps their physical arrogance and sense of pride which makes them the delight of colonels and the despair of shopkeepers. Even as soldiers, however, the Pathans are troublesome garrison troops[5] just as they are superb combat soldiers. Pathans were also recruited into the Indian police services because of their stature and their reputation, but whatever else they may have been as soldiers and policemen, they were not popular. The nationalists considered them cruel instruments of imperial rule — as political strike-breakers — and they were both feared and hated. Perhaps the profession of law and order does not

[5]Singapore will not soon forget the orgy of violence unleashed by a Pathan unit which ran amuck in 1918. See General Thimayya's vivid account in Humphrey Evans, *Thimayya of India: A Soldier's Life* (New York, 1960), pp. 168-169.

attract popular affection.

Prior to the Second World War, Punjabis comprised 50 per cent of the army, and the Gurkhas another 12 per cent. Pathans, Kashmiri Dogras and troops recruited in the United Provinces added another 14 per cent. The Mahrattas enjoyed a martial tradition, but the British policy of recruitment from politically insensitive areas doomed them to a small portion of the total strength, only 4½ per cent, and the Rajputs from the Rajputana region contributed 4½ per cent. Bengal and Assam, the largest population area and the cradle of Indian nationalism, had not one soldier, and South India contributed only 2½ per cent of the army, and most of it from the Muslim Moplah tribe of the Malabar coast.

Troops were raised as independent units and their homogeneous caste and communal character was maintained. It has been suggested that the orthodox Sikh religion owes its continuance to the British insistence that Sikh troops keep the faith of their fathers and follow every practice in letter and spirit. The turban was the official headgear of Sikh regiments and the five accouterments of the orthodox Sikh were part of the soldier's authorized pack. With similar practices applied to Hindus, Muslims and near-animists, and with caste differences similarly highlighted, there was a constant reminder that India was a divided land, and that its people held different hereditary sentiments. Only the Sikhs and Gurkhas were considered "pure" enough to constitute whole regiments, since they were the two most different "nations" in the army in appearance, in practice, and in clan feeling.

A parallel policy pursued by the British Indian government was to recruit, train and house the troops in regions far from the centers of political development such as Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and the larger cities of the United Provinces.

Another procedure which kept the Indian army unusually divided was to recruit officers from outside the areas furnishing the bulk of the enlisted personnel. Thus it was

that the first two commanders-in-chief of the Indian army, Chariappa and Thimayya, were from Coorg in South India. When the King's Commission was opened to Indians in 1917, some North Indian "martial races" officers were chosen, but the practice was to keep officers and men from identifying too closely with each other, and with a given region or community in India.

The purpose of this unique form of military organization was to prevent the growth of a sentiment within the army which might be turned against the colonial power as it had been in 1857. Divide and rule, the slogan which has been so unfairly applied to so many British policies in the subcontinent was an admitted principle in the military services. And in fairness, it can be argued that the army, like the entire social fabric of the subcontinent, was divided well before the British arrival and that the British simply acquiesced in this. Furthermore, there seems to be adequate historical evidence that South Indian troops were less effective than those recruited in North India (from 1886 the Madras regiment filled its ranks with North Indian soldiers), nor was it incumbent on Britons to make of the Indians what they were not, and what they resented becoming.

All the same, the policies of concentration of authority in foreign colonels, the rotation of officers, the isolation of the army from the major currents flowing in Indian history, the maintenance of the traditional order in dress, ceremony, worship and dietary habits, the recruitment of troops from special regions and castes, and the continuance of units strictly defined by hereditary differences certainly bore little resemblance to the national armies which characterized European states after the French Revolution. General Thimayya has testified to the difficulties of using these divided regiments in combat. Hence, while it would be fair to say that there was an interaction of the Indian legacy and British policy in military affairs, it is equally so to note that the Indian army was organized for a mission of police

functions more than national defense. This was certainly the case until the Second World War when the entire structure, function and recruitment policies were radically shifted to meet immediate needs.

Typical of the role and mission of the army was its deployment cycle of four years in police garrison duty, two years in tribal patrols along the frontier, and two years in formal training exercises.

Characterizing the defense assumptions of the Indian government were the staff organization and corps command assignments of the army. Sectors were assigned, and four of the nine corps of the army were in what is now West Pakistan — 1st Corps (Peshawar), 2nd Corps (Rawalpindi) 3rd Corps (Lahore) and 4th Corps (Quetta). The other primary military garrisons were Mhow (5th Corps), Poona (6th Corps), Meerut (7th Corps), Lucknow (8th Corps) and Secunderabad (9th Corps). Both the 9th Corps and the Burma Corps were under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief while the other sector commands were under local control.

India's vast population was very important in the world wars, and during World War I the Indian army contributed 1,215,000 officers and men to overseas operations. At the end of that war, Indian officers were offered the King's Commission rather than the Viceroy's Commission (which limited promotion opportunity to Risaldar Major (Cavalry) and Subadar Major (Infantry). It is interesting to note that this liberalization followed the opening of the Indian Civil Service to Indians by fifty-three years.

World War II pressed the tradition-bound Indian army into totally new forms, and even Bengalis were admitted to military service. Regimental ethnic composition was maintained as completely as possible, and the more technical specialties in the armed services, such as the air force, tended to be monopolized by Anglo-Indians who were more politically motivated to loyalty to the British than were the awakened nationalists of other groups. The record of the

Indian army in World War II has been meticulously catalogued by the Joint Historical Board of the Indian and Pakistani Army,[6] but the more intriguing civil-military or planning aspects of the army are notable only by their absence.

The war must have had a revolutionary effect on military and strategic thinking in India. The threat to India's security, and it was very real, came not from the northwest where the garrisons lay poised, but from the east where not one corps command was located. Air operations "over the hump" flew from eastern India, and not the fields of Peshawar and Rawalpindi, and it was an Asian foe and not the Russian invader who was the enemy. The entire pre-war focus was inverted, and the old truths were mocked. The foreign policy of India, based on weak regional antagonists and secure flanks, was put to the test, and but for the exhaustion of the Japanese armies, might have been exposed as weaker than it seemed.

[6]Bisheshwar Prasad, *Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939-45* (Bombay, 1954.) See also Major Donovan Jackson, *India's Army* (London, n.d.) and Dharm Pal, *Traditions of the Indian Army* (Delhi, 1961).

CHAPTER TWO

Nationalism and Fragmentation in South Asia

The ebb of European power in Asia was as remarkable as had been its flow. The defeat of Japan was a Pyrrhic victory for Europe in Asia, for it emboldened subject Asian peoples while enervating imperialist nations. Within three years after the peace papers were signed aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*, the victors in World World II were fleeing from their embattled strongholds.

When future historians look back to the five-year period following the end of World War II, they will surely mark this half decade as one of the great divides in modern history. The imperial phase of the European Age had come to a close. The newly independent governments almost immediately set into motion plans to modernize, i.e., Westernize, their ancient societies at a pace no colonial governor dared attempt.

It is worth remembering that South Asian nationalism had deep roots extending back to the late nineteenth century. Every generation of nationalist leadership has seemingly passed through an intellectual adolescence in a different milieu. The early Indian nationalists were proper nineteenth-century Liberals while their followers found the gospels of Fascism or Socialism-Communism more appealing. It is the social content of modern nationalism which now sets it apart from that of the other eras.

Indian nationalism, of both Liberal and Socialist

variety, grew up in a secure environment. India was shielded from the carnage of the Crimea, of the European adventures of Bismarck and his successors, of the colonial encounters in Black Africa. Churchill no doubt sharpened his journalist's pencil on the North-West Frontier during the tribe-hunting days, and there were vigorous practice wars occasionally, but the overwhelming preponderance of power lay at home: the tiger was on the Viceroy's leash.

At the same time within India, in the pleasant and tolerant environment created by a secure government, the seeds of nationalism were taking root. There were no draconian measures against the nationalist leaders, and until the world wars began to shake Britain's hold over its own destiny, its treatment of the opposition was in the best parliamentary tradition. It was, in the fashion of the London stage, a talky sort of parlor game in which, within the spirit of the house, one is allowed to abuse the host in measured sentences.

As if to further dilute the early virulence of nationalism, it passed from the hands of the Liberals into the gentle care of Mohandas K. Gandhi whose patented technique was non-violent non-cooperation. His technique was also to maintain a broad coalition of nationalist groups and interests. Socialists, terrorists, Communists, regionalists, all fluttered in and out of the great current of the Indian National Congress. Moreover, Gandhi's great double vision allowed him to blend Europeanized Indians with the traditionalists who were unsure of stance, but firmly rooted in the hoary tangle of the past. As the Congress saw its ultimate success against the British in building a mass movement out of an elite club, it was Gandhi who provided the vision and the symbol.

Walking the world stage self-consciously at first, he found his success in the quaint amalgam of British barrister and Indian saint. Posing as a representative of a non-violent Indian ideology, he in fact became the helpless underdog who compelled the British to a measure of guileless support.

"Half-naked fakir" he might be to Churchill, but who could arrest him, who could condemn him, who could abuse him without arresting, condemning and abusing the helpless? And, together with his equally helpless fellows of the Indian nationalist movement, he evolved and perfected an almost perfect theoretical helplessness as a strategy to lash the chagrined powerful masters of India into surrender.

To pose as the embodiment of Hindu-Jain gentility was to appeal to tradition, and India is the home of many traditions. It is truly said that the Indians can get together only in the institution that separates them: caste. As Gandhi mobilized tradition to bring to Indian nationalism a mass dimension, he kindled passions which crystallized community identity and thus helped unwittingly to foster divisions in Indian society. Three hundred million Hindus took pride in their newfound political culture, but as it turned into a religio-populist revival with a Hindu content, one hundred million Muslims drew back into themselves.

At the end of World War I, Gandhi had forged an alliance of all elements, and especially the religious, against continued British rule, but as time passed, and Indian nationalism grew, the Muslims saw the spectre of Hindu domination. Democracy implied majority rule, and the largest single "nation" of Muslims in the world would become a permanent minority. Even the prophet of the new order, J. S. Mill, had recognized that a minority's only real protection lies in a tolerant majority.

In the period from 1919 until the Second World War, Muslim leadership had looked, in its view objectively, for signs of a tolerant majority. Errors of judgment, or the sheer competitive play of politics, and all of the personal confrontations, frustrations and tragedies of political men can, in an environment of tension and suspicion, be seen as intolerance and persecution. And this is not to rule out the existence of sheer and rank intolerance, openly shown, which must have existed in some regions of India. The Muslims read the Motilal Nehru Report and found minority

demands ignored; they saw in small quotas in the services and the universities discrimination; they saw in the violated electoral alliance in the United Provinces in 1937 their political future betrayed; in Gandhi's intuitive and puzzling tactics they could not find a place. Nirad Chaudhuri, in his remarkable autobiography,[1] has perhaps said it best when he suggests that it was not that the Hindu abused or discriminated against the Muslim, but rather that he ignored him, and set forth a program in which he had no place.

Indian nationalist developments were, in any case, strange. The nationalism of Europe, according to classical Marxist economic analysis, developed within a commercial middle class which wanted a strong state to protect profitable markets and interests. This middle class offered its wealth to the state in exchange for external protection and internal liberty. Indian nationalism also found its prime exponents among the middle class, but rather than commercial or entrepreneurial they were drawn heavily from professional groups. Tariff protection, certainly the most obvious demand of a commercial middle class, was not given to Indian industry until 1923, but the universities and government posts were demanded and gained well before. Central banking came to India only in 1936, but the growth of the legal profession had outstripped any possible job market decades earlier.

The evolution of a unique middle class was paralleled by the concentration of that class's interests in a very few cities in India, all of them the creation of British rule. As late as 1930, 70 per cent of the currency circulation in India was found in Calcutta and Bombay, and the rest of the subcontinent was a vast subsistence economy with several hundred million people paying their taxes, on occasion blessing the Victorian peace, and at other times cursing the efficiency of the British-raised police. Caste barriers had been weakened in the cities, but Indian tradition was not a slender reed to be snapped off by a small group of alien

[1] *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London, 1951), p. 500 *et passim*.

conquerors from a parochial island off the coast of Gaul.

The extent of the nationalist-minded middle classes, and hence the popular base of the nationalist movement, was largely urban and Western-educated. It was not just Gandhi's synthesis of mass and elite which was unique and which made Indian nationalism moderate. The Indian rural social system is extremely stable and is based upon the notion of inequality justified by ritual and theological tenets. The place of the soul in this life is a product of former lives and former acts. A rise in status is the product of *dharma*, social obligation, and must await another life. Marx, in describing religion as the opiate of the masses, may well have been thinking specifically of the Hindu metaphysical system.

The result of a stable traditional society and a professional middle class-led nationalist movement was an unusually moderate nationalist movement. The radical element entered only because the political goal of a democratic India threatened the Muslim population's separate tradition, and they demanded their own state. From the cross fire of nationalism, xenophobia, tradition and hereditary sentiment and from the personal tensions and ambitions of leaders came the Pakistan movement.

Pakistan came into existence less than a decade after the idea ceased to be ridiculed by Britisher and Hindu alike. Ten years is a short time for men to adjust to the end of an era, to cast away a dream of a free and united India, to realize that a British "given" could not longer be. Before the rough and contested edges of the Pakistan movement were worn smooth with the negotiations of generations of men, it was a reality. In fact, it was two realities, East and West Pakistan, divided by almost 1,000 miles of India.

It was incredible to many Indian leaders, Hindu, Sikh and Muslim alike, that this should happen just as India was becoming free from British rule. India was one, they said, and North Indian culture, language, architecture and life were profoundly Indo-Muslim, with the emphasis on the latter. With Urdu the language of North India and the

Muslim dress elegantly draped on the Indian prime minister, how could the Muslims suddenly separate out to populate the Indus valley from the Punjab to Sind, and the delta of the Ganges in Bengal? Perhaps it was only human to think that this great cataclysm was temporary—that the blood of common saints, common couplets and a common economy would reverse the flow of political passions. But all of the king's horses and all of the king's men could not put India together again.

The legacy of the king's men in training the leaders of the new nations of South Asia was perhaps their finest contribution. No other country in the world has enjoyed the supreme compliment of social mimicry as has Britain. Macaulay's dream did come true, both in seeing a race of men, English in manners, taste and thought, but Indian in blood and brown in color, and in seeing Britain's brightest day when Indians could take charge of their own affairs in the great democratic tradition. Macaulay and his heirs wanted no more than that their subject peoples should learn civic virtue, and kneel before the highest of altars, justice.

Apart from just praise, however, it is important to examine the preparation for civic life and national security which the Indians and Pakistanis, Ceylonese and Burmans, enjoyed. The services and the army were in the process of becoming non-European, but more progress in "nativization" was made in the last three years of rule than in the preceding fifty. As late as 1935 only one-third of the elite Indian Civil Service was in fact Indian.

It would be unreasonable to apply twentieth-century welfare state standards to nineteenth-century colonial rule to mock the latter. Nonetheless, the British legacy was of a government and an army oriented to maintaining law and order. The excellence of this organization, the "steel frame," has been the strength of every country in South Asia, and has carried all of them through difficult days. The nationalist legacy, however, was flavored with a notion of an activist and revolutionary state, fomenting change, social uplift and

planned economic growth. The governmental community of India thus inherited one legacy, and the political community quite another. Condorcet and Laski were the prophets of the new Indian political dream, but it was Lawrence and Curzon who stalked the corridors of the various ministries.

As the British boarded their ships for the hot voyage through the Suez Canal, a nightmare began for the subcontinent. The reality of communal and religious hatred stood stark and naked as the awful process of killing half a million persons began, and as another nine million ran for their lives. The Indian subcontinent, once more, was divided, and who could foretell where its fragmentation would stop, with several dozen major language groups, hundreds of castes, and several major religious minorities.

Casting their view eastward, the Indian government saw not only East Pakistan, with its swaying cane and jute fields isolated from the mills of Calcutta, but also an independent Burma. In 1935 the British had thought it best that Burma be administered separately, but it was part of the British Indian family. Now, in 1947, Burma's future was with her own people, and commendable as that might be in principle, Indians may have wished, just a bit, that an old imperialist friend might have hung on to stave off the unknowns of the east. Apprehensions began to rise as Burma became less stable, and less united. It was, after all, the eastern flank that the British had first consolidated from Calcutta, and the most recently challenged corner of the subcontinent's frontier.

To the south, Ceylon had received her independence but soon developed problems in sustaining it. Lying not far from the surface of Ceylon's public life was the Sinhalese-Tamil quarrel. As time passed, India had cause to weep as the lovely island became the scene of ugly communal riots leading to what some Indians saw as a Sinhalese apartheid policy. And for miles of sea and coastline, once protected by the white ensign of the world's mightiest navy, there was emptiness.

To the north lay the undefined subtle arrangements of

border politics, once supported on British bayonet points. India inherited the subsidy arrangements and special treaty alliances with Himalayan kingdoms, but the negotiating party had left the scene, and the papers looked flimsy to the casual observer. Behind the Himalayas lay Tibet, and the new China eager to be born. Only the pain of the labor gave a clue to the vigor of the new child which would soon be set loose as a neighbor.

And to the west lay an almost mortally wounded sister dominion — her cities in flames, what cities there were. The government faced anarchy without pencils, nor paper nor office files. The new army of Pakistan was trying to make its way across the subcontinent while a civil war was claiming thousands of lives every day. By 1948 almost 1 in 10 citizens of West Pakistan were refugees — not refugees bringing wealth, or tools, or skills, but cultivators uprooted from their land and shorn of more than they could carry. The refugees were also a terrible burden for India, but its vast bulk had a potential for absorption not remotely approached by the thin strip of riverine land laced along the Indus from Kashmir to the sea.

Perhaps, as Disraeli said, emotions do rule mankind. In any case in the terrible summer of 1947 there seemed to be an unpardonable lack of humanity on the part of many officials involved in the population transfer. It is common knowledge that Gandhi undertook a fast to force the Indian government to transfer Pakistan's share of funds from the Indian Reserve Bank. It is equally clear that Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's prime minister, sought to reduce the strident and often unreasonable charges of his countrymen against India. But when one has exhausted the few examples of grace and gentility, there remains a vast store of hatred. It is hard to justify those who, in a vastly superior position, lacked generosity when it was within their power to heal as well as torment. Sardar Patel's hard line toward Pakistan begot for India not a superior position, for it inherited that, but rather an enmity which lives on fifteen years after his

death. While one may quarrel with Pakistan's lack of perspective in viewing its neighbor, an underdog's hurt and misery are understandable to the outside observer.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the fondest dream of the Indian nationalist was a free, united and democratic India and that the creation of Pakistan on the eve of independence brought instead division and chaos at the outset. The final boundaries of Pakistan were revealed only in the last minutes of British rule as Lord Mountbatten expedited the transfer of power. It is one of the great curiosities of contemporary history that the British departure from the subcontinent is praised for its efficiency and despatch — curious because over half a million people died in its aftermath in unplanned and unforeseen population exchanges, died because essential services were not left intact, died because partition details were left in the hands of partisans, and not magistrates. The unseemly hurry of the British to leave the subcontinent even left the joint command of the army to fend for itself, and to maintain a unity when its political allegiance was being wrenched out of age-old patterns of control.

Whatever the pain and anguish of the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, the wounds might have healed in the solace of a common language, economic self-interest and mutual compassion, but for Kashmir. The idyllic valley, so beautiful and so historically tortured because of its beauty, was once more the object of a contest. The British, in their haste, left the Indians and Pakistanis to make their own matches with the princes who ruled Indian India, the antique states not directly administered under British rule. Kashmir was a princely state with a population overwhelmingly Muslim and a Hindu ruler.

Both India and Pakistan wanted Kashmir. There is reason to think that the prince in Kashmir wanted allegiance to neither of the two states to the south since this would mean a loss of power and autonomy. Yet it was unthinkable that the state should be independent. The rivers

of the Indus system rise in the state, and hence provide the lifeblood of agriculture in West Pakistan and western India. The state's strategic importance is indisputable, having frontiers both with the USSR and China. If only one sees Kashmir, in summer, when the Indian plains are unbelievably hot, dusty and ugly, stripped of trees and sweltering in the sun, and then the snow-capped peaks, the German-Swiss carved wooden architecture, the lovely Kashmiris and the houseboats on the lake — only then does the Kashmir dispute assume a human dimension that is somehow lost in the lawyers' briefs presented to the world forum of public opinion for judgment.

Pakistan's case for claiming Kashmir rests on the notion that the partition of the subcontinent was based upon the principle of religious community. In contested areas, the people were given a right to vote for the state they sought to join. The basis of partition was the religious composition of border districts, and under these rules, most of Kashmir and certainly the Srinagar region would go to Pakistan.

The legal position is that the British allowed the princes to make an independent judgment as to accession. In almost all cases, the decision was *pro forma* because most of the princes ruled small territories surrounded on all sides by the territory of either India or Pakistan. But Kashmir was large, isolated and bordered by other states. Every lawyer knows that legislation admits of exception, and that courts are necessary to fill out the law in its widest dimension — but in which court was Kashmir to find its judge?

The specifics of the Kashmir imbroglio are only partially known and perhaps they never will be fully understood, lying deep in the motives of men as they do. The verifiable facts include an invasion by Pakistani tribesmen — Pathans from the North-West Frontier Province — a popular rebellion in Poonch District of Kashmir state, the loan of officers from both armies to fight in Kashmir, and the missions of both India and Pakistan to seek the Maharaja's affection or at least his accession. As in most great historical

disputes, the partisan is able to prove his case with standard works, tomes and documents, as both India and Pakistan have demonstrated since the matter was brought before the United Nations in 1948. What can be accepted without dispute is that the Kashmir affair has continued to poison relations between the two countries. A useful exercise is to read one week's press in either country, and especially Pakistan since it seeks a revision of the present, Indian-enforced status of Kashmir. One might assess the Kashmir dispute, therefore, not with a view toward legitimacy of title, but as an unusually embittering irritant between the two prime successors of the British Indian Empire.

At best, relations between the two countries would have been tense. India's population includes fifty million Muslims who did not emigrate to Pakistan, and whose position is exposed. They are often considered pro-Pakistan, and anti-Indian, and therefore as a Fifth Column. Pakistan's smaller Hindu minority is in an identical position, but since it is almost entirely concentrated in Bengal, and is generally lower caste, and since Bengali society was the best integrated in the subcontinent, there has been less trouble. A constant emigration of Bengalis from the province is to be noted, but can be explained most fairly as demographic rather than political.

And no one could forget the carnage of partition, at least for a generation or two.

But the continuance of the Kashmir dispute, with its every element symbolizing the whole range of past and present conflicts between the two countries, has repelled them from each other. As the years slip by, the bridges built by poets and saints decay, and national interests diverge, a new economy based on autarchy of a sort develops, and distrust becomes a syndrome, part of a negative mentality, objectively irreversible.

In perspective, the actual disputes of the region blend into a new pattern of political structure in process of formation since the European withdrawal. It is the fragmentation

of political organization in South Asia, and the rise of rival states within the region, which is of cardinal importance.

While the new South Asian regional system did not accord with the mental vision of the Indian nationalists which had been evolving since 1885, it also did violence to the notion of economic development and growth. The most important result of the division of the British Indian Empire, however, was neither political nor economic: it was military. The security of the entire subcontinent, which had been built by the British for a century, was shattered. Thousands of miles of new frontier, all artificial, were created. The great northwestern bastions and the Khyber and Bolan Passes fell to weak and almost defenseless Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani officers found themselves facing one another in battle over Kashmir, and later still were involved in an arms race. East Pakistan constituted a great enclave very near Calcutta, and nearly pinching Assam off from the rest of India.

The irony of the defense position was that the Indians found their immediate antagonist to be the very same country controlling the most strategic positions on their defense perimeter. Their foe's weakness might therefore invite aggression and turmoil which could destroy India's own security. The dilemma of the Indian government is amply clear, and policy has accordingly followed short-term, reactive principles. India faced Pakistan with its best troops, branded the sister dominion international enemy number one and ignored the strategic redefinition of its regional security environment.

The Indian military posture toward Pakistan detracted from the total power and resources India could muster to superintend the other vital interests left by the departing British raj. Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal were paid a minimum attention while more pressing problems within the subcontinent received first priority. It is well to remember the obvious. When Britain withdrew from India the productive resources of the Clyde, of Vickers and

de Havilland and Rolls-Royce, also withdrew. The cooperative defense establishment that had made the Indian army powerful was severed, and India and Pakistan found themselves with limited and aging armaments. Without resorting to the Dulles "power vacuum" theory in all of its aspects, it is apparent that India ceased to figure heavily in the world power balance. The illusion remained for a time, but inevitably decayed.

The same winds of history blowing India and Pakistan to independence were at work in China, across the Himalayan barrier. The civil war from which the Communists were to emerge victorious was well on its way to completion, and the "agrarian reformers" were erecting a strong and totalitarian centralized state. With the final victory of Mao Tse-tung's legions, Western European enclaves on the mainland of China were eliminated, with the sole exception of Hong Kong. In the next decade China's foreign policy would seek to cleanse its domain of all European interests, the Russian included. The internal tasks of the new government at Peking were herculean, but were begun with a territorial consolidation of what Peking's new masters considered to be historically Chinese. Chinese cartographers colored their maps very ambitiously, and the Indians' first casual concern for their new neighbor was inevitably to be tinged with some apprehension.

By 1950, the last vestiges of European great power control in the politics of South Asia had vanished. The independent governments of four states were experimenting with their own forms and ideas, exhilarated by the power and majesty of nationalism. The Korean War, grim as it was, brought high prices for the commodities of the new countries, and they prospered. India, under the sole leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru following the assassination of Gandhi, was pushing toward economic development. Pakistan, under the guidance of Liaquat Ali Khan, who succeeded Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the nation's leader after 1948, still found its essential tasks in building a minimal

government to go with the new state. And it was still suffering from the Kashmir dispute, an evacuee property deadlock and the refugee problem. The miracle was that the state continued at all. Burma was seeking to give a new direction to its life, as was Ceylon, but the way seemed bright and the future sure. The new wave of nationalism was the wave of promise and prosperity.

CHAPTER THREE

Politics and Policies in The New South Asian States

Few new countries have a well-developed policy and program to lead them from the joy of independence to the maturity of nation-building. Nationalism's forte is mobilizing grievances, not charting new solutions. Nationalist parties often disintegrate in the unseemly quarrel over spoils and the other trappings of political power. India was unique in having a plan of action which had been debated and discussed for a very long time before independence. The Indian National Congress was in fact a coalition of interests which was the product of a political consensus among most leadership groups except the Muslims.

Gandhi's example of austerity in personal tastes and the puritanical aspects of Congress agitations against British "pomp" and "waste" established standards for the new officials and ministers of independent India. It was Jawaharlal Nehru, however, who directed the emerging notion of an active state pursuing socialist goals. Son of a remarkable father, scion of one of the leading families of the United Provinces, sensitive repository of the virtues of North Indian civilization, Nehru was educated at Harrow and Oxford. Hand-picked by Gandhi as the popular political leader of the Congress government, his attitudes were more British than Indian in every particular of form, practice and spirit.

Nehru's education, and that of many of his Indian fellows in the England of the early years of the twentieth century, was at the feet of the English socialists. As it developed in Britain, in contrast to the continent and Russia, socialism was the economic prerequisite to true democracy,

and embodied all of the democratic virtues of equality, civilization and liberty. Technology was well on its way to making an earthly material Utopia possible, and in the early decades of the century earnest, far-seeing men were working out its implications in London, Paris, Berlin and elsewhere. The Russian Revolution was as closely watched as an experiment in social engineering and planned change as was the French Revolution a century and a quarter earlier. The central issue was whether political society — the state — could remake the entire society; whether the *ancien régime* could be subdued with the sword. Nehru did not stop his insatiable search for organizing principles of government and society for the new India, but it seems clear that he adopted the socialists' system as an optimum goal for India. It is equally clear that he abhorred the collectivization and totalitarian methods of the Soviet Union in establishing socialism. His outlook might, therefore, have been fairly characterized, as Donald Smith has said,[1] as that of an Asian Social Democrat.

Mr. Nehru's supporters, the "verification group" of modern political science, generally accepted the role of government in society postulated by Congress socialism. This was a natural reflection of the professional rather than entrepreneurial middle class that had grown up under the British aegis. If the state was called upon to plan, and to control, and to distribute, it was the educated, urban, English trained professional who would be in control of the bureaucracy. Had India found its middle class to be largely commercial instead, it is unlikely that the notion of socialism would have had the same appeal.

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the Congress had only the support of a small middle class. One of the anchors of the program of the Congress party was democracy and the free functioning of an opposition. Since independence, the Congress has remained not only in control of the national government, but of all of the state govern-

[1]Donald E. Smith, *Nehru and Democracy: The Political Thought of an Asian Democrat* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1958).

ments as well except Kerala for a short time. The pattern and program, as well as the personalities, of the Congress party have continued to receive the freely expressed support of the Indian people.

India was able to move with alacrity in implementing state economic planning and representative democracy because it had imaginative and continuing leadership and a well-conceived plan prior to independence, and also because the inherited "steel frame" of the civil and military services guaranteed continued social stability and control. India experimented because it could afford to experiment without endangering its national life.

The nationalists did not have a clear idea about their military policy. Armaments, they knew, were costly, troublesome and unproductive in an economic sense. India inherited a pacifist tradition in domestic and external affairs and had no irredentist claims with the possible exception of the "Azad" area of Kashmir. Nehru reasoned that every need of India could be accomplished by diplomacy more sensibly than by warfare, and he successfully negotiated with the French for the liquidation of their enclaves in India. When the Chinese demanded that Indian troops be withdrawn from Tibet, he was ready to accept the demand as part of the normalization of relations between the two countries. True, the Indian government was not averse to the use of force to secure certain objectives, as was shown in Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh, Goa and the other Portuguese enclaves, but it abjured an image of military power.

It is clear that the philosophical and Gandhian aspects of a pacific stance in world affairs accorded both with the diplomacy India was advancing in the world as leader of the "unaligned" states, and also with the developmental needs of the new India. The economic development of the country assumed such a large capital investment that India had little resources for its military machine. To some degree, India was what it preached to the outside world — a nation intent on peace, uncommitted in the East-West Cold War but

willing to act as the honest broker, and primarily at work on nation-building at home.

When the worst aspects of Stalinism ended in the Soviet Union and McCarthyism was interred in the United States, Nehru's position became more understandable, and although he was thought in some quarters to be sympathetic to Communism, many statesmen saw his stand as properly nationalist and in the tradition of the young American Republic. It was Washington's Farewell Address, after all, that bade the United States keep out of European rivalries regardless of the "moral" quality of the struggles and it was on this principle that Jeffersonian diplomacy was founded. India followed precisely the same course, and trafficked, as did the Yankee traders, with both sides in their own interest and that of their new country.

Although US-Indian relations were especially embittered when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and began receiving arms, there was a steady growth of understanding and appreciation for India's position in America and the West generally. The 1958 Joint Congressional Resolution citing India and Pakistan as countries of unique American concern marked the beginning of a new United States image of India.

The resolution, and fulsome American praise for India, grew out of an increasing tolerance for neutralism throughout the world, but perhaps more importantly it stemmed from the rising spectre of Communist China. As the twentieth-century raced toward an uncertain future, and as more states listened to the siren call of the Soviet and Communist Chinese claims that their system alone can insure development and progress, the need for an effective counterfoil came to be felt. India, with its functioning democracy, effective diplomacy and socialist pattern of state planning, emerged together with Japan as the only major countries in Asia which might speak for a non-Communist system of change and development. The great cliché — describing an objective reality of sorts — was that the future of democracy

would depend on the race between India and China. The Indians themselves accepted this role with great enthusiasm, and projected a larger-than-life-size image of Indian progress throughout the world. Some Indians even began preaching a higher truth to the developed countries, Soviet and Western alike, about the verities of the Orient.

India's foreign policy was tailored to the unique role and curious environment of mid-twentieth-century world politics in which military power is largely concentrated in the hands of only two powers. To the external world, and especially to the small states emerging onto the world scene, India was uncommitted, standing above the battle between the Western and Eastern camps, holding high the truly human values of world civilization and, incidentally, the interests of the small states.

A world seemingly at war listened to the words of India and wanted to believe them. Madame Pandit's discourses on "bridges to peace" were a welcome balm in the days of the Korean War, multi-megaton weapons and the frightful psychosis of Washington and Moscow. Small wonder that the world tried to magnify the message of peace from the wise men (women) of the East.

As Gandhi had baffled the imperial power with his symbolism of the little man, so too did his weak nation attempt to bind the arms of the superpowers with the illusive cords of world public opinion and an international and timeless morality. From the forum on the East River in New York, India's delegates built from weakness, and became accepted spokesmen of the weak nations who gained great strength as the Cold War passed from encirclement to deadlock and finally to competitive coexistence. Neutralism, the child of the Nehru-Nasser-Tito axis and mother of the Bandung conference, cloaked the new states with a mantle allowing them flexibility in a world dominated by a balance of terror. So long as the elephants of the jungle were at each other's throats, the small animals might play.

Within its region, however, India manifested the legacy

of the British and the normal aspirations of a large country. It recognized its pivotal position between the Middle East and the Far East, and it accepted the over-all defense posture developed by the British. When Sikkim, for example, showed signs of seeking extra-Indian direction in its foreign relations, a "revolt" developed which was settled when the ruler accepted Indian protection. The event was the more important because the Chinese had moved into Tibet, and Sikkim's close ties, including an alliance between the ruler and a Tibetan noblewoman, tended to compromise India's security.

All of the border states came under closer Indian control following China's seizure of Tibet in 1950, but no coherent policy based on apprehension over further Chinese claims developed. The primary weakness of India, according to its leaders, was not in any case along the Himalayan frontier but on the West Pakistan and Kashmir frontier. The military strategists of India could not help but react to the new needs of a fragmented subcontinent. But without a solution of the Kashmir dispute, they were unable to develop a cooperative relationship with Pakistan. India's diplomacy called for military force as a coercive agent in the smaller states, but this was not possible with Pakistan. The alternative was cooperation, and it was made impossible because India considered Pakistan a hostile state, and Pakistan considered India a proven aggressor. Domestic politics on both sides of the frontier were involved and intertwined with militarily irrational postures of belligerence.

The dichotomy of Indian foreign policy was thus compounded. To the world, and on world issues, India was the dove of peace, whereas within the region she stood accused of power politics. The armies of India and Pakistan sham-battled on the frontiers to the applause of their respective capitals. To the sound of these far-off, low-scale rumblings, the world, too busy with bigger quarrels, paid little attention. Almost everyone wondered why the Pakistanis were so peevish about India, or why India should be so concerned

about a small neighboring state with only a quarter of India's population. Besides, to see an Indian and a Pakistani, who could tell from what country they had come? Nevertheless the Pakistani information officer was saddled with an almost impossible job: explaining to a war-like world that the Indians were especially warlike, when to Europeans they seemed the very essence of the reverse. The task might have been easier if Prime Minister Nehru had been quoted:

> Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country.[2]

The Indian government continued to believe that it was in the interests of the country to organize a foreign policy in such a way as to neutralize or isolate Pakistan. In any case, a hostile Pakistan did not endanger primary Indian policy goals in the first few years after independence.

The View from Karachi

Pakistan was born with a bias against the Hindu society and its political instrument, the Indian National Congress. Had relations been good, Pakistan would not have been created. Bad blood flowed between the states even before they were states, and the horrors of partition deepened hostilities. Part of the partition plan was the transfer of military supplies in agreed proportions to Pakistan from their storage depots in India. After war broke out in Kashmir, the Indian government refused to deliver these weapons, and the war in Kashmir was limited in part because of Pakistan's demonstrable military weakness.

The first tasks of Pakistan's leaders were concerned with the establishment of a functioning government. The party leaders almost overnight became ministers, and the political side of Pakistan's evolution was ignored while the governmental side was being developed. This applied not only to the civil services, but to the army and air force as well. Nonetheless, the lack of concern with party life and

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (New Delhi, 1961), p. 28.

the inability of the party-government leadership to capture the imagination of the country with a program ruptured the unity of the nationalist coalition.

Six years passed and the indirectly elected national assembly still sat in Karachi, their mandate from the people now grown cold. The growth of the services and their remarkable record in keeping the state from collapsing was accomplished at the cost of the health of representative institutions. Political power naturally gravitated to the executive agencies of government and not to the politicians whose position was increasingly tenuous.

Pakistan's history was played out in the shadow of India's hostility, and together with the struggle for survival, Pakistan's external policy was directed at asserting its international personality and escaping diplomatic isolation by India. It worked on grandiose plans of an Islamic commonwealth until one prime minister, the late H. S. Suhrawardy, aptly summarized the whole scheme as "zero plus zero equals zero." Overtures to various Muslim countries were coolly received; Nasser, who spoke for the modern Arab world, considered Nehru an ally in the larger struggle against colonialism. Pakistan's loyalty to the Commonwealth was not ample to offset Britain's paramount concern with her large investments and interests in the Republic of India. Indian support for Afghanistan's irredentist claims to an indeterminate "Pukhtunistan" embittered Pakistan's relations with her immediate neighbor to the northwest. An objective assessment of Pakistan's diplomatic predicament must have been gloomy indeed.

Weak and insecure states have a way of involving great powers in their struggles, even though a classic dictum in diplomacy cautions a great power against involvement in situations where lesser allies have the initiative. Nonetheless, Pakistan was seeking security and freedom from India's superiority at the same time that the United States was seeking Asian allies and bases in its struggle against militant world Communism. The completely dissimilar aims of

both countries notwithstanding, the situation invited a closer relationship. Inexorably the subcontinent was drawn into the Cold War.

Originally the Middle East defense organization was to have been an Arab affair to fill the vacuum left by the departing colonial authorities. But for many reasons,[3] the focus of the alliance was shifted to the non-Arab northern tier states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the projected pact which was to exclude Communist China from further adventures in Southeast Asia, similarly lost the adherence of India and Indonesia, the most important powers in the region, and instead focused on smaller states with dissimilar interests. Pakistan found itself, for once, favored by its geographic bifurcation. West Pakistan fits into a Middle Eastern pattern while East Pakistan was quite clearly in Southeast Asia. Karachi commanded the Persian Gulf and Chittagong the Bay of Bengal.

For Pakistan, it was a diplomatic miracle. At the stroke of a pen, it would receive military hardware of the most modern variety, an alliance with the most powerful state in the world, a ready-made set of friends and allies immune to seduction by India, and millions of dollars besides. All that was necessary was to assign some territory for American use and declare hostility to the world Communist conspiracy, as it was called. This was a very small price for Pakistan to pay in 1954, for the Soviet Union and China had little or nothing to do with Pakistan and Communism was surely not a live domestic issue. On the part of Pakistan, this was not a matter of conviction — there was simply nothing to talk to the Soviets about — no borders, no trade and no interests.

While Secretary of State Dulles explained the defensive nature of the alliances and their anti-Communist orientation, they nevertheless obviously implied a re-entry of Western political influence into a region in which the Indians felt themselves supreme. Mr. Dulles' protest when India

[3]See John Campbell, *The Defense of the Middle East* (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1960).

reacted violently against the Pakistan-American relationship missed the point, because Pakistan had successfully frustrated Indian regional policy by means of the American foil, and would now begin to build a military establishment which could equip the "martial race" Muslims with modern equipment. The Indians argued, as the Pakistanis did in 1963, that no donor state can control the use of arms once they are held by another state, and guns that would shoot Communists would also shoot Indians.

Once arms started flowing to Pakistan, and its defensive and offensive capability grew, the Indians felt obligated to turn their forces increasingly toward Pakistan and to undertake a considerable expansion of their own military establishment. The process of escalation, or arms race, had the curious characteristic that both nations called upon foreign suppliers of equipment and capital for aid. Selig Harrison has pointed out the ludicrous aspects of the United States arming two of its friends against one another at the American taxpayer's expense.[4] What is perhaps even more important is that an arms race in the mid-twentieth century comes to involve not only the US and its Western allies, but the USSR as well.

India, in order to offset the Pakistan-American alliance, sought friendship and closer ties with the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles was certainly as thoroughly hated by the Indians as had been Lord Curzon five decades before because he had spoiled the subcontinent's regional isolation, unhinged the balance of power against India, and forced India to make a large commitment, both economically and diplomatically, in the interests of its own security. It was a shattering experience for New Delhi. It sullied the clean hands of the professional pacifists to have to buy French tanks with American dollars, or to barter for Russian vetoes in the Security Council at the expense of keeping silent about the Hungarian revolt. India, because of the impingement of the Cold War, was losing both its flexibility and its regional hegemony. Its

[4]Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States," *The New Republic*, August 10 and 24 and September 7, 1961.

economic development was being slowed, and the weight of its international preachments was discernibly lighter.

All of this was viewed quite happily from Karachi. Pakistan, since 1947, had become a veritable garrison state and the alliances were the first breakthrough Pakistan's diplomacy had scored. Later, criticism of the pacts would develop, but in 1954-55, after seven years of humiliation and frustration, they were warmly welcomed.

Pakistan's leadership, quite apart from the tasks of nation-building, was quite unlike that of India. Under British rule the Muslims were important only in the army, and to some extent in the provincial civil services. There was hardly any class of Muslim businessmen except those of the trading communities of Bombay, and the lure of the rupee was less appealing to most university students than the public service. After Mohammad Ali Jinnah died, and Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951, the leadership of Pakistan passed directly into the hands of professional bureaucrats and soldiers. Their training was not in diplomacy, nor were they business-minded. They knew how to govern and how to soldier, in the proper British colonial sense. They were legatees of the Lawrence school of administration — treat the people justly, tolerate no nonsense, see after law and order, and make the place secure. When Khwaja Nazimuddin was removed by the Governor-General, even though as Prime Minister he commanded a majority in parliament, the Lawrence wing of Pakistan's public servants came into control of the country.

Even if India had not posed such difficult international problems for Pakistan, this group might have come to power in any case, and might have organized their nation in such a way as to pursue external security at the expense of domestic economic and political development. But the ifs of history, happily, need not be its grist. The new government of Pakistan, facing enormous internal and external problems and viewing India as a military threat, saw military security as its first priority. The opportunity to develop it

was presented by the United States, and the opportunity was not let slip by.

Pakistan committed itself to the West in every fashion possible. It formally cast its vote with its allies on many of the issues of the Cold War, and offered its UN votes to aid the cause of the "Free World." In exchange, the United States undertook to up-date the Pakistan army's equipment and tactics, convert the air force to jet power, develop airfields, install communications equipment, and provide certain defensive vessels for the small navy. As an ally, Pakistan qualified for commodity aid to offset its food deficit, and economic and defense support aid to develop the economy. The United States offered its diplomatic aid to help settle the Kashmir dispute in a manner generally seen as being in Pakistan's interest. This series of developments so radically changed the South Asian political environment that the Indian government was forced to develop a new diplomatic posture based not on non-alignment, but on double alignment.

The New Indian Diplomacy and Domestic Politics

New Delhi decided to seek closer ties with Moscow after Pakistan joined the Western pact organizations. Simultaneously, it withdrew its formal commitment to submit Kashmir's status to the people of the state, branded Pakistan the stooge of foreign interests, and redoubled its efforts in international propaganda.

The Bandung conference of 1955 offered India an ample opportunity to announce its opposition to neo-colonialism and foreign interference in the lives of the new states. When the Prime Minister of Ceylon made pointed references to Soviet colonialism, Prime Minister Nehru was clearly irritated. India's studied posture was designed to condition Soviet reactions and also to impress the representatives of Peking at the conference.

After the death of Stalin Nehru had visited the USSR, and Bulganin and Khrushchev returned the visit in the

winter of 1955. Substantial aid, including defense materials, was offered by the Soviets and accepted by the Indians. The high point of the Soviet-Indian honeymoon was in 1956 when the diplomacy of Russia, China and India was proceeding in a common stream. India had broken the encirclement policy of the West by inviting the so-called Soviet spider into its parlor, and the only result was enhanced aid for India. When the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt was launched during the Suez crisis, it was Nehru's close friend, V. K. Krishna Menon, who was counseling Nasser. India's repeated warnings concerning neo-colonialism seemed to have been accurate. At the same moment, however, the Hungarian Revolution began and Soviet imperialism was on display for all the world to see.

The Indians played an important role in condemning and censuring the Western powers for their Suez adventure but paid no public heed to the Soviet repression in Hungary. Critics of India's neutralism said that the Indians willfully ignored those aspects of neutralism which concerned the Soviet bloc, but were hypersensitive toward Western policies. There can, indeed, be no justification for India's one-sided anti-colonialism except, as the Prime Minister said, the national interest. At that moment, India needed economic and diplomatic support from the USSR. The United States and its Western allies did not support the Hungarians in their rebellion, and yet were asking non-committed states to join in a verbal condemnation which would do no more than previous verbal condemnations of the Soviet Union had done. This was the Indians' rationalization of their embarrassing position.

The left-leaning posture of Indian diplomacy accorded with the cabinet consensus which was developing. Briefly stated, the Congress began to fear that Indian social progress was lagging behind plan and behind actual needs. The conservative forces within India, especially within the individual states, were uniting to block radical legislation or at least to vitiate its implementation. Sentiment was there-

fore growing in favor of a more positive and directed approach to domestic affairs. The "ginger group" of Congress activists sought at this time a more direct committal on the part of the entire Congress to socialism.

The domestic Indian political scene accordingly witnessed a left-right dialogue, with the Prime Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, and K. M. Panikkar clearly working on the side of the left. While cabinet composition in the Indian government has been balanced, the policy recommendations of the prime minister do carry extraordinary weight. State enterprise thus became more important, and the public sector goals were made more ambitious.

Domestic politics during these years were, in some degree, tied to India's international posture, the leftists favoring closer ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China and the conservatives advocating continued friendship toward the West. Political parties and personalities, however, took up positions, not on the basis of an assessment of their international implications, but rather in terms of ideological or domestic considerations. The result was that foreign policy lobbies developed within the cabinet, and individual politicians became identified with particular policies and factions.

Yet one issue continued to unite the country: opposition to Pakistan. The right-wing groups had long agitated for a harsh policy toward Pakistan, and the leftists joined the chorus on the ground that Pakistan was a neo-colonialist base within the subcontinent.

In both India and Pakistan, the involvement of the governments in Cold War politics tended to polarize public life within the nations. Pakistan's leaders were chosen with an eye toward their acceptability in the West, and a high-ranking American was invited to become "political advisor" to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. As India, in turn, moved closer to the USSR to offset American aid to Pakistan, its internal politics followed a more leftist orientation. National autonomy was a short-lived phenomenon in Southern Asia.

CHAPTER FOUR

India and Pakistan and The Rise of China

Jawaharlal Nehru had been in China in the early days of World War II, and when he later wrote of his experiences, he prophesied that "a new China is rising, rooted in her culture, but shedding the lethargy and weakness of ages, strong and united."[1] Few Indians, however, shared his prescience, and those who did failed to foresee the clash between the two largest states in Asia. India's China "expert," the late K. M. Panikkar, could not decide about the country. In 1943, when he wrote *The Future of South-East Asia,*[2] he noted that there was no such thing as an Asiatic mentality, but rather many Asiatic mentalities. He concluded this survey by arguing that "essentially, the responsibility for defense must fall after the war on the local power of India and Indonesia." In 1948 Panikkar was accredited as ambassador to the Nationalist Chinese government in Nanking, and reported that "it was understood that China as the recognized Great Power in the East after the war expected India to know her place."[3] After the Communist government routed Chiang Kai-shek from the mainland, Panikkar was reaccredited to Peking and filed the Indian government's sharp protest following Peking's invasion of Tibet in 1950. He was dutifully impressed with Chinese discipline, but shaken by its imposition.

[1] *China, Spain and the War* (Allahabad, 1940), p. 11.
[2] New York, 1943, p. 111.
[3] *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1955), pp. 26-27.

Panikkar returned to New Delhi in 1952, the "old China hand" of the Congress government. While he apparently saw an arrogance and ruthlessness in the new masters of China, he may have thought it was particularly important for India to reach a true detente with Peking as soon as possible. Panikkar had written that Mao Tse-tung and others in the government were no doctrinaires, but that Mao was "one with whom it was possible to discuss and do business."[4]

And no matter what their manners or political posture, they were in control of China, with which India had a frontier as soon as Tibet was conquered. It was an American, and not an Indian, report which said that

> The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.[5]

Surely Panikkar's reporting, in part reflecting the expert opinions of Commonwealth observers, was similarly sanguine about the popularity and strength of the new regime.

The events surrounding the 1950 invasion of Tibet are intriguing. As soon as he arrived in Peking in May, 1950, Panikkar was struck by posters and propaganda materials calling for the "liberation" of Tibet. The British Indian government had kept trade missions, an armed guard and transport facilities under its control, but the domestic control of the country was in the hands of the Dalai Lama.

The independent Indian government had inherited the privileges of the British Indian government in Tibet, and had maintained them after 1947. It was a standard policy of both India and Pakistan to consider the status of their frontiers and treaty rights sacrosanct. It is unlikely that the Indian government gave much consideration to this matter immediately after independence. A government publication issued in 1948 suggested that

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[4] *In Two Chinas*, p. 79.

[5] As reported by John Davies in the 1949 State Department paper 3573, cited in Harold M. Vinacke, *The United States and the Far East* (Stanford: For the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), p. 27.

> With the exception of the countries of the north-west the Indian Dominion has inherited almost all the old neighbors, and fortunately in her relationship with them has had no evil legacies to wipe out.[6]

The Chinese, however, considered Indian troops and agents in Tibet as an "evil legacy" that should be eliminated.

It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese assessment of the situation placed more emphasis on the *de facto* autonomy exercised by the Dalai Lama than on the Indian presence, but Panikkar reported that the Chinese were very concerned about the presence of Nepali troops in Tibet.[7] Nonetheless, the Peking government apparently made no effort to negotiate the withdrawal of Indian missions in Lhasa before their invasion of 1950. The Indian ambassador was more concerned with the impending Chinese intervention in Korea than with Tibet, and when the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet in late October, he learned of it from Peking radio.

The Government of India filed a very strong protest with the Chinese government in the aftermath of the invasion of Tibet because it found itself involved in at least three issues: the *de facto* independence of Tibet, Indian treaty rights in the province, and broader Chinese-Indian relations. The future course of diplomacy between the two countries was conditioned by China's harsh rejection of the Indian complaint. Panikkar, naively or not so naively, notes that the Chinese even "accused India of having been influenced by the imperialists."[8]

Two years later Panikkar returned home, and the government of India began reassessing its policy. That assessment had already begun at the time of the invasion, when Sardar Patel chaired a committee to plan and evaluate Indian foreign policy toward China in Tibet, yet, its deliberations remained unpublished. It must be remembered that 1950 was the darkest year of the Cold War. Russia was suffering under the last years of Stalin, and a garrison-state

[6]Government of India, *After Partition* (New Delhi, 1948), p. 100.
[7]*In Two Chinas*, p. 105.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 113.

mentality had begun to develop in the United States. The Chinese simultaneously began a two-front war — in Korea against the greatest power in the world, and indeed the blue and white ensign of the United Nations, while also challenging India in Tibet. Panikkar considered his mission to Peking as one to demonstrate a middle way of non-alignment, and away from Cold War, but it was a poor year for non-alignment.

It seems likely that when the People's Liberation Army invaded Tibet, Indian intervention was considered a possibility. The invasion was made at the onset of winter and no advance notice was given. It seems equally obvious that the Dalai Lama asked for aid from India, which was considered and then denied by New Delhi. Thereafter, the Dalai Lama found himself without the means to resist the Chinese and, after protracted negotiations, agreed to Chinese sovereignty with assurances that Peking would respect Tibet's historic and unique personality. The Indian facilities were undisturbed but closely watched and coolly regarded. During the years of the Korean War, the People's Liberation Army acted with purpose but tactfully. Medical clinics, schools and other social services were introduced. More especially, an ambitious program of road-building was begun to link China with Tibet. The pattern of building was not isolated to Tibet; instead, Tibet was linked with Chinese Turkistan, another turbulent and formerly autonomous province.

The Korean War came almost as a godsend to China. It offered Peking an opportunity to press thousands of its people into a highly disciplined national experience. It offered a heady radicalization of the continuing nationalism marking modern Chinese life, and it committed the Soviet Union to a massive program of military and economic aid under the rubric of "socialist solidarity." Out of the prolonged war came, for China, the largest jet air force in Asia, and a confident, battle-trained and proven mass army. When the armistice was finally concluded, Chinese arms had held their own against the greatest power in the world,

their industrialization was proceeding apace and even the crops were good. War seemed to be in the Chinese national interest.

In the "peace" following the Korean War, the Peking government turned to domestic needs, and especially to bringing outlying provinces under the complete control of the central government. This was a classic policy of all newly powerful Chinese governments throughout history, just as was the centrifugal tendency of Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, Sakhalin and Sinkiang under weaker ones. The policy seemed to the world to be so radical because for the entire preceding century Chinese power and authority had shrunk, first at the hands of overseas imperial powers, and then at the hands of the Japanese, who very nearly devoured the heart of China. No sooner had the Japanese been defeated than the civil war tore at Chinese society with even more ferocity than the Japanese aggression. And within slightly more than a year after the end of the civil war, China was committed in battle against foreign foes in Korea.

At the end of the Korean War, therefore, China was at peace and united for the first time in almost a century.

Its leadership was confident, powerful and disciplined. The new forms of social organization being tried in China with appalling regimentation were apparently producing amazing results. The few journalists traveling through the country wrote their headlines with a view toward the "great leap forward." The Chinese genius, so long committed to fratricidal combat, apparently was reasserting itself.

Even though the Indians were well aware of China's newfound power and purpose, they also saw themselves at odds with Peking. The invasion of Tibet was "shocking" and the Chinese refusal to accept non-alignment as a possible "non-imperialist" form of foreign policy was distressing. Meanwhile, India was also emerging as the leader of a new force in world politics. When Madame Pandit was elected President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, India had, at least for many states, become the

official "honest broker." At the end of the Korean War, it was natural that she should be invited to preside over the thorny prisoners dispute.

The Indian contingent sent to Korea to implement those aspects of the armistice relating to prisoner exchange was led by the army chief of staff, General Thimayya. By the end of his term, there could be no doubt that he considered the North Koreans and Chinese Communists the most difficult and troublesome people with whom he had ever been faced. The Chinese, on the other hand, considered him little better than a Western imperialist. And thus another oblique clash took place between China and India, motivated both by the difficult environment in which the states met, and by the different interests each was serving.

The Indians also began bolstering their interests in the Himalayan buffer states, as the British had done when a Chinese army invaded Tibet in 1908. Indian diplomacy, however, was in no way controlled by the Ministry of Defense. Quite the contrary, in fact, was the case. The Prime Minister of India has, since independence, held the portfolio of external affairs. His interest in sending Indian troops to Korea to supervise the truce was to enhance India's image as an Asian neutral with some muscle and organizational skill. This, in turn, would strengthen India's position in world councils even though her military might was negligible.

Shortly after the end of the Korean conflict, the Chinese decided to tighten their control of domestic affairs in Tibet, and to expell India by terminating the special position which she had inherited from the British. It was at this time, two years after K. M. Panikkar had returned to India, that a major policy decision was forced upon the Congress government. China gave every indication that it would follow a "modernization" program in Tibet, while liquidating Indian interests and establishing reciprocal trade missions to replace those established, staffed and protected by Indian arms.

The diplomatic initiative had shifted to China, whose

position, after Korea, was manifestly superior to India's. The simple reality was that the People's Liberation Army had completed a network of strategic roads, airfields and garrisons in Tibet. The work of the Chinese in "nation-building" activities was acknowledged as progressive, and something of a popular front had developed within one faction of the Buddhist theocracy. On the other hand, the Indian army was poorly equipped and isolated from Tibet. It lacked modern aircraft and found its flanks insecure, held by a hostile Pakistan. Moreover, its legal position was poor, for it could not ask Portugal and France to vacate their enclaves in India in one breath, and in another claim treaty protection for its unique rights in Tibet. Moreover, the Chinese were becoming, it seemed, a little more mellow in international affairs. In this situation, India had no choice but to yield to China.

The 1954 treaty between the People's Republic of China and India was also sped on its way by the US-Pakistan arms accord, and India's apparent drift toward the socialist countries. The acceptance of the treaty was, therefore, not viewed as a surrender by the Indian public, but rather as part of a new security arrangement in which relatively worthless rights were traded for real advantages. Seldom are treaties sold to the signatory powers as anything other than a great victory, but the Sino-Indian accord was especially well received because it laid the groundwork, the world was told, for the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," or *panch shila.*

It is worth remembering that the Chinese government had just gained a diplomatic victory at the Geneva Conference which liquidated French rule in Indo-China. Thereafter, they began pursuing a policy which emphasized, not the military strength at their disposal, but their superior diplomatic position. Therefore, it was with considerable grace that Peking offered to India, as the basis for their accord, a charter for Asian diplomacy incorporating the five principles. They are, or more accurately were, mutual respect

for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Both Nehru and U Nu received the happy news from Chou En-lai during his diplomatic tour in June, 1954. In fact, Chou En-lai's speeches in India smack of a "bourgeois nationalist dictator's" sentiments.

> Revolution cannot be exported; at the same time, outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted.[9]

In the context of the continuing debate between Communist China and the Soviet Union, these words have an ironic ring indeed.

In part the conciliatory posture of Chou En-lai and his government were in reaction to an increasingly efficient regional defense organization set up by the Western powers in Manila. Most of the ex-colonial successor states in Southeast Asia were unnerved by China's aggression and proven strength, and there was some of the psychology of the Balkan states after World War I, when France organized a small-state entente against resurgent Germany. The events in Korea and Indo-China, and the increasing threat of guerrilla Communism in Asia, pointed to the need for some strengthening strategy.

At this juncture, however, largely at the instance of India, a conference sponsored formally by the Colombo powers was convoked in Bandung, Indonesia. Billed as an African and an Asian conference, it met to dramatize the new importance of the non-Western states in world politics. China was in attendance, and on its best behavior. The conference could hardly have had any other than an anti-Western European bias since the invitees were primarily post-colonial governments in the first flush of local chauvinism. Beating the lion and cursing the French had done quite well in the first half of the century, and it continued to be a popular theme at Bandung. As if to mock SEATO's aims, the presence of China in peaceful assembly gave no

[9] Quoted in A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York, 1960), p. 100.

one an excuse to fear for the peace of Asia. Equally important, the conference served to reawaken the post-colonial Asian and African states to the power of the Western nations and the vulnerability of the new states to continued "neo-colonialist, i.e., American," pressure.

India, apparently believing Chinese professions of friendship and tolerance, tried a return to a policy of active cooperation and alliance with China. Various missions of high-ranking Indians like Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao visited Peking on good-will missions, and India, with the USSR, actively worked to secure China's admission to the United Nations, at the very moment when the Chinese were building a strategic road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and were beginning to push roads through to other frontier points. Moreover, despite the open-handed generosity of the Indians, the Chinese cartographers were issuing maps showing considerable portions of what India considered to be her own as Chinese territory.

Nonetheless, the bellwether of India's China policy, K. M. Panikkar, wrote of the cultural underpinnings of *panch shila* and effused that "undoubtedly, what gave a spiritual and cultural unity to non-Islamic Asia was the prolonged contact between India and China."[10] In just three years' time, he would write: "In history, India and China have, politically speaking, constituted two different worlds which, though touching on each other, have not influenced each other greatly."[11] In the three years after Bandung, however, the theme was cultural unity and "Hindi, Chini, Bhai Bhai." Friendship societies sponsoring Indo-Chinese activities mushroomed, and the Chinese began negotiating with Indian contractors to construct a very large and elegant embassy in New Delhi. The Chinese trading agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong, and Chinese banking agencies in India, were sometimes suspected of more than profit-seeking, but at the same time, India's trading stations in Tibet at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok, and trade with

[10] *India and China* (Bombay, 1957), preface, p. x.
[11] *Common Sense About India* (New York, 1960), p. 137.

that country, were also maintained. And, as if to show complete trust and affection, Mr. Nehru's visit to China in October of 1954 was often seen at the time as a complete triumph of Indian diplomacy.

History is, of course, much clearer when viewed in retrospect. On the basis of their information, the Indians were perhaps maximizing their position. After the 1954 Tibetan accord and the "spirit of Bandung" in 1955, the Indian government had reason to believe that it had a powerful but friendly state on its northern frontier. India's military position was not conditioned by Chinese activities, and when India began the first photo-reconnaissance flights over Tibet, their revelations must have been shocking. Nonetheless, New Delhi had embarked on a program of economic development at home and of pacifism outside the South Asian region. Besides, while it implied a difficult time for the Tibetans, what were India's interests in this area, so backward, poor and inaccessible? The 1956 events in Hungary, but more especially in Suez, confirmed Nehru's concern for walking the fine line between the Great Powers while mobilizing other powerless states to do the same.

Between 1956 and 1959, however, the world changed rapidly, and the very forces which had produced and emboldened independent India began working against her. Control of the leadership of the neutralist camp was now passing into the hands of a younger and more militant generation of nations being born in Africa. Ghana and Guinea would not defer to India because of its more venerable status, and respect based on superior power was hardly appropriate.

India's domestic economic development, on which the future role of India in Asia so much depended, was impressive, but population growth seemed to eat away at its vitals. The Five-Year Plans were statistically sound, but their implementation was slow and often impossible. The food grains problem deepened and the nation came to count upon US surplus commodity assistance as well as capital investment. Meanwhile, China's economy seemed to be set-

ting new records and moving much quicker than the Indian. Even ignoring the public relations bias of economic planning and statistical offices, the Indian performance seemed less impressive than that of China. This was particularly important because India had to lead by example if she was to lead at all, and the example was not inspiring.

In the subcontinent, India's neighbors were also experiencing severe problems. After five years of very unstable cabinet government in Pakistan, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army took control of the government. The Indian government was quick, perhaps a little too quick, to condemn General Mohammad Ayub Khan's government as a naked dictatorship. The purpose was clear, but limited; Delhi wanted to point out to the world that Pakistan asked for a democratic plebiscite in Kashmir, but denied it to its own citizens. Even assuming that this was solely noble sentiment, and that it removed the necessity for a democratic decision in Kashmir, it ignored the need for a rapprochement with Pakistan. Surely by 1958 the Indians had adequate information suggesting a military build-up in Tibet, and the existence of roads and facilities along India's frontiers. Nevertheless, even though the leaders of the two countries got together shortly after General Ayub's *coup d'état,* nothing came from the meeting.

Burma, suffering from near-fatal confusion, also came under benevolent military rule. As in Pakistan, federal–state or central government–autonomous province tensions taxed the slender supports of national unity. Charges of corruption were rampant, party discipline seemed a thing of the past, the decay of nationalist party unity brought forth many splinters, all seeking special rewards from successive governments.

Unhappy Ceylon found its society extremely tense, with Tamil-Sinhalese quarrels erupting in violence. Martial law was soon to be needed, and although politicians remained in control, an attempted *coup d'état* was in preparation. In all four of the successor states of the British Indian empire,

regional, parochial and linguistic rivalries developed, and in each strong measures were needed to maintain national unity. Only India was able to preserve a democratic system, and it was sorely tested by the creation of the linguistic states in 1956.

The entire regional security of South Asia, as well as its development and prosperity, was, by 1958, depressingly precarious. As history was to show, 1958 was equally important to Sino-Soviet relations, and to China's new militancy in Asia, which manifested itself by renewed fighting for the offshore islands. In this context, Chinese claims to territory along the Tibet-Indian frontier were once more advanced systematically, and a hard line was taken toward Prime Minister Nehru in the Chinese press.

One of the issues which developed in the Sino-Soviet dispute was the proper treatment of so-called bourgeois nationalists. Soviet policy, in part conditioned by Western "containment" theory, found in leaders like Nasser and Nehru tactical allies for certain purposes. The public diplomacy of the USSR constantly played upon issues appealing to the new nations, and justified the tactic on the ground that any anti-imperialist developments and movements must be aided in this period of history. The Chinese, on the other hand, had their own ideas about Asian leadership and no intention of watching the rise of a potential regional rival in India. Not surprisingly, they increasingly deplored the aid which the USSR was offering Nehru's government. Even the Communist Party of India began to show signs of internal rift on the issue of the Chinese and Russian alternative Communist *Weltanschauungen.*

Early in 1959, there was a major revolt in Tibet stemming from Chinese interference in local Tibetan affairs in contravention of the 1950 treaty. The world first learned of the rebellion when India began to receive thousands of Tibetan refugees, and finally when the Dalai Lama found his way to Indian sanctuary. The suppression of the Tibetan revolt was as savage, if not more so, as the Russian

siege of Budapest in 1956. The Dalai Lama asked for help, and then asked that his plea be laid before the United Nations. There was talk of a government-in-exile. It is unnecessary to discuss the agonizing policy choices before the Indian government, but its actual policy was confined to strong verbal protest, muffling the Dalai Lama, and an unwillingness to act as a forum for the Tibetan case. It was a situation unusually unfitted to India's diplomacy of reasoned moderation, mobilized world opinion or UN consensus, and an absence of military might or local presence.

Moreover, the Chinese made no secret of their territorial ambition along India's northern frontier, and moved to increase their diplomatic contacts with India's neighbors. Nepal had been courted since 1954; now the Chinese moved rapidly to court Pakistan and Burma. In August of 1959, Prime Minister Nehru announced to his country that there had been border incidents involving security forces of India and China, and released a white paper on the exchanges of notes concerning the border problem. Nonetheless, there was no fundamental shift in Indian foreign policy, and when President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan offered, subject to an understanding on Kashmir, to join India in a military alliance for the defense of the subcontinent, he was rudely rebuffed. The Indian defense minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, presumably with a full catalogue of reports and aerial photographs of the regions involved, blithely continued to suggest that Pakistan was India's primary enemy. The deployment of Indian forces continued to reflect the bias of the minister, and the "political generals" affair, which embittered relations between General Thimayya and Krishna Menon, probably had much larger implications. Nonetheless, the Indian fixation on a relatively non-existent Pakistani threat remained a most mystifying aspect of Indian security policy. K. M. Panikkar's ambivalence toward the Chinese nation was apparently still reflected in the highest councils of the state, while a consensus within the government on the question of Pakistan continued to exist.

The Ministry of External Affairs, had its voice been heard, could have shown the Indian leadership an almost identical problem existing between China and Burma, and could have predicted Chinese policy toward India on the basis of the Burmese experience. The Burmese recognized as early as 1948 that their frontiers were indeterminate, and made an offer to renegotiate them. The Chinese demurred, much as they later failed to notify India of their 1950 Tibetan operations. When the Burmese army found itself in action against Nationalist Chinese bands in its northern zone, it also discovered the Communist People's Liberation Army of China occupying Wa State in Burma. Once more, the Burmese sent a note to China to no effect, and in 1955 the Chinese and Burmese armies in Wa State clashed. The Burmese government asked China to withdraw to the other side of a frontier line drawn by a commission of the League of Nations in 1937 and ratified by China in 1941, but the Peking regime refused to recognize the boundary. Chinese maps showed 70,000 square miles of Burma as Chinese, and in 1956 Chinese forces entered Kachin State, immediately above the central plain of Burma. Burmese premier U Nu went to Peking in October of 1956, and thought that he had solved the issue, but Peking refused to accept what for Burma was a large surrender of territory and principle. It was finally General Ne Win, who arrived in Peking in January, 1960, who settled the frontier dispute, and with a smaller territorial concession than had been made by his predecessor. Nonetheless, Burma had still been humiliated by the Chinese and had been forced to take the posture of supplicant at Peking to stabilize its frontier.[12]

The lessons of Burma, even at the height of the era of *panch shila* and the spirit of Bandung, illuminated Chinese methods and Chinese aims. In the case of Burma, a minimum force was used, and ambiguous claims to large amounts of territory were advanced for purposes of bargaining. Only a fool could have thought that it was the territory or the

[12]See Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty," *Pacific Affairs* (Summer, 1961), pp. 174-183.

frontier which concerned China. After all, what threat does Burma pose to any of its neighbors? Obviously, therefore, the Chinese intention was to assert its informal suzerainty over the country, and to establish a position of dominance over the external relations of Burma. Privately, somewhat later, a Burmese official said to an American visitor that Burma was on the periphery of a great power, and would choose to be a Finland and not a Hungary if it had to become a satellite.

Burma had been a part of the British Indian defense system, and India's troops guarded and helped build the Burma Road. Cooperative activity between countries of South Asia, and the industrial genius of the British, had produced a formidable power complex prior to 1947. The core of the old British Indian military establishment was Indian, and yet during Burma's months of crisis, India stood silent, awaiting its own punishment at the hands of the Chinese. Peking was not foolish enough to alienate all of the countries of the region at the same time, although it very nearly did. The so-called Colombo Powers failed to cooperate for their common protection and thus found themselves abused individually. Even the Indian leadership and its defense organization did not allow their empathy for a bleeding neighbor to reshape their policy. Thus began the crisis in confidence in Prime Minister Nehru's policies and thus also began India's sufferings.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Undeclared War in Southern Asia

Nations do not change their conceptions of the world overnight, and neither do governments. The 1959 rebellion in Tibet focused public and governmental concern on Sino-Indian relations, but no radical changes emerged from the intra- and extra-governmental debates. In all of the South Asian countries, foreign policy is largely the province of the government and not the politicians. This is partially the result of colonial conditioning. It is also due to the continued reluctance of governments in the region to take the public into their confidence and to elicit public support for foreign policy. In Pakistan, the political community is interested in international politics, both because of Kashmir and because of the very real feeling for other Muslim countries, but there is very little informed discussion on alternative policies. Ceylon and Burma are somewhat less sensitized to world affairs, and have generally followed policies of response rather than of initiative.

Indian foreign policy was truly monopolized by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and one of the sharpest criticisms of him must surely be that he did not train an external affairs minister to succeed him. V. K. Krishna Menon was able and experienced in foreign affairs, but he was so entirely the partisan that no one imagined that he could conduct India's foreign policy from the posture of an almost virulent anti-Western bias. Even a modest intelli-

gence could see that India's policy of non-alignment required a figure in New Delhi of ambiguous quality — one who would appear to be one thing to Washington and quite another to Moscow. It was thought that Mr. Nehru kept V. K. Krishna Menon in the cabinet not only because of his ability, but because, like Sir Stafford Cripps in Churchill's government during World War II, the cabinet needed someone who could talk with the Russians.

Another element which tended to centralize the foreign-policy making power in the hands of the prime minister was his own skill. India's diplomatic edifice is largely his creation, and it has accomplished much for a country as weak as India. The USA and USSR have been busily outbidding each other to help India, and to some degree, India has tended to take the place of the European neutrals in acting as a focus for conciliation in world politics. It was clear to anyone who cared to see that the prime minister was directly responsible for this remarkable accomplishment, and Indians took a justifiable pride in their leader's handiwork.

A third element in Indian foreign policy, as in the foreign policies of Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, is the lack of information and understanding of world politics outside the government. News tends to be "managed" if not completely dominated by government spokesmen, and an unofficial foreign affairs community has not emerged in the region. Only in 1964 did the Indian School of International Affairs, perhaps the leading academic institution devoted to the study of India's world position, decide to institute a Chinese area study program. Panikkar's many books on China include acknowledgments to G. F. Hudson in the United Kingdom for help on details and understanding, and the Indian diplomatic service, no less than the universities, has counted heavily on foreign help.

The seeming polarization of Indian politics between the conservative and liberal wings of the Congress, and their more extreme outriders beyond the Congress pale, has also tended to blunt foreign policy debate. Because the lib-

eral-left segment of Indian political life has continued to be committed to a pro-socialist bloc foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet rift came almost as a godsend since the left could thus remain pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese. Nonetheless, the invasion of Tibet and the rebellion in 1959 were difficult facts to reconcile with liberal-left aims in India, and a national election was scheduled for 1962. Congress experts became increasingly concerned about party factionalism, and aware of the need for a foreign policy consensus if the elections were to be won. For the first time, moreover, a party of the moderate right, the new Swatantra party, was challenging the assumptions and supposed successes of Indian foreign policy, and such criticism before elections often tends to rivet the ruling party to its old policies, which was certainly the case in India.

While it is true that India appeared to change her established foreign policy very little after the 1959 Tibetan rebellion, a reappraisal was taking place in the Ministry of External Affairs. Based upon extreme concern on the part of defense personnel and the proven *mala fides* of Peking, the agonizing reappraisal set two policies in action. The first saw an increasing military commitment to the defense of contested areas in northern India and Kashmir. The second aimed at eliciting Soviet help in moderating China's militancy. Neither of these was publicized in the West, and it appeared to many observers that the Indians were doing nothing about a major challenge to their independence. The continued presence of V. K. Krishna Menon in the Defence Ministry was considered almost suicidal, as was India's anti-Pakistan posture. The fact that the Indian army was brought into the open a little more conspicuously, and that before the 1962 elections it would demonstrate its power in conquering Goa, was not enough to offset this criticism.

The invasion of Goa in December, 1961, was the result of many Indian aims and policies. For some time the Indian government had been asking Portugal to vacate its enclaves as had the French at Pondicherry. The Portuguese had

refused to discuss the matter the way the French had because they considered their enclaves part of metropolitan Portugal. The precise timing of the invasion, however, was not related to Portugal's diplomatic intractability alone.

India wanted to absorb Goa not only because of the indignity of continued colonial rule on the subcontinent but also because Goa was a good harbor, held substantial reserves of iron ore, was a hotbed of smuggling activities, and was also a pocket of relative affluence in the midst of a general Indian austerity. For the prohibitionist elements in Indian society, it was an almost unbelievably sinful place where whiskey was not only plentiful, but cheap.

There was also the issue of Krishna Menon's approaching election campaign in Bombay North constituency which was to be the most bitter and hard-fought in the entire country. The "Victor of Goa" could parade as the great nationalist, known not only for his opposition to Pakistan but for his active elimination of European imperialism. There was every reason to think he enjoyed his public image.

Disentangling motives is difficult at best, and contraproductive at worst. Nonetheless, one can see another thread in this affair. On the one hand, India was losing the confidence of the new African states, since they wanted to direct the affairs of their own continent without deferring to anyone while India's presence in the Congo appeared to be Western-inspired. The last colonial presence in Africa is Portuguese, and the invasion of Goa by India was both militant and humiliating for Portugal. India therefore earned a few points from the African nationalists. On the other hand, India showed that its army was more than ceremonial, and that the government was not dedicated to *ahimsa* (nonviolence) in the Gandhian tradition. This lesson must have been directed to the Chinese. European and American cartoonists had a field day figuratively replacing Gandhi's walking stick with a sword, but this was precisely the Indian intention. Unfortunately, the Portuguese did not really test

the Indians in Goa, and the few casualties inflicted were largely by mistake. Rumors of looting did not enhance Indian prestige, and the image of the campaign, except within India, was that of a comic opera in which the soldiers stumbled over their own swords.

The Goa affair was begun, of course, after almost three years of increasingly bitter boundary quarrels with the Chinese which resulted from the growing militancy of Chinese diplomacy in 1957-58. After the Dalai Lama's flight and the April, 1959, announcement of his asylum in India, the cold war between India and China heated up. Blunt language replaced diplomatic niceties in the flow of wordy notes between New Delhi and Peking, and the notes began to reflect not only past history, but the clashes and affronts to national sovereignty of yesterday and the day before.

The Chinese repeated their Burmese strategy, alternating between the use of force and diplomatic initiative. They claimed that India was attempting to continue the Western imperialist policy of encroachment on Chinese territory, and demanded the liberation of Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan. Nepal, which was by treaty an independent country, was given special treatment including aid from China. Large tracts of Indian territory were claimed, as they had been by Peking in its disputes with Burma and Pakistan.

The Indians argued that their frontiers with China, especially in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), were "firm by treaty, firm by usage and firm by geography." In November, 1959, Nehru declared that aggression against Nepal would be considered aggression against India, and that, in the aftermath of the Tibetan rebellion, Indian troops had been sent to Sikkim and Bhutan. The "buffer zones" were reduced further when the Indian army was given charge of the frontier zones in Ladakh and NEFA which had previously been held by militiamen and Indian intelligence officers. Direct confrontation between the Indian and the Chinese armies was therefore established. India's posi-

tion was stiffening militarily as well as diplomatically, but the actual force levels on the contested frontier were small. India had no way to supply its troops except by air, but the Chinese, between 1951 and 1960, had built almost 3,750 miles of roads.

In August, 1959, an Indian picket in NEFA was captured and a defensive position at Longju was surrounded by Chinese troops. Alternating between accommodation and conflict, Prime Minister Nehru admitted that it would be foolish to go to war for a few mountains, but charged Peking with "pride and arrogance of might." As if to lend emphasis to his charge, the Chinese killed nine Indian police and captured ten more 40 miles inside the Indian Ladakh frontier in mid-October. In early November, all police were replaced by Indian military units and the Ladakh region was put under military control.

The 1960 Indian military budget reflected an increase of almost $60 million which was attributed to growing frontier tensions, but this was not a massive increase. In fact, when border passions were running especially high, Prime Minister Nehru invited Chou En-lai to Delhi for talks. In mid-April, 1960, the two leaders met, but their differences were not resolved. Meanwhile, Indian military preparation was proceeding apace, and in August the army announced the completion of a 280-mile strategic road linking Ladakh and central Kashmir.

Indian diplomacy also appeared to be succeeding. The Soviet Union announced, through the press, that it hoped that both parties could come to a peaceful accommodation in the matter of their frontier dispute. This neutral position greatly embarrassed the Chinese, who were charging India with willfully upholding a colonial legacy. Russia's continued praise and support of India at the same time that aid and support were being withdrawn from China was a further irritant. The Chinese found themselves increasingly isolated from the mainstream of Communism, and its fount, the Soviet Union. Moreover, India's diplomacy seemed to appeal

to a large number of states in Asia that refused to commit themselves in the world power struggle. Finally, the Chinese began to take seriously the notion so assiduously cultivated by the Indians — that a great test was taking place in Asia between China and India.

A more immediate but perhaps less important change was taking place along those parts of the frontier which were in dispute. The Indian army was digging in and building communications and logistic systems. In 1961, Prime Minister Nehru announced that the military balance in the disputed areas had shifted in India's favor and this assertion drew a left-handed endorsement from the Chinese when Peking announced that it would take decisive action should the Indian build-up continue. In December, 1961, Goa fell, and in the heady pre-electoral climate in India, Defense Minister Krishna Menon answered his critics by stating that India would reclaim the border "one way or another."

While the Indians were setting their modest defense organization into operation, China was busily taking the diplomatic steps necessary to isolate India. In 1959 the Chinese called for boundary talks with Pakistan in their zone of Kashmir. While Chinese propaganda condemned Nehru as a traitor to nationalism and a stooge of Western imperialism, Peking courted the government of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan. Although Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO, its love for SEATO was never real: China was far removed from most of Pakistan, while CENTO was directed toward the Soviet threat from the northwest. Thus the apparent contradiction in China's position is not as striking as it might seem, since it was so clearly in Peking's interest to ignore Pakistan's formal commitment against Communism. As the Sino-Indian rivalry developed, the Pakistanis became increasingly friendly to Peking, justifying their policies by reference to the axiom, "my neighbor's neighbor is my friend."

In January, 1961, the Sino-Burmese border agreement negotiated in 1960 was signed by Chou En-lai in Rangoon,

and in October Nepal signed a treaty delimiting her frontier with China and giving Mount Everest to both countries. Both Nepal and Burma also negotiated trade and transit agreements, and the government of Nepal agreed to a road linking Tibet and Nepal to be built by the Chinese in the interests of trade. More active steps were also taken to conclude agreements with Pakistan.

Toward the end of 1961, the Chinese began an unannounced military build-up in Tibet.

No one knew, in January, that 1962 would be a disastrous year for India — for its diplomacy, for its security, for its image as an honest broker, and for its development plan. No one knew, in January, that before the year had run its course American C-135's would be operating from Palam and Dum Dum airports, and that British colonels would again be essential to India's defense. No one could have foreseen the domestic implications of a war with China which would force Krishna Menon out of the government, seriously weaken the Prime Minister's authority and place India under emergency government.

The year began with a continuous and increasingly impolite barrage of notes between the governments of India and China over the border, both in Ladakh and NEFA. Conditions in the frontier zone were extremely tense. The Nepalese government found itself faced with a minor rebellion in the southwest which it implied drew support from India. The Indian government denied the charges, and hoped instead for closer relations with the government of Nepal which was then following a "neutralist" policy or, as the king labeled it, a walk between giants. In Bhutan and Sikkim domestic factions were involved with the competing regional great powers.

Nonetheless, India carried on as usual and held — almost serenely — its third general elections which returned the Congress standard-bearers to power for another five-year term. Jawaharlal Nehru received his near-customary large majority. Individual spokesmen of the liberal and left

wing of the Congress had varying fortunes, but outstanding figures such as Krishna Menon were returned.

Diplomacy proceeded apace. India, in the interest of "national security" and to dramatize her determination, ordered certain Chinese nationals out of the country. She served notice on China that the 1954 trade agreement between the two countries would be allowed to lapse unless the frontier areas in contest were evacuated by the Chinese army. Since Peking did not agree to these terms, trade between the countries ended on June 3, 1954. Chinese trade agencies in India were closed as were Indian ones in Tibet.

Within a month, widespread skirmishes began in Ladakh near Chipchak in the Galwan valley, and in the Pangong lake region. Experts met in August in an effort to avert another outbreak, but failed. In early September, Chinese troops crossed the 14,000-foot Tangla Ridge which formed the McMahon Line frontier in western NEFA. In October, fighting began near Dhola. The scale of the clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols was small, but their frequency increased. Chinese officials were unwilling to accept India's proposals, and the Indians were not willing to make their pilgrimage to Peking to beg for what they considered to be their own.

In the early fall of 1962, the Prime Minister announced to the nation and the world that the Indian army had been ordered to clear Indian territory of Chinese aggressors, while suggesting at the same time that no violence would occur if the Chinese withdrew to positions they had held prior to September 8. At the same time, a new corps command for the NEFA region was established and placed under the command of Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul, a friend of Krishna Menon who enjoyed a reputation as a political general and logistics expert. As Quartermaster-General, Kaul had been in charge of the road-building program begun in the north in 1959 and was familiar with the terrain and its problems. It has even been argued that he was the author of the Indian "forward policy" which called

for Indian advance posts flanking Chinese positions in contested territory,[1] but he vehemently denies this.[2]

On October 20, the Chinese launched a major offensive which overwhelmed General Kaul's advance pickets and fixed defensive positions. The entire disputed area in NEFA was brought under attack and the struggle in Ladakh was intensified. In a special evening program of All India Radio, the prime minister announced to the country a series of defeats in battle, and spoke of the cruel awakening from a dream into the harsh world of power realities.

Having chastened the Indian army in what were to be preliminary skirmishes, the Chinese government offered an armistice on the condition that both armies withdraw their troops 12½ miles from their actual lines of control. India demurred, but the reverses on the front were so serious that a state of emergency was declared on October 26. In the meantime, the massive mandate given Krishna Menon in the February elections was abruptly and bitterly withdrawn, and the Congress party rank-and-file demanded his resignation. Nehru defended his defense minister and personal friend, but the cabinet, party and nation were in no mood to listen. Menon resigned from the defense ministry but initially kept a new ministry of defense supply, ironically the field in which he had the poorest record. His second resignation came within a fortnight, and Y. B. Chavan, chief minister of Maharashtra State and the man whose party organization had given Menon a great victory in Bombay, was brought to Delhi to restore public confidence.

Meanwhile, conditions on the front were going from bad to worse. The army was retreating and there were rumors of panic. On November 15 the Chinese drove to Towang, the district headquarters abandoned earlier by civil authorities, and then flanked the retreating Indian forces by capturing Se La and closing the route to Bom Dila which was also captured. The Assamese plains, the oil of Gauhati, and the foreign exchange-earning tea plantations

[1] See Welles Hangen, *After Nehru, Who?* (New York, 1963), pp. 257-258.
[2] Personal interview with the author, May 12, 1964.

were only 30 miles from the Chinese forces when the Prime Minister again talked to the nation, this time with a monumental sadness in his voice, as he said "our hearts go out to our brothers in Assam." It was clear that Assam was lost, and that the army was incapable of checking the Chinese advance at that time.

The Chinese were almost as successful in Ladakh where the cream of the army was stationed to protect Kashmir from Pakistan. India lost forty-three posts including Demhok and Daulet Beg, and all talk of capturing the Aksai Chin road linking Sinkiang and Tibet came to an end.

As soon as the magnitude of the first defeat of Indian arms was realized, a call for help went out to Britain, America and the Soviet Union. The entire policy instituted in 1959 which had counted upon military strength in the contested areas and diplomatic pressure by the USSR on China had failed. The so-called "neo-colonial" powers had now to be summoned to pick India's chestnuts from the fire. Indians in high places may have ruefully remembered that Krishna Menon had prohibited Indian army patrols from firing, no matter what the provocation, on Chinese troops — an order which General Kaul rescinded — but they were now even more concerned with what he might have done in the West.

India actually need not have been concerned. Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States offered immediate military aid to India including, apparently, some British field officers with Indian troop experience. Slowly at first, and then like a flood, came information concerning the lack of proper equipment at the front.

Suddenly, however, six days after the Bom Dila campaign which had wrecked the NEFA corps, the Chinese decided to withdraw their forces 12½ miles back of the lines of actual control of November 7, 1959, which was well north of their earlier position which Nehru had publicly conceded to them. This unilateral withdrawal was made conditional on an armistice, non-interference with the Chi-

nese withdrawal, Indian acceptance of their sector of 12½ miles of neutralized zone, and a prohibition of any attempt to re-establish any of the forty-three Indian posts in the Ladakh region. On paper, it looked like an exchange of Ladakh territory for some in the northeast.

The Indian government was as surprised by the withdrawal as by the attack. For one, the government thought very few people on the outside knew that India was following a military "forward policy" in the contested regions. Also, the weight of Chinese arms had been so overwhelming that no one imagined that the withdrawal was a response to Indian policy.

Rumor was king in New Delhi following the Chinese withdrawal, and when British and American missions arrived to assess India's defense needs, it was encouraged even further. The hard fact remained, however, that the Chinese had withdrawn, that there was room for honest difference of opinion on the precise frontier between India and China, and that the Indian forward policy may have been the *immediate* cause of the Chinese campaign. To more than one diplomatic observer, Chinese policy appeared to have aimed at administering a dignified oriental slap in the face, followed by an unchallenged withdrawal. India had been grossly insulted and was left powerless to protect her honor. As Sardar Panikkar had discovered on his first mission to China, India was supposed to know her place and to see that China was in fact the great power in Asia.

In the heat of battle, India had called for help from the West which, with reference to her image as the leader of the non-aligned nations, added insult to injury. Though huge American planes droned over the large cities of northern India day and night, the Ministry of External Affairs asked newsmen not to photograph them, while the ministry of information issued statements noting that India remained non-aligned since she was seeking help from the USSR as well!

The curious and unreal nature of India's international posture was evident when Y. B. Chavan made his maiden

speech in Delhi and spoke of "Communist" rather than "Chinese" aggression. It is said that he was told thereafter to avoid the careless use of labels and to stick instead to nationalities because Indian diplomacy was still very much continuing its efforts to use the USSR as a foil against China. In fact, the leader of the Indian Communist Party went to Moscow, almost as a minister without portfolio, to seek Russian aid, and in the outcome the USSR did agree to supply jet fighters and to build a plant for their construction in India. Later, there were air-to-air missiles built to Soviet plans for Indian air defense needs.

Even though the elections were still fresh in the public mind, the Chinese action brought the foreign policy of Nehru and the Congress under sharp attack. It was Congress, the leaders of the opposition argued, which had deflected public attention toward Portugal and Pakistan, and away from the real enemy. It was not enough that Krishna Menon had been made a scapegoat; his policies, after all, were Nehru's policies and Congress policies.

The evolving foreign policy debate crystallized along recognizable lines. C. Rajagopalachari, octagenarian chief of the Swatantra party and distinguished servant of his country in its early years, noted that as a matter of fact non-alignment was dead and India should restore working relationships with the Western countries in its own defense. He was joined by a broad range of rightist-conservative parties, and by a large number of civil servants.

The Prime Minister had his own ideas about non-alignment, however, and so long as the price for Western aid did not include emnity toward the USSR, he could adopt a new form of double alignment. The Sino-Soviet split, in which India was more than a minor issue, was tailor-made for this new diplomacy. Moreover, Western policy encouraged India to seek help and commitment from the USSR as a possible means of weakening the socialist camp as a whole. At the crucial juncture the Russians did indeed send a few planes by slow boat, and offered to build an airplane factory in the

future, which made Nehru's position at once more tenable.

The first reactions to Indian reverses in Pakistan were both sweet and sour. The sweet part, and it was savored, was the enjoyment one gets from seeing the neighborhood bully meeting a bigger bully. The sour part was in knowing that there was an even bigger bully in the neighborhood.

Although the Indians voiced deep apprehension over possible Pakistani opportunism in Kashmir, that seems a remote possibility. The United States repeatedly gave India assurances that it was exercising its rights of inspection to insure that no US-aid arms would be used in offensive adventures. Some Pakistanis privately said that they were not jackals, waiting for wounded game, no matter what their personal feelings toward India and the Kashmir dispute.

Just as the West had tried to forestall an armed clash between India and Pakistan when China was fighting, so too did they attempt to patch up differences between the two countries in the interest of the common regional defense. These efforts were given added meaning when Pakistan stridently protested arms shipments to India on the very same grounds India had used nine years earlier — they were said to unbalance the power relationship in the area, and the use of arms cannot be really restricted once they pass from the donor's physical control. As arms shipments to India began, Pakistan began questioning its pacts and its friends. The press was dominated by articles denouncing American bad faith, and increasingly, praising Chinese policy.

President Ayub, as a military man, noted that Pakistan was in the process of completing a border agreement with China which was equitable and fair. He said that the Indians had refused conciliatory Chinese offers, that they had ambitions to become a great power in Asia, and that China had been forced to humble them. He said that as any military man knew, the Chinese could not support a full-scale invasion of India from their base in Tibet which was, in any case, incomplete, and that from the beginning theirs had been

a limited action. American arms, he contended, would not strengthen India against China even if that were desirable, and therefore the arms would only serve further to dim hopes for a plebiscite in Kashmir and for Pakistan's security.

Into this environment came W. Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys whose aim was to bring India and Pakistan together so that regional security could be enhanced, and Indian and Pakistani troops deployed against a common external foe. Despite Ayub's argument, almost all Pakistanis recognize the power and danger of China, and befriend her only because India continues, in their view, to be hostile. If, therefore, Kashmir and related issues could be settled, it was argued in Washington and London, the region could settle down to essential tasks. The Chinese were interested observers of these events, and it was indeed on the very day when Swaran Singh, the Indian representative, arrived in Rawalpindi for talks on Kashmir, that they released the news of the border accord with Pakistan.

The Chinese, however, were not the only irritants in the negotiations. No sooner had Duncan Sandys reached an agreement with Nehru to have Kashmir seriously discussed than the same Nehru announced that while India would talk there could still be no question of actual change. This infuriated Sandys, and all other parties to the negotiations. Yet, although they were attacked by the Chinese and labeled as insincere, the talks went on to their inconclusive end. What really mattered was that there was a Western willingness to help regardless of any Indo-Pakistani settlement. Moreover, the continuation of both United States and Soviet aid seemed to restore something of the old patina to Indian foreign policy. Or did it?

CHAPTER SIX

The Asian Cold War

With the ebb of European power in Asia, and the rise of newly independent states, it was expected by some that the old rules of *Machtpolitik* and black diplomacy would cease. The European state system was blamed for most of the world's ills by the new nationalist leaders, and they thought that, once their new nations were created with high ideals and pacific creeds, the problems which they faced would somehow yield to solution. The development of an Asian cold war between India and China, the regional dispute over Kashmir which embitters relations between India and Pakistan, and the weakness of the united front of non-committed nations shows clearly how fond was the dream, and how harsh the reality.

In modern history there have been three periods in which large numbers of new states emerged on the world scene: the Napoleonic era in which most of Latin America became free of Spanish rule; the aftermath of World War I when the Eastern European states and the modern Middle Eastern states were born amid the disintegration of the multi-national Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires; and the aftermath of World War II when Asia and Africa were freed of European rule. In none of these periods did the emergence of new states fundamentally change the rules of politics. In all of these periods disputes between the successor states developed.

What is most obvious about the rise of small new states is that they lack strength when confronted by a large imperial power. The Central American states in the early days of their independence were protected from European powers by the Monroe Doctrine, but it was not until Franklin Roosevelt's time that the Monroe Doctrine was supplemented by the Good Neighbor policy. The United States remains the colossus of the north, and its immense importance weighs heavily on the small states of the hemisphere.

The Eastern European states lasted less than three decades before they fell successively before Nazi aggression and Soviet expansionism. They lacked the resources, size and power to maintain their national sovereignty.

In Asia today, the "shatter belt" of new states in South-East Asia finds itself faced with a Chinese great power with aggressive aims. In this regional system, the continued military presence of the Western powers offers muscle and wealth, but in the nationalist view, the West is as much of a danger as is China. Nationalism reduces the efficacy of direct assistance in almost all new countries. Therefore, the region can find security only by developing popular, stable and effective national governments immune to Mao Tse-tung's "stage one" in which the peasantry is alienated from the nationalist government and converted into a guerrilla force under Communist leadership. Without strong local leadership, the enormous human resources of China, and its guerrilla strategy, will destroy the fragile "Balkan" system which emerged from colonial rule, and China will have thrust her sword southward to divide the world truly between east and west with the Straits of Malacca and perhaps the Indian Ocean becoming a Chinese *Mare Nostrum.*

As Russell Fifield's recent study shows,[1] the prime objective of United States foreign policy in the region is to insure stable growth in which a prosperous and developing Japan and India bring leadership and aid to their near-neighbors. The Chinese, however, are not unaware of

[1] *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* (New York, 1963).

Western policy, and have proven to be extremely able diplomats. They have courted Japan, wooing it with offers of the great market lying behind US-imposed trade barriers, while at the same time humiliating India through the use of force. When the West sponsored SEATO, the Chinese used India and Indonesia as foils, and watched with satisfaction as the SEATO bastion was jerry-built of widely separated and small states in the region.

With their own state unified, in part by force, the Chinese are more than willing to encourage and support small national groups to split away from central governments. As in the USSR, the nationality question is of great importance in Asia. By encouraging Balkanization, and centrifugal tendencies within neighboring states, the Chinese help to create weak and divided foes. They can then utilize their superior strength to convert the new states into Chinese feudatories.

In part, Indian foreign policy has attempted to bring together countries which are individually weak but determined to maintain their independence. The success of this policy was based on the character of public international debate on world affairs and on the existence of a mobilized international community willing to support small states in time of trouble. Without inviting Western military support, Indian policies aimed at stabilizing the world in the region from Suez to Malacca. It is for this reason that India was and is anxious that the People's Republic of China be admitted to the United Nations so that its representatives can step into the glare of public debate.

Having recognized the need for unity in the region, however, the Indians were unable to effect it even within the subcontinent. Before the Chinese humiliated India in NEFA, they were able to isolate her from Nepal, Burma and Pakistan. When Ceylon was asked, in the aftermath of the struggle, to support India, it announced a neutralist policy between the two Asian powers. Ghana, one of the torchbearers of neutralism, condemned the British for sending

military aid to India, and the Egyptian endorsement of the Indian position was slow to come. The entire neutralist coalition seemed illusive. Nonetheless, India returned to its old foreign policy and resurrected the doctrine of neutralism even though the Chinese dagger still protruded from its back. In the months following the Indian defeat, the Nehru government sent missions abroad to explain its position, but the damage had been done. India was shown to be a paper tiger, while China stood revealed as an immensely powerful and determined country.

Neutralism, or non-alignment, was, after all, nothing more than a glorified policy of national self-interest based on the notion that a non-committed state can trade with and profit from all belligerents. The infant United States, when it followed this policy, however, did not attempt to build a bloc in world politics based on an ideology of national self-interest. What India discovered to its dismay in 1962 was that very few states in or out of the region thought the Sino-Indian quarrel was related to them in any way.

With most of its newly independent "allies" maintaining their "neutralist" purity, and with a continuing Chinese diplomatic offensive embarrassing and isolating India, the rivalry between the two largest Asian states was given a specifically local focus. It was in South Asia that the confrontation was taking place, and would be won or lost. The international orientation of India continued, but since it was not master of its own home, it could hardly expect to be heeded in far-off lands.

Once more, therefore, political leadership and domestic and regional politics came to the fore as prime factors in India's search for security. Unfortunately, the governments in the region have been unable to reorient their political systems and policies in order to build regional harmony. This stems from the asymmetrical structure of the South Asian state system in which global and regional politics are contradictory.[2]

[2]See, for a general statement, Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, XV (No. 2), January, 1963, pp. 213-235.

Indian foreign policy was developed to avoid conflict with the Superpowers, and to provide an alternate role for India in which its flexibility would be maintained and its friendship worth courting. The Bandung Conference, the Korean prisoners repatriation mission, the Laos Neutrality Commission and the peace-keeping operations in which the Indian army is involved reflect India's initiatives as well as her international acceptance. Probably no capital in the world provides such opportunities for diplomats of the Soviet and Western camps to meet and talk as does New Delhi.

India found it possible to play a key role in alienating the USSR from China, by accepting military equipment from arsenals in Prague as well as Washington. Economic aid has been forthcoming in large quantities from both blocs.

Nonetheless, the Great Powers remain deeply involved in the region for their own reasons. The United States has armed Pakistan and continues to utilize certain facilities in that country as part of its world-wide military posture. The Soviet Union has substantial interests in Afghanistan as well as influence in the Communist party organizations throughout the region.

At present, the interests of India, America and Russia are moving closer together, but that was not always the case in the past and perhaps will not be so again in the future. Foreign policies cannot be erected upon perpetual international friendship and common interest. The initiative lies outside India, and India is therefore vulnerable to changing fortunes in Moscow and Washington, and perhaps as important, in the United Nations. Furthermore, the need to move in harmony with Russo-American developments limits India's diplomatic flexibility toward other states and particularly toward its neighbors.

A further limitation on India's diplomacy is that its internal development is tied to continuing great power patronage which need not necessarily remain a permanent feature of the international scene. India's foreign policy

rests, therefore, on the cornerstone of a dual alliance, and its internal economic development is fed by that dual alliance. Consequently, the pattern of aid allocation, the utilization of resources, internal political development, diplomatic stance and details of foreign policy reflect India's assessment of the Great Power reaction. Moscow, or Washington, exercises something like a veto on Delhi's actions whenever the stakes are high.

The Regional Powers

Ranking in importance with the dual alliance with the superpowers is India's desire for regional hegemony in South Asia. In order to fill its role as uncommitted leader of the Asian states, India has in fact to speak for South Asia. Its bulk, its resources and its military forces dwarf the next largest power, Pakistan. With Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan falling within India's regional interest, its voice would be magnified if a cooperative diplomacy could emerge. It was with this idea in mind that the Colombo Powers notion developed, which added Indonesia but omitted Afghanistan from the "Indian" bloc. The Colombo Powers together with the Australasian Commonwealth would then constitute an important and powerful force for regional security. Unfortunately, the global international system impinged on the Colombo scheme, and Australia and New Zealand shifted their defense orientation to the United States and not the Commonwealth. Later, Australia and Indonesia became entangled in regional disputes.

The plan for a large South Asian bastion safeguarding regional security foundered not only on global impediments but especially on the thorny problems of Indo-Pakistan relations. The half million dead at the time of partition, and the latent anti-Muslim, anti-Pakistan sentiments of a considerable portion of the North Indian voting population, offered a convenient political issue. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh party, almost as a cardinal principle, made Kashmir the prime foreign policy issue in the country. So long as

Kashmir was popularly identified with Pakistan's hostility to India, and vice versa, politicians felt they could not settle the issue without risking serious losses in their constituencies and throughout the country. In any case, there was no reason to settle the affair so long as Pakistan was weak and isolated, and India was secure. Both Burma and Ceylon enjoyed better relations with India than Pakistan, but neither linked their fortunes with those of Delhi. In general, both countries supported India in the United Nations and elsewhere, but the support was freely given, and not the product of Indian power in the region.

The Antagonist Regional Power

The entrance of China into active participation in world affairs has injected a new element into both global and South Asian regional international politics. China has proven itself immune from Soviet strictures and theology, and has not hesitated to act militantly in its own interest. The Communist Parties of Asia are increasingly moving toward an acceptance of Peking's leadership and tactical direction, even as the nationalist governments are supported publicly by the USSR under the banner of anti-colonialism. This reflects the European focus of Russian diplomacy, just as the conflict between the socialist powers reflects the immediate interests of both.

With the end of global bi-polarity, India faces a situation in which it no longer serves an "in-between" function. Instead, its non-alignment is an irritant to Chinese foreign policy, because China has conflicting regional interests with India, and both seek hegemony in their region.

In this environment, China can capitalize on regional disputes just as the USSR did in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East during the 1950's. The cornerstone of the new Chinese posture in South Asia is a regional encirclement of India, and a policy of support and friendship for Pakistan, erstwhile SEATO, CENTO and American ally. To shocked diplomats from the West, Pakistanis blandly reply

that India has had dual alignments with the West and the USSR, and that Pakistan is now simply moving to align itself with China and the West. As India justified her non-alignment in terms of national interest, Pakistan justifies its new foreign policy in terms of national interest. Shortly after the beginning of large-scale American military aid to India, the foreign minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, told the National Assembly of Pakistan that any attack by India would "involve the largest state in Asia." When the US protested a Karachi-Peking air link, Pakistan replied that BOAC had been seeking it for some time, but that the Chinese smiled on their application because of cordial diplomatic relations. When the Pakistan-China border agreement was signed, Pakistan said that surely the United States did not want to see Pakistan at war with China since the US was pledged to come to Pakistan's aid.

These are proper answers from the coquettish foreign ministry, especially since the West considers many of Pakistan's grievances genuine and therefore has not responded by eliminating aid or support. Moreover, there is no reason to think that China will really be fully embraced by Pakistan. A semi-ally is often more useful and less expensive than a fully aligned partner. Once more, the global interests of the Great Powers diverge from the local and regional interest of a particular country, a fact which introduces instability into local affairs. In this particular case it is Pakistan which finds it expedient to conclude a working arrangement with China which weakens India's flanks, but which does protect Pakistan should India seek to use her enhanced military strength to assert hegemony in South Asia.

South Asian history is curiously repetitive. The great theme is the dialectic between unity and fragmentation that has been going on for the last three thousand years or more. The same pattern seems to explain both the passivity of the Indian kingdoms in their external relations, and their wonderfully diverse quality within the subcontinent. Certainly no major geographical area in the world is as socially diverse

as the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. Throughout history, the fragmentation of peoples and kingdoms invited invasion, and the invaders invariably found the Indians bickering, quarreling and so concerned with local affairs that they ignored columns of the invaders until it was too late to stop them. In every case, the invader found local rivals and partisans eager to become junior partners of the imperialist power. So it has been from Aryan times to the British epoch.

The subcontinent has not changed very much in the centuries since the Harappan civilization. The monsoon still arrives to slake the thirst of the desiccated soil, the villagers still toil over the exhausted fields, and men still deeply distrust their fellows. Even two hundred years after the advent of European nationalism and populist democracy, India finds itself many nations, and the Indians retain many gods and loyalties requiring devotion.

The future of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma in the world community is unclear. In many aspects, it seems that history is repeating itself, and that particularity and diversity are valued above unity and homogeneity. So long as the subcontinent's inhabitants are mesmerized by their own differences and hostilities, and are not sensitive to broader currents endangering their very existence, new imperialisms will find the fertile fruit of Hindustan easy plucking, and will even be welcomed by handmaidens shaking the tree.

On the other hand, statesmen in all the countries of the region are trying to reconcile political passions with diplomatic and security needs. The release of Sheikh Abdullah, popular leader of Kashmir, and the new flexibility of India and Pakistan toward new issues is a promising portent. In democracies, or near-democracies where the popular will is heard, local issues tend to obscure larger perspectives. It falls to political leaders to articulate the needs of the countries they serve, and to make the international tension which threatens their existence meaningful. It is a task faced by all governments at all times in all countries, but upon its successful completion depends peace and security in South Asia.

CHAPTER SEVEN

After Nehru, What?

The untimely death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, interrupted the most promising diplomatic negotiations between India and Pakistan in the decade following Liaquat Ali Khan's death. Sheikh Abdullah, playing an unaccustomed role as arbiter, announced the day before Nehru's death that

> The President of Pakistan has said he would be glad to meet Prime Minister Nehru to discuss ways and means of finding a satisfactory solution to this issue.[1]

He told newsmen that this was a "substantial achievement" and that he was returning to India "a happy man." Instead, he flew with the official funeral party of the Pakistan government to mourn an old friend, dead at seventy-four.

The calm with which political India took the loss of the nation's first and only Prime Minister was a mark both of the strength of the Congress party he led, and of the intimations of impending tragedy following his earlier stroke. The Congress party had little difficulty in choosing Lal Bahadur Shastri, adroit conciliator of the party, to lead the government and nation. In addition, after Kamaraj Nadar, the former Chief Minister of the important southern state of Madras, had set forth his plan for the revitalization of the Congress Party, he too found himself in a strong position. With Kamaraj now the Party President and

[1]The text is reprinted in *Pakistan Affairs*, Vol. XVII (June 1, 1964).

Shastri the leader of the government, India stands to benefit from a notable degree of skill on the governmental no less than the party level. Both the populous, Hindi-speaking north (Shastri is from Uttar Pradesh, the "Prussia" of modern India) and the leading southern state have thus come to be represented in the highest councils of the country.

Shastri's cabinet, expanded to fifteen members, follows the Nehru precedent of the balanced political ticket. Of the political giants, only Morarji Desai, conservative finance minister before the Kamaraj Plan, is without a seat in the new government. Once more, leaders of the left (minus Krishna Menon) and the right must struggle within the party and within the cabinet. The coalition that is the Congress party, therefore, has been maintained and seems likely to endure through the fourth general elections in 1967. The predicted succession crisis has not materialized. This is not to say it may not in the future, or that Shastri's control is permanent, but it is to the credit of India's politicians that leadership passed smoothly from one generation to another.

The crucial question is not, therefore, "After Nehru, Who?" but rather, "After Nehru, What?" For, in the months following Nehru's stroke, the stresses in Indian life became much more obvious. Jockeying for position within the government in anticipation of the impending succession was exacerbated, and meanwhile policy decisions were often preempted by senior officials rather than by political leaders. Romesh Thapar, writing in the influential *Economic Weekly* of Bombay, noted that

> in certain areas of decision-making, senior members of the bureaucracy (through apparently innocuous bodies like the 'Negotiating Committee') and individual bureaucrats (as in the Ministry of External Affairs) have begun to wield a dangerous degree of power.[2]

One is struck by the parallel with Pakistan after Liaquat

[2]March 14, 1964.

Ali Khan, in which senior members of the civil service made policy while politicians jockeyed for position.

The absence of the supreme arbiter in the Indian government will tend to weaken the official unity of government policy, and it is likely that intra-governmental policy disputes will become more acute. This is an especially important problem as India rapidly expands its military forces and as economic development requires increasingly complex coordination. As Prime Minister Nehru said after the Chinese encounter of 1962,

> The real thing that's out of joint is our whole mentality, our whole government, the way government is run here.[3]

In the immediate future, India must find a way to support an army of 850,000 men, to modernize an archaic military establishment, to garrison a frontier along the roof of the world, and to restore a sense of security and confidence to the Indian people.

It must evolve a creative diplomacy capable of exerting influence over Burmese foreign policy, and in support of the continued independence and vitality of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. It must find ways and means to spike an evolving Sino-Pakistani *rapprochement*, either by neutralizing its importance or by securing a positive Pakistani commitment to South Asian regional security.

Underlying these massive tasks is the obvious and crucial economic and industrial development of the country without which neither military security nor effective diplomacy is likely to ensue. As early as 1959 the Prime Minister said that he knew that "a strong China is an expansionist China" but that the government of India hoped that "the lapse of time and events will confirm it [India's position] and by the time a challenge comes, we will be in a much stronger position to face it."[4] The tragedy was that India's economic development was not oriented to its security needs,

[3]Quoted in *The New York Times*, November 4, 1962.

[4]Reprinted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 377, from a speech delivered on November 27, 1959.

and in precisely the year of Nehru's speech, the defense budget was reduced by $27 million. While statistics from Communist China are difficult to assess, one expert estimates that military expenditures in 1959 in China were $2.3 billion, or roughly four times those of India.[5]

Nonetheless, China was able to sustain high levels of military expenditure because its economy was growing and already much larger than that of India. The recent sluggishness of Indian economic growth is the cause of grave concern, the more so because China's economic growth continues apace.[6] It seems unlikely that Chinese pressure for leadership in Asia will diminish, or that India will have another several decades of international peace to work out its own problems. Aspirations, problems, pressures and potentials have come together in the present, and it is the responsibility of the present leadership to create public confidence, program momentum and national progress.

Security Policy

In the aftermath of the Chinese war the Indian defense forces came into their own within the government. With the humiliation of military defeat still fresh, and public support for a much larger military establishment, priorities within the government were reversed and the Planning Commission was given a mandate to produce defense supplies and a defense industry. The army was directed to build its strength by almost a quarter, and military expenditures were projected to increase by a factor of 4. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were approached for the latest military equipment, including Mach 2 supersonic aircraft.

This almost complete reversal of policy within a period of twenty-four months carried with it its own dangers as Indians began to conceive of their policy problems as almost entirely military. This emphasis, and the drive toward high

[5]See R. G. Boyd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy*, New York, 1962, p. 18.

[6]An interesting account is by Joan Robinson, "Notes from China," *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay), February 1964, pp. 195-204.

levels of armaments, answered only one of the interrelated needs of Indian foreign policy. Moreover, it produced apprehension on the part of Pakistan on the grounds that Indian diplomacy had not shifted toward an accommodation with Pakistan, but rather toward a more bellicose hostility. At the most inopportune moment religious riots in Eastern India and East Pakistan, ostensibly triggered by the theft of a holy Muslim relic in Kashmir, further embittered relations between the two countries.

The Kashmir dispute was once more brought to the United Nations Security Council by Pakistan following the disturbances in the two countries, and the government of India sent Mahomedali Currim Chagla, Minister for Education and a Muslim, to put forth its arguments. The reopening of old wounds in public, Indian resentment at the support given Pakistan by Britain and the United States, and the fever-pitch tension within India and Pakistan produced the most bitter exchange of recent years.

Pakistan's spokesman, Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto, representing the most militant viewpoint within his own government, considered the appointment of a Muslim Indian to present India's case nothing short of hypocrisy on the part of India. His presentations had nothing of the calm and logic of his predecessor's, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. Mr. Chagla's speeches were equally militant, labeling the Sino-Pakistani agreement a "marriage of convenience between two aggressors."[7]

At perhaps the darkest moment in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, Sheikh Abdullah, the imprisoned leader of Kashmir's nationalists, was released. Apparently at the instance of the future prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the release opened new possibilities in the diplomatic field. In the week-long tour of Kashmir, Abdullah spoke as a Kashmiri nationalist, reopening what for many Indians is the painful prospect of an independent Kashmir.

[7] *Weekly India News*, Vol. III, No. 4 (May 15, 1964).

Traveling to New Delhi to talk with Indian officials, and especially Nehru, the "Lion of Kashmir" seemed much more the responsible arbiter, considering both India and Pakistan as his primary interest. In his Indian travels Sheikh Abdullah canvassed the widest possible spectrum of Indian leadership in an effort to build confidence in his vision of a *détente* with Pakistan. In an India still tense with communal passions, this was a most welcome but difficult task.

Later, in Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah had an opportunity to present his ideas directly to the Pakistani leadership. Because the Pakistani press had been extremely selective in abstracting Abdullah's Kashmiri and Indian speeches, his high-level talks in Pakistan were of special significance since they received nationwide coverage. President Muhammad Ayub Khan sobered the militantly pro-Peking, anti-Indian wing of his government and press, and, on May 26, agreed once more to discuss Kashmir with Prime Minister Nehru. It is important to remember that Ayub Khan was twice rebuffed when he called for similar talks in May and October, 1959, before the Chinese invasion. On the other hand, of course, Pakistan could hardly lose in discussions reopening the Kashmir dispute.

The death of Jawaharlal Nehru spoils the immediate opportunity of the governments to discuss Kashmir, but the central role of Prime Minister Shastri in arranging Abdullah's release suggests that he will move to consolidate the progress made in Abdullah's negotiations.[8] The central question is whether he will have the political strength, within the cabinet, to overcome strident and vocal opposition to any change in the present status of Kashmir. Abdullah and Nehru had such a close relationship, and the imperatives for settlement in the wake of Kashmir disturbances and communal rioting were so immediate, that perhaps some of the pressure for negotiations has passed.

[8] In his first nationwide broadcast since becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri said on June 11, 1964, that "we must reverse the tide" of "unfortunate relations" between India and Pakistan and praised President Ayub Khan's "wisdom and understanding." *The New York Times*, June 12, 1964.

The near future will therefore be crucial, especially since the United States has refused to increase the magnitude of arms aid out of deference to Pakistan's apprehensions.

If India and Pakistan can find ground for a common security policy, the United States and the Western allies will find it possible to meet India's needs for new equipment and massive defense support. If, on the other hand, regional antagonisms continue to push Pakistan toward China, thus weakening relations with the United States, it will be difficult to aid India without weakening India's regional position. It has been truly said that the future lies with the Indians and Pakistanis themselves and with no third party.

Domestic Policy

In both India and Pakistan, there are strong forces working against a settlement. The Indians believe that they are being blackmailed into delivering part of Kashmir to Pakistan in exchange for American military assistance. They suggest that Pakistan is using China as a bargaining counter to force the United States to pursue a less than generous policy toward India. Many Indians do not think that Pakistan would come to the aid of India if China attacked, no matter what understandings may have been formalized. They suggest, therefore, that India turn to the USSR and any other nation in the world which will give India aid "without strings" and that India become a garrison state strong enough to withstand the direct military aggression of China and the blandishments of a pro-Pakistan Western alliance.

This foreign policy position corresponds to the domestic party affiliation of many of its sponsors. The Indian left is concerned with the power of a conservative government receiving large amounts of arms from the West. This, according to many leftists, may unbalance the Indian political community in favor of the right, which could in turn lead to the crushing of the left.

Moreover, the popular anti-Pakistani feeling in most North Indian cities offers a useful campaign plank to use against political opposition. The issue also allows a marriage of convenience between the religious right in India, which opposes Pakistan because it is not Hindu, and the secular left, which opposes the *détente* for very different reasons. Together, these segments of the political community can mount a massive polemical campaign in the streets between elections, and at the polls during voting.

In Pakistan, strangely enough, the very same segments of the political spectrum oppose negotiations with India. The religious right supposes that Hindu India wants nothing more than to absorb Pakistan into "Mother India" while the left seeks closer ties with the People's Republic of China to advance its own domestic cause. Because Pakistan's government has more coercive power at its disposal and seems more willing to use it, the potential disruptive effect of these groups is less than in India, but it should not be minimized.

General opinion in Pakistan, as in India, seems to favor moving outside a Western-imposed or induced settlement in favor of more flexible diplomacy. Pakistan is moving closer to China while maintaining membership in Western alliances because that policy maximizes its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. The more militant segment of Pakistan's vocal public suggests moving out of the Western camp and much closer to China, *à la* Burma, but this policy is as unrealistic as its parallel in India which suggests that India can develop as a great military power without the West.

The central reality is that both states are extremely weak, that both are actually endangered by Chinese intention to establish hegemony over the area, and that the West, especially the United States, is the only source for developmental capital, food grain reserves and massive military assistance. But this assistance cannot be maximized unless the governments in the area accept the common and mutual nature

of the problems that beset them and this implies that they be willing to compromise on their regional differences. This will require political courage on the part of the moderates in both governments.

Economic Policy

The governments of South Asia have every reason to expect help in their economic development. They have proven that they are willing to accept a degree of austerity, financial control and outside "advice" unthinkable anywhere in the developed countries or even in Latin America. Indian economic planning exhibits some of the latest and most sophisticated techniques available to economics, and the Indians and Pakistanis are willing to experiment with untried and foreign ideas, though any British or American businessman would balk at such ideas. Both governments, in short, are willing to satisfy their friends that assistance generously given will be put to the best possible use, and will be generously acknowledged.

The parochial mentality of various Congressmen and Senators notwithstanding, it would take a narrow or a vicious mind to deny assistance to struggling countries maturely and intelligently attempting to develop their economies.

The answer to "After Nehru, What?" or "After Ayub, What?" may very well rest equally on the Indian-Pakistani and American governments. If the nations themselves can solve their quarrels and resolve for a common defense, the West must be willing to provide an arsenal to buttress regional determination. And if India and Pakistan can resolve many of their differences, they will continue to face the mounting pressures for development and a reasonable standard of living. It would be short-sighted to ignore the consequences of the failure of democratic and pluralistic societies in South Asia to meet these aspirations.

The rise of China and the outbreak of war in Asia have only dramatized the great themes of international politics.

The Chinese have demonstrated not Communist orthodoxy but rather the fruits of discipline, hard work and resolve in meeting problems. Militancy has grown with confidence and with a virulent chauvinistic nationalism. The countries of Southern Asia, with or without massive Western help, must also show discipline, courage and resolve in meeting their problems. Within a democratic context, these virtues produce not only development, but a self-sustaining political community encouraging liberty, and with liberty, creativity, and with creativity, a greater civilization.

Part II

Reference

contents

A Brief Chronology of Indo-Pakistan Relations

1947-1962

1947	
July 18	Indian Independence Act receives the Royal Assent and India and Pakistan are recognized as successor states of the British Indian Empire.
August 14/15	India and Pakistan become independent. The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir executes a "Standstill Agreement" with both dominions but it is not accepted by India.
August 18	Pakistan becomes a member of the United Nations. India was the successor state to British India which was a signatory at San Francisco. The boundary commission awards are revealed.
August 19-30	Severe rioting in the Punjab.
August 31	Joint India-Pakistan Punjab Boundary Force dissolved. Each country takes control of its side of the Punjab frontier.
Sept. 13-Oct. 12	Considerable rioting and tenuous law and order in Poonch district of Kashmir. A separatist group emerges.
October 13	Government of Pakistan protests to Government of Jammu and Kashmir over "repression" in Poonch.
October 24	Provisional Azad (free) government of Kashmir established at Palundari, Poonch district. Pathan tribesmen enter Kashmir state in large numbers.

October 26	Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir asks assistance from Government of India against tribal invasion.
October 27	Maharaja accedes to India. Accession accepted by Lord Mountbatten on behalf of Indian government with a pledge to submit the accession to a popular referendum. Indian troops flown to Srinigar, barely avert tribal-Azad force conquest.
October 30	Pakistan government refuses to accept accession of Kashmir to India. Disclaims complicity in tribal invasion.
November 1	Lord Mountbatten meets Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in Lahore.
December 10	Estimates of population exchange between India and Pakistan total over nine million. Half million feared dead.
December 31	India refers Kashmir war to United Nations.

1948

January 15	Security Council hears Kashmir case.
January 30	M. K. Gandhi assassinated in New Delhi.
July 7	U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) arrives in Karachi. War in Kashmir continues.
August 27	State of Emergency declared in Pakistan.
September 11	M. A. Jinnah dies.
September 13	Hyderabad State invaded. Pakistan protests.
December 4	Indian offensive in Kashmir. Pakistan regular army committed partially.

1949	
January 1	Truce arranged by United Nations declared in Kashmir. Observers take posts along cease-fire line.
January 12	Provisional truce line accepted by both parties.
January 22	Admiral Chester W. Nimitz appointed Plebiscite Administrator by United Nations Security Council.
September 20	Pakistan refuses to devalue its currency to parallel sterling and Indian rupee devaluation. Economic disputes between India and Pakistan.
1950	
April 8	Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, agree to negotiate differences, ban "cold war" of words between their governments.
April 12	Sir Owen Dixon appointed UN mediator of Kashmir dispute.
April 26	Prime Minister Nehru arrives in Karachi for conversations.
May 4	Editors of Indian and Pakistani newspapers agree to respect the "No War" Nehru-Liaquat agreement.
August 22	Dixon reports failure of his efforts to mediate Kashmir dispute.
1951	
February 9	Pakistan and the United States sign a Point Four Technical Assistance agreement.
February 25	Pakistan devalues its rupee to accord with the Indian rupee.

March 9	Military conspiracy uncovered in Pakistan. Officers arrested. Rumored military coup d'état would have adopted militant line on Kashmir. Leading Communists in Pakistan also arrested.
April 30	Dr. Frank Graham appointed U.N. Representative to UNCIP.
October 16	Liaquat Ali Khan assassinated.
December 21	Graham admits failure of Indo-Pakistan accord talks.
1952	
January 17	USSR charges United States and Britain seek to make Kashmir a military base against USSR and People's Republic of China.
February 2	U.S. announces aid of $10 million to Pakistan.
1953	
January 3	First announcement in Pakistan regarding accession to Middle East Defense Organization.
April 17	Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, dismissed; Ambassador of Pakistan to United States appointed Prime Minister.
August 17	Governor-General of Pakistan extends term of Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, to January 16, 1959.
November 17	U.S. notifies India that it is strongly considering a military agreement with Pakistan. Indian government strongly protests, noting possible shifts in balance of power in the region and complications to Kashmir settlement.
December 1	USSR protests proposed Pakistan-US accord.

1954	
January 5	Prime Minister Nehru declares that the proposed US-Pakistan defense pact is against the interests of freedom in India and all Asia.
February 26	Surprise conference between Pakistan and Indian Prime Ministers.
March 1	Prime Minister Nehru rejects President Eisenhower's offer of military assistance.
April 24	Prime Minister Nehru offers 6-point plan to solution of the Indo-Chinese border dispute.
May 14	"Delhi Agreement" linking Kashmir fully to India; Pakistan protests.
May 17	Public announcement of US-Pakistan Mutual Security Program Agreement.
June 25	Chou En-lai in Delhi.
September 7	Pakistan joins Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
October 19	Prime Minister Nehru in Peking.
October 24	Pakistan's Parliament dismissed by Governor-General. Political confusion as speaker of Parliament petitions courts for reinstatement.

1955	
January	Visit to India by Tito.
February-April	Court proceedings in Pakistan to reinstate parliamentary government.
April 18	The Bandung Conference in Indonesia, sponsored by India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia.
June 7	Nehru in Moscow.

June 24	India and Pakistan agree to the good offices of the World Bank (IBRD) on the issue of the Indus River waters.
August 26	India and Pakistan ratify a trade agreement.
September 23	Pakistan accedes to the Baghdad Pact.
November 3	Ad hoc agreement between India and Pakistan over water use.
November 18	Khrushchev and Bulganin visit India.
December 10	Khrushchev endorses Indian control over Kashmir.
December 13	Panch Shila endorsed by India and the USSR.

1956

February 26	Indian and Pakistani troops clash in Kutch.
February 29	Reinstated Parliament in Pakistan approves Constitution.
March 10	Government of India protests against SEATO discussion of Kashmir.
May 6	Ministerial level conference in Dacca, East Pakistan, concerning refugees.
July 5	Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers confer in London.
July 24	Revision of Indo-Nepalese trade treaty.
September 26	Indian and Pakistani agreement to divide the waters of the Indus River system.
November 28	Chou En-lai in Delhi.
December 16	Prime Minister Nehru in Washington.

1957

January 24	Marshal Zhukov in India.
January 29	Chou En-lai in Nepal.
April 5	Following second general Indian elections, Communist Party of India Ministry takes control of Kerala state.
June 13	Nepal asks for separate foreign exchange account ending former joint Nepalese-Indian arrangement.
June 29	India turns over 72 mile long road linking India and Kathmandu, Nepal, to Nepalese government.
November	U.N. Security Council debate on Kashmir. V. K. Krishna Menon says changed conditions void need for plebiscite; USSR announces veto should Dr. Graham be sent to Kashmir as representative of U.N.
December	Prime Minister Nehru in Sikkim.

1958

January 16	U.S. Army Chief of Staff in India.
January 23	Communist China armed forces delegation arrives in Delhi.
June 2	India signs air agreement with Soviet state airline.
June 13	India and Pakistan close respective consulates in Bombay and Lahore.
September 9	Pakistan Prime Minister in Delhi.
October 7	Military coup d'état in Pakistan; Constitution abrogated. General Mohammad Ayub Khan named Martial Law Administrator.
November	Gunfire in Assam on the Syllhet frontier of East Pakistan.

December 5	Cease-fire in Syllhet.
December 22	Nkrumah in Delhi.

1959

January 15	India and Pakistan exchange territory on Bengal frontier in implementing border award.
April 3	Prime Minister Nehru makes public statement on the asylum granted the Dalai Lama of Tibet.
April 10	Indian Air Force reconnaissance plane shot down over Pakistan.
May 14	Indian economic mission sent to Moscow.
July 8	Agreement signed with British Hawker-Siddeley aviation company to build AVRO 748 transport plane in India.
July 31	President of India takes over rule in Kerala state following wide-spread disorders against Communist ministry.
August 6	Prime Minister Nehru makes major public policy speech on Tibet.
August 28	Prime Minister Nehru reports broad violations of Indian territory in North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh by China; reaffirms Indian protection of Bhutan and Sikkim.
September 1	Prime Minister Nehru and General Ayub Khan meet.
September 2	Prime Minister Nehru makes parliamentary statement on the resignation, later withdrawn, of General Thimayya over the "colonels' case" controversy.
November 14	Communist Party of India endorses India's frontiers with China.
December 9	President Eisenhower in India.

1960

February 17	Khrushchev in India.
March 4	Pakistan Army Commander Mohammad Musa in Delhi for talks.
April 19	Chou En-lai in India.
September 19	Indus River Treaty providing for wide-scale diversion and balancing of Indus waters signed by Ayub Khan, Nehru and Iliff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
December 3	General P. N. Thapar replaces General Thimayya as Chief of Staff of the Indian army.

1961

March 4	INS Vikrant, India's first aircraft carrier, commissioned in Belfast.
March 14	Indian troops leave for the Congo operation.
June 24	HF-24, Indian designed supersonic fighter, makes maiden flight; experiences difficulties in exceeding speed of sound.
December 15	L. I. Brezhnev, President of the USSR, arrives in India.
December 17	Indian troops invade Portuguese enclaves of Goa and Daman.

Chronology of the Sino-Indian Confrontation

The listing of publicly reported incidents, confrontations and military clashes between Indian and Chinese police, officials and military personnel spans the period between the signing of the Tibetan agreement in 1954 and the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. From it one can infer the prolonged history and steady escalation of the Sino-Indian dispute.

DATE	INCIDENT
June 1955	Bara Hoti
September 1955	Damzan
April 1956	Nelang
September 1956	Shipki La
October 1957	Walong
June 1958	Khurnak Fort
Sept.-Oct. 1958	Aksai Chin region
September 1958	Lohit Frontier Area
October 1958	Sangcha Malla and Lapthal
July 1959	West Pangong Lake
August 1959	Khinzemane and Longju
October 1959	Kongka La
June 1960	Taktsang Gompa
September 1960	Jelep La
October 1960	Hot Springs
May 1961	Chusul
July 1961	Chemokarpola
August 1961	Nyagzu and Dambu Guru
September 1961	Unpopulated area 78°12′ E, 35°19′ N
January 1962	Roi Village and Chip Chap
April 1962	Sumdo
May 1962	Spanggur
June 1962	Various roads across Indian-claimed territory
July 1962	Galwan Valley and Chip Chap, Chang Chenmo and Pangong
September 1962	Thagla and Dhola
October 1962	The Invasion

Source: *Indian Affairs Record*, November, 1962, VIII (2), pp. 291-2

A Chronology of the Month of War

October 20, 1962	A large Chinese force, estimated at 30,000 men, launched an attack in NEFA,* captured Khinzemane and Dhola. Simultaneous attack in Ladakh aimed at posts in Chip Chap Valley. Two Indian posts fall.
October 21	Intensified campaign in Ladakh. More posts fall.
October 22	In NEFA, Lohit division under attack. In Ladakh, seven posts fall and Tsang Dhar is captured.
October 23	General Chinese advance in NEFA. Chinese near important town of Tawang.
October 24	Chinese government offers cease fire on both frontiers if certain conditions are met. Offers immediate possibility of negotiation, and truce at present lines of control. Continued advance of Chinese army in NEFA and Ladakh.
October 25	*Pravda* commends Chinese peace offer. Calls McMahon Line (NEFA frontier) an imperialist line to the disadvantage of both China and India. Chinese army captures Tawang and Indian army pulls back from some posts in Galwan Valley, Ladakh.
October 26	In heavy fighting, a general retreat of Indian forces from Jang and Walong in NEFA. President Radhakrishnan proclaims State of Emergency in India under article 352 of the Constitution. On the same day the Defence of India Ordnance, 1962 is promulgated. Ambassador Galbraith affirms United States support of McMahon Line.
October 27	Indian defense holds in Damchok and Jara La in Ladakh.
October 28	Damchok and Jara La lost to Chinese army.
October 29	2,000-2,500 Indian casualties reported.

*North East Frontier Agency

October 30	British announce support for India. Agree to send aid and support frontiers and to recognize Indian frontier claims.
October 31	Prime Minister Nehru assumes portfolio of defence. V. K. Krishna Menon remains in cabinet, despite widespread criticism.
November 1-14	General quiet on the front. Turmoil in domestic Indian politics.
November 4	V. K. Krishna Menon made Minister for Defence Supply.
November 7	V. K. Krishna Menon resigns from cabinet.
November 8	Prime Minister Nehru reaffirms non-alignment as the basis of Indian foreign policy, but admits it complicates India's posture. Its essence is defined as the avoidance of permanent military alliances. Y. B. Chavan, Chief Minister of Maharashtra, appointed Defence Minister.
November 14	Indian army moves to reoccupy areas in Walong, NEFA.
November 15	Massive Chinese offensive in Walong.
November 16	Walong falls, Chinese announce capture of 927 Indians, including a Brigadier.
November 17	Chusul in Ladakh under attack.
November 18	Continued pressure on Chusul. In NEFA, Chinese capture Se La Pass, cut Indian retreat to Bomdi La.
November 19	Bomdi La in Chinese hands.
November 20	Lt. Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri, Indian C.-in-C. of the Southern Command, made chief of the Army staff.
November 21	Unilateral cease-fire announced by the Chinese.
November 22-23	Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys arrive to survey military and political situation; attempt to bring India and Pakistan closer together in face of threat.

Source: *Indian Affairs Record*, November 1962, VIII (2), p. 292-4

Basic Demographic and Economic Data on India and Pakistan

Basic Demographic and Economic Data — India

Source: *Census Paper No. 1*, Census of India, 1961, New Delhi, 1962

Unit	Square Miles	Population (1961)	Literacy %	No. of Literates	Urban %
India	1,178,945	439,235,082	24	105,333,281	17.97

Key Indices of Indian Development
Student Population, 1949-1959

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1959*, New Delhi, 1960

Year	Total in millions	Primary in millions	Secondary in millions	B.S. and B.A. in thousands
1949/50	23	17.8	4.3	85
1950/51	25	18.6	4.9	86.6
1951/52	26	19.2	5.3	99.4
1952/53	28	19.8	5.6	108.6
1953/54	29	21.2	5.9	121.5
1954/55	31	22.6	6.3	133.8
1955/56	33	22.9	8.5	150.9
1956/57	35	23.9	9.6	168.6
1957/58	38	24.7	10.6	188.9
1958/59	(tent.)	24.1	14.0	N.A.

National Income by Origin at Current Prices in 100 Crores of Rupees

Source: *Statistical Abstract of India, 1959*, New Delhi, 1960

Year	Agriculture	Mining, Mfg. and Enterprise	Commerce, Communications Transport
1949/50	44.9	15.0	16.6
1950/51	48.9	15.3	16.9
1951/52	50.2	16.8	17.9
1952/53	48.1	17.0	17.8
1953/54	53.1	17.7	18.0
1954/55	43.5	18.0	18.1
1955/56	45.2	18.5	18.8
1956/57	55.2	20.0	19.6
1957/58	52.9	21.2	20.7
1958/59	61.9	21.4	21.1

Year	Services	Total N.I.	Per Capita Income Current	Constant
1949/50	13.8	90.1	251	251
1950/51	14.4	95.3	268	248
1951/52	15:0	99.7	275	250
1952/53	15.4	98.2	265	254
1953/54	16.0	104.8	280	268
1954/55	16.5	96.1	255	270
1955/56	17.3	99.8	260	270
1956/57	18.2	113.1	290	280
1957/58	19.3	114.0	285	275
1958/59	20.4	124.7	310	290

Basic Demographic and Economic Data — Pakistan

Source: Government of Pakistan, *Statistical Pocketbook of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1962

Region	Square miles	Population (1960)	Literacy %	No. of Literates	Urban %
Pakistan	365,504	93,691,000	15.3	14,382,700	10.4
East Pakistan	55,126	50,840,000	17.6	8,936,000	4.4
West Pakistan	310,378	42,850,000	11.7	4,772,600	17.1

Key Indices of Pakistani Development
Student Population

PRIMARY

Year	Total	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1950	3,057,000	2,293,000	764,000
1958	4,470,000	2,985,000	1,485,000
1959	4,614,000	3,066,000	1,548,000

SECONDARY

Year	Total	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1950	1,113,000	515,000	598,000
1958	1,348,000	495,000	853,000
1959	1,401,000	489,000	912,000

National Income by Sector

in million rupees (Rs. 1 = $0.21)
in constant prices (base = 1950-53)

Year	Agriculture	Mining	Mfg.	Govt.	Banking
1950/51	10,824	26	1,279	858	51
1954/55	11,630	39	1,935	1,049	71
1959/60	12,324	57	2,783	1,362	129
1960/61	12,551	66	3,010	1,342	145

Year	Transport	Services	Rental	Trade	Total N.I.
1950/51	504	1,543	1,036	1,669	18,324
1954/55	538	1,668	1,108	1,872	19,858
1959/60	665	1,841	1,222	2,119	21,693
1960/61	688	1,878	1,247	2,149	22,606

Foreign Economic Aid to Pakistan

(in millions of rupees)

Year	United States	With All Other Sources	Year	United States	With All Other Sources
1950/51	nil	.4	1955/56	316.1	371.7
1951/52	nil	2.1	1956/57	623.0	706.1
1952/53	33	75.0	1957/58	1,069.8	1,194.4
1953/54	85.6	138.3	1958/59	583.0	656.7
1954/55	58.0	100.6	1959/60	943.5	988.7

Source: *Statistical Pocketbook of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1962

National Policy Organization: India, Pakistan and China

National Policy Organization — The Republic of India



National Policy Organization — Islamic Republic of Pakistan

(under the Constitution of 1962)

National Assembly

(156 members, chosen equally from East & West Pakistan, and including 6 women)

Separation of Powers

President

Head of state and Head of Government. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Cabinet

Ministries of External Affairs and Defense

Chosen by, and responsible solely to the President

Military Services

The system of election is indirect, with an electoral college of 80,000 "Basic Democrats" elected on the basis of adult franchise electing in turn both the members of the national assembly and the President for concurrent, five year terms.

National Policy Organization — People's Republic of China



National Policy Machinery in Communist China; Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, (86th Congress, 1st session) Committee print, Washington, GPO, 1959, p. 15

The Sub-continent of South Asia; Political



Map, Major Railway Net With Army Corps Command British India, 1939

Source: C. Collins Davies, *An Historical Atlas* op. cit., pg. 94, with modifications by author

The Partition of Bengal, 1947

From: Government of India,
After Partition, New Delhi, 1948



The Partition of Punjab, 1947



From: Government of India, *After Partition*, New Delhi, 1948

The Frontiers of Kashmir According to the Government of India, showing Pakistani and Chinese de facto Control

Source: *Indian and Foreign Review*, I (6), January, 1964, p. 17

Map Showing Disputed Areas As Seen From The Chinese Viewpoint

Source: *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, Peking, 1962 (enlarged edition)






1. THE WESTERN AND MIDDLE SECTORS
Karakoram Pass
SINKIANG
Sinkiang
AKSAI CHIN
Kongka Pass
Tibet
THE WESTERN SECTOR
Leh
Pangong Lake
Spanggur Lake
Rudok Dzong
CHINA
LADAKH
TIBET
Parigas
Road
Chuva
Chuje
Shipki Pass
Gartok
THE MIDDLE SECTOR
Puling-Sumdo
Sang
Tsungsha
Sangcha
Lapthal
INDIA
Pulan Dzong
NEPAL

Military Security and Defense Data: India, Pakistan and South Asia.

The information in the following section is derived from public documents. No effort has been made to remove some obvious inconsistencies. In any case, it should be noted that this data is primarily useful in suggesting levels of magnitude in military expenditures and that it does not furnish any meaningful guide to actual military force levels.

The Division of the British Indian Armed Forces, 1947-48

Branch and Unit Type	India	Pakistan
ARMY		
Infantry Regiments	15	8
Armored Corps	12	6
Artillery Regiments	18½	8½
Engineering Units	61	34
Signal Corps & Supply Units (RIASC)	Distribution of the existing layout on a territorial basis	
Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Units	10	4
Indian Pioneer Corps	Group HQ and 9 coys	2 coys
RIAS Transport Units	34	17
Ambulance Platoons	15	7
Indian Army Medical Corps (Hospitals)	82	34
Military Farms	29	20

Source: *After Partition*, Government of India, Delhi, 1948, p. 96

Branch and Unit Type	India	Pakistan
NAVY		
Sloops	4	2
Frigates	2	2
Fleet Mine-Sweepers	12	4
Corvettes	1	—
Survey Ships	1	—
Trawlers	4	2
Motor Mine-Sweepers	4	2
Motor Launch	1	—
Harbor Defense Motor Launch	4	4
Landing Craft	All	—
AIR FORCE		
Fighter Squadrons	7	2
Transport Squadrons	1	1

Gurkha Regiments

Of the ten regiments of Gurkha troops in the British Indian army, six regiments were transferred to the Indian army and four regiments joined the British army. In the agreement signed between Britain, India and Nepal in November, 1947, these strengths were authorized.

Division of Stores and Ordnance Factories

No agreement could be reached on the division of stores and ordnance factories between the two Governments. At one time it was decided to refer the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal. But ultimately a compromise was effected between the two Governments which provided

(1) That "Pakistan's share of the military stores will be one-third of the stocks held in India and Pakistan on the date of partition or one-third of the maintenance and reserve requirements of the two Dominions calculated on an agreed basis, whichever is less. The balance, if any, will fall to India's share."

(2) That "no physical division of the ordnance factories will take place, the Indian Dominion taking full liability for their book value." India agreed to make available to Pakistan a sum of Rs. 6 crores to be drawn as and when required by way of assistance towards setting up of ordnance factories and a few other essential installations such as a Security Printing Press. There were, at this time, 16 ordnance factories, all of which India retained under this agreement.

The Officer Corps of the Indian Army
August 15, 1947, to April 1, 1948

Service and Rank	Number Before August 15, 1947	Number on August 15, 1948	Number on January 1, 1948	Estimated Number on April 1, 1948
European Officers	10,000	1,200	Slightly more than 300	300
Army				
(Indian Officers) Battalion and Regimental Commanders		less than 10%	95%	All Commanders in Lt. Col. level
Brigade and Sub-area Commanders		5%	100% Brigade 70% Sub-area	
Divisional and Area Commanders		Nil	All Area and Divisional Commanders except 2	
Brigadiers (Artillery and Signal Corps)		Nil	60%	80%
Major-Generals		12½%	62½%	62½%
G.O.C.-in-Cs.		Nil	All Indians (by the middle of January 1948)	
Commander-in-Chief				Indian C. in C.
Royal Indian Navy				
(Indian Officers) Commissioned and Warrant Officers		76.5%		91.4% Commissioned 61.4% Warrant Ship Commanders 100% Indian Officers Commanders of Shore Establishments 100% Naval HQ Staff 88%
Royal Indian Air Force				
Commissioned Officers	Mixed with RAF British Officers 100 Airmen 500			All Indian Officers except 6 RAF (Br.) Officers and 7 more to be taken on loan.

Source: Government of India, *After Partition*, Delhi, 1948, p. 102

Military Force Levels in South Asia (1955), Estimated

Ceylon	India	Nepal	Pakistan
ARMY			
3,000-5,000 organized as one independent infantry brigade.	300,000-500,000 including 1-2 armored divisions, 5-10 infantry divisions. Reserve and territorial forces also exist.	15,000-30,000 mainly static infantry battalions. Poor organization and equipment. There is an Indian military Mission in Nepal.	200,000-400,000 including 5-10 infantry divisions, 1-2 armored divisions.
NAVY			
Token	2 cruisers, 15-20 destroyers and frigates. 40-50 minor craft, Dockyard at Bombay. 1-3 squadrons of flying boats.	Nil	Above 5-10 destroyers, 1 cruiser, 20-30 minor craft. Dockyard at Karachi.
AIR FORCE			
Token	15-20 jet fighter squadrons. Under 10 bomber-maritime reconnaissance sq. Under 5 transport sq. A substantial reserve of pilots and transport aircraft available from India's civil aviation. Aircraft overhaul and assembly at Bangalore.	Nil	10-15 jet fighter squadrons, 2-3 bomber-reconnaissance sq. 3-5 transport sq.
REMARKS			
	India's armed forces have the highest record for valour and ability in two wars. Some defense production installations were constructed by the British such as the cordite factory in S. India. India's industrialization is leading India to military self-sufficiency.	Nepal permits its subjects (Gurkhas) to be recruited to British and Indian Gurkha Regiments.	Formerly part of the Indian armed forces, Pakistan's services have excellent traditions and war record. A large part of her army consists of irregulars raised for the Kashmir campaign. There is a US military mission in Karachi. Some defense industries exist.

Source: Indian Council on World Affairs, *Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area*, New York, 1958, Appendix II

Year	Population (millions)	Size of Armed Forces	% of Pop. in A.F.	GNP in US $ (000)	Defense Budget (000) $	% of GNP	Defense ex per Capita $
BURMA							
1955	19.7	no data	—	1,028,000	69,550	6.76	3.53
1956	19.9	33,000	.165	1,096,000	73,980	6.75	3.71
1957	20.1	no data	—	1,132,000	77,110	6.81	3.83
1958	20.3	112,000	.551	1,120,000	85,180	7.60	4.19
1959	20.5	113,000	.551	1,155,000	84,280	7.29	4.11
1960	20.7	no data	—	1,254,000	90,510	7.21	4.37
1961	22.7	80,000	.352	1,304,000	84,780	6.50	3.73
1962	23.2	100,000	.431	1,356,000	83,360	6.14	3.59
1963	23.7	no data	—	1,411,000	96,990	6.87	4.09
CEYLON							
1955	8.72	———	—	1,161,000	—	—	—
1956	8.93	———	—	1,068,000	6,370	.59	.71
1957	9.17	———	—	1,120,000	8,360	.74	.91
1958	9.39	———	—	1,181,000	13,440	1.13	1.43
1959	9.63	———	—	1,259,000	15,180	1.20	1.57
1960	9.90	———	—	1,323,000	14,760	1.11	1.49
1961	10.20	———	—	1,363,000	15,510	1.13	1.53
1962	10.40	———	—	1,404,000	16,060	1.14	1.54
1963	10.70	———	—	1,446,000	14,360	.99	1.39

Year	Population (millions)	Size of Armed Forces	% of Pop. in A.F.	GNP in US $ (000)	Defense Budget (000) $	% of GNP	Defense ex per Capita $
INDIA							
1955	390	———	—	22,160,000	414,200	1.86	1.06
1956	398	400,000	.1	24,623,000	401,700	1.63	1.00
1956	398	400,000	.1	24,623,000	523,900	2.12	1.31
1957	406	430,000	.105	25,683,000	454,000	1.76	1.11
1957	406	430,000	.105	25,683,000	582,800	2.26	1.43
1958	414	430,000	.103	27,788,000	656,000	2.36	1.58
1958	414	430,000	.103	27,788,000	492,000	1.77	1.18
1959	423	430,000	.101	28,959,000	630,000	2.17	1.48
1959	423	430,000	.101	28,959,000	583,700	2.01	1.37
1960	433	550,000	.127	29,938,000	558,600	1.86	1.29
1961	443	530,000	.119	31,435,000	587,900	1.87	1.32
1962	453	560,000	.123	33,007,000	686,200	2.07	1.51
1963	462	584,000	.126	34,657,000	786,600	2.26	1.70
1964	471	no data	no data	36,390,000	1,820,000	5.00	3.86
PAKISTAN							
1955	83.3	no data	—	5,611,000	171,500	3.05	2.05
1956	85.1	no data	—	5,960,000	163,800	2.74	1.92
1956	85.1	no data	—	5,960,000	230,000	3.85	2.70
1957	86.9	no data	—	6,001,000	145,400	2.42	1.67
1958	88.8	223,000	.251	6,036,000	207,900	3.44	2.34
1958	88.8	223,000	.251	6,036,000	273,000	4.52	3.07
1959	90.7	223,000	.245	6,297,000	200,500	3.18	2.21
1959	90.7	223,000	.245	6,297,000	223,000	3.54	2.45
1960	92.6	223,000	.240	6,449,000	208,100	3.22	2.24
1961	94.5	143,000	.151	6,707,000	202,200	3.01	2.13
1962	96.6	252,700	.261	6,975,000	206,400	2.95	2.13
1962	96.6	252,700	.261	6,975,000	210,000	3.01	2.17
1963	98.6	252,700	.256	7,254,000	240,000	3.30	2.43

(Source: H. Roberts Coward, "Military Technology in Developing Areas: Supplement to Interim Progress Report of the Arms Control Project", Center for International Studies, Cambridge, Mass., December 31, 1963)

Military Expenditures, India, 1950-1964

Defense expenditures per year from revenue in Rs. crores

Year	Total	Army	Air Force	Navy	Services
1950/51	168.32	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1951/52	197.39	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1952/53	192.38	153.29	15.62	8.65	14.81
1953/54	198.05	144.19	28.58	10.39	14.87
1954/55	201.34	145.48	29.58	10.05	15.22
1955/56	188.37	131.89	30.05	12.09	14.40
1956/57	211.83	146.70	38.58	12.44	14.11
1957/58	274.02	172.98	77.75	14.13	14.17
1958/59	279	146	75	16	14
1959/60	266	142	59	14	15
1960/61	311	175	59	18	15
1961/62	344	184	61	19	18
1962/63	500	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1963/64	814	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

Year	Total Expenditures including Capital (US $ millions)*	% of Budget
1950/51	N.A.	N.A.
1951/52	342.0	22.1
1952/53	359.0	21.9
1953/54	372.6	21.5
1954/55	373.3	20.4
1955/56	344.5	16.0
1956/57	405.9	17.2
1957/58	505.4	18.6
1958/59	556.3	18.6
1959/60	N.A.	N.A.
1960/61	N.A.	N.A.
1961/62	N.A.	N.A.
1962/63	N.A.	N.A.
1963/64	N.A.	N.A.

Sources:
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*These are Goodall's figures and estimates.

Military Expenditures, Pakistan, 1947-1962

(in millions of Rs.) from revenue as against total budget

Year	Defense Expenditures	Total Expenditures	Capital Expenditures for Defense
1947/48	153.8	236.0	.3
1948/49	461.5	647.0	116.1
1949/50	625.4	856.0	126.8
1950/51	649.9	1,266.2	53.1
1951/52	779.1	1,442.3	122.8
1952/53	783.4	1,320.1	211.2
1953/54	653.1	1,108.7	149.2
1954/55	635.1	1,172.6	78.3
1955/56	917.7	1,433.4	103.4
1956/57	737.9	1,294.1	82.1
1957/58	810.4	1,495.2	77.5
1958/59	1,074.0	2,067.7	29.8
1959/60	959.8	1,626.6	33.8
1960/61	981.5	1,698.6	26.1

Sources: *Pakistan, 1961-62*

(in $10 thousands)

Year	Revenue	Capital	Total	Defense	% of Total
1960/61	413.7	378.0	791.7	212.1	27
1961/62	468.3	403.2	871.5	218.4	25
1962/63	441.0	556.5	997.5	220.5	22
1963/64	470.4	785.4	1,225.8	239.4	19

Source: August, 1963, Vol. II, (3) of Interim Report Series, Embassy of Pakistan

*Foreign Aid — India**

USA	18,549.6
USSR	3,849.3
UK	1,835.2
Canada	1,182.6
Australia	143.1
New Zealand	34.5
West Germany	2,016.7
Japan	657.1
Czechoslovakia	231.0
Switzerland	109.0
Italy	214.3
Yugoslavia	190.5
Norway	31.9
Poland	143.0
International Bank (IBRD)	3,734.8
UN Special Fund	44.3
UN Expanded Technical Assistance	18.6
Ford Foundation	217.6
IDA	421.4
total	**33,662.5**

*Total amounts, in millions of rupees, to 1962; one rupee equals US .21 or 1 shilling, 6d.

Source: V.K.R.V. Rao and Dharm Narain, *Foreign Aid and India's Economic Development* (study 4 of the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi), Asia Publishing House, New York, 1963.

Indian Election Results, 1952, 1957 and 1962
Lok Sabha (Lower House) of Parliament

Party	Seats in Lok Sabha 1952	1957	1962
Congress	364	371	353
Communist Party of India (CPI)	16	27	29
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)	—	19	12
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party	9	—	—
Socialist Party	12	—	—
Bharatiya Jana Sangh	3	4	14
Swatantra Party	—	—	18
Others and independents	85	73	59

Party	Popular Vote for Lok Sabha 1952	1957	1962
Congress	47,665,875	57,579,593	51,247,168
Communist Party of India (CPI)	3,484,401	10,754,075	11,377,765
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)	——	12,542,666	7,819,088
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party	6,156,558	——	——
Socialist Party	11,216,779	——	——
Bharatiya Jana Sangh	3,246,288	7,149,824	7,265,514
Swatantra Party	——	——	7,337,017
Others and independents	34,174,594	32,487,754	28,674,167

Source: Myron Weiner, "India's Third General Election," *Asian Survey*, May, 1963, pp. 14-15.

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