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AMULYACHANDRA SEN

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IN
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SCHOOLS AND SECTS IN JAINA LITERATURE

Being a full account compiled from original sources of the
doctrines and practices of Philosophical School and
Religious Sects mentioned in the canonical
literature of the Jainas

By



AMULYACHANDRA SEN, M.A., B.L.

*Of the Vidyabhavana (Institutus of Research),
Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan*




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Dedicated to my guru

Principal Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya

In whose character and learning his pupils have seen the
true ideal of Indian scholarship and at whose suggestion
this humble work was undertaken

CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
PART I	
I. The Ājīvikas	4
II. The Brahmanic Schools— Sāṃkhya and Yoga Śāśvatavādins Purānists The Upaniṣads	13
III. Ātmaśaṣṭhavāda	18
IV. Tajjīvataocharīravāda	19
V. Nāstikavāda	22
VI. Buddhism	23
VII. Minor Schools	17
PART II	
Classification into Four Great Schools :	
1. Kriyāvāda	29
2. Akriyāvāda	32
3. Ajñānavāda	34
4. Vinayavāda	36
PART III	
I. Religious Sects	39
II. The Sect of Pārśva	42
III. Schismatic Schools among the Nirgranthas	43
IV. Nirgrantha Criticism of other Schools	45

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ERRATA

At page 4, line 22 and throughout the work the name of the commentator should be read as Śīlānka.

At page 2 line 1 and throughout the work *ṇ* where followed by *k* or *g* in any word should be read as *ṅ*.

<i>At page 7, line 21 for</i>	<i>theif</i>	<i>read</i>	<i>thief</i>
„ 8 „ 20 „	Kuṇḍaggama	„ Kuṇḍa	
„ 10 „ 17 „	Māṇibhadra	„ Maṇi	
„ 10 „ 21 „	snakts	„ snakes	
„ 10 „ 30 „	The Gosāla	„ Then Gośāla	
„ 12 „ 10 „	das	„ was	
„ 13 „ 39 „	Tevijjia	„ Tevijja	
„ 15 „ 16 „	<i>ṇhāyā kayavalikammā</i>	„ <i>ṇhāyā kayavalikammā</i>	
„ 26 „ 12 „	Sākhyaputra	„ Sākya-	
„ 27 „ 8 „	Gunaratn?	„ Guṇa-	

INTRODUCTION

The canonical literature of the Svetambara Jainas contains many references to various philosophical schools and religious sects apparently contemporaneous with itself. Although the canon in the form we have it now is a creation of the Council of Valabhi held in *circa* 454 A.C. under the presidentship of Devardhigaṇin, yet the matter contained in it is much older. This Council reduced the text to writing. The first collection was, however, made by the Council of Pāṭaliputra which, according to Hemacandra, met during the reign of Aśoka Maurya. Additions were made no doubt during the subsequent redactions, but the essentials remained unchanged through the long years of canonical revision which brought with it accretions of extraneous matter. The statements which form the subject matter of discussion in the following pages picture a state of things much earlier than Devardhigaṇin's age and earlier even than the Council of Pāṭaliputra.

The beliefs and practices discussed in the Jaina texts were considered heretical from the point of view of the Jainas or the Nirgranthas, as they were called in the earlier days, and as such it was necessary for them to state and criticise the views and practices of many of those schools and sects. An attempt has been made in the following pages to give a comprehensive account of all these sects and schools. Some works outside the Jaina canon have also been sometimes referred to for the purpose of illustrating the matter contained in the canon. References in the later works of Svetāmbaras and Digambaras to systems of thought adverse to them have been rejected for the simple reason that they deal with circumstances of later ages influenced by conditions of later times when such works were composed. In many cases parallel references and accounts have been mentioned from the literature of the Buddhists, as they and the Jainas having started their career about the same time the former are likely to furnish reliable evidence on matters referred to by the latter, both being outside the Brahmanical fold and having a strong critical outlook.

That the time the Jaina canon treats of was one bristling with conflicting views and rival schemes may easily be gathered from such statements as "See, there are men who control themselves, whilst others

only pretend to be houseless."¹ The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, one of the oldest of the canonical texts, says that "To friendly or hostile heretics one should not give alms, drink, dainties and spices. . . nor do them service. . . . Some here are not well instructed as regards the subject of conduct ; . . . they pronounce opinions. . . . Know that all this is without reason."² The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra*, another of the most authoritative texts, says "These heretics will never be saved. . . some unworthy *śramaṇas* who hold wrong doctrines are afraid of what is free from danger and are not afraid of real danger."³ "Some who search after truth and pretend to practise the Law, follow the false Law and do not arrive at the right thing ignorant of what is right and wrong they do not get out of misery . . . they praise their own creed and blame that of their opponents."⁴ In a passage of fierce denunciation it has been said that the heretics will never be saved from the sufferings of the world.⁵ In the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* false belief is spoken as an instrument that causes pain (*micchādamsanasalla*).⁶ It has been divided into two classes, *abhiggahiya* and *anabhiggahiya* which Abhayadeva, the commentator, explains as that proceeding from acceptance of wrong doctrine and that proceeding from other causes. In the *Bhagavatī* there are frequent mentions of heretical schools and of heretical ascetics who came to question Mahāvīra. The *Jñātādharma-kathā*, *Antaḥkṛtadaśā* and *Praśnavyākaraṇāṅga Sūtras* also contain occasional references to *micchādamsanasalla*.

In the *Upāsakadaśā* praising of heretical teachers and intimacy with them have been regarded as offences against the law of right belief.⁷ The animosities of the time are well illustrated by the remark of the newly converted lay disciple Ānanda made to Mahāvīra: "Truly, Reverend Sir, it does not befit me from this day forward to praise and worship any man of a heretical community, or any of the devas of a heretical community, or any of the objects of reverence to them ; or without being first addressed by them, to address them or converse with them ; or to give or supply them with food or drink ; except it be by the command of the king or the community or any powerful man or deva or one's own elders or by the exigencies of living."⁸ Frequently does Mahāvīra

¹ Ācār.S. I.i.2.2; I.i.3.4; I.i.6.3.; with a slight variation in I.i.7.2.

² Ibid. I.vii.1.1-3.

³ Sūt.S. I.i.2.5-10.

⁴ Ibid. I.I.ii. 15-23.

⁵ Ibid. II.ii.79-81.

⁶ Sth.S. i.48; Bhag. I.6, 52.

⁷ Upās.S.i.44.

⁸ Ibid. i.58.

refer to the need of refuting heretical doctrines: "Surely, venerable companions," says Mahāvīra to his disciples, "if those servants of the *Śramaṇa* who are householders living among householders, refute the theories of heretics, then much more, venerable companions, must the Nirgrantha ascetics who are students of the sacred collection of the twelve *Āṅgas* be able to refute the theories of heretics by means of these arguments, questions, proofs and explanations."⁹

In the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* bad monks who do not protect themselves from sin, who though having the appearance of monks are the lowest among their worthy brethren, have been likened to heretics: they are despised in this world like poison, they are no bodies in this world or in that beyond.¹⁰ The views and teachings of heretics have been called delusive talk which is untrue and without any meaning.¹¹ Opinions and manifold doctrines not conforming to the Nirgrantha creed were declared to be contemptible which a monk was advised to abandon, for they were productive of evil everywhere.¹² Faith has been held to be easier to obtain for those who though not versed in the sacred doctrines are not acquainted with other systems and hold no wrong doctrines. Right faith depends on the avoiding of schismatical and heretical tenets.¹³ Among the eight principles on which excellence of faith rests, are counted absence of preference for heresies, and non-shaking of right belief at the prosperity of heretical sects.¹⁴

In the *Nandi Sūtra* Mahāvīra has been eulogised as the moon who ever vanquishes the Rāhu of *Akriyā-vāda*,¹⁵ as the destroyer of the lustre of other schools,¹⁶ and as the destroyer of the pride of false faiths.

It will be seen from the remarks quoted above that the time was full of various opinions, views, beliefs, schools, sects and teachings.¹⁷ They were not at all friendly towards each other as can be easily gathered. It will now be our task to examine the many references throughout

⁹ Ibid. vi.174.

¹⁰ Uttar. S. xvii.20

¹¹ Ibid. xviii.26.

¹² Ibid. xviii.26, 30.

¹³ Ibid. xvii.26, 28.

¹⁴ Ibid. xvii.31.

¹⁵ Nan.S. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid. 10 & 22.

¹⁷ How differences and disputes arose over subjects that would be regarded as beyond the scope of religion in the present day is illustrated in Bhag. S. 11.9.418, in the story of Prince Śiva where cosmographic details form the subject of the disputes; and in 11.12.435, where duration of the gods' lives in different heavens is hotly debated. Manifold disputes and their uselessness are also referred to by the Buddhists in *Duṭṭhatṭhaka*, *Suddhatṭhaka*, *Paramatṭhaka*, *Paśūra*, *Māgandīya*, *Cūlavīyūha* and *Mahāvīyūha Suttas* of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*.

the canon with a view to find out what views each of them upheld and whether any of them can be identified with schools whose doctrines we are familiar with. This will serve a double purpose of showing in the first place what was the historical background of the Nirgrantha doctrine, what views they felt called upon to refute and thereby establish the superiority of the Nirgrantha creed, and secondly of showing though in an indirect manner, the condition of many doctrines of the time by means of the light thrown by the Jainas regarding the philosophical and religious atmosphere of India of that period. It is agreed that a hostile critic's remarks cannot be accepted in full in judging the value or contents of a creed it took upon itself to criticise, yet the opinion of an adverse critic seen through a proper perspective has its own value for historical purposes, indicating as it does the currents of popular opinion. It is to be remembered that this work is not intended to be a history of the philosophies of the time. The principal object is to get as clear an idea as is possible of the tenets, as they appeared to the Nirgranthas, of other schools and sects in those ancient days with a view to create a suitable background for the study of Jainism.

Many of the statements met with in different places are vague, such as the vehement denunciation of those who injure earth-bodies, water-bodies, plants, wind-bodies, animals, etc.¹⁸ for such would apply to many non-Nirgranthas. Jacobi thinks¹⁹ on the authority of *Silānka*, the commentator, that "others only pretend to be houseless" refers to the Buddhists. It must be pointed out, however, that we know now that there were in those days many kinds of houseless ascetics besides the Buddhists, to whom the remarks of the Jainas would equally apply.²⁰ We shall deal, however, with only those statements which are particular, precise, and identifiable, and consider them in the order of importance given them in the Jaina texts.

PART I.

(I) THE ĀJIVĪYAS.

The doctrines of the Ājivīyas are the best known heresy to the Nirgranthas. Judging from the frequency of their appearance and the

¹⁸ *Acār. S.* I.i.2.2; I.i.3.4; I.i.5.4; I.i.7.2; I.i.6.4.

¹⁹ *SBE.*xxii.p.4.

²⁰ See also *Sūt. S.* I.i.1.6 & I.ii.1.8; and the long disputes between Nirgranthas and others in *Bhag.* 8.7.337; 13.2.595-596; 18.7.632-634; and 18.8.640; *Sth. S.* 3.2.167; *Aup. S.* 38.

vehemence and care with which they are denounced it seems probable that the doctrines of the Ājīviyas played an important part in the life of the times.

The Ājīviyas believed that though it is proved that there are individual souls, they experience pleasure and pain, and on dying lose their state of existence, yet misery and pleasure are not caused by the souls themselves, for how could it be caused, they asked, by other agents as time, etc? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal pleasure, and pain are not caused by the souls themselves nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the fate assigned them by Destiny.²¹

Another account states that there is no such thing as exertion or labour or power or vigour or manly strength, but that all things are caused by destiny which is unalterably fixed.²² This has been called the doctrine of Gosāla Maṅkhāliputta. From the story of Saddālaputta, the potter of Palāsapura, and an adherent of the Ājīviyas, we get the leading doctrine of Gosāla. The story runs thus:

Saddālaputta once brought out his potter's ware from within his workshop and placed them in the sun. Mahāvīra happened to come upon the scene and asked "Saddālaputta, how is this potter's ware made?"

Saddālaputta: "Reverend Sir, this ware is at first clay, then it is kneaded with water, and then it is mixed well together with ashes and dung; then it is placed on the wheel, and finally many bowls and jars of various sizes are made."

Mahāvīra: "Saddālaputta, is your ware made by dint of exertion and manly strength, or on the other hand, is it made without exertion and manly strength—*kim uṭṭhāṇeṇam vā kammeṇam vā baleṇam vā virieṇam vā purisakkāraṇarakkameṇam kajjanti udāhu anuṭṭhāṇeṇam jāva apurisakkāraṇarakkameṇam kajjanti?*"

Saddālaputta: "Reverend Sir, it is made without exertion and manly strength, and all things are unalterably fixed."

Mahāvīra: "Saddālaputta, if any one of thy men were to steal thy unbaked or baked ware or scatter it about or make holes in it or let it drop into pieces or place it outside unguarded or if he were to indulge in outrageous familiarities with thy wife Aggimittā, what punishment would thou inflict on that man?"

²¹ Sūt.S. I.i.2.1-3.

²² Upās. 6.166.

Saddālaputta : “Reverend Sir, that man I will curse or beat or tie up or frighten or threaten or cuff or fine or bully or even before his time deprive him of his life.”

Mahāvīra then pointed out that if all things were unalterably fixed and depended not on exertion then he ought not to take any action against his servant’s conduct for the servant was not responsible for it. This convinced Saddālaputta of the falseness of Ājīviya doctrines and he was converted to the creed of Mahāvīra.²³

The Parable of the Lotus-pool is an important chapter in which the views of some of the leading schools have been stated.

There was a lotus-pool containing much water and mud, full of white lotuses, delightful and magnificent. In the very middle of this lotus-pool grew one big white lotus. Now there came from each of the four quarters a man proud of his own abilities and attempted to fetch the big white lotus. To each of them as he proceeded the water and mud seemed to extend, so that he could neither reach the white lotus nor return to the bank and was stuck in the mud. Then came a restrained monk who called aloud standing on the bank and the big white lotus flew to him. Mahāvīra narrated this story and asked his disciples if they understood the meaning of the simile and on their answering in the negative explained that the lotus-pool meant the world, the water meant *karman*, the mud meant pleasures, the lotuses meant people in general, the big white lotus meant the king, the four men meant the heretics, the monk meant the Law, the bank meant the Order, and the monk’s voice meant the preaching of the Law, and the big lotus flying up meant *nirvāṇa*. Different teachers went to the king to teach him but only the Nirgrantha ascetic succeeded.

One of these four teachers, an Ājīviya, states his doctrines as follows :

There are two kinds of men, one admits and another does not admit action. Both are alike, their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force. An ignorant man thinks of the case as follows : “When I suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble, am afflicted or undergo punishment, I have caused it ; or when another man suffers, etc., he has caused it.” Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. A wise man thinks about the cause as follows : “When I suffer I did not cause it or when another

²³ Upās. 7.195.200 ; 6.166.

man suffers he did not cause it. By the will of fate all beings are born, are made to suffer changes of life or to die."²⁴

Adda's discussions with various teachers, while renouncing the life of a Prince he was on his way to Mahāvīra, are interesting. In these discussions one man states that if an ascetic living alone uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him or has intercourse with women, he commits no sins thereby.²⁵ Harṣakula, author of the *Dīpikā* on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, and *Silāṅka* identify this man as Gosāla which is corroborated by the fierce personal attacks he makes on Mahāvīra in course of the discussions. This is natural enough, for the relations between the two were notoriously bitter. The fact, however, appears to be that the Ājīviya doctrines have been put forward through this fictitious person.

The soul of him who is pure will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude, but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hate; and that he who has lived on earth as a restrained monk will become free from *karman*, and as clear water which was free from defilement again becomes defiled, so will be the soul. This doctrine has been attributed to a school. Harṣakula thinks that the Ājīviyas are meant. *Silāṅka* mentions the *Trairāśikas* besides Ājīviyas. The *Trairāśikas* are the Jaina followers of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy.²⁶ They are so called because they believed in a third state of existence besides *jīva* and *ajīva*.²⁷

In some places the Ājīviyas are mentioned by name but hardly anything is mentioned regarding their views.²⁸ Once we find them asking the Nirgrantha elders the question whether an article belonging to a young monk belongs to himself or to another, if it is stolen by a thief when the young ascetic is observing the *sāmāyikas* and the monk goes after the thief.²⁹ They are said not to accept Mahāvīra's doctrine of abstention from sin of body, mind and speech in the three-fold divisions of doing it oneself, getting it done by another, or approving of another's doing it.³⁰

On the life of Gosāla we have the following details supplied by the Jainas. His father was called Maṅkhali who used to wander about from

²⁴ Sūt.S. II.1.30-33.

²⁵ Ibid. II.vi. 7.

²⁶ SBE.xlv. p. 245, n.2.

²⁷ See *infra* the sixth schism led by Rohagupta.

²⁸ Bhag. 1.2.24.

²⁹ Bhag. 8.5.328.

³⁰ Bhag. 8.5.329.

place to place exhibiting a picture. Maṅkhali once came with his wife Bhaddā to Saravaṇa and took up his lodging in the cow-shed of a wealthy Brahman called Gobahula and Gosāla was born here. He followed his father's calling. At one time Mahāvīra was residing in a weaver's house at Nālandā where Gosāla also happened to come in course of his wanderings. A householder named Vijaya of the city of Rāyagaha entertained Mahāvīra with great honours. Gosāla heard of this from the people and meeting Mahāvīra offered to be his disciple whereupon the latter gave no reply. The same offer was made by Gosāla on two subsequent occasions with the same result. Mahāvīra left Nālandā and Gosāla in his mood of dejection gave away his belongings, shaved his head and went away. He met Mahāvīra again in Paṇiyabhūmi, repeated his offer and it was accepted this time. They lived together in that place for six years.³¹

Once on the road from Siddhatthagāma to Kummaggāma they came across a sesamum shrub in blossom. Gosāla asked if it would die and if so where its seeds would reappear. Mahāvīra replied that the shrub would die but its seeds would appear again in the pods of the same shrub. Gosāla disbelieved this, called Mahāvīra a liar, and going up to the shrub uprooted it but a shower of rain having fallen the shrub took root again and Mahāvīra's prophecy was fulfilled. Now they went on to Kuṇḍaggāma on the outskirts of which they met the ascetic Vessayaṇa practising penances with his arms uplifted, his face turned towards the sun, and his body covered with lice. Gosāla asked the ascetic if he was an ascetic or a lice-heap. This enraged Vessayaṇa who released his fiery forces (*teullese*) to burn Gosāla but Mahāvīra out of pity for Gosāla counteracted the forces by releasing his own forces. Finding himself thwarted Vessayaṇa exclaimed "That will do, Sir, that will do." Gosāla questioned Mahāvīra about the meaning of such exclamation and the latter explained what was about to happen. Then Gosāla enquired how long it took to acquire such forces and how such forces could be acquired. Mahāvīra answered that it could be acquired by dint of penances. Afterwards when they were on their way to Siddhatthagāma they happened to pass the sesamum shrub mentioned before. Gosāla narrated to Mahāvīra his past prophecy and claimed that it had been falsified as the shrub was yet alive. Mahāvīra explained that Gosāla's uprooting it on the previous occasion had fulfilled his prophecy about its death and the coming down of the shower which revived it had caused the seeds to appear in the pods, for

³¹ According to Kalpa. S.5.122, Mahāvīra lived only a year in Paṇiyabhūmi.

all plants were capable of re-animation. Gosāla disbelieved it, went up to the spot and on closely examining the shrub found the seeds. This led him to conclude that not only plants but all living beings were capable of re-animation. Then he left Mahāvīra.

Gosāla then practised the severe penances for acquiring fiery forces and succeeded after six months. Now he proclaimed himself a Jina and founded the Order of the Ājīviyas. The headquarters of the Order was in Sāvattī in the shop of the potter woman Hālāhalā. In the twenty-fourth year of Gosāla's ascetic life he was visited by six ascetics with whom he discussed their doctrines and propounded his own theory from the eight Mahānimittas belonging to the Puvvas consisting of the principles of obtainment and non-obtainment, pleasure and pain, life and death. He met a disciple of Mahāvīra and notified to him his intention of destroying Mahāvīra by means of his fiery forces. The threat was conveyed to Mahāvīra who forbade Nirgrantha ascetics to hold any communication with Gosāla. Surrounded by his disciples, Gosāla called on Mahāvīra and angrily ridiculed him for having called Gosāla a disciple of Mahāvīra. "Maṅkhaliputta who was a disciple of Mahāvīra," said Gosāla "was dead and reborn in the heavens as a god. But I whose name was Udayi was born in the body of Ajjuna and entered in the seventh re-animation the body of Gosāla, which I still hold." He then went on to narrate in detail the processes of re-animation he had undergone in the bodies of different persons in different places and how in his seventh and last re-animation he obtained omniscience in the body of Gosāla in the potter shop of Hālāhalā. Mahāvīra in reply told him that he was like a thief who being chased by villagers attempted to conceal his identity under various disguises and in various places of hiding. Gosāla was enraged at this and hotly abused Mahāvīra. A disciple of the latter intervened but was burnt up by Gosāla's fiery forces. Another disciple also met with the same fate. Mahāvīra himself now rebuked Gosāla who attempted to burn him but was unsuccessful. A scene followed of trial of strength between the two teachers. They parted and Mahāvīra instructed his disciples to go and annoy Gosāla with questions.

After sometime Gosāla was stricken with a fever and being delirious he held a mango in his hand, drank liquors, sang, danced and made improper advances to Hālāhalā, and sprinkled on himself the cool muddy water from the potter's vessels, which acts, Mahāvīra explained to his disciples, led to the Ājīviya doctrines of the eight Finalities (*aṭṭha-*

carimāim). The first four of the eight Finalities were the last four acts performed by Gosāla, viz., the last drink, the last song, the last dance and the last improper solicitation. The other four were the last tornado, the last sprinkling elephant, the last fight with big stones and missils,³² and the last Tīrthaṅkara who is Gosāla himself.

Gosāla's sprinkling himself with the muddy water from the earthen vessels gave rise to the doctrine of the four things that may be used as drinks, and the four things as their substitutes by virtue of the coolingness. Those that may be used as water are the cow's urine, water accidentally collected in potter's vessels, water heated by the sun, and water dripping from a rock. Those that may be used as substitutes are holding in the hand a dish or a bottle or a jar or a pot which is cool or moist; squeezing in the mouth a mango or a hog-plum or a jujube or a *tinduka* fruit when it is unripe or uncooked, but not drinking its juice; squeezing in the mouth *kalāya* or *mugga* or *māsa* or *simbalī* beans when they are unripe or uncooked, but not drinking the juice; and feeling the touch of the moist hands of the gods Puṇṇabhadda and Māṇibhadda when they appear on the last night of six months to one who eats pure food for six months, lies successively for two months each on bare ground, on wooden planks, and on *darba* grass. He who submits to the touch of the two gods furthurs the work of venomous snakts but he who does not do so generates in himself a fire which burns his body and he dies and attains liberation.

Ayambula, an Ājīviya came to visit Gosāla at the time and felt ashamed finding Gosāla in a delirium. He was about to go away but Ājīviya elders called him back, explained the new doctrines and asked him to put his question to Gosāla after throwing away the mango in his hand. Ayambula did so and asked about the *halla* insect. Gosāla replied "This which you see is not a mango but only the skin of a mango. You ask about the *halla* insect—it is like the root of the bamboo; play the lute, man, play the lute." The Gosāla feeling the end approaching called his disciples and requested them to observe his funeral with all honours and proclaim that he was the last Tīrthaṅkara. But afterwards he felt that he was not an omniscient but a false teacher and a humbug but that Mahāvīra was the true Jina. Then he called his disciples and asked them to treat

³² The first three of the latter four refer to historical events of the time. The sprinkling elephant was known as *Secanaka* and belonged to king Śreṇika of Magadha who gave it to his younger son by queen Cellanā. His elder son Kuṇika on becoming king demanded the elephant from his brother which was refused. This gave rise to war in which stone missiles were used.

him with dishonour after he was dead and proclaim his misdeeds and the Jinahood of Mahāvīra. Then he died. The Ājīviya *theras* closed the door and pretended to carry out Gosāla's last instructions, and then they opened the doors and gave him a funeral according to his original wishes.³³

The austerities practised by the Ājīviyas are classified into four kinds, *viz.*, severe austerities, fierce austerities, abstention from ghee and other delicacies, and indifference to pleasant and unpleasant food.³⁴

It is said in the system of the Ājīviyas that all the living beings are subject to an ungratified desire to enjoy, and hence their earning of livelihood is by killing, cutting, etc.³⁵

The varieties of the Ājīviya ascetics are these:—those who beg in every second house, those who beg in every third house, those who beg in every fourth house, those who beg in every fifth house, those who beg in every sixth house, those who beg in every seventh house, those who accept lotus-stalks only as alms under certain conditions, those who beg in every house, those who do not beg if there is a flash of lightning, and those who practise penances by entering big earthen vessels.³⁶

The names of the twelve adherents of the Ājīviya doctrine are given as Tāla, Tālapalamba, Uvviha, Saṁviha, Udaya, Avaviha, Nāmudaya, Namudaya, Anuvālaya, Saṁkhavālaya, Ayambula and Kayaraya. They abstained from eating five kinds of fruit, *viz.*, *umbara*, *vaḍa*, *bora*, *satara* and *pilaṅkhu* and are said to have given up eating roots, bulbous roots, etc.³⁷

The Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists, which contains an account of the doctrines of the six principal teachers contemporary with Buddha, gives an account of Gosāla's teachings from where we get the same denial of the usefulness of effort or manly vigour. "*N'atthi atthakāre n'atthi parakāre n'atthi purisakāre ; n'atthi balam n'atthi viriyam, n'atthi purisathāmo, n'atthi purisaḥarakkamo*—the attainment of anything does not depend either on one's own acts or on the acts of another or on human effort ; there is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or human vigour."—*Digha-nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 53. Every thing depends on fate, and salvation depends on a long series of births of different kinds.

³³ Bhag. 15.539-554.

³⁴ Sth.S. 4.2.310.

³⁵ Bhag. 8.5.330.

³⁶ Asp. S. 41. For Buddhist evidence *cf.* Mahāvagga 3.12.9 for the last of these classes, and Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta for ascetic practices resembling these.

³⁷ Bhag. 8.5.330.

No change can be effected in this long series of transmigrations by any effort on the part of an individual.

Dr. Barua has reviewed in an exhaustive manner all the matter available on the life and teachings of Gosāla.³⁸ We do not intend to go here into any detailed examination of Gosāla's teachings, for which one must be referred to Dr. Barua's work. The conclusions reached by him hold up Gosāla and his teachings in a far better light of course. But the fact remains that his teachings were stubbornly opposed by Mahāvīra and Buddha alike. It is essential to remember that Mahāvīra's opposition was due to Gosāla's main doctrines of man's destiny being pre-ordained, that human effort could effect no change in it, and that emancipation was to be obtained only after a long series of transmigrations. These views come out prominently in both the Jaina and Buddhist accounts of Gosāla's teachings.

Jacobi and Dr. Barua are of opinion that contrary to the Jaina account Mahāvīra was a disciple of Gosāla for sometime. The reasons put forward in support of this hypothesis are that Mahāvīra was a mere learner in the first twelve years of his monkhood, that he became a nude ascetic in the second year of his monkhood, that Gosāla predeceased Mahāvīra by twelve years and was therefore his senior, and that Gosāla was recognised as a teacher at least two years before Mahāvīra. Against this hypothesis may be urged certain considerations. Gosāla's being a recognised teacher before Mahāvīra does not prove anything. Accepting the Jaina version Gosāla was not recognised as a teacher so long as he was associated with Mahāvīra, and proclaimed himself as such only after his separation from the latter. Such proclamation may have taken place before Mahāvīra won recognition as a teacher. Again, if Gosāla had ever been Mahāvīra's teacher we would have expected the Buddhists to record something to that effect. We would have expected also that Gosāla would be made to say something regarding his claim when he visited Mahāvīra to upbraid him for the latter's calling Gosāla a disciple.³⁹ Further, if Mahāvīra borrowed nudity from Gosāla he would not have continued in it when he renounced the discipleship of Gosāla. Although the *Bhagavatī* account of the relation subsisting between the two teachers cannot be accepted in full, it is doubtful whether a reversal of the relation can be accepted as true. The truth very probably was that the two ascetics joined and lived together for

³⁸ *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Chap. xxi. For a fuller treatment see Barua, *The Ajīvikas*.

³⁹ Bhag. 15.550.

sometime during the years of their probation. Difference of opinion on very important matters separated the two as we can infer from the *Bhagavatī* account.⁴⁰ Their joint life must have been of short duration, one year only,—which was prolonged in later accounts to six years.

(II) THE BRAHAMANIC SCHOOLS.

About the cult of popular Brahmanism we have many references in Jaina literature. Many Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas support it, they claim to have seen, heard, acknowledged, thoroughly understood in the upper, nether, and side-long directions, and in all ways to have examined it; with such extensive experience and deep wisdom they declare that all sorts of living beings may be slain or tormented or treated with violence or abused or driven away, and there is no wrong in it.⁴¹

The creation and governance of the world by the gods, as taught by some philosophers, has been regarded as an error.⁴² This can be attributed to the Brahmans, for no other contemporary school would regard the gods as creators or governors of the world.

The creation of the universe, according to a "great Ṛṣi" whose name is neither mentioned in the text nor preserved by Śīlāṅka or Harṣakula, is by Svayambhū;⁴³ according to some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas it is from the primeval egg.⁴⁴ Both of these evidently refer to Brahmanical views and this conclusion is corroborated by the allusions to the doctrine of Brahman almost in the same breath with these Brahmanical views, for the doctrine of Brahman, as we know, sprang from followers of Brahmanism.

Owning of possessions and engaging in undertakings is held to be compatible with reaching perfection by some;⁴⁵ this suggests the Brahmanical priests who would support a non-ascetic religion of rituals and ceremonies and themselves possess wealth and properties. Buddha's criticism of the Brahmans as owners of property in contrast with the possessionless Brahmā whom they worshipped is significant in this connection.⁴⁶

The gods are declared by some as putting an end to misery.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁰ Bhag. 15.554.

⁴¹ Ācār.S. I.iv.2.3.

⁴² Sūt.S. I.i.3.5.

⁴³ Sūt.S. I.i.3.7.

⁴⁴ Sūt.S. I.i.3.8.

⁴⁵ Sūt.S. I.i.4.3.

⁴⁶ Cf. Tevijjia Sutta.

⁴⁷ Sūt.S. I.xv.16-17.

meaning is that only the gods and not men are capable of attaining *mokṣa*, i.e., in order to obtain *mokṣa* a man must first attain a god's status and then progress onwards to final liberation, for as mere man he cannot obtain liberation. This is probably a piece of casuistry on the part of the Brahmanical priests to tempt *yajamānas* to engage their services for securing by means of sacrifices the status of gods after death.

While arguing with Adda one man says⁴⁸ that those who always feed two thousand holy mendicants acquire great merit, become gods and that is the teaching of the Veda. This is clearly a statement put into the mouth of a follower of Brahmanism.

Stories are mentioned of various Brahmanical adherents engaging in disputes with Nirgrantha ascetics. The subject matter of the discussion is not of much importance but the descriptions which precede about the intellectual equipment of the Brahmanical disputant are very interesting. As for instance, in Sāvattī dwelt a mendicant Khandaya by name of the Kaccāyana gotra, a disciple of Gaddabhāli. To him went Piṅgālaya, a Nirgrantha adherent, and asked whether the world was with or without an end, whether the *jīva* was with or without an end, etc. Khandaya was terribly upset, we are told, by these questions, could give no answer, kept quiet, and at last went to Mahāvīra for setting at ease his severe discomfiture. All we can inferentially gather from such accounts is that in the opinion of the authors of these narratives the followers of Brahmanism and other schools concerned could not give a satisfactory solution of such vital problems, but we must beware of reading too much in these statements. Probably to set off Khandaya's indifference to high metaphysical curiosity we are told that he was a teacher of, prevented corruption from entering into, retained in his memory, and was well-versed in the four Vedas Ṛik, Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan, to which is added Itihāsa as the fifth, Nighaṅṭu as the sixth, along with the Aṅgas, Upāṅgas, and the Rahasya, knew the six Aṅgas and the philosophy of the sixty categories, arithmetic, phonetics, ceremonial, grammar, prosody, etymology, and astronomy and in many other branches of knowledge suited for Brahmanic mendicants.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Sūt.S. II. 6.43.

⁴⁹ Bhag. 2.1.90; the same enumeration is referred to by a rubric in 15.541 and 18.10.646; repeated in Vip. S. 1.5., Aup. 38, and Kalpa S. 2.10. 'The philosophy of the sixty categories' is explained by Abhayadeva as 'the doctrine of Kapila,' *saṣṭhitantra* which means the Sāṅkhyā system. The analogous formula of the Buddhists for describing a Brahman, as given in the Amlaṭṭha S., is pretty much the same with a few minor additions.

There is an interesting account of a Brahman priest named Mahessara-datta who was learned in the Vedas, etc., and who in order to enhance the realm and power of his patron King Jiyasattu caused everyday a Brahman boy, a Kṣatriya boy, a Vaiśya boy and a Śūdra boy to be seized and their hearts extracted alive with which he performed *homa* sacrifices to propitiate the gods on behalf of the king. On the eighth and fourteenth lunar days he sacrificed two boys from each of the four castes, in the fourth month four boys from each caste, in the sixth month eight boys, and after a year sixteen boys from each caste. Whenever the king was attacked by an enemy, the priest caused eight hundred boys from each caste to be seized and performed *homa* 'sacrifices' with their hearts extracted alive.⁵⁰ Although this story is too monstrous to deserve credence it is curious how the underlying idea of offering human sacrifice on the eve of important undertakings, hinted in the older Brahmanic literature, still lingered in the popular mind.⁵¹

In all the narrative passages in the canonical literature of the Jainas the constantly recurring formula about people performing domestic sacrifices, expiatory ceremonies, etc.,—*ṇhāyākayavalikammā kayakouya-maṅglaṇyachhittā*—is used to describe the daily life of people who are not yet converted by Mahāvīra to the Nirgrantha doctrine or in respect of whom the question of conversion does not arise. All these persons, from princes to peasants, belonged apparently to the Brahmanical fold in the absence of any reference pointing to their adherence to any other creed.

Making a slight departure from the order we are following in our treatment of these various philosophical systems, we shall take up at this stage some views which are associated with the Brahmanical fold.

SAMKHYA AND YOGA.

The world was created according to some by Īvara; according to others this world with living beings and lifeless things with its variety of pleasure and pain was produced from *paḥāṇa* (*pradhāna*).⁵² The first of these two views is to be ascribed to the adherents of a theistic school, and the second to the Sāṅkhya system, or we may take them to refer to the theistic and atheistic followers of the Sāṅkhya philosophy.⁵³

⁵⁰ Vip.S. 1.5.

⁵¹ Cf. Sat. Br. VI.ii.1.5.; XIII.vii.1.8.

⁵² Sūt.S. I.i.3.6.

⁵³ See Jacobi, SBE, xiv, p. 244, n.4.

The attainment of perfection is possible, it has been maintained by some,⁵⁴ only by their method of religious life and not otherwise, and that even before the attainment of salvation they obtain power over others and possess everything to be wished for. Śīlāṅka thinks that the Śaivas and Ekadaṇḍins⁵⁵ are meant here. The possession even before emancipation is obtained, of everything to be wished for refers to the *siddhis* or supernatural powers with which we are familiar with in the later Yoga system of Patañjali. Perfection and freedom from disease are the aim of some⁵⁶ who are taken to be Śaivas by Śīlāṅka. A sound mind in a sound body seems to be their aim in common with Patañjali.

According to one school, when a man acts or causes another to act it is not his soul which acts or causes to act.⁵⁷ Harṣakula and Śīlāṅka ascribe this view to the adherents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy according to whom *prakṛti* acts while the *puruṣa* looks on, and because the *puruṣa* or the soul has no form and it is all-pervading it has no responsibility or agency. The doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa, as stated in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the Buddhists upholds this view. He taught that when one acts or causes another to act or commits sins no guilt follows. By doing virtuous acts, by generosity or truthfulness no increase of merit follows. There is neither merit nor demerit. Buddhaghōṣa says that Pūraṇa Kassapa was a naked mendicant, but he is probably confusing him with Aclaka Kassapa, a different person. Kassapa's idea is that the soul is passive and not affected by good or bad deeds.⁵⁸

ŚASVATAVADINS (ĒTERNALISTS).

In the opinion of another philosopher⁵⁹ the world is boundless and eternal and it exists from eternity and does not perish. Harṣakula and Śīlāṅka say that the eternal aspect of the universe means, according to this view, that it has no destruction and that the natural order of things is immutably fixed—one who is a male now will ever be such hereafter, one who is a female will always continue to be such and so on.

⁵⁴ Sūt.S. I.i.3.14.

⁵⁵ They hold that emancipation is obtained by a knowledge of the twenty-five principles, says Śīlāṅka.

⁵⁶ Sūt.S. I.i.3.15.

⁵⁷ Sūt.S. I.i.1.13.

⁵⁸ See Barua : *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 278. The Buddhist version is an exaggerated account of Kassapa's views. Although at first sight it appears like Nāstika-vāda, it is not so as a perusal of Ajita Keśakambali's views would show—Ajita's being true Nāstikavāda.

⁵⁹ Sūt.S. I.i.4.6.

PURANISTS.

Another philosopher says⁶⁰ that the world is limited but eternal. This view is ascribed by Harṣakula and Śilāṅka to Vyāsa, for Vyāsa says that the world consists of seven islands.

THE UPANISADS.

The view is said to be held by some fools that as the earth, though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so the intelligent principle, *viz.*, the *ātman*, appears under various forms as the universe.⁶¹ That the world is created is said to be an error committed by some philosophers.⁶²

The universe again is said by some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas to have been produced from the primeval egg and that He (Brahmā) created the things.⁶³ Some say,⁶⁴ that the knowledge of the highest authority is unlimited. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka argue that that which has no limit in time and space is called unlimited by some teachers ; but those who possess a knowledge of this unlimited by means of super-sensual vision do not thereby necessarily become omniscient. The meaning appears to be that the Vedāntin's idea of the Absolute is that it transcends knowledge and that one who knows the Absolute becomes, as it were, the Absolute himself, both the ideas being very frequent in the Upaniṣads. The Jainas, however, contend that those who possess a knowledge of the Absolute as a transcendental Being do not thereby themselves become entitled to be called omniscient. The text goes on to say that the same philosopher holds that the knowledge is limited in every way. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka regard these two apparently contradictory views to belong to the same philosophers, and solve the difficulty by taking the latter view to allude to Brahmā's sleep for a thousand years alternating with his wakefulness for another thousand years during which he is unconscious and conscious respectively and so the knowledge is both limited and unlimited. The context of the verse is that the Nirgrantha ascetics should know the ordinary views of the common people for some of them say things which are the outcome of a wrong understanding, and as an illustration mentions apparently contradictory views held by Vedāntins and Purānists.

⁶⁰ Sūt.S. I.i.4.6

⁶¹ Sūt.S. I.i.1.9.

⁶² Sūt.S. I.i.3.9. Cf. Kaṭha Up. II.v.9-12.

⁶³ Sūt.S. I.i.3.8.

⁶⁴ Sūt.S. I.i.4.7.

In Adda's discussions one man appears and says⁶⁵ that he and his predecessor (whom we have already identified as an adherent of Brahmanism) follow very much the same law, that they stand firm in it, and shall do so in the time to come ; he says that he believes that virtue consists in good conduct and that knowledge is necessary for liberation, that with regard to the circle of births there is no difference between them, but that they assume an invisible, great, eternal, imperishable, and indestructible Soul who excels all other beings in every respect as the moon excels the stars. This is clearly the opinion of Vedānta, but Śīlāṅka ascribes this view to Ekadaṇḍins, and refers to their *ācāraḥpradhānam śīlam uktam yamaniyamalakṣaṇam* which suggests Patañjali's system of Yoga. It would appear from this that the Śaivas, Ekadaṇḍins, and Vedāntins held in the early days closely allied views.

In the Parable of the Lotus-pool one of the teachers states his doctrines in the following way.⁶⁶ All things have the Self for their cause and their object. They are produced by the Self, manifested by the Self, intimately connected with the Self, and are bound in the Self. As for instance a tumour or a feeling of disposition is generated in, grows with, is not separate from, but is bound up with the body, so all things have the Self for their cause. Just as an ant-hill or a tree or a lotus springs up, grows in, is not separate from but bound up in the earth, or just as a mass of water or a water-bubble is produced in water, grows in water, and is not separate from water, so all things have the Self for their cause.⁶⁷

In the above statements the word which has been put into the mouth of the speaker to mean the Self is *purisa* (*ḥpuruṣa*). But the same speaker has been described elsewhere⁶⁸ as *īśarakāraṇiya* (*īśvarakāraṇika*), one who holds *Iśvara* the Supreme Soul as the cause of everything. We find thus that *Iśvara* and *ḥpuruṣa* have been synonymously used in the same way as the Upaniṣads establish the identity of Brahman and the ātman.

(III) ĀTMASASTHA-VADA.

According to one school there are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance ; the soul and the world of five elements are eternal ; these six substances do not perish either with or without a cause ; the non-

⁶⁵ Sūt.S. II.6.46-47.

⁶⁶ Sūt.S. II.1.26.27.

⁶⁷ Cf. Muṇḍaka Up. II.i.9 ; Tait. Up. II vi, III.i ; Bṛhad. Up. II.i.20 ; III.vii.3-23 ; and Svetāś. Up. I.6.

⁶⁸ Sūt.S. II.1.25, 28.

existent does not come into existence, and all things are eternal by their very nature.⁶⁹ This is known as the "Doctrine of the soul as the sixth substance." Harṣakula includes the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas amongst its adherents, and Śilāṅka includes the Sāṃkhyas and Śaivādhikārins who accept the authority of the Vedas.⁷⁰ Śilāṅka quotes many verses of the *Bhagavadgītā* to illustrate the philosophy of the indestructibility of the soul and the non-coming into existence of the non-existent. "If the non-existent came into existence," remarks Śilāṅka, "it would make the growth of a horn possible to an ass." This doctrine of the eternal existence of the soul and the five elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air, and sky is a criticism of the Buddhist view that things are changing every moment without any cause, and of the Vaiśeṣika view that things are destructible just as a pitcher is destroyed if struck with a staff. The reply of this school is that a thing is not destroyed either with or without a cause, a pitcher smashed with a staff exists, lives, and continues in the broken pieces, for out of that lump came its existence.

We have to compare in this connection the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccāyana stated in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha, II, p. 56). Pakudha held that seven things, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air, ease, pain, and the soul are neither made nor commanded to be made, are not created and are of a permanent existence. There is nothing called slayer or the slain. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain no one thereby deprives another of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.

(IV) TAJJIVATACCHARIRA-VADA.

The five gross elements are the original causes of things and from them arises another thing, *viz.*, the soul. This is another philosophy well-known to the Jainas. The soul is a product of the elements and has no independent existence of its own. On the dissolution of the body of five elements a living being ceases to exist and nothing is left over.⁷¹ Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual *jīva* 'soul.' These souls exist as long as the body, but after death they are no more, there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond, and on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.⁷²

⁶⁹ Sūt.S. I.i.115-16.

⁷⁰ In the Sāṃkhya system there are other elements besides these five.

⁷¹ Sūt.S. I.i.1.8. Jacobi has linked this verse with the following one. This is not justified, for the latter refers to Vedānta.

⁷² Sūt.S. I.i.11.12.

The Parable of the Lotus-pool explains the theory thus.⁷³ Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is what is called *jīva* or what is the same, *ātman*. The whole soul lives; when the body is dead it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire only dove-coloured bones remain and the four bearers return to the village with the hearse. Therefore there is and exists no soul different from the body. Those who say that the body is distinct from the soul cannot tell whether the soul is long or small, globular or circular, triangular or square, sexagonal or octagonal, black or blue, red or yellow or white, sweet or bitter, hard or soft, heavy or light, cold or hot. As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows the sword and the scabbard separately, as he draws a fibre from the *muñja* grass and shows the stalk and the fibre separately, or as he can take bone and flesh, butter and milk, oil and oil-cake, juice and sugarcane, and fire and *araṇi* wood and show them separately, so no one can show the soul and the body separately and therefore no soul exists. Life ends here, as it naturally follows, and there is nothing beyond.

The discussion between king Payesi and Kesi, a young ascetic lucidly explains the logic on which this philosophy was based.⁷⁴ The discussion as compressed is as follows:

Payesi: "Sir, is it your doctrine that the soul and body are two different things and not the same thing?"

Kesi: "O Payesi, it is the doctrine with us, the Nirgrantha ascetics that the soul and the body are two separate things and that they are not the same thing."

Payesi: "If, Sir, that is your doctrine then why does not my grandfather who was a tyrannical ruler and must have been reborn in the hells for many of the sins committed by him, come and warn me, his favourite grandchild, against committing such sins? If he did then I would believe that his soul is still alive and that the soul and the body are separate things."

Kesi replied at length to the effect that if a person offended against his queen and if when Payesi seized the offender in order to punish him

⁷³ Sūt.S. II.i.15-17,19.

⁷⁴ Rāj. 65-71

the latter wanted to be allowed to come away so that he might warn his relations against committing such acts lest they also be punished as he was, then would Payesi allow him to come away? Similar was the case with those suffering torments in hell, they could not come away howsoever they might long for it.

Payesi: "I had a grandmother who was a very pious lady and must have been born in the heavens after death. If she would come and exhort me to righteousness then I would believe that the soul and the body are different things."

Kesi answered at length pointing out that as Payesi would not respond to another's call to come away while Payesi was entering a temple properly sanctified, through fear lest he be defiled so also his grandmother too would not come.

Payesi: "Once while I was seated in my outer hall of audience surrounded by many chiefs, my Prefect of the Police brought a thief in chains whom I ordered to be put alive in an iron vessel which was hermetically sealed and guards were placed around it. Then after some days I went to the iron vessel, caused it to be unsealed and myself looked for the soul of that thief. If there were holes in the vessel I would have believed that the soul had escaped but as there were none therefore no soul exists apart from the body."

Kesi answered that just as if a man took a trumpet inside a house, closed every opening carefully, and then sounded the trumpet it would be heard outside although there was no apparent outlet, so the soul also could penetrate through earth, stone, etc.

Payesi: "Once I cut into pieces a thief, and put the body inside a closely guarded hermetically-sealed iron vessel. Opening it after some time I found countless number of worms. Because these living worms originated out of the dead body—for there was no opening for them to enter—my doctrine is sound that the soul and the body are not different things."

Kesi replied that the king must have had occasion sometime or other to watch the heating of iron and he must have then seen how it became red-hot. There were no opening in the iron through which the fire could have entered, and in the same manner the soul of the dead man had gone out and the souls of the worms had entered the iron vessel unperceived by the senses.

2145

Payesi then argued that the decay of the body in old age showed there was no permanent underlying *jīva*, to which it was said in reply that the body was merely the material which was liable to decay without effecting any changes or decay in the underlying energy of the *jīva*. He then argued that he once killed a robber weighing him immediately before and after his death and found no difference between the two weights. If the robber had a soul different from the body there would certainly have been some difference in his weight before and after the soul left the body. Again he argued that he cut into many pieces a robber, looked very closely into it for a soul but found it nowhere. Kesi replied that the weight and form of the soul were not perceptible by the ordinary organs of sense.

(V) NĀSTIKA-VĀDA.

The philosophy of the Nāstikas or those who deny the existence of the soul was well-known to the Jainas. There is a reference to those who ignore and deny the tenets of the Nirgranthas,⁷⁵ which Śīlāṅka understands as an allusion to the Buddhists and the followers of Bṛhaspati, the latter being a well-known school of Nāstikas.

A more precise reference speaks of those that profess exclusive belief in the five gross elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air and sky. These five are all that exist and there is nothing in addition to these.⁷⁶ This ultra-materialistic view is in line with Cārvāka's famous doctrine of the non-existence of the soul or God or a life hereafter. Śīlāṅka quotes the notorious statement attributes to Cārvāka wherein the latter holds that there is nothing beyond what is perceived by the senses, the past never returns, there is no *karman* or its effects, the dead never comes back, there is no future life and that the body is but the fortuitous combination of the elements.

The Parable of the Lotus-pool states the doctrine in the following manner :

There are only the five elements through which is explained whether an action is good or bad. The five elements are not created, directly or indirectly, nor made ; they are neither effects nor products, they are without beginning and end, they always produce effects, are independent of a directing cause, they are eternal. What is does not perish, from nothing nothing comes. All living beings, all things, the whole world consists

⁷⁵ Sūt.S. I.i.1.6.

⁷⁶ Sūt.S. I.i.1.7.

of nothing but these five elements. They are the primary cause of the world even down to a blade of the grass. A man buys or causes to buy, kills or causes to kill, cooks and causes to cook, he may even sell and kill a man—and even then he does not do any wrong.⁷⁷

In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists the doctrines said to belong to Ajita Kesakambali are an echo of Nāstika-vāda. Ajita taught that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. After death the elements constituting the body return to the elements. On the dissolution of the body everyone is cut off, annihilated and after death there is nothing.⁷⁸

This doctrine is also called Lokāyata-vāda. Tājñivataccharīra-vāda held practically the same view with Nāstika-vāda only with this difference that while the latter deny altogether the existence of the soul the former admit it, but the logical end of both the views would be exactly the same.

(VI) BUDDHISM.

A heretic says in connection with the use of water for various purposes that it is justified on the ground of his having permission to drink it or take it for toilet purposes.⁷⁹ Śīlāṅka takes these heretics to be Buddhists. This can be accepted without objection for we know that Buddha declared that no sin was committed by drinking water and he permitted bath and washing to his ascetic disciples.⁸⁰

The Nirgranthas looked upon the Ājīviyas as their worst opponents but if facts are considered they suffered most at the hands of the Buddhists in later times. Buddha was a junior contemporary of Mahāvīra, and had therefore greater need and occasion for counteracting and criticising the creed of the latter than Mahāvīra had of fighting with the doctrines of a junior. The rivalry of the two sects grew stronger after Mahāvīra's death. These facts account to some extent for the comparatively scantier mention and criticism of Buddhistic doctrines in the literature of the Jainas than what would normally be expected of the two chief sects of the time.

⁷⁷ Sūt.S. II.1.21-24.

⁷⁸ Barua : *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 293, points out that Ajita's views were not materialistic in the gross sense in which they were understood by Mahāvīra and Buddha, but what he really meant was a protest against the view that soul and body were entirely separated.

⁷⁹ Ācār.S. I.i.3.7.

⁸⁰ Cf. Mahāvagga 1.25.12 5.13.7

With regard to the suffering of cold by renouncing clothes and fire, some heretical monks are reported to say that they would put on more clothes and by kindling a fire they would be able to bear the very painful influence of the cold.⁸¹ This may be regarded as applying to the Buddhists for they were certainly not indifferent to unnecessary suffering. We cannot of course be absolutely certain, for Brahmanical ascetics would also light a fire and take clothings for protection from cold.

The doctrine of five *skandhas* of momentary existence has been ascribed to "some fools." They are said not to admit that the soul is different from, nor identical with the elements, that it is produced from a cause (the elements), nor that it is without a cause, *i.e.*, that it is eternal.⁸² This is a clear reference to the Buddhists with their *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *viññāna*, *saṃjñā* and *samskāra skandhas*. The existence of a soul in the popular sense of the term apart from the five *skandhas* was denied by Buddha.

Earth, water, fire, and air, these four *dhātus* are said to combine to form the body according to the *Jāṇakas* (*jñānins*).⁸³ Harṣakula explains *Jāṇakas* as *ḥaṇḍitammanyā Bauddhāḥ*. A variant in the text reads *yāvare* (*ca + aḥare*) for *Jāṇayā*, and this also has been explained as referring to the Buddhists. Jacobi thinks⁸⁴ that the word, *Jāṇaya*, may be derived from *yāna* 'vehicle,' which the Buddhists used to designate the two sections of the church, *viz.*, the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. Against this may be pointed out that the Buddhists used the word in respect of themselves only after the great schism arose among them, whereas the present statement appears to be older in age. However all opinion is agreed in understanding this passage to be a reference to the Buddhists.

The Akriyāvādins who deny *karman* and do not admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments⁸⁵ are understood by Śīlāṅka to refer to the Buddhists. The doctrine that everything has but a momentary existence and that there is no continuous identity of existence between a thing as it is now and as it will be in the next moment is one of the Buddhist theories. The Buddhists are included among Akriyāvādins by the Nirgranthas because by not admitting the existence of *jīva* they were considered to deny *karman* as well. Jacobi takes this to refer

⁸¹ Ācār.S. I.vii.2.14.

⁸² Sūt. S. I.i.1.17.

⁸³ Sūt.S. I.i.1.18.

⁸⁴ SBE. xlv, p. 238, n.4.

⁸⁵ Sūt.S. I.xii.4

to Sāṃkhya, because according to it the *puruṣa* does not act.⁸⁶ We shall have to treat of Akriyāvāda at greater length later on, but in connection with the present verse it has to be pointed out that although this verse and the one following have been commented upon by Śīlāṅka at great length as applying to the Buddhists, yet we must widen the limits of Akriyāvāda beyond Buddhist doctrines.

In the discussions of Adda one man appears and says⁸⁷ that if one pierces a lump of oil-cake with a spit mistaking it for a man, or a gourd mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it one will be guilty of murder according to his views. If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him mistaking him for a lump of oil-cake, or a baby mistaking it for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby mistaking him or it for a lump of oil-cake, puts him or it on the fire and roasts, that will be a meal fit for the Buddhas to break fast upon.⁸⁸ Those who always feed two thousand worthy monks, says this man to Adda, acquire great merit and become powerful gods in Arūpadhātu. This is an account, although exaggerated, of the Buddhist view that motive determines whether an act is sinful or not. If the state of mind was murderous it was a sin even though the act committed in execution of this intention did not actually result in the loss of life ; again, no sin is committed by the accidental killing of life when the act intended was not murder. It has to be taken as an echo of Buddha's statement that the state of mind accompanying an act was more important than the actual result of the act.⁸⁹ The Arūpadhātu is the highest heaven of the Buddhists. The combination of all this is sufficient to establish its reference to the Buddhists.

Another verse credits some with holding that salvation which was a pleasant thing was produced by enjoying pleasures.⁹⁰ Harṣakula and Śīlāṅka take it to refer to the Buddhists and quote many passages in support of their identification :

sarvāṇi sattvāṇi sukhe ratāṇi, sarvāṇi duḥkhāc ca samudvijanti |
tasmāt sukhārthi sukham eva dadyāt sukhapradātā labhate sukhāni ||

⁸⁶ SBE. xlv., p. 316, n.3.

⁸⁷ Sūt.S. II.6.26-29.

⁸⁸ *Buddhāna tam kaṣṭhāni pāraṇāya*. Harṣakula explains *buddhānam* as *śākyānām*, while Śīlāṅka says *Buddhānām api bhojanāya योग्यं भवति*, which shows he took it to mean 'for the Buddhas.' 'Buddha' was used by Jains and Buddhists alike to denote their master and in itself is not sufficient to indicate its applicability to the latter.

⁸⁹ Cf. Buddha's conversation with Dīgha Tapassī a Nirgrantha ascetic and with Upālī, a lay disciple of Mahāvīra and Upālī's conversion in *Upālī Sutta*.

⁹⁰ Sūt.S. I.iii.4.6.

All beings seek happiness and turn away from suffering ; therefore the seeker of happiness should give happiness, for the giver of happiness obtains happiness.

maṇuṇṇam bhoyaṇam bhoccā maṇuṇṇam sayañāsanam |
maṇuṇṇamsi agāramsi maṇuṇṇam jhāyae muṇiā ||

Having enjoyed a pleasant dinner, a pleasant bed and seat, a saint dwells in a pleasant abode and meditates pleasantly.

mṛḍvī śayyā prātarutthāya peyā, bhuktam madhye pānakam cāparāhṇe
drākṣākhaṇḍam śarkarā cārddharātre mokṣascānte Śākyaputreṇa drṣṭaḥ ||

A soft bed, drinks in the morning, dinner at midday, drinks in the afternoon, and grapes and sugar at night—these have been laid down by Śākhyaputra as leading to salvation.

These are supposed to be drawn from works of the Buddhists themselves explaining their faith or from the writing of others professing to explain it. It is quite clear that as a matter of fact they are taken from the writings of hostile critics and from satires on the teachings of Buddha. Harṣakula thinks that the verse in the text might refer to *svaīrthyas*, some members of the same order as the speaker's, *i.e.*, the Nirgranthas. The events of later days led the commentators, one feels constrained to say, to fasten every possible adverse criticism on to the Buddhists to make up, as it were, for the dearth of anti-Buddhist statements in the texts. The present instance is a very strained attempt to drag in the Buddhists. Both in this verse as well as in another⁹¹ Harṣakula is undecided about its exact application and names several possible alternatives. The truth probably is that the allusion was to a distinct view which held that like is produced by like and therefore mokṣa being an agreeable thing is obtained by living an agreeable and comfortable life. This is the view held by the Tāntrikas.⁹² The Sātavādins also held the same view.⁹³

The doctrine of Buddha has been included among those false beliefs which are the products of wrong knowledge.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Sut.S. I.iii.4.10.

⁹² See *Cittaviśuddhiṭṭhakarāṇa* attributed to Āryadeva, JASB, lxvii, 1898, p. 175, and *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, p. 37. I am indebted to Pandit Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya for these references.

⁹³ This has been discussed later.

⁹⁴ Anu. 40; Nandi 42.

(VII) MINOR SCHOOLS.

A school of philosophers thought that a *jīva* performed *sammattakiriyam* (*saṃyaktvakriyā*) right conduct and *micchattakiriyam* (*mithyātvakriyā*) wrong conduct at the same time, *i.e.*, while it performed right conduct at the same time it performed wrong conduct also, and while it performed wrong conduct it performed also right conduct at the same time.⁹⁵ Malayagiri, the commentator, says that it is the doctrine of Caraka. Gunaratna says that Caraka represented a school of Sāṃkhya.⁹⁶

Another view held by some was to the effect that there was no harm in enjoying the pleasures of the senses for it gave relief to the enjoyer without causing harm to any one else, just as the squeezing of a blister or boil gave relief and has no dangerous consequences. A ram drinks the quiet water which gives it relief. If this harmed the ram we could have said that the act was harmful but as it did not there is surely no harm in it.⁹⁷ In the identification of the upholder of this view Harṣakula has the same doubts which he had with regard to Sātavādins mentioned above.

According to another school it is not only the soul which does not exist but nothing exists. Everything is mere appearance, a mirage, an illusion, a dream or phantasy. There rises no sun nor does it set ; there waxes no moon nor does it wane ; there are no rivers running nor any wind blowing ; the whole world is unreal.⁹⁸ The Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and the popular Māyāvāda which arose as an off-shoot of Vedānta owe their origin probably to this school which is met here in the literature of the Jains for the first time in the history of Indian philosophical thought.

In Sāvātthī there were two rival schools who disputed the point whether knowledge was superior to conduct or conduct was superior to knowledge.⁹⁹ Abhayadeva, the commentator, quotes some of their views, *e.g.*,

kriyaiva phaladā puṃsām na jñānam phaladam matam |
yataḥ strībhakṣyabhogajño na jñānāt sukhito bhavet. ||

Conduct always bears fruit, not so knowledge—just as one having merely the knowledge of enjoyment of women does not thereby become happy.

⁹⁵ Jivā. S. 3. 104.

⁹⁶ *Tarkarahasyaḍīpikā*, a commentary on *Ṣaḍḍarsanasamuccaya*, p. 31.

⁹⁷ Sūt.S. I.iii.4.10-12.

⁹⁸ Sūt.S. I.xii.7.

⁹⁹ Bhag. S. S.10.354.

jahā kharo candanabhāravāhī bhārassa bhāgī na hu candaṇassa ।
evam̐ khu nāṇī caraṇeṇa hīṇo nāṇassa bhāgī na hu sogāe. ॥

As ass carrying a load of sandal wood carries only a load but does not enjoy the sandal wood, so the man possessing knowledge but devoid of conduct enjoys his knowledge but does not obtain progress.

The supporters of knowledge on the other hand said :

* vijñaptiḥ phaladā pumsām̐ na kriyā phaladā matā ।
mithyājñānāt pravṛttasya phalāsam̐vādadarśanāt. ॥

It is knowledge which bears fruit, not so conduct, for wrong knowledge does not produce the desired result.

paḍhamam̐ nāṇam̐ tao dayā evam̐ ciṭṭhai savvasam̐jāe ।
annāṇī kiṃ kāhī vā nāhī cheyapāvayam̐. ॥

First comes knowledge, then charity—thus are constituted all those who are restrained : one lacking in knowledge knows not what to do or what to know, and whether one is wise or a sinner.

PART II.

CLASSIFICATION INTO FOUR GREAT SCHOOLS.

The account of philosophical schools mentioned in the Jaina canonical literature has been dealt with exhaustively above but the most important part of the work yet remains unfinished, *viz.*, their classification according to a method well-known in this literature.

The heretical creeds of the time were all comprehended by Mahāvīra under four heads¹⁰⁰, *viz.*

1. Kriyāvāda.
2. Akriyāvāda.
3. Ajñānavāda.
4. Vinayavāda.


These four great schools comprise three hundred and sixty-three schools¹⁰¹: Kriyāvāda consists of one hundred and eighty schools, Akriyāvāda consists of eighty-four schools, Ajñānavāda consists of sixty-seven schools, and Vinayavāda consists of thirty-two schools¹⁰².

The scheme of classification in details is as follows :

1. Kriyāvāda.

Kriyā denotes the existence of *jīva*, etc., and those who admit the existence of *jīva*, etc., are called *Kriyāvādins*.

The Jains have the "nine principles" of *jīva* soul, *ajīva* non-soul, *āsrava* the inflow of karmic matter into the soul, *bandha* the consequent bondage of the soul, *saṁvara* stoppage of the inflow, *nirjarā* shedding off the karmic matter, *puṇya* merit, *aṇya* demerit, and *mokṣa* emancipation. Let us take the first, *jīva* and draw a table as below :



¹⁰⁰ Sūt. S. I.xii.1 ; Sth. S. 4.4.345 ; Bhag. S. 30.1.824 ; Utt. S. 18.23 ; Nandi 47 ; and Sūt. S. II.ii.79.

¹⁰¹ Sūt. S. II.ii.79.

¹⁰² Nandi 47 ; Guṇaratna quotes the following couplet—
 Aśiisayam kiriyānam akiriyavāiṇa hoi culasī l
 Annāṇia sattaḥṭhī veṇaiyānam ca battisam ll

Those who admit the existence of the soul (*jīva*) by itself (*svataḥ*), for all eternity (*nitya*), through Time (*kāla*) are the first school. They say that the soul exists in its own nature, it is eternal, and acts through Time. They are called *Kālavādins*. Guṇaratna quotes the following as stating their doctrine :

na kālavatirekeṇa garbhabālaśubhādīkam |
yat kiñcij jāyate loke tadasau kāraṇam kila ||
kim ca kālād ṛte naiva mudgapaktirapīkṣyate |
sthāyādīsannidhāne'pi tataḥ kālādasau matā ||
• kālābhāve ca garbhādi sarvaṃ syād avyavasthayā |
pareṣṭahetusadbhāvamātrād eva tadadbhavāt ||
kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ samharate prajāḥ |
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ ||

The blossoming of trees and plants, the appearance of fruits, the change of seasons, the movement of stars and planets, the periods of gestation, infancy, adolescence, youth, old age, etc., could not have taken place if there were no Time. In the absence of Time everything would be in disorder, but such disorder we neither find nor desire. Cooking, for instance, depends not on the bringing together of fire, pan and other materials, but on Time. It is not at the sweet will of man that causes happen, but according to the order of Time and we cannot dispense with it.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *īśvara* (God) are the second school called *īśvaravādins*. They regard the universe as made by God who is endowed with the attributes of perfection and is the ordainer of heaven or hell for men.

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *ātman* (Self) are the third school called *Ātmavādins*. According to them the Self creates everything.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *niyati* ('the fixed order of thing') are the fourth school called *Niyativādins*. According to them there is a principle called *niyati* by which all that exist assume their form in a prescribed manner, and not otherwise. Whatever comes out of something at one time always comes out of that thing in a regular manner, as otherwise the law of cause and effect and the law of uniformity of nature would not be in operation, for there would be nothing to determine the order of events (*anyathā kāryyakāraṇavyavasthā pratinīyatarūḥavyavasthā ca na bhavet niyāmakābhāvāt*).

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *svabhāva* (Nature) are the fifth school called *Svabhāvavādins*. They hold that everything is caused by Nature, *e.g.*, the clay becomes a jar and not a piece of cloth, a piece of cloth comes from yarn, while a jar does not do so. The uniform production of jars from clay shows the order of Nature. Guṇaratna quotes the following as illustrating the doctrine of *Svabhāvavādins* :

kaḥ kaṅṭakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ |
 vicitrabhāvaṁ mṛgapakṣiṇām ca ||
 svabhāvataḥ sarvamidam pravṛttaṁ |
 na kāmācāro 'sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ ||
 badaryāḥ kaṅṭakas tīkṣṇa ṛjuṛ ekaśca kuñcitala |
 phalaṁ ca vartulaṁ tasyā vada kena vinirmitam ||

‘What causes thorns to have sharp points and birds and beasts to have their own wonderful ways? All this is ordained by Nature and there is no caprice anywhere. Of the jujube tree the thorns are sharp-pointed, some straight, some bent, the fruit is round—by whom are all these made?’

Even the simple phenomenon of the cooking of the *mudga* also depends on Nature. The *kaṅkaduka mudga*, for instance, cannot be cooked even after the combination of a pan, fuel and Time, for by nature it is a kind of cereal that is not softened by boiling. Therefore that in the presence of which effects follow and in the absence of which effects do not follow is to be regarded as the cause.

We have thus obtained five schools under *asti jīvaḥ svataḥ* “*nityaḥ*.” Under *asti jīvaḥ svataḥ* “*antiyaḥ*” we shall have another five schools accordingly as the non-eternity is predicated of *kāla*, etc. Then under the head *asti jīvaḥ parataḥ* “*nityaḥ*” we shall have another five schools according as “not of itself” is predicated of *kāla*, etc. The five classes of *kāla*, etc., are to be supplied under both *nitya* and *anitya* varieties of *svataḥ* and *parataḥ*. The *parataḥ* schools mean that the existence of *jīva* is admitted not of itself but as it is distinguished from other objects, for it is well-known how things are known by contrast with other things just as shortness is known as that which is not long, and in the same way the soul is known by distinguishing it from such objects as pillars, etc. The *anitya* varieties of *parataḥ* would give us yet another set of five schools. So we have twenty schools on *jīva*, the first of the “nine principles” and by extending the same classification to each of the eight other “principles” we have altogether

nine times twenty or one hundred and eighty schools comprised in *Kriyāvāda*.


To *kriyāvādins* have been ascribed the views that unless a sinful thought is translated into action or a sinful act performed with a sinful motive the full karmic consequences will not follow and such acts will affect the soul but slightly¹⁰³, and that misery is produced by one's own works and not by the work of somebody else, *viz.*, fate, creator, etc.¹⁰⁴

The meaning is that the state of mind and conduct must combine to constitute sin for any one of them without the other would not give rise to the consequences of a sinful *karman*. Śīlānka points out that they hold that action alone leads to liberation even though it be unaccompanied by right knowledge and right faith.

2. Akriyāvāda.

The *Akriyāvādins* deny the existence of the soul, etc., for according to them everything is of a momentary existence and a state comes to an end the moment it comes into existence, and therefore, it cannot have any *kriyā*. Without continuity of existence no *kriyā* is possible, the existence itself is the cause and effect of it.

The *Akriyāvādins* are of eighty-four varieties obtained in the manner shown below. Let us take seven of the "nine principles" leaving out *puṇya* and *aṇuṇya*. Of these seven let us take the first, *jīva*, and draw a table thus :



The divisions of *nitya* and *anitya*, as in the *Kriyāvāda* table, are not necessary here as the question of eternity and non-eternity does not arise when the existence itself of soul, etc., is denied. *Yadṛcchā* is put last because all *Akriyāvādins* are *Yadṛcchāvādins*. The same six divisions from *kāla* to *yadṛcchā* are also to be considered under *parataḥ* as under *svataḥ*.

Those who say that no soul exists in itself through Time are the first school. According to them the existence of objects is established from their signs or effects and there are no such signs or effects from which the

¹⁰³ Sūt. S. I.i.2.25-28.

¹⁰⁴ Sūt. S. I.xii.11.

existence of the soul can be established. The same argument is applied in denying the existence of the soul through *īśvara*, *ātman*, *nīyati* and *svabhāva* as in regard to *kāla*. *Yadṛcchā* means obtainment of results without any determining cause. The *Yadṛcchāvādins* see no uniformity of causal relation in the world. *śāluka* 'the root of a particular kind of water-lily' comes of a *śāluka* as well as of cowdung ; fire comes of fire as well as of *arani* 'a piece of wood' ; smoke comes of smoke as well as of a combination of fire and fuel ; *kandalī* 'a particular kind of plant with white flowers appearing very plentifully in the rainy season' comes of *kanda* 'bulbous root' as well as of seeds ; the *Vaṭa* tree comes of seeds as well as of a section of a branch, and wheat comes of wheat-seeds as well as of bamboo-seeds. So there is plurality and not uniformity in causal relations and everything comes into existence accidentally (*yadṛcchātah*) as in a freak. Guṇaratna quotes the following as illustrating the views of Akriyāvādins :

atarkitopasthitameva sarvaṃ
 citraṃ janānāṃ sukhaduḥkhajātam |
 kākasya tālena yathābhīghāto
 na buddhipurvo 'sti vṛthābhīmānaḥ ||

All this has come into existence by accident—the various joys and sorrows of men ; all this is like the striking a crow by a palm-fruit, which is not preceded by design. It is useless to think (that the origination of things is preceded by design).

Thus under *nāsti jīvaḥ* "*svataḥ*" we have obtained six schools and under *nāsti jīvaḥ* "*parataḥ*" we shall have a set of another six schools. Therefore there are obtained twelve schools under the first of seven "principles" and by extending the same classification to each of the other six "principles" we have altogether seven times twelve or eighty-four schools comprised in Akriyāvāda.

Another classification of *Akriyāvādins* divides them into eight classes¹⁰⁵, viz.

Ekavādins who believe in one supreme soul as the first cause.

Anekavādins who believe in one supreme principle manifesting itself in several principles.

Mitavādins who gave a fixed size to the soul.

Nirmitavādins who regard the universe as created by God.

¹⁰⁵ Sth. S. 8.3.607.

*Sātavādins*¹⁰⁶ who believe in obtaining mokṣa by living a comfortable life.

Samucchedavādins who believe in the constant destructibility of things.

Nityavādins who believe in the eternity of things.

And *Na-santi-ḥaralokavādiṅ* who do not believe in a future life or soul, etc.

It will appear from the above classification that all possible non-Jaina creeds have been comprised under those eight classes of *Akriyāvāda*, the scope of which is certainly wider than in the previous classification into eighty-four classes.

The *Akriyāvādins* are mentioned in the texts as not admitting that the action of the soul is transmitted to future moments¹⁰⁷, and as holding that nothing exists and all forecasts of the future are false¹⁰⁸.

3. Ajñānavāda.

The *Ajñānavādins* deny the necessity or importance of knowledge. According to them knowledge is not the highest thing for where there is knowledge there is assertion of contradictory statements by different disputants resulting in dissensions which soil the mind and bring on a longer period of wordly bondage. But if *ajñāna* or negation of knowledge is upheld it generates no pride and there is no ill-feeling towards others and therefore the chances of wordly bondage are removed. The result of volition is *karman* and the result of *karman* is bondage which is of dire consequences and has to be suffered from, it having been produced by resolute and determined volitional activity. But that *karman* which results from the activity of mere body and speech unprompted by mental action is not volitional and therefore is not productive of severe suffering nor does it entail dire consequences. Such unvolitional effects of *karman* are swept off easily by good activities like the easy blowing off by the wind of dust particles adhering to a very dry and white wall.

The absence of volition of mind is generated by the force of *ajñāna* for where there is knowledge there is volition. Therefore one desiring *mokṣa* should adopt *ajñāna* and not knowledge to lead him along the path of perfection.

¹⁰⁶ See notes 90-93 and 110.

¹⁰⁷ Sūt. S. I.xii.4.


¹⁰⁸ Sūt. S. I.xii.10.

Supposing for argument's sake that knowledge is necessary, how is one to know for certain what is knowledge? It cannot be known. All philosophers differ in their idea of knowledge. We cannot say which of them spoke the truth. The followers of Mahāvīra may say that he obtained omniscient knowledge and therefore the knowledge that proceeds from him is right knowledge. But how is one to know in the absence of any evidence to prove it that Mahāvīra alone obtained omniscient knowledge and no one else? The story of the gods coming down from heaven to worship Mahāvīra and thus testifying to his omniscient knowledge is not to be trusted for there is no evidence to prove that it really so happened. Traditional evidence is also untrustworthy because it cannot be definitely known whether such tradition was set on foot by an imposter or a worthy man. What has not been proved cannot be believed. The phenomenon of the coming down of gods from heaven is shown by magicians also and in itself is not enough to prove the omniscience of anyone.

Granting even, say the *Ajñānavādins*, that Mahāvīra was omniscient how do we know that the Nirgrantha scriptures are really his teachings and not circulated by knaves? How again are we to know if Mahāvīra used the words in the scriptures in the same sense as they are taken now? How do we know what his real intention was?

Therefore it is established that owing to its being the cause of longer bondage in the world and owing to want of definite certainty, knowledge is not the highest thing but *ajñāna* is the highest thing.

There are sixty-seven schools under Ajñānavāda obtained in the following manner. Let us take the first of the nine "principles" and draw a table as below :



Here *sattva* means existence in its own form. *Asattva* means non-existence in other forms. *Sadasattva* means simultaneous existence in its own form and non-existence in other forms. When such existence and non-existence are to be expressed at one and the same time in one word it becomes indescribable, there being no such word and therefore it is said to be *avācyatva* 'indescribability.' When from one point of view it is existent and from another it is indescribable and the two are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *sadvācyatva*. When from one point of

view it is non-existent and from another it is indescribable and the two aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *asadavācyatva*. When from one point of view it is existent, from another it is non-existent and from yet another indescribable, and all these aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *sadasadavācyatva*. Thus we have these seven schools under the first "principle" and extending the same classification to each of the other eight "principles" we have nine times seven, *i.e.*, sixty-three schools. These refer to the nature of the nine "principles" severally, but as for their origin in general four other schools are possible, *viz.*, *sattva*, *asattva*, *sadasattva*, and *avācyatva*—the other three forms of the seven possible variations are not used in this case as they are used only in respect of the several parts of a thing only after its origin has taken place which is not the case here. The last four added to the previous sixty-three give us sixty-seven schools under *Ajñānavāda*.

The first school on *jīva*, for instance, says "Who knows if there is *jīva*? No one does, because there is no evidence to prove its existence. What again is the use of knowing it? If it is known it will give rise to volition which will stand in the way of attaining to the next world (*jñātasyābhiniveśahetulayā paralokaḥpratīpanthitvāt*). In the same way are to be described the other varieties of *asattva*, etc., as also their origin in general.

It is obvious that although the *Ajñānavādins* say they have no need of knowledge and that it is unnecessary, they happen yet to be the employers of the acutest arguments.

4. Vinayavāda.

The *Vinayavādins* or *Vainayikas* do not accept signs, external rules of ceremony, and scriptures but uphold the supremacy of reverence as the cardinal virtue leading to perfection. There are thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda* obtained in this way. Reverence may be shown to eight classes of beings, *viz.*, god or master, ascetic, man, aged persons, inferiors, mother or father, and to each of these eight classes of persons reverence may be shown in four ways, *i.e.*, by body, mind, speech and gifts. There are thus four times eight or thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda*.

The three hundred and sixty-three philosophical schools of Jaina literature are thus obtained by totalling one hundred and eighty schools of *Kriyāvāda*, eighty-four schools of *Akriyāvāda*, sixty-seven schools of

Ajñānavāda and thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda*¹⁰⁹. The commentators Śīlānka, Abhayadeva and Malayagiri as well as Hemacandra accept this classification as a standard.

Buddhist Classification of Contemporary Schools.

It is of interest to compare in this connection Buddha's classification given in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* of contemporary philosophical thought into sixty-two schools, *viz.*

The four schools of Eternalists or *Sassatavādas*. They held that the soul and the world are both eternal. The first three schools held this view as a result of their having perceived through a recollection of the memories of past lives that the soul and the body have always been in existence, and the fourth school held this view not as a result of memory but on logical grounds.

The four schools of Semi-Eternalists or *Ekacca-Sassatikas*. The first school believed that Brahmā was eternal but not individual souls, having come to this conclusion through partial remembrance of past states of existence in higher worlds. The second school believed that debauched souls are not eternal but that undebauched souls are eternal. The third school believed exactly the same thing as the second school except that in the case of the former the debauchery of the gods is mental unlike the debauchery of the gods of the latter school which is physical. The fourth school held that the soul was eternal but not the body.

The four schools of Extensionists or *Antānantikas*. The first school held that the world was finite, the second that it was infinite, the third that it was infinite sidewise but finite upward and downward, and the fourth that it was neither finite nor infinite.

The four schools of Eel-wrigglers or *Amarāvikkhepikas*. They did not give categorical replies to any question but avoided them by ambiguous and equivocating replies, and differed only in respect of the motives for giving such replies.

The two schools of Fortuitous-Originists or *Adhiccāsamuḥḥannikas*. They held that the soul and the world came into being without a cause, having come to this conclusion as a result of remembrance of past lives in the case of the first, and as a result of logical reasoning in the case of the second.

¹⁰⁹ *Tarkarahasyadīpika*, a commentary by Guṇaratna on the *Śaḍḍarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra, B. I., p. 19.

The thirty-two schools of Conscious-maintainers or *Uddhamāghatanikas*. They believed that the soul after death passed into various states of existence, *viz.*, conscious or unconscious, subject to decay or not subject to decay, neither conscious nor unconscious, and all in respect of the form, finitude, different modes of consciousness, and happiness of the soul.

The seven schools of Annihilationists or *Ucchedavādīs*. They held that the soul is annihilated after death and they identified the soul with the body, essence of the body, mind, infinite space, infinite consciousness, or as being bondless or being beyond ideas.

The five schools of Nirvanists or *Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādas*. They believed that a soul was capable of obtaining complete emancipation in this visible world by full enjoyment of the pleasures of the senses¹¹⁰ or by each of the four stages of *dhyāna*.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Sātavādins *supra*. notes 90—93, 106.

PART III.

RELIGIOUS SECTS.

Besides philosophical schools the literature of the Jainas has interesting information regarding various kinds of religious sects.

A sect believed abstention from salt or garlic, onion, young camel's milk, beef, and liquors as the path of perfection¹¹¹.

A sect believed in the use of cold water for bath and ablutions as the path of perfection¹¹².

Some ascetics believed that by tending a fire they would reach perfection¹¹³.

Hatthi-tāvāsas. They used to kill an elephant with arrows and lived many months on its flesh. The motive was to spare the lives of other animals for as long as the flesh of the elephant would last. They claimed that they committed but one sin, the killing of the elephant, in a year or so which was counterbalanced by the merit earned by not killing other lives during this time¹¹⁴.

Bāla-tāvāsas. They lived only by eating leaves that fell off naturally from trees¹¹⁵.

Kandapṭhiyas. They earned a living by performing antics and making people laugh by making various movements with the eyebrows, mouth, teeth, lips, hands, feet, and ears. They made others laugh but did not laugh themselves¹¹⁶.

Caragas. They went about begging and carried a *dhāṭi*¹¹⁷. They went out to beg only after meal¹¹⁸, says Hemacandra in his commentary on the *Anuyogadvāra*.

The names of the following sects are mentioned in long lists of ascetical orders in several places¹¹⁹.

Kībbisiyas. They went about speaking ill of religious teachers and holy people.

¹¹¹ Sūt. S. I.vii.12.

¹¹² Sūt. S. I.vii.12.

¹¹³ Sūt. S. I.vii.12.

¹¹⁴ Bhag. S. 11.9.418; Aup. 38; Sūt. S. II.vi.52.

¹¹⁵ Bhag. S. 1.2.25.

¹¹⁶ Bhag. 1.2.25; Aup. 38.

¹¹⁷ This is the explanation of Abhayadeva; the word however seems to be *ghaṭi* a begging-bowl.

¹¹⁸ Bhag. 1.2.25; Anuyog. 20 and 26.

¹¹⁹ Bhag. 1.2.25 and 11.9.418; Aup. 38 and 41; Anu. 20 and 26.

Tericchiyas. They dwelt in places unfrequented by cows, horses and other animals.

Ābbhogias. They earned a living by gaining the confidence of people by administering auspicious baths, exorcising evil spirits and interpreting dreams. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* of the Buddhists also mention these as the ways by practising which many mendicants earned their living.

Hottiyas. They performed *agnihotras*.

Pottiyas. They put on a special kind of clothes.

Kottiyas. They slept on the bare ground.

Jaṇṇais. They performed *yajñas*.

Thālais. They carried all their belongings with them.

Huṃvauṭṭas. They carried a water vessel with them¹²⁰.

Dantukkhaliyas. They lived on fruits and used their teeth as mortar.

Ummajjagas. They bathed by taking only a dip.

Sammajjagas. They bathed without dipping in water.

Nimajjagas. They remained in water only for a short time.

Samṣakkhālas. They rubbed and cleansed their limbs with mud.

Uḍḍhakaṇḍūyagas. They never scratched the lower parts of the body.

Ahokaṇḍūyagas. They never scratched the upper parts of the body.

Dāhinaḱūlagas. They dwelt only on the south bank of the Ganges

Uttarakūlagas. They dwelt only on the north bank of the Ganges.

Samkhadhāmayas. They blew a conch-shell to keep people away.

Kūladhāmayas. They blew a conch-shell on the river bank to keep people away while they took their meal.

Migaluddhakas. They killed animals.

Jalābhiseyakiḍhiṇagāyas. They took their meals only after a bath

Ambuvāsins. They lived in water.

Vāuvāsins. They lived in airy places.

Jalavāsins. They remained submerged in water.

Bilavāsins. They lived in caves.

Velāvāsins. They lived on the sea-coast.

Rukkhamūliyas. They lived under trees.

Ambubhakkhins. They lived by drinking water only.

Vāyabhakkhins. They lived by inhaling air only.

Sevālabhakkhins. They lived by eating moss.

Mūlāhāras. They lived by eating roots only.

¹²⁰ Cf. *Cullavagga* 5.10.1.

Kandāhāras. They lived by eating bulbous roots only.

Pattāhāras. They lived by eating leaves only.

Puṣṣhāhāras. They lived by eating flowers only.

Phalāhāras. They lived by eating fruits only.

Biyāhāras. They lived by eating seeds only.

Tayāhāras. They lived by eating bark only.

Parisaḍiyakandāhāras. They lived by eating rotten bulbous roots only.

Parisaḍiyamūlāhāras. They lived by eating rotten roots only.

Parisaḍiyapuṣṣhāhāras. They lived by eating rotten flowers only.

Parisaḍiyaphalāhāras. They lived by eating rotten fruits only.

Parisaḍiyaphattāhāras. They lived by eating rotten leaves only.

Vakkavāsins. They put on a dress of bark.

Disāpokkhins. They sanctified all sides by sprinkling water and then collected fruits and flowers.

Uddaṇḍagas. They went about with a raised staff.

Goamas. They earned a living by making a young bull, painted and decorated, perform tricks of foot-lifting, etc.

Gobbaias. They followed a cow wherever it went, ate grass.

Kukkuiyas. They earned a living by amusing people by making many kinds of grimaces and gestures.

Some sects abstained from milk, curd, butter, oil, treacles, honey, spirits and meat.

Dagaviiyas. They took water as the second item in the meal.

Dagataias. They took water as the third item in the meal.

Dagacauṭṭhas. They took water as the fourth item in the meal.

Dagaṣaṇcamas. They took water as the fifth item in the meal.

Dagachatṭhas. They took water as the sixth item in the meal.

Dagasattamas. They took water as the seventh item in the meal.

Mohariyas. They went about saying all sorts of incoherent and absurd things also indulging in great garrulity in order to amuse people.

Some sects went about dancing and singing to entertain people.

Bahudayas. They stopped one night in a village, five nights in a town and lived on whatever alms they got.

Kuḍivvayas. They lived in houses and regarded conquering of anger, greed, pride and illusion as their goal.

Cīrigas. They put on rags collected from the road-side.

Cammakhaṇḍiyas. They put on a dress of hide.

Paṇḍuraṅgas. They besmeared their body with ashes.

Bhikkhoṇḍas. They would eat nothing except what has been obtained as alms and would not take milk unless it had been milked by another.

Haṃsas. They lived in mountain caves, roads, hermitages, temples and gardens and entered a village only for begging alms.

Paramahaṃsas. They lived on river banks, the confluence of streams and wore discarded clothes and rags.

Besides these there are mentions of mendicants who worshipped Nārāyaṇa ; of eight Brahmanical mendicants named Kaṇha, Karakaṇḍa, Ambaḍa, Parāsara, Kaṇha, Divāyaṇa Devagutta and Nārāya ; of eight Kṣatriya mendicants named Silai, Sasihāra, Naggai, Bhaggai, Videha, Rāyarāya, Rāyarāma and Bala ; of Sāṃkhas (*Sāṃkhyas*), Jois (*Yogins*), Kavilas, Bhiuccas (disciples of Kapila and Bhṛgu) ; of those who practised penances in the sun or surrounded by fire ; of ascetics who practised austerities with an arm uplifted¹²¹ ; of mendicants in Vajjabhūmi who ate rough food and carried a staff with them¹²² ; of the six Disāyāras named Sāṇa, Kalaṇḍa Kaṇiyāra, Acchidda, Aggivesayaṇa, Ajjuna and Gomāyuputta¹²³.

The texts mention only the names of these sects of ascetics but give no other details. The little information which is collected here is from the remarks of commentators. It is apparent that the information supplied by the latter is not full, but nothing more is available.

II. THE SECT OF PĀRŚVA.

The sect of Pārśva came to be amalgamated with the Nirgranthas. A discussion once took place between Goyama, the chief disciple of Mahāvīra and Udaka, a follower of Pārśva, on whether a movable being is to be called a movable being or beings which are for the time being movable. Udaka went on to argue that one who took the vow of abstention from killing one class of animals abstained in fact from killing all classes of animals, for the same being who was now born in one class may be born in other classes as well, and beings which are outside the class now may come later on into the class. To this Goyama replied at length pointing out its incorrectness on the ground that as the vow of not killing an ascetic is not broken by one who kills a man who used to be an ascetic but is no longer so, in the same way all classes cannot be brought within one class¹²⁴.

¹²¹ Bhag. 15.543

¹²² Aṅg. S.1.8.3.5.

¹²³ Bhag. 15.539

¹²⁴ Sūt. S. II. vij. 14.

Kalāsavesiyaputta, a disciple of Pārśva, questioned the knowledge of Nigrantha elders and finally wanted to be converted from his own doctrine of four vows to that of five vows (*Cāujjāmāo dhammāo pañcamahavvaiyam saṇḍikkamaṇaṇi dhammaṇi uvasaṇḍajjittā*¹²⁵). On another occasion elders belonging to the sect of Pārśva came to Mahāvīra, asked him questions and finally were converted by him at their own instance from the doctrine of the four vows to that of five vows.¹²⁶ The five vows were of *ahiṇsa* non-injury, *aṇḍa* truthfulness, *asteḍa* non-theiving, *aparigraha* possessionlessness, and abstention from *abrahma* unchastity.

There is a very instructive discussion between Goyama, a disciple of Mahāvīra and Kesi, a follower of Pārśva. Two important points which emerge from this discussion are first, that Pārśva omitted the vow of celibacy because he included it in the vow of possessionlessness. The absence of its specific mention however led to corruption which was set right by Mahāvīra's inclusion of celibacy as a distinct vow. Secondly, Pārśva allowed an upper and an under garment to his disciples while Mahāvīra recommended complete nudity, the explanation being that there is really no conflict in this for Pārśva's direction was with the purpose of giving his disciples a characteristic mark to distinguish them from others while Mahāvīra's nudity symbolised that knowledge, faith and right conduct are the true causes of final liberation and not outward marks.¹²⁷

The parents of Mahāvīra were lay disciples of Pārśva, and Mahāvīra was therefore brought up as such and continued in it till after he renounced the world. A man of outstanding personality and gifts as he was he could not be content merely with the knowledge of the law. He wandered about alone and single to realise the truth for himself. We have already noticed his association with Gosāla. His teachings bear testimony to his having associated with other schools. This is an important matter in the proper study of Mahāvīra's religion but full justice cannot be done to this subject here as it is outside the scope of the present enquiry. It will suffice for our present purposes to note that Mahāvīra reverted ultimately to his former sect and effected improvements in it.

III. SCHISMATIC SCHOOLS AMONG THE NIRGRANTHAS.

Although nothing compared with the material contained in the *Kathāvatthu* of the Buddhists regarding various opinions on doctrinal

¹²⁵ Bhag. 1.9.76.

¹²⁶ Bhag. 5.9.226.

¹²⁷ Uttar. S. 23.33.

matters among themselves the literature of the Jains yields some information on schisms within the order of the Nirgranthas.

Jamāli, who was Mahāvīra's sister's son and also married his daughter, was the first man to start the schism. He was a prince and renounced the world in order to be an ascetic follower of Mahāvīra. Once he begged permission of Mahāvīra to go out on a tour with five hundred ascetics, and although permission was asked three times Mahāvīra vouched no reply. Jamāli took the law in his own hand, went away wandering and fell ill on account of having taken bad and improper food. During his illness he asked his companions to spread a bed of dry grass for him and when it was being done he enquired if the bed was ready. His companions said the bed was ready but going up to it he found that it had been only half-ready. Instantly it occurred to him that "a thing is done when it is being done" as taught by Mahāvīra was false. He announced his new idea to his companions some of whom agreed with him. He thereupon declared himself a Kevalin. Jamāli's followers are called Bahurayas because they held that the completion of an act required more than one unit of time. This is the first schism and it arose in Sāvattī.¹²⁸

The second schism was started by Tissagutta at Usabhapura or Rāyagaha. His followers are called *Jīvaṇśāsīyas* because they identified the jīva with the space occupied by it.

The third schism was led by Āsāḍha and had its origin in Syetavi. Āsāḍha doubted if gods and saints were really so. His followers are called *Avvattīyas*.

The fourth schism arose in Mithilā and was started by Assamitta. His followers are called *Samuccheiyas* because they held that inasmuch as every thing is subject to destruction after having come into existence, the effects of good or bad deeds are not to be enjoyed or suffered from.

The fifth schism was started by Gaṅga at Ullakātira. His followers held that it is not true that only one feeling can be felt by the mind at one time and are therefore called *Dokiriyas*.

The sixth schism arose in Antarañjī and was started by Saḍuluya or Rohagutta. His followers are called *Terāsīyas* because they held that there is a third state of existence besides jīva and ajīva.

The seventh schism was started by Goṭṭhamāhilla at Dasapura. His

¹²⁸ Bhag. 9. 33. 383-387.

followers are called *Abaddhiyas* because according to them the *jīva* is not bound by *karman*.¹²⁹

IV. NIRGRANTHA CRITICISM OF OTHER SCHOOLS.

The Jaina literature contains some criticism specifically directed against the beliefs and practices of some of the contemporary schools. Later commentators have read into many of the passages in the canon criticism of others by implication. These might or might not have been meant in the texts to be criticism against the parties, the commentators take them to be directed against, and are therefore unnecessary to deal with. But the other class wherein we find in a very clear manner the criticism made as also the party it is directed against, is important as it shows from yet another point of view the stand the early Nirgranthas took in contrast with their contemporaries.

The *Ājīviyas* have been criticised on the ground that they do not understand that things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion.¹³⁰

If everything was unalterably fixed, as the *Ājīviyas* believed, and if there was no *purisakāra* how was it that the gods only were gods and not everybody? A god attained to that status by dint of his exertion, otherwise all would have been gods or none would have been such. From our everyday experience we find that the course of things can be altered by human exertion,¹³¹ our reason dictates exertion which none can deny.

The Vedānta doctrine of the *ātman* being the substratum of all existence is criticised on the ground that if that were true how can the consequences of evil *karman* performed by one result in the suffering of the same individual?¹³² The one *ātman* underlying all would make the consequences sufferable by all of the wrong deeds done by one or by another individual who had nothing to do with the wrong deed. Again, if there were one *ātman* common to all there would be no difference in the lots of individuals or in their castes or station in life, and all would be sharing equally the perfection of the *ātman*.¹³³ The inactivity of the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya would also be open to the same objection of not accounting for the variety we find in the world in the lots of men.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Sth. S. 7.3. 587.

¹³⁰ Sūt. S. I.1.2.4.

¹³¹ Upās. 7.200.

¹³² Sūt. S. I.1.1.10.

¹³³ Sūt. S. II.vi.48.

¹³⁴ Sūt. S. I.1.1.14.

The *Tajjīvataccharāvādins* are criticised as offering no solution to such problems as whether or not an action is good, whether or not there is a life after death or whether perfection is attainable.¹³⁵

The Buddhists are criticised as placing unreasoning faith on the authority of Buddha. They have permission, they say, of doing this or that. Any one familiar with the rules of Vinaya of the Buddhists knows how frequently the necessity arose for Buddha to accord his permission to this act or that on the part of his disciples, and this has been criticised on the ground that Buddha's permission does not justify a wrong act.¹³⁶

Kriyāvādins are criticised on the ground that they put all the emphasis on outward acts which is not correct for a sinful thought even though not carried out into execution is none the less sinful.¹³⁷

Akriyāvādins are criticised for not believing that there is *karman* and its transmission to future moments.¹³⁸

Brāhmaṇs, *Ajñānavādins* and *Vinayavādins* are criticised in general terms and the Jaina emphasis on non-injury, necessity of right thinking, and right knowledge come out prominently from these criticisms.¹³⁹

The *Sūnyavādins* who deny the existence of all visible world and all future are told in answer that as astrologers, dream-interpreters and other kinds of diviners are sometimes able to predict future events it cannot be said that there is no future.¹⁴⁰

Those who believed in perfection to be attained by bath, abstention from some articles of food, or by tending a fire are criticised on the ground that if perfection was attainable by contact with water many fishes, tortoises etc., would easily obtain perfection.¹⁴¹ If water washed off bad *karman* it would also wash off good *karman*, and if it washed off sin many people who killed living beings in water would be sinless.¹⁴² If perfection was attainable by tending a fire many mechanics would easily obtain it.¹⁴³ By drinking liquor or eating meat and garlic people of course attain a state different from their normal state but that state is far from the state of perfection.¹⁴⁴ Clothed in humour though these criticism are yet they reveal a strong common sense on the part of the Nirgrantha critic.

¹³⁵ Sūt. S. II.i.17.

¹³⁶ Ācār. S. I.i.3.7.

¹³⁷ Sūt. S. I.i.2.29.

¹³⁸ Sūt. S. I.xii.4.

¹³⁹ Ācār. S. I.iv.2.4. Sūt. S. I.xii.3; I.i.2.17.

¹⁴⁰ Sūt. S. I.xii.9.

¹⁴¹ Sūt. S. I.vii.14-15.

¹⁴² Sūt. S. I.vii.16-17.

¹⁴³ Sūt. S. I.vii.18.

¹⁴⁴ Sūt. S. I.vii.13.

The soil of India has always been very favourable to the growth of religions and philosophies and the information obtained from the literature of the Jainas fully bears testimony to it. It will be seen that the teachings of Mahāvīra whose disciples are yet a living body in the land of their birth, were an attempt on the part of the founder to provide a solution to the intense problems of religion and philosophy which stirred the heart of India in that distant age.
