AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ART

S. K. NANDI,
M.A., LL.B., D.Phil. (Cal.)

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
1962

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He was awarded the Griffith Memorial Research Prize for 1949 by the University of Calcutta.

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He is a sectional president of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

He is on the Governing bodies of different educational institutions.

He has been teaching philosophy and aesthetics for the last fourteen years.

At present he is Assistant Professor in the Presidency College, Calcutta.

He published papers on aesthetics and philosophy in the noted research journals of India and abroad. And he collaborated with Prof. Raymond Bayer (of the International Institute of Philosophy, Paris) in publishing the wellknown book on world aesthetics in two continental languages, French and Spanish.

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

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

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To

My Mother

FOREWORD

Dr. Sudhir Kumar Nandi is one of our front-rank younger workers in the field of aesthetics, and this monograph which was accepted by Calcutta University in partial fulfilment of his candidature for the degree of D.Phil. (Arts), shows the extent of his competence in the understanding and evaluation of the aesthetic theories of what he calls "the master minds of the West".

It is well that Dr. Nandi does not attempt to build up any theory of his own but confines himself to an analytical study of the theories of six eminent western thinkers, Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, and Romain Rolland and Croce. The chapter on Rolland is especially welcome since his aesthetic theory and attitude have not yet been sufficiently studied and analysed. Welcome is also the concluding chapter where he attempts a comparative study of the aesthetic theories of Benedetto Croce and Rabindranath Tagore.

Dr. Nandi leans heavily on Croce's theory of art as expression, a theory which he thinks, is upheld by the views of Rabindranath. He has sought to maintain his stand throughout and critically examine all other theories from this point of view. I feel that he has been able to make out a case that demands hearing.

Throughout Dr. Nandi has given evidence of a disciplined mind, critical understanding and sound judgement. He writes with clarity and precision and often with conviction. I hope his book will be a welcome addition to the fast growing literature on the subject.



(Niharranjan Ray)

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PREFACE

I worked as a University Research scholar and subsequently as a Research Fellow under Dr. S. K. Maitra M.A., Ph. D, George V Professor and Head of the department of philosophy, Calcutta University during 1948-1951. The fruits of my researches have been embodied in the present thesis, entitled "An Enquiry into the nature and function of Art". It is divided into six chapters dealing with the aesthetic theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Romain Rolland, Croce and Rabindra Nath Tagore, the last chapter being a comparative study of the aesthetic theories of Benedetto Croce, the noted Italian philosopher and Rabindra Nath Tagore, the celebrated Indian poet. In the present volume, I have largely confined myself to the study of the aesthetic theories of the master minds of the West. In a subsequent volume I propose to make an analytical study of the theories of the Indian Ālamkārikas such as Bharata, Ānandabardhan, Abhinabagagupta and others.

I largely subscribe to the theory of art as expression, as propounded by Benedetto Croce and have tried to maintain it throughout. From this view point, I have critically examined the theories concerned.

I take this opportunity of expressing my deep sense of gratitude to my professors, whom I consulted freely while writing the thesis and particularly to Professor S. K. Maitra, without whose help and guidance, this thesis could never have been brought up to its present form.

I must also thank the authorities of the Calcutta University and the University Grants Commission for kindly undertaking the publication of this volume. The Pooran Press authorities must also be thanked for the neat production of the book.

MAULANA AZAD COLLEGE,
CALCUTTA.
5th February,
1961.

S. K. N.

INTRODUCTION

We have taken art in the sense of fine art and unlike the ancient thinkers, we have deliberately looked upon it as something different from craft and similar other things. In our quest to determine the nature and function of art, we have taken Plato as our starting point. A. W. Schlegel in his book, entitled "Dramatic Art and Literature",[1] tells us "were I to select a guide from among the ancient philosophers, it should undoubtedly be Plato, who acquired the idea of the beautiful, not by dissection which can never give it but by intuitive inspiration". Plato's right to guide in the field of aesthetics, as far as European aesthetics is concerned, is indisputable. It is well remarked that the whole of European philosophy is a footnote to that of Plato and this is very largely true not merely of European ethics and metaphysics but also of European theories of art. To determine the nature of art is in itself a colossal task. Fantastic suggestions have been made by many eminent thinkers of different times and countries and art has already been defined in a thousand different ways. Some contend that the uncertainty about the function of art and the determination of its character is due to its confusion with various other forms of activity of kindred nature. The Greek tendency to indentify art with craft is an instance in point. Such confusion, according to Prof. Collingwood, has landed us in fallacies of 'precarious margins'.[2] Poetry, as a species of art, has been defined by estimable authorities as imitation of human life, glimpse of the divine, wine of the devil, expression of emotion, sublime expression of truth, aspiration toward beauty, communication of pleasure, speaking pictures, apparent pictures of unapparent realities, reality, make-believe, concrete or abstract metaphor, metre, madness, wisdom, sanity, trance—there is almost no way left in which poetry remains yet to be defined. Moreover, the notion of poetry, as we find it to-day, is totally different from what it was in the old days. With the process of mental evolution, human conceptions are fast changing. Ideas and values also change. Sri Aurobindo notes this change with the evolution of human cycle. He writes :[3] "To us poetry is revel of intellect and fancy, imagination a play thing and caterer for our amusement, our entertainer, the

[1] Lecture XVII.
[2] Vide 'The Principles of Art !'
[3] See 'Human Cycle' by Sri Aurobindo, p. 7.

nautch girl of the mind. But to the men of old the poet was a seer, a revealer of hidden truths, imagination no dancing courtesan but a priestess in God's house commissioned not to spin fictions but to image diffcult and hidden truths". Thus there is a definite change of outlook in us and to-day we do not look upon poetry and other forms of art so seriously as our fore-fathers used to do. The amusement theory of art is the widely known view. The office of the seer of hidden truths has been denied to the poet by many critics of to-day. Sometimes they uphold their views with apparent justice and logical consistency. It is really difficult to make out, at the first instance, who is in the right—the modern or the ancient critic. That is why a critical enquiry into the nature and function of art, is neither superfluous nor redundant event to-day.

Plato's suggestion that poetry is esoteric and unique can not be readily accepted in view of such confusion and divergence of opinion in regard to the nature of poetry. The irrationality as well as the uniqueness of poetry so boldly attributed to it by Plato will scarcely bear examination; in fact, no less an authority than Kant will have poetry defined as containing an essential element of rationality in it. In the nature of art, Kant tells us, there always is an element of intellectualism. As against the view of Kant, we find such an eminent thinker as Sri Aurobindo totally denying rationality and intellectualism in the ordinary sense, in all true art. He writers :[4] The creation of beauty in poetry and art does not fall within the sovereignty or even within the sphere of the reason. The intellect is not the poet, the artist, the creator within us; creation comes by a suprarational influx of light and power which must work always, if it is to do its best, by vision and inspiration. It may use the intellect for certain of its operations, but in proportion as it subjects itself to the intellect, it loses in power and force of vision and diminishes the splendour and truth of the beauty it creates. Both Plato and Sri Aurobindo agree that the source of poetry is supra-rational. But their findings are altogether different. Genius, the true creator, writes[5] Sri Aurobindo, is always supra-rational in its nature and its instrumentation even when it seems to be doing the work of the reason; it is most itself, most exalted, in its work, most sustained in the power, depth, height and beauty of its achievement when it is least touched by, least mixed with any control of the mere intellectuality and least often drops from its heights

[4] The Human Cycle, p. 169 by Sri Aurobindo.
[5] Ibid.

of vision and inspiration into reliance upon the always mechanical process of intellectual construction. Art-creation which accepts the canons of the reason and works within the limits laid down by it, may be great, beautiful and powerful; For genius can preserve its power even when it labours in shackles and refuses to put forth all its resources; but when it proceeds by means of the intellect, it constructs, but does not create. It may construct well and with a good and faultless workmanship, but its success is formal and not of the spirit, a success of technique and not the embodiment of the imperishable truth of beauty seized in its inner reality, its divine delight, its appeal to a supreme source of ecstacy, Ānanda. Another suggestion that poetry is something so general as to be almost co-terminous with experience itself is also baffling. It overlooks the fact that poetry is the expression of the unique experience of the poet. It is not unique as experience for the poet's experience might have been shared by many in the past. It is unique because the poet expresses in his own unique way. There it is uncommon and peculiar. There it bids farewell to the experiences of the common herd of men. It is unique in its expression. However the nature of poetry defies analysis in either direction, whether we regard it as rare and esoteric like divinity or general and common as experience itself. Plato's theory of poetry as originating mysteriously from an 'impulse of the divinity within' does not encourage any discussion or analysis, if we hold with Plato that the poetic activity is an 'unconscious activity,' we mean thereby not merely that the poetic activity is mysterious in its nature, but also that the consciousness of any activity as poetic is incompatible with the poetic character of such acts.[6] Such a position, we are sure, will not be acceptable to any poet worth the name. Poetic activity may be inspired but certainly not unconscious, as alleged by Plato. Introspection is possible only through retrospection but the peculiar character of the poetic activity according to such a position, makes any introspective assessment of its function totally impracticable. Therefore, we can not even reach it *post facto* retrospectively or inferentially through comparing the experiences of different individuals since reports of such experiences can never be available. Art, in Plato's view, eludes our grasp and we can never know it. Its very character baffles any easy characterisation. Tagore, too holds a similar view. He writes: "art is māyā—it has no other explanation but that it seems to be what it is. It never tries to conceal its evasiveness, it mocks even its own definition and plays the game of hide-and-seek

[6] Vide Poetry Monads and Society by H. Kabir.

through its constant flight in changes".[7] Tagore's characterisation of art as 'māyā' reminds us of Irving Babbitt's characterisation of art as 'illusion for the sake of illusion, a mere Nepenthe of the spirit, a means not of becoming reconciled to reality but of escaping from it."[8] Thus we find that from Plato down to Tagore, artists and art-critics stand baffled when they attempt at an explanation of the nature of art. For Plato, 'Poetry' originates from an impulse of the divinity within and such an impluse is always indefinable. It is inherently irrational or sub-rational and that is why Plato is so trenchant in his criticism of art. Tagore goes the way Plato has gone, when he tells us that it has no other explanation but that it seems to be what it is. 'This seeming reality' if we may call it so, is the theme of art and the aesthetic approach to life and reality is a class by itself and we shall presently try to determine the nature of this 'approach'.

Apart from the divergence of views on the nature of art, a number of other difficulties stand in the way. It is a pertinent question whether all forms of art—poetry, painting, architecture, sculpture and music can be subsumed under one head and they all can be judged with the same criterion. It is also doubtful whether a single theory will cover the whole field of art and not only poetry or painting exclusively. The theory of art is, moreover, not only the theory of beauty. The two can not be equated. Art has to deal with the sublime and the ludicrous. Sublime, like the beautiful, does not arise from the conformity between content and activity. Like the ludicrous it does neither express the failure of expression. The sense of the sublime arises only when we fail to comprehend the grandeure and magnificence in nature. The categories of human thought can not adequately conform to the bigness of the content concerned. sublimity is the failure of comprehension and expression on the part of the creator as well as of the appreciator. Sublimity is not expressed ; it is only hinted at. Successful expression gives us the sense of the beautiful, the sense of the harmony between the form and the content. This question of harmony does not arise at all in the case of the sublime. Ludicrous or comic is the expression of the failure of expression. The failure is well expressed and that is what gives rise to the sense of the comic. From a study of the nature of the comic, of the sublime and of the beautiful, it is quite difficult to ascertain at the outset whether a single theory of art will cover all these diverse

[7] Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 38.
[8] The New Laokoon, p. 85.

problems of the field of aesthetics. In the present volume we have mainly confined our enquiry to the beautiful in art. We propose to deal with the sublime and the ludicrous in a subsequent volume.

We shall have also to adjudicate upon the respective claims of reason (thought) and feeling in matters of artistic creation. There are diverse views, as usual, also on this point. There are eminent scholars and thinkers who look upon the aesthetic world as supra rational or sub-rational and deny the competency of reason to survey this field of aesthesis. Plato considered art to be irrational and this lack of rational element in art led Plato to denounce it altogether. Sri Aurobindo, like Plato, denied rationality to art. But he did not denounce the value of art on that score. He considered the realm of art to be beyond the spell of reason. The intuitive intelligence in man when it has been sufficiently trained and devoloped, can take up always the work of the intellect and do it with a power and light and insight greater and surer than the power and the light of the intellectual judgment in is widest scope. This 'intuitive intelligence of Sri Aurobindo comprehends within itself the contemplativeness of the faculty as well as the immediacy of feeling. There is an intuitive discrimination, he tells us, which is more keen and precise in its sight than the reasoning intelligence. This is one side of the problem. Kant, again, admitted an element of intellectualism in art. Croce, on the other hand, declared art to be below the thought level. But it is in no way inferior to thought in dignity. Logic comes after art and art is devoid of any reality-consciousness. This discrimination between reality and unreality is a thing of the logical plane. In the realm of art, it is yet to emerge. Art is concerned with feeling. The immediacy of feeling constitutes the soul of art. There are people who take a middle course and allow both feeling and thought to take their respective seats in the realm of art. Rabindra Nath Tagore, for example, subscribes to such a view. This thought-feeling tug of war can not be easily brushed aside. Like many other problems of art, this also stands out as a baffling question.

Being keenly alive to such difficile problems of aesthetics, we undertake, in the present volume, to offer a critical study of the great philosophers who have discussed aesthetics as a branch of their philosophical enquiry. We have throughout avoided some misconceptions about art which have vitiated the speculations in this regard of some of the greatest names in philosophy. One such misconception as we have already noted, is that a theory of art is only a theory of

beauty. Such a view totally disregards the central fact that art creates not merely the beautiful but also the sublime. Secondly, a theory of art, which confounds it with a theory of poetry also suffers from the same defect of undue restriction and limitation. No theory of art is adequate which does not consider all its varieties, viz., music, poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture. And a theory of art which equates it to a theory of poetry suffers from fallacy of confounding the genus with a particular species comprised within it. A third point which we shall try to make out in our critical examination of the different theories, is the treatment of art as a branch of a comprehensive theory of reality reflecting the idiosyncrasies and the limitations of the general theory to the prejudice of the autonomy of art as art. This is true in particular of Hegel's theory for whom reality is absolute spirit and the real is rational and the rational is real and art as an imperfect form of the self consciousness of the absolute spirit is an imperfect expression of the logic of reality and must be overpassed and transcended by philosophy as most adequate self-expression of the absolute spirit. We might call it the intellectualist fallacy or the fallacy of logicism about art. Similar fallacies vitiate the speculations of writers like Tolstoy, who make art subservient to the ends of morality or social good and the service of humanity. In all such cases, a pre-conceived view of reality or of man in relation to the world colours and distorts the view of art as an autonomous independent object of enquiry.

In the following six chapters, we have examined views of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Croce, Romain Rolland and Tagore, the last chapter being a comparative study of the views of Tagore and Croce. While criticising the above views, we have offered our own views on the subject. We have tried to reconstruct in our own way views of these master minds whose utterances on the nature of art are not quite consistent with the autonomy of art as art, for some reason or other.

CHAPTER I

PLATO

Bosanquet remarks[1] that "in Plato we see both the completed system of Greek theory concerning art and side by side with this, the conceptions that were destined to break it down". If we approach the earlier Greek philosophers or even Plato with a view to find in them a simple reflex and appreciation of the plastic and poetic fancy of their fellow country men we shall be disillusioned. When a reader, modern in his outlook, finds that the fair humanities of old religion aroused among the wisest of early philosophers either unsparing condemnation or a sense of allegorical misconception, he is forced to summon up all his historical sympathy if he would not conclude that Heracleitus and Xenophanes and Plato and the allegorising interpreters of whom Plato tells us were incapable of rational criticism. But in reality this moral and metaphysical analysis, directed against the substance of a poetic fancy, was the natural sequel of artistic creation and the natural forerunner of a more appreciative theory. That is why Plato's total denial of any value to art brought in its train the restatment of the artistic values by Aristotle. Plato directed his attack with all the vehemence and force at his command and in his eagerness to outdo the 'aesthetic culture' and to replace it by a new type of 'ethical culture' (to borrow the terms from Sri Aurobindo) he overlooked the true nature of representative art. His analysis does not convince a modern reader. Aristotle came out of the Platonic world and offered an analysis which may be considered as an outcome of the Platonic position. Moreover, the creation of Hellenic poetry and formative art stands as an intermediate stage between popular practical religion and critical or philosophical reflection. The legendary content of this art was neither the work of the poet nor of the formative artist. It was the work of the national mind in its long development out of savagery. This national mind acted through the individuality of poetic genius, a genius which was born with talents and attained its full stature through personal enterprise. The imaginative form of the Hellenic art and the legendary content as well, came from the national mind, no doubt, but the progressive significance and refinement in the national thought and emotion was largely

[1] See History of Aesthetics, p. 47.

due to individual genius. The legacy of the nation was galvanized, reshaped and reformed in the genius of a true artist. Though we may reasonably doubt whether any word corresponding to beauty or the beautiful was ever used in the whole range of Hellenic antiquity in a meaning perfectly free from confusion with truth or goodness, yet it is certain that art was more than nature as was pointed out later by Aristotle and that the definite presentation of ideas in beautiful shape prepared the way for an explicit aesthetic judgment by developing a distinct type of sentiment and enjoyment. Thus in Hellenic art and poetry of the 5th century B.C. we catch glimpses of a "consciousness in relation to beauty". This beauty-consciousness was more than practical and natural and theoretically it was less explicit. It was over shadowed by other considerations not quite consistent with the autonomous nature of beauty. Sometimes art was considered to be a propaedutic to philosophy, sometimes a handmaid of morality or religion. Hellenic art influenced the Greek pantheon and gods and goddesses were made after what the Greek poet or the sculptor considered to be the true image of the divinity. We notice the existence of a profound truth in the familiar saying of Herodotus,[2] that Homer and Hesiod made the Hellenic theogony and determined the forms and attributes of the gods for Hellenic belief. The full force of this reflection is measured by the interval between the early wooden image and the Phidian statue or between the superstition of a savege and Antigone's conception of duty. It was in the world of fine art that Hellenic genius had mainly recorded and in recording, had created this transformation.[3]

When, therefore the first recognition of the existence and significance of art assumes the shape of hostility to the anthropomorphic content which it retains, we see not only that the reflective idea of beauty is still conspicious by its absence, but that theory in advancing beyond the popular faith fails to recognise the actual refinement of that faith by which poetic fancy has made the way for the speculative criticism which condemns it. We must observe, on the other hand, that the criteria now actually applied—the wholly unaesthetic criteria of reality and of morality—spring from a principle from which we shall only in part escape within the limits of Hellenic antiquity. This principle is that an artistic representation can not be regarded as different in kind or in aim from the reality of ordinary life. The

[2] Hdt. 2. 53.

[3] Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics. p. 47.

Hellenic mind could not as yet understand that the aesthetic approach is different altogether from our realistic or practical approach to life. Beauty is a human value of a different nature and it also belongs par excellence to the domain of art. True art exhibits beauty in all its freshness and grandeur, devoid of what is accidental and transitory in nature. Nature fails to attain the perfect expression which we call beauty and art is an attempt in this direction to supplement nature. Where nature fails art succeeds there. Art expresses what the 'trembling hand of nature' fails to express. This was overlooked by the Hellenic mind and it largely confused aesthetic issues with other issues. But in all fairness to the Greek intellect, it must be said that to make a distinction between the practical world and the world of art is difficult for immature reflection. Hellenic thought was no exception to it. The Greek world of Ideas, before or outside the philosophic Schools, was wholly free from dualism. Its parts were homogeneous. The Hellenic Good, for example, was not conceived as an unseen being merely capable of an incarnation, such as could not express or exhaust his full spiritual nature; his real shape was human and his place of dwelling was on a particular hill and in a particular temple. The representation of divine being was a likeness in bold relief than a mere symbol in dim profile. The symbol worship was far from the Greek mind. It preferred divine representation in human form, carved out of bronze or stone, a likeness of man in 'cold flesh and blood'. In Greek pantheon human imagination had the least scope for a proper play, far less in art. Greek divinity was a more porportionate, more symmetrical, and more attractive human form. It was not a symbol which might faintly suggest Him who could be known only in the spirit, but a likeness of one who dwelt on earth and whose nature was to be visible[1] and not to be invisible. Greek thought did not care much for 'suggestiveness' in art and they valued much the stupendous force of likeness to reality, for the unsophisticated Greek mind was not yet tutored enough to appreciate the subtleties of the activity of spirit. Bare nature was more real to them than he finest specimens of suggestive art. And this can be easily detected if we look at the specimens of Greek art, especially the divine representations in human form. Schelling's remark that in Homer there is no supernatural goes to show how far the Hellenic mind was obsessed with reality-consciousness, in the ordinary sense of the term. Whatever was visible, was of higher value to the Greek mind. Greek God had been conceived as a part of nature. "And, therefore,"

[1] See Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics, p. 47.

writes[5] Bosanquet, "although a work of creative idealisation unparalleled in the history of the world had been performed by the plastic fancy of Greece in the age that culminated with the highest art of Athens, yet in the absence of any mystic sense of an invisible order of realities the prevalent impression produced by this world of beauty was rather that of imitative representation than of interpretative originaion". Plato waged war against all such imitative representation and in a sense he was quite justified in banishing the poets from his ideal polity. If the poets were only to imitate, to copy what was in nature, what was the good in retaining them ? That was Plato's argument. The then Greek art in being purely imitative, in the literal sense, gave Plato a long hand in condemning representative art. Plato could not make out the true nature of art for true art was hardly to be found in the purely imitative works of the Greek artists. He saw imitative art only and he condemned it. Plato's Philosophy of art could not turn to a symbolic interpretation of it and Greek art was largely responsible for it as well. Moreover, Plato could have assumed the right sort of attitude towards art had he not been prepossessed with the idea of doing good to the people of Greece in general. There is a far cry between the two—art and social service. If we confuse one with the other, we will land ourselves in Paradoxical conclusions and preposterous views on art.

Plato's attitude towards religion and art is determined more or less by moral and political points of view. "In an age when poets were theologians and their works took the place of revealed documents —when the theatre bore an important part in religious worship—art and religion stood in the closest interconnection".[6] Plato's Deity coincides with the idea of the Good, the belief in providence with the conviction that the world is the wrok of reason and the copy of the Idea. Plato's conception of divine worship was one with that of virtue and knowledge, for his religion was philosophic monotheism. Plato primarily examined art with regard to its ethical effect. In the Socratic manner the conception of the beautiful is referred to the conception of the good and thus they were largely confused. It is no sufficient justification of a poem to plead that it is beautiful. Beauty is not an autonomous human value in Plato's ideal Republic. It is not worth retaining, if it does not subserve the ends of morality. The preposterous notion that "the exercise of the beautiful is to be

[5] Ibid.

[6] Zeller's outline of Greek Philosophy. p. 161.

controlled even in details by the state" is carefully harboured and elaborated in the 'Republic'. Plato was blind to the fact that this sort of control by the state of the nature and function of the beautiful in art would lead to the utter destruction of art. As Rolland preferred truth to arts, so Plato preferred morality. If Poetry can not exist under the yoke of morality, it must not be allowed to exist at all. It can also be made out of Plato's writings that art is merely a means to philosophy. The end of all education, according to Plato, is the knowledge of the ideas and every other subject, viz, science, mathematics or art is introduced into the educational curriculum solely as a preparation for that end. They have no value in themselves. This is obvious from the teachings of the 'Republic' and it is even more evident in the 'Symposium' where the love of beautiful objects is made to end, not in itself, but in philosophy.[7] Thus, while Plato, on the one hand, will condemn an art which does not subserve the interests of the moral life, he on the other hand, will encourage art as a propaedutic not merely to morality but to philosophy as the highest wisdom. As a philosophic artist Plato failed to understand the real nature of pure art which subserves no other object. This failure on his part vitiates his whole system of aesthetics.

Plato's famous 'mimesis' theory tell us that poetry is an imitation, "not of the essence of things, but of their appearances to the senses". This is his prime objection against the admissibility of poets in his ideal Republic. He further objects that art arises from a "dim enthusiasm" and it claims our sympathies equally for what is false or true, bad or good. Art (as in comedy), Plato points out, flatters our lowest inclinations and by its varied play endangers the simplicity and directness of our character. Poetry is irrational and it originates from an impulse of the divinity within. In 'Ion' Plato tells, us: "This faculty of speaking well about Homer is not an art (referring to Ion's power to recite Homer) but a divine power which moves you like that in the stone.....All the good epic poets compose all their beautiful poems not by art, but by being divinely inspired and possessed by the muse; (Plato, however, in the 'phaedrus' does not rule out art entirely as irrational but considers it only as the handmaid of inspiration). So too the good lyric poets, not being in their sound senses, compose their beautiful lyrical pomes.[8]" Poetry, both epic and lyric are divinely inspired creations and they are

[7] A critical History of Greek Philosophy, by W. J. Stace, p. 230-1.
[8] Vide Plato's works vol. IV. p. 287.

irrational (if not suprarational). That is the contention of Plato. He regarded art as mere imitation and he had no other way but to call lyric poetry, Croce's 'lyricita' as divinely inspired. The poet, in his view, does not work by reason, but by inspiration. He does not or he should not create the beautiful by means of rules or by the application of principles. It is only after the work of art is created that the critic discovers rules in it. But this does not mean that the discovery of rules is false but that the artist follows them unconsciously and instinctively. We do not believe for example, that the object of tragedy is to purge the heart by terror and pity and this to be a conscious object. The tragedian does not set out accomplish that end consciously. He may do it without knowing or intending it. This kind of instinctive impulse is generally called 'inspiration'. Plato does not consider 'inspiration' to be something exalted but on the contrary thinks it to be low and contemptible just because it is not rational. Plato characterises this inspiration as 'divine madness', divine indeed, because the artist produces beautiful things but madness because he himself does not know how or why he has done it. The poet fails to explain the wise and beautiful things that he presents in so beautiful rhyme, rhythm and language. His feelings prompt him to write and there is no concious guidance from reason. The poet's inspiration, therefore, is not on the knowledge-level but it is of the nature of right opinion, which knows what is true but does not know why.[9] Plato's craze for conceiving everything in terms of reason made him deny good recitation and composition of poems the rank of real art. He conveniently overlooked the fact that there may be a category higher than 'rationality' in his sense of the term and poetry might belong to a category, which might be termed 'Suprarational'. Poetry is certainly not an art like surgery or the art of healing. It belongs to the domain of what we moderns call fine arts. In our sense there is hardly any distinction between art and fine art, and as we have already pointed out, one can be substituted for the other. Plato's confusion of art and craft was at the root of all his misconception about art and its true nature. However, Plato detests this so-called irrational element in art. He opines that art must harness its services to the cause of philosophy and thus can it be treated as an instrument of moral culture. Thus art is made serve a purpose extraneous to its nature and its spontaneity and freedom are sacrificed at the altar of social utility. It should, in the opinion of Plato, demonstrate or exhibit the 'goodness of virtue and the heinousness of vice and this

[9] See. A critical History of Greek Philosophy by W. J. Stace, p. 232.

was in his opinion the highest mission that art is expected to fulfil. Plato banished from his state "not only all immoral and unworthy narratives about gods and heroes, but also all extravagant and effiminate music and the whole body of imitative poetry including Homer. In the same manner Plato requires that rhetoric, the ordinary practice of which is most emphatically condemned, shall be reformed and made to subserve philosophy".[10]

Poetry, as has already been pointed out, originates from an 'impulse of the divinity within'. This Platonic legacy still lives and we find its echo even in such eminent art connoisseurs of modern time as Prof. O. C. Ganguly. Prof. Ganguly defines[11] art 'as the process of arousing aesthetic emotions by the creation of significant forms devised in purple moments of spiritual exaltation'. Plato's 'divine madness' and Prof. Ganguly's 'spiritual exaltation' are of kindred nature, if not identical. We can only wonder why Plato wanted to shut out of his 'Republic' the voice of God speaking through man. Perhaps his sense of rationality appeared to be jeopardised by this irrational element in the causation of art. Plato's mimesis theory is well-known and that he wanted to banish the poets from his Republic is also not less familiar to the student of aesthetics. Let us quote a passage[12] which summarises Plato's well known polemics against all representative art : "And there is another artist (besides the workman who makes useful real things). I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he ?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other worksmen .....This is he who makes not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven and the things which are in heaven or under the earth ; he makes the gods also.....Do you not see that there is a way in which you could make them yourself ? There are many ways in which the feat might be accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon make the sun and the heaven and the earth and yourself and other animals and plants and all the other creatures of art as well as of nature in the mirror.

Yes, he said ; but that is an appearance only.

[10] Vide Zeller's outlines of Greek Pholosophy. pp. 162-63.
[11] Vide his article on "What is Art."
[12] Republic. Bk. 10, Jowett, marg. p. 596-97.

Very good, I said you are coming to the point now; and the painter as I conceive, is just a creator of this sort, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

And what of the manufacture of the bed? Did you not say that he does not make the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he can not make true existence but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of the manufacturer of the bed or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.—No wonder then that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.—Well then here are three beds, one existing in nature which as I think that we may say is made by God—there is another which is the work of the carpenter? And the work of the painter is a third? Beds then are of three kinds and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the manufacturer of the bed and the painter? God, whether from choice or necessity, created one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.....Shall we then speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied, inasmuch as by the natural power of creation. He is the author of this and of all other things. And what shall we say of the carpenter; is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator; and the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore like all other imitators he is thrice removed from the King, and from truth?

That appears to be the case. Then about the imitator we are agreed. And now about the painter, I would like to know whether

[13] The allusion is to Bk. IX. p. 586 ff.

he imitates that which originally exists in nature or only the creations of Artists (artificers).

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? You have still to determine this.—I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality, which is the art of painting—an imitation of things as they are or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth and can do all things because he only lightly touches on a small part of them and that part an image. For example : a painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter or any other artificer, though he knows nothing of their arts; and if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter. And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts and all things else that every body knows and every single thing, with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met and whom he thought all knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation. And so when we hear persons saying that the tragedians and Homer who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice and divine things too, for that the good poet must know what he is talking about and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there is not a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have been deceived by imitators and may never have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not real substances? Or perhaps after all they may be in the right and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak well?—Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as though he could do nothing better?—The real artist who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations : and

would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair ; and instead of being the author of encomiums he would prefer to be the theme of them."

From the foregoing lines quoted from Plato's 'Republic' we learn that art works with images and not with reality or realities which can act or be acted upon in he world of daily use and that these images do not symbolise the ultimate reality as created by God. God, the master artist is the only creator and painters and other artists are only imitators. As is obvious from above, Plato considered art to imitate the commonplace reality (i.e. the bed made by the carpenter) which is relative to every day purpose and sense-perception. And he holds that the images of art must be judged by their capacity of representing common reality either with sensuous completeness or with intellectual thoroughness ; the reality however is preferable to the imitation, and it is added lower down, even beauty depends on a correct representation of use.[14] The empirical world was read to Plato, only so far as it shared in the nature of Idea. Art, regarded as imitation of experience or life was still further removed from the idea and doubly unreal. Plato tells us with dogmatic certainly that the painter is neither a creator nor a maker and what he creates is useless for it does not work with realities which can act or be acted upon in the world of daily use. This norm of utility is imported by Plato into the domain of art as a criterion of artistic value. It is unfortunate that Plato considered the aesthetic values from a pragmatic point of view. Plato's 'Idea' was ordered, precise, and rational and nature's uniformities only imperfectly adumbrated or suggested order, precision and rationality, for nature imitated the Idea. Art imitated nature and it lacked even the imperfect uniformities which a discerning eye sees in nature. Plato's agrument is not very clear. For argument's sake, if we admit that art only imitates nature we do not understand why it should not partake of the character of nature herself. When nature imitates 'Idea' and retains order, precision and rationality of the original to some extent, why should art imitating nature lack the precision of even the imperfect uniformities of nature. Plato was committed to such an embarassingly unsound position and as we have already pointed out, the imitative character of the Greek art of Plato's time was largely responsible for it. His crusade was against the representative type of art, nay a particular type of it, as we shall presently see. Plato's threefold gradation of reality and the total denial of it to art evoked bitter criticism. Caudwell[15]

[14] Plato. Republic, p. 601.
[15] Christopher Caudwell. Illusion and Reality. p. 43.

dismissed Plato as a reactionary and fascist philosopher, who denied all culture, "particularly contemporary culture." It is clear from Plato's treatment of art and poetry that Plato did not distinguish between art and craft. His 'mimesis' theory of art is vitiated by a false conception of imitation. Plato identifies it with mimicry. Plato's assimilation of poetry to painting gave him a long hand in condemning poetry as nothing but a literal representation of 'models' but this is not tenable. It would appear from Plato's views on art that he believed that art in all its forms can be explained in terms of a single theory. But it is doubtful whether music and poetry as also the plastic arts like sculpture painting and archietecture are amenable to uniform treatment and explanation. A Monistic theory of art may suit some temperaments who look for unity in all forms of diversity, but the data—regarding the different forms of art may not warrant treatment in terms of a unitary theory without violence to their respective natures. It has been argued in defence of poetry, against Plato that "Painting can never be a visual art. A man paints with hands, not with his eyes". Prof. Abercrombie[16] suggests that Plato's assimilation of poetry to painting facilitated his attack on poetry "for the notion that imitation is mimicry is most easily supported in painting." Plato's identification of poetry and painting was not justified. A statue, or a specimen of Greek painting could easily be taken as an artifact but a poem or a piece of music baffles such characterisation. But his identification of the two made the task easier for Plato and and he condemned art. Prof. Kabir[17] summarises Plato's arguments against art in the following words : (a) " Art was only an imitation of real life and therefore less valuable. For what is the white of the palette beside the whiteness of the smallest flake of show. (b) Art is harmful for such mimicry exercises and excites the emotions. By increasing our sensibility to the point of sentimentality, it tends to the debility of spirit and a weakening of moral fibre. Among arts, the craft of poetry is the most futile : it is not only an unnecessary and superfluous but also an unworthy form of activity. "We may point out in passing that true art is not photography and art never tries to copy nature in its minutest detail. It is not the work of the artist. The true artist recreates nature and leaves the stamp of spirit on the artistic creation. The work of art far surpasses in dignity and grandeur the handiwork of nature. Secondly, art or poetry does not leave us burdened with the emotions, it evokes. We are left, purged

[16] Lascelles Abercrombie—Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 79.
[17] H. Kabir. 'Poetry, Monads and Society', p. 6.

of them. They are discharged in the act of enjoyment. It is a common experience that after witnessing a tragic drama, we feel refreshed and renovated. Plato could not read the situation correctly. It was Artistotle, who came after him, that showed a proper understanding of the situation. Thirdly, Plato wrongly judged art from the pragmatic point of view. He, like Hegel, wanted to fit art in his Scheme of metaphysics, doing violence to the autonomy of art as art. Plato had many preconceived notions both ethical and metaphysical and whenever art did not agree with such notions, it was blamed and condemned. He overlooked the fact that art was an autonomous object of study and not a mere branch of a preconceived system of metaphysics or ethics. Plato's denial of beauty to the province of fine arts has also led philosophers, to review the whole problem of representation and 'imitation' as they stand related to art in the system of Plato's philosophy. In Plato's eyes the artist and the poet rank many degrees below the true lover of beauty, who is on a level with the philosopher.

It will be interesting to note in this connection that the Platonic problem is not dead altogether with the modern thinkers. Dr. S. K. Maitra poses the platonic question and gives the answer appropriate to it. He asks :[18] when fine arts imitate reality, is it proper to designate it as an act of creation ? Plato did not consider art to be an act of creation and hence he considered it unfit to be retained in his Republic. But we agree with prof. Maitra, when he holds that mere imitation of what is, is not art proper. Art is not something unreal. It follows reality and it recreates reality in a way that lends it a value of a different order. Art neither literally imitates reality nor contradicts it. It transcends reality and presents it in a new shape and form—a form which may be vaguely hinted at but not completely represented in nature or the common facts of experience. So we find that art does not imitate the things as was suggested by Plato. Art, to be worth the name should not aim at mere copying. It far transeends in beauty and suggestiveness the handiwork of nature and

[18] See 'Darśaner Swarūp', p. 3-4 (Published in Darśan, Kārtick-Māgh, '55 B.S.)

সুতরাং চারুশিল্প যখন সত্যেরই অনুগমন ব্যতীত অন্য কিছু হইতে পারে না তখন ইহাকে সৃষ্টি আখ্যা দিয়া ইহার বৈশিষ্ট্য নির্দ্দেশ করায় সঙ্গতি কোথায় ? এতদুত্তরে বক্তব্য হইতেছে যে যদিও ইহা অসত্যের সৃষ্টি না হইয়া সত্যেরই অনুগমনরূপ এক প্রকার পুনর্গঠন বা নির্ম্মাণ কৌশল হিসাবে নির্দ্দেশ হইবার উপযোগী তথাপি যাহা আছে, তাহারই পুনরাবৃত্তি বা অনুকরণ কখনই চারুশিল্পাখ্যার উপযোগী নহে। পরন্তু ইহা হইতেছে সেই প্রকার সৃষ্টি অবিরোধী হইয়াও বাস্তবাতীত নূতন রূপ অবতারণা দ্বারা নূতন ভাব বা উপভোগের উপযোগী।

it is enjoyed for its own sake. We also find that the Aitareya Brahmana of the Rgveda, one of the earliest documents of Indo-Aryan thought and culture, enunciates".[19]

> "Aum śilpāni śaṃsanti Devaśilpāni.
> Eteṣām vai śilpānāmanukṛtiriha śilpamadhigamyate.
> śilpaṃ hāsminnadhigamyate ya evaṃ veda yadeva
> śilpāni. Ātma-saṃskṛtirvāva śilpāni chandomayaṃ
> va etairyajamāna ātmānaṃ saṃskurute".

i.e. "They (the authors) belaud the Śilpas (that is to say recite hymns in glorification of Śilpas or works of fine and technical art) which glorify the (artistic creations of the) gods. Verily, these (earthly) products of human workmanship are to be taken as ectypes or reproductions of the (celestial) archetypes of divine creation..... One who regards (the terrestrial) arts in this light has assuredly acquired an insight into the nature of art. In and through (works of) art the artist regenerates his soul or makes it rhythmical (to the Cadence of cosmic creation) or, even hereby the person (for whose benefit the priest recites the hymn in praise of divine creation or performs the purificatory ceremony) chastens his own soul". The Ṛsis of the Ṛgveda unlike Plato, conceived art as partaking of the nature of the Real. The creations of the artist were regarded as ectypes or reproductions of the celestial archetypes of divine creation. The author of the Aitareya Brāhmana comes closer to Plato in respect of his conception of Śilpas that glorify the artistic creations of the Gods'. Plato favours such poems as offer hymns to Gods and recite praises of good men. But unlike Plato, the author of the Brahmana, did not want to banish art in any of its forms, as not partaking of the nature of the real i.e. Ideas. The notion of utility, determined by wordly interests guided both Plato and Aristotle though in different degrees, in the formulation of their conceptions of art, while the authors of the Ṛgveda had no such 'utility' bias. Both Plato and Aristotle failed to fully realise that art forms a class by itself and it should be judged by a standard of its own. 'What Plato failed to see' writes[20] Stace, 'was that the artist does not copy his object but idealizes it. And this means that he does not see the object simply as an object but as the revelation of an Idea'. The artist does not see the phenomenon with the eyes of other men. i.e., see them as they are or appear to be.

[19] Quoted in 'Art and Culture' Vol. IV. p. 56.
[20] See His 'A Critical History of Greek Philosophy.' p. 231.

He penetrates the sensuous envelope and exhibits the Idea shining through the veils of sense. What Plato failed to see was not overlooked by Hegel, Art, according to Hegel,[21] does not slavishly imitate nature. On the contrary it is just this pure externality and meaningless contingency of nature that is has to get rid of. Thus in portrait painting, such pure externalities as warts on the skin, scars, pores, pimples etc. will be left out. For these do not exhibit any thing of the inner soul, the subjectivity which has to appear in manifestation. In so far as art takes natural objects as its subject matter at all, its function is to divest them of the unessential, soulless, crass concatenation of contingencies and externalities which surround them and obscure their meaning and to exhibit solely those traits which manifest the inner soul or unity. Another difficulty in Plato's conception of art which we have already noted, is with regard to the divine origin of poetry. His theory of poetry as originating mysteriously from an 'impulse of the divinity within' defies all analysis and discussion. Like Plato if we attribute poetry to some divine impulse and the poet is considered to be inspired and possessed by muse, we thereby discourage all attempts to determine the nature of art. Moreover, as we have already sen, Plato identifid art with craft. He failed to distinguish between the two and also he had not formulated any positive definition of art to start with. Had he done so, much of the controversies regarding his theory of art would have vanished. In fairness to Plato, we must admit that the conception of art as different from craft is a later achivement of human mind and it will be anachronostic to suppose that Plato could distinguish between the two. Some noted modern critic[22] contends in defence of Plato that he never intended to banish art in general but a particular type of it viz. the 'amusement art of the new generation'. We do no find in Plato, an adverse criticism of lyric poetry, the purest form of fine art, and its consequent banishment from his ideal city. We shall discuss this point in due course and try to ascertain what Plato really wanted.

The idea of symbolism, i.e. of the embodiment of invisible realities in sensuous form is absent in Plato's theory of representative art. Plato could have easily pointed out that the whole perceptible universe was a symbol of Ideas and his philosophy of art would have changed beyond recognition and his consequent strictures on poets and artists could have taken a new form. The later symbolism in Europe deve-

[21] See 'The Philosophy of Hegel' p. 447 by W.T.Stace.
[22] Prof. Collingwood in his Book, 'The Principles of Art'.

loped from the Platonic philosophy of art and it is difficult not to suppose that later European theology (to which fine art became so profoundly related) has its ultimate source in the simile of the 'Republic' where the Sun and its light are conceived as the offspring and symbol of the absolute good and its manifestation.[23] And in a somewhat different arrangement of the same scheme, the only begotten universe of the Timaeus, the god, perceptible to sense (who is the image of the ultimate reason) also suggests ideas which were destined to become for centuries the principal content of symbolic imagination. But Plato was so much under the influences of the dominant notions of his time that he could not but be blind to the great possibility of this symbolic movement in art. Art does not live in the aerid region of mere imitation, far from the living touch of the spirit. This was not revealed to Plato and Plato could not define the relation of the symbol and the symbolised in artistic level. To Plato, Images and Imagination ranked below nature and science. His craze for reality at first hand and the generalization that representative art is reality at second hand guided his subsequent observations on art and morality. Plato's conception of the water tight compartments of the three fold gradations of reality with idea, as the highest, and art as representative of the sensible reality (which is an imitation of the Idea) as the lowest is hardly intelligible. We do not understand how it can be consistently maintained, when the monumental works of Homer, the Eliad and the Aenid, had already established themselves as creations of the highest artistic genius. The "suggestiveness" (of the romanticists) in art, which far transcends line and colour, shape and sound, was obviously overlooked by Plato. Plato lost sight of the fact that art is neither mere imitation nor distorted representation of nature. Had it been so, photography would have been acclaimed as the best form of art. A mere catalogue of factual events would have far surpassed in artistic excellence the great works of Homer, Raphael, and Picasso. Plato's imitation theory of art has been well-caricatured by Voltaire in his famous satire 'Candide'. Lord Pococurante, the fashionable art connoisseur takes Candide to his art gallery and shows him the paintings by Raphael. "They are by Raphael" said the Senator;[24] "I bought them a few years ago at a high price, out of sheer vanity; people say they are the finest in Itally, but I do not like them at all". The reason for dislike comes in the next line. The colours are too dull, the faces are not sufficiently rounded and do not stand out enough

[23] Vide Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics.
[24]. Candide, p. 91.

against their back ground ; the draperies have nothing of the appearance of the real material ; in conclusion, the mighty lord summarises : "In a word, inspite of all what one may say, I can not consider them as true imitations of nature. I shall only like a picture when it makes me think I see nature itself". Here Voltaire's 'Lord' repeats most plainly what Plato wanted to establish in his 'Republic' with regard to the nature of art. A mere likeness satisfies the 'Lord' and a true imitation of nature is his highest ideal for art. Most probably he was educated in the school of Plato. He learnt from Plato that art is imitaion and where there is the slightest deviation from the phenomenal reality. art suffers badly.

Aristotle read the true implication of 'imitation' in Plato's 'mimesis'. For him, poetry imitates human actions and not at random but with reference to a definite plan or purpose. The artist, says Aristotle, should imitate things not as they are but as they ought to be. The case for ideal imitation, has been pleaded by Aristotle. The artist should give us truth, but a select truth raised above all that is local and accidental, purged of all that is abnormal and eccentric, so as to be in the highest sense representative. Art is an improvement upon nature. The post-Aristotelians did finally come to understand this much of Aristotle's meaning that they were not to imitate ordinary nature but a "selected and embellished nature". (la belle nature as the French critics termed it). But the problem remained, with reference to what standard were they do select in arriving at their imitation. Were they to select with reference to an image of perfection in the mind ? The Neoclassicist would raise the objection that such a norm would invite the reader or beholder to look within and thus lose the standard of judgment in a 'vaguely subjective' chimera. This difficulty is overcome by some, by referring to the master artists of the past. 'Little need we to go directly to nature' says Scaliger 'when we have in virgil a second nature'. Thus it is suggested that the adventurer in the field of art does not require to chase an illusive image of perfection in his own mind but he is simplyto copy the master artists of the world—Homer, Milton and Kalidasa. Here we come across the un-Artistotelian meaning of the word 'imitation,—'the imitation of models'. If we accept this meaning, the whole progress of art in general, would have been impossible. If we were only to copy the specimens of ancient art, if we were to look through the glasses, used by our masters, our creations would become lifeless imitations or at the most 'true copies' of what already existed. No new movement in art would have been possible and 'symbolism', 'cubism', etc., would have remained unknown to us

even now and for all times to come. Abbé Batteux, the valiant exponent of 'imitation' theory, asks :[25] "What;.....Is not poetry a song inspired by joy, admiration, gratitude? Is it not a cry of the heart, an enthusiasm (e'lan) in which nature does everything and art nothing? I do not see in it any painting or picture—but only fire, feeling, intoxication. So two things are true; first, lyrical poetry is true poetry, second, it is not an imitation". Abbé Batteux, overcomes this objection 'presented in all its force' and concludes that lyrical poetry is only imitation after all. We need not follow the process by which he arrives at this momentous conclusion, "though this process would illustrate in a very interesting way the pseudo-classic attempt to discredit the spontaneous in favour of the formal, to identify art with artificality".[26] If we logically follow Aristotle's conception of 'ideal imitation' we have no other alternative but to fall back upon the 'vaguely subjective' of the neo-classicist, for imitation must be made with reference to an image of perfection in the mind of the artist. Now if any one objects that, on this view of art, aesthetics becomes purely subjective since my only data are personal experience of particular emotion, then our humble reply to such critics is this that "any system of aesthetics which pretends to be based on some objective truth is so palpably ridiculous as not to be worth discussing. We have no other means of recognising a work of art than our feeling for it".[27] Art is nothing but a successful objectification of subjective feelings. Plato's 'mimesis' theory is totally unacceptable to a modern critic for the simple reason that it did not notice this subjective element in art. A true artist never cares to study the phenomenon in every detail, for details, necessary for a Copyist, are useless for an artist. A true artist does not follow reality but creates a 'reality' which possesses a higher spiritual value. The artist is concerned with the feelings that are evoked by natural phenomena which are empirically real and he is a successful artist then and then only if he can successfully desubjectify the subjective feelings and present it in a significant form.[28] Though we do not fully agree with Clive Bell's definition of significant form, we borrow the term from him and mean thereby 'successful expression' of subjective feelings, accompanied by proper 'psychical distance'.[29]

[25] Beaux Arts reduits a un meme principe, p. 244.
(Quoted in I. Babbitt's The New Laokoon).
[26] Irving Babbitt, 'The New Laokoon', p. 14.
[27] Clive Bell. Art, p. 8-9.
[28] Cf. Clive Bell's 'significant form' as propounded in his book 'Art'.
[29] See Dr. Bulloough's 'psychical distance as a factor in Art and an Aesthetic principle'.

Before we pass on to Aristotle, we will do well to examine critically the much debated contention that Plato wanted to banish the poets from his city. People believe and the belief is almost universal, that Plato wanted to banish the poets from his ideal republic. They, amongst whom we find even the most modern writers on aesthetics, attribute to Plato the syllogism 'imitation is bad; all art is imitative; therefore, all art is bad'. Hence, they conclude, 'Plato banishes art from his city'. Here imitation is used in the sense of literal representation, i.e. mere copying. Such a gross misunderstanding of the Platonic position can be noticed even in Sri Aurobindo, the noted mystic philosopher. 'We have', writes,[30] Sri Aurobindo, "a curious example of the repercussion of this instinctive distrust even on a large and aesthetic Athenian mind in the Utopian speculations of Plato who felt himself obliged in his Republic first to censure and then to banish the poets from his ideal polity". A man of Sri Aurobindo's intellectual eminence uncritically accepts the common belief that Plato banished all poets and all forms of poetry from his ideal polity. An analytical study of the Platonic position will reveal undoubtedly that Plato never wanted to banish poets in general. His attack was directed against a particular class of poets, who were weakening the moral fibre of the Greek people as a whole by their third-rate compositions. Such poems only appealed to the lower nature in men and thus stimulated, the Greek people were fast losing their highly ethical culture. The facts that lead to the belief in the banishment of art from Plato's ideal polity are :[31] (a) that 'Socrates' in Plato's Republic divides poetry into two kinds, one representative and the other non-representative. (392 D). (b) that he regards certain kinds of representative poetry as amusing but for various reasons undesirable and banishes these kinds only of representative poetry not merely from the schoolroom of his young guardians but from the entire city. (398 A). (c) that later in the dialogue he expresses satisfaction with his original division. (595 A) and (d) reinforces his attack, this time extended to the entire field of representative poetry with fresh arguments (595 C—606 D). (e) and banishes all representative poetry, but retains certain specified kinds of poetry as being not representative (607 A).

The myth about Plato's banishing the artist (or poet) from his ideal city is derived from a misunderstanding of Republic, 398 A, which reads as follows :—

[30] The Human Cycle, p. 118.
[31] See R. G. Collingwood. 'The Principles of Art', p. 46.

> "We should reverence him as something holy and marvellous and delightful : we should tell him that there is not any one like him in our city—and that there is not allowed to be; and we should anoint him with myrrh and crown him with a diadem and send him away to another city for our own part continue to employ for our Welfare's sake a drier and less amusing poet and story-teller, who should represent to us the discourse of a good man".

We can misinterpret, as many in the past have done, the above passage and tell the people at large that the victim of this banishment is the poet as such, if we overlook the concluding lines altogether. But if we interpret rightly and without any prejudice, we can easily see through the myth that Plato wanted to banish the poets form his Republic. Plato's intention was not to banish the poets as such but a particular kind of poets. The poets, condemned by Plato, were not even representative poets as such but the entertainer who represents trivial or disgusting things : 'the kind of person who makes farmyard noises and the like'. At this stage of the argument (Book III) not only some kinds of poets but even some kinds of representative poet are explicitly retained in the city, namely, these who 'represent' the discourse of a good man'.

In the tenth book Plato's position has slightly changed. But here he does not regard all poetry as representative. In Book III, Plato banished some representative poetry because what it represents is trivial or evil ; in Book X all representative poetry is banished because it is representative. This is clear from the first few lines of the book, where Socrates congratulates himself on having decided "to banish all such poetry as is representative." It never entered Plato's head, remarks[32] Prof. Collingwood, that any reader could think that this implied the banishment of all poetry ; for when (607 A) Socrates says 'the only kind of poetry we must admit is hymns to the Gods and praises of good men,' no character is made to protest : "But was not all poetry to be excluded" ? Tragedy and comedy were no doubt representative poetry in Plato's view. Plato's pronounced view on drama, at least when he wrote Book X is that all drama must go. 'While writing Book III', writes Collingwood[33] "Plato intended to admit into his republic a certain kind of drama more or less Aeschylean

[32] The Principles of Art, p. 48.

[33] Prof. R. G. Collingwood, See his 'Outlines of a Philosophy of Art'.

in character." Plato had never any intention of attacking all forms of poetry and he never regarded poetry in general as representative. This will be quite clear to us if we read the first half of Book X with an unprejudiced eye. We can easily see that about fifty times or over Plato uses the Greek synonym for 'represent' or some cognate word. While reading, we will always be reminded that the author (i.e. plato) was discussing representative poetry and not poetry in general. Homer was attacked not because he was the king of poets in general but because he was the king of tragedians and Plato regarded tragedy, as has already been pointed out, as a form of representative poetry. Plato was careful enough to draw a distinction between the representative poet and the 'good' poet. In 605 D, again it is said that when Homer or a tragedian causes us to bewail the misfortune of the hero he represents, we praise him 'as a good poet'. Finally we will see that at the end of the whole argument, when Socreates seems half to relent and promises to hear with sympathy whatever can be said in defence of the accused, the old distinction is still insisted upon : the acused is never poetry but 'poetry for pleasures' sake.

The practice of misinterpreting Plato is so general and common that critics are eager to read into the lines of Plato the death warrant for all arts. Some modern critic[34] writes : "In any case Plato does in the end banish from his Republic all imitative poetry just because it is imitative. Even non-imitative poetry does not fare much better, for the exception in favour of 'hymns to the gods and praises of good men' is more apparent than real". The above quoted passage can hardly be regarded as a fair and unbiassed judgment on Plato's real position as regards poetry and art in general. Plato never intended to banish the poets from his republic. What he wanted was to put the clock back and revert from the amusement art of the Greek decadence to the magical art of the archaic period and the fifth century. Plato was no doubt, guilty of a serious confusion in identifying representative poetry with amusement poetry in so far as amusement art is only one kind of representative art, the other kind being magical art. Moreover, he never told us what poetry was in itself? This failure, on the part of Plato, to define what poetry was, does not absolve us totally from the reponsibility of presenting Plato's views faithfully and correctly and we can not be excused on that flimsy pretext from the charge of misinterpretation. Prof. Collingwood explains the cause of this general misinterpretation of Plato and his explanation seems to

[34] H. Kabir, in his Poetry Monadas and Society, p. 4.

us to be a correct diagnosis of the disease. He explains :[35] "The reason why modern readers have taken Plato's attack on representative amusement poetry for an attack on poetry as such is that their own minds are fogged by a theory—the current vulgar theory—identifying art as such with representation." Bringing this theory with them to Plato's text, they read into that text their own preconceived ideas and misunderstand Plato thoroughly inspite of all that Plato could do to prevent them.

[35] The Principles of Art, p. 50.

Chapter II

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle, taught in the Platonic school of thought, made some striking improvements on Plato. He could not fully transcend the Platonic categories and as such his theory of Art was largely influenced by his master. He accepted Plato's familiar distinction between representative and non-representative art.[1] He did not consider art to be essentially representative. Some kinds of music were representative to him but not all. Thus Aristotle followed Plato in the main, but not in every detail. With regard to poetry, Aristotle considered one of its kinds (viz. dithyramb) as representative which Plato had classified as non-representative, and another (epic) as wholly representative which Plato had classified as representative only in part. "Epic poetry and tragedy, as also comedy, Dithyrambic poetry and most flute-playing and lyre playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means or by difference in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations".[2] Aristitle agrees with Plato that drama is representative. And as the function of representative art is to arouse emotion, drama is essentially a means of arousing emotion. In the case of tragedy, this emotion is a combination of pity and fear. He further agreed with Plato and held that the emotions a dramatic performance arouses in the mind of the spectators, impede the due performance of every day activities. Aristotle deliberately took upon himself the task which Socrates had left in Republic 607D, to the 'Champions of Poetry', men who are not poets but lovers of poetry—the task of speaking on her behalf in prose and arguing that she is not only pleasant but wholesome for a city and for the life of men. 'She' here, as the context shows, is not poetry but poetry for pleasure's sake, i.e., a form of representative poetry (607C). Aristotle is claiming the place of such a chamption and offers the 'Poetics' as the "Prose speech" Socrates asked for. The 'Poetics' is therefore in no sense a 'Defence of Poetry'; it is a defence of poetry for pleasure's sake or Representative Poetry. It is significant that Aristotle's 'Poetics' contains no reference to lyric poetry.

[1] Vide Collingwood's principles of Art, p. 50.
[2] Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Trans. by Ingram Bywater), p. 23.

This silence may be due to the fact that since Plato had not questioned the value of such poetry, Aristotle did not deem it necessary to offer any special defence for it. That our assumption seems to be a likely explanation is suggested by the fact that lyric poetry would have given Aristotle invaluable aid in making out his central position as against Plato. But Aristotle does not refer to lyric poetry and instead, refers to music and architecture in modifying the Platonic conception of mimesis. 'Mimesis' for us, means representation or imitation, and it will be well to point out that we use the word 'Representation' here in the sense of 'imitation'. We do not find any justification in distinguishing between 'imitation' and 'Representation' as Prof. Collingwood does.[3] 'Imitation' does not necessarily imply that a work of art is imitative in virtue of its relation to another work of art which provides it with a model of artistic excellence. Any work of art may and does really imitate nature and even if it imitates, it may be of the supreme artistic value if properly executed by a true artist. And if we restrict the word 'imitation' to mere copying of art-models, the whole of 'Poetics', in that case, is to be recomposed and reinterpreted. Bernard Bosanquet paraphrases Aristotle's celebrated definition of tragedy, laid down in the 'Poetics' thus : "Tragedy is a representation (lit. imitation) of an action noble and complete in itself and of appreciable magnitude, in language of special fascination, using different kinds of utterance in the different parts, given through performers and not by means of narration and producing, by (the stimulation of) pity and fear, the alleviating discharge of emotions of that nature".[4] Here we find that Bosanquet uses both the words 'imitation' and 'representation' in the same sense and we think he is quite justified in doing so. In the works of modern art-critics and writers on aesthetics, we find that the distinction usually made between representation and imitation hardly serves any useful purpose, because it does not contribute towards a better understanding of the true nature of art. We therefore join issue here with Prof. Collingwood and his distinction between representation and imitation. It seems to us to be rather a case of distinction without any difference. Originality, in the sense of not having anything in common with anything in nature or previous artistic creations is absurd. There is a sense in which we may call any genuine work of art as original but originality in that sense does not mean total unlikeness to other works of art or objects of nature. The view that art proper is not representative does not

[3] See his book 'Outlines of a Philosophy of Art'.
[4] Vide History of Aesthetic, p. 64.

imply that art and representation are incompatible. A representation may be a work of art; but what makes it a representation is one thing and what makes it a work of art is another. So, in discussing Plato and Aristotle, we do not deem it necessary to draw a line between 'imitation' and 'representation' when they both imply virtually the same thing.

Aristotle's defence consists in the same line of attack, which Plato pursued. The defence admits all the facts alleged by the critic and reinterprets them so as to turn them to the credit of the view criticised. This is done in a convincing way. Aristotle carries the psychological analysis of the effect of amusement art on its audience one step further, beyond the point where Plato had left it. Tragedy, let us illustrate the point at issue, generates in the audience emotions of pity and fear. We sway between the emotions and for the time being lose ourselves in a trance of inactivity. A mind heavily laden with these emotions is thereby rendered unfit for practical life. So far Aristotle agrees with Plato. Plato, at this stage, however, abruptly concludes : 'therefore tragedy is detrimental to the practical life of its audience'. Aristotle proceeds further than Plato and on analysis finds that the emotions generated by tradedy are not allowed to remain burdening the mind of the audience. They are discharged in the experience of watching the tragedy. This emotional defection or 'purging', leaves the audience's mind, after the tragedy is over, not loaded with pity and fear but lightened of them. "This effect of tragedy is not only pleasurable but also beneficial. Tragedy, in Aristotle's view, is a sort of nervous specific which provides a 'Catharsis'—we might say 'a good clearance'—of emotions which might otherwise break out inconveniently. It saves us from psychical distress by providing an emotional outlet".[5] It helps us to restore our mental equilibrium and lends to the calm and placidity of mind, so useful in a world torn by strife and toil. The effect is thus the opposite of what Plato had supposed. In this connection we may note the observations of Prof. G. R. G. Mure.[6] He tells us that the purpose of tradegy is to excite pity and fear so as to afford a safe outlet for surplus emotion which it is dangerous to confine. Aristotle speaks of tragedy which he considered to be the most important form of poetry, as "by means of pity and fear accomplishing (the) purgation of such emotions." Aristotle's notion of tradegy is closely bound up with his 'Katharsis

[5] Aristotle's 'Art of Poetry', p. 15, by W. Hamilton Fufe.
[6] Vide His Book entitled 'Aristotle' p. 226.

theory' and from references in 'Politics' to the specially purgative effect upon excessive "enthusiasm" (mystic ecstacy) of certain musical performances and also from the obviously medical phraseology, we may infer that the purpose of tragedy is to excite pity and fear so as to provide for them a peaceful 'purgation' and leave the audience fresh and renovated. The suggestion is that this imaginative and in one sense secondary emotion which Plato had failed to distinguish from the emotion of 'real' life, tends, unlike the latter, to moderate real feeling and not to produce a habit of excessive reaction. The purgation is a purely pleasurable experience. That is why we enjoy even the most horrible scenes on the stage, the strangling of Desdemona or the murder of Duncan. That is why we enjoy the sorrowful plight of Hamlet, the prince of Denmark and the pitiable wailings of Cordelia. In our practical life, had we been faced with such situations we would have lent our helping hands to these unfortunate men and women of flesh and blood, at least we could have shed tears over their misfortune, with a real sense of sorrow. But in a dramatic performance we enjoy them and the artistic medium which the dramatist interposes makes this difference. Butcher, the noted annotator of Aristotle tells us : "Tragedy is a vent for the particular emotions of pity and fear and 'Katharsis' is physical stimulus which provides an outlet for religious fervour."[7] The emotional result is a 'harmless joy'. The spectators undergo a Katharsis of some kind and feel a pleasurable relief. The feelings of pity and fear in real life contain a morbid and disturbing element. In the process of tragic excitation, they find relief and the morbid element is thrown off. As the tragic action progresses, when the tumult of the mind, first roused, has afterwards subsided, the lower forms of emotion are found to have been transmuted into higher and more refined forms. The painful element in the pity and fear of reality is purged away ; the emotions themselves are purged. The function of tragedy, then, is not merely to provide an outlet for pity and fear but to provide for them a distinctively aesthetic satisfaction, to purify and clarify them by passing them through the medium of art. Aristotle's tragic Katharsis involves not only the idea of an emotional relief but the further idea of purgation of the emotions so relieved. Butcher further tells us that tragedy acts on the feelings and not on the will. It does not make man better but removes certain hindrances to virtue. The tragic Katharsis requires that suffering shall be exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects and the spectator himself be lifted above the special case and brought face

[7] Vide Poetry and Fine Arts, Ch. VI.

to face with universal law and the diverse plan of the world. The feelings excited must have their basis in the permanent and objective realities of life and be independent of individual caprice and sentiment. The above exposition of Aristotle's position is worth-commending. Some of the later commentators misinterpreted Aristotle and took the aim of dramatic art to be merely to excite pity and fear. M. V. Cousin[8] answers one such critic and poses the question : "If the aim of dramatic art were only to excite in the highest degree pity and terror, art would be the powerless rival of nature". True, had it been the case, art could not have surpassed nature in any way. All the misfortunes represented on the stage are very feeble and unimpressing in comparison with those sad spectacles which we may see every day. We can not but tacitly admit that the first hospital is fuller of pity and terror than all the theatres in the world. Subsequently Cousin brings in his notion of the 'beautiful' and poses it as the 'panacea for all ills'. The dramatic art, according to Cousin, adumbrates the eternal notion of the beautiful in a peculiar way of its own and thus he tries to offer a defence of Aristotle's notion of tragedy with the help of his notion of the beautiful. This is not very convincing. Cousin could have given a better defence of Aristotle's position, had he taken a leaf out of Butcher's. The aim of tragedy is certainly not to arouse in us the idea of the beautiful, as he wrongly supposes.

It will be interesting to note that Aristotle was not pioneer in using the word 'Katharsis' and probably it came from an Egyptian source. Gilbert Murray,[9] tells us that tragedy, according to Greek tradition, is originally the ritual play of Dionysus, performed at his festival and represents the 'sufferings' or 'passions' of that god. We are never directly told what these sufferings were which were so represented ; Herodotus, the great historian, remarks that he found in Egypt a ritual that was 'in almost all points the same.[10] This was the well-known ritual of Osiris, in which the god was torn to pieces, was much lamented and searched for and later discovered or recognised. And the mourning by a sudden 'Reversal' turned into joy. Gilbert Murray concludes :[11] 'I hope it is not rash to surmise that the much debated word 'Katharsis', 'purification' or 'purgation' may have come into Aristotle's mouth from the same source. It has all the appearance of

[8] Vide his 'Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good', p. 179.
[9] Vide Preface, 'Aristotle, on the Art of poetry'.
[10] Cf. Hdt. ii. 48 ; Cf. 42, 144 (quoted by G. Murray).
[11] Preface, 'Aristotle, on the Art of poetry', p. 15.

being an old word which is accepted and reinterpreted by Aristotle rather than a word freely chosen by him to denote the exact phenomenon he wishes to describe." We learn from the accunt left by Herodotus, that the Dionysus ritual itself was a katharmos or katharsis—a purification of the community from the taints and poisons of the year that is past, the old contagion of sin and death. Thus it will not be an extravagant hypothesis if we conclude that the notion of katharsis was accepted and reinterpreted by Aristotle.

"Aristotle attempted to justify poetry against Plato's attack but his thought could not fully transcend the Platonic categories." A modern critic,[12] makes the above allegation against Aristotle, and we think he is justified in part, if not fully. Like Plato, Aristotle also thought of art as a craft and shared with his master the belief that poetry must be judged by the results it yields. But in the estimation of results, Aristotle gave proofs of a better understanding of the nature of poetry. As has already been pointed out, Plato thought of tragedy as detrimental to the practical life of men and women as it generates in them the emotions of pity and fear and incapacitates them in the proper discharge of their daily duties. Aristotle read the situation correctly and opined that tragedy, the highest form of poetry, makes us better suited to face the problems of life for it 'exercised and discharged these emotions in the experience of watching it.' Both Plato and Aristotle agreed in holding that the function of the poet is to generate socially valuable emotions i.e. emotions which render some amount of service to society as a whole. They only differed in their judgment as to what actually the poet achieves. For Plato, the problem was not a critical estimate of art, or a true analysis of the nature of poetry. For him, the problem was the decadence of the Greek world : its symptoms, its causes and its possible remedies. The great philosopher wanted to save Greece from the intellectual and moral bankruptcy that was hanging over her head like the sword of Damocles. The amusement art that was largely in vogue in the Greece of his time was looked upon by him with disfavour and the supersession of the old magico-religious art was highly condemned by him. He regarded the supersession of the magico-religious art and the introduction of the new amusement art in its place as one of the many symptoms of the Greek decadence. He fought single handed against this impending peril and in his earnest desire to do good to the Greek people as a whole, he could not always do pustice to poetry and art.

[12] H, Kabir, in his book, 'Poetry, Monads, and Society' p. 60.

But his discussion of poetry is rooted in a lively sense of realities. He knew the difference between the two arts—"the kind of difference that there is between the Olympia pediments and Praxiteles"[13]—and he tried to analyse it. But he could not analyse it perfectly as his diagnosis of the case was misleading. He wanted to banish the new art from his 'Republic' and it was all his practical bias and not a carefully considered judgment that accounts for this attitude of his. He thought that the new art of the decadence is the art of an over excited, over-emotionalized world; "But it is really the exact opposite. It is really the 'art' of an emotionally defecated world, a world whose inhabitants feel it flat and stale",[14] as Prof. Collingwood says. The new art of Greece showed which way the wind blew. Greece of the time of Plato was completely bankrupt emotionally and was totally dull and dreary. That is why they indulged in the amusement arts, which Plato so strongly condemned. The new art was the art of a waste land, of a pepole bled white of their emotional ardour. Aristotle was a man of the next decade and with another generation's experience to instruct him, corrected Plato on the facts. He had no mission to save a people from the impending catastrophe and he lost Plato's sense of their significance. He no longer feels what Plato had felt, standing on the threshold of Greece's decay. The greatness of the fifth century gave Aristotle some thing else than what the decadence of the fourth century gave to Plato. Aristotle, a native of the new Hellenistic world, saw no gloom overhanging it. He saw things in a better perspective. That is why he could give evidence of a better understanding of the nature of poetry and fine art.

But the theory of Katharsis does not carry much weight with modern critics, because it was prompted by some utilitarian motive. The 'Katharsis' theory, as advocated by Aristotle, is perhaps the subtlest form which the utilitarian theory of art has achieved. With the renovation in the conception of the aims and objects of fine arts, the utilitarian theory has lost much of its importance and consequently the 'Katharsis' theory has lost much of its ancient glamour. Moreover, Mr. Kabir alleges,[15] what exactly Aristotle meant by Katharsis we can never know. He never explains it fully and result is that one may read into it any meaning one likes. Gilbert Murray[16] accounts for such confusion and variety of interpretations of the same theory

[13] See R. G. Collingwood's 'The Principles of Art'. p. 52.
[14] Vide R. G. Collingwood's 'The Principles of Art'. p. 52.
[15] Poetry, Monads & Society, p. 62.
[16] Preface, 'Aristotle, on the Art of Poetry'. p. 4.

in Aristotle's 'Poetics'. He tells us that, for one thing, the treatise is fragmentary. It originally consisted of two books, one dealing with tragedy and epic, the other with comedy and other subjects. We possess only the first and it seems to be unrevised and unfinished." It is in the nature of a manuscript of an experienced lecturer, full of jottings and adscripts, with occasional phrases written carefully but never revised as a whole for the general reader. Another difficulty in the way of understanding 'Poetics' and all such great works of ancient Greek literature is that of proper translation. Where words can be translated into equivalent words, the style and meaning of an original can be closely folowed ; but no translation, asserts Murray, which aims at being written in normal English can reproduce the style of Aristotle and make clear what Aristotle originally meant. In the light of observations made by Gilbert Murray,[17] we think that Mr. Kabir[18] is somewhat justified when he alleges, 'what exactly Aristotle meant by Katharsis we can never know'. However, we will do well if we consider some of these interpretations and that for two reasons. Apart from the intrinsic interest of some of these interpretations, such consideration helps us to realise that the function of art can not be explained by analogy with craft. The rejection of a utilitarian interpretation of Katharsis will also throw more light on the nature of mimesis and thus help us to understand the nature of art itself. As we have already pointed out, most of the interpreters of Aristotle hold that the emotions evoked are worked out or purged in the experience of the tragedy itself. The mind of the audience is left, after the tragedy is over, not burdened with terror and pity but lightened of them. Just as a purgative concentrates and drives out of the body its undesirable products, tragic poetry effects the purgation of pity and fear by administering these very emotions. Aristotle, to substantiate his arguments, tells us of ecstatic music curing persons already possessed of ecstacy. But the analogy does not help him for there is no real analogy between such cure and the 'Katharsis' of tragedy. In the case of ecstatic music, the ecstacy was already there. Following the law of two negatives negating each other, (*Similia Similibus Curantur*) we could get a calm and peaceful state of mind in the case of ecstatic music cited by Aristotle but in the case of tragedy we do not get an audience already possessed of pity and fear. Had it been so, Aristotle's analogy might have been acceptable to us. Tragedy, to be curative, must first produce the disease it is meant to cure, for spectators do not

[17] Vide his book entitled "Aristotle on the Art of Poetry".
[18] Vide his book entitled "Poetry Monads & Society".

go into the theatre already possessed of fear, anxiety and grief. Moreover, the Katharsis theory cannot explain the fact that the audience not only goes away feeling the better for the experience but enjoys it and to such an extent that it repeats such experience time after time. It is argued[19] on behalf of Aristotle that the analogy of medicine, in this case, is in the nature of an inoculation to achieve immunity from disease. By arousing in us emotions of pity and fear, which in real life might be unpleasantly and perhaps dangerously disturbing, tragedy prepares us to meet such situations with proper responses. But, this argument cannot account for the fact that we enjoy the dramatic representation and we cannot possibly conceive, barring a few abnormals, who enjoy incoulation as common people enjoy a tragic scene in Shakespeare's 'King Lear'. So we find that whatever Katharsis may mean, inoculation or homeopathic purgation, it cannot account for our enjoyment of art. No modern critic, in defence of Aristotle's theory of Katharsis can possibly explain away this element of enjoyment in art. Prof. Maitra tells[20] us that this element of enjoyment is primary in all true arts. It is not logically tenable to deny art all knowledge-element altogether but such intellectual element occupies a secondary place in it. It should be admitted by all art-critics and artists as well that this knowledge-element in art is a mere handmaid of creation and enjoyment. So we find that the element of enjoyment in art cannot be easily shelved or explained away when there are good reasons to believe that the essence of art is primarily a form of joy. We agree with Dr. Maitra that intuition or expression is the essence of art; artistic creations are accompanied by an element of joy, though according to some, it is not its ultimate significance. Finally, we can legitimately disbelieve when we are asked to believe that the emotions evoked by tragedy are completely discharged in the experience, for experience itself tells otherwise. It is common knowledge that poetry affects a permanent refinement of the sentiments and increases both the range and acuteness of our responses.

Aristotle regarded tragedy as Kathartic not only for the poet but also for the spectators. That is why we hesitate to suggest the assimilation of Katharsis to Freud's therapy by abreaction. The poetic cons-

[19] Vide 'Poetry, Monads & Society' by H. Kabir.

[20] Dr. S. K. Maitra. Vide his article entitled "Darśaner Swarūp" (published in Darśan Kartik—Magh) 1355.

চারুশিল্প হইতেছে মূলতঃ সৃষ্টি ও ভোগাত্মক অনুভূতি। ইহাতে জ্ঞানের কোন স্থান নাই তাহা বলা অসঙ্গত হইলেও ইহাতে যে জ্ঞানের স্থান আছে তাহা হইতেছে গৌণ—সৃষ্টি ও উপভোগের সহকারীরূপে. মুখ্যতঃ নহে, ইহা অবশ্যই স্বীকার্য্য।

truct, as we learn from Freud's empirical discoveries, cannot represent an abreactive therapy even for the poet. For the sake of agrument if we admit that the poetic phantasy did have abreactive effect on the poet, it is not likely that it should have a similar effect on every spectator. It is not at all convincing, and we cannot believe the fact that all the members of the audience should have the same complex and the same associations as the poet. Empirical tests show that no two neurotics have exactly the same complex while analysis shows that the associations behind the complex are generally highly personal. So we find that it will not do to assimilate Katharsis to Freud's therapy by abreaction. Caudwell has rightly pointed out that the assimilation of Aristotle's Katharsis to Freud's therapy by abreaction is an overrefinement of Aristotle as well as a misunderstanding of what therapy by abreaction actually is. To quote Caudwell :[21] "Poetic creations like other phantasies, may be the vehicle of neurotic conflicts or complexes. But phantasy is the cloak whereby the 'Censor' hides the unconscious complex. So, far from this process being Kathartic it is the opposite, according to Freud's own principles. To cure the basic complex by abreaction, the phantasy must be stripped of its disguise and the infantile and archaic karnel laid bare". So we find that in Caudwell's opinion, abreactive therapy is the opposite of Aristotle's Katharsis and their identification can only be the result of confusion.

It is sometimes suggested that the 'Katharsis' of Aristotle is very similar to the sublimation of modern psychoanalysis. We donot think that they come from the same stock though they are of kindred nature. In both we find a temporary and partial resolution of the conflict between man's instincts and his environment. In both of them fellings attached to these instincts are diverted from their immediate practical objecives. Thus far they are similar. Let us now note their dissimilarity. In Katharsis, this diversion takes place without any deliberate or conscious planning on the part of the agent. In sublimation it need not be necessarily unconscious. There is an element of escapism in sublimation. It is an adaptation of instinct to environment. But in such adaptation, the nature of the instinct does not remain intact. It is either disguised or distorted. Further, the feeling accompanying the instinct is switched to some new objective and is not self-contained. Whereas, in the Katharsis of art, there is hardly any escapism. The contradiction between the instinct and the environment is solved in sublimation by switching off the emotions into some new channel, and

[21] Caudwell's Illusion & Reality, p. 48 ff.

in Katharsis it is achieved by insulating the emotions from all contact with the environment itself. In Katharsis the emotion becomes its own objective and neither requires nor permits any distortion. In sublimation, there may be an element of chance but the perfect interrelation of elements in art is the result of a creative effort. Sublimation may be noble and unselfish, but Katharsis in art is always disinterested. This conception of Katharsis also explains why even the ugly and the imperfect can be the object of art.

Now we turn to the Aristotelian doctrine of 'mimesis', which is perhaps the subtlest form which the utilitarian theory of art has assumed. His theory, though an improvement on Plato, could not go beyond the 'Platonic Categories' as he was still suffering from the preconceived notions imbibed from Plato. Like Plato, he also thought that art and poetry should be justified by results that have some bearing on our practical life and in his 'Poetics' defines 'imitation' in a way that makes poetry serve some practical purpose. Babbitt, tells us : "Imitation is the pivotal word of the 'Poetics'." For Aristotle poetry not only imitates, but it imitates human actions and not at random, but with reference to a definite plan or purpose : the poet is to turn away from himself and his own emotions and work like the painter with his eye on the object.[22] Aristotle wanted that the poet should be intensely objective but at the same time he tells us that the artist should imitate things not as they are but as they ought to be. He speaks of an ideal imitation and expects of the artist a selected truth, raised above all that is local and accidental, purged of all that is abnormal and eccentric, so as to be in the highest sense representative. The artist, writes Fyfe,[23] holds a mirror up to nature. But this mirror is not an ordinary mirror. Neither does it exactly reproduce nor does it distort the objects which confront it ; indeed its function is the exact opposite of distortion ; according to Aristotle, it presents a picture in which the confused and therefore unintelligible facts of life are reduced to coherence. It transforms a blur into a picture. And in order to perform this miracle of giving form to chaos, the dramatist's first business is to make his story one coherent whole. He must not cut a slice at random from real life ; he must select incidents to illustrate his own conception. Ibsen, speaking of "Ghosts" in one of his letters, says, "My object was to make the reader feel that he was going through a piece of real experience". It is his selection

[22] The New Laokoon, p. 9.
[23] W. Hamilton Fyfe : Aristotle's Art of Poetry, p. xxii.

and the consequent effect of inevitable sequence which achieves this. Experience presents life as an irrational tangle of incidents. The artist's mirror makes sense of the tangle and represents life with a pattern distinct in the threads. There is unity in it, the need of which has been so much stressed by Aristotle. A story that 'has unity' will tell us what must happen or at any rate what probably would happen. The 'imaginative' imitation of the artist presents to us not the confused and confusing details but the governing principles of human life; he gives us, in Aristotle's language, not the 'particular' but the 'universal' and the pupils who attended Aristotle's lectures on Poetry would be expected to remember how he had said, speaking on quite different subject, that 'the value of a universal is that it reveals causal connexion.' So we see that to 'have unity' the story in a drama must be 'universal' and to this end the incidents must be so selected that they seem to be bound in a strict sequence of cause and effect. It is selection that gives to art its own reality, and that is why Aristotle says that poetic drama is something more philosophic or scientific than an accurate calendar of events. It reveals the permanent and universal characteristics of human nature. Art is not concerned with what is accidental and in this respect Aristotle and Hegel agree to some extent.[24]

Thus artists should improve upon nature and in their artistic creations nature should be represented in a greater glory. Nature, as Dante thought of her, is like a great workman, whose hand trembles and the artist, worth the name, should try to realise this deeper purpose which Nature suggests but does not actually fulfil. This ideal imitation, which is the keynote to Aristotle's 'Poetics' is certainly an improvement on Plato's theory of 'Imitation'. Aristotle thought that the general origin of poetry was due to two causes, each of them being a

[24] It is worthnoting here that Aristotle's theory in this respect is only a reconstruction of Plato's theory of mimesis and its significance. Plato, as we have noted, condemned not all art but only such as merely reproduced or represented nature. In Plato's view, such art is two removes separated from the ideal reality which nature only imperfectly imitates. The function, therefore, of true art as distinguished from the merely representative, will be according to the inner spirit of Plato's theory, to go beyond nature so as to bring out the ideal reality underlying it. This is what Aristotle virtually says when he insists on art representing not the particular facts as they present themselves without order in experience but the universals which underlie such facts and make them into a significant and meaningful system or whole.

part of human nature. He tells us:[25] "Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this that he is the most imitative creature in the world and learn at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation." The truth of this second point can easily be appreciated if we make a thorough analysis of experience when we enjoy a work of art. The objects of artistic representation might be very painful in actual life but in artistic representation that 'painful' of real life turns into a source of pleasure and joy. Thus a tragedy, when enacted on the stage, not only evokes pity and fear but at the same time we enjoy the tragic happenings. Imitation, Aristotle further tells us, being natural to men and women, as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, it was through their original aptitude, and a series of improvements, that they created poetry out of their improvisations. But Aristotle, as has already been pointed out, does not tell us to imitate nature. He repeatedly told us that metre, in which the musical throb of emotion is most distinctly felt, is not of the essence of poetry : its essence is rather in imitation—not of the ordinary facts of life, but of those facts selected and arranged, as Aristotle would say, in what one is tempted to call his own special jargon, "according to probability or necessity."

Tragedy, the highest form of poetry, is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is "a certain kind of activity, not a quality." Character, in Aristotelian sense, gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or otherwise. In a play accordirgly they do not act in order to portray the characters; they include the characters for the sake of the action. So that, concludes Aristotle, it is the action in it i.e. its fable or plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Aristotle further points out that the truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. This need for unity in the work of art was felt by Aristotle and he advocated it in unambiguous terms. Gilbert Murray in expounding the position of Aristole observes :[26] "But it is characteristic of the classical views that Aristotle lays his

[25] 'Aristotle on the Art of Poetry', pp. 28-29.
[26] 'Aristotle on the Art of Poetry', Preface, p. 19.

greatest stress first on the need for unity in the work of art, the need that each part should subserve the whole, while irrelevancies, however, brilliant in themselves should be cast away". Thus the unity in any work of art, to be true to the Aristotalian tradition, should be preserved by imitating one complete action, with its several incidents well-knit and closely connected. An action which can be imitated in any work of art must be complete in itself, "as a whole of some magnitude." Aristotle laid so much emphasis on 'imitation' that later thinkers like Abbe Batteux took imitation in the sense of literal representation to be the essence of art. Even lyrical poetry, of which Aristotle is significantly silent, was not spared. Lyrical poetry certainly does not conform to the Horatian simile '*ut picture poesis*' i.e. as is painting, so is poetry. The subjective element in lyrical poem cannot be explained away. But Batteux totally ignores all such subjective contribution towards the making of poetry and proceeds to prove somehow that "lyrical poetry is only imitation after all." He concludes: "And so whether poetry sings the emotions of the heart or acts or narrates, or sets either gods or men to speaking, it is always a portrait of general nature (*la belle nature*), an artifical image, a picture, the one and only merit of which consists in right selection, arrangement, true likeness: ut picture poesis."[27]

The Horatian simile might be construed and interpreted in a different way. Instead of tying down lyrical poetry to painting we can pull up painting to the level of lyrical poetry and that is done in almost all the famous paintings. In that case we will have to say: As is poetry, so is painting. 'The lyricita' of Croce does not copy the object. A work of art can at the most be an 'emotional representation (as designated by Collingwood) of nature. If the aim of art were only to copy the outer world, the things as they are, in that case poetry and history would have become identical. But Aristotle definitely tells us :[28] "The poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary." The distinction between the historian and the poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—we might put the work of Herodotus into verse and it would still, asserts Aristotle, be a species of history. The distinction really consists in this that the one describes the thing that has been and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence, in the estimation of

[27] Vide his 'Beaux—Arts reduits a Un meme principe.'
[28] Vide Poetic. p. 9.

Aristotle, poetry is more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. History which relates what has actually happened has neither beginning nor end. We can never possibly exhaust all the antecedents or consequents of any single event. Hence an element of irrationality or chance must remain in our historical representation of facts. It is this element Aristotle has in mind when he talks of poetry as a nobler and more philosophical thing than history. Following Aristotle in the main a noted modern philosopher writes :[29] "Though there may be room for the play of imaginative reconstruction in historical narratives, yet the imagination which is admissible in historical narration is the one that follows in the wake of the particulars of experience. In history, there is no room for a consistency or coherence that is achieved through an abstract universal, functioning independently of its particularised instances in experience. And for this very reason while history must be distinguished, on the one hand, from art as being a purely receptive or passive form of cognition incompatible with creation, it must also on the other hand, as aiming at a particularised synthesis of empirical facts through the given particulars of experience, be distinguished from philosophy which aims at consistency or synthesis through universals. The aim of history is the discovery of those particular temporal and other relations which hold between the particular facts of experience which function as real in unalterable temporal relations". So we find that both history and art deal with the 'particular'. But what Aristotle's account ignores is the element of creation in art. If art imitates not the fact as it is but an idea or ideal suggested or merely hinted at by the fact, it does not express it as mere abstract ideal or idea but gives it concrete expression in a particular image i.e. in the words of Shakespeare, 'a local habitation and a name'. From the foregoing observations it is clear that Aristotle recognised the ideal in art, which is quite foreign to Plato. "Yet when we observe", observes Bosanquet,[30] 'that this principle is introduced as an inference

[29] Prof. S. K. Maitra. Vide 'Darśaner Swarūp' [Darśan, Kartick-magh 1355] ইতিহাসে কল্পনার স্থান থাকিলেও দৃষ্ট বিশেষানুগমনরূপ যে কল্পনা কেবল সেই কল্পনাই ইতিহাসের উপযোগী। যাহা বিশেষ পরিহার করিয়া কেবল সামান্যরূপে সমন্বয়ের উপযোগী তাহার স্থান ইতিহাসে নাই। এবং এই কারণেই ইতিহাস একপক্ষে যেমন সৃষ্টি অনুপযোগী জ্ঞানাত্মক বোধ-হিসাবে চারুশিল্প হইতে পৃথক বা ভিন্ন বলিয়া গৃহীত হইবার যোগ্য, সেইরূপ অপরপক্ষে বিশেষ বিষয়ক বিশেষাত্মক বিরোধ সমাধানরূপে ইহা দর্শনাদি হইতেও ভিন্নরূপে গ্রহণযোগ্য। যাহা যাহা বিশেষরূপে সত্তাবান হইয়া অপরিবর্ত্তনীয় নির্দ্দিষ্টকালিক সম্বন্ধে অবস্থিত তাহাদেরই পরস্পর যে বিশেষকালিক ও অপরাপর সম্বন্ধ তাহাই আবিষ্কার করা হইতেছে ইতিহাসের লক্ষ্য। [পৃঃ ৪]

[30] Vide History of Aesthetic. p. 59.

from the postulate of unity in the plot or action of a drama, that this single and self-complete action is more or less contrasted with the portrayal of human individuality and that the 'scientific' element of poetry lies in its typical generality, we are obliged to doubt whether the idealisation thus acknowledged is more akin to the formal limitations or to the positive greatness of Greek drama.' If Aristotle, in order to stand by his commitment that "poetry is more philosophical (or scientific) and more serious than history"[31] really preferred the enfeebled later comedy of types and manners to the pregnant Aristophanic comedy of humour and portrait satire",[32] his ideas are far less kindred to ours than his language. If his utterances are not meant for misleading the reader, we may safely hold, following Butcher, Ingram Bywater and others that the principle was enunciated by Aristotle only to mean that representation or imitation is not to be wholly fettered by given reality. Poetry does not imitate life; it imitates conceptions of life. 'Imitation' does not stand as a link between the work of art and the outer nature. Abercrombie rightly points out that the 'connection effected by imitation is not between poetry and the world without, but falls wholly within the being of poetry."[33] 'Mimesis' is thus seen to be not a mimicry of life, as conceived by Plato and others, but an expression of the imagination. The poet's mind seizes a feeling tone of experience and enjoys it for its own sake. This imaginative enjoyment is expressed in art. In actual life, any object of which we are conscious calls into action a set of instinctive reactions and sometimes we are not conscious of our reactions before they actually occur. These reactions are always accompanied by suitable emotions. Without our conscious interference the sight of a mad dog produces in us the emotion of fear and a tendency to run away. But in imaginative life the conative part of our reaction to sensation is left out. The result is that the emotional and perceptual aspects of the experience are apprehended much more clearly than in normal practical life. In imaginative life, to quote Roger Fry[34] we become "true spectators, not selecting, what we will see, but seeing everything equally and thereby we come to notice a number of appearances and relation of appearances, which would have escaped our notice before, owing to that perpetual economising by selection of what impressions we will assimilate, which in life we per-

[31] Poetic, 9, 3.
[32] See Poetic, 5, 3 with reference to Crates.
[33] Abercrombie's 'Principles of Literary Criticism', p. 86.
[34] Vision and Design. p. 20.

form by unconscious processes." It is this vision of the whole, that art seeks to express. That is why Aristotle emphasised so much the need for the element of unity in the work of art. The unity of vision leads to the unity of artistic creation. It is true that Aristotle gave us an elastic explanation of the idea of imitation and we were given to read a new meaning in it. But he did not reject it in favour of the idea of symbolism. Given reality was still for him, as for his master, the standard by which he judged any work of art but he saw that it must be idealised. This is a position fairly in accordance with the apparent actual process of artistic creation but ultimately it is inconsistent with itself. For, if given reality is the standard, what is to indicate the direction in which it is to be idealised? The true answer, "a deeper reality" is excluded ex hypothesi so long as given reality is the standard. Thus the immense possibility of symbolism as a theory of art could not reveal itself to Aristotle, far less to Plato. Aristotle could realise that art is corrective of nature but could not fully realise that it could also symbolise the spirit instead of imitating the matter.

But the utilitarian heresy of social service that art is expected to perform is not compatible with the explanation that we have offered for the Aristotelian doctrines of katharsis and mimesis. In our explanation, freedom and disinterestedness are the essence of art. Mimesis thus explained expresses our imaginative vision, the experience of an event complete in itself and undistorted by the demands of conformity to practical needs. In the 'mimesis of art' every element is in a focus of relationship with everything else in it. That is why in art we get, says Abercrombie,[35] "not merely a flashing accidental moment of unified experience, but a prolonged continuous series of moments securely and infallibly organising their own perfect system of inter-relationship and thereby manifesting the only significance which is absolutely necessary to our minds—the revelation of law and order in things." The analogy of Mimesis as explained above with children's play is also evident. Children never copy in their play what they exactly see but they express the mental images that constitute their own imaginative life. Similar is the case with a true artist. Katharsis is seen to be a counterpart to mimesis—the enjoyment of experience for its own sake and uninfluenced by the necessity of any responsive action. Mimesis provides us with vivid imagination of significant experience and katharsis is our ability to withhold

[35] Abercrombie's 'Principles of Literary Criticism', p. 56.

the act at the height of energy and enjoy experience for its own sake. It is, however, difficult to hold that this was Aristotle's intention for, in the end, he justifies poetry by social utility. The legacy of his master was there to influence him. Like Plato, he too judges poetry by the effect of the emotions aroused by art in the purposes of actual life. Tolstoy regarded the utilitarian value of poetry to be significantly important and his position may be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of the Platonic and Aristotelian notions of poetry as serving social ends. Tolstoy is the modern disciple of the ancient Greek masters and he tries to judge art by its moral efficacy and social utility. As a result, he had to condemn the creations of Michael Angelo, Raphael and Titian and most of Beethoven, and all his own writings, previously written, as bad or false art. In the end however, Tolstoy admitted that examples of morally desirable and therefore good art are to be found for the most part among works of inferior quality. This tantamounts to the admission that art must be judged by a criterion other than that of moral utility. But this truth, they could not see clearly on account of their utilitarian bias. Aristotle, unlike Plato, ascertained the place of the 'ideal' in the realm of art and his theory of ideal imitation could easily produce a modern theory of expression as propounded by Croce, and Carritt. If we explain his 'ideal imitation' as emotional representation of nature, we could easily explain art as the successful objectification of subjective feelings, without having any reference to social service. In many respects, Aristotle comes very near the modern thinkers like, Croce and Gentile. But his bias for social service did not allow him to present to the reader a theory of art, modern in every way. Aristotle overlooked the fact that art should not be guided by any other motive than the creation of true art. An artist is only to express, for the true nature of art is the objectificaion of subjective feelings in individual images. The imaginative life of the artist reveals itself in the works of art. And if we try to read the alphabets of social value in any specimen of true art, we will import something foreign and alien to the domain of fine art. This truth could not reveal itself to Aristotle as he was under the influence of Plato. It did not strike him that he should challenge the fundamentals of the Platonic conception of art. He thought in his master's way and that is why modern thinkers allege that he could not wholly transcend the Platonic categories, though he made some striking improvements on Plato.

Chapter III

KANT

While the names of Plato and Aristotle stand out as the most eminent art critics of ancient Greece, the name of Kant occupies a no less eminent place in modern speculations on the nature of art. In this new world we find the old values are fast changing. The The metaphysical criticism of fine art which treated it as an inferior representation of common reality has been replaced by a view which ranks it as the superior co-ordinate of natural products, both having beauty only as freely symbolic or expressive of supra-sensuous meaning. Imitation gives place to symbolism ; and even if art is held to be in one sense bound by external reality, it is understood that in as far as it deals with mere form or with imaginative ideas it has the advantage over nature rather than otherwise. The metaphysical criticism of the Platonic type is replaced by theories of the metaphysical import of beauty. The confusion between aesthetic and practical interest and consequent moralistic criticism of art no longer baffles a student of aesthetic. With the frank acceptance of what Plato treated as its inferiority viz., the restriction to imaginative form or semblance, it is now opposed alike to sensuous solicitation and to definitely conceived purpose, and the beautiful is finally freed from the suspicion of sensuality and from the claims of moral proselytism. In Kant, we find,[1] a faint trace of moralism in as far as the permanent value of the beautiful is referred by him exclusively to its representation of moral ideas and the moral order in consequence of the subjectivism which hinders him from plainly asserting the existence of any more general system which might express itself not only through morality in the world of conduct, but otherwise, in other spheres. In pointing however, to a supra-sensuous unity common to the world of nature and of freedom, he really transcends this false subordination ; and we might say that beauty is for him a symbol of morality only because and in as far as he understands morality to symbolise the noumenal reality of which the sensuous order is an appearance. The formal principle of unity in variety, in a work of art, so much stressed by Aristotle, is transformed into the principle of expressiveness, characterisation, and significance. In this new epoch,

[1] cf. Bosanquet's observation on Kant (History of Aesthetic, p. 283).

somewhat free from the Hellenic influence, we can notice a positive or concrete structure of aesthetic science in the making. "The outlines are firmly traced and the materials are lying about in heaps, but the building is hardly begun." The idea of beauty is still, to borrow the expression of Bosanquet, a concrete conceived in the abstract, a meeting point of polar extremes, not yet exhibited in the kinds and phases determined by their varying relations.[2]

Prof. Caird's curt dismissal of all Kant's remark on aesthetics as having 'nothing that is worthy of special mention' though sweeping and unjust, reflects the general opinion. This unfavourable reception seems partly due to the fact that Kant himself says in a note that his division of the fine arts 'is not put forward as a deliberate theory but is only one of various attempts that can and ought to be made' and partly to the analogy which, according to his usual practice, he employs as a guiding principle and which seems in some respects fanciful. The analogy adopted by Kant results in a division of the fine arts into three classes (i) the arts of speech; (ii) the formative arts or those for the expression of ideas in sensuous intuition; (iii) the arts of the beautiful play of sensations (as external sense impressions). There are people who regard this classification to be justified. "The justification for framing a division of the fine arts" writes Meredith,[3] generally on the basis of an analogy to the modes of expression adopted in speaking and the precise significance of that analogy, are apparent from a consideration of the justification in the case when the analogy seems most far-fetched viz. that in which formative art is brought under a common head with gesture in speaking. For through the outward forms of which this art avails itself "the soul of the artist furnishes a bodily expression for the substance and character of his thought, and makes the thing itself speaking, as it were, in mimic language."[4] In his third critique[5] Kant stresses the distinction that in the case of fine art the 'idea' 'must be excited through the medium of a concept of the object whereas in beautiful nature the bare reflection upon a given intuition, apart from any concept or what the object is intended to be, is sufficient for awakening and communicating the idea of which that object is regarded as the expression.' All Kant's observations on the particular arts

[2] Vide History of Aesthetics (Bosanquet). p. 283.
[3] See 'Critique of Judgment'—Preface.
[4] Preface, p. CXXVIII. Kant's Critique of Judgment (Meredith edn)
[5] The Critique of Judgment.

turn on the extent to which the concept of the product affords room for the expression of aesthetic finality. If this had been more clearly perceived, Kant's treatment would propably have been better appreciated.

In the critique of judgment Kant is faced with the problem of reconciling 'to be' (Sein) and 'ought to be' (Sollen), nature and freedom, which Kant considered to be antithetical in his previous critiques. Kant overlooked the fact that the order of nature, which seems to shut us in, is no foreign necessity to which we are subjected. It is our own understanding that prescribes the law of necessary connection for its objects, as it is our own sensibility that supplies the forms of time and space under which they appear to us. In so far, therefore, as the general framework or systematic form of the whole goes, it is we who make the nature in which we seem to lose the freedom of our spiritual life or independent self-determining energy. And as it is just this general systematic form in which lies the necessity from which we are shrinking, it may be said in strict truth that we are afraid of our own shadow--of what which the unconscious working of our own minds has created. 'Things in themselves' are really phenomena—things which exist only for us and which exist, even for us, only by the activity of our own thought. It is true, indeed, that we too form, in one point of view, a part of this phenomenal world; we are present to ourselves as objects existing, like other objects, in space and time, and going through changes which are determined according to necessary laws. But this phenomenal presence to ourselves is not our whole being. I am not merely one object among many other objects in the world of which I am conscious; I am the conscious self without which there would be no world of objects at all. A conscious being not only has a place among objects, but it is the subject for which they exist. It is the principle in relation to which such conditioned things exist. It is not in time and space at all, for these are but the forms of its perceptions—forms which cling to its objects as objects but cannot be applied to it as the subject for which these objects exist. The source of the categories—the principles of necessary connection in experience—cannot be brought under the categories. Now the question arises, 'Is the subject a mere unity to which knowledge is referred?' Is it exempted from all the determinations of objects and is void of all determination of its own? Can we say only that it is free in the negative sense, that that necessity of relation which belongs to phenomena, as such, cannot be predicated of it, seeing it determines other things, but not itself? Or can we go

on to show that it is free in the positive sense, that it determines itself and can we follow it in this self-determination and trace out the forms in which it manifests its freedom. The answer, Kant holds, is given by the moral consciousness, which is a consciousness of ourselves as universal subjects and not as particular objects. This is shown by the fact that conscience ignores all external determination. It is the consciousness of a law which takes no account of the circumstances of the phenomenal self or of the necessary conditions under which its changes take place. In thinking of ourselves as under this law, we necessarily regard ourselves as free—as the authors and the sole authors, of our actions. This law is a "Categorical imperative" that listens to no excuses but with its "Thou oughtest, therefore thou canst" absolutely throws upon ourselves the responsibility of our own deeds. Such a law we might be disposed to treat as an illusion because of its direct contradiction to our empirical consciousness of ourselves, if we had no other consciousness of ourselves; "but our previous examination," writes Caird,[6] of the empirical consciousness has already obliged us to refuse to apply to the subject the knowledge which we have ourselves as objects of experience". The necessity of nature is, thus taken out of the way by the proof that the knowing self is not a natural phenomenon and the moral consciousness finds nothing to resist its absolute claim to belief and obedience. The "primacy of practical reason" is thus established and a place is found for the freedom of the spirit, without any doubt being cast upon the necessity of the nature. The primacy of practical reason involves that the necessity of nature is somehow harmonised with the law of freedom, however little it may be possible for us to comprehend this harmony. Hence the phenomenal self—the subject of feeling and desire—must conform itself to the real or noumenal self; and the pure self-determination of the latter must determine also the whole nature of the former. But we are not able to represent this to ourselves except as a gradual process of transformation of our sensuous nature by our freedom—a process of transformation which, because of the essential difference of the two, can never be completed; and thus the moral law postulates the immortality of man as a subject who is at once natural and moral. Kant finds a way reconstructing the spiritual, without prejudice to the natural world. For if, on the one hand, the world of nature is treated as phenomenal, while the world of spirit is regarded as the real and the only real world; yet, on the other hand, the phenomenal world is recognised as the only world

[6] See Hegel—by Edward Caird. p. 119. For a detailed study.

of knowledge, while the real world is said to be present to us merely in faith. Now Faith is essentially a subjective consciousness, which cannot be made objective. Without following Kant any further, it is possible now to point out that reality as known is phenomenal or essentially related to consciousness. Kant does not carry the demonstration to its furthest logical limit and retains the idea of a "thing-in-itself" out of relation to thought. Thus there creeps into the system an absolutely irreconcilable dualism, which Kant attempts to heal in his Critique of Judgment. Sense and understanding, necessity and freedom, the phenomenal and the real self, nature and spirit, knowledge and faith, are pairs of opposites which he can never either separate or reconcile. He cannot separate them, for his whole philosophy starts from the proof that nature is phenomenal and must be referred to that which is not itself natural; and, on the other hand, he necessarily conceives the noumenal—that which is set up against the phenomenal—as the absolutely real and as determining and in a sense including in itself the phenomenal. Thus Kant tries to effect a compromise between the necessity of nature and the freedom of the spirit in his third critique. The aesthetic judgment stands midway between the two worlds, the world of necessity and the world of freedom. Thus in short, the theoretical reason taught us to comprehend the world only according, to the laws of nature: practical reason disclosed to us a moral world in which all is under the control of liberty. There was then an insurmountable cleft between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of liberty (free will). The problem for Kant is to reconcile them. He had apparently long felt the necessity for bridging the "immeasurable gulf.....between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom."[7] Kant seeks the solution in that faculty which mediates alike between understanding and reason and between knowing and feeling: in the faculty of Judgment, as the highest faculty of feeling. "Whether judgment now, as middle term between understanding and reason, supplies its object, the emotion of pleasure and pain, as middle term between cognition and volition, with constitutive (not merely regulative) a priori principles of its own—this is what the Kritik of Judgment has to determine."[8] Judgment in the general sense is the faculty of thinking a particular as contained in a universal and exercises a twofold function: as 'determinant' judgment it subsumes the particular under a given universal (a law), as 'reflective' it seeks the

[7] Critique of Judgment Introduction, p. 13.
[8] History of Philosophy. A. Schwegler, p. 240-41.

universal for a given particular. To quote Kant :[9] "If the universal is already given (say, by the understanding) Judgment is determinant. (This is Judgment in knowledge). If however the universal is to be found out by the judgment, this judgment is reflective. (The second judgment is aesthetic or teleological)". Since the former coincides with the understanding we are here, concerned only with the reflective judgment, judgment in the narrower sense which does not cognise objects, but judges them and this according to the principle of purposiveness, 'a purposiveness which enables us to regard nature in her discrete multiplicity as an ordered and harmonious whole. But the purposiveness of nature is not inherent. It is a purposiveness which the reflective judgment ascribes to itself as if nature in all her diversity had had a unity imposed upon her by an understanding'.[10] Judgment is supposed to effect a sort of compromise and Subject as a sensible being (i.e. man) embodies this compromise. 'This compromise', Kant tells us[11] 'is neither practical nor truly cognitive'. This is the notion of purposiveness, as indicated above. Freedom is the purpose judged to be actualised through mechanism. If only it is held that man as natural is free, that would contradict mechanism, but not certainly if freedom belongs to man as intelligible. The intelligible freedom is uncognitively (and non-practically also) the ground of mechanism.

The function of the faculty of judgment is to think the particular as contained under a universal; it naturally refers the empirical plurality of nature to a supersensual transcendental principle as ground of unity to this plurality. This principle, as object of judgment will, therefore, be the notion of design in nature, for design is nothing less than this supersensual unity which constitutes the reason of the reality of objects. Then all design, all realization of proposed end, being attended with satisfaction, it will be easily understood why judgment has been said to contain the laws for the emotion of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. This judgmental design or purposiveness, Kant tells us, is transcendental while practical purposiveness is metaphysical. A transcendental principle is itself no knowledge but only the condition of the knowledge of object in general. A metaphysical principle is knowledge (though a priori) of some empirical

[9] See Critique of Judgment, p. 18 (Trans. J. H. Bernard).
[10] See Knox's 'The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel & Schopenhauer', p. 14.
[11] Critique of Judgment, p. 40 (Trans. J. H. Bernard).

object. Judgmental purposiveness is transcendental in the sense that it is the condition of the knowledge of empirical objects in general. Practical purposiveness, on the other hand, presupposes particular empirical wills.[12] Adaptation in nature, however, may be either subjectively or objectively conceived. "An object is really or objectively purposive (perfect) when it corresponds to its nature or its determination, formally or subjectively purposive (beautiful), when it is conformed to the nature of our cognitive faculty."[13] When subjectively conceived, we experience pleasure or pain directly on the presentation of an object and before we have formed any notion of it. An emotion of this nature can be referred only to a harmonious relation subsisting between the form of the object and the faculty that perceives it. Judgment in this subjective aspect is aesthetic judgment. When objectively conceived, we form first of all a notion of the object and then decide whether the object corresponds to this notion. Judgment as the faculty cognisant of objective adaptation is named teleological judgment. The perception of purpose is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. When an object is objectively purposive, the pleasure is based on a concept of the object and it is a logical satisfaction; when subjectively purposive, it springs from the harmony of the object with our cognitive powers and it is aesthetic satisfaction. "Aesthetic pleasure", Kant tells us "is universal, because its ground is found in the universal, though subjective, conditions of reflective judgment viz. in the purposive harmony of object with the cognitive faculty".[14] However, the objects of the teleological and the aesthetic judgment, the purposive and the beautiful products of nature and art, constitute the desired intermediate field between nature and freedom.

Having ascertained the nature of aesthetic judgment in the philosophy of Kant, let us try to determine his conception of art. Kant in his third critique[15] arrives at the conception of fine art as something absolutely distinct and *Sui generis*. Its rules do not point to anything that can be realised simply by the adjustment of means to the required end nor yet to anything that can be accomplished because it ought to be accomplished. The possibility of art depends rather upon the free play of the cognitive faculties. Hence, Kant tells us, the rules

[12] Critique of Judgment (Trans. J. H. Bernard), p. 21.
[13] Vide History of Modern Philosophy—Richard Falckenberg, p. 401.
[14] Critique of Judgment. (Trans. J. Bernard), p. 34.
[15] Critique of Judgment.

of fine art are not rules predetermined and prescribed. The rules cannot be laid down in neat formulae and they can never serve as precepts—for then the judgment on art would be determinable according to concepts. Rather the rule should be gathered from the performance i.e. from the 'product'. The artist does not operate according to concepts and definite purposes. He can neither explain (even to himself), nor impart, his method. *A posteriori* examination of any work of art may lead us to our desired result, but we cannot possibly prescribe the rules for an artist to follow in the matter of execution of any work of art. For we ourselves, if not artists, do not know them unless we have the opportunity of seeing any true specimen of artistic creation. We are not supposed to imitate these artistic models literally in order to create further works of art but we are to 'follow' the models. Kant explains the nature of this 'following' thus: "The possibility of this is difficult to explain. The artist's ideas arouse like ideas on the part of his pupil, presuming nature to have visited him with a like proportion of the mental powers. For this reason the models of fine art are the only means of handing down this art to posterity. This is something which cannot be done by mere descriptions (especially not in the line of the arts of speech) and in these arts further more only those models can become classical of which the ancient, dead languages preserved as learned, are the medium."[16]

Kant's treatment of the products of fine art and his characterisation of them as beautiful must dispose of two primary questions, viz. (a) how the conformity to law is obtained and (b) how the freedom of the imagination is assured. That it is possible, Kant tells us, to reconcile certain mechanical side of fine art with its freedom is apparent from the fact that fine art requires a certain mechanism. For without this, the soul which gives life to the work of art and which is essentially free would be 'body-less and evanescent'. In poetic art, there must be correctness and wealth of language as likewise prosody and metre. They, in a sense, curtail freedom and impose certain restraints so that art may not come down to mere play. We will understand better Kant's conception of artistic freedom if we carefully note how he distinguishes art from handicraft. Art is free while handicraft may be called (to borrow the Kantian phrase) 'industrial art.' We look on art as something which could only prove final as play. Art differs from handicraft as the free spontaneous purposiveness of play differs from the coercive, utilitarian purposiveness of work. Art is an occupation that is intrinsically pleasant and work is an

[16] Critique of Judgment. (Meredith's edition), p. 171.

occupation unpleasant in itself and attractive only by virtue of an external principle—i.e. economic remuneration. Work is consequently capable of being a compulsory imposition. And thus distinguishing art from craft, Kant tells us : "it is not amiss, however, to remind the reader of this : that in all free arts something of a compulsory character is still required or as it is called a mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free and which alone gives life to the work would be bodyless and evanescent."[17] The thought of something as end must be present, or else its product would not be ascribed to art at all but would be a mere product of chance. In that case the famous tragedies of Shakespeare, like Hamlet etc. would not have needed a genius like its celebrated author but they could have been produced through chance by an inexperienced compositor of any press through the permutation and combination of the alphabets. Hence, despite the fact that the possibility of fine art depends upon freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties, it is necessary to set out from the proposition that art has always got a definite intention of producing something. Were this, 'something' however, to be mere sensation (something merely subjective) intended to be accompanied with pleasure, then such product would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the feeling of the senses. On the other hand, were the intention directed to the production of a definite object, then, supposing this were attained by art, the object would only please by means of a concept. But in both cases the art would please, not in the mere estimate of it, i.e. not as fine art, but rather as mechanical art. Hence the finality in the product of fine art, though it may be intentional, must not have the appearance of being intentional, i.e. fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognise it to be art. Nature proves beautiful, when it wears the appearance of art and art can only be termed beautiful where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of the spontaniety of nature. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature is by the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with the rules prescribing how alone the product can be what it is intended to be, but with an absence of laboured effect i.e. without academic form betraying itself. The artist in the creation of artistic products must conceal the fact that he had always the 'rule' present in his mind and that it fettered his mental powers. Kant in his frantic effort to reconcile freedom and determinate rules, prescribes a middle course. The rules for an artist are there in his mind but

[17] Critique of Judgment, 304, 20.

in producing an artistic creation he should hide the fact that he was guided by certain rules. When he enjoys a limited freedom, he will have to show that he enjoys it in the widest latitude. This position of Kant is not very convincing. The true artist never plays a game of hide and seek. In our view, an artist while in the making, must abide by the rules, which he can pick up from the works of his masters and this is true upto a certain limit. And when his talents mature, he can venture on new voyages and at this stage freedom is at the maximum. No artist can totally break away from his cultural and spiritual moorings, but we call him original who can go the farthest away from the traditional conventions and can go successfully. All men must suck at the breast of universal ethos and this is also true of all true artists. This observation proves to be true if we carefully read the biographies of the master artists of the world. We find in the life of Tagore, for instance, that he was taught in the traditional schools of art and literature and later he broke away from them successfully. He was original no doubt, but his 'originality' was also determined by all that went before him. The present is the culmination of the past and it again, in its turn will help to shape the future. Similarly, the traditional rules and conventional laws are galvanised in the genius of a true artist and take a new shape and form and we call him original. The people who come after him, read again in his works certain rules by which he was supposed to be guided unconsciously. They again found a school and a tradition and in its turn, it is also transcended like its predecessors. Here we fully agree with Aristotle's observation in point that the inspired poet follows the rules unconsciously. We are told that the artist is not conscious of any determinate rules and procedure that guide him without his knowledge. In a fit of inspiration the poet bodies forth his vision on paper or canvas, stone or brass, bronze or clay. The rules are latent and the critic can easily make them out on a careful analysis of the work of art. So, in our view, it is not true that the rules are present in the artist's mind and the artist is conscious of them, while creating a work of art. It is also not acceptable to us that the artist hides the fact that his work was determined by such rules. We hold with Aristotle that the rules determine from within and without the knowledge of the artist. Inspiration is not irrational. The work of an inspired artist, on a careful scrutiny, betrays certain laws which go to show that the artist's imagination was fettered by them, the artist being altogether unaware. So we find that there is nothing like absolute freedom in the domain of art and that the artist enjoys only a semblance of freedom in this sense.

Kant characterises this freedom in art as being limited by purposiveness without a purpose. There is a vague notion of the artistic product in the mind of the artist and it is to be bodied forth and given a local habitation and a name. It is no concept but the suggested meaning of nature is concretised in the work of art. The purpose of art is to express visibly the light that never was on sea or land, as a concrete individual object of experience, without doing any violence to the notion of freedom. But we do not agree with Kant, as indicated above, that though the artist is conscious of his fetters, he still exhibits a mock freedom. The true position in our view is that the true artist, while creating, does not enjoy freedom absolutely but he does not know it. The traditional ways, which he transcends, work in him, though without the knowledge of the artist. Moreover, his freedom is circumscribed by the medium through which he expresses. But contrary to what Kant had supposed, the artist is never conscious of his limited freedom nor does he give himself an air of absolute freedom, though fully aware that he does not enjoy it as Kant opines. Moreover art to be beautiful never cares to look like nature. A beautiful specimen of art expresses only and it desubjectifies the subjective feelings. We may cite the sketch of 'Dandi march' of the noted artist Nandalal Bose, as an instance in point. Mahatma Gandhi never looked like the 'soldier' of freedom' as he has been depicted in this celebrated sketch. In a few lines the artist created 'the strength and determination, the fortitude and firmness' for which Gandhiji stood. The sketch of Gandhiji is like that of an iron man made not of flesh and blood but of steel. Here the artist did not want a photographic semblance of the man, Gandhi as he looked like but he wanted to recreate the attitude, which was Gandhiji's, when he set out on his famous Dandi march. So the question of semblance with nature does not arrise at all.[18] The recent art-movements such

[18] We agree here with Prof. Collingwood's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory. Prof. Collingwood holds that the brute facts of experience do not constitute the real sense of Kant. For him a real sensum can only mean one which has undergone interpretation by the understanding, which alone has the power to confer the title real; an imaginary sensum will then mean one which has not yet undergone that process. Kant approached the problem along a new line. Instead of trying to conceive real sensa and imaginary sensa as two co-ordinate species of the same genus, he conceived the difference between them as a difference in degree (The Principles of Art, p. 171). However, we are not so much concerned here with the real and imaginary sensa of Kant. Here we are discussing the relation of art to nature. What we want to point out is that Kant stressed the importance of imagination

as symbolism, cubism, etc. illustrate our point at issue. If art is to resemble nature, and that be our criterion for judging a work of art, we are pushed two thousand years back to the days of Plato in point of time. 'Imitation' theory in the sense of literal representation of naure does not help us much in these days when human thought and culture have already advanced a great deal. Kant was conscious of the limitations of Plato's mimesis theory and that is why in the later pages of the Critique we hear him advocating the view that art is expression. That is why Kant tries to attach a different meaning to the much discussed proposition that art should look like nature i.e. art ought to be imitative. Fine art must be like nature in a way that concerns itself as fine art i.e. it should look natural. What makes it look like nature in this sense is the "presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules prescribing how alone the product can be what it is intended to be, but with an absence of laboured effect (without the academic form betraying itself) i.e. without a trace appearing of the artist having always had the rule present to him and of its having fettered his mental powers".[19] Kant wanted to emphasise the element of freedom in any work of art when he tells us that the finality in its form must appear as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of pure nature. Knox in his exposition of Kant's aesthetic theory, tells us that art is beautiful when it approaches nature in its freedom from binding and definite concepts.[20] Upon this feeling of freedom (in the play of our cognitive faculties) rests the pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Now whether we are dealing with 'natural' or with 'artificial beauty' we can say generally in the words of Kant: "That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of judging it".[21]

The Kantian statement that fine art has a mechanical side, does not mean that fine art itself is in any sense a mechanical art but merely that something 'academic' constitutes the 'essential condition' of art. Here Kant's observation in point runs thus : 'Despite the marked

in the field of art for it is imagination that makes art what it is. Imagination is distinct from sensation on the one hand and intellect on the other. This activity, without which, according to Aristotle, intellection is impossible, the 'blind but indispensable faculty' which, according to Kant, forms the link between sensation and understanding deserves a special study.

[19] Critique of Judgment. 307. 25.

[20] See I. Knox's 'The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel & Schopenhauer'. p. 46.

[21] Critique of Judgment. p. 187.

difference that distinguishes mechanical art as an art merely depending upon industry and learning, from fine art as that of genius, there is still no fine art in which something mechanical, capable of being at once comprehended and followed in obedience to rules and consequently something academic does not constitute the essential condition of art.' There is always an essential reference to the concept of what the thing is intended to be, and as a result the perfection of execution (i.e. proximity to the concept) should be taken into account. "If however, 'Kant tells us, "the object is presented as a product of art and is as such to be declared beautiful, then seeing that art always presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality) a cencept of what the thing is intended to be must first of all be laid at its basis. And since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account—a matter which in estimating a beauty of nature as beautiful, is quite irrelevant"[22] When Kant writes that the beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing', perhaps he means the 'concept of a thing'. For him beauty in art lies in the representation whereas beauty in nature lies in the thing. To estimate the beauty of nature, Kant does not need any previously possessed concept of what the object is intended to be. In the case of nature, aesthetic judgment is not required to bother much about its material finality (i.e., the end) ; the form of a beauty in nature pleases on its own account. Thus Kant admits that fine art partakes of the character of mechanical art in so far as its freedom is curtailed by the conformity to a concept. But Kant rises above this difficulty and saves fine art from being a mechanical art. Art 'displays itself not so much in the working out of the projected concept as rather in the portrayal or expression of aesthetic ideas containing a wealth of material for effecting that intention.'[23] In explaining the nature of 'expression' taken to be the keynote of his aesthetic theory Kant writes 'since the imagination, in its employment on behalf of cognition, is subjected to the constraint of the understanding and the restriction of having to be conformable to the concept belonging thereto, whereas aesthetically it is free to furnish of its own accord, over and above that agreement with the concept, a wealth of undeveloped material for the understanding to which the latter paid no regard in its concept, but which it can make use of not so much

[22] Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. 311. 10.
[23] Ibid. 317. 25.

objectively for cognition as subjectively for quickening the cognitive faculties and hence also indirectly for cognitions, it may be seen that genius properly consists in the happy relation which science cannot teach nor industry learn, enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept, and besides, to hit upon the expression for them—the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others.[24] This latter talent is properly that which is termed soul. For to get an expression for what is indefinable in the mental state accompanying a particular representation and to make it universally communicable—be the expression in language or painting or statuary —is a thing requiring a faculty for laying hold of the rapid and transient play of the imagination and for unifying it in a concept (which for that very reason is original and reveals a new rule which could not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples) that admits of communication without any constraint of rules.[25] But the further point that the delight arising from aesthetic ideas must not be made dependent upon the successful attainment of determinate ends (as an art mechanically directed to results) and that consequently, even in the case of the rationalism of the principle, an ideality of the ends and not their reality is fundamental, is brought home to us by the fact that fine art, as such must not be regarded as the product of understanding and science but of genius and must therefore derive its rules from aesthetic ideas, which are essentially different from rational ideas of determinate ends. "The principle of the idealism of finality" Kant tells, "is still more clearly apparent in the fine art. For the point that sensations do not enable us to adopt an aesthetic realism of finality (which would make art merely agreeable instead of beautiful) is one which it enjoys in common with beautiful nature."[26] Thus we find that although fine art is directed to the production of something, it is the 'nature of the individual' and not a set purpose that in products of genius gives the rule to art (as the production of the beautiful). Fine art derives its rules from aesthetic ideas and not from rational ideas of determinate ends. Understanding, in the case of an aesthetic idea fails with its concepts ever to attain to the completeness of the internal intuition which imagination conjoins with a given representation. Similarly, imagination, in the case of a rational idea fails with its intuitions to attain

[24] Ibid.
[25] Critique of Judgment. 317. 5, 10.
[26] Ibid. 350. 30.

to the given concept. Both kinds of these ideas have the seat of their principles in reason and they only differ in this that the principles of the rational and the aesthetic ideas depend upon the objective and the subjective principles of its employment respectively. We have observed above that a true artistic creation derives its rules from the 'nature of the individual' and we are not to look for objective standards for our guidance in the matter of artistic creations. Rules and precept are incapable of serving as the requisite subjective standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned finality in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please every one. A particular rule for taste may hold good in a very limited circle but it cannot account for the universal appreciation accorded to the wall and roof paintings and carvings of Ellora and Ajanta cave temples. This standard of aesthetic judgment, according to Kant, should be found in the element of mere nature in the subject, which eludes the grasp of all rules and determinate concepts. It is the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties (unattainable by any concept of understanding) and it is that which forms the point of reference for the harmonious accord of all our faculties of cognition—the production of which accord is the ultimate end set by the intelligible basis of our nature. Thus it is possible for a subjective and yet universally valid principle *a priori* to lie at the basis of that aesthetic finality for which no objective principle can be prescribed.[27]

[27] We may here compare Sri Aurobindo's position with that of Kant. Says Sri Aurobindo in his 'Human Cycle' (pp. 170-71) : "Great art, is not satisfied with representing the intellectual truth of things, which is always their superficial or exterior truth; it seeks for a deeper and original truth which escapes the eye of the mere sense or the mere reason, the soul in them, the unseen reality which is not that of their form and process but of their spirit. This it seizes and expresses by form and idea, but a significant form, which is not merely a faithful and just or a harmonious reproduction of outward Nature, and a revelatory idea, not the idea which is merely correct, elegantly right or fully satisfying to the reason and taste. Always the truth it seeks is first and foremost the truth of beauty—not, again the formal beauty alone or the beauty of proportion and right process which is what the sense and the reason seek, but the soul of beauty which is hidden from the ordinary eye and the ordinary mind and revealed in its fullness only to the unsealed vision of the poet and artist in man who can seize the secret significances of the universal poet and artist, the divine creator who dwells as their soul and spirit in the forms he has created. (For a detailed study please see his chapter on 'The Suprarational Beauty').

The pleasure in an aesthetic judgment and the pleasure in a teleological judgment are different and yet in both cases pleasure comes from the perception of purposive connections—a purposiveness which is neither logical nor practical but psychological and affective. In both cases the mind is absorbed in its own process, enjoys its own subjective harmony and is not concerned with the definition of the object. The pleasure which the reflective judgment occasions is derived from the reflections upon the processes of the mind (from the play of representations in an aesthetic judgment). In an aesthetic judgment the feeling of pleasure is the predicate and it is pleasure produced by the mere reflection upon the form of an object. The form of a thing is judged to be purposive when it is adapted to the contemplating subject without the intervention of an end or a reflective idea. Thus, we find that aesthetic pleasure does not presuppose any 'end' or does not require any reflective idea to intervene. A mere adaptation of the form to the cognitive faculties of the contemplating subject gives rise to the aesthetic pleasure which is universal in its appeal.

Kant determines the nature of the beautiful in art and nature from four points of view viz. quality, quantity, relation and modality. In quality, the beautiful is the object of a satisfaction that is wholly disinterested. This element of 'disinterestedness' is equally present in the true appreciation of a work of art and of a handiwork of nature. The first moment is apparently directed against the empiricists who emphasized the primacy of sense qualities in the aesthetic experience. According to the empirical tradition, the special faculty that deals with beauty (and in the case of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, also with morals) is taste. It is rooted in pain and pleasure and judges directly by evoking sensuous satisfaction without the intrusion of intellectual analysis and without reference to formal elements and criteria. A true work of art satisfies the appreciator for its own sake. We are not prompted by any practical motive while appreciating it. Shelley's 'Skylark' arouses in us a sense of deep satisfaction while we feel interested in it in the sense of 'practical interest'. The distance, the sense of detachment, must always be present in the case of art-creation or art-appreciation. This element of detachment or disinterestedness has been well expressed in the popular saying : "Tis distance that lends enchantment to the view." The term 'distance' is used metaphysically and not in the sense of spatial or temporal separation. Dr. Bullough in his theory of psychical distance tells

us[28] of the same thing which Kant means by 'distinterestendness' or 'detachment' in the case of the appreciation of the beautiful in art. Dr. Bullough makes his position pretty clear by well-chosen examples, for the phrase 'psychical distance' has an unfortunately mystical connotation. At least once he uses the expression 'detachment' for psychical distance and explains 'detachment' thus : 'let it be supposed that an individual is on a ship during a storm and there is serious danger of ship-wreck. It is quite possible that even in such a situation a man of artistic temperament would admire the movements of the waves and the dash of the spray, entirely oblivious of the danger and with no concern as to what the high seas may ultimately do to the ship.'[29] This is the attitude of a true artist. But when suddenly, a wave larger than any previous one approaches and the artist's muscles are set in preparation to meet the blow, Dr. Bullough would say that at that instant he has entirely lost his distance i.e. his aesthetic attitude. In the words of Kant, the artist then loses his 'disinterested' attitude and consequently he cannot derive any satisfaction appropriate to it. It will now be better understood why Dr. Bullough has termed the distance 'psychical'; for it denotes the mental attitude. In the one instant the man is entirely lost in the shape of the wave and its force and in the colour of the water ; in the next, although he still sees the shape and its colour, he is interested only in his preparation to meet the contingency.

The beautiful differs also from the good. The good as the object of will (a faculty of desire determined by reason) always presupposes a concept of what the thing ought to be. Indeed, to will something and to have an interest in its existence are synonymous. As for the beautiful, there is no need to have a concept of it in order to know what sort of thing the object ought to be, for "flowers, free delineations, outlines interwined with one another without design are called foliage, have no meaning, depend on no definite concept and yet they please."[30] Here, we are primarily speaking of what Kant calls free beauty. Kant sums up[31] the first moment thus : 'Taste is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it, by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful. The notion that the

[28] Vide 'Psychical distance as a factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle'.
[29] Vide The Aesthetic attitude. Herbert Sidney Langfeld.
[30] Critique of Judgment. p. 50.
[31] Ibid p. 55.

disinterestedness, characteristic of the apprehension and the appreciation of the beautiful constitutes one of its fundamental differentionis was not wholly novel with Kant. Mendelssohn had already written : "We contemplate the beautiful in nature and in art, without the least motion of desire, with pleasure and satisfaction. It appears rather to be particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our possession and even though we be never so far removed from desire to put it to our use."[32] It goes to the credit of Kant, of course, that no one before him treated it with such consistency and with such dialectical skill and precision. Kant's treatment of the subject influenced greatly such eminent thinkers as Schopenhauer and Alexander. It is this Kantian doctrine of aesthetic contemplation as wholly emancipated from all interest and desire that became the essence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of art. We find an echo of Kant in the following lines of Schopenhauer : "If.....a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things.....if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why and the whether of things and looks simply and soley at the what.....he is pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge."[33] It will be interesting to note that there are important differences between Kant's and Schopenhauer's views. Kant's approach to the problem of disinterestedness in aesthetic contemplation is logical and the doctrine of disinterestedness becomes the precondition for the universality of the judgment of taste. Schopenhauer is concerned with the psychological state of consciousness in aesthetic contemplation and he exalts the disinterestedness charactistic of aesthetic experience as a manifestation of genius and as conducive to a feeling of personal blessedness flowing from a cleavage of personality—the emancipation of the intellect from the thralldom of the will.

Kant distinguishes this disinterested satisfaction of the beautiful in art and nature from the satisfaction that accompanies the 'agreeable' and the 'good'. We are also interested in the agreeable and the good. In the case of the agreeable our satisfaction is not so much detached as in the case of the 'beautiful' and it is accompanied by a feeling of desire. Our satisfaction in the good is at the same time 'motive to my will for the realization of it.' And only in the case of the

[32] In the Morgenstundan (quoted in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy. Vol. II. p. 528).

[33] The World as Will and Idea, p. 231. (Haldane translation).

beautiful our satisfaction is totally free from 'interestedness'. In quantity the beautiful in art or in nature gives a universal satisfaction. Kant writes : "The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction".[34] As regards the 'agreeable' every one is convinced that his pleasure in it is only a personal one. What is agreeable to me, may not be so to the man sitting next to me. Here in 'agreeable' the whim and caprice of an individual have a big part to play. We donot consciously claim an universality in the case of what is only agreeable to us but when we say 'this picture is beautiful', we expect everyone else to find it so. But this decision of taste, which is the faculty of aesthetic judgment, does not arise from notions. Its decision, therefore, is merely subjective. The universality of a judgment of taste does not mean that all objects of a class are beautiful but that a certain particular object will appear beautiful to all beholders. The judgments of taste are singular judgments. Kant derives this 'subjective universality' (if we may call it so) from the first moment (which explains the beautiful as an object of disinterested satisfaction). The disinterestedness of the satisfaction indicates that it is not based on any inclination of the subject or on any interest and consequently it must be grounded on what may be presupposed in all men. Thus Kant maintains the universality of the aesthetic judgment but avers that it is subjective and divested of specific conceptual meaning. The universality of an aesthetic judgment implies that the judging of the object is anterior to the pleasure in it. Otherwise the pleasure in the aesthetic experience would be identical with the pleasantness in sensation and would retain only private efficacy i.e. would be dependent on the representation through which the object is given. Kant thinks that this is the very key to the critique of Aesthetic judgment. He asserts, therefore, that the judging of the object is the ground of the pleasure which is obtained from the perception of the harmony of the powers of cognition and hence is posterior to the act of judgment. The universality of the satisfaction is based on the universality of the subjective conditions for judging of objects.

In relation, the beautiful is that in which we find the form of adaptation, without conceiving at the same time any particular end of this adaptation. Kant writes: "The Judgment of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)."[35] The form of the object adapts to the

[34] Critique of Aesthetic Judgment p. 55.
[35] Critique of Judgment. p. 69.

attitude of the subject and if they conform to each other the object appears to be beauiful. In an aesthetic judgment, the beautiful object is perceived as exhibiting a purposiveness without purpose i.e. a purposiveness without the representation of an end, without a concept of its nature. In the expression 'purposiveness without purpose' Kant wants to say that it is the form of purposiveness of an object which affords the satisfaction that is universally communicable without the aid of a reflective idea and that consequently, there can be a union of the imagination and the understanding in a judgment of taste that is not congnitive. In this judgment a concept is present, but it is the general concept of the agreement of the form of an object with the cognitive faculties, i.e. a sort of cognition takes place in which the understanding participates but is not determined by definite concepts. And as regards modality, the beautiful is the object of a necessary satisfaction without the aid of any notion. Kant writes : "the beautiful is that which without any concept is cognised as the object of a necessary satisfaction."[36] The necessity of this satisfaction is not a theoretical objective necessity, for then it would be cognized a priori that everyone will feel the same pleasure in the beautiful object; nor is it a practical necessity for then the pleasure would be necessary result of an objective law and would show that we ought to act unconditionally in a certain way. Aesthetic satisfaction is exemplary, is 'a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state.'[37] Therefore, Kant presupposes a 'sensus communis' which makes possible the communication of the feeling for beauty. All men share in the 'sensus communis' by which we donot understand an external sense, but the effect resulting from the free play of our cognitive powers.[38] It is essentially different from the understanding which judges and communicates knowledge by means of concept and not feeling. It is an ideal form allowing one to make into a rule for all a judgment that agrees with it and the satisfaction occasioned by it. Every consciousness, may at least be regarded as capable of causing pleasure. The agreeble according to Kant, actually does cause pleasure. But the beautiful must cause pleasure, as if there is a causal connection between the element of beauty and the sense of aesthetic satisfaction. "The necessity of the aesthetic judgment, then is a necessity of the agreement of all in a judgment which is regarded as example of a

[36] Ibid, p. 96.
[37] Critique of Judgment. p. 91.
[38] Ibid, p. 93.

universal rule, which rule again it is impossible to assign. The subjective principle which underlies the judgments of taste, therefore, is a 'sensus communis' that determines only by feelings and not by notions what should please or displease."[39]

Now, at this stage of the enquiry, the answer is possible for the question : does the adaptation of things to our judgment of them (their beauty and sublimity) lie in us or in them ? Aesthetic realism assumes that the supreme cause of nature has willed the existence of things which should appear to imagination as beautiful and sublime. The organised forms are the principal witnesses for this view. But again, in its merely mechanical forms, nature seems to testify such a tendency to beauty that it is possible to believe in a mere mechanical production even for those more perfect forms as well and the adaptation consequently, would lie, not in nature, but in us. This is the position of idealism and renders possible an explanation of the capacity to pronounce a priori on the beautiful and the sublime. The highest mode of viewing the aesthetic element however, is according to one view, to regard it as a symbol of the 'moral good'. For, 'ought' and 'freedom' and 'moral good' are identical in one sense and beauty is nothing but the felt harmony between the 'ought' and the 'is', between the cognitive faculties which perceive and the form of the object. And thus in the end, taste, like religion, is placed by Kant as a corollary to morals.[40]

To summarise the position of Kant, art, is the product of genius ; 'a natural beauty is a beautiful thing' and art or 'artificial beauty is a beautiful representation of a thing'.[41] The constituent factors of genius are intellect and imagination and genius is the capacity for representing aesthetical ideas. And Kant tells us that by an 'aesthetical idea, I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought, without, however, any definite thought i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it ; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. We easily see that it is the counterpart

[39] A. Schwegler. History of Philosophy. p. 242.

[40] The objection to this view is that it confounds every 'ought' as a 'moral ought' i.e. the *ought to be* with the ought to do. Value is not necessarily moral value and the aesthetic 'ought to be' can be identified with the moral ought to do only at the sacrifice of their essential distinction.

[41] Critique of Judgment. p. 193.

(pendant) of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept to which no intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate.'[42] The aesthetical normal idea is an intuition of the imagination representing the individual as an example of the entire species. It is a generic image, constructed out of many individuals. It attains its end when it represents the species correctly. The aesthetical ideal is an intuition of the imagination representing an individual as the most perfect embodiment of the species. It is the highest type of dependent beauty and is restricted to Man, since Man alone possesses a 'supersensible substrate' and can determine his purposes in the light of Reason. The aesthetic Ideal of Kant possesses meaning and significance, both moral and intellectual and is thereby excluded from the sphere of free beauty. It is as the expression of aesthetic Ideas that art is play and yet directed toward the production of an object; it has intention and yet non-utilitarian intention. It is not, however, directed toward the production of a sensation or toward the definition and explanation of a concept. Art is the expression of aesthetic Ideas which contain a wealth of material for effecting an intention. "Fine art, like science, is not the product of understanding, but of genius, and derives its rule from aesthetic Ideas which differ from rational Ideas of determinate ends." Kant is averse to any philosophy of art which acknowledges it to be an expression of genuine emotion and a communication of authentic experience. It has been affirmed in contradistinction to Kant's view that 'art is the communication of unspeakable experience'.[43] The rationality of art is not the logic of an abstract conceptualism, of a detached analysis. It is the logic of a qualitative situation, of an imaginative experience. The integrity of the artistic product consists, so to speak, in its ontological convincingness, in its fullness of being. Absence of integrity and presence of aesthetic falsehood in a work of art indicate alike a certain intrinsic dissonance, the influence of some external consideration, or simply lack of talent and intuition. In speaking of kinship between beautiful nature and beautiful art, Kant simply means that art becomes beautiful as it is more completely enfranchised from reflective ideas, as it is more fully made merely according to rule but not according to concept. Kant is not attempting to abolish the hiatus between art and life; nor is he trying to emphasize the need and significance of a logico-imaginative consistency, in a specific work of art. This logico-imaginative consistency was envisaged by Aristotle when he

[42] Ibid. pp. 197-98.

[43] See Knox's 'The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel & Schopenhauer'.

wrote that a tragedy must have a beginning, a middle and an end. This Aristotelian formulua—'beginning, middle and end' is no self-evident truism but a serious utterance emphasizing the organic teleological unity of a work of art. The need for this integrity in any work of art was similarly felt by St. Thomas. He considered integrity, proportion and clarity to be the essence of art. By integrity, Thomas does not mean undeviating imitative realism, an imitative representation of nature which would invalidate the art, say of the impressionist; Integrity means, for Thomas, the making of the thing in terms of itself and according to the law governing its making. Aesthetic integrity is wholeness, is inner fullness and qualitative consistence. In a work of art, every detail—line, colour, tone, word, rhythm, image, idea, incident, character—must accord with this dominant regulative quality of the whole situation must become inwoven in the significant total aesthetic texture under the guidance and sovereignty of the imaginative reason. Prof. Dewey also insists on this integrity in a work of art when he demands 'the presence of a dominant quality in a situation as a whole'.[44]

Aesthetic judgment, according to Kant is primarily concerned with the formal qualities of objects, i.e. with those qualities which can be apprehended in unity by the harmonious accordance of the understanding and the imagination without the aid of a scientific concept, without the determination of the Practical Reason, without appeal to the senses or emotions and consummating in a feeling of pleasure flowing from the perception of this free, spontaneous agreement of the cognitive faculties and the form of the beautiful object. Kant builds his aesthetic theory upon a basis of paradoxes. His theory is consistently formal. A moral quality, grand and fervent, has been sometimes attributed to it. In order to explain the analogy between beauty and morals, Kant resorts to a doctrine of symbolism. All intuitions are either schemata or symbols. The schemata contain direct, the symbols contain indirect representations of the concept. A symbol is thus opposed to the discursive but not to the intuitive. It is a presentation of a concept neither as a sign nor as abstract schemata, but obliquely through the application of the rules "of the reflection made upon that intuition to quite different object of which the first is only the symbol."[45] The analogy lies in the rules determining the reflections in both cases, that is, in the thing or intuition

[44] See Philosophy of Civilisation. p. 100.
[45] The Critique of Judgment. p. 249.

or idea and in the symbol. Kant further explains his point by comparing a monarchical state to a living body if it is rationally (constitutionally) governed and to a machine (hand mill) if it is governed by an arbitrary, absolute, individual will, and saying that "between a despotic state and a hand mill there is, to be sure, no similarity; but there is a similarity in the rules according to which we reflect upon these two things and their causality."[46] It is in this sense that beauty is a symbol of the good and that the judgment of Taste has a reference to the supersensible; Kant's master-thought and dominant purpose are omnipresent with him and the moral value of beauty coincides with his metaphysical needs, for "Taste makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest."[47]

The first moment—the disinterestedness of the judgment of Taste —refers to the Practical Reason in general, just as the third moment—the freedom of the beautiful object from conceptual determination—refers to the theoretical Reason in general. The first moment manifests the influences of Reason upon the Understanding, of a Practical upon the Theoretical faculty. It reveals the state of mind in aesthetic contemplation. It explains how beauty can become a symbol of the good. The moral symbolism of beautiful does not contravene Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the good. It is precisely because the judgment of Taste is free that it attains both theoretical and practical value and discloses the profound import of beauty. Beauty, as Kant conceived it, is the transition from the realm of nature to the realm of freedom and suggests the possibility of a supersensible ground in which the Theoretical and the Practical faculty are bound up into unity. As a symbol of the good, the judgment of the beautiful is universally valid despite the fact that it is not defined by a concept. The judgment of Taste is based on the autonomy of the subject but the disinterestedness of the pleasure in the beautiful is a guarantee that it dwells in what may be presupposed in all. Kant's 'moral' symbolism of beauty is directly connected with the paramount theme of his aesthetic theory and casts some light upon the meaning and intent of the four moments. In the third critique, it is not the paradoxes or the analogy between the beautiful and the good which is of enduring worth and abiding influence. Kant's great merit lies in the fact that he put in the current of modern

[46] Critique of Judgment p. 249.
[47] Ibid p. 252.

aeshetic two momentous ideas. He made the principle of harmony the root-thought of his philosophy of art and beauty. The notion of art as a reconciliation of impulses, as an appeasement of desire, as possessing an effective soothing spiritual power conduct to peace and serenity, was already faintly glimpsed by Plato. Now, to be sure, the harmony which aesthetic experience engenders is the fine, spiritual flower of vision and comprehension, of the contemplation—not merely of the form of an object—but of the eternal, evernew, ever-growing qualities and meanings of life. Kant is constantly speaking of the abstract, of the formal accordance of the cognitive faculties. Yet there is graver import latent in his words. Of equal importance is Kant's emphasis upon the 'disinterestedness' and 'purposiveness without purpose' of the judgment of Taste. And here, too, Kant liberated the judgment of Taste—not only from subservience to the scientific or moral concept but really from all content and meaning and converted it into 'a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain.' Historically viewed, it was an indispensable task. For it was the historical tradition to treat art as a moralistic pedagogic instrumentality, as an "elementary philosophy', or else as a sensuous amusement, as a delectable pastime, or as a combination of both. Plato's attitude is well-known. The names of Strabo,[48] Plutarch,[49] Dante,[50] and a good many noted authors can be cited as examples who regarded poetry and art as subservient to some end extraneous to it. Kant's doctrines of disinterestedness and of 'purposiveness without purpose' were not only a revolt against the historical tradition but also a salutary concentration upon the more specific, the more autonomous aspects of beauty and of art. But his revolt was only a partial one as his doctrine of dependent beauty and his ultimate surrender of the beautiful to the morally good show. He liberated beauty from its heteronomous bondage and endowed the harmony of the cognitive faculties in the aesthetic experience with no content. He consigned 'significant' beauty and almost all species of art to the category of dependent beauty i.e., of beauty that adheres to a concept. He was blind to the possibility that art could truly manifest a 'purposiveness without purpose' and at the same time, it might come to us as 'free, bright and enchanting'.

We may say, however, that Kant's lasting contribution to the theory of art lies in his doctrine of freedom of the spirit in art. Freedom

[48] See his 'Geography'.
[49] Vide his 'How a young man ought to study poetry'.
[50] See Epistle. 7.

secures not merely the autonomy of art as against a slavish dependance on extraneous non-aesthetical ends, but also its inherent inexhaustibility in any fixed form or forms. For Kant, art or aesthetic judgment was the ground where the 'ought' could realise itself as 'is' that is to say, in the aesthetic field Kant envisaged a union of the two; rather he expected a fusion or complete identification of the two. But aesthetic judgment or art could not properly discharge the function ascribed to it by Kant for the reason that the manifold of sense came from 'without'. If Kant could derive them from 'within' as Croce did afterwards, the notion of his aesthetic judgment as totally free would not remain only in the utopian level. There is in Kant a definite hint in this direction and that is why he made art subserve the 'moral good'. His 'ought' (freedom) is trying to realise itself as 'is' through the beautiful presentations in art and nature. But his notion of the 'thing-in-itself' and the brute data coming therefrom are not 'posited for the convenience of exposition' as Croce had supposed. That is why the significant idea of the aesthetic judgment as the meeting point of the 'Sein' and the 'Sollen' as propounded by Kant remained in the form of a mere suggestion and could not be fully worked out in Kant's scheme of aesthetics. That is where Croce's theory is a definite advance on Kant.

CHAPTER IV

HEGEL

Hegel's aesthetic system does not make any parade of the dialectic method which constitutes the essential difficulty of his other philosophical works. Questions as to the degree in which the dialectic controls the construction of the Aesthetic, must be argued not with reference to the structure of the latter which is tolerably plan, but with reference to the nature of the former, which will never perhaps be thoroughly agreed upon. "In Hegel's aesthetic" writes Bosanquet,[1] we possess a specimen of the reasonable connection which the dialectic was intended to emphasise without the constant parade of unfamilar terms which have been thought to be mere lurking places of fallacy. The evolution of beauty, in Hegel's system, depends on a principle analogous to that which Schelling appealed to in a far more artificial form". In every process of change construed according to the postulate of causation, that which ceases to exist must be supposed so to cease because its nature is no longer adequate to the claim made upon it by the connected system within which it has its being. In a formal and technical sense, therefore, it may be contended that in every causal process, any element which ceases to be, must necessarily be replaced by something more adequate than itself to the requirements of the process as a whole. But such a deduction would be purely formal, because it is possible that the elements of the causal connection might be of a limiting or destructive character and the reason for the better adaptation of the succeeding element to these demands might lie in its possessing not a large but a scantier content. To conditions which forbid life, corpse is better adapted than a living man. But within any evolution which has in fact a progressive character the formal principle just indicated will have a real bearing. In it a missing element will be replaced by something which better harmonises with the systematic and causal process as a whole, giving way before necessities which in part its own activity has modified into a form in which it can no longer meet them. If we are pleased to express these relations of 'before and after' by saying that every positive existence, in a progressive evolution, passes over into its negation, which

[1] His History of Aesthetics, p. 335.

then necessarily makes way for a further positive result, including both the earlier positive and its negative, the phraseology is technical but not altogether unintelligible. Within conrcete and causal process there is no such thing as a bare negation. Hegel might have been aware of this. However this may be, we have only to master the conception of a necessary progressive movement so far as will enable us to follow the structure of the Aesthetic. Moreover, we will have to note carefully and critically examine how one stage is bypassed and transmuted into the next higher stage. The triadic movement of the spirit through art, religion and philosophy does not represent the true picture of the dialectical movement, as conceived by Hegel. This branch of the Hegelian philosophy, as has already been pointed out, is simple in its form and dialectical method has hardly any application here. Hegel is not so much concerned with the 'form' of his aesthetic theory. That is why dialectic has not been imposed on it. What he wanted was to prove conclusively that spirit realises itself in and through art, religion and philosophy and art was thus considered to be the sensuous representation of the absolute.

Divergent views are there with regard to the sense in which Hegel considered art to be an expression and consecration of spirit. It is difficult to ascertain at the outset what he considered to be the meaning and function of art? Before we try to solve such problems we will do well to contrast briefly the 'lietmotiff' of Hegel's metaphysics with that of Kant. Kant called his philosophy critical, because he believed he had shown simultaneously the efficacy and the limits of Theoretic Reason. Kant thought he had rendered phenomenal experience coherent by means of the a priori categories of the understanding, that he had reaffirmed the noumenal truths by means of the a priori apodictic postulates of the Practical Reason, and finally that he had spanned the chasm between the natural and the super-sensible realm by means of the Aesthetic Judgment. Hegel's pan-logical idealism was in conflict with the Kantian dichotomization of reality into a phenomenal and a noumenal world. Hegel exalted reason to an eminence from which it could have an adequate and co-ordinated knowledge of the whole of reality—of reality as the incessant temporal forward march of the Absolute, of spirit, of God. But obviously, a reality, which is the grand unfolding or development of spirit is, by implication, inherently rational and can, in consequence, be apprehended by human reason (which has, indeed, now ceased to be a mere instrument of knowledge and has become itself part of, or akin to reason). It follows that all distinctions between phenomenal and noumenal ex-

perience must find their source and fulfilment within reality. "The scene of reason is the universe and its season is enternity; but its holy of holies is human consciousness and its blossom time is the flaming hour when all thought—art and religion—will have flowered into the sabbath language of spirit which is divine philosophy".[2] Meanwhile the entire sensible world is animated with an indwelling somnolent rationality in a process of gradual emergence until that sacred moment shall have arrived, until the full self-consciousness of spirit shall have been achieved. In this rational Hegelian universe pervaded by spirit, beauty is the sensuous presentation of the Idea. And by Idea, Hegel means nothing less than the concrete cosmic process regarded as ideal unity. For Hegel, this unity of world process means spirit construed neither as an abstract, transcendent and empty universal nor as a series of atomistic, particular, limited exemplifications but as the single totality of both, as the unity of Kant's phenomenal and noumenal, of necessity and freedom, of the natural and the metaphysical. Hegel insists upon the concreteness of the Idea; it is basic to his philosophy. He does not accept the Platonic Idea as transcendent to experience. He conceives the Idea to be Mind (Geist), at once infinite and all inclusive and yet individual and determinate. He writes:[3] "We cannot more succinctly define the absolute Idea, in the above use of the expression, than by saying it is mind (spirit): and we may add that the mind thus referred to is not mind regarded as finite, that is, subject to the conditions and limitations of sense-perception but the universal and absolute intelligence, which, out of its own free activity, determines Truth in the profoundest signification of the term."

Hegel's system consists of three parts:[4] Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of spirit. Under the third art, religion and philosophy are subsumed. In the first the Hegelian dialectic is concerned with the logic of thinking, in the second with the logic of natural growth, in the third with the logic of history and cultural change. The substance of the Philosophy of spirit is expressed in three different forms, as Art, as Religion, and as Philosophy. The substance is the same there is only a difference in form. According to Hegel, art is a lower form of Philosophy, to be absorbed and transmuted in Religion and then with Religion to be absorbed and transmuted in Philosophy. As

[2] Vide Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics.
[3] Philosophy of Fine Arts. Trans. by F. P. B. Osmaston. Vol. I. P. 126.
[4] See Lotze's Geschichte der Aesthetik in Dentschland. (English trans. in Knox's Kant, Hegel & Schopenhauer).

the sensuous presentation of the Idea, art is in the sphere of Absolute Mind, together with Religion and Philosophy. Art is, therefore, to be regarded as one of the three forms wherein the freedom of spirit is expressed and realized. It is the first manifestttion of the Absolute; it is the sensible expression of Truth.[5] The absolute is immediately present to sensuous perception in the beautiful or in art. The beautiful is the shining of the Idea through a sensuous medium (stone, colour, sound, verse) the realization of the Idea in the form of external sensuous manifestation. Richard Falckenberg[6] writes of Hegel's philosophy of fine arts : "Absolute spirit is the unity of subjective and objective spirit. As such, spirit becomes perfectly free (from all contradictions) and reconciled with itself. The break between subject and object, representation and thing, thought and being, infinite and finite is done away with and the infinite recognised as the essence of the finite. The knowledge of the reconciliation of the highest opposites or of the infinite in the finite presents itself in three forms : in the form of intuition (art), of feeling and representation (religion), of thought (philosophy)". The beautiful is, thus, co-ordinate with Religion and Philosophy and is distinguished from them only in its form—that is, in its sensuous expression, in the plasticity of its images which render the Idea accessible to senses. To quote the words of Hegel : "Accepting, then, this fundamental similarity of content, these three spheres of absolute spirit only differ in the forms under which they present their object, that is, the Absolute, to human consciousness.....The form of sensuous perception is appropriate to art in the sense that it is art which presents truth to consciousness in its sensuous semblance; but it is a semblance, which, under the mode of its appearance, possesses a higher and profounder meaning and significance although it is not its function to render the universality of the notion wholly intelligible through the medium of sense.[7]

We have already seen that art is the sensuous presentation of the Absolute Idea. But the first sensuous form in which the Idea manifests itself, and therefore the first form of beauty is not art but nature. Nature is the Idea in its otherness. And since the Idea is here not the pure Idea, the Idea as it is in itself, but rather the Idea buried in an external and sensuous medium, nature is, accordingly, beautiful.

[5] See The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel & Schopenhauer by A. Knox p. 82.

[6] See His History of Modern Philosophy, p. 50.

[7] Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts (Osmaston's Translation) Vol. I p. 139.

But there are degrees of beauty in nature. If we look at the lowest phase of nature, crass matter as such, we find that the Idea is so sunk and buried in externality as to be practically invisible. The parts of a lump of iron are indifferent to one another. If they are separated they remain what they are. Such an object, therefore, is scarcely to be regarded as beautiful. Rising somewhat higher we have such an object as the solar system. Here we have indeed an interdependence of the parts upon one another and moreover a centre of unity, the Sun. But the relations of the bodies of such a system are still governed only by mechanical laws. And moreover the unity, instead of being an ideal unity which pervades the members and is inseparable from them is on the contrary itself a separate material object, the Sun. The unity here is itself merely one of the parts. It is only when we reach the phenomena of organic nature, life, that we find true beauty. For in the living organism all the parts are bound in an ideal unity which is the pervading soul of the organism. However, the beauty of nature exhibits grave defects. The necessity of infinitude and freedom for the exhibition of true beauty is unquestionable and they have the top priority. The Idea, as such, is absolutely infinite. "It is the concrete unity of the 'Notion' with the object i.e. it is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity".[8] The Idea is constituted by three factors, viz., (1) the unity of the Notion which puts itself forth into (2) differences, plurality, objectivity which return again into (3) the concrete unity of the above two factors. Now what is essential here is that it is the Notion itself which puts itself forth into differences and then overreaches the distinctions within itself which it has thus created. Its entire development is a developent out of its own resources. It is thus wholly self-determined, infinite and free. Hence the beautiful object, if it is truly to manifest the Idea, must itself be infinite and free. It must, as an organism, evolve all its differences out of itself. They must be seen to proceed out of the ideal unity which is its soul. But the living organisms as mere links in the infinite network to the necessity of nature, are not free. The beauty of nature is, therefore, essentially defective on account of the finitude of natural objects. If, therefore, the human mind is to apprehend adequately the Absolute in sensuous form—which is the demand of spirit in the present sphere —it must rise above nature. It must create objects of beauty for itself. Hence arises the necessity for art in the system of Hegel. Art alone is truly beautiful. The beauty of nature is inferior to the beauty of

[8] For a detailed study of Hegel's Idea see 'The Philosophy of Hegel' p. 444 by W. T. Stace.

art in the same degree as nature in general is inferior to spirit. For art is the creation of spirit.

So art is the sensuous incarnation of the Idea. The Idea is the content and the sensuous embodiment is the form. The Idea as art is therefore an individual configuration of reality whose express function is to make manifest the Idea—in its appearance. The beautiful is the absolute (the infinite in the finite) in sensuous existence, the idea in limited manifestation. To the beautiful (and its sub-species, the beautiful as such, the sublime and the ludicrous) belong two moments, thought and material; they are Inseparably together as if they are entwined. The material expresses nothing but the thought that animates and illuminates it and of this thought it is only the external manifestation. This thought is the spiritual content and the material is the material embodiment and a perfect fusion of the two gives rise to a perfect work of art. This spiritual content is the Absolute and beauty is the vision of the absolute shining through a sensuous medium. Now the nature of the Absolute may be variously conceived e.g. as subject, as spirit, as reason and thought, as the universal. The spiritual content may be, therefore, of various kinds. It may consist in the conception prevalent in any age or among any people, of the absolute being—the fundamental religious concepts of a race. It may be constituted by any general idea of a spiritual kind. It may be the activity of those universal forces, love, honour, duty which sway the human hearts. It may be any thought, other than a mere idiosyncrasy or caprice, anything, that is to say, which is substantive and essential and which forms a part of the inner subjectivity and soul-life of man. All that is essential is that it should be capable of acting as a focal centre of unity which displays itself in and permeates each and every part of the material embodiment. Hegel considered the control of all the parts of a work of art under a single central unity to be essential so that the whole forms an organic being in which the unity is as the soul and the plurality of the material embodiment is as the body. In the ideal work of art, these two sides, content and embodiment, are in perfect accord and union, so that the embodiment constitutes the full and complete expression of the content, whereas the content, on its part, could find no other than this very embodiment as adequate expression for it. But this perfect accord and union are not always attained.[9] That is why there is always a restless forward march from one form of art to another. The evolution in art has

[9] See The Philosophy of Hegel. pp. 451-52 by W. T. Stace.

been possible for this lack of perfect accord and union of form and content.

According to the relation of these moments, according as the outer form or the inner content predominates or a balance of the two occurs, we have the symbolic, the classical and the romantic forms of art; in the symbolical form the phenomenon predominates and the idea is merely suggested. Here matter rules; the thought struggles through it only with pain and difficulty in order to bring the ideal into manifestation. Here all is arbitrary and irrational, a search for adequate expression because nothing is yet formed which is adequate to be expressed. In the classical form both the idea and intuition, or spiritual content and sensuous form, completely balance and pervade each other, in which the former is ceaselessly taken up into the latter. Here the ideal has conquered its adequate existence in the material: form and mttter are mutually absolutely commensurate. The half-formed fancies of the human spirit is on the way to the fully formed. The awakening mind reacts against its nightmares by realising its own nature as a compact and definite self in a compact and definite world of relations and seizes for the representation of its definite reasonable unity the natural and adequate symbol furnished by the human figure. In the romantic form the phenomenon retires and the Idea predominates. Classical art, according to Hegel, is the most beautiful for it perfectly harmonises the form and the content, the thought and the material. Romantic art is nevertheless higher and more significant. For here spirit predominates and the matter is reduced to a mere sign and show, through and beyond which the spirit ever breaks and struggles further. The compact and definite self as we find in classical art-form is no enduring phase. "The little Greek sphere of fixsd natural relations", writes Bosanquet, "is torn asunder by the great historical forces operative both within and without it, and the idea, assuming the form of a progressive antithesis in which the Greak past is itself a factor, can no longer be adequately represented in a compact and simple shape but demands embodiment, if not actually in thought, then in some medium of sense as nearly as possible approximating to thought".[10]

As we have already noted, the three historical relations of the Idea to its sensuous form are the symbolical, the classical and the romantic. The development of art in a series of historical grades corresponds to

[10] See Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics p. 347.

the stages in the temporal emergence of spirit in a process of self-recognition, of a knowledge of the meaning of its own absolute essence. In the symbolic stage, art with its yearning, its fermentation, its mystery and sublimity is symbolic in the restricted sense in which the symbol is put over against or outside of the idea or experience. Symbolical art reveals man as just beginning to come to spiritual self-consciousness and to recognize himself in nature. "Natural objects," writes Hegel, "are thus in the first instance, left just as they are, while at the same time, the substantive Idea is imposed upon them as their significance, so that their function is henceforth to express the same, and they claim to be interpreted, as though the Idea itself was present in them".[11] Idea, as expressed through the symbolical art, is indefinite, obscure and ill-comprehended. Both in the content and in the form of art "there is a defectiveness in the Idea." 'There is, for instance', writes Hegel,[12] a formlessness, a false conception of shape, an inability to master beauty, in the architecture and sculpture of the ancient Hindus, Egyptitns and Chinese'. The reason for this, in Hegel's view, is that the very content, the very thought of their art, lacked determinateness, was not complete and absolute in itself. Symbolical art resorts to grotesqueness and exaggeration in order to suggest, to adumbrate, the spiritual in natural phenomena. Hegel finds this to

[11] See Hegel's Philosophy of Fine arts (Osmaston's edn) Vol. I p. 103.

[12] Hegel's sweeping observation on oriental art (Hindu, Chinese and Egyptian) will be repudiated by all careful scholars of oriental civilisation as a piece of ignorant dogmatism without foundation in fact. To say that Hindu art is either sculpture or architecture and even as such only more symbolic architecture than sculpture, is nothing but a carricature of the actual facts of the case. The Hindus excelled not merely as builders of temples but also in stone and marble representations of human forms of the Divine as the numerous figures of Vishnu and Siva and of Krishna both in northern and southern India abundantly testify. Nor is Aryan art confined to Hindu sculpture and architecture as it comprises also the achievements of Buddhism in the field of art through the numerous and various representations of the figure of the Buddha in different postures and conditions. Nor is it true to say that Hindus had nothing to contribute in the field of music, poetry and painting. The paintings in the Ajanta cave temple, the works of Vālmiki, Kālidas and Tulsidas and Vyāsa and other luminaries in the field of Indian literature and poetry will compare favourably with the highest achievements of Shakespeare and Milton and Dante and Goethe and Virgil in the same sphere. Hindu music also has its own individuality and beauty which may not be as well known to Europeans as it should be, but which despite deserves the highest commendation from all connoisseurs of musical art.

be evident in the primitive artistic pantheism of the East. In symbolical art the final inadequancy of form to content remains insuperable, the plastic configuration and the Idea donot coalesce. There is a gap between them, there is mutual negation and the Idea remains apart and alone in sublimity. The supreme and the uniquely characteristic symbolic art is architecture. It raises a temple for the spirit of God and is the "first pioneer on the highway towards the adequate realization of Godhead". In architecture the sensuous material being greatly in excess, the true adequacy of form and matter has to be sought in other forms of art. Its material is stone arranged in obedience to the laws of gravitation. Hence the character that belongs to it, is of mass and massiveness, of silent gravity, of oriental sublimity. It overcomes the cosmic duality of Mind and Nature and purifies the external world and coordinates it under the laws of symmetry. Architecture shelters the God against tempest and rain but it does not yet express Him. The building and the Idea which it symbolizes are disparate. There is no proper harmonisation of the two. The relation subsisting between Idea and form is abstract for the ideal cannot be realized as concrete spirituality in the material and medium of architecture. The forms of architecture are inadequate to the Idea and are essentially the forms of inorganic nature regulated by the laws of symmetry.

After architecture comes sculpture. It is still in subjection to a stiff and unyielding material but an advance, nevertheless, from the inorganic to the organic. Forming it into body, it converts the matter into a mere vehicle, simply ancillary to it. In representing the body, this building of the soul, in its beauty and purity, the material completely disappears into the ideal ; not a remnant of the element is left that is not in service to the idea. It is only in the corporeal presence of sculpture that spirit can be brought within the periphery of vision and artistic anthropomorphism here is not a degradation of the spiritual but an elevation to the essence of the spirit. It is in sculpture that classical art achieves its fullness of being. In this classical stage, mind shakes off its drowsiness, dispels the obscurity which has engulfed it, and in its incandescent self-realization divines in the human form the harmony of meaning and expression, of Idea and its sensuous embodiment. It conceives of the human form, ideally depicted, as a representation of the universal human mind, as the visible vesture of mind, as individually and concretely determinate spirituality. It divests the human form of the defects that belong to the merely sensuous and liberates it from the finite contingencies

relevant to the phenomenal. Sculpture makes further improvements upon what architecture has achieved. Architecture purifies the external world, makes nature cognate with mind and sets upon it the seal of spirit and erects the sanctuary of the God. As in sculpture, the God Himself enters the temple "in the lightning-flash of individuality which smites its way into the inert mass, permeating the same with its presence".[13] The medium and material of sculpture, though crude and gross, are spiritualized by the pervading presence of God and His statue is wrought in ideal forms of the human shape revealing the spiritual essence in its eternal repose and self-possession and blessedness.

Much of the material element in sculpture is harnessed to the service of the Idea. But the life of an artistic creation—its soul or spirit does not come out in sculpture. Romantic art is alone equal to this task. Here there is again, as there was in symbolical art, a conflict between content and form but on a spiritually higher level. The defectiveness of symbolical art was a consequence of the defective symbolisation of the Idea which constituted its content. But the inadequacy of the configurative expression to the Idea in romantic art manifests the transcendence of the Idea as Absolute spirit to sensuous form and points to its own realm as the appropriate place for the consummation of its reality. From the stand point of art, the classical stage was the most perfect. But by being so, it displayed the spiritual imperfection of art, its inability to render the Idea as Idea, as infinite spiritual content, Classical art could not endure for ever. As regards harmony of content and form, of the divine and the human, in classical art, it could be achieved only because the Hellenic God was an object of immature thought and sensuous imagination and hence could be represented in bodily shape. This unity based upon a naive anthropomorphism and moving in the restricted sphere of fixed natural relations, had to be dissolved. The God of romanticism is the God of christianity. He is presented to Mind as no longer in bodily form but as Absolute spirit and the determinate content of His existence is reason. Hegel writes[14] in the 'Philosophy of Mind : "and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form, but as only finding

[13] See Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts (Osmaston—edn) Vol. I pp. 113-14.

[14] See Paragraph 562. The Phil. of Mind is the third and last part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical sciences in outline'. (Wallace Trans.)

himself in himself and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spirtitual world alone. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty : it presents him as only condescending to appearance as the divine, as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towards its significance". The unity of the divine and the human is now possible only in spirit, in spiritual knowledge. Spirit—absolute, infinite and universal —transcends and eludes the sensuous imagination and the sensuous media and cannot be truly suggested by the temple subject to mechanical law or by the human form, finite and phenomenal. That is why we require the romantic arts. In the "Philosophy of Fine Art",[15] Hegel says "Art must deliver itself to the inward life, which coalesces with its object simply as though this were none other than itself, in other words, to the intimacy of soul, to the heart, the emotional life, which as the medium of spirit itself essentially strives after freedom and seeks and possesses its reconciliation only in the inner chamber of spirit. It is this inward or ideal world which constitutes the content of the romantic sphere : it will therefore necessarily discover its representation as such in inner idea or feeling, and in the show or appearance of the same. The world of the soul and intelligence celebrates its triumph over the external world and actually in the medium of that outer world makes that victory to appear, by reason of which the sensuous appearance sinks into nothingness. "Spirit, at the romantic stage, is in the sphere of reason and in the reflected appearance manifests itself in the heart and mind, in the life of intelligence, in the inner ideal being. Romantic are flows from and appeals to, the emotions, the heart, the soul, the divine passions. Feeling is the essence of romantic art. It is the great healer and reconciler. The artistic adumbration of spirit as subjective feeling, as God, as the Absolute, in communion with the human nature, as revealed in His community, is the truimph of the soul over the external world. In romantic art the sensuous medium sinks into insignificance, for spirit must be expressed in thought and if not solely in thought, then in the most immaterial of sensuous media, as near to thought as possible.[16]

Painting, music and poetry express the spirit of romantic art. They constitute the arts in which the predominance of material over form is almost at a discount and represent a more intimate union of

[15] See Osmaston Edition Vol. I. p. 109.

[16] See The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, p. 90.

sensuous medium and spiritual significance than architecture or sculpture. In painting we find that the medium is no longer a coarse material substrate but the coloured plane, the spiritual play of light; it produces only the show of solid dimension. When it is ideal, it is capable of expressing the whole scale of feelings, moods and actions —actions full of dramatical movement. Here we find the quality of visibility to be ideal. The 'presentedness' in painting is transcended through suggested ideas. We see more than what is depicted in it. Raphael's 'Madonna' is an instance in point. This famous painting in which the mother and the child are represented suggests something more—the eternal, tender and divine relation of mother and child, the relation that is godly and sublime. Thus the presented matter, according to Hegel, is transcended in painting in a way which is not possible in sculpture and architecture. Painting does not depend upon a mass of mere weight as in architecture, nor upon a three dimensional representation, as in sculpture. Painting can make apparent, can induce us to read into it ideally a third dimension and hence 'liberates art from the objective totality of spatial condition, by being limited to a plane surface".[17]

Painting is too objective; the perfect sublation of space, is however music. It is subjective. Its material is tone, the inner trembling of a sonorous body. Musc quits consequently the world of sensuous perceptions and acts exclusively on inner emotion. Its seat is the depth of the emotional soul whose movement is within itself. Music is the most subjective of arts. It is the romantic contrast to painting. It does not appear under the form of space as co-existence but as temporal ideality, as continuity in the mind. It is liberated from the impediments of matter and extension and as a permanment work of art can only have an ideal existence in memory. In painting visibility has been rendered ideal, but it is still colour, it is yet light, playing upon a material surfacc. This material content is negated in music; it is converted into sheer audibility. Music expresses the essence of inner life. It is a forward-step from painting, for it embodies 'pure ideality and subjective emotion in the configurations of essentially resonant sound rather than in visible form".[18]

[17] Hegel here is obviously guilty of a puerile psychological blunder. The third dimension in paintings is not an effect of suggestion and subjective reading on a two dimensional plane, but, as a common student of phychology is aware, a presentation or a presentative experience resulting from association and ocular physiology governed by established psychological laws. Wundt's theory of *fusion* and *complication* was unknown to Hegel.

[18] See Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art. (Osmaston Trans.) Vol. IV. p. 4.

Poetry or the literary art has the privilege of universal expression. Its material is no longer sound simply, but sound as speech, sound as the word, the sign of an idea, the expression of reason. Poetry shapes not this material, however, in complete freedom, but in obedience to certain rhythmico-musical laws of verse. All the other arts in a sense, are summed up in poetry. Poetry is feeling, clear cogent and coherent, whereas music is feeling, vague and indefinite. Music, in its perfect union of sensuous medium and spiritual content, marks a transition from the abstract sensuousness of painting to the abstract spirituality of poetry, just as sculpture, in its coalescence of form and content, marks a transition from symbolical to romantic art: ".....the realm of idea—breaks away on its part likewise from the bond of music and in the exclusive art of poetry discovers the adequate realization it demands".[19] The chains that bind music to this earth are cast off in poetry. For in poetry the mind uses sound to express an ideal content as the mere external sign for ideal perceptions and conceptions. Sound in poetry has ceased to be the substance it was in music and has become a sign, a shadow, pointing to something other than itself, to a realm of spirit. The idea which poetic sound signifies is concrete and not vague and nebulous as in painting or music. The true medium of poetry is not sound but the imagination and the intellect and since imagination is indispensable to all the arts, it may be affirmed that all the arts possess a peotic element. "But in poetry intelligence and imagination are the exclusive medium".[20] Poetry is, consequently, the freest and the most exalted of the arts. Its home is in the sphere of spirit and it belongs to the life of the soul, of emotion, of reason. At this point—in the noblest of the arts, in poetry—art transcends itself, for "it is just here that it deserts the medium of a harmonious presentation of mind in sensuous shape and passes from the poetry of imaginative idea into the prose of the thought"[21] i.e. into the objectivity and universality of the spirit which is reality. Thus we get the maximum amount of freedom in poetry, an element essential to constitute the essence of true art. Hegel considered beauty and freedom to be closely related.

[19] Ibid Vol. IV p. 5.

[20] See Hegel's Phil. of Fine Arts (Osmaston Edn.) Vol. I. p. 120.

[21] See Knox's The Aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer" We fail to understand how intelligence and imagination could be characterised as 'exclusive mediums' of poetry. On Hegel's own admission, without imagination, no form of art, whether sculpture or architecture, can be properly appreciated. Without the assistance of the full play of the faculty of intelligence in man, no amount of imagination

Kuno Fischer writes[22]: 'Hegel associates beauty, like spiritual progress in general, with the consciousness of freedom'. He thinks that to grasp this is essential for the clear comprehension of Hegel's aesthetic. According to Kuno Fischer, in the system of Hegelian aesthetic, the doctrine of Freedom and the doctrine of Beauty depend upon each other. Nothing is of greater importance than the realization of this connection—a connection which Kant discovered, Schelling elucidated and Hegel developed. It is the key to Hegel's aesthetic and to its most successful inferences and deductions. It is also possible to say in place of Freedom Truth, and, briefly, Absolute Idea. The subject must be in a state of perfect freedom in order to be able to contemplate and represent aesthetically; the object, likewise, must be in a state of freedom in order to be able to appear aesthetically or to be represented aesthetically. The Ideal, according to Hegel, is Beauty, born and begotten of spirit. What objective reality, in the form of natural beauty, strives to achieve but does not fully attain—that the imagination produces, creates, completes. In the process of aesthetic creation it is not sufficient that one is overwhelmed by the object; the object must rather be mastered, assimilated, transmuted into the substance of the spirit. Inspiration is material. Not merely being inspired —a process that seldom takes place on a plane higher than that of dim and nebulous feeling; but inspired creation and formation which constitute specific artistic ability or genius. The contemplation of genius is a seizing of the object in its full force and freedom—a seizing in which the insight of genius and the objective reality are indissolubly bound up. In seizing this matter or meaning and impressing a universal character on the perceptible imagery of representation, we have the true essence of fine art. However, concrete and particular may be the forms of art, they must be different for having passed through the mind, which is the faculty of universals. "Poetry will always insist upon the energetic, the essential, the distinctive, and the ideal is this expressive essence, not the merely actual, to represent whose details in any scene e.g. in a scene of every day life, would be languid and spiritless."[23]

can help us in the proper appreciation of any work of art. If through the good office of intelligence we donot understand the full implication of what we are going to appreciate, we fail to appreciate it fully. Intelligence aids the proper appreciation of any work of art. This is a truism.

[22] See His book entitled 'Hegel's Leben, Working und Lehre' (Trans. by A. Knox).

[23] See History of Aesthetic, Bosanquet, p. 341.

The above classification of fine arts leads us to recall the sources of the conception of this classification. The combination of these three stages, viz. architecture, sculpture and painting, music and poetry, suggests a connection with Schelling's 'powers'; that is to say, the process which generated the three successive forms of art is again represented within each one of them by the division into particular fine arts. Here it is necessary to bear in mind that the whole notion of a concrete idea as the reality, is referred by Hegel to Schiller. The direction assigned to the movement from classical to romantic makes explicit, as Schelling himself does not, the notion latent in his 'real' and 'ideal' series of arts. The addition of the symbolic art-form as a pre-classical stage is a reflex materially, of the interest excited by the Schlegels and other Romanticists in Oriental poetry and antiquities and thus the parallel drawn by Hegel between the symbolic and the Romantic tendency corresponds to the fact that the same anti-classical contrast and rebellion brought the data of both into notice. The technical terms 'symbolic' appears to be a special application of the idea of symbol or allegory, the former being extended to the whole of art by Solger and the latter by Fr. V. Schlegel. It is needless to say that the notion of the 'classical' which forms the centre of the whole evolution is in the spirit of Winckelmann and draws its sterling soundness from Hegel's intense sympathy with him and with his subject. And finally, the exceedingly suggestive treatment of the Ideal, not as an exclusive phase of Art, but as the whole range of fancy that is reacted on and specialised into concreteness by the general demands of expression in each age and further by the particular sensuous vehicles which determine the powers of the several fine arts, is probably, we submit, due to Schelling's idea of mythology as a sine qua non for art. For this mythology essentially meant the organised province of imagination applicable to a particular range of artistic production. The modern had, according to Schelling, to make his mythology for himself out of the material given to the intelligence of his age. Bosanquet writes :[24] "This concrete aspect of the imagination in itself and apart from the actual work of production has never, so far as I am aware, been duly noted by professional art-philosophers except in a degree by Schelling and Hegel and in one particular region by writers on music." That not only the musician imagines in tones and the poet in ideas but the sculptor in marble, the iron-worker in iron, the wood-carver in wood and the painter in colour—this is the vital principle which lies at the root of the due classification of the

[24] See His History of Aesthetic, p. 348.

arts, and is thoroughly comprehended in Hegel's 'ideal'. "This highly trained skill in the thoroughly perfect manipulation of the material is involved in the notion of the ideal, as it has for its principle the total incorporation in the sensuous and the fusion of the inward spirit with the outward being".[25] The demands of execution are subsequently and separately treated. Hence we must note that Hegel is here speaking of the artistic imagination qua imagination only and requires that it should be moulded, by habitual intercourse with its material. Thus the differentiation of the ideal leads up to the classification of the arts, which we have already discussed. Here we deem it necessary to comment on three distinctive points concerning it.

The first point to be noted is the double basis of classification. The classification is founded upon a combined historical and analytic principle which is supposed by Hegel to represent the same differentiation, both in succession and in co-existence, repeated within phases of the succession. True to this principle of classification, each separate art ought to have been treated in three forms, symbolic, classical and romantic, just as each of these three art-forms should have been pursued through the peculiarities of the five different arts. The culminating point of the group of particular fine arts at any period is thus to be found in that branch of art which corresponds within the co-existent system to the then dominant phase of the succession. Architecture, the art of incomplete symbolism is the climax of pre-classical or merely symbolic art; Sculpture, the art of complete and compact though limited expressiveness, is the climax of classical or self-complete and balanced artistic production of the Greek age and so on. This principle of double classification has been condemned by many eminent historians of aesthetics. In Schasler's view, this principle contradicts itself in creating a single art under more than one form, although he sees that the empirical facts give some support to such a method. Hartmann is more emphatic in pointing out this defect in Hegel. He avers that the confusion between the division of Forms of style and the division of the particular arts is fatal to Hegel's whole system and he complains that the 'confusion" recurs within the treatment of each separate branch of art. Zimmermann makes similar criticisms on the intermixture of historical and philosophical principles and on the feature of recurrence and in addition, can find no distinction between the symbolic and romantic and infers that both of these, being inadequate in form to their import, must fall outside beauty.

[25] Hegel i(b) (quoted in Bosanquet's History of Aesthetics)

Zimmermann thinks that history should be severed from philosophy as absolutely as the story of Newton's apple from astronomical theory. The conception of symbolism would exist if there had never been a work of art bearing that character, nor a period, nor a people devoted to it.[26] "This is, indeed", observes Bosanquet,[27] "the high a priori road. The conception of linguistic or algebraical symbolism would no doubt have existed if only language and algebra had existed and fine art had never been heard of. But whether out of these essentially different species of the genus the conception of aesthetic symbolism would have been generated, if no aesthetic sensibility had ever been observed, I must take leave to doubt. The whole nature of the philosophical success is here at issue". We are also in doubt like Basanquet, regarding the validity of the criticism offered by Zimmermann and others like him. History and philosophy should not be considered as totally separate for both are the results of the activity of the spirit. "Historicity", writes Croce[28] "is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form. Historicity is not form but content : as form it is nothing but intuition or aesthetic fact". History and philosophy are not identical and the point of difference has also been stressed by Croce. "History does not construct universals and abstractions but posits intuitions. The this and here is its domain as it is the domain of art." History, unlike philosophy, does not construct the concepts of the real and unreal but makes use of them. History is included in the Universal concept of art. History, in fact, is not the theory of history, which comes under the purview of philosophy. Philosophy is not intuition, in the Crocian sense but concept, not individuality but universality. Here we may note with interest that the world of what has happened, of the concrete, of historical fact, is the world called real, natural, including in this definition both the reality called physical and that called spiritual and human. All this world is intuition : historical intuition, if it be shown as it realistically is ; imaginary or artistic intuition in the narrow sense, if presented in the aspect of the possible, that is to say, of the imaginable.[29] From the confusion between the demands of art in general and the particular demands of history has resulted the theory of the probable as the object of art, which has lost ground to-day. However, the pure or fundamental forms of knowledge are two : The intuition and the concept—art

[26] Zimmermann i. 711.
[27] History of Aesthetic, p. 350.
[28] See Aesthetic, pp. 26-27.
[29] See Croce's Aesthetic p. 30.

and science or philosophy. With these are to be included History, which is, as it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the concept, that is of art receiving in itself philosophic distinction, while remaining concrete and individual.[30] So we find that Zimmerman's absolute severance of philosophy from history as "the story of Newton's apple from astronomical theory" is not tenable. From Zimmerman, an able writer of the Herbartian School, and a pure formalist in aesthetic, no other criticism could reasonably be expected.

Next we are to note the facts that support the double basis. Philosophy as we know is essenially concrete; its principles are bound to be clear, its logical sequences coherent, and its distinctions objective. But in logic, the abstraction of abstractions, it is wholly impossible to motive and correlate the phenomena without referring to their empirical context in the more and less developed language and intelligence of peoples. Yet in logic we are dealing on the whole with a system of which the parts, the individual sciences, are able to co-exist in their highest form and vitality. In aesthetic this is not so; and inspite of the unity of art all evidence points to the conclusion that it cannot possibly be so. Architecture, as we know, was the most important art of the pre-classical period and the extra-classical world, though in this world and period we do not find the culmination of architecture. This is all that the theory absolutely requires; but the other arts comply with it less grudgingly. Sculpture was the pride of Greek art and in Greek art we find the greatest achievements of pure sculpture. For us, Greek painting and music hardly exist; and though this, if a sheer accident, ought not to influence our theories yet we know enough to conjecture with likelihood that acquaintance with these productions would not, when brought into comparison with their modern correlatives, have profoundly modified our ideas of the history of art. Greek poetry is, beyond any doubt, romantic in comparison to Greek sculpture, and plastic or narrowly classical in comparison to modern poetic art. Painting and music as we know them, practically begin with the modern world, and music in particular attains greatness after the impulse of formative art, if not wholly exhausted, had lost its centrality and certainty of achievement. Not only are these arts romantic par excellence as compared with the sculpture and architecture even of modern times, but they attained their culmination, so far as history has yet gone, within the romantic development and as a whole, in separate and distinct epochs. With reference to poetry, the universal

[30] For a detailed study see Croce's Aesthetic, ch. III.

art, it would indeed be unbecoming to speak of a modern superiority so far as excellence is concerned; but in that which separates poetry from the other arts, its profoundness, its freedom and its spirituality, it cannot be denied that modern poetry is more poetic and less "plastic" than that of Greece.

It is good to begin in every classification by a precise definition and delimitation of the subject matter of our classification. In view of the disparateness of much of the material of Art the delimitation or definition has to be effected through subordinating the analytic distinction of the arts to the historical distinction of the art-forms. Thus when Hegel treats at length of symbolic, classical and romantic architecture, we understand that these three forms are essential distinctions in architecture and that architecture again is the "Symbolic" species par excellence in each of these art-forms. Hegel's treatment of this is very largely influenced by Goeth's 'Deutsche Bankunst'. However, it is idle to treat architecture or sculpture, as Hartmann does, by mere general analysis avoiding all reference to their characteristic periods; for inevitably in all such analyses the natural peculiarities of the object-matter are neglected, and nine-tenths of the important phenomena are omitted. The relation, for example, of fine architecture to building or engineering on the one hand and to sculpture on the other is thus discussed, wholly without reference to the actual development of architectural decoration in the greatest periods and to the position of the artist-workmen in regard to Greek, and again, in regard to, romantic ornament. The most important issues are consequently either overlooked or inadequately, if not wrongly alluded to. The wholly unfree character imputed by Hartmann to architecture and all the minor arts and crafts cuts a troublesome knot conveniently at first sight, but leave the far worse perplexity behind, that on this view some beautiful art qua beautiful is unfree. Nothing but a more appreciative treatment such as even in a short abstract[31] like that of Hegel, is seen to be, can combine the truth of Hartmann's idea with that of Ruskin's equally extreme doctrine that architecture is throughout subordinate to sculpture.

But when, leaving the successive art-forms, we come to consider the co-existing system of the arts, a definite ground of classification is unquestionably necessary. Here, the wealth of Hegel's knowledge and industry has disconcerted his critics and even his followers. At

[31] See Appendix I Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts (Osmaston Edn.)

the close of the chapter printed in the Appendix, Hegel mentions two possible abstract principles of classification : the sensuous medium and the relation to space and time. The former might be treated either with reference to the actual material employed or as in a fuller passage,[32] with reference to the effect on the spectator's perception. No Schasler is unable to see why, having mentioned this basis of division, in the latter passage, he at once lets it fall and recurs to the principle of Symbolic classical and romantic as the only one really concrete principle of classification. It seemed strange to Schasler why had Hegel forsaken both these principles and recurred to the three-fold division of art-forms. We are not to go far to find an answer. Hegel so acted simply because, in adopting this latter division he was actuated by the desire to exhaust the content of both these abstract principles, while, even taken together, they are not sufficient to found a division upon. We should note that Hegel employs[33] the first, before dropping it, to clear the ground by excluding the non-aesthetic senses of touch, taste and smell ; the two latter as dealing with matter in process of dissolution being destructive if not appetitive in their relation of the object and the former as in contact only with the particular as such being unable to apprehend a systematic unity in sensuous form. This is probably the true differentia of non-aesthetic senses, and all other non-aesthetic characteristics in them are only of importance as conditions or results of this. The point then of Hegel's concrete principle of division, by which he simply enquires into the powers and conditions of the several arts as human activities producing a certain effect by more or less material means, is this, that by not tying himself down to any abstract principle he is able to let each art stand out free in its full individuality. This explains why he would not rank painting with sculpture against music with poetry or the like. If, for example, we approach the question simply as one of sensuous appearance to the observer, then we lose all touch of the material which sets the task to the artist ; but this is the essential difference e.g. between sculpture and painting ; moreover, all formative arts at least are essentially athletic[34] and through their relation to the artist we obtain an invaluable insight into the nature of expressive self utterance which later criticism in England has independently developed. The character of each individual art is thus scrutinised

[32] See Appendix II, Ibid 253.

[33] See Appendix ii, 253, Philosophy of Fine Arts (Osmaston translation).

[34] See Collingwood's 'Principles of Art' Chapter on 'Language & Languages', p. 341.

by Hegel with a view to the coincidence between its expressive capacity as a whole and any content or import which it appears especially fitted to embody. For it is on the balance and reaction between expression and import that the distinction of the art-forms rests. No parallel series are established. The analogy between architecture and music is simply noted, by the side of other analogies which music presents, as also is a somewhat unpromising resemblance between sculpture and epic poetry.

It has been said that Hegel's classification is a descending series.[35] But this is not so. The romantic arts are the culmination of art as such, though it is mere truth to say that they are not the culmination of beauty in the narrower sense. Whether art, in attaining its culmination, does not tend to pass beyond itself[36], just as in architecture, it has not wholly attained its idea, is another question; and whatever the future may have in store, there is no doubt that the whole ground and content of life, being thoroughly reflective and intellectual, is quite otherwise related to the beautiful to-day than it was in Greece or in the middle Ages. In saying that the art-spirit is essentially in evolution we do not deny that the evolution may be renewed on a higher level than before. The net result, on the whole, is a linear classification, representing the increasing ideality of the arts in terms of all the bases of division, which we have already noted. The intervals between the arts may be imagined as equal, for the three romantic arts are allowed full and free individuality within their class-heading, and music in particular is for the first time put in its true place as the art in which pure feeling and necessary structural form—the two extremes of the mental world—are brought into absolute oneness, so that without any recognisable object or idea the movement of things in as far it interests our feeling is built up into an organic and necessary fabric.

Kant, in the third 'critique' offered a study of the aesthetic activity along with the teleological judgment, as one of the modes of representing nature, when the mechanical conceptions of the exact sciences are surpassed. Schiller considered it as the ground of reconciliation in the struggle between necessity and liberty and Schelling conceived it as the true organ of the Absolute. For Hegel, this aesthetic activity became a mode of apprehending the Absolute. In the

[35] See Hartmann's 'Aesthetic' Vol i. 127.

[36] Appendix, ii, 234 ff.

'Phenomenology' he makes it a form of religion, superior to merely natural religion, because it is, indeed, a mode of realising the subject as absolute self-conscious spirit. In the 'Encyclopaedia', he makes it, with but slight difference, the religion of beauty, a first degree in relation to revealed religion, inferior to the latter, as this latter, in its turn, is inferior to philosophy. The history of poetry and of art consequently appears in the lectures on Aesthetic, as a history of philosophy, of religion and of the moral life of humanity; a history of human ideals, in which the individuality of works of art, that is to say, the properly aesthetic form, occupies a secondary place, or is referred to only incidentally. If the conception of art, as engaged upon the same problem as religion and philosophy, is common to his time, what is peculiar to Hegel is the relation which he establishes between those three forms and the distinctive character which he assigns to art in relation to religion and philosophy. For Hegel, as we have already seen, self-realisation is not possible except through self objectification. The absolute, that objectifies itself through art, religion and philosophy, is real as the objectified absolute content of the different forms of absolute consciousness. In place of the autonomous subject as the unobjective constitutive principle of objectivity (as we find in Kant), we are offered by Hegel the objectified subject as the true fruition and fulfilment of the spiritual reality. Like others, Hegel could not make the aesthetic activity complementary to the philosophical activity, solving in its way the problems that were insoluble to philosophy. The artistic activity is distinct from the philosophical only through its imperfection, only because it apprehends the Absolute in a sensible and immediate form, whereas philosophy apprehends it in the pure medium of thought. This means logically that art is not at all distinct; and that for Hegel, it is practically reduced to philosophical error or illusory philosophy. Art, in Hegel's view, must culminate in philosophy which addresses itself again to the same problem upon which art has worked in vain and attain a perfect solution of it.[37]

Hegel's notion of Absolute gave rise to a philosophical controversy. On this issue alone "interpreters of Hegelian philosophy have contradicted each other almost as variously as the several commentators on the Bible. It is contended by some that Hegel's Absolute is an impersonal Unity, a society of finite but perfect individuals. Dr.

[37] What is living and what is dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, p. 129 by B. Croce.

Mctaggart tells us that Hegel's' "Absolute is a unity of persons, but it is not a person itself".[38] The self differentiations of the Absolute are perfect finite persons', of some of whom our own selves are the imperfect and limited manifestations. On the other hand, the conclusion of the bulk of the British expositors of Hegel is that the Absolute is a person, a subject and not a mere substance, who necessarily reveals Himself in nature and more fully in man. The commonly accepted view of the nature of Hegel's Absolute is that it is the self-conscious unity that comprehends within itself and transcends the relative distinction of subject and object. It is the Central Unity, the supreme spiritual principle, in which all things have their being and find their ultimate explanation and out of which they proceed. It is the absolute subject without relation to which no object can exist and whose own existence depends upon its manifestation in the universe of interrelated objects. Dr. Caird interprets[39] Hegel's Absolute as "the idea of a self-consciousness which manifests itself in the difference of self and not-self so that through this difference and by overcoming it, it may attain the highest unity with itself". This highest unity with itself is achieved through the triadic movement of art, religion and philosophy. The first stage of this triadic movement is Art, the immediate view of the Idea in objective actuality; the second Religion, the certainty of the idea as what is above all immediate reality, as the absolute power of being, predominant over all that is individual and finite; the third, Philosophy, the unity of the first two, the knowing of the idea as the absolute that is no less pure thought than immediately all-existent reality.[40] With regard to the notion of Hegel's Absolute, we differ from Dr. Mctaggart when he holds[41] that it is an impersonal unity of persons. We neither accept the position of Mctaggart nor that of Caird. We fully agree with Dr. Halder when he writes :[42] "I hold that the Absolute is a self-conscious unity of its constituent selves", as self of selves, not an impersonal unity of persons. The absolute of Hegel is a unity differentiating itself into persons and realising itself as unity through the differences it reconciles. It, in one word, is the organic unity of selves—a veritable omni-personality which is at the same time a multi-personality "As the consciousness of the self", writes Dr.

[38] Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 58.
[39] See 'Hegel', p. 183.
[40] See 'History of Philosophy' by A. Schwegler, p. 341.
[41] See his 'Studies in Hegelian Cosmology'.
[42] See his 'Hegelianism and Human Personality' preface p. iv.

Caird,[43] "is correlative with the consciousness of the not-self, no conception of either can be satisfactory, which does not recognise a principle of unity, which manifests itself in both, which underlies all their difference and opposition and which must, therefore, be regarded as capable of reconciling them". The true conception of the absolute of Hegel can be reached only if we can effect a compromise between the extreme views of Dr. Mctaggart, on the hand and of Dr. Caird on the other. Such a compromise we find in Dr. Halder and fully agree with him that Hegel's absolute is a 'Self of Selves', a self-conscious unity of its constituent selves and not an impersonal unity.

As is wont with Western thought, the objective idea of this absolute spirit inspires Hegel's idealism and colours his conceptions of art, religion and philosophy. According to Hegel, self-realisation through conscious self-objectification constitutes the life of the Absolute as concrete spiritual reality. Spirit that is unconscious of itself, spirit without conscious objectivity is empty, abstract spirituality without life. The movement of experience is the objective unfolding of the eternal spiritual reality, the spirit's self-mediation in conscious self-objectification. The life of the absolute, Hegel contends,[44] is thus a perpetual give and take, a giving forth of itself as objective content and a conscious self-attaining and self-fulfilment in the consciousness of its objectivity. The eternal reality mediates itself through itself in the consciousness of the finite—its outgoing as objectified reality is also an incoming or returning into itself as concrete self-conscious spirit. Art, religion, and philosophy represent the successive stages of this self-mediation through self-objectification. Art is the absolute mediating itself in the consciousness of the finite as objective sensuous immage : it is the self-concretion of the absolute as the form of the artistic object ; it is the absolute objectifying itself to sense as symmetry or harmony of sensible form. But as art necessarily falls short of the spiritual content it represents, the absolute content as spiritual necessarily transcends the sensuous limitations of artistic representation. The religious consciousness is an advance on the artistic ; it is the experience of the absolute content as a personal self-communication of the absolute to the finite spirit, a dual reciprocal objectivity of the absolute to the finite and of the finite to the absolute, the

[43] See 'Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge, p. 341.

[44] See 'Studies in Philosophy and Religion' p. 5 by Prof. S. K. Maitra, M.A., Ph.D.

self-communication of God to man and man's spiritual unity with God through prayer, devotion and love. The religious plane, according to Hegel, represents a higher level of absolute consciousness than does artistic representation in symmetry and beauty of sensuous form. But we do not stop at that. The quest of spirit transcends religion and it is philosophic realisation in which culminates this triadic movement. Religion does not take us into the heart of the spiritual reality for it represents the absolute content as felt experience. Thus the Absolute of religion lacks objective necessity i.e. falls short of its character as self-justifying reality. Just as art is superseded by religion, religion in its turn, merges into philosophic realisation. Philosophy is the realisation of the absolute as self-necessitating objectified experience. Philosophy thus represents the highest stage, the fruition and fulfilment of the absolute consciousness. What religion presents as a subjective necessity of feeling, philosophy realises as an objective necessity of thought.

Hegel's conception of art does not stand the test of logical scrutiny for he considered every form of spirit save the supreme form, to be a mere provisional and a contradictory way of conceiving the Absolute. He failed to discover that the first ingenuous theoretic form is lyric or the music of the spirit and there is nothing philosophically contradictory in it. The philosophical problem is yet to emerge. When Hegel begins his meditation upon the phases of spirit, he is already at a point where that region is behind him and yet he does not recognise that he has passed it. Art is below the level of meditation. It is precisely subject without predicate; the subject as such that is quite other than the nothingness and void of the thing-in-itself and of the thing without properties. Art is intuition without having any intellectual relations whatsoever. It is the emotion which a poem communicates, through which there opens a view reality, which we cannot render in intellectual terms and which we possess only in creating it.

In fact Hegel does not shrink from the extreme consequence of his theory. When philosophy is completely developed, art ought to disappear from Hegel's view-point bscause it becomes then useless or redundant. The history of art, which Hegel traces, is directed to showing the gradual dissolution of artistic form. If it is argued, in defence of Hegel that the death of art, of which he speaks, is that eternal death, which is an eternal rebirth such as we observe in the spirit of man, when he passes from poetry to philosophy, rising from

the intuition to the universal, so that in his eyes, the world of intuition loses its colour, we may point out in reply that Hegel speaks of the death of art, not in the sense of perpetually renewing itself, but as actually about to happen or as having happened, of a death of art i.e. in the historical world, i.e. in a sense which is in complete agreement with his conception of degrees of reality as a series of opposites, difficult to abstract and to separate from one another. It is for this reason that the system of Hegel has appeared to be a cold intellectualism, irreconcilable to the artistic consciousness. Such intellectualist fallacy or the fallacy of logicism vitiates Hegel's theory of art for he wanted to fit in his metaphysical scheme of the universe his notion of art and did not treat art as an autonomous free subject of study. He considered art to be an imperfect expression of the logic of reality and to be overpassed and transcended by philosophy as the most adequate self-expression of the absolute spirit. He willingly signed the death warrant of art only to adhere to his pre-conceived metaphysical idea—that the reality is absolute spirit and the real is rational and the rational is real.

Art is expression of inner emotion and as such it is the spirit's self-objectification in individual image. But it does not imply that art is the realisation of the Absolute in sensuous form. Any emotion, we hold with Croce, may be matter for artistic expression. Croce defines art as vision or intutition. He tells us that the artist produces an image or a phantasm and he who enjoys art turns his gaze upon the point which the artist has indicated, looks through the chink which he has opened and reproduces that image in himself. This intuition does not distinguish between reality and unreality; art lacks the thought that is necessary ere it can become myth and religion and the Faith that is born of thought; the artist is not concerned with the 'belief or disbelief in his image' but he simply produces it.[45] Art is, as successful expression of the inner emotions, the self-intuiting of the soul in an individual image, the concrete image-expression of the inner "sentimental tumult". The absolute may be matter for artistic expression in this way quite as much as the relative and the finite. As we have said before, a flower on a crannied wall and the much lamented fate of an erstwhile chaste lady are equally worthy of artistic expression. Hegel's restriction of art to the absolute content is an artificial and arbitrary narrowing of its sphere not warranted by the facts of experience. Moreover, Hegel's view of

[45] See 'Essence of Aesthetic' by B. Croce. (Trans : by Ainslie) p. 18.

art as realisation betrays an obvious confusion of expression and realisation. To express is not necessarily to realise. That art is conscious self-expression is undeniable but it is sheer confusion to mistake the enjoyment of the expressed emotion for the consciousness of its reality. Art, in our view, is both enjoyment and free contemplation, enjoyed objectivity as well as detached contemplation of it. Art in this respect, may be regarded as a kind of spiritual self-emancipation, the spirit's self-freeing from its conscious objectivity. It is emanicipation however not as realisation in a sensuous objectivity as Hegel says, it is emancipation rather as transcendence of the enjoyed self-objectivity. It is, in short, a kind of free subjectivity contemplating its own objectivity with detachment. We may say that art is a preparation in this respect for the higher freedom of pure subjectivity which Indians call 'Svarupāvasthiti'. 'Svarupāvasthiti' is the spirit's rest in itself, spiritual self-repose, the freedom of unadulterated spirituality emptied of all objectivity. Art is a preparation for the higher subjectivity as the detached contemplation of an enjoyed self-objectivity.

As a consequence of the fallacy of logicism, as we have termed it, Hegel fails to explain language. He never reaches the region of aesthetic activity and therein the theoretic form which is truly primary. Language, for Hegel, is an organized contradiction; it is the work of 'Productive' memory. Language produces 'signs', which is defined as 'immediate intuition'. This intuition, according to Hegel, represents a content "altogether different from that which is its own". The form of language is 'intellectual' and is the product of a logical instinct. Language tries to express the individual but due to this logical form it cannot do so. We do not understand how Hegel could ever think that a human activity such as language does not attain its end, that it proposes to itself an end that is absurd and therefore that it must dwell in a self-deception from which it cannot escape? Language is essentially poetry and art; by language and by artistic expression, we grasp individual reality, that individual shading, which our spirit intuits and renders, in terms of sounds, tones, colours, lines and so on. Perhaps that is why Croce considered language to be adequate to reality. Hegel could not completely understand language because he thought of it in a mutilated and intellectualized manner and ultimately declared it to be contradictory. This is true of the language of prose and of poetry as well. In his "Aesthetic", he considers poetic language to be mere sign, essentially different from the lines and the colours of

sculpture and of painting and from the musical tones. Thus, we find that Hegel's erroenous logical theory concerning distinct concepts conceals from him the place that properly belongs to the aesthetic activity and suggests to him a philosophy of language, which leads him of necessity to consider language as an error. Art receives a similar treatment at his hands. He transfers art to a place "where it does not belong and where, like language (which has first been arbitrarily separated from the representative and aesthetic activity with which it altogether coincides), it too ends by appearing as nothing but imperfection and error. That is why Croce accuses[46] Hegel of having failed to recognise the distinctive nature of the aesthetic, the historical or the naturalistic activity, that is to say, art, history or the physical and natural sciences. As we know, the Hegelian dialectic of position, negation and their synthesis is the pivot round which his whole system of philosophy turns. But Hegel failed to notice the distinction between "opposites" and "distincts". This confusion between the synthesis of opposites and the relation of distincts, was fraught with grave consequences. Such confusions led Hegel not to recognise the autonomy of the spirit and he did not attribute their just and proper value to the various forms of the spirit. In Hegel's system, writes Croce,[47] "error was confused with particular truth and as philosophical errors had become for Hegel particular truth, so particular truths, were bound to be associated with errors and to become philosophical errors, to lose all intrinsic measure to be brought to the level of speculative truth and to be treated as nothing but imperfect forms of philosophy".

Hegel might have confused particular truth with philosophical error and Croce might have been justified in condemning Hegel on that score; but it goes undoubtedly to the credit of Hegel that he gave us a somewhat comprehensive treatment of all forms of art with architecture, sculpture, poetry, painting and music. Hegel's 'Philosophy of Fine Art' was not like Aristotle's 'Poetics', dealing only with poetry and poetry alone. Most of the ancient medieval thinkers identified art with some of its particular forms. To some, art was only poetry, to others it was mere painting. Hegel rose above such delimitation and narrowing of the scope of art and treated it as including within itself all the five celebrated forms, viz. poetry, painting, music, scupture and architecture. Hegel ushered in a new

[46] See "What is living and What is dead in the philosophy of Hegel".
[47] Ibid.

era in thus providing us with a comprehensive phenomenology of art, describing art in all its various forms without undue restriction of its scope to literature or poetry. We may here point out in passing that Hegel's classification of art into symbolic, classic and romantic overlooks at least one other important species of art viz., the mystical art. That the romantic art in Hegel's sense of the term, falls short of what may be called mystical art is quite obvious from the fact that in Hegel's pan-logical scheme there is no room any where of the supra-logical or supra-rational as such. Art as romantic is romantic only, according to Hegel, as suggesting a rational content which far overpasses the expressive capacity of what it uses as the material for the suggestion. In mystical art, however, the material and the content are not distinguished as less or more logically coherent forms of the same stuff which is the absolute spirit as a completely logical whole but as being wholly disparate and incommensurable, belonging to discontinuous dimensions of being, the material belonging to the order of the rational and the intelligible and the suggested content being the "wholly other" i.e. the supra-rational and the supra-logical.

CHAPTER V

ROMAIN ROLLAND

Rolland was a humanist at the first instance and then an artist. He was largely influenced by Tolstoy and his outlook on life and art bears testimony to such influence. Rolland regarded social service to be the first duty of every man and he wanted art to serve such an end. An artist having nothing to do with other people's welfare is no artist worth the name. What distinguishes Romain Rolland from others, what distinguishes the beginner of those days and the fighter of the thirty years that have since elapsed, is that in art he never creates anything isolated, anything with a purely literary or casual scope. Invariably his efforts are directed towards the loftiest moral aims; he aspires towards eternal forms; strives to fashion the monumental. Spiritually he feels at one with the Indian seers (ṚSis), who say : भूमैव सुखम् नाल्पे सुखमस्ति (Bhūmaiva sukham, nālpé sukhamasti). His goal is to produce a fresco, to paint a comprehensive picture, to achieve an epic completeness. He does not choose his literary colleagues as models but does take as examples the heroes of the ages. He feels more at home in Tolstoi's war and peace, in Goethe's universality, Balzac's wealth of imagination, and in Wagner's promethean art than he does in the activities of his contemporaries, whose energies are concentrated upon material success. His zeal for the absolute is almost a religion. He dreams of creating a Sistine of symphonies, drama's like Shakespeare's histories, an epic like 'War and Peace'. The timeless is his true World. Among latter-day Frenchmen none but Victor Hugo and Balzac have had this glorious fervor for the monumental; among the Germans none has had it since Richard Wagner; among contemporary Englishmen, none perhaps but Thomas Hardy. Rolland believed that a moral must be the lever to shake a spiritual world to its foundation. The moral force which Rolland possesses is a courage unexampled in the history of modern literature. This young man, writes Stefan Zweig about Rolland, whose financial position was precarious, who had no powerful associates, who had found no favour with newspaper editors, publishers or theatrical managers, proposed to remould the spirit of his generation simply by

his own will and the power of his own deeds. He wanted to reform his contemporary society and he wanted the services of art to be harnessed in this direction. That is why he was haunted by the problem of art as a socially creative force. And he tried to find a solution in the line indicated by Tolstoy. He believed that it was only Tolstoy who solved this problem of art and solved it satisfactorily. Tolstoy had achieved a universality which applied to the people of Europe as a whole and not to any particular caste. Rolland writes :[1] "Yes, the whole of our art is nothing but the expression of a caste, sub-divided from one nation to another, into small opposing groups. There is not one artistic soul in Europe which unites in itself all the parties and races. The most universal, in our time, was that of Tolstoy. In him we have loved each other, the men of all the countries and all the classes. And any one who has tasted as we have done, the powerful joy of this vast love, will never again be satisfied with the fragments of this great human soul which the art of the European Coteries offers us". Humanist Rolland places above everything else his notion of the good and judges the works of art from this point of view. This he learnt from Tolstoy :[2] "All that tends to unify mankind belongs to the Good and the Beautiful. All that tends to disunite it, is Evil and Ugly. That which unites people is good and beautiful for Humanity. Well, if the champions of Science and of Art have the good of humanity as their object, they should not ignore it; and if they do not ignore it, they should cultivate only those arts and sciences which lead to the fulfilment of that object". According to Tolstoy, human welfare was the summum bonum that any science or art should aim at. That alone is of value, he said,[3] which binds men together; the only artist who counts is the artist who makes a sacrifice for his convictions. The precondition of every true calling must be, not love of art, but love for mankind. Those only who are filled with such a love can hope that they will ever be able, as artists, to do anything worth doing. Thus social good and beauty were looked upon by Tolstoy as synonymous. For him, beauty had no other import than the capability of doing good to others. This pragmatic standard of social service was handed down to Romain Rolland by Tolstoy and Rolland accepted this view unquestioningly, only to throw it away as useless in his mature age. The artist in Rolland was not satisfied with this creed of social service and he went

[1] See Life of Tolstoy by R. R.
[2] Vide Tolstoy's letter to Rolland.
[3] Romain Rolland : The Man and His work by Stefan Zweig. Page 20.

beyond such vague standards of human welfare, to be prescribed as the end of art. We shall notice such changes in due course.

Rolland thought of introducing Peoples' theatres with the aim of tutoring public mind and of initiating them in the higher standards of morality and ethics. Art to be worth the name, should help the people in their moral regeneration and cultural upliftment. As Plato wanted to banish amusement art from his Ideal Republic, to save the people of Greece from moral bankruptcy so Rolland wanted to make art serve the end of social service for he wanted to eradicate selfishness from the hearts of the men of his time and thus help them love each other. The creed of universal brotherhood and love of mankind as propounded by Tolstoy was accepted by Rolland and he assigned to art such aims as the propagation of fellow feelings amongst the people of all classes. This was the result of Tolstoy's influence.

Rolland was not totally convinced of such an office of art, as was assigned to it by Tolstoy. Doubt was lingering in Rolland's mind. His first letter to Tolstoy gives evidence of his mental unrest and indecision as to what art should do? He does not fully understand why Tolstoy condemns art which does not shatter his "miserable ego and unifies" him with the Eternal Life. Rolland tries to understand Tolstoy's point of view. He writes to Tolstoy : I believe to have understood that you condemn Art because you detect there the selfish desire of subtle enjoyments which make our selfishness more coarse by the hyper-excitability of our senses. I know that, alas, for most of the so-called artists, art is nothing but an aristocratic sensualism. But is not art something else, something more[4]: "This doubt is there in his mind and we find in his 'magnum opus', 'John Christopher' such lines "But above all—above all if you were musicians, you would make pure music, music which has no definite meaning, music which has no definte use, save only to give warmth air and life".[5] It will be interesting to note that Tolstoy did not condemn art as such and in his book entitled, 'What to do' he has explained his attitude at length. According to him, the ethical formula of primary importance is "to take the service of others as little as possible and to serve others as much as possible, to demand the best and to give the utmost possible in our relations with others". This simple formula was of the highest importance to Tolstoy and he judged all art-movements in the then

[4] Vide Rolland's letter to Tolstoy. (See appendix, Rolland by A. Aronson).
[5] John Christopher Vol. III, P. 403.

Europe in the light of this preconceived notion. "This formula," writes Tolstoy,[6] "which gives a rational meaning to our existence and the happiness which results from the same remove all the difficulties at one stroke, no less the difficulty appearing before you : that relating to the role of intellectual activity to science and Art". Thus Social service, service to others gives a new meaning to all art-movements as well as to all sciences. Tolstoy further tells us that to create true works of art, the artist must have an 'intimate conviction' in his ability as an artist; he must believe that he is an artist and that "he must be so and he cannot but be so." Such convictions are rare and cannot be realised except by the sacrifies which he makes for his vocation as an artist. Tolstoy laying down certain dicta as conditions precedent for the creation of any true work of art, writes :[7] "A person who continues to fulfil his duty of sustaining life by the works of his hands and yet devotes the hours of his repose and of sleep to thinking and creating in the sphere of intellect, has given proof of his vocation. But one who frees himself from the moral obligations to other individuals and under the pretext of his taste for science and art takes to the life of a parasite, would produce nothing but false science and false art". Thus we find that manual labour is not incompatible with the vocation of a true artist which the then continental artists wrongly supposed. Tolstoy wanted to remove the taboo of manual labour from the minds of the fashionable artists and art connoisseurs of his time. He never questions the utillity of what he calls "Real Science" or "Real Art" and "it is impossible and useless either to prove or to disprove them". Why art degrades itself and plays the role of False art, is a question of great importance for Tolstoy, and for Rolland as well. Tolstoy writes to Rolland : "That science and art play a false role in our society is the result of the fact that the so-called civilised people, headed by the scholars and the artists form a caste of their own, privileged like the priests. This caste has all the defects of other castes, lowering and degrading the very principles under which they organise themselves. So we do not get a true art". Art thus loses its universal appeal. It becomes an instrument of play and privilege to a particular class and imbibes the spirit of sectarianism. This is the main contention of Tolstoy and Rolland in his early youth was initiated in such teachings of Tolstoy.

[6] Tolstoy's reply to Rolland's first letter (see Appendix Rolland by A. Aronson).

[7] Ibid.

Alex Aronson[8] describes the intellectual atmosphere of Rolland's early days. The young artist could not find answers to his questions and he in vain searched for them in Shakespeare and Beethoven. "And neither Shakespeare nor Beethoven could give an answer to the pressing problems of the time. Thus only Tolstoy remained". The Tolstoy of Ivan Ilytch with his insistence on the problem of death and human misery remained and also the Tolstoy of 'what is to be done', with his pronounced indictment of art and of such master-artists as Beethoven and Shakespeare. Tolstoy rejected them as artists of Fourth rank and rejected all modern arts as merely sensual and morally corrupting. The youth of Europe of Rolland's time was given a choice between the master artists of the old and their idol of the present. Rolland had to choose between the two—the dynamic greatness of a Shakespeare or a Beethoven and its accompanying joy to live, on the one hand, and the Tolstoy of Ivan Ilytch with his foreknowledge of death and condemnation of the artistic impulse on the other. Rolland could not decide as to what he should do and in a letter written to Tolstoy, he asks : "why does manual labour become one of the essential conditions of true happiness? Should one voluntarily deprive oneself of intellectual activity, the sciences and the arts, which seem to you to be incompatible with manual labour?" For long Rolland's letter remained unanswered. At last Tolstoy wrote : "True science and true art have always existed, and will always exist just as other forms of human activity and it is impossible or needless either to doubt or to prove it"[9]. Tolstoy waged a crusade against what is false in science and in art and such falsity, according to him, characterises the works of those artists" who constitute a privileged caste like the priests". This caste of the artists has all the vices of other castes, which according to Tolstoy, results from a sectarian outlook on life and society. Such false arts have the vice of lying heavily upon the masses and "over and above, depriving them of what they pretend to propagate". Rolland here for the first time, found to his satisfaction the definition of an artist "in terms of human conscience". In a subsequent letter written to Tolstoy in 1897, Rolland writes that Tolstoy was not against art as such but he was leading a crusade against the artists of the day who made art a mere profession. There is no more the old antagonism of art and morality in Rolland's mind. Rolland is convinced of the mission of art that it should do

[8] See "Romain Rolland" p. 10.

[9] Tolstoy's letter to Rolland. Vide Appendix. Romain Rolland by A. Aronson.

good and moral service. He writes : "I dream of nothing more than to do a little good to men and draw them away from the nothingness that kills them". Rolland took art to be a living force, acting and reacting on the society in a way that may lead to its betterment. "The drama" Rolland tells[10] us, "to be a living art, must be of and for the people. Art should be a source of constant energy and it should refresh people with new vigour and vitality. Drama should urge people to act, for, "the happiness of simple and healthy man is never complete without some sort of action. Let the theatre be an arena of action".[11] Action, to be socially beneficial, presupposes introduction of order and harmony 'into the chaos of the soul', otherwise action will be aimless and destructive. This noble task of harmonising the conflicting forces within, is ascribed to art by Rolland. He implies that the people will have to learn from the theatre how to act and how to think. Theatre will be both a school and an entertainment. Rolland defines art to be a school 'not so much of academic learning and scholarship, as of feeling'. The moral lessons should be simple and understandable by all. The plot should be based on the struggle of man with the elemental forces around him. No class struggle, no enmity, hatred or feeling of ill-will should be the theme of art. It should represent humanity as a whole, without any reference to the diverse castes and creeds that tend to create divergence in men. "The people's Theatre shall be open to everyone who is of or for the people. Let us construct in Paris an epic for all Europe".[12]

This type of didactic theory of art is not peculiar to Rolland alone. To justify the ways of God to men, to sharpen and deepen the appreciation of nature and natural beauty or to enchance, refine and spiritualise human life and relations are ends to which poetry and painting have often been harnessed. Shelley writes[13]: "The poet not only beholds intensely the present as it is and discovers the laws

[10] See People's Theatre, P. 105.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The People's Theatre, P. 105.
While Rolland wants the drama to act in the service of humanity, he at the same time lays down that it must not depict the collision of Forces and must prepare only for harmony, smoothness and absence of conflict of all sorts. He forgets that conflict is the very soul of dramatic representation and to the extent that a drama succeeds in representing the clash and collision of forces leading to a climax and perhaps also in addition to an anti-climax, to that extent is it the highest form of dramatic art.
[13] See 'A Defence of Poetry'.

according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present and his thoughts are the germ of the flower and fruit of latest time." For him, the function of poetry is unacknowledged legislation for the world. If we consider poetry and art in general to be 'instructive', we mean thereby that 'poetry is an object of human experience'. But in fact, poetry or art is not covered by what we actually experience; art transcends experience and its suggestiveness can never be found in what we really experience. Art is not a photographic copy of our actual experiences. Imagination works and lends colour and freshness to our hackneyed day to day life. Mr. Joad, in the same vein as Rolland tells[14] us that "art is essentially didactic and the vehicle of a message". The poet, according to him, is a seer, who responds to values which have not yet entered into the texture of common experience. He is the herald of a new dawn. In short, poetry is the instrument of evolutionary purpose, facilitating the emergence of a new level of consciousness. Joad's metaphysics teaches us that there is a world of value—non-human non-material, non-mental but yet real, which is somewhere there, waiting to be discovered independently of our seeking. The artist's pilgrimage is to this land of values and his creation is a mere act of discovery. In Joad's opinion, the artist is a columbus and not a copernicus. The creator's glory is withheld and the artist is invested with the honour of a chance-seeker. Joad takes us back to Plato's realm of Ideas as values and the artistic creation according to him, is nothing but adumbrating the ideal values in empirical material. The poet does not start with the object of solving a social or moral problem or promulgating a new doctrine as Rolland supposed. He is not even conscious that his poetic endeavours are expected to accomplish a general betterment of the race. Not only does the poet usually exhibit no desire of conscious social service, but not infrequently, he is ill-suited for effecting a betterment of life even should he so desire. More often, the artist lacks the requisite knowledge for effecting any improvement in society. Here we will do well to recall the poignant lines of Stephen Spender : "It is destructive for an artist to say that he knows something which he only believes or hopes to be true. My argument is that as a man of action it may be necessary to assume this knowledge but as an artist, it is not only wrong, it is impossible to do so. It may be necessary for the purposes of organisation and confidence that revolutionary workers should adopt a belief which tells them quite positively certain things about the

[14] See his 'Master Life and Mind'.

future. But the point is that it is not really true that people know these things and it is the business of the artist to know it is not true. If a little bird is paralysed with the conviction that in ten minutes' time a very nice serpent which has just looked his way is going to eat him, there ought to be one minute centre of the bird's consciousness that is aware of a million other possibilities and that centre is the artistic consciousness[15]" Even where the artist possesses the necessary social sense and the requisite knowledge, it would be no part of his function as a poet to undertake or engineer social reform. In Fact, there is something incompatible between such knowledge and its expression in a work of art. Art, when harnessed to the cause of educating people, loses the very soul of it. It comes down to the level of a mere school lesson and misses that grace and charm, that freshness and vivacity which make art what it really is. Rolland knew it and that is why he could rise above such didactic theories of art. He knew that 'Othello' was in no sense a drama with a moral and if it preaches any moral unconsciously, it has nothing to do with the artistic excellence of 'Othello'. It may be argued that the function of the poet is to teach through his own peculiar instrument; but this will not do. For if this peculiarity can be determined only in terms of poetry, the whole question will have been begged again. Joad boldly faces this predicament and in an attempt to aruge away his own sense of the "paradoxical in ranking the poet, not with the artist as the creator or contemplator of a nobbler and in some sense perfect world, but with the preacher and the propagandist, as a grinder of axes" asserts that poetry is quite distinct from music, painting and the other forms of art. Inspite of his brave words, says Kabir[16] this is perhaps the reduction ad absurdum of his theory. We are unable to accept Mr. Kabir's appraisement of Joad's position. It appears to us that C. M. Joad is only bringing out the inner essence of the much misunderstood Plato's theory of mimesis. The artist does not create but only adumbrates, according to Joad, the ideal values which are real in a transcedent realm. It is possible to believe in the creation of real novelty in art as we have in the aesthetic theory of Croce and it is possible also to believe in creation as adumbration only as we have in Plato. But this does not reduce the artist of the Platonic theory to the level of a propagandist who belives in art for the sake of the utility or capacity for social service. That others should share in the enjoyment of the art he creates or adumbrates may constitute a motive

[15] 'The Destructive Element', P. 135.

[16] See 'Poetry, Monad and Society' by Humayun Kabir.

for aesthetic activity. But if it is social service, the believer in art as creation is as much guilty of a didactic view of art as a believer in art as adumbration.

'Life', Rolland tells us, 'cannot be linked with death and the art of the past is more than three quarters dead'.[17] Art, to be living, should have a constant communion with the life around and when art ceases to commune with life, it is dead. The art of the past did not satisfy Rolland and he considered its effects to be detrimental to the society at large. The first requisite to a normal healthy existence is that art shall continually evolve together with life itself. That is why he detested all sorts of fetishism in art. He could not understand why classical mummies should be preserved in the art-galley to influence the younger generation of artists? Why should there be so many precedents to follow? He writes: "I do not know whether the Society of to-day will create its own art but I am sure that if it fails to do so, we shall have no living art, only a museum, a mausoleum wherein sleep the embalmed mummies of the past".[18] We have been taught to respect the memory of what has been and we find it exceedingly difficult to tear ourselves asunder. But we must, Rolland tells us, tear ourselves loose from our ancient moorings, so that we may set sail for newer adventures. He let no opportunity slip of jeering at fetishism in art. He did not consider it necessary to preserve the idols or classics of any sort. He only had the right to call himself the heir of the spirit of Wagner who was capable of trampling Wagner underfoot and so walking on and keeping himself in close communion with life".[19] The past is dead and from the classical works of art life has faded or is fast fading out from day to day. If some of the ancient works still retain some of their pristine power over us, 'I am not sure that that power is beneficial now-a-days'. Nothing is good except in its place and time. Rolland pleads for the acceptance of human values as changing and transitory. The forms which were charming and noble in one century are more than likely, when carried over into another, to appear monstrous anachronisms.[20] Rolland here follows

[17] [The Peoples' Theatre], Introduction, P. 5.
And yet a reflective philosopher will say that life is perpetual dying and renewing of itself and that unchanging eternal life is the blank or emptiness of death.

[18] The Peoples' Theatre, Introduction, P. 6.

[19] John Christopher, Vol. 2, P. 227.

[20] Rolland here ignores the universality, the eternal immutable element in all true art. Even if art has value as representing or otherwise suggest-

Tolstoy. One of the dangers of art, Tolstoy points out, arises from the fact that the forces of another day, when brought into an epoch where they do not belong, occasion, serious disorders. It is not only in the domain of ethics that a 'meridian decides the truth' and 'a river fixes the boundary'; it is the same in art.[21] What was good for yesterday, is no longer good for this day and what is good for to-day may not be so for the day to some. Certain ages proscribed all representation of the nude, not only on moral but on aesthetic grounds. The sculptor of the Middle age shunned the naked body as a thing deformed believing that "clothing was necessary to bodily grace": The painters of the school of Giotto found "no-perfect proportion" (cennino cennini in 1437) in the female body. Fénelon, in the seventeenth century condemned Gothic architecture for the identical reasons which render it most beautiful in our eyes. Gluck, a genius of the eighteenth century,, considered it an insult to be compared with Shakespeare. Michael Angelo, the great Italian Painter, spoke of Flemish art in derision. He opined that it was "Good for women, priests and other pious people". Tolstoy's Moujik is disgusted with the venus of Milo. Moreover people of the same generation may not approve the same form in art. It is possible that what is beautiful to the cultured few may seem ugly to the people at large and that it fails to satisfy their needs which are equally legitimate. "Let us[22] not," Rolland tells us, "blindly seem to impose upon the people of the twentieth century the art and thought of the aristocratic society of the past. And besides, the People's Theatre has more important work to do than to collect the fragments of the bourgeois theatre.[23] Rolland

ing the ideals relevant to a particular age, or place yet such art has value as befitting expressions of the inner spirit and motiff of the particular age or place which becomes thereby a value to be enjoyed for its own sake *in all times and places.*

[21] This is also a gross mis-representation of the unconditional moral imperative of ethics. It is no doubt true that no code of conduct is obligatory in vacuo and that every duty has application as morally imperative in a particular situation and under specific conditions. But despite this, it remains true that the duty which becomes morally imperative in a specific situation is authoritative for the situation not merely for the time that the conditions of the situation last but it is authoritative for such situations for all times and all places. This is the real import of the unconditional authority of moral duty.

[22] The People's Theatre, P. 7.

[23] Here also we must join issue with both Tolstoy and Rolland. It may be true that the art which evokes admiration in a particular age, may under different conditions of another age fail to elicit an equal degree of admiration and appreciation. But this no more proves the relativity

fully knew the difficulty in prescribing absolute rules of procedure in matters of artistic creations. He was aware of the divergence of taste amongst people of the same place and of the same time. He writes[24]: "I shall not try to lay down absolute rules of procedure : We must remember that no laws are eternally applicable, the only good laws being made for an epoch that passes and a country that changes". Art is essentially changeable, specially popular art. Not only do the people feel in a manner far different from the cultured class, there exist different groups among the people themselves : the people of to-day and the people of tomorrow : those of a certain part of a certain city and those of a part of another city. We can not presume to do more than establish an average, more or less applicable to the people of our own time.

Rolland, a new convert to the ideals of Tolstoy, tried to formulate rules for a people's theatre. People's theatre, according to him, should represent the fundamental problems of life in a simple and intelligible manner. His craze for doing good to the masses and for making art an agent for the upliftment of the people at large led him to lower down the artistic level to the intellectual standards of an uncultured populace. He turned towards the past and rejected almost everything as unsuitable for satisfying the needs of his generation. He even rejected his own idols, whom once he regarded as truly great artists. Shakespeare and Wagner were rejected outright. Rolland writes[25] : "What profit can the people derive from the abnormal sentimental complications of Wagner, the excessive eroticism, the metaphysics of Valhalla, Tristian's death-scented love, the mystico-carnal torments of the Knight of the holy grail ?" Thus Rolland rejected all that were once dear and valuable to him. We fail to understand whether he pleads for two kinds of drama—one simple and elemental for the people and the other sophisticated and refined for the intellectual elite alone ? Rolland unknowingly touches here upon one of the main problems of his life : the problem of an elite, the forerunners, those who suffer for the common men, who are crucified for the reduction of mankind and *thereby*

of art than changing moral codes of different times and places establish ethical relativity as the last word on morality. The human mind grows under the stress of changing circumstances and its capacity for artistic vision and creation also improves with maturascence of experience. But this only proves gradual unfolding ff the essence of art in human experience and not its intrinsic relativity or its conditionality.

[24] Peoples' Theatre, P. 103.

[25] People's Theatre, P. 40.

show them the way. Here we find for the first time Rolland becoming aware of the necessity of affirming an ideal which will hold good for the elite alone. His conception of what a people's theatre should be naturally leads us to draw a dividing line between the culture of the masses and that of the chosen few. For never will the common man, the man on the street, understand the prophetic ideal of those whom Rolland will later call the fore-runners. We are at a loss to understand how the artist at his best, can cater to the taste of the 'people' of Rolland, maintaining the excellence and integrity of their works. If the artist keeps one eye on the people for whom he creates and the other on his cration, he can not be expected to give his best in his work of art. In such cases the people will not be tutored to the best tradiions of a nation and the artist will fail to perform his duty of helping his own men in the matter of educating their taste. If the artist looks to the people and their intellectual incapacity first and then creates, the works of art will not really help them for whom they are intended. Rolland knew this. That is why he asked the artists and art-critics of his time to mould the taste of his people and thus become "Napoleons of public taste." The people should follow and try to understand the artist. "It was the artist's business to lead the public but not the public, the artist".[26] The artist knew no limitation on his freedom from outside. When he creates he does not remember for whom he creates. Like the painters of Renaissance, the true artist creates for the sake of creation. Here we notice an apparent contradiction in Rolland. Sometimes he pleads for the rejection of all the classics as monstrous anachronisms for they do not suit the taste of his own generation. That is, he asks the artist to abide by the demands of his generations so that their notions of beauty and fine art are respected to the minutest detail. The artist, from this point of view, should not impose anything upon them. His duty is only to satisfy the popular demand. And again, Rolland expects the artists to be 'Napoleons of public taste,' to lead the public in matters of aesthetic appreciation. The people, writes Rolland, should try to understand the artist. That is the artist should go his way and the people should try to follow him. So here we notice an anomaly. He contradicts himself and repudiates what he held before. We agree with Rolland's latter observation that artists should create the public taste. If this privilege is denied to the artist and they are asked to submit to the popular demands, the progress in art, in that case, becomes an absurdity. Without the introduction of something novel,

[26] See John Christopher, Vol. III, P. 85.

something that never was on sea or land, art becomes stagnant and lifeless. No new movement in art is possible in such conditions. Because artists are free to present new things, that is why we have progressed so much in the realm of art. But this does not imply the total rejection of the classics. There is an universal element in all true art which even today, makes acceptable to us, the works of Shakespeare and Goethe, Milton and Kalidasa, Picasso and Rambrandt and others of the kind.

Rolland like Bergson was a worshipper of elan vital i.e. life-force. He seemed to feel its pulsation everywhere, in art, morality and religion. Nothing shall be dead and every thing will breathe life and vigour. This was the fond expectation of Rolland. He wanted dynamism in art and that is why he was even prepared to let go all the accumulated classics of the world literature and art. This dynamism, the movement to newer avenues of creation, were for him a perennial source of joy, and this joy born of spiritual activity was, in his view, the essence of artistic creation. As Goethe says, "If the poet is ill, let him first of all cure himself; when he is cured, let him write".[27] Rolland also subscribed to this view. John Christopher, his immortal creation, was perpetually in a "state of jubilation which had no need of joy." It would adapt itself even to sorrow: its source overflowed with life, was its strength, mother of all happiness and virtue. This life-force according to him is the source of all artistic creations. "To live is to live too much!.....A man who does not feel within himself this intoxication of strength, this jubilation in living—even in the depths of misery—is not an artist. That is the touchstone. True greatness is shown in the power of rejoicing through joy and sorrow".[28] This over-flow of life and its expression go hand in hand. Life changes, so does art and that is the explanation offered by Rolland for the myriad varieties of expression of similar contents. Tagore felt puzzled over the variety of musical forms in different countries at different times. He makes a frank confession[29]: "I have always

[27] Here we may point out that vigour and robustness in life do not necessarily lead to robustness in art and literature. True literature can thrive also on morbidity in man. Flaubert's 'Madam Bovary' is an instance in point. Health and vigour in the artist do not always produce good literature. Dispeptic Swift's satire, consumptive Keat's poems bear eloquent testimony to the contrary. Morbid Strindeberg's 'Father' is no mean achievement in the literatary field. Instance of the kind can be multiplied, which go to disprove Rolland's observation.

[28] John Christopher, Vol. II, p. 177.

[29] Roland and Tagore, Edt. by A. Aronson and K. Kripalani, p. 83.

felt puzzled why there are such great differences in musical form in different countries. Surely music should be more Universal than other forms of art, for its vehicle is easy to reproduce and transmit from one country to another." Rolland offers an explanation for this apparent diversity of musical forms[30] : "In every country, music passes through several stages. The difference observed at any particular time may possibly be due to a difference of the particular stage of development. Music has its childhood, growth and decay. The first song of emotion finds expression through a form which is scarcely adequate, there comes a perfect harmony between emotion and external form and finally a certain formalistation, a stereotyping and decay. If life continues, a new outflow and a new cycle begins again. "Thus we find that Rolland in offering the above explanation is quite consistent with his general position that the flow of life effects changes in the level of art. Rolland is not alone. Tagore also agrees with him." It is the same in every form of art ; in literature also we find that a new urge creates its own form. Thus art and life go hand in hand.

The foregoing discussion may lead one to think that Rolland did not admit Universality in the field of art. It appears as though Rolland thought of art as essentially acceptable to a particular class of people and of a particular time. If art changes with a corresponding change in life, then certainly, the universality of art stands eternally cancelled. But Rolland was quite conscious of this universal element in art. It is this element that makes acceptable to us the works of the master artists of the old, such as Homer, Kalidasa and Picasso. The mode of living, which was theirs, is gone long since. The world in which they lived is no more. But art and literature of those days are still living. Rolland accounts for this universality in art that makes it acceptable to all men. "Thus highest art, the only art, which is worthy of the name, is above all temporary laws : it is a comet sweeping through the infinite. It may be that its force is useful, it may be that it is apparently useless and dangerous in the existing order of the workaday world : for it is force, it is movement and fire : it is the lightning darted from heaven : and for that very reason, it is sacred, for that very reason it is beneficent".[31] The highest art, i.e., art worth the name, is above all temporary laws and as such its appeal is universal. Rolland believed in such universality

[30] Ibid.

[31] John Christopher, Vol. IV, p. 365.

and that is why he repeatedly told[32] Dilip Kumar to propagate Indian music in the West. Rolland believed that there is a universal element in all true art which makes it acceptable to all irrespective of time and place.[33] He says : "I am definitely of opinion that real art must of necessity appeal to all but the half-educated. That is to say, really great art must appeal to the uneducated and to the well-educated alike".[34] Rolland is trenchant in his criticism of the half-educated. They can not apprecite works of art for their little learning damps the freshness of their soul. The grinding mill of the so-called modern education cures them effectually of that freshness of spirit which is responsive to art. Thus here we find, an obvious contradition. Rolland sometimes pleads for the total rejection of all classics as they are no more living. Classics are back numbers that served their day and that is why he asks the artists of his time not to look back to the past for guidance but to move forward being inspired by the inherent creative urge. Classics no more possess their pristine power, their vigour and life, which once throbbed in their hearts. If any of the ancient works possesses some of their original robustness, such robustness Rolland tells us, is not beneficial for the present generation. This is one side. On the other hand, Rolland pleads for looking back to the past for harking to the ancient voices of the master artists of the old. When Tagore told Rolland that of the Italian cities only Florence retained detachment so very necessary for artistic creations and without this detachment the life of art can not exist, Rolland replied in unambiguous terms : "Lately Florentines have been looking back to their ancestors. This is probably the secret of Florence being a great artistic centre".[35] Such lines can be quoted from here and there, where Rolland speaks of the universal appeal in art and they reveal Rolland's inmost thoughts on the nature of art. He tells us : 'But a great creation in art must contain in its rich granary element enough wherewith to satisfy the spiritual hunger of all. Did n't Christ himself say: 'May all eat and drink of it: take, for it is my blood.' And surely Christ did not die for a handful of catechumens.

[32] See Among the Great by D. K. Roy, Ch. I.

[33] Evidently Rolland is moving far away from his initial position, that art must always be relative to the time place and circumstances and it is no art unless it reflects the spirit of the time. The difficulty in Rolland's theory is much the same as in Rabindranath's. We have here a variety of standpoints which can not be brought together and made into a consistent whole without violence to their central affirmations.

[34] Among the Great, p. 18.

[35] See Rolland and Tagore, by A. Aronson, p. 83.

Why should you have a great artist suffer, dream and create for just a few initiates? The illumilation of a real song, like the inspired word, falls where it pleases the Divine. Our role is not to choose our audience: Our role is to sing away. Here Rolland strikes a distinct note and he is no more under the obsession of doing good to the people of France, nay to the people at large like his Greek predecessor Plato. Being under the influence of Tolstoy, the great humanist, he adhered to the theory that art must serve the purposes of life and as such he rejected all the classics, as they had no reference to the pressing problem of the time. The theatre should be a "school not so much of learning and scholary habits, as of feelings". Such professions Rolland made no doubt, but his belief in the inherent power of true art to occupy a permanent place in the history of mankind was unshakable. So we find him contradicting his earlier observaion on art. He believed in the permanence of art and its universality. When he was not worried and pre-occupied with his mania for social service and rather free from the influence of Tolstoy, we get glimpses of his true conception of art. He does not deny the universality of art. The appeal of oriental music is no less irreststible to Rolland in any way than much of the Western music and thus Rolland tries to prove that the appeal of music is universal. Rolland writes: "I for one have felt nearer in spirit to these forms of art and musical expression than to the music of Puccini or Massenet". We fail to understand how Rolland could appreciate oriental music whose genesis goes back to many hundred years. Oriental music specially, the *rāga saṁgit*, has her ancient origin and it is handed down from generation to generation. It is classic and as such it should have been condemned by Rolland. Such music has no reference to practical utility also. So far as we know, Rolland never tried to utilise the Katharsis theory of Aristotle in order to prove the utility of music as such. So from the utilitarian point of view, which Rolland valued so much, music was much handicapped. Yet Rolland preferred Oriental music and he was convinced that oriental music must have a ready acceptance on the continental soil. He believed that there was something of permanent and lasting value in the oriental music which will make it agreeable to the Western world. Here Rolland lets go the elements of relativity which he so boldly attributed to art and admits that at least music, a species of art, is universal in its appeal. He tells Dilip Kumar :[36] "Give what you have to give with both hands. If there is any thing of lasting value in your contribution, believe me,

[36] Among the Great, p. 39.

it can never altogether miscarry. Our task is to give our best to sow. The rest does not depend on us. It is not very clear what Rolland exactly means by 'giving our best'. Does he mean that art is the expression of our selected and embellished personality as conceived by Tagore. Is it only the expression of our higher self? If Rolland means like Tagore that art is the expression of what we aspire to be i.e. our higher self, we differ from him. If art be the expression of personality, this personality must comprise our whole being, both animal and rational. The content does not so much matter as the expression of it. Successful expression makes art what it is. We may express either the beast or the angel in us, it does not make much difference. What matters is the expression, which is identical with intuition, as held by Croce. So we do not agree with Rolland that to make true art we require the best of our personality. Out passions and our compassions, love and hatred, are equally worthy to be theme of art. Any art gallery, any shelf of books will prove it conclusively that our virtues and our vices are equally important for any true artist. Ivanhoe and Brian de Bois Gilbert live side by side in the world of art. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other are denizens of the world of aesthesis. We should not try to give our best in the work art : rather we should try to give in the best way possible.

Rolland in his first book[37] on Beethoven describes the act of artistic creation as a continuous struggle between contradictory forces. This conception of creation was indeed in opposition to every thing the French have thought or said in the past about the creative process. This emphasis on the dualism in the creator's soul, his passionate striving for self-expression and the necessity he finds himself in "to subdue the form to his will" leaves no place for the conception of a 'divine inspiration'. Rolland thus made a restatement of values. In thus revolting against the accepted French traditions, Rolland was largely influenced by Nietzche. His books on Beethoven remind us again and again of Nietzche's conception of a superman, of him who perishes because he wanted more from life than the mediocrity of self-satisfaction. Just as Nietzsche conceived of a struggle between the Ego and his fate, so also does Rolland see in the lives of his heroes the very incarnation of this super human conflict : "Had destiny descended only upon some weakling or on an imitation great man, and bent his back under this burden, there would have been no tragedy in it, only an every day affair. But here destiny meets one of

[37] Published in 1903.

its own stature, who seizes it by the throat, who is at savage grips with it all the night till the dawn—the last dawn of all—and who, dead at last, lies with his two shoulders touching the earth, but in his death he is carried victorious on his shield ; one who out of his wretchedness has created a richness, out of his infirmity the magic wand that opens the rock".[38] We are concerned only with result. We are not so much aware of the intense effort involved in the creative process. The process starts like a groping in the dark, a gradual awakening of the spirit, the great solitude of feverish and exhausting labour. We do not see the innumerable sketches that were needed to give the only perfect shape to an experience. "For only when the medium of art has been subdued to the will of the creator, has the raw material of life been transformed into a work of art." Only when reason gains the upperhand, has life been fulfilled. It is in such a way that the creator marches from fulfilment to fulfilment and more often than not this fulfilment means death : and after every death the artist is reborn again, stronger than ever and ready for a new sacrifice. "He is the masculine sculptor who dominates his matter and bends it to his hand; the masterbuilder, with Nature for his yard. For any one who can survey these campaigns of the soul from which stand out the victories of the "Eroica" and "Appassionata", the most striking thing is not the vastness of the armies, the floods of tone, the masses flying into the assault, but the spirit in command, the imperial reason".[39]

Rolland further explains this creative process in his book on Beethoven. He calls the common multitude the 'herd'. Common men in their utter unconsciousness and unawareness only supplied the fertile soil on which the creative process subsists. Their existence was necessary to provide Beethoven with the raw material of art ; only the clash between his genius and the trivialities of the herd could bring about that tension which led to creative effort. There is no vital art save that which is linked with the rest of humanity. The link might be one of antagonism and conflict. Johann Sebastian Bach,[40] even in his darkest hours of isolation, was linked with the rest of humanity by his religious faith, which he expressed in his art. Handel and Mozart, by dint of circumstances, wrote for an audience and not for themselves. "It is good for humanity", Rolland tells[41] us, "to remind

[39] Roman Rollan : Beethoven the creator, p. 34-35.
[39] Romain Rolland : Beethoven the creator, p. 27-28.
[40] John Christopher, Vol. IV, p. 56.
[41] John Christopher, Vol. IV, p. 56.

genius every now and then : 'what is there for us in your art? If there is nothing out you go?" In such constraint genius is the first to gain. The callousness of the people leaves the genius in a state of spiritual unrest and the constant discrepancy between the genius's sensibility and people's complacency leads to a deepening of the artist's awareness. Aronson thus describes[42] this relation between the genius and the people : "The relation between the genius and the people is always one and the same ; as in a love-relationship the tension between two human beings leads to a deepening of the affections". Thus when the artist expresses, he not only expresses his subjective emotions and feelings but those of the people of his time. Through constant action and reaction, the contemporary society and her people contribute largely towards the making of the artist's mind and when the artist desubjectifies the subjective reactions, they are no more of any particular individual but they belong to all. This position of Rolland may legitimately be considered as not very sound. The stimulus offered to the artist evokes the artistic reaction no doubt, but still the reaction is of the artist's mind and it is coloured by his subjectivity. It cannot be considered as representing the subjective reactions of the people of a whole society under similar circumstances. It is purely the artist's subjective reaction ; but it attains a universal character not because the content or the mode of reaction could be shared by others but because it is the successful expression of the subjective feelings of the artist. Successful expression or desubjectification invests the work of art with such a universality as cannot be explained in ordinary terms. Such expression, which is art proper, is always below the level of thought and this primary spiritual activity is universal. Rolland explains this element of universality in a different way. According to him, the artist in expressing himself expresses his age : "Beethoven has succeeded in constructing in music the imperishable monument of an epoch of humanity, the type of classical art in which is fixed for ever the harmony of one of the great hours of the spirit, the perfect equilibrium of the inner forces, the full consonance of the thought with the matter employed and subdued".[43] Rolland's explanation of Universality in art is not very satisfactory. He explains, rather explains away, this element, so important to make art what it really is, as a mere expression of 'his age'. But great works of art such as those of Homer and Kalidasa have long since crossed the bounds

[42] A. Aronson, Rolland, p. 45.

[43] Romain Rolland : Beethoven the creator, p. 199.

of their ages and have been hailed as true specimens of art by people of all ages. Rolland fails to account for this sort of universality, which means and includes 'all times'. Moliere had his influence over the French society for two hundred years and this sort of quasi universality can be partly explained on Rolland's theory. But the universality of Rambrandt and Picasso, of Shakespeare and Beethoven cannot be explained on Rolland's hypothesis. Rolland tells[14] us : "It was this common mould which it was the business of the great artist to express. His ideal should be a living objectivism in which the poet should throw himself into those for whom he sings and denude himself of self to clothe the collective passions which are blown over the world like a mighty wind". The greatness of the creator is one with the greatness of the people among which he lives. For never can the individual fulfil himself in a social vacuum. The unconscious creations of the people will again be reflected in the works of the master artist. He shall reflect his age, his society. Tagore also writes in a similar vein : "Men are never true in their isolated self and their imagination is the faculty that brings before their mind the vision of their own greater being. We can make truth ours by actively modulating its inter-relations. This is the work of art." Reality according to Tagore, is not based in the substance of things but in the principle of relationship. Thus, for Tagore, to be real is to be related. Without being related, i.e. unrelatedness means unreality. Isolation means death of the artist. Like Rolland, Tagore also appears to plead for a social life for the artist. It is society that makes the artist and the artist and the critic remodel the society in their turn. The artist gives in his turn only what he received earlier. His awareness, his mental discipline, his will which subdues the ever moving passions of his soul, they are all rooted in the 'black earth', in the speech, in the toil and in the blood of the people. The artist, in short, being a social creature, a man who lives and moves in the society, reflects in his creations what he experienced as social being. But there are also moments in his life when the artist in some exalted mood experiences something which does not pertain to the common herd. All such experiences do not refer to the 'black earth' and yet when properly expressed, they claim to be placed in the best art galleries of the world. All great arts are created in such moments of divine exaltation and in such rare cases, something more than the contemporary society is reflected in the works of art. That is why one set up of a particular society

[14] John Christopher, Vol. IV, p. 96.

does not stand in the way of a true artistic creation. The antique and obsolete mode of living in the days of Hamlet and its representation on the stage, with all its old problems does not minimise the artistic value of Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' even to-day. For there is something else in it than a mere photography of the then society. Rolland's explanation does not satisfactorily explain the fact that we, even to-day shed tears over the tragic end of Desdemona and our hearts bleed at the sight of the forlorn Yaksha on the Ramgiri hills. We no longer belong to the age of Shakespeare and Kalidasa, and yet we share the feelings of these master artists, though they expressed only their 'age' according to Rolland. So we do not accept Rolland's explanation of the universality in art.

Art critics often fail to notice the psychology of creation, while judging a work of art. They lack in sensitiveness and as such they do not see beyond the "line". The creator's mind remains sealed to them for ever. But Rolland always wanted to read "between the lines", whether they were musical lines or the lines of colour or the printed word. He could very well see the difference between the statue of Michael Angelo and a symphony of Beethoven. The difference was not only the medium employed, it was also an obvious difference in their approach to life and not least of all, a difference of temperament. "But while in the grandiose intellectualism of Michael Angelo, the master workman, the line is dry, cold and abstract, Beethoven's line is always full and moist with sap, like the spring-filled tree-trunks of the fine Gothic portals."[45] But the question of line is ultimately one of form only. It does not affect the soul of the creator. For, however chaotic the inner life of the artist may be, his "will" or his "reason" will subdue the storm within. Beethoven succeeded only partly; in Michael Angelo's figures we no longer are aware of the "whirlwind of God;" there is the serenity of complete resignation, a kind of sombre joy of having succeeded in repressing what was evil in him. Humanist Rolland was obsessed with a peculiar temperament and he always found suffering where others could see joy. For, he knew that there is only a short step that leads us from the tears of sorrow to the tears of joy. In his diagnosis, Beethoven's sufferings were due to a death-struggle between the Ego and the Universe, one trying to subdue the other; it was also the tragedy of his deafness, which Rolland always considered to be the result of his superhuman struggle for self-realisation.

[45] R. R. Beethoven the Creator, P. 78.

In his new book[46] on Beethoven Rolland gives a new conception of musical creation closely akin to yogic practice. Such a conception can only refer to the master artists of the world, e.g. Michael, Kalidas and Shakespeare. Their meditation and absorption are in no way lesser in degree than those who practise Yoga. The purpose of Yoga as a whole, according to Hiriyana,[47] is to assist man in the ascent from the narrow personal view congenital to him to the larger vision which brings freedom with it. Art, likewise, helps man to take a detached view of life and thus realise freedom through sensuous representation. The appreciator is led to a world of freedom and beauty. If art is regarded as objectification of subjective feelings, it necessarily implies detachment and broadness of vision. 'The keyword to this stage of discipline of Yoga', Hiriyana tells us[48] 'is impersonality. Man must overcome the egoistic impulses in him which are the source of so much evil in the world? The impersonal attitude thereby attained, is described as 'dispassion' (vairāgya). The lower detachment (apora vairāgya) is akin to the artistic detachment.[49] As in Yoga, so also in the creation of a work of art, the subject does not identify himself with the object. The object of art is the subject objectified. It means the complete separation of the subject from his ego or empirical self and the subject merges himself completely in the objective content. Such separation is also characteristic of the meditation or Yoga as conceived in the Sankhya-yoga system. This is different from the upanisadic yoga. In the upanisads,[50] we find that the individual self unites with or merges in the absolute self by means of yoga but in the yoga system 'where no such self is acknowledged, it comes to be by itself, through detachment (asanga) from Prakriti. 'Thus yoga, which means union here virtually means disunion or viyoga in the Sankhya-yoga system. Thus the yogic disunion or detachment is somewhat akin to the artistic disunion of the feeling from the subject. But the deep concentration as is needed for yogic practice is not commonplace and if we try to generalise it as a condition precedent for all artistic creations, we

[46] Published in 1929.

[47] The essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 122.

[48] Ibid, P. 123.

[49] We may note here that in the representation of the gods and the goddesses in the Hindu pantheon, Siva [whose other names are Jogesh, Jogindra, the King of the Yogis and who represents to the Hindu mind the embodiment of Yoga at its highest perfection] is depicted as absorbed in the yoga of music, playing on the tamburin.

[50] Ibid, P. 26.

will misunderstand Rolland. He tells us specifically that it is not for ordinary artists and musicians. Rolland writes : "Music developes in its own elect that power of concentration on an idea, that form of yoga, that is purely European,[51] having the trails of action and domination, that are characteristic of the West : For music is an edifice in motion, all the parts of which have to be sensed simultaneously. It demands in the soul the vertigious movement, in the immobile, the eye clear, the will taut, spirit flying high and free over the whole field of dreams".[52] Later on, in the same book he speaks of the connection between Beethoven's "perpetual congestion of thought that never ceased its concentration and the catastrophe that overtook the organism".[53] According to Rolland "Beethoven's passionate pursuit, this multiplication of the idea that has been seized upon, bent to his will, subdued, produces on simple and sincere natures that yield themselves upto it an effect of hypnosis, a yoga. Even a casual glance at his book on Vivekananda will reveal a number of startling statements about the supposed similarity in the concentration of thought required for yogic practices on the one hand and artistic creation on the other. We read in his book[54] that Vivekananda could attain the heights of contemplation only "by sudden flights amid tempests which remind me over and over again of Beethoven".[55] Later on he speaks of the mystical experience as "an attitude of mind latent in all who carry within themselves a spark of the creative fire" and mentions particularly "Beethoven's crisis of Dionysiac union with the mother, to use one name for the hidden Being whom the heart perceives in each earth beat."[56] Rolland goes so far as to say that in all countries and at all times thinkers and artists have unconsciously practised intense meditation and again cites Beethoven as example, who "in complete ignorance of Rāja Yoga in the strict sense of the word"[57] achieved it and thereby wrecked his physical organism to such an extent that

[51] This is a misconception. Music and yoga or the music of yoga and the yoga of music receive equal emphasis in the Hindu cults of Śiva, Ganapati and Saraswati especially in the cult of Śiva who is represented as Yogarūra i.e. as absorbed or completely merged in yogic trance while playing on his tamburin. So also Nārada, the seer, is represented as chanting divine psalms in religious absorption by playing on his bina.

[52] Beethoven the Creator (1929), P. 42-43.

[53] Beethoven the Creator, (1929). P. 342.

[54] Life of Vivekananda.

[55] Ibid, P. 4.

[56] Ibid, P. 70.

[57] Ibid, P. 256.

it brought about the final tragedy of his deafness. And lastly he insists upon the fact that Vivekananda "although an artist by race and a born musician went so far as to reject the dangerous power of artistic emotion, especially that produced by music, over the exact working of the mind".[58] Like the Indian yoga, one who has attained to it, carries it about with one everywhere, when walking, talking, working, in every act of the daily life."[59] Deep concentration of mind leads to a total blackout of all physical movements and when such concentrations are long and enduring nature takes her revenge. A complete paralysis of some physical organ is the result. Such a thing, in the opinion of Rolland, happend to Beethoven. Rolland's diagnosis of Beethoven's deafness was supported by Dr. Morage. He wrote to him : "Your comparison with Indian yoga appears to me to be very exact".

Rolland agreed with Tolstoy that art must call men to purposeful action. His love of humanity prompted him to make art subservient to the ends of social service. He lamented the absence of this love in his contemporary artists. He writes. "The artists of that time were far removed from that love. They wrote more or less only for a more or less anarchical and vain group, uprooted from the life of the country, who preened themselves on not sharing the prejudices and passions of the rest of humanity or else made a mock of them."[60] This sincere feeling for others is a condition precedent for all true artistic creation. This 'other regardedness', to borrow a word from Croce, is the sine qua non of Tolstoy's conception of art. Rolland, in his early days subscribed largely to the views of Tolstoy. In Tolstoy, the need for action becomes obvious : not only is it explicitly stated in his novels and essays but there is between the lines an implicit moral urge towards action which distinguishes Tolstoy from Rolland's other heroes. And action based upon a revaluation of life, ultimately means social action. Rolland writes : "But as Tolstoy was not a Hindu mystic for whom extasis is enough, as in him were mingled the dreams of the Asiatic with the mania for reason and the need for action of the man of the West, he had afterwards to translate his revelation into a practical faith and to deduce from this divine existence rules for our daily life."[61] Here

[58] Ibid, P. 262.
[59] Ibid, P. 280.
[60] John Christopher Vol. IV. P. 56.
[61] See R. R. Life of Tolstoy.

for the first time, doubt arises in Rolland's mind. If indeed, it is the noblest function of a writer in our time to show the way to action and especially to the right kind of action, the agonies of an over-strained sensibility, the self-imposed sufferings of a tormented soul, have no place in the work of art. And yet Tolstoy's own life was full of torment and unhappiness. If the faith' of a writer should lead to action, then this faith must indeed be complete. And yet there is much that remains fragmentary in Tolstoy's faith. Rolland writes[62] of Tolstoy : "But I must say nevertheless that Tolstoy is a bad guide. His tormented genius has always been incapable of finding a practical way out. His deep fraternal compassion induced him to condemn art and science as being the privilege of the elite alone. And his philanthrophy did not help him a bit in that it did not help him alleviate the suffering of others. And if he had not conquered the world by the glory of his great art, his moral and religious thought would never have spread everywhere with such far-reaching repercussions". So, we find that Rolland is gradually over-coming the influence that Tolstoy exercised over him. Unfortunately Rolland is never as difinite as he should have been in his later criticism of Tolstoy. Rolland in his early days was a valiant champion for Peoples' Theatre and he wanted to retain only such art as rendered service to the people to alleviate their distress and suffering. He believed in such a power, which art was supposed to possess, as could make the worst sufferings of man lighter and easier. He tells Dilip Kumar : "There was a time, you know, when I was not very well off—when I could afford only the galleries of the theatres and the concerts. There I used to see again and again how the tired pale faces of those hardworked poor people about me leap to life whenever the music or the acting caught fire."[63] A single symphony of Beethoven far surpasses in moral effect half a dozen of social reforms. Such a symphony appeals to the heart and in a moment the whole man is changed into a new being. The more down-trodden the community the greater is its spiritual need for art. The forces of the world outside hound the man from one end to the other and he seeks refuge to console his afflicted soul. In such hours of frantic seeking for a safe harbour art comes to the rescue of the suffering soul. The more grinding the miseries from without, the more fortifying the cosolation from within. Rolland had such a conception of art and it is already quite familiar to us.

[62] Letter to Dilip Kumar Roy, dated March, 1922.

[63] See 'Among the Great' by D. K. Roy. P. 13.

Being inspired with such a conception he pleaded that it was a part of an artist's or intellectual's duty to devote his leisure hours to the elimination of obvious social injustices and inequities. For, one of the deepest creative impulses of the artist lies in his realisation of the unity in apparent diversity. The artist is in search of this unity and his mission is to realise it. For Rolland, every oppression is a discord—an anachronism, which cannot but vitiate the best artistic creation at its source. He could find support in the famous lines[64] of Yeats :

"All things uncomely and broken,
all things worn out and old,
The cry of a child by the roadway
the creak of a lumbering cart,
The heavy steps of the ploughman,
splashing the wintry mould,
Are wronging your image that blossoms
a rose in the deeps of my heart."

Rolland's thesis that art and the artists must serve the people is an old story. But Rolland did not end there. His artist's instinct gave him an inkling of the true nature of art. When art serves any social end and is pursued for the sake of the social end it serves, we have no more the best possible art but only a mediocre or an indifferent variety of it. No true artist should be prompted by any extraneous motive either to do good to himself or to others by his act of creation. The artistic motive should be self-contained. It should not, under any circumstances, reflect some purpose, inconsistent with its intrinsic nature as an end in itself. The artist should not be diverted by any motive, either self-regarding or other-regarding. Such a position is not consistent with the autonomy of art or with what Rolland said before. He tells us :[65] "Now my whole life has taught me this that the first and paramount duty of the artist and the intellectual is to be true to his inner call and urge sleeplessly : he must above all keep the lamp burning in the shrine of inner perceptions and must create when his daemon prompts him". This is certainly contradictory to what he so long professed and preached. But this contradiction saved his reputation as an artist and art-critic, for it is through this contradiction he lets us know that he did not fail to realize the true nature of art. He became a

[64] See his 'The Rose in the Heart'.

[65] See among the Great, P. 17.

believer in the theory of 'art for art's sake' and this triumphant belief was ably expressed through the lips of John Christopher, his immortal creation. Christopher told[66] Sylvian Kohn, a fashionable art-connoisseur : "Art for art's sake'.....That's a fine faith. But it is the faith of the strong. Art ! To grasp life as the eagle claws its prey, to bear it up into the air, to rise with it into the air, to rise with it into the serenity of space". He thus not only repudiates his previous conviction that art is for life's sake, he also tells us in definite terms that a democratic art, as conceived by Tolstoy, is a misnomer. He writes : "Oh ! wretched men ! Art is no common ground for the feet of all who pass it by. Why, it is a pleasure, it is the most intoxicating of all. But it is a pleasure, which is only won at the cost of a strenuous fight. It is the laurel-wreath that crowns the victory of the strong.[67] All his professions with regard to the utility of art as a socially creative force are thrown into the wind. Rolland is no longer a believer in Tolstoy's theory that only that art is worth the name that serves the good of the majority of men. The excellence of art is no more to be determined by the standard of maximum social benefit. Here Rolland stands totally free from the influence of Tolstoy.

The question whether art will be for the sake of life, whether its values should be dictated in terms of utility and social service was set at rest. It no longer troubled Rolland for he found the answer. Sri Dilip Kumar asked Rolland : "Should art be uplifting in its very nature ? If not, would not the function of art be exhausted in supplying to the human soul a mere ephemeral joy, pleasurable no doubt, but of no very deep import or significance ?" 'The answer that Rolland gave is worth-perusing. It throws lights on the inner recesses of his heart, which cherished his well-thought ideas on the problem : "First of all, it is good to take one's stand on this bed-rock truth that no true pleasure or joy is ephemeral. For every true thrill or delight must of necessity elevate us, bequeathing its leaven of permanent inspiration. But another thing must equally be borne in mind in this connection : this feeling of elevation or elation is not necessarily a handmaid of bad art married to lofty moral. Take for instance, any didactic poem or novel of the banal type. You will find after reading it that for all its high moral fervour, you are not a bit the wiser. Take next some recognised work of art without any

[66] John Christopher, Vol. III. P. 82.
[67] John Christopher, Vol. III. P. 82.

moral whatsoever. You will find it will breathe into you something bracing, even uplifting, as you put it[68]. Next Rolland goes to cite the case of a lady, Malwida Von Mysenberg by name, who was a friend to Rolland. She was a lady of 'the highest culture' and she wrote in her reminiscences that once in a great crisis of her life she witnessed a performance of Othello, which gave her a clue to the meaning of life : so much so, that the recaptured thrills of life and colour where there had been only a grey waste of lifelessness. Yet Othello can hardly be called a play with a moral ; Rolland writes :[69] "You seem surprised at the incredible impression made by Othello on Malwida Von Mysenberg. But do you know that the impression produced on the whole public of the Theatre Francoise by Sophocles' Grim tragedy King Oedipus was something very similar in nature? Here Rolland strikes the right chord and we fully agree with him that a true work of art, a thing of beauty may refine and purify us and often without our knowing it but that is not the aim art tries to attain. If art does not do any thing else than to express the artist's feelings, that 'anything' is accidental and has nothing to do with the true nature of art. If a work of art pleases anybody and teaches another and irritates a third one, these 'pleasing' 'teaching' and 'irritating' are not to be taken into consideration for they are mere accidents. 'Othello' is not full of morals and Shakespeare never contemplated any moral to be propagated through 'Othello'. Yet if any one like Mysenberg can draw out any moral from it, we cannot characterise this moral element to be the prius of its artistic excellence. There may be something bracing or morally energising in a work of art and it can help the reader to find out the way that he is looking for. But moral influence has nothing to do with the excellence of any artistic work. Both of them may be there without being dependent on each other in any way. They are something confused "Thus in art, we find the opposites of aspiration and achievement, of beauty and utility stand out in their bold antagonism when viewed in the abstract. Art is like the sun whence it is sprung. The Sun is neither moral nor immoral. It is amoral. It is that which is. It lightens the darkness of space. And so does Art.[70]

This conception of art, free from all extraneous considerations was latent in Rolland and he considered freedom to be an important factor. He detested all sorts of affected style, and working in a

[68] Among the Great : D. K. Roy, P. 24.
[69] In a letter to D. K. Roy.
[70] John Christopher, Vol. IV. P. 365.

closed room was a sin in his opinion. He could never reconcile himself to the idea that artists should produce sealed chamber compositions. Rolland always thought of Beethoven composing as he strode across country, rushing down the hillsides, swinging along through sun and rain, terrifying the cattle with his wild shouts and gestures. Such vigour and life, such freedom and wildness were what he admired most in art. Rolland of 'John Christopher' is the greatest champion of freedom for the artist. He made great efforts to combat the stay-at-home spirit of the French, who will shut themselves up in their homes and cannot be induced to go out. So their music lacked air and freshness and life. "It was sealed chamber music, sofa music, music with no sort of vigour". Rolland had an instinctive dislike for such "constructed" works of art. He had a feeling that the genial Cantor always wrote in a closed room. His work smacked of stuffiness. His music lacked the brave outdoor air. Rolland shared ideas and ideals of art with Beethoven and Handel. Like them, what hurt him in all of them, especially in the classics was their lack of freedom. Lack of freedom means lack of creative urge in the artist and as such they were merely made to order. The true nature of artistic freedom is that sort of freedom with which the bird sings. Music must be spontaneous, life-like and self contained. Rolland's dislike for the classics was due to the lack of life and vigour in the classics on the one hand and freedom on the other. But his dislike for the German Romantics was none the less severe. These Romantics claimed to be the most spontaneous, most free and at the same time they were the least constructive. Artists like Schumann had poured their whole life drop by drop into their innumerable works. They were sincere to the core. Falsity was farthest away from them. They could not be taxed with that. Schumann said what he felt. His fault did not lie in saying what he had felt but "his fault was in feeling falsely". His feelings were false and his art had the imprint of these false feelings. So his art remained far away from truth, which Rolland valued so much for the life of art. According to him, depicting this type of false feelings was the worst falsity and German art abounded in this type. Rolland writes : "The more a German musician is naive and in good faith, the more he displays the weakness of the German soul, its uncertain depths, its soft tenderness, its want of frankness, its rather sly idealism, its incapacity for seeing itself, for daring to come face to face with itself. That false idealism is the secret sore even of the greatest of them, of Wagner.[71] So,

[71] John Christopher, Vol. II. P, 170.

according to Rolland, False representation as well as false conception or idealisation lead to falsity in art. They are equally blame-worthy. They hamper the true mission of art—a mission which art unknowingly fulfils. Such falsity leads to bad art. Truth had the first preference for Rolland. It was the highest human value. His love of art never outweighed his love of truth. Truth to him, was greater than art and he had no hesitation to forego his claims as an artist if art has anything to do either with false representation or with false conception or idealisation. He wanted to see in the artist modesty and sincerity, the two handmaids of truth. A really truthful man cannot but be modest and sincere. If art dabbles in falsity, it loses its universal element, that which makes it universally acceptable.[72] Rolland writes[73] : "Be true even though art and artists have to suffer for it. If art and truth cannot live together, then let art disappear". This truth element in art assures the greatness of the artist as well as the permanence of his work. Gottfried, John Christopher's uncle indicted John's musical compositions as they were not true to his feelings, written as they were simply for the sake of writing. There were pride and immodesty in the composer and they had their reflection on the composition. So it was not good. Gottfried told[74] Christopher : "A man is always punished when he is proud and a liar in music. Music must be modest and sincere or else, what is it : impious, a blasphemy of the lord who has given us song to tell the honest truth". But if Rolland means by truth correspondence with the factual world, his conception of art becomes all the more poorer. Correspondence theory of truth drags art to the level of mere photography. Mere resmblance or exact copying cannot make art what it is. Had it been so, nature would have been the best specimen of art. Any human effort in this direction would have been surperfluous. If we interpret Rolland's insistence on truth as mere correspondence with the factual world, we tacitly admit the charge of Plato against

[72] John Christopher, Vol. II. P. 215.

[73] It would appear from Rolland's views that the conception of truth and falsity can be decided once for all as such without the least chance of its subsequent rejection as untenable and demanding substantial modification. This is a position, however, that will not bear examination. Even a tyro in metaphysics will hesitate to dogmatise any particular conception of truth or falsity as a last word, any particular concept of truth or falsity as the immutable, irrefutable view of the matter. Rolland does not say what is or should be the criterion of truth or falsity in art. Rolland's own view of the absolute immutable truth or of falsity either need not be itself absolutely and unalterably true.

[74] Ibid. P. 122.

art and art becomes a superfluity. Moreover, correspondence theory overlooks the element of suggestiveness in art. Art is not art by virtue of what it reflects from nature but for something else that far surpasses the bounds of lines and colour, of sounds and words. Another important point to be noted in this connection, is that of freedom. If truth means correspondence, the freedom of the artist is largely limited by the brute facts of experience. Imagination is crippled. The 'skylark' of Shelley becomes an impossibility, 'urvasi' of Tagore turns to an absurdity. So Rolland guards against false conception or idealisation and not so much against false representation. Incoherent conception makes art ludicrous. False feelings always make bad art. That is why Rolland indicted Schumann. Representation, not of the factual world, but even true representation of emotions i.e. emotional reactions are not considered essential by Rolland for the purposes of real art. Rabindranath also shares Rolland's views. Tagore tells[75] Rolland : "The purpose of art is not to give expression to emotion but to use it for the creation of significant form. Literature is not the direct expression of any emotion. Emotion only supplies the occasion which makes it possible to bring forth the creative act." And Rolland agrees with Tagore on this point. Thus we find that emotions occasioned by any incident should not be translated into the language of any form of art. It supplies the 'occasion' and as such is a condition precedent of any artistic creation, according to Rolland.

The next important question with regard to Rolland's conception of art is whether there is any intellectual element in art. Authorities on art are not at one as to whether art should contain an intellectual element as a necessary factor of its essence. Sri Aurobindo is of opinion that art at its highest is possible only at the supra-rational plane of experience whereas Kant held that there is an element of intellectualism in all true art. Rolland holds that want of intellectual training does not in any way hamper proper artistic appreciation. But he does not subscribe to any of the extreme views and accommodates both feeling and intellectual elements as equally important in his theory of art. He tells us that an unsophisticated mind conduces to better appreciation of art while knowledge dispels the mystery woven round the mind of the audience. At least this is true in the case of music. It is a mistake to claim that a deeper

[75] Rolland and Tagore. Ed. by Alex Aronson and Krishna Kripalani, P. 80.

knowledge of a work of art intensifies the enjoyment of its contemplation. Its knowledge uniforms the enjoyment but withal renders it cold in that it dilutes the mystery.[76] There is no denying the fact that in music, appreciation may be the fullest, even though the appreciator does not understand the meaning of the piece of music as such. Rolland tells[77] Roy : "The enigmatic fragments of the concerts (heard in the day of my unsophisticated youth) used to assume the colossal proportions they did, by virtue of what the heart and the imagination wave around it all. Now, however, we have traversed the paths much too often, having learnt since to recognise the sovereign order and reason which once lay concealed behind the apparent delirium of the imagination. Here it may appear that Rolland, like Croce, will hold the scale in favour of feeling element in art. But this is not his real view. Says Rolland. "The highest appreciation is possible only when you strike the golden mean between the two attitudes intellectual and emotional. This striking the golden mean is possible for all genuine art-connoisseurs and artists."[78] The power of harmonisation is almost native and instructive with them. In Beethoven, we find this happy harmony in its native spontaniety—this marriage of the intellectual appeal with the emotional. There is in him, a blending of the two, which is hard to distinguish. So far as the common man is concerned, the emotional element no doubt, dries up with advancing age. In our youthful days, we are easily moved to tears or to a sense of great joy and deep satisfaction at the least stimulation. But with advancing age, our response becomes weaker and sometimes we fail to

[76] This is both true and false. It is true in so far as it rightly stresses the opposition of feeling and thinking, so that thinking and contemplation must necessarily reduce the intensity of feeling and conation. This is a truism of psychology. The more intense the feeling, the more is thinking in abeyance and the more intense the thinking, the more colder is the feeling so that the two may be said to be inversely related though neither can function without the other. To make a general application of this rule to all forms of art without exception will be misleading. For example in the particular case of poetry and painting a knowledge of the subject matter is essential for a true appreciation. This is also true for sculpture and architechture, specially, in the case of any form of modern painting, e.g, cubism, if we are not helped with a proper understanding of the subject matter of the artistic work, we fail to appreciate it. The same also is the case with poetry, both ancient and modern.

[77] Among the Great by D. K. Roy, P. 19.

[78] Ibid. P. 20.

respond altogether in our old age. This is true of the ordinary man without exceptional gifts. But a great artist retains his native freshness unimpaired. Age does not deprive him. Wagner composed his famous "Parsifal" when he was 63 years old. Even at this old age his emotional nature did not get atrophied and overlaid. Rolland, in support of his contention cites Nietzche's 'Origin of Tragedy' as an authority in point: "In that book Nietzche has delineated two types: Apollonian and Dionysian. The former are are the disciples of Apollo and stand for intellectualism. The latter are the disciples of Dionysius and stand for unbridled emotionalism. The outlook of each on life is sound upto a point. The correct view of life should aim at the harmonisation of these two attitudes".[79] Such harmonisation is always unconscious. A real expression makes art what it is. When something is 'intuited', no intellectual category, in the Kantian sense works there. It is below the thought-level. Our head does not help so much as our heart, in the proper appreciation of any work of art. But this does not mean a total negation of all knowledge-element. To be emotionally conscious, certainly implies a primary knowledge of what we are conscious of. In appreciating the 'Madonna' of Raphael, the 'apotheosis of motherhood', we must have a primary conception of what it stands for. We may not intellectually scrutinise the conceptions of such motherhood and all its ethical implications, we may not go into details, but we must have a primary notion of the sacred relation between the mother and the child. Then and only then we can fully interpret the emotional response that is evoked in us by such a piece of painting. Such knowledge is not very important, but it is there. We may not count the knowledge-element as the deciding factor but it also has its contribution towards the creation and appreciation of art. Appeal in art is mainly emotional. We agree with Croce here. But this does not mean that knowlege is in exile from the domain of art. The famous painting of Rabindranath.[80] by Subho Tagore, I remember, seemed to be an enigma to us. A few words of explanation offered by the artist opened the gate of a new world before our eyes. We could very well visualise against an infinite background a moving meteor, calm, serene and effulgent, which resembled the face of Rabindranath. It represented the mighty expression of his face, with those dreamy but luminous eyes and the face was lit with a dynamism that is peculiar to the brush of Subho Tagore. We had

[79] See Among the Great, P. 30, by D. K. Roy.
[80] Recently exhibited, at the Ashutosh Hall, Calcutta University.

a better appreciation when we had a few words from the lips of the artist, offered as an explanation. The recent art-movements go to show that knowledge element must always be present in the proper appreciation, not to speak of the creation of art. That is why in all art exhibitions of modern artists, we find ready booklets explaining different art-exhibits. Without such explanations, the spectator has very little chance of proper appreciation. There is no denying the fact that art, at least poetry and painting are growing more and more intellectual and thereby becoming less and less popular. The aesthetic activity, as contended by Croce is below the intellectual level and it is the primary universal act. The more intellectual it becomes, the less is its appeal to the common men. But there is such a thing as our intellectualism in art and this, it appears to me, to be the great danger that threatens the majority of modern art movements. If artists thus indulge in intellectual acrobatics in the name of art, we are sure, art will die a natural death. It will live for the cotery of a 'vain group', as pointed out by Rolland. In the field of modern Bengali poetry, such things are happening. Poets have started intellectualising their works and as a result poetry is losing her appeal not merely to the common readers day by day but becoming an esoteric cult of a closed circle. The harmony of the intellectual and the emotional appeal, so much stressed by Rolland is no more there. It is becoming one-sided. It is losing its 'warmth, life and air', which emotion alone can give.

CHAPTER VI

TAGORE AND CROCE

Art must be distinguished from the Philosophy of Art. It is possible to philosophise on Art without being an artist as contrariwise one may contribute to real art without any clear comprehension of its nature or essence. Croce was no artist himself though his philosophy of art shows extraordinary insight into the real nature or essence of artistic creation. Tagore is an artist in the first instance and only secondarily a critic of art. It would appear that an artist who takes to philosophising on the nature of art is obviously on surer ground than one who philosophises on art without being able to produce real art. But this is not always the case and as regards Croce it is certainly not the case. For though he has no artistic creation to his credit, he yet shows as a critic of art an insight and firmness of grasp which are rare even to poets and artists of great renown and fame.

Tagore is a mystic poet and philosopher. Some may contend that poetry and mysticism are incompatible. But Professor Radha Krishnan, in his "Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore" holds that they are not incompatible and he cites Dante, Goethe, the auhors of the Upanishads and many of the classical poets of religious Asia as instances in point. Rabindranath was not alone in combining mysticism with poetry but only he swelled the number of the galaxy of mystic poets whose talents will never be questioned. On the other hand, Croce is neither a poet nor a mystic. He is a consistent logical thinker of the highest order. Like Tagore, he refuses any extramental reality or attribute thereof and in this respect they both differ from Kant. Kant's thing-in-itself is a chimera to them. Both Tagore and Croce agree that truth and beauty are subject-dependent. Croce has to his credit the great achievement of installing aesthetics on its own pedestal. He has rightly been called[1] the Adams Leverrier, who discovered Neptune. Like Adams, he vindicated the existence of another science as yet unknown and assigned to it its proper function. Thus Croce liberated Aesthetics from subservience to philosophy and

[1] See Preface, 'Philosophy of Croce' by Wildon Carr.

established its autonomy in the commonwealth of human knowledge and culture.

In Croce, we have the objectivistic view of spiritual life as objective self-fulfilment through objectified self-expression. The life of the spirit, according to Croce, is unceasing self-objectification as intuition-expression of the spirit's inner "sentimental tumult", the spirit's *a priori* aesthetic synthesis of feeling and imagination, the intuition or objectified expression of its inner stirrings. But intuition is only the first stage of spiritual fruition; the satisfaction which it brings is that of successful expression. Side by side with this satisfaction however appears a new dissatisfaction, the dissatisfaction of the intellect to know i.e., to sort and classify the image-expression as reality. Thus intuition passes over into perception i.e., into the knowledge of reality. In this way the *a priori* aesthetic synthesis becomes a new synthesis i.e., an *a priori* logical synthesis of representation and categorisation of judgment through the relation of subject and predicate, which is the knowledge of a fact as the particularisation of an Universal; the perception of the image as reality. Even logical synthesis, according to Croce, does not represent the last stage; with the satisfaction of knowledge, appears a yet new dissatisfaction, the dissatisfaction of the desire for action. With the appearance of knowledge, in short, appears also the consciousness of value, every new reality known generating a new ideal possibility and a new sense of value, with new concomitant aspirations, desires and longings of the soul. And so the logical synthesis prepares the way to a practical *a priori* synthesis which as a new desiring and a new feeling is a new passionateness of the spirit that craves for appropriate expression. And thus the spirit moves on spirally from expression, through logic and practical synthesis, to renewed expression at a higher level, this circular movement being repeated at higher and higher stages as spiritual life advances. Thus in Croce's Neo-Idealism, we have a repetition of the objective view of the spirit as necessary circular movement from objectified expression, through reality and ideal aspiration, to objectivity again, the process dragging on without end being the endless progression of the spiritual life towards objective fruition.[2]

Tagore was also a subjectivist in art. He agreed with Einstein that had there been no human beings, the Apollo of Belvedere would

[2] Studies in Philosophy and Religion, pp. 10-11, by Prof. S. K. Maitra.

no longer be beautiful. They both hold that beauty is subjective. But Einstein though his logic failed him, told Tagore that truth, unlike beauty was not subject-dependent : "I can not prove that my conception is right but that is my religion.[3]" Thus one of the ablest scientists of the day took refuge under cover of 'religion' when he could not prove that there is any extra-mental something, which we may term as 'Truth'. Croce too is a subjectivist and he emphatically asserts that the matter of intuition apart from its form is only an abstraction made for the convenience of description. It is his studied opinion, quite consistent with his idealistic position, that "matter does not really exist but is posited for the convenience of exposition". Tagore tells us that art is simply indefinable. Art "never tries to conceal its evasiveness, it mocks its own definition". That is true and that is why people differ so much in their definitions and in their determinations of the function of poetry and art. We have already seen that Prof. Kabir[4] speaks of this 'uncertainty' about the function of Poetry and opines that this is due to the nature of poetry itself. Tagore was conscious of this illusive nature of art and poetry ; that is why he called art 'māyā' and holds that art seems to be what it is.

Croce and Tagore quite readily agree that it is spirit's activity in man that makes poetry possible. Romain Rolland[5] shares this view with them and tells us that an idle life is not compatible with artistic aspirations. Spirit is essentially active. Activity is its very nature. For Croce, "the concrete reality of the spirit consists in its ceaseless activity. This spiritual activity is broadly divisible into two kinds, theoretical and practical. Knowing and willing are however very closely related because there can not be any willing without knowing. Knowing again involves two kinds of activity, aesthetic and logical.[6] The nature of this activity of the spirit was anticipated in the celebrated line of Milton : 'They also serve who stand and wait'. Spirit's activity does not express itself in incessant muscular movements which have bearing on our practical life. When we are outwardly calm and not busy with our pen or brush, the spirit works within and art takes its birth. When we externalize the already intuited 'Work of art' and depict it on paper or canvas it is a mere technique and not a part of the spirit's activity which really constitutes

[3] See Religion of Man, Appendix, by Rabindranath Tagore.
[4] See his 'Poetry, Monad and Society'.
[5] See John Christopher.
[6] See D. M. Dutt. Contemporary Philosophy.

the work of art. The reasons for Croce's exclusion of the "external" work of art are various and complex; but none is more compelling than his intention of formulating in expressionism an aesthetic of complete and free creativity. "If by art be understood the externalization of art", Croce writes[7], "then utility and morality have a perfect right to enter into it: that is to say the right to be master in one's own house". For Croce, the structure of the work of art, the 'image', 'intuition' or 'expression' is precisely the 'form' which permits us to distinguish freedom from that which the "spirit can never apprehend in itself as simple matter.....", from mechanism and passivity which the spirit of man "suffers but does not produce." The complete creativity of the imagination produces the "indivisible" and individual intuition, the image or the 'work of art'. Each image is 'novel' and therefore incomparable. "And as I have indicated elsewhere", writes Nahm,[8] "Croce's identification of the artist with the free creator, implies, inasmuch as he likewise identifies 'taste' with 'what produces it', that judgment is likewise absolutely free". In this context Croce quotes the famous saying of Michael Angelo: "One paints not with one's hands but with one's brain". The aesthetic fact has been worked out within. It is the work of the spirit. Leonardo shocked the prior of the convent Delle Grazie by standing for days together opposite the "Last supper" without touching it with the brush. He remarked of this attitude 'that men of the most lofty genius, when they are doing the least work, are then the most active seeking invention with their minds'. The painter is a painter because he sees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. The object to be painted stands before the artist like a world to discover.

It may be urged, in the face of this acceptance of nominalism for aesthetic judgment that the most evident implication of expression without 'matter' and to the exclusion of making, would appear to be that judgments are absolutely free because they are absolutely meaningless. One might, indeed, yield to the temptation to conclude that the 'image' as the structure of the work of art would necessarily be precluded as ground for objective judgment. Yet, it would appear, such a conclusion would be incompatible with another level of Croce's argument since he argues that "We find our own impressions fully

[7] See Aesthetic, p. 16.

[8] Milton C Nahm: 'Structure and the Judgment of Art'. (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLV No. 25).

determined and realized in the expression. of the poet". More specifically, "We are not Dante, nor Dante We", but "in that moment of contemplation and judgment, our spirit is one with that of the poet and in that moment we and he are one thing".[9] Such suggestions in view of the asserted individuality of expressions, are the more confusing, because Croce denies that the work of art produced by the artist is 'symbol' for our experience : "if the symbol be conceived as separable—if the symbol can be on one side, and on the other the thing symbolised.....the so called symbol is science or art aping science."[10] It is significant that to account for the identity of spirit of which he has written, Croce introduces into the theory of expression the analogue to Alexander's "presented external thing" in order to provide for the 'reproduction' induced by physical beauty or stimulus.[11] Alexander assumes in tracing the development of the 'instinct for constructiveness' into 'object of contemplation' that he has offered a sufficient analysis of the emergence and character of fine art. The account, however, goes beyond the author's initial postulates, which are that the initial basis for the aesthetic sense is this 'instinct for constructiveness' and that the aesthetic impulse and the aesthetic emotion which goes with the impulse are an outgrowth of that instinct, "when it has become first human and next comtemplative".[12] For, in order to relate the making of the work of fine art and the experience of making i.e., the judgment upon it, Alexander converts the process, making it into the object of judgment. In aesthetic experience, however, no external object or event, corresponding to that made by the artist is in fact made. The contemplation of the process, that is, our judgment or aesthetic experience (Alexander[13] appears to identify the two) must therefore be regarded as an event, meaningful in large part as the perceiver's reconstruction in imagination of the maker's original and successive mental and physical processes as these were directed to the production of the work of art. "The work of art throws the spectator back into the frame of mind in which the artist produced it"[14]. However, it would be an error to conclude, that the 'real' as object of judgment in Alexander's theory is the imagined event alone and to the exclusion of the object or event made. "By

[9] See Aesthetic (Ainslie Translation), p. 121.
[10] Ibid, p. 34.
[11] Ibid, p. 125.
[12] See his 'Art and Instinct', p. 6.
[13] See for example his statement concerning evaluation in 'Beauty and other forms of Value', p. 7, and his agreement with Croce ; Ibid, p. 29.
[14] Ibid, pp. 29-30.

the simple process of imputation", Alexander contends[15], the object brought before the mind, forms part of the whole perceived external object because the conation to which it corresponds is linked into a unity with the conations evoked by the presented external thing. Thus there are significant reasons for retaining even by "imputation" the "presented external thing" in an examination of the judgment of the 'real'. Of more immediate interest, however, is the fact, that it is precisely upon the issue of the 'reality' of the external object that expressionists like Croce denied the relevance to 'aesthetic' of making. For the expressionist, the image and the object made are not complementary but rather mutually exculsive.[16] In the theory of expression, the real is the imaginative reforming of the artist's expression or imaginative process. "How could we judge", asks Croce, "What remained external to us?"[17] Thus Croce's position negates at the outset the first of the three traditional philosophies of art viz., those of making, symbolizing and expression and establishes the last.

According to Croce, artistic creations are in the pre-judgmental level and they are due to the activity of the spirit. Art is not the intuition of a concept, not the sensuous representation of the Idea. It is an autonomous expression of spirit preceding in time but not in dignity the logical concept. Tagore in his 'Religion of Man'[18] speaks of this creative activity as follows: "A gigantic creative endeavour built up its triumph in stupendous carvings defying obstacles that were overwhelming. Such a heroic activity over the greater part of the Eastern continent clearly answers the question, 'what is art?" "It is the response" let us repeat, "of man's creative soul to the call of the Real". Spirit in man responds to the spirit eternal and they are identical on ultimate analysis. This response is art. In a similar attitude Hegel defines art as the "Absolute mediating itself in the consciousness of the finite as objective sensuous image; it is the self-concretion of the absolute as the form of the artistic object, the absolute objectifying itself to sense as symmetry or harmony of sensible form".[19] Hegel's definition denies any content to art in the

[15] Ibid, p. 26.

[16] See Collingwood, The Principles of Art, p. 14.

[17] See Aesthetic, p. 121 and Compare Collingwood's 'The Principles of Art', pp. 150-151.

[18] Religion of Man, p. 139.

[19] See Dr. S. K. Maitra's Studies in Philosophy and Religion.

sense of any extramental matter. As a consistent idealist he can hardly admit the existence of any reality other than spirit. In art spirit is essentially active and this has been also pointed out by Prof. Radhakrishnan in his exposiion of Tagore's Philosophy of art. He holds that poetry is nature idealised and as art is distinct from nature so is naturalistic poetry distinct from true poetry. The former requires mere observation while the latter demands meditation on the material observed. Thus we find that the activity of the spirit makes the distinction between true poetry and naturalistic poetry. Naturalistic poetry is vitiated by the 'mimesis' of Plato and that is why Plato gave his verdict against the artists and poets who merely copy nature.

Both Tagore and Croce agree over the question of art being a result of expression. Croce regarded intuition, to be identical with expression and this intuition-expression, an elementary and spontaneous activity of the human spirit was taken to be identical with art or imaginative experience. He writes :[20] "Intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge, independent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function ; indifferent to later discriminations, posterior and empirical, to reality and to unreality, to formations and perceptions of space and time even when posterior" : intuition and representation are distinguished as form from what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation or from psychic material ; and this form, this taking possession of, is expression. To have an intuition is to express. It is important to note that Croce does not mean by 'expression' the technique of externalization of the already intuited 'matter'. This expression of Croce requires a natural medium for externalization e.g., words, colours etc. So we find that the essence of art is in the internal expression ; it requires a natural medium, as we have already seen. The subsequent process of materialisation falls outside aesthetics. Tagore agrees with Croce in a general way. With regard to their agreement, we may point out that Tagore also regarded expression to be the primary truth about art. With expression, art fails to communicate the inmost reactions of the poet to his environment. In his paper entitled "The Religion of an artist",[21] Tagore tells us : "Things are distinct not in their essence but in their appearance ; in other words, in their relation to one to whom they appear. This is art, the truth of which is not in substance or logic

[20] Aesthetic, pp. 18-19.

[21] Vide Contemporary Indian Philosophy.

but in expression." Here Tagore speaks in the same vein as Croce. They seem to agree without any reservation. But this is not the case. Tagore qualifies the above statement thus : "In one respect the statement is true. Expression is the primary truth about literature". He poses the question : Is this also the ultimate truth ?" Doubt lingers in his mind. Tagore does not overlook the importance[22] of expression but unlike Croce, he does not give it an all important place in his scheme of aesthetics. He tells[23] us : "But this is to be admitted that the primary and the main requisite for literature is that it should be well expressed. Literature may do even without glorious ideas, but it cannot exist without being expressed. A stunted plant may still be called a plant, but a seed cannot be so-called". So Tagore also agrees with Croce in declaring that expression is the primary aesthetic fact. Croce denies talent if there is no expression of it. In Croce's view, if one is not able to express oneself one has nothing in one to express. 'One often hears people say that they have great thoughts in their minds but that they are not able to express them. But if they really had them they would have coined them into just so many beautiful sounding words and thus have expressed them'. The 'mute inglorious Milton' of Grey is a myth to him. For he identifies intuition and expression and intuition-expression is the only aesthetic fact. Tagore also gives so much importance to expression as to deny any talent whatsoever to a mute artist. He who lacks expression lacks what makes a true artist. Tagore's scepticism about silent poetry is well expressed in the following lines : Unuttered poetry self-contained expression are two unmeaning phrases that have gained currency in certain quarters. But to call a person a poet, who may be gazing at the sky in a rapture as silent as the sky itself, is like giving the name of fire to a piece of wood that is not alight. Poetry is expression : what is or is not silently passing through a person's mind matters little to others who are outside it."[24] Thus we find that Tagore virtually identifies the aestheic fact with expression. Tagore is a subjectivist ; so, like Kant, he cannot attach an objective purpose (though he calls it 'purposiveness without a purpose') to a work of art. Both 'form' and 'content' come from within. So we fail to understand how Tagore can delimit the all important function of expression in the

[22] Sahityer Pathe, p. 171.

[23] Sahityer Pathe, p. 171.

[24] Quoted in "Tagore" and 'Croce' by P. J. Chowdhury (appearing in Visva Bharati quarterly, Feby.-April, 1942).

scheme of his aesthetic. We ask Tagore in the words borrowed from him : 'how can he call a piece of wood 'fire' when it is not alight'. Expression is like the fire that makes the wood (content) aflame. We are conscious that the analogy is not very happy for fire and wood do not come from the same source. But in the case of an artistic fact, both form and content come from 'within'. Croce has rightly pointed out the difficulty of separating them. He treats them as 'one inseparable entity.' But Tagore is very particular about this content of art. Expression for him is only the primary truth about art and not its ultimate significance. Tagore tells us clearly : "the primary truth about literature is its expression but its ultimate truth is expression of man as a complex of sense organs, mind and spirit. We do not only see that there is expression but also how much is expressed".[25] Again he tells us: "Either through one's own joys and sorrows or through those of others or through creation of human characters—man must be expressed. All else are means only."[26] So we find that Tagore wants to balance the two—"expression" and "what is to be expressed". Expression is not everything for him as it is for Croce. Tagore attributes greater importance to what is to be expressed. Tagore demanded human personaliy to be the subject of expression and it should be the subject matter of all kinds of literature. He defines the mental life of man, to be expressed in literature, as follows: "The chief indication of literature consists in its relationship with human life. Where does the mental life of a man reside? It is there where our intelligence, will and taste work harmoniously together, in a word, where resides the essential man. It is there that literature is born".[27]

According to Tagore 'personality' and the 'nature without' are complementary. "We receive but what we give". We humanise nature and nature in its turn helps to develop our personality. Our contribution towards the making of nature what it is, has been, well explained by Tagore in the following lines : "My point is this—the world of literature means a world in relationship with human life. The reflection of an evening sky on the sea gives rise to miraculous beauty, the brilliant image of the sky acquires a new property when it comes in contact with the transparent liquidity of water; in a similar manner the image of the universe falling on man gets life

[25] Sahityer Pathe, p. 171.
[26] Sahityer Pathe, p. 171.
[27] Ibid. p. 163.

and feelings. We humanise great nature by mixing with it our joys and sorrows, hopes and desires; only then it becomes proper material for literature."[28] While Tagore thus specifies the content of literature as distinct from its form, Croce treats the form and the content even in thought as inseparable.[29] According to Croce, anything may be the content; the expressed matter is intellectually unanalysable into the 'matter' and 'its expression'. Tagore believes in a successful fusion of the two in any true work of art but Croce condemns such a view as 'eclecticism'.

Tagore further specifies the 'content' and restricts it to such characters in man which are permanent. He wants the 'representative' man to enter into the domain of art and to be made the subject matter for any artistic creation. He consciously excludes all somatic tendencies in man as unessential and transitory. In short, he does not want the expression of human personality in all its aspects to be the object of art but only an embellished and selected side of human personallity. The higher personality devoid of its grosser elements is the proper theme of art. Tagore believes that man's essential nature is what he aspires to be. "Thus it is that whatever is great in man, whatever is permanent and he cannot exhaust through his actions, is captured in literature and this naturally builds up the nobler aspect of mankind."[30] Here is evidently an amazing confusion of thought. To say that art is concerned only with the higher and the universal elements of man hardly bear examination in the light of the empirical evidence. Such a standard will exclude Milton's 'Satan' and Vālmīki's 'Rāvan' as also Victor Hugo's 'Hans of Iceland' from the sphere of art as being not its fit objects. Art is asmuch concerned with the nobler and higher elements in man as with his baser and ignoble passions. Nay more, art does not even exclude the common place and may choose even the simplest events of life for the creation of beauty such as we have in Wordsworth's 'We are Seven'.

[28] Ibid. p. 167.

It may be pointed out that Tagore might be correct as regards art as literature but art also includes painting, sculpture, music etc. and it is doubtful whether in landscape-painting as a form of art, the appeal to human emotions is through the humanising of nature. Art is not art unless it appeals to man and so far implies relation to human emotions. But this does not mean that only in so far as we have a humanised object that art appeals as art. At least this cannot be true of art as landscape-painting, architecture and some forms of music.

[29] See Aesthetics, Ch. II.

[30] See Essence of Aesthetics, p. 39.

Tagore further explains and accounts for this fact of expression in art. He quotes from the Upanisads : 'Ānandarūpam Amṛtam Yad Vibhāti' (That which reveals itself as immortal joy), and tells[31] us 'in our country there is a concept of the highest self. He is called Sachchidananda (as the accomplished reality which as such is the identity of consciousness and bliss)'. 'This joy is the last word and there is none after it. When in this joy resides the principle of expression there is no meaning in the question whether it does any good to us or not.'[32] Thus expression and joy are identical. Again he says[33] 'The joy consists in the revelation of myself to me ; mist damps our spirit.' Now this 'ānanda' (joy) is the character of our true self and it is identical with the universal self. This universal self is 'Ānanda Swarūp', according to the Upanisads, and Tagore accepts this position. Thus in true expression we taste the joy that fills our true being and thus we come to know this being, our purer and higher self. So Aesthetic expression, involves self-realisation. Thus Tagore comes closer to Hegel when he holds that the true self realises itself in and through itself as presented in sensuous form. Since our finite self is not the individual fragmentary self but the universal spirit, expression implies communion of the individual self with the rest of the universe.

Here Tagore apparently confuses between Croce's 'expressionism' and Hegel's theory of 'absolute content' in art. Moreover, the acceptance of the Upanisadic conception of 'Ānanda' and its identification with expression makes the problem all the more difficult. Tagore identifies expression with joy and then tells us that 'this joy consists in the revelation of my self to me'. That is to say expression in an object of art expresses the self of the artist which again in its turn is identical with the universal self. So in art the universal self is expressed ; as it is known through this expression, it also realises itself as objectified 'content'. The 'content' of Tagore must be taken as the absolute 'content' of Hegel because through this objectification the individual self knows itself and on Tagore's own admission this individual self is no other than the absolute self. Thus we find that Tagore virtually identifies the Upanisadic 'joy' with 'expression' (evidently of Croce) and again he identifies this joy with the knowledge of the self. This joy is a true character of the individual self which

[31] Sahitya, p. 64.
[32] Sahityer Pathe, p. 11.
[33] Ibid. p. 41.

is identical with the universal self. Now this knowing of 'Self' through the object of art is self-realisation and it is self realising itself through the artistic image. Here Tagore follows Hegel consciously or unconsciously. Thus on account of this 'eclecticism' (to borrow the Crocean expression), we find Tagore admitting expression to be a primary fact only and not the ultimate significance of art. For this reason following Hegel, he specifies the content of art as the expression of super-personal reality! Thus he sails in two boats and that is why his theory of art, is not always logically consistent.

Mr. P. J. Chowdhury concludes,[34] after a long and interesting discussion on the relative positions of Tagore and Croce, with regard to art and art criticism : "Again, by making expression mean expression of the individual experience and not of some super-personal reality which is common for all, Croce has made the problem of communication in art difficult and he has raised but left unsolved the more general problem of the one and the many". We do not agree with Mr. Chaudhury on this issue and consider Croce to be right when he means by expression the expression of some individual experience and in our view, he thus makes the problem of communication easier. We do not accept his defence for Tagore's delimitation and narrowing of the content of art to the experiences of some super-personal reality. We fail to understand how the problem of communication in art becomes easier when we restrict its content to the experience of something super-personal. Such experiences are certainly not very common with the common herd of men who live on the 'black soil'. Moreover, art will cease to be art proper if it represented the universal as distinguished from the individual and the concrete and would in that case be only another name for abstract philosophical speculation. To create is to particularise, to embody in an individual image and art, as creation as well as enjoyment must necessarily aim at the concretely individual. The universal either as self or as reality can be an object of abstract contemplation and thought and not of creative activity. It is a truism to say that if we take art to express the common experiences of an individual and not of some super-personal reality as Tagore has conceived, we make the problem of communication easier. It is no doubt true, that if we aim to express some super-personal reality through the medium of art, its appeal will not reach all sections of people. If

[34] Vide "Tagore and Croce". (Visva-Bharati Quarterly, February-April, 1947).

art expresses experiences which are common place, it can easily be communicated to others and appreciated by them. The expression of super-personal reality will make art unintelligible to many for they may not have such experiences at all. Tagore means that art must express what is universal, what is permanent in human nature. Nothing is permanent and nothing is temporary in us. It is the magic wand of the artist that makes a particular character lasting and immortal. Falstaff of Shakespeare certainly does not represent any super-personal reality. It represents the common man in us, the man as a tissue of inconsistencies and contradictions. Shylock the Jew stands as an immortal creation and he certainly does not represent any nobler virtue in man than inordinate greed for wealth and a thirst for revenge, so common in man. Iago, the villain in Shakespeare's 'Othello', Brian de Bois Gilbert in Scott's 'Ivanhoe' are certainly not types of characters that may be admitted by Tagore in his kingdom of art remaining true to his theory. They do not represent the super-personal reality in man and yet their artistic value shall never be questioned. Tagore talks of gluttony and tells us that the throne of literature will never go to it, for it has no higher value than a mere instinct. Thirst for revenge, greed and love of falsehood and inconsistency are no better than gluttony and yet they are immortalised through Shylock and Falstaff. We can multiply instances both from poetry and painting. But it is useless. Not to speak of others we can quote from Tagore many an instance which will show that art can become what it really ought to be, even if it expressed the ordinary experiences of our day to day life. It does not require a super-personal reality so much as a true expression to make art what it is. So we hold with Croce that successful expression of subjective feelings makes the essence of all true art. It is immaterial whether the expression is of a super-personal reality or of the common work-a-day experiences of life.

Another point of difference may be noted in this connection. Croce holds that poetry is not the expression of poet's personality. Tagore repudiates this theory. For Croce, a man cannot be known merely by what he intuits and expresses (by his aesthetic contemplation) but he is known also by what he understands through logical concepts, and what he wills and does, besides what he merely intuits and expresses. So from poetry which expresses only the aesthetic experience of a man, we can know only a very small part of his personality. For Tagore, a man's essential nature is made up of his knowledge and imagination and both of these are revealed in

his poetry and so poetry is the expression of a poet's personality. Tagore writes : "Our study and observation, our conversation and thinking, all put together make up for each one of us an essential character. According to the essential character we are either attached to the world or repelled by it, either nationalists or inter-nationalists, worldly or spiritual, lovers of action or of thought. My particular character must be present in my writings either in a manifest or hidden form. Whatever I may write, lyrics or anything else, I reveal thereby not merely a momentary mood of my mind ; the very truth of my inner being impresses its mark on them". This essential character of man characterises all his writings. His works bear an impress of this character,[35] which is another name for 'personality'. Tagore's personality means the mental life of a man. This mental life resides there "where our intelligence and feelings, desire and experience, all have melted and mixed into a perfect Unity".[36] Tagore calls this 'personality' to be man's 'real individuality'.[37] There is a kind of unity in man, Tagore contends, underlying his various thoughts and feelings and actions, which are regarded to be the root nature in him. This is not apparent and not clearly perceptible. This unity is mostly inferred from his conduct so that we may refer the various acts of omission and commission at various periods of his life to the self-same personality. The general trend of thought in the West is that the dramatist least reveals himself in his works for he has to identify himself now with 'Othello' and with 'Iago' the next moment. But Tagore repudiates this conception. He writes : "That each of Shakespeare's dramatic progenies has got a clear individuality does not mean that they have no element of Shakespeare's character in them".[38] Again he writes in 'Sāhitya' :[39] "With the poetry of Dante, the poet's life is indissolubly mixed up ; if we read the two togeher, we can better appreciate and respect each". Thus a poet's life is complementary to his work ; one is to be read along with the other. The artist leaves a permanent impress on what he creates. The whole of man creates the literature. Man reveals himself in various situations in little fragments. These fragmentary parts of him constitute his philosophic, scientific and other activities. The observant part of a man makes science.

[35] Sahityer Pathe, p. 164.
[36] Ibid. p. 163.
[37] Sahitya, p. 68.
[38] Sahityer Pathe, pp. 163-64.
[39] Sahitya, p. 163.

But where Literature or painting or music is born, there the 'whole of man' is concerned. Here Tagore does not certainly mean by the 'whole of man' man in his colourful entirety but means man's 'inner being', his 'essential character', 'what he aspires to be'. If he means otherwise and we are asked to understand the man in all his diverse moods and conducts as we find him in our daily life, Tagore stands self-condemned. For his considered views as above shown are a direct negation of such a conception. Unlike most of the Western thinkers Tagore does not think that poetry is the expression of a passing mood; for him the poet puts his very self in his poems and he who reads the poems touches the poet. "It is not that we can on every occasion bring it out by analysing poetry, nevertheless, we quite well feel its influence".[40] This observation of Tagore also does not seem to be convincing. If art and poetry were the expression of a poet's personality, that is constituted by his higher self i.e. what he aspires to be, the works of the self-same artist could not have been so various and colourful, sometimes paradoxically conflicting. Tagore gave expression to a thousand and one transitory moods of his personal experiences in metre and rhyme, in line and colour, and they are enshrined in the heart of eternity. In 'Sandhyā Sangīt' he speaks in one strain; in 'Prabhat Sangīt' again, he speaks in another. In our view, poetry does not offer a poet a scope for expression of his personality, rather it demands from him rigorous depersonalisation. A poet should be self-sacrificing, not self-expressive. A poet, like a catalyst in a chemical action, brings about the action (combination of thoughts and feelings) but does not combine his self with the products of the reaction (the poem). Sometimes Tagore speaks of a rosy view of life and sometimes he sings a sorrowful song. They certainly do not equally constitute the poet's personality, far less they express the super-personal reality. Sometimes in the same book of verse the poet delineates two characters fundamentally different and yet they reach true artistic height. We quote the characters of 'Duryadhan' and 'Gāndhārī', as depicted by Tagore in his 'Gāndhārir Ābedan' as instances in point. One represents fraud, guile and dishonesty, the other honesty, simplicity and truth and as artistic creations they claim equal credit. If the same personality of the poet is working in both as Tagore thinks it does it must at once be both A and not-A, the saint and the villain at the same time. Logic teaches us that reality cannot contradict itself. So how can the poet express

[40] See Sahityer Pathe, p. 164.

himself at the same time in two characters totally antagonistic and flagrantly contradictory. If Tagore contends that the poet's personality is always changing and the temporary mood of the poet is a constituent factor of his personality we have nothing to say. But he tells us,[41] that art expresses what is universal and what is permanent in man. If all these varied and sometimes contradicting moods of the poet are equally 'universal and permanent', then universal and permanent lose their accredited meaning. Croce is right when he holds that through a work of art we know only a very small part of the poet's personality. According to Croce's view "a man is known by what he understands in logical concepts, wills and does besides what he intuits and expresses". We agree wholly with Croce that the poet and the man cannot be equated without a remainder and that the entire man never comes out in the poet as such.[42]

Referring to the period of his life while writing 'Prabhat Sangit' (Morning Songs'), Tagore wrote : "I know not how of a sudden my heart flung open its doors, and let the crowd of Worlds rush in, greeting each other".[43] Whereas in the 'Sandhyā Sangīt' (Evening Songs), the poet seems to have been reserved and reticent, in Morning Songs it is as if he had come out of himself, or had by some magic power lifted the veil between himself and the rest of the World. The 'Morning Songs' carries a message of spirit that is virilely conscious of its place in the world, which he loves boundlessly and of which he gives his readers Worsworthian, glimpses.[44] Thus the gloom and indecision, confusion and the feeling of isolation that we notice in the 'Evening Songs' are replaced by a lively sense of oneness with the rest of humanity, nay with the rest of the Universe. In Morning Songs, the poet has changed beyond recognition. The 'awakening of the waterfall has been complete'. This change of attitude towards men and matter is a constant feature in any poet, worth the name. The more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates.[45] Thus we find that Tagore was not justified in dogmatising that poetry is the expression of a poet's personality which essentially

[41] Sahitya, p. 166.

[42] Tradition and Individual Talent.

[43] Cf. Jibansmṛti, p. 173.

[44] See Rabindra Nath Tagore, his personality and work, p. 65—by Prof. V. Lesny.

[45] Vide Tradition and Individual Talent, by T. S. Elliot,

consists of 'what the poet aspires to be' i.e., a personality which has virtually no reference to the varied experiences of his day to day life.

It is the studied opinion of Tagore that a poet's or an artist's biography is to be constructed out of the materials strewn all over his poetic or other artistic creations. We can not reach the true poet or the artist by studying his life and manners and philosophical views. The poet eludes our grasp for this is not the right type of approach. Tagore writers" : A poet's biography does not help us to know the poet. But his works give us a true picture. We know the personality of Shakespeare, though a very comprehensive one, through strenuous efforts. We generally fail to perceive the principle of unity of character in such master artists. For there is so much variety in them due to their wide sympathy and rich humanity that we lose sight of the thread of unity that holds together this variety. Tagore writes : "when the individual self of an author identifies itself with the great human self through sympathy, then upon his nature does the universal spirit put its stamp. The personality of a good dramatist and the human nature outside it combine so harmoniously that it is hard to separate them".[46] This 'synthetic personality' of the artist, according to Tagore, makes possible the Universal acceptance of his works. Shakespeare knew through love and insight the hearts of men and women of all ranks and revealed them through art. The deep sympathy for his fellow-men on the part of Shakespeare, led him to a proper understanding of the essential nature of man. Tagore would say that Shakespeare's personality absorbed within itself the different smaller personalities whom he depicted so vividly and truthfully in his plays. In terms of Leibnitz's monadology we may say that a great author is a more enlightened, developed and active monad that intuits and reflects the less developed, comparatively confused and passing monads.[47] This view of Tagore does not find favour with the Western critics in general. They hold that art is the expression of the poet's feelings. The artist momentarily identifies himself with various feelings and expresses them as if they were his own. The poet's sincerity is not deep-rooted as it has no mooring in the poet's personality. The true poet does not express his personality in his work of art. The artist only objectfies what was his own experience and then makes it available to the rest of the world. This expression of passing feelings, which we call art, does not give us a true

[46] Sahityer Pathe, p. 168.

[47] R. Latta's Monadology, p. 105.

picture of he artist. This is evident in the case of Shakespeare. The critics who tried to reconstruct the personality of Shakespeare from his literary works, came to discover quite a number of Shakespeares as conflicting and contradictory as 'Iago' and 'Othello', as Hamlet the prince of Denmark and his villain uncle. A consistent logical analysis will go to show that a great poet identifies himself with all kinds of personalities at different times and expresses with equal felicity all kinds of thoughts and feelings. Thus it is difficult to determine from the writings of Shakespeare whether he was a pessimist or an optimist, an atheist or a theist, a fatalist or a believer in Freewill. For, these antithetical attitudes have all been expressed in the writings, of Shakespeare. This capacity for depersonalising himself in all the true artists, has been called by Keats 'negative capability'. He writes :[48] "And at once it struck me what quality went to form a man of achievements especially in literature and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean negative capability, that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason". Again he writes[49] in another letter : "As to the poetic character itself it is not itself—it has no self, it is every thing and nothing. It has no character—it enjoys light and shade ; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated. It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the Chameleon poet". We believe with Keats that a true poet does not express his personality except under a qualification, for what a poet expresses is not merely an objective content but a content qualified by his subjective feelings. These feelings take their colour from the poet's personality. It is a truism that different people look upon the same object from different points of view. These points of view are determined by their different likings and dislikings, their beliefs and disbeliefs, their inclinations and apathies, in a word by their respective personal equations. It is not true that the poet has no personality, as held by Keats. This personality, this thought feeling pattern, determine our outlook on life and thus help us to create various works of art.[50] 'Tajmahal' the epitome of the emperor's love towards his beloved, has been the subject matter of many a literary enterprise. But the same

[48] Letter to George and Thomas Keats, 28 Dec. 1817.

[49] Letter to Woodhouse, 27 Oct. 1817.

[50] Cf Mr. P. J. Chaudhuri's article on Tagore (published in the Visva-Bharati quarterly).

thing has been differently delineated by different poets and artists because of their varying thought-feeling patterns i.e. their personalities prompted them to see the same thing differently. Thus personality of the artist tinges his works of art in a way but art is not the mere expression of the poet's personality, as Tagore contends. Croce believes in peotic impersonality. He writes :[51] "The saying : The style is the man can also not be completely criticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic and the practical and from the theoretic character of the aesthetic activity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation : he is will which contains the cognitive moment in itself. Hence the saying is either altogether void as when it is taken to mean that the style is the man etc.....or it is erroneous as when the attempt is made to deduce what a man has done and willed from what he has seen and expressed, thereby asserting that there is a logical connection between knowing and willing". The corollary to this impersonality in art is artistic insincerity. According to Croce, aesthetic sincerity consists in giving adequate expression to momentary intuitions. It has hardly any ethical side. He writes :[52] "Finally, sincerity imposed as a duty upon the artist (a law of ethics also said to be law of aesthetic) rests upon another double meaning. For by sincerity may be meant, in the first place, the moral duty not to deceive one's neighbour and in that case it is Foreign to the artist. For indeed he deceives no one, since he gives form to what is already in his soul. He would only deceive if he were to betray his duty as an artist by failing to execute his task in its essential nature. If lies and deceit are in his soul, then the form which he gives to these things can not be deceit or lies, precisely because it is aesthetic. If the artist be a charlatan, a liar or a miscreant, he purifies his other self by reflecting it in art. If by sincerity be meant, in the second place, fullness and truth of expression, it is clear that this second sense has no relation to this ethical concept. The law both ethical and aesthetic reveals itself here as nothing but a word used both by ethics and aesthetic". It is quite clear from the above that Croce did not believe in aesthetic sincerity in the sense of being true to what one says in a work of art. What the artist is expected to do is nothing but to give adequate expression to what he feels. Sincerity in the sense of fullness and truth of expression may be expected from the artist. But sincerity in the ethical sense is far from Croce's mind. On the other hand Romain Rolland

[51] See Aesthetics Ch. VI (Ainslie edition).

[52] See Aesthetic Ch. VI. (Ainslie edition).

agrees with Tagore that sincerity is necessary on the part of the artist for a true artistic creation. Rolland told us repeatedly that lack of sincerity in music, falsity in art make bad art; Christopher's early compositions were not true music for they lacked artistic sincerity. For they were written for writing's sake.

The last point of difference noted[53] by Mr. Chaudhuri is with regard to the problem of communication in art. Croce regards poetry as the expression of the poet's ordinary work-a-day experiences so he cannot explain, alleges Mr. Chowdhury, why one's expression of individual feelings is understood by others. Croce simply tells us that intuition is a universal activity. He regards the poet (in his poetic mood) as unconscious of the readers. But Tagore tells us that a bird may be unconscious of its listeners but a poet is never so. The poet addresses his society (Sahitya p. 7). To communicate is a natural and conscious desire in man. The poet in fact consciously writes such things as will be appreciated by his readers; he expresses that which his fellow beings feel, he being the most concious point of his time. So consequently, in Tagore's opinion, the poet is to make a compromise between inspiration, taste and judgment, on the one hand, and the public taste on the other. He must have some social sense. Self-expression, according to Tagore, is in one respect self-socialisation. Here again we note the same inconsistency as previously. If self-expression be self-socialisation, in that case the theory of the expression of super-personal reality as the essence of art can not be advocated. In fact, Tagore's theory would land us into the paradox of vulgarisation of the higher values of life as the essential function of artistic expression. It is sheer common sense that people at large understand better the commonest of experiences of the poet than the one experienced in a rare moment of inspiration or exaltation. So if the poet, at the time of creation, keeps one eye on the artistic work and the other on his readers, he certainly needs to forego much of his 'attachment' to the super-personal reality, which he is supposed to give utterance to. So we find a logical anomaly in reconciling the expression of super-personal reality in art and society—conciousness which a true artist is expected to possess. There is another important point to be noted in this connection. If, while creating, the artist has in mind the society at large i.e. his audience and readers and spectators we do not understand why most of the master

[53] In his article "Tagore and Croce" (Published in the Visva-Bharati Quarterly).

artists of world were the least appreciated by their contemporary socities. Milton had to go abegging for a publisher. The story of Johnson is too well-known to us to need repetition. Michael Madhusudan had to die in hospital for want of recognition. We do not understand how this brute fact of non-recognition of poets and artists by their contemporary society, all the world over, can be explained with the help of the Tagorite hypothesis. Croce can explain the position better. He tells us that the artist is oblivious of his contemporary society and that is why he is least appreciated in his life time. Posterity, richer in experience and knowledge, vision and wisdom, appreciates the artist better and it is distance of time and space that helps it in the matter of proper appreciation : 'Anti Santam na jahati, anti santam na pasyati'.

Rabindranath believed in a philosophy of divine immanence and his poetry needed such a belief. He felt one with the outside world and this feeling of oneness gave him a vision of reality rare in modern poetry. The following verses of Rabindranath have almost an Upanisadic ring of identity of soul and nature :

"মনে হয় যেন সে ধূলির তলে
যুগে যুগে আমি ছিনু তৃণে-জলে,
সে দুয়ার খুলি কবে কোন্ ছলে
বাহির হ'য়েছি ভ্রমণে।"

[প্রবাসী, উৎসর্গ কাব্যগ্রন্থ]

According to him, art is the realisation of the spiritual in the naural, the disclosing of the spiritual significance of the merely factual or the brute material. Like Wordsworth, Tagore's love of nature was so great that he regarded every aspect of nature as a symbol of beauty. He was not a crude workshipper of nature for its own sake, but he viewed it as an attribute of the divine ; "not for the abundance of joy that it brings into life but for the intimations it gives of a higher spiritual life." This feeling of one-ness comes from the other-regarding activity of the spirit. According to Croce, as we have already noticed, spirit's activity can be broadly divided into two kinds, knowing and willing. Willing involves two kinds of activity, economic and ethical i.e., self-regarding and other regarding. This other regarding activity of the spirit makes us feel one with the universe and this feeling of oneness helps us in our quest for the

spiritual and eternal beyond the immediate temporal interests of our daily life. We may recall in this connection Shakespear's observation that art itself is nature. He laid so much stress on this other-regarding activity of the spirit in his view of art that he identified nature and art. Art is not nature but 'nature deeply felt and meditiated upon'. A mere catalogue of natural phenomena does not make real art or true poetry nor does photography constitute the essence of true art. Poetry bodies forth the forms of things unknown and incarnates the ideal in the habitation and shape of the actual. True art is at once the realisation of the ideal and the idealisation of the real, the spirit made flesh. We have quite a genuine but a higher kind of real object. Poetry is truer than fact. It has some higher spiritual reality. So the greatest poetry should embody an ideal vision or a true philosophy, according to Tagore. With this philosophic vision, the vision that discerns the fundamental unity of matter and spirit, of being and non-being, no great poetry can ever be born. If it lacks this vision poetry comes down to the level of mere verse-making, and loses its universal appeal. In Croce's intuition, this vision is there to make it *simplex et unum*, "that is to say the multiple images were to find their common centre and dissolve in a comprehensive image".[54]

Art takes its birth according to Tagore, in the region of the surplus. There are large outlying tracts surrounding the necessities of man as distinct from animal, where he has objects that are ends in themselves. Sayanacharya, the celebrated Vedic commentator says : "Yajne Hutasishtasya Odanasya Sarvajagatkāranabhūta Brahmabhedana Stutih Kriyate".[55] 'After the completion of the sacrifical rites, the food offering which is left over, is praised because it is symbolical of Brahma, the original source of the universe.' According to this explanation, Brahma is boundless in his superfluity which inevitably finds its expression in the eternal world process. Here we have according to Tagore the doctrine of the genesis of creation and therefore of the origin of art.[56] Man has a fund of emotional energy which is not all occupied with his self-preservation. This surplus seeks its outlet in the creation of art and man's civilisation is built upon this surplus.[57] This surplus in man makes him what he is. When he

[54] See Croce's Essence of Aesthetic.
[55] Quoted in Contemporary Indian Philosophy. p. 34.
[56] See Tagore's paper entitled 'The Religion of an Artist'
[57] Civilisation and art can not be equated without violence to their respective meanings. Civilisation is a complex affair that includes not

attunes himself to the divine immanent in nature, his soul overflows with emotions which the poet expresses in his aesthetic creation as the receptacle of this overflowing surplus as it were in a state of ecstacy. Prof. O. C. Ganguly probably means this type of ecstacy when he defines art 'as the process of arousing aesthetic emotions by creation of significant forms devised in purple moments of spiritual exaltation'. Valmiki, the epic-poet sang out : '*mā niṣād prtiṣthāṁ Tvama gama śāśvatī samā*, (O thou hunter, thou shall never in thy life establish theyself) and this poetic outburst had its spring in the very excess of human emotions. Poetry is not work, but an outburst of an affluence. It is the expression of an excess where the whole soul comes out. These emotional expressions go far beyond their bounds of usefulness. Whenever a feeling is aroused in our hearts which is far in excess of the amount that can be completely absorbed by the object which produced it, it comes back to us and makes us conscious of ourselves by its return waves. This is why of all creatures man knows himself : because his impulse of knowledge comes back to him in his excess. He feels his personality more deeply than other creatures because his power of feeling is more than can be exhausted by his objects. This efflux of the consciousness of his personality requires an outlet of expression. Therefore, Tagore concludes, in art man reveals himself and not his objects.[58] Thus art deals with the world of personality and it withers away when the personality is waning and it thrives when the personality develops. "Art we create and art ends by creating us. It is both our creation as well as creative of our personality. When we stop and think and create we are overwhelmed no doubt. This overwhelming comes of the impact of the Infinite on the finite".[59]

merely art but also the crafts, science, technology, philosophy etc. Art may have its source in man's surplus energy. But the same cannot be said of science, technology and crafts which arise from the peremptory necessity of adjustment to environment, without which man would not live at all. Rabindranath would extend the spencerian surplus energy theory to civilisation in all its aspects, theoretical as well as practical. This certainly will not bear critical examination in the light of the facts of the case.

[58] See Tagore's 'Personality'.

[59] We might as well say that in the domain of morality we create the good will as well good will creates ourselves. Thus there is no speciality of man as artist. It is a truism to say that in every act of will, we will not merely and object but also will ourselves thereby and become a different individual.

As art is the expression of human personality, the personality must carry in its womb the germs of all great virtues to make great art possible. A robust optimism, a faith in the future of humanity as a whole should inspire a true poet. Pessimism, Tagore tells us, is incompatible with true artistic creations. Pessimistic poetry stands self-condemned. It is the rhythm of life that expresses itself in the rhythm of poetry. A distorted soul or a worried mind cannot produce what we call poetry.[60] The true poet, according to Tagore, finds his happiness in the world and he who finds nothing valuable in this world cannot write good poetry. Disinterested love is the true artistic attitude towards nature and creation. This disinterested love for nature results in disinterested joy in the field of artistic creation and appreciation. As we have already seen, Kant in his third 'critique' told us that disinterested joy is the end of art. In the same vein Tagore tells us that the ultimate feeling in true art should be one of 'triumph and satisfaction'. The poet sometimes may describe the tumult of the soul but only to conclude that underneath it there is a settled peace. Thus peace—a lively peace full of the grandeur of a noble soul—is the last word in all true art. Art itself is something that grows and cannot be said to have finality in any form. So is art-criticism which is a reflective study of art. There is no finality in any view of art. It is not acceptable to us that art must necessarily express an optimistic or hopeful view of life and its ultimate problems. In Tagore's view, art is the expression of the artist's personality and a sense of failure or of the futility of life is as much a phenomenon of personality as an exultant optimism or a rosy view of life. Tagore's poems of 'Sandhyā Sangīt' are an instance in point. In these poems the poet's soul does not find any way out and he gropes in the darkness. His spirit is fettered and the poet wants to break through the walls that surround him. Though these poems of 'Sandhyā Sangīt' do not carry any message of hope for mankind, yet they are specimens of true poetry. When the great poet of the last century,

[60] It is true that in Rabindranath's works, we generally do not come across a satanic character or any great tragic end that leaves a deep impression on the mind and it may possibly be due to the fortunate circumstances that Rabindranath himself had not many occasions to come face to face with the darkest and ugliest aspects of life. But it is certainly no sufficient reason to banish them from art as being not proper objects for artistic creation or appreciation.

Michael Madhusudan sings[61] of his own failure in life : he is as much expressing himself in the higher poetic forms as any optimistic poetry that deserves to be ranked as best poetry in literature. Hem Chandra lamenting on life as a great illusion and a hoax is no less poetic in his rhymes than any optimistic poet in his most exalted moods.[62] Such examples can be multipied. Let us quote from Shakespeare's 'Macbeth' :

'Life is but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour
Upon the stage, and then is heard no more.
This is a tale told by an idiot
Full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing'.

This sense of futility which prompted the poet for the time being, to look upon life as a 'walking shadow' bereft of all reality also gave rise to true poetry. We agree with Keats that our 'sweetest songs' always tell of the 'sadddest thoughts', which are too deep for tears. Luigi Pirandello, the Nobel laureate of 1934, in his novels, dramas and short stories bears neither any message for mankind nor any gospel for the posterity. He is a professed pessimist and one of his critics tells[63] us : "He is a pessimist with a dry heart. All through his works, there is a haunting feeling of sadness and despair. His world is a world of frustration and aridity, illusion and irrationality. He has no religion—no God". Still, no one denies the genius of Pirandello. His works 'The old and the young', 'The late Mattin Pascal' and above all his short stories will ever live to enrich the treasures of the world's literature.

Matthew Arnold tells us that poetry is the criticism of life. Tagore belongs to the same school of thought. Poetry does not copy facts but interprets them. Against the ugly show of things he

[61] আশার ছলনে ভুলি' কি ফল লভিনু হায়,
তাই ভাবি মনে,
জীবন প্রবাহ বহি' কালসিন্ধু পানে ধায়
ফিরাব কেমনে ?

[62] জীবন এমন ভ্রম আগে কে জানিত রে,
হ'য়ে এত লালায়িত কে ইহা চাহিত রে ?

[63] Vide. S. N. Bose's 'The Art of Pirandello.'

sets their inner spiritual beauty. The imagination of the poet plays with the facts of the world and makes them express the spirit of the whole. Art expresses the universal in and through the particular. The feelings expressed by the artist are his own feelings, and yet they are shared by one and all. 'This universal element of art can only come into being', Tagore writes, 'if we can realise the spiritual unity of life and matter, if we can rightly acertain the relation between the universal and the particular'. Art deals with concrete universals i.e., universal immanent in individuals. True universalism does not thrive at the cost of the individual. It lives through it and its appeal remains ever the same. To quote Tagore : 'The true universalism is not breaking down of the walls of one's own house but the offering of hospitality to one's guests and neighbours.' Art *undeniably* expresses our subject tive reactions to life ; it may be prompted by a sense of failure and futility and sadness or of exulant joy, hopefulness and optimism. What is enjoyed in art is the success of the objectification of our subjective reactions to life and its varied situations. The so-called universal element in art is nothing but the successful objectification or one may say the objective embodiment of the evanescent subjective emotions. Such an eminent thinker like Bertrand Russell has opined that Beethoven's symphonies can not be regarded as universal as they are not the creations of universal minds and as they are purely personal to him. Russell means that the symphony is not like a mathematical truth which is an object to all minds and uses the mind of the individual as merely the occasion of its formulation. 'But' writes Tagore, 'it has to be admitted that everyone ought to appreciate Beethoven's creation, that if there is no deficiency of the mind, every one must appreciate it.'[64] When with proper training the opposition of ignorance and unfamiliarity have been overcome the appreciation of the best composer is assured and can be impeded only in some particular men as listners. "Thus we find that Tagore pleads for the removal of 'ignorance and unaccustomedness' as conditions precedent for a proper appreciation of Beethoven's symphonies. This condition for art-appreciation is of a negative character. Appreciation of such works of art as Beethoven's symphonies can be regarded as universal if only we remove the impediments that stand in the way of proper appreciation. Thus we find that appreciation of art is conditional, however we may try to explain away the element of this 'dependedness'. What holds true of the appreciation of Beethoven's symphonies holds true of other works of art which are supposed to be universally

[64] Thoughts from Tagore, p. 184.

appreciated. We cannot ensure this element of 'universality' in any work of art by characterising art in this way or that. On the other hand, we do not deny universality altogether. What we mean is this : that successful expression in the Crocean sense gives us that type of universality which works of art are supposed to enjoy. It is nothing but expression, that type of expression that we find in Shakespeare and Kalidasa, Rambrandt and Picasso, Raphael and Milton, that makes true art and ensures its universal acceptance. Art appreciaton is certainly not universal in a sense in which hatred, love and anger claim universality. We use it in a limited sense as has application only in the domain of the fine arts. So art is nothing but giving a local habitation and a name, to the airy nothings that are only passing feelings of an individual in a given situation.

Tagore comes very near Hegel when we hear him sing out in "Gitanjali" :[65] "My poet is it thy delight to see thy creation through my eyes and to stand at the portals of my ears silently to listen to their own eternal harmony". Tagore in his own way tells us how the 'Infinite realises itself in and through the finite'. That art is expression of inner emotion and as such the spirit's self-objectification in individual image is undeniably true. We accept this position. But this admission does not imply that we commit ourselves to the Hegelian position to which Tagore virtually adheres. We do not agree that art is only expression and realisation through such expression of the absolute in sensuous form. Any emotion, we hold with Croce, may be matter for artistic expression, and art is art as successful expression of the inner emotions. "Art may be described" writes[66] a noted modern philosopher, 'as the self-intuiting of the soul in an individual image, the concrete image expression of the inner sentimental tumult'. We do not deny that the absolute of Hegel or the super-personal element in our personality as conceived by Tagore may be matter for artistic expression. They may surely be expressed in art this way quite as much as the relative and the finite, what is necessary for the expression being an emotion or stirring of the soul within.

Art gives us taste of reality through freedom of mind. "An artist", Tagore tells us, "may paint a picture of a decrepit person not pleasant to look at and yet we call it perfect when we become intensely conscious of its reality". Plato thought that art fails in its mission to give us a glimpse of the real and he indicted art as doubly

[65] Gitanjali, P. 65.

[66] Dr. S. K. Maitra. See his 'Studies in Philosophy and Religion.' PP. 7-8.

removed from reality. But Tagore differs from Plato in this respect and to him art represented the inexhaustible magnificence of creative spirit. It is rational and it also overpasses rationality. Art is neither fully intellectual nor moral. Sometimes it is didactic. But it is a mere accident. True art has no practical purpose either of 'hewing wood' or of 'drawing water'. Art is a window through which we gaze upon reality and come face to face with the Infinite. This infinite, this absolute is the content of art. Unlike Croce, in Tagore's scheme of art both content and form are considered to be equally important. Tagore can neither ignore 'matter' nor 'form'. His emphasis is on 'form' no doubt, but he cannot forego 'matter' altogether. That is where he differs from Croce. Rabindranath takes form to be innate and 'not imposed from without.' There is an organic unity between matter and form, pervading the work of art as a whole and the artistic value lies in this unity. For the 'true principle of art is the principle of unity and taste-value lies there'. Matter and form taken by themselves are mere abstractions. Aristotle and Hegel also stressed this 'unity' in a work of art and they considered it to be the sine qua non of true artistic excellence. The work of art must have a beginning, a middle and an end, in a word, it must be a closed unity where no discord grates on our imagination. Carlyle holds a similar view : "As the briefest definition one might say, forms which grow round a substance, if we rightly understand that, will correspond to the real nature and purport of it, will be true, good ; forms which are consciously put round a substance, bad". Coleridge in a similar vein gives a similar defence of the Tagorite position in his 'Lectures'. To quote Coleridge : "The organic form, on the otherhand, is innate ; it shapes as it develops itself from within and the fulness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form." Form is living with an adaptibility of its own. It develops to suit the richer content. We do not understand how Tagore, being a thorough going subjectivist can differentiate between the form and the content of art ? When matter and form, taken by themselves are, on Tagore's own admission, mere abstractions, how can they be differentiated even in thought-level ? When they come from the same source as one indivisible essence, we will do well not to drive a wedge between the two. When the form grows with the content and the content witrers with the form, it is better to hold with Croce that they constitute an indivisible whole. According to Croce, the form and content of art cannot be so separated even in thought-level for one is indistinguishable from the other. Croce differs from Tagore in this respect. To Croce, form is every thing. Intuition is art and intuition and ex-

pression are identical. "The Aesthetic fact, therefore, is form and nothing but form".[67] Croce further tells us : "The poet or painter who lacks form, lacks every thing because he lacks himself ; the expression alone i.e., the form makes the poet."[68] Croce to be logically consistent with his definition of art as intuition had to deny any 'extramental object. Tagore had no such responsibility to discharge. He was essentially a poet and a mystic philosopher. We do not expect of a poet logical consistency so much as intuited truth and it is too much to expect of a poet logical consistency which may be met with in the writings of a professed philosopher. Tagore cites the example of a diet and tells us that the taste value does not lie in the component parts. It is in the whole. Similarly, the artistic value of any work of art lies in the unity of 'matter and form' and not in either separately. The value inheres in the work of art, regarded as a whole, as a unity of all that it stands for. No surgical operation can bring out the pulse that throbs and makes art the living emblem of human imagination.

The idolatry of form in the West Tagore tells us, is due to a misunderstanding of the aim of art. The aim of art is not the realisation of form. The realisation of spirit is what art aims at. Here we have an echo of the Indian theory of art that "the outward shape by which the content is made perceptible is merely there for the sake of mind and spirit." The artist tries to represent the ideal. Thus it is the expression of the ideal content, which is claimed to be the aim of art and this is made possible through sculpture, painting, poetry, music etc. Beauty is the main element of this expression and it is presumed by Western critic that creation of beauty is the central aim of art : "Tagore contends that beauty in art has been the mere instrument and not its complete and ultimate significance." When beauty is wrongly regarded as the end of art, form gets the upper hand and poses as if it is the end. To Rabindranath, as to Indian thought in general, beauty is subjective. It does not inhere in the object. Tagore tells us :

"আমি চোখ মেললুম আকাশে,
জ্বলে উঠল আলো
পুবে পশ্চিমে।
গোলাপের দিকে চেয়ে বললুম, সুন্দর,
সুন্দর হোলো সে"।
[আমি, 'শ্যামলী' পৃঃ ৬]

[67] Aesthetics p. 16.
[68] Ibid. p. 25.

Beauty is not a mere fact. It cannot be surveyed and mapped. So it cannot be accounted for. "It is an expression"—an expression infinite in its variety and detail. Its abode is finite but it points to the infinite. It is bound by time and space but it far transcends them in its suggestiveness. The appreciation of beauty is always personal so it is beyond all scientific calculation and objective characterisation. In the words of Tagore "Beauty is in the ideal of perfect harmony which is in the Universal Being: truth the perfect comprehension of the universal mind."[69]

Croce's conception of art centres round the much praised and much blamed theory of intuition. To the question "what is art", Croce unhesitatingly replies: "I will say at once, in the simplest manner that art is vision or intution."[70] Croce's intution has a peculiar interpretation in the history of Aesthetics. It is totally unlike conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge is always reality conscious, aiming at establishing reality against unreality or at resolving unreality by including it in reality as a subordinate moment of reality itself. As we know, Green, Urban, Morris and many other thinkers maintain that aesthetic experience is a department of cognition and the aesthetic object is some sort of sign, containing a reference to something beyond itself. They swing to the other extreme and hold a view as far removed as possible from that of Croce. But Croce's intuition has no reference to reality. It means precisely indistinction of reality and unreality, the image with its value as mere image, the pure ideality of the image. Dr. S. K. Maitra[71] accords whole-hearted support to Croce; he writes: "Croce is unquestionably right in denying the consciousness of reality in art. Art, according to him, is distinguished from Logic by the absence of reality-consciousness." In art level, the spirit is not concerned with the reality or unreality of the image; it simply produces it. The intuition objectfies some inner emotions and feelings and there its duty ends. It does not further try to ascertain its relation to reality. Thus according to Croce, art is devoid of any reality-conciousness. In denying reality-conciousness to art, Croce makes common cause with artists like Thomes Hardy. Hardy writes[72] 'Art is concerned with seemings only' 'the mission of art being to record

[69] Tagore, Personality, p. 19.
[70] See Essence of Aesthetic.
[71] See his Studies in Philosophy and Religion.
[72] Quoted in 'The Esthetic function of language by A. Isenberg (Published in the Journal of Philosophy Vol. XLVI No. 1).

impressions, not convictions'. Intuition, however, in the words of Croce "is the undifferentiated unity of the perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible". Gentile shares Croce's activistic idealism. He defines art as "the exaltation of the subject released from the chains of the real". Even if the matter is borrowed from nature and history it "is not there for its own sake but for the soul's life, for its feeling. It represents the 'I' as it stands in its subjective immediacy".[73] In our intuition we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external reality but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they might be. "Intuition reveals character, individual physiognomy. Tagore's observation that art is expression of selected personality, in our sense, does not suggest the same thing. For Tagore's conception of art has reference to reality and, in his opinion, the artistic excellence is determined by its proximity to reality. Here Tagore comes closer to Plato. Plato has also a similar criterion to judge the merit of any artistic work. Here we may note another anomaly in Tagore. Tagore is a sjubectivist for whom all that is, is dependent on the subject for its existence. When reality depends on the subject for its existence and is real only as to 'me', we do not understand the necessity of introducing reality-consciousness in art. When reality itself is 'posited merely for the convenience of exposition' Tagore's position becomes tenable only if we deny reality consciousness to art, as Croce did.

Let us explain at length, the nature of intuition, which is the pivot of Croce's conception of art. His definition of intuition naturally leads one to think of its identity with sensation. But it is not so. Sensation implies mere passivity whereas intuition is the activity of the spirit. It is the first grade of mental activiy. According to Kant, sensations are developed by intellect into knowledge proper through the logical concepts. Croce's intuition is below the logical level. It is the sensuous expression of feelings in individual images. It is the activity that gives form to sensuous content. Mere sense devoid of individual form are not intuition. When they are presented to the mind couched in some form, they rank intuitions proper. Sensa as such are the inarticulate matter to which intuition imparts form and apart from the latter they are only unreal abstractions. To quote Croce: "the intuition or presentation is distinguished from the sensitive flux or wave, from what we merely feel and experience from psychical matter as formed. And this form, this taking into possession is the

[73] See The Theory of Mind as pure act. p. 223.

expression".[74] Thus we find, it is the activity of the spirit that differentiates mere sensation from intuition and makes intuition what it is. Intuition produces objects for it enjoys them. As regards natural beauty man is like the mythical Narcissus at the fountain : nature is simply a stimulus to the imanigation of the beholder and to believe otherwise is to commit the fatal error of confounding beauty with physical facts. Croce frankly[75] tells us that art is neither a physical nor a moral fact. But pure intuition is lyricism. 'Lyricita', which signifies the representation of states of mind, passion, feeling and personality. At this primary grade or level of mental activity, the distinction of real and unreal does no exist. This distinction emerges on the next higher level when the products of intuition are subjected to logical judgment. Here Croce utters a distinct note and tells us that art has nothing to do with intellectual elements. Neither Kant nor Tagore agree with Croce here. Even in the realm of art they admit some intellectual element to be indispensable, nay, to constitute the very essence of art. Tagore tells us that art is neither fully moral nor fully intellectual. And he attributes an element of cognition to the artistic activity. In his view, the intellectual element is there and without it art cannot thrive. Kant's definition runs is a similar spirit. He defines a "work of art as the adequate representation of a concept, in which intellect and imagination are combined in the genius of the artist."

Intuition and expression are identical. One cannot be separated from its physical embodiment. "Every true intuition." says Croce, "is at the same time expression. Whatever is not objectified in an expression is not intuition, it is not an image or presentation but sensation and animal nature."[76] It is not possible to distinguish intuition from expression in this cognitive process. The two appear at the same time because they are not two but one. This expression should not be confused with the external representation in colour, shape, music, or language. External representation is not the real artistic act, it is only an execution and the intellectual element as conceived by Kant and Tagore consists in this process of execution on paper or canvas or stone. Real art, according to Croce, is internal and purely mental. "The artist says what has already been said within, sings what has been really sung within, he externalizes what has been inwardly

[74] See Estetica, p. 14.

[75] See Essence of Aesthetic.

[76] Estetica p. II.

intuited." Expression is really mental and we should not confuse it with the act of externalization, which is also unfortunately called expression. "The terminology" says Croce, "is unfortunate because the work of art is always and only internal and what is external is no longer the work of art."[77] This identity between expression and the aesthetic fact leads to the identity of philology and aesthetic. Language and art can easily interchange places without creating any confusion in their respective spheres. Listowel[78] tells us that "Croce's error in identifying art and language is so gross and palpable that even a child could perceive it." How can the richness and variety of aesthetic experience be equated with language in ordinary experience? If all utterances are artistic, then every man, as soon as he has learnt the use of tongue with the first words that emerge from the incoherent babble of infancy is ipso facto a poet. Volkelt, the noted German aesthetician condemns this identification of aesthetics and linguistics by Croce and calls it a "curiousity of Philosophy."[79] In our opinion the position of Croce is not indefensible. The babble of infancy of a child or of Adam and Eve in those primitive days of human civilisation were prompted by the desire to communicate. The history of the origin of language will tell us that it was prompted by some utilitarian motive. It had a definite purpose to fulfil and an aim to achieve, and that is to communicate with others. It is precisely here, in our view, where Croce's expression' differs from language as expression. He[80] definitely tells us: "Another negation is implied in the definition of art as intuition: if it be intuition and intuition is equivalent to our theory of expression in the 'original sense of contemplation,"[81] art cannot be a utilitarian act". The main function of language is to communicate to others and it is done with a practical end in view. Language is art not as a medium of communication: it is art only in the sense of "intuition-expression." The artist creates and is not consious of society at large. The artist in Adam, while creating, is not conscious even of Eve, not to speak of other people. And that is the true nature of art. While language has a defintie object viz. to make others understand what one feels, what one wants and what one stands for, a true artist is oblivious of himself and his

[77] Estetica p. 58.

[78] See 'A Modern History of Aesthetics' & 'A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics.'

[79] System der Aesthetik, Vol. III (Engs. Translation).

[80] Croce. The Essence of Aesthetics, p. 11.

[81] Ibid.

wants and is not prompted by any end extraneous to the nature and autonomy of art as art.

The definition of art as intuition gives us some corollaries which are negative in character. It denies that art is a physical fact. Phycal facts, according to Croce, do not possess reality and art is supremely real as the central spiritual reality. Thus the real character of art is incompatible with the shadowy nature of physical facts. So they cannot be identical. Secondly, art is not a utilitarian act, as has already been pointed out. Art is intuition. So art cannot be any utilitarian activity of the spirit. True art has nothing to do with a conscious effort for obtaining pleasure or keeping off pain. It has also nothing to do with the useful. A third nagation is that of art as a moral act. Intuition being a theoretic act is opposed to practical acts of all sort. Good will which makes a man honest does not make him an artist. Art is not the result of any act of will. So it transcends all moral discriminations, the dichotomies of good and bad. Greek sculpture does not stand condemned at the bar of public opinion for their expression of human nudity. It is useless to judge the moral value of 'Jupiter and Venus in embrace' when it excels in artistic excellence. Art must live for its own sake. If any extraneous motive is imposed on art, art ceases to be what it is. Art is like a rivulet gushing out with a life and vivacity of its own. It babbles and murmurs and may whisper in our ears something that may ennoble us, teach us and give us solace but that is not its conscious doing. A conscious purpose baffles itself in the field of art.

Beauty, which is expression, is identical with art. This is Croce's view. Tagore does not equate art with beauty. It is the hand maid of art, according to Tagore, not its ultimate significance. Tagore recognises the importance of matter as well as form in art. Form alone does not make art what it is. But Croce repeatedly tells us that it is form and form alone that makes a work of art worth the name. An analytical study of the literature of Tagore and other master artists of the world literature will tell us that Tagore was not right in differing from Croce that it is form i.e., activity of the spirit that makes a true work of art. We do not deny that 'matter' is there but it has no 'say' in the matter of contributing to its worth or artistic value. It is not the guiding factor in any work of art. A casual meeting with a former lady-love in a Railway compartment, a wild flower on a crannied wall, a Trojan war or the tragic death of a woman of ill-fame are all equally admissible as themes of

true poetry. Proximity of artistic 'matter' to reality, in the ordinary sense of the term, does not help to make true art. It is the form that lifts it to the level of art. Things may happen in one order and they may be recreated in a different order. Kumaraswami defines[82] reality as that wherein we do not experience the sense of want. There is no resemblance between nature and the work of art, yet we do not feel it, for there is something else which satisfies our aesthetic faculties. From a distance the true work of art gives us impression of the 'real' but viewed at close quarters the illusion is dissipated. It is no reality then, neither the representation of it. It is mere technique, as the Chinese art critics call it, and there is no prescribed rule at all to guide the artist. The nature of artistic creation has been explained in the Tantras thus : "The creation of the artist is like the flight of a bird from one tree to another leaving no trace of its flight in the air. This is true of all artistic creation. The spirit that creates soars higher from the 'presented reality' and the artistic creation is like a flight from one tree (presented reality) to another (product of art), and we cannot trace the trail through which the artist passed from one to the other. The spirit recreates the presented reality through imagination. And this re-creation, as the handiwork of spirit as artist, is of much higher spiritual value. It is poetic truth far removed from truth in the ordinary sense of correspondence with the factual reality. Tagore tells us of the higher spiritual value of such poetic truth in unambiguous terms in the following passage :

"সেই সত্য যা' রচিবে তুমি,
ঘটে যা, তা' সব সত্য নহে। কবি তব মনোভূমি,
রামের জনমস্থান অযোধ্যার চেয়ে
সত্য জেনো"।
['ভাষা ও ছন্দ', কাহিনী কাব্যগ্রন্থ]

Truth is thus recreated in the creative imagination of the artist. That is why Tagore proclaims that the poet's imagination has far greater importance than the real place of factual occurrence; for, in imagination the artistic facts are created and recreated perpetually. In 'Sāhitya', Tagore tells us that the readers of Vālmīki have constructed a (mythical) biography of the poet on the basis of his poetry; this biography is truer than the actual life-history of the poet. Such mythical biographies are of higher spiritual value for they bear the

[82] Vide 'śilpa dṛṣti' by Sri Nandalal Bose.

impress of the spirit. They are constructed from data which are supplied by spirit itself. Poetic works or works of art are the result of the primary activity of the spirit. So we find that Tagore does not value so much the factual happenings in our day to day life as the handiworks of the spirit in man. Here he strikes the right note in asserting that poetic truth is of higher order than the truth in the sense of factual correspondence. But Tagore is not always consistent. He retains in his scheme of art and art criticism the reality-consciousness which is of lesser spiritual value than the works of art themselves, on his own admission. But Croce overcomes this anomaly which we find in Tagore, by holding that a true work of art does not refer to reality in any way. The reality-consciousness emerges in the next level and it is conspicuous by its absence in the art-level. So in one sense, both Tagore and Croce agree in denying reality-consciousness in art. According to Croce, it is yet to emerge in the logical level and according to Tagore it is already transcended in the level of art and recreated in the imagination of the artist, having a greater spiritual value. Thus we find that where Tagore is a poet and an artist he agrees with Croce unknowingly ; but as an art-critic he issues pass-ports both to matter and form and tells us that they are indispensable for any true work of art. This is logical contradiction. If, as Tagore says "Beauty is the expression of truth" and if this truth be "the perfect comprehension of the universal mind", we do not understand how imaginary situations and our subjective reaction thereto, can be proper objects of artistic creations. Croce is certainly right here in his insistence on expression as the essence of art and expression certainly as Croce says is the form in which the artistic content incarnates itself.

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** The above noted works have been freely used. Reference to extracts has not always been possible.