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THE OUTLOOK IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 18, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Ingrams, who has kindly come to talk to us today on "The Outlook in South-West Arabia," is well known to most of you as a colonial administrator of great experience and widely travelled, who has written much and who was lately Adviser on Overseas Information at the Colonial Office. Amongst Mr. Ingrams's achievements is a dual achievement by himself and his wife: they were jointly awarded the Lawrence Memorial Medal of this Society; and that is unique.

Mr. Ingrams then delivered his lecture as follows:

FOR a long time we used to regard the Middle East as being an area in which trouble was not to be unexpected; and in the Colonial sphere we are now becoming accustomed to having crisis hover from one territory to another. Aden belongs to both these fields but until recently has been very free of trouble.

PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA


Now, there is a quite deplorable situation, even in Aden Colony itself. Some of the strikes have come to an end recently, but there are or have been strikes among refinery workers, bus and taxi drivers, Aden Airways employees, and lightermen. The Protectorate is no longer the happy place it was a few years ago. Innumerable small incidents have been taking place there. There have been about 1,000 over a period of a year or so, and some have involved British lives. Some of them are internal incidents, but a great many have been instigated from the Yemen.

Of course, we have always been used to a suspicious atmosphere with the Yemen, but after the 1934 Treaty there was for long a fairly reasonable state of affairs. Now, the Yemen is thoroughly estranged from us.

In these conditions there was, of course, no hope of us getting oil concessions in the Yemen. They have recently given one to the Americans and the other day they made a claim to Kamaran because we had given a concession there to a British Company. Kamaran is administered by the Governor of Aden, but it is completely separate from either Aden Colony or the Protectorate. It is in a special position of its own. It belongs to the allied and associated powers of the first world war. Somebody had to run the quarantine station, and so we did it. Now, by usage, sufferance and other lawful means, we administer the Island.

Then again, in the Yemen the internal situation is again uneasy, and it is quite possible that there will be further insurrections there against its unpopular rulers.

A new factor in the Aden Protectorate is that the Saudis are giving arms to the Protectorate tribesmen and stirring them up, and, curiously



enough, collaborating in doing so with the Yemenis, whom they can hardly be said in the ordinary course of events to love very much. In addition, there is Egyptian propaganda—the notorious Saut el-Arab which is continually abusing us.

I was told the other day by an officer from Aden that nowadays when he travels round the Protectorate and sees the usual groups of bedouins sitting round thorn bushes with their goats, he often finds a radio-set hanging in the thorn bush. They are listening, of course, to the Saut el-Arab. As often as not it is declaiming about the iniquity of the *Mustamaraat* of the English. The meaning of the word is “colonization.” The bedouins have no idea what *Mustamaraat* is. They just know it is something very bad because the Saut el-Arab says so. Since they dislike British interference with them they are very ready to listen.

On top of that, as you will know, Russia has been making greater advances as part of a general Middle-Eastern and African propaganda offensive: it has renewed its treaty with the Yemen and this has been followed up by a mission from the Czechs. One from the Poles is also planned. As far as I can see, there is nothing to choose between the type of propaganda that comes off the Saut el-Arab and the type that comes from Moscow. That, then, is a rough idea of the general unsatisfactoriness of the position.

BASIS OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

Arab friendship in South-West Arabia is particularly important to us. The Aden Protectorate was built up by treaties with the chiefs to provide a *cordon sanitaire* round Aden. It is important from the point of view of Aden's security that Arab friendship should continue. This friendship is even more important now, because there are still chances that oil may be found in the Protectorate—oil which we need so desperately.

In the past, the friendship with the Arabs in the Protectorate had always depended on the guarantee they had of their independence. We had treaties of protection with them and we never interfered with their internal affairs. They were perfectly happy always to leave their external relations, such as they were, to us and were extremely glad to have our protection, because the Yemen had always tried to claim their territory and had often attacked them. Yemeni rule had very rarely been fully effective, but there had been about 100 years of fairly effective Yemeni rule over what is now the western part of the Protectorate down to about 1728.

Friendship with the people of the Protectorate has never before been seriously affected by outside events. Even the business of Palestine did not greatly disturb it. There were anti-Jewish riots in Aden itself, with serious loss of life, after the partition of Palestine, and there were demonstrations against the partition of Palestine in parts of the Protectorate, but these events had no real effect on our relations or on the personal relations between those of us who worked with the Arabs and the Arabs themselves. Relations were always good.

Nor is it necessarily to be expected that outside propaganda will affect relations with South-West Arabia. I remember that when I first started work in the Hadhramaut there was an outcry in Egyptian and Iraqi papers and

in Arab papers in the Far East. This died down when it was seen that we were not engaged in an imperialist effort, but that we were really trying to help the people and that, in fact, they were getting no less independence and a great deal more peace than they had had before. When that was understood, the references in Arab papers became friendly.

In the Colony there had always been a very friendly atmosphere from soon after our taking Aden in 1839. There had been some misgivings at the start because the people felt this was perhaps the beginnings of a Western expansion in South Arabia, but the misgivings were allayed when they saw that we went no further than Aden and that we were really trying to make friends with the Arabs in the region. They saw, too, the kind of *laissez-faire* policy which was followed in Aden. Aden was taken in 1839 and Hong Kong in 1840, and a *laissez-faire* policy was then the fashion. It was followed in both these places with very great success until very recently. Arabs were perfectly free to come in and out as they liked. There were no immigration controls or anything tiresome like that. In 1850 Aden became a free port and Arab trading flourished, free of irksome controls.

But, of course, inevitably the changes and events since the war have made some unrest to be expected, because Aden has rapidly got into a very overcrowded situation. A lot of industrial undertakings of one sort and another have grown up, and this must inevitably lead to some unrest.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARABS IN CLASSICAL TIMES

It helps in understanding the position as it is now to cast an eye back to the ancient incense trade. There are very interesting parallels between what happened in the story of the incense trade and what is happening now in the story of the search for oil. The people in South Arabia had a practical monopoly of incense, and on that and on their overland trade everybody through whose country the incense was carried, up to the modern Jordan, lived and built up a civilization. Places like Petra, for example, flourished on the trade from the south. Quite early on there were colonies of Greeks, and they all got on very well with the local people. They quarrelled among themselves but not much with the local people. They did not attempt anything in the nature of political or military control. Alexander, of course, had ambitions to conquer Arabia, but he died before he could undertake that.

The Romans followed the Greeks and things went on fairly well as long as they confined their activities to trade, but during the time of Augustus they started political and military activities. They started "tidying up" the small States which had formed under the influence of Hellenism, and in 25 B.C. they sent the 10th Legion overland to try to conquer South-West Arabia. That expedition was a disastrous failure, but in the middle of the First Century A.D. they discovered the changes of the monsoon in the Indian Ocean and that led quite soon to the transport of incense by sea.

Everybody wanted to get their incense cheaper. The Arabs, having something which they knew everybody else wanted, not unnaturally

wanted the highest price they could get for it. The discovery of the changes of the monsoon resulted in the destruction of the overland trade, and thus the ancient South Arabian civilization. Perhaps it was not very much of a civilization, because it was largely imitative, borrowed from Hellenic and Iranian sources. As the funds dried up, so the civilization died away and the Arabs returned to their desert life.

It was the Roman colonization and aggression which marked the emergence of the xenophobia that the Arabs have always felt to the West since, and also the peculiar kind of Arab nationalism.

I think there is a considerable difference between Arab nationalism and the kind which is now so familiar to us in Africa. When we went into a country in Africa during the last century, our arrival meant an expansion of freedom. We stopped tribal fighting, the slave trade and that sort of thing. It was only when people began to feel that they were not getting the things they wanted to get, like sufficient education or opportunities for making money, or when they felt irked by colour questions, that they felt frustrated and demands for political freedom arose. The demand for political independence is quite inevitable, but I think it only comes naturally as the last demand. In the Belgian Congo, for instance, there is no particular sign of the emergence of nationalism, because no frustrations have yet been felt.

Arab nationalism seems to appear, and it is certainly so appearing now in South Arabia, at even a threat to so-called independence and the Arab way of life and to their rather meagre resources; Arab nationalism is, therefore, a defensive reflex.

If an Arab country comes under foreign rule there is quickly nationalist trouble. That happened very early on in South Arabia. In the sixth century A.D., the Emperor Justinian instigated the Christian Abyssinians to conquer the Yemen. The Yemenis immediately felt their nationalist feelings arise and the nationalist leaders went off eastwards—significantly—and got help from the Persians. The Persians came and turned the Abyssinians out, but they stayed themselves. The Yemenis might profitably remember that today, but man is notoriously insensitive to the teachings of experience.

We got on very well in South-West Arabia for over 100 years. Then, recently, came a change of policy. We have a very real desire to try to improve the lot of the people there and it is really that which has caused the trouble. There are more Europeans in the Protectorate than there were before the war—more than the Arabs would really want to see. Above all, there was this very well-intentioned proposal for Federation.

It was quite obvious to Colonial-trained administrators that the tiny States of the Protectorate could not do any good by themselves, and it was proposed to them that they should think about federating. A picture was also built up of an administration, on rather the Colonial model, which would have had to be run by Europeans. As one Arab ruler put it to me, "After we had been getting closer to each other with the growing peace, we were frightened by federation. We knew it was good in principle, but when we began to look round we could look at each other and say: 'He is going to be more important than me,' and so on. You have always

been kind and friendly with us, but we know what you are when you are running things. You will be running us before long."

Federation was seen definitely as a threat to independence. You might say, in other words, that during the first 100 years or so of our occupation of Aden, the Arabs saw and liked the Greek side of us, but that when the Roman side appeared, they did not like it.

Oil has not yet been found in the Protectorate, but to complete the parallel with the old days of the incense civilization, there is now a civilization and culture growing up in the Persian Gulf States, borrowed this time from the Europeans and the Americans. But I do not think it has any deeper roots than that of the old incense civilization.

The money has been spent, as far as it can be, wisely in the Persian Gulf States, but the trouble is that there is just too much money and that the rulers are taking fantastic sums for their own use, and the people are just not learning to produce by their own efforts.

REACTION TO FEDERATION PROPOSALS

The Federation proposals in the Protectorate led to a chain reaction.

They were regarded by the Yemen as a breach of the 1934 Treaty. That was on their interpretation of the Treaty. They thought that the *status quo* meant that everything in the Protectorate was to remain as it had always been. But perhaps there are other fears stronger than even these legalistic objections, because the Zeidi rulers are always afraid of their Shafis. We usually estimate the Shafis at two-thirds of the population of the Yemen and the Zeidis at one-third, but I notice from an account of the late Imam's tax books that he estimated that there were 55 per cent. Zeidis and 45 per cent. Shafis.

In the old days, the Shafis used to be encouraged by the Turks, but when the Zeidis took over, they oppressed the Shafis. During late years, one of the things that has annoyed many people has been the royal monopoly of trade. It had something to do with the assassination of the late Iman Yahya and the attempted *coup d'état* on the life of the present Iman Ahmed, his son. All these things, and the general fear of what is happening in the Protectorate, make the Yemeni rulers uneasy.

There followed the encouragement given to the Yemen by Egypt and the Arab League, and now there has come this active participation by the Saudis. In addition, one cannot neglect the fact that the Russians are now involved.

I do not want to be too gloomy about this, but Communism really does seem to be making much more impact recently than it has done before. Syria seems to be riddled with it, and it is getting worse elsewhere in the Middle East. There is the great expansion of diplomatic and trade activity on the part of the Russians and their satellites in the Sudan, in Libya, in Ethiopia, in Liberia and in the Yemen. They have, of course, had an Embassy in Addis Ababa for a very long time but nothing particular seems to have come out of it. Indeed as far as their African activities are concerned, they have had extraordinarily little to show for all their effort. Even when they shifted over to the use of the World Federation of

Trade Unions as their main instrument and extended its activities, I do not think they got on much faster. There is no real Communist Party in any Colonial Territory yet except, of course, Cyprus and Malaya. In Africa, I think there is only one party that has Communist aspirations, and generally they have very little result from all their propaganda.

In the case of Aden, it is worthwhile remembering what happened to Jordan. It was a happy, paternally ruled country under King Abdulla, but in 1948 there was the great mistake of taking in a large piece of Palestine, with a different type of inhabitant. There were also the refugees. Most of the Communism in Jordan has come not so much from the activities of these refugees but from the intelligentsia—as it usually does in this kind of expansion—from doctors, teachers, lawyers, and so on.

When we compare that with the picture of Aden, I think it will be seen that Aden too had that happy kind of "backwardness" until fairly recently. It has, however, trebled its population since 1931: there is the great oil refinery and there are other undertakings, and these have resulted in the creation of an industrial proletariat. It is connected, of course, with the Protectorate and the Yemen because that is where it is recruited.

There has been the usual lack of contact which occurs when a place grows too fast for the administration to be able to keep in touch with the people. There has been a consequent lack of intelligence and the growth of an intelligentsia. There have not been enough well-qualified local teachers, and teachers from Egypt and Syria have been recruited. No matter how much they have been vetted, they naturally must have Arab nationalist feelings. Aden is completely free of Communism at present, but I suggest that it is a possibility that one has to look for.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

As regards the present political situation in the Protectorate, the governor has recently had a meeting with the rulers and there are rather better prospects. He told them that the British Government was convinced that it was only by some form of closer association that they could expect to strengthen their internal economy and social organization, but he also said categorically that they were entirely free to negotiate among themselves what form of association they wanted. If they wanted British advice it would be available, but they could accept or reject it as they liked, and whatever course they chose, the British Government would continue to help in the way it had always done. If there were combinations of States, it would help the combinations of States; or it would continue to help individual territories.

The rulers expressed their appreciation of these assurances and said that they would increase their confidence in and strengthen their friendship with Her Majesty's Government. They said that their discussions "about a more acceptable organization of their countries should be in accordance with the public spirit as crystallized and developed in the aims and objects of Arab nationalism." The real substance of these assurances was in the references to confidence and friendship; it meant that they saw a return to

the period when they had lived in independence and friendly relations. I know that some of them had been unhappy that relations had suffered. I think this means that as far as they are concerned, they do not now regard their independence as threatened. If the tribesmen can think the same, I do not believe that any amount of hostile propaganda will have effect.

The rulers of the Aden Protectorate have never been masters in their own houses. They do not expect to be, because Arab tribes do not willingly accept rule. You will remember what Ibn Khaldun said : that every Arab regards himself worthy to rule and is not prepared to listen to either his father, his brother or the head of his clan. It is a very common proverb down in the Aden Protectorate that every tribesman considers himself a sultan.

On the possibilities of closer association, I do not think one can be very optimistic. The Arabs have never achieved an administrative federation. You may remember the remarks of Lawrence: that to talk about Arab federation was fantastic; if they were going to progress they would have to have it, but it would have to come from within. So far, the Arabs have achieved unity only under strong rulers.

There have been federations of tribes in South Arabia but, I think, always arising from weakness. When a tribe has been on the decline, it has sometimes had an arrangement with its neighbours to join together for defence, but that is a very different thing to uniting and subordinating themselves in a common administrative federation.

As far as we are concerned, we are under one or two disabilities in our approach to this question. Psychologically, we find it extraordinarily difficult, especially in the Colonial sphere, to regard self-government and independence in terms other than those of Western institutions, such as Parliamentary democracy, local government, and so on.

Then, of course, we have a certain measure of responsibility for these peoples under our protection, and I think we are handicapped by a feeling of conscience in respect of them. We do not feel nearly so free, for instance, as the Americans must do over their oil endeavours. I dare say the State Department in Washington gets a good many headaches at what happens in Arabia. We have always the feeling that the money that comes from any oil which may be found in the Aden Protectorate must be used to the best advantage of the whole territory and that attitude is a feature of our colonial policy.

It is extremely difficult for us who live in fertile lands to understand the philosophy that comes out of the deserts. Our Græco-Roman-Christian civilization stems essentially from fertile lands. It is because of this that we develop ourselves and expand and are constructive. Our environment has made us creative and given us an appreciation of law and order and a social conscience. The effects of living in deserts, however, are necessarily quite different. I got this feeling very strongly living amongst people in the Aden Protectorate, which is essentially a desert region. In the latest Aden Biennial Report the maximum amount of land estimated to be cultivable in the 112,000 square miles of the Protectorate is given as one per cent.

The well-known Arab individualism is essentially a product of the desert, and so are the exuberant ideas of freedom and independence as well as a very highly developed sense of cupidity. Desert dwellers cannot produce anything, so they cannot respond to ideas of change and progress as we do. Naturally, if people do not have property and feel that it is necessary to raid their neighbours, law and order cannot have much appeal. Further, as history has shown, Arabs do not seem to have any real staying power when they get into settled conditions. They lose the virtues that come with them from the deserts.

In general, there has been a failure of democracy as we know it throughout the Middle East. I would attribute a lot of it to individualism and to the general desert conditions of the region, the enormous size of the areas, scattered populations, low income, and so on.

I think it will take time to re-establish a satisfactory state of affairs in South-West Arabia, but I think that essentially the right kind of line is the policy which Lawrence described in the 1920s as being the British policy for Arabia—to keep a ring-wall round it and to allow the people to fight out their own complex and fatal destiny; to keep it as an area of Arab individualism.

In these days, of course, it is not quite so easy to do that literally as it was before, but the nearer we can keep to it, the better. I do not regard that myself as a pessimistic policy. Arabs can be persuaded to do things for their own good if one works with them from within and sees things through their eyes: it needs a lot of persuasion but it is said that the ancient Arabs developed eloquence because they would listen only to persuasive leaders. The important thing is to see whether Arabs, with their outlook on life, can make a success of the proposals for betterment we put to them.

If we are to maintain the influence we have had there, I think it is most important that we should show strength. One thing that is necessary in these Middle-East countries, I think, is to show that we have got a great deal of strength and that we are prepared to use it, but to use it in accordance with the general trend of what the people feel is right.

A chief who recently came to see me was talking of these small affairs in the Protectorate and he said, "You will remember that when my father was alive, you and he used to sit on the floor discussing affairs. My father knew that you knew what he could do and what he could not do with his tribesmen, and he knew also that you respected the Arab way of looking at things and did not want to disturb it. But he also knew that you had by you a big whip and that if it was necessary you would use it, and you would use it justly. There is not the same kind of intelligence about doing these things today."

Speaking of the earlier days, I would say that the Royal Air Force is *par excellence* the right kind of force to use. I think it is a great mistake to put in a lot of ground troops. "Face" is enormously important with Arabs and they are almost bound to fight with ground troops. The Royal Air Force was in a very strong position. It was extraordinarily good and friendly with the people on the ground, and its friendliness did not interfere with any action it had to take from aloft. No face was lost by the

people by giving in to air action. They could not reply—there was no reasonable reply—and so nobody blamed anyone who gave in.

In pre-war days, if highway robberies took place, we did not resort to direct punitive bombing. We used what was called blockade bombing [which avoided casualties] to make things uncomfortable and to make the tribe concerned come in and have its case heard and, if it was found guilty, pay a fine. If, however, we had tried to use air action to bring dissident tribes into subjection to rulers whom they never really accepted, we would not have had public opinion behind us. There was nothing shameful in highway robbery—it was good old-fashioned raiding—but at the same time it was recognized as a nuisance; and so we had public opinion behind us and we had also the support of those who were bombed. Not infrequently they came to the Royal Air Force and said, "Thank you very much for coming and bombing us. You saved our faces." I have seen that happen myself once or twice. The Arab idea of rulers and tribesmen is quite different from ours of monarchs and subjects.

The point I wish to make is that there must be a good show of force and that air-force is psychologically better than ground-force, especially European ground-force.

There is a great need for what I call empathy. One must have not only sympathy with these curious people and like them, but one must be able to see things through their eyes. If we can do this, we can generally lead them along to something that is at least a tolerable compromise between us and them.

I go rather further than that. We must be extremely careful about things like education. I did a great deal in starting education myself in those parts, but it must always be done with the background in view. One must think of the kind of life to which the people are returning. I remember years ago being impressed, for instance, with what Dr. De Lacy O'Leary said in *Islam at the Cross Roads* about the misuse of Western education in Arab countries. That influenced me rather in determining the kind of Arab education we would have in these bedouin areas.

A large primary and secondary school system, all tied up with Western examinations, will end with the creation of a disgruntled intelligentsia. There is not the right background for Western-type educational systems when only one per cent. of the land is cultivable.

The best way of helping these Arabs is to help them to develop in the framework of their own institutions. Progress may be slow but friendship will be maintained.

The CHAIRMAN: We have about ten minutes, and Mr. Ingrams has said that he will kindly answer any questions or comments which anyone cares to make.

Mr. LANGE: One of our most staunch and faithful rulers in that part of Arabia was the Sultan of Lahej. I am quite sure that there are a good many other as staunch and faithful chiefs, particularly those who, during Mr. Ingrams' time in Arabia, accepted the position of England. Is there much possibility that these faithful people are much swayed by the present propaganda which goes out from Egypt and possibly from Russia?

Mr. INGRAMS: The Sultan Abdul Karim of Lahej died some years ago, and his son is not at all the same kind of character. Sultan Abdul Karim was a great personality himself, a very wealthy man, and he had no formal treaty of protection with us. He was nominally an independent ruler. All these things combined to give him influence and make him the premier chief of the Protectorate. His son, now in his place, is, of course, much younger and inexperienced. He has no particular personal influence and he has signed a treaty which not only puts him under protection, but compels him to accept advice.

One subtle feature which I think affects the position is that the family of the Sultans of Lahej is not a very old one. The Sultan descends from a governor appointed by the Imam of the Yemen in the eighteenth century. I remember that some years ago the Sultan of Lahej wanted to contract a marriage between his own family and that of another family, whose pedigree dated back to the gods of ancient Himyar and had been on the seat, for a couple of thousand years or more. The Sultan with the longer pedigree was very much of a bedouin and the Sultan of Lahej was a very wise, statesmanlike person, but the proposed match was too much of a *mésalliance* to be considered.

To some extent, some of these chiefs who have been such great friends of ours are getting into the same position as the chiefs who have been our friends in other parts of the world. They have identified themselves too much with us. We have done a lot in supporting them, even in some cases bombing their tribes into submission to them. There is rather a danger of their being regarded as Imperialist stooges and not being able to give the help they used to give, for they lose influence with their people. In what they do, however, they are very loyal to us.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Was there a time when the Yemen held the territory down to the Aden coast?

Mr. INGRAMS: Yes. Throughout a good deal of the time of the Rasuli dynasty, Aden was a Yemeni port, down to about the middle of the eighteenth century. Pretty well the whole of the Western Protectorate was at one time, in the Arab sense, in their control. It is only occasionally, once or twice, that the Yemen has had any control in the Hadhramaut. But over the length of history control was not often very effective.

Colonel GUERRITZ: How far can the rulers command the loyalty of their people, and how far are they willing to subordinate their independence to a federation?

Mr. INGRAMS: As I tried to indicate, probably every sensible Arab would say that he agreed that unity was necessary, but when it came to the point they would be unlikely to achieve anything. When one is thinking of tribes, the tribal system in South Arabia is entirely different from the African idea of tribes. In Africa there is a corporate body and a corporate mind. In South Arabia a man only accepts his so-called ruler—he is not really a ruler, but a sheikh—if he can persuade him that it is the best thing to do, and in certain cases of danger.

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK: Why do the internal stresses between the minorities in the Yemen affect the Aden Protectorate?

Mr. INGRAMS: The whole of the Protectorate is Shafi, and there is a

large Shafi element in the Yemen. The Yemenis have felt that they can keep their own Shafis more or less in order in the usual oppressive ways which they have always used, but they are afraid that if the Aden Protectorate people get too forward and develop, and combine with their own Shafis, they will be overthrown. I think that eventually that is probably what will happen. If that did happen I do not think the rest of the Middle East would shed any particular tears over it, but it must clearly come about by Arab action and we must not be involved in it.

Colonel GUERRITZ: If the Yemenis are so hostile to us, could we not encourage the Shafis to take up that attitude against them?

Mr. INGRAMS: I do not think we could consider that. It would do much more harm than good.

A Lady MEMBER: In 1950 relations with the Yemen were much better. What was the immediate cause of the deterioration?

Mr. INGRAMS: The proposals for federation.

Mr. HAMILTON: Is any effort made to broadcast on an equivalent scale, to compete with these people at their own game?

Mr. INGRAMS: There are the B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts and Aden's own broadcasting station. I do not know about "on an equivalent scale," but I think the station is doing reasonably well. Aden is now being listened to quite a lot by the people in the Protectorate. The station uses a lot of local music, which attracts audiences, and I think that, provided straight news is given and a feeling of sympathy with Protectorate feelings is engendered, progress will be made. With the ordinary rank and file of the listeners, however, it is emotions which play so much more important a part than reason.

In the Hadhramaut, when I was there a year or two ago, some of these people at a dinner party said, "You know how it is with us. We much prefer listening to Syria and Egypt, because the people are Arab and independent, but we always listen to the B.B.C. to check whether they are saying the right thing." Other people are not quite so discriminating as that.

I remember also that the last time I was there, I was speaking to the Arab Director of Education in the Quaiti State. During the war there had been a big famine. Government servants and merchants had agreed to set aside a little from their salaries to help in famine relief. He told me what they were doing with it now. Most of it was being used to provide money for students to go to Egypt, Syria, Iraq—all the independent kind of places. When I queried this, he replied: "You know how it is. We know they get a good education in your places, but our heart must naturally be on the other side."

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is up. We have had a most interesting lecture from Mr. Ingrams. The part that I personally enjoyed so much is the way he has brought out, in this age of mass production and Communist theories, the vital part of the wise dealing with the human factor in all these things. He has given us a very good picture, and on your behalf I thank him very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

