


METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

N. A. THOOTHY



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POPULAR PRAKASHAN BOMBAY

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“All the sciences are connected; they lend each other material aid as parts of one great whole, each doing its own work, not for itself alone, but for the other parts; none can attain its proper result separately, since all are parts of one and the same wisdom.”

—ROGER BACON

PREFACE

THIS BOOK forms Part II (On method) of the magnum opus, *The Vaishnavas of Gujarat* (Being a Study in Methods of Investigation of Social Phenomena), by the late Dr. N. A. Thoothi. The consolidated work which was accepted for the D. Phil. of the Oxford University in 1924 was brought out in book form in 1935. This is a reprint of that second part.

'What does the sociologist want to understand? What is he about to investigate? What does he aim at and attempt?' are some of the pertinent questions by which the researcher is often baffled. Dr. Thoothi raised these questions; he answered them so as to enable the social investigator to be clear and precise at the outset about the focus of his inquiry. That is not all. The researcher has to develop a habit of mind; a habit, Dr. Thoothi said, 'not to claim finality but to cultivate a sense of limitations both of his observations and of the material observed'. "The crux of the problem under investigation will then be expressed in the form of questions such as 'What?', 'How?', 'Where?', 'When?', 'Wherefrom?', 'Whence?', 'Why?', and 'Whither?'. That having been done, the investigator will then be occupied with the measurement and the correlations of the 'Whats' (or the structures) and the 'Hows' (or the functions) of the phenomena inquired into.

These are some of the logical steps that are essential for social research and Dr. Thoothi has presented them in a lucid and convincing manner. The immense importance of this treatise to a research worker lies not only in the presentation of these steps but also in the fact that this

work is based on the experience that Dr. Thoothi had during an actual testing of these steps in his masterpiece.

Indeed, this work will be valuable to the novice and to the trained research worker who aspire to comprehend the social reality.

Dr. Thoothi served in the School of Economics and Sociology, University of Bombay, as Reader in Sociology for more than 25 years. He has successfully launched a number of sociologists who today occupy good positions in University Departments of Sociology and as research scholars and workers with the government.

ALOO J. DASTUR
RATU D. PARIKH

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THE BEGINNING AND PURSUIT OF THE INQUIRY

I

THIRTY-SEVEN years ago I was a scholar—one among about 150—in a municipal school in Bombay. The teachers and the students were Gujarati Hindus. There were only two Parsis, my brother and myself.

The school had a 'water-mahārāj' who was in charge of the water-room. In this room there were many cups, and the Mahārāj told us which particular cup each one of us had to use when drinking; and my cup had to remain outside the room. The Mahārāj would not let any of us take the water from the water-pot by ourselves. He himself poured it out for us. And after having used the cup we had to wash it, the Mahārāj once more pouring out the washing water for us, and then leave the cup in its proper place. Every one of the boys seemed to be understanding all this, except myself and my brother. I asked my grandfather about it, and he explained: 'Oh, they are Hindus, it is in their *Dharam*'. This did not satisfy the child-inquirer. So I asked some of my schoolmates about it, and they explained: 'Oh, our *gnyātis* are different, and so we can't drink from each other's cups.' On asking them why they were not allowed to touch the water-pot and why only the Mahārāj could touch it, they said: 'But the Mahārāj is

a Brahmin and none of us can touch it because we are not Brahmins'. I could not understand this at the time, but often mused to myself, 'Perhaps I shall some day know why this is so'. And no wonder this curiosity caught hold of my child-mind; for there were over thirty cups in the water-room of a school attended by about a hundred and fifty boys.

And when they talked of their different *gnyātis* I always got into the habit of asking them what it was, what the difference was between one *gnyāti* and another, and so on. I yet remember one calling himself Lohār, another calling himself Soni, a third calling himself Daśa-Lad, and so on. The headmaster and two of the assistant teachers were Anāvils, they said; while Maganlāl and Ishwarlāl masters were Vāniās of some caste. What the difference between the one and the other was and why, no one could tell me. All we knew was that it was there.

All this did not quite satisfy me. I thought a world of these complications and wrapped them up in an amount of mystery, the material for which was amply provided by some of my friends, who talked to me of the *mahātmya* (greatness) of Ambāji and Bahucharāji, of Srināthji and Mahādevji, and others. And the mystery deepened as all those friends took me to their homes, showed me their gods and goddesses, gave me part of the delicious *prasād* (food offering) for the gods to eat, and showed me the then wild-looking pictures of these gods and goddesses. In our games this mysterious element, and this sense of difference were always present in the midst of our school-boy unity. The boys offered me food, but only on a plantain leaf plate; they gave me water, but willingly poured it out in my palms for me to drink. And they never seemed to feel doing something extraordinary. I always felt it and explained it away by saying: 'Oh, that is their "*Dharam*". I am not of their *gnyāti*. It does not matter.'

I left the school and very soon forgot all about my

early schoolmates, for they did not continue their education, and went to work. I joined a High School, where the same old thing was repeated so far as the water-room was concerned. Only, there were some more cups, the room was large, and the pots were many more. And I could not use the Hindu-room. A separate room was provided for the Parsis; and in one of its corners there was a separate pot and a couple of cups for the Mahomedans only. A Parsi water-man attended to the management of this room; but unlike the Hindus, we helped ourselves to the water.

Then I joined a college. Here there was no special water-room and there were no special cups: we all used the same cup, taking care that it was clean. Most of the Hindu students talked of their *gnyātis*, but surprised me by calling it all 'humbug'; they talked of their *Dharma*, but with an amount of ridicule that disturbed my early impressions. But for all my asking, nobody could explain to me what the whole social organization was or what it meant. I found some people extolling it, others indifferent to it, and still others chafing under it. But it seemed to me that they were doing this to something intangible—they did not quite know what. And my purpose in giving the above autobiographical sketch has been to portray the way in which the spirit of an average Indian—educated or uneducated—gropes for the solution of an elusive problem, viz., that of understanding the difference between man and man.

I was, therefore, naturally led to find out what it all meant. This resolve was made about the year 1913, and since then, year after year, I have continued my enquiry both in Bombay during termtime, and in Gujarat during the holidays. It happened that my vacation time coincided with the marriage season, between March and June, when all are at home, life is at its best, and there is so much to see and know.

I searched for books in order to learn as much as I could. They had much to give, but not in a satisfactory

way. I was told to read Grihya-Sutras, Purānas, Mahā-bhārata, Rāmāyana, Manu-Smriti, and so on. I read these and prepared myself for the examination of existing conditions in regard to the life of those who belonged to these *gnyātis* and followed these *Dharmas*.

II

I happen to belong to a community, that has a certain feeling of regard for the Gujarati Hindus. For, though the Parsis almost dislike the Mahomedans and have no regard for many of their ways of life, they have a great respect for the Hindus' purity of life, tender-heartedness, and regard for others' religious beliefs. This does not necessarily mean that the Parsis care for things that concern the Hindus' spiritual life.

And being born of Parsi parents I had begun my babblings in the Gujarati language; and due both to further study and association with the people I learnt the history, language and literature of Gujarat, so that when I lived with them it was not difficult for me to understand their ways and to live like them. For, if a sociologist wants to do any good to himself and to his inquiry, he should avoid embarrassing the people as far as he can help it; for these people get easily embarrassed by one's living in ways strange to theirs. In some particulars, therefore, I had to be exceedingly careful. One of these was regarding my dress, and another my food. I did not give up my native dress but avoided all semblance of Western influence in cut and form, so that the whole appearance showed me to be orthodox. Simple dress, as the native understands it, does not oppress the simple-minded villagers, with the result that by and by they become so accustomed to you that they consider you as one of their own people.

But more important than dress is the question of food. In regard to the latter the Gujarati Vaishnavite is exceedingly touchy. It revolts his whole being to think of

anyone taking non-vegetarian diet; and such a person cannot be one of them, and cannot concern himself in their affairs and well-being. But I was used to vegetarian diet, and therefore found it easier to live among the people. Thus I had no trouble whatsoever in gaining the confidence of the men and women of the families and *gnyātis* amongst whom I lived. In case these two conditions are fulfilled one is welcome almost everywhere amongst the higher and lower *gnyātis*, amongst the rich and the poor. A social enquirer must, if he wants to study Hindu society, live *with* the people and live *like* them.

But if one wants to learn their inner life and their deeper motives, he should learn to feel like them, or at least to develop an understanding sympathy. This is simple to do, so far as the Vaishnavites are concerned. For instance, Brahmin or Vaiśya or Śudra, they all like you to join in their devotional songs. Instruct them by reading stories from the *Purānas* and other simple books of lore, sing to them, and with them, the hundreds of poems they all carry in their memory, and they feel that you are one of them. These methods of living like them and feeling like them do not only help us to gain the confidence of the people, but also enable us to understand all that happens around us from the view-point of the native himself. Any thoughtless remarks like, 'Oh, don't talk nonsense', 'That cannot be', 'This is your imagination,' 'Your *Dharma* is bunkum,' 'Such *gnyāti* laws must be destroyed', are dangerous, and are apt to alienate them from you. To do this to one individual is quite sufficient to incur the disfavour of the whole *gnyāti*.

How to secure introduction to the villages, is the next question. I was very fortunately situated in this matter also, in that I had contracted many friendships with men of different castes coming from different parts of Gujarat. They were only half aware of what I was about. Only in a few cases did I let them know of my purpose, viz.,

studying the life of the people. The only way in which we could introduce any topic of discussion to the elders of a family was through religion; and if one talks with due respect and courtesy to these elders, they do not mind healthy criticism of their beliefs and customs. In fact, in many of our conversations they themselves criticized these, and impatiently asked for advice to overcome their difficulties. But these difficulties are mostly in regard to matters that touch the purse more than anything else. For instance, both men and women who are about to be adversely affected by the *gnyāti* law in regard to the feasting of the *gnyāti*, talk with condemnation of the 'wicked old custom,' and seek advice and guidance as to the way in which they can escape it. Or, when a very young daughter becomes widowed, the mother whispers her own views in regard to the cruelties and oppression of society. Kindly, sympathetic talk, and a behaviour that shows personal concern in the difficulties of the family or of the individual is quite appreciated, and enables the sociologist to see the native generalize, favourably or unfavourably, for himself. Besides, such occasions, enabling him to talk and think in the language of the native, raise a fresh point to enquire about and know the sentiment of the rest of the *gnyāti*. For, the *gnyāti* laws are based on customs, and are obeyed because they are *gnyāti* laws. And, though some of them oppress the family or the individual, the opinion of the whole *gnyāti* as such may not be against them; but if properly tackled, the *gnyāti* as a whole may be persuaded to end an oppressive custom (*āchāra*). So that, in order to learn whether a particular *Dharma*-law or *gnyāti*-law is oppressive to the majority of the members of the *gnyāti* or only to a few families, or to a single family, or to a few individuals, the best way is to go about asking as many people as possible, especially women, who, in my opinion, are, indirectly, as instrumental in overthrowing an oppressive custom as they are in conserving it.

This need for gaining the confidence of women cannot be overemphasized. The many ways in which I achieved it were simple, straightforward and effective. A natural love for children, flavoured with sweets and lemon-drops, works wonders in this direction. Making them sing sacred verses, taking interest in whatever the little ones say and do, naturally endears us to them, and goes a good way to gain confidence of their mothers.

But just as the best gift is that which is given unasked, so the most interesting facts that the sociologist gathers about a society or a people are those which are revealed when two or more housewives gather together of an afternoon and try to unburden their souls by telling each other their difficulties, their personal joys and sorrows. I had the good fortune to be present at many such siesta hour conversations, giving me insight into the real problems and difficulties of Vaishnavite life.

But, the most important person to know and to be introduced to, is the village Brahmin. He is generally a good fellow, ready to help you in every way he can, putting at your disposal all his knowledge about the various families under his care, as also the difficulties and life of one or other of the families and of the whole *gnyāti*. The best way to be introduced to him is through a Brahmin friend of his who describes you as a learned man, full of knowledge about *Dharma*, well-versed in *Bhakti* poetry, and a vegetarian. Such an introduction gives the village Brahmin, and through him the villagers, the notion that the newcomer perhaps knows everything worth knowing about them, and does not come in their midst to find out anything fresh; this puts them at ease and enables them to behave in their most natural and most normal manner.

Some of my Brahmin students made this very easy for me. Their parents introduced me to the Brahmin and everybody else as their children's *Guru*; and, in fact, people rarely felt that a non-Hindu was present in their midst to find out their ways of life. I was also very

fortunate in knowing good Brahmin gentlemen who actually joined me in my many visits to the various parts of Gujarat; and we often lived as guests of the village Brahmin.

Now the way in which I was introduced—as a man who knew the *Sāstras* well,—forced me to assume the airs of a native Brahmin who understood all that was going on when social and religious affairs were discussed. Such a rôle is bound to land one sometimes in an awkward position. But one may come out successfully from such situations with a little tact and foresight.

And let us in passing emphasize that the village Brahmin's position with regard to the educated men of the community is none too enviable. They generally curse him in secret, and chafe and fume at his restraining hand. Nevertheless the ordinary villager respects the Brahmin's word more than that of any one, and a riotous young man, untouched by 'civilization', who will not obey his parents, oftentimes improves his ways due to the persuasions of the Brahmin.

III

Having considered in the last section how one should go about, let us now find out what one should enquire about and know, so that he does not only gather his material and see it in its actual setting in the life of the people, but verifies such observations as he has come across in books or heard reported from the people. Let me explain. In dealing with village communities like the ones with which we have been concerned, one has always to remember that the present state of their society is the result of a historical evolution dimly known to the people themselves; that their religious organization, social organization, habits of life, methods of cultivation, marriage laws, working hours, etc., have a definite relation with a culture and a tradition that is past and gone. So that the enquirer must be prepared to expect what

he may come across and what he may not. To do this he has to go through a vast amount of literature,—historical, poetical, religious, and social—in order that he may be able to see to what extent these traditions yet persist among the people. To take one instance: I was fully aware of the marriage laws and customs of the *Vānīā gnyātis* which were under my observation. As a book-man who believed in what books say, I should never have cared to inquire about the definite relations between the families of the bride and the bridegroom. But one must always take care to verify, directly or indirectly, the statements made in books like the *Manu-smṛiti* and others, or the dogmatic enunciation of the law by the ordinary Brahmin priest. This sceptical attitude must always be present: 'Let us see if this contradicts what we already know.' And the success with which this method was used in finding out the actual marriage customs which in many cases definitely break and go against the already known and customary beliefs and laws, as reported in the first part of this dissertation, I leave to the reader to judge.

By this I do not mean that one should always be in search of exceptions and please oneself by finding that the rule is broken. For, as soon as a rule is found to have been broken, one has not to rest content with knowing it. Why was it broken? Was it really broken? Is it the beginning of a new custom? Has it the approval of the opinion of the *gnyāti*, and to what extent? Or, is this breaking of the custom a deliberate attempt of a family or of an individual to overthrow and rule out the power of the *gnyāti* over them? All these questions will place the whole problem in its right setting and perspective, so that we shall know where we are. And this is really essential and indispensable, because times and manners change so quickly nowadays, and so inexplicably (apparently), that one cannot hope to find out or understand the significance of events without minute inquiry.

The next important thing that one should bear in mind is the rough classification of the facts and attitudes of his life, and their relation to each other, as the native understands it, and supplies it ready-made. A certain set of facts and behaviour is called by the villager his *Dharma*; others he justifies, approves of, defends and tolerates in the name of *gnyāti*; others yet, he refers to his family tradition, which he either stands by or rejects. Thus the native broadly divides the facts of his life into *Dharma*-facts, *Gnyāti*-facts, and Family-facts.¹ Ordinarily, no thought, word, or deed is ever talked of with reference to the individual by these people, as far as my observation goes. But one finds persons in the cities with a lack of respect for these three sets of facts, which their elders respect and adhere to at any cost. And sometimes when an individual breaks this tradition of respect to the religious, communal and family organization, he is considered an exception, a recalcitrant breaker of the law. I have already given one instance where such a recalcitrant son was considered dead both by his family and his community. Of course, we must remember that youth always displays itself in these Vaishnavite Communities as elsewhere, with an inclination on the part of the individual to resent coercion, and even to attempt to break the law. The parents do not mind it; for, by and by the impetuosity of youth calms down and the boy gets accustomed to the domineering influences of family traditions and thus of the social and religious customs.

Thus the sociologist is supplied with a threefold classification of the facts of life by the native himself. As to the fourth, viz., the individual, as the sociologist knows more and more of the people and the organiza-

¹ But as we have already seen, the whole tenor of the Vaishnavite's life is permeated and dominated by *Dharma*.

tions that govern them, he is obliged to deal with it in the later stages of his enquiry.

V

Having found out the structure of the pigeon-holes in the native's mind, the sociologist has to endeavour to see how these aspects are interrelated with each other, and the order of importance in which these facts are seen and acted upon both by the individual and the community. This naturally leads him to arrange these in a sort of hierarchy, from the most effective and most functioning to the least effective and the least functioning. The inter-dependence that one notices, of caste organization and *Dharma* organization, is the first to attract the notice of the student. We generally find abundant evidence forthcoming in terms of a tradition moulded by ingenious and subtle devices in the name of religion, morality, duty, law,—all expressed by the one word, '*dharma*'. This tradition clings like a leech to the larger groups we call *gnyātis*, which (as has already been shown) are more than mere aggregates of all the families which come under them. *Dharma* could not function by itself. It is the *gnyāti*, sanctioned by the *Dharma*, of course, which puts its sanctions into operation, multiplies it, changes it, conserves it, overthrows it. So that during the first year or two of investigation and study, the family appears to be quite intact, self-sufficient, self-dependent, so to say. One is thus led to conclude that the family is the ultimate unit of social organization. It is only some time later that one realizes the strength of the sanction of the *gnyāti* laws which the family looks up to, in order that all that the members of the family think and do what might be the proper and the right thing to do. And it is when a family decides against the doings of one of its members, and in favour of the caste laws, that one perceives that the real functioning units are both *gnyāti* and *Dharma*.

Who breaks a law, then, both social and religious? For, with these communities the mystic halo that hovers round everything, brings everything under *Dharma*; and every duty, seemingly purely religious or purely social, has a socio-religious significance and motive behind it. That these socio-religious sanctions are sometimes broken, and that these are broken by individuals, sometimes with the approval, but oftentimes with the disapproval of the family, makes one conclude that all such changes as do come, come from individual breakers of law, if one might be allowed to use that expression to describe them. The individual sometimes carries his own family with him; sometimes a few more families of the caste, thus forming a new caste. And sometimes whole castes are converted to the view of the individual.

The fact that strikes one forcibly, and the point to be specially noticed here, is the really synnomic character of this society. Nothing is possible (at least it was so till a few years ago) without individual lead. Discontent there is, and pretty widespread; but mass action is unknown; and changes come about almost by accident, as when a young man with some experience of the world outside his little village or town takes it into his head to disobey a *gnyāti* sanction, to break a *dharma*-rule, and strike out on his own. Then come forth many to join him. But unfortunately they follow like sheep. Even in their revolt they are meekly obedient. All this tends to show to what extent custom does not necessarily represent the will of the people, and its acceptance by them and their approval of it.

VI

But the social enquirer must always be alert and watchful on all sides, lest he fall into an error like every other scientist.

For in all scientific investigation there lurks the danger of over-emphasizing certain aspects of a subject,

and a tendency to minimize the importance of the rest. This is especially true of the sciences which study and have a direct bearing on human society, e.g., anthropology and psychology. But in order that one may be able to understand even a single aspect of the human drama thoroughly, one must view it in its proper setting, never losing sight of the many-sidedness and complexity of human organizations. Nothing in nature need be presupposed as abnormal; and everything may be explicable, however strange it may appear to us on the face of it. For example, we have noticed the seemingly absurd custom of early marriages amongst the Vaishnavites, and we have explained, in the light of regional, historical, and psychological phenomena, the necessity and the rationale of it. We have similarly noticed and explained the position of woman, and the all-pervadingness and the grip of *dharma*. The tyranny of *dharma* and *gnyāti* sanctions, and its contact with Islam and Christianity have helped us to realize the inevitableness of the phenomena of *sampradāyas*. And in the light of all these inextricably interdependent facts, we have been able to understand the how and the why of the Vaishnavite individual's plight.

But in spite of all its chequered aspect, all its complexity, a society may be controlled by a central governing attitude—held consciously or unconsciously—which determines its behaviour, and to which all its beliefs, superstitions, idiosyncrasies, may be referred. It may be called the prevailing 'humour' of the body-social. It is an important part of the sociologist's task to find this out, because, changes which a society stands in need of may only be brought about to the extent to which its controlling factor can be touched and influenced. Thus 'magic' forms the substratum of, and explains so much of the 'savage'. And we have seen that *Dharma* plays the same part in the life of the Vaishnavite. To him *Dharma* is the touchstone of life. This is the key which opens up many a dark place for us and explains many

an obscurity; and we repeat, it is by exploring and exploiting this key-position that we may hope to infuse new life into the Vaishnavite society, nay even into Hindu society as a whole.

OUTLOOK AND SCOPE OF THE SOCIAL INQUIRY

I

WHAT DOES the sociologist want to understand? What is he about to investigate? What does he aim at, and attempt? Answers to questions like these could take a variety of forms. Perhaps the most direct and general may be that the sociologist is after understanding human life in all its details and intricacies with a view to arrive at, and possibly enunciate, a complete synthesis of human studies, not merely to learn but also to direct and even improve human life, its purposes and points of view. All that concerns the human comes within the purview of the sociologist.

The construction of such a complex synthesis necessarily involves the huge and difficult task of generally acquainting one's self with aspects of human life in all their varied relations and contacts, now singly or in group, now concretely or in the abstract, each in its due order and proportion, in order to lay bare the qualities that lie behind each one of them, and the points of contact between them, so that the ultimate aim and purpose of fathoming the structure and meaning of the whole, and reconstructing it, may be adequately served.

The labours of all the scientists, all the artists, and

philosophers will therefore provide the sociologist with the raw materials for his studies. These may work, each in his laboratory, studio or cell, remote from one another, ingrossed in their special tasks concerning one aspect or another of human life. Thus the mathematician, the physicist, the chemist and the biologist, provide, each in his own sphere, materials, theories and laws regarding the abstract material factors in the external life of man; or, the logician, æsthetician, psychologist and moralist, each with his independent analysis, theoretical though, of the inner life of human beings; or if we consider the statistician, technician and the bio-technician, each has been giving his own concrete details regarding the practical and applied aspects for the management and direction of phases of the external life of man; and, the jurist and the lawyer, the artist and the psycho-technician, may each yield us his rich crop of material regarding the practical organization, management and discipline of the inner life and purposes of man. It is very evident that each of these groups of workers, theorists and technicians, scientists, artists and craftsmen, gives its own invaluable quota in the making up of our knowledge about the concrete phenomena of the world of nature, of human life and its purposes, and the relations of these sets of facts with one another. They help the sociologist and the socio-technician enormously by supplying them with data from their own fields of work which have a distinctly human significance and value. But it will also be clear that the scientist in his laboratory or field, and the artist in his studio, study only aspects of the human phenomena, though important and vitally necessary, yet without any definite reference to the whole of human life.

Therefore, the sociologist takes all the details that each of these workers, thinkers and artists brings out, to his vast hall, seeks to co-ordinate their results into a synthesis, and demonstrates that they are all working in the same direction, serving the same cause, and inspired

by the same purpose. In this synthesis the sociologist surveys and re-surveys all fields of life-knowledge, ever going from details towards generalizations, and, in the light of the latter, understanding, illuminating and explaining better and more fully the former. This shows that the sociologist has to be always alive to everything that happens in the worlds of science and art, relevant for the construction of a completer, more co-ordinated and surer synthesis. In this sense, sociology is like the positive sciences, ever ready to correct and to improve, to give up a part or whole of a cherished theory in the light of new facts revealed to him by discoveries in science. Thus the synthesis of a sociologist is but a hypothesis; and, within certain limits, he has the right of the scientist to entertain rival hypotheses in order to test their relative validity, rather than dogmatically cling to a single hypothesis in terms absolute and unbending, like the philosopher. In short, the sociologist is after the ever-eluding search of a deeper and more and more complete synthesis of life-processes and forms which fresh, renewed and retested co-ordinations of all the branches of our knowledge and activities are bound to yield, and strives towards that vision of perfection wherein knowledge should coincide with truth and reality. For it is of the very necessity of any life-theory that it must ever endeavour, not merely to observe and classify whatever life has been evolving, but also to interpret and explain the same.

The sociologist, then, must of necessity have a working knowledge of all the sciences and arts, such that he may be able to absorb all the material he is in need of. Such versatility, however, is but the lesser half of his equipment. For he must be possessed of the complementary aptitudes and disciplines of the scientist and the philosopher, of the field-worker and the 'student', in order that he may be enabled to realize and fulfil the infinite aim and dream of science towards discovering standards and laws of an abiding nature. Thus, for an

adequate and correct measure of success, the sociologist has to achieve a considerable degree of high efficiency, both in the field of versatility and in ability to think out and formulate correct and adequate hypotheses.

The first and foremost quality in such an enquirer is therefore a sense of active, creative wonder. Like the child he must be moved by what is going on round about him; he must keep wandering and wondering, with an open and sympathetic mind to which every new fact and sentiment found is but a key to a greater and vaster hall of dreams. Thus did Newton, Darwin and Aristotle tirelessly search into every possible nook and corner and recess, eagerly puzzled themselves with questions, and hopefully sought for their meanings and bearings, with the help of their observations and experiments; even then, while observation and experiment have their great value, it may also be that these need the help of the most increasing of the powers of life, viz., that of reflection, of reasoning interpretation, of objective, suggestive and purposive explanation. Thus the preliminary and simpler attitude and interests of the scientist need to be complemented by the maturer and more reflective considerations and examination of the philosopher. For, let us not forget, that these are but two complementary perspectives, in which the respective preponderance of observation and experiment, and the reasoned and interpretative enquiry of reflection, differ only in degree; active sensibility arouses observation and intelligence at the earlier and preliminary stages of all scientific enquiry; but this, during the later stages of its pursuits, subjects itself to the control of reason and reflection. Only, that in this process, most of us lose much of the touch of live objectivity which forms the vital rhythm of the earlier and most necessary phases of the scientist for all time and under all circumstances. And it is Reason's direct touch and living contact with objectivity at all stages of scientific enquiry, even in its most abstract makes and moods, that gives to the

Western, and especially the British, way of thinking so much of the fragrance of life and human interest. Thus the scientific and the philosophic points of view, usually considered of an opposite and contradictory nature, converge towards the self-same point wherein both coalesce into a new synthesis which may not merely help us to understand, form a hypothesis, and test its validity with the help of observation and experiment, but also to interpret and explain the hypothesis in terms of reflection. It is perhaps this that entitles the sociologist to reshape, remodel, and even to change his environment, and therefrom man's outlooks and inlooks and dominant occupations in life, by carrying out huge experiments in planning such as we have been witnessing in our own days.

The sociologist, then, becomes the rightful inheritor of the fruits of other's labours. Rightful, because he knows how to use this wealth to the general advantage. To change the figure, he gathers the threads and weaves them together; he reconstructs the human fabric with his general apprehension of its life-design. In other words, he is the conductor of the orchestra, the harmonizer of varied tunes and scales. He is the master-synthesizer of human values. It is this, its fundamental notion,—a definite generalization of the several exact sciences—that makes sociology as concrete and useful as the rest of them. That is the general aim of sociology.

II

Having raised the fundamental issues regarding the problem, scope and meaning of sociology, let us now turn our attention, for a while, to the question of the Classification of the Sciences and Arts which is the central problem of Sociology, according to Comte.

Life expresses itself in two ways. The one is the natural, wherein it is enacted as a matter of course, somehow, anyhow, without reference to any understanding,

purpose or direction; the other, which may be called the cultural, wherein meanings are increasingly understood, purposes and ideals are sought to be framed and fulfilled, work and thought get more and more co-ordinated into a system, and life forges its way through agencies and institutions of organization, management, order and law. The simple life of trees, birds and animals furnishes illustrations of the natural phase wherein the course of events depends, rather more than less, on trial and error, wherein work or activity does not come forth as a result necessarily of mental endeavour, no question or problem of life is sought to be solved with a view to betterment, life as a whole is not understood, the problem of nutrition is solved piecemeal without reference to life as a whole—individual and group—and food-search is merely an expression of life-effort towards answering a practical issue in terms of a more or less psycho-physiological function with the help of muscles, rather than by the use and efforts of any higher mental activities. Somehow, in this manner the solutions of the lower forms of life are elementary; mental activity is stirred merely to serve the practical and natural ends of existence, like protection of the young, for instance. Thus birds indulgently busy themselves to build up nests which involve the working of mental energy of a certain sort and quality. But this is no mental activity that works itself towards any new way of development. Anyhow, life involves action and work and service of the mind; these grow increasingly, and the more intimately and closely form part of life itself in all its vital issues, the more life demands of the organism to solve the problems within and without itself. So, in the higher orders, life-activity is not merely, or mainly, in terms of psycho-physical reactions, but in terms of mental effort.

But can we say therefore that such animals, including man, possess knowledge? It is true that man displays more of such mental effort than the rest of the higher animals. But can they be said to have knowledge? In

this way, perhaps, man could be distinguished from the rest of the animal kingdom. Man has come to have not merely mental activities, not merely a mind, but an organized mind which can not only think out, but also co-ordinate past happenings and experiences, within and without, which can be brought to bear upon the present and even the future, not merely to see but even to foresee. Thus, if human life fundamentally demands work in order to maintain and direct life, human mind at a certain stage of its evolution must develop itself into an organized mechanism and a centre for the service and direction of life itself. The accumulated product of all this, through generations of endeavours and their records, may be called knowledge and culture in the most general sense of the words.

Now, most of us believe that when we become considerably conscious of life and its happenings, at a certain stage we must call it knowledge; and this knowledge is acquired by us empirically. But this does not suffice man. A further effort, at the organization of this knowledge in terms of the sciences is made incessantly, with the help of finer and finer mental discernment, devices and outlooks. Thus the self-same structure called *mind* reveals itself in its several phases of life-expressions in the service of greater and higher calls of life.

And, finally, in order to solve the problem of life itself, we have not only to develop the sciences, but also to determine and frame a system of the sciences in terms of relations and interactions, points of contact and of opposition if any. And the more organized, correlated, harmonious, and co-operative this system of sciences is, the more and the better will human effort respond to the calls of life, from crafts to arts, from work to synergy, from folk-life to polity. Thus life has many problems to solve; and the more of them we solve, the more appear that were hidden, as if, in the womb of these solutions; so that problems and aspects, ever new and subtler, have to be faced by man in an unending series of human

issues and subtleties, before man may at all be able, in any sense, to fully understand and live life to the nicety of perfection.

Yet, not till we probe deeper and deeper into the mysteries of the behaviour of a single aspect of reality, and thus develop and systematize our knowledge of the same, can we ever fathom and reach the deeper and more vital connections among the several aspects in their basic relations. Thus the building up of a knowledge, i.e. a science, nowadays reveals that in order to understand the phenomena that lie directly within its purview, we have to know them as related to the rest of reality, starting with the more related and intimate, till ultimately the remote and more remote are all seen in terms of a system of relations. This means that while it is true that we should develop specialisms in our scientific pursuit, we must remember that in the interests of greater and greater victory in any specialism we need also to know, if not actually to master, other branches of knowledge, especially with reference to their vital points of contact.

But we have also to develop a science which does not merely solve a single aspect or problem of life, but many more besides for the purpose of the conquest of life. By solving each individually, we cannot understand or manage life as a whole. If life as a whole must be organized, if its meaning and direction must be determined and definitized, that is to say, if the sciences must interpret and serve human problems, if human life at its best must necessarily be a reaction of the activities of the sciences, we must see the sciences in terms of interrelated wholes, and give a definite meaning to such an interrelation in terms of a whole. Such a system of relations between the sciences may be called the Classification of the Sciences. It recognizes the value of each single scientific discipline; it also seeks to see them related in a certain order and manner for mutual benefit and help; it seeks to correlate the theoretical discipli-

nes with the practical pursuits and problems of life; it sees the subjective and objective sciences as interrelated disciplines going the same way in terms of a certain correspondence between them; thus, it knits all human endeavour, inner and outer, theoretical and practical, material and mental, into a design wherein each is given its proper place and assigned its function in the scheme of things. This perhaps enables the man of science to study and understand life as a whole.

Thus a Classification of the Sciences increasingly helps man towards the proper learning, management and organization of the arts of life. Arts and crafts then increasingly become applied sciences. Design, forethought and will display their rôle as characteristic central-points of such a life. Arts and crafts are more the results of mental endeavour than of mere responses to the call and physical necessity of life. This means that the higher organized life is equal to work plus ideal, so that no activity of life is superior or inferior, in that both together strive to reach a goal which neither, by itself, can approach; work and ideal are thus complementary, each increasing the power of the other towards the perfection not only of themselves, but also of life.

Thus will the sciences gather, comprehend, co-ordinate and systematize, and the arts learn to use the findings of the sciences for the use, benefit, advancement and glory of life. So, as knowledge increases life expands in its self-expression; learning thus ceases to be a static process; the evidence of intimacy of relation between knowing and doing makes learning a becoming, and life increasingly more so. Thus knowledge becomes more and more an instrument of understanding and interpreting, and thus guiding the problems of life for those that foster it. Thus will science help us towards the conscious management of human relations in all their details and general design. If human life must be organized, knowledge and organization of knowledge must precede its organization, direction and control.

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH IN HUMAN INVESTIGATION

THE INSATIABLE URGE in man to use and, therefore, to know his surroundings has carried him on the way of progress through the thousand corridors of time. The wonder with which he gazes at this universe, and the urge within him to know and to find out impels him onward on this path, because he realizes that each discovery is only a stepping stone to another; and as each stone is set in its proper place, he is able to master and control his surroundings more and more for his use, enjoyment, and betterment. This march forward leads him to a more and more definite outlook and way of life. Of course, each single phenomenon under consideration has its own bearings, and its understanding depends upon the attitude and outlook in respect of the whole. Thus, through ages of such efforts, experience culminates in terms of more and more definite and accurate measurements of the phenomenon observed, with methods of devising and using instruments of measurement for the ultimate purpose of determining standards of value or norms. In order to regulate the tasks of his life, humble or great, man has realized that he must measure, directly and indirectly, all the facts connected with them in terms of standard measurements or norms; for, ultimately, this alone can impart an

exactness, a regularity and a controlling power to human existence. In the social universe we find conflicts of ideals and purposes; they are already there for us to deal with as the normal facts of our lives; and, from time to time, most of us find ourselves as misfits with reference to these, so that life seems to be mostly a struggle against such conditions of disharmony. It is here that the sociologist steps in and promises to rectify these conditions, and retransmute them into instruments of functional harmony. His task lies in the correlation of these disharmonies, rather than in dissolving them; so he takes them for granted as the necessary concomitants of human existence, and strives to understand and reset them in terms of a system or science. In fact, it may be said that the chief business of the sociologist is to show how these differences and antagonisms may be regarded as necessary parts and aspects of an organic whole, towards the making of which they all converge, and how in this very process of convergence disappear the seeming contradictoriness which parts and aspects display when considered singly, without reference to the whole.

This urge to know is expressed, initially, in the form of a vague indefinite 'why' which lies at the root of all human endeavour to know and to do. In life we are called upon to deal with practical issues that face us incessantly; and, in the necessity of their solution this initial 'why' is a pervading, dominating factor. The necessity to give a response, an adequate answer to this 'why', is at the root of all inquiry—pseudo-scientific, scientific, and philosophical.

Now let us remind ourselves that every definite, practical issue demands its point of view in the inquiry; and therefore a point of view fundamentally directs the nature of an inquiry. And when the various outlooks manifest themselves and present their various solutions we have next to explain the variety of, and the divergence between, these solutions in terms of inter-depen-

dence, inter-connection, of relevancy, and thus to attempt to justify the truth and validity of these. Thus a problem may be viewed from different points of view, each point of view giving birth to different activities called forth by the inquiry; and though these activities and views are different, their relation, their connection, lie in the fact that they are trying to answer the 'why' from different points of view. Some of them may solve, or attempt to solve, the practical, some the theoretical, and some the speculative issues raised by this 'why'.

The urge for solution of any problem is based on some practical need or necessity of life. In order to work out a solution efficiently we classify relevant facts in terms of similars and dissimilars; this eventually leads us to formulate the theories and laws governing the behaviour of facts from the point of view of the enquiry. Thus we measure each individual issue to find out the laws that govern it. Then, there may arise the question regarding the meaning of the whole in which each part or aspect functions subordinately to the whole, the problem of seeing, that is to say, the parts and aspects as but functioning and vital units from which the whole derives its organized nature. The parts or aspects are thus seen as necessary for, and inseparable from, the meaning and purpose of the whole. Thus once more we find that the practical, the theoretical, and the speculative solve the self-same 'why' from different points of view.

In general, the practical is solved in our crafts and arts, the theoretical disciplines generally come under the general designation of the sciences, and speculative activity is the special preserve of the philosophers. We have taken the view that these three concern themselves with the measurement of the same phenomena and their manipulations; all of them are concerned with the desire to know the nature of, and to deal with, the problems we have to face in human life. That is why art, philosophy, and science are so intimately related to one another;

and unless man concerns himself in vital relations with all the three he cannot be said to have attained the fulfilment of his being. So, let us not forget that even when we are strictly practical, our practice is imbued with theory and speculation, both patent and latent; so also when we theorize, we must to a certain degree speculate and deal with the practical; and when we speculate, we have considerably to draw upon the theoretical, and solve problems to satisfy the commonsense or the practical. In the growth of knowledge, in his dealings with the life within and the life without, man has thus before him all these points of view, inseparable and, for all practical purposes, real. So, when we use the word 'philosophical' to describe our attitude towards things, events, and ideas, we but emphasize the speculative; similarly, when we are scientists we are incessantly attempting to measure these in terms of quantities and qualities of a theoretical nature; and, in a like manner, one is an artist or a craftsman when he deals with the same phenomena in a practical manner, i.e., sets about the concrete realization thereof. In this way, for the sake of analysis and in the interests of clarity, we have to emphasize any one of the three; but the separation of the three altogether, and for all times and circumstances, will make for a confusion of life-values, and will altogether vitiate our estimate, perspective, and management, not only of these problems, but also of life itself. Thus art, science and philosophy are so intimately related to each other that only a synthesis of all the three can make the organization of life complete.

We measure any phenomenon in terms of qualities or quantities or both. The man in the street, the craftsman or the artist, concern themselves vaguely with qualities and quantities, in the main; but, for them, these are not distinct from each other; nor do they like to allow this separation between the quantitative and the qualitative. The artist, for instance, will say that though he likes to

measure, yet that alone cannot satisfy him; for he does not want merely to measure; he wants to deal with a given situation to serve his own want or purpose; and if in order to achieve this, measurement becomes part of the very necessity of attaining his purpose, he most willingly submits himself to the discipline of accurate measurement. In this way have painters been studying human and animal anatomy, and the laws of perspective drawing, thus educating themselves in order to satisfy the scientific needs of their task; therefore anatomy is looked upon as a necessary servant and help-mate of their art. As in painting and sculpture, so in music: the European scientist has created devices and instruments which measure sound to such niceties and minute details that the musician has but to seek the scientist's help and guidance in the making of musical instruments; and the physicist's analysis of sound enables him to present to the musician better instruments such as may more and more adequately reproduce and body forth the subtle workings of the inner life and finer emotion of the musician, and thus to perpetuate the impassioned experiences and moments of eternity that a few indeed of the human race enjoy, live and generate. But these units of measurement of the physicist, so useful and helpful for the study of sound to the musician, will and never can of themselves create original music or a musician. Then, take the systems of musical notation, Oriental and European: they record musical experiences with an accuracy which even mathematics cannot command; for they give measures, exact and accurate, not only of the qualities but also of the quantities of the emotion which symbolizes itself in terms of sound values. Yet, given the knowledge of all these notations and records of a musical piece by, say, Beethoven or Mozart, with the help of these few musicians of the world will dare say that they can interpret the piece so as to interpret the personality of these masters. And, in a like manner, do the artist and the practical man seek

their refuge and justification in terms of a philosophy of the beautiful, even in terms of a philosophical view-point which may relate their work, ideas and ideals to an ultimate ideal of reality, of which these may be just aspects and details.

And now a word about philosophy, which lies at the other extreme. The philosopher admits that a thing can be understood with reference to many values and the standpoints arising out of them; and, no doubt, one can fathom its meaning, to an extent, in terms of each of these values; but, says he, the task of studying Reality partially, from a definite yet narrow view-point, is meant for the practical man and the scientist. On the other hand, the philosopher claims it his business to relate any given fact, idea or phenomenon to the universe as a whole, to define it, that is to say, in terms, of the ultimate understanding and nature of Reality. Thus, the philosopher's business is to interpret finite experiences in terms of final values which are beyond the finite valuations of the scientist and the practical man. It will be seen that the philosopher seeks to solve an ultimate issue in terms which are also of an ultimate character; for him any finite piece of experience is but a reflex of and from the ultimate; therefore finite things and experiences must be placed in their legitimate position and viewed in their proper perspective; thus they are appraised in terms of, and as viewed from, the angle of the infinite. In this sense, the philosopher pursues the widest possible enquiry, in which the findings of the experiences and explanations, so far as they go, of the practical man and the scientist, are not only taken for granted but are also interpreted and co-ordinated towards the final explanation which the demand of an ever deepening quest leads him to formulate. We can thus see that in building up his Theory of Reality, the philosopher has to give an interpretation of the Categories of Nature in terms of the harmonies of his theory; but even in this attempt he only *evaluates*, but does not

describe, and certainly never measures quantitatively. Thus, it will appear that the philosopher assumes that everything in the universe is within his purview; the whole of the universe is for him the problem for his investigation, though not as such, finite, in contrast with other finite facts, but with reference to the general design, purpose and meaning of the universe as a whole. May we not therefore say that philosophy is concerned in the main with the qualitative?

Midway between the practical and the philosophical inquiries lie the scientific outlook and method, in that science is concerned with the measurement of (1) quantities or structures with reference to relevant qualities or functions, and (2) qualities or functions with reference to specific quantities or structures. Thus science seeks to find out the greatest common factor, or the least common multiple or the common denominator between qualities and quantities or quantities and qualities that make up and govern the phenomena under investigation.

In order to construct his system on a sound foundation, the scientist must, first and foremost, define, as far as possible, the scope of his inquiry. Not all things, nor all happenings could possibly give him any definite results. He has therefore to accept and reject facts and sequences from the masses of evidence that face him, as relevancy demands; the subsequent classification of the selected facts and sequences has to be made also in response to the exigencies of relevancy; and even this classification has to be correlated in terms of a system called science, once more in answer to the call of relevancy. Thus relevancy defines a science, creates it and builds it up, by measuring structures in terms of functions, and functions in terms of structures.

Like the practical man and the philosopher, the scientist also starts with a 'why', a questioning attitude. And after defining for himself the scope and purpose of the 'why', i.e., the point of view or the perspective, he sets

to himself the arduous task of measuring the phenomena under his purview.

Now, this measuring is not done in a rough-and-ready, haphazard manner and by guess-work. It needs standards or norms of measurement which the scientist either devises for himself or inherits from the make-shifts, devices and plans of the practical worker, craftsman, and the artist on the one hand, and the speculations, ponderings and wisdom of the philosopher, on the other. Anyhow, the scientist has to measure the phenomena he reviews, wherever possible, with instruments of measurement, exact and uniform. And these instruments need not necessarily be material—i.e., of an observational and experimental nature. For, pure mathematical relations, series and formulæ are the non-material and ideal instruments of measurements, exact and uniform, in terms numerical, or functional, or both. Thus, for instance, in geometry, the mathematician gives us ideal relations in terms of points, lines, triangles, circles, etc.; or, as in algebra and the calculus, he gives us ideal equations, formulæ, series and summations of series in terms of quantities of positive or negative numbers, or functions, or both.

This does not mean that the scientist has to rest content for all time with the available instruments which enable him to measure his material for the time being. Part of his duty as a scientist lies in correcting old instruments and finding out new ones, not only to eliminate mal-observation, error and irrelevancy, but also to be able to probe further and deeper into the nature of his material, in order that thereby he may arrive at new correlations, more exact and definite, between structures and functions, such even that the fundamental laws or uniformities that govern them may be laid bare and made available to the scientist. It is in the incessant consciousness of these duties and responsibilities of the scientist that the progress and hope of the sciences rest, viz., that man is increasingly enabled to find more and

more exact units of measurement in response to the standing challenge of the 'whys' of nature and life which produce structures and functions that defy the scrutiny of the human mind.

In regard to scientific procedure, the investigator is fundamentally occupied with the measurement and correlations of the 'whats' (or the structures) and the 'hows' (or the functions) of the phenomena under investigation. At the starting point, each individual structure is handled separately and by itself, in regard to all its details, in terms of exact measurements. This is followed by mechanical adjustments of each structure with its immediately neighbouring structure or structures, in terms of mechanical functions, yet therefore not necessarily of lesser importance. This leads on to the discovery of the manifestations of some functions in terms of the local structures as instruments of functions. A few structures which now offer themselves for analysis, get defined in a single system of associated functions. New functions come forward demanding interpretation; these are explained in the operations of interacting structures called systems. We have now to face stranger structures yet; these are revealed as functional inter-relations between systems. A few functions that still demand unravelling are seen as organized by structures of the central management that controls inter-relations between the systems. And the few structures that then immediately challenge interpretation are traced as instruments of synthetic functions operating fundamentally in the interests of the economy of the life of the organism as a whole.

The above analytical procedure completes the utmost limits of analysis and synthesis of the 'whats' and the 'hows' in terms of each other, in ascending stages, magnitudes and relations of organic systematizations. But so many 'hows' yet remain unsolved in terms of 'whats'; and an equally threatening troop of 'whats' remain unreduced in terms of actual 'hows'. The scientist has there-

fore to seek for new avenues, and seek recourse in the questions, causes and relations to which these mysterious 'whats' and 'hows' can be assigned.

Clues to these mysteries are afforded by the associations of 'whats' and 'hows' with (1) the environment in which they play their parts, and (2) the present history which conditions the life of the organism and of the species to which it belongs. Thus viewed, not a few of the challenging 'whats' become explainable in terms of 'where-functions'; so also, a few of the otherwise irreducible 'hows' can be solved in terms of 'when-structures'. But so many 'whats' and 'hows' yet challenge the inquirer; these 'whats' are revealed as survivals of 'where-from-functions'; and the 'hows' likewise are traced back as remainders of 'whence-structures.'

The above rather terse and complicated review can be made simpler by illustrations from Anatomy, Physiology, Taxonomy, Ecology, Palæontology and Embryology. Thus, for example, the osteologist measures, in the first instance, the details of the material, size, shape and other characteristics of every single bone of the whole skeleton in all its complicated parts, without seeking for meanings or values. When this is done, he carefully proceeds to relate each bone in terms of local contact or contacts with the immediately neighbouring bone or bones. A correlation in terms of functions can now be extended between remoter bones. Each bone is thereafter traced back, in terms of higher functions, to wholes called systems comprising the bony skeleton like the exo-skeleton and the endo-skeleton. This leads on to a correlation of each of the bony systems in terms of the whole functioning unit, the skeleton. The skeleton can now be set up into its proper structural and functional relations with the rest of the systems of the body like the muscular system, the nervous system, and so on. Thereafter, in his most general analysis and synthesis of the 'whats' and the 'hows' in terms of each other, along with an appreciation of the other systems, the osteolo-

gist settles the specific contribution of the bony skeleton towards the management and economy of the living body as a whole.

It will be seen from the above illustration that the significance of structures as structures and of functions as functions is analyzable into new correlations and interpretations; and this analysis may in the end yield the broadest meaning and orientation with regard to both of them. Though the scientist is thus enabled to obtain more real and true measurements and perspectives of structures and functions, many of the problems connected with them remain mysteries that await solutions. Thus there are some structures which cannot be located in terms of actual functions; and a number of functions cannot be definitely related to exact structures. Realizing that these early correlations of 'whats' and 'hows', though important, are only of an immediate and relative value, the scientist is urged to seek out new avenues of correlations. After a series of comparings and contrastings of the details and the general design of the skeletal structures and functions of various species and genera, the osteologist sees them intimately located in relation to definite types of environment like water, air or land, and to specific stages of historical development. The 'where-functions' explain some structures as specific 'whats' with reference to the special requirements of life in a particular habitat; and the 'when-structures' are resolvable into some functions devolving upon the species arising out of the struggle for existence. Thus, for instance, the developments of the pelvic-bone, the knee-joint, the palm and the thumb of the human skeleton, as compared with those of other animals, are illustrations of structures that respond to 'where-functions'; and the receding character of the nasal bone and the jaws of man, in comparison with those of other animals, points to functions related with the present life-history (in a biological sense) of man, that is to say, in terms of 'when-structures'. Similarly, the coccyx bone in man is

traceable as a rudimentary survival of the tail, that is to say, a 'whence-structure'; and the embryologist's findings of traces and assimilation of the visceral arch, so essential for fishes in their watery home, into the jaws, etc. of the human skeleton, point towards survivals of 'where-from' functions, now no longer necessary.

To summarize then. After having completed the initial inquiry of classifying the relevant facts and sequences in terms of 'whats' and 'hows', and correlating the 'whats' and 'hows', in terms of a system, the scientist proceeds further in his analysis wherein the 'whats' and 'hows' are related to place and time. The different variations between the 'whats' and 'hows' are thus understood in more and more dynamic terms: *by itself* the organism is thus shown as non-existent; it is, on the other hand, set in its proper perspective—in a habitat and as historically evolving. The qualitative and quantitative values of the various factors of the habitat in terms of reactions on the structures and functions of organisms, are thus investigated far and deep; and the 'when' and 'whence' functions yield deeper and more dynamic explanations which reveal various structures and functions as embodying, defining and illustrating an evolutionary process. Directing his gaze backward and forward in place and time, the scientist is enabled not merely to formulate and enunciate the final 'why' in terms of the laws that operate on structures and functions, and work changes in them in a series of happenings in space and time, but also to peer into the future in terms of 'whither' structures and functions. Thus his prognostications are matters not of mere conjecture or idle dreaming, but are based on science; and the deeper and the more accurate the correlations of structures and functions in space and time from out of which the 'why' is obtained, the more accurate will be our analysis of the shape of things to come. These journeys into the realms of the future thus test the accuracy of the 'why'—the law or the uniformity—which the scientist has found out.

And here the scientist and the philosopher work in the same direction, in the same field; for they are inspired by the self-same desire to define life in general and the universe as a whole. But there is a fundamental difference in their method of attacking the problem: the scientist cheerfully plods along a long and weary way, with various halts and searchings, from point to point, marking every detail and its location, inductively arriving at his hypothesis and explanations; the philosopher, leaving details to themselves, deductively comprehends their place in the scheme of the universe which they enunciate. For the scientist, the world of plurality is, and must be, real; for the philosopher, it may even be an appearance and a delusion.

Let us now try to gauge how far and in what manner the scientific point of view and procedure outlined above can be made applicable in the field of Social studies.

The sociologist begins by recognizing clearly the fact that the scope of his work includes not only a study of the society or the community, but of the individual as well. About individuals as individuals, as physical entities with definite structures and functions, the social anthropologist need not necessarily concern himself, though such study may be beneficial, and supply invaluable material for a completer interpretation. But social anthropology concerns itself more with individuals as social entities. And while many such individuals go to make a community or a human group, this human group is not merely an aggregate of the individuals that make it. It is much more than that; and so also is the individual much more than a mere isolated, self-sufficient unit. We must therefore study both the individual and the society, and each in all its aspects. And this must be done of each of the aspects singly as well as in its setting in the whole drama.

What questions, under these circumstances, has the social investigator to ask himself in regard to one and

all of these topics under his observation? What are, in other words, the relevant questions, answers to which may supply the sociologist's material? Without claiming finality, and with a due sense of their limitation, we may say that they are the 'what?', 'how?', 'where?', 'when?', 'wherefrom?', 'whence?', 'why?', and 'whither?' of the matter under observation. Such a systematic questionnaire will enable one to arrive at a composite understanding of the manifold phenomena of human life and society, as exemplified in the communities he studies. Thus the 'what?' refers to the morphology of both the individual and the community; and the 'how?' to their physiological counterpart. The 'where?' settles the place, the cosmic environment which forms the background of their functioning; the 'when?' naturally refers to the historical element; the 'whence?' and the 'wherefrom?' give us clues as to the extent to which the present is a continuation of, and a reaction from, the past; a synthetic co-ordination of all these correlations may yield the 'why' or the law which may explain the phenomena as a whole; and the 'whither' prying into the future to perceive what might be from the experience of what has been, tests the correctness of that law.

Thus, although the main enquiry is the 'what?' and the 'how?' of social phenomena, the answers to these two only cannot satisfy the aim and purpose of the sociologist; for, stopping there, he may be able to *see* a society, but cannot *understand* it. The 'what?' and the 'how?' show us puppets, somehow agitated, somehow functioning; but as soon as their 'where?' 'when?' and 'whence?' are fixed the full drama is enacted on the stage, the wires which pull them about are discerned; and having understood the main direction in which the wire-pullers pull, we are compelled to ask, and even to foretell, the 'whither?'

Now such a questionnaire as this, therefore, will carry us very far; but not far enough when we know that, unlike other animals, both man and his society have an

extra-biological nature. Hence his life has phases and aspects, changes and leaps, which cannot all be explained and correlated in terms, and in the light, of a professedly biological attitude which such a questionnaire presupposes. What, then, shall we do in order that this aspect of the situation may be correlated with the results which the biological questionnaire may yield? This problem leads us, first, into at least an enunciation of the factors that go to make man an extra-biological animal. Man's pursuit of art and science, the complex economic structure which he creates, and his religion which dimly bodies forth his inmost yearnings, are all expressed in a heritage which may be termed 'social memory'. This enables man to be a progressive animal. Add to this a greater, more powerful, and specifically human factor, that of contact with other social groups, and the processes of learning and teaching that necessarily follow out of it. This is only vaguely present in the rest of the animal kingdom.

In what manner, then, shall we accommodate our method to this specifically human factor? Let us see. After all, what is contact with other peoples, friendly or otherwise, but an 'extension', an influence that creates mutual vibrations between the 'whats' and the 'hows' of these different societies? We have seen, for instance, how the 'what' and the 'how', the 'when' and the 'whence' and 'whither' of one folk (at one time Moslem, at another time Parsi, a third time European, and so on), have affected the Vaishnavite society; and within the Hindu group we have observed the Saivite 'what', 'how', etc., affecting those of the Vaishnavite group. It is only thus—in terms of vibrations, actions and reactions, produced when two or more human groups come into contact with each other—that we are able to see the definite importance, relation, and contribution of contact in sociological studies. Hence, after his biological inquiry the sociologist further asks: Were this people conquered, and by whom? Did they conquer, and whom? How far afield did they

roam, and where? What trade and commerce and adventure did they engage in? The complexity and the protean quality of Greek or Roman or modern European civilization can only be explained in the light of their contactual history.

THE BIOLOGICAL AND REGIONAL APPROACH

I

IN PART I of this essay I have tried to trace, at several places, the definite causes why changes take place in the seemingly fixed and static religious and social organizations amongst the Vaishnavites of Gujarat. We have seen how the elasticity of the *Dharma*-notion from time to time allows it to be changed, and how an old *Dharma*-sanction is revoked and a new one is established. In matters of religion it has been shown that it is such forces at work which bring a new *mata* into existence; and even new changes within the same *mata* have been found in the history of *sampradāyas*. In our consideration of the *gnyāti* organization we have shown how, due to the exigencies of new circumstances, *gnyāti* laws have been abandoned or modified. What were those forces that brought about such a change? We may trace these in greater or lesser detail by calling them biological, geographical or regional, economic, and contactual.

It is now our duty to discuss these forces, and show their value in the interpretation of facts. What we are about to do forms part of a method that not merely proposes to describe, but also to correlate and interpret social phenomena. Let us, then, begin with biological

forces at work that tend to disintegrate social and religious forces. This method of sifting evidence and finding out the forces at work should not be resented by those of us who are religiously minded; for, a biological method of attack in science does not necessarily negate religion or the inner life of man, which makes him a personality. For scientific purposes, when we consider man as one of the living animals, we are able to see more of Man as a whole. For, since Darwin we have developed the biological sciences so much, that help from that quarter might prove very fruitful. Let us, therefore, enunciate the principal assumptions of the biologist, and see to what extent they are applicable and useful in the explanation and interpretation of human society, both with reference to the individual and to the race.

The biologist starts on the assumptions that—

- I. Organic life goes on, and expresses itself in, the struggle for (1) nutrition, and (2) reproduction. Nutrition involves food-search and is primarily for preservation of the individual; reproduction, on the other hand, primarily subserves the interests of the species.
- II. This struggle for nutrition and reproduction creates relations of competition and co-operation between the members of the same species.
- III. This struggle is a struggle in space and time.
- IV. As living in space, the organism (1) has some habitat either on land or in water or in the air or in several of these; (2) comes into contact with other kinds; and (3) is affected by this contact both as a competitor and a co-operator in its food-search.
- V. As living in time it (1) has a history—individual, family, and racial; (2) reacts to the phe-

nomena of (a) day and night; (b) the seasonal cycle; (3) grows old; and (4) dies.

VI. In the interests of reproduction and nutrition, animals (both as individuals and in groups), like man, (1) use devices for attack and defence, (2) make provision for future needs, and (3) exhibit self-sacrifice and care (or the reverse) of the male for the female, and of both or one of the parents for their offspring.

VII. We infer, therefore, that they are not mere automata, but that they lead a sort of mental existence with the senses, feelings, etc.

Now, all this indicates how biology may assist sociology in regard to method; for, all these factors continue to concern the human group. Man has his struggle to preserve himself and his race; this struggle takes place in a definite region and in a definite period of time, which go to make what we call his own history (individual and racial), and also that of his contacts with other people and other regions; and lastly, men use intelligence to devise some means of defence and attack against dangers—physical, animal, social. Thus it is obvious that the rôle of environment should form an important consideration in the understanding of the making of the life and history of human groups.

II

Now sociologists like Leplay, Demolin, and Ratzel, and historians like Buckle, emphasize that his environment affects man, and that the place where a people live largely moulds their life. And to a certain extent they are right, as has been shown amply in our study of the Vaishnavites of Gujarat. It has been shown, for instance, that the people of the region of Gujarat have been seeking from time to time for a faith that might enable them

to justify their daily work and their social outlook, in preference to a philosophy of life and religion that exhorts people to think beyond space and time, and to an existence, non-biological rather than extra-biological.

Or, to take another instance, the geographical influences on the formation of *gnyātis* and sub-*gnyātis* are considerable; those who migrate to the land of plenty form themselves into new castes called after the definite geographical region from which they emigrated. After settling for a while they once more split up into smaller sections, each calling itself after its last place of domicile, yet retaining the old designation with reference to its former domicile.

These are instances that refer to the influences that geographical conditions tend to produce on the social organization of the region. But the possibilities of the place must influence the nature of the daily work of the people, that is to say, their various occupations. This is amply shown to be the case by the fact that most people live on agriculture, because the soil is fertile; that because Gujarat has a fertile soil, while the regions round about it to the north, east and west, are poor, both in soil and in water supply, people from these poor regions immigrate to Gujarat to find work and a more secure economic existence. Thus the natural wealth and the possibilities of the region attract human masses round about it, while the surrounding areas become less populated, due more to geographical forces. Gujarat once boasted of a sea-borne trade with Africa; and has yet a good coastal commerce; this also is due to its large sea-front and many harbours, and the opportunities they provided in the days of small vessels. And, lastly, the more or less level plains that the country is blessed with, as compared with the region round about it, makes it the corridor of trade-routes that radiate towards the south, the east and the north.

Thus Ratzel and Leplay are to this extent right. For, after all man has to live on the earth, and geographi-

cal conditions limit the biological possibilities of his life; and to that extent he is controlled by his habitat. He depends on the air to breathe, on the sun's efficiency and energy to grow food, on water and food to nourish himself; and he is controlled by the nature of the region: deserts, plains, mountains, rivers, temperature, rainfall—all these go to control man's efforts in finding food and in settling in a region. The seasonal phenomena, direction of winds, rainfall, etc. settle the working season in the several areas. And the natural distributing centres of the region become market places. It can further be shown that in the case of both the primitive and the civilized alike, most of the occupations are direct results of the possibilities of the region; with this difference, that the civilized man takes a greater advantage of these possibilities than his primitive brother.

One more point: in order to make use of the possibilities of the region and *live*, man needs tools; either the tools to till the soil, or the bow and the arrow, the spear and the staff to fight the enemy, the net to catch fish, the lasso to capture animals for milking and domestication, for furs and skins and flesh. And naturally all these opportunities are conditioned and limited by the nature and extent of the soil and of the flora and fauna of the region.

III

Let us see to what extent this geographical outlook can be used in field-work, and with what success. This idea was suggested to me by my contact with Professor Geddes in 1919. Till then I was only dimly aware of the extent to which the geographical environment moulded the life of the people.

After this I always tried to find out the economic possibilities of the region and the extent to which these were used or misused by the people, and why. In the opening chapter of Part I, I have tried to give a geogra-

phical account relevant to the present study. And in the succeeding chapters I have tried to show to what extent these geographical facilities are used or abused, or left unused, and the difficulties surmounted, owing to the nature of their social and religious organizations, by the people of the region.

Such a method adopted by the field-worker is all the more justified because in doing so he will avoid the unnatural attitude of studying merely individuals, or merely religion, or merely social organization, or merely economic organization. Such isolated phenomena exist only in the mind of the specialist who abstracts one or the other aspect from a concrete picture and makes a detailed inquiry into the same. The sociologist sees man and society as related to a definite region, and he sees the extent to which the region helps or hinders them; for, after all, it is in finding out to what extent man's physical and social surroundings help him to express his inner personality that the broadest problem of sociology lies.

This will make it very obvious that the geographical method alone does not and cannot tell the full story. All the gifts of nature are of use to those people only who know how to use them. The American Indian, for instance, did not develop his country but lived in it precariously, as a primitive hunter, inspite of abundant natural resources about him. But after Europeans went there, we know how they have created the America of today. The physical environment controlled the Indian, but the control was not beneficial. Potentially the land was wealthy, that is to say, it could be made to support a much larger population; but no one had found out how to develop its value.

Or, there is yet another direction in which man has overcome the dictates of regional disabilities. Better means of transport have broken the sense and effect of distance, with the result that people regard a hundred miles to-day as they did a few during the past. And, in its turn, this new factor has done much to break up the

village community as a mere village community, and made it alive to and concerned in a larger whole, say a district. And these in their turn are affected by similar larger wholes of which they acknowledge membership, and with which they carry on commerce. In fact, the introduction of railways has contributed much to the rise of nationalism in India. For, railways not only carry men of different castes from one place to another, or concern them with reference to their economic interests, but also carry ideas from place to place with important effects in a country where newspapers are little known, illiteracy abounds and custom rules. 'Hindustan' has become a term of larger significance than in the old days.

All this shows that the character of human life depends very much upon human knowledge, and the use of the environmental factors depends upon the extent to which our sense of curiosity urges us to work upon our environment and makes us seriously consider in what new ways it can be manipulated, handled, and treated, in order that it may bring new help, new power not only to serve biological needs, but even cultural advancement.

IV

The above discussion leads one naturally to an important consideration in regard to the inequality of social growth and development. For, as we survey the history of the world and of the various peoples inhabiting it, we are struck by the fact that of several lands similarly (or nearly so) situated, only some are developed whilst others are not, some are developed in one way, some in another. One may, then, legitimately ask: Why do some folk develop the possibilities of their habitat more or less than, or in a way different from, others? Why do some yield to the dictates of their cosmic environment, whilst others dominate them? The answer must be manifold.

The first and geographical approach to the answer lies in considering that although two regions may be equally rich in possibilities, one of them may be so situated as to be subject to frequent attacks and consequent insecure existence, whilst the other may be in a comparatively safer position. Secondly, the nature of the climate, with its physiological reactions, and the psychological counterparts of such reactions, determine the activities of a folk. Thus the climate of the tropics and the luxuriance of its produce enable the folk of those regions to live with little labour or exertion; and this gradually deprives them ultimately of any inclination to 'live better'. The energies of the Eskimos are almost entirely spent in their dire struggle to exist, which leaves them no time for self-upliftment. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Great Britain are so happily situated that though their struggle against nature does not become too difficult, they are always kept alert and alive, hopeful and cheerful and always striving for 'better conditions'. Thus a combination of the above two causes may produce a socio-religious system which may either help towards the freedom and advancement of the individual and society, or one such as we have described in the first part of this essay, preventing man, both as individual and as member of a group, from utilizing his opportunities to the full, as also from rousing himself to fight scourges like famine and disease, which periodically ravage his country and disable him. Of course, these disabling circumstances can be eliminated, as is being slowly done in the case of Gujarat.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF SOCIETY

I

WE NOW COME to the consideration of the two fundamental ways in which human groups form themselves. There is the more or less primitive phase of the group organisation on the one hand, and the more or less civilized phase on the other. Professor Geddes calls the first of these, the 'psycho-biological' phase; for, it expresses essentially a biological rather than a cultural existence. Psychic life is at its lowest level in this phase; and whatever it contributes, it does so as a servant, and not as a master of the struggle for the necessities of life. Or, to use another and a more telling expression, and this time from Dr. Marett, this lower phase is 'synnomic': for customs are shared as a result of the sub-conscious urge to live. The civilized phase, on the other hand, called 'bio-psychological' phase by Professor Geddes and 'syntelic' by Dr. Marett, is one in which the life of individuals in a community and of the community itself, is regulated by ends or ideals resulting from a conscious selection of principles and standards of life.

Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the synnomic type is that the social organization of the folk admits of little opportunity to the individual to ponder

on his environment and find out new ways. For, 'new ways' are tabooed in such a society. This is the greatest defect of the Vaishnavite *gnyātis*, in which the individual is not only forced to consider customs, social and religious, as laws and duties, but in breaking them, he runs the risk of incurring severe penalties like those described in the earlier chapters. What the fore-fathers did, the living elders do; and the sons in their turn are invariably expected (and forced) to act similarly. Does not this indicate, therefore, a sort of gregariousness, so that as soon as a man loses or gives up his place he feels himself lost like a lost sheep? 'Gregariousness is not association.' Such close, continuous and forced contact with others hinders the development of personality and independence of character, which are the primary factors that characterize members of a syntelic society. This point is amply borne out in our discussion of the Vaishnavites of Gujarat, where it has been shown how the individual, in spite of possibilities of self-development, does not grow due to his fixed position in respect of *Dharma*, *gnyāti*, and family bonds. The changes that take place do so in spite of these handicaps, and are due to the revolt of the individual who brings new ideas from contact with other people.

From the moral point of view, members of synnomic societies are handicapped for want of the power of self-determination and self-expression in regard to conduct and character. Thus, moral sanctions are external rather than internal; the individual has to submit to them willy-nilly. So that, this society almost assumes the character of a herd. It forms an opinion or assumes an attitude as in a crowd—inexplicably. Their opinions are neither personal nor balanced; for they do not 'proceed from a truly judging. i.e., critical self.' The individual looks outward, 'taking his cue from his neighbours in the mass,' or from the slightly more self-determined head of the caste. For, driving a number of sheep through a gap in the hedge, there will always be one sheep first through

the gap; and this one normally takes its cue from customary morals as expressed in *Dharma*.

Thus customs at the synnomic level are the aggregate of forces whereby social habit rules the individual members of the group, as a flock of sheep controls the behaviour of each of its members. On the other hand, the customs at the syntelic level are the several useful formulæ derived from past experience for the guidance of the individual, in order that he may be spared the trouble of finding them out for himself, afresh each time, and thus saving his energy from dissipation. To the extent to which they savour of force on the individual person or group, and fall short of keeping up with new changes and developments, they are injurious.

II

Now if a people continue to exist at a synnomic level, their struggle for mere existence is not likely to transcend itself into a struggle to live well, then a determination to live better, and lastly an aspiration to live a higher life. Among the Vaishnavites of Gujarat, for instance, the consciousness that they had a great past and that their present is somehow unworthy of their past is always alive. This, together with the other circumstances we have mentioned (e.g. contact. education, etc.), has saved them from an ignominious and perpetual relapse to the synnomic level.

But when a folk cease to be a mere folk and become members of a polity, it is because they begin to live a more conscious life and are animated by a purpose to reach an ideal. Not that, at this higher stage, the folk and the polity cease to attend to the mundane necessities of existence; but that now the search, the struggle for food, becomes a means to an end, and ministrant to a higher purpose. Work and labour, in this phase, are not determined merely by the bare nature and possibilities of the place; it is actuated by a selection of means

adjusted to certain spiritual ends, and is undertaken and completed by a consciously co-operative effort. This may well be termed 'synergy', for results are attained and ends are furthered by the co-operative efforts of scientific dreamers and other intellectual workers on the one hand, and of master-craftsmen on the other. Occupations then become vocations, and work takes on the character of cultural activity. In the hands of such a society a region is lifted above itself and transformed into a London or a Venice or a Paris.

Paris, London, or New York (inspite of their slums, etc.) are supreme examples of man's conquest of nature, of his overcoming the handicap of space and the rush of time. When the surface of his town and city can hold no more, when his streets are not broad enough to hold his traffic, the Londoner and his brothers the Parisian and the New Yorker have dug underground and created artificial space. Or does the Seine divide Paris into two parts? The Frenchman promptly throws innumerable bridges across the watery-course, thus reducing what would have been a dividing factor and a hindrance, to the most negligible minimum. And still man is not satisfied. He wants to save up his energies more and more; he has at present no clear notion for what. But the more he frees himself the more he feels his physical environments as fetters—on his body? on his soul? He does not know. But he knows this: that they are fetters and must be cast off. And so have emerged the telegraph and telephone and 'wireless' from his feverish brain.

Such conquest of nature, of earth, water, air, of space and time, is thus no mere 'materialistic' conquest as Easterners are apt to think; for they minister unto the higher needs of man. In fact, the coming super-man will be such to the extent to which he effectively attends to his biological needs by co-operative effort, in order that the whole community, and not merely specialized individuals called thinkers and philosophers, may have

more time and leisure to attend to the higher tasks of life. Not in shunning to recognize, not in going away from our nutritive and reproductive needs, but in attending to them more fully and adequately, shall we be able to rise more and more in the spiritual scale.

III

I have said that the society we have been discussing is synnomic. I have arrived at this conclusion after sifting of evidence. I have also affirmed that this was due mainly to the fact that the individual was crushed and his personality suppressed. And finally I have expressed an opinion that in order to locate communities on the scale of civilization one must try to see how the individual is related to his society, how the latter affects the former's activities, and to find out to what extent being a member of society helps or hinders the self-expression and self-expansion of the individual's personality.

This is not a plea for Individualism. It is simply part of the argument for a theory of society which may be briefly stated thus:

Man is essentially a social animal. The higher he evolves, the more civilized he becomes, the more does he realize and feel the need of living in society. For, as he becomes more 'tamed' he loses the vigour and ferocity of the lower animals to fight danger and contend against adverse circumstances. He becomes more and more a user of instruments, devised and made by himself. But the making and using of them requires many men, requires in short living together in a community. Gradually, therefore, he realizes that the highest that humanity is capable of must be achieved in, through, and for society. This is doubtless regarding society ideally. And indeed, it is conceived here as essentially the seeding and training ground for the higher man.

Now, human society is not a mere association of individuals. It ought to make mutual help possible in all

human activities, and towards the furtherance of human aspirations. This means that the social individual must curb his ego-centric tendencies and try more and more to be ethno-centric. Nor does society merely exist for itself; if it is to do any good to itself or to other societies, if it is to be progressive, it must look beyond itself, consider itself a unit of the human family.

Again, it must be borne in mind, that society is made up of individuals, and exists for the benefit of the individual and the advancement of the species *Homo*. Now every person is an 'individual', is unique. Life, and all that evolves out of it, has a myriad facets. Therefore every person has always something of value to contribute towards the fullness of life. This he can do if his personality, that is to say the quality or qualities that make him an 'individual,' is sufficiently developed. Therefore he must be allowed full latitude, consistent with the welfare of the group. It is essential; for nothing can grow or develop in darkness, in insufficient space or air. A free and fresh atmosphere, plenty of sun—in such conditions only can Life glow and flourish in joy and hope. And if the constituent parts are healthy, the whole must be healthy. This is our case for individual freedom, and the whole argument may be summed up in the words of Goethe:

*Es bildet ein Talent sich in der Stille,
Sich ein Charakter in dem Strom der Welt.*


In the history of India and of the East examples of personalities facing the storm of the world, most stormy, are not lacking. Thus did Buddha live. He gave up his home, parents, wife, children, power and wealth, not because he could not manage these, nor because this world was too much for him, nor because he was tired of the world, nor because he did not want to shoulder the responsibilities of the natural consequences of his acts and deeds. His giving up was not a device to

abandon life and its problems, but in obedience to a call to prepare himself to learn how to face them, a call actually to go out in the wide wide world and face them. His burdens were not burdens merely of his little self, but of the world of humanity. He carried these night and day, within and about him, through a life crowded with selfless beneficence, love and service; his life is a long, long episode of learning and teaching how to conquer life; he sought the deliverance of his fellow-men—and therefore his own—so that man may master pain and pleasure, poverty and disease, unhappiness and misery, sin and death, and thus live everlasting life, here and now, and hereafter. So also did Christ demand of His disciples to give up the things of the world, and seek first the Kingdom of God. He does not thereby ask us to abandon our posts, losing courage, refusing to face facts. He preaches to us to go headlong in the midst of the storm; He wants us to reach its very centre; He yearns that we seek out evil in its lair and fight it, conquer it, and enslave it with the power and peace of God that passeth understanding, even as He did when He walked on earth. He lays the burden on us to transform the world and the things thereof, according to the pattern of His Kingdom, by seeking it first. Rama as he acquits himself, even to a fault, in his several rôles—those of son, brother, warrior, husband and king—we must admit that his life is a succession of vicissitudes and trials, of living and giving up his best for duty's sake in the storm of the world, and bequeathing to us an everlasting picture of gentlemanliness, heroism and the Life Beautiful. The *Sampradāyas* that deify Rama and hold him up as the Shining One, an example of the highest and best, do not do so in vain when we consider how ideally, and like a god amongst men, Rama faced and suffered through the storms of the world and worldliness for the sake of and in answer to the demands of *Pitri-bhakti*, *Griha-dharma* and *Raja-dharma*. And Bhishma Pitamaha lived the life of selfless devotion to duty, gave up infinite opportunities

of rightful enjoyment of life and the things thereof, even standing by the wrong side for duty's sake; and with his dying breath taught the lesson of Duty which still rules the Hindu conscience. Then Krishna, the most misunderstood of world Teachers: from birth to death he faced the storms of the world in the service of his fellow-beings for love's sake. He never lived for himself; his life was lived for the sake of others. He took birth only in order to redeem the world. *Paramārtha*, selfless service of others, is the touchstone of Krishna's life whether in childhood, in boyhood, in the bloom of youth and in the maturity of age, and in His life as a man of action and as a teacher. The example of such a life, lived and practised and thought out, yields the final word on the practical conduct of life, viz., to do the duty allocated to each of us without any idea or hope of reward, as a matter of dedication to God, for His sake, a dedication, a self-surrender made and accomplished in the ever-active willingness, not only to put aside but to cast away and abandon one's personal hopes, ambitions, wishes, desires, predilections, interests, in His service, in His *śarana*, for the advancement of His Will and Purpose. He was born and he lived for the sake of resuscitating *dharma*. He showed how out of the dark side of man's domestic life, and how out of the strange mixtures of vice and virtue in the human personality, can be wrought out the hope of man and the coming of His Kingdom. And of Mahatma Gandhi, also a Vaishnavite, the latest of His devotees, the last of His *avatars* or reincarnations according to the belief of millions, what more need be said? Living in the world, though not of it, having torn the Veil, having realized for himself the Reality obscured by the myriad *māyās* of existence and of worldliness, having realized for Himself the utter, degrading, disastrous futility of seeking after things of the earth, earthy, he yet does not abandon his fellow-men to their fate, to wallow in the mire of *māyā*; but, like Krishna, Buddha, Rama, Christ, filled with a great

compassion, takes upon his own frail shoulders their burdens, lives with them, among them, like them, lends a helping hand to the least of them, tries to lead them to the Fount of Lovingkindness, and teaches by *practical* example the path of Duty through Love and Service which has already taken our world a stage further in civilization.

Thus only may man, facing the world, struggle ever onward and upward with a greater courage and a greater hope.



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