

*K. Satchidananda Murty*

**Indian  
Foreign  
POLICY**

*Scientific Book Agency*

IN this book an attempt is made to analyse and appraise Indian foreign policy. Part I of this book starts with a brief discussion of classical Indian theories, passes on to a consideration of Gandhism and ends up with an analytical exposition of independent India's foreign policy. For this last purpose it relies heavily on the writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, who is not only a great statesman, but as Sir Alec Douglas-Home said, "a philosopher with great distinction of mind." In Part II are discussed three specific issues—Goa, Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan relations. Part III carries further the general discussion, reaches certain conclusions and ventures to make a few concrete suggestions "for improving the fundamental instrumentalities of foreign policy". An Annexe containing the following four sections throws more light on some of the points discussed in the text: 1. The Sastras, Asoka and Gandhi, 2. Ethics and Politics, 3. The Blocs and Peaceful Coexistence, 4. Russia, India and China.

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# ***INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY***

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# INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

*Professor of Philosophy*

Andhra University, Waltair

*With a Foreword by*

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

Yale University

AND

*An Introduction by*

QUINCY WRIGHT

University of Virginia

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# FOREWORD

*By*

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

*Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University*

Professor Murty's timely volume comes at a period of tragic yet necessary transition from the era of Nehru. The eyes of the world are once more on India where the soundness of the fabric of the Indian state is receiving crucial tests in internal and foreign affairs. It is a commonplace of political science that the fundamental predispositions of a body politic are brought into the open during periods of change in active leadership. The shared expectations, demands, and identities of the nation must provide a common map of stable conduct.

I interpret Professor Murty's book as evidence of the emerging policy sciences of India and hence of the entire world community. These essays clarify the value goals of national policy, distinguishing long range from currently pressing objectives. Policy alternatives are weighed on the scales of presently available knowledge of history and behavior, and of critical estimates of the probable shape of things to come. A problem oriented approach of this kind is too mature for fanaticism, too empirical for undisciplined fantasy, too responsible for self-indulgent passivity or despair.

In some ways the most striking contribution of these essays is to locate the challenges of today in the perspective of the enduring conflicts of Indian tradition. It is an important moment in the intellectual life of any society when the members of successive generations are able to perceive themselves as contributing to the resolution of traditional disharmonies in their civilization. Disharmonies exist in every tradition, no matter how diminutive or inclusive the group involved. When these discrepancies are fully understood a basic generalization is confirmed : local conflicts are also universal conflicts.

Consider the contradiction in Indian tradition between the Kautilyan doctrine that states ought to be power states, never satisfied with their territorial or other assets, and the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism that "discouraged Machiavellian politics and deglamourized war". Or the contradiction between the doctrine that the proper domain of politics is the continent of India, and the Buddhist dream of a universal polity of peace and benevolence. Parallel conflicts are found in every civilization. After all, the range of goals and strategies for the human social process is narrow, and while small folk societies may fail to perceive some major alternatives, the great urban based civilizations of India, China, Egypt and elsewhere have enough experience and ingenuity to recognize all possibilities. Everywhere it is apparent that bodies politic may seek isolation from others, or aim at being included in a universal common-



wealth ; they may rely on coercion or persuasion as preferred strategies of political action ; they may seek to magnify the dignity of all individuals, or aim at holding most human beings in permanent subordination.

The larger significance of perceiving the conflicts within one's own tradition is that one is thereby equipped to comprehend the enduring conflicts of human society. The experience gained through insight into the national self, and the discipline achieved by active commitment to policies of conflict resolution, are transferrable to the problems of world politics.

In the course of its brief history of independence India has made a mark on world thinking by what may be called the strategy of selective and plural rather than permanent bloc alignment. Professor Murty analyzes the policy of non-alignment in revealing detail. It is impossible to read his discussion without regretting the semantic necessities that gave to the program a purely negative label. Non-alignment, Murty explains, is not indifference. It is not neutralism. It is not immoral. Murty argues strongly that the Chinese crisis is a vindication of non-alignment.

Permeating this analysis of world politics is a distinction, partly explicit and partly latent, between values and institutions. Economists have found it necessary to distinguish between the general theory of wealth shaping and sharing, and the varied network of institutions that in concrete circumstances are specialized to production,

distribution, investment or consumption. Political scientists, similarly, distinguish the general theory of power shaping and sharing, and the network of institutions specialized to decision in the arenas of national and transnational affairs. By distinguishing between values and institutions it is possible to appraise the degree to which institutions conform to, or facilitate, a postulated set of value goals; or on the contrary, deviate from these goals, or impeded their realization. Murty suggests that all states are in varying degree peace loving or aggressive; and he might carry such comparisons much further. The crucial point is that when we examine national or transnational politics we apply the same value criteria to all institutional acts and traits, and adapt our policies to the task of strengthening the factors of understanding, conviction, loyalty and material capacity which may resolve the conflict in value optimalizing ways.

Aside from the author's explicit proposals on such pressing topical questions as non-alignment and Kashmir, the essays contain important suggestions for improving the fundamental instrumentalities of foreign policy. The "Suggestions for Reorientation" are the proposals of a scholar who truly lives in his epoch, and sees India with an impressive blend of vision and commitment.

Law School  
Yale University  
July 15, 1964

## INTRODUCTION

*By*

QUINCY WRIGHT

*Professor of International Law, University of Virginia*

### 1

It is less characteristic of Indian than of Western philosophy to assume that universal ideas or principles can be discovered by which all observations can be explained, all contingencies foreseen, all inconsistencies reconciled, and all problems solved. Indian philosophy, less affected by the Platonic insistence on the reality of universal ideas, has been more inclined to believe that inconsistency, conflict, and change are the essence of things. The universe may not be a logical construction, consequently Dr. Murty may be justified in "presuming that truth is multiple and that several different ways of the good life are possible both in politics and in social organization". (p. 41).

Such ideas have, of course, been held by some Western philosophers and scientists such as Heraclitus and Democritus, but in the West, at least until the rise of modern pragmatism and relativism, belief in absolute truths has dominated, especially in the fields of theology and political ideology and, as pointed out by F. S. C. Northrop, in his comparison of East and West, this belief has been an

important cause of wars, both hot and cold, in the West but less so in the East until the recent importation of Marxism, a typical Western absolutistic belief, to China, Korea and Viet Nam.

Because of their skepticism about universal and eternal truths, Indian philosophers may have an advantage in explaining and guiding international relations, a field characterised by inconsistent ideologies, intergroup conflict, and rapidly shifting relationships. Both Western and Eastern students will, therefore, read with interest this analysis of contemporary international relations by an Indian philosopher, acquainted with both ancient and modern writing in the field. They will be stimulated by his conclusion that :

“A policy which refuses to take any ideology or way of life as final, perfect and worthy of being imposed on the whole world, which maintains that all conflicts are in principle capable of being solved through mutually tolerant intercourse of minds, and which believes that peaceful coexistence is possible on the basis of mutual respect and co-operation without any insistence on conversion to what is considered to be *the* truth and *the* right way of living, is very much needed today and for a long time to come”. (Preface).

Dr. Murty points out that in all civilizations there have been both “realists” (Kautilya and Machiavelli) who generalize on the basis of past experience, and “idealists” (Asoka and Erasmus) who generalize on the basis of human needs and future potentialities. There have been advocates both of national interests and of human

interests, both of expediency and of principle as the proper bases for foreign policy decisions. Consequently, it is not surprising that governments, including the Indian government have seldom been consistent in the application of whatever principles they may profess. They have acted as the exigencies of the particular situation suggested and have been able, if they thought it useful, to find justifications for their principles.

Dr. Murty indicates the wealth of such interpretations presented by Indian philosophy, some of them unfamiliar to the West. His exposition of the divergencies between the ancient Indian Machiavellians of the Sastras and the ancient Indian Erasmians of Jainism and Buddhism, both to be found in the texts of the epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, is most interesting. The former believed that the end justifies the means and that defense of a particular kingdom or aggression to conquer all of India were both just ends, but they differed on the best means. The Arthasastrins (Kautilya), corresponding to Machiavelli's "foxes" recommended artifice, infiltration, subversion, propaganda and economic pressure in preference to war which was always risky and expensive. The Dharmasastrins (Manu), corresponding to Machiavelli's "lions" considered such methods contrary to Dharma (morality) and advocated heroic war for just ends, win or die. The "idealists", were also divided into two schools. The Buddhists like Asoka thought the entire world could be converted to

dharma by peaceful means, but the Jains and the Hindus of pacifistic inclination, like Gandhi, tended to be pragmatic. They advocated ahimsa or non-violence when it was likely to be successful or when an unfavorable power situation, as in India's struggle for independence against Britain, offered no alternative, but they did not rule out the use of force. Furthermore, although hoping for universal peaceful coexistence, as did the Buddhists, they thought, as did the Sastraic writers, that Indian governments should devote themselves to Indian problems, especially the unification and independence of India.

The Indian "realists", Dr. Murty emphasizes, confined their attention to relations between Indian states, and generally opposed imperial expansion against non-Indian cultures. They were "isolationists", believing that Indian princes should seek peaceful coexistence with outside cultures but the earlier writers saw little hope of peace within India, believing, as they did, that wars were just whether for defense or conquest. Even the righteous conqueror, who they hoped one day might unify the world—meaning the Indian world—as a Chakravartin should confine his wars to India. The concept of the Chakravartin or supreme ruler maintaining justice and peace suggests the emperor of Dante's *De Monarchia*, but with the important difference that the Indian writers limited his authority to India defined geographically and culturally, whereas Dante, although he referred to the world of Christendom,

thought Christianity would eventually be accepted by the entire World. Papal authority was believed in the Middle Ages to extend to the non-Christian world entitling the Pope to call for a crusade against the infidel and to give Christian princes secular authority over non-Christian lands as he did in dividing the extra-European world between Spain and Portugal in 1494.

In the modern world, Western "realists", although denying Papal authority, especially after the Reformation, took a similar universal view in holding that all overseas territories were, under international law, subject to acquisition by a European state through discovery and occupation. Consequently power politics applied particularly to the relations of European states with peoples of different cultures in the colonial areas of America, Asia, and Africa. The typically "just war" in the Middle Ages was the Crusade against the infidel and in the modern period it was the imperial war to extend the benefits of the "civilization" of the imperial power to the "uncivilized" peoples. No Indian writers, according to Dr. Murty, advocated or contemplated the extension of Indian culture outside of India by force. Whether realist or idealist, they believed that different cultures should coexist peacefully.

Indian and Western thinkers have, therefore, approached the modern problem of intercultural relations from opposite points of view. Doubtless this difference stemmed

from the parochial and isolationist character of traditional Hinduism in contrast to the universal religions of Christianity and Islam. Like Christianity, Islam had a mission to convert the world by war (the *Jihad*) if necessary. Buddhism was also a universal religion, but rooted in Hindu philosophy, it opposed expansion to other cultures by force. The great Buddhist emperor Asoka utilized only peaceful methods to expand Buddhism, although in his early career he had sought with some success to unify India by force.

The Indian and Western approach to domestic government has also been from opposite points of view. The West developed the concept of the sovereign state with a monopoly of power within its territory superior to all local authorities and with an expectation of loyalty from its subjects, but Indian philosophy, although recognizing India as a geographical and cultural unity, did not regard it as a state in this sense. Even if unified by a Chakravartin, he must rule by moral rather than physical force, and must recognize the autonomy of the princes under him. Dr. Murty points out the inherent contradiction in this ideology :

“Every King was exhorted to become the Chakravartin and everyone equally exhorted to resist aggression, defend his kingdom, fight, win or die. The Sastras nowhere say that once a Samrajya, an all-India state, is established, all ought to be loyal to its head and that no vassal should even dream of disrupting it. This led to internecine strife, a constant war of all against all.” (*Annexe*, p. 133-4).



With this philosophy it is not surprising that, in spite of its geographical and cultural unity and its partial political unity for brief periods under Asoka and Akbar, India never became an independent, united state until 1947 and then under the leadership of western educated Indians, Gandhi and Nehru.

In his section on specific issues, Dr. Murty presents an informing analysis of the meaning of non-alignment which under Nehru and since his death has been India's dominant foreign policy. He defines and approves this policy on the basis of India's national interest in much the same terms as Washington recommended an American policy of avoiding European entanglements in his farewell address of 1797.

Dr. Murty suggests that national interest justified the inconsistency in India's rejection of Portugal's claim to Goa, based on over four centuries of occupation and general recognition of its title, because that claim was initiated by invasion of Indian territory and "colonialism". At the same time, India maintained its own claim to the Macmahon line and parts of Ladakh on its northern frontier on the basis of treaty and prescriptive rights inherited from the British regime, but China rejected this claim because it originated in aggression and "colonialism". Describing India's interpretation of international law in the case of Goa, Dr. Murty writes : "International law as it stood provided no remedy, for it was largely a Western creation.

suited to the national interests and ambitions of Western powers and their domination over colonial lands". (p. 47) In regard to the northern boundary dispute with China, he writes : "Few would agree that naked aggression and flouting of international law regarding accepted boundaries should be tolerated, lest nuclear warfare take place". (p. 68). It is difficult to see how peaceful coexistence of states can be established unless this position is accepted as it has been by international law ; by the Latin American states when in gaining independence they accepted "the status quo of 1810" established by Spain and Portugal as a basis for settling boundary disputes ; and by the African states when in the Cairo Summit Conference of 1964 they called upon all African states to accept the existing boundaries established by the colonial regimes. Peaceful means for modifying boundaries should be available and the willingness of India to negotiate or adjudicate with China on the boundary issue differentiates this case from that of Goa on which Portugal refused to negotiate. The use of force, however, could not be justified in either case under the terms of the U. N. Charter. It also appears that India's attitude toward self-determination and the use of force to effect it was not wholly consistent in the cases of Kashmir, Tibet, Indonesia and Hungary, which perhaps indicates the inherent difficulty of applying this principle under varying conditions.

Most of the book was written before the death of Prime

Minister Nehru. Dr. Murty expresses his admiration for Nehru's policies which were also India's policies, but he indicates in his concluding chapter that the Chinese invasion of 1962 had induced India to be more "realistic" about the use of force in contemporary international relations and more devoted to the national interests of India than to the interests of mankind. The problem of the relation of the part to the whole, of the national state to the world community, explored by the ancient philosophers, has even more relevance in the contemporary world. In the nuclear age, when all states are vulnerable to annihilation from the most distant parts of the earth, the greatest "national interest" of each, may be the establishment of conditions in which the peaceful coexistence of all is assured. Dr. Murty suggests this in his discussion of the Indian concept of peaceful coexistence among diverse cultures, in his citation of Juvenal's statement "*nihil humani mihi alienum est*" (p. 69) and in his comment: "World peace is the condition which enables nations to plan for prosperity" (p. 23). Although Dr. Murty is a "realist" in recognizing the role of national interest and power in the making of foreign policy by a sovereign state, a role which he thinks was always in Nehru's mind more than in Gandhi's, he also suggests that a proper synthesis of expediency and principle, of national interest and human interest, of international politics and international law, and of appraisals of the long and short run consequences of alternative

decisions, sought for by students of international relations, in both ancient and modern times, in both East and West, remains a problem. It is likely to remain so in a period when generalizations in the field rapidly become obsolete as the progress of science and of inventions in both technology and sociology alter the conditions and the values on which such generalizations must be based. Dr. Murty's analysis of India's ancient philosophy and current policy in the international field throws light on the problem even if it does not solve it.

On current problems, Dr. Murty's exposition of the reasons for accommodation of Indian and Pakistan policies, especially in regard to minorities and Kashmir, his suggestion for some form of confederation among South Asian states, and his modesty in recognizing that his proposals may be improved by negotiations will certainly be interesting to Indian statesmen. His practical guides to Indian policy makers, in the final section of the book, should interest policy makers of all nations.

Western students of the recent hot and cold wars and of the turbulent history of the state system during the past few centuries will probably agree with Dr. Murty's skepticism about the wisdom of statesmen (p. 120) recalling the comment of Swedish foreign minister Oxensterne in the troubled 17th century, "with how little wisdom the affairs of nations are conducted". Dr. Murty's insistence on the need of advice from historians, political scientists, cultural

## INTRODUCTION

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anthropologists, and others before decisions are made ; on better selection and training for diplomats ; on appreciation of the relativity of all value systems and avoidance of moral lectures on the basis of any one of them, and on better understanding of the roles of power and of ideas in the contemporary world should contribute to the amelioration of that situation.

Department of Political Science  
Makerere University College  
Kampala, Uganda  
July 25, 1964

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## PREFACE

Philosophers ought to concern themselves with the examination of the problems that face the world and try to clarify the assumptions and issues involved and should wish to affect the situation in their own countries and the world. A philosopher's work should also have contemporary relevance and practical applicability. Normative considerations should be related to actual situations, the cognitive to the emotive, and the ethical to the political. There is much truth in Aristotle's theory that the supreme practical science is politics, of which ethics is but a part. According to our tradition, "politics is the supreme basis of the entire living world, verily in it are included the three ends of life (profit, pleasure and piety), as well as the *dharma* of salvation in all its clarity"<sup>1</sup>. An individual is a member of a society and a state and the good lives of its members constitute the good life of a society and a state; whereas it is the structure and policies of a state that enable an individual to enjoy human rights and lead a good life. Welfare and security (*yogakshema*), and well-being and happiness (*hitasukha*) are, as Kautilya and Asoka recognised, the ends of government. Political science studies the good for man, while ethics investigates the ultimate end of all action. In and through a complete and good life alone can meta-

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1. *Mahabharata, Santiparva*, Madras, (1935-6), p. 266.

physical as well as mundane freedom be sought. *Rajadharma* is the prolegomena to *mokshadharma*. From Plato to Dewey, Russell and Jaspers, and from Uchathya,<sup>2</sup> Vamadeva and Vyasa to Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan, the best philosophers have considered ethics and politics to be inseparable ; and these in turn are tied up with metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and definitions. Philosophic thought and political action should coincide. To discuss and seek to influence state policies is a philosophic as well as a civic duty. One who keeps aloof from politics is, as Pericles said, not a 'quiet' but a 'useless' citizen.<sup>3</sup>

In this essay an attempt is made to analyse and appraise Indian foreign policy. The foreign policy of a country is shaped by its history, culture, geography, economic conditions and the personality structures of its leaders. Indian foreign policy is a part of our culture,<sup>4</sup> and an element of our political tradition. So in Part I of this essay I start with a brief discussion of classical Indian theories, pass on to a consideration of Gandhism and end up with an

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2. Uchathya was a "supreme Brahman-knower" who taught Mandhata the principles of politics, while Vamadeva was a "seer of Reality" who explained the ideals of kingship to Vasumanas. (*Mahabharata, Santiparva, Chs. 84-5.*) 'Uchathya' is spelt as 'Utathya' in the northern recension.

3. *Thucydides, II. 40*

4. A culture which allows the peaceful coexistence with mutual toleration of different castes, races, social orders, laws, religions, sects, and political institutions.

analytical exposition of independent India's foreign policy. For this last purpose I rely heavily on the writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, who, I believe, was not only a great statesman, but, as Sir Alec Douglas-Home said, "a philosopher with great distinction of mind". "He was", Prince Norodom Sihanouk rightly said, "incontestably one of the very rare philosophers—perhaps the only one—who after having accepted heavy government duties knew how to be a thinker and a man of action". In Part II I discuss three specific issues—Goa, Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan relations. Part III carries further the general discussion, reaches certain conclusions and ventures to make a few concrete suggestions. Among these, the principal one is to reaffirm the words of wisdom which Emperor Aurangzib uttered long ago, *viz.*, the formulators and executors of state policies and diplomats should be familiar with the histories, cultures, religions, resources, modes of warfare and forms of government of different nations, and the theories of the origins, progress and decline of states and revolutions.<sup>5</sup> Because I felt it was necessary to say something more on some of the points touched in these parts, an Annexe has been later added. Even this is but a cursory treatment of several important issues. I wish I had written this earlier and incorporated it in the proper places in the text. Prof. Quincy Wright has rightly suggested that §1 of the Annexe should come in

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5. F. Bernier, *Travels In The Mogul Empire*, Oxford, 1916, p. 156.

after the section ending on p. 14, § 3 after that ending on p. 42, § 4 after that ending on p. 114, and § 2 after that ending on p. 119.

Proofs of this book (except the Annexe) reached me about a week before Nehru's death. The policy of non-alignment was one of the great contributions of our late Prime Minister. It has served not only India's interests, but has to some extent contributed to world peace. It would be a tragedy if Nehru's death were to "weaken the driving force behind the non-aligned movement".<sup>6</sup> Insofar as non-alignment is not indifference to belligerents and conflicts, and seeks to promote freedom and social justice within nations and equality and peaceful coexistence among all nations, it does not become unnecessary so long as ideological and power conflicts exist. While the power conflict between the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia appears to be less now than before, it is not resolved, and the ideological struggle continues and is proposed to be intensified by the U.S.S.R. as well as by some powerful sections in

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6. Indonesian First Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito K. Idagdo believes this would happen, and thinks, because of the partial test ban and the relieving of tensions between the Eastern and Western Power Blocs, the necessity for non-alignment has decreased. (For this statement, see *The Hindu*, June 1, 1964). But I think the Ceylonese Prime Minister's evaluation of non-alignment is sounder than that of Idagdo. (*Infra*, p. 111-2). Idagdo ignores that there is yet no complete ban of nuclear weapons, that there are existing stocks of weapons, that China is against this ban and that several problem areas like Berlin, Cuba, and Viet Nam can be the causes of a possible nuclear conflict.

the U.S.A. If Goldwaterism were to triumph and if U.S.A. were to attack North Viet Nam or China, or if Khrushchev were to be succeeded by a rigid Stalinist, the world may go back to the kind of situation in which it was some years ago. Meanwhile, the peasant-industrial contrasts among nations sharpened by colour distinctions,<sup>7</sup> the contradiction between "imperialism" and "revolutionary liberation movements", and the racial cleavage between Soviet and Maoist Marxisms are being used to introduce new and tragic complications into the ideological struggle and may lead to another kind of a realigned world of new power blocs.<sup>8</sup> For instance, a militant alliance of some underdeveloped coloured peasant nations is sought to be formed against the industrialised "revisionist" and "imperialist" white nations. To promote their own national interests and assert their own independence of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., some West European as well as East European governments are developing friendly relations with the country that advocates such an alliance. Such a thing would not be less disastrous than the antagonism

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7. The British Prime Minister in the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference warned against the danger of the world being split up into white "have" countries of the north, and the coloured "have-not" countries of the south.

8. In a recent interview to two British journalists President Nasser rightly stated that though the Russo-American war is thawing, the Sino-U. S. cold war is raging leading to new power combinations. (He might have appropriately referred to the Sino-Russian cold war too.) From this he concluded that non-alignment has still a positive role to play. (Cf. Idagdo's view).

between the Eastern and Western power blocs, supposed to be on the wane now. Moreover, in view of what is happening and what might happen in Cuba, Cyprus, Laos, Viet Nam and Malaysia, and on the Sino-Indian border, what Idagdo calls the "policy of averting war" has not yet become unnecessary. A policy which refuses to take any ideology or way of life as final, perfect and worthy of being imposed on the whole world, which maintains that all conflicts are in principle capable of being solved through a mutually tolerant intercourse of minds, and which believes that peaceful co-existence is possible on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation without any insistence on conversion to what is considered to be *the* truth and *the* right way of living, is very much needed today and for a long time to come.

So far as India is concerned, we may be sure that Nehru's great principles and policies will continue to be followed, because on May 29, 1964 our parliament resolved to strive for the ideals for which he dedicated himself; and our new Prime Minister in his nationwide broadcast on June 11, 1964, assured that non-alignment would continue to be "the fundamental basis of our approach to world problems and our relations with other countries". Earlier on June 2, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri said Nehru's foreign policy "is and will be beneficial" for our country.

I have said in this essay that friendship with Pakistan must be one of the foundations of our foreign policy, as it

would serve the interests of both the countries and as there are no real obstacles to this. After this has been printed, following Nehru's death, President Ayub Khan has on June 1, 1964, stated that the future of our two countries lies in friendship and good neighbourliness, that bitterness and recrimination in the past has done no good to either side, and that if West European nations after decades of fighting could join in "a common economic endeavour", it should be easier for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences. This important and wise statement was welcomed wholeheartedly by our Prime Minister and India's desire for friendly relations with Pakistan reiterated by him. Though later the effect of these statements was somewhat marred by the comments of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, and some of its leaders and journals, because of the promise of American arms aid to India, Pakistan's President again reiterated his country's goodwill for India and expressed his readiness to come to Delhi to meet with our Prime Minister. This is a fine and commendable gesture. While in Europe recently, he went further by stating that the defence of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent must be the joint responsibility of both the countries,<sup>9</sup> and that there must be a negotiated settlement of all Indo-Pakistan disputes to avoid "mutual ruin".<sup>10</sup> India should

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9. Statement in London on July 13, 1964, in the speech to the Foreign Press Association.

10. Statement in Dublin on July 17, 1964.

now take an active lead in utilising this opportunity, attempt to settle the Kashmir issue once for all,<sup>11</sup> and forge plans for a "common economic endeavour" with Pakistan to start with.

It is as yet premature to think of an Indo-Pakistan confederation, but in due course something even more than this is certainly practicable. A confederation of all South Asian states can be brought into effect by treaties among the free nations in this area, each living under its own constitution, governed by its own laws, and preserving its own way of life and worship. A common desire to

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11. As Pakistan has rejected the idea of an independent Kashmir, and as India is unwilling to have a plebiscite or an UN trusteeship, the only possible solution would be to accept the cease-fire line as a permanent boundary with territorial adjustments to be made on either side by negotiations between the two governments. India can sacrifice "Azad Kashmir" and Pakistan the Kashmir valley. Boundaries of both can however be redrawn in a mutually satisfactory way. (There is greater justice in Kashmir remaining in India than Pukhtoonistan remaining in Pakistan, and Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia remaining in China, for while in Sinkiang 80% of the population are Uighurs, Turki speaking Muslims, in the Inner Mongolian districts of Ninghsia and Kansu also Muslims predominate.) After such a settlement, Kashmir can be made more stable by integrating it into a new state with Himachal Pradesh and parts of Punjab, and settling in the Kashmir Valley considerable numbers of the refugees who have come from East Bengal, and by rapid industrialisation and the spread of education and modern ideas. A similar approach to Nagaland would be beneficial to the country. To build a fully democratic and secular state, stagnant breeding areas of religious exclusivism, tribalism, casteism and parochial patriotism, whether in Kerala, Kashmir or Madras, should be drained and reclaimed as quickly as possible.



jointly preserve their freedoms and to cooperate in bettering the economic conditions of their masses through pooling their resources and creating something like a common market, can be the basis of this confederation. Such a confederation can adequately defend itself against the twin threats to all these countries : Western hegemony and communist infiltration as well as aggression. This proposed organisation would radically differ from all the present groupings of states as it would be primarily a cultural alliance of free and equal states without any hegemonic interests and without any intention to propagate or impose a particular ideology on the whole world. It would mainly seek to promote common economic interests and secure mutual collaboration in the spheres of education, culture, and technology, but when necessary, also in self-defence. The Islamic, Buddhist and Hindu cultures of these countries will then have an opportunity to flower fully, and each of these free states can make its progress towards democracy in its own way at its own pace, each fully retaining its own identity and freedom and following the law of its own nature. To start with, Afghanistan, Pakistan, all the Himalayan states and India can set up such a confederation of themselves by treaties.<sup>12</sup> Of

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12. Although recently there has been some toying with the idea of forming a bloc with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as members, as the *Outlook* of Karachi pointed out, Pakistan being geographically, culturally and historically a part of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, its problems are "with" India and its defence

course, Kashmir would be in it. The Mohenjodaro-Harappa civilisations, the Vedic-Upanishadic complex, Buddhism, Gandhara culture, the Mauryan Empire, the Indo-Afghan Sultanate of Delhi, the Mughal Empire and the British Empire have created from Kabul to Arrakan and Khatmandu to Kanyakumari a certain community of ideas, beliefs and habits, in spite of all the tensions and occasional conflicts in this vast region. Afghanistan, Baluchistan, the Indus Valley in Pakistan, and the homeland of the Buddha (Nepal), have influenced India tremendously, while in turn India's influence on these countries has been enormous. Great was the contribution of Afghans, Baluchis, Pathans and Punjabis to Indic and Buddhist cultures and thought, while Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Gulburga, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda made significant contributions to Islamic culture. The mutual indebtedness of Nepal and India is immense. In the past the peoples of all these states have fought with each other, ruled over each other, and over long periods cooperating, fraternising and intermixing with each other have enabled not only a free communication among their faiths and cultures, but their interpenetration by each other. In the colonial

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and foreign policies have to be "congenitally" oriented to the problems of this sub-continent. Ayub's statements (*vide supra*) also recognise this. Similarly, history and destiny have linked up Afghanistan, the Indo-Pak subcontinent and Nepal to each other, and they cannot do without each other. Surrounded, so to say, by Russia and China, their alliance will give a firm foundation to their security and economic stability.

period they have all together fought for freedom against the British. This ineradicable common history points to a common destiny. On this common ground a free association of these independent states is certainly possible. In its own interests such a confederation should deem it a privilege to have the full and equal partnership of Burma and Ceylon in this quest for peace, freedom and human well-being.<sup>13</sup> Buddhist culture, British administration in the past and common aspirations since their emancipation have produced in these two rice-eating nations an outlook which they share with Afghanistan, Nepal and India, and norms and mores in all these countries are similar if not always identical. Statesmen and intellectuals of these countries would therefore do well to think of the common bonds, ideals, and interests of their peoples to make them the foundations of a free cooperative association for peace and prosperity, a rather distant but practicable goal. But this consummation must be brought about speedily if monolithic ideas were to be prevented from rooting out the personalities and liberties of these nations.

I am grateful to Profs. Harold D. Lasswell and Quincy Wright for their kindness in writing a Foreword and an Introduction respectively. I value these contributions

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13. To allay possible suspicions it would be good if India and Pakistan were to agree that the confederation should always be presided over only by the Heads of the smaller states in rotation and that its headquarters should not be in these two bigger countries.

from such eminent authorities of world-wide repute in political science and international law.

*Vis-a-vis* some points in the Introduction, I wish to state this : (1) It does not necessarily follow that the universe or reality is irrational or inconsistent if we say that *the* truth is not comprehended by the human mind, in its completeness. This is especially so in the case of metaphysical and ethical truths. (2) I do not think Hinduism has ever been "parochial" or "isolationist", but it certainly refuses to become 'universal' by force. Many races in India and many non-Indians over the centuries became Hindus, and people outside India too did become Hindus (e.g., in South-East Asia and Central Asia). The Balinese still continue to be Hindus. "From Persia to the Chinese Sea, from the icy regions of Siberia to the islands of Java and Borneo, from Oceania to Socotra," wrote Sylvain Levi, "India has propagated her beliefs, her genius, her tales, and her civilization". (3) Liberation of colonial territories and border disputes between two neighbouring countries are not on the same level, especially if in the latter case one of the concerned states is ready to settle them peacefully. So the Goa action and the Chinese aggression cannot be legitimately compared. In the former case all possibilities of peaceful settlement were closed by Portuguese intransigence. (4) Like Tagore I believe that nationalism is a "great menace", and like the Stoics I consider the cosmos my city. But like De Gaulle I realise

that at present the sovereign nation-state is a reality which cannot be ignored. So in a world where national interests override those of mankind, no single state can and should put the latter above the former. Reality and practicality should be heeded more than ideality, though statesmen should strive to realise the latter to an increasing extent. In view of the present power structure in Asia, and the need to confront and contain China, and as political and diplomatic means alone have proved insufficient for this purpose, India ought to develop sufficient defensive strength of its own, both in its own interests and those of Asia, and, if necessary, for this there is nothing immoral in developing its own national nuclear and missile forces, which will serve as political instruments as well. (5) India must continue its age-old living tradition of not casting covetous glances at any territories beyond its borders, nor must it swerve from the path set to it by Nehru, namely, of not pursuing any kind of hegemonic or ideological interests. *Apropos* this and what is found *infra* p. 8ff, I wish to refer to Raja Man Singh of Amber, who hesitated to cross the Indus, which he considered as the *Atak* (natural barrier) of India, when Emperor Akbar asked him to reduce the revolt in Kabul, then a province of the Mughal Empire, though Man Singh was mostly responsible for Akbar's victories from the Caucasus to the Arrakan.<sup>14</sup> The true

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14. J. Todd, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Oxford, 1920, p. 391.

Hindu-Buddhist spirit refuses to commit aggression, though in Man Singh's case it was overlaid by Mughal imperialist interests. We must remain loyal to this true Indian spirit which hates aggression and tyranny.

My colleague Dr. B. V. Kishen and my two sons Yasomitra and Raghunatha have helped me in preparing the typescript for the press. Proof-correction has not been perfect and some mistakes (*e. g.*, "Vasubandhav" for "Vasubandhu" on p. 6) have crept in.

Andhra University  
Waltair, July 1964

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

# PART ONE

## IDEOLOGICAL MOORINGS

### I

#### (a) Traditional Indian Theories of Foreign Policy : The Positivistic Kautilyan Theory :

From very ancient times there have been in India two attitudes regarding the formulation of foreign policies and inter-state relations. Of these the first refers *only* to states within India. This is found in the *Artha Sastra* of Kautilya, the *Smṛti* of Manu and some portions dealing with polity in the *Mahabharata*. Other *arthasastras* and *dharmasastras* echo it. According to this, states ought to be power states, which should never be satisfied with either the territory or the power they have got. Expansion of territory, attempts to control neighbouring states and deceptive friendliness when the neighbouring states are more powerful,—these were laid down as the norms for inter-state relations. War was considered to be an ennobling and purifying experience for the ruling caste. The rulers were taught that rivalry, territorial ambitions, the use, when necessary, of cunning in diplomacy and ruthlessness in war were princely virtues. There is however some difference between the *smṛtis* and *arthasastras* on this point. The *dharmasastras* held that even aggressive wars when waged with fairness and humanity towards the vanquished, the wounded, the prisoners and the noncombatants were a matter of duty for the Kshatriyas, the aim always being aggrandisement and establishment of suzerainty over other states and not the liquidation of the conquered dynas-

ties and the incorporation of their territories as provinces in the conquerors'. After conquest the conqueror no more concerned himself with the conquered territories, but was satisfied if their rulers remained autonomous vassals. On the other hand, the *arthasastras* held that wars should be undertaken only as the last resort when statecraft failed to achieve this purpose, not because wars were immoral, but as they were expensive and troublesome and victory was not certain. While the *smṛti* attitude was romantic, the *arthasastras* were extremely practical and unscrupulous. Loss of money and men in wars never worried the *dharma-sastra* and *arthasastra* writers, because by territorial acquisitions and the seizing of the wealth of conquered princes the first kind of loss could be made good, while the loss of life should not bother the rulers because souls are immortal, and, further, those who die heroically in battles go to heaven and war is a duty of the Kshatriyas. As Kautilya puts it, the destruction of enemies and the gaining of superiority are desirable ends, and all neighbouring states are potential or actual enemies. But *arthasastra* writers on the whole favoured (1) *Tushnim yuddha*, psychological warfare carried on by means of hostile propaganda, infiltration, fifth column activity and subversion, and (2) *Kuta yuddha*, strategic or economic warfare aimed at the destruction of the resources and food supplies of the enemy, and assassination or kidnapping of the military leaders and ministers of the enemy states, or converting them into traitors. The *arthasastras* advised open aggressive warfare (*prakasa yuddha*) only when a state was strong, united and stable and the enemy not so. Sincere and permanent peace among states within India was inconceivable to the *artha-* and *dharma-sastra* writers.

It was as a result of this kind of ideology that Hindu kingdoms were almost always engaged in internecine



warfare. The lack of a common purpose among the Hindu kingdoms was partly responsible for the fact that India was never completely unified politically before foreign conquerors imposed such a unity. One relieving factor about this theory was that it did envisage the possibility of a universal sovereign—*chakravartin*—arising as a saviour-conqueror who would subjugate all the states in India and impose on them a rule of peace and prosperity. But since every Hindu prince was exhorted by this ideology to become the *chakravartin*, political confusion was the only result of this. But the *Smritis* and the *Mahabharata* make it clear at many places that while a just war is moral, Kautilyan tactics to win and retain political power is a dangerous path beset with sin.

The above point of view was that of the Indo-Aryans, one of the most aggressive people known to history, whose book the *Rgveda* in a way laid the foundations for the political theories which were later developed by Kautilya and Manu. It is conceivable that subsequent to the Greek invasion of India, the ideas of the Greeks and the Persians may have influenced these Indian political theorists. Anyway the classical Hindu treatises on polity advocate this Indo-Aryan ideology, although statesmen are advised to cultivate the virtues of mercy, friendliness and compassion, and promote peace whenever possible, without forsaking the conception of the state as an organism which never possesses the plenitude of power and territory necessary for it.

#### (b) **The Moralistic Asokan Theory :**

From immemorial times in India there was an autochthonous philosophy which maintained that penance, self-abnegation and noninjury of all beings were the means for

getting rid of sins and obtaining salvation. The schools of peripatetic mendicants—*parivrajakas*—which were so common before and during the time of the Buddha appropriated this philosophy to a greater or lesser extent. The Upanishadic philosophy synthesised this with faith in the reality of the Spirit and tried to reconcile it with Vedism. The Jainas were the most dominant among these wandering sects, and they made non-injury the most important and cardinal virtue. The Buddha was influenced by many of these sects, although he never exalted non-injury to fanatic heights. The Buddha was the first to enunciate the principle that violence and enmity must be conquered by compassion and love. Although the Jainas and the Buddhists considered Ahimsa (non-injury) as the foremost duty, it was expected to be practiced rigorously only by the monks. The laymen and certainly the rulers were expected to practice ahimsa only in so far as it was practicable. Great Jaina kings like Kharavela and Kumarpala as well as some Buddhist kings like Harsha and Kanishka did not give up warfare. Jaina writers like Somadeva argue that wars cannot achieve much, that it is always better to use sugar than poison to gain desired ends, but that if the enemy can be vanquished only by force, it is a folly to apply other means. A few Jaina thinkers like Hemachandra adopted an extreme viewpoint and envisaged the ideal king as a puritan who would impose morality, especially *ahimsa*, by law and enforce its practice by all. In general Jaina princes behaved no better than Hindu princes. The Buddha however was decidedly against warfare. Conquests by the sword, he taught, can never establish an enduring rule; they bring misery and unrest to both the conquered and the conquerors. "The slayer gets a slayer in his turn,—a man who spoils is spoiled in his turn." (*Sugatehavagga*) Buddhist monks.

were asked not to talk of wars and heroic deeds in battles, and not to participate in wars even by advising kings. (*Brahmajalasutta*) As a result of their sins, conquerors like Chandragupta, Buddhist tradition said, ended their lives miserably. (*Manjusrimulakalpa*) The Buddhist books condemn all aggressive warfare anywhere. The *Manjusrimulakalpa* says kings directly influenced by the Buddha never undertook wars for aggrandisement or territorial acquisition. All Indian rulers were exhorted to think of only victory through righteousness. The Buddha also taught that if the people of a state lived in concord, unity and mutual tolerance, followed democratic conventions and respected law and tradition, their states however small would flourish and could not be overthrown even by big powers. (*Digha Nikaya*) Generally speaking, Buddhist rulers were more peaceloving than Jaina and Hindu rulers.

Jainism and Buddhism discouraged Machiavellian politics and deglamourized war on the whole. When Asoka after the experience of devastation caused by the Kalinga war, became a Buddhist and gave up conquest and war as instruments of his foreign policy, a new dimension of inter-state relations became possible. States whether in or outside India should coexist in mutual amity and concord and people within a state should also similarly treat each other with tolerance and love. War must be totally renounced by a civilized state, but defensive action to safeguard one's rights is certainly justified. This is the gist of the Asokan edicts as far as inter-state relations are concerned. A Mahayana *sutra*, the *Suvarnaprabhasottama*, condemned all warfare as sinful and also distasteful to gods, and advised all kings in and outside India to give up evil thoughts and avoid all fights and disputes with neighbours. Prosperity and peace will come to India only when

all Indian kings abandon mutual suspicion, fear and covetousness, and learn to be content with their own territories and treasuries. If the rulers are not moral, there will be no righteousness in their realms, and consequently there will be no material prosperity too. Only when its internal government and external relations are based on ethics would a country prosper. Ills befall the land which is ruled by immoral persons. Thus a plea to moralise politics in *all* its aspects was put forward by this unique *sutra*, while Hindu classics generally agreed that when necessary a moral means may be adopted to gain, augment and retain political power to serve the people and make them prosperous. Asokan edicts and *Suvarnaprabhasa* are the greatest peace manifestos ancient India produced.

Except for a letter on morals by Nagarjuna to a Salivahana king and a brief treatment by the Buddhist thinker Aryadeva, this theme unfortunately did not get any detailed attention from Buddhist philosophers. A great Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhav, was however Samudragupta's minister. For some reason or other there are no comprehensive Jaina or Buddhist books on political science. Some Jaina writers like Somaprabha taught that politics and state service were sinful as it was impossible to avoid reprehensible actions and strive for righteousness in political life and government service. Although Yudhisthira in the *Mahabharata* also voices such sentiments, he is often told that one who uses politics and war as means for promoting dharma and the welfare of the people not only atones for the sins he may have committed, but gains much merit thereby. (The *dharma-sastras* also, however, do not speak highly of government service, they rate agriculture and commerce higher. Government service gained prestige only gradually after India lost its independence. This apathy and indifference towards statecraft and politics

might be one of the reasons for the short-lived political power of the Jaina and Buddhist kings. This point of view, which was entirely different from the Indo-Aryan and seems to have had its origin within Indian autochthonous consciousness, was overlaid by the dominance and perhaps also by the greater suitability to practice of the Indo-Aryan theory, because of its appeal to the rulers' pleonexia. Anyway, most classical political theorists and rulers of India adopted the Indo-Aryan viewpoint. It is also a pity that no great Vedantic thinker except Vyasa concerned himself with political theory. Their exclusive interest in metaphysics was partly responsible for the neglect of politics by the best minds and for the backwardness and loss of independence of this country. One important Vedantin—Vidyaranya—was however interested in political activity and helped in founding the Vijayanagar empire. He was an exception. Vedanta could consistently with its metaphysics support only a type of foreign policy based on peaceful and friendly coexistence among states everywhere.

### **The Two Theories : A Comparison :**

While the Kautilyan attitude in *some* respects is similar to that of Shen Tao, Shang Yang, Han Fei Tzu and Mao Tse Tung, the other Indian attitude is comparable to that of Mo Tzu of China who maintained that the practice of mutual all-embracing love is the only right thing and the state's primary function is to fix this standard and reward those who follow it and punish those who flout it. Confucius and Mencius too based their political philosophy on ethics and righteousness. Mencius distinguished between *wang*, wise paternal government based on morality, which is carried on through moral instruction and education.

(corresponding to the Asokan type) and *pa*, a military government based on force and compulsion. Something like the Athenian and the Spartan, the Grotius-Pufendorf-Locke-Jefferson-Roosevelt and the Machiavelli-Hobbes-Nietzsche-Stalin traditions are found in all cultures. Modern India has chosen the former while Maoist China the latter. There is however a radical and most important difference between the Kautilyan theory on the one hand and the Chinese and Western theories. The *smrtis* and *arthasastras*, as I will now go on to show, never conceived this theory as applicable to relations between an universal Indian state and states outside India. It was expressly meant for inter-state relations within India only and implied isolationism towards non-Indian states. The Asokan theory on the other hand was meant to be applied always and everywhere, and its advocates pleaded for its universal application.

### **Hindu Culture Taboos Inter-Cultural Wars : Absence of Imperialism within Hindu Culture :**

In the *dharmas*- and *artha-sastras* and the *Mahabharata* we find another curious approach towards foreign relations. It lays down the principle that the people belonging to one culture should not enter into an aggressive war with people belonging to another culture. This involves the consequence that it is illegitimate for Indians to provoke a war with people of another culture, or try to conquer territories outside India. It was perhaps this belief along with the other belief that a person must be born or spontaneously grow into a culture and a religion, that was responsible for the absence of aggressive wars by Indians against neighbouring countries.

Hindu political thinkers defined the imperial field

(*chakravarti kshetra*) as India then conceived by them. The conception of India varied from time to time, but ultimately it came to mean the country stretching from the Himalayas to the southern sea and from the western sea to the eastern sea. This was the earth, *chaturanta prthvi* which an Indian paramount king should legitimately aspire to rule. Even Kautilya never envisaged that a Hindu emperor's rule should extend beyond this. The *Mahabharata* lays down that an Indian empire must not go beyond these geographical limits. Arrian testifies that "a sense of justice" prevented Indian kings from attempting to conquer territories outside India. The kings of India should not, says Manu, meddle in the political, cultural and religious affairs of those outside India (*i.e.*, *aryavarta* as he then conceived it). In fact he prohibits the upper castes from even visiting countries outside India ; only sudras could do that. So did Baudhayana. This was a sort of Monroe Doctrine of isolationism with a vengeance. The ideal implied in "*Krvanto visvam aryam*" (Aryanisation of the whole world) was not very different from the desire to Hellenise or Christianise the whole world, although all these three were utilised by politically ambitious and unscrupulous men to promote their own aggrandisement ; but unlike in the case of the other two ideas, Aryanisation was never planned or attempted outside India. In the beginning the land of the Aryans was conceived as the region of the seven rivers (the five rivers of the Panjab together with the Indus, and the Kabul substituted later by Sarasvati) ; later it came to include the Yamuna-Ganga valley. Later by the time of the Nanda period when the territories south of the Vindhya came to be known, they were referred to as the Dakshinapatha ; but even in the Sunga times the land of the Aryans was supposed to be only North India bounded by the seas on the west and the

east and the Himalayas and the Vindhyas on the north and south. (*Manu*, II. 22.3) It was in that context that Aryanisation of South India was conceived. Kautilya thought of the whole of India—north and south—as one politico-cultural unit. It is in the Itihasa-Purana tradition, which crystallised in the Gupta Age finally, that the whole of India is described as one country—a geographical and cultural whole to be ruled by one suzerain ruler, without destroying regional and local traditions, religious and administrative systems and even dynasties, giving full autonomy to every village and province. This was the ideal of the best Hindu conquerors. If this is imperialism, Hindu imperialism—cultural or political—never dreamt of extending its sway beyond the geographical limits of India. Aryanisation was conceived only with reference to South India ; Agastya being the pioneer of it. But the traditions, law and customs of the South remained and remain in many ways different from the North. Neither Hindu religion nor ethics ever attempted complete uniformity and regimentation of thinking or behaviour.

The Buddhist books of course speak of a world-state “ruled” by one person, but such a person, they taught, ought to establish the universal state not with the sword but with love (*Dighanikaya*). Such a ruler is the king of righteousness (*dharmika dharmaraja*), who adopts *ahimsa* and non-stealing (*asteya*). He does not at all undertake military expeditions, but, as Bana said, conquers the whole earth by his spiritual influence. (*Harsha Charita*, IV.) The Buddha conceived himself as a chakravartin of that sort. He is the supreme king of righteousness (*Sela Sutta*). This is a conception similar to that which regards Christ as a king, a prince, but of peace and goodwill. Asoka tried to follow that ideal conceiving the whole world as his sphere of activity, all people as his people and making



the welfare of all beings in and outside his territories his concern. But this confusion of a spiritual empire with the terrestrial was not very fruitful. The Buddhist ideal like the Christian was purely spiritual—establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth. It has nothing to do with Caesars, armies and diplomacy.

Talk of Hindu imperialism and colonisation is as inappropriate as that of Christian imperialism and colonisation. It is true Hindus and Buddhists went to South-East Asia and Ceylon as traders, settlers and as missionaries. None of them went as invaders or conquerors. Some of them settled down in those countries, intermarried with the local people and founded kingdoms and empires. But they came to look upon those countries as their own; lived, fought and died there. They did not drain off the wealth of those countries, nor did they long to get back enriched to India. The capitals of the states they founded were located in those far-off lands and these states did not owe any allegiance to, nor were they controlled by, any power religious or secular—within India. The Indian dynasties that ruled in South-East Asia underwent a process of indigenisation similar to that which some of the Sakas, Pahlavas, Huns, Turco-Afghans and Mughals underwent in India. Kanishka's aggressive war against China and the Chola conquests of and rule over Indonesia and Ceylon, were deplorable incidents and rare exceptions that proved the general rule and are repugnant to Hindu and Buddhist ideologies. But ideologies and religions do not completely govern peoples' actions. The Cholas, besides, did not fight with alien cultures, but with dynasties which belonged to their own culture. There has thus been really no deliberate Indian imperialism at any time in history.

On the other hand, wars of Indian states against each other were justified because mutual rivalries between neigh-

bouring rulers of the same culture were supposed to be a political virtue. Also, such intra-cultural mutual warfare may fortunately throw up a chakravartin who will then bring everlasting peace to all the people of that culture. As already said this also was condemned by Buddhist tradition. It is interesting to contrast this attitude with that of the Semitic cultures. The Christians, although this was never the intention of Jesus or the apostles, considered it their duty to go to war with the non-Christians to impose Christian rule upon the latter. Men like St. Bernard of Clairvaux and St. Francis of Assisi encouraged the crusades. Great thinkers like Dante and Leibniz in their peace plans for Europe always maintained that it was immoral to have wars among Christian states, but that it was quite ethical and appropriate for the Christian states to fight against heathens and the infidels. Islam also held a similar view. On the other hand, because Hinduism was considered to be not something which can be imposed upon aliens, and because Buddhism never approved proselytisation through force, history does not show any evidence of aggressive wars waged by Buddhist and Hindu cultures. It is true the Aryans destroyed Mohenjodaro and Harappa, but they were not Hindus ! When in the contemporary world Buddhists and Hindus display an aversion to inter-cultural and ideological struggles, it is possible that within the subconscious of their national minds there lurks the inherited belief that a culture, a religion or an ideology must not be imposed on anybody by force. One must either be born into them or one must grow into them voluntarily. The long survival of Hindu culture for thousands of years may be partly due to its aversion to wage wars upon other cultures and destroy them. Toynbee teaches that intolerant cultures perish sooner or later.

### **Inter-State Relations in Ancient India : Their Present Relevance : A Conclusion :**

The ancient Indian attitude to inter-state relations may be summarised thus. Early Indo-Aryan ideology glorified warfare and aggression as means of aggrandisement, fame and acquisition of wealth and territory. This was the romantic tribal view found among most early vigorous peoples. Developed Hindu ideology encouraged warfare among the states within India as a means of the unification of India and the establishment of an all-India state which would usher in an era of perpetual peace and prosperity for the whole of India. The Hindu thinkers expressly forbade aggressive wars on other cultures and states outside India. There was a kind of Monroe Doctrine towards states outside India. Jainas more or less agreed with all this. But Buddhist ideology denounced warfare among the states within as well as outside India and condemned all aggression anywhere on whatever pretext. It advocated friendly relations among all states everywhere. At the same time, it dreamt of a great and holy personality establishing a kingdom of righteousness throughout the whole world by means of love and compassion. A spiritual empire would weld together all nations and people, but this was not at all conceived in political terms, and is similar to the Christian conception of the kingdom of heaven. Asoka tried, but failed to translate it into a political reality in his own way.

Throughout the pre-Muslim period as the energies of the best Indian kings were devoted to establish an all-India state as an enduring reality, they had no time to even think of any policies towards non-Indian states. When foreign invaders came the former defended themselves to the best of their abilities, but never themselves embarked

on aggressive wars outside India. After the establishment of Muslim and British rules in India, there was no chance for Hindus to think of any foreign policy. The attitude of the best Indian Muslim rulers was similar to that of the Hindus, *viz.*, to establish a lasting all-India state and to ignore the world outside India. Men like Akbar tried to achieve the unification of India mainly through conciliation, tolerance, diplomacy and regional autonomy ; others through warfare. The *Ain-i-Akbari* favourably expounds the Hindu ideals of kingship and statecraft. The attention of Medieval Indians was confined to India, that was their whole world. They fought among themselves and with whoever came as invaders from across the Himalayas or the seas. During the British period Indian foreign policy was made in London. After the British quit India when independence came, Indians again had an opportunity to think of a foreign policy. Independent India started as a political unity, so the question of unifying India was no more relevant. What should be the policy towards other states? That was the only issue. Independent India could have translated the Kautilyan ideology into the international sphere, although Kautilya was concerned only with the internal situation in India. But deliberately and consciously India chose to follow the type of policy which the Buddhist tradition and Asoka advocated, *viz.*, friendly relations with all states, a foreign policy based on peace, freedom and equality of all peoples. Since both Hindu and Buddhist traditions are emphatic that India must never have aggressive designs and must allow other cultures and states to work out their destinies in their own ways, the present foreign policy of India is in tune with Indian tradition and history.

I will now go on to give the background of Indian foreign policy and the attitudes and factors that shaped it.

## II

**Attitudes towards Indian Independence :**

In the 19th century the liberal attitude of the British rulers, who were nurtured on the philosophies of freedom developed by Locke, Milton and Mill, was partly responsible for the awakening of the Indian masses. During the British rule the unification of India occurred to an extent which was unique in Indian history. Through English education, the modern concepts of nationalism, rights of the people, and freedom became fully familiar to Indians. It was in a situation of this sort, that in the late 19th century and in the 20th century two divergent programmes for Indian independence were formulated. One of them was inspired by the way Colonial America liberated itself from British control and by the way in which the French and the Russian people overthrew the ruling classes. The other kind of programme was based on the conviction that it was providential that the British came to India, unified the country and exposed it to science and modern technology. It was considered to be the destiny of the Indian people to be ruled by the British and to be taught their methods of self-government and parliamentary democracy. It was also thought to be possible to win self-government from the British without any revolution and struggle by persuading them to voluntarily give up their control over India. A free democratic people, it was held, would not keep under subjugation another nation when they were convinced the subject nation was mature enough for self-government. Circumstances in India were such that by their sporadic acts of terrorism, the Indian revolutionaries were not able to achieve much. Further the popularity of the concept of Ahimsa since the time of Asoka, the absence of an aggressive spirit, the weakness of body and spirit which to

some extent got inbred into the people during centuries of Muslim and British rule, the Karma theory which appeared to justify social and political realities, and the political belief that the sovereign rules by divine ordination—all these together made the Indian masses look at the efforts of the revolutionaries with indifference, if not often aversion. On the other hand, the Indian liberals with their appeals and petitions to the Viceroy and the British parliament and with their speeches in the Indian legislatures could only obtain limited reforms and vague promises of self-government in the remote future. These promises appeared to be unconvincing because steps to fulfil them were not taken.

### **The Gandhian Programme :**

It was in this context that Mahatma Gandhi emerged with a new plan of action for Indian independence. Without going into details, we can say that the following were the important shaping influences on him. Christ's sermon on the Mount as interpreted by Tolstoy reinforced Gandhi's childhood convictions, which were engendered by the Jaina environment of his native Gujarat and by the doctrines of Vaishnava saints. The impossibility of Indians ever getting the unity and the military might that will enable them to throw the British out of India, along with the success of strikes, demonstrations and mass-meetings in Britain on many occasions made him forge a weapon which can be used for driving out foreigners. The attitudes of the 'extremists' like Tilak and others, the success of boycott and passive resistance in, especially, Bengal, and Aurobindo's doctrine of nationalism and passive resistance must also have influenced Gandhi. Moreover, the supreme merit of the weapon was that its use could be justified by invoking

the Buddha, Christ and the Vaishnava saints. The writings of men like Thoreau, and the experiences and martyrdoms of the weak but spiritually strong in history which in the end converted tyrants and despots, made him conceive of a new type of political action. The Gandhian method was not that of passivity or of non-resisting acquiescence in evil. The good man does not agree with what the wicked man says, however powerful the latter may be ; he does not also do whatever he is dictated to do by men in authority ; at the same time he does not fight with the evildoer. He sticks to his principles while seeing the opponents' point of view, and disagrees with the opponent without any fear. Refusal to do anything which is not in tune with his principles and convictions under any circumstances ; efforts to bring about a change of heart in the opponent without in anyway injuring him—these are what the good man will resort to. In seeking to convert the opponent one must be ready for suffering, taking care to see that the opponent does not suffer. Thus to bring about the opponent's conversion one must be ready to resist evil and violence only with love and tolerance. But at the same time one can subject oneself to all sorts of sacrifices and sufferings, in order that this may be an atonement for one's own sins, and so that it may also generate a spiritual force which will make the opponent reasonable and reconciling. It was by this kind of technique called 'Satyagraha' that Gandhi energised the Indian masses. The theory underlying it was believed to be in tune with Christianity and with some of the fundamental Indian beliefs. Gandhi claimed the *Gita* supported it. So it obtained general support both in the West and in India. It appeared to many that from the standpoints of religion and ethics there could be no criticism of it. The only general criticism of it was that it was impracticable. But after the second world

war when India became free without any revolution, the prestige of Gandhian ideology and technique went up very high. The temper of the people in India, international public opinion and lack of adequate power and resources to keep India within their empire made the British withdraw from India. It was true that the influence of Gandhi made Indians more or less fearless, made the educated and vocal sections yearn for freedom, and made the British will to power weak and waver. But subsequent to independence, it satisfied the pride of some patriotic Indians to claim that the non-violent struggle for independence under Gandhi's leadership was *solely* responsible for the freedom of India, though the political philosophy of Locke, Burke and Mill, British traditions, the changing pattern of power politics and international public opinion were as much responsible as Gandhi for the freedom of India. However the post-partition massacres and riots in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent showed Gandhi and the world that the doctrine of non-violence had as much influence in India as Christianity in Europe and that satyagraha was adopted by the majority of Indians as the only possible tactics to win independence.

### **Factors responsible for the formulation of Indian Foreign Policy :**

It can be said without any danger of contradiction that the foreign policy of Independent India has been shaped almost exclusively by Prime Minister Nehru. This does not mean that it is his arbitrary creation. As he often maintains in the Parliament, history, the present circumstances and recent Indian thinking are responsible for it. Although history and the situation in contemporary India provided the environment in which independent India's



foreign policy had to be shaped, it must be noted that it was quite possible to have another type of foreign policy, as is proved by the fact that some other South-East Asian countries and Pakistan chose to adopt different foreign policies. Pandit Nehru formulated the present policy out of free choice, though he was circumscribed by his own training, experience and convictions. This is to contend that Indian foreign policy is as much his creation as it is inherent in the history and thinking of India, in spite of the fact that he himself has tried to make out that it was the only inevitable policy in the circumstances. No policy is inevitable at any time and none the only possible one.

### **The Approach and Mentality of Pandit Nehru :**

Because Nehru is so much responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, it is important to keep in mind his own life and experience to arrive at a correct understanding of it. His autobiography and his recorded conversations with men like Cousins and Mende help us in this respect. He is a graduate of Harrow and Cambridge. At these places he was exposed to the influences of British political theories and practices and modern science. His approach consequently became empiricist and non-doctrinaire. The spirit of freedom which he imbibed in England and his close observation of the way parliamentary democracy works made him an uncompromising opponent of all forms of dictatorship and totalitarianism. He was one of the few men in Asia who understood correctly the nature of Fascism and Nazism and became their foe before and during the second world war. At the same time as a former public school boy and a student of geo-politics, pacifism never attracted him. Unremitting fight with every means at one's disposal against tyranny and dictatorship is a

course of action that appeals to him. It was because of this that he asked for support for the Allies and condemnation of the Japanese and the Germans during the second world war. From his youth he was attracted by socialism, the Fabians being the persons who seem to have inspired him. He later made a close study of Marx, visited Soviet Russia and came to believe that socialism in some form or other is the only way in which the poverty and misery of mankind can be eliminated. The modern writers who seem to have influenced him most were men like Shaw, Russell and Einstein. His interest in world history has led him to understand every problem in its perspective. But his scientific outlook has made him adopt an undogmatic attitude towards Marxism and socialism. He has many times asserted that though he wanted socialism he did not want the antiquated Marxian brand of it, which might have been relevant and good when Marx formulated it, but not now. Advancements in technology and development of scientific knowledge render political and social theories obsolete. Only a constant revision will bring them up to date and make them relevant and suitable. One's own experience, history and circumstances must give rise to suitable political theories and actions. This has been the guiding conviction of India's first Prime Minister as evidenced by his speeches and writings. But in addition to this empiricistic trend, there is another component in his theory. Like Russell and Wells, Nehru has also always been a bit starry-eyed and idealistic. His ultimate political ideal has been the establishment of a cosmopolitan world state in which inequality and poverty will be absent. Naturally one of the things he abhors most is the enslavement of one people by another people and one class by another class. Colonialism, capitalism and feudalism are violently hated by him.

One of the greatest influences on Nehru has been the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Although Gandhi's intuitionistic, rural and religious outlook, which does not like machines, material prosperity and modern forms of social and political organisation, is foreign to the mentality of Nehru, which is empiricist, analytic and in tune with the modern scientific spirit, Nehru found that Gandhian techniques were the only possible ways of political action for Indians fighting for freedom. Gandhi also taught him fearlessness and the importance of right means for right ends. The success which Gandhism achieved and his own hatred of violence and imperialism have made Nehru's foreign policy one that hates sabre-rattling, violence, aggression and tyranny in any form. The civilised methods of open discussion and reconciliation appeal to him more than threats, tensions and conflicts. It may also be added that while he has an ambivalent fascination for Advaita Vedanta, he seems to like the empiricist agnostic approach of Theravada Buddhism and the policies of Asoka more than he does Hinduism with its faith in Vedic authority, the caste system and Kautilyan politics. (In recent years ethics and spiritual values have become more important to him than before.) All these characteristics of Nehru's mind help us to rightly understand his foreign policy.

### **The purposes of Foreign Policy :**

In spite of all else that may be said, the foreign policy of a country must be primarily conducive to its own security and progress. No foreign minister can sacrifice his own country's interests in pursuance of other objectives. The major criterion therefore of a country's foreign policy is the coldly and rationally calculated national interests of

that country. When freedom came to India it was a backward country, industrially and technologically underdeveloped, but with pride in its glorious past and great civilisation. It was militarily very weak, and the partition of Pakistan and the holocaust that followed made it anaemic. The world situation that confronted it was that of the cold war. Two mighty countries almost equally strong, but with different ideologies were fighting, each trying to make its own way of living the universal way. In spite of the defeat of fascism and nazism, imperialism and racism were very much alive after the end of the second world war. Many of the African countries still remained colonies, and the idea that the brown, black and yellow races were inferior to the white was still dominant in Europe and America. It was in this context that India had to develop her foreign policy.

### III

#### **Foreign Policy and Security :**

Security was free India's paramount need. Militarily weak India could not be at logger-heads with any powerful country. Naturally therefore, India proclaimed its friendship for all countries, and practised it as far as possible. As Nehru said in his 1958 speeches in Parliament, by its friendship with all the countries, India sought to gain its security. This allowed India not to be obsessed by the danger of possible foreign invasions.

A backward country when it becomes free and adopts democracy as a way of its life thirsts for material prosperity. The problem of hunger and poverty becomes the basic problem, failing to solve which a politician cannot hope

to remain in power. World peace is the condition which enables nations to plan for prosperity. A state of war will not allow agriculture and industries to prosper. Peace is therefore a basic necessity for the development of backward countries. As a consequence of this India pleaded for the establishment of conditions which will usher in a stable world-order and peace. This cannot be achieved unless tensions are lessened. The chief factor responsible for tensions is the cold war. So in its own interests and the interests of other countries, India asked for a cessation of the cold war, and refused to join sides with either bloc.

### **Foreign Policy and Independence of International Political Action :**

A newly independent country will lose its potential importance in the councils of the world if it joins the camp of a powerful country. Knowing that it then will not have any independent policy of its own, other countries will tend to ignore its proclamations and aspirations. It will in course of time be treated as just a satellite. A new country which seeks influence in world councils must have freedom of political manoeuvre. In such a case that country can influence to some extent at least the policies of other countries and that country can also act in changing circumstances according to its best judgments. These considerations led India to keep aloof from both the power blocs.

### **Foreign Policy and Dependent countries :**

When a newly independent country is attempting to grow into the status of a big power commensurate with

its population and potential resources, it can have no natural sympathy for imperialistic countries and for countries which believe in racial superiority. Such a country would like to see the structure of the world society altered so that it and other countries may have equality in international councils. While natural sympathy will make a newly independent nation the champion of the liberation of subject nations, its desire to be treated as an equal will make it an opponent of racism. Another source of inequality of nations in international councils is the abysmal backwardness of some countries as against the material advancement of other countries. Quite naturally a newly independent underdeveloped country will urge for the abolition of backwardness and economic inequality among nations.

To sum up, security which will preserve national independence demands that a newly independent country should be on friendly terms with all other countries. The desire to retain independence of action in international relations and the urge to win respect for its own viewpoint in the world councils do not allow it to align itself with another powerful country. On the positive side the liberation of colonies, opposition to racism and progress of underdeveloped areas become the planks of its foreign policy.

### **The Two Aspects of Non-Alignment :**

Nehru has characterized Indian Foreign Policy as that of non-alignment. According to him, it has two aspects. On the one hand it avoids cold war and on the other hand it enables India to act as it thinks best. He believes that non-alignment is an independent and "positive" policy, which is definite and dynamic. (*Parliamentary speeches of 1958 and September 2, 1960.*) By non-alignment he

means only non-alignment with either of the two military blocs. Non-alignment is not isolation from what concerns freedom in any part of the world. As the Prime Minister proclaimed, "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral."

### **Is Non-Alignment Indifference ?**

Foreign commentators have often identified Indian non-alignment with indifference or neutrality. With a prime minister who is cosmopolitan in his outlook and who envisages the ideal of a world-state, it is preposterous to say that his policy is indifferent to what is going on outside his country. India is vitally interested in the freedom of other peoples, because it is a Republic based on adult franchise and a federal principle which unites almost autonomous states, and with a constitution guaranteeing to its citizens fundamental human rights. When freedom is menaced in another country, a militarily weak country can do little more than raising its voice against oppression and tyranny. Even the mighty U. S. A. did very little when the Hungarian Freedom movement was ruthlessly suppressed, in spite of all the talks of "rolling back communism". It is true that India had been tardy in raising its voice in time against the Hungarian massacre and the Tibetan rape, while its voice was prompt and strong whenever it was needed in support of a colonial country fighting against an imperialistic European country. This is because India understands the nature of colonialism and the way it sucks the life and the vitality of a people much better than it does the nature and goals of international communism. More will have to be said however on this at the end.

**Non-Alignment and Neutralism:**

Often Indian Policy has also been characterised as neutrality. Nehru has denied this vigorously. Before we agree or disagree with this, it is necessary to understand what neutrality is. (I am taking neutrality and neutralism as synonymous terms.) On the positive side neutrality involves the desire to keep one's country out of war with all the economic and moral decay that accompanies a war. On the negative side it involves the refusal of a state to associate itself with a belligerent state. The bases of neutrality are non-participation and sovereignty, and the determinants of neutrality are unconcern, passivity and disinterestedness. Only when a nation is self-sufficient and sovereign and only when there is a balance between its resources and population, can there be real neutrality. The plight of the Scandinavian countries which wished to be neutral during World War II shows that without internal strength and international decency there can be no neutrality. When giant states are struggling for world domination, neutrality as defined above, becomes impossible. In view of all this the one country which for a long time successfully practiced neutralism was the U. S. A. The policy of the Founding Fathers of the U. S. A. was neutralism. With his doctrine that U. S. A. should not enter into "entangling alliances", Washington supported the original policy. In spite of their disagreement on all domestic issues, Hamilton and Jefferson agreed on the neutralist theory of foreign policy. Between 1806 (Jefferson) and 1904 (Theodore Roosevelt) twentyone major proclamations were issued by successive American Presidents, reiterating neutralism. The most important development during this period was the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) that U. S. A. would have nothing to do with international politics as long as



it did not intrude into its hemisphere. During the Russo-Japanese crisis in 1904, Theodore Roosevelt applied the neutralist theory ; and again in 1935 when Fascist Italy went to war against Ethiopia, Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that "our duty and the interests of our country and humanity" require the U. S. A. "to remain aloof from disputes and conflicts, with which we have no direct concern." Secretary of State Stimson also maintained neutrality and non-belligerency as the pillars of American policy. In 1940, Roosevelt was still talking of "dynamic non-belligerency", and even in 1941 Roosevelt and Sumner Welles were able to issue only the Atlantic Charter, but not extend Lend-Lease to Britain though they knew that the victory of Nazism would destroy European civilisation. Some years later under the pressure of an attack on U. S. A., its isolationism broke, and it got fully involved in the second world war. It was in 1947 when Britain told U. S. A. that it could no more help preserve Greece and Turkey from communist attacks and infiltration that U.S.A. had to step in and fill the vacuum. So arose the Truman Doctrine and much later the Marshall Plan to build up European economy, for if Europe succumbed, Soviet Russia would have become *the* world power. In 1949 was formed the NATO, which finally ended American isolationism and neutrality. It can be seen from this that till American interests were endangered and till America was involved in all parts of the world, there was no talk about the "manifest destiny" of America to save the world and its duty to preserve liberty and human civilization all over the world. It must however be remembered that the philosophy of Locke and Jefferson implies that the freedom of any nation must be the concern of free people everywhere, and that it is the duty of a free country to rush to the aid of another country which is struggling

to maintain its freedom. (It was on this principle that in 1898 President McKenley helped the Cubans against the Spanish, and yet called it as the action of a "neutral".) But only a world power can afford to act on this principle, and only after the second world war U. S. A. is trying to act on this principle.

### **Non-Alignment Not Neutralism :**

From the above account, it should be clear that for a country which is newly independent and which has not yet carved for itself a position of power in the political structure of this world, the sensible thing is to keep out of direct involvement in conflicts that do not directly concern it. At the same time a free democratic country should not be indifferent to the suppression of the freedom of other peoples. The question of neutrality arises when there are two belligerent states fighting against each other and when it is possible for a third state to be of effective help to either of them. In a cold war when often the struggle is between ideologies, and when a state by joining either camp cannot in anyway resolve the situation, if that state remains unaligned, it cannot be charged with neutralism. Especially when a state is concerned with the achievement and preservation of freedom everywhere, and when it is prepared to lend its voice and its power for this task and for the cessation of hostility, that state is not certainly neutral. An active state ready to participate in world affairs and prepared to shoulder responsibilities cannot be neutral.

The readiness of India to shoulder responsibility in Korea, in Laos and in the Congo shows that India's policy is not indifferent and passive when peoples' lives and freedom are in danger. When the sending of troops abroad

to protect the freedom of other peoples was authorised by the legally processed rules and decisions of a world community, India did not hesitate to respond to the challenge. In situations where this was not possible and when the call did not come from the world community, India had to content itself with condemning nations which in its opinion were aggressive and imperialistic. Inasmuch as passivity and disinterestedness towards the freedom and well-being of other peoples do not characterise Indian policy, it is not neutralism. At the same time, beyond raising its voice, the world situation and its military weakness do not permit India to be always an effective force. Aware of its weakness, its urgent domestic concerns and the world situation which will worsen if conflicting tendencies are sharpened, India has put her faith in getting together, discussion, conciliation and mediation, as general principles in world affairs. It may be brought as an accusation against India that when its immediate interests are involved, it has not cared for these general principles. Kashmir is cited often as an instance to prove this. With the present system of nation-states in the world, when the territorial integrity of a nation is involved in dispute, there can be no compromise. About this more will be said in Part Two.

### **Panchasila and Non-Alignment :**

At the beginning of this essay it has been pointed out that there were in India two types of approaches to foreign policy from very early times, though one of them was meant only for states within India. It has been already said that the Gandhian approach is close to the autochthonous Indian approach rather than to the Indo-Aryan. Because of the prestige which Gandhism obtained in post-

independent India and because of Nehru's greater liking for Buddhist humanism and Asokan ideology in general, *real-politik* and Machiavellian tactics have been in disfavour ; whereas concern for safe-guarding the newly won independence and the need for peaceful development have made India formulate the *Panchasila* : non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. *Panchasila* is only a consequence of non-alignment. It was first formulated in the preamble to the agreement between China and India in 1954, and later India jointly with many other countries affirmed it. In an earlier book I have discussed *Panchasila* at length.

#### IV

##### **Non-Alignment based on convictions, not expediency :**

The sincerity that underlies India's adherence to non-alignment is demonstrated by its continuing adherence even after the Chinese attack on India. Nehru has defended non-alignment by rightly maintaining that if a policy is the correct one, it does not lose its value merely because a nation which previously professed adherence to it, has now turned traitor to it. He has called the talk of leaving this policy as "utterly wrong and useless." To invoke foreign armed aid to defend India in this context is, according to him, to forget its history and jeopardise freedom and shatter its place in the world. (*Speech of September 23, 1959*). To conclude this trend of thought, his position seems to be that since India does not want war or the approaches to war, there is no reason for it to belong to

any one side. While doing what it considers to be right, it reserves to itself the right to disagree with others. (*Speech of September 2, 1960*).

**The Cold War based on a Monistic Approach : Pluralism a Fact :**

The cold war approach ignores the fact of the unity of humanity and the possibility of human beings living in a variety of ways with different social and political organisations. To think that one's own way of life is the best and that the others are wrong and immoral is arrogant. On the basis of experience and logic no particular way of life can be demonstrated to be the only right one. Even when one is convinced that a particular way of life is good, if he wants others to adopt it, the civilized way would be to persuade them through one's own example and argument and not by force. In this context, to think that there are only two possible ideologies and only two ways of international political action, is to place a limitation on one's powers of thought. Truth may be multiple and it is a lop-sided view which sees that there could be only two ideologies. Even in the present-day world there are more than two ideologies, but because of the power behind them only two of them seem to be the contenders. Just as not to belong to either Islam or Christianity is not immoral, it is possible for a country not to subscribe to either the communistic or the Western capitalistic credo and yet have a right kind of foreign policy. This does not mean that both these ideologies are right, but that even if one of them is better, there need not be a crusade on behalf of it. If presented with right arguments and convincing evidence of the good results that it can achieve, people if given the freedom, will choose that system which gives a

hope of better living. It is possible for some to maintain that one of these ideologies is the final truth which can neither be doubted nor questioned, but short of a revelation or omniscience nothing can substantiate such a position. Human experience and history are constantly developing ; men's knowledge of the world is also ever growing. Experience, history and knowledge of facts have been interpreted in diverse ways and as man is a free, creative being, there are still possibilities of new interpretations of these. In view of this, no ideology, religion or culture that has so far been discovered can claim to be universal, final and perfect. Further, even if two ideologies are mutually contradictory and even if they are exhaustive alternatives, it is not necessary that one of them should be adopted. It is possible to have a dialectical approach and attempt to transcend them in a new synthesis. This means that it may be possible to envisage a scheme of ideas which will synthesize parliamentary democracy and freedom on the one hand, and equality, social and economic, on the other hand.

### **Alignment spells loss of freedom :**

By belonging to one of the two blocs a country will lose much of its identity. A number of people would be ready to concede that a non-aligned country like Cambodia, Ghana, or Israel has greater freedom in shaping its international relations than countries which are members of the blocs. Besides, this loss entails the destruction of the freedom to think in the realm of international politics. Non-alignment will serve a country's interests better. Against the centralistic tendencies of the power blocs, non-alignment upholds decentralization and emphasizes the self-determination of states. In times of crisis the non-

aligned states may be of possible use as mediating factors, whereas in normal times they serve as a discouragement to the intensification of the cold war, and constitute a moderate public opinion for the power blocs. In spite of the formation of blocs after the second world war, if there is still room for independent foreign policies, it is because India and some other countries have not inserted themselves into either bloc.

### Is Non-Alignment balancing ?

Opposition parties in India and foreign critics have often condemned Indian foreign policy as that of sitting on the fence. Now this is an entirely wrong way of judging this policy because it mistakenly presupposes that there are only two ways of action possible in this world. As Nehru made it clear (*vide 1958 Parliamentary speeches*), he would have joined one of the blocs if he believed this ; but according to him there are more than two possibilities. In another speech of his he has maintained that non-alignment is not an acrobatic feat of balancing between two different sides sitting on a spiked fence, but its goal is to uproot the fence and throw it away. (*Speech of September 2, 1960*)

In a speech in Calcutta University in early July 1963, Minister Asoke Sen, a legal authority, described Indian policy as "Neutrality" and said India was a pioneer in adopting this at the time of a cold war. In a cold war also, he is reported to have said, there is a state of belligerency, as there are tensions, and neutrality attempts to 'balance' them. Indian policy from the beginning has been positive neutrality. As the cold war is likely to be permanent, the concept of neutrality, he suggested, has to be remodelled. It is surprising that an Indian cabinet minister

should have thus interpreted our foreign policy. First of all, the formulator of this policy has several times stated that it is not neutrality, not even positive neutrality, and that he disliked the word 'neutral' very much. (*Speech at Madras on April 14, 1959 ; Press statement in New York on Oct. 4, 1960 ; Lok Sabha speech on November 22, 1960*). Secondly, while powers may be balanced, tensions cannot be balanced. Thirdly, Indian foreign policy is not at all trying to balance anything, if the Prime Minister is to be believed. India has not, so to say, sat on a hedge without having the courage to come down this or that side. It has committed itself to many things, only it is not committed to one of the two military blocs. Its policy is not isolationism.

#### **The World consists of Peaceful as against Expansive States :**

A correct understanding and representation of the world situation cannot be had by conceiving the world as divided into two clear-cut divisions, communist and anti-communist. That, as Nehru said, is an oversimplification which has no relation to facts and confuses understanding. The clue to the comprehension of the world situation is to think of national rivalries and of some states which are expansive, or want to expand (*Speech of September 23, 1959*). A careful study of the past diplomatic history of countries and an analysis of the objectives and motives which underlie foreign policies as a result of the different cultures and living laws of various peoples is necessary for the correct understanding of the contemporary world situation.

#### **Other factors responsible for Non-Alignment :**

It has already been said that because India needs peace for development, it has been steering clear of all entangling



alliances. In addition to this, by history and temperament, the majority of Indians have a horror of concerning themselves with the affairs of other peoples. Ancient Hindu foreign policy was one of isolationism. It may be said Hindu ethics has been individualistic rather than social. The Gita teaches, according to Gandhi, *anasakti*, non-attachment ; Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta ask us to regain our true nature—to be mere detached spectators (*saksi*) of the world-show. Jainism tells us that *all* doctrines are partial truths and all assertions only probable. Asokan edicts speak highly of tolerance of all views and the importance of the actual well-being of people. These attitudes when transferred to the international sphere result in confirming neutralist tendencies and in trying to keep one's country as a political monad, whereas other concepts such as "the whole world is one family" (*vasudhaiva kutumbakam*), "the good of all beings" (*sarvabhutahita*) and "the welfare of the world" (*lokasamgraha*) tend to make Indian policy a dynamic one concerned with the freedom and welfare of people all over the world, and do not allow it to become neutralism.

Unlike the Western countries which have been practising diplomacy for some centuries, India did not have much of diplomatic history. The reason for this is the geographical isolation of India and its not having independence in the recent past. As a result of this, India has inherited no record of hostility or special alliance with any country. So it is relatively more free from prejudices than some other countries with long diplomatic histories. Another point to be considered is it may be silly for a country without military might to try to interfere in the affairs of other countries, because many will not heed its advice and warning ; yet many times India spoke out without mincing matters.

**Non-Alignment permits an experimental attitude :**

So in terms of the vital interests of India, and on its own merits non-alignment has been freely chosen as its policy. This enables India to adopt a non-doctrinaire experimental approach towards international problems. As it keeps itself aloof from the power blocs and contending ideologies, it is free to be a mediating force in congenial situations. This has enabled India to combine enlightened self-interest with a touch of idealism in most cases. This does not mean however that all the details of its foreign policy have been completely based upon altruistic moral principles. To give but two examples, it has been unable to recognize Israel for fear that it may anger the Arab states ; and its stand regarding the Cuban episode was not as forthright as that regarding the Suez crisis.

**Non-Alignment and External Aggression :**

It may be brought as a criticism against Indian policy that while problems of defence required its joining one of the blocs, its not joining has left it weak. The two possible dangers for a country are from without and from within. India is militarily weak to defend itself against any powerful aggressive country. But at the same time it is potentially great because of its size, resources and population. If the Indians have the necessary will, ability and unity of purpose, they can rally tremendous psychological strength and can be very strong in the negative sense of the term. This means that India can resist aggression and can make things difficult for the invading armies. Not being a little country, or even a highly industrialized country, its population is widely dispersed. It is not congregated in a few cities which can be wiped out by a few atom bombs. So the threat of nuclear warfare is not so grave for India, China,

or the U. S. A., as for small countries like England, Sweden or the Philippines. Further, because of its geography India is not in the way of either bloc and there is no necessity either for it or for the blocs that it should join one of them. Some think such a necessity has arisen because of Chinese aggression. This point I will discuss in Part Two. By keeping itself strictly to what concerns it, India hoped that others too would find no ground to interfere in its affairs. Lastly, the newly strengthened nationalism does not permit a newly independent country to put itself at the beck and call of another country.

#### **Non-Alignment and Internal subversion :**

As far as the internal danger of infiltration is concerned, alignment cannot save a country from it. Vietnam and China are example of this. Infiltration will be possible when there is a vacuum in people's minds. Habits of freedom in both thinking and doing things will be the only adequate bulwark against infiltration. Again an ideology can appeal to people if it promises to do something for them which is not already being done. The great merit of communism is that it promises abolition of poverty and establishment of an economic democracy. In India the noncommunist parties have already adopted this as their goal and the ruling party is seeking to achieve it through parliamentary methods. Insofar as these efforts are successful and subversive internal and foreign propaganda and activity are disallowed, violent upheavals can have no appeal to Indians. Locke rightly pointed out long ago that toleration should not be extended to those who are not prepared to extend it to others. He also held that those who owed allegiance to a foreign power cannot claim toleration for themselves from their state.

As I said elsewhere, "if a religious or secular ideology which does not tolerate anything that is at variance with it is tolerated, it may soon become dominant in society. Thus complete toleration may lead to its own destruction." (*Studies in the Problems of Peace*, p. 331.)

### **Alignment of no value in the present context :**

Critics of non-alignment must also have an adequate answer to the following question. How does alignment save a country? In these days of polaris submarines, missiles and rockets a country can be wiped out by long-distance bombing before its strong friends can come to its help. Also, alignment of small countries with the super-powers does not seem to benefit the latter, because the weak countries become a burden, as they have to be supplied with arms and defended. And in order that they may not be lured away by the other bloc, the satellite countries have to be given continuous economic and technical assistance, which is bound to be a burden for the great powers. A satellite country cannot in these days be of much use as a strategic base because of the development in the techniques of guided weapons and long-distance bombing. The mutual fear of the super-powers will to a large extent keep them from committing aggressions against the small countries. It, therefore, seems to be a wise thing not to join any bloc but to take all defensive measures, remaining independent and calm.

### **The utility of Non-Alignment :**

In addition to the fact that alignment has no value, non-alignment has proved itself to be an utilitarian policy. A non-aligned country is apt to be wooed by both the

contending power blocs. For retaining friendship with it, and influencing it, both the great powers may be readily willing to give it all possible economic and technical assistance. Recent histories of countries like Cambodia, Ceylon and India have proved this.

### **Peace and Stability without Alignment :**

If we analyse the causes of tensions in Asia, Africa and Europe they seem to be mainly three. (1) The suppression of the freedom of one people by another. Whether it is Hungary and Tibet, or Algeria and Angola, the question of communism *versus* non-communism, does not enter into the picture, but only the question of tyranny and dictatorship. It must be also realised that old-style colonialism is not yet dead, while there is also such a thing as communist neo-imperialism. (2) Inequality based upon race is another persistent cause for tension. Here again as incidents in U. S. A., and South Africa showed, communism does not seem to be the culprit. Nor has communism abolished colour prejudice, as some recent disgusting incidents in Moscow have shown. (3) The misery and want of millions when they are awakened to the fact that others are living in plenty, is another main cause for unrest and tension. It is in such contexts that the problem of communism *versus* non-communism assumes importance. If irrespective of the interpretations of history it is recognized that poverty and misery are evils to be eradicated, then communism will have no advantage over its competitors. In the uncommitted nations the important thing is to realize that poverty is an evil that must be removed in the shortest time possible and to take necessary steps. If this can be achieved by parliamentary

democratic means, there will be no danger of these countries becoming victims of infiltration, and as for aggression from outside, as already said, international public opinion and the almost equal strength of the power blocs will effectively prevent it.

### **Possibility of co-existence :**

Those who believe in human rationality and goodness must also agree that persuasion and convincing examples will carry weight with most people. In view of this it is rational to see that the cold war attitude of recrimination, threats and armaments competition is gradually made to vanish by the slow building up of mutual reconciliation and confidence. Non-aligned countries could help to bring in such an atmosphere through the U. N. O. and otherwise. It is not necessary that reconciliation should require surrender of principles. If the great powers yield on details, shed the desire to construct their own global hegemonies and make it a rule never to send abroad their armies except when the legally valid decisions of the U. N. require it, then it is not impossible for ideologies and great powers to co-exist in peace. Reconciliation can thus proceed through a synthesis of conflicting views. The experience of independent India in solving the problems of native states and zamindaris shows that it is not necessary that revolution and violence should take place to bring in an egalitarian society. Similarly, peaceful pressure and friendliness and goading by the great powers may remove many tensions and conflicts. It is well-known how the combined attitude of Russia and the U. S. A. solved the Suez crisis, while the courage of Kennedy and the wisdom of Khrushchev averted a possible nuclear war over Cuba.

### **Foreign criticism of Indian Policy :**

When we examine the foreign criticism of Indian foreign policy, it seems to be arising out of chagrin and out of the fear of some countries which have vested interests in other countries. The anti-imperialistic and anti-doctrinaire approach of Indian policy seems to be an irritant which is responsible for the misdirected criticism of it.

### **The Eastern and Western Blocs not just Black and White : Non-Alignment fully ethical :**

In the above account, it has been presumed that truth is multiple and that several different ways of the good life are possible both in politics and social organization. But even if we take the principle of contradiction for granted and believe that democracy and totalitarianism are contradictory like light and darkness, they are not represented by the two blocs of today in a clear-cut manner. Communism is not just totalitarianism, otherwise it would not appeal to so many millions of people, and could not have instilled into millions a sense of purpose and directed their energies to some worthwhile goals. Moreover, it could not have been also responsible for the great developments in science and technology in the communist countries if it were mere dictatorship. The increase in standards of living of Central Asia, Mongolia and China and the many developments in public health and administration that have occurred there, belie the allegation that communism is an unqualified dictatorship like Nazism and Fascism. Similarly, freedom and democracy cannot be totally identified with the Western bloc. There is such a thing as capitalistic expansionism even as there is a communistic empire. The Western tolerance of Fascism in Africa, its support

of dictatorships in some European, Asian and Latin American countries, the British Suez adventure as well as the U. S. attempt on Cuba and their bombings of Yemeni and Korean villages and the hesitation which all the Atlantic powers have shown towards the liquidation of colonialism demonstrate that the Western bloc is not always overfond of democracy, human rights and the principle of self-determination. Neither of the two blocs is the representative of light, nor the other that of darkness. "No government or social system", pointed out President Kennedy on June 10, 1963, in a Washington speech, "is so evil that its people must be considered to be lacking in virtue". He also recognised that "mutual abhorrence of war" is a "trait" common to the U. S. A. and Soviet Russia. In this situation to charge uncommitted nations with having adopted an unethical attitude is foolish.



# PART TWO

## SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES

### A

#### Goa Action

##### **Gandhi and Goa :**

All over the world Mahatma Gandhi is known for his advocacy of non-violence ; by and large India's struggle for independence was non-violent, and the British transfer of power peaceful, "one of the greatest acts of reconciliation in history" as President Radhakrishnan called it sometime back. India's advocacy of peaceful methods in solving all international disputes was considered to be an irrevocable principle of its conduct, and until the Goa action India's record of international activity, it is agreed by all, corresponded to its professions. Inasmuch as Goa was a part of India, the liberation of Goa was not really international action, but as this had to do something with Portugal and as our External Affairs Ministry dealt with Goa till a few days back, in a way it was an international issue. The Goa action came as a great shock to many in the West because of the image of India in their minds as a nation of peace and non-violence, and of Nehru as a statesman who stood for moral principles in politics. If a similar action had been taken by another country and another statesman, say, by China and Mao with regards to Formosa or Macao, the intensity of the shock, the resentment and the condemnation would have been much less.

Thus in a way the spirited criticisms in the West of the Goa action were a tribute to India and Nehru.

But at the same time it must be remembered that Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence is neither simple nor entirely pacifist. Forty years ago Gandhi wrote that we need not eschew violence in dealing with robbers, thieves, or nations who invade India. (*Young India*, Sept. 29, 1924.) Gandhi applied the principles of non-violence to the needs of the Indian freedom struggle as conceived by him. In the first world war he recruited soldiers for the British, as he thought the sacrifice of Indian soldiers in defence of the British empire would strengthen the fight for freedom within that empire. In the second world war, he was against India's participation in it, because in the circumstances then the threat of an opposition to the British war effort would, he believed, strengthen the Indian struggle for independence ; yet during certain phases of the second world war he allowed the Congress to negotiate with the British on the basis of participation in the war, though he personally kept himself aloof so that he could remain free to launch a struggle against the British if necessary. He never advocated absolute non-violence without a consideration of the circumstances, and he also realised that what India practiced under his leadership was the non-violence of the weak, as he called it. As mentioned by Maulana Azad in his autobiography, the resolution of the Indian National Congress Working Committee passed on July 14, 1942, which must have had Gandhi's approval, implied that if the British government arrested the Congress leaders, people were free to adopt any method, violent or non-violent. The Kashmir operation in 1947 was approved by Gandhi. He also repeatedly said that while it was best to resist evil non-violently, it was better to fight than to give in from cowardice or apathy.

It is better to fight with a sword, he thought, than to have a sword in one's heart. In 1946 he wrote much on Goa. Maintaining that "in free India, Goa, the little Portuguese settlement, cannot be allowed to exist as a separate entity in opposition to the laws of the free state", (*Harijan*, June 30, 1946) he declared : "The hands of imperialism are always dyed red", (*op. cit.*, Sept. 8, 1946) "the blood of the innocent (civil resisters) will cry out from their tombs or their ashes" with a voice "more potent than that of the living." (*op. cit.*, Sept.) Finally, Gandhi never hoped that non-violence would be ever accepted as a state policy ; nor did he think a modern state based on force could accept it. (*Satyagraha*, p. 385 ; *For the Pacifists*, p. 42-4.)

#### **Nehru's Views on non-violence and the Goa Action :**

As he himself said, Nehru did not give "an absolute allegiance to the doctrine of non-violence or accept it for ever". (*Glimpses of World History*, (1934), Vol. II, p. 1124.) Addressing the Institute of Pacific Relations at Lucknow on October 3, 1950, he admitted that while Gandhi preached non-violence and they followed him "to some extent", they "did not understand him". "We see around us" he continued, "a world full of violence. Our government maintains an army, a navy and an air-force and we are often constrained to have recourse to violence. The efficacy of non-violence is not entirely convincing. None of us would dare in the present state of the world to do away with instruments of organised violence. While I grant that we must keep armies, it is also true that armed forces have not solved the problems for which violence is offered as a solution." On July 26, 1955 in the Lok Sabha he said the government of India was not pledged to non-violence, and no government could be. On December 28,

1961 after the Goa action, he reiterated that while India's policy is to "try to encourage the forces of peace and settle problems peacefully", "in the present-day world it is not possible for any nation to adopt a policy of non-violence". (*The Indian Express*, December 29, 1961.) [If "force" is distinguished from "violence", much of the confused thinking about non-violence will be avoided. See my book, *Studies in the Problems of Peace*, (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960) p. 267-277.] Thus Indian government never claimed to have entirely renounced violence for all purposes. Nehru's justification for the Goa action was that a dead-end was reached in India's dealings with Portugal and every other means was exhausted, and so ultimately India had to resort to the lesser evil of force against the greater one of colonialism in our land with all the violence, injustice and aggression it involved. Yet, he frankly admitted that the "military approach was alien to our culture and traditions" and what was done was "repugnant to the genius of the land" and his "own personal convictions". He was great enough to confess that by this "something has been lost in terms of our philosophy of peaceful solution to all such problems". (*Blitz*, Dec. 30, 1961.)

### **Background to Goa Action :**

In September 1955 in the Lok Sabha, Nehru declared that the solution of the Goa problem "must be" by peaceful methods, as otherwise "the roots of our policies and our behaviour will be given up". Since then India made many fruitless efforts to negotiate with Portugal, and bring pressure on it through countries like Britain. The U. N. General Assembly passed a resolution that there should be no colonies left in the world, but no action was taken by

any colonial power on this. The Secretary-General of the U. N. urged Portugal and India to negotiate on this matter in accordance with the U. N. Charter and resolutions, but Portugal replied that it was prepared only to negotiate on the basis of Goa being a part of its territory and on the basis of the co-existence of its territories and India *for ever*. Because it would be argued that such things were the internal matters of colonial countries, their peaceful solution through the U. N. would have been impossible even if the matter had been raised in it, especially as Britain and other colonial powers would have supported this stand. International Law as it stood provided no remedy, for it was largely a Western creation suited to the national interests and ambitions of Western powers and their domination over colonial lands. Besides, Portugal held Goa to be a part of its territory and claimed as much sovereignty over it and its people as at home and refused any discussion of this point. Above all, there was a widespread belief in India that the Atlantic Charter powers had planned to convert Goa into a military base and thus bring the cold war directly into this country. It was in this context that India decolonised Goa.

### **Appraisal of the Goa Action :**

It is possible to view the Goa action as a "direct breach" of the U. N. Charter and international law, as Adlai Stevenson and Lord Home did. If the letter of the Charter and international law as it stands are considered to be more important than their spirit, and if maintenance of peace everywhere at any cost is more important than the acceleration of the independence of colonies, the Goa action is certainly unjustifiable. But it is difficult to agree with Rajagopalachari that it was "clap-trap" and that India

thereby had lost the moral power to raise its voice against the use of military power. (*Indian Express, Dec. 27, 1961.*) It can only be argued that as a result of this, India should logically extend this attitude to the liberation of all other colonies and has no right to advise any colonial people that they should achieve their independence under all circumstances only through non-violent methods such as civil disobedience or *satyagraha*. Logically India now cannot say that military power should not be used for the liberation of colonies ; but it can still certainly and consistently condemn military action in other cases. When the oppressors and the imperialists, whoever they are, show no signs of humanheartedness and readiness to abdicate their ill-gained power or possessions, the down-trodden (including the untouchables in India and the Negroes in U. S. A., or South Africa) have the right to rebel and overthrow them. Also, free countries have the duty and the right to aid in the liberation of colonial and captive peoples wherever they may be, whether in Africa and Asia, in Eastern Europe, or in Western Europe and Latin America. This is in accordance with the philosophy of Locke, Jefferson, Tom Paine, and Lincoln, and surprisingly, also Marx. (*I have discussed this at length in loc. cit., pp. 244-50.*) Indian political theory too admits peoples' right to tyrannicide and revolution, when necessary. But in international relations it is often impossible to proceed on the basis of logic, idealism and altruism.

As Harold Wilson (on Jan. 3, 1962) and Henry Kissinger (on Jan. 6, 1962) pointed out, there was no doubt that Goa was a colony and a part of India, and that Portugal was not prepared to give it up and that the U. N. could not have solved this problem, even if the issue was referred to it, because Portugal would have claimed that it was an internal matter. As the Italian journal *AVANTI* commen-

ted, the Goa action was like Garibaldi's invasion of Italy with his 1000 men a hundred years ago, which destroyed the oppressive Bourbon regime and brought unity to Italy. Still, as Harold Wilson rightly pointed out, while the Goa action could be understood, the same methods and words could be used by any aggressor for "less justifiable purposes". Lastly, as Kissinger hinted, the action was taken in "a precipitate manner" ; "India might have waited another year for another U. N. resolution on the subject". As no action was taken against the aggressors on the northern border and as the Goa action was taken just before a General Election, some opposition leaders and newspapers in India somewhat uncharitably called it an "election stunt". All political activity in democratic countries is based on a consideration of victory in general elections and that is as it ought to be.

Goa's merger with India may not have been liked by some vested interests ; but it must be remembered that when the U. S. A. and India became independent and shook off their colonial yokes there were many in both the countries who resented the new order of things. Goa has a sub-culture of its own, because of its Catholic majority, its four centuries old colonial rule of a different type from the British and its own language, Konkani, which some say is only a dialect. Goa cut off for some centuries from the mainstream of national life has developed distinctive features of its own ; so without destroying its regional culture and the good it absorbed from its contact with Portugal, by democratic processes and through constitutional methods it must be gradually integrated with India. The retention of Goa as a separate state or its incorporation as a district in one of the neighbouring states is not an important issue, though linguism and chauvinism demand that the latter should become a *fait accompli* at once. To

develop Goa's economy and to enable its people to function democratically and live a free life as citizens of this great republic ought to be the most important concern of Goans and the government of India. For the first time in its history in December 1963, Goa had free general elections ; thus a first step in this direction was taken. This coming of democracy to Goa and the extension to its people of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution have more than justified the Goa action. This action, however, would have been unnecessary if Britain and the U. S. A., had forced Salazar to liberalise and democratise his rule in Goa and to agree to free Goa by gradual changes after negotiations with India. The West was as much responsible for the Goa action as India. However it is also time for India to bury the past, extend a hand of friendship to the Portuguese people and normalise its diplomatic relations with their government. Surely Salazar is not more diabolical than Mao. India needs friends and next to Spain, Portugal has a great influence in Latin America.

## B

### SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

#### **Background to India-China Relationship :**

As was stated in Part I of this paper, independent India wanted to be on friendly terms with all countries. Our government specially planned to cultivate friendly relations with (1) England and the Commonwealth, (2) the U. S. A, (3) the Soviet Union, (4) the Afro-Asian nations, and, most important of all, (5) China, "that mighty country



with a mighty past, our neighbour", which "has been our friend through the ages". (*Nehru's Broadcast, Sep. 7, 1946.*) Although Moscow in the earlier years scorned Indian independence and non-alignment, and though new China from the beginning rejected Indian policy, holding the view that "to sit on the fence is impossible", as "neutrality is a camouflage", and "a third road does not exist" (*Mao's message to the C. P. I. in 1949*), India tried to be friendly with both the blocs. In the early years of Indian independence China did not recognise this independence, considered India still as a colony and Nehru a stooge of imperialism. It was Nehru's greatness he ignored all this and put *raison d'état* above all. The writings and speeches of Nehru before his assumption of office and also since he became Prime Minister show that China always fascinated him very much. He was greatly attracted—and rightly in my opinion—to its culture and traditions. He once wrote : Confucian teaching made the Chinese "the most courteous and perfect-mannered and cultured in the world." "In China there has never been any autocracy or privileged class." "China has never been the slave of religion and has not had any priestly hierarchy". "There are many other differences (besides race, outlook and culture, between India and China) and yet there is a strange unity between India and eastern and southeastern Asia". (*Nehru on World History, (ed) S. K. Padover, Bodley Head, London, pp. 10, 43, 131.*) Of course, none of these statements of Nehru are entirely correct. He dreamt of a new awakened Asia in which China and India would coexist in mutual friendship and respect, working out their individual national destinies and arranging their internal affairs as they thought best without mutual interference. This was a noble and beautiful dream, which if realised would have been the salvation of Asia. Unfortunately it was not shared by

the other party and this was conclusively proved only in October 1962.

Nehru, however, never "misunderstood" China ; he knew its history, its "greatness", its being a "world power or would be world power", "a mighty power" "sitting on our borders". (*Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Delhi, 1961, pp. 368, 375. All page references infra are to this book.*) China and India, he said, are next to each other and have to remain so for millennia to come. He knows that the Chinese "national trait" is "a onetrack mind" ; "from fairly early in history they had a sensation of greatness" and considered the rest of the world to be at a lower level fit only to pay tribute to it. (p. 263). This was "encouraged by the semi-isolation in which revolutionary China grew up" since its establishment. (p. 367). Having visited Communist China, Nehru also knew at firsthand its intense nationalism, and its highly centralised form of government which rules the country by expeditious, efficient and unquestionable decrees, which cannot be criticised by its people. (pp. 308-12). It was his policy to develop friendly relations with China even before the communists came to power there. As he rightly considered the revolution there to be "basic" and "stable", India recognized the Communist Chinese government. (p. 368). Even in the early years of the Chinese Republic, Nehru knew that "from the very first day this problem about our frontier was before us". (p. 377). But India did not raise it with China in "an acute form", and our government remained content with declaring its position in the Parliament and elsewhere. The Chinese did not challenge this, and our government after careful consideration felt that time would confirm its position and if in the future "a challenge" came, it would be in a better position to meet it. (*loc. cit.*)

**Tibet and Sino-Indian Relations : A Re'sume' :**

The British Indian government sent an expedition to Tibet in 1904, which imposed itself on Tibet, stationed troops there and acquired extra-territorial rights. This stationing of troops continued ever since even after independence came to India ; and postal and telegraph installations and rest houses established by the British Indian government continued to be the concern of the Indian government. After the Communists came to power in China, the Chinese army entered Tibet in 1950, and the question of Indian extra-territorial rights in Tibet was raised. The Indian government willingly gave these up, withdrew its army detachments, handed over installations and rest houses to China, and finally in 1954 entered into an agreement for protecting the Indo-Tibetan pilgrim traffic and trade, which incorporated the "panchasila". (pp. 313, 322.)

When the Chinese first began to talk about "liberating" Tibet, as the Indian government thought "Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was a historical fact" which it recognised, it could do not do anything beyond conveying to China its hope that the matter would be settled peacefully and in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people. (pp. 302-303). Responses to this were not very courteous, still China replied the matter will be settled peacefully. In 1959 the Indian public came to learn that the Chinese had penetrated into Ladakh and built roads and airfields there by 1957, although the Indian government knew something about this from October 1957 and began sending protests. Meanwhile in 1959 there was a revolution in Tibet which was ruthlessly suppressed by China, although previously the Chinese government many times declared that though Tibet was a part of their state, it was not a province but an "autonomous region". In April 1959 the Dalai Lama

and Tibetan refugees fled to India and received asylum. Subsequently thousands of these refugees poured in. Deep resentment was expressed by many in India at these happenings, and there were rallies and demonstrations condemning the Chinese. Border violations by the Chinese in Nefa area thereafter (especially after August 1959) grew more frequent and open. All these incursions in Ladakh and Nefa were preceded by showing Indian territory as part of China in Chinese maps, and when India protested the reply was given that they were just reproductions of old maps and could be revised if necessary in future. In April 1960 the Prime Ministers of the two countries met ; later official teams visited each other's countries, discussed and produced reports. Meanwhile border incursions and penetrations by the Chinese continued, along with allegations that it was always the Indians who were trespassing into the Chinese territory. With inadequate equipment and while unprepared militarily, the Indian government tried to resort to premature action to overthrow the aggressors, as it was stung and goaded by the opposition political parties and wide-spread sentiment in the nation. As the highest authority in the land said, all this was a miscalculation and a blunder. In October 1962 came as a climax the large-scale Chinese invasion, the Indian military debacle, and then the unilateral cease-fire.

### **Explanation of Chinese Behaviour :**

There has been some sort of mutual suspicion between the Chinese and the Indian governments since 1950 when memoranda were exchanged between them on the occasion of the Chinese armies entering Tibet. The Chinese believed (maybe they only alleged without believing) that the Indian

government was a stooge of the British government and that India sent these notes on the advice of the British, and from the beginning the Chinese notes to India on Tibet were never polite. The Chinese wanted to consolidate their position in Tibet militarily, and sure of not being detected and professing "panchasila" and lasting friendship, they slowly penetrated into Ladakh. Later when the Tibetan revolution came in 1959, they alleged Kalimpong was its centre and that it had the Government of India's support. The asylum given to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees infuriated the Chinese. They with their type of society could not also understand how in India there could be so much criticism and so many demonstrations without the government inspiring them. China's bellicosity and invasion were due to the following reasons : (1) It never believed in coexistence ; war with noncommunist countries is, it thinks, inevitable. (2) It thinks boundary questions and territorial disputes, which are a legacy of imperialism, may be settled by force. (3) It wanted to divert its peoples' attention from internal tensions and crises. (4) It wanted to impress other countries with its power and acquire glory. (5) By upsetting India's plans and economy, it wished to prove that its own type of society was superior. It thereby hoped to acquire leadership in Asia. (6) It is possible that by a successful conquest of India and its "liberation," it wished to disprove Soviet "revisionist" tendencies and assume leadership of the Communist bloc. (7) It abhorred the Indian way of life, and thought the Indian government will fall like a rotten fruit and that communists will assume power.\* (8) It hoped that as India was non-aligned, the West would not rush to its

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\*According to S. A. Dange, "the root-cause of the border dispute would appear to be political and ideological attitudes",

aid, while Russia would be forced to support China to preserve socialist unity. (9) It could not repress its inherited tendency to be expansionistic and assimilative of neighbouring countries. Events proved that China miscalculated and committed a stupid blunder.

### **Reasons for Indian Policy :**

From 1950 to some extent and more clearly from 1954, the Indian government knew that China might become a danger to this country. But as Nehru confessed in Parliament, there was nothing India could do. Whether India recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet or not, China came to occupy Tibet and was not going to leave it. It must also be remembered that in conversations with Nehru, Chou En-Lai assured him that they did not think the McMahon Line to be valid as it was laid down by British imperialism, but that they recognised it because of long usage and friendship with India. If the border problem had been raised in an acute manner and pressed, "the breaking point" would have come then itself and "trouble on the frontier would have come immediately". (p. 377-8). India hoped to develop itself industrially and technologically in a peaceful way and consolidate its position in the world before such troubles with a powerful neighbour were allowed to erupt. Besides, India hoped that if China became a member of the U. N. and was treated in a friendly way, it would gradually cease to be expansionistic, and amenable to world opinion. So India continued to spend more money on industrial and agricultural development than on defence, and continued to hope for stable, sincere and peaceful relations with China. It also rightly held that the "basic factor in defence" was industrial growth and technological development. (p. 371 ff.) Any other

policy, as Nehru said, may have brought "infinitely greater dangers sooner" when India did not yet have the prestige and wide friendship which it had later. (p. 359). Lastly, as Nehru confessed in December 1959, he "did not expect" there would be "aggression" by China. (p. 371). India "took it for granted" that by now in international politics, the rule of the jungle had been replaced by that of law, and that "naked" and "massive invasions" were "a thing of the past". (*Lok Sabha Speech, Nov. 8, 1962*). Events in October 1962 belied these hopes, assumptions and expectations.

Thus in spite of India's best efforts, a conflict between India and China, which Nehru considered to be "a tragedy of the deepest kind" for India, China, Asia and the world, developed. (p. 366) India was compelled to resist aggression, preserve its honour and integrity and also prevent international standards from deteriorating into the jungle law of "might is right". (*Nehru's Letter to Heads of States, October 26-27, 1962*).

### **Tibetan Outrage : can our Government be blamed ?**

It was rather absurd to expect that India could have prevented the suppression of Tibet, when for instance, the Atlantic countries could not do anything about Hungary and are unable to do anything now in South Viet Nam. As Henry Kissinger so rightly remarked (at Bombay in January 1963), in Tibet India faced a "dilemma" in foreign policy, that of "balancing its own capabilities against the intentions of the countries it dealt with". As the *recognized* constitutional position stood, China had a right to be in Tibet, while as a newly independent nation which stood for the liberty of all peoples, India had no desire to stick to the extra-territorial rights in Tibet which it inherited

from the British Indian government. Kissinger justly pointed out that nobody in India was to be blamed for what happened, because nobody could have suspected how the Chinese would act once they reached the border. "By the time one becomes certain of the course of events it is too late to shape them" ; and one "desires to play safe where one cannot be sure what the probable course of events would be". Had India irrevocably and fully condemned the Chinese outrage on Tibet, it would have led to the abandonment of Panchasila and hope of peaceful relations with Peking for ever and meant India's joining the Western Bloc at that time, for Russia then had not yet developed tensions with China. Spending money on fortifying 2000 miles of frontier with China and more money on defence, India would have been left with little resources for industrial development. In a situation precipitated by the condemnation of China and breaking off relations with it, right-wing opposition parties would have asked for American bombing bases in India, and as defence would consume all the available resources, the Indian communists would have exploited the economic situation which would then have held out no hope. Only "fools", said Kingsley Martin in an article "Reflections on Tibet", which he wrote in 1959, would have been glad if India gave up its "neutralism" then. But, it may be said, surely without joining the Western Bloc, India could have built up its border defences, more energetically on a colossal scale. Apart from the fact that it is not a joke for an underdeveloped country to build an impregnable 2000 mile Maginot line without massive foreign aid which no country would give except to an ally, India did not expect that naked aggression of the sort that later occurred would take place, and it gave priority to developmental plans. However India showed great courage in throwing open its hospitality to the Dalai



Lama and the Tibetan refugees, thus infuriating China. India's humanism was vindicated by this, more it was impossible to do.

### **The Success of Non-Alignment :**

It is difficult to see how the Nefa military debacle proves that Indian foreign policy has failed. It only proves India's military unpreparedness. If two countries fall out and go to war, obviously there will not be friendly relations between them (p. 364) and they will be aligned against each other. If one of these was previously following the policy of non-alignment and friendly relations with all countries, it could still continue to do so with all other countries, and when war comes to an end, with that particular country too. After all no alliance or antagonism is permanent. When a country which has solemn agreements with another country to preserve mutual friendship and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, perfidiously breaks the agreement and undertakes naked aggression, it is illogical to say that the policy of trying to maintain friendly relations with other countries has been proved to be incorrect. It may be said that India should have anticipated this and militarised itself, but if this had been really done, and double or triple what had been spent on defence had been spent on it, there would have been much greater criticism both within and outside the country. Further, being a democracy India could not have forced and regimented itself as China did.

The spontaneous world-wide reaction in favour of India after the Chinese invasion shows that Indian foreign policy was by and large successful. The prompt military aid rushed by U. S. A., and Britain and the sentiments

expressed by the British leaders in Parliament, contrasted with the rather equivocal initial stand of Russia, and made some opposition leaders in India demand that it align itself with the West. Slowly however it was found that the West was trying to make long-term military aid conditional on India settling the Kashmir question, and that the West was not so ready to commit itself to long-term aid, especially to help India manufacture defence equipment. The U. S. A. is still groping for a policy that would reconcile its loyalty to Pakistan and its friendship with India. Britain cares more for its trade with India and equally so with China, than for building up India as a bastion of democracy against China. On the other hand, it was gradually discovered that Soviet Russia was not supporting China in its conflict with India\* and that "on many occasions it has expressed to India its sympathy in this matter", and has continued to help India chiefly in regard to its economy, and has promised to do so in future also. (*Nehru's speech at Madras, June 12, 1963*). But for world opinion, Western readiness to aid India, lack of Russian support, and the determination showed by the Indian government and people, China would not have halted its victorious armies and declared a ceasefire. It was the discovery that it was becoming isolated that halted China's attempt to march further, and not its "magnanimity" and

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\* The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party wrote to its opposite number in Moscow that "the touchstone of proletarian internationalism for every communist party is whether or not it resolutely defends the whole of the Socialist camp". It alleged that a certain socialist country is pursuing "opportunist line and policies", not defending the unity of socialist camp, but creating "tensions and splits within it", helping "capitalist countries to attack fraternal socialist countries". (*The Indian Express, June 20, 63.*) This means, in other words, that Soviet Russia is helping India and the West to attack China !!

concern for peace as Bertrand Russell imagined. That Soviet Russia and the U. S. A. should have done so much for India which is not a member of their military alliances, without caring for the resentment of China and Pakistan, is a high tribute to India's non-alignment and prestige. Both of course did so also with an eye on their national and ideological interests ; but no country ever did otherwise. President Radhakrishnan was right when he said in Delhi on Dec. 18, 1962, addressing the Central Citizens' Committee, that the principle of non-alignment was put to the test and found adequate in this crisis.

### Theoretical Issues :

The crisis only proved that Chinese theory (Mao never made a secret of it ; *vide* his message cited *supra*) had no room for non-alignment, that according to it the world was divided between communists and imperialists, and that non-aligned nations should be shaken from their positions and made to align themselves with either bloc by cajolery or force. This was realised by Indian policy makers only as a result of China's "wanton and massive invasion", said Nehru, and India consequently is "growing up". (*Foreign Affairs, March 1963.*)

This perfectly logical attitude that if X is right, not-X must be wrong, is the classical communist position, and was also the position of Dulles and is of men who continue that line of thinking. On June 18, 1963, the Chairman of the Party Commission on Ideology (Leonid Ilyichev) told the Soviet Communist Party Plenum that "there could be no peaceful coexistence of ideologies", and according to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee such a coexistence is a treason to Marxism-Leninism and a betrayal of the cause of workers and peasants. The Party however

graciously decided that nations could peacefully coexist. (*Meeting in June 1963*) A full-scale ideological war is the "main task" for Soviet Russia. Khrushchev accordingly rules out ultimate compromises, but considers that capitalism and imperialism will ultimately break up and disintegrate due to internal contradictions and competition with the socialist countries. For him non-alignment too is a transitory phase, because historical necessity and the success of communist countries will convert every country to communism sooner or later, and this, he thinks, could happen in many ways, and not necessarily through a bloody revolution. The present position of Soviet Russia is that it is impossible to declare a war against imperialists, because it may mean a thermo-nuclear war which would destroy not merely capitalists, but many nations and all the millions of workers in those nations. If attacked, it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, but it would not itself now provoke a war which would destroy whole continents. Its aim is to consolidate the socialist system and spread its influence on the "world revolutionary process". While it preaches the doctrine of peaceful coexistence among nations, it clearly says that such a relationship can not exist between the "antagonistic classes" within capitalist states". It however admits that the working class and national liberation movements need not always resort to armed uprisings everywhere. Socialist revolution can succeed sometimes even through peaceful struggle. Russia by its example and influence plans to "beat" capitalism in "economic competition". Declaring itself always on the side of the working classes everywhere, Russia encourages them "to wage the class struggle" employing whatever means they think are appropriate, and promises that it will and can help them if they rise against their oppressors in the capitalist countries. (*Khrushchev's Speech*

*in Frankfurt-on-Oder on 3-7-63 ; Pravda "Open Letter" July 1963.*) This is claimed to be an original theoretical contribution as great as that of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Mao and the Chinese communist party dispute this and condemn it as "revisionism". Khrushchev stands for coexistence and for the conversion of other countries by showing socialist superiority of achievement in all fields, and by propaganda and, if possible, subtle non-violent subversion from within through dedicated indoctrinated men. The Chinese Party thinks this to be false theoretically and untrue to Marx and Lenin, and believes in open revolutions and forcible "liberations." The Chinese communists believe that the working classes and nations under colonial rule can liberate themselves only by armed revolts, that there can be no coexistence between communist and capitalist countries and that a war must be waged to end imperialism and colonialism as fast as possible. They also assert that territorial disputes and border conflicts left over by history can be settled by force, for in the past imperialists have occupied other peoples' soil and without being forcibly expelled they will not quit. Oppressed nations, they say, cannot coexist peacefully with the imperialists and achieve disarmament unless they are to remain in perpetual slavery. The nuclear test ban treaty arrived at by U. S. S. R., U. S. A., Britain, and other nations is a "big fraud" for the Chinese. They consider the atom bomb a "paper tiger", and the losses that might result from a nuclear war against imperialists to be only "a secondary question". The Chinese believe that in a nuclear war imperialism will perish, and that "the victorious peoples" "will create at an extremely fast rate a civilisation 1000 times higher than that which now exists under the capitalist system". (*Chinese Communist Party's Letter to Soviet Party, June 1963 ; various statements*

by Chinese leaders like those by Chou En-lai on April 26, 1964 and Mrs. Kuo Chien in Algiers on March 23, 64.) In its plans to have an all-out war with its opposing socio-political system to liberate oppressed people, in its fervour that its own system is completely right, its faith that in a war it only will emerge victorious and its intolerance of all those who disagree with it the Chinese programme of "spearpoint to spearpoint" (as they call it) resembles the Dulles policy of "brinkmanship". Theirs is a crusading *jehadic* spirit. The Chinese naively believe that in a nuclear war communism will triumph, for will not Truth be victorious and the wicked perish in the final struggle? Animated by this sort of a perverted apocalyptic messianic faith, the Chinese think attention should not be paid to material prosperity and improvement of living standards, but to the maintenance and promotion of the revolutionary spirit against capitalism, colonialism and imperialism.\* (*Khrushchev's speech on 16-4-64*). They want the present generations to content themselves with a starvation diet, relentlessly work, fight and die in anticipation of a future heaven on earth. Theirs is an ascetic missionary faith, fanatical and zealous, which sacrifices personal freedom, happiness and dignity for the sake of an utopia revealed by their historico-dialectical materialism. They are not sceptical, critical and even humane enough to ask : how can we be sure all this is not moonshine? Even if it is not, is all this sacrifice, terror and regimentation worthwhile and needed?

Not all the theorists even in Russia and East Europe

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\*In practice, however, China adopts a "high-power nationalist line" (*Pravda*, May 13, 1964) and is on friendly terms with Pakistan, Japan, France and Britain and is waging a political war with U.S.A. and India as well as Soviet Russia. A contradiction between its theory and practice !!

agree with Khrushchev, and may be many in China disagree with Mao in their hearts. Diametrically opposed to die-hard communists, the firm anti-communists consider communism to be "slavery" and therefore for them there can be no neutrality between freedom and communism, nor any peaceful coexistence with communism. For them neutralism is "immoral". (*Declaration of Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League in Tokyo in October 1962.*) As Yoshida of Japan who belongs to this group said in a meeting of that League, neutralism is a handy instrument of the communists to emasculate and divide the free nations. These people forget that neutralism and belligerency are both as old as states, and that for long periods and even now some of the most advanced countries have been and are neutral.

The Chinese Communists and men like Dulles and Yoshida adopt the logic of 'Etiher/Or', which demands an uncompromising final choice between two alternatives. The latter consider communism and "Freedom" (*sic*) as exclusive alternatives, like darkness and light, wrong and right, error and truth, the demonic and the divine, and think that the West more or less embodies "Freedom" ! Communism will never in their opinion change and give up whatever undesirable qualities it may have. The orthodox communists reciprocate this feeling, they believe U. S. A. and the West to be "imperialists" (*sic*) out to suck the blood of the innocent peoples in Asia and Africa. They think that the capitalistic West has not changed and will never change and never cease to exploit its own working classes and the underdeveloped countries, unless open revolutions and "liberations" are carried out. Both these groups think peaceful coexistence is impossible, and that sooner or later a war between the two camps is inevitable. India rejects this approach ; it considers the dia-

lectic of 'mediation' to be superior to the logic of 'Either/Or'. The concept of 'mediation' implies it is possible to preserve contradictions by transmuting them through inclusion of them in a synthesis, thereby somehow reconciling them without any need for annihilating either of them. The orthodox communists and the naive Puritans like Dulles think this principle of "both —and" to be wrong.\* Their approach is doctrinaire, exclusive, militant, full of zeal and governed by a one-track mentality. Since they think they have the absolute universal truth, they are intolerant towards all other theories and practices based on them. They believe it their duty to carry on a crusade against others, and refuse to tolerate even neutrality towards their position. It is a theological approach. India rejects this and adopts a philosophical outlook.

Truth may be one and absolute, but only omniscience has it in its plenitude. We can only know aspects of it and what we think is truth may be after all error. Complete eternal truth does not ever become the possession of finite man. This is our conviction. So there could be many approaches to and formulations of truth ; with charity and humility we have to tolerate others' convictions and ways of life. As Nehru once said, China adopted "democratic centralism", and India "parliamentary democracy", though his adjective in the first phrase may not be apt. In some matters relating to promoting people's welfare India did better than China, while in others relating to the same China did better. (p. 311-2) For us with our conditioning and background, our system is the best ; may be for them theirs is the best, anyway they ought to know it, as it is their business. So India is prepared to

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\* There are similar attitudes in philosophy and theology : e. g. Hegel *versus* Kierkegaard and Soderblom *versus* Karl Barth. All that is another long story.



peacefully coexist with China, with Pakistan and every other country. But if they do not let it be at peace and commit aggression, it will fight at any cost and for any length of time. No power can suppress and defeat it. As President Radhakrishnan has pointed out in his American tour, Indian policy is not "any kind of equivocation, or giving away of fundamental principles on which democracy is based". Again : "We are committed to freedom, justice and fellowship. When these are violated we condemn the aggressor. Non-alignment provides us the opportunity to have independent judgment on issues". (*Speech to Citizens' Committee on Dec. 18, 1962.*)

### **Russell and Toynbee : A Reply**

In *Unarmed Victory* containing letters to and from him, Bertrand Russell has criticised India for its role in the recent Sino-Indian conflict. In a speech in New York delivered in June 1963 Arnold Toynbee is reported to have equated India and China and criticised them for neglecting food production and devoting themselves to fighting for barren mountain heights. Both these great men usually adopt positions which it is not possible for ordinary people to appreciate and much less adopt. Russell has always been an internationalist, and since the invention of nuclear weapons, his one great concern has been to make the two great powers renounce nuclear tests and destroy existing stock-piles. Toynbee has been an unrelenting foe of nationalism and considers it to be a pest. Theirs is a cosmic outlook and they think of the past history—of the rise and fall of nations and cultures, and of the future destiny of mankind. So it is no wonder they are some-

times out of tune with present realities and current problems. Toynbee himself recently said his mentality is that of the 21st century.

“From the point of view of the world and of humanity in general”, Russell wrote, “the details of the China-India boundary dispute are irrelevant ; there ought not to be war over them”. The first assertion is rather strange ; the second is acceptable to any reasonable man. For this line of thinking even if an aggressive nation attacks another peaceful country and occupies some thousands of miles of its territory, it is irrelevant, provided this does not end in nuclear warfare. And, so that this contingency may not arise, the attacked country must keep quiet ! Few would agree that naked aggression and flouting of international law regarding accepted boundaries should be tolerated, lest nuclear warfare take place. Some may prefer to die fighting for preserving their national integrity and freedom—for the chance to believe what one wants and live as one likes—than to accept slavery. To unleash nuclear warfare against anybody is criminal. On this point all except China and Albania are agreed. But very few would agree that when borders are violated and territorial integrity is imperilled, a nation must remain passive to prevent the possibility of a nuclear war. A nuclear holocaust, some would say, is preferable to passive acceptance of aggression and the extension of totalitarianism. Besides, if, as Russell says, the Sino-Indian boundary dispute is irrelevant and does not concern other countries and humanity, why should it lead to the involvement of others and possibly nuclear war? Should disputes be settled without understanding their nature and examining their causes and terms of settlement and without rectifying injustices, and should aggression be tolerated merely because world peace will be endangered? Lastly, whatever

concerns or pertains to any individual anywhere is relevant to all humanity. "*Nihil humani*", said Juvenal, "*mihi alienum est*". Otherwise, it is silly for us to concern ourselves with negro-rights in the U.S.A., a famine in China, or a tornado devastation in Mexico. So the Sino-Indian conflict concerns all humanity, especially as the Chinese attack was motivated by political and doctrinal considerations. Russell and Toynbee seem to ignore this widely recognised fact. A permanently soft, "standing apart" attitude based on a fear of major war in all situations commits a rape on justice and self-respect.

Russell has charged that India has cared more for national interests than for peace and conciliation. As long as there are nation states in the world, it is the first duty of their governments to protect and strengthen them. The moment they do not act thus, they become traitors to their own countries and will be forced to go out of office. If the Indian government discharged this duty, it ought to be only congratulated. However, it must be remembered that many times before and after the Chinese attack the Prime Minister of India has offered to settle the boundary dispute with China through mediation and conciliation, or through arbitration by eminent persons, or in the International Court of Justice. (*Speech at Madras on June 12, 1963 and later in Lok Sabha too.*) China did not agree. It also did not accept the proposals made by Ceylon and other powers. Reiterating that "India would always like to avoid a major conflict", Minister Lal Bahadur Sastri said in Parliament on Feb. 19, 64, that India would not take a rigid view or think only in terms of war and that "the door for discussions and negotiations would never be closed" provided they were "in keeping with national honour and dignity". There cannot be a saner and more balanced policy than this. No nation state has ever shown

greater dignity, patience and readiness for reconciliation than India in this situation. Not caring for its agreements with India and the latter's demonstrated willingness to negotiate or refer the matter to an international authority, China has invaded a friendly neighbouring country. It is amazing that Russell should admonish India, and think China in this dispute has been "reasonable and temperate". No one who knows the Chinese attitude towards nuclear warfare and the use of force to settle border disputes and the fact that China occupied a very considerable stretch of Indian territory motivated by politico-ideological factors, could have made such an astonishing statement about the sweet reasonableness of the Chinese.

Russell thinks China has a "legal case". If so, why does it not agree to have mediation or arbitration, or refer the matter to the International Court? Why does it not agree to the Colombo proposals in toto and enter into direct negotiations? He could try to persuade China to do so, as India has already agreed to such a course.

Russell has charged that India by turning to the West for arms has ceased to be neutral and thereby increased the chances of war. This is again not correct, for India turned both to the West and Soviet Russia for arms, and intends to do so in future in such situations, and has asserted it will be friendly with both. Of course, it can receive aid only from those who give, and if one of them refuses to give, or is tardy in giving, naturally India will be forced to receive aid only from where it can get; trying on its part to remain on friendly terms with both. Friendship and co-operation with Russia are and should be the basic features of Indian foreign policy. On its side Russia is at present reciprocating this attitude and is also strengthening its economic and cultural ties with India. So Russell's fear

that India may have weakened the neutral "bloc" (*sic*) and its "potential weight as arbitrator" is unjustified.

Till nation-states die out and a world-order based on justice, equality and peace (for which the people and government of India yearn more than any others) is established, any government has to care for its own national interests first, and till then boundaries and territorial integrity of countries will be very important. To seek to violate them is a form of brigandage and to keep quiet when such a thing happens is to accept slavery. Peace cannot be considered to be of such overwhelming importance that justice, freedom, self-respect and dignity should be sacrificed for its sake. Peace must have its foundations in freedom, honour, equality and justice and such a peace with China must be our aspiration.

## C

### INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Till a few years back India and Pakistan were integral parts of one country with one government, one law and a common way of life. Then they were constituted as two sovereign independent countries. Soon after that, unfortunately religious riots on an unprecedented scale took place both in Pakistan and North India; thousands were killed, horrors were perpetrated and millions were uprooted in both the countries. Largescale migrations of hundreds of thousands from one country to another took place. Nothing more cruel, violent and senseless happened ever before in history. Although ill treatment and persecution of minorities on that scale has stopped for about a decade now, this year there have been again a

large exodus of refugees from East Pakistan to India and riots in India, which have brought shame to both the countries. The problem of minorities in both these countries overshadows and embitters much of the Indo-Pakistan relations. The next important problem which still remains unsettled is Kashmir. I now propose to deal with these two. Happily some border problems and the canal waters dispute were solved in 1958 and 1960 respectively. Finally, I will venture to put forward some considerations and suggestions that might help formulation of a long-term policy.

### **The Minorities :**

Let us start with a little history. Turco-Afghans, Mughals and some Iranis came to India as conquerors, settled down and made this country their home. If there had been internal unity and peace, and if national or even religious interests had been put above dynastic and selfish interests, this would not have happened. That these foreigners came, conquered and settled down to rule shows that there was something radically wrong with the Hindus then. Mahatma Gandhi said the British occupied India and ruled over us because we in a way wanted it, allowed them to do so and co-operated with them. If India had unitedly and wholeheartedly willed to rule itself and not to obey and cooperate with the aggressors, it could have done so. What he said about the British applies to the West and Central Asian conquerors from across the Himalayas too. But unlike the British they became citizens of this country, as the Aryans did in remote times after they invaded India, destroyed Mohenjodaro and Harappa civilisations and converted all the natives into *sudras*. Many other peoples also came from outside India and became completely

Indian, *e.g.*, the Rajputs and Jats, the Parsees and others. We have a large segment of population with Mongoloid features also. All these are as much Indian as the descendants of the Aryans, and the Dravidians who too may have migrated from outside India. *Perhaps* the Australoid peoples, the tribes and the lowest castes alone are the descendants of the original natives of India.

There are about 50 million Muslims now in India, ninety percent of them are the descendants of Indian converts, who cannot even dream of claiming descent from the soldiers, warlords and nobles who came from Iran and Turan. The blood of the few others also has become mixed for some centuries now. These facts have to be asserted because some Muslim historians talk of all Indian Muslims as the pure descendants of noble conquerors from outside India, heirs to a glorious culture and followers of the greatest religion. Others claim that these West Asian conquerors from across the Himalayas took pains to conquer India to give it a higher civilisation, unity and democracy. All this is familiar nonsense. We used to have history books glorifying the Aryan conquest of India and speaking with contempt of Dravidians as barbarians who were civilised by them. We have British historians telling us that the British came and ruled over us to civilise us and make us fit for self-government, and that this was an act of Christian charity and self-sacrifice for which we ought to be grateful. And now we have the Chinese waiting to liberate and civilise us! It was for plunder and loot that many invaders came to India in the Medieval times, others came out of an ambition to carve out kingdoms for themselves, establish dynasties and gain fame and glory. Some of these or their descendants turned out to be good and great rulers. Islam and God had nothing to do with these invasions and conquests, with these plunders

or massacres. Many historians often forget this. Nor had Christianity, it may be remembered, anything to do with the acts of the Spanish conquistadores, the doings of Clive and Hastings, or the cruelties of the Rowlatt Act and the Jallianwalah Bagh. Men's baser instincts and the weakness, servility and disunity of the victims were the causes for these. The civilisation or religion of all conquerors is not necessarily higher than that of the conquered. Aryan civilisation and those of the Goths, Vandals and Huns were not higher than that of Mohenjodaro and Rome. Nor were the Mongolian, Arab and Turkish civilisations higher than the European, though Europe succumbed to the invasions of these people. Islamic culture made great and lasting contributions to Indian life and thought as did European culture at a later date. But that does not make them higher than Hindu and Buddhist cultures. Many of the religious prejudices in modern India would vanish if the right kind of history were to be written and taught. The problem of the minorities in any nation is rooted in either a wrong understanding of history or ignorance of history.

By any criterion all Indian Muslims are full and equal citizens of this country. It is not their fault that they are citizens of India any more than it is the fault of the Brahmins of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Kashmir who have Indo-Aryan features, or other people who have Mongoloid, Australoid or Dravidian features. Anyway no Indian has pure Aryan, Dravidian or Turanian blood ; and one blood is as good as the other. To think that Indian Muslims are second-class citizens, and to imagine that they have less patriotism than the Hindus, the Christians and the tribes is an unpardonable crime. To believe that their religion is in anyway inferior to that of the Hindus is a foolish vulgar egocentric prejudice. Man to man a



Muslim is as good as a Hindu. Indian culture and heritage are as much the patrimony of Indian Muslims and Indian Christians, as of the Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas and Sikhs. If the majority of the people in North India realised all this, there would not have been riots in India after the partition and quite recently again. If the Muslims have to be massacred or sent out of India, so must the Aryan-featured higher castes and then the Dravidian upper castes too. In fact a few fanatics in South India want the Brahmins to quit as, it seems, they are Aryans with no right to be in South India. In that case the tribes and the lowest castes could legitimately ask these "Dravidian" gentry too to leave India, or be ready to be slaughtered. If, on the other hand, only people belonging to a certain religion should live in India, the turn of the Christians, Parsees, Sikhs and Jews to get out would come after that of the Muslims ; and the *reductio ad absurdum* would be reached when someone gets the idea that a campaign must be started to have all the Saivas expelled or massacred, or it might be the Vaishnavas !

Not infrequently minorities in either India or Pakistan at some place or other are put to some trouble, or are illtreated or injured in some way ; news gets about, repercussions occur in the other country, and these in turn start similar events in the first country with inevitable consequences again in the second country. Then somehow they subside to recur again. Riots have originated in both these countries. It is no justification to say that minorities are subjected to inhuman horrors and cruelties in Pakistan ; if India is an advanced modern *secular* democracy where law and fundamental human rights fully prevail, in this country at least all minorities—racial and religious—ought to be safe, whatever may happen in Pakistan. But atrocities have been committed in both the countries.

The Chinese killed so many Tibetans who are the followers of our Lord Buddha, an avatara of Vishnu, but fortunately no one thinks it proper to murder all the Chinese population in Calcutta. It is strange that *a few* Hindus should think differently and in a beastly perverted way about Muslims. There may be some sense in wreaking vengeance on the real culprits, but it is irrational to kill vicariously innocent followers of that religion living in another country. The fifty million Muslims in India cannot be sent out of India ; they will not leave the country of their forefathers, where their homes and properties are, nor is there any reason why they should when they have as much right to be here as the Hindus. Even if they are willing to go, Pakistan is not ready to receive them. It has enough problems of its own already and cannot bear any considerable influx of population. Nor are milk and honey flowing in Pakistan to attract any citizens of this country. So it is silly to think of exchange of population between the two countries. As Nehru rightly said, it is a "fantastic proposal" "completely opposed to our political, economic, social and spiritual ideals". (p. 464) The Vishnu and Kurma Puranas proudly asserted : Ours is a land of religious plurality and cultural diversity. To change this is to destroy India's personality.

The Hindus must become fully conscious of this and accept Indian Muslims as fraternal co-citizens with equal rights with whom they must live and work together and also understand and appreciate Islam and Muslim contribution to India. Indian Muslims on their part should become conscious of the entire Indian heritage to which they are also heirs, develop greater effective loyalty to India and wholeheartedly participate in and contribute to the national life and the building of a greater New India. Then only can national integration and democracy be

realised in India. A contented and happy Muslim population in India would not only be a source of strength to it, but of great prestige throughout the Muslim world which sprawls across Africa and Asia. There used to be wars between Catholics and Protestants in Europe, and till recently in the West the Jews and Catholics used to suffer disabilities in England and other countries. In India all its citizens enjoy equal rights. There is no reason why here we should not achieve as much integration between Muslims and Hindus, as England, France, Germany and U. S. A. have achieved among the Jews, Catholics and Protestants.

In this context it is also well to remember that the British and the Hindus were as much responsible as the Muslims for the creation of Pakistan. Imperialism by its own logic had to follow the Divide and Rule policy and a part of the credit for cutting up India into two should go to the British. The mixing up of nationalism with Hindu religious revivalism and obscurantism, the conception of India as a goddess (repugnant to rigorous monotheism) and the employment by Hindu leaders of medieval concepts in politics roused suspicions even among liberal Muslims and increased the Muslim tendencies to separatism. More confidence in the Muslims, greater liberality in understanding their needs and meeting their demands, along with a completely modern and entirely secular approach to politics on the part of the Congress leaders would have nipped Muslim separatism in the bud. But from any point of view the Muslims now in India cannot be blamed for Pakistan.

Anyway, there is now Pakistan, and there are some millions of Hindus there. What should India do about it? First and foremost, it should set up a perfect example of minority treatment which could become an ideal to inspire other countries. The welfare of the citizens of Pakistan

is its concern, if they are ill-treated or persecuted there, we on humanitarian grounds ought to protest both directly and in the U. N. and create a world opinion and, if possible, initiate international action which will force Pakistan to behave better. I do not see what more we could do legitimately. Economic sanctions can be applied and diplomatic relations cut off, but that would harm both the nations and not solve the problem. And, surely we cannot go to war whenever persons of Indian descent are discriminated against, persecuted or killed in riots in different countries in the world. It should be a different thing if Indian citizens with Indian passports were to be ill-treated by any government. We must remember that Pakistan is a sovereign independent country and if minorities there are treated barbarously, we can and ought to condemn that, but cannot resort to direct action. What could Europe do about the Jews in Nazi Germany and what is Africa doing about Negroes in the southern states of the U. S. A.?

If India in spite of its poverty and population problems keeps open borders and extends an unlimited permanent welcome to *all* persons of Indian descent from Pakistan, Ceylon, Zanzibar and other countries, the continuous streams of refugees would disrupt our economy, retard our development plans and may form groups of malcontents dangerous to our stability. For India its own peoples' interests should have priority over that of others. As Jesus said, "Let the children first be filled for it is not meet to take the children's bread, and cast it". Charity must begin at home; it is not a virtue to rush to the aid of others when one's own people are living in misery (*Saktah parajane-data, svajane duhkha jivini—Manu, XI. 9.*) An idealism which is not rooted in reality will not succeed. If there is no

strict control of such migrations, it is also possible that planned efforts may be made to have Pakistani Muslims infiltrate into Assam, Rajasthan, Panjab and Bengal to convert them into Muslim majority areas which will in due course demand merger with Pakistan, or just to have elements on whom Pakistan can rely when a need arises, or merely to ease the population pressure in Pakistan.\* So our national interests demand that there should be a large permanent growing Hindu minority in Pakistan. Humanitarianism and sympathy for co-religionists and persons of Indian descent ought to be tempered by considerations of real politics and national interests.

It is also the duty of the Indian government and leaders of all political parties here to strongly advise Hindu citizens of Pakistan to sincerely look upon it only as their homeland and nation, be loyal to it and get themselves assimilated in the national life there by sharing the enthusiasm, interests and culture of the majority community and participating in the building of a free and prosperous Pakistan. By their patriotism, sincerity, tact, resourcefulness and drive, the Pakistani Hindus must attempt to create opportunities for themselves in their own country. Indian leaders should encourage them not to keep themselves sullenly aloof from the activities and thinking of their own country. They must become extroverts and go-getters. In my visits to Pakistan I found most of the Hindus there have not cheerfully accepted and adjusted themselves to the duties and obligations of their Pakistani citizenship and

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\* For whatever reasons Muslim population in border states has increased rather surprisingly, viz., by 38.56% in Assam, 38.01% in Panjab, 36.48% in West Bengal and over 32% in Rajasthan, while the average rate of Indian population growth has been 21.5% and that of Muslims in India 25.61%. Population increase in Pakistan has been by 30%. These figures are for 1951-61. Either infiltration or deplorable economic conditions in Pakistan can explain this.

have not made an uninhibited sincere attempt to contribute their best to Pakistan with loyalty and zeal. Our government and leaders of all parties ought to encourage them to do so. We cannot be the guardians of the minorities in another independent country, nor can we allow any other country to set itself up as the saviour of the minorities in our country. The sooner our leaders become fully aware of this the better it would be. If Pakistani leaders care for peaceful relations with India, they too ought to realise this and do what they can to encourage all Indian Muslims to be entirely loyal to India only and not to look towards Pakistan for any kind of inspiration, support or guidance in any situation at any time. The destinies of Indian Muslims are tied up with India and of Pakistani Hindus with Pakistan. No sovereign independent state can and ought to tolerate extra-territorial loyalties. Peaceful Indo-Pakistan relations can be established only on this foundation.

### **Kashmir :**

Here too let us have some history. The Kashmir government of its own accord acceded to India in 1947, mainly due to the insistence of the popular leadership under Sheikh Abdullah, though the Maharajah seems to have preferred an independent Kashmir. This accession was in conformity with the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament and was accepted on behalf of the Crown by the then British Governor-General, as India was still a Dominion then. When tribesmen from across the frontier encouraged and equipped by Pakistan raided Kashmir and its government asked for help, India provided it and appealed to the UNO against this aggression. Subsequently Pakistani troops moved into some parts of Kashmir.

In the UNO and in the parliament too, the government of India endorsed the principle that Kashmiris themselves should settle their fate by confirming or not confirming this legally valid accession. "From the very beginning", said Nehru in the Lok Sabha on March 28, 1951, "it has been our declared wish that the people of Kashmir should themselves decide their future". India was willing to have a plebiscite in Kashmir after the evacuation of aggressive armies. Pakistan admitted that its troops occupied parts of Kashmir and also agreed to withdraw them before U. N. commissions. In the same speech Nehru also stated that "we have always been agreeable to the idea of a peaceful settlement through mediation". India also several times offered to enter into a no-war pact with Pakistan. But this was not accepted ; and Pakistani armed forces occupying a portion of Kashmir were not withdrawn. Meanwhile a new military and political situation arose because of Seato and Baghdad Pacts, and constitutional developments took place in Kashmir and India because the people demanded them. So, as Nehru clearly said on March 29, 1956, any efforts to settle the dispute must take all this into consideration. Since then free general elections have taken place in Kashmir and the democratically elected Kashmir constituent Assembly by its own decision integrated the state with India in 1956. More than a decade ago when its accession was not confirmed by the elected representatives of its people a plebiscite in Kashmir was no doubt promised under certain conditions, which still remain unfulfilled. During this time developments in the international situation as well as in Kashmir have occurred. Through constitutional processes and by its own choice Kashmir has made itself as much a part of India as Bengal or Madras. Kashmiris have thus decided their own future.

No state of the Indian Union has the right to secede.

So, what appeared logical and proper many years ago may not be so now. Moreover, in view of the recent happenings in East Pakistan and their repercussions in India, a plebiscite in Kashmir with the certain possibility of rousing not only in Kashmir, but also in India and Pakistan, religious feelings to the point of rioting, loot and arson would be a great disaster to the whole of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. So with some reactionary Hindu communal groups waiting for an opportunity to destroy secularism, India with its fifty million Muslims, cannot now afford to allow communal feelings to be whipped up in Kashmir for the purpose of a plebiscite of the sort Pakistan desires, as that would have repercussions all over this sub-continent. No state could agree to jeopardise its security, stability and integrity. Kashmiris can legitimately work for greater administrative, cultural and linguistic autonomy, more representation in the Indian parliament, more central aid for their agricultural and industrial development, and regular free elections based on adult franchise just as in the other states of the Indian union ; but India cannot encourage them to undo what they themselves achieved, viz., integration with India. The Kashmir constitution declares that state to be an "integral part" of India , just as any other state in the Union of India. The Nagaland and Kashmir have special problems of their own and are entitled to special treatment, but neither they nor the leaders of the Dravidistan movement can be allowed to endanger the territorial integrity of the nation.

There is however Article 370 in the constitution of India which says that our parliament can make laws for Kashmir only in those matters which correspond to what is specified in that state's instrument of accession to India. Whether any matter so corresponds or not is to be decided by the President of India in consultation with the government of



that state, but the President has the power to declare this article to be inoperative whenever he thinks fit. This article was intended to be temporary till the people of Kashmir confirmed their state's accession to India, although such a provision was legally unnecessary because the Indian Independence Act did not give such a right to the people of any princely state which acceded to India. The ruling chief's accession was an accession by the sovereign on behalf of himself and the people of his state. Yet in the case of Kashmir, the Maharajah acceded because he was pressed to do so by popular Muslim leadership. The Parliament of India in view of that state's Muslim majority and the contention of Pakistan provided an opportunity to the Kashmiris to confirm this accession. This they did eight years ago, their constituent assembly declaring Kashmir "is, and shall be an integral part of the Union of India". (*Section 3 of Kashmir Constitution*). In view of this it is high time for the parliament or the President of India to abrogate Article 370 which from the beginning was stated to be temporary and transitional. Some instability and uncertainty are likely to continue until this is done and India firmly declares that as far as it is concerned the Kashmir issue has been irrevocably settled, and acts accordingly by refusing its participation in any further discussion about Kashmir either in the UN or outside it. Propaganda by anyone to upset this ought not to be allowed in any part of India including Kashmir. A state which allows its citizens to preach secession cannot last long : no state which values its integrity and security would permit any such movement.

It is possible that Pakistan may allow itself to be incited by such a course of action to attempt aggression ; so immediate steps must simultaneously be taken by us to strengthen the defence arrangements on the Indo-Pakistan border

both in the west and the east, and keep constant greater vigilance to see that no surprise attacks by land or by air are possible. India must also be prepared for an open break with Pakistan on this question, and that alternative may be preferable to a smouldering never-ending conflict which is more enervating and expensive. We must also take into confidence Soviet Russia and U. S. A. in advance regarding our plans and aims, and make them appreciate the rationale behind them, and see that they remain at least neutral in any possible open conflict with Pakistan. No rupture, however, need be permanent ; for there can be no lasting alliances or enmities between states. At least in history so far there have not been any such. But if our diplomacy is conducted with greater intelligence and tact and initiative is seized, we may be able to convince Pakistan that our people are not prepared for any other course of action and that this has become inevitable, and mollify it by accepting the cease-fire line in Kashmir as a permanent boundary, *if* our parliament approves this. There seems to be no other practical alternative in this matter ; for in spite of all that we or the UN may say Pakistan will not withdraw its armed forces from those parts of Kashmir which are in its possession. In view of our ideology and present situation, we cannot launch a war to make Pakistan withdraw from Kashmir, or 'free' 'Azad' Kashmir. We cannot refer this matter alone to arbitration or mediation *now*, without reopening the question of the whole of Kashmir. So the sensible thing may be to accept what has been a *fait accompli* for some seventeen years, and which we cannot hope to undo without much military preparation and many international repercussions, especially situated as we are *vis-a-vis* China. Rigidity of postures is not conducive to national interests. Firm purposeful action of this sort to settle the Kashmir issue

with Pakistan is an immediate necessity, as otherwise it may continue to be a festering poisonous sore infecting all our external relations.

But nothing on earth is eternal and no political system, arrangement or plan is perfect and unalterable for ever. So, notwithstanding anything said above, if some popular leaders of India and Kashmir (e.g., J. P. Narayan and Abdullah) could now evolve something new acceptable to the Kashmir legislature and the parliament of India, which could at the same time effectively and finally dispose off the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, that should indeed be a most welcome development to reasonable and peace-loving people everywhere. But things should not be allowed to drift further for long in anticipation of a miracle taking place. Firm, prompt and courageous decisions are the essence of wise political action. The supreme ends to be always kept in mind are of course, the security, happiness and prosperity of India and Kashmir.

### **Long-Term Policy :**

Our national interests demand that whatever may be the present problems that create tensions with Pakistan, our foreign policy should aim at creating and maintaining friendly relations with it. Without Pakistan coopting, the defence-preparedness of this sub-continent would not be complete. In view of common history, heritage, ethnology and the same way of life, it is unnatural for these two neighbouring countries to be not on friendly terms. If India cannot achieve friendship with Pakistan, how could it think of peaceful coexistence with other countries? Peaceful coexistence with Pakistan has greater meaning and value than, say, with Egypt or Yugoslavia. The problems of the minorities and Kashmir are not insolu-

ble. They can be solved on the lines suggested above, or by adopting better solutions if they can be hit upon. What is required is initiative and quick, firm and positive action.

In formulating a long-term policy with Pakistan the following points deserve to be kept in mind : (a) The present government in Pakistan is not a brazen dictatorship. People there do not have as much freedom of political thought and expression as in India ; government there is not a democratically elected one based on adult franchise. But it is not unpopular and it has given a better government to that country than ever before since Jinnah Liaquat Ali Khan died. There is no regimentation or control of people's behaviour in any way. Newspapers are strictly controlled, but quite vigorous criticism of government in their legislature and from the public platforms is found. In literature and art, in humanities, social and natural sciences no attempt to control thought is found. Finally, since the form of a country's government is the concern of its own people, and as we have cordial relations with many nations which are ruled by dictators of one sort or the other, the structure of Pakistan's government and the form of its polity should not matter to us any more than in the case of the others.

(b) Pakistan calls itself an Islamic state, but actually it is just like any other newly independent state trying to modernise its life and institutions. Many of our politicians both in the Congress and the Swatantra parties talk frequently of *dharma*, *Ramarajya*, *varnasrama*, revival of the unique ancient Indian glory and what not ; some other political parties are much worse. In the same way Pakistanis talk more about Islam, the Sharia and the Caliphate. The people there do not care much more for religion than here ; everywhere what people want is material prosperity and

progress. Education, science and industrialisation have much lower standards there than in India, so ways of thinking, habits and superstitions found in all societies dependent upon agrarian economy and rural life, are more widely prevalent there than here. Their economy is less planned and more capitalistic than ours. The Ulama are kept in check by their government and the educated and the urban workers do not care for them. Parties like those of Maudoodi and more conservative groups have no greater popularity in Pakistan than the right-wing Hindu communal parties have in India. So it is unjust to make much of Pakistani theocracy. The Hindu-Muslim conflicts and the East-West tensions in that country are to a large extent rooted in economics. More often in the past the minorities in East Bengal have been squeezed out of their occupations by competition and unfavourable treatment rather than deliberately driven out for religious reasons.\* One may remember the plight of Zamindars and Anglo-Indians all over India in the years immediately following independence, the similar situation of a number of Muslim and Catholic families following police actions in Hyderabad and Goa, the misery of rickshaw pullers and tramcar drivers when some Indian cities put them off the roads, and the tragedy of toddy-tappers, handloom weavers and gold-

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\* I do not believe the allegation that Pakistan government is since January 1964 systematically killing or driving out the more than 10 million non-Muslims in East Pakistan to bring down the population there to a level below that of West Pakistan. At present there are 45 million people in East Pakistan while there are only 40 million in West Pakistan. In my opinion Pakistan government is a humane dictatorship. It is the better life in developing democratic India that attracts Muslims and non-Muslims from East and West Pakistan. Pakistan's economic foundation, according to its own planning commission, is "really shaky and tottering". Due to ethnic and linguistic differences, high population pressure and poor economy, East Pakistan remains a threat to West Pakistan. People in the former are also politically more conscious and aspire for democracy and modernism.

smiths when certain fads, reforms or new modes of production were introduced in India. Certain classes, castes and followers of some religions suffer when there is any drastic change in political, social or economic organisation. This may cause poverty and destitution, spread of unrest, demonstrations and riots and consequent repercussions. To blame any religion as the sole cause of all this is folly. The prejudice of *some* Pakistanis against Hinduism is not greater than that of *some* Hindus against Islam. The best Islamic tradition recognised Hindus as *Zimmis*, a protected and tolerated minority. But all this does not mean there are no goondas in Pakistan and that cruelties were not perpetrated on the minorities there ; but it was not Islam which inspired them to do so. It must not also be forgotten that some Pakistani Muslims sacrificed their lives to protect their Hindu neighbours.

I found Indian philosophy a popular optional subject among philosophy students in Lahore. Pakistani intellectuals have friendly interest in Indian thought. Tagore, Nehru and Radhakrishnan are widely read and respected by the elite there. President Ayub and others are reported to be very proud of Mohenjodaro, Harappa and Taxila. People in the streets, shops and hotels, taxi and tonga drivers showed nothing but friendliness towards an Indian Hindu visitor. I met Khwaja Abdul Majid (Deval Sharif) of Faizabad, a Pir (guru) reported to be highly respected by President Ayub and several highly placed men in Pakistan. He expressed no antagonism towards Hinduism, and on the contrary spoke with respect about Rama and Krishna and asserted that a good man who sincerely loves and worships God, whether a Muslim or not, will certainly attain heaven. Another venerable Pir in Peshawar expressed the same attitude towards other religions in conversations with me. Men like Parvez who have written voluminous books which

are sold in large numbers are trying to reinterpret Islam, introducing modern trends of critical thinking into Islamic theology and social thought. I also came across some atheists and sceptics. If India opens Chairs for Indian philosophy, history, Sanskrit, Pali and other subjects in Pakistani universities and sends the right type of sound scholars with modern critical minds, who are not victims of taboos regarding ritual cleanliness, food and dress, but who can mix with people there and participate in their life, Indian thought and culture can gain many Pakistani admirers. Scholarships should be offered to Pakistanis to come to India and study ; and our Hindu nationals encouraged to study Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Islamics. These are some ways of removing national prejudices.

(c) Mad men are not ruling Pakistan. I do not believe the men who really matter there have designs to conquer India and establish a successor state of the Mughal Empire. But they seem to be genuinely afraid that after Nehru, if a conservative right-wing government comes to power in India, it may attempt to invade Pakistan and unify the two countries. They are not sure the majority of Hindus have accepted Pakistan as a final fact. Talk of Akhand Bharat by some Indian leaders lends fire to Pakistani imagination and confirms their suspicions. Their military pacts appear to have been very much the results of fears of India and Soviet Russia, their tensions with Afghanistan the physical distance that separates East from West Pakistan. and the resentment of East Pakistanis against West Pakistan. There is also discontent in Baluchistan and NWPF, not to speak of East Pakistan. Pakistani governmental propaganda campaign against India is as much to divert their peoples' attention from all this as to promote their alertness against the suspected dark designs of the Indian colossus. Newspapers are enco-

uraged to carry on an anti-Indian hate campaign for both these reasons. Pakistan is having a honeymoon with China, and having ourselves tried to be on the friendliest terms with that country we cannot consistently object to that. It aims at the leadership of the Muslim world, hence the undercurrent of jealousy and suspicion found in Egypt-Pakistan relations. All this does not mean that situations will not arise when Pakistani leadership—present or future—may try to launch an attack on India. Pakistanis are also told regularly that their army is one of the best in the world and superior to the Indian. So while preparing itself in every possible way for a possible military crisis, Indian diplomacy should do all it can to prevent such a situation, and attempt to win the goodwill and confidence of Pakistan and, if possible, enter into a permanent treaty of mutual non-aggression and mutual defence in case of need. India being a bigger and more developed country with a stable democratic government should take the initiative and positive steps to corrode Pakistani fears and suspicions and create goodwill in its leaders and people. That would be for the good of both India and Pakistan.

(d) There are several people in Pakistan in their late thirties and above who remember their life in India before partition, and there are many who have migrated from Uttar Pradesh, Bengal, Bombay and South India. Most of them have nostalgic memories of India, their previous work, associations and friends here. Many Pakistanis have relatives in India. A fund of potential goodwill for India exists among them. This must be tapped before they pass out. New generations are coming up in Pakistan who know nothing about India and have as much sentiment for it as for any other country in Europe or Africa. They are also fed upon anti-Indian propaganda which they believe is truth. Something must be done before these



people come to power and responsibility in Pakistan. Hopes for Indo-Pakistan friendship would be much less than now. Immediate Indian action to dissipate the phobia and hatred for India in some Pakistani minds is called for.

(e) Pakistan has also a secret admiration for India. Whatever the government of India does in the administrative, economic and educational spheres Pakistan seeks to imitate. Recently, in spite of its pacts, it is even trying to practice non-alignment in foreign policy and take an independent stand on issues. Pakistani attitude towards India is thus an ambivalent one.

(f) Above all, it would be fruitful if Indian diplomats sent to Pakistan can at least converse in Hindusthani fluently, and are well-read about Islamic religion, culture and history. For some time to come it is also wise to select only South Indian Hindus for important diplomatic posts in Pakistan, as they are relatively free from prejudice against Muslims.

To conclude, Chester Bowles with much insight correctly and aptly said that a love-hate relationship exists between India and Pakistan. It lies within our power to psychoanalyse ourselves first and get rid of this lurking hate within some of us, and then try to psychoanalyse the other party and cure them. A would-be analyst must first undergo analysis himself.

# PART THREE

## DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

### **Military Alliances :**

Some people have asked, would China have attacked India if it had been a member of the Seato Pact? Has it not abstained from 'retaking' Formosa till now in spite of its threats, because of the U. S. 7th Fleet's keeping guard in South China Seas? On the contrary, a communist may say that if India had been a member of the Warsaw Pact, Indo-China border problems would not have erupted into an armed clash. But many think that way India would have lost a good deal of its hard-won independence, and, who knows, in that case Pakistan might have attacked it! Now, a military pact even with a Western country involves either the stationing of foreign armies in large numbers in this country, or the pouring in of military equipment. As will be shown, for the latter too a price has to be paid. Countries like England, France and West Germany are resenting their becoming American bases and are trying to avoid that and the piling of nuclear weapons in their territories as far as possible. Energetic and great leaders with vision like De Gaulle are refusing to depend upon the U.S.A. for the ultimate defence of their countries. The presence of foreign troops never produces a happy atmosphere and brings many new problems. Moreover, as the so-called "air-umbrella" affair after the Chinese attack revealed, the West was ready to provide India with

air-defence and striking power only if supersonic squadrons were allowed to be entirely operated by British and U. S. pilots and radar and ground communication system was under the exclusive control of Western air-bases. The West showed no readiness to help India manufacture supersonic planes or train pilots for them, unless India became a Western base. They also insisted that they should themselves assess Indian defence requirements and should be allowed to supervise the arms supplies they might give to prevent misuse. More recently (1964 March-April) British Defence Secretary Thorneycroft made it clear that Britain in view of its business and trade interests would defend newly independent commonwealth countries from "external aggression and internal disturbances" and that it was not necessary for these countries to acquire sophisticated weapons and modernise their armed forces. In other words, these countries are to be treated as adolescents ; modern weapons should not be put in their hands, their defence should be the concern of Britain. Defence cannot be separated from foreign policy or home affairs. And, why would countries which refuse to arm and strengthen other countries defend them unless the latter pay a price for it ? It is clear neither the West nor Soviet Russia are interested in making India strong and self-sufficient for defence, but may be ready to defend it keeping it weak, in their own national interests. Was it for this that India struggled so long for emancipation from the British? Moreover in this space-age of polaris submarines, inter-continental missiles, rockets and satellites, the practice of stationing foreign troops and bases may not guarantee security. De Gaulle recently stated U. S. A. cannot prevent Soviet Russia taking over Europe ; so the latter must stand on its own legs. As for getting equipment, no country will give it free to another in an entirely disinterested manner.

Paying for it and raising up and training of armies swallows a weak country's finances and energies, and the peoples' lot will remain as poor as ever ; or else, payment may have to be made by surrendering some of the weak nation's sovereignty to a powerful ally. Of course, without even a pact, a powerful nation may defend a weak country in an emergency, and later try to extract its pound of flesh.

Powerful advanced countries will never help weak countries to become completely self-sufficient in manufacturing defence equipment, lest the latter assert their independence. By entering into military alliances, weak and newly dependent countries fall into the purely military line of thinking, give greater importance to defence and neglect industry and technology. That way they remain permanently and inherently weak and dependent.

Unless a country is modernised the aid it receives remains unassimilated. Progress in science and technology, industrialisation, an efficient honest government and a well-trained army,—only these will enable any aid—economic or military—to be utilised. I have been in Iran, Turkey and Greece, and found that in spite of American aid they have not made greater progress than India for this very reason. Geared to American economy and tourist traffic, their cities and upper classes have become chic and “modernised”, the countries remain still backward and poor. But it was of course due to American aid that they remained free, though this prevented them from developing strong native material bases for their freedom and progress. Also, the countries which joined the Seato or Cento have not gained significant military strength. (Recently after its tenth anniversary Senator Wayne Morse described Seato as a “worthless organisation”.) Otherwise, why is not Pakistan still self-reliant? Why does it still fear India so much and hobnob with China in spite of the colossal

American aid it received? Thailand too is not entirely assured and fearless today ; China is still a night-mare to it. Nor have these countries tried to stop communism in S. E. Asia. Ultimately in real-politik, pact or no pact, a country will rush to another's aid only if it thinks that its interests too will be served thereby ; otherwise with some excuse or other it will keep quiet. In the Suez crisis, U. S. A. did not become U. K.'s cohort in spite of the Atlantic alliance, and though Egypt was non-aligned, Khrushchev threatened that Russia will come to its aid. Without any alliance, both Britain and U. S. A. rushed to India's aid and though China belonged to the communist bloc, Russia cautioned it to cool off. This proved that Russia cared more for its national goals than for socialist unity and the monolithic quality of its bloc. It considered its influence in India and friendship with it more important than standing by China, though the latter cried hoarse that it was attacked by India. The Atlantic Pact, in spite of Portugal's appeals to Britain and U. S. A., and Lord Home's prior hobnobbing in Portugal, did not save Goa for Portugal. There never were, nor will be lasting alliances in international politics.

Subsequent to the Chinese invasion, Averall Harriman said it was in the interests of America to allow Soviet-American friendship to grow and let India remain non-aligned. In spite of the heaviest odds in the perilous days of October 1962, India clung to non-alignment, and Soviet Russia approved this by announcing that the promised MIG plant will be installed, and that economic aid will be continued. Britain declared that it will stand by India in its hour of need, in spite of India's attitude in the Suez crisis and its Goa action. All this made some Pakistanis wonder why they should not get out of the Seato and become non-aligned ! *The Guardian* remarked that it was India's

continued non-commitment in the cold war which ensured that Khrushchev was not thrown into Mao's arms. (Nov. 17, 62.) The *Washington Post* commented in December 1962 : "Nehru would stand to gain little that is not now available to him by openly lining up with the West ; by doing so he could lose what he was now receiving from the East". (PTI report from New York, December 18, 62.)

### **What is Essential for Independence ?**

Recent history in Kuomintang China, Indo-China, Korea and Viet Nam has proved that when the people of a country on the whole lack industrial and technological strength and the requisite will and spirit, no amount of foreign military aid will protect a country from going under. While modern arms and equipment are very important, plentiful supplies of them alone will not save a country, unless its people on the whole are determined and contented and unless the country has developed inherent strength through industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture. Some West European nations showed how hard and almost impossible it was for the Nazis to conquer them, although their military resources were comparatively poor. Development of the proper spirit, unity, a sense of purpose and fulfilment, and the country's resources are the most important factors in a country's defence, and not mere foreign bombing bases and aid in abundance. When India succumbed before the first European onslaughts in the 15th and 16th centuries and later, it was then not because of European technical superiority. Except for slight advantages in gunnery and maritime skill, there was little difference between them. The Europeans were alive with energy, imagination and a sense of purpose. They

had a vision of their historical destiny, a tremendous vitality, a burning faith in themselves and in the possibility of progress, and an iron determination to prosper and make their views prevail all over the earth. So in spite of the slight superiority of their technical margin, and their crude and rough manners, and because of greater ruthlessness and savagery, Europeans triumphed over India. Much earlier it was the same case with many foreign invaders. So as some people say it was not always the inferior weapons of India only that led to the success of its foreign invaders. Though the Europeans had a similar advantage over them, they could never completely conquer, subjugate and govern the hardier and more determined peoples like the Turks, Iranians, Afghans and the Japanese, who in spite of their small size and poor resources and military equipment, did not become colonial people. It was their spirit that protected them. Greater unity, vision, a coherent philosophy, purpose and determination are what India needs now as ever, and not foreign arms so much. If it has these it can withstand a hundred Chinas.

It is curious that Chinese leaders recognised this truth long ago, while in India most of our leaders do not understand the importance of people having a faith, a vision and a common will. In 1960 Chinese Defence Minister Marshal Lin Piao told an Army Conference : "We handle both weapons and men, but attach greater importance to men's role. The atom bomb of spirit, *i.e.*, man's ideological consciousness and courage, is much more powerful and more useful than the material atom bomb". General Fu Chung, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, urged the Chinese not to fear nuclear war because "atom bombs cannot occupy countries, it is finally done by men". What India needs most for preserving its freedom and integrity is the right

philosophy and right will. No country can fight unless it has a faith, an ideology or philosophy to live by and fight for. Even Nehru does not appreciate this fully, and constantly talks about industrialisation, technology and science, while many other Indian leaders are much worse thinking only in terms of armies and equipment. The great strength of the Communist bloc and China is their coherent philosophy and their faith in it. Nations which expect to withstand them must also develop an appropriate system of ideas.

### **Present Defence Policy :**

India's present position is that in spite of the Chinese invasion, it will not align itself with either bloc, but will be friendly with both U. S. A. and Russia. It will fight against the invaders, with all its might, securing arms from wherever it can, and "taking help from others", but will not ask other countries to defend it. (*Nehru's speech in Delhi, Nov. 9, 62.*) The country's defence will ultimately be the country's responsibility, and not that of a distant super-power, and its defence will not be "handed over" to other countries. If because of its non-alignment, other countries will not give aid, India "will fight with sticks and lathis and not give up. It is hardly possible for any enemy however big or powerful to suppress India". (*Nehru's speech at Madras, June 13, '63.*) Like De Gaulle, Nehru is inspired by his country's grandeur and destiny and wants it not to be tied to the apron strings of a great power, but develop its foreign relations and defence independently. It is right that our defence policy should be based upon our sovereignty, independence and self-sufficiency.



**Comments by Some Indian and U. S. Leaders :**

It is also interesting to note that one of the foremost Indian leaders, who does not belong to the Congress Party, has gone on record saying that the policy of non-alignment "needed no change" and "was not questioned by any of India's friends" (Jai Prakash Narayan at a news conference in Delhi on Nov. 3, '62.) According to him, "the real culprit was the mental and emotional alignment that went about in the garb of non-alignment." Ideological prejudices, he thought, produced "political myopia" and "double standards", which prevented timely appraisal of events. On June 3, 1963 at Lucknow, J. B. Kripalani was reported to have declared he was not against the government's foreign policy, but only against its actions which were inconsistent with non-alignment. He did not like the government to practise a perversion of non-alignment. But in his Lok Sabha speech of April 11, 1964, Kripalani, however, declared that the Indian policy of non-alignment was "a complete failure" and asked government to have a "fresh look" at it. Because of it, government failed to safeguard national interests, and forgot "principles, strategy and tactics". Mass military aid, he said, can come from the West only. He had however no positive suggestions regarding a new policy that can hereafter be adopted. As he said, mass military aid may come from the West, but will it come free? Will it allow us to retain our sovereignty and independence in full? Can we even while getting it continue to have independent foreign and defence policies? If not, to escape possible invasion by one country, is it wise to hand over ourselves to another country and become a satellite?

Soon after Chinese attack, an elder statesman of India, C. Rajagopalachari stated that non-alignment on India's part was an excellent policy which helped world peace as

long as neither party made aggression on India. He holds that when definite aggression has taken place there is no room for non-alignment, and there is no meaning in discussing this policy any longer. According to him, non-alignment terminated automatically when Russia did not veto Chinese conduct. This criticism fails to take into account the point that a policy does not become wrong merely because one of the parties upholding it deviates from it in practice. It also ignores the fact that it may not be possible for a great power to condemn one of its allies in public, especially when that ally is also potentially a great power. There is no evidence that Soviet Russia did not criticise China in private.\* It also gave implied support to us by publicly remaining neutral over that conflict, continuing to be friendly with us and giving economic aid and promise of a MIG plant. If our friendly relations with Eastern bloc have to be broken, then because the other bloc did not condemn Portugal and Pakistan, India should cease to have friendly relations with the Western bloc also. In practical politics it is too naive to expect that any foreign country will have an identity of outlook with us on all matters. Since then developments in Sino-Soviet relations, the Russian stand that international border disputes should not be settled by force and its criticism of Chinese arrogance and aggressiveness have shown that India was wise in not taking the two blocs as permanent integral entities to either of which every nation should belong. More recently however Rajagopalachari changed his stance by saying that non-alignment is a "moral policy connected with the peace of the world" and that "it is very ridiculous, therefore, for

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\*According to the Soviet journal *Kommunist* (May '64), Chinese differences with Russia stemmed from the latter's refusal to support the Chinese "aggravation" of Sino-Indian border dispute.

people to defend it by saying that it has paid good dividends". (*Bangalore Speech on Feb. 1, 1964*). If it is a moral policy it must be the right policy too, but there is nothing ridiculous in showing that a moral policy has also been an utilitarian policy. Some policies may be moral by some absolute standards, but may pragmatically be unjustified. Others may be in tune with absolute norms as well as expedient. Morality and utility, norms and self-interests, ethics and expediency are not always contradictory. Another Swatantra Party leader, Homi Modi, on the same day spoke approving the policy of non-alignment but stated that our government did not honestly follow it and that the present situation arose because of this. (*Speech on Feb. 1, 1964*.) These criticisms of J. P. Narayan and others make a common point, viz., India did not consistently follow non-alignment though it was the right policy. This criticism is not entirely unfounded.

The Indian government's attitude to Hungary as contrasted with its attitude to the Suez crisis, its passivity when China suppressed the Tibetan revolution, its role in the U. N. when El Salvador sponsored a motion on Tibet, its lukewarm support of the proposed Malaysian Union though its Prime Minister was the one Asian statesman who unequivocally condemned the Chinese attack on India, the consistent Indian sponsoring of communist China for membership in U. N., the speeches in previous years of its representative in U. N. which (some think) often supported the Eastern Bloc and harshly condemned the West, the contrast between its attitudes on Suez and Hungary, its non-recognition of progressive Israel, its platitudinous advice on the Berlin crisis, its persistent underrating in public of the Chinese danger till October 1962 along with the speeches of some of its important spokesmen

magnifying the threat from Pakistan, its not bringing the Chinese penetration into Ladakh to our Parliament's attention earlier, and its unpreparedness to meet the Chinese challenge : these and similar things are responsible for the kind of comments which have been cited. Many in the West also share this view that the Indian government has on the whole been non-aligned in favour of the Communist bloc and unfavourably towards the West. India, for example, they say, did not care to condemn Soviet Russia though it resumed nuclear tests on the very day the Belgrade Conference of Neutral nations opened, while towards U. S. A., it adopted a harsh attitude on similar occasions. (I vividly remember how in a Princeton Conference in 1959, Prof. Eric F. Goldman tried to arraign me by asking how Indian Policy could claim to be ethical in view of its double-faced cynicism and gap between its profession and practice. He is now a consultant to the President of U. S. A.) This line of thinking is well brought out in the Report to the U. S. Congress of its House Committee on Foreign Affairs which toured all over the world in late 1961. This Report, for example, says : Indian leaders show little grasp of realities. Indian dedication to peace is obscured by a mist of words. India supports a motley array of leftwing dictators who profess neutralism of the communist variety. It does not, the Report also says, practically apply the moral standards it publicizes.

### **Our external relations in the past and Non-alignment :**

The above interpretation of Indian foreign policy is not entirely just, but it cannot be brushed aside. The reasons for India's behaviour may be enquired into. A review of India's voting record in the U. N. shows that in earlier

years India found itself more often than not on the side of the U. S. A. It did not hesitate to condemn the role of Moscow in the Korean war ; and Nehru at that time seems to have even remarked to a journalist that Russia was following "a nationalistic expansionist policy". India also approved the Brussels Pact. During that period the Communists in Russia and China did not hesitate to call Gandhi a "bourgeois reactionary" who "aped the ascetics" and "pretended" to support Indian independence, but helped the imperialists and "betrayed" the people (*The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*), and they considered the Indian government to be not fully independent and only a stooge of the British imperialists. With the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the receipt of impolite replies to Indian memoranda on this subject, the possibility of danger from this giant neighbour loomed large on the horizon. So the Indian government while still doing its best to promote camaraderie with China and while making Sino-Indian friendship the pivot of its Asian policy, began to get closer to Russia, as it hoped that when the need arose Russia might act as a check on China. Russian support on the Kashmir issue in the U. N., along with Dulles' view that non-alignment was 'immoral' brought India closer to Russia.

Pakistan's entry into a military pact with the U. S. A. led to further deterioration of India's relations with the Western bloc. U. S. A.'s close ties with European colonial countries and its oft-given support to dictatorships in Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Latin America, while condemning Soviet Russia's "empire", did not project an attractive image of the Western bloc. India's understanding of colonialism along with its slight experience of the goals and methods of international communism made it look upon the colonial and ex-colonial countries.

with dislike. In Africa, in Indo-China, in Indonesia, everywhere leading European countries were engaged in a last-ditch fight to preserve their colonies, and the U. S. A. was in military pacts with them, while Soviet Russia unhesitatingly condemned them. Whenever the question of liberating colonies or racism came up, India found itself by the side of Russia. The U. S. A. was often against, or abstained from voting, when these issues came up in the U. N. India desperately tried to bring China into the U. N., because it felt the "real China" ought to be there and not Formosa, as otherwise a large proportion of humanity had no representation in the U. N., and because if China joined the U. N. it would have to accept the U. N. charter and to some extent be bound and controlled by it and U. N. resolutions. It was in India's interests to see this was achieved, to prevent China from playing any tricks on the northern border. Perhaps China would not have been so ruthless in Tibet and so aggressive against India, if it had been allowed to join the U. N. China's isolation somewhat kept it in ignorance of the thinking and feelings of the contemporary world, and India tried to bring it into the comity of nations in what it believed to be its own and the world's interests. All this made India support China on a number of occasions against the West. This excessive concern with China kept India somewhat apart from other Asian countries like Japan, Philippines and Thailand, which were Western-oriented. To sum up, if the U. S. A. had always followed in the post-war period a liberal altruistic policy such as that of Roosevelt and Kennedy, if there had been no Dulles, India would have been closer to the West.

This is all past history. Nehru has now realised that China is "an expansionist, militarist country". (*Lok Sabha Speech, Nov. 8, 1962.*) He knows the Sino-Indian

problem will be there for years to come, and that defence against possible aggression is necessary. But he does not even now think that communism is the major issue in this context. (*loc. cit.*) As he thinks that events till now have proved India's policy of non-involvement in military blocs to be right, "basic policies" will not change, but will be "adjusted". (*Foreign Affairs, March 1963*) The crisis has shown that India was complacent, smug and unprepared, living in an idealist world of dreams. Since it has now waked up to realities and the recent experiences have matured it, its non-alignment which has emerged triumphant may be more practical and in tune with *real-politik*.

#### **Discrimination between the two blocs necessary :**

There has also been a tendency on the part of many Afro-Asian nations to equate the two blocs. The two power blocs of today differ in essentials as one of them is committed to an ideology which envisages the establishment of a monolithic world society, imposing a particular way of life on the whole world. While Russia and China have an ideological quarrel, both remain committed to a world revolution. Russia asserts coexistence does not extend to ideologies or the classes within non-communist societies, and that between its own and the other way of life there will be continued competition and conflict. While most of the newly independent nations know the evils of colonialism intimately, and while some of them fight tooth and nail communist subversion at home, they have not fully realised the implications of international communism. While colonialism is dying out and even the ex-imperialistic countries are condemning it, communism is resurgent and backed by the military might of the Eastern bloc. As the history of some East European, especially the Baltic

States and South East Asia proves, international communism *may* be dangerous to the independence of countries. At present Russia is only committed to help revolutions of oppressed classes and colonial nations in non-communistic countries, but China is committed to foment them and declare even a nuclear war against anti-communist nations. If both give up these positions and leave it to the people in each country to have the type of society they want and work out their destinies in their own different ways without interference, it would be possible to equate the two blocs. Till then to profess equal fear or liking for both the blocs is neither appropriate nor necessary for even neutrality. As Grotius and Vattel have shown, partiality and neutrality are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to be neutral and impartial without being blind to the merits and demerits of contending ideologies.

### **Racism and Inequality :**

It is quite natural that the positive working principles of the foreign policies of newly independent Afro-Asian countries are centred upon the freedom of dependent people and opposition to racial discrimination. But in Africa, as the Congo bears evidence, a new type of racism came to the fore in the recent past. Hatred of the Whites and the desire to victimize them is as much a form of racism as the ill-treatment of the Blacks by the Whites. The Negro Movement in the U. S. A. called 'Black Muslims'\* is an example of Black racism. In Africa, China is busy fanning up Black racism against the Whites. Moreover, neither all the committed nor all the non-aligned nations have

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\* Its leaders say God is black and that the Whites are devils and snakes who never did any good. There are similar white organisations.



established complete equality of all the communities and religious, cultural and ethnic groups within their states. Colour prejudice is not dead in the U. S. S. R. as recent event reveals. Untouchability has not completely vanished in India, nor have religious and caste prejudices. So, it is a little ridiculous to be perpetually shouting against racism and inequalities in other countries, without removing them in one's mind and country.

### **Global outlook necessary :**

While Asia and Africa are no doubt important, it is wrong for the statesmen of these countries to be obsessed by these countries' problems only. In the times of Metternich the foreign policies of the world revolved round Vienna. Subsequently, Paris, London and Washington became centres of world power. In recent decades Moscow along with Washington shares this honour. But this is an age of interdependence of all continents and statesmen should gradually learn to transcend parochial nationalism. In this age for Asia and Africa to ignore Europe and America is as big a blunder as for the latter to ignore the former. The pre-war Japanese slogan "Asia for Asians" now sought to be revived by China is a foolish slogan. "The world for humanity" is the only right ideal.

### **Non-Alignment must continue :**

Non-alignment, the basic policy of India in its External Affairs, has been its sheetanchor ; by abandoning it India will simply drift without moorings. (*Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 326*). "Its roots", as he pointed out, "go back to the time of Asoka and earlier". (*Address to the 67th Congress session, Jan. 6, 1962.*) It is grounded in "the

ancient tradition and culture of this country". (*Speech at Lucknow, May 13, 1963.*) Non-alignment is a positive concept with an implicit philosophy behind it ; for the Indian government "it is a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the convenience of the day". (*Speech in Rajya Sabha, Sept. 10, 1959.*) Besides the fact that our foreign policy has "sprung from the soil" of India, it has been shaped for over forty years by Nehru's wide and intensive studies of history and politics, his travels and unique contacts with people here and abroad, and its main lines have been stressed many times by the resolutions of the Indian National Congress. If we remember all this and the statements of some important Indian leaders (quoted above) that they approve the policy and have objections only to its application, Nehru's claim that even if another party comes to power in India, it will have to follow the same policy more or less, is justified. Besides all this, non-alignment has served the interests of India, has expressed its will to be free, and finally has been tested in a great crisis and has emerged triumphant.

The fact that most other newly independent nations in Asia and Africa including Israel, have adopted the same type of policy, shows that it is in a sense perhaps even inevitable to new and emerging nations. This is proved by the fact that even the U. S. A. followed the same kind of policy for many years in its history, till its global position and resources forced it to depart from it. The highly advanced and progressive countries of Scandinavia, especially Sweden, and Switzerland have benefitted by following a similar kind of policy for several decades now. Thus theoretical and pragmatic considerations as well as history demand a continuation of India's present foreign policy with "adjustments".

Apart from all this, if there are no non-aligned states

in the world, the U. N. will lose its value, for if it only consists of committed states, what will be the use of the debates in it and the resolutions passed in it? Whom will they convince or impress? And who will sit there as the impartial audience ready on the whole to judge issues on merits and vote accordingly? Without the non-aligned nations, the power blocs will have no moderating influences to work on them and no opinion to respect and fear ; also, international commissions of enquiry and control will be hard put to find persons acceptable to both the blocs as chairmen ; maybe there would be no one fit to be the secretary-general of the U. N. even, if all countries become aligned with power blocs. The comity of nations needs at least some nations to be uncommitted and non-aligned.

### **Commitment and non-alignment :**

It is often said that India has not shown appreciation of the fact that non-alignment is possible only because the West is containing the communist bloc. It is obvious that if there were not two almost equally powerful blocs, there would not be and could not be non-alignment. If in the whole world there is only one total and monolithic super-power, there will be no question of alignment. Everything would be under its sway. Happily till then there can be non-alignment. If there are no powers to be balanced there would be no balance of power, similarly if there are not at least two military blocs there could be no non-alignment. It is true that but for the Western bloc, there may have been more communist expansionism, subversions of governments, open and bloody revolutions incited by foreign powers and creation of satellite countries. Malaya, Greece, Iran and Turkey occur to one's mind. It is equally

true that but for the emergence of Soviet Russia as a super-power after the war and its encouraging declarations and help where possible to colonial peoples, some of the Western nations would not have relinquished their colonies and empires as they did, and others would not have been forced to do so. Aggressions as in the Suez crisis would not have been abandoned but for Soviet Russia. The U. S. adventure in Cuba and the British bombing of Yemeni villages would have been taken to their logical ends, if Russia's deterrent strength had not been present. Moreover in the Middle East and the Far East, countries conflicting with each other are not exceeding the limits because they are afraid of getting involved with one of the super-powers. British, Belgian and Portuguese imperialism in Africa and U. S. hegemony in Latin America would have been greater but for the presence of the communist bloc ; while in Formosa, Malaya, Laos and Vietnam, in Bhutan, Nepal and even India, communist expansionism would have been more active but for the fear of the U. S. A. If the communist bloc had not been there, perhaps right-wing dictatorships and capitalistic nations in Europe and elsewhere would not have been as quiet in their external relations as they have been.

It is good to recognise that both the blocs have a mutual sobering influence on each other, curbing likely desires to be predatory. There is however, it must be repeated, a great difference between the two blocs, *viz.*, one of them is at present committed to an uncompromising proselytizing ideology which proclaims that by historical necessity it would one day be the only prevalent one in the whole world, and that the right type of society can be established only on its basis. In the other bloc too there are zealous uncompromising fanatics, but as a whole it is not committed to a monistic comprehensive creed which is

considered to be the complete truth that must be spread by sword and blood ; its windows are open, fresh air from all sides blows into it, a thousand flowers bloom there. In the application of foreign policy this should not be forgotten. Neither commitment, nor non-alignment should be judged in absolute and exclusive terms ; and to condemn either as immoral has no justification.

### **Present situation and non-alignment :**

It is argued by some that since the world is changing fast and has changed, non-alignment must be given up. Relations between Soviet Russia and U. S. A. have improved over the last two years. Russia and China are now engaged in a deep ideological quarrel as well as in a struggle for world influence. Pakistan has developed friendly relations with China and the latter says Pakistan's membership of Seato and Cento is for defensive purposes. Indonesia for whose freedom India did so much is not now very friendly towards the latter. Differences have arisen among the Nato powers. France and West Germany do not like the developing friendliness between Soviet Russia and U. S. A. Britain excluded from the European common market does not have identity of outlook and purpose with the West European powers. Meanwhile, it has been found there is no Afro-Asian solidarity, national interests and personal rivalries among their leaders making it impossible. Poland and more recently Rumania have been following a more independent attitude, whereas Yugoslavia which defied Stalinist Russia in 1948 and asserted its independence has recently been friendly towards Soviet Russia and has become a principal ideological foe of China and Albania. All this is true, but should non-alignment be given up? Non-alignment arose chiefly because there

were two power blocs, but it is also "the product of the clash between conflicting ideologies" as the Prime Minister of Ceylon pointed out. (*Address on March 23, 1964.*) Statements of the Russian leaders and journals like the *Pravda* make it clear that this ideological conflict will continue. This fundamental conflict will continue, assure the American leaders (*Vide Dean Rusk's address in Washington on Feb. 25, '64.*) As long as this conflict continues, uncommitted nations can either join in it, or keep aloof remaining non-aligned. If this conflict were to cease, naturally non-alignment would cease. It is obvious when there are no two blocs and ideologies, there can be no non-alignment with them. As Mrs. Bandaranaike said, if the need for non-alignment is eliminated, that would be a triumph of this policy. Of course, as she pointed out, it must respond to changing circumstances without losing the essence of this concept. That countries like Pakistan and France have put their national interests, as they now see them to be, above their loyalties for blocs and military alliances does not prove that non-alignment has failed, but that rigid military alliances have failed. Non-alignment was never meant to annul national interests ; if any spokesmen of our country have really shown a tendency to do that, it is their personal fault, not of the principle. If in its application, miscalculations have been made and national interests have suffered to some extent, that again only proves that the concerned politicians have made errors in their judgments. But we must also remember no statesman can be omniscient, all have to act on the basis of probabilities. International politics is a power game in which one has to take risks ; miscalculations will continue to be made, but have to be rectified as soon as discovered. No country's foreign policy has been an unqualified success in every way at all times, nor can it be as long as human

behaviour cannot be predicted with complete mechanical certainty.

By being a pioneer in formulating and trying to follow the policy of non-alignment, India has shown great wisdom. It has anticipated that the world power structure cannot for ever be based on the two bloc system, that contradictions would inevitably develop within both, that alignments would tend to shift radically and new alignments would be formed, and that it is unwise to tie up one's foreign policy to the apron strings of another, however big the latter may be. During the recent past when the two blocs appeared monolithic and formidable, India remained uncommitted to both, and unentangled by military alliances. It made a success of it. Of course, China attacked it and occupied over 14000 square miles after first entering into a non-aggression pact with it. This ought to have been foreseen, some say. Even if it had been, there was no need to lose one's identity, join a bloc and also lose the friendship of Soviet Russia, another great country just across our borders. That would have strengthened China in its ideological struggle with Russia over the issue of peaceful coexistence of nations, and would have helped to consolidate the unity of the Communist bloc. By not joining the Western bloc, India helped to undermine the Russia-China solidarity to some extent. Thereby it enabled Russia to keep itself neutral in the first instance and later denounce the use of force involving international boundaries, and also retained the continuity of Russian aid. But for its non-alignment India could not have obtained Russian support over the Kashmir issue. At the same time this non-alignment helped U. S. A. and Britain to give it economic aid over the years and rush to its military aid and stand by it in its urgency. No greater success could be expected of a policy. The only legitimate criticism can be that without giving

up non-alignment, India should have foreseen the Chinese designs, militarised itself, strengthened its borders impregably and obtained arms and equipment in anticipation. The only fair reply could be that this was a blunder, but that it is human to err.

Thus if there was no justification in the past to join blocs and enter into military alliances, there is less need now to do so when cracks are appearing in the blocs and when some countries which are members of military pacts are virtually becoming indifferent to them and are trying to develop freedom of manoeuvre in diplomacy and action. So Nehru was right when he stated in the parliament on April 13, 1964 : "From any point of view it would appear that non-alignment had not only succeeded in the past but was more desirable today". The present and coming generations in India have reason to be grateful to Prime Minister Nehru for his foreign policy among other things.



## SOME CONCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS

### **International political reality :**

There will be no kingdom of heaven on earth. There is also no well-founded hope of a cosmopolitan world-state based on democracy, equality and justice being realised in the foreseeable future. The world now consists of many big and small nation states. Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are inseparable from statehood, and these are possible only by having power. Power is thus the essence of a state. Power may be derived not only from military strength, but from population, natural resources, industrialisation, diplomacy and above all from ideology. Some fortunate nations may have more than one of these. Some states are more powerful than the others, a few are super-powers. Enlightened self-interest, the perils and uncertainties of wars, the possibility of other nations being drawn into a conflict between any two nations, international law, public opinion and the desire to be popular, the U. N. O., the mutual deterrent strength of super-powers, the general dislike of adventures that upset the status quo and the balance of power, the conscience of mankind speaking through certain great personalities in every age and nation,—these are responsible for preserving peace and the inviolability of international boundaries. But now and then, lust for power and aggrandisement, pressures of population combined with low economic standards and unemployment, and an urge to spread out, conquer, colonise and rule, economic imperialism, missio-

nary zeal to spread one's religion, doctrine or culture, a desire to unify the world or a group of countries and give it peace and prosperity, philosophies which teach that it is a particular nation's or class' destiny and right to rule over the world, real or imaginary insults or grievances, claims based on old history or myths, sometimes sheer madness or stupidity—these lead to aggressions. At what time, from which quarter and why aggression may be committed cannot be predicted. Eternal vigilance is therefore the price of freedom.

### **National interests :**

National interests are not immutable, they change because of international developments, existing state of society in one's own country and other countries and the progress in knowledge and techniques of production. There are however two paramount interests which remain unchanging though ways of preserving them vary, and they are : external security and internal stability, the twin conditions necessary for national welfare and happiness. As to what are all the actual national interests at a particular time and how best they may be promoted—this can be determined only by politicians at the helm of affairs from time to time. Very few politicians are wise, but a good number of them are at least intelligent and capable of thinking, others are not, just as it is the case with philosophers, historians and others. When politicians can think and clearly fix long-range national goals and immediate objectives, know how and when to take decisive steps to achieve them, how to deal with unexpected internal and external events and how to give up their policies when they are proved to be either unfruitful or erroneous, they provide great leadership to their countries.

**The Politicians' Task : The End of Political Action :**

To promote national interests is the one duty of a politician in power ; as he is put in power for that purpose, he ought to be solely concerned with that. (I am here talking of democratic countries only.) Everything else, whether world peace and freedom, poverty of other nations, old treaties, existing alliances or tensions, must be subordinated to that. No alliance or enmity and no ideological or religious considerations should stand in the way of the promotion of national interests. A man is a Prime Minister or a President of his own nation, not of the world, so he is responsible primarily to his own people ; it is their welfare and his country's security and stability that must come before everything. Personal friendship with leaders of other nations, personal interests of oneself and the interests of one's political party or community, the religion, race or socio-political structures of other nations, international public opinion, one's own inclinations, prejudices, and existing national alliances and enmities—all these must be kept aside if they contradict national interests. *Raison d'etat* must be the one criterion by which a statesman ought to judge every policy. In international politics it is military strength and diplomatic initiative and skill that give one prestige, not personal morality, good intentions and talk about peace and nonviolence. The world of De Gaulle, Khrushchev and Mao is still that of Bismarck, Richelieu, Samudragupta and Kautilya. Any politician who acts otherwise would prove himself a Don Quixote. Politicians do talk about the indivisible peace, happiness and freedom of the whole world, but there has been no successful politician who has not subordinated them all to his own national interests, and, of course, no politician would continue in power if he sacrifices the latter. Insofar as one's own national interests and the peace, prosperity and free-

dom of other nations do not come into conflict, the better type of politicians all over the world have always worked for both. History also teaches that democratic states which have developed unity, common purpose and defensive strength and can yet contain themselves and remain non-aggressive, prosper and survive for long. The nation or the state is not a metaphysical entity over and above the people, nor are they prior to the people, it is for the good of the people these institutions are created. So national interests must always coincide with the welfare, happiness and progress of the people ; only diabolical political theories identify them with the interests of any one class, a political party, a particular religious or racial community, a group or a junta within the nation. Similarly, *all* political theories—whether Gandhism or Marxism—can only be hypotheses on the basis of which action to promote peoples' material prosperity and happiness can be undertaken. They must be cast away when they fail to be of use for this purpose. Theories are meant to provide plans to achieve desired goals ; people do not exist to prove that theories are final and infallible.

National interests are those that promote the welfare and happiness of the majority of the people within a nation in accordance with their expressed will, subject to natural rights, from time to time in free elections. As all human beings are of equal worth, no government or party has the right to sacrifice present generations for the sake of the happiness of a remote future generation. The happiness and well-being of the present generation is as important as that of future generations. Only an inhuman philosophy will ask the present generation to toil and struggle and deprive itself of all comforts and pleasures *solely* for the sake of future generations, or for the sake of building up the aggressive military strength of the state. An exclusively futuristic perspective:

is as awful as a narrow vision limited only to the present. Whatever means can logically and scientifically promote national interests defined in this way are ethical in politics. The nature of the ends sought to be achieved determine the nature of the means to be employed. A democratic state which seeks to achieve the welfare and happiness of its people and build up only defensive strength will employ one type of means, whereas another type of state with other ends in view will employ different means. Ends define the means and through different appropriate means only can the different objectives be realised at different times in different societies. Vacuous phrases like 'non-violence' or 'revolutionary spirit' are useless in providing appropriate plans of action ; only rigorous contextual thinking based on knowledge and experience can fill concepts with content and make them fruitful.

## SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REORIENTATION

(a) **A Brains Trust** : Brilliant statesmen are rare phenomena, much rarer than scientific, surgical or philosophical geniuses. In democracies, and more so in underdeveloped countries it is possible that often only mediocrities come to power. The right kind of decision making in foreign affairs requires some knowledge of the histories, religions, philosophies, cultures and living laws of the nations with which one has to deal. Simultaneously, one must be sure of one's national goals and needs and how to achieve them. Obviously all this cannot be the work of any one politician, however brilliant he may be. Especially in our country the ruling party is attracting less and less numbers of intellectuals ; there are no theoreticians of stature in the party except Nehru. Men who read and think and have knowledge of world history, geopolitics and different ideologies are rare in that party. So it is necessary that our Ministry of External Affairs should have an advisory team consisting of historians, philosophers, political scientists and cultural anthropologists. It should be their business to study and understand the international situation in all its aspects, understand and clarify issues and put forward for the consideration of their Ministry and the Prime Minister alternative possible lines of action and explain their implications. It would of course be the cabinet's business and responsibility to decide which policy to follow and how, but it must have the requisite information on the basis of which to decide and act rightly. Such a team could also advise how to project

the right image of our nation abroad, how best to explain our policies to other nations, and how to attempt to win the approval and cooperation of other countries. All this is the job of scholars with technical competence in their special fields who must put in a good deal of study and team work. A group of M. P.s, or partymen, a sub-committee of the cabinet, or a pack of civil servants cannot appropriately and adequately discharge this important task. The sooner our external affairs ministry avails itself of the services of a team of consultants, the better it would be for our country.

(b) **Training of Diplomats :** Much has been written about the 'ugly American', but we too have our ugly Indians abroad. Merely because a man has passed in a civil service examination, he would not become a successful diplomat. Years of service in the central secretariat also may not make one a good diplomat. It would be a disservice to the country to appoint as ambassadors only partymen who have to be placated, M. P.s who cannot be given places in the cabinet, or politicians who have to be dropped from the central and state cabinets. It would be equally injudicious to think that any man who has been in a high-salaried post (e.g., a vice-chancellor, a high court judge, or a general) could be a good diplomat. Similarly, just because one is a Muslim or a Parsee and a nice chap, one may not succeed as an ambassador in the Arab world or in Iran. There is also a superstition in India that only men in their late fifties can be ambassadors. aptitude and capacity should be the only criteria for diplomatic appointments. Some authors, intellectuals, university professors, newspaper editors and artists too could become excellent diplomats ; so could some industrialists, business executives and sportsmen.

India has not tapped these classes yet for this purpose, but has relied too much on civil servants and politicians. Ambassadors-designate must be given ample time for preparation and study spread over several months before they take up their duties. Government must ensure that they have adequate knowledge of the literature, history, religion, politics and culture of the country to which they are going. They must be people who have read a lot and done their home-work. The days are gone when anybody with an impressive physical appearance, an attractive wife, good family connections, easy social manners and capacity to waltz and consume cocktails could have been given diplomatic assignments. We must emulate the way in which Soviet Russia trains and works its diplomats. It is also important that our diplomats should be sympathetic to the countries they are posted with an unshakable fundamental loyalty to our national interests, and a capacity to mix with the people in those countries. An attitude of superiority and moral primness on their part would injure our interests.

(c) **Area Studies** : India although a major country with worldwide interests is not taking adequate steps to prepare itself for its international role. In order that trained men be available for selection as advisers to the external affairs ministry, and as cultural counsellors in our embassies abroad, foreign languages and cultures must be studied more widely. An insignificant number of our countrymen are well-versed in European languages other than English and hardly any in Afro-Asian languages. Our universities have paid no attention to the study of the histories and philosophies of the Far East, the Middle East and other areas. Few Indians know modern Arabic and Persian. Our government should provide scholarships for studies in these areas, open departments and institutes for this



purpose and absorb qualified men turned out by them. While Europe and U. S. A., have several institutes for Sovietology, Sinology, Egyptology, Turkology etc., we do not have them. (For example, during 1947-1952 Britain spent an additional £750,000 on encouraging Oriental and African studies. As a result of the Hayter Committee Report, their U. G. C. is fast expanding these facilities.) We have no facilities for studies in Spanish and Catholic culture, without which we are poorly equipped to deal with Spain and all Latin American countries. Consequently, our diplomats are not assisted by our own specialists, and many aspects of our external affairs lack realism. It is as important to spend money on these studies as on science and technology.

(d) **Independent Diplomacy** : In the actual conduct of external affairs, our government has shown too much concern for the opinion of a few non-aligned countries and for that of Russia, and, till some time ago, China. We must remember there are other countries in the world besides these. The goodwill of West European countries, Britain and U. S. A., and many noncommunist Asian countries is of as much value as that of, say, Egypt, Ceylon or Yugoslavia. It must be also remembered that while we must care for popularity, we should not be obsessed by it and neglect national interests, especially security. For example, in solving the Sino-Indian conflict, what Tito or Mrs. Bandaranaike may think is not as important as our national interests. Prestige is more important than popularity abroad and that depends on taking a considered independent attitude, seizing diplomatic initiative, and having armed strength. India needs to cultivate more friendly relations with nations in Asia like Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Their alignments

and membership of military pacts should not matter just as China's alignment and membership did not matter in the past. Again, India has paid scant attention to the development of relations with African and Latin American countries. (China has gained considerable influence in some of these countries.) It would be also a pity if it cannot be friendly with progressive, democratic and socialistic Israel and cannot explain to the Arab countries that this is a recognition of reality. If De Gaulle can recognise Mao's China, and be yet friendly with Formosa and U.S.A., why cannot we do so in the case of Israel and Formosa? Lastly, the slant in the application of our policy in favour of communist countries and left-wing dictatorships, which was apparent, must be removed. For a truly non-aligned country, injustice and dictatorship whether of the communist or capitalistic type must be abhorrent. Also, there have been occasions when India has offended nationalist sentiments of Africa and Asia by its caution and tardiness in encouraging them. In the Congo it often ruffled militant African nationalism ; it delayed somewhat in recognising the Provisional Algerian government ; it hesitated to condemn colonialism outright at Belgrade ; and on West Irian it could have supported Indonesia more enthusiastically. It found it difficult to agree to join other Afro-Asian countries in resolving to apply sanctions against South Africa. All this is difficult to reconcile with its history of the struggle against the British and, recently, against the Portuguese. Colonialism and imperialism as well as militaristic expansionism of the West or of the communist countries must equally be condemned without injuring its national interests by a democratic non-aligned country. The wobbly hesitant attitude of some non-aligned countries and the favourable attitude taken by some of them towards China after October 1962, show that

India has not yet won their firm friendship and confidence. No non-aligned Afro-Asian country positively aligned itself with India in the Sino-Indian conflict !

(e) **No Sermons** : In the past, the Indian government showed an inclination to set itself up as a moral monitor of the world and a mediator in world disputes. Since its conflict with China it has sobered itself up. We must know our limitations, and also remember that no government can arrogate to itself the position of mankind's moral conscience. Great personalities like Vinoba Bhave or Schweitzer, respected all over the world for their integrity, humanism and impartiality, could judge nations and governments and offer suggestions for world peace and freedom. Intellectuals, elder statesmen (e.g., Lord Attlee or Churchill now), great writers, poets, artists and scientists could hope to speak as mankind's conscience, but not national governments. Such persons too may make wrong judgments, but every nation would respect and also pardon them, whereas ephemeral governments who primarily have to concern themselves with their countries' interests cannot do this.

(f) **Defence** : All effective diplomacy must be backed by strength. Ours is a great country surrounded by important nations like Soviet Russia, China and Pakistan. Without an adequate defence strength we can never impress them and talk to them as equals. So it must be our chief concern to make ourselves self-sufficient and strong for defence purposes, arming ourselves with sophisticated weapons. In view of China's ideology and its military power, it is wise to reconsider our attitude to nuclear weapons. If the U. S. A. and Soviet Russia in spite of their conventional military forces think it wise to maintain

nuclear deterrents of unimaginable power, and if in spite of Nato and Warsaw Pacts, France and China think it necessary to develop their own nuclear strengths, in the world as it is constituted today, there is nothing wrong in our developing nuclear strength for defence and giving it up when stable peace with China becomes a reality. There are rumours that Pakistan has designs on Assam and the attitude of China is well-known, and for this they may use infiltration and guerilla techniques. In view of this we must improve our capacity to deal with guerilla and mountain warfare. Unless we introduce compulsory military service for a fixed period for all young men within a certain age group, we cannot cope up with our defence requirements. Such a discipline may also be good for building up our civilian character and national integration.\* Men cannot also fight with a will and vigorously unless they know what for they are fighting. The Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army had this advantage over the Kuomintang Army. It would be desirable for our army also to have a political wing to infuse into it a purposeful determination to fight for a faith and a vision and intelligible objectives. Lastly, it is strange that none of our universities or our Defence Research and Development Council undertakes advanced studies and research in military psychology and psychological warfare.

**Importance of Ideas :** Wars are today won as much by weapons as by psychology and ideology. Universities and

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\* We may learn from the example of small neutral Switzerland which has a well-equipped and superbly trained army of 800,000 troops, while France has only 705,000, West Germany 355,000, U. K. 415,000 and Italy 470,000. It is because of this strength that Swiss neutrality is respected though it is not a member of any bloc. A non-aligned India similarly needs military strength commensurate with its size and population.

government should pay increasing attention to develop and promote an understanding and love of our national heritage and culture, so that no propaganda from outside can hope to subvert our way of life and institutions. This is one of the tasks to which our historians and philosophers must be harnessed. As Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Mill, Dewey, Croce, Jaspers and others recognised, preservation and extension of freedom ought to be one of the great concerns of theoreticians. The East-West struggle is for mastery over the mind. It is a bourgeois prejudice which thinks philosophy and history are unimportant, that nothing results from the nuances of thought. The power of the Eastern bloc arose from the thinking of a little group of theoreticians led by Lenin, quarrelling around a cafe table in Switzerland. Pakistan was the result of Indian Muslim undergraduate thinking in England. The American revolution would not have occurred but for Locke's theories. The menace of ideology is greater than that of atom bombs. Symbols and alien icons have their own magic power. Only the vision of a great, free and democratic India can sustain us to remain on our feet in this ideological struggle and preserve the personality of India from the onslaughts of the West and the East.

## ANNEXE

### § 1

#### THE SASTRAS, ASOKA AND GANDHI

*Indian Unity and The Chakravartin* : I wish to add some more details to what has been said in Part I on the Hindu ideology of war and peace. Ancient Hindu theorists recognised that defensive wars and wars undertaken to secure justice or punish the wicked were just. Also, a righteous war, they said, is that which is undertaken solely for the sake of establishing an Indian ruler's suzerainty over the whole of India. The only end of such a war must be to establish a unified political organisation throughout India from coast to coast under one just person with all other rulers as his autonomous vassals. This supreme ruler, chakravartin, is responsible only to see that all the rulers protect people and safeguard *dharma* (the moral law as understood by man's reason and conscience and as found in the scriptures and interpreted by Brahmanas). He secures *abhaya* (fearlessness) and *sama* (peace) for all. Hindu political theorists realised that in India cultural unity and a common territory with natural frontiers have bound by a common destiny, determined by common living conditions, diverse peoples with different languages, faiths and customs into a community of character. They wanted this community to live together in a single state, providing regional autonomy and equality to all the groups in the north and the south. A righteous conqueror only desires that other rulers should only recognise him as their overlord. If they refuse, he fights with them till they submit, or he is himself killed. A victory obtained in this way is

*dharmavijaya*, righteous victory. (See *Mahabharata, Santi-parva*, Ch. 59, 38 ; *Arthasastra*, Bk. XII, ch. I) Such a person only can perform the great sacrifices like *asvamedha* (horse sacrifice) which assure one the highest status in heaven. A just conqueror does not drain away the resources of a conquered territory ; as he does not desire booty, he does not loot, nor does he disturb the established customs, laws and religions of the conquered. He grants peace as soon as the vanquished ruler submits, and reinstates him or his son on the throne as an autonomous vassal. Such a vassal's only obligation is to acknowledge the chakravartin's over-lordship and attend the sacrifices or marriages etc., which the latter may perform and present him with gifts. He is not controlled by the chakravartin in any way, so long as he follows dharma. If there is no legitimate heir to the throne and if the ruler is killed, a royal prince is consecrated as its ruler by the chakravartin and allowed to rule autonomously. All the people in such a conquered territory must be pacified and conciliated without using violence. The righteous conqueror acts according to the peoples' wishes, respects and even adopts their ways of life and follows peoples' leaders. Of course the conqueror can receive the diamonds, gold, horses etc., which a vanquished ruler willingly presents to him. These he will spend in performing sacrifices involving charity and for peoples' welfare. All other types of victories are greedy or demonic victories (*lobha-vijaya, asura-vijaya*). Wars undertaken to acquire other's land and treasures to satisfy one's selfish interests are greedy wars, while wars undertaken to kill enemy kings and capture all that belongs to them and ravage their countries are demonic wars. In a righteous war unfair means (e.g., poisoned weapons, magic, poisoning enemies' water supply, ravaging the country) should not be used ; non-combatants and those

who surrender should not be harmed, people should not be enslaved and peace granted as soon as the other party admits defeat and submits. Righteous wars must have only one end in view : the political unification of the whole earth within the natural confines of India under the supremely just ruler, who is thereby enabled to perform holy sacrifices. Heaven is assured by the sastras to the unifier of India.

Anyone who carefully and impartially reads Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (especially the chapter *Labdhaprasamanam*, Bk. XIII, ch. 5), or Samudragupta's inscriptions finds they considered an all-India state to be the most important political end. Samudragupta's aim was to "bind", "unite", or "consolidate" the earth (*i.e.*, India) by the extension of his valour restrained by dharma, for he wanted to conquer not only the earth but also heaven with his good works. (*bahuviryaprasara dharanibandhasya — dharmaprachirbandhak — divam karmabhiih uttamaih jayati.*) This explains why he captured and liberated many kings, while he destroyed others as well as republics opposed to his unification, and merged them in his territory. Another Gupta conqueror Baladityagupta, for instance, conquered Mihiragula, a Hun, but following his mother's advice pitied him, gave him a royal maiden in marriage and reinstated him. Kalhana in *Rajatarangini* speaks of another such king. The *Itihasas* and *Raghuvamsa* too mention such kings who got righteous victories. Kings desirous of such a victory, the *Mahabharata* says, may have to harm many people and during a war kill often those who ought not to be killed (*ghnanti avadhyam anekadha*), but after becoming victorious, they make the people prosper again (*vardhayanti punah*), benefit and protect them in every way, and bestow fearlessness on them. Then by arresting the sinners and cherishing the good, by sacrifices, penance and charities, they



become pure and sinless.<sup>1</sup> (*Mahabharata, Santiparva*, Madras, 1935-6, p. 490. References below are to this.)

*The Lesson For Us* : This ideal of a lasting universal Indian state was never fully realised till India became free in recent times. There were several reasons for this : The country was so vast and communications in those times were so difficult. Every ambitious and able king tried to be the chakravartin, or declared himself completely free and sovereign as soon as a would-be chakravartin who conquered him left his territories, or as soon as he died. Parochial patriotism and centrifugal tendencies of various types existed. Hardly did any chakravartin try to give permanence to his "empire", by integrating it on a secure basis. There were frequent foreign invasions as well as internal anarchy more often than not, because there were no citizen armies, and the bulk of the people had no arms and were unwilling to fight. Fighting was the profession of a particular caste only. There was no constitution, convention, or dynastic loyalty to the chakravartin, which

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1. Thus there was in India no Hindu or Buddhist imperialism. Chandragupta, Samudragupta, etc., were not imperialists, but men who sought to found a universal Indian state, just as men who fought a civil war in America and established the U.S.A., and those who united Wales, Scotland & England into one state cannot be called imperialists. Control of the whole of India by Indians from Pataliputra, or Pratisthanapura, or New Delhi, safeguarding the individual rights, diverse regional cultures, languages, religions and laws, is not imperialism. It must be added that most warring kings in Hindu India fought out of greed or for plunder and rapine ; some so that they may be qualified to perform the *asvamedha* (horse sacrifice) and go to heaven. Very few had a clear conception of an all-India state ruled with justice. Most wars in India were atrociously unrighteous wars, even as few wars in Christendom were "just wars" in the Augustinian sense.

could serve as the principle of unity throughout the vast country. Loyalty, if at all, existed for the person of the chakravartin and not for the state or system he brought about. When he died, there remained no binding force. A vague ideal in the sastras was not enough. The kind of loose organisation, or so-called empire, with autonomous villages, independent kingdoms and republics, which the chakravartins sought to build up lacked cohesion and fell apart as soon as strong personalities were not at the helm. Had the system been centralised and systematised with one law based on justice and equality of all and uniform administration destroying autonomous kingdoms, and if vassals had been substituted by removable, supervised consuls appointed from time to time, or if an aristocracy loyal to the integrity of the empire had been built up throughout the country, such an organisation might have endured.<sup>2</sup> Too much decentralisation, excessive regional autonomy, and the caste system which made the country's defence the responsibility of a single caste, were some of the causes for the political anarchy and successive successful foreign invasions. Kautilya and Samudragupta sought to introduce some centralisation, but they failed.<sup>3</sup> Above all there was a contradiction in this sastraic ideology. Every king was exhorted to become the chakravartin and everyone equally exhorted to resist aggression, defend his

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2. The Mughal Empire too disintegrated because these conditions were not achieved in it. It never became a truly national and constitutional state. Besides, its nobility was not indigenous or at least it did not consider itself so ; and was neither hereditary, nor loyal to the empire, nor had it any solidarity with the people. The Mughal Empire was a military state influenced by Muslim priesthood and ruled by personal despotism. Muslim India did not recognise non-Muslims as full citizens, even as ancient Hindu India denied human rights to the Sudras.
  3. Sultan Alauddin Khalji tried to make terror the unifying prin-

kingdom, fight, win or die. The sastras nowhere say that

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ciple to bind his Sultanate, and fortunately failed. Otherwise, something like Mao's regime would have come to stay in India. Akbar very nearly achieved a number of the necessary conditions for an all-India national state and adopted, as Shivaji recognised, a policy of universal harmony (*sulh-i-kul*) of all religious sects as well as atheists, but did not try and succeed in making either all Muslims or all Hindus, especially some Rajput chiefs like Rana Pratap (whose patriotism and chivalry were recognised by men like Rahim Khankhana, a great Mughal noble, though this patriotism was not extended to the whole of India) look upon his empire as an all-India state transcending and yet preserving and tolerating all religious differences and meant to serve Hindus and Muslims alike. But he succeeded in creating among the Rajputs a sense of attachment to his person and to that of his successors by his tolerance and marriage alliances, but not to the empire, the system. His attempt to evolve a synthetic religion and a common culture antagonised both the Muslims and the Hindus. Only a few courtiers praised the attempt. Freedom and equality to all communities, tolerance of all religions, a policy of permanent peaceful coexistence with the independent Hindu states in Rajputana and the South, a loyal hereditary aristocracy which considered itself Indian and a tradition of peaceful succession to the throne might have made the Mughal Empire enduring, and welded the Muslims and Hindus into one nation. Akbar had some such vision of Indian unity but it was not clear and he could not transmit it to others. His successors undid what he did. The Early Mauryans and the greater Guptas had a better vision of Indian unity, but they could only adopt bloody means to forge it and had neither clear ideas nor the practical ability to secure its endurance. The Cholas and Vijayanagar, etc., did not have a developed all-India outlook. Shivaji appears to have had something of that sort ; and *perhaps* earlier Rana Sanga, and later Haider Ali, and Bahadur Shah in 1857 to some extent had a national outlook. Anyway, it is to the British and then to Sardar Patel and Nehru, we owe India's political and administrative integration. Patel's statesmanship in this matter surpasses everyone else's. But the Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs in India have yet to cherish and fully realise the secular ideal.

once a samrajya, an all-India state, is established, all ought to be loyal to its head and that no vassal should even dream of disrupting it. This led to internecine strife, a constant war of all against all. There was no moral restraint on those who disrupted an established universal state (e.g., on the Sungas who broke up the Mauryan state). Everyone was asked to commit aggression as well as defend oneself. Rulers' paranoia, glorification of war by poets and sastras, the readiness of unemployed men and tribes to enlist themselves as mercenaries, the interests of the Brahmana class who wished to keep the Kshatriyas in a constant state of warfare so that they could control society, the indifference of citizens to politics and government, and the caste system produced political anarchy. An all-India peace was a mirage. Altogether this whole ideology was most disastrous. All this has a lesson for modern India. A strong centre, uniform law and administration, readiness of all citizens to arm themselves and defend the country, and an adequate well-equipped standing army are necessary to preserve our independence and integrity. Caste, linguistic chauvinism, greater autonomy to the states within the union and decentralisation may be dangerous to our security. The so-called village republics "have been", as Dr. Ambedkar said, "the ruination of India. What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism?" (*Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 39.*) With individual citizens as their units and their natural rights guaranteed, we must have a strong democratic centralised state in India. Loyalty must be towards India as a whole and not to linguistic states, villages, communities, or castes.<sup>4</sup>

4. It may be asked, if India cared so much for political unity and independence, how was it conquered so many times? *Firstly*, that India has no history except that of its "many" foreign

: *Kautilyan Inter-state Relations* : Kautilya's goal, as already said, was to establish a universal Indian state, like Machiavelli's who too wanted to work for national unity in Italy. Both prescribed the only methods which they thought would achieve this. Here are a few brief extracts from Kautilya : "The sources of welfare and security are peace and industry (*samavyayamau*). Efforts to realise the fruits of works begun is industry. The preservation of the security necessary for the enjoyment of the fruits of industry is peace. Peace and industry are the effects of the six-fold policy." (*Arthashastra*, Bk. VI, ch. 1.) "One inferior to another should enter into an alliance upon certain conditions with the latter ; one in a superior position to another should start hostile operations against the latter ; one who thinks he can neither harm nor be harmed by another should keep quiet ; one who is endowed with superior means (policies) should march against the other ; one who is devoid of power should surrender ; whoever is in need of help should enter into an alliance with one and hostilities with another. These are the six forms of policy. Of these a ruler ought to resort to that by which he thinks he can develop the defensive strength (forts, roads, etc.)

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conquests is a myth propagated by imperialist historians as well as by Marx. It was not conquered more often than some European states, nor was internecine warfare in India more widespread or continuous than in, say, France, Germany, Italy, or Greece. *Secondly*, no foreign conquest of India was accepted or tolerated. Every conquest was sought to be repelled. After every conquest and occupation, forces of resistance gathered, increased and fought the conquerors till the latter were either merged in the country's population losing their superiority as well as identity, or were driven off. From Mohenjodaro till today, the history of India is one long continuous attempt to establish and maintain a single integral independent state guaranteeing personal freedom and social justice to all, and to repel and remove the attacks and obstacles that prevent the realisation of this ideal.

and the resources of his state (commerce, agriculture, forests, mines etc.), and retard those of his enemies".<sup>5</sup> (*Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 1.) "If the advantages from an alliance or hostile relations are equal, alliance is preferable ; for from hostility may result decrease of power, loss of wealth, going out of one's country, various difficulties and sin. This applies to remaining quiet and marching against another also." (*Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. II.) By these means did Kautilya seek to achieve national unity, peace (*sama*) and fearlessness (*abhaya*).

*Righteous War* : The following passages throw light on this concept and how such a war should be the last resort. "A wise ruler should always avoid war, and must secure the end by the other three means."<sup>6</sup> *Varjaniyam sada yuddham*. (*Mahabharata*, p. 352). Of these concilia-

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5. The Sanskrit terms for these six forms of policy are : *sandhi*, *vigraha*, *asana*, *yana*, *samsraya*, *dvaidhibhava*. It is not entirely correct to translate the first three as peace, war and neutrality. Among states within India Kautilya conceived no lasting peace ; there could be peace in India only if there was one universal Indian state. Otherwise, any state is encircled by a number of neighbouring states situated immediately on its circumference and a number of states beyond them. Neighbouring states are actual or potential enemies while states situated beyond them are allies. A state contiguous to two actually or potentially belligerent states, capable of helping both singly or jointly, or of resisting either of them individually, is a *madhyama* (middle one). A state beyond the territories of all these states, much stronger than them all including the *madhyama*, and capable of helping them all jointly or singly, or resisting each of them individually is an *udasina* (indifferent or neutral one). (*Arthashastra*, Bk. VI, ch. 2.)
  6. These are conciliation, gifts and intrigue (*santva* or *sama*, *dana*, *bheda*). The last is *danda* or *yuddha*. Intrigue includes hostile propaganda, threats, coercion, sowing of dissensions, infiltration and subversion of enemy states. Intrigue was supposed to be a lesser evil than war as it involved less loss of life. On the whole, the *dharmashastra* and *Mahabharata* prefer war to amoral means,

tion is the easiest and these three should precede war which should be the last. (*Arthashastra*, Bk. IX, ch. VI.) "Without a war should a king achieve victory. Victory through a war is deplorable (*Jaghanyam*)." (*Mahabharata*, p. 479). "One should attempt to conquer enemies through conciliation, gifts or intrigue, using all these together, or separately ; but never by war. *Na Yuddhena kadachana*. Because victory and defeat in war are uncertain and inconstant, war should be avoided". (*Manusmṛti*, VII. 198-9). "Sometimes in a war both the parties are destroyed." (*Kamandakiya Nitisara*, IX. 61). "One should cease fruitless enmities." *Viramet sushka vairebhyah*. (*Mahabharata*, p. 523). "A king should not desire to conquer the earth through non-dharma, for by whom can an unrighteous conqueror be approved? An unrighteous victory will not be permanent, it cannot take one to heaven, and will lead to the fall of such a conqueror and his state too." (*Ibid.*, p. 486). "Nothing is greater than a victory gained through dharma." (*Ibid.*, 487).

*Sanctity of Promises and Religions* : "Whoever breaks his treaties or fails to fulfil his promises becomes unreliable to his and his enemy's people also.<sup>7</sup> So does one who acts against his people's wishes (*avisvasyo—praktiviruddhacharah*). A ruler should adopt the culture of the land and its religious faith.—He should respect (or worship at) all the religious places (*sarva devatasramapujanam cha*), and favour the learned, the orators, the philanthropic and the courageous." (*Arthashastra*, Bk. XIII, ch. V.) This shows that Kautilya, in spite of the amoral means he advocated,

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while the *arthashastra* prefers amoral means to war, but not, of course, to moral means.

7. Marcel Sibert in his *Traite' de Droit International Public* (Paris, 1951) observed that the cardinal rule of international law "*pacta sunt servanda*" goes back to Kautilya.

had great respect for treaties and different religions and customs in (he makes this clear) one's inherited as well conquered territories. No just conqueror would, he held, disturb peoples' ways of life or their religious faiths. A plural society within a single universal Indian state—was his ideal.

*Asoka* : I wish to add the following points to what I wrote about Asoka. (1) He renounced all aggressive warfare, because, he concluded that (a) no victory is a victory when it involves slaughter, death and deportation ; (b) in a war many good men who are non-combatants as well as those dear to them are afflicted by misfortune, injury, death or deportation, and (c) in every country there are sincere adherents of some religion or other and any harm done to them is a harm done to their religion too.<sup>8</sup> As he held all religions to be sacred, this he considered a crime. He went further and said even a just war should as far as possible be avoided : Anyone's wrongs should be forgiven to the extent they can be forgiven. (*Yopi apakaroti kshantavyah eva yah sakyah kshamanaya*) (Rock Edict XIII) It has been said that Asoka gave up warfare only after

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8. It is appropriate to mention here the teaching of the Buddhist philosopher Aryadeva, as interpreted by Chandrakirti : Some sages may have said it is dharma for kings to wage wars, but they are evidently incorrect, for only that which conforms to the moral law ought to be followed and anything that contradicts it has no authority. If a king can resort to treachery and deceit to kill his enemies, why should dacoits who do the same be condemned? If to sacrifice oneself in a war is righteous, why is it not moral to spend and exhaust oneself and one's property in riotous living and debauchery? The latter too is as much a self-sacrifice as a war. In other words, Aryadeva argued that political power should be bound by the same rules as those of personal morality of ordinary men. There can be no special morality of monarchs. (*Chatuhsataka*)



the Kalinga war as "he had nothing more to fight for."<sup>9</sup> This is wrong because in the deep south, the independent states of the Cholas, the Pandyas and Keralaputra flourished, and then there were the unconquered border peoples (*antanam avijitanam*) as well as the conquered forest tribes (*ataviko vijito*) who were unpacified. To all these he extended friendship. He assured both the latter groups that they could trust him and fear nothing from him and announced he would as far as possible forgive all their wrongs and exhorted them to take to dharma.<sup>10</sup> (Rock Edict XIII ; Kalinga Edict II). For the small independent states in the south he offered nothing but peaceful cooperation although he could have easily conquered them. And there were many foreign states outside India, conquests of which he never thought of though he had a huge army and ruled for over forty years over a sub-continent, without any internal or external troubles.

(2) Desiring non-harm (*akshati*) and equal treatment (*samacharya*) of all beings, Asoka held only "victory of dharma" to be the most important. He claimed he won such a victory not only in his own territories (*iha rajavishayeshu*), but also among the frontier peoples and in Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Cyrene and Epirus, as well as in the independent South Indian states. (Rock Edict XIII.) Some scholars have held that by the term he used (*dharmavijaya*) he did not mean the victory of dharma, but just righteous conquest such as a would-be chakravartin waged according to the Hindu sastras. This is wrong because he claimed he obtained *dharmavijaya* (*sa cha punarlabdhah*)

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9. K. M. Munshi, Letter no. 271, *Bhavan's Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 9, 1962.
10. By Dharma Asoka meant avoidance of sin, performing good deeds, compassion, charity, truthfulness and purity. (Pillar Edict II.)

in Syria, Egypt, Macedonia etc. Since he never made a righteous or an unrighteous conquest of these countries, he could only have meant victory of dharma. He sent messengers of his dharma to these distant countries, and rulers and peoples there must have heard them with respect and expressed some sort of assent to what they preached. In other countries to which his messengers did not go also, hearing about Asoka's righteous conduct (*dharmavrttam*), people, it seems, followed it. This made him think righteousness was becoming victorious throughout the world. A vain dream ! Any other kind of conquest could not result in non-harm (*akshati*) which he desired. Further, in the same edict he asked his descendants not to undertake any new conquest. Let conquerors with weapons, said Asoka, prefer a truce and mild force (or punishments)<sup>11</sup> (Rock Edict XIII). He contrasted victory of dharma with victory gained through weapons, and considered only the former to be the true and permanent victory. This may be understood thus : He thought he had won a victory for dharma in India and abroad in far-off countries and wanted his successors also to emulate him. That was his will and testament. If however others<sup>12</sup> resorted to conquests with weapons, he hoped they would use minimum force and soon conclude a truce.<sup>13</sup> Thus Asoka clearly

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11. "*Santim cha laghudandatam cha*", says the inscription. *Santi* is not peace, *sama* is peace. *Santi* is cessation of hostilities or a truce. In a religious context it means a spiritual state free from attachment, aversion and other passions. May be he had that too in his mind.
  12. The inscription does not say 'others', but implies this. Having asked his successors to emulate him and contrasted *dharmavijaya* with *sarakarshino vijaya* (armed victory), he could not have cynically expected them to resort to the latter.
  13. I have used the edition of *The Edicts* published by the Adyar Library, Madras (1951), which contains the Pakrit text and its

went beyond the monstrous ideology of the Hindu sastras which taught in the interests of political unity : Strike if your neighbour is weak, bide your time and overcome him with guile if he is strong ; become by hook or crook the chakravartin and then wash off your sins by performing an *asvamedha* and providing your subjects with a just rule. Asoka's *dharmavijaya* was entirely different from that of the Hindu sastras. His political thought had no room for aggressive warfare of any kind either for establishing an universal Indian state or invading states outside India. He envisaged and advocated the possibility of peaceful coexistence among all the states in the world, as some Buddhist books referred to in Part I did.

*Gandhi* : If one develops the realistic component of Mahatma Gandhi's teaching, it would amount to this : (1) Non-violence is good, it is great, it is the highest law. If anyone practices it absolutely and rightly, by his soul-force he would be able to prevail over all evil, hatred and injustice. If a community of men were to cultivate it, they would become the perfect society. But all this cannot be done, taught Gandhi, by men unless they practice virtues like celibacy, manual labour, non-possession, truth-speaking, etc. But no one has achieved this, and no society or state constituted as it is at present can, he realised, practice such non-violence.<sup>14</sup> (2) He preached non-violent non-cooperation with the British as a means for getting national independence ; he knew the nation would not

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Sanskrit rendering. In the present exposition, the translation and interpretation are mine.

14. Gandhi clearly stated non-violence cannot be built on factory civilisation or an industrial society ; nor is it possible in the absence of a belief in God (a self-existent, all-knowing, all-embracing living force and light). See Gandhi, *For Pacifists*, pp. 101-2, 104-5.

have accepted this if other means were available. Without conviction, India resorted to the non-violence of the weak in its fight for independence. India's scant respect for non-violence was exhibited in the post-partition riots after independence came, and recently.<sup>15</sup> (3) Moreover, Gandhi recognised these facts : (a) Modern states are based on force, and cannot non-violently resist internal disorders or external aggression<sup>16</sup> ; (b) states have the right to wage defensive as well as just wars<sup>17</sup> ; (c) military training and military service are duties for citizens of independent states who enjoy the security, rights and benefits provided by their states which are supported by their taxes<sup>18</sup> ; (d) those who are disloyal to their states can be shot as that is a great crime.<sup>19</sup>

It is clear that according to Mahatma Gandhi, participation in war or resort to violence is not unjustified to win or maintain national independence, though non-violence of the brave is certainly preferable.<sup>20</sup> He did not preach

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15. If India had possessed a sword to fight the British, said Gandhi, it would not have listened to his gospel of non-violence. (Quoted by M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life, Vol. I*, p. 395). Non-violence was a temporary ideal to secure India's independence. (P. F. Power, *Gandhi on World Affairs*, p. 58.) India adopted only non-violence of the weak ; its non-violent action was half-hearted. (Gandhi, *Delhi Diary*, p. 73, 346 ; *Towards Lasting Peace*, pp. 207-8). According to him, when people capable of fighting behave non-violently with self-control and voluntarily take on themselves suffering as the substitute for injury to others, that is the non-violence of the strong and the brave. Its anti-thesis is non-violence of the weak and the cowardly.
  16. *For Pacifists*, p. 42.
  17. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 58 ; *Delhi Diary*, p. 40, 44-5.
  18. Citations in C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 141 ; *For Pacifists*, p. 46, 57.
  19. *Delhi Diary*, pp. 25, 37, 259.
  20. Gandhi's participation in World War I, readiness to make India

“universal non-violence”, but “non-violence restricted strictly to the purpose of winning our freedom.”<sup>21</sup> Non-violence, he said, had no “pertinence” if independent India was invaded ; and for securing national unification, he implied, a state might use force as in Hyderabad and Junagadh.<sup>22</sup> An independent state may go in for a just war when all other methods fail, in which case its citizens have an obligation to serve it in return for the security and benefits it gave them throughout life. To sum up, a nationalist, Gandhi knew, can not be a pacifist, and politics based on patriotism and independent states is irreconcilable with non-violence in all situations. While he held that violence is preferable to cowardice or passivity in the face of tyranny and injustice,<sup>23</sup> he was opposed to the use of force in any form and at anytime to serve the ends of aggression or tyranny.

The difference among these three approaches (Sastras, Asoka and Gandhi) is this. The Sastras ignored the world outside India and tried to help in the establishment of political unity and a just rule in India through righteous conquest. On the other hand, Asoka’s was an universal view. He sought to bring about the victory of dharma throughout the world imagining himself a sort of Pope for this purpose and preached the peaceful co-existence of different states and religions with mutual respect within and outside India.

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a “defence theatre” against Japan in World War II if Britain liberated it, and his support of many national liberation movements, confirm this.

21. *For Pacifists*, p. 44.

22. Power, *Op. cit.*, ch. 3 ; *Delli Diary*, passim ; *For Pacifists*, p. 48.

23. Power, *Op. cit.*, p. 39. He also believed war has “redeeming features” and admired “courage and heroism” displayed in just wars. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Concord alone, he declared, is commendable. *Samavaya eva sadhuh*. Gandhi's was a partriotic and nationalistic view. His mission was to secure the establishment of an independent and united Indian state. He wanted truth and non-violence to be the means and bases for this.<sup>24</sup> If, however, people were not prepared or qualified to achieve this through non-violence, they should secure it through courage, violence and even a just war, if necessary, for national independence, unity and justice were the highest values. All these three, sastras, Asoka and Gandhi, failed to achieve in full their aims.

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24. I know very well that Gandhi sometimes wrote and spoke about non-violence in absolute terms. Thus he made a few statements to the effect that he worked for truth and non-violence and not for the freedom of the country. He advised nations attacked by aggressors or groups victimised by tyrants to resist non-violently. This, he said, can be done by yielding to the aggressors possession of everything they want, simultaneously refusing to co-operate with them and refusing allegiance to them. Another alternative for the defenders would be to offer themselves unarmed as cannon fodder to the aggressors inviting them to walk over their own corpses. If a nation "has one mind as also the will and the grit to defend its honour and self-respect", it can, he said, by these methods non-violently defend itself against the whole world in arms. Such non-violence will change the aggressors' hearts and convert them. All this is the idealistic and utopian component of Gandhi's thought, which had as much effect on anyone or any party in India as the Sermon on the Mount on Europeans.

## ETHICS AND POLITICS

I wish to add the following note to clarify what I earlier said (p. 117) about national interests<sup>24A</sup> and the politicians' task, though I may still sound dogmatic as I have no space to develop my position: If there are ethical principles they must apply consistently and equally to states, *i.e.*, men who run governments, as well as to citizens, and if any state must be bound by morality and law, so must all states be. As the good life is impossible without citizenship in a state and as it is a state which confers on individuals security, freedom and other benefits, and as a stateless person's rights are insecure, the citizens of a state have a duty to support and serve it. This *prima facie* obligation towards one's own state overrides one's obligations to humanity at large, if and when there is a conflict between the two, just as the *prima facie* obligation towards one's own family is greater than towards others. In most cases, however, there is no such conflict and generally in promoting the real good of one's own state, *i.e.*, the welfare and happiness of the people that constitute it, one serves the whole world, just as by discharging one's familial and civic obligations one serves one's state too thereby. Further, if the people of a state themselves do not serve it, who else will do so?

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24A. As defined in the following and earlier, dictatorship, territorial aggrandisement, domination of other countries, or colonisation cannot be identical with real national interests, and in these days of universal vulnerability world peace is a real major national interest of all countries.

The statesmen in power in a state have no right to sacrifice the real interests of their state (*i.e.*, the happiness of their own people) for what they may think to be the good of humanity, for they have to act not only on behalf of themselves but on behalf of all the people in their state. They should however make such a sacrifice, if the good of humanity is known precisely and if their people give them a mandate to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of this greater good. Otherwise a government ought not to impose sacrifices on their own people for the sake of others. While one's own country and nation have greater claims on one than others, the statesmen and the citizens of every state must take into consideration the interests of other states and not violate the lives, liberties and happiness of other peoples, because a state ought to behave towards other states as it thinks they ought to towards itself. But whereas individuals and groups within a state cannot resort to violence or take the law into their own hands, because the state is there to protect the legitimate interests and rights of every one of its citizens, a state may have to go to defensive war, as there is yet no international authority to guarantee and protect the integrity and independence of all states. It follows from all that has been said that one's obligation to obey the government of one's own state is not absolute, if it is not a moral government and if its actions are not solely devoted to secure the liberty, welfare and happiness of all its citizens. Thus it may become an individual's duty to disobey and defy an aggressive, dictatorial, or totalitarian government, and try to change or overthrow it. It must also be recognised that a government has the right to promulgate legislation in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the majority of its citizens, unless this violates natural rights. It is a citizen's duty to follow all the democratically and duly



enacted laws of the land and strengthen the state. Loyalty to one's state is an ethical obligation. A traitor deserves drastic punishment and cannot be tolerated by any state. Even when a citizen conscientiously feels it is his duty to change the government of his state, it is a crime to invoke or receive foreign aid in any form for this. It is a much greater crime to attempt to subvert the structure and traditions of one's own society inspired by foreign ideologies or governments. A legitimate revolution must be spontaneous, popular, entirely indigenous and as far as possible constitutional, but need not be always non-violent.

Lastly, in dealing with other states, to safeguard the security, integrity and interests of one's own state, it might be permissible, when unavoidable, to resort to means which are not considered moral in interpersonal and intergroup relations within a state. But a distinction must be made firstly between the morality of political power and the morality of those trying to acquire political power within a state, and secondly between the dealings of men in power with people in their own state and their dealings with the governments of other states. Nothing but traditionally recognised and legally justifiable means ought to be used by a person or a group to gain power for themselves within a state, or for the retention of such power, and this applies also to the dealings between a government and its people. This is because, as already said, within a state there are precise and well-recognised laws which are enforceable and by which it is best for everyone within the state to be bound, unless they are constitutionally changed. But in the international sphere there is as yet no such situation. Further, as the good of a state is a greater good than that of an individual or a group, and as the logic of the intercourse of states is different from that of private dealings between one man and another as well as one group and

another within a state, when absolutely necessary in the interests of their states, governments need not be bound by the rules of personal morality in international relations. Where, however, there is a universally recognised international law and an authority to enforce it, it is obviously immoral to flout it. Still, such a transcending of the rules of personal morality must strictly be a temporary expedient (*apaddharma*), and may have to be resorted to only when it is established that the desirable end of the state is unachievable by following the rules of interpersonal or intergroup morality and law. Only the conscience of the statesmen in power, the end sought and the circumstances can judge this. Dharma is subtle and it is as difficult to practise it as to tread on a sword's edge without cutting oneself. *Sukshma gatih dharmasya.*

**THE BLOCS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE**

I now wish to say something further regarding the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of communism and capitalism,<sup>25</sup> and some aspects of East-West relations. We may start by remembering that when the Bolsheviks succeeded in their revolution in Russia, the capitalists did everything they can to remove them from power by sending armies into Soviet territory and navies to bombard, blockade or occupy Soviet ports, and by attempts to start a counter-revolution through fifth column activity and secret support to anti-Bolshevik forces. All this did not succeed. The capitalists realised that the new regime had come to stay, that Russia provided a vast export outlet to their countries and that in the case of an aggressive war with Soviet Russia, their governments could not be certain of the support of their own working classes. On its part Soviet Russia realised that in view of what Lenin called the worldwide interrelationship of economies and its own backwardness, it could not exist and develop without the technological and financial aid of capitalist countries. So "a certain temporary equilibrium of forces" (Stalin) was established between the West and Soviet Russia. Many times in the intrawar period both Lenin and Stalin expressed the view that capitalism and communism could peacefully coexist and fruitfully collaborate on the basis of "a reciprocal guarantee of the inviolability of internal political and economic organisation", and declared that

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25. By this I mean in the following any anti-communist social system. I do not use it in a pejorative sense.

Soviet Russia was not seeking to refashion the world by its force and that export of revolution was nonsense. At the same time they could not conceive that Soviet Russia and the imperialist countries could coexist "for a long time", for war between them was "inevitable" someday.<sup>26</sup> Their 'peaceful coexistence' was based on expediency.

On the other hand, the West was not also prepared for permanent peaceful coexistence with Soviet Russia ; it continued to look upon the Bolsheviks with "hatred and scorn"<sup>27</sup> and "fear" because Soviet Russia was a "Godless State", *i.e.*, "a state going forward based on a new principle.....social justice."<sup>27A</sup> The West encouraged or at least acquiesced in the growth of Hitler's power hoping he would attack Russia,<sup>28</sup> and, as Eden said, while the Nazis were conquering country after country, the "bogy of Bolshevism" was used "to frighten Europe".<sup>29</sup> The West also never criticised the "military, semi-Fascist dictatorships"<sup>30</sup> that ruled in all the East-Central European countries then ; it recognised Nazi Germany had a special interest in that region and compelled Czechoslovakia to cede several districts to Germany and later acquiesced in its becoming a German "protectorate". It betrayed democracy in Spain. Even during the second world war

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26. For references, see A. Rothstein, *Peaceful Coexistence*, (Penguin 1955), chs. 3 & 6. Rothstein, a communist, tries to explain away the bellicose statements of Lenin and Stalin and tries to depict Soviet Russia as a gentle peaceloving state.

27. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. II, Pt. III, ch. 17.

27A. Attlee's speech on Nov. 24, 1937 in celebration of the 20th anniversary of U. S. S. R.

28. L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude*, p. XII f, p. 143 ff.

29. Speech on Red Army Day, Feb., 23, 1943.

30. Keeton and Schlesinger, *Russia and Her Western Neighbours*, p. 115.

in spite of an alliance of convenience between the West and Soviet Russia, the theoreticians of the former hated the latter, considering it a "barbarous" upstart state, a "new colossus" which would stride across post-war Europe, and feared the possibility of a "measureless disaster", viz. of Russia "overlying" the "ancient states of Europe", which stood for "culture and independence".<sup>31</sup> They envisaged the formation of a United States of Europe with Great Britain, "the bulwark of Western civilisation", as the rallying point to stand up against Soviet Russia, and Anglo-American armies unexhausted on the Russian front in occupation of post-war Europe. In 1944 itself Churchill and Stalin, on the former's suggestion, in effect agreed to have spheres of influence with varying degrees of predominance in Greece and East-Central Europe.<sup>32</sup> It was this arrangement, and not the Yalta Agreement, that settled the fate of these countries<sup>33</sup>. During the war, Churchill tried to make U. S. troops occupy more territory than they had a right to under the agreements with the U. S. S. R., while he was prepared to "work with" rearmed Nazi troops "if the Soviet advance continued".<sup>34</sup> In the countries liberated by it, Soviet Russia actively helped the formation of communist governments, while in Greece, West Germany and Belgium, right-wing governments were restored by the West,<sup>34A</sup> and denazification

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31. Churchill's Cabinet Memorandum of October 1942 and Smuts' speeches on Nov. 25, 1943 and Jan., 25, 1944.

32. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 198 ff.

33. See on this, Churchill, *Ibid*, p. 369.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 300, 438-9, 442, 446. Statement on Nov. 23, 1954.

34A. Long ago Machiavelli pointed out that when auxiliaries (the forces of a powerful neighbour) are invited to come and defend a weak country, they prove dangerous, for if they lose it is the weak country which is defeated, and if they conquer they would

and demilitarisation of Germany carried out half-heartedly, and agreed reparations to Soviet Union were not fully paid. Thus the iron curtain was jointly manufactured by the mutual hatred of the West and the Soviet Union.

Seeing that their country could not be the pivot of the envisaged alliance against Soviet Russia, British statesmen thrust this role on the U. S. A., and in the spring of 1946 came Churchill's famous Fulton, Missouri, speech which split the post-war world into two armed camps. Communism was declared in that speech "a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation" and the world was warned that post-war Europe "did not contain the essentials of permanent peace". British statesmen like Churchill and Halifax during and after the war did everything they can to prevent sincere cooperation and mutual trust developing between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., by portraying the former as a champion of slavery and imperialism and Europe as the scene of a clash of conflicting ideas. (Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 504, 530.) An understanding between the two world powers would have reduced Britain's importance and injured its imperial interests. (*op. cit.*, pp. 502-3.) Partly because they came to see the dangers of the spread of communism and partly because they could thereby "subordinate" post-war Europe to their own country and "directly or indirectly manage its affairs", the U.S. leaders accepted this role. (De Gaulle's Statement, July 24, 1964.) Thus came the Nato into existence to preserve a Western "Christian" civilisation which harboured and patronised French, Belgian, Dutch, British and Portuguese imperialisms, the Fascisms in Europe of Salazar, Franco and Metaxas and *apartheid* in Africa. The Nato

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not go away and the weak country's servitude begins. If one makes common cause with another more powerful than oneself, one rests in his power if he wins. (*The Prince*, chs. 13, 21.)

is not compatible with the spirit of the U. N. Charter, and from the outset communist countries were kept outside it; it arose as an anti-communist alliance. It was not more idealistic than the Holy Alliance of 1815. In their frenzy and hysteria, some Americans in the mid-fifties spoke of massive retaliation, preventive war, brinkmanship, rolling back of communism and liberation of "captive European nations". It was however again left to Churchill to first recognise "the appalling character" of a war for this purpose and its "final consequences", and to distinguish between "the idea of peaceful coexistence vigilantly safeguarded" and "the mode of forcibly extirpating the Communist fallacy".<sup>35</sup> Thereafter efforts to unleash a holy war against Russia receded. I do not recall any statement by Stalin or Khrushchev in the post-war period threatening they would go to war against capitalism to eradicate it. On the other hand, even Stalin several times after the war asserted that peaceful coexistence of commu-

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35. As *The Economist* (Aug. 28, 1954) put it, Churchill "first trod the path that has led to peaceful coexistence" on April 30, 1954 when he advocated peaceful relations with Russia at a Primrose League meeting in London. In June he met with Eisenhower and seems to have convinced him that the West and Soviet Russia "have", in the President's words, "to find ways of living together". On July 12 in Parliament he made a speech on vigilant peaceful coexistence from which I quoted above. In a similar way in 1820 England's Castlereagh warned the Quadruple Alliance not to try to maintain the *status quo* in other states by force and direct intervention. The patriotic Churchill must have realised that in an all-out war with Soviet Russia, while U. S. A. might emerge triumphant, the U. K. would derive no advantage. If there were two major powers at least, the smaller powers could manoeuvre and get some benefit; if there were only one world power, every other state would be under its hegemony.

nism and capitalism was possible and desirable.<sup>30</sup> This might have been due to the nuclear start which the U. S. A. had, or to the genuine Soviet desire not to be expansive any more and the faith that capitalism would ultimately crumble because of its own inherent contradictions.

From all this it does not seem unjustified to draw the following conclusions : (1) It was not Soviet Russia alone which unleashed the cold war which led to the formation of the two blocs. The West to preserve its own hegemony and colonial possessions and to prevent the spread of the Soviet way of life which would lead to the disappearance of the privileged classes, formed a military bloc against Russia. Its concern was to preserve Western supremacy in Asia and Africa, and safeguard capitalism and the interests of the upper classes in the West.<sup>36A</sup> The Russian plan was to consolidate communism in Eastern Europe and spread it all over the world by every means possible. (2) Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe was possible because there before the second world war freedom and democracy were absent, while after that war there was no outstanding non-communist leadership. Above all, Churchill and Stalin virtually agreed to divide Europe into spheres of influence, as earlier after the Sino-Japanese war Russia, Britain, Germany etc., divided China ; as in 1907 Britain and Russia agreed to divide Persia ; and as in the late thirties the West agreed to the

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36. Rothstein, op. cit., p. 48-50.

36A. Nato cracked when the Western countries found it does not serve their national and class interests. The emerging alignments of U. S. A. with Russia, of France with China, and British trade with Cuba and China, show how much altruism here was behind the formation of blocs. In a recent interview to *Quick* of Munich President Johnson, it seems, asked the Germans to make up their quarrel with Communist countries.



German incorporation of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia ; and as in 1940 Germany and Russia agreed to divide East-Central Europe between themselves. (3) According to Attlee, the modern Russian rulers "inherited" Russian imperialism, and rejecting moral values they "conquered" by "force or fraud" a number of countries throwing around them an "iron curtain", and preached "slavery and the negation of human happiness."<sup>37</sup> But it was by exactly similar methods and teaching that the British and other Empires came into existence and were maintained. The Nazi persecution of Jews and the communist resort to immoral means in East-Central Europe were not more horrible and diabolical than the doings of European imperialists in America, Asia and Africa ; only the victims were whites in the former case, whereas they were coloured in the latter case. The Red Indians and the Incas, the Carribean population and the Australian bushmen—history records how the Western 'Christian' Civilization dealt with them. Even the most liberal imperialism, the British, perpetrated in India horrors like the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre and the 'crawling orders' under the Rowlatt Act, apart from acts of daily tyranny. Even now the sufferings of men like Chief Luthuli and Nelson Mandela do not seem to touch Western hearts as much as those of Communist victims. As an anti-communist said, the civilization that calls itself Christian was built on the blood of the innocent.<sup>38</sup> If the U. S. leaders like Senator Bridges, General Mark Clark and William Bullitt were concerned for freedom and human happiness, why did not they talk of using the atom bomb to liberate African and Asian countries from Western imperialism and *apart-*

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37. Speech on Jan. 26, 1951.

38. Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, (Vintage Books, 1955) p. 214.

*heid?* Why was there no talk of rolling back Fascism in Spain, Portugal and Latin America? (4) This might be a generalisation, but in no country in the world with a clean efficient democratic government did communism make any headway ; and in almost every case the anti-communist leaders whom the U. S. A. supported proved to be dictatorial, corrupt, or inefficient, and in some cases all three, while men supported by Russia did not have the last two traits. (5) The methods by which communism has been propagated were the same by which the Aryans spread the Vedic faith in India, and at a later day Christianity and Islam were spread all over the world. The ruthlessness, fraud and brutality which Catholicism and Protestantism displayed towards each other in their religious wars, and Islam towards *dar-ul-harb* set the models for later ideological wars. But curiously while sectarian wrangles and some persecution of each other among Jainas, Buddhists, Saivas and Vaishnavas in medieval India were not unknown, there was among them no warfare, no organised or largescale propaganda, and no suppression of other religions by organised force supported by the power of the state. A great merit of these Indian religions was they never sought to convert men of other cultures and countries forcibly. However, in congenial circumstances they all attempted to impose themselves on Indian people through inducements, bitter polemics, edicts, law, or coercion.<sup>39</sup>

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39. Buddhist, Hindu and Jaina classics nowhere say all religions are equally true ; these faiths declare each other untruths and try to tear each other to pieces by resorting to logic and invoking empirical experience. The several Hindu systems and sects behaved in the same way towards each other. Endless debates were carried on to decide whether Siva or Vishnu was the supreme deity. Places of worship and idols and stupas of rival sects were sometimes destroyed and sometimes converted into one's

But in course of time all these Semitic and Indian religions learnt to behave sensibly and peacefully coexist with each other.

In the past if different cultures, religions, empires and kingdoms have been able to coexist peacefully, there is no reason why they should not now. It does not seem to be the final and considered view of Marx and Engels that a communist state must necessarily export revolution, or impose communism on all other states by national wars. Some statements from Lenin and Stalin can be cited in support of the view that communism and capitalism can peacefully coexist till the latter disintegrates due to its own contradictions. But even if Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, in some of their moods taught otherwise and wanted communism to wage a holy war against capitalism, communist states now will not be bound by that unless they believe it to be practicable and reasonable. If religions like Vedism, Christianity, Islam, etc., which were militant at one time have lost their militancy and learnt the ways of peace, so can this new religion. "The power of reality and the power of life", wrote Milovan Djilas, "have always been stronger than any kind of brutal force and more real than any theory".<sup>40</sup> Growing contacts with other civilizations and improved living conditions of the masses liberate a nation from the tyranny of ideology. We must not also

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own. Instances of kings like Sasanka, Kumarapala, Kulottunga, etc., who persecuted followers of other sects were not lacking. While men like Hemachandra sought to impose ahimsa by force, Gautamiputra Satakarni and others tried to impose the caste system by force. Some Vijayanagar kings in their wars behaved towards Muslims as brutally as the latter towards Hindus. The frenzy, zeal and hate of rival sects which Indian sectarian religious vernacular literature displays are intense.

40. *The New Class*, p. 214.

forget that there are capitalists who think it a moral obligation to eradicate communism by force. The communists, of course, hope that working classes in capitalist countries will see the superiority of socialism, rise up against their masters and emancipate themselves. The capitalists hope that the benighted peoples of "captive" countries will rouse themselves, throw off the communist "yoke" and become "free". Communism is inevitable, it is claimed, because history has decreed so. Human nature and the spirit of liberty will triumph, it is retorted, and freedom will one day spread to Soviet Russia and China too. Both parties find signs of the approach of the denouements they wish for. Meanwhile there are socialist heroes who seek to destroy capitalist civilisation by a nuclear war to erect on its ashes the new communist civilisation, while there are also 'Christian' gentlemen who are prepared to atom bomb China and Russia to give their peoples true liberty (or 'cocacola culture' as a French professor sneered). The world has to be saved from both these groups of fanatics.<sup>40A</sup>

If the opposition between the West and the Communist blocs is the antithesis between freedom and totalitarianism, and truth and falsehood, no right-thinking man in the nations uncommitted to these blocs will hesitate to side with the West. But this is not the case. Fear and hatred of the growing power of Russia and Communist governments newly set up in East-Central Europe, which might form an aggressive monolithic bloc, brought the Atlantic Alliance into existence to preserve the status quo in the

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40A. See however, *supra*, p. 105-6. The Western bloc seems to be a lesser evil as it has no coherent militant ideology, considered to be final and perfect which it seeks to impose on the whole world.

Western society and Western hegemony in the world. It does not appear to be a voluntary alliance of free states formed purely for self-preservation and to achieve and safeguard freedom all over the world. The policies of the Western bloc serve the world-wide economic interests of American business and Western colonialism. It seeks to preserve its dominance by "weapons technology, strategic bases, and purchases of poor states"<sup>40B</sup> through aid to underdeveloped countries, whereas the U. S. hegemonic interests were served by outright gifts to European nations ravaged by war. The Atlantic alliance fell apart once it was demonstrated that Soviet Russia has ceased to be expansive, and countries like Britain, U. S. A. and France have been and are vying with each other to develop friendly diplomatic and economic relations with some communist countries. If communism is Satanism and the Western creed (if there is one) divine revelation, surely the West ought not to be so anxious to seek cooperation with the former. How can freedom ally itself with slavery? That the communist world is not monolithic and totally controlled by Moscow has been proved by their independence and defiance of Moscow, which Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania and Albania, and above all China, have increasingly shown in recent years. It is also difficult to think of post-Stalinist Soviet Russia as totalitarian; it is still a dictatorship, but there are all sorts of dictatorships in the West and colonialism, which are no better. The Chinese seem to have chosen communism as the only means to speed up their stagnant underdeveloped society and to establish their nation as a world power. Mao's China is aggressive and expansive as the British and French Empires, and Stalinist Russia were at one time, but if men like

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40B. Karl Jaspers, *The Future of Mankind*, p. 130

Attlee and Montgomery are to be believed, one doubts whether it is as totalitarian as its enemies depict it. To think that China would forever be as it is now is naive pessimism. In due course, either due to changes in circumstances or its leadership, it may also become liberal and peaceful. There are the untouchables in India and the Negroes in U. S. A. who do not yet enjoy human rights, and slavery still persists in some countries of the Middle East and South Africa, while in all the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries the grinding poverty and oppression of the labourers and peasants make a mockery of freedom. To say that there is no freedom only in the communist countries is unjust. While one is ready to grant that personal liberty flourishes in the West to a much greater degree than in the communist countries, one wonders whether the achievement of equality has not been retarded in most Western countries. To say that freedom is a higher value than equality is arbitrary; a poor man if given the option may prefer to forego some of his personal liberty to have guaranteed employment and at least living wages. A famished people would certainly prefer bread to personal freedom. Death may be better than total absence of liberty, but life with a little liberty may not be worse than death. The problem is how to reconcile equality with freedom and how to construct a society in which both are realised. Perfect realisation of both may only remain a dream, but efforts in that direction make both capitalism and communism irrelevant, for a better type of society than both can be envisaged. The evolution of a positive democratic state, which combines public and private initiative in reconstructing society, and underwrites the economic and social wellbeing of a nation by redistributing wealth and stabilising economy, can avoid the crises and contradictions of capitalism as well as the dictatorship

of communism. Countries like Switzerland, Scandinavia, and maybe Britain seem to have arrived nearer to this goal than all the others.

Anyway, the two blocs<sup>40c</sup> have now disintegrated, but the two ideologies still contend for supremacy, and meanwhile other types of military alignments appear to be in the offing. It is not impossible that China, some West European countries and some underdeveloped countries may form an alliance against Russia and the U. S. A. If in the past Britain could support Japan against Russia, and allied with the latter fight against Germany which for some time was Russia's ally, and if Russia and U. S. A. could jointly threaten Britain in the Suez crisis, it is not inconceivable that China in alliance with some West European, Afro-Asian and Latin American countries might fight against the U. S. A. and Soviet Russia. Communist countries which have waged cold wars against each other, may not hesitate to wage hot wars if their national interests and hegemonies are involved. As previously each of the two blocs claimed it was defending and extending liberty, the two new emerging alliances may also each advance the same claim. For India the path is clear, viz. to preserve its own immemorial way of life, to build an open plural secular society based on freedom, justice and equality, taking the best elements from the contending ideologies, and arm itself as adequately as possible for self-defence against all aggression, military, economic as well as ideological.

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40c. The blocs however did one good thing, viz., each checked the expansive and hegemonistic tendencies of the other, and helped the small countries in each other's grip to assert their independence. A cold war between two major powers is advantageous to the smaller powers as they are likely to be wooed by both, while growth in economic strength and political vitality allows satellites to emerge as independent powers (e.g. China, France, Rumania).

## RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA

There was a stage in Lenin's later life after the first world war when he lost hopes of capitalism in the West being overthrown by its internal economic decline and the uprising of its proletariat. So developing a contempt for Western values, no more recognising economic dialectic as the law of historical change in all societies, considering the peasantry as the historically chosen revolutionary class, and the Soviet form of organisation as simple and applicable even to pre-industrial peasant feudal and semifeudal relations, Lenin looked upon Asia as the decisive theatre in the struggle for socialism.<sup>41</sup> He believed that the backward Oriental countries, after a revolution in which their peasantry and nationalism would emerge victorious, would invade the "civilised countries of the world" in the "imperialist West," resulting in a reconstruction of the latter and the building of a socialist society in it. "In the last analysis", he wrote, "the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe."<sup>42</sup> A war with non-Western nations, this implies, is necessary to bring about in the capitalist West a transition from capitalism to communism.

The Chinese communists take this as their doctrinal

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41. *The National Liberation Movement in the East* (Moscow, 1957), p. 267.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 315. On the possibility of peasants winning freedom, see also p. 52.



foundation. According to them, the emerging countries of the three continents (Asia, Africa and Latin America) are now the "main zone of the world revolutionary storms", and the main contradiction now is not between communism and capitalism, but between national liberation movements and imperialism. The whole cause of international proletarian revolution now hinges on these liberation movements. The main task of the communist countries, says China, is to further them and support them by an uncompromising stand against imperialism; whereas the communist parties in the West should prepare for this imminent struggle. China therefore has formulated a "three-continents strategy" based on "the storm centres of world revolution."<sup>43</sup> It believes that only its revolutionary experience is applicable to the non-Western world and that revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries must follow the Chinese model. This means that national liberation movements must be under "proletarian hegemony" and that there must be an armed revolution in every case.<sup>44</sup> Undoubtedly this is a development of one aspect of Leninism. But curiously enough the Chinese also believe that if this "correct" approach prevails, national 'liberation wars' and 'people's revolutionary struggles' will paralyse the 'imperialist system' and disintegrate it without a world war.<sup>45</sup>

The Soviet Communist Party "decisively rejects" this "harmful theoretical formulation" of "the main zone of

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43. CCP letter to CPSU, June 14, 1963; *Peking Review*, June 21, 1963.

44. Liu Shao-Chi's speech in WFTU in Nov. 1949. But in the mid-fifties and recently again China found it necessary to admit that national bourgeoisie may succeed in liberating their countries, and forming independent governments, and that proletarian hegemony may be eventually secured.

45. *Peking Review*, Sept. 6, 1963, p. 10.

storms" and "the three continents strategy", as well as the universal validity of Chinese experience. Communist countries should now peacefully coexist with capitalist countries and achieve economic and eventually political superiority over the latter, and "not test by force the stability of the capitalist system".<sup>46</sup> Communist parties in the capitalist countries, says Russia, should strengthen their political influence and attempt to seize power through peaceful parliamentary methods as far as possible, and communist parties in the developing countries should not assume power hastily, but try to influence the dominant political forces in their countries to follow the non-capitalist path. In other words, Russia desires that communist parties in the underdeveloped countries should while increasing their own political influence try to make the parties and persons in power in their countries align themselves with Soviet Russia and against the U. S. A. and if necessary against China too. This has been the policy of the rightists in the Indian communist party also. Only under Russian pressure the Chinese agreed to accept that a peaceful transition to socialism may be possible, while it was because of the latter's insistence that their two Parties in 1957 declared that seizure of power through force and violence by communist parties is not eschewed, and that non-peaceful transition is also possible.<sup>47</sup> To sum up, while Soviet Russia now emphasises only "peaceful transition to socialism by the parliamentary road", China

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46. Khrushchey's public warning in Peking in 1959.

47. See *People's Daily*, Editorial, Sept. 6, 1963. Recently (June 1964) during his Indonesian visit Mikoyan declared that Russia advocated only the peaceful coexistence of different social systems, but not of the oppressors and the oppressed, the landlords and the farmers, and the colonisers and the colonised.

maintains that Stalin's basic policies and methods were "correct",<sup>48</sup> and that its own armed revolution should serve as the prototype for others.

China has gone through three postures towards independent non-communist underdeveloped countries. In the late forties and early fifties it considered them to be governed by bourgeois nationalist regimes which were "the lackeys of imperialism." Then came the 'Bandung line' and the wooing of neutralist Afro-Asian governments. In this phase it granted that bourgeois nationalist regimes could be independent and gradually come under proletarian hegemony.<sup>48A</sup> From 1959 it went back to its old position in theory, but in practice continued to cultivate friendly relations with countries like Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nepal and Yemen. Taking as its basis some views expressed by Mao in 1946, a new theory was elaborated in 1963. According to this, in between the communist world and the U. S. A., called the centre of world imperialism and world reaction, there is 'a vast intermediate zone' composed of two parts. The first consists of independent countries and countries striving for independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the second of all capitalist countries, except the U. S. A., by which (it is alleged) they are all controlled.<sup>49</sup> China now plans to "unite with whom one can unite", except, of course, with U. S. A., U. S. S. R., and India, an "imperialist puppet" (*sic*). It now proposes to form "the third force" with France, Germany, Italy, Britain and Japan ; and says that Marxism-Leninism cannot be the monopoly of a communist party and can be used by any revolutionary, and cites Castro and Ben Bella as having taken "the correct

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48. Ibid.

48A. Russia has not yet swerved from this line.

49. *People's Daily*, editorials, March 4, 1963 & Jan. 21, 1964.

road to win independence and freedom".<sup>50</sup> This theory is intended to help China exploit the differences among Afro-Asian nations, and between Russia and the U. S. A., and achieve its own big power interests. With Chou En-lai's tour in Africa began the active implementation of this plan to form "the third force". All this is evidently not to really wage a war on the U. S. A., but to frighten it to make peace with China on what Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, calls the two "principles", viz. peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five principles and a guarantee that the U. S. A. will withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and Taiwan straits.<sup>51</sup> As already said, China believes "imperialism" can be frightened and rendered impotent by strengthening national liberation and "people's revolutionary" struggles all over the world. If it fails to achieve this, it is not, however, afraid of a possible nuclear war with "imperialism". But China's unprincipled policy is evident from its clandestine trade with and supply of explosives to the racist South African government, its trade with and participation in smuggling activities in Macao and Hongkong, and its incitement of Malays to demand Maphilindo while it goads the Indonesians and the Chinese in Malaya to oppose Malaysia.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is not entirely ideological, but is also a dispute over leadership and for power. Each of these two countries desires to be the principal authority to direct international communism and each wants that its own national interests should have greater weight in the "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism and the

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50. Chou's interview with Galeano of Uruguay; *Peking Review*, Jan. 3, 1964, p. 34.

51. New China Agency Report in *The Indian Express*, June 21, 1964. Chen Yi at the same time says China is going to acquire its own nuclear force.

formulation of communist policies. Russian reluctance to share nuclear power with China and the lack of Russian support for the Chinese plan to "liberate" Taiwan and the aggression on India are the other reasons for this dispute. It is also alleged that Russia carries on subversive activities in Sinkiang, considered by some as the pivot of Asia, and that it enticed and coerced in 1962 many Chinese citizens into its territory. Some in fact regard the Sino-Soviet clash as a quarrel basically over frontiers and territory, China trying to get back all that Russia took from it in the 19th century. The "Great Leap Forward" and the Communes Programme of China were attempts to advance beyond Russia in 'communist construction' and caused Russian resentment. In the crises in Korea, Lebanon and Cuba, their contradictory attitudes intensified their dispute. Mixed up with this ideological and leadership struggle, there are overtones of a racial clash too. China tries to present itself as a champion of the coloured and underdeveloped nations against the "big power chauvinism" of what it depicts as a white giant, namely, Soviet Russia, a friend of U. S. imperialism, and emphasises the irrelevance of Russian experience for the liberation movements of Afro-Asian and Latin American peasant societies.

While there is no foreseeable possibility of the Sino-Soviet dispute resolving itself, neither of these two countries is likely to accept the other's dominance; nor may they quarrel irrevocably because their ultimate goal is identical and they share some common interests. At the same time in view of their border problems, national interests and rivalry for leadership in the Afro-Asian world, a final breach too is not impossible. Both plan to dominate Asia. Russia, unable to contain China, penetrate into Inner Asia, and encircle India, has become a friend of

the latter and Afghanistan to gain political influence thereby. To offset this and acquire control of Southern Asia, China has sought to isolate India by developing friendly relations with Burma, Indonesia, the Himalayan kingdoms and Pakistan. Its frantic attack on India was intended to demolish the latter's prestige, establish itself as a major power, expose Soviet Russia's ideology as incorrect, consolidate its occupation of the strategically important Askai Chin, and, lastly, strike a blow at Soviet-U.S. rapprochement.<sup>52</sup> If the two nuclear powers become friendly, China could never recover Taiwan, nor would its support be needed by Russia. In such a case in Europe Soviet Russia would dominate, and in its hemisphere the U. S. A., whereas in Africa and Asia the status quo might continue. It is this which makes De Gaulle also develop an independent policy and attempt to build up China against Russia. By this France seeks to regain its influence in S. E. Asia and its former African colonies, while China hopes to be given nuclear secrets by France. In a way Sino-Soviet friendship reinforced by their common aim would be dangerous for India too, for then in any possible predatory move by one communist power the other's support for it would be automatic. In fact if in some way the Sino-Soviet dispute were to be reconciled, it would be not improbable for China to have Russia's complete sympathy and concrete support in an armed conflict with India, as indeed they were once offered by Khrushchev through Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsiao on October 13 and 14, 1962, in return for the Chinese endorsement of the Soviet stand in the Cuban crisis.<sup>53</sup> When it

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52. *Tass*, Sept. 10, 1959.

53. *People's Daily*, editorial, Nov. 1, 1963. As *Pravda* in its editorial

sued Russia's national interests, Khrushchev, in his talks with Mao in October 1959 advised China to accept the Two-Chinas solution and make peace with the U. S. A. But a bellicose American administration under someone like Goldwater might force Soviet Russia and China to fraternise once again and act in concert; or a successor of Khrushchev who cares more for Leninism, Stalinist methods and communist unity, might do the same. If the U. S. A. attacks North Viet Nam or China, Russia may be forced to come to their aid, so China might incite North Viet Nam to provoke the U. S. A. It is also possible that Russia might like to see China humiliated by the U.S.A. Also, a future Russian attempt under a different leadership at possible expansion in Asia is not inconceivable ; after all the Russian expansion in Asia and its influence in Persia did once pose a threat to Afghanistan and Baluchistan, the mountainous outposts of British India, and in recent times the Seato and Cento were meant to prevent a similar danger. It may be recalled that Czar Paul prepared to invade India in 1801, while in 1878 the then Czar ordered General Abramov to lead a column from Samarkand to Chitral and Kashmir. Russian writers like Terent'yev (1870) regarded the Pamirs and Kashmir as "a broad gate to India left open by nature for Russia". Ideas do not die and history may try to repeat itself sometimes. It is also conceivable that if China's expansion comes to a stop and an equilibrium is reached in South-East Asia, a concord may be arrived at between the U. S. A. and China, and countries like Viet Nam, Thailand and India might be advised to become friendly towards China.

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on Oct. 25, 1962, sided with Peking in the Sino-Indian border dispute, this story is believable. At all other times *Pravda* took a neutral stand (e. g., on Sept. 9, 1959), but more recently it has taken a pro-Indian stand. No posture is permanent.

With U. S.-Russian rapprochement, West Germany and France seem to have received similar implied advice. What is possible in Europe is not impossible in Asia.

To conclude, since all communist regimes can dispute and clash violently with each other<sup>54</sup> as well as become good friends of willing capitalist states, when it suits their power interests, India cannot take for granted permanent friendship with any one of these three powerful states (U. S. S. R., U. S. A., China), each of which desires world hegemony. Vigilant peaceful coexistence with all these three must be our goal, but if in any acute crisis this becomes impossible, it would be safer to lean towards the U. S. A., in view of its past history and ethos. India should also cultivate friendly relations with Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and, above all, Japan, the only countries capable of standing up to China, and also attempt to help communist leadership in S. E. Asia assert its independence of China, in the way in which East European countries did against Soviet Russia. Long ago the *Mahabharata* taught us: "Due to circumstances and changes in capacities, friends and enemies are made. Depending upon external causes and their prevalent interests and capacities, as the course of events neither remains the same nor uniform, friends become enemies, and enemies are converted into friends. No one is for ever anyone's friend, for ends determine mutual relations. So one should not trust the untrustworthy, nor trust too much the trustworthy; one should make others trust one, but not trust others. At times one has to enter into an alliance with an 'enemy', and start hosti-


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54. The first important communist who referred to the Sino-Soviet clash as one of national interests was Luigi Longo, in a speech in the Italian Communist Party Central Committee. (*L'Unita*, Dec. 23, 1961.)



'lities against a 'friend'. 'No confidence in anyone' is in brief what the *nitisastra* teaches. Even those who need not be suspected ought to be suspected, for a danger when it comes from an unsuspected quarter uproots one." Such, says our great epic, is the essence of policy.<sup>55</sup> All the great powers in the past and now have followed and are following this policy, and they would cease to be so if they give it up.

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55. *Santiparva* (Madras edition), pp. 695, 681, 692, 697, 701, 713, 703, 708, 723. *Nasti jatya ripurnama mitram nama na vidyate ; Arthatastu nibadhyante mitrani ripavahsada ; Samarthya yogat jayante mitrani ripavah sada ; Kale hi ripuna sandhiih kale mitrena vigrahaah karya ityeva tattvajnah prahuh ; Sankshepo nitisastranam avisvasah paromatah ; Bhayam hi asankitat jatam samulamapi krntati.*



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